FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XIII, WESTERN EUROPE REGION Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XIII Western Europe Region United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Western Europe Region (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII) Contents Preface Selection and Editorial Policies Sources Abbreviations Persons Introduction Western Europe Region (Documents 1-339) Index Selection and Editorial Policies Selection and Editorial Policies Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues that cannot be documented in the volume but will be addressed in editorial or bibliographical notes. The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the Foreign Relations series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The compiler-editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors gave priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records (which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes). Selection Criteria (in general order of priority): 1. Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States; 2. Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted; 3. The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy; 4. The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members; 5. The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies; 6. Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues; 7. Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State; 8. Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State; 9. The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions; 10. Economic aspects of foreign policy; 11. The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance; 12. The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies; 13. The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies; 14. Documentation that illuminates special decisionmaking processes that accomplished the policies recorded in particular volumes; 15. Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes. Scope and Focus of Documents Researched and Selected for Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XIII The documentation printed in this volume highlights U.S. policy toward European economic and political integration, U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. attitude toward the Multilateral Force (MLF) and Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). It further discusses the position of the United States with regard to the question of nuclear sharing within the Atlantic community. The primary institution responsible for policy formulation on these questions was the Department of State. Documents were included from the files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, who drafted many of the papers on the MLF and ANF and directed the special working group devoted to these problems. He also participated in the conversations between Secretary of State Rusk and his foreign counterparts and President Johnson and European leaders when these topics were discussed. Because of the extensive amount of documentation on U.S. participation in NATO, the editors selected summaries of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings and summary records of the visits of the NATO Secretaries General to Washington, during which long series of conversations were held. The editors also focused on documenting the U.S. response to French withdrawal from the NATO military command structure in March 1966. President Johnson set the tone of the response and Francis Bator of the National Security Council Staff coordinated the details of the policy. For the period after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the editors selected documentation that shows that the White House took an active role in the formulation of policy toward NATO. The editors also selected reports from posts in Brussels, London, and Paris to document U.S. policy toward the general question of European economic and political integration and toward the second British application for membership in the Common Market in 1967. Editorial Methodology The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Incoming telegrams from U.S. Missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes. The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote. Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record. Sources Sources The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute, although access to some records was restricted, as noted below. The editors have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. Intelligence-related files maintained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research became available to the Department historians only after this volume was compiled. Arrangements have been made for Department historians to have access to these records for future volumes; if any documentation relevant to this volume is found, it may be included in a subsequent volume. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of these agencies and the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The Department of State has arranged for access to the audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone conversations, which are held at the Johnson Library. The first audiotapes became available to the editors in late 1994, with most to follow during 1995 and 1996. The editors decided not to delay publication of this volume, but if relevant records are found among these telephone conversations, they may be included in a later Foreign Relations volume. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanded access to Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records still in the custody of that Agency. Department of State historians' access is arranged by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of the access, and the variety of documentation made available and selected for publication in the volumes has grown. The following are the particular files and collections consulted and cited in this volume. Unpublished Sources Department of State Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files . In February 1963, the Department changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The new system was divided into broad categories: Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social. Within each of these divisions were subcategories. For example, Political and Defense contained four subtopics: POL (politics), DEF (defense) CSM (Communism), and INT (intelligence). Numerical subdivisions further defined them. The following were the most important files used in this volume. Other files are indicated in the annotation to the documents. DEF(ANF), Atlantic nuclear force DEF(MLF), Multilateral force DEF 1 EUR W, plans and policy toward Western Europe DEF 6 FR, armed forces, France DEF 4 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization pact and agreements DEF 6 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization armed forces DEF 12 NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization armaments EEC 6 UK, British membership in the European Economic Community ECIN 3 EEC, European Economic Community ECIN 6 EEC, membership in the European Economic Community FN 12 GER W, balance of payments with West Germany INCO–GRAINS EEC, grain questions with the European Economic Community NATO 3, North Atlantic Treaty Organization meetings NATO 3 BEL(BR), North Atlantic Treaty Organization meetings, Brussels NATO 3 FR(PA), North Atlantic Treaty Organization meetings, Paris NATO 7, visits of NATO officials POL FR–US, political relations with France POL EUR W, political relations with Western Europe Lot Files . Documents from the central files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized personal, bureau, and office files, the lot files of the Department of state. A list of the lot files used in the preparation of the volume follows: Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961–1967. Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379 Files of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, 1942–1970. Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327 Diaries of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, 1948–1974. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961–December 1964. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials for 1965. Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conference attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials, September 1966–April 1967. Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials, May 1967–January 1968. Conference Files: Lot 68 D 475 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials, June–November 1967. Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of state and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials for 1968. INR Files Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460 Files of Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, 1962–1967 Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1953–1964. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1964–1965. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1966. President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149 Collection of the President's memoranda of conversation with foreign visitors, 1956–1964. President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217 Collection of the President's memoranda of conversation with foreign visitors, 1965–1968. Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of conversation. Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of conversation of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, 1961–1964. SIG Files: Lot 74 D 164 Records of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, 1967–1968. S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182 Reports, memoranda, memoranda of conversation, and other documents on the multilateral force, 1963–1965. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209 Country files, memoranda, policy papers, and memoranda of conversation to and from the Executive Secretariat, 1963–1966. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 216 Miscellaneous S/S files, 1964–1966 S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164 Secretary of State's memoranda for the President's evening reading and for luncheon meetings, 1964–1971. S/S–I Files: Lot 79 D 246 One box of S/S microfilm on selected topics including conversations with leading Soviet officials for the 1960s. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to the National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents, 1961–1966. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961–1968. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318 Cabinet and National Security Council records, 1966–1968. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security File Agency File Country File Files of McGeorge Bundy Files of Robert Komer Files of Walt W. Rostow Memos to the President National Security Council Histories NSC Meetings File Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Files Meeting Notes File Office of the President File Papers of Francis M. Bator Rusk Appointment Book Tom Johnson's Notes on Meetings Published Sources Only those publications cited in the volume are listed here. De Gaulle, Charles. Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964 . New York, undated. Europa Arkiv, Zeitschrift fur International Politik , 1965. U.K. House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates , Fifth Series. London. U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 . Washington. ———. Department of State Bulletin . Washington. ———. Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 . (Revised edition) Washington, 1971. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 . Washington, 1963. ———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968–69 . Washington. U.S. Senate. Congressional Record, 1966 . Washington. Wilson, Harold. The Labour Government, 1964–1970: A Personal Record . London, 1971. Abbreviations Abbreviations ABC, atomic, biological, chemical ABM, antiballistic missile ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACE, Allied Command, Europe ADM, atomic demolition munitions AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AFCENT, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe ANF, Atlantic Nuclear Force ASAP, as soon as possible ASYG, Assistant Secretary General ASW, antisubmarine warfare BALPA, balance of payments BAOR, British Army on the Rhine BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation Benelux, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg BMI, Office of United Kingdom, Malta, and Ireland Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BOP, balance of payments B/P, balance of payments Busec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the European Regional Communities CAP, Common Agricultural Policy; series indicator for outgoing White House telegrams CDU, Christliche-Demokratische Union (Christian-Democratic Union) CDU/CSU, Christliche-Demokratische Union/Christliche-Soziale Union (Christian Democratic/Christian Social Union) Cedto, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ChiCom, Chinese Communist CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe circ, circular COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Consultative Group, based in Paris, consisting of nations seeking to control the export of strategic goods to Communist countries COMBILANT, Iberian-Atlantic Command CONUS, Continental United States C/S, Chief of Staff CSU, Christliche-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) CXT, common external tariff DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DefMin, Defense Minister Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Deptel, Department of State telegram DOD, Department of Defense DPC, Defense Planning Committee DPWG, Defense Planning Working Group E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs EC, European Communities Ecbus, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the European Regional Organizations to the Department of State ECSC, European Coal and Steel Community EEC, European Economic Community EFTA, European Free Trade Area Embtel, Embassy telegram ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee EUCOM, European Command EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/AIS, Office of Austria, Italy, and Switzerland Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/BMI, Office of United Kingdom, Malta, and Ireland Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/RPE, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/RPM, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Community E/W, east/west Exdis, exclusive distribution only FBX, France and the Benelux FDP, Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) FonMin, Foreign Minister FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FYI, for your information GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDR, German Democratic Republic GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State GOB, Government of Belgium GOF, Government of France GOI, Government of Italy GOM, Government of Malta GOS, Government of Spain G/PM, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs HMG, Her Majesty's Government IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff LDC, less developed country L/EUR, Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs, Department of State Limdis, limit distribution LOC, line of communication M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs MAP, Military Assistance Program MC, Military Committee MDS, market differential subsidy MFN, most favored nation MFR, mutual force reductions MilRep, military representative MLF, Multilateral Force MOD, Minister of Defense MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile NAC, North Atlantic Council NADGE, NATO Air Defense Ground Environment NAFTA, North Atlantic free trade area NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization) NATUS, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDAC, Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NFPE, NATO Force Planning Exercise Nodis, no distribution Noforn, no foreign distribution Notal, telegram distribution code indicating that the corresponding reference telegram was not sent to all addressees NP(W)G, Nuclear Planning (Working) Group NPT, non-proliferation treaty OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OT, Office of International Trade, Department of State P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State PAL, Permissive Action Link PermDel, Permanent Delegation PermRep, Permanent Representative POLAD, Political Adviser Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State R & D, research and development reftel, reference telegram RPE, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State RPM, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State S, Office of the Secretary of State SAC, Strategic Air Command SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic S/C, Counselor of the Department of State SC, Select Committee SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SecDef, Secretary of Defense SecDel/MC, Secretary of State Delegation/Memorandum of Conversation SecGen, Secretary General Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his delegation to the Department of State Secun, series indicator for telegrams from the Under Secretary of State to the Department of State septel, separate telegram SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe Sitcen, situation center S/MF, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Multilateral Force Negotiations S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State SPD, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party) SPECOM, Special Committee STR, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations SYG, Secretary General TB, test ban TEA, Trade Expansion Act Topol, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State or his delegation U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UGP, unified grain price UN, United Nations UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNGA, United Nations General Assembly USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency US/MC, United States/Memorandum of Conversation USNATO, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State USRO, Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State WEU, Western European Union WG, Working Group Persons Persons Note : The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions relevant to the events documented in the volume. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State Adenauer, Konrad, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Ailleret, General de Brigade Charles, Commander in Chief, French Forces in Germany Alphand, Herve, French Ambassador to the United States until October 1965; thereafter Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry Baker, Vincent, Officer in Charge of Nuclear Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1966 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 1966 Bator, Francis M., senior member, National Security Council Staff, 1964–1967; President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1965–1967 Beigel, Edgar J., Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Blumenthal, W. Michael, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 1968; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Bowie, Robert R., Counselor of the Department of State, September 1966–April 1968 Brandt, Willy, Governing Mayor of West Berlin until December 1966; thereafter Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister Brosio, Manlio, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from August 1964 Brown, George, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, August 1966–March 1968 Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until February 1966 Butler, Richard A., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 1964 Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cargo, William I., Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from October 1967 Carstens, Karl, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry until October 1966; Secretary of Defense from December 1966 Cattani, Attilio, Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry Cleveland, Harlan, Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from September 1965 Clifford, Clark, Secretary of Defense from March 1968 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister until May 1968 De Gaulle, Charles, President of France De la Grandville, Jean de la Chevadiere, Chief of the Treaty Section of the French Foreign Ministry De Leusse, Bruno, Minister-Counselor of the French Embassy in Washington De Leusse, Pierre, French Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1965 De Staercke, Andre Marie, Belgian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States from April 1965 Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury until April 1965 Duckwitz, Georg F., State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry from 1967; German Representative to the trilateral offset negotiations Erhard, Ludwig, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 1966 Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister from March 1965 Farley, Philip J., Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, January 1966–August 1967 Fenoaltea, Sergio, Italian Ambassador to the United States until April 1967 Fina, Thomas W., Officer in Charge of European Integration, Department of State, September 1965–August 1968 Finn, Richard B., Deputy Director of the Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until July 1966 Finletter, Thomas K., Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until September 1965 Foster, William C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fowler, Henry H., Secretary of the Treasury from April 1965 Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture Furnas, Howard E., Executive Director of the Multilateral Force Negotiating Team Getz, John I., Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from August 1966 Gordon Walker, Patrick, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, October 1964–January 1965 Grewe, Wilhelm G.K., German Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister Hallstein, Walter, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community until 1967 Harlech, Lord, British Ambassador to the United States until April 1965 Harmel, Pierre C., Belgian Foreign Minister from March 1966 Healey, Denis W., British Defense Minister from October 1964 Herter, Christian A., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations until December 1966 Hinton, Dean R., Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1967 Home, Sir Alexander Frederick Douglas, British Prime Minister until October 1964 Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States from January 1965 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1965–October 1966 Katz, Abraham, Director, European Community-Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Office of the Organization for Economic Development, Department of State, from September 1966 Katzenbach, Nicolas deB., Under Secretary of State from October 1966 Kiesinger, Kurt G., Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from December 1966 Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, until January 1967 Knappstein, Heinrich K., German Ambassador to the United States Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1966–December 1967 Komer, Robert W., member, National Security Council Staff, 1961–1965; President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; Special Assistant, September 1965–March 1966 Kosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Krag, Jens Otto, Danish Prime Minister Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1965 Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe; also Commander, U.S. European Command Lucet, Charles, French Ambassador to the United States from December 1965 Luns, Joseph, Netherlands Foreign Minister Mann, Thomas C., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 1965–May 1966 Mansholt, Sicco L., Vice President of the European Economic Community Marjolin, Robert E., Vice President of the European Economic Community Martin, Paul, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs McAuliffe, Eugene V., Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1966 McCloy, John J., former High Commissioner for Germany and Representative to the trilateral offset negotiations McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 1965 McGhee, George C., Ambassador to Germany until September 1968 McKillop, David H., Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until June 1966 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 1968 McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1964–July 1967 Myerson, Jacob M., Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, 1966 Neustadt, Richard E., consultant to President Johnson, 1964–1966 Popper, David H., Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until September 1965 Rey, Jean, European Economic Community Commissioner for External Relations until 1967; thereafter President of the Commission of the European Communities Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until April 1966; thereafter President's Special Assistant Roth, William M., Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations until March 1967; thereafter Special Representative Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Saragat, Giuseppe, Italian Foreign Minister until 1965 Schaetzel, J. Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, until September 1966; thereafter Representative to the European Communities Scheyven, Baron Louis, Belgian Ambassador to the United States Schroeder, Gerhard, German Foreign Minister until October 1966; thereafter Defense Minister Schurmann, Carl W.A., Netherlands Ambassador to the United States Seydoux de Claussone, Francois, French Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until 1965 Shuckburgh, Sir Evelyn, British Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Smith, Gerard C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Multilateral Force negotiations Solomon, Anthony M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 1965 Spaak, Paul-Henri, Belgian Foreign Minister Spiers, Ronald, I., Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Springsteen, George S., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until October 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Stewart, Michael, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 1965–August 1966, and from March 1968 Stikker, Dirk U., Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until April 1964 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from September 1965 Strauss, Franz Joseph, former German Defense Minister and, from December 1966, Finance Minister Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 1966; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union Thomson, George M., British Minister and Representative to the trilateral offset negotiations Tuthill, John C., Representative to the European Communities until June 1966 Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 1955 Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 1964–June 1967 Von Hassel, Kai-Uwe, German Defense Minister until October 1966 West, George S., Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from May 1965 Westrick, Ludgar, State Secretary in the Office of the German Chancellor Wilson, James Harold, British Prime Minister from October 1964 Western Europe Region Western Europe Region 1. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 6, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on January 19. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” 2. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 14, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on January 19. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 3. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 14, 1964, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF). Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 27. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of II.” While the Secretary of State and the Italian Foreign Minister were discussing the MLF, President Johnson and President Segni also talked about the question. A 4-paragraph memorandum of their conversation is ibid. A memorandum of the Presidents' discussion of U.S. interest in the Atlantic Alliance, European unity, and the Kennedy Round is ibid., POL EUR W. 4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 16, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF) 9–5. Confidential. Drafted by Howard E. Furnas, Executive Director of the Multilateral Force Negotiating Team. 5. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, January 25, 1964, 1:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel and Kaplan (EUR/RPE), cleared by Tyler and Hinton (RPE), and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, Rome, Paris, London, Luxembourg, and The Hague. 6. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 4, 1964, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 5 and approved in S on February 16 and in U on February 11. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 7. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 5, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Schaetzel and approved in U on February 10 and by the White House on the same day. The conversation was held at the White House. 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 11, 1964, 4:41 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)3. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on February 10; cleared by Schaetzel, Furnas, Klein, S/P, and DOD; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Paris Topol and CINCLANT for POLAD. 9. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 12, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2369. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise and Knox and approved in S on February 20. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” 10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, March 2, 1964, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)12. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Ankara, Athens, Rome for USDOCOSouth for Burris, Brussels, The Hague, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR. 11. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 6, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 NATO. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Schaetzel and approved in S on March 16. The conversation was held at a lunch-eon given by Secretary Rusk in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. 12. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 18, 1964, 5:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper and approved in S on March 29. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 13. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, March 26, 1964, 3:56 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC-EFTA. Confidential. Drafted by Joel W. Biller and George R. Kaplan (EUR/RPE); cleared by EUR/RPE, GER, and E; and approved by Schaetzel. Sent to the European Community posts (Geneva for Mission and GATT), Bern, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Lisbon, Oslo, Vienna, and Stockholm. 14. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to Belgium (MacArthur) Washington, April 2, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH(TH). Secret; Informal-Official. Drafted by Popper on April 1 and cleared by Francis E. Meloy (WE). Copies were sent to Bohlen and Finletter. 15. Editorial Note 16. Memorandum of Discussion Washington, April 10, 1964. Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, MLF #1. Secret. The source text bears the date April 11 but has no other drafting information. Another copy indicates the memorandum was cleared by Bundy. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, April 16, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)1. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for Finletter, London, Brussels, Athens, and Ankara. 18. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Saigon, April 17, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)12. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Rusk was in the Far East for the SEATO Council Meeting and visits to Saigon and Taipei April 10–20. 19. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 26, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland on April 27 and approved in S on May 2. The conversation was held at the British Embassy. 20. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 29, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. 21. Memorandum for the Files Washington, May 2, 1964, 12:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Blitgen on May 14. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 22. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, May 4, 1964, 7:21 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–2 FR/NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper; cleared by Tyler, G/PM, S/P, WE, and DOD; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to CINCLANT and to Paris for USRO. 23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State The Hague, May 10, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for USEC, London, Luxembourg for Embassy and USEC, Paris for Embassy and USRO, Rome, and Geneva. 24. Memorandum of Conversation The Hague, May 12, 1964, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH(TH)). Confidential. Drafted by Spiers on May 13 and approved in S on May 24. The conversation was held at the Princess Juliana Kazerne. The source text is labeled “Part VI of VI.” The Foreign Ministers also discussed Vietnam, selection of the new NATO Secretary General, German reunification, Cyprus, and East-West relations during this conversation. Memoranda are ibid. 25. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, June 7, 1964, 12:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC-SP. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Jean R. Tartter (EUR/RPM) on June 2 and cleared by four EUR offices, U, and E. Repeated to 18 posts in Europe, Algiers, Lagos, Rabat, Tel Aviv, and Tunis. 26. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, June 15, 1964, 8:12 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–GRAINS EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Kenneth Auchincloss of the Office of the Special Trade Representative and cleared by Blumenthal, E, EUR/RPE, and GER. Sent to the EEC and EFTA capitals, Geneva, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, and Tokyo. 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, July 3, 1964, 11:55 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files DEF(MLF)3. Secret. Drafted by Vincent Baker (S/MF) on June 23; cleared by Smith, Spiers, Bundy, BNA, S/P, and U; and approved by Tyler. 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, July 8, 1964, 6:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Secret; Priority; Nodis. A typed note indicates the text was received from the White House. 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, July 14, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Secret;Nodis. 30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, July 31, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis, Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris for USRO. 31. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, August 27, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Secret. 32. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 7, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Lambert. 33. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) Paris, September 14, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Tyler. Secret. 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, September 17, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. 35. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) Washington, September 19, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Personal for the Ambassador. 36. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson Bonn, September 30, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. The source text is a Department of State translation. A copy of the German language text is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. 37. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 6, 1964, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Finn and approved by Ball on October 7. The conversation was held in Ball's office. 38. Letter From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard Washington, October 7, 1964. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. 39. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Missions Washington, October 8, 1964, 9:11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Sent to the other NATO capitals, Stockholm, Moscow, Geneva, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH, and CINCUSAREUR. 40. Editorial Note 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, October 23, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–GRAINS EEC. Secret; Exdis. 42. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, October 23, 1964, 8:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Confidential. Drafted by David H. McKillop (WE) and approved by Tyler. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and USRO. 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, October 29, 1964, 8:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas M. Judd (EUR/BNA), cleared by Tyler, and approved and initialed by Ball. Also sent to London, Moscow, Paris for the Ambassador and Finletter, and Rome. 44. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 31, 1964, 11 a.m.–1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Benjamin H. Read. 45. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, November 4, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis. The source text also beans an Exdis stamp. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels and passed to the White House. 46. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 8, 1964. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, MLF #2. Secret. Attached to a brief memorandum from Bundy to Rusk and Ball, also dated November 8, which stated that he had tried to outline the positions fairly, but in any case wanted them to have his own assessment of the situation. 47. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, November 15, 1964, 5:24 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by David H. McKillop (EUR/WE) and approved by Tyler. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USRO, and Moscow. 48. Memorandum of Conversation Bonn, November 17, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Tuthill and Blumenthal and approved in U on December 12. 49. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 17, 1964. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. 50. Draft Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 19, 1964, 12:55–1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Secret. The memorandum was “dictated but not seen” by Neustadt. The conversation was held in the Oval Room of the White House. 51. Editorial Note 52. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, November 25, 1964. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272. Top Secret; Sensitive; Personal; Literally Eyes Only. Also addressed to Rusk and McNamara. 53. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, November 30, 1964, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 U. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London for Ball and Bruce. 54. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Department of State Paris, December 2, 1964, 3 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House and OSD. Ball visited London and Paris November 30–December 3, primarily for talks about the MLF. Documentation relating to the trip, including memoranda of conversations and reporting cables, are ibid. and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2443. 55. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, December 4, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–GRAIN EEC. Secret. Passed to the White House. 56. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) Washington, December 6, 1964. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, December 6, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. 58. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. 59. Editorial Note 60. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 7, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2460. Secret. The source text, dated December 10, bears no drafting information. The conversation was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. 61. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 8, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2460. Secret. The source text, dated December 10, bears no drafting information. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 62. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) Washington, December 9, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182, Memoranda. Secret. 63. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, December 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. 64. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, December 15, 1964, 12 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 65. National Security Action Memorandum No. 322 Washington, December 17, 1964. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272,MLF #4. Secret. 66. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, December 20, 1964, 11:18 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Confidential. Drafted by Popper on December 19, cleared in draft by Schaetzel and in part by DOD, and approved by Tyler. Repeated to USUN and three military commands. 67. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, January 9, 1965, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, London, Rome, and The Hague. 68. Letter From Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Schroeder Washington, January 13, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but the telegram sending a copy to Bonn for delivery to Schroeder was cleared by Ball and Bundy and initialed by Rusk. (Telegram 1955 to Bonn, January 13; ibid.) A similar letter was sent to British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker on January 14. (Telegram 4338 to London; ibid., DEF(ANF)) On the same day, circular 1267 to the NATO capitals reiterated the substance of the U.S. position set forth in this letter. (Ibid.) 69. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, January 15, 1965, 9 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London and Paris. 70. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 18, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Spiers, initialed by Tyler, and approved in S on January 28. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Regional Organizations Washington, January 18, 1965, 6:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Confidential. Drafted by George S. Vest (EUR/RPM); cleared by Popper, BNA, and L/EUR; and approved by Schaetzel. Repeated to Valletta and Rome. 72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 3, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel, Deane R. Hinton, and George R. Kaplan (EUR/RPM) on February 2. 73. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to GATT, at Geneva Washington, February 6, 1965, 9:46 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EFTA. Confidential. Drafted by Joel W. Biller (EUR/RPE); cleared by Hinton, BNA, WE, OT, and Herter; and approved by Schaetzel. Repeated to Bern, Bonn, Brussels (for the Embassy and USEC), Copenhagen, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Paris (for the Embassy and USRO), Rome, Stockholm, The Hague, and Vienna. 74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 4, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. Copies were sent to Ball and McNamara. 75. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 8, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(ANF). Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Tyler. A copy was sent to Ball. 76. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, March 11, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9. Secret. 77. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 19, 1965. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. Drafted by Francis Bator on March 19. 78. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on March 31. The conversation was held in Rusk's conference room. The source text is labeled “Part 4 of 5.” 79. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk Bonn, March 30, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. 80. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 20, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S and U on May 3. The conversation was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI.” 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, April 29, 1965, 11:20 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spiers on April 22; cleared by G/PM, GER, S/P, Schaetzel, and DOD; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Paris Topol. 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium Washington, May 1, 1965, 12:29 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(ANF). Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schaetzel on April 30, cleared by McKillop and Popper, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Bonn, London, Rome, and The Hague. 83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, May 4, 1965, 2015Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn and London. 84. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, May 9, 1965, 1103Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 UK(LO). Confidential; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State London, May 14, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2505. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vest and cleared by Popper. Repeated to Paris Topol and Bonn. 86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, May 21, 1965, 7:53 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Richard H. Davis (EUR). Repeated to London, Rome, Bonn, Paris for USRO, Brussels, The Hague, and Moscow. 87. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, June 2, 1965, 7:27 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers; cleared by Popper, Schaetzel, G/PM, and DOD; and approved by Davis. Also sent to Paris for USRO and to CINCLANT for POLAD. 88. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. Drafted by Obst and Kent and approved in the White House on June 29. The conversation was held in the President's Office. The source text is labeled “Part three of nine.” 89. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, June 10, 1965, 7:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–5 FR–US. Secret. Drafted by Leddy and Schaetzel; cleared by Ball, Thompson, and Kitchen; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris for USRO and POLADs SHAPE and EUCOM, Rome for Burris at Naples, and Bonn for Parelman. 90. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 16, 1965, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper, initialed by Leddy, and approved in S on July 6. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, June 21, 1965, 9:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Ball. 92. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and european Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, June 29, 1965, 2000Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the NATO capitals. 93. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 6, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Givan on July 19, cleared by Popper and RPE, and approved in U on July 22. The meeting was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” 94. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 6, 1965, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers. The meeting was held in the Pentagon. 95. Editorial Note 96. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Finletter) to Secretary of State Rusk Paris, July 12, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. 97. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, July 13, 1965, 2000Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the NATO capitals. 98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, July 15, 1965, 1:47 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hinton and Leddy, cleared by Schaetzel, and approved by Leddy. Sent to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, The Hague, London, Rome, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Luxembourg, and Geneva. 99. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) Washington, July 26, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Confidential. Drafted by Vest. 100. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) Washington, August 19, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Leddy. 101. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, September 1, 1965, 0420Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Paris and London for the Ambassadors and passed to the White House. 102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 10, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara and Ball. 103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, September 23, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. Drafted by Baker. 104. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 27, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Ford and approved by S on October 25. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 4.” Memoranda of conversation on NATO, the EEC, and a Dutch request for military and nuclear technology are ibid. 105. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, October 26, 1965, 12:42 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Julius W. Walker (EUR/RPM), cleared by Vest and EUR, and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USRO. 106. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 8, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vest and approved in U on October 15. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball's office. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium Washington, October 21, 1965, 7:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BEL–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Anderson and Jay P. Moffat (EUR/WE) and approved by Leddy. Also sent to USEC in Brussels, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, The Hague, London, Rome, Bonn, and Luxembourg. 108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 8, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. A copy was sent to Ball. 109. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 12, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Fina. 110. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, November 16, 1965, 2016Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, and Brussels. 111. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) Washington, November 24, 1965, 1–3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Mr. Bundy, Vol. 17. No classification marking. On November 25, Mr. Bundy sent copies to Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and Thompson. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR) 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities Washington, November 24, 1965, 4:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Bonn, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Ottawa. 113. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, November 28, 1965, 1900Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, and the Department of Defense. 114. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, November 29, 1965, 2010Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Bonn and passed to OSD. 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, December 9, 1965, 9:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. Drafted by William B. Bader on December 8; cleared by Spiers, Kitchen, Johnson, Finn, G/PM, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn. 116. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, December 14, 1965, 1810Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Madrid, Bonn, Athens, and Ankara. Rusk was in Paris for the 36th North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting December 14–16. 117. Editorial Note 118. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, December 18, 1965, 2035Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Secret; Priority. Repeated to the NATO capitals, Saigon, and USUN. 119. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 20, 1965, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst and Puhan. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.” 120. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 20, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by McGhee. A more detailed memorandum of this conversation, drafted by William D. Krimer, is ibid. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 121. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, December 23, 1965. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294. Secret; Nodis. 122. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State Brussels, December 30, 1965, 1650Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W–US. Limited Official Use. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg for the Embassy and USEC, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rome, and Geneva and passed to USIA. 123. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 30, 1965, 3:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop. The conversation was held in Ball's office. 124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 17, 1966. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217, WH/Mr. Bundy 1965. Secret. A copy was sent to Ball. The source text is attached to a January 17 memorandum from Mr. Bundy to Ball, which stated that since he and the Under Secretary had a longstanding difference on the MLF question, he wanted Ball to have as precise a statement of the President's position as he could manage. 125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, January 27, 1966, 2:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas O. Enders (EUR/RPE); cleared by STR, EUR/RPE, E, U, and the White House; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to Brussels for the Embassy and Busec and repeated to Rome, The Hague, London, Geneva, Luxembourg, and Paris. 126. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 27, 1966, 11:55 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Top Secret; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Lindjord and Newman and approved in S on March 7 and in U on March 1. The conversation was held in Rusk's conference room. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 5.” 127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium Washington, January 28, 1966, 3:51 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by LeRoy F. Percival (EUR/RPE); cleared by McKillop, Hinton, GER, and RPM; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rome, Bonn, Luxembourg, and The Hague and repeated to London. 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, February 2, 1966, 7:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ball and approved by him for Rusk. Repeated to London and Paris. 129. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk Bonn/Bad Godesberg, February 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W. Confidential. 130. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, February 10, 1966, 7:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by Spiers. Sent to London, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Bonn, The Hague, Rome, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, and Luxembourg. 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, February 18, 1966, 7:51 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by Spiers. Repeated to London for Ambassador Bruce only and Geneva for Foster and Timberlake only. 132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, February 18, 1966, 7:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Spiers. Passed to SACEUR. 133. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “The following message was transmitted directly to Prime Minister Wilson from President Johnson on February 20, 1966.” A copy of the message was transmitted to London in telegram 4853, February 20, for Bruce's information. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262) 134. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, March 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. 135. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, March 2, 1966, 8:27 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FR–US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy; cleared by Ball, Thompson, and Bator; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Brussels for USEC. 136. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, March 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. The source text has no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:11 p.m. and passed to the White House. 137. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Johnson Paris, March 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 5559 from Paris, March 7, received at 2:45 p.m. and passed to the White House at 2:59 p.m. (Ibid.) This letter is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 317–318. 138. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson Washington, March 7, 1966, 10:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Box 177, France-NATO Dispute, Vol. I. Secret. 139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, March 8, 1966, 6:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Richard W. Boehm (EUR/RPM) on March 7; cleared by Spiers, Leddy, and Thompson; and approved by Ball. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 140. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, March 10, 1966, 6:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Hinton and Schaetzel and cleared by Ball, Thompson, McKillop, Finn, Vest, E, and STR. Sent to Bonn, Brussels (also for USEC), The Hague, London, Luxembourg (also for USEC), Paris, Rome, and Geneva. 141. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, March 11, 1966, 1915Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and passed to the White House. 142. Aide-Mémoire From the French Government to the U.S. Government Paris, March 11, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, NATO Documents. No classification marking. For a similar translation, which also indicates how this aide-memoire differs from the ones sent to the other NATO governments, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 318–321. 143. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, March 16, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert Komer, Box 2, Memos to LBJ. Secret. 144. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, March 17, 1966, 12:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel on March 15; cleared by Leddy, Thompson, and RPE; and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels (also for USEC), Geneva, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris (also for USRO), and Rome. 145. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 17, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted on March 18 by Vest and approved in S and U on March 22. The conversation was held at the Department of State. A summary of it was transmitted to London in telegram 5480, March 18. (Ibid.) 146. Letter From President Johnson to President de Gaulle Washington, March 22, 1966. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. No classification marking. The source text bears no drafting information. A notation on a covering memorandum states that the original was handed to Ambassador Lucet on March 22. The letter is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 321–323. 147. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, March 22, 1966, 2244Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) Washington, March 23, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 216. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. In a memorandum to Rusk, March 23, summarizing the conversation, Leddy noted that it lasted about 30 minutes. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209) 149. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, March 29, 1966. 150. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, March 31, 1966, 1640Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 151. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 4, 1966, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) 152. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State Brussels, April 6, 1966, 1708Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, Geneva, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris, and Rome. 153. Memorandum Washington, April 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to an April 10 memorandum from Ball to the President, which states that both the Departments of State and Defense agreed on the language in the memorandum. In a telegram to the President on April 11, Bator referred to the memorandum as the “draft Ball-Acheson instruction” and noted that it was perhaps tougher than Johnson might have wished. (CAP 66158; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3) 154. Aide-Mémoire From the U.S. Government to the French Government Washington, April 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. No classification marking. The source text bears no clearing or drafting information, but the aide-memoire was discussed with the other 14 NATO allies excluding France on April 7 and sent to the President for his approval on April 8. (Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, April 8; ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 328–330. 155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, April 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it is attached to an April 12 memorandum from Bator to the President, which stated that it was an excellent exploratory memorandum, which had Acheson's support. Bator added that the procedure and suggested plan in paragraphs 2 and 3 offered a real opportunity to break the existing impasse and would provide a good basis for a reply to Prime Minister Wilson's letter (Document 149). 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, April 17, 1966, 1730Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38–6. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin. 157. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 17, 1966, 11:15 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret. 158. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, April 22, 1966, 1720Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and passed to the White House and USIA. 159. National Security Action Memorandum No. 345 Washington, April 22, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316. Secret; Nodis. Rostow sent a draft of the NSAM, dated April 18, to Johnson attached to an April 21 memorandum. In the memorandum, Rostow stated that he, Rusk, McNamara, Acheson, Ball, and Bator all agreed on the need to concentrate on nuclear consultation. However, McNamara believed that a European clause contained in the draft should be excluded. (Johnson Library, Papers of Francis Bator, Box 28, Nuclear Role for Germany) Apparently the draft was discussed at a meeting at the White House on April 21, since the European clause was deleted and the second paragraph of the text printed here was added. 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, April 29, 1966, 1350Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to London and Paris. 161. Memorandum from President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, May 4, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Nodis. 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, May 13, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on May 11; cleared by Beigel, Acheson, Ball, and Thompson; and approved by Schaetzel. Repeated to London and Bonn. 163. Memorandum by Dean Acheson Undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Attached to the source text are a transmittal memorandum from Acheson to Rusk, May 13, and a memorandum from Rusk to the President, also dated May 13, saying that the memorandum had been prepared at Rostow's suggestion and that he and McNamara agreed that it formed a good basis for further guidance on negotiations with France over NATO. 164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, May 17, 1966, 7:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 SP. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas W. Fina (RPE) and Jacob M. Myerson (U), cleared by McKillop, and approved and initialed by Ball. Sent to 14 posts in Western Europe. 165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson Washington, May 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, Vol. 3. Secret. 166. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) Washington, May 19, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 167. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 20, 1966. Source: Department of Sate, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel. The source text is labeled “Part I of II Parts.” A summary of the discussion, which was held at the White House, was transmitted to the NATO capitals in circular telegram 2292, May 21. (Ibid., POL 7 BEL) 168. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, May 21, 1966, 0005Z. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information, but a shorter draft is attached to a May 19 memorandum from Ball to the President. (Ibid.) 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, May 23, 1966, 4:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Spiers; cleared by Ball, Acheson, Schaetzel, and GER; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris. 170. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, May 27, 1966, 7:28 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Confidential. Drafted by Hinton, cleared by U and E, and approved by Schaetzel. Sent to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, and Geneva. 171. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, May 28, 1966 . Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information, but in a May 24 memorandum to Ball, Acheson reported that the memorandum was written under his direction, cleared with the Department of Defense, AEC, and JCS, and that McNamara had suggested a number of changes that had been incorporated into the paper. 172. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk Paris, June 3, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Rusk. Confidential; Personal. 173. Memorandum by the Acheson Group Undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Attached to a June 3 memorandum from Vance and Ball to President Johnson, drafted by Acheson, which states that this memorandum is the final response to NSAM 345 (Document 159). 174. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, June 6, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:28 p.m. 175. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, June 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:48 p.m. 176. Memorandum of Conversation Bonn, June 9, 1966, 11:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 11.” 177. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, June 10, 1966, 0802Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 178. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson Washington, June 22, 1966, 7:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis Bator, Box 28, NSAM 345. Confidential. 179. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 25, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S–I Files: Lot 79 D 246. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL and S/S on June 25. 180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Germany Washington, June 27, 1966, 4:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM); cleared by Schaetzel, McNaughton, Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker, WE, RPM, G/PM, and AEC; and approved by Ball. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 181. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, June 27, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis. 182. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, June 28, 1966, 2014Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin. 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, July 2, 1966, 1610Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Geneva. 184. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 5, 1966, 0947Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Ottawa. 185. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Schaetzel and initialed by Acheson. 186. Memorandum From Dean Acheson to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. Drafted by Baker. 187. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, July 19, 1966, 2009Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin. 188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, July 19, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Hinton. 189. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, July 26, 1966, 2018Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 190. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, July 29, 1966, 1536Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Exdis. 191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, August 6, 1966, 2:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 FR–US. Secret. Drafted by Beigel; cleared by Getz, Stoessel, U, and OASD/ISA; and approved by Vest. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 192. Letter From Foreign Minister Schroeder to Secretary of State Rusk Bonn, August 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Nodis. Translation. The German language original is attached to the source text. 193. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson Washington, August 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 10. Secret. Another copy of this memorandum is dated August 12, 12:45 a.m. (Ibid., Papers of Francis M. Bator, Meetings with LBJ, 8/24/66, Box 17) 194. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson Bonn, August 11, 1966. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret. Translation. The German language original is attached to the source text. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State Brussels, August 19, 1966, 1536Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, London, Paris for Crawford, Rome, and Luxembourg. 196. Memorandum of Conversation Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved by the White House on August 30. The meeting was held at the Rossmount Inn. The source text is labeled “Part 6 of 9.” 197. Briefing Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson Washington, August 23, 1966, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Meetings with LBJ, Box 17. Secret. Attached to an August 23 memorandum of transmittal to the President and to a memorandum suggesting how the meeting at 6:30 p.m. might be organized. The meeting was not held on August 23, but the following day at 6:30 p.m. A last minute memorandum from Bator to the President and his indecipherable notes on the meeting are ibid. No other record of the meeting has been found, but Document 198 indicates what happened. 198. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Nodis. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “President sent following message to Prime Minister August 26.” Another copy of the message indicates that it was sent to Bruce for his information in telegram 37597, August 30. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) 199. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur. The source text bears the notation “for Pres Evening Reading.” Copies were also sent to Ball, Leddy, and Johnson. 200. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Nodis. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “Message from President to Prime Minister September 1, 1966.” 201. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, September 3, 1966, 1320Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret. Repeated to London and Paris. 202. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson Bonn, September 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Geheim (Secret); Exdis. 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, September 8, 1966, 3:10 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to London. 204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, September 16, 1966, 1:41 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Vest and Leddy on September 15; cleared by Ball, RPM, L, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 205. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 19, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Confidential. Approved in S on September 23. The conversation was held in the Secretary of State's suite at the Waldorf Towers. 206. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 23, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at USUN. The time of the meeting is from the U.S. Delegation's chronology of Secretary Rusk's participation in the General Assembly meetings. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 71) 207. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 26, 1966, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House on December 2. The meeting was held at the White House. Chancellor Erhard visited Washington September 24–27. 208. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson sent October 1, 1966.” 209. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, October 5, 1966, 8:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Beigel and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to USUN. 210. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, October 7, 1966, 1930Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 211. Editorial Note 212. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, October 22, 1966, 1444Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Manila for Secretary Rusk. 213. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, October 22, 1966, 1700Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 214. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, October 28, 1966, 8:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel, Vest, and Getz; cleared in L/EUR and EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 215. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, November 11, 1966. 216. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, November 15, 1966. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. Bruce was informed of the message in telegram 85292 to London, November 15. (Ibid.) 217. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, November 18, 1966, 9:21 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by Springsteen and Vest, and approved by Leddy. 218. Letter From John J. McCloy to President Johnson Washington, November 21, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, U.S. Forces for the NATO Central Region, Box 39. Secret. 219. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, November 22, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:08 a.m. 220. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, November 24, 1966, 1827Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Bonn. 221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium Washington, November 26, 1966, 10:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Vest,INR, S/P, and four offices in EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow. 222. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and approved in S on December 3. According to Rusk's Appointment Book the conversation was held at 2:35 p.m. (JOHNSON Library) The source text is labeled “Part I of III.” 223. Scope Paper Washington, December 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 115. Secret. Drafted by Vest and cleared by Hinton, McAuliffe, Myerson, Springsteen, and Leddy. Prepared for the December 14–16 NATO Ministerial Meeting. 224. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by MacArthur. Copies were sent to Leddy, Kohler, Bowie, Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, and S/S. The meeting was held in Senator Mansfield's office. 225. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, December 10, 1966, 1953Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. 226. Summary Notes of the 566th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, December 13, 1966, 12:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, December 13, 1966, 8:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Leddy. Rusk was in Paris for the NAC Ministerial Meeting. 228. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, December 14, 1966, 0236Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR (PA). Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 229. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, December 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:30 a.m. 230. Memorandum of Conversation Between John J. McCloy and Chancellor Kiesinger Bonn, December 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 17. No classification marking. The meeting was held at the Palais Schaumburg. 231. Record of Meeting With President Johnson Austin, Texas, December 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Box 3. Top Secret. Prepared by Rostow on December 19. 232. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, December 17, 1966, 1733Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Moscow. 233. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 10, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR W–US. Confidential. Drafted by Moffat and approved by S/C on January 30. 234. Record of Meeting Chequers, England, January 21, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 25, Europe, 2 of 2. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. 235. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 8, 1967, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S and M on February 17. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room. The source text is labeled “Part 4 of 10.” 236. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, February 11, 1967, 4:07 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by McAuliffe and Springsteen, and approved by Eugene Rostow. 237. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson Washington, February 23, 1967, 10:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 17, 2/24/67 Meeting with the President. Secret. 238. Letter From President Johnson to John J. McCloy Washington, March 1, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 18, Trilaterals March–April. No classification marking. Drafted by Rusk and Rostow. 239. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, March 6, 1967, 6:50 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 9:25 a.m. 240. Record of Meeting Washington, March 8, 1967, 12:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security Council Histories, Trilateral Negotiations, Book 2. Secret. The time of the meeting is derived from two memoranda by Bator: one to the President at 9:45 a.m. on March 8, in which Bator noted that this could be a “crucial” meeting and asked how it should be organized, and a second at 10:45 a.m., which outlined the issues as summarized by McCloy here. (Both ibid.) 241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, March 11, 1967, 12:03 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy and cleared by Bator. 242. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and John J. McCloy Washington, March 15, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, March 21, 1967, 9:59 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Michael R. Gannett and approved by McAuliffe. Also sent to London and Paris. 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, March 30, 1967, 1233Z. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, April 6, 1967, 4:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Drafted by Getz and Palmer, cleared by OSD/ISA and EUR, and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, April 7, 1967, 4:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Newlin, cleared by Baker, and approved by McAuliffe. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 247. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Secretary Brown Washington, April 18, 1967, 8 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. The conversation was held in Rusk's dining room. 248. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator Mike Mansfield Washington, April 21, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. 249. Final Report on Trilateral Talks London, undated. Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Trilats, April–May 1967. Confidential. 250. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, May 2, 1967, 8:14 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Fina; cleared by Hinton, EUR, E, STR, and BMI; and approved by Springsteen. Sent to 15 Western European posts. 251. Summary Notes of the 569th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, May 3, 1967, 12:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, May 10, 1967, 7:22 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Romine; cleared by Kohler, McAuliffe, Springsteen, McNaughton, G/PM, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Moscow, London, Bonn, and Brussels. 253. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 19, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC-UK. Confidential. Drafted by Romine. The source text is labeled “Part I of III.” 254. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson Washington, May 25, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Secret. 255. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 2, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–1:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Leddy and approved by the White House and S on June 14. The conversation was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The source text is labeled “Part IV of IV.” 256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, June 8, 1967, 9:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by NEA, RA, Eugene Rostow, Leddy (in draft), and Springsteen (in draft); and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, USCINCEUR, SHAPE for POLAD, and EUCOM for POLAD. 257. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 9, 1967, 4:06 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 13–2 US. Confidential. Drafted by Percival and approved in S on June 14. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. Memoranda of Rey's conversations with Bator, Leddy, and Owen, all on June 9, are ibid., EEC 3, ECIN 3 EEC, and FT 13–2 US. 258. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, June 17, 1967, 1845Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 LUX(LU). Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, Moscow, CINCLANT for POLAD, Vienna, Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Budapest, Warsaw, CINCEUR for POLAD, SHAPE for POLAD, and the Department of Defense. 259. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 11, 1967, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 GER W. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved by the White House on July 13. The meeting was held at a luncheon at the White House. 260. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the British Assistant Under Secretary of State (Watson) Washington, July 13, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Leon Sloss (G/PM) on July 12. 261. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, July 20, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Confidential. Drafted by Bowie and initialed by Rusk. 262. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 14, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–3 EUR. Confidential. Drafted by Foley and approved in S on August 17. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 3.” 263. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 15, 1967, noon. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 68 D 475, CF 37. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst and approved by the White House on October 4. The meeting was held at the White House. Kiesinger visited the United States August 13–19. 264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, September 6, 1967, 1648Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Bowie, Kohler, Springsteen, McAuliffe, and Thompson; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, CINCEUR, SHAPE for POLAD, and EUCOM for POLAD. 265. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 18, 1967, 5:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on September 28 and by the White House on October 5. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part V of VI.” 266. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 25, 1967, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Memcons. Confidential. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in G on September 29. The conversation was held in Kohler's office. 267. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 27, 1967, 6:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Approved in S on September 29. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. 268. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, October 4, 1967, 0307Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Stoessel, Kohler, and EUR/FBX; and approved by Rostow. Also sent to Brussels for Bowie, EUCOM for POLAD, and SHAPE for POLAD. Repeated to CINCEUR and Belgrade for Leddy. 269. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, October 10, 1967, 1124Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Brussels for USEC. 270. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 16, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Bowie and initialed by Rusk. 271. Record of Discussion at the 23d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Washington, October 19, 1967. Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. Prepared by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director, on October 23. 272. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, October 25, 1967, 1740Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 273. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, October 25, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a November 2 memorandum from the Department of State to Walt Rostow, which indicates that the paper was being sent to the White House in response to a “recent expression of continuing interest” and that it was developed in the course of an interdepartmental study of the topic. 274. Memorandum of Conversation Brussels, November 6, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and approved in M on November 16. The meeting was held at the Belgian Foreign Ministry. 275. Intelligence Note No. 904 Washington, November 9, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and transmitted from INR Director Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary Rusk. 276. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals Washington, November 16, 1967, 0306Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Robert Anderson (EUR/FBX), cleared by Leddy, and approved by Rostow. 277. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, November 23, 1967, 0334Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 278. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 6, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Taylor on December 8. 279. Memorandum of Conversation Brussels, December 11, 1967, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Drafted by Glenn and Knight on December 12 and approved in S on December 21. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry. 280. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, December 13, 1967, 1055Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London. 281. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, December 14, 1967, 1749Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Madrid. 282. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 18, 1967, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow. The conversation was held in Rostow's office during lunch. 283. Intelligence Note No. 1020 Washington, December 26, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Transmitted from the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, George C. Denney, Jr., to Secretary of State Rusk. 284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, January 16, 1968, 0108Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Katz, cleared by GER and BMI, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to brussels and London. 285. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, January 17, 1968, 2029Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, January 18, 1968, 2238Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Joseph L. Smith, cleared by McAuliffe and GER, and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to three military commands. 287. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 7, 1968, 5:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 3. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information. 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium Washington, February 16, 1968, 0003Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Confidential;Limdis. Drafted by Katz on February 12; cleared by U, E, EUR, STR,AEC, ACDA, the White House, and Treas-ury; and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Geneva, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, London, and Vienna. 289. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 19, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by the White House on February 28. 290. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Crump on February 23. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, February 22, 1968, 1832Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by McAuliffe and USNATO, and approved by Springsteen. 292. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, February 23, 1968, 1621Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to London and Paris. Rostow repeated the text of this message to the President in Texas in CAP 80525, February 23. (JOHNSON Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 64, Part 2 of 2) 293. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, March 13, 1968, 1921Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Valletta, Rome, Naples for USDOCOSouth for POLAD,SHAPE, and USCINCEUR for POLAD. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe Washington, March 16, 1968, 0046Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Fina, cleared by Katz, and approved by Leddy. Sent to 10 posts in Europe. 295. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson Washington, March 16, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Baker and cleared by Farley. 296. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 21, 1968, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on March 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 22, 1968, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. 298. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, March 28, 1968, 1451Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Warsaw. 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, April 10, 1968, 2152Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and Captain Hanks (OSD/ISA); cleared by OSD/ISA, JCS, and McAuliffe; and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, SHAPE for POLAD, EUCOM for POLAD, and USCINCEUR. 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, April 17, 1968, 2114Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Baker and Robert Kranich (ACDA); cleared by G/PM, OSD, and JCS; and approved by Getz. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State The Hague, April 19, 1968, 1800Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense and to the Mission to NATO and repeated to the other NATO capitals, Geneva, and USUN. 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland Washington, April 23, 1968, 1655Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Fina, cleared by Wells Stabler (AIS), and approved by Leddy. Repeated to 13 European posts. 303. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 30, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on May 6. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 304. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 1, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W–US. Confidential. Drafted by Malin and approved in M on May 9. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, May 9, 1968, 2018Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Irving G. Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), cleared by McAuliffe and EUR/BMI, and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to Bonn and London. 306. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 10, 1968, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S on May 13. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 307. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Foreign Minister Harmel Washington, May 25, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. No classification marking. 308. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 5, 1968, 3:50 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Katz and approved in S on June 15. The time of the conversation is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (JOHNSON Library) 309. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 US. Secret. Drafted by Ingram. The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” 310. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, June 8, 1968, 1313Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense and the other NATO capitals. 311. Research Memorandum No. REU–35 Washington, June 11, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted from Thomas L. Hughes, Director of INR, to Secretary Rusk. 312. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, NSC File. Secret. Attached to the source text, which bears no drafting information, are: a June 15 memorandum of transmittal from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Walt Rostow, a June 17 memorandum from NSC Secretary Bromley Smith to the Council stating that the paper would serve as the basis of discussion for the NSC meeting on June 19, and the agenda for the NSC meeting. 313. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 19, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret. Drafted by E. R. Fried. A shorter set of notes on this meeting are ibid., Meetings Notes File. 314. Memorandum of Conversation Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Approved in S on June 25. The meeting was held at the Embassy Residence. 315. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Reykjavik Washington, June 26, 1968, 0046Z. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 300. Secret; Priority;Nodis. 316. Intelligence Note No. 512 Washington, June 28, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 ICE(RE). Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and sent from INR Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr., to Secretary Rusk. 317. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 10, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and approved in M on July 23. 318. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 164, Luncheon Meetings with the President. Secret. Attached to a July 11 memorandum from Clifford to Rusk, which stated that the Department of Defense was continuing to examine the military threat to Europe, the NATO Alliance, U.S. troop levels in Europe, and alternative ways to meet the threat with a reduced troop presence. This talking paper was intended to help in the continuing discussions of these problems. 319. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 15, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Allen and Barreda on August 2. 320. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 25, 1968, 11:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, Folder 7. Confidential. Drafted by Obst. The conversation was held at the White House. 321. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, August 26, 1968, 2146Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the other NATO capitals. 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, August 29, 1968, 2122Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by McAuliffe, and approved by Leddy. 323. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, Folder 7. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Attached to a September 4 memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, which transmitted the order of business for a meeting of the National Security Council on that day. 324. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, September 4, 1968, 5–7:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The source text bears no drafting information. 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, September 6, 1968, 0243Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by McAuliffe. A typed note on the source text indicates that the White House was informed. 326. Memorandum for the Record Washington, September 13, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Fried on September 14. 327. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 16, 1968, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SP. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. 328. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, September 23, 1968, 1910Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, September 26, 1968, 0126Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Katz, cleared by BMI and E, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Luxembourg, The Hague, Rome, and Brussels. 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, October 2, 1968, 1514Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Flash. Drafted by McAuliffe and approved by Springsteen. 331. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State Brussels, October 5, 1968, 1358Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels for the Mission to the EC and the Embassy. 332. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 7, 1968, 8:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sebastian and Toumayan and approved by S/S on October 15. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, October 16, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–1 EUR E. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by George Kaplan (EUR) and Robert H. Baraz (INR), cleared by seven officers from EUR and INR, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, Moscow, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Vienna. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text. 334. Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68 Washington, November 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, Messages, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the source text indicates the memorandum was prepared solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. 335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, November 7, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Drafted by Myerson on November 1 and cleared by Leddy and Springsteen. 336. Memorandum of Conversation Brussels, November 14, 1968, 10:10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Drafted by Vine and approved in S on November 27. The meeting was held at the EEC Commission Building. 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, November 16, 1968, 1243Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, Madrid, Moscow, and four European military commands. 338. Research Memorandum No. RSE–175 Washington, December 13, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Transmitted from Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary Rusk. 339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, December 20, 1968, 1817Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 SP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Blumberg (EUR/RPM), cleared by Leddy, and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to Madrid and the Mission to NATO. 1. Memorandum of Conversation 1. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 6, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Common Market and Tariff Negotiations PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Mr. W.R. Tyler, EUR Mr. E.J. Beigel, WE France Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy Mr. Bruno de Leusse, Minister Counselor, French Embassy Ambassador Alphand said the results of the latest meetings at Brussels 2 are good and may open the way for moves toward political institutions. He was struck by the fact that this result is not considered such a good thing here. He said the allegations about an ultimatum were unfounded and that the Six had reached decisions in accordance with their previous agreement to take action on a common agricultural policy by the end of 1963, and to agree about undertaking trade negotiations with outside countries. The consolidation of the EEC will increase demand for US goods, which had increased 60 percent over the past five years, although perhaps not for the same goods. He did not believe this was a sign of protectionism. The Secretary said we have been cautious in commenting since we were not sure what happened at Brussels. He had indicated in his press conference 3 last week that we find the results politically encouraging but realize that in trade questions details are important. Some misunderstanding had arisen out of reports of the talks with Erhard. 4 When we get the details of the Brussels decisions we will discuss them with the Commission and with the Six, but there is to be no special US-German machinery. We are pleased by the absence of catastrophe at Brussels but we did not wish to go overboard until we had seen the details of the decisions. The Ambassador said that while they may not make the full 50 percent linear reductions they will at least move in the direction of tariff cuts. He realized how complicated were tariff negotiations. He deplored the fantastic article from Luxembourg in today's Wall Street Journal about protectionism under French leadership. This is not at all what De Gaulle said to the President in November. The Secretary noted that decisions may be taken at Luxembourg this week about steel tariffs and said the question is whether we can get into the trade negotiations in May before restrictive measures are taken in various countries. Ambassador Alphand said that the French had the idea that Wormser should come here for talks but he would not wish to see charges of any special US-French machinery. Although the visit had been envisaged before Brussels, he wondered if we were still interested. The Secretary said that we would inquire of Governor Herter and would be in touch with him. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on January 19. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” 2 For an analysis of the European Economic Community (EEC) meeting, which ended on December 23, see circular telegram 1163, Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Document 90 . 3 For a transcript of Rusk's press conference on January 2, see Department of State Bulletin , January 20, 1964, pp. 81-89. 4 For documentation on Chancellor Erhard's visit to the United States December 28–29, 1963, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Document 89 , and XV, Documents 248 - 256 . 2. Memorandum of Conversation 2. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 14, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT The Brussels Meeting of the EEC and European Unification PARTICIPANTS Italy Foreign Minister Giuseppe Saragat 2 Ambassador Attilio Cattani, Foreign Ministry Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Minister Franco Malfatti di Montetretto, Chief of Cabinet to Minister Saragat Minister Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Italian Embassy Miss Bonaccorsi, Interpreter United States The Secretary Mr. George W. Ball Governor Herter Mr. William R. Tyler Ambassador Frederick Reinhardt Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE Mr. Walker Givan, WE Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter After a discussion of the Italian political situation, the Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to comment on the situation in the EEC and prospects for European unity in light of the Brussels meeting. The Foreign Minister replied that Brussels marked an important step toward a common agricultural policy, but there should be no illusions that it also marked progress toward political union; much water must flow before political unity is achieved. Noting that both De Gaulle and Erhard have mentioned the possibility of new initiatives, the Secretary asked what measures to promote European unity the Foreign Minister considered likely or desirable in the near future. The Minister replied that it was good for leaders to talk about unification and that, viewed in the spirit of Atlantic partnership as outlined by President Kennedy, it is obvious that Europe must become united; but it is impossible to conceive of a unified Europe without the UK. Although we cannot stand immobile, we cannot do anything that would hamper Britain from adhering later. If there is to be a political relance, it must be done without polemicizing with the UK and with the British fully understanding every step. If any group of Italian politicians should agree on a European initiative without the UK, their initiative would lead nowhere because a majority of Italians would never approve it. The Italians intend to make this clear to De Gaulle next month in Paris. At the same time Italy does not intend to join any crusade against De Gaulle; this is unnecessary since his policy collapses by itself, as illustrated by the fate of the Paris-Bonn axis. But De Gaulle must be convinced that Italy will not accept European integration without Britain. The Secretary asked what the Foreign Minister would advise the United States to do now: Should we stay outside the problem and leave it to the Europeans? The Foreign Minister replied that the United States cannot stay outside because it and Europe are members of the Atlantic community. The only question is where the United States should intervene, and the best place is the UK. The Minister regretted having to criticize friends in the British Labor Party, but when Wilson attacked the Brussels decisions he did a disservice to integration. Secondly, when Walker (hopefully a future Foreign Secretary) talks as if it were necessary to have a directorate with Germany and France he is adopting a Gaullist position. The Secretary said the Italians could dismiss the second point from their minds. Any proposals of a directorate would have a high infant-mortality rate. The first point on the Brussels decisions is more complicated and depends mainly on a successful outcome of the Kennedy Round trade negotiations, 3 which we consider necessary for Atlantic cohesion. The Secretary invited the Foreign Minister to comment: Did he anticipate a successful Kennedy Round? The Foreign Minister replied that Italy's views are receptive, as are those of the Benelux and to some extent Germany since the Kennedy Round more or less suits their economic situation. The French are more reserved, but the atmosphere as a whole is favorable and the French will find this difficult to resist. Governor Herter asked whether the Brussels decisions implied that the EEC agricultural policy is now fixed or whether it is still negotiable; we are concerned since it is our position that industry and agriculture should not be considered separately but as different aspects of the same thing. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not regard himself as expert in agricultural matters and could only reason as a man in the street. He believed, however, that agriculture would present the most difficulties to negotiators, even among the Europeans themselves, in view of the disparities in their agricultural development. A common policy, however, has the merit of inducing all concerned to modernize their agriculture. It has effectively awakened Italian leaders, who are now doing something to renovate Italian agriculture. The Secretary said he felt the Kennedy Round negotiations deserved to be approached on the broadest political basis in the perspective of the Atlantic partnership. Too technical an approach could have a poor result. For example, in 1960 he would have regarded the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 4 as impossible, but fortunately this legislation was approached with a broad view for the common good of all concerned. Governor Herter commented that it would be difficult to divide the problem into agricultural and industrial sectors. Restrictions in agriculture would make it difficult to move in the industrial field—hence his earlier question whether EEC agricultural policy is fixed or still negotiable. The Foreign Minister replied that the EEC members have reached agreement in three fields—meat, rice and fats—on the basis of compromises considered useful for Europe. It may be possible to change them when they are reviewed in a wider framework. Though no expert, he thought these agreements were not unchangeable. He cited as a parallel the Italian shift recently with regard to steel tariff increases. When the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community, headed by an Italian citizen, moved against the Italian position, Italy accepted the High Authority's decision. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on January 19. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 Foreign Minister Saragat accompanied Italian President Antonio Segni on his visit to the United States January 13–18. A memorandum of the part of the conversation on the Italian political situation is ibid., DEF (MLF). Additional documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in volume XII. 3 Reference is to the GATT Ministerial negotiations which would begin on May 4 to discuss tariff reductions. 4 The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, approved October 11, 1962; P.L. 87–794. 3. Memorandum of Conversation 3. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 14, 1964, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT MLF PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE Mr. DeSeabra, Interpreter Italy Foreign Minister Giuseppe Saragat Ambassador Attilio Cattani, Foreign Ministry Ambassador Mario Toscano, Foreign Ministry Minister Franco Malfatti di Montetretto, Chief of Cabinet Ambassador Angelo Corrias, Chief of Diplomatic Protocol Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Minister Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Italian Embassy Miss Bonaccorsi, Interpreter Foreign Minister Saragat said that for Italy the problem of the MLF was one of timing and principally timing affecting the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The Foreign Minister had talked to Nenni on several occasions recently and has found Nenni personally favorably disposed to the MLF. The problem of time, however, is unavoidable and cannot be telescoped. Nenni told the Foreign Minister he must have time to prepare his party. He does not need a long time—only four or five months, perhaps. Foreign Minister Saragat said it is important to note Nenni has undertaken a commitment to prepare his party for the decision. The Foreign Minister said that the attitude of the UK is an important one and will have great influence in Italy whatever the results of the UK elections. Anything that the U.S. can do to bring about a more favorable attitude by the UK would be helpful in Italy. Foreign Minister Saragat said he has accepted British Foreign Minister Butler's request that he prolong his stay by a few days during his forthcoming visit to the UK. He plans to use this time to talk to Labor Party leaders. He will ask them not to do anything which would make the Italian problem more difficult. He will also tell them of the Italian position on MLF. Saragat continued that despite the Italian commitment in principle to the MLF and the favorable disposition of many groups, some obstacles remain and must be removed before final and formal acceptance of the MLF by Italy. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for his views. He did not see any contradiction between what the Foreign Minister had been saying and the need to move along with the MLF. If we have a MLF report by the first of March we can then move on to draft an agreement. Meanwhile the multilaterally manned ship experiment can go forward. The Secretary emphasized that it was important not to lose forward movement. With regard to the UK, the Secretary said the Foreign Minister may find during his visit to the UK that there are differences of opinion there. It should also be noted that there are differences between what the British of both parties say now and what they are likely to say or be able to say after the election. The Foreign Minister will need to feel his way to see what the real UK position is. The Secretary emphasized that in any event he wished to assure the Foreign Minister the US is not pulling away from the MLF. We feel that the MLF is of great importance. Foreign Minister Saragat reiterated that the Italian decision has been made in principle. The Prime Minister is convinced on the subject of MLF as is the Vice Prime Minister (Nenni). The only thing that is required is a little more time. Ambassador Reinhardt knows the situation very well and can confirm this. The Secretary said that the Foreign Minister in a previous conversation in the day had said something important about his visit to London. 2 He had said the decision with regard to the MLF would be an Italian decision made in Italy's own interest and would not be determined by what was said to him in London. The Secretary continued that the British lack interest in the MLF for two reasons: (1) they already have a nuclear force of their own and therefore lack political motivation; and (2) the British Military feel they will not be able to have other things they want if they are obliged to make the financial effort required by participation in the MLF. The Secretary said that on a personal basis he felt that the UK will not be able to stay out of the MLF in the long run if the momentum of the MLF is maintained. He believes the UK will come in if they see the rest of us going ahead. Foreign Minister Saragat said that the opposition from the right in Italy is attempting to overthrow the coalition government. The U.S. must be careful not to give them an opportunity by pressing Italy for too early a decision on the MLF. The Foreign Minister said that when he talked with Nenni regarding the experimental MLF ship, Nenni had seemed very understanding. The problem therefore was not connected with the matter of final acceptance of the MLF but was instead one of time. Nenni could have created difficulties over the ship experiment but did not do so. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF). Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 27. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of II.” While the Secretary of State and the Italian Foreign Minister were discussing the MLF, President Johnson and President Segni also talked about the question. A 4-paragraph memorandum of their conversation is ibid. A memorandum of the Presidents' discussion of U.S. interest in the Atlantic Alliance, European unity, and the Kennedy Round is ibid., POL EUR W. 2 See footnote 2, Document 2 . 4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 4. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 16, 1964. SUBJECT Approval for Mixed-Manning Demonstration I recommend that you approve prompt implementation of the MLF mixed-manning demonstration along the lines set forth in Secretary McNamara's memorandum of August 26. 2 Defense concurs in this recommendation. You will recall that the Secretary of Defense submitted his report in response to President Kennedy's instructions. It recommended that such a demonstration be carried out in a U.S. Navy ship. The Paris MLF Working Group has discussed this subject, approved the project, and invited governments to participate. We have now heard from the Germans, Greeks, Turks, Italians, and British, who wish to join us, using a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the demonstration. The Italian decision is particularly encouraging, since it must reflect a decision by the Socialists, as well as the other three Coalition parties. The Dutch representative has indicated that his country, which joined the Paris Working Group talks only this week, is still studying the matter. The Belgians have said that they do not intend to participate. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF) 9–5. Confidential. Drafted by Howard E. Furnas, Executive Director of the Multilateral Force Negotiating Team. 2 Attached but not printed. A typewritten note on the source text states that the White House approved the recommendation on January 20. 5. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 5. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, January 25, 1964, 1:54 p.m. 1359. Brussels and Luxembourg pass USEC. Ref: Bonn 2451, 2454. 2 Subject: Guidance re UK and European Political Union. 1. Despite momentary lull, the Six remain attracted, with varying degrees of interest and for different reasons, to new initiative for political union. Emboldened by their success in overcoming year-end Community crisis, they see a need and perhaps opportunity for further consolidating European Community and quite logically consider that next step should be political one. Some elements within the Five may be ready now or in the near future, in fact, to compromise and accept De Gaulle's “confederal” concept with only limited if any “revision” clause looking to eventual “federal” union. During past year, insistence by Five has weakened on British involvement in political union discussions. Further, there appears to be less sensitivity by Six about relationships of EEC to non-member European states. 2. We would be concerned, as we have been in the past, if discussions and negotiations were to lead to inward-oriented “small Europe,” which had characteristics of excluding British for all time, promoting “Europe des patries,” and ignoring collateral policy of Atlantic partnership. 3. Odds seem against French view prevailing out of current flurry of activity. As Embassy Bonn points out, history of past several years has demonstrated that self-interest of other Five operates as considerable safeguard to our basic political and security interests in Europe. 4. Important to note ambiguity Erhard's position. He emphasized during discussions in Washington in November 3 and again December in Texas lack of parliamentary control over Common Market Commission. Referred vaguely to need for political authority but at same time turned back suggestions that answer could be found in directly-elected parliament. Nor did Erhard accept fact that Council of Ministers is institutional device to meet problem of high-level national political control. Noteworthy that Erhard's thinking on these subjects has not substantially changed over last several years, e.g. he has resented EEC authority over number of economic questions and implication that Community engaged in economic planning. He also dislikes President Hallstein. While Erhard seems to have retreated from position favoring early heads of government meeting on political unity outlined in his Bonn press conference, it cannot be discounted that his thoughts as outlined above in certain respects seem closer to De Gaulle's than to those of European integrationists. Question will be whether in longer run views of Schroeder or Erhard prevail. 5. Evidence suggests that Belgians, Germans and Italians—and, of course, Dutch—would insist, at least at outset any discussions, on three criteria on which the Fouchet proposal floundered: 4 the integrity of NATO, no undercutting of three economic communities, and option that political arrangements could be revised to introduce principle of federalism. In view of the array of nations opposed to De Gaulle's position, it seems unlikely that an early initiative will be launched. 6. British Government has been conducting intensive campaign to insure its participation in any new moves toward political unity and has asked for our support to this end. 5 Even should we be wrong in our prediction that early initiative is unlikely, we do not see how United States could intervene to profit either the British or ourselves. In fact, expression of American views on a yet unborn proposition would hardly be persuasive with our friends and lend currency once again to epithet “Anglo-Saxons” which would be used against British (Deptel 4404 to London). 7. In this complex European situation American officials will have to move with care. While we want responsible Europeans to be in no doubt as to our views as to desirability or value of political unity, we do not wish to be charged with interference in matter. Against this background you may use foregoing analysis and following specific points to restate US views on European unity or in response on inquiries about US attitude on UK participation in any new initiative in this field: a. Although we remain vitally concerned with form and direction of European unity, we intend to keep open mind and await clearer indication than we now have of nature and timing of any new move. At this stage, before any European state has put forward a specific proposal we may have best opportunity to reiterate our support of basic criteria outlined in paragraph five above, without opening ourselves to charge of interference in delicate internal community negotiations. b. We feel that UK interests will be kept in mind and defended most capably by combination of Britain's own diplomatic efforts and those of the Benelux countries, Italy and Germany. We would hope that Five will find it possible to defer any new initiative until after British elections as means of keeping European issue out of the British campaign. c. Finally, it is clearly up to British to demonstrate to their Continental friends—and to skeptics as well—that in fact and theory they want to play a constructive role in making of Europe. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel and Kaplan (EUR/RPE), cleared by Tyler and Hinton (RPE), and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels, Rome, Paris, London, Luxembourg, and The Hague. 2 Telegram 2451, January 13, stated that recent events in Europe suggested that the United States should reassess its position on European political unity, outlined German thinking on the question, and proposed that Washington adopt a sympathetic posture toward political initiatives. Telegram 2454, January 14, asked Rusk and Ball for their personal consideration of the question. (Both ibid.) 3 For a memorandum of Erhard's conversation with President Johnson at the time of former President Kennedy's funeral, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XV, Document 242 . 4 Reference is to the November 2, 1961, plan for political union proposed by the French politician Christian Fouchet. 5 The British Ambassador had asked Rusk for U.S. support on January 13. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) On January 21, Tyler informed him that U.S. support of a British role in any movement toward European integration remained unchanged, but that direct U.S. involvement or representations would not be helpful and might raise charges of Anglo-Saxon interference in European affairs. (Telegram 4404 to London, January 21; ibid., Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC) 6. Memorandum of Conversation 6. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 4, 1964, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT NATO Political Consultation PARTICIPANTS Dr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General 2 Mr. David Bendall, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General Mr. John Getz, Director of the Office of the Secretary-General The Secretary Under Secretary Ball Mr. Philip Farley, USRO Mr. David H. Popper, EUR/RPM Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, EUR/RPM Dr. Stikker said that he might say something at the May meeting about the importance of NATO political consultation. However, he was disappointed because while there was general agreement to improve such consultation, NAC discussions tended to be limited to questions of procedure. It was essential to consult on the implications of the French recognition of Communist China, on Berlin and Malaysia, as well as on Cuban trade and credits to the USSR. However, there was little chance of success on the latter two subjects because of the fixed British attitude. The Secretary noted that in his earlier private conversation with Dr. Stikker 3 he had asked whether it might be useful for the United States to prepare a paper which would assess the possible erosion of United States public support of NATO if the current trends in NATO continued, such as French recognition of Communist China and a relaxed attitude toward Cuba trade and credits to the USSR. When such a paper was prepared, Ambassador Finletter could absent himself while the other fourteen Permanent Representatives discussed it. Usually the question was asked “What is the United States going to do about NATO?” The purpose of the proposed paper would be to seek an answer to the question “What is NATO going to do about the United States?” Noting that the Belgians had been pressing for NATO consultation on the question of French recognition of Communist China, Dr. Stikker said that the danger was that the Belgians might interpret NATO's refusal to discuss this question as giving Belgium a free hand to carry out its own explorations with the Communists. Spaak might feel free to make a trip through Eastern Europe because of a belief that there was no common NATO policy with regard to the Alliance's relationship to the Communist Bloc. Dr. Stikker added that he had attempted to discourage such an interpretation by the Belgians. Mr. Popper pointed out that one of the problems for the United States was that political consultation often seemed untimely because the United States faced specific operational problems which made consultation difficult. For example, one question which had to be considered was whether or not it would be prudent to consult in NAC on the Chinese Communist recognition issue in advance of De Gaulle's press conference. In reply to a question from the Secretary, Dr. Stikker said that five NATO countries now recognize Communist China, observing that as Dutch Foreign Minister he had favored recognition by the Netherlands, although such recognition had taken place before the Korean War. Commenting on our relations with the French, the Secretary said that there was considerable understanding on fiscal matters, some meeting of minds on trade, and that Secretary McNamara and Messmer 4 seemed to get along well. But there was no area of agreement on the larger political issues. 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 5 and approved in S on February 16 and in U on February 11. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 Stikker visited Washington February 3–5. A memorandum of his conversation with Tyler on February 3 at 4 p.m. on current NATO problems is ibid., SCI 3 NATO; memoranda of his discussions with various U.S. officials at 10:15 and 10:45 a.m. on February 4 on Cyprus, MRBMs, and NATO force planning are ibid., DEF 4 NATO and DEF 12 NATO. 3 No record of this conversation has been found. 4 Pierre A. Messmer, French Defense Minister. 5 Rusk and Stikker also discussed the May NATO Ministerial Meeting and the relation between NATO civil and military authorities. On the former, Stikker believed it was too early to make an appreciation of the meeting; on the latter, he reported that decisions taken by the Standing Group and Military Committee were seldom based on coordinated governmental positions and this often created problems. (Memoranda of conversation; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Stikker developed the problem of relations with NATO military authorities further in a conversation with Ball on February 4, stating that he was not kept fully informed of their activities and that the only solution was to station a representative of the Secretary General with both the Standing Group and the Military Committee. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 7. Memorandum of Conversation 7. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 5, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT NATO PARTICIPANTS The President Dr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO Mr. John Getz, Member of NATO International Staff Under Secretary of State George W. Ball Mr. Philip J. Farley, Political Adviser to Chief of USRO J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs Mr. Ball told the President that Dr. Stikker had finished a series of useful discussions with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and invited Dr. Stikker to summarize the current situation in NATO. 2 Dr. Stikker began by noting that De Gaulle's influence was to be seen everywhere. He was personally not so worried about the Six in view of the cohesion of the European Community and the internal French pressures in favor of the Common Market which together were too strong to permit the General to break up the Community. Dr. Stikker went on to say that this does not mean the French will be easy to negotiate with. For instance, at the December Marathon meeting the French got all they wanted while the Germans made all the biggest sacrifices. However, we must anticipate that De Gaulle would continue to block U.K. entry into the Common Market for this would challenge his dominance. Dr. Stikker said he was disturbed about De Gaulle's influence on NATO. He recalled De Gaulle's attempt to develop a Tripartite Directorate which he did not get and which would have been highly disruptive. French cooperation since then can be obtained only to the extent that this helps France have its own way. Dr. Stikker added that he thinks a Directorate would not work in any event due to the mounting importance of Germany and the increased influence and pride of Italy. Dr. Stikker insisted that he admired De Gaulle as a man but thought it important to appreciate the extent to which he blocked so many avenues of progress. He does not want to take action and thus presents the alliance with a difficult dilemma of how to react. There will either be hard collisions or we shall have to find some way of working around the General. He felt that a collision is not the way to handle him, that it will not change his position. He said, for instance, that the alliance has not been blocked on an air defense system but had succeeded in working out an arrangement in which there was a degree of French cooperation. Dr. Stikker defined this alliance operation as one of mutual respect or tolerance in which the French would not be asked to do things they did not want to do but would not block action by other members of the organization. Dr. Stikker noted, however, that on many occasions when you need De Gaulle he says no as he had just done on Cyprus. Dr. Stikker suggested that the danger of De Gaulle could be seen from the press conference 3 to which he had listened twice to be sure that he got an accurate impression. Dr. Stikker said this was the same type of nationalism Europeans had experienced in earlier periods. The message was one of power of station, and “no one can control me.” Dr. Stikker indicated that there are many in France who like this talk and this type of strong man. But what had been and will be the reactions in other countries? The French insist they have to have a nuclear bomb but why will not others insist on the same national prerogative. Right now we have a good democratic government in Germany through such leaders as Erhard, Schroeder and Von Hassel, but what does the future hold with men like Strauss and Guttenberg? 4 In Italy at the moment there is devoted support for NATO by men like Segni and Saragat. The President said he understood, but asked what we could do about this situation. Dr. Stikker went on to say that a somewhat similar situation arose out of the position of the U.K. No member of the alliance should come to the Council with a rigid position. This induces other countries to perform similarly. Dr. Stikker referred to the November 18 NAC meeting on credits. He suggested it must be made clear to the British what their obduracy means. He speculated on whether Home actually realized the significance or the implications of British positions in NATO. Mr. Ball injected that there would be an opportunity to talk about this matter when the Prime Minister arrived in Washington, and Dr. Stikker said this was why he was raising the question. He went on to say he was as much worried about what the U.K. is doing now as by the French attitude because both would encourage other countries to act in the same fashion. The President turned to Mr. Ball and asked what was the status of the Cyprus matter. Mr. Ball replied that he was not going off to London today in view of the fact that there seemed to be some flexibility in the Cypriots' position and this would give the British a day or two to see what they could negotiate. He said it was much better for the British to take the lead if they were able and willing to do so. He said it would be necessary to watch Ankara very closely for the next few days. There might be involved a week or so of negotiations. Dr. Stikker said while the immediate problem of Cyprus was not in his compass, nevertheless the implications were of vital importance to NATO. Mr. Ball was asked whether he thought Makarios 5 would accept the proposals put forward, to which Mr. Ball replied he thought there was a possibility he would. The President, turning to Dr. Stikker, said how much he admired his work as Secretary General and the personal sacrifice he was making for NATO. While things were perhaps not as good as we would like them, they were better than we had a right to expect. He said he understood Dr. Stikker's view on France and this was a problem we would have to live with. He said he had had good visits with Erhard and Segni and looked forward to seeing Home shortly. 1 Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Schaetzel and approved in U on February 10 and by the White House on the same day. The conversation was held at the White House. 2 Memoranda of Stikker's conversation with McNamara on February 5 and with other Department of Defense officials on February 4 and 5 are ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. These conversations dealt primarily with NATO force planning, infrastructure, and MRBMs. For a memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Stikker, see Document 6 . 3 For a transcript of De Gaulle's press conference, January 31, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964 , pp. 245–258. 4 Franz Josef Strauss, former West German Defense Minister, and Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, Bundestag member. 5 Archbishop Makarios III, President of the Cypriot Republic. 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, February 11, 1964, 4:41 p.m. 5001. Re London 3805. 2 Department of course agrees need to lay out and achieve clear understanding military justification for MLF. However this different from accepting obligation to prove (as UK appears to wish) that MLF has built-in advantage, in purely military terms, over other strategic weapons systems, since this not our contention. We wish stress concept of military “utility” in discussions with UK and others and do not plan try to demonstrate across-the-board “advantage” which we do not claim. We do believe that in certain respects MLF would have advantage over other alternatives which might be considered able to meet desire for strategic nuclear capability under theatre command, e.g. MLF cheaper and more quickly available than Polaris subs; it is based on operationally ready system, unlike Missile X; it is more modern and less vulnerable than manned bombers based in Europe. Also, since it would add diversity to overall West's strategic force by introduction new system, it would thereby complicate defensive operation for Soviets and this could be counted as advantage. However, fundamental point is that MLF would be efficient and effective weapons system fully capable fulfilling part of overall Western requirements for next generation missiles. It is not in any sense merely a “political” weapons system, although political purposes it designed to serve are of major significance. Essential fact is that in terms of accuracy, reliability, yield, range, cost and invulnerability MLF would meet military criteria which must govern choice of systems programmed for future construction. MLF, any more than any other single strategic weapons system, is not designed to be simultaneously most accurate, highest yield, longest range, or most invulnerable system in Western arsenal; no such “ideal” weapon exists. However, its particular combination of capabilities and characteristics will ensure MLF would have important military role in armory of West's strategic retaliatory forces and be significant contribution to versatility these forces. Neither would MLF simply be unnecessary add-on to West's strategic forces. If MLF is built along presently conceived lines, 200 ready well-protected “in theatre” MRBMs it would provide would be substituted for other presently programmed external strategic forces. Since MLF will be assigned SACEUR, these missiles will be available for inclusion in his Scheduled Program to cover targets on ACE threat list. These targets presently covered by mix of theatre and external forces, including both aircraft and missiles. With passage of time, and in light of changing technology—including obsolescing aircraft in both US and Europe—and changing nature of Soviet targets, increased Western missile strength—both in theatre and external—will be needed to maintain this effective coverage. MLF can contribute to this increased missile strength by furnishing its portion of the mix targeted against Soviet missile sites, airfields and other targets which constitute threat to NATO Europe. In absence MLF, other missile forces would have to be procured to maintain this effective coverage. US is convinced on basis thorough study that MLF can be fully justified in strictly military terms. Nevertheless we continue to believe some most important arguments in favor are political in nature and it is mistake to look at MLF only from standpoint military aspects. This message does not deal with political factors since apparently UK has found these fully persuasive already. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)3. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on February 10; cleared by Schaetzel, Furnas, Klein, S/P, and DOD; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Paris Topol and CINCLANT for POLAD. 2 Telegram 3805, February 7, reported that the British seemed inclined to drag out the deliberations of the Paris Working Group, particularly in light of the expected parliamentary elections. The British also believed that although the political merits of the MLF were obvious, a convincing statement needed to be made on its military benefits. (Ibid.) 9. Memorandum of Conversation 9. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 12, 1964, 11 a.m. SUBJECT The Kennedy Round PARTICIPANTS British Side R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 2 Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Under Secretary, Board of Trade Ambassador Ormsby Gore Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office Denis Greenhill, Minister, British Embassy Sir Eric Roll, Financial Minister, British Embassy N. Henderson, Secretary to Mr. Butler Tom Bridges, Secretary to Mr. Butler R.M. Hadow, Press Secretary, Foreign Office U.S. Side The Secretary of State Governor Herter Governor Harriman Ambassador David K.E. Bruce William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR Philip H. Trezise, Deputy Assistant Secretary, E McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard I. Philips, Director, P/ON M. Gordon Knox, Deputy Director, BNA After Secretary Rusk had introduced Governor Herter, the British Foreign Secretary remarked that it was becoming increasingly clear that there would be much difficulty in deflecting Common Market countries from an autarchic commercial policy. Despite Mr. Erhard and the goodwill of Italy and the Benelux countries, the United Kingdom was not at all sure that the Six could be kept on a liberal trade path. From the British point of view, the Kennedy Round affords a great and unique opportunity for influencing the direction and future of the Six in trade policy. It was a matter of great concern, therefore, to HMG that the Kennedy Round aim of a fifty per cent linear tariff cut might be diminished and eroded by agreement on an unfavorable disparity formula or by a failure of the Six to allow sufficient access to EEC markets for exporters of agricultural products. Mr. Butler noted that the United Kingdom is undertaking a system under which domestic agricultural production will be limited and exporters given a more or less assured share of the market. He wondered whether the European position would be in any respect as liberal or forthcoming. Governor Herter replied that we find ourselves in near agreement with the United Kingdom. We too are concerned that the eventual disparity formula may be used by the French to disrupt the entire Kennedy Round, especially if France first were to obtain from its European partners a favorable arrangement for intra-EEC agricultural trade. We think that the next few weeks should be devoted to probing Common Market intentions, both with respect to disparities and on the Mansholt plan for agriculture. Governor Herter noted that the French have said that they do not wish bilateral talks with the United States until the middle of April and he assumed that they hoped in the meantime to get a good settlement within the EEC on agriculture. He thought that the French did not necessarily wish the Kennedy Round to succeed but that France's position would depend on intra-EEC developments. Mr. Butler wondered whether the decisions taken by the Common Market Ministers in December could be taken to mean that these were final judgments which could not be altered, or whether they were negotiating positions which could be subject to change. Secretary Rusk observed that it seemed to him that the Common Market decisions could scarcely be taken as final since we are considering a process of mutual commercial exchange. Obviously, if the Six were to think about keeping the United States or other suppliers out of Europe, then the United States for its part would have to consider what access should be provided to the American market. Sir Richard Powell said that he did not think the Common Market could have an entirely autarchic end in mind. He did think, however, that the French would be more or less satisfied to have nothing happen in the Kennedy Round. After all, French industry already has been exposed to a large dose of competition within the Common Market. Moreover, there are indications from remarks made by General De Gaulle and others that the Government of France takes a reserved view about the political importance of the Kennedy Round. Although he had no hard evidence that the French would stand consistently opposed to a sixth round of tariff negotiations, Sir Richard's guess was that the French would not be willing to move unless pressure could be exerted on them. Such pressure, he thought, would have to come from Germany and other EEC countries. The question in his mind was whether the Germans and others would be able to exert enough pressure. He had noted in this connection that Governor Herter appeared not to be in a hurry to complete the Kennedy Round. Governor Herter said that this was right, that he was in no great hurry. His concern was with getting a satisfactory end product. He thought that if we were in good shape by the spring of 1965, the United States would be quite satisfied. The British Foreign Secretary came back to the question of disparities and asked if the United States had an alternative to the Common Market formula to be presented at Geneva. Governor Herter said that we have looked very closely at the trade statistics and that, subject to further examination, the EEC two-to-one formula might not be very damaging to the principle of a 50 per cent cut. This would be particularly the case if we could add the principal supplier criterion or qualification to the EEC approach. However, more work needed to be done in this area. Sir Richard Powell noted that we have a tactical problem here which also involves the Swiss and the Swedes. Mr. Butler turned then to agriculture and wished to know whether we were prepared to take a more flexible approach in the agricultural sector than in the industrial sector, taking into account the wide range of agricultural commodities involved and the special problems surrounding agriculture in every country. Governor Herter said that the answer was “yes”, that we could entertain special approaches and arrangements for agriculture. He said that the British representatives should remember, however, that the United States is a large agricultural exporter with special interests in agricultural trade. Sir Richard Powell remarked that although British and American interests in the Kennedy Round were very close indeed, UK and US trade configurations were not identical. The UK is not a large agricultural exporter but it does have vital interest in the export of industrial products. The UK exports to the Common Market three times as much as it exports to the United States and most of the British exports are industrial goods. The Foreign Secretary observed at this point that the European Free Trade Area, with 90 million people, would achieve free trade between its member countries by 1966 and already had an overseas trade equal to that of the United States. Mr. Butler summed up the discussion by repeating that the United Kingdom put a very high premium on obtaining a 50 per cent linear cut on Free World tariffs through the Kennedy Round. From the British point of view, this was an over-riding objective. The United States, [he] said, could expect from HMG the fullest possible measure of cooperation. Governor Herter said that we were in very close rapport and that he, for his part, could assure Mr. Butler that the United States not only welcomed the statement of British intentions but would be actively consulting the UK at every point during the preliminaries to the Kennedy Round and in the course of the tariff negotiations themselves. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2369. Confidential. Drafted by Trezise and Knox and approved in S on February 20. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” 2 Butler accompanied Prime Minister Alex Douglas-Home on his visit to Washington February 12–14. 10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 10. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 2, 1964, 9 p.m. Polto 1225. At invitation WG, SACEUR gave his personal views on military value of MLF. SACEUR described his requirement for mix of submarine, seaborne, and land based MRBMs and IRBMs to carry out his assigned mission to deter or defeat Soviet threat to ACE. At present, he confronted with 600 Soviet missiles, an increasing number being put in hardened sites and he had at his disposal few missiles (US Polaris submarines), (UK V-bombers) and obsolescing strike aircraft which faced excellent improving Soviet air defenses. This missile gap produced decline in his ability discharge mission and weakening of deterrent. While he had no detailed technical information on MLF specifications such as warheads, SACEUR stated MLF would have great military utility in that it would provide needed missile power which he could use effectively. While MLF was no substitute for mix, it would be very considerable contribution toward his mix requirement. In response questions why MLF should be created if external forces available for job, SACEUR said every military commander wants forces assigned to him adequate to discharge his mission. When compared with external forces,MLF had advantages of flight time, accuracy due to proximity, and survivability due to mobility. SACEUR noted greatest accuracy with land based missiles. This advantage compensated for in part by proximity MLF to target. While he did not know characteristics of MLF warheads, SACEUR stated he had enough targets to be covered by Polaris A–3 missiles far enough from population centers to be consistent with NATO constraints policy. SACEUR has no great problem in incorporating MLF into NATO Command and Control System, which could be done easily on patterns V-bombers and US Polaris. UK permanent representative said that no decision had been made to create MLF and in studying question care must be taken not to overlook other systems that might meet requirement better.SACEUR observed this hypothetical situation. He had to consider what was likely to be available to meet three parts of his missile mix. MLF would meet seaborne part. As for land based missile X, research and development not yet completed. New missiles had lead times of years. In SACEUR's opinion, MRBMs would not be obsolescent at end of decade. He not certain about fate of manned aircraft. In response question of Italian permanent representative, SACEUR emphasized no one single weapons system could cover all of his present and foreseeable requirements. In response to question “taking into account the presently assigned SSBNs and other weapon delivery systems at present targeted or programmed to be targeted on SACEUR's threat list, would the addition of 200 Polaris A–3 missiles in the MLF be of military utility for the achievement of SACEUR's mission through the next ten years?” SACEUR replied “Yes, the MLF would have great military utility in the next ten years”. Detailed resume of discussion in preparation for distribution after review by SACEUR. Comment: SACEUR was clear and unequivocal, initially and under probing questioning, in his position that he would welcome assignment MLF to his command and would find MLF of considerable military value. While making clear MLF would not satisfy completely his MRBM requirement, and avoiding over-stating military case for MLF, his candid and direct response to questions and reiteration of basic endorsement of MLF as contribution to defense ACE would provide valuable point of reference in future WG discussions. Finletter 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)12. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Ankara, Athens, Rome for USDOCOSouth for Burris, Brussels, The Hague, CINCLANT, and CINCEUR. 11. Memorandum of Conversation 11. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 6, 1964, 1 p.m. SUBJECT European Unity and the Atlantic Alliance PARTICIPANTS Europeans 2 Sicco L. Mansholt, Vice President, EEC Robert Marjolin, Vice President,EEC Jean Rey, Commissioner, EEC Louis George Rabot, Director General, Agriculture Pierre Millet, Director General, Internal Market Theodorus Hijzen, Special Representative of the Commission for the GATT Negotiations Pierre Lucion, Chef de Cabinet to Commissioner Rey Michel Hedreul, Adviser to the Vice President of the EEC U.S. The Secretary of State The Secretary of Agriculture Robert V. Roosa, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, Department of the Treasury Christian A. Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations John W. Tuthill, United States Representative to the European Communities William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs After welcoming the Commissioners the Secretary of State said he hoped it would be of interest to them if he outlined the general situation vis-á-vis the Soviet bloc. While this appeared to be a period of motion he was not sure of the directions but he was sure that the big questions would still be with us, such as Cuba and Viet Nam. He noted there had been small progress made in disarmament but no major movements in that area. It would be incorrect to refer to the situation as one of detente. A new sobriety had been introduced into the East-West relations due to an awareness of the terrible dangers of nuclear war. This new sobriety was one result of the Cuban affair. Southeast Asia remained the point of gravest danger. Turning to trade, the Secretary of State said that this was subject to review, noting the imminent hearings before the Senate which he thought would go on for several months. We did not expect substantial growth in trade due to the limitations of Soviet gold and exchange resources and exports of interest to the United States. In addition the lack of a lend-lease settlement inhibited extension of normal credits. The Secretary of State observed that for the past fifteen years the United States had been a minority of one within the Alliance in East-West trade. Perhaps we had been wrong and our allies right, and maybe as the subject is explored a compromise can be found. With regard to disarmament the Secretary of State said he could not see any early agreement. He thought future steps would be small and might take the form of Khrushchev's policy of “mutual example.” Perhaps agreements could not be written but what may develop would be a “coincidence of policy” as for example in the field of a nondissemination of nuclear arms and reductions of defense spending. Turning to trans-Atlantic relations the Secretary of State observed that some people see only disarray in the Alliance. He wondered if this was an accurate picture and called attention to the extent this disarray seemed to be due to unsolved intra-European problems. In this connection he wished to underline the importance attached to the Kennedy Round. The Secretary thought it a pity that at a time when Khrushchev has so many problems we in the West are forced to mark time. If, in contrast, we were moving strongly towards European integration and Atlantic partnership this would be real strength. Unfortunately we have been diverted, at least temporarily, from this course. Mr. Rey thanked Secretary Rusk for his welcome and responding to the final point the latter had made suggested breaking the problem down into three areas: economic, political and military. He noted that the process of political union was stalled and that the military problem was at this moment the exclusive property of the individual nations. But he proceeded to outline the rather surprising progress that had been made even during the difficult year of 1963 in the area of economic unity. He felt that from the breakdown of the U.K. negotiations in January 1963 to the successful Marathon meeting before Christmas a basis had developed which would allow the community to move rapidly ahead in 1964. He noted in this connection President Hallstein's proposal for a further acceleration of the program for eliminating national tariffs. Mr. Rey also noted the very substantial progress made in the monetary field and his expectations that more would be seen in this area. The fusion of the executives was succeeding and by 1965 the United States would be able to deal with only one commission—although he could not say now whether it would be 9 or 14. Finally, he stressed that the purpose the community had in mind was to construct a community for the closest possible cooperation with the United States. Mr. Mansholt also picked up the final point made by the Secretary of State and posed the rhetorical question, “How is Europe going to be organized?” He noted that the veto of U.K. entry was a great shock which had led to questions in the United States as to “Who is Europe?” “Is it De Gaulle?” Mr. Mansholt said this is not true. The European states are “involved in a difficult struggle but De Gaulle's ideas of Europe are not those we want.” He underscored Mr. Rey's observations on the remarkable progress that had been made in 1963 despite the internal difficulties. He referred as well to the recommendations being made with respect to the European Parliament. Mr. Mansholt accepted the fact that current European tensions preclude progress on political union but suggested that this step is not essential now. While a fully effective Atlantic partnership will need an economically and politically unified Europe it is not possible to give an answer on the political front now. Mr. Mansholt emphasized that progress in economic unity combined with the mandate given to the Commission by the Council of Ministers to engage in the Kennedy Round is really all that can reasonably be asked for. He furthermore predicted that the end of the negotiations would see success. Mr. Mansholt emphasized most strongly that the Kennedy Round is the last chance for the community to show what kind of Europe we are to have. The big problem will be agriculture but he believed these difficulties would be solved as well. Mr. Marjolin associated himself with the views of his colleagues. He noted as well the problems and difficulties that lie ahead. He recalled an observation the Secretary of State had made before lunch to the effect that the latter, when asked about Berlin, said he would be content if he could leave the problem in the same shape for his successor. Mr. Marjolin said that many of these problems such as agriculture could not be solved quickly and would have to be worked over a long time, both within Europe and between Europe and the United States. He called attention to the extent that America had profited from the Common Market with an increase of exports into the community of 80% since 1958. He said the Market had been helpful to the Free World as a whole but he admitted that as in all things matters could have been better. Mr. Marjolin noted that the European Community was the United States' child. It would never have come into being without United States support. He suggested that the advantages recited earlier, he hoped, show clearly that the United States had been wise and correct in its policies. By the end of 1965, Marjolin noted, the Common Market would be deciding most economic issues by majority rule. This is the way European federation would come about, dealing first with assorted economic matters and leaving the “higher issues of policy” to national governments. But these are the important issues of international life, these assorted matters, and he argued that the European Community would continue to be a real partner in its relations with the United States. The Secretary of State expressed his interest in the observations made by the three Commissioners and suggested that we should give more attention to public information on these matters. Perhaps if people understood the situation better they would see that it was more a sense of disarray than a fact of disarray in our European and Atlantic affairs. By way of analogy he said he was personally not too concerned over the apparent disagreement of strategy within the Alliance for he felt this too was a superficial rather than a real issue. He suggested that when we get down to issues of how we deal with a clear threat then we find there is much greater unity than we had thought to be the case. He concluded by saying that he wanted to be sure we gave more attention to the public affairs aspects of the Atlantic Community. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 NATO. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Schaetzel and approved in S on March 16. The conversation was held at a lunch-eon given by Secretary Rusk in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. 2 The EEC officials were in Washington for talks March 5–6. Memoranda of their conversations with Ball, Herter, Under Secretary of the Treasury Robert V. Roosa, and Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller, during the morning of March 5, are ibid., ECIN 6 EEC. A summary of the discussion on trade disparities that afternoon was transmitted in circular telegram 1628, March 6. (Ibid., ECIN 7 EEC) Except for the conversation recorded here most of the discussions on March 6 were devoted to agriculture. (Circular telegram 1636, March 7; ibid.) 12. Memorandum of Conversation 12. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 18, 1964, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT NATO Ministerial Meeting at The Hague, May 1964 PARTICIPANTS Dr. Dirk U. Stikker, NATO Secretary-General Mr. John Getz, Director, Office of the Secretary-General The Secretary Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary Mr. Philip J. Farley, Director,USRO/POL Mr. David H. Popper, Director, EUR/RPM After a private discussion, 2 the Secretary-General raised the question whether he should include in his Annual Political Appraisal, to be circulated 14 days before The Hague Ministerial Meeting in May, his views on the central issues confronting the Alliance. He could do this, he said, in a particularly appropriate way because it would be his last such appraisal. As Stikker saw it, NATO's principal problem today was that the rule of unanimity, as exploited mainly by the French, stood increasingly in the way of a satisfactory NATO organization. He suggested that a practice adopted in the OECD might be initiated in NATO to overcome this problem, at least in part. In OECD, if a member disapproved of action desired by the majority, that member could abstain from participation while other members went ahead without it. This was in accord with what should be a basic doctrine of an Alliance—that no member should compel another to take action against its will; but on the other hand, no one member should be able to prevent others from taking necessary action. The proposal was consistent with the doctrine from taking necessary action. The proposal was consistent with the doctrine of “mutual forebearance” which Stikker had previously advocated. It had in fact been applied in the case of the Multilateral Force, where the French were standing aside passively, but it would be much easier to move in this way if the action could be taken within rather than outside NATO and if it could be explained as a NATO action. This was not the case with the MLF. The Secretary remarked that there were two kinds of vetoes in organizations such as NATO and the UN. There was what might be called the parliamentary veto, and there was the de facto veto arising out of the need for physical participation by the disagreeing state. Thus, a project like the MLF could proceed without French acquiescence, but in a matter like the establishment of a control post system it was impossible to force the French to permit control posts to be established on their territory against their will. Dr. Stikker noted that NATO had managed to cope with French objections with respect to the Athens Guidelines and the Inter-Allied Nuclear Force; but that if the MLF were established by action outside NATO there would be serious difficulties if MLF participants wanted to establish its headquarters in France or have MLF vessels armed with nuclear weapons enter French ports. An abstention doctrine in NATO might help in meeting such problems or at least make the position of NATO Permanent Representatives easier if they were to serve on the MLF Board of Governors. Mr. Tyler commented that the French were perfectly willing to let the MLF go ahead without them so long as French territory and facilities were not involved; if they were, the French could be expected to be far more difficult. The Secretary-General added that there were bound to be serious difficulties with the French in any event in working out such problems as the legal status of MLF personnel. At this point Stikker said that he had in mind suggesting the abstention doctrine in the Annual Political Appraisal. The Secretary thought that perhaps Stikker's personal views on this matter might be included in a personal annex to the Appraisal designed for Ministers only, and that a discussion of the Secretary General's views on basic NATO problems might perhaps take place in a small private session for Foreign Ministers. The Secretary added that in the last three years, during Stikker's incumbency, NATO had gone much farther in discussion of matters outside the NATO area than had previously been the case. Perhaps in his Appraisal the Secretary-General could speculate as to whether this had been a good idea and had been helpful, and whether the practice could be expanded. Dr. Stikker mentioned the recently established procedure of opening all NAC meetings with a period of political consultation. He said it was highly popular. There was no problem in persuading members to participate. The important thing was the countries should not enter upon consultation with rigid positions. The Secretary then remarked that for several years ahead, barring war or intense crisis, disarmament questions would be coming regularly before governments and would be discussed in NAC. Four NATO members were represented at Geneva, a fifth having decided not to sit in, and the question therefore arose whether there should be more permanent machinery in NATO to deal with disarmament problems. Dr. Stikker thought not. The Council and the Committee of Political Advisers dealt with these problems quite adequately; there was a regular fortnightly report from Geneva; and these organs could take up any particular items, with the aid of experts, at any time. Dr. Stikker referred to the recent NAC discussions of the observation post problem. Here the difficulty was that the Standing Group had refused to produce adequate military advice in the absence of political guidance, while NAC had been hampered by the absence of a useful military report. Given the resulting deadlock, Stikker had posted a chart with a hypothetical system, and this he said had stimulated the British and later the Americans to produce papers, including specific observation post plans. Stikker continued that in his opinion there was something institutionally wrong with the Standing Group, and that he would like to refer to this subject in his Annual Political Appraisal. On the most important matters, such as observation posts and strategy, one could not get a useful opinion out of them; consequently, NAC had to use national experts, drawn from each member state. He thought the Standing Group problem was becoming worse. Essentially the difficulty was that the Standing Group was multi-national, so that if one member said “no” most of the time, effective action was impossible. The Secretary noted that once military problems got beyond the field commander level, they were intermingled with political factors. In such situations it was difficult for Standing Group members to furnish purely military advice. And so, Dr. Stikker added, these matters came to the NAC and were decided there. If a war situation ever occurred, the Standing Group, he thought, simply could not function. It would be necessary to improvise a much higher level body. In the present circumstances, he felt something must be done about the relationship between the political and military sides of NATO. The military acted as a clan apart from others. They were not subject to political control until matters reached the action stage. They were reluctant to keep the Secretary-General informed and thus often got into difficulties—as for example in the present case of the Italian protest over the International Planning Staff proposal. 3 The Secretary referred to other possible changes in NATO organization. He asked whether it would help if we made the NAC a standing body at the Ministerial level. This would not result in any great change for the US Government, but could other governments do it? Stikker said that his own experience was that in a parliamentary system of government only the cabinet was responsible and could make top-level decisions. The Foreign Minister could not evade or share his individual responsibility. Mr. Schaetzel pointed out that the exploration of this subject, which the Secretary had commissioned Mr. Rostow and him to make at the December 1962 meeting, had produced rather negative results. The Secretary nevertheless felt that NAC decisions did not carry the weight they should carry among governments. If NAC were constituted at the Ministerial level this might make a difference, and Foreign Ministers would have to be called together only when some specific circumstances required their participation, and not regularly whether or not needed. The Secretary-General said that meetings twice a year were highly desirable from the international standpoint because such regularity helped to produce necessary papers and precipitate decisions. The Secretary asked whether there was a broad consensus within NATO with respect to Eastern Europe or whether it would be useful to discuss Eastern European problems at the May Meeting in greater detail. Stikker felt there was considerable agreement on the facts, but there were great differences of view on whether there should be active negotiations with Eastern European countries. The negative French position made it difficult to proceed. The Secretary suggested there might not be fundamental agreement on the significance and implications of what was happening in Eastern Europe. We in the US were much more cautious than others in assuming that there was an East-West detente, even though on the other hand we were criticized by some nations for going too far in negotiation. Perhaps the negative French position was based on the French view that there just was not going to be any war. Dr. Stikker agreed, stating that the French were doubtless using the US military umbrella in striking their attitudes. The Secretary wished the French would fill out the gaps in their position. They said they were dissatisfied with NATO organization; in his recent interview with the US News and World Report Couve de Murville had refused to spell out the changes the French would like to see, on the ground that no one would agree with them; perhaps a logical deduction was that we should go ahead as we now are until we do agree on the changes to be made. The Secretary-General said that the Canadians, Belgians and Dutch all favored consideration of this problem. His French sources (Seydoux and De la Grandville) had left some doubt in his mind as to how the French would react to such a discussion in NAC. The latter had said that the French could accept it but would remain silent. If the Secretary-General were to suggest an abstention doctrine, he would carefully refrain from singling out the French in any special way. In further discussion of French motives Stikker said he had heard a report, not corroborated, that SACLANT's negotiations with the French for naval cooperation after the recent withdrawal of French naval forces from commitment had failed. An arrangement had been made between the Admirals concerned, but De Gaulle had turned it down. In Stikker's mind, this was a serious development. If NATO was to function effectively in war, arrangements for coordination would have to be made before the war started. The Secretary supposed that when the imminence of the military threat decreased, it was natural that there should be less concern for the strength of an Alliance. He thought we in the United States had had considerable success in maintaining our military alertness and strength, but he was not so sure about the Europeans. The Secretary-General said that the Germans too had kept up their guard, but this was no longer true in Belgium. It was hard to make a judgment about Norway and Denmark (the Secretary commented that Foreign Minister Lange had realistically remarked that we had not yet reached the promised land); the UK was concerned with internal problems but had somewhat increased its defense budget; and in Italy, Segni, Saragat and Andreotti had kept the Italians in a good position. Concluding the discussion Stikker asked whether the Secretary agreed that he might carefully bring the fundamental NATO problem to the attention of the May Meeting. The Secretary stressed the need for care; he did not think we should raise these issues just because Foreign Ministers found them more entertaining than a routine review of current developments; but with reasonable care he thought the Ministers should be able to discuss with each other the central issues of the Alliance. Mr. Tyler remarked that this 15th anniversary meeting was an appropriate occasion for doing so. The Secretary expressed the hope that Dr. Stikker would have a private discussion of the subject with Under Secretary Ball and Mr. Acheson at the Bilderberg meeting 4 and said he would mention the matter to Mr. Ball. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper and approved in S on March 29. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 No record of this discussion has been found, but presumably during it Stikker informed Secretary Rusk that he planned to announce his resignation on April 3. Memoranda of Stikker's conversation with McNamara on March 18, with other Defense Department officials on March 19, and with State, Defense, and Treasury Department representatives on March 19, are ibid., DEF 4 NATO, DEF 1–4 NATO, and DEF 6 NATO. 3 On March 11, the Italian Ambassador had complained to Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson that the filling of a new position in the Standing Group by a German officer would violate the spirit of understanding between the United States and Italy that Italy would have a larger role in the group. (Memorandum of conversation, March 11; ibid., DEF 4 NATO) 4 Held March 20–22 at Williamsburg, Virginia. 13. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 13. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, March 26, 1964, 3:56 p.m. 1783. EEC-EFTA Relations. 1. Department somewhat concerned over reports of discussion possible creation “political umbrella” (Bonn 3266) 2 or “roof over EFTA and EEC” (Bonn 3285) 3 and apparently related suggestion by Erhard that “European position” toward Kennedy Round be developed through coordination EEC and EFTA positions (Hague 1275). 4 2. If this approach were to be taken seriously, it could be potentially harmful both to Kennedy Round and to further development European political unity for these reasons: a. Inference that Europe as whole has interests significantly different from those of US and others in Kennedy Round. b. Creation of special competitive groups such as EFTA/EEC vs. US or US/EFTA vs. EEC (Depcirtel 1443) 5 is unsound premise on which to base politically important and mutually beneficial trade negotiations. c. Implications which might be drawn from equating even on relatively loose basis EEC, which is functioning nucleus united Europe, and EFTA, which because of neutral status of some of its members and their resistance to idea of common policies has no potential to become more than limited commercial arrangement. d. Most dangerous in long term, implicit reduction of political content of European integration to lowest common denominator, e.g., links based solely on intra-European trade, and possible discrimination by such a grouping against US exports. 3. If by “cooperation” Erhard meant ad hoc consultations between EEC and EFTA member countries on Kennedy Round issues (Bonn 3266), we would of course have no objection. 4. Request all addressees report any further indications any senior Europeans considering EEC/EFTA links for Kennedy Round. If necessary, posts may draw on message in discussions with officials but not media. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC-EFTA. Confidential. Drafted by Joel W. Biller and George R. Kaplan (EUR/RPE); cleared by EUR/RPE, GER, and E; and approved by Schaetzel. Sent to the European Community posts (Geneva for Mission and GATT), Bern, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Lisbon, Oslo, Vienna, and Stockholm. 2 Dated March 12. (Ibid., POL 7 SWE) 3 Dated March 13. (Ibid.) 4 Dated March 5. (Ibid., POL 7 GER W) 5 Dated February 6. (Ibid., ECIN 6 EFTA-US) 14. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to Belgium (MacArthur) 14. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to Belgium (MacArthur) 1 Washington, April 2, 1964. Dear Doug: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of February 26 and March 16, 2 in which you describe Foreign Minister Spaak's proposal to raise at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in The Hague in May the question of a review of the North Atlantic Treaty. My comments are also directed to your letter of March 23 addressed to me. 3 As you know from my memorandum of March 19 to Walt Rostow, 4 I have serious difficulty with Spaak's proposal. It is not that we in the Department disagree fundamentally with his analysis of the current state of affairs in NATO. Like Spaak, we tend to react with frustration and exasperation to the day-to-day conflicts which arise predominantly, though not exclusively, from French obstruction. (Recall, for example, the recent performance of the British on trade and credits matters.) We recognize that if present trends continue, the result might ultimately be disastrous for NATO and unfortunate for all its members. We believe, however, that Spaak tends to disregard the substratum of solidarity that still prevails in NATO. While the outlook is certainly not encouraging, we do not consider it desperate. The problem M. Spaak presents is whether, in this situation, forcing the issue of NATO reorganization through the appointment of a review group would help us or harm us in coping with the French. Spaak seems willing to contemplate with relative equanimity the possibility of a breakup of NATO as a result of the French reaction to what would probably be considered a drastic anti-French proposal. I very much doubt, however, that other NATO members would enter joyously into such a conflict; certainly we here would have grave reservations about it at this moment. Indeed, with elections approaching in the UK and the US, German nervousness on security and Alliance problems in general, and the precariousness of the Italian internal situation, I think the time is quite unpropitious for embarking on such an operation. Accordingly, in further discussion with Spaak, you might assure him that we share his determination that the French must not be allowed to sabotage NATO. But we do not believe that the moment has yet come to initiate a “Wise Men's” review which would only highlight the problem and, as M. Spaak has recognized, would provoke a confrontation with the French. For the time being we would prefer a more subtle approach in which we might take steps to keep NATO moving without French participation, wherever the French chose to remain aloof. That is why we have responded sympathetically to Stikker's recent suggestion that we try to adopt in certain cases the OECD practice of moving ahead on specific problems where there is an opposition of one, allowing the others to proceed on their own while the dissenter stands aside. 5 If we could generalize this practice, there would be many ways in which we could proceed in spite of the French. Through this type of procedure we might apply a steady if undramatic pressure on the French. We would try to act in such a way that the responsibility would be centered on them, rather than on us, for provoking a crisis. Hopefully it would then become clear to De Gaulle that he would risk isolation if he persisted in trying to block NATO activities supported by all other Members. As for the May Meeting at The Hague, we expect that Dirk Stikker may very well refer in his Annual Political Appraisal to certain fundamental problems confronting NATO, and we will surely wish to comment on them—in a careful and a non-contentious way. We hope the Secretary will reaffirm our view that NATO and its institutions will continue to be necessary for Western security as far ahead as we can see. We also hope that, recognizing the complexities of the emerging East-West situation, he will make some allusion to the need for keeping NATO in step with new developments so that it may continue to be a flexible and effective instrument of North Atlantic policy. We know that NATO cannot continue in existence indefinitely without changes in its structure and functions. That is why we have applauded Spaak's efforts to increase NATO's cooperation in non-military and non-European affairs as well as to improve NATO's general effectiveness. Nevertheless, we think a “Wise Men's” review of NATO would be premature at this juncture. Perhaps Spaak would agree that the idea of such a review might be thrown out at the May Meeting as an item for further consideration as we approach the 20th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the context of a general modernization operation, such a review would be less likely to antagonize the French and more likely to produce results. We would not, however, think it desirable actually to set up a panel of “Wise Men” until, at the earliest, the December 1964 NATO Ministerial Meeting. Given the penetrating character of Spaak's thinking on all these issues, we hope you can induce him to review the subject in this broader context. We would be most interested to know what reaction he gets from his exploration with other Foreign Ministers of the “Wise Men's” review proposal. (In this respect we were interested in your telegram 1450 and Chip Bohlen's comment in Paris' 4548.) 6 This is certainly one of the matters the Secretary will want to talk over with Spaak in Brussels, and with other NATO Foreign Ministers in bilateral conversations or possibly a restricted session at the NATO Ministerial Meeting. 7 With best regards, Sincerely, William R. Tyler 8 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH(TH). Secret; Informal-Official. Drafted by Popper on April 1 and cleared by Francis E. Meloy (WE). Copies were sent to Bohlen and Finletter. 2 In the February 26 letter, MacArthur reported that Spaak wanted to review the North Atlantic Treaty because he believed De Gaulle was trying to destroy NATO and the review would smoke him out. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) The March 16 letter has not been found. 3 In this letter, MacArthur reiterated that Spaak was very serious about a review of NATO to arrest the existing “erosive drift” in the organization. (Ibid.) 4 Not found. 5 See Document 12 . 6 Telegram 1450 from Brussels, March 27, reported that Spaak had visited The Hague on March 26 and discussed with the Dutch the idea of undertaking a basic review of NATO at the Council meeting in May. While no decision was reached, both sides agreed that such a proposal might be useful in forcing the French to take a definite stand on the future of the Alliance. In telegram 4548 from Paris, March 28, Bohlen commented that De Gaulle had frequently made clear his view that the Atlantic Alliance was “of indefinite value,” but also believed that the organization, as distinct from the Alliance, should undergo certain unspecified changes. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH(TH) and DEF 6–8 FR/NATO, respectively) 7 At their meeting on May 9, Spaak and Rusk devoted most of their time to a “frank” and “cordial” exchange on the status and problems of NATO. Spaak reiterated his concern over the condition of NATO, particularly in the face of independent French activities that threatened its solidarity. Secretary Rusk agreed, outlined several problems around the world that fitted this picture, stated that the French wanted to alter NATO but refused to say how, and concluded that there were still many areas where French influence or action could be crucial so it was necessary to consider carefully what should be done and how. (Telegram 217 from The Hague, May 10; ibid., NATO 3 NETH(TH)) 8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 15. Editorial Note 15. Editorial Note At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on April 3, 1964, NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker announced his intention to resign. He had previously informed Secretary of State Rusk of this decision, and on March 23 Rusk sent a message to Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, British Foreign Secretary Butler, and Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson expressing his hope that the European members of the Alliance could agree on a successor, thus avoiding the difficult situation that occurred in selecting Stikker in 1961. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) On April 4, Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea informed Assistant Secretary of State Tyler that Italy felt justified in laying claim to the position. (Memorandum for the Secretary, April 4; ibid., NATO 8–3) On April 21, the Italian Government officially proposed Manlio Brosio, who had also been a candidate when Stikker was selected, and 2 days later the United Kingdom proposed Sir Harold Caccia. Following further discussion between Italy and the United Kingdom, the British withdrew their candidacy and Brosio was elected Secretary General. 16. Memorandum of Discussion 16. Memorandum of Discussion 1 Washington, April 10, 1964. MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION OF THE MLF AT THE WHITE HOUSE, AT 5:30 P.M., ON FRIDAY, APRIL 10, 1964 PRESENT The President, Acting Secretary of State Ball, Ambassador Finletter, Messrs. Foster, Rostow, G.C. Smith, W.R. Tyler, McG. Bundy and Klein Acting Secretary of State George Ball started the discussion by reviewing the progress of the MLF. He discussed the rationale of the concept, stressing the danger of perpetuating German discrimination and emphasizing the need for giving the Germans a legitimate role in the defense of the Alliance, but “on a leash.” He thought there was substantial possibility of reaching informal agreement on the terms of a charter this spring and summer and charter-signing ceremonies by the end of the year. He said the Department had been conducting informal consultations with Congressional leaders and the results were favorable. Thus far, there was no evidence of opposition. Therefore, he felt the time had come for broader consultations with the key Congressional committees concerned. Ambassador Finletter supplemented Secretary Ball's remarks by reporting on the progress of the Paris Working Group. He told the President the educational phase had about reached its end and the time had come to move into the action phase. The way had been prepared for drafting the charter and if the President would give the go-ahead sign, the MLF would be accepted by a number of countries. Responding to the President's question about the views on MLF within the United States Government, Mr. Bundy said there was a consensus supporting it, but that Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Foster had serious reservations. The MLF, he said, could provide an Atlantic solution to the problem of the nuclear defense of the West and weaken French and British determination to hold on to their national nuclear establishments provided it were not forced upon the Europeans. Ambassador Finletter said it was his view that the U.S. had to stop being diffident about the MLF. Harold Wilson told him bluntly the British had the impression that President Johnson, as President Kennedy, was not really interested in the project. Saragat also expressed concern about the situation. He said the American attitude had complicated the problem for the Italians, since Harold Wilson kept insisting that the U.S. really did not want the MLF. Therefore, Saragat asked Finletter to urge the President to give specific endorsement to the project so there would be no misunderstanding the American position. Moreover, it was Ambassador Finletter's view that even a Wilson government would join the MLF. He was sure that in the long run Wilson would do what the U.S. wanted and therefore it was important to tell him that the MLF was good for the Alliance. In this connection, Secretary Ball added that the British in general, and Harold Wilson in particular, wanted to discourage the MLF, preferring instead to run the U.S. deterrent. But the British would go back to the MLF if the United States made it clear that the MLF was the only alternative for them. In this connection, Mr. Bundy pointed out that we had to take cognizance of the forthcoming British elections and did not want to handle the MLF in such a way as to complicate the campaign. Mr. Foster interjected to say the President ought to be aware of the Soviet Union's strongly negative views on the MLF, citing Soviet attacks on the project at Geneva. He also warned against tying U.S. hands in such way that it could be immobilized in future disarmament and non- dissemination discussions. Mr. Foster said he would be happy if we could move on the MLF with “all deliberate speed.” As for Ambassador Kohler's view (as described in the Secretary's memorandum to the President) 2 —that “the Soviet leaders find MLF less objectionable than the kinds of MRBM arrangements that might come about in its absence. There is no evidence MLF is preventing conclusions of disarmament agreements that the Soviets might otherwise favor and that would be in our interest,”—Mr. Foster said he disagreed with that estimate. It did not coincide with his impressions from his talks with the Soviets at Geneva. At the conclusion of the meeting the President directed that: (1) The Department of State broaden its discussions with the Congress on the MLF and begin informal briefings of the committees concerned. (2) The Europeans be told that in his judgment the MLF was the best way to proceed. The President also felt the MLF could satisfy the pride and self-respect of the Europeans but warned against trying to shove the project down the throats of the potential participants. (3) If possible, agreement on the MLF be reached by the end of the year. As for the public presentation, the President asked Ambassador Finletter to talk with the press immediately after the White House meeting and explain that he reported to the President on the problems of the Alliance and the progress on the MLF. The President cautioned Ambassador Finletter against giving the press the details of the discussion in advance of Congressional briefings. However, he thought the Ambassador ought to refer to the MLF portions of Secretary Rusk's speech of April 7, 3 citing it as the expression of this Administration's policy on the MLF. 1 Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, MLF #1. Secret. The source text bears the date April 11 but has no other drafting information. Another copy indicates the memorandum was cleared by Bundy. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) 2 A copy of this 4-page memorandum from Rusk to the President, April 8, with a 6-page annex on the “what” and “whys” of MLF, is ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF). 3 For text of Rusk's address on the Atlantic Alliance to the Overseas Press Club of America, see Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1964, pp. 650–655. 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 17. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, April 16, 1964, 6 p.m. 3754. For Acting Secretary. Ref: Deptel 2873. 2 Ambassador Finletter and DCM (in the absence from Bonn of Ambassador McGhee) saw the Chancellor at noon today. State Secretary Westrick, Ambassador Grewe, and Assistant Secretary Krapf were also present. After DCM had made the points in reftel, Finletter described the Friday White House meeting in which he said the entire question of MLF policy had been thoroughly covered. The President had carefully considered the subject and was fully cognizant of the need to move ahead. The study phase has now ended and we must now go into an action phase. Finletter added that he had received specific instructions in Washington on the work to be done in Paris. After reviewing the British and Italian situation, as well as the relationship of Cyprus to Turkish and Greek participation, Finletter noted that the time set for U.S. adherence to the MLF Charter seemed to be the earliest appropriate since 1964 and [sic] was a U.S. election year. We wanted to be sure that a tight schedule was maintained both in Washington and in Paris, where work would proceed parallelly, in order to reach our objective before the end of 1964. Finletter observed that close German cooperation would be required in order to enable us to exercise the strong leadership necessary. We believed that U.K. would eventually come in, though it might not be prepared to do so at first. We also thought that the concrete situation was such as to favor other governments joining MLF. Erhard said the President could be assured of continuing German support of the MLF in which his country had a large stake both for political and technical military reasons. As far as France was concerned, without denying the existence of the Franco-German treaty, the Germans wanted to avoid any suspicion that they sought any part in the French “force de frappe.” A major point favoring the MLF was that it would tie the U.S. and Germany together in Europe. Erhard then reviewed the MLF situation in various countries he had recently visited. He was convinced that the U.K. would eventually come in, even under a Labor government. In Italy at first there had been real distrust of the MLF. In response to Italian fears regarding French hegemony and the implications of the “force de frappe,” he had found a particularly effective argument to be that the MLF was the best way to neutralize the “force de frappe”. Even Nenni had seemed persuaded by this. Dutch participation was not 100 percent clear, but he thought they would come in. As to Germany, there could be no doubt about its adherence. Among other things, the MLF provided a useful argument against Soviet charges that contemporary German leaders were revanchist. Their joining would be the best proof that they had no nationalist aspirations in the weapons field. Erhard went on to say that there would be no trouble in getting the MLF through the Bundestag. While there were some opponents, these were not significant. This was essentially a bipartisan issue on which the SPD would support the government. In response to Erhard's query, Finletter said he did not believe the U.S. Congress provided any basic problem on the MLF. In espousing the policy on MLF which had been explained to the Chancellor, the President had expressed his confidence that the Congress would approve the Charter which would be negotiated. In response to a further query, Finletter added he did not think this would be an issue between the parties in the U.S. There was nothing in the Republican tradition which would necessitate their opposing the MLF. Erhard added that it was, of course, important that as many countries as possible be brought into the MLF. Finletter observed that we wanted this too. However, the MLF was a daring innovation necessary to the solidarity of the West. People did not always take kindly to new ideas, and this was a subject which had not yet demonstrated mass appeal. There was a real need of leadership and of German cooperation with us in the Paris Working Group. We were convinced that support for the MLF would snowball once it became indisputable that it was going to succeed. People would come to recognize it as indispensable to the kind of solidarity which the West requires. Grewe observed that Ambassador Finletter had made clear that we were moving into a new phase in the MLF discussions. This would involve intensive U.S.-German discussions required to keep the momentum up. These might become public, in fact it might be desirable that they do so. Erhard commented that the German Government would not seek publicity in this matter, but it was clear that such cooperation between the two countries was necessary to progress. He did not fear that public discussion of this cooperation would cause any trouble in Germany. Finletter noted that Germany was the first country to hear directly of the results of the Washington decisions. An important start had been made by the U.S. making clear its intentions. An intense effort was not required to achieve the desired goal by the end of the year. Erhard reiterated that the President could be told that Germany was fully prepared to cooperate. He looked forward to discussing this subject further during his anticipated meeting with the President in June. Comment: This was a highly useful launching of consultations following upon the White House meeting. Erhard was well briefed and gave unqualified support to the action program implied in the schedule presented to him. Although the Foreign Office was represented at this meeting, Finletter plans to return to Bonn early next week to meet with Schroeder (who will be in Bonn for a few days before leaving for his Latin American trip with Luebke), and possibly Von Hassel, to have more detailed discussions of specific work involved during the balance of 1964. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)1. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for Finletter, London, Brussels, Athens, and Ankara. 2 Telegram 2873 to Bonn, April 15, instructed McGhee to see Erhard and/or Schroeder to inform them of the decisions taken at the White House meeting on April 10. (Ibid., DEF(MLF)) Regarding the meeting, see Document 16 . 18. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 18. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Saigon, April 17, 1964, 1 p.m. Secto 59. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reference Polto 1 of April 14, 2 I find it difficult to be patient in face of whining from various quarters across the Atlantic. Reftel should have broken down words Europe and Europeans into their component parts because on these matters there is no such thing as Europe. It is elementary that there will be no MLF unless a representative grouping of NATO countries wants it and that there will be an MLF if they do. I told Finletter and others just prior to White House meeting 3 that I was unable to make a personal commitment to support MLF with only Germany, Greece and Turkey. It is also elementary to me that the United States does not expose itself to a major prestige setback by pretending that the American Republic and NATO will come crumbling down if at the end of the day Italy and Great Britain decide they want none of it. I do not know why we cannot deal with this matter in a businesslike fashion as a constructive worthwhile move without involving it with a second coming of Christ. I am also concerned about the attitude around NATO headquarters toward disarmament. Every NATO government in the UN has voted regularly for disarmament and many of them have pushed us at times in UN and elsewhere to go farther and faster than we thought wise. Our responsibility toward this arms race is to try to prevent this globe from becoming a cinder and we must be forgiven if we try to get on with it even if others are hypnotized by toys and gadgets which they themselves only dimly understand. My own view is that we should get on with both the MLF and disarmament. If we get to a point, which I doubt, where we are forced to make some choices between the two, responsible governments should consult with each other and decide what to do. This is in no sense an unusual problem. It arises in connection with the armament of the United States, NATO force goals, US commitments about divisions in Europe and many other problems. What I would like to see, therefore, is a little more maturity on these matters, but I doubt we can achieve it; but I do not want us to appear apologetic, defensive or embarrassed. No Foreign Minister has whined to me in terms like Polto 1 and until they do I am not much interested in lesser fry. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)12. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Rusk was in the Far East for the SEATO Council Meeting and visits to Saigon and Taipei April 10–20. 2 In this telegram, Finletter raised the issue of whether to “force” the MLF on the Europeans. Referring to the White House meeting on April 10, he stated that it indicated that the United States would take no action to achieve the MLF unless the Allies asked for it. Finletter proposed that a middle ground between “force” and permissiveness be staked out urging the Allies “courteously and without pressure” to accept the MLF for the common good. He concluded that anything less than this would be “misunderstood by Allies who cannot understand that most powerful member of Alliance is as diffident as all that.” (Ibid., DEF(MLF)) 3 See Document 16 . 19. Memorandum of Conversation 19. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 26, 1964. SUBJECT MLF PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Thompson Mr. Tyler Mr. Ausland U.K. Foreign Secretary Butler 2 Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Undersecretary Mr. Greenhill, British Minister Mr. J.N. Henderson, Private Secretary to Mr. Butler Mr. R.M. Hadow, Head of News Department, Foreign Office During the course of a talk with Foreign Secretary Butler at the British Embassy at 6 PM on Sunday, April 26, the Secretary said he would like to raise the subject of the multilateral force. He said we would like to do something on this before the end of 1964. He noted this would fit the Italian book. He realized that the fact that the UK was having elections in October made it awkward for Mr. Butler. He added that we consider the MLF important and that it will come into being. However, we didn't want to create difficulties for the British Government. Mr. Butler replied that the Prime Minister had asked him to put to the Secretary the British position very bluntly. This was that the U.K. Government could not take a position on the MLF before elections. If necessary, the Prime Minister would have to take this subject up with the President. Mr. Butler added that the U.K. had raised the idea of a mixed-manned bomber force. This, however, was not an alternative to the sea force. Mr. Butler also noted that the project for an experimental ship was under way with British support, and the U.K. had thought this was their bit prior to the October elections. The Secretary noted that even if we did agree to the UK proposal on bombers at the present time, the UK still couldn't move. Mr. Butler replied that this was correct. He added that he didn't want to see a rift with the US because of political difficulties. He realized that it was better to have the MLF than for the Germans to have their own nuclear force, but he still couldn't move before elections. The Secretary replied that he understood this. He would like to know, however, what the limits were on the British to consult prior to the final decision. Could they participate in the preparation of a draft agreement? Mr. Butler replied he would have to consult on this but in any event the British would have to reserve their position. Lord Harlech said perhaps it would be possible to prepare the agreement in some form other than as a draft treaty. The Secretary said that this might be a working group report on what should be in the articles of agreement, but in such form as to be readily transformable into a treaty. Mr. Butler said he would like to emphasize that it was essential that he be in a position to say to Parliament until it rises that the government had made no commitment. It would, therefore, be awkward if any document prepared were called a draft treaty. Lord Harlech said it was also important that the government be able to indicate that the new UK proposals were not being brushed aside. The Secretary said if the UK proposals became a substitute for ships or a device to postpone agreement it would not be good. Mr. Tyler said that it should be possible to avoid a milestone in June which had inevitably to be followed by negotiations. After relating the German situation on timing, Mr. Tyler came to the conclusion that anything produced after January would cause trouble. The Secretary said he thought the best thing to do would be to prepare a report which could be turned into an agreement promptly after the UK elections. Mr. Tyler also emphasized that he would not want to see the new UK proposals delay progress on the seaborne force. Lord Harlech replied that it was important in the UK that the UK proposals be considered. The Secretary replied that he understood this, but that it would not be desirable for the UK proposals to be discussed as alternatives to a seaborne force. Mr. Butler said this had never been suggested. The Secretary concluded the discussion by saying that he would pull this together for further discussion Monday and asked Mr. Tyler to get in touch with Mr. Gerard Smith. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ausland on April 27 and approved in S on May 2. The conversation was held at the British Embassy. 2 Butler was in Washington for the CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting. 3 At a second meeting on April 27, the two sides reached the following “Conclusions of Anglo/American Discussions about the MLF”:“1. The UK will not be expected to take any steps on the MLF prior to October which could be construed as a commitment by HMG.”2. It is assumed that in the interim the Working Group in Paris will continue to work on plans and language which could be converted into charter form for decision in November or December 1964.“3. The UK stated its intention to submit detailed technical support data for the proposals presented to the Working Group by Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh. It was understood that these proposals are not submitted as an alternative to a seaborne MLF, but should be considered in parallel with the seaborne MLF project.” (Topol 1660 to Paris, April 28; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)3) 20. Memorandum of Conversation 20. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 29, 1964. SUBJECT Soviet View on MLF PARTICIPANTS Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary After dinner at the Soviet Embassy, Ambassador Dobrynin asked me whether the United States intended to move ahead with the Multilateral Force. I said we were and that the Working Group in Paris had been making good progress. He said that he was very sorry to hear this as it would make things difficult for both of us. I said that this opinion was certainly based on a misunderstanding of what the Multilateral Force was going to be. I said that, on the contrary, the Soviet Government should be pleased at a solution which permits non-nuclear powers to participate in nuclear arrangements without acquiring national control over nuclear weapons or their release. The Ambassador said that the Multilateral Force would only satisfy the German appetite for nuclear weapons for two or three years, after which Germany would insist on acquiring nuclear weapons for itself. I said that, on the contrary, the Federal Republic of Germany would be satisfied at playing the role of a full and equal partner in the Alliance by participating in the Multilateral Force. I added that, in spite of the difference in our present opinions and assessment of the role of the Multilateral Force, I felt sure that the Soviet Union would eventually recognize that far from increasing the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Force was so organized and controlled as to satisfy the security requirements of both the Soviet Union and of the United States. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. 21. Memorandum for the Files 21. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, May 2, 1964, 12:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Mr. Ball Mr. Johnson Mr. Tyler Mr. Schaetzel Mr. Popper Mr. Conroy Mr. Blitgen Mr. Weiss SUBJECT U.S. Contribution to NATO Infrastructure Background Secretary Rusk called a meeting on May 2 to discuss the U.S. share of NATO infrastructure costs and a proposed letter drafted in EUR replying to one from Secretary McNamara on this subject. 2 Mr. McNamara had proposed that he send letters initiating bilateral discussions with selected NATO MODs to lay the ground work for obtaining a reduction in the U.S. cost share for NATO infrastructure. Mr. McNamara's letter also made reference to his conversations with Mr. Stikker in which the Secretary of Defense had stated that the U.S. would contribute no new funds to infrastructure until the cost sharing formula is put on a more equitable basis. 3 The proposed reply to Mr. McNamara agreed that a substantial reduction for the United States in future infrastructure cost sharing was in order. The letter took the line, however, that we should seek this reduction beginning with Slice XVII (1966) and that we should continue to provide funds as necessary to Slice XVI, with an overall ceiling of 50 million pounds ($140 million) at our current cost share of 30.85%. The proposed reply also cautioned against extensive pressure on the FRG at this time in order not to jeopardize current offset negotiations with the Germans. The letter further pointed out that it would be undesirable from a U.S. point of view for the Germans to become the major contributor to NATO infrastructure, thereby eroding or counteracting U.S. influence on this major NATO program. ( End of Background ) The Secretary stated his concern regarding the high cost of infrastructure and the changed economic conditions both in Europe and the United States. He emphasized that our allies are not shouldering an equitable share of the overall NATO defense burden. He observed that the Europeans pay for no defense infrastructure here so he wondered why we should continue to pay for infrastructure in Europe. He was not sure the infrastructure principle for establishing cost sharing was “good enough”. He believed it necessary for the allies to take on more of the multilateral costs in the European area. Mr. Tyler and Mr. Schaetzel agreed that the allies should assume a greater share of the NATO defense burden. They pointed out, however, that the issue at the moment is how to handle the short term problem of funding Slice XVI. They believed that any serving of an ultimatum by the Secretary of Defense on the allies which threatened to contribute no new funds to Slice XVI would seriously jeopardize our longer term interest in the program and would be thoroughly disruptive within NATO generally. The Secretary pointed out that we are in a “desperate situation” regarding our costs in comparison to those of Europe and that the allies “will not move unless we are harsh”. Unless the United States starts now it will be too late. He agreed with the Secretary of Defense that we should start negotiations now for a substantially reduced share and that our proportion should be not more than 25%. He said that politically, it would be of great advantage if we could get our cost share of infrastructure down to 25%. The Secretary said he was bothered by the tone of the proposed State letter to Mr. McNamara. Mr. Rusk felt that the possibility of a collapse in the infrastructure program if the U.S. contributed no new funds to Slice XVI was only one side of the coin. We should also consider that the other side of this coin is that the allies must have our consent for these programs. He asked again why the United States should pay for facilities in Europe when the allies do not pay for our facilities in the United States. It was explained that the infrastructure facilities are for support of the NATO forces in general, including our own. He was advised that there is a very small amount of NATO infrastructure in the United States at SACLANT headquarters at Norfolk. The concept of obtaining NATO funding for other U.S. defense installations within the continental limits is being considered, pro and con, in the interagency study on infrastructure soon to be forwarded for his approval. At this point the Secretary said he was less interested in having the Europeans share the costs here in the United States but he firmly believed that the Europeans should assume an increased share of the cost in Europe. In response to numerous questions from the Secretary, Mr. Conroy and Mr. Blitgen described the composition and geographic distribution of the infrastructure program, the method and criterion for developing both the annual and long term programs, the timing involved, the cost shares and method for determining these shares, the financing of usership charges and the relationship of these charges to the infrastructure budget and the status of certain individual projects such as NADGE. Secretary Rusk asked what would be the effect of ending infrastructure. He was informed that this was a matter which had never really been seriously considered until now, that these infrastructure facilities formed a major system of fixed facilities in support of NATO combat forces, and that a cessation of the program would have very far reaching repercussions. The Secretary asked if the host country did not derive an ultimate economic benefit from the investment in facilities on its territory. If so he asked why the host country shouldn't pay a larger share in anticipation of this benefit. Mr. Tyler and Mr. Weiss said that such an arrangement presumes that the facility would be withdrawn from NATO use, an eventuality we would be reluctant to concede in advance. Mr. Conroy and Mr. Blitgen also explained that in seeking to develop individual cost shares for a long term program, the contributive capacity of the individual nations, and the economic benefits of the infrastructure projects to the host nations are considered. Certain local costs such as public utilities services, access roads and land are contributed by the host nations and these costs are substantial. In the last analysis, however, the cost shares are determined by “horse-trading” at the conference table and these negotiations are usually arduous. If infrastructure projects were surrendered at some later date as no longer useful to NATO, a problem of determining the residual value of the facilities, i.e., how much the host nation should pay back to the other allies for obtaining full title to and use of the installations, would arise. This problem has not confronted the Alliance to date in any significant way. Mr. Tyler and others emphasized that they were in fundamental agreement with the Secretary on the objectives of a reduced U.S. share. They felt the infrastructure program must be continued. The problem of an Interim Slice XVI had arisen after Mr. McNamara, on President Kennedy's instructions, had informed Congress in June 1963 that we would renegotiate a new cost share this year, seeking a substantial reduction. In this connection, Mr. Conroy pointed out that infrastructure has become the largest single item in the Military Assistance Program in Europe and the Congressional Committees therefore give it undue attention as another handout of grant aid, which it is not. The Secretary asked what progress had been made in removing the infrastructure item from MAP and transferring it to the defense budget. He was informed that Congress had been approached about this change. The Department understands, also, that for internal administrative reasons, DOD did not have sufficient time to make the change this year. Secretary Rusk hoped the change could be made. It was pointed out that Interim Slice XVI is really a holding action which was designed to fill the gap until the NATO Force Planning Exercise and the general debate on strategy could be concluded. The NATO Military Authorities would then have a basis for formulating the next longer term infrastructure program and cost ceiling against which a new cost sharing formula could be negotiated. Secretary Rusk questioned Mr. Stikker's ability to come up with an agreed strategy upon which to develop new military requirements. Mr. Popper observed that there has been some progress in the NATO Force Planning Exercise. Secretary Rusk again alluded to the unfavorable situation which the United States faces and stated that the U.S. still bears a disproportionate share of the defense burden. He said he was in sympathy with the McNamara position expressed in the Sec Def letter. Mr. Weiss pointed out that, while as a matter of principle we should work for an immediate reduction, the amount saved for the U.S. in connection with Slice XVI, would be relatively small as compared to the next four-year program. Mr. Tyler said that the amount appeared to be no more than $5 to 7 million. The Secretary said he agreed that we should make a reduction in the next four-year tranche our primary objective and work towards that end. In order to facilitate that effort, and recognizing the greater financial implications of the four-year program, we should put the heaviest emphasis on this objective rather than on Slice XVI. He accepted the suggestion that bilateral conversations should be started now to lay the ground work for obtaining the longer term reduction. He concluded by asking that the proposed letter be redrafted, making his position more responsive to Mr. McNamara on this problem. 1 Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Blitgen on May 14. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 Neither McNamara's letter nor the draft reply has been found. 3 A memorandum of Stikker's conversation with McNamara on March 18 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. 22. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 22. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, May 4, 1964, 7:21 p.m. 2057. Depcirtel 1989 and replies thereto. 2 Following summary and tentative analysis sent for your information. Your comment requested. 1. As addressees presumably now aware, latest change in French naval relationships with NATO became effective through announcement by Admiral Douguet, French MilRep to NATO Standing Group April 27, and through official French press confirmation following day. As result, it appears that French naval officers may no longer serve on NATO naval headquarters staffs or in units under non-French naval command. (As far as we are aware, French officers are still serving at SACLANT.) At same time, French announcements and Foreign Office (Paris 5108) 3 indicate French willing make some type of arrangements (but not formal or general agreement) for naval cooperation between French naval units under purely French command and NATO-committed naval units of other countries, to be applied in time of war. Though not specifically stated, it would also appear French intend to continue to make bilateral arrangements for cooperation in peacetime maneuvers between US Sixth Fleet in Mediterranean and French Mediterranean squadron, and may soon complete arrangements with SACLANT for similar bilateral cooperation in naval exercises in ACLANT area. 2. Since French Mediterranean units were removed from NATO commitment in 1959 and all Atlantic units except five submarines were similarly removed effective January 1, 1964, there is certain logic in April 27 moves. These could be construed as tidying-up of anomalous situation in which French officers but not French ships had been serving in the international chain of command. In addition French have referred to heavy requirement for personnel and materiel for support of nuclear tests in Pacific. It may as SACLANT indicates now be possible to work out through French naval liaison officers some procedures through which French vessels would operate in joint maneuvers and French officers would plan for French naval measures in event of war, in such a manner that end result would not be greatly different from what it was when French fleet was earmarked for assignment to NATO in war. 3. In strictly operational terms, therefore, new status may prove tolerable from purely military standpoint, though it is too early to be certain. 4. Broader implications of French move are, however, profoundly disturbing, because they strike at heart of NATO defense system. That system was built up over time on assumption that Alliance could either deter or effectively withstand weight of Soviet military power only if advance arrangements were made and commitments undertaken to ensure that NATO forces would act under integrated command and in coordinated fashion if the Alliance were compelled to fight. Present system of NATO commands and planning units, NATO-committed forces, commonly financed NATO infrastructure, NATO standard equipment arrangements, NATO production and logistics arrangements, etc., while not without shortcomings, represent fruit of years of painstaking effort to build effective NATO military machine without destroying integrity of national forces. Overall result has been to move considerable distance toward “strength through unity” concept, and long-term trend has hitherto been in direction of slow increase in general coordination. 5. French press comment and French National Assembly Foreign Affairs debate April 28 and 29 make it very clear that French Government is in principle opposed to this philosophy and to the established NATO military system. This is because it inevitably results in some limitations on the unfettered national freedom of action which during the April 28 debate Couve de Murvillle so emphatically claimed France now possesses. Qualified French sources are quoted in press to effect that scrapping of NATO integrated command system is an element in the so far unenunciated French plans for NATO reform. This is plausible deduction from events and statements quoted above. 6. Carried to the extreme, French military disengagement from NATO—while maintaining national Alliance ties French insist are a necessity—could limit Alliance military arrangements purely to a system of agreements between national military staffs for the “coordinated” use of national armed forces under separate national commands in event of aggression calling Alliance obligations into play. This in itself would not preclude some advance over usual arrangements under traditional military alliances. On other hand, result could differ little if at all from situation preceding first and second world wars. It would require major modification in the present system of force commitments to NATO which goes long way toward allowing NATO commanders to make war plans with assurance that forces meeting determined standards will be immediately available to seek predetermined military objectives. It would certainly result in elimination, or transformation to planning and cadre status, of present NATO headquarters and international commands. Depending on extent to which carried, it could greatly diminish the expectation we have today that in event of aggression NATO forces would move into action as provided under existing NATO commitments, under NATO plans and NATO commanders. The consequence could then be a less well coordinated and weaker defense, and a major loss in trust and assurance within the Alliance. It is, of course, possible that whatever the French intentions another effect of French actions could be to stimulate a fundamental re-examination of NATO structure and procedures, which could in the end have beneficial results. 7. In any case we could not expect the French to take drastic action in immediate future. In their cat-and-mouse game with NATO, French have so far been extremely careful to proceed in small steps, no single one of which would provide a crisis. We assume that, lethargic though it is, French public opinion would be deeply disturbed by overt French government action clearly directed toward destroying NATO. Withdrawal from NATO commitment of French ground or air forces, or withdrawal of French personnel from SHAPE and subordinate ACE headquarters, would involve major readjustments and would have serious consequences for French defense system. Same would be true if French withdrew from NATO air defense system. Shock to Franco-German relations would be profound if present French contribution in Central Europe area (deficient though it is) were substantially reduced. French experience in nuclear war tactics would be halted if French nuclear-equipped air units presently teamed up with NATO stockpile weapons in Germany were removed from committed force category. French would suffer appreciable losses if their officers could not participate in NATO planning and in host of NATO infrastructure, logistics, and research and development activities from which they are always most alert to draw advantage. Finally, French voice in NATO military affairs would be muted if French MilRep were to be withdrawn from NATO Military Committee and Standing Group. 8. So far we have seen no sign that any other allies intend to emulate the French. It remains possible, however, that over the longer term others might be inclined to follow the French example. State and Defense are studying problem in depth and assessing its implications for Atlantic interdependence, in effort to ascertain what if any adjustments of benefit to US and Alliance can be worked out. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6–2 FR/NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper; cleared by Tyler, G/PM, S/P, WE, and DOD; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to CINCLANT and to Paris for USRO. 2 Circular telegram 1989, April 25, reported that information from several sources revealed that France would soon demand that its remaining naval forces no longer be under the command of NATO flag officers. The U.S. Missions were requested to sound out the other NATO members discreetly to find out their reaction. (Ibid.) 3 Dated April 28. (Ibid.) 23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 23. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 The Hague, May 10, 1964, 6 p.m. Secto 7. I had informal 1-hour conversation with officials European Community executives after earlier call on Hallstein and Chatenet. 2 Present were Hallstein, Mansholt, Marjolin, Rey, Von Der Groeben, Levi Sandri, and Schaus (all EEC), plus De Groote (EURATOM) and Coppe (ECSC). Conversation was wide-ranging and necessarily general, but I believe useful in giving key European Community officials appreciation of underlying US policies. Talk opened with frank discussion of psychological climate in US-European relations today. Hallstein said that Europe wishes make reality of Atlantic partnership, which is announced goal of US policy. Hallstein said Europe's fundamental objective is to attain unity and hence equality with US. Europe also wishes gain self-respect by playing major role in world along side US. I replied by saying that US today has necessarily taken on heavy burden of responsibilities around world. I explained that we do this out of harsh self-interest, not philanthropy; that we care nothing for prestige involved; and that we are more than happy to share these responsibilities. I explained further that we are prepared go very far in pragmatic working together on specific common tasks. Overt merging of sovereignty poses problems for us, but American people prepared go very far indeed in working together with other nations when they are convinced combined approach is only practical means. On Kennedy Round, I stressed necessity of success as one of most important specific areas where combined action desirable which can be of benefit to both partners in Atlantic area and to free world as a whole. Hallstein, choosing his words carefully, said that one should not be pessimistic as regards solutions for technical issues in KR. On agriculture, both Mansholt and Rey made appeal for patience in our negotiations, stressing great difficulty Community faces in trying to negotiate with third countries while at same time unifying its internal agricultural policies. I stressed importance of expanding trade to US in context our world-wide foreign aid and military responsibilities, mentioning particularly importance of agriculture. I cited as great dilemma of our times that we are faced on one hand with agricultural surpluses in more developed parts of world and with population explosion in LDC's. Problem of De Gaulle raised frankly by Rey, who stressed that he felt it wrong that De Gaulle problem should be portrayed as one between US and France when in reality it should be quarrel between De Gaulle and rest of Europe. I replied that there was one common thread which ran through all our difficulty with De Gaulle. This was his insistence that we accept him and France as the spokesman for Europe without assent of rest of Europe. This claim we cannot accept. I expressed full understanding of how an individual Frenchman could, given the history of France over the last 25 years, be strongly sympathetic to what De Gaulle had done to restore stability and self-respect, but I expressed deep regret that De Gaulle's energies have been directed toward building up narrow national prestige of France. Story would have been entirely different if France had thrown same energy into building a really united Europe and an effective partnership. If this had been done, France's and Europe's prestige today would indeed be enormous. Instead, De Gaulle seems to be intent on building up France's national prestige at the expense of France's friends. (These comments seemed to elicit a very sympathetic response from the Commissioners.) Nuclear question was raised by Mansholt who pointed out that some—not all—Europeans wanted a larger nuclear role. I replied by emphasizing very heavily complete indivisibility of nuclear defense in an alliance. I pointed out further that US, in field of nuclear defense, has two great areas of responsibility. Aside from Atlantic area, we are facing in Pacific very grave responsibilities, and are facing them alone. We cannot, in light of this, pool our global nuclear responsibility. Nevertheless, at the Atlantic area we have gone very far indeed. I noted in general terms enormous power of nuclear forces located in Europe, use of which is subject to joint decision with our allies. This, I said, should be proof enough of how far we are willing to go in sharing our responsibilities with our allies in the Atlantic area. Our great nuclear strength, rather than giving us national independence, makes us highly interdependent with our allies. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for USEC, London, Luxembourg for Embassy and USEC, Paris for Embassy and USRO, Rome, and Geneva. 2 Secretary Rusk visited Brussels May 8–9, and then The Hague May 10–14, for the NATO Ministerial Meeting. At a luncheon at Brussels on May 9, he delivered a major speech stressing continuing U.S. support for European economic and political unity. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , May 25, 1964, pp. 810–815. Rusk transmitted a report on his meeting with Hallstein at 2:45 p.m. in Secto 6 from The Hague, May 10. (Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC) 24. Memorandum of Conversation 24. Memorandum of Conversation 1 The Hague, May 12, 1964, noon. US/MC/7 UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE THIRTY-THIRDMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL The Hague, Netherlands, May 12–14, 1964 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Ronald I. Spiers, EUR/RPM Italy Foreign Minister Saragat Secretary-General of Foreign Ministry Cattani Director-General of Political Affairs Fornari Miss Bonaccorsi (interpreter) SUBJECT Atlantic Policies Mr. Saragat said he could not over-state the importance of the Atlantic Alliance in Italian policy. NATO was more important and necessary than ever. In fact, NATO was more important to Italy than the Common Market. Without the latter Italy could pull through; without NATO it was doubtful that Italy could survive. The Secretary expressed a hope for success in Mr. Saragat's policy of drawing other coalition members into support of this policy. He noted that in some cases this would be as difficult as docking an ocean liner without tugs. The Secretary said that he expected to comment on the MLF under Item II of the Agenda. His silence on this subject in his initial statement should not be construed as U.S. lack of interest. 2 The US is a strong supporter of the MLF. Mr. Saragat said that a principal danger on the horizon—which he did not, on the other hand, wish to over-emphasize—was the policy of De Gaulle on the question of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. He said he had had very frank talks with General De Gaulle. Italy is convinced that De Gaulle will not push so far as to break up NATO, particularly since this would cause a serious rupture with the Germans. This factor sets a fundamental limit on how far De Gaulle can go, but within these limits we can expect many more headaches from the French. He had told De Gaulle that if Moro and the Italian Government were to follow the same policy as he, we would “in six months have handed Italy over to the Communists.” He had the feeling that this was the only thing which he had said which really impressed De Gaulle, who was, he believed, playing the game of the French Communists. The Secretary said our basic view was that we must find a way to go on with the necessary business of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, without rancor and without engendering unnecessary passionate argument. He was clear that there was only one issue at the bottom of our troubles with France, namely, Eisenhower's and Kennedy's refusal, in 1958 and 1961, to accept De Gaulle's proposal for a “Directoire,” which meant in essence giving France the ability to speak for Europe without the consent of the others. We should demonstrate patience without being diverted from pursuing policies which were good for the Alliance. We can only hope that, sometime, the situation will improve. Mr. Saragat repeated that he was convinced De Gaulle would not break up the Alliance. He was, however, somewhat concerned about when Labor in the UK would turn to a more realistic policy on Europe. He was hopeful about this, although he felt that now Labor was “50 years behind the times” in its attempt to develop an “extra-Continental” alliance before getting into Europe. However, this policy is likely to lose us two years, although we can hope that the evolution in Labor's views will take place in parallel with the evolution in French policy. The Secretary said he wished to say a word about the US–UK special relationship, which was often more talked about than existing in fact. We assume that to the extent there is a special relationship it will extend to Europe when Britain moves into Europe. We do not want this to be a barrier to the U.K. entering Europe. Mr. Saragat said that a principal problem was convincing Labor that they would not be abandoning this relationship with the US if they shifted their European policy. The Secretary said that we must always be aware of the tremendous influence and responsibility which could be exercised by an enlarged Europe (with all of the individual connections with other parts of the globe which the British, the French and the Italians have and which they would bring with them into a united Europe), working in partnership with North America. This would constitute a historic development of the center of the free world. The tragedy of the present moment is that this movement has been set back at a time that the Communist world is in disarray. We are foregoing great possibilities and prospects by this fact. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 NETH(TH)). Confidential. Drafted by Spiers on May 13 and approved in S on May 24. The conversation was held at the Princess Juliana Kazerne. The source text is labeled “Part VI of VI.” The Foreign Ministers also discussed Vietnam, selection of the new NATO Secretary General, German reunification, Cyprus, and East-West relations during this conversation. Memoranda are ibid. 2 Agenda Item II was the Secretary General's Annual Political Appraisal. Copies of the agenda, the appraisal, and Rusk's comments on it are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2396. For text of Rusk's statement as honorary President of the Council, May 12, see Department of State Bulletin , June 1, 1964, pp. 850–852. 25. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 25. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, June 7, 1964, 12:43 p.m. CA–11925 SUBJECT Spanish Relations with the European Economic Community [Here follow Parts 1–3. Part 1 summarized Spanish representations in Washington and noted that on May 16 the Spanish Ambassador had discussed the question with Under Secretary Ball. Part 2 reviewed the U.S. position on association with the EEC, stressing that the United States opposed discriminatory trading blocs that were primarily economic without compensating political advantages. Part 3 reviewed the course of EEC-Spanish talks since Spain applied for membership in 1962.] 4. U.S. Policy on Spain and the Common Market If Spain determines to renew its “candidacy for Europe” and is not quickly rebuffed by the EEC, it is likely that the United States will be under continuing Spanish pressure to support the Spanish application, and that the Spanish Government will act in the knowledge of the important U.S. military and space interests in Spain. While of course showing interest in Spain's economic problems, U.S. officials should nevertheless remain entirely noncommittal on relations with the EEC and should particularly avoid any suggestion that the United States might be able to intervene on Spain's behalf with the Common Market. It is highly doubtful that United States support of Spain would be helpful in overcoming the forces in Europe which still appear to be strong enough to prevent Spanish association. Moreover, Spanish and possible German initiatives to revive the question are not timely since they will undoubtedly complicate the existing problems of European integration, thus coming into conflict with our over-all policy objectives in Europe. Any association between the EEC and Spain that might emerge under present circumstances is most likely to be a non-MFN commercial arrangement. Such a relationship would be contrary to our trade policy and inimical to the commercial interests of the United States and other third countries. An agreement involving preferences in favor of Spanish products over competing Mediterranean products, e.g. citrus fruits, would be economically damaging to other Mediterranean countries and would intensify pressure for similar associations with the EEC. We also have in mind that other third countries have tried to induce the United States to intervene on their behalf for preferential trade arrangements. We have consistently refused to accede to these requests. In fact, we have energetically opposed Nigerian association and continue to do so. Current U.S. policy on Spain is that “in the long term the U.S. looks to the development of a stable and popularly-backed system of government in post-Franco Spain and its full integration into the broad European and Western Community—politically, economically, and militarily.” Circular Telegrams 1906 of April 10, 1964 and 1975 of April 23, 1964, 2 provided guidance for commenting on Spanish relations with the EEC. Briefly, these messages defined our position as follows: (a) We find it difficult to endorse arrangements involving discrimination against the U.S. and other third countries by a broadening of the Common Market preferential area. (b) The continued development of the Spanish economy is of great interest to us, but the Kennedy Round offers the best opportunity for Spain and other countries to reduce the adverse trade effects of the EEC. (c) We support increased Spanish participation in European and other multilateral organizations such as the OECD where Spain is already able to play an active role. This policy remains unaltered. However, in view of the nature of the Under Secretary's response to the Spanish Ambassador in connection with Spanish ties with the EEC, U.S. officials should, as noted previously, observe a noncommittal position and for the present not convey point (a) above. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC-SP. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Jean R. Tartter (EUR/RPM) on June 2 and cleared by four EUR offices, U, and E. Repeated to 18 posts in Europe, Algiers, Lagos, Rabat, Tel Aviv, and Tunis. 2 Neither printed. (Ibid., ECIN 6 EEC-SP) 26. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 26. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, June 15, 1964, 8:12 p.m. 2350. Erhard talks—Kennedy Round. Ref: Circ 2339. 2 Kennedy Round was subject hour's discussion morning June 13 between Herter and Erhard. 3 Schroeder, Westrick among participants on German side; McGhee, Blumenthal, Roth on U.S. Conversation dominated by subject of effect grains price issue on KR. Before Erhard arrived, Schroeder asked for U.S. statement that grains price unification is not precondition to KR. Herter replied to Schroeder and later to Erhard with points contained reftel (text subsequently handed to Germans), stressing problem was created by EEC, not U.S., since from U.S. viewpoint negotiations could go on without price decision. However, EEC refusal move ahead in KR agricultural discussions in absence grains decision presents very serious difficulty. November 16 exchange of offers and exceptions lists must cover both industry and agriculture. If no agreement on basis agricultural negotiations before then, exchange of lists would be postponed indefinitely and we would be left with no idea when meaningful progress in KR possible. Erhard stated he had underestimated feelings and pressure of German farmers' organizations on grains question. He suggested that solution might be to agree now that price level will be set and unification take place in 1968. He said that if unified price established now with implementation delayed until 1966, it may prove unacceptable to others among Six at time of implementation especially in light inflation. Chancellor brought up question of access assurances, saying he was quite sure price alone is insufficient as regulator of imports. Access assurances, he noted, are contrary to Commission's philosophy. He suggested solution along lines of a “mixed formula” where trade flow depends not only on price but also on some other commitment. Commission, he added, seems to be making some move that direction.FRG would continue to press for import guarantee. Herter expressed full agreement on need for access assurances, since unified prices would not possibly be low enough to ensure access. Also explained pragmatic approach we suggest for agricultural negotiations. Then restated dilemma presented by EEC's link of decision on grains price to agricultural negotiations. Erhard replied that he couldn't make binding response to this question now. We would discuss problem with Hallstein and with deGaulle in their meeting July 3–4. Though he recognized present stalemate, he at no point indicated grains price decision could be made this year. While stating that KR will not fail because of German position on grains price, he rejected thesis that grains price only stumbling block. His parting words were: “No one is as firmly interested as Germany in success of KR. One cannot advocate something with fervor on one hand and then say no when the decisive question is put.” Westrick remained for further lengthy discussion after Chancellor had left. Said frankly that government doubts it could get Bundestag majority for grains price unification now. Though this not absolutely necessary, he added that in election period it would be very difficult to take decision opposed both by Free Democrats and substantial group within CDU. Herter reiterated need to work out negotiating rules on agriculture before November, and Westrick agreed that FRG would help. Returning to earlier discussion of access assurances, Westrick thought Commission has “certain flexibility” in its agricultural mandate enabling move on access. Presently it is not disposed to use this flexibility, but FRG would exert pressure to change this attitude. Comment : Discussion leaves us with no illusions that FRG can be persuaded to agree to unified grains price levels this year, even under EEC or U.S. pressure, which was never solicited. Present impasse will continue unless stalemate broken in one way or other. However, we will know more about possibility stalemate being broken after Hallstein and deGaulle visits to Bonn. Meanwhile, posts should continue follow line set forth reftel. In continuing to report on this subject, EEC posts should comment on whether Commission and member states (except Germany) will continue insist on grains price unification as prior condition KR agricultural negotiations as word of German position gets around. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–GRAINS EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Kenneth Auchincloss of the Office of the Special Trade Representative and cleared by Blumenthal, E, EUR/RPE, and GER. Sent to the EEC and EFTA capitals, Geneva, Ottawa, Canberra, Wellington, and Tokyo. 2 Circular telegram 2339, June 13, reported that a unified grain price decision by the EEC was not now indispensable; that the problem of grain prices seemed to lie in Brussels; that unless the EEC could negotiate on both industrial and agricultural products, the final results of the Kennedy Round would be in jeopardy; and that unified grain prices could not be seen in isolation. (Ibid.) 3 Erhard visited Washington June 12–14 for talks with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk. Memoranda of their conversations, primarily on German-related topics, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2413. For text of the joint communique issued on June 12, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 536–538. 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, July 3, 1964, 11:55 a.m. Topol 23. London's 6356; Rome's 3415. 2 It may be useful in light both Italian and UK reactions to proposed MLF schedule to clarify US position in this regard. Hand of opponents of MLF will be strengthened to extent they able misrepresent US attitude as one of inflexibility and unrelenting pressure upon allies to meet fixed timetable regardless political circumstances in states concerned and regardless whether governments stand or fall. Request your views on use of following line of reasoning with Italy and UK on this matter. US proposed timetable calls for preparations to proceed at such pace as to be ready for decision and signature by November–December. Since these preparations would be undertaken without commitment, we do not see why this schedule should pose insuperable problems for any of governments concerned, and the earlier such preparations completed the easier it will be for post-election UK government and other governments to consider problem in all its dimensions and better position all will be to make decision on signing agreement. As to signing date, we continue hope and expect that sufficient number of governments to permit establishment of Force may be prepared sign agreement at end current year. But this is, of course, decision for them to make in light of their individual circumstances; while explaining the basis for our own views and actions, we do not intend to apply pressure on them with respect to either substance or timing. As we have often said, no individual country (e.g. Italy or UK) is in our view essential to that end; an additional element whose implications we will have to consider is growing favorable trend in Low countries. Inability of country to sign at end of year would not of course necessarily deprive it of opportunity to be founding member, since several months would be required for legislative action and deposit of ratification before treaty could come into effect. Arrangements could be made for signing by UK or Italy during this period. Indeed, some Labor spokesmen have indicated that it would be easier for a Labor government to sign if others had already done so, so that UK did not seem to be taking initiative. Even at that stage there would be room for at least some flexibility on date of deposit of required ratification if desirable to achieve broader base for initial components of Force. Nor do we exclude Charter in sufficiently flexible terms that weapon system add-ons of kind in which UK interested might be provided for in principle in advance of full elaboration of details. Thus US considers schedule as envisaged already contains the essential elements of flexibility required to meet principal UK and Italian concerns. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files DEF(MLF)3. Secret. Drafted by Vincent Baker (S/MF) on June 23; cleared by Smith, Spiers, Bundy, BNA, S/P, and U; and approved by Tyler. 2 Telegram 6356 from London, June 22, reported British concern that the United States might attempt to force a decision on the MLF before the new government elected in the fall had time to organize itself. Telegram 3415 from Rome, June 19, reported Italian concerns that a decision on the MLF give due consideration to both the fall British election and the West German elections in the spring of 1965. (Both ibid., DEF(MLF)4) 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 28. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, July 8, 1964, 6:37 p.m. 67. For Ambassador from McGeorge Bundy. 1. The President asks you to call on Chancellor promptly to express President's deep appreciation for highly confidential message conveyed in your 47 2 and to convey following message in reply. 2. President is most grateful for the Chancellor's confidence and will insure that there is no disclosure of the contents of his message, or indeed of its existence. 3. On substance, the President finds himself in full agreement with views expressed by Chancellor, and in particular re-emphasizes his conviction that it can never be useful for Germany to be forced to a choice between France and the United States. We are all members of the same alliance. The US continues to believe that interdependence of Europe and America is inescapable reality upon which policy of all must be based. President believes that De Gaulle's proposals to the Chancellor fly in the face of this reality, and that it is of highest importance that De Gaulle should learn to recognize the firmness and rightness of the position the Chancellor put forward. Thus although President regrets any argument among allies, he cannot but send his thanks to Chancellor for the position he stoutly and clearly set forth to De Gaulle. 4. You can reassure Chancellor once more that US would welcome an improvement of relations with De Gaulle and will always be ready for serious discussion with France. Moreover, US will not squabble publicly with De Gaulle. At the same time Chancellor can be quite sure, as you have already said, that the US will never make any private agreement with De Gaulle or anyone else at expense of Germans. Nor can US regard the General as spokesman for Europe. 5. President hopes that as time passes it may be possible to make new beginnings toward stronger partnership, always with room for France and never with any thought of exclusiveness. This is immediate value of MLF, and the President repeats his belief that it will be important to move ahead promptly with this major undertaking in the last months of 1964. 6. If there should be any fresh prospect of wider agreement among Germany, France, US, UK and Italy, President would gladly lead new and strong effort by all to move forward. Please note inclusion of Italy, whose solidarity in Alliance needs constant attention. 7. The President values your prompt and comprehensive report of Chancellor's extraordinarily revealing conversation and sends thanks. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Secret; Priority; Nodis. A typed note indicates the text was received from the White House. 2 In telegram 47 from Bonn, July 6, McGhee transmitted a detailed report given to him by Erhard of the Chancellor's July 3–4 meeting with De Gaulle. Erhard characterized the talks as “tough,” and related that he had told De Gaulle he could not agree with President De Gaulle's concept of Europe, stressing that Germany's relationship with the United States was the decisive point. The Chancellor told McGhee that the results of the meeting were meager and asked whether the United States had any plan for improving its relations with France. (Ibid.) 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 29. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, July 14, 1964, 3 p.m. 139. Pass White House. I called on the Chancellor June 13 at my request. I first went over again with him the message from the President contained in Nodis Deptel 67, 2 which I had previously conveyed to him through Minister Westrick. 3 I complimented the Chancellor on his courageous speech in Munich (in which the Chancellor had made a reference to the communication received from the President) and on the favorable comments on the speech in the German press. The Chancellor seemed particularly interested in the foreign press reaction, and inquired what the American reaction had been. I told him that the news stories had been favorable and offered to send him a summary of editorial comment. I referred to the Chancellor's proposal made in his speech for a NATO summit meeting to be held after the American and British elections, and asked how this proposal related to the President's suggestion that he, the President, might be willing to take an initiative leading to wider agreement between Germany, France, the U.S., the U.K. and Italy. The Chancellor replied that he considered such an initiative could be quite helpful. Before Europe can discuss political union, it must reach a common policy on defense, which means that they must agree on the future organization of NATO. The Germans would welcome a discussion of NATO with a group including France. France would in such a group be isolated in its purely national concept of the NATO military organization. All the others, including Germany, would strongly favor integrated forces. He asked whether or not the President had in mind a meeting of the Five to discuss NATO in general from above, or whether they would meet within the framework of NATO. He would prefer the former. I said that although it was not explicit in the President's communication, I assume that this is what he meant. The Chancellor would also welcome the proposed forum to discuss the whole range of problems existing between France and the FRG. He seemed to think that the first step towards any initiative by the President should be a meeting with De Gaulle, perhaps to be followed by a summit meeting of the Five. Even if this could not be held until after the elections, both he and Westrick pointed out that it would be well if preparatory work were begun now. The Chancellor then clarified what he considered he had undertaken to report to General De Gaulle in their meeting held July 3–4. It was not incumbent upon Germany to make specific proposals for European political union. Indeed, there was no proposition acceptable to De Gaulle which could meet the vital interests of Germany. He had in his meeting with De Gaulle agreed to propose only methods, or techniques, within the treaty—not plans as to the expansion of the treaty as such. (His aide explained to me later that what he had in mind might, for example, be to recommend a French-German committee to be set up within the treaty to consider this question further, or that representatives of specified nations might be called upon to consider the matter further.) It is quite clear, however, that Erhard has no present intention of making any new substantive proposal for European political union. The Chancellor seemed quite eager to find out the results of my luncheon discussion (Embtel 136) 4 with former Chancellor Adenauer. When I asked him whether he thought he and Adenauer should work together, within the party, the steps that they should take in the future leading toward European political unity, he indicated that he was “skeptical.” (Adenauer, as reported Embtel 136, is not unhappy at the moment because he feels that Erhard has no real views and he is confident he can bring him around to his own, Adenauer's, views. In a sense, this is right. Although Erhard knows what he does not want, he does not appear to know just what he does want.) Erhard, on the other hand, is deeply suspicious that Adenauer's protestations of wanting to put out invitations to a large group (reftel) to join a political union (which Strauss, who has gone so far as to spell out machinery for such a move, also espouses) represent a tactic, whereas his real intention is to force a permanent union between Germany and France. This, in the Chancellor's view could only result in German domination by France. Since no proposal, acceptable by France, was likely to be acceptable by others, Adenauer would, after the others had declined, have a good moral case for proceeding with German-French union. In order to assure that France and Germany would have some company (apart from Luxembourg, which is the only other country of the Six everyone agrees would join), Adenauer has been proposing the inclusion of Portugal and Spain. Erhard says that he chided Adenauer as to the appearance which would result if France and Germany ended up in the same grouping with the only two dictators left in Europe. Erhard said that the people at the CSU convention in Munich were so confused that they were proposing that Czechoslovakia and Poland be included in the invitations for political union. Erhard himself, however, reverted to the suggestion made in our meeting of July 6 5 that invitations to join a political union need not necessarily be limited to the EEC countries—specifically mentioning the UK and Scandinavian countries as being possible candidates. Comment: I believe that the Chancellor sees real possibilities in the suggestion contained in Nodis 67 that the President take some initiative in bringing together the five countries. The Dept may wish to give additional thought to how this concept can be further developed. We will forward our own suggestions. It is interesting that the principal interest of the Chancellor in such an initiative appears to derive from its possible usefulness in helping him resolve the dilemma arising out of his confrontation with De Gaulle within the narrower framework of the French-German treaty. Comments on the Chancellor's observation on political union will be embodied in our overall summary. It is quite clear, however, that he has no intention of making substantive proposals for unity at this time. He is concerned about the future tactics of Adenauer whom, despite what he (Adenauer) says, Erhard sees interested only in driving on toward French-German union. 6 McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Secret;Nodis. 2 Document 28 . 3 McGhee reported on his meeting with Westrick on July 10 in telegram 120 from Bonn, July 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W) 4 Dated July 13. (Ibid., POL 12 GER W) 5 See footnote 2, Document 28 . 6 McGhee also discussed the De Gaulle-Erhard meeting with Schroeder on July 14 and concluded that the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor saw “pretty much eye to eye in evaluating the motives of the French,” but there were problems with the “French” wing of the CDU/CSU. (Telegram 138 from Bonn, July 14; Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W) 30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, July 31, 1964, 11 a.m. Unnumbered. With recent crescendo of Soviet attacks on MLF, I have given considerable thought to long-range implications of current Soviet posture, particularly with regard to likely Soviet attitude toward non-dissemination agreement in various predictable situations. Moscow must itself be undergoing some soul-searching on this question with eye particularly on China. I assume Department is also taking hard look at policy prospects, not only with regard to Soviet and Chicom attitudes but also FRG posture in event MLF failure. Following thoughts may be useful to Department in its own contingency planning: 1. As suggested Embassy telegram 104, 2 the Soviets can be expected to be actively hostile to MLF during its formative period, particularly if they suspect it may fail. Current tactic, as reflected by differential emphasis in July 11 notes, 3 is to peel off support for the project with the aim of reducing its participants to point where project likely to abort. 2. In opposing MLF, Moscow is reacting in familiar Pavlovian fashion to Western defense measure. I believe, however, that Soviets are also probably genuinely concerned that MLF will only hasten the day when FRG becomes a nuclear power. While July 25 TASS statement on US–NATO nuclear agreement represents familiar effort to tar US as insincere in support non-dissemination, it also probably reflects tendency read agreement as merely one of successive steps making FRG “finger on nuclear trigger” eventually inevitable. Embassy notes with interest Tsarapkin's veiled warning on this question (Geneva telegram 1982). 4 MLF would obviously give rise to problems of military nature for Soviet strategic planners, but I am inclined to think Soviets are even more concerned with political implications. Specifically, they probably fear effect of possession of nuclear weapons on West German political stance, particularly toward Central Europe. They may also feel that they will be called upon to share their nuclear monopoly in some fashion with their allies—if only to give positive content to their warnings of need for appropriate counter-measures and to prove they have equal confidence in their own allies. 3. Given popular appeal of non-dissemination agreement, and concern over possible West German acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is natural that Moscow should imply strongly that creation of MLF will end Soviet willingness sign non-dissemination agreement. Propaganda leverage aside, however, Soviets must ask themselves seriously whether non-dissemination agreement would continue to be in their interest (a) if MLF becomes reality; (b) if it fails and pressure for an independent European or Franco-German nuclear deterrent grows; and (c) after China explodes its first device. Central question for Soviets (as well as for US) is at what point does the expansion of the nuclear club undercut the whole rationale for non-dissemination agreement and even require that Moscow leave itself the option of supplying, or threatening to supply its allies and friends with nuclear weapons. 4. It seems to me that Moscow has even more reason to fear an arms race involving nuclear weapons than the West, and accordingly will continue to have more compelling reasons to press for a non-dissemination agreement. There are many more states in non-Communist world with capacity to build and maintain nuclear weapons than in the Bloc. Also, we obviously have less qualms about acquisition of nuclear weapons by our allies than Moscow has about weapons in the hands of an anti-Soviet Polish or Rumanian Government, or nervous, belligerent Pankow. Should nuclear arms race escalate and fear spread, Soviets might in addition be subjected to pressure for aid or at least extension of nuclear shield to such self-assertive, anti-Western states as Indonesia and UAR. Moscow would have serious reservations about acceding to such requests with the attendant risks that such “friends” would follow policies inviting Soviet involvement in nuclear holocaust. Moscow might decide, therefore, to opt for non-dissemination policy, even with MLF, in order to avoid or postpone moment of dangerous escalation in nuclear arms race and anguished decisions which it would pose. Such a decision would be the more likely if MLF were accompanied by guarantees against FRG national production, possession or control nuclear arms (see paragraph 7 below). 5. Possibility that Communist China will explode nuclear device in the relatively near future provides more immediate and compelling reason for Moscow's pressing non-dissemination agreement. Soviets can have no expectation that Chinese would enter an agreement which would require them to forego nuclear capability. Non-dissemination agreement which secured the almost universal support of nuclear have-nots would serve, however, like TB agreement, to dramatize which states “are for peace and which for war.” Soviets will expect Chinese to exploit acquisition of nuclear weapons to enhance their power and prestige in Asia. (“See what backward Asian people can achieve in face opposition of both imperialists and revisionists.”) Implicit in Chinese criticism of Moscow's efforts to share “nuclear monopoly” with “imperialists” is also suggestion that Chinese would share nuclear secrets with their N. Korean, and even Indonesian allies—posture which Peiping can easily assume when it lacks bomb. In this phase of heightened rivalry, particularly in Asia, Moscow has obvious interest in finding new cudgel with which to flog Peiping and an issue which can become focus of organization drive by pro-Soviet elements and criterion by which to separate friend from foe within communist movement. 6. Ban on nuclear weapons for nuclear have-nots is more complicated issue to manipulate, however, than TB agreement. Soviets are obviously sensitive to danger that they may themselves enhance impression and corresponding fear of Chinese power by making too much of an issue over possession of nuclear weapons. Hence steps taken, notably last autumn, to emphasize cost of constructing meaningful arsenal, including means of delivery. Similar concern may explain curious citation in June 15 note to CCP of US statements that Chinese follow “moderate” policy in deeds in contrast to militant words. 7. Moreover, non-dissemination agreement would be effective weapon to isolate Chinese only if it is signed by overwhelming majority of states. To persuade states with nuclear potential like FRG, Sweden, Israel to participate, agreement would presumably need to be phrased in general language of desirability rather than absolute ban, and include escape clause along lines existing proposals. 8. Soviets would certainly seek additional guarantees as condition their abandonment of opposition to MLF in event MLF should become or seems about to become reality. As minimum they would require FRG adherence to non-dissemination agreement commitments not to receive weapons. Might also demand broadening of FRG's WEU commitments to include USSR, possibly in form of agreement to which GDR would be set up as signatory. While such pledges could pose problems vis-a-vis the FRG, they not necessarily undesirable from our point of view. (I would appreciate Bonn's comments on FRG reaction to such gambits, as well as generally on FRG attitude toward non-dissemination in event MLF failure.) 9. We obviously cannot be categoric in projecting Soviet behavior. It seems to me, however, that Moscow must find itself at present pulled by opposing policy considerations. On one hand, it seeks to use maximum propaganda leverage against MLF. At same time, it may wish to move to get campaign against dissemination of nuclear weapons underway before Chinese explode first device. Moscow cannot move on a non-dissemination agreement until it chooses to overlook US policy of promoting MLF—for any effective worldwide campaign must be founded on US-Soviet cooperation. One could argue that the longer Moscow persists in its anti-MLF campaign, the more serious we must take its claimed fear that MLF will open door to FRG acquisition of nuclear weapons. Once anti-MLF phase in Soviet policy is past—for one reason or another—we may find ourselves forced to decide whether our own long-term policy interests dictate that we should assist Moscow in its anti-Chinese campaign by pressing non-dissemination agreement if only as final, perhaps futile effort to avoid facing up to world in which nuclear weapons have truly become conventional. Kohler 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis, Repeated to Bonn, London, and Paris for USRO. 2 Dated July 11. (Ibid.) 3 For text of the July 11 Soviet note protesting the mixed-manning demonstration of the missile-bearing destroyer U.S.S. Biddle, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents , 1964, pp. 476–478; for the August 28 U.S. reply, see ibid., pp. 483–484. 4 A mistaken reference since telegram 1982 concerns the World Health Organization. Semen K. Tsarapkin was the Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. 31. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 31. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, August 27, 1964. I have been following with interest the Paris discussions on future NATO arrangements with an independent Malta and the exchanges on a possible NATO tie and presence, and I venture this personal comment on a wholly informal basis. 2 Given the Cyprus experience and the fact that elements in the Maltese political picture could produce a Cyprus-like problem there, I think an effective case can be made for a NATO tie and the establishment of a NATO presence before the island is given its independence and before this matter becomes enmeshed in internal Maltese politics. Obviously there are some legal and political problems which must be ironed out. On balance, however, I do think timing is important and that these matters should, if possible, be resolved early enough so that on September 21, the NATO tie and the NATO presence are in place. If, subsequently, difficulties do develop, NATO then will be in position to deal with them in terms that make most sense to the West. As our leading specialist on attractive Mediterranean islands you will, I think, appreciate this point perhaps better than anyone else—so I send this memo to you. McG. B. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Secret. 2 The question of NATO's future relationship with Malta had been under active discussion in July and August. On July 31, Tyler sent Rusk a memorandum stating that the United States agreed with the United Kingdom that after independence it would be undesirable for the island to be either a member or an associate member of NATO. (Ibid.) On August 11, a memorandum to Ball suggested that Malta continue to be in the area subject to defense by NATO without any formal membership tie. (Ibid.) Discussions in the North Atlantic Council on July 24 and August 13 highlighted these same differences among the Alliance members, with most being dubious about a formal tie, but wanting some link to safeguard Western security interests. (Topol 267 to Paris, August 18; ibid.) 32. Memorandum of Conversation 32. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 7, 1964. SUBJECT US Position on an Austrian-EEC Arrangement PARTICIPANTS Mr. J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. Francis X. Lambert, EUR/WE Dr. Wilfried Platzer, Austrian Ambassador 1. Preliminary Remarks Ambassador Platzer had asked for a briefing on the US position on an Austrian-EEC arrangement. Mr. Schaetzel apologized for asking the Ambassador to come in on a holiday. He explained that he himself would be leaving for Europe on Wednesday, September 9. The Ambassador said that he was grateful to have an opportunity to speak with Mr. Schaetzel because one of the principal topics to be discussed at the Austrian Ambassadors Conference scheduled for Vienna September 19–22 would be Austria's relationship with the EEC. Mr. Schaetzel said that we had followed Austria's approaches to the EEC through the years and particularly since the “expectant period” of 1961 and early 1962. As we saw the situation, Austria's relationship with the EEC revolved around two problems: the question of Austria's neutrality and the type of arrangement that might be negotiated. 2. Neutrality We looked upon Austria's neutrality as basically a matter of Austrian responsibility. We were very respectful of how Austria had handled it, particularly Austria's not having looked to other powers for an interpretation or definition of its neutrality, but having relied upon itself, as evidenced in its having joined the EFTA and sought an arrangement with the EEC. In short, we agreed that Austria had the freedom to interpret and define its own neutrality. 3. Austrian-EEC Relations We had always looked upon the Austrian-EEC problem as a unique one, and we had a sympathetic attitude toward Austria's achieving a relationship with the EEC provided the relationship would not create a precedent and the arrangement worked out would minimize discrimination against third countries. We continued to hope that the success of the Kennedy Round would go a long way toward eliminating Austria's trade problems. We had also noted that Austria's trade experience with the EEC had not been as bad as was thought in 1961–62 that it would be. We would therefore hope that in the continuing negotiations with the EEC it would be possible for Austria to take into account the possible benefits of the Kennedy Round and that any arrangement worked out would not be discriminatory. Against this background, we would hope for a successful conclusion of the negotiations. The Ambassador pointed out that Austria's talks with the EEC were approaching a new stage. Until now only preliminary discussions had been held, but it was anticipated that a new phase, namely, formal negotiations, would get under way sometime this fall. Mr. Schaetzel said that he understood that one of the problems that lies ahead related to Austria's own desires with respect to an arrangement with the EEC. The Ambassador replied that it was very difficult to come to conclusions on this score. Opinions in Austria were much divided. Differences existed not only between the coalition partners but within each of the parties; many Peoples Party adherents opposed an arrangement, and many Socialists favored one, and vice versa. Moreover, the Ambassador had recently talked with President Mayer-Gunthof of the League of Industrialists, who had told him that there were wide differences of opinion even within that group. There was also the problem of the USSR's attitude. Mr. Schaetzel said that one of the few really predictable things was that anything that tended to strengthen Western cohesion would be opposed by the USSR with various degrees of intensity. In this connection he wished to say once again that we believed it was the responsibility of Austria itself to decide how it wished to interpret its neutrality and its attitude toward an EEC arrangement. Otherwise, we saw no reason why Austria should hold back in its efforts to arrive at an arrangement with the EEC. He did not think there was any change in our basic attitude since we first started discussing this matter in 1962. We had always taken into account the fundamental fact of life about Austria's large trade with the Six, and we thought it almost inevitable that some kind of special relationship would eventually be worked out. At the same time, we were quite hopeful that, despite difficulties, there were real prospects that the Kennedy Round, when the negotiations were completed next year or in 1966, would turn out to be the most successful negotiations we had ever attempted. Remaining difficulties pertained primarily to agriculture. We understood that Austria was more interested in industrial products. The Ambassador remarked that this was “absolutely correct”. Austria exported relatively few agricultural products to the Six, some cheese and cattle, wine and timber, but these were “not absolutely basic”. Mr. Schaetzel asked the Ambassador's prediction on what was likely to happen this fall. The Ambassador replied that he thought the negotiations would get started and we “could only see how things go”. In reply to Mr. Schaetzel's question whether the preliminary talks had gone a long way toward laying the groundwork for successful negotiations, the Ambassador said that he would not say “toward successful negotiations,” but at least Austria had been able to find out where it stood with the EEC. The problem was not so much an economic as a political one, particularly as related to Austria's neutrality. It had been much easier earlier when Switzerland was also seeking a relationship with the EEC. He recalled that in the Moscow Memorandum of April 1955 2 mention was made of Switzerland as the model to be followed by Austria with respect to neutrality. Mr. Schaetzel said that we would be interested to see how the negotiations unfolded in the fall. He added that he would like to exchange views again with the Ambassador upon their respective returns from Europe. The Ambassador said that he would return to Washington on September 24 and would be delighted to have another opportunity to speak with Mr. Schaetzel. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Lambert. 2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin , June 20, 1955, pp. 1011–1013. 33. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) 33. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) 1 Paris, September 14, 1964. Dear Bill: I have been thinking for some time over the Brosio report of his conversation with De Gaulle on NATO, which you undoubtedly have seen (Polto 366, September 5, 1964). 2 While this report contains nothing of startling newness it nevertheless seems to me somewhat more brutal and specific than previous De Gaulle statements on the subject of NATO. Also, the fact that it was made to the Secretary General of NATO, with De Gaulle's authority to pass it on to NATO Delegations, seems to put these utterances into a somewhat special category. I would like to comment here, however, that I think that Brosio is wrong in his impression that De Gaulle is seriously thinking of denouncing the NATO Treaty. De Gaulle has always made a very definite distinction between the treaty setting up the Alliance and the structure of the organization. This, I think, emerges with sufficient clarity from his talk with Brosio. While I fully realize that there is undoubtedly no disposition in Washington to take any action which might precipitate a row with De Gaulle at this time, especially before elections, I really am beginning to wonder how long we should remain quiescent in the face of De Gaulle's gratuitous interpretation of American policy. You will notice in Paragraph 3 of the report in question he asserts that the U.S. is no longer interested in Europe, having transferred its main preoccupation to the Pacific, and as a consequence, as stated in the report, “U.S. would not come to assistance Europe if attacked by Soviets”. I don't know exactly what method we can use to convince De Gaulle or at least cause him to lay off this type of criticism, that the U.S. does not have any intention of going back on its pledged word in regard to the defense of Europe and/or the use of nuclear weapons if it seemed necessary. However, I do think that sooner or later our policy of rolling with the punch will begin to react against us. It seems to me that having made these statements, which are directly contrary not only to the announced intentions of the U.S. but also to its solemn obligations under the NATO Treaty, to as important an international official as Brosio would give us a certain basis for objecting. I imagine this will have to await the election, but I would certainly think, if only for the record, that we should take up with De Gaulle our refutation of his thesis in regard to the intentions of the U.S. vis-a-vis Europe. I fully realize that De Gaulle does this in order to justify the enormous expenditures for France involved in the creation of the force-de-frappe, but I am concerned that if he continues to make these statements, and they are unrefuted by us, sooner or later through the process of erosion we will come to have this view in part accepted by a number of other countries in Europe. It would not be difficult to write out an iron-clad refutation of this thesis, including the stationing of troops in Europe, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the soil of Europe, provisions of the Treaty itself, as well as the fundamental considerations which led the U.S. to sign the Treaty in the first place. It is hardly likely for the U.S. to stand by and let Europe be overrun by the Soviets in the belief that we would be permanently saving a number of American cities. The foregoing are just idle thoughts, but I wish you would discuss them with Mac Bundy (for whom I am enclosing a copy of this letter) and let me know in due course what you think could be done, if anything. 3 There is no hurry. As I have said, you obviously do not wish to do anything before the election, and De Gaulle is off next Sunday for almost a month. Yours, 4 P.S. Avis and I are planning to take two weeks off at the end of this month and go down to the Cote Basque, taking advantage of the General's and Couve's absence from Paris. 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Tyler. Secret. 2 This telegram reported that in a 50-minute “relaxed, courteous and calm discussion” on September 5 with Brosio, De Gaulle had made the following points: NATO needed sufficient forces to fight the Soviet Union in case it decided to attack in Europe; France opposed NATO as an organization since its object was integration of national efforts, which De Gaulle opposed; and NATO was no longer necessary because the United States was not the only Western power with atomic capability. Brosio had asked De Gaulle how the NATO treaty might be revised, but the Gaulle said such suggestions would be useless since the United States would be “diabolically opposed to his ideas,” and nothing would come of the discussion. Although De Gaulle did not mention it specifically, Brosio got the impression that France would denounce the treaty in 1969. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF)1) 3 On September 18, Tyler replied that he had just heard the same argument from people at the NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Washington and that he would discuss Bohlen's letter with Rusk in an effort to work out some plan to leave Europeans in no doubt about the U.S. commitment to Europe without making specific reference to De Gaulle. (Ibid., Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Tyler) 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, September 17, 1964, 8 p.m. 1079. Embtels 900 and 929. 2 When I talked to Chancellor Erhard on Sept 16, I made ref to President's suggestion (Deptel 67), 3 which I had conveyed to Chancellor following his recent meeting with De Gaulle, that President might, after forthcoming elections, be willing take an initiative to establish firmer basis for cooperation between US, Germany, France, United Kingdom and, he would hope, Italy, if there were a fresh prospect of wider agreement. I also recalled subsequent suggestion, made in Chancellor's speech at CSU Convention in Munich July 12, for NATO summit meeting. Minister Westrick had on Sept 4 suggested to me that Chancellor might in fact be willing to take an initiative with De Gaulle in bringing about such a meeting (Embtel 900). I asked Chancellor if he would clarify his present thinking on this general question. He replied that he believed such meeting might, after appropriate soundings and preparations, make contribution to defense of Atlantic world, particularly in view of fact that NATO was “running out”. He felt that future of NATO itself would be one best subject for discussion at such meeting. Unless we reach agreement soon on this question, time will work in favor of French and success of Kennedy Round and other overall Atlantic objectives will be adversely affected. Such limited meeting should, however, not actually be called on NATO basis since the NATO countries excluded would be offended. The most logical ostensible basis for a meeting of the US, UK, France and Germany would be as signatories of Bonn Convention, although meeting could in fact be devoted to broader concepts of Western cooperation. This did not mean that he was against inclusion of Italy, but that it would be difficult to justify Italian participation while excluding others. He considered that an initiative by President along these lines would be helpful. In response to my query, which I put to him on a purely personal and hypothetical basis, as to whether he would be willing sound out de Gaulle to see if he would be agreeable to such meeting, and to President's taking the appropriate initiative, he answered with alacrity that he would. As a matter of fact, he had sounded out De Gaulle, not specifically with respect to summit meeting of any particular grouping of states, but more along lines of whether meeting between himself and President might not result in better understanding between the two. He thought it significant that De Gaulle did not say no, nor did he say that such a meeting would be without value. De Gaulle had merely replied, “We will have to see.” Chancellor continued that in his judgment many unresolved problems which had arisen under the Franco-German treaty could be approached with more hope of success after a US-French rapprochement. He speculated that President might first meet with De Gaulle with understanding that he (Erhard) would join with them later. He did not explain, nor did I seek clarify, the question whether there was any discrepancy between such an approach and a four or five power meeting. Having received word in telephone conversation with the Dept earlier in the day 4 that favorable consideration was being given in Washington to my proposal contained in Embtel 929 that the Chancellor be encouraged to make some approach to de Gaulle, I asked Chancellor whether he had any objection to my sounding out our govt on this question. He said he would welcome our reaction. He then recalled that he had queried me immediately after the recent De Gaulle visit as to what U.S. reaction would be in event De Gaulle, following what he might have considered a rebuff, should turn to the U.S. (Embtel 47). 5 He remembered the assurances which he had received at the time from President (Deptel 67). He wanted make it clear, however, that he was “not afraid” of a U.S.-French rapprochement. It is clear that De Gaulle wishes to establish closer cooperation with Germany, but it also understood that Germany not willing accept De Gaulle's concepts. Since Germany and U.S. have similar concepts, De Gaulle cannot hope achieve full cooperation with Germany without at the same time harmonizing his views with U.S. In parting, Chancellor asked me extend his warm greetings to President Johnson. Comment will follow. 6 Other subjects discussed in this meeting will be covered in separate telegrams. 7 McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 900, September 5, reported that the Federal Republic was interested in a NATO summit meeting. Telegram 929, September 9, suggested that the United States should make its position on such a meeting known. (Both ibid.) 3 Document 28 . 4 No record of this telephone conversation has been found. 5 See footnote 2, Document 28 . 6 In telegram 1106 from Bonn, September 18, McGhee commented that Erhard found himself caught between the disparate policies of the United States and France and, for that reason, sought a summit meeting to relieve some of the pressure. McGhee then suggested various scenarios for a summit meeting, concentrating on a tripartite meeting of the United States, France, and West Germany, and proposing schedules that might assuage British and Italian sensibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3) 7 Telegrams 1077, 1078, and 1080, all September 17, reported the discussion of Western European and Soviet related topics. (Ibid., POL 7 WEU, FN 11–1 USSR, and POL 7 USSR) 35. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 35. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 1 Washington, September 19, 1964. Dear David: This is a Saturday morning letter stimulated in part by Bob Schaetzel's account of his informal talk with you last Wednesday evening. 2 As I understand it, you expressed very strongly your views that we ought to take our foot off the European accelerator pedal and, while making clear our position on the principles governing effective Atlantic relations, leave it to the Europeans to work out when and how they propose to organize themselves into an entity which would constitute a basis for partnership. During those four weeks away from the fuss and fever of Washington I had the opportunity to think things over and assess in my own mind the validity and the prospect of success of some of our policies. As a result, I am more than ever convinced that we have made a very great mistake over the last three years in trying to push Europe along one particular road, in spite of the fact that the conditions for success in this venture were obviously not present, and that by exerting such pressures we were tending to justify the suspicion (exploited but not originated by deGaulle) that what the United States is really after is an Atlantic framework within which Europe will be expected to play a predetermined part within predetermined limits only. I want to make it clear to you that I believe strongly in the broad lines and the goals of our European policy as defined in the key speeches by the President and other high government spokesmen. Of these speeches, that by President Kennedy on July 4, 1962, 3 is perhaps the most noteworthy. What I am objecting to and regretting is the constant effort to give this policy a specific content in the immediate future by nagging and worrying and lecturing all and sundry in Europe or over here who we felt might be useful instruments for our purpose. Such an attitude was bound to create resentment and to cast doubt on our motives. Since our efforts were obviously destined not to achieve the desired result, they also cast doubt on our wisdom and maturity and, by inference, tended to justify deGaulle's thesis that America's interests in the organization of the West are not necessarily the same as Europe's. Even now the lesson has not been learned, and there is still a lot of climbing up and down trees, and wheels spinning in a vacuum in the whole area of Atlantic relations. It is very hard indeed for some people to accept the fact that the best, indeed the only, policy which we should pursue in order to contribute to the creation of an Atlantic relationship which will serve our long-term national interests, is to leave it to the Europeans to work out the mode and manner and timing of their own organization. If they are convinced that the principles of our policy (interdependence and partnership) are in their long-term interests, they will so comport themselves as to create the conditions which such a mutual policy requires for its success. If they are not convinced of this, harrying them, telling them they ought to be, and excommunicating those who are not sufficiently responsive in our view, is certainly not going to make them change their minds. Moreover, the moralizing note of reprobation which is sounded from this side of the Atlantic with regard to those attitudes in the field of European unity which displease us is simply poison to our purpose and interest. I am not advocating a negative policy with regard to our European relations. As you know, this is the area to which I am most attached and in which I believe deeply. I do plead, however, for distinguishing between the formulation of policies with goals and objectives which can be expected to appeal to Europeans and thus stimulate them in their own way and in their own time to advance in our direction, and the attempt to bring about and accelerate this process by appearing to arrogate to ourselves the wisdom and the right of definition as to how this should be achieved. I think we will have a great chance after the election to recast the role of the United States in European eyes and thus to liberate and encourage renewed, and hopefully productive, efforts by Europeans to move in the direction of greater political unity. However, for this to happen, there will have to be basic agreement and understanding within the executive branch of the government, not only in our goals, but on the nature of the approach required to promote them. Equally important, and perhaps even more difficult: there will have to be agreement and understanding on what efforts, attitudes and tactics are not merely wasteful, but unhelpful. It may well be that this will be the most difficult of all. I would appreciate it if you would keep the foregoing confidential. I am not showing it to anyone in my office. Betsy and I look forward very much to seeing you again in December, and send you all much love. Yours ever, Bill [Here follows a handwritten postscript of a personal nature.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Personal for the Ambassador. 2 Bruce recorded that following a dinner on September 16, he, Schaetzel, Popper, and other U.S. officials discussed future U.S. policy in Europe. The Ambassador believed “that the present temper in Washington is in favor of action for action's sake.” No other record of this discussion has been found. (Ibid.) 3 For text of this speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , pp. 537–539. 36. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson 36. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson 1 Bonn, September 30, 1964. Dear Mr. President: Last April you transmitted to me through Ambassador Finletter, your Permanent Representative with NATO, a message in which you expressed your firm intention to initiate all necessary measures in the United States to make it possible to sign an agreement on the Multilateral Nuclear Force before the end of this year. 2 I informed you at the time through Ambassador Finletter that I fully concurred in your views and intentions in this question. At our meeting in June we confirmed this agreement and set it forth explicitly in our communiqué. 3 The heads of our Delegation in Paris have endeavored to further the discussions in the working group of the eight interested states in order that the treaty might be signed by our target date. Unfortunately, the working group has not made such rapid progress as I had hoped. As matters stand, there is little prospect that this group will be able by the end of the year to work out a draft treaty to which all governments concerned could quickly agree. In the meantime our two Delegation Chairmen in Paris have worked out an initial working draft for an MLF Charter. This draft no doubt needs revision, but in my opinion it should be submitted to the other interested governments as soon as possible. This seems to me all the more important in that the most recent political developments make it desirable to meet the envisaged signature date, if possible. The main reason for this view is the danger that the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations may adopt a resolution calling on us to suspend all negotiations and other arrangements which might in any way alter the status quo in the area of control of atomic weapons, pending the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of atomic weapons. Other resolutions opposing the establishment of the MLF are also within the realm of possibility. In Geneva clear tendencies in this direction have become discernible among the uncommitted states. I therefore consider it important that we take some step that will tend to ensure the establishment of the MLF before such a resolution is adopted in the General Assembly—which might happen as early as January 1965. For me there is also another reason: if I do meet with Mr. Khrushchev I should first like to see something definite accomplished with regard to the MLF. Because of these considerations I deem it desirable to sign the MLF Treaty as early as the end of November or the beginning of December of this year. Unfortunately, it is not to be expected that all eight of the interested governments will be prepared at that time to sign. Perhaps we may still be able to persuade some government or other to sign with us. However, we must be prepared for the possibility that no third or fourth government can make a decision to sign at that time. It is my belief that, even so, we should take the lead in order by our example to spur others to accession. In such an eventuality we should, however, consider how we might by some appropriate clause in the Treaty avoid misinterpretations and the impression that we wish to place the MLF solely on a U.S.-German basis. We have developed some ideas about this which Ambassador Grewe, who will transmit this note, might explain. On this occasion Ambassador Grewe can also set forth our ideas on the question of how we might in connection with the conclusion of the MLF Treaty achieve better coordination and consultation in the field of overall nuclear strategy and thereby perhaps make it easier for some states that are still hesitant to join the MLF. 4 I hope that we shall soon be able to place the MLF on a firm basis and should be very grateful to you if you would inform me of your views on this question. Cordially yours, Ludwig Erhard 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. The source text is a Department of State translation. A copy of the German language text is ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. 2 See Document 17 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 26 . 4 German NATO Permanent Representative Wilhelm Grewe delivered the letter to the President to Secretary Rusk on October 2. In a private conversation at that time, Grewe raised the issue of coordination and consultation with the United States on overall nuclear strategy. Rusk replied “firmly” that while the United States was willing to consult about nuclear strategy, it was “not willing to give any veto or any control over the U.S. nuclear deterrent to countries who were not taking the same commitments and risks in the world.” (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182) In another conversation with Rusk and State Department officials, Grewe discussed at length how agreement on the MLF might be reached by the end of the year. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Erhard signed the German language original. 37. Memorandum of Conversation 37. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 6, 1964, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT MLF PARTICIPANTS Germans Ambassador Grewe Mr. Blomeyer Mr. Kroneck Americans The Under Secretary Ambassador Smith Mr. Ronald Spiers, RPM Mr. Richard B. Finn, GER Mr. Robert Anderson, U The Under Secretary opened by saying that there is no ambiguity in President Johnson's interest in the Multilateral Force. He wishes to move ahead with the force. As regards timing, the Under Secretary said that the US is in favor of keeping to the agreed schedule. Following the British election and after further developments in Italy and the Netherlands, the US hopes that other countries will get on board quickly. The Under Secretary assured Ambassador Grewe that a prompt answer to the Chancellor's letter 2 will be forwarded, and that this response would probably be affirmative. Ambassador Grewe said that he had had useful discussions during his trip to Washington. 3 He emphasized that he had not wished to reopen in Washington the points being discussed in Paris but had felt that discussion on future tactics would be useful. He stressed that the FRG wants to proceed in the most effective way toward creating the force. He agreed that it is important to work closely with the British, the Italians and the Dutch. The Under Secretary referred to Harold Wilson's press conference on October 6 and quoted from the news ticker to the effect that Wilson did not think the MLF gave Germany a finger on the nuclear trigger because of an American veto. The Under Secretary said that American officials have discussed this subject on a number of occasions with Wilson, and it is their impression that he wants to retain freedom of maneuver. Ambassador Grewe said he thought the MLF was not too far from the defense doctrine of the Labor Party in the UK. The Under Secretary asked about the position of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns. Ambassador Grewe replied that Luns seemed to be in a 50–50 position. In principle he seems positive toward the MLF but is reluctant as regards timing. He claims to have trouble with his parliament on this, even though Luns' staff does not appear to see any great difficulty here. Luns also is looking to the British attitude. Ambassador Grewe stressed the importance of proceeding as far as possible in the eight-nation working group in Paris and of continuing the bilateral US–FRG discussions in Paris at the same time. The Under Secretary asked whether the UK was taking an active role in the eight-nation group. Ambassador Grewe replied that the UK position varies. Sometimes they are cooperative and sometimes they delay. On several issues—MLF flag, legal status of MLF and disciplinary rules for MLF personnel—the UK has reopened discussions and insisted that appropriate principles must be inserted in any MLF charter. The Ambassador said that in his opinion it is not a question of speeding up the work of the eight-nation group but rather a problem of the necessary political will to make progress. Ambassador Grewe asked about press treatment of his visit. Mr. Spiers said there had been little comment in the US press but that Chancellor Erhard's statement of October 6 regarding the possibility of the US and the FRG going it alone was receiving some attention. Ambassador Smith suggested that the best press treatment would be to say that Ambassador Grewe's visit was a further routine meeting in a series of meetings on this subject. Ambassador Grewe thought that the German press might want a little more. He suggested that something also be said to the effect that we are adhering to the schedule set forth in the Johnson-Erhard communique of June 4 and that we are studying the question of signatories. Mr. Spiers said that the subject of the MLF had come up at the Department's noon briefing, where a statement had been made to the effect that the US hopes as many nations as possible will join and that the question has not come up at this point regarding possible signature by only two nations. It had been added that Ambassador Grewe's visit does not involve a negotiation. Reference had also been made to the timing indicated in the June communique. The Under Secretary said it should be made clear that the Ambassador's visit does not involve negotiations. It should also be stressed that we want to have as many signatories as possible. Ambassador Grewe said he was leaving immediately for New York and would be returning to Europe in a day or so. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Finn and approved by Ball on October 7. The conversation was held in Ball's office. 2 Document 36 . 3 Memoranda of Grewe's conversations with Smith, Tyler, and McNamara on October 5 are in Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). 4 See footnote 3, Document 26 . 38. Letter From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard 38. Letter From President Johnson to Chancellor Erhard 1 Washington, October 7, 1964. Dear Mr. Chancellor: I was glad to receive your letter of September 30, 2 delivered by Ambassador Grewe, which outlines your thinking on proceeding with the Multilateral Force. We believe the Multilateral Force will have great political and military value to NATO, to both our countries, and to our common objectives. In providing a framework for a greater sharing of the responsibilities for the nuclear defense of the Alliance, we expect it will add a new and promising dimension to partnership between the United States and Europe. The best way to insure maximum participation in the Multilateral Force at the outset is for our countries to demonstrate the importance we attach to this project. For this reason I agree we should hold to the timing goal set forth in our communique of last June, 3 and also to the purpose of making sure that we do not allow this great undertaking to be represented as merely a German-American venture. After the British elections, we should be able to make a more precise judgment about which other governments will be ready to participate and how we ought to proceed. In the meantime, our representatives in Paris should get on with their jobs as expeditiously as possible. Issues which will need resolution at a high level to insure early completion of the Charter should be identified clearly and as soon as possible. In your letter you also mention the prospect of using the Multilateral Force to improve nuclear consultation within the Alliance. This is a most important subject. We have given it much thought and would be glad to discuss it with your government promptly, and to learn of your thinking on the matter. In this connection, I have given considerable thought to a possible meeting with Western leaders after our elections. I am sure you understand that I cannot make any firm commitments or proposals until after the elections. But if I am chosen to go on, I intend to be in touch with you very soon thereafter to discuss our next steps. Sincerely, LBJ 4 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. 2 Document 36 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 26 . 4 President Johnson's initials appear in an unidentified hand indicating he signed the original. 39. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Missions 39. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Missions 1 Washington, October 8, 1964, 9:11 a.m. CA–3816 SUBJECT NATO Secretary-General Brosio's Visit September 28–29 The following summary is based on uncleared memoranda of conversations. It is for information only and its contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. This airgram summarizes the principal subjects discussed during the recent visit to Washington by NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio. Mr. Brosio met with the President and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, as well as many other U.S. officials. The basic issues discussed were: (1) East-West Relations; (2) French Attitude Toward NATO; (3) NATO Force Planning Exercise; (4) Multilateral Force; (5) Greek-Turkish Relations; (6) US Contribution to NATO Expenses; and (7) Consultation on Disarmament Issues in NAC. 2 Arrangements for this visit probably exceeded any previous visit by a NATO Secretary General. They included the Presidential plane from New York to Washington, an honor guard, a large luncheon hosted by the President, and a trip with the President to SAC Headquarters at Omaha. This was essentially a “get acquainted” visit. Mr. Brosio appears to be aware that he is ushering in a new phase in the life of NATO and that his record as Secretary General may depend upon his ability to adapt NATO to a new set of political requirements in a rapidly changing world. He favors close political consultation in NATO on all issues and would like to see NATO used to arrive at coordinated policies on world issues. Mr. Brosio sees his role as that of the honest broker. Although he gave the impression that he does not wish to take sides publicly on issues which are divisive, he appears personally to support most of our policies. 1. East-West Relations Mr. Brosio thought it was important that NATO have an active role in considering East-West relations. Otherwise, individual members would tend to follow their own path with the Soviets. NATO should be the center for consultation, for exchanges of information, and coordination of positions. This was the only protection against the Soviets trying to take advantage of differences among the members. Mr. Brosio was of the opinion any meaningful rapprochement with the Russians was likely to be achieved in the context of the German problem, not disarmament. The situation was now at a fluid stage, with the Soviet Union-Communist China conflict bringing a momentary reduction of tensions, and perhaps we were at the beginning of a period of change in which the Soviet Union would come forward with something “sensible”. From his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Paris he had the impression the Soviets might look more seriously at a settlement in Europe. He was interested in the prospective contacts between the Germans and the Soviet Union and thought that the French policy also bore watching. Secretary Rusk agreed that it was urgent and important to get a common appreciation of what is going on in the Communist world. He suggested the Political Advisers Committee discuss the matter, bringing in experts from capitals as desirable, in preparation for discussion at the December Ministerial Meeting. At the time of the Meeting, the question should be taken up both from the point of view of Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Chinese Communist relationship. There was very considerable movement in the Eastern European situation and we could expect some initiatives from one side or the other, or both, although there is not as yet any serious basis for initiatives which hold promise of serious negotiations. There is feeling in Germany, principally atmospheric at this point, about the need for a new move for reunification. It is hard to see such a move which does not involve substantially new security arrangements in Europe and the Germans do not seem to be prepared to address themselves to this aspect of the problem. The territorial question is also difficult. The United States has registered its willingness to discuss the problem if the other three powers are prepared to move together. 2. French Attitude Toward NATO Mr. Brosio stated that on a continuing basis, his principal preoccupation since he took over as Secretary General has been the French attitude toward NATO. He summarized the major points of deGaulle's position: (1) deGaulle thinks that although the threat has diminished the Alliance is still necessary; (2) he remains adamantly opposed to the Alliance, at the same time refusing to suggest changes in the treaty or the organization; (3) he stresses European unity as a key factor; (4) he persists in his opposition to any change in Alliance strategy, doubting that the United States would use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe; and, (5) he continues to be concerned with the unavoidable effect of political events in the outside world on the Alliance. Mr. Brosio concluded that deGaulle would not do anything for the present, but in 1969 might well denounce the treaty. This made it most urgent that the Alliance members act in advance to forestall events in 1969. We would need to get the French to say what they want, initiating proposals in order to get them to express their views. Mr. Brosio did not think it reasonable to try to have initiatives for changing the organization until after the German elections in 1965, but certainly they should be undertaken from 1966 on. 3. NATO Force Planning Exercise Mr. Brosio said there was no possibility of reaching agreed force goals by December. Both the Alpha and Bravo goals of SACEUR are qualitatively unattainable; either might cost an additional $20–$25 billion above present force expenditures over the five-year period. He felt that no attempt should be made to reach conclusions to be presented at the Ministerial Meeting. It would suffice for the DPWG to develop a progress report which could be reviewed by NAC and by a Defense Ministers meeting in December. He expressed the opinion that unless “some government” took the initiative of leadership the others would never reach the point of developing conclusions on goals and strategy which it was hoped this Exercise would produce. One method to exercise the leadership he feels is required would be to proceed immediately to discussions on strategy and request the military to fix force goals corresponding to the strategies discussed. United States views on reorienting the Exercise should be presented in the DPWG rather than NAC where opposing views might become too rigidly fixed. He expressed his concern over the stature of the DPWG, pointing out that many of the national delegations are staffed by representatives having little knowledge of the subject and virtually no authority and adding that the major NATO commanders tend to consider the DPWG as a group of amateurs. He would hope that delegations could be bolstered with senior military experts from member countries, even on an ad hoc basis. In meetings with Secretary McNamara and officials of the Department of State, Mr. Brosio was informed that we attach great importance to the NATO Force Planning Exercise and to moving ahead with it as rapidly as possible. We believe that the structure of the DPWG and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) is a good one, but that the DPC, on which the Permanent Representatives sit, should take a more vigorous part in overseeing the working of the DPWG. This would bring the Secretary-General, as Chairman of the DPC, into closer contact with the problem areas. Mr. Brosio is in a position to influence the progress of the Exercise and we would welcome his taking an active role. Secretary McNamara said a December Ministers of Defense meeting should be planned tentatively. A final decision could be made in late November. (Mr. Brosio had said he preferred that an MOD meeting not be separate, but favored setting aside an afternoon during the regular meeting. Secretary McNamara did not disagree.) If an interim report from the DPWG were presented to the DPC by November 20, we could prepare comments by December 14 at the Ministers Meeting. The United States contribution would not be in the form of hard recommendations based on definite conclusions, but would offer alternative strategies for examination. 4. Multilateral Force Mr. Brosio regarded the MLF as a desirable project which will add to NATO's strength and go far toward meeting the MRBM problem. However, it is a military force with its own quasi-political institutions. He wanted to explore the functions and powers of these institutions and the relationship they will have to NATO. He had been informed of the acceleration of the schedule for conclusion of the MLF agreement and thought that at this stage it would be useful to have contact established between NAC and the MLF Working Group. This would ensure, from both the military and political points of view, that the arrangements evolved in such a way that others would not be able to create difficulties and the MLF would be a strengthening rather than divisive development for the Alliance. He feared the situation might arise in which the MLF Working Group would have agreed on a statute which then would be presented as a fait accompli to the Council. Although it was difficult to foretell French actions, the possibility that they might go so far as to use the MLF as a pretext for creating a major crisis in the Alliance was reason enough to prepare procedures for relating the MLF to NATO which would avoid criticism and objections. He was told that although the MLF Working Group was ready to discuss its activities with the rest of the Council after a number of problems had been resolved, to do so at this moment might be premature and disrupting. We expect to keep the Secretary General fully informed on an informal basis, and remain ready to consider more formalized reporting arrangements from the MLF Working Group to the Secretary General at such time as they may seem desirable. The Council would have an opportunity to examine the agreement and recommend changes when it went to governments before the end of the year. Hopefully, we see as one of MLF's greatest advantages an opportunity to establish the principle that NATO must be sufficiently flexible to allow like-minded allies to work together while keeping all informed. 5. Greek-Turkish Relations Mr. Brosio was doubtful that either the United Nations General Assembly or the efforts of UN mediator Galo Plaza would lead to anything helpful in the Cyprus situation from the point of view of NATO. The General Assembly could pass resolutions but could not alter a treaty. Galo Plaza could make no headway without Makarios' consent. If no progress were made, perhaps Greece and Turkey would face the fact that they need to engage in direct negotiations. The question then became, Who would lead them? No matter who it might be, whether NATO or a representative from the United States, the matter must be kept secret to avoid publicity which might endanger the possibility of successful negotiations. Under Secretary Ball explained that the United States had proceeded from the beginning on the assumption that no negotiations had a chance if Makarios were directly involved. Makarios wants to be free of both the treaty and Greece, achieving total independence, and is seeking to nurture a “self-determination” atmosphere which will inhibit the Turks. As one step, he hopes to use the Cairo non-aligned conference to get endorsement of self-determination for Cyprus and de facto freedom from the Zurich accords. Meanwhile, Cyprus has become an internal political problem of the first order in Turkey and the situation there continues to deteriorate. At the same time, the Greek Government is realizing that it must settle a situation which contributes to Communist strength, upsets capital investment in Greece, and cuts the tourist trade. There is a growing will to settle the issues through reconciliation with the Turks. The Under Secretary wondered whether the Greek Government would be willing to give enough concessions. He and Mr. Brosio agreed that the most recent Greek position, described as enosis with protection of minorities, continuation of UK bases, and a NATO base with Turk participation, did not represent progress, backing away as it did from a Turkish base. The Under Secretary added that he expected pressures from Makarios to revive in November. Before leaving Paris, Mr. Brosio had been informed that the Greek Government refused to accept the 1956 resolution 3 as a basis for his examining Greek-Turkish relationships. It was, however, prepared to discuss, within the limits of the “watching brief,” measures to foster Greek-Turkish cooperation which would not touch on Cyprus. Mr. Brosio said it was difficult to make any real headway with the Greeks and Turks since one could go only so far before running up against Cyprus, a matter in which NATO could not intervene. Still he was willing to try to do something. Under Secretary Ball said he thought it was important and most useful to create a beginning of direct Greek-Turkish conversations. This would be the first time they had been willing to talk together and while talks went on, the Greeks would be able to work towards improved control of the island for action at a later date. 6. US Contribution to NATO Expenses Mr. Brosio inquired as to our intentions toward reducing the United States share of contributions to the Infrastructure Program to 25%. He was unaware of any economic reasons for the United States position. The reaction of other delegations was not promising and although his staff had explored numerous criteria for evaluating national contributions, none had produced an obvious justification for the reduction. United States insistence on negotiating on Slice XVI and refusal to discuss further Slices has raised suspicions among other delegations concerning the ultimate reduction we will seek, even though, as he believes, they are coming to realize that some modification may be necessary. As an approach to negotiations he suggested the United States agree to contribute to Slice XVI at the present rate but work toward the possibility that when an agreed percentage is reached for Slices XVII through XX it would be retroactive for Slice XVI as well. In order to place the entire question of cost sharing in its proper perspective he suggested the United States also be prepared to negotiate its proposed reductions of contributions to the civil and military budget in the same framework. In Mr. Brosio's view, the solution to the question could have psychological and political repercussions and he cautioned against undercutting our position of primacy in the Alliance by placing other members in the position of contributing at the same or higher levels than we. An uncompromisingly rigid position would give “some country” the opportunity to force acceptance of its view that national infrastructure is preferable to a common program. If presented a convincing case with latitude to maneuver he will make every effort to assist the United States in reaching a satisfactory solution. Assistant Secretary Tyler explained that strong Congressional feeling exists that the United States' contribution is high in proportion to the economic ability of other members to share the burden. While Congressional interest may overemphasize the issue, the United States contribution figure of 30% has become a subject of contention. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara are under considerable pressure from Congress to reduce the burden. It was emphasized that our interest in a reduction in no way implies a lessening of United States support for the Alliance, but represents a search for a method of continuing full support in the face of legislative criticism of what appears to be an imbalance. 7. Consultation on Disarmament Issues in NAC Mr. Foster, Director of ACDA, raised the question of how to handle disarmament issues in NAC. When the subject of disarmament is raised at the next UN General Assembly, the Soviets probably will press the United States on: (1) non-proliferation; (2) general disarmament; and possibly, (3) the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes. The proposal for a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles, the observation posts, and the Gomulka plan may also be topics of discussion. Mr. Foster felt time was wasted by asking NAC to concentrate on the details of these issues. He thought the consultation process would be improved if NAC were asked to express its views on substantive policy and strategy and not on the wording of proposals which are to be put to the Soviets. He cited the NAC discussions on observation posts and on a freeze on nuclear delivery vehicles as examples of too much attention to detail. Without addressing himself directly to the question raised by Mr. Foster, Mr. Brosio said that NAC should be seized of the problems when they are still negotiable and not frozen. He said he would take Mr. Foster's suggestions into consideration. He expected to discuss disarmament issues with Secretary General U Thant as well. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Sent to the other NATO capitals, Stockholm, Moscow, Geneva, CINCLANT, CINCSOUTH, and CINCUSAREUR. 2 Memoranda of Brosio's conversations with Rusk, Tyler, Foster, Dillon, and McNamara are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2435. No memorandum of his conversation with President Johnson has been found. 3 For text of the Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Differences Between Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 14, 1956, see Department of State Bulletin, January 7, 1957, p. 17. 40. Editorial Note 40. Editorial Note On June 4, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk discussed with Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, the possibility of his preparing a study “of how the Atlantic nations might improve their structures and procedures for concerting policy and action.” Rusk asked that the study be completed in the fall and that it consider the contingencies that President De Gaulle remained in power beyond 1965 or that he left office at the end of that year. (Memorandum of conversation, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) Bowie consulted extensively with officials in the Departments of State and Defense and in July visited Europe where he continued discussions with U.S. representatives in London, Bonn, Paris, Brussels, and Rome and with various foreign officials. Bowie visited Europe again in September for a meeting with key U.S. officials at London before drafting his report. The resulting 25-page report, completed on October 15 and transmitted to Rusk 5 days later, began with the premise that Atlantic relations were at a critical stage, and concluded that NATO should be reorganized to include a strengthened executive, six ministerial meetings each year, and expanded political consultations. With regard to military questions, Bowie proposed the creation of a Defense Minister with an integrated planning staff, abolition of the Standing Group, attachment of the Military Committee to the Defense Minister, and the creation of a central integrated reserve force to lay the basis for the integration of all NATO forces. A copy of the report is ibid., POL 3 NATO. 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 41. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, October 23, 1964, 6 p.m. 1585. Unified grain price. In my meeting with him today on other subjects, I cited to the Chancellor the communique issued by the French Information Minister on October 21 on the question of the organization of the EEC agricultural market. 2 I recalled the position we had taken with the Germans on this question. Although we did not consider a UGP to be required for a successful Kennedy Round, except perhaps at the end of 1965 or the beginning of 1966, we had always attempted to make it clear that the Germans themselves must make the decision as to whether a UGP was required by the situation existing within the Common Market. In his view, would General De Gaulle's obvious threat lead the Germans to a reappraisal of this situation? The Chancellor replied vigorously and without hesitation that this “menace (threat) has nearly made it impossible.” He would not have made the UGP decision in any event. However, De Gaulle's position has only served to stiffen the German position. It would have been hard for them to take this decision in the first place, however, they are now “almost bound not to.” They had committed themselves not to a favorable decision but to a declaration by Dec. 15. Germany was in no way in default on agricultural matters under the Rome Treaty. As a matter of fact they had given in to France in many ways in which they had not been required to, i.e., the agricultural regulations affecting dairying, meat, etc. As a matter of fact, he was becoming increasingly unhappy about the development of the various Common Market regulations on agriculture. The Common Market has “glided into them as if in a traum.” It was clear that De Gaulle wanted Europe to raise everything it could for itself and to purchase only what they could not raise. He understood the problem which the various regulations had created and would continue to create for us. It was, moreover, unreasonable to ask Germany to make a decision in 1964 as to the price of wheat in 1966. He could not take such a decision until after the German elections. It would be difficult then but the “great pressure” (i.e. political) would be off. He appreciated the U.S. position in this matter to the effect that it was not necessary to reach a grain price decision until that time. I did not attempt further to clarify our position. Comment: The Chancellor's expression of intent with respect to whether or not he would accede to De Gaulle's threat to withdraw from the EEC unless there is a UGP was strong and clear. This matter has, according to an assistant, been discussed with the Cabinet since the French announcement; however, no vote was taken. The Chancellor had taken the same position in the Cabinet meeting that he had taken with me. My informant cautioned me, however, that those who might be inclined to accede to de Gaulle's demands had not yet had their innings and the position Erhard has taken may not be final. Even with me, he was somewhat equivocal, i.e. his words were “almost bound not to.” I think it extremely important that Erhard's preliminary reactions on this question be held in great confidence, since it would obviously be embarrassing to him and to us if his views became known prematurely and through US channels. I must admit that I have perhaps been overly pessimistic in my reporting about Erhard's being able to make an about face by accepting UGP after the election. Despite the political difficulties this would cause him, he obviously considers this less onerous than the loss of votes he would suffer in the event of a decision now. The US position as he understands it is an important element in his tentative decision. If we have any desire to change his decision, this would be the time to change or clarify our position. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–GRAINS EEC. Secret; Exdis. 2 For text of this statement, in which France threatened to leave the EEC if a common agricultural market were not organized, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , p. 522. 42. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 42. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, October 23, 1964, 8:15 p.m. 733. Ref: Circular 700. 2 Following based on uncleared memcon, 3 is subject to review and is FYI only. At his request Amb. Alphand called on Secretary October 23 for exchange of views recent international developments. It apparent, however, main thrust of Alphand call was to sound out Secretary on status of MLF and express concern about its realization as alleged divisive element for NATO and Europe. Without being as specific as was French Embassy Counselor De Leusse in his earlier conversation with Assistant Secretary Tyler, reported Dept. Circular 700, Ambassador made clear his concern but without admitting to official change in French line that while France would not join MLF, it would not oppose membership of other NATO countries. Even after being assured MLF would not be outside NATO but would be new force (rather like 16th new member) available to NATO and under its high command, Ambassador insisted MLF by creating new groups of ins and outs within NATO constituted most serious divisive problem confronting organization. Secretary challenged this view pointing out current French policy toward NATO has posed as difficult problem for maintaining NATO unity as any other. Furthermore, faced with growing possibility of proliferation of national nuclear weapons programs, continuation of present nuclear arrangements could lead to far greater source of disruption for NATO than if nothing done at all along lines now contemplated under MLF. MLF plus broad international non-dissemination agreement should meet as effectively as possible fears of Soviets and others re German aspect of nuclear weapon problem. Referring to De Leusse view reported in Reftel that MLF would produce chill in French-German relations, Tyler asked why this would be so in light of declared French policy of not opposing German membership. Obviously discomfited, Alphand evaded direct reply. While Alphand claimed he was expressing own views and not on instructions, it apparent he pursuing at higher level De Leusse approach as means expressing growing French opposition and concern about MLF without yet abandoning official line of non-opposition to membership of other NATO countries. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Confidential. Drafted by David H. McKillop (WE) and approved by Tyler. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and USRO. 2 Dated October 21. (Ibid.) 3 A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. 4 On October 23, Ambassador Bohlen also raised the changing French position on MLF with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. Citing De Leusse's demarche, Bohlen asked if the French position had changed and reported that Couve “was not too forthcoming on the answer.” Couve raised some of the same issues that Alphand had. Bohlen told him that if the French were developing serious doubts, they should discuss them with the United States before some dramatic declaration by de Gaulle had unfortunate repercussions on U.S.-French relations. (Telegram 2384 from Paris, October 23; ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, October 29, 1964, 8:30 p.m. 1251. MLF. Following Noforn, FYI only, is summary discussion NATO nuclear matters and MLF during talks British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker had with Secretary, Under Secretary, and other officials October 26–27. 2 Gordon Walker emphasized what he had to say represented preliminary thinking Labor Government and should not be regarded as concrete proposals. Labor recognized time had come for decision on nuclear matters within alliance and HMG had no intention create delay. He thought by time of anticipated Wilson visit to U.S. HMG would be prepared for more definitive discussion. What HMG was thinking of was, Gordon Walker said, a larger nuclear force consisting of British V-bombers, British Polaris submarines, if HMG decided to buy a certain number of them (three or four), an equivalent number of American Polaris submarines, and a mixed-manned element (MLF), which would play a less conspicuous role than originally planned. UK element would be committed unconditionally with no “national interest” withdrawal clause. Whole force would be co-targeted with U.S. national nuclear deterrent. Britain would like veto in new force but considered American veto essential. Gordon Walker went on to say HMG would prefer not to participate in mixed-manned MLF element of proposed new force except perhaps on token basis. He thought Labor Government would be able to cope with political opposition in UK to MLF if MLF part larger force. On other hand, Labor was opposed to MLF as isolated step and would be most unhappy if U.S. went ahead alone with Germany on MLF. Gordon Walker also repeatedly stressed his conviction that Germany would not be satisfied for long with participation in MLF unless it part of larger force he had outlined. Secretary and Under Secretary in turn emphasized our aim was to draw Germany permanently to West. While there was little present German insistence on nuclear capability, future pressures could bring about dangerous change in German attitude unless solution reached which Germany could reconcile with her national interest. MLF would give Germany both propinquity to weapons and share in control which should satisfy German aspirations for long time to come. Our preliminary reaction was that even though UK were to commit its Polaris submarines to proposed new force, this would fall short of minimum degree participation by UK required. Failure UK participate substantially in MLF could be taken by Germans as form of discrimination—MLF was considered by British as being good enough for Germany but not good enough for UK. Exchange of views between Gordon Walker and U.S. officials did not clarify exact reason Labor Government's opposition to British participation in mixed-manned element. Both financial and political considerations were mentioned by Gordon Walker. Point he stressed most repeatedly as real problem with MLF was that it would not satisfy Germany in long run. Gordon Walker agreed at end of conversation that it was highly desirable that initiative for creation of new force, if British decided to put forth firm proposals, should come from UK and Germany, rather than U.S. and UK. No direct or implied commitment was made either by U.S. or UK participants in view mutual recognition UK thinking still tentative. Secretary welcomed “ferment of ideas” on nuclear matters taking place in Labor Government. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas M. Judd (EUR/BNA), cleared by Tyler, and approved and initialed by Ball. Also sent to London, Moscow, Paris for the Ambassador and Finletter, and Rome. 2 Memoranda of Gordon Walker's conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2439–2440. 44. Memorandum of Conversation 44. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 31, 1964, 11 a.m.–1 p.m. SUBJECT Summary of Discussion on MLF, Atlantic Defense and Related Matters PARTICIPANTS Under Secretary Ball Assistant Secretary Tyler Executive Secretary Read Mr. John McNaughton, Defense Department Professor Richard Neustadt Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House Note: Each of the participants was given a copy of the attached “Notes for Discussion”. 2 (a) MLF General Objectives and the FRG Mr. Bundy expressed the view that we should consider any MLF arrangement satisfactory which met German emotional needs for first class membership in the immediate future without worrying about whether the force provided Britain with such a special position that it would lead to subsequent German demands for equal treatment. The Under Secretary stated that he viewed the MLF as just “a step in an evolutionary process” towards greater European integration. Mr. Bundy agreed and stated that the MLF would be hard to achieve in view of hardening French opposition. He would be willing to settle for anything we could get that would include UK, German, Italian and US participation and would provide something to build on. The Under Secretary stated that if we started with a force which had two types of units—(1) national and (2) mixed-manned—the former might move in the direction of mixed-manning at a subsequent date, but the very existence of a national component would probably lead to German demands for similar national components of their own. Mr. Ball noted that next issue of “Time” would contain a report from Bonn that the Germans were disturbed at the reported US–UK delay in timing of the MLF. The story also indicated that the Germans thought the UK proposals put forward by the Labor Government were so extensive that it would be unlikely if the MLF could be agreed upon before the German election, which would be a setback to Erhard. Mr. Tyler stated the view that neither the Italians nor the Dutch would be ready to move on MLF before January 1, and therefore the German hope of a year-end signing was bound to be disappointed. The German timing question was discussed at some length, and it was agreed that there was probably no magic in the January 15 date the Germans have been citing as essential for the start of the MLF debate, although the Bundestag recess in late June was a fixed final date. There was a consensus that the calendar was being used unduly as a reason for expedition by the FRG, but that the Bundestag problem had to be considered in our own scheduling. There was some discussion as to whether it would be feasible to let the whole MLF-Atlantic nuclear force question slide for two or three years. Were we really sure whether we would be better off after the creation of an Atlantic force? Wasn't there more stability in the present situation than we gave credit for, since the Germans were not about to proliferate? Mr. Bundy suggested that these questions should at least be addressed consciously as part of the policy-making process. Mr. Ball thought it would be disadvantageous to delay these decisions. The number one asset we have going for us in Europe at the moment is confidence in US judgment and initiatives, and this would be gone if we delayed much longer. He thought that the forces for proliferation in the world, particularly in Asia, were greater than we had anticipated prior to the Chinese detonation. It was agreed that there was nothing to be gained by delay and that there would probably be very little change in the picture after German and French elections next year. Mr. Bundy expressed the hope that the arguments for proceeding now would not be dominated by the arguments about meeting German desires but with the affirmative gains of creation of a genuine Atlantic force. (b) France and the MLF Mr. Bundy stated that the force must be “plausibly open to the French”, and one of the key problems here is that if we insist on members making a commitment “for the life of the Alliance” this is precisely the thing that de Gaulle would be most opposed to. (There was discussion of the withdrawal provision in the NATO Charter, and it was agreed that during the 20-year period provided in the Treaty or thereafter if the Organization is extended, withdrawal would require one-year notice.) The suggestion was made without resolution that the duration clause in the new force charter might provide that it remain in being as long as the UK was an active participant, since this might be longer than the “life of the NATO Alliance” in view of French threats. Mr. Bundy suggested that we should permit the French to join at a subsequent date by permitting participation of “another kind of nuclear force”, such as it suggested by the French proposal for “coordination” of the Mirage force with the Alliance. He thought that it would be a mistake to treat the Atlantic force as something that required the participation of all members' nuclear forces in being, as DOD had urged at one time. It was agreed that the MLF could not be made palatable to the French, because it was in direct conflict with the French objective of an independent Europe and because of its decisively Atlantic character. It was agreed that Mr. Tyler would be responsible for seeing that the US proposal was made in a form and at a time as compatible as possible to reasonable elements in France to minimize opportunities for Gaullist attacks against it as a conspiracy against France and Europe. Mr. Tyler will obtain Ambassador Bohlen's views on these questions. (c) The UK, MLF and a Broader Atlantic Nuclear Force The Under Secretary stated if the UK agreed to put its Polaris into an Atlantic force subject to US permissive link safeguards, with transfer of ownership and flag to an Atlantic command, it would be hard for the Labor Government to justify it to the British people since it would cost far more than participation in the MLF. Mr. Bundy stated he thought the Labor Government merely wanted to be able to say to its people that it had part of the British Navy attached to the NATO Command. Mr. McNaughton noted that it would cost the British about $650 million to build three Polaris units, which might constitute one-fourth of the force which they now contemplate, as set forth in the Gwynn-Jones' article. 3 The minimal manpower contribution the UK might make to the MLF was discussed and it was decided it would be in the neighborhood of a thousand men in a five-thousand-man force. It was agreed that from the US viewpoint it would be ideal for the US and Europe to have separate vetoes over all units in the Atlantic nuclear force, but it was assumed that the UK also hoped for a third veto of its own. There was a consensus that we should not push the Germans and Italians too much until the British have “sniffed the air” in both Rome and Bonn, but we should approach the Germans with our views on the British proposals before the Wilson December visit. (d) The December Crises: EEC Agricultural Policy and the Kennedy Round Mr. Ball stated that we were building up towards a year-end crisis in two major areas: (1) the failure of the FRG to come up with a common grains price proposal which is a prerequisite to a Common Market agricultural accord; and (2) the French threat to torpedo the Kennedy Round. Taken as a package this posed a threat both to the other EEC members and to the US. He noted that on EEC agricultural policies, De Gaulle was on the right track and had all EEC members except Germany with him. It was agreed that the Under Secretary and Mr. Tyler will do a paper on the various strands of the December crisis and the implications for the debate on MLF and any broader Atlantic nuclear force. It was recalled that the Germans had promised the French only to state a view on a grains price for the Common Market by December 15, but they had also promised us not to let the grains price question interfere with the Kennedy Round. Arguing from the latter commitment, we should attempt to persuade them to come up with an acceptable CAP proposal. Mr. Bundy asked if there was any way that we could take the blame publicly to permit Erhard to come forward with an acceptable grains price proposal in time to permit Common Market progress. The question of delaying the Kennedy Round and its importance vis-á-vis MLF was discussed. It was agreed that the French would oppose the MLF regardless of Common Market or Kennedy Round developments, and there were many disadvantages in any KR delay. Mr. Ball stated the view that the US had made a mistake in advising the FRG last June that there was no technical reason why the Kennedy Round could not go ahead without a grains price agreement. Mr. Tyler noted that CDU support in Germany was based in large measure on the rural vote and the farmers would probably sit out the next election if Erhard caved on a common grains price. Brandt has been silent on the question to date but he does not depend on the farm vote for support. (e) Schedule After extended discussion the following tentative schedule was agreed to: Messrs. Ball and/or Bundy would go to Berlin for the meeting Mr. McCloy was arranging on November 11–13. Erhard would be there, and if they remained in Germany until the 16th, they could get a report on Gordon Walker's talks with Schroeder on the 14th-15th. It was thought to be desirable to stop in London on the way back from the FRG for another round of talks before the Wilson visit. Rome was another possible stop on this trip, although it did not seem to be necessary, and would conflict with the November 22 Italian elections. Harold Wilson would come to the United States to visit the President sometime after December 11, when Parliament recesses, and before Christmas. In view of the Secretary's absence (he leaves New York for Paris on December 12), pre NATO bilaterals and big 4 FonMin meetings in Paris December 13–14, and the NATO meeting from December 15 to 18, December 21 and 22 seem to be preferred dates for the Wilson visit. (f) Assignments 1. DOD—McNaughton and Rowan —The application of a permissive link system to submarines—how many US personnel would be required on subs manned by UK personnel to make the system operative and to permit necessary communications; in other words, the feasibility of a “veto squad” on UK subs. (Mr. McNaughton noted that there was a general PAL study underway at present which would be completed January 1, so that this would be in effect a reliable pre-study estimate on this specific limited question.) 2. DOD—McNaughton and Rowan —The terms under which United States submarines might be committed to an Atlantic force—the problems of permitting UK personnel to be present under conditions similar to those that we would wish to incorporate in a PAL system on UK-manned subs. (It was agreed that the Germans would probably not object to such a US–UK arrangement. Mr. McNaughton reported that Rickover's people believed that genuine mixed-manning on submarines was not feasible from an engineering security and safety viewpoint.) 3. DOD—McNaughton and Rowan —The advantages and disadvantages of a UK transfer of aircraft and Pershings to an Atlantic nuclear force. 4. Ball and Tyler —“The various strands of the December crisis”—EEC common agricultural policy problems; the Kennedy Round; implications for MLF and ANF. 5. Mr. Ball —A discussion of three possible alternatives for the Atlantic Nuclear Force: -1-An ANF consisting only of a mixed-manned surface component with the British share rendered at once equal and cheap and with British subs converted for hunter-killer purposes (or at any rate left separate). -2-An ANF with two components, one of them mixed-manned (as above) and the other subsurface—consisting of British submarines and maybe an equal number of American submarines assigned irrevocably, and under the control of the ANF governing board with control enforced through a two key system (as well as through some element of at least binational manning). -3-An ANF in either of the variants above with a third component: aircraft and/or Pershings. Note: Mr. Bundy suggested the paper, but the Under Secretary volunteered to do it himself. G/PM expertise might be utilized here. It was agreed that the group would meet again on Thursday, November 5, at a time to be arranged by Mr. Read. (11:00 a.m., November 5, 1964, set subsequently.) 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Benjamin H. Read. 2 Not found. 3 Reference is to Alun Gwynne-Jones' article in the London Times, October 23, 1964, which sketched the outline of a new British proposal for participation in the MLF. 4 On November 3, the principal officers of the Department of State directly concerned with the MLF met in Under Secretary Ball's conference room to discuss the British proposal. While no conclusion was reached at the meeting, three alternatives were considered: 1) The MLF as presently contemplated, 2) commitment of British nuclear forces to either an Atlantic or Allied force; or 3) mixed-manning of British Polaris submarines. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)) At the November 5 meeting of the interagency MLF group, the participants discussed further permissive links, the inclusion of aircraft and missiles in the ANF, mixed-manning of British Polaris submarines, and ANF ownership of the British submarines. The meeting concluded that the United States should not express its position on these topics pending further talks with the Europeans. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.) At another meeting on November 10, the MLF group heard a report from Ambassador Bruce, who was certain the MLF would be acceptable to the Labour government as long as it was part of an overall deal on defense matters. The group also considered a paper that outlined various alternatives on the employment of the British Polaris submarines. (Memorandum of conversation with attached alternative paper; ibid.) 45. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 45. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, November 4, 1964, 6 p.m. 1742. I called on Chancellor Erhard late yesterday at my request. He expressed appreciation for the letter from President Johnson of November 2 (Bonn 1268), 2 delivered to him the previous day, which dealt principally with the recent discussions with British FonSec Gordon Walker in Washington on the MLF. The Chancellor said that he would reply to the President shortly. Without elaborating, the Chancellor volunteered that we would see a new political situation in Bonn tomorrow. He was obviously referring to the results he anticipated from a series of intensive meetings he had been holding during the day with CDU/CSU Party leaders in an attempt to achieve party harmony. This is being reported separately in Embtel 1741. 3 Now that the American elections are about over, direct relations between us must continue. It would, perhaps, be helpful for FonMin Schroeder to meet soon with Secretary Rusk. Later, perhaps after his inauguration, he hoped to receive President Johnson. Returning to the question of the MLF, the Chancellor observed that General De Gaulle says that German participation in the MLF will violate Germany's duty to Europe. The Chancellor believes that he may want to downgrade the MLF so as to “push Germany down”. He wanted to make it clear to us that the attitude of De Gaulle will in no way influence Germany in its decision to participate in the MLF. If Germany were to accede to De Gaulle's current attack on the MLF she would become a “laughing stock”. Germany cannot accept a “law laid down” by De Gaulle. Germany cannot “yield to pressure.” Germany will remain firm on the MLF and hopes that the U.S. will. Continuing, the Chancellor said that in the light of recent developments he did not feel that it was possible to sign the MLF this year. The effort should not, however, be postponed too long in 1965 otherwise the public will get used to indecision concerning the MLF and will lose interest in it and fail to support it. In view of the time-table forced on him by the forthcoming German elections, the Chancellor thought we should not delay beyond February 1 at latest. The Chancellor felt, moreover, that it is now all the more important that President Johnson come to Europe as soon as convenient after the elections, to talk with De Gaulle about “nuclear systems.” Perhaps he will be able to persuade De Gaulle to integrate the force de frappe with other European nuclear efforts. If, however, the President should fail—if De Gaulle says no—we must all feel free to proceed in taking the necessary action in the nuclear field. The Chancellor said that he wished to make it clear that what he had in mind was something within NATO, not among a few disintegrated states. He asked me what further details I could give him of the results of the Gordon Walker visit. I assured the Chancellor, in the first place, of our continued firm determination to proceed with the MLF as indicated in President Johnson's letter. During the discussions in Washington Gordon Walker had presented no specific alternative to the MLF as we have planned it. He had indicated a preference for the inclusion of other British nuclear forces on a non-mixed-manned basis, and a desire to minimize both the size and the degree of British participation in the multilateral seaborne force. He had also asked for more time for a decision. We had, however, made no commitments as to any changes in the existing concept of the MLF, or in any extended delay. We had indicated clearly that any changes would have to be in agreement with Germany and our other partners. It is heartening, however, that the new Labour government appears to have such a positive attitude toward the MLF, and we believed that we should make every effort to see if the matter cannot be negotiated out with them on a basis acceptable to all. In this connection we were particularly interested in Gordon Walker's forthcoming visit to Germany scheduled for November 14. We felt that by this time the British should be in a position to present more specific suggestions to the Germans as to their concept of the nature and composition of the force. We assume that the Germans will listen carefully to what the British have to say, however, we want to make it clear that we do by no means feel the Germans need necessarily accede to all of the British proposals. We have been involved in the MLF together for a long time and are prepared to play our role alongside the Germans and other participants in whatever negotiations are required with the British. I advised the Chancellor that, in view of the importance of getting on with the MLF, Under Secretary of State Ball was prepared to come to Bonn to meet with him on November 16 following participation in the fourth German-American conference to be held in Berlin November 12–15 where he would have opportunities for prior discussion with FonMin Schroeder. Ball would, in addition, wish to discuss with the Chancellor a wide range of other matters, including UGP, centering around the present impasse in the general Common Market-Kennedy Round area. The Chancellor said that he would welcome Secretary Ball's visit and asked me to extend him an invitation in his behalf. 4 Comment: The Chancellor's comments on the MLF as [garble] believed to raise several interesting points of emphasis. He does, in the first place, indicate a sharp reaction against De Gaulle's current attempts to block the MLF—and a determination to proceed with its development at all costs, seeing in failure to do so a disastrous defeat. He seemed somewhat apprehensive about the results of the Gordon Walker talks, perhaps as a result of not being fully advised up to this point on what took place. His suggestion that the signing of the MLF might be postponed as late as February 1 is the first time, to my knowledge, that we have heard the Germans mention such a late date, and should provide a reasonable compromise between our present January 1 date and the British suggestion of a March date. In any event I feel that Germany could be set off her time schedule if the signing were delayed beyond February 1. I consider it important that we continue to emphasize to the Germans that we will be with them in further negotiations and not leave them alone to negotiate a compromise with the British. Of particular interest is the Chancellor's suggestion that President Johnson make an effort to reach agreement with General de Gaulle on the inclusion of the force de frappe within a European “nuclear system.” Despite his firmness on MLF, the Chancellor obviously does not relish the prospect of a head-on collision with De Gaulle on the MLF and would be much happier, particularly from the standpoint of his internal political opposition, if De Gaulle and his force de frappe could be integrated into the planning for a European nuclear force. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis. The source text also beans an Exdis stamp. Repeated to Paris for USRO, London, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels and passed to the White House. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) The letter stressed that the U.S.-U.K. talks had covered a wide range of topics and that the British had outlined some preliminary ideas about the MLF. 3 Dated November 4. (Ibid., POL US–GER W) 4 In telegram 1746 from Bonn, November 4, McGhee reported that he had mentioned to the Chancellor how several issues, including French participation in the EEC, the success of the Kennedy Round, further European unity efforts, and perhaps even the MLF, had been linked by France to the question of a common grain price. Erhard admitted that some of these issues had been linked, but he felt that the threat to leave the EEC was a bluff. (Ibid., Central Files, INCO–GRAINS EEC) 46. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 46. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 8, 1964. SUBJECT NATO Nuclear Policy This subject will be high on the agenda for our talks on Tuesday, and the following memorandum is designed to indicate (1) where the problem is now; (2) how the various parts of your Government see it; (3) what the solution may be; and (4) the guidance that you might wish to give at this stage. 1. Where the problem is now When you last saw it, the multilateral force was proceeding through technical discussions in Paris, with a proposed target of agreement among participants by December. This was always optimistic, but the Germans and our MLF advocates both wanted a target to keep the work going. In the last six weeks three things have happened: (1) The Germans rather clumsily gave too strong an impression that we and they might go ahead bilaterally. We gently cooled this idea. But it is still in the background. Our official position is one of supporting this force on a multilateral basis and believing that there will be a number of European participants when the time comes. (2) The British Labour Government has adopted a much more flexible and interested posture than it had taken in opposition. Gordon Walker advanced unofficial proposals by which the United Kingdom would become a member of a new NATO nuclear group, using its Polaris submarines as its major contribution, with possible add-ons from aircraft and perhaps even a reluctant token contribution to the MLF itself. These proposals are carefully unofficial. Our response has been to show interest and to emphasize the importance of finding a system which meets the interests of the Germans. But we recognize and respect the British desire not to buy a whole new weapons system just two years after Nassau (to specialists in this subject, what is fascinating is the very close relation between Labour's current attitude and that of the Home Government—the only important differences are those of political imagery, and on the whole those differences may make it a little easier for Labour than for the Conservatives to join in a new package deal). (3) Meanwhile, back from South America, and ready for bear, General De Gaulle has been informed that this damnable thing may happen if he doesn't do something about it. From his point of view that would be a disaster, because it would tie the Germans and the British, and probably the Italians and the Dutch, to an Atlantic nuclear defense policy. The General honestly believes in what he calls a European policy. Moreover, both he and his devoted French followers honestly believe that only what is French is European and vice versa. So the French Government, by public statements, background briefings, and diplomatic demarche, has declared that the MLF is hostile to France and incompatible with a proper European policy. 2. How the various parts of your Government see it In broad outline, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and I have very similar fundamental views. We believe that the MLF is the least unsatisfactory means of keeping the Germans well tied into the alliance, but we see it as a means, and not an end in itself. We are strongly opposed to a bilateral German-American bargain, although we are willing to make others just a little bit nervous by refusing to be categorical on this subject in public. We want the British in the game, just as we did at Nassau, and we are not disposed to make their task more difficult by sticking to a rigid formula—or timetable. Guidance has already gone out to the field making it clear that we no longer expect final agreements in December—or even in January. Behind this basic agreement there are divergences. Dean Rusk rightly finds the French behavior outrageous, and I think he believes we are required to engage in a public debate against them. To a considerable extent he is surely right, but I feel—and I think Bob does too—that it is important for us to be more polite and more forthcoming than the French deserve, at every stage, in order to weaken their claim that we are deliberately encircling them and trying to prevent a European Europe. Bob McNamara is sometimes torn between his very sound political assessments and his obligations as a salesman of dollar-earning hardware. For example, one significant element in the British position may be their need to keep in the business of producing useable and saleable aircraft. The best way of doing this politically is probably to license the TFX for production under a British name and paint-job, but that might cut into our own TFX market, and so Bob may be resistant. One of our jobs is to introduce McNamara the statesman to McNamara the merchant and make sure they do not get in each other's way (I am trying to make a beginning on this, but while the statesman always listens to Dean and sometimes to me, the merchant will listen only to you). Potentially more dangerous than these marginal differences among your senior advisers is the fact that for at least two years the MLF has been handled at lower levels of the Government by men who have a passionate commitment to their own view of Europe, of Germany, of the MLF, and of wise U.S. policy. These men are determined to make the Europeans do what is good for them, and at the moment their one and only medicine is the MLF as it stands. I think George Ball has softened these men a little in the last two weeks; some of them are now prepared to give a little to the new British Government. But they are still governed by an attitude of rigid hostility to the French, paternalistic domination of the Germans, and a serene conviction that if only Presidents will say what they tell them to, all will be well. They also tend to believe, against all experience, that if Uncle Sam plays the firm nanny, the British can be forced out of the independent nuclear business for their own good. 2 These men drive the French and the British up the wall. In addition to these troubles within the Executive Branch there is a major Congressional hurdle down the road. A curious collection of liberals, Joint Committee atom-guarders, and neo-isolationists would probably beat the MLF today if there were a totally free, silent, secret vote in the Senate. All of this can be turned around if we get a bargain that has wide European support, and it is not an immediate problem, but we should have it in the back of our minds. 3. Outlines of a solution I strongly believe that this complex and challenging problem can and should be resolved over the next 6 to 9 months. The outlines of an answer are already visible, and they would include: (1) A new name for the enterprise—the one which looks best right now is “Atlantic missile force.” (2) A process of control which gives us a veto over any firing and gives to major European participants a veto over any element to which they themselves have made a major contribution. (3) An ostentatiously open attitude to the French, with repeated invitations to membership and repeated offers of “cooperation” if they choose to stay outside. (4) An interlocking set of financial and political bargains on details in which the dominant object is to make the British and the Germans see their common interest in agreement. 4. What you now need to do about it All this will take time, and much careful thought and action. I believe what it requires from the Presidency right now is: (1) A clear signal to all departments that this problem is Presidential business and that all activities in support of U.S. policy in this field must be reported to the White House and have such clearance as the White House requires. (2) An order that all negotiators and travellers working on this problem have written instructions cleared by State, Defense, and the White House (this is important because emissaries of State below Dean Rusk and George Ball often take a rather hard and dogmatic line, while emissaries of Defense tend often to be either merchandisers or military skeptics). 3 (3) An order that a detailed U.S. position be developed for discussion and decision by you in advance of Harold Wilson's visit, which could and should lead to a private understanding between you and him that would then be widened through the Germans and Italians to lay the necessary base for the whole enterprise. After you have heard Rusk and McNamara on Tuesday, you may wish to confirm instructions of this sort, revised as you then decide. 4 McG.B. 1 Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, MLF #2. Secret. Attached to a brief memorandum from Bundy to Rusk and Ball, also dated November 8, which stated that he had tried to outline the positions fairly, but in any case wanted them to have his own assessment of the situation. 2 On November 9, Ball sent a memorandum to Rusk stating that he had talked at length with Ambassador Bruce that afternoon about the MLF. Bruce strongly urged that the United States “should be tough with the British,” believing that the Labour government would do its best to drive a hard bargain but would be surprised if the United States gave in. Bruce also wanted the Department of State to take full control of the MLF negotiations, and Ball noted that Bruce's views were at variance with Bundy's. (Ibid.) 3 The orders requested in paragraphs 2 and 3 were issued on November 14 as NSAM No. 318. (Ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316) 4 No record of the meeting on Tuesday, November 10, has been found. 47. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 47. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, November 15, 1964, 5:24 p.m. 924. Ref Dept Circular 700. 2 Subject: US-European Relations. Following is based on uncleared memcon, Noforn, subject to review and FYI. 3 MLF . Calling at his request November 13, Ambassador Alphand had frank exchange of views with the Secretary on NATO and Atlantic affairs in course of which he delivered broadside against MLF, predicting “very serious situation” if MLF takes shape. Claiming French cannot understand why United States has “suddenly started to press creation MLF” as of “top political priority”, Alphand used whole battery of French arguments that MLF would: 1. Integrate European nations such as Germany into American controlled defense organization outside of NATO dividing latter and making common European defense policy impossible upon which depends attainment of European union. 2. Involve smaller European powers in adventure for which they have displayed little enthusiasm. 3. Whet German appetite for national nuclear program with Germans perhaps using MLF as first step toward attainment own nuclear capability. With Germany only European country with unsatisfied territorial claims, such capability could create serious threat for rest of Europe. 4. Provoke dangerous reaction of Soviets who could regard MLF as casus belli. 5. Fail serve useful military purpose. On other hand, Alphand's defense of French force de frappe seemed to rest on fact it French controlled and hence wholly European in nature that invested it with “goodness” alien MLF lacking. In vigorous riposte Secretary made following points: 1. There has been no change in US position on objectives of MLF since plan first put forward to French and world in December 1961. Only difference between then and now is project almost ready for realization. 2. It French who in last three weeks have misleadingly changed their policy, since during MLF gestation period, we led to believe France herself uninterested in MLF but not opposed to membership by others. 3. Since Germany is closest bullseye for Soviet nuclear missiles, it only natural Germans interested in sharing in nuclear defense strategy which MLF would make possible without creation of German national program. MLF thus outlet for any German appetite French nuclear capability has whetted. 4. US has never contemplated German-US bilateral arrangement which contradiction in terms of MLF. 5. Under circumstances Soviets could not regard creation MLF as hostile act and if accompanied by non-dissemination agreement, their fears would be even more groundless. 6. MLF would not be outside NATO but under it as source of additional nuclear power like new member, which no more divisive for other NATO members than French force de frappe. 7. Talks with other NATO partners have revealed firm support for MLF. They regard it as opportunity participate in common nuclear defense of West together with United States, which would not be only member with veto. 8. Military experts of eight nation working group has found MLF can make valuable military contribution to strength of alliance. NATO and Europe . In discussing NATO and European situation generally, Secretary thought it would be most helpful if French Foreign Minister could explain specifically what French mean when they talk about need for NATO reorganization and common European defense and foreign policies. So far we just do not know and other European partners seem to share this obscurity. In this connection, Secretary wondered whether French thought European policies ipso facto had to be “different” from US policies when they have so much in common. Alphand replied unless MLF affected things, he did not foresee any profound changes called for in NATO until Europe in position evolve common defense and foreign policies and enter into “dialogue” with United States. Eventually to have such “dialogue”, Alphand claimed US and European policies would have to be different. In any case, France against US taking European countries “under its wing” and against whole idea of Atlantic integration, which Alphand said he had told Secretary four years ago. Disclaiming any US desire extend maternal wing cover to Europe but reiterating desirability for further clarification of French views on these important matters, Secretary said he would think over Alphand suggestion for Secretary and Couve de Murville getting together for talk after Secretary's arrival December 12 in Paris and before opening of NATO meeting. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR-US. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by David H. McKillop (EUR/WE) and approved by Tyler. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USRO, and Moscow. 2 See footnote 2, Document 42 . 3 Not found. 4 On November 19, Bohlen had a similar conversation about the MLF with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, who made most of the same points that Alphand had. Couve agreed that he and Rusk should have a serious discussion of the question when the latter visited Paris for the North Atlantic Council meeting in December. Bohlen commented that Couve seemed quite relaxed on the subject, while admitting that French policy had changed, and he speculated that the French were waiting to see what effect the new British proposals had before pushing the issue further. (Telegram 3105 from Paris, November 19; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 48. Memorandum of Conversation 48. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Bonn, November 17, 1964. SUBJECT Grain Price Unification and Related Issues; Hallstein's Personal Situation PARTICIPANTS President Walter Hallstein, Commission of the European Economic Community Under Secretary Ball 2 Ambassador George C. McGhee Ambassador John W. Tuthill Ambassador W. Michael Blumenthal Mr. George Springsteen, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary Unified Grain Price President Hallstein stated that while there was movement on the problem of grain price unification within the German Government, a final decision has not yet been taken by Chancellor Erhard. Defhues is one of the few key members of the CDU who remains adamantly opposed to a decision at this time. Hallstein's view is that even though it is more difficult to take a decision now than it would have been six months ago, the decision is nevertheless necessary and will probably be taken within the next few weeks. The Under Secretary agreed with President Hallstein's assessment, and advised him that, in his conversation with Chancellor Erhard yesterday, he had urged that Germany take this step. He also felt it was likely that the decision to move ahead would be taken in the near future. Hallstein took considerable satisfaction in the Community's decision to table its exceptions list on November 16th. He emphasized, however, that there were many key issues to be resolved within the Community in the next few weeks. President Hallstein stressed his hope that the timing of decisions on MLF would be such as to avoid complicating the decisions that must be taken within the European Community. He came back to this theme several times. He indicated no doubt in his mind as to the desirability of the MLF, but he placed considerable emphasis on the desirability of allowing the Community to resolve its problems first. The Under Secretary pointed out that Foreign Minister Schroeder would be visiting the United States and the United Kingdom in the next few weeks; that Prime Minister Wilson would be visiting the United States, and that he, Mr. Ball, would be returning to Paris and possibly to London. He said that, with these diplomatic talks, it would be quite clear that the MLF was an important issue under active discussion. Therefore statements would be made and, of necessity, publicized. Their tone would be such as to indicate forward movement on the MLF. The Under Secretary left President Hallstein with no illusion that the United States would slow up progress on the MLF. He did indicate that the various diplomatic discussions would necessarily take some time. President Hallstein described what he felt could be accomplished in a year-end package negotiation within the Community, assuming that the Germans agree to unified grain prices. He felt that agreement should be reached on acceleration of the EEC internal tariff reductions and progress on a number of items involved in the Erhard proposals. He considered that the words “political unity” were far too strong to describe the specific Erhard proposals, but he felt, nevertheless, that there were a number of elements on which agreement would be possible. Ambassador Tuthill expressed surprise that President Hallstein had not mentioned the need for change in the December 1963 Community mandate in the field of agriculture and the Kennedy Round. President Hallstein asked what in fact would be necessary. Ambassador Blumenthal and Ambassador Tuthill then listed three elements which, in their view, would have to be changed or reinterpreted in order to allow meaningful agricultural negotiations in GATT. These were: (1) Clarification that the Community was not expecting its partners to adopt the montant de soutien themselves as a basis for negotiations. (2) An understanding that the use of the montant de soutien as a basis for Community offers would not be so wide as to result, by this means, in a de facto extension of the levy system to a significant range of agricultural products not presently under the variable levy system. (3) Some improvement in the mandate in order to give meaning to the GATT Ministers' decision to achieve “significant liberalization” i.e., to achieve reduction of protection for some agricultural products. President Hallstein appeared somewhat surprised at this position, but Ambassadors Blumenthal and Tuthill pointed out that these essentials had been discussed in some detail with Mansholt in Brussels, and with Rabot and Hijzen in Geneva. President Hallstein inquired whether formal agreement on the kind of general rules language discussed at the last bilateral Geneva meeting would fulfill the requirements for creating a better basis for agricultural negotiations. Ambassador Blumenthal explained that this was probably not so, since the language involved had been designed to protect both the United States and the EEC position while postponing further elaboration of the basis for agricultural negotiations. The language in question would not serve to assure that the Community was in a position to meet the three points mentioned above. President Hallstein asked when the United States Government felt the Kennedy Round negotiations would be concluded. Under Secretary Ball and Ambassador Blumenthal stated that, while the United States Government would like to see the negotiations concluded sometime in 1965, it was recognized that in fact they might run into the early part of 1966. It was clear that Hallstein raised this question in the context of possible future action on the part of the French blocking the progress in the Kennedy Round. He pointed out that as of January 1966, the French would not have the veto right on the Kennedy Round and similar issues. He stressed once more his well-known conviction that it is essential to get past this date. The Under Secretary asked President Hallstein whether he felt that the French might raise questions during 1965 about the January 1, 1966 termination of the unanimity rule in Community decision making on commercial policy and similar matters. President Hallstein replied that there had indeed been some indication to this effect. The picture was not clear and one could not be certain what the French Government really had in mind in this regard. With respect to the questions as to the German attitude regarding the loss of veto, Ambassador McGhee pointed out that if Germany had made the decision on the unified grain price, it would not have any reason to fear the veto. President Hallstein agreed. Philosophizing on tactics of the Commission, he stated that it was basic Commission policy to concentrate on weaving every thread in the fabric in order to strengthen the Community and thus to make it more difficult for De Gaulle to break it up. He stated that the decision to go ahead on November 16 was one such thread and the unified grain price decision would be an even more important one. Hallstein's Personal Political Plans President Hallstein confirmed the newspaper reports that he had been offered a “good” (meaning undoubtedly a safe) constituency in Wuerttemberg-Baden. He stated that he could not have received a more attractive offer should he decide to return to German politics. He stated that he had not made a decision but that he would have to give his friends an answer “early in 1965”. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Tuthill and Blumenthal and approved in U on December 12. 2 Ball visited Berlin and Bonn November 14–17 for talks primarily on the MLF and the EEC unified grain price. For a report on his trip, see Document 49 . 49. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk 49. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 17, 1964. SUBJECT Conclusions from Conversations in Bonn and Berlin on MLF The conversations I have had in Berlin and Bonn over the past three days 2 have led me to the following conclusions: 1. The German Government is still eager to go ahead with the MLF. In fact, it would regard the failure of the project—or even a substantial delay in concluding an agreement—as a dangerous setback. 2. At the same time the Government's ability to negotiate from strength has been materially weakened by termites on the home front. The brutal French attack on the MLF—re-enforced by dark threats of possible Gaullist reprisals—has become a major element in the bloody internecine fighting within the CDU. Those threats are providing the ammunition for the so-called Gaullist wing. This is a curiously heterogeneous group (Adenauer, Strauss, Guttenberg, Gerstenmeier, and Krone) whose single point of cohesion is a passionate desire to get rid of Schroeder and embarrass Erhard. Underlying this sabotage operation is a considerable amount of anti-American feeling and a strong strain of resurgent German nationalism. 3. Erhard is regretting the day that he let Adenauer remain head of the CDU rather than assuming party leadership himself. Adenauer has turned completely sour on Americans—a people, he says in private conversation, who are “not fit to rule”. At the same time, he exhibits a curious love-hate attitude towards de Gaulle, combining his long-time sycophancy with threats that, if De Gaulle is crossed by the Germans over the MLF, he will turn East toward Moscow. 4. The MLF is not a party issue; it is merely an intra-CDU issue. Both Brandt and Erler assured me that the SPD would support it—particularly if the British Labour Government comes on board. The FDP will mostly oppose but they don't count for much. 5. On balance, it is fairly clear that Erhard can still force the MLF through the councils of the CDU, since the party hacks don't dare oppose him openly since he is their prize vote-getter. Once past the Government the treaty could be easily pushed through the Bundestag. The Government feels that it cannot delay too long since it is imperative to keep the issue out of the campaign. 6. Apart from trying to induce the British to take a sensible line, the best way we can help Erhard and his Government is by making a big show of trying to bring the French along with us. I was asked again and again by anxious Germans what steps we were taking to canvass the whole question with De Gaulle. How soon was someone going to talk to him? Was the President planning to see him right away? A recounting of all the steps we had taken over the last two years to persuade the French to join was not good enough for the Germans. 7. The FRG quite definitely wants the British in but is not yet clear as to the implications of the British proposals. Gordon Walker apparently was no more precise with the Germans than he was with us. He did manage to create the impression that the Wilson Government wished to be reasonable and the Germans now have the feeling that the ghost of Vansittart no longer haunts No. 10 Downing Street. The German reaction so far is one of wariness, but they intend to give the British the benefit of the doubt, and they are watching with great interest the efforts of the British Government to develop a position on the MLF at the Chequers meeting this coming weekend. 8. The Germans are most sensitive to the possibility that British maneuvering may leave them with a junior status. They were pleased with Gordon Walker's assurances that the British Government intends not to seek any “special position”, but rather to acquire an equal footing with the Germans. The British concept of a comprehensive nuclear force in which the mixed-manned surface ships constitute only one element is disturbing to the Germans, but they have not yet firmed up a position against it. 9. The loss of strength and confidence on the part of the CDU is one of the most striking facts on the German political scene. The SPD leaders are feeling their oats. Willy Brandt talked with apparent great confidence of the ability of the SPD to capture the September election—or at least to reduce the CDU total vote to the point where a grand coalition could be put together. A good deal of active politicking is going on. Strauss and his lieutenants are maneuvering—with not much subtlety—to try to form a coalition of the CSU with the SPD. Both Brandt and Erler assured me that they would have none of it. The most likely result, they said, was an SPD coalition with the CDU, with the CSU and the FDP left out in the cold. 10. Apart from the fear of provoking a head-on confrontation with De Gaulle, the most serious doubt with regard to the MLF stems from continuing misgivings regarding what the Germans understand to be the American strategic concept. Erhard made much of this in talking with me, indicating that he badly needed arguments to deal with the Gaullist element in the CDU who are using this to undermine the MLF. I did not undertake any serious educational effort on this question, since I assume that von Hassel will be full of the subject on his return from Washington. (Carstens tells me that Bonn has not yet received any detailed reporting regarding the results of von Hassel's visit.) The French are obviously playing all the changes on this issue with considerable effect. They argue that De Gaulle is prepared to fire his force de frappe at the first Russian who sets foot on German territory, whereas the US plans to let Germany be eaten up piece by piece before resorting to a nuclear defense. Krone, who is a minion of Adenauer's, is insisting that the whole MLF issue be held up until there has been a full review of strategy by his National Security Council (which is, for practical purposes, an honorific organization). Recommendations 1. We must design a specific plan of campaign to demonstrate to the Germans and the other nations of NATO who are worried by French threats, that we are making every possible effort to bring France into the MLF. Much can be done by beating out a tattoo on the “open door” and “vacant chair” themes. In addition, there needs to be some early and conspicuous US conversation with De Gaulle. This should be held before Harold Wilson's visit to the US to avoid the pattern of Nassau. One possibility would be for me to try to see De Gaulle, at the President's direction, when I go to France the end of the month for the OECD Ministerial Meeting. The timing would be about right—December 2 or 3 before Wilson comes on the 7th. I mentioned this possibility to Erhard as something we might consider, and he immediately brightened up and said, “very good idea.” 2. We should also explore the possibility of sending a high-powered briefing team to Bonn to educate the Chancellor and a selected group of his colleagues on the strategic concept. It is possible that this can be handled effectively by von Hassel and General Stettner, but they might find it useful to have some well-qualified Americans reinforcing their own educational efforts. 3 George W. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. 2 Reports on Ball's conversations with Erhard and Schroeder on November 16 were transmitted to Bonn in telegrams 1492 and 1494, November 17. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2443) For a memorandum of his conversation with Hallstein on November 17, see Document 48 . 3 In a memorandum for the President's evening reading on November 17, Secretary Rusk wrote the following: “George Ball reported these findings to me upon his return this afternoon: 1) Erhard is still eager to go ahead with MLF; 2) His ability to negotiate is weakened from within the Christian Democrats (Adenauer, Strauss and others) and not from the Social Democrats (Brandt and Erler) who say they would support MLF; 3) Erhard can still push MLF through the party and Bundestag but fears any substantial delay into the September election campaign; 4) They definitely want the British in MLF but got nothing more specific than we did from Gordon Walker—they are trying to keep an open mind on British proposals; 5) They most fear a head-on confrontation with De Gaulle and hope we will make a great show of trying to bring him along.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) 50. Draft Memorandum of Conversation 50. Draft Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 19, 1964, 12:55–1:30 p.m. SUBJECT MLF In this portion of the meeting there were present in addition to the President: Senator Humphrey Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara McGeorge Bundy Under Secretary Ball John McCone Llewellyn Thompson Bromley Smith Richard Neustadt At the end of the session, Secretary McNamara and Messrs. Smith and Thompson left and Secretary Dillon came in to talk about British balance of payments, but before he began there was some further talk of this subject. At Secretary Rusk's suggestion, Under Secretary Ball opened by reporting briefly on his conversations in Berlin and Bonn. He said there was no doubt that Chancellor Erhard was firmly behind the MLF and had the capacity to get it through the Bundestag. Erhard faced no inter-Party problem since the SPD had no intention of opposing him and Berlin Mayor Brandt had assured Ball that the SPD would support the government on this matter. The FDP was insignificant in this respect and was internally divided. Erhard's problem was intra-Party within the CDU. It had been a tactical error to leave Adenauer as Party Chairman. Adenauer now had two primary motivations: first, to get rid of Erhard by any means, and second, to pursue his fascination with de Gaulle. Around der Alte there was now grouped an odd combination of politicians on the outs with the Chancellor: Strauss, Guttenberg, Gerstenmaier, et al. They played with Adenauer and played on Party fears of antagonizing France or destroying the Franco-German relationship. Therefore, we had a French problem which manifested itself through this divisiveness within the German CDU. In Bonn, Gordon Walker had said nothing different from what he had said to us here except that he was a bit less forthcoming on the prospect of British mixed-manning in surface ships. The British were now going to have a week-end at Chequers where for the first time the chief members of the government would confront defense policy problems together. Mr. Ball thought it quite likely that they could work out an accommodation with us and the Germans on MLF. It was too soon to be sure, but he was hopeful. There was now to be a sequence of consultations. He himself was going to London and Paris, Wilson was coming here December 7–8 and the NATO Ministerial meeting would follow on December 15. In the course of these consultations, we might find it possible and needful to move fast for an accommodation. However, this prospect required no decisions today, with one exception: the need for contact with De Gaulle before Prime Minister Wilson visited the United States in order to avoid any impression of another Anglo-Saxon deal. Ball made the point that in the eyes of London and Bonn, and also with regard to our own public, it was important not to leave De Gaulle free to create the impression that we were trying to isolate the French or work against them. Therefore, we should prepare to demonstrate our interest and concern for France by a public and serious approach to De Gaulle—an approach which put to him the question: “What do you want?” We should seriously make the point to him (in such fashion that it was understood publicly): “We are not against you, but we don't know what troubles you, and we don't have proposals from you.” Ball emphasized that this demonstration should begin before Wilson's meeting with the President. He recommended therefore (on the basis of discussion earlier in the morning among members of the “Ball committee”) that we ask Jack McCloy to head a small mission to talk with the French about nuclear relations. McCloy could go to Paris in the first part of December when Ball would also be there (OECD). He and McCloy could see Couve and then McCloy could see De Gaulle. The Secretary could follow on when he came over for the NATO meetings—December 15. Since there was no prospect of a Johnson-De Gaulle meeting yet, these meetings could serve as a public indication, a conspicuous gesture, that we were not trying to steam-roller the French against De Gaulle and were seriously interested in opening a dialogue if he chose to be forthcoming. The President asked whether emissaries of this sort from him to De Gaulle wouldn't just seem—as it did to him—as if Johnson were just needling De Gaulle. Ball responded that last summer when he had gone as an “emissary” to discuss the Southeast Asian question he had had a session with the General which was frank and agreeable. Rusk added: “and sterile”. Secretary Rusk then observed that even so, it was useful to make this sort of gesture. We should not leave De Gaulle in a position to say that we haven't tried to keep him in touch. The President asked: “What was the gain in not waiting until the Secretary reached Paris December 15?” Rusk and Bundy responded that it was important to prevent press talk about a repetition of the Nassau pattern, of the Nassau error. The President then asked: “What was our own situation on the Hill?” Bundy responded that the situation was tough, but unformed. Ball elaborated by saying that we had held off real consultations with Congress deliberately waiting for the Europeans to work out with us a concrete proposition. Congressional attitudes were therefore rather negative on MLF and relevantly uninformed about it. The doubts were uninformed doubts. We would have to go to work on this but cannot do it until we know precisely what it is we are going to want Congress to accept. Secretary Rusk observed that our delegation to the NATO parliamentarians had a good briefing session in the Department and had presented a strong statement at the parliamentarian session. Senator Fulbright was particularly helpful. The President asked whether Congressional attitudes could be spelled out a bit more. Rusk then said that the negativism came chiefly from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, not from the Foreign Affairs Committee. Secretary McNamara broke in to say that the situation really was as Bundy had put it. There was considerable negativism but it had not hardened. It could be swung around if a good presentation were possible after the Wilson visit. Secretary Rusk observed that there were two central questions on the Hill. First, do the Europeans really want this? Second, does it really contribute to unity in the Alliance? Bundy noted that there was a third question of equal, or more weight: “Are we letting go control?” Senator Humphrey observed that this last question was the central issue. Now the general attitude in key quarters on the Hill—the Joint Committee and also the Armed Services Committee—was strongly negative, but no concerted effort had been made yet to demonstrate that control was safe. Secretary McNamara noted that the key Senators were Russell, Anderson and Pastore. He thought Pastore was ready to be helpful and that Russell could swing Anderson if he himself were convinced. This was crucial. Mr. Bundy observed that opposition from the Liberals could never be overcome but that this would not matter if the Russells and the Andersons were persuaded. Senator Humphrey asked Bundy: “What about 'Scoop' (Jackson)?” Bundy responded that he did not know what had been done with or about Jackson. Returning to his theme, Senator Humphrey pointed out that a key factor was jealousy between the Foreign Relations Committee and the Joint Committee (which includes key members of the Armed Services Committee). The more forthcoming Fulbright seemed to be the more instinctive resistance would be found in the attitudes of Russell, Anderson, et al. Mr. McNamara concluded this phase of the discussion by emphasizing that in any event we would lose the Liberals, but what was crucial was not to lose Russell and Anderson. It would not be easy to assure Russell's support, but he thought it could be done. This was not at any rate something we could go to work on as yet. We had no proposition to put forward. This phase of the meeting broke up at that point and then as Secretary Dillon came in the President returned to the question Ball had posed about McCloy. The President said he was very dubious about this and he'd like to have Dillon's view of it. “I have the reaction,” the President observed, “that this sort of emissary is just going to irritate De Gaulle. He's after bigger fish. He wants to talk to me and he wants to talk about things that are very important to him—assuming he wants to talk at all.” Bundy observed that there was another way to go about making the needed gesture: the President could call in Alphand and give him a letter to De Gaulle asking the latter to let us know what he had to propose and telling him we were continually interested in his views. The President said that this appealed to him better than the McCloy idea did. Turning to Dillon the President sketched the background of the discussion and asked what Dillon thought about McCloy. The President repeated that his own instinct was negative. “De Gaulle”, he said, “might well conclude that there was no government operating in the United States, just bankers from New York. De Gaulle certainly was not going to succumb to a bunch of errand boys. He might react the way President Johnson would if De Gaulle started sending French bankers over here as his personal emissary.” Secretary Dillon broke in to agree. The President went on to say that if he were to send an emissary short of the Secretary of State, it ought to be someone identified with public service in the United States—not a banker, and ought to be someone more perceptive about France and less identified with Germany than McCloy. Dillon agreed that McCloy was wrong for that reason. Bundy observed that McCloy had an old wartime association with De Gaullists but this did not interrupt the President's train of thought. The President went on to say that McCloy's German connection was all wrong—to say nothing of his banking connection—if anyone were to go it should be a Truman or an Eisenhower type. He would far rather send Eisenhower than McCloy. Secretary Dillon observed that that would certainly flatter De Gaulle, but that it was really the President De Gaulle wanted to see. Perhaps the thing to do at this stage was merely to let De Gaulle know that the President intended to see him after Inaugural. Secretary Rusk observed that in any event there was no need to decide this matter today. One should take it back and think it over and then come back to the President. The latter nodded and turned to the question of the run on sterling which had brought Secretary Dillon into the room. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Secret. The memorandum was “dictated but not seen” by Neustadt. The conversation was held in the Oval Room of the White House. 51. Editorial Note 51. Editorial Note At the end of November 1964, Richard E. Neustadt visited London at the request of the White House. In a meeting with Prime Minister Wilson on November 25, he stated that he had to come to avoid misunderstandings in light of the 1962 Skybolt experience and stressed that his visit did not represent a change in U.S. policy toward the MLF. He added that discussions the previous day at the Defense and Foreign Ministries on the subjects of mixed manning, Polaris submarines, and surface forces indicated that the United States and the United Kingdom were on a collision course, because the British seemed unable to appreciate the political value of the MLF surface fleet to the other NATO governments involved in the Paris discussions. He concluded by noting that the Prime Minister could not expect the United States to throw away 2 years' work. The Prime Minister replied that for the United Kingdom there were two questions: 1)whether there should be a surface fleet at all, and 2) whether the British should be in it, if there were one. The United Kingdom believed the answer to the first was no and hoped to present better alternatives. (Telegram 2565 from London, November 25; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO) On November 26, Neustadt continued the discussion with Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker. Both men agreed that one critical aspect of the problem was German involvement and the avoidance of any appearance that the United States and the United Kingdom were ganging up on Germany. Neustadt concluded that the discussion between the United States and the new Labour government must begin from the question: “What is the U.S. position on the surface fleet?” And in the coming weeks, when Ball again visited Europe and Wilson went to Washington, the United States must make clear that the principle of a surface-ship component in any MLF or ANF was a sine qua non. (Telegram 2582 from London, November 28; ibid.) 52. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 52. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, November 25, 1964. SUBJECT The Future of the MLF Against my own expectations of two weeks ago, I am reaching the conclusion that the U.S. should now arrange to let the MLF sink out of sight. Whether this should be done quickly or slowly is an important tactical question, but the overriding point which I wish to suggest in this tightly limited group is that we should now ask the President for authority to work toward a future in which the MLF does not come into existence. I reach this conclusion because it seems increasingly clear that the costs of success would be prohibitive. They would include at least the following: 1. A deeply reluctant and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain. 2. A Germany whose governing party was divided on this issue and whose participation was ambiguous in meaning. 3. Additional strains on an Italian government which is weaker and not stronger as a result of its last elections. 4. At least a temporary setback in efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons by international agreement (those who believe strongly in such agreements, in all countries, are skeptical of the MLF). 5. A protracted and difficult Congressional struggle in which we would be largely deprived of the one decisive argument—that this arrangement is what our major European partners really want. 6. A constitutional debate in NATO which, even if successful, would provide justification for further Gaullist outrages against the organization. 7. A genuine and enduring blow to Franco-German relations which the Germans will blame on us. This is not an attractive prospect, and the MLF is not worth it. From my own conversations with the President, I am sure that he does not feel the kind of personal Presidential engagement in the MLF itself which would make it difficult for him to strike out on a new course if we can find one which seems better. I believe we can. The fundamental requirement is that we should work in harmony with the Germans, and my own judgment is that our first course should be to engage in a most intimate and careful discussion with Erhard himself. When he chooses to be, both his popularity and his position make him the undisputed political leader of Germany. I myself believe that he would be glad to join with the President of the United States in a radical defusing of the MLF and a proposal for a completely fresh look at the nuclear defenses of the Alliance, with an ostentatious inclusion of France in this process of discussion. As long as the German Chancellor is treated with care and dignity by the American President, I believe we can meet the main purposes of the MLF, at least in the short run, without paying its heavy costs. And even if a fresh look should lead nowhere over the next year or two we would still be free to take new steps with the Germans if the situation then demands it. I do not believe that any such steps need be worse than the MLF is today. Since this question is fundamental to the Johnson/Wilson talks, and since the President counts very heavily upon the advice of the four of us, I hope very much that we may be able to talk this matter out among ourselves over the weekend. I am calling Dean Rusk separately to ask if he will propose times at his convenience for a meeting under his chairmanship. McG. B. 1 Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272. Top Secret; Sensitive; Personal; Literally Eyes Only. Also addressed to Rusk and McNamara. 53. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 53. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 30, 1964, 6 p.m. 3262. For Secretary from Ambassador. De Gaulle received me at noon today for what turned out to be a very general, relaxed conversation of about one-half hour. I gave him the President's message about Ball's visit and your desire to talk to him in December on a number of things, to which De Gaulle indicated that he would be glad to see you. I then told the General that while I had no particular instructions or any special questions to take up with him, since I was going home on a short visit I knew that his views in general on any current questions were always of great interest in Washington. I mentioned in this connection the general subject of U.S. relationship to Europe and secondly anything that he might tell me in regard to French views on the future organization of Europe. 1. Relationship of U.S. to Europe. De Gaulle began by saying that in the last fifteen years there had been a considerable change in the situation affecting Europe, particularly in the immediacy and nature of the Soviet threat. He said that whereas fifteen years ago many believed the threat to be real and immediate it had now apparently diminished to the point where virtually no one in Europe, and he ventured to say in the United States, believed in a Soviet attack. Since the West was hardly prepared to try and reach Moscow by military force and Soviet Union apparently was not prepared to inaugurate military measures against Western Europe there seemed to be a very good prospect for an extended period of peace. China was of course another question but that would not materialize in the form of a threat for at least fifty or a hundred years. For the immediate future it would appear that peace was a very real possibility and that this, together with a revived Western Europe, was one of the fundamental changes which had occurred affecting relations with the U.S. For example, because of these two factors he felt that European countries were again becoming “personalized” by which he meant they were beginning to assert their own personality and in effect to be seeking in one way or another their independence which could not but affect their relations to the U.S. He added parenthetically he thought the German interest in the MLF was merely a concealed measure of expressing their nationalism (this was only time during conversation that MLF was mentioned). 2. Future European Developments. De Gaulle then turned to Europe and said that while an economic Western Europe, at least of the Six, was a possibility—which would be put to the test on agricultural policy by the end of this year—the next step which would involve some form of political unity was a much more difficult task. In fact there was no European policy at the present time since each European country was following its own policy. For example Germany was preoccupied with the question of reunification. Whether through some strong move against Soviet Union as Foster Dulles had appeared to favor or through some negotiated arrangement with the Soviets was as yet unclear. France was in no hurry to see a reunified Germany since such a Germany would be a very “disquieting” influence in Europe. The truth was however that Germany was far from having a European policy at the present time and in fact, for reasons of its own security, did not object to being protected by the U.S. On the other hand, Holland, for example, had in the past feared French domination and more recently that of Germany. It had been her custom to turn originally to England for protection, but with the diminishing weight of England she was not disposed to turn to the U.S. to offset her fears. There was another element to the problem while not directly a manifestation of the inability of the European nations to evolve a common policy—this attitude towards a so-called third world. Whereas France genuinely wished to help these countries, some European countries (he did not specify which) were not really anxious to help these third world countries to develop. De Gaulle, after outlining the objections that he saw towards the unity as against the unification of Europe (a distinction he made in the French language) ended by saying that frankly he did not see clearly the way to European unity at the present time and left me with the impression that the attitude of Germany, because of its preoccupation with reunification, was an insurmountable obstacle towards any realization in the political field at the present time. De Gaulle at this point volunteered that France had recognized China primarily in order to maintain contact. I then inquired of the General whether or not he thought that in regard to Vietnam the Chinese Communists, given their present ideological state of mind, would ever be able to accept an agreement which would in effect cut back Communist influence in Vietnam. De Gaulle stated that in Geneva in 1954 the ChiComs had not sought to proclaim Communism for all of Vietnam and he saw no insuperable obstacle in the same formula being followed in any future conference with Vietnam. I then mentioned to De Gaulle how important Europe had become to the U.S. since the end of World War II, mentioning briefly our previous one hundred eighty years of isolationism, and that the signature of the NATO pact had been an enormous step for the U.S. to take. I also told him that in view of the immense military presence in Europe of the U.S. and the cost of such presence it was difficult, in the words of the late President Kennedy , to envisage a military presence in Europe without a corresponding political presence. De Gaulle replied in this connection that he thought that with the passage of time and the further diminution of the Soviet threat, events in Eastern Europe, particularly the loosening of the Soviet Bloc, it would become less necessary for the U.S. to maintain large forces in Europe. He felt it would be normal and logical at that unspecified time for the U.S. progressively to reduce its forces in Europe. I told him I thought this would take a good long time since even the slightest move in the direction of reduction of forces caused great anxiety and cries of alarm from Germany, which he admitted was the case. De Gaulle said that he had always envisaged the continuance of the Alliance since he felt that France, no matter what happened, because of the tradition of friendship and association which existed between our two countries would wish to be allied with the U.S. as indeed it would wish to be allied with England. He said however that he felt that the present structure of NATO, which in effect, according to De Gaulle, provided for American control, was not satisfactory to France. When I asked him what sort of reform the French had in mind he gave the standard reply that they were not prepared to put forth any proposals at the present time, but in reply to my question as to the time factor he indicated that France would not be prepared to stay in the present NATO structure at the expiration of the twenty years of the treaty, i.e., 1969. I inquired how plans and other organizational matters, which we felt necessary in time of peace, could be made without some comparable organization to that existing in NATO, to which De Gaulle rather airily replied that general staff studies could of course be made coordinating actions for use in time of war. I mentioned at that point the importance of the nuclear problem and the great changes that they had introduced in relations between states, as well as military matters, but he showed no disposition to discuss this aspect of the matter. In conclusion, De Gaulle sent his very best regards to the President, whom he said had been given a very exceptional mandate by the American people, which he said gave him a great deal of opportunity for action in the coming months. Reverting to Vietnam, since as he said I had brought it up, he wished to express the very sincere hope not only for the sake of the people of the world but also for the U.S. itself that we would find some means of disengaging ourselves from this situation. He said the longer it was postponed the worse it would get. In general he said if he would dare to offer any advice he would say that U.S. policy in the future should not be based upon general principles, or particularly declaration of such principles, but should be supple, realistic and reasonable. Comment : De Gaulle was in an unusually affable and easy frame of mind. Little new emerged from the talk except that I found of considerable interest his definite statement to me that France was in no hurry to see German reunification and the related subject that Germany as a divided country was one of the obstacles to any progress on European unity. The second point of some interest was his definite statement that France would not stay in NATO after 1969. While he did not so state, I could not avoid to some extent the impression that he was thinking of a recasting of the treaty, possibly along bilateral lines since he spoke in this connection of France's need for alliances with the U.S. and England. In actual fact, a treaty of collective security would much more logically entail some form of collective organization than would a bilateral treaty. This conversation seemed to me to reveal very clearly the old fashioned and negative cast of de Gaulle's thinking on foreign policy. 2 Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 U. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London for Ball and Bruce. 2 Following a speech on November 22, De Gaulle had talked with Bohlen about the U.S. reluctance to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. When the Ambassador mentioned the thousands of American troops and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as an example of the U.S. commitment, the President commented that tactical weapons might be used, but that no one could expect the United States to risk its cities by using strategic nuclear weapons. (Telegram 3167 from Paris, November 23; ibid., DEF 1 EUR) 54. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Department of State 54. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 2, 1964, 3 a.m. Secun 3. For Secretaries of State and Defense and Bundy from Ball. I met for an hour on the afternoon of November 30 with Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street. He was accompanied by the Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker (who left mid-way in the meeting), and his Private Secretary Oliver Wright. I was accompanied by Ambassador Bruce and my Special Assistant, George S. Springsteen. Gordon Walker started the meeting by summarizing the conversations in which he and I had just engaged. 2 He reported my statement, in reply to his query, that the British could not expect the United States to match the Polaris submarines to be contributed by the UK to an Atlantic missile force. The Prime Minister countered in a jocular vein by saying, “This is a nice beginning. Maybe we had just better wait and start next week.” The Foreign Secretary then reported that I had indicated to him that we were not doctrinaire in our approach to the multilateral nuclear force but we were determined that any ideas for accommodation must not compromise what we considered the basic objectives of the MLF. Moreover, any changes must be acceptable to other participants. He said he had been about to ask me about the US veto when we had broken up our meeting in order to come to the Prime Minister's office. I responded to his comment about the veto by recalling my recent conversations with the Germans at the fourth German-American conference in Berlin on November 14. I had been asked by the German participants to state the US position with regard to a possible European deterrent. I had replied to this query by asking what was meant by a “European deterrent.” If it meant an offer by France to use the force de frappe in the defense of Europe the effect would be merely to transfer European reliance from Paris to Washington [sic]. In that event the USG would, of course, have to re-examine its military relations with Europe. The Germans had been unanimous in saying that they would never be in favor of a European deterrent on these terms. The Prime Minister interjected, “nor would we.” I had then said that if we were talking about a European deterrent that might emerge as a result of the political unification of Europe that which brought about the creation of a competent executive authority to which the European nations had been willing to delegate the authority to make the life or death decision involved in the use of atomic power then this would have created a new situation which we would have to examine. But that time was obviously far in the future. Wilson interjected at this point to inquire whether we meant an executive which was established prior to actual political unification. Gordon Walker said that this was a hard point to define. I said that what we should tell the Europeans was, “You build a united Europe with a competent executive and we will look at the situation after you are finished”. But we were certainly not ready to agree now to relinquish our veto even if they succeeded. The Foreign Minister interjected to say that any language on this point in any agreement regarding a multilateral force would require very careful drafting. I agreed but added that we were prepared to develop language on this subject under which the United Kingdom would, in effect, have the right to veto any action by the US in relinquishing its own veto. The Prime Minister asked if we would say this publicly, and asked if I were familiar with his recent speech in Parliament on the multilateral force. 3 I answered that I was very familiar with his speech. We had been frankly disturbed by the speech and particularly by his reference to the MLF as a “divisive force in Europe”. This was the kind of language that De Gaulle was using—not the kind of language we expected from the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister looked momentarily embarrassed but sought to explain his statement. He was assisted by Gordon Walker who observed that the MLF had been frequently referred to as a “divisive force” during the election campaign. The Prime Minister added that if I wanted to see a real Gaullist speech I should read the one delivered in Parliament by Peter Thorneycroft. 4 It was, he said, unforgivable for the Tories to insist on a debate on the MLF on the eve of an important negotiating session with the United States. It made it all the more difficult for the Labor Party because the Conservatives threatened to force the issue to a vote. The Tories, he insisted, had introduced the Nassau issue into the election campaign by posing as the great defenders of the “supreme national emergency” clause. He himself felt this was counter to President Kennedy's view of Nassau, which stressed the multilateral aspect of that agreement. He said he cited this as an important factor in political terms because it formed the background for his handling of the debate in Parliament on the MLF. The actual details of Gordon Walker's discussions in Washington in October had not been reported to anyone but the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. Therefore, he could not bring the MLF question into the Cabinet until after the Chequers meeting. In actual fact he did not go to the Cabinet until last Thursday on this matter. He had succeeded in forcing the issue through—and, he said with considerable emphasis, he had taken his political life in his hands when he had talked about the possible disposition of Polaris submarines in the debate in Commons. He had done all this, he said, because he fully realized that considerable momentum had built up since Nassau. He, therefore, had gone far in committing himself on putting the Polaris submarines into a multilateral force in spite of his earlier election statement. The Prime Minister then suddenly shifted the basis for his defense of his Parliamentary statement by saying that he probably had more accurately expressed the idea of “divisive” in his Guildhall speech. What he meant by “divisive” was a “dispersion” or “dissipation” of effort within the Alliance as a result of the undertaking to construct a wholly new weapons system. At this point I said that he might be interested in the considerations that were influencing the present attitude of the USG. Discussion of the MLF had proceeded for a long time. We had worked with other nations in Paris for many months. We had examined with great care various alternative schemes. The MLF seemed to offer the best solution. It was admittedly somewhat complicated but that resulted from the fact that we had to deal with the political structure of the world as it was, and that structure consisted of a number of nation states. In view of this fact there were only two ways to approach the problem of nuclear management. We could approach it on a collective basis or by creating a number of individual national deterrents. The latter course held great dangers. We were prepared to work with HMG on trying to find accommodations for its problems. However, we were not prepared to do so at the expense of compromising our objectives. Our principal objectives were to tie Germany closer to the West, to strengthen Atlantic unity and to discourage nuclear proliferation by providing nonnuclear nations an opportunity to participate in the ownership, management, and control of nuclear weapons. Moreover, any adjustments of the basic plan must, of course, be acceptable to the other interested nations. The Prime Minister then asked how we proposed to move the discussion toward some agreed basis. I said that we hoped to be able to find a range of solutions for our mutual problems when we meet next week in Washington. We should not, however, continue too long with bilateral discussion. Early in January, perhaps beginning sometime the week of the 3rd, we might find it useful to have a multilateral meeting at the ministerial level. I though that at least five nations should be asked to attend such a meeting—the US, the UK, the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch. The Prime Minister asked if such a multilateral meeting would be held under an “umbrella” such as NATO. I replied that in my view this would not be very practicable. Gordon Walker then chimed in to say that a NATO umbrella would involve too many people and create too many other difficulties. There was a brief discussion as to a possible site for a meeting. I suggested Switzerland or perhaps The Hague, but said this was something we could discuss in Washington. Gordon Walker pointed out to the Prime Minister that during the first part of January he would be in the midst of his electoral campaign. The Prime Minister instantly responded that this was no problem since Healey could be the representative for the British Government. The Prime Minister then stated that he was in thorough accord with the idea of a ministerial meeting in early January, and stated quite emphatically that we could not continue to discuss the matter very much longer on a bilateral basis. He then noted that he might be in the United States again late in January at the UN General Assembly. He would be prepared to go to Washington for a formal or informal visit, depending on which appeared more useful at the time. I remarked that this might be quite helpful but that we could not delay progress until the latter part of January. Gordon Walker then said that he would be seeing the German Foreign Minister on December 11 and that he would see Spaak before next week. He also mentioned that he planned to see Saragat again. He added that he doubted that there could be useful discussion of the MLF at the NATO Ministerial meeting. [Here follows discussion of the Congo.] At this point Gordon Walker left. Immediately the Prime Minister became noticeably more relaxed and candid. He gave the impression of a man who knew what he wanted but was on guard in the presence of his own Cabinet colleagues. I said that I thought it might be helpful to describe to him the prevailing atmosphere in Washington. President Johnson was approaching his pending visit as a meeting between friends who had problems to be worked out together. I said that I mentioned this because I was aware of a school of thought in London which held that the only way to succeed with the Johnson Administration was through hard bargaining. The Prime Minister interjected to say that he wished to get ahead with the problem but he did not feel that this was a situation in which there could be no “trade”—in the sense of an “exchange” of one point for another. I said that we were not thinking in terms of haggling or selling carpets. Everyone was well disposed toward the Wilson government and anxious to get off to a good beginning. But, I said, we must view these talks as a situation in which each side says “My problem is such and such, your problem is such and such and we must try to find a solution together.” With this attitude we stood a good chance of succeeding. The Prime Minister said that he faced political problems—both domestic, and in the field of foreign affairs. President Johnson had the great advantage of having “smashed” the opposition. Wilson was faced with the possibility of another election—perhaps in the spring—in which the defense issue would be a key element. At the moment it was popular to take the Gaullist line in Britain. Therefore, he said, “I must come back from Washington in a very strong position, not perhaps next week but at least at the end of January.” The Prime Minister then picked up a clipping from the London Times of Saturday, November 28, regarding my trip to London. He read various portions of it. He noted that it said: “Mr. Ball is well acquainted with the latest Presidential approach to the nuclear proposals.” Looking across the table he said, “I agree with that statement.” He said that the article also indicated that President Johnson was firmly committed to the MLF, and he believed that too. He said furthermore that the United Kingdom was not against a multilateral force. “We are,” he said, “committed to that part of the Nassau agreement which deals with the inclusion of national forces in a multilateral force but we are against the other part.” Continuing further he said that he was greatly interested by one statement in the article which said that “Any proposal designed to perpetuate national control …will be unacceptable.” He asked me if that was an accurate statement of the United States point of view. I said that it was not a very accurate statement of our present thinking. The Prime Minister replied, “That is too bad. I had hoped that it was.” I then explained to him that the decision to give up the British national deterrent was a national decision which only the British could make. We were hardly in position to insist that the British give up their deterrent since we had originally worked with them in developing it. And at Nassau had ratified its extension into the next generation of weapons. The Prime Minister then said “Suppose we came to Washington with a fall-back proposal which involved our keeping our own Polaris but giving in to the mixed manned surface fleet?” I replied that would be fine with us. The Prime Minister, grinning like a fox, then said, “Ah, you agree with Tory policy but not with Labor policy. You would prefer that we would all go back to Nassau.” I said that at Nassau the UKG had indicated that it did not plan to participate in the mixed manned force but it had committed itself to giving that force “a fair wind”. I recognized that if the United Kingdom now decided to turn over its Polaris submarines irrevocably to an Atlantic nuclear force, we would see benefits in that course. By divesting itself of nuclear weapons the HMG might help to arrest the present disturbing trend toward proliferation—a trend that had been given a new impetus by the recent Chinese explosion. I said that we could explore further in Washington whether it was at all feasible for us to go on record as encouraging the British relinquishment of its national nuclear system, if that would be useful to the Prime Minister in facilitating British participation in the mixed manned force. However, this would require further thought and I did not wish to express a definite view at this time. It should be clear however, I added, that if we were going to succeed in developing an arrangement in Washington it would have to provide for some British participation in the mixed manned surface fleet. The Prime Minister said that during the election campaign the Tories had made a great point of saying that the Labor government would turn over the defense of the United Kingdom to the Americans. We would recognize that there were anti-American elements both in the Tory Party and the Labor Party. These elements did not control either party—particularly the Labor Party. However, he had to face the fact that merely to hand over the British Polaris submarines on a non-returnable basis could well be political suicide. [Here follows discussion of British Guiana.] Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House and OSD. Ball visited London and Paris November 30–December 3, primarily for talks about the MLF. Documentation relating to the trip, including memoranda of conversations and reporting cables, are ibid. and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2443. 2 Ball had met for about an hour at noon with Gordon Walker and Defense Minister Denis Healey and members of his staff to discuss the military aspects of the MLF. The talks focused on mixed manning and the British desire for a clear U.S. statement about its control of nuclear weapons. Ball summarized the conversation in Secun 2 from Paris, December 2. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 3 For text of Wilson's speech to Parliament, November 23, see House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, vol. 702, cols. 930 ff. 4 For text of former Defense Minister Thorneycroft's speech on November 23, see ibid., cols. 1015 ff. 55. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 55. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, December 4, 1964, 5 p.m. 2145. Pass to Governor Herter and Secretary Freeman. Grain price unification. In my meeting today with FonMin Schroeder on a variety of subjects I expressed appreciation for the fact that the Germans had, in presenting their grain price proposals in Brussels, linked them to the success of the Kennedy Round, particularly the agricultural negotiations. I said that I wished to make clear, however, that we considered the grain price suggested by the Germans, i.e., 440 DM per ton, too high—indeed, we considered 425 DM proposed by Mr. Mansholt as being too high. We hoped the Germans would be flexible in their negotiations on this point. There was a grave danger that even at the Mansholt levels there would be such an increase in grain production within the Common Market that the exports of the US and other outside suppliers would be jeopardized. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, INCO–GRAIN EEC. Secret. Passed to the White House. 56. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 56. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 1 Washington, December 6, 1964. [Here follow diary entries on unrelated subjects.] We had another meeting with the President at 3 p.m. 2 It was a Loulou. Johnson said he had found no support whatever for the MLF either abroad or at home. It would command only a minority of votes in the Senate. Was he to be put in the position of Woodrow Wilson, and discover that a treaty he had advocated was repudiated by the Congress? In short, he did not intend to have a showdown with Wilson on this. Bob McNamara, that marvelous fellow, talked in contrary advocacy; George Ball did likewise. George is out on a limb, which the President may saw off. Unfortunately, Acheson was not there. I contributed my mite, acknowledging an ignorance of Congressional reactions, but attempting to place the controversy on an Atlantic plane. Johnson, from time to time, telling Texan or other stories, picturesque in language, confused us as to how he might negotiate. There were many divagations in his remarks from the subject at issue. At one point, directing his attention to me, he said he had read in the New York Times an article by Tad Szulc saying I intended to retire; “What was that nonsense? Would I not remain?”—the post was unspecified. Those present were slightly flabbergasted, as was I. I answered that I had not inspired such articles, but for the past two years had submitted my resignation on each January 1st. The President said he thought that inadmissible, and would I stay? I replied by suggesting we discuss the affair in private. This was agreeable to him. Then we continued. What he will say to Wilson tomorrow is wrapped in mystery. Dean Rusk, just arrived from New York, was projected into the affray. In a cautious, somewhat equivocal fashion, he sponsored a postponement of decision. I was disappointed, for I do not know where we stand. [Here follow diary entries on unrelated subjects.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 2 On December 5, Bruce, McNamara, Bundy, Acheson, Neustadt, and Ball had met with the President for 2 hours beginning at 1:15 p.m. Bruce summarized the meeting as follows: “In the course of our Presidential interview, no definite commitment was made on the cardinal point; that is whether Johnson would tell Wilson that British participation in a mixed-manned surface ship force was a sine qua non to his acceptance of any British proposals. I surmise he may state this in his talks on Monday, but is evidently anxious to give further thought to it, before reaching such an irrevocable decision. We were frank in pointing out that there was no support in any party in Britain for our conception; it was only likely to be agreed as an element in a package deal.” (Ibid.) 57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 57. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 6, 1964. SUBJECT MLF—An Alternative View 1. You asked yesterday why President Kennedy was tentative and careful about the MLF. It was rightly pointed out that there were different reasons at different times, but in the last half of 1963 the reasons were, I think, dominated by his feeling that if he could only get the MLF by major and intense U.S. pressure, it was not worth it. His exact reasoning I do not know, but I do know that he reacted very strongly and affirmatively to a memorandum which I sent him on June 15, 1963 (Tab A). 2 While parts of it are outdated, I think it may be worth your attention, and I attach it. 2. I do this partly because I feel that we have not given you a full and fair statement of the case against pressing hard now for the MLF. I myself do come out on the side of going ahead very hard with Wilson himself, but you are entitled to know that there is another side of the case, and it would go something like this: (1) The MLF or AMF will make very heavy demands on direct Presidential leadership, and there are better things for the President to do. It is all very well to talk of Bob McNamara converting the Senate, but the man who will really have to do it is the President. (2) The new force, even though wider and better than the old MLF, will have many opponents, and their voices will be heard, whatever specific leaders of governments may say. The most important of them are as follows: A. France . General De Gaulle's hostility is fixed and strongly supported by all French Gaullists. Tactically, the violence of French feeling can probably be somewhat moderated if you visit Paris and reason with him, but the underlying hostility of France will remain. It is true that the French propaganda now is preventive in purpose, but it will continue at least until ratification in all countries. The French will charge us with dividing the Alliance and blocking the future of Europe, and many who do not support de Gaulle will believe them. The Germans will be split by this French pressure and they, too, will show some tendency to blame us. B. The Soviet Union . The Soviets already charge that the MLF is a reopening of cold war hostility. Most of their opposition I consider tactical, but it is built on their genuine fear of Germany, and it strikes a lot of resonance among peace lovers and liberals in all countries. C. Most professional military men are cool at best, and many are openly opposed. Lemnitzer is warning against this enterprise as divisive within the Alliance. Norstad is publicly against it. The JCS will be loyal but probably not enthusiastic. General Eisenhower may not be any better than neutral and could be opposed. D. American commentators like Lippmann and George Kennan are violently opposed. Lippmann believes that there is no serious support for this force anywhere except among a few faddists in the State Department. He will shortly come back from Europe saying that his travels have confirmed this impression. (Walter, more than most, sees only what he wishes to see in nuclear matters.) E. The Joint Committees and the Armed Services Committee are very wary of any treaty which seems to affect U.S. nuclear power and still more wary of any amendment of the McMahon Act. Holifield has publicly stated his opposition, but this is of course less important than what Russell and Anderson decide. F. Hubert Humphrey summarizes Senatorial sentiment as strongly opposed and on many grounds. While we have never made a major Administration effort with the Senators, there are a large number who have informed themselves reasonably well, and I think it is fair to say that right now I know of not one hardened supporter, while there are many skeptics and many outright opponents. Hubert says that when Livingston Merchant gave informal MLF briefings on the Hill last year the surface response was polite, but the real reaction was negative. 3. All this means that we will have a great effort of political education ahead of us even after we have gone past Wilson and worked out a genuine multilateral agreement, perhaps in January or February. President Kennedy used to say that we would do this only if the Europeans really wanted it. Given the level of European skepticism, we will have to make an entirely different case based on our own judgment that this is what the whole Atlantic Community now requires if it is not to break apart and if Germany is not to be tempted into another disastrous national rearmament. (Incidentally, all those in America who fear the Germans will be hostile—as many of them are already.) 4. The devil's advocate might continue by saying that the choice this week is not at all as black and white as men like Acheson say. Even if Wilson says “yes” there will be further problems of timing and tactics which may give you later moments of choice. And if he refuses to say “yes” at this stage, there is still quite a political charade to be played out. 5. The devil's advocate would argue that even on this basis we can save most of our real interests—though not the MLF itself. 6. The Germans will still need us as friends and we will need them. This basic common interest is exemplified in the enormous U.S. nuclear and conventional forces now in Germany, and most of those forces will still be there, MLF or no MLF, in the coming years. 7. We can continue to prevent de Gaulle from dominating Europe even without an MLF—the Europeans themselves have no desire to follow him. His nuclear force is not a big magnet. The number of Germans who really tie their fate to France as against the U.S. is ridiculously small. The German politicians who favor France today would be the first to come to Washington if they ever came to power. 8. We can enlarge political and nuclear consultation even without an MLF. It is true that this is an inferior way of doing it, but if the MLF is not destroyed by us but by circumstances, new consultative procedures could usefully show our good will. 9. We can leave the British Polaris problem unsettled and let London stew in its own juice and thus show that we are true to our doctrine that any new arrangement must take full account of the needs of the Germans. 10. We can also say clearly that we will go right back to the MLF—and perhaps even to more drastic measures—if the Cold War heats up again (it is worth remembering that the MLF was generated in 1960–62, a period of heavy and active Soviet pressure on Berlin; the absence of that pressure is a major part of our present tactical problem). 11. In sum, the devil's advocate would state your choices this way: (1) If you go full steam ahead, you face a long, hard political fight, a major confrontation with De Gaulle, and a possibility of defeat or delay which would gravely damage the prestige of the President. (2) If you go half steam ahead, there will probably be no MLF, but it will not be your fault alone. You will have kept the letter and spirit of the Kennedy readiness to move if the Europeans wanted it. There will be trouble with the Germans, but nothing unmanageable. There will be plenty of opportunities for debate, discussion and delay, and for gradual and ceremonial burial. Your wisdom, caution and good judgment will have the praise of liberals, of military men, of the British, of the French, and of many Germans—and you will have freedom to make a different choice later if you wish. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. 2 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Document 201 . 58. Memorandum for the Record 58. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, December 7, 1964. I talked to the President on the telephone from my office to his at 1:30, and he gave me the following debriefing of his conversation with Harold Wilson between 11:30 and 1:00 today. 2 The President said that the conversation began with a discussion of the British and American elections. The President pointed out to the Prime Minister that there were a lot of problems which did not show in the U.S. returns, especially with respect to international affairs. He said that our folks were damned tired of being told that it was their business to solve all the world's problems and do so mainly alone, and that he was very wary of taking any tall dives that might get him into the situation Roosevelt got into in 1937. Against this background, the President spoke frankly but kindly to the Prime Minister about the troubles which the latter had already given the President. He pointed out that the impression which had been created by the British budget, with its heavy emphasis on social security, and the pressures created against the pound had combined to make the President's own budgeting process very difficult. He had originally planned on a budget of $107 or $108 billion and now he was forced to think in terms of $101–$102, which would make it very difficult to carry out the programs he wanted. This British decision had shaken us up some. The President said the second thing which had given him trouble was the monetary action of the British Government. The British had made trouble for themselves and for others by sounding as if they did not believe in the instrument of the bank rate and then using it very heavily and suddenly. The third point the President made was that the British economic problem was in no sense over, and we might well expect a good deal of trouble in the next 60 to 90 days and that problems for the pound would also be problems for the dollar. Finally, the President talked to the Prime Minister about the difficulties created by his speech on Atlantic nuclear defense in the House of Commons. By that time, the President said, the Prime Minister was almost on the ropes. The Prime Minister said that on the Atlantic nuclear force he laid the blame on Flora Lewis. (Later on in the day the President described this episode to Rusk and McNamara by saying, “He chased Flora Lewis all around the room.”) The Prime Minister knew that this episode had created a serious episode and he wanted us to know that he had not said no to the MLF but only to a force without a US veto. On the MLF, he had said maybe. (Later the President told us this reminded him of the girl who, when she said maybe, really meant yes, and the President said he was not in a position now to accept the bargain.) The President reminded the Prime Minister of the difficulties Sir Alex Douglas-Home had given him on commenting on Cuban busses from the White House steps. This time the Prime Minister had given him trouble ten days before the visit. The Prime Minister said he felt very sorry—that he had meant to give a very preliminary and general discussion as the President did at Georgetown. The President returned to the Atlantic nuclear problem and said he himself would not take any adamant position and had no intention of forcing the matter now. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] We had been over there twice now in his lifetime and we did not want to have to do it again. He said that the best people in his government had worked on this, both under President Kennedy and under him, and they just did not see any other way of doing it than the way that was now before us. The President told the Prime Minister that a stitch in time saves nine, and that if we couldn't solve this problem and tie the Germans in, [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The Germans had made rockets for the U.S. and the British, which proved they had brains, and they lent a lot of money to the UK, which showed that they had money. All they needed now was will, and that was what we had to prevent, so that we should all get together and work this thing out. Bob McNamara would show the Prime Minister how to reduce his force from 5 submarines to 3, and take the money and men he had saved, and put the men on the surface ships. The President knew the Prime Minister wanted to keep our finger on the trigger, and we want exactly the same thing; the object was to keep the Germans with us and keep their hand off the trigger. The President repeated that McNamara and the other Americans could show the British how to join in on this without any real trouble, and with no cost. Earlier, in the presence of the Prime Minister and Sir Burke Trend, the President had debriefed to Trend and me by saying many of the same things. He pointed out in that meeting that he had spoken of Erhard's problems. (He later told Rusk and McNamara that the Prime Minister had been low on Erhard and high on Willy Brandt.) The two had agreed that Adenauer was no help. Mr. Wilson remarked that while he had agreed on the fact that the Germans presented a real problem, he had not got to specifics. The President said that he had described all his best advisers as men with the temperament of Rhodes Scholars, dangerously sympathetic to the UK, and had made it clear that while he was “not going to put his feet in concrete” or get the Prime Minister's feet in concrete, he did very much hope that we could reason it out together. In this meeting he put his point about the Germans by saying that he had just won an election by preaching against discrimination in the United States, and he could not now preach in favor of discrimination in international affairs. The President said that he and the Prime Minister had agreed to have a private talk on monetary matters with experts from both sides, and he asked me to arrange a meeting at which Secretary Dillon, Chairman Martin and Chairman Ackley would be present at 4:45. This I later did. McGeorge Bundy 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy. 2 For another account of this meeting, see Harold Wilson, A Personal Record, pp. 46–48. Wilson visited Washington December 6–9 for conversations with the President on questions of mutual concern. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 59. Editorial Note 59. Editorial Note While President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson met in private (see Document 58 ), Foreign Ministers Rusk and Gordon Walker met in the Cabinet Room and discussed British Guiana, India, South Africa, China, and Secretary Rusk's conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the United Nations. (Memoranda of conversation, December 7; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2460) The President and the Prime Minister joined the Foreign Ministers in the Cabinet Room at 1:10 p.m., where Wilson said that no decisions on the MLF would be taken during his visit. (Memorandum of conversation, December 7; ibid.) At 3:45 p.m., following a luncheon at the British Embassy, the U.S. and British Foreign and Defense Ministers began a general discussion of defense problems with the British reporting the very serious economic pressure confronting them and the need to cut back their worldwide commitments. They submitted a paper entitled “Atlantic Nuclear Force, Outline of Her Majesty's Government's Proposal,” subsequently circulated to the other NATO members, which committed British strategic nuclear forces to a new Atlantic nuclear force with the exception of certain bombers, included four Polaris submarines, acceded to the concept of German equality in the force, and agreed to try mixed-manning for some of the bombers. A memorandum of the Ministers' conversation is ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, MLF #4. A copy of the British paper is attached to a December 15 memorandum by Bundy. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF(ANF)) 60. Memorandum of Conversation 60. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 7, 1964, 5 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Under Secretary of State Ambassador David K. E. Bruce McGeorge Bundy William R. Tyler Richard E. Neustadt The British Prime Minister The Foreign Secretary The Defense Secretary Lord Harlech Sir Burke Trend Sir Harold Caccia Sir Solly Zuckerman (The principals were absent when the meeting began. The President and the Prime Minister joined the group at 6:10 p.m.) In the absence of the principals Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by turning to the subject of Minutemen and the problems of mixed-manning them. He said many looked across the Pacific and therefore NATO should not become involved. British Defense Minister Healey observed that such a force, at best, would only be a fraction of the U.S. total capacity. And Gordon Walker added that one wing of mixed-manned Minutemen could not control the remainder. Mr. Ball said that he did not believe the Germans had an interest in participating in a mixed-manned weapons setup in continental U.S. They wanted something in the European area and not anything clearly in the physical control of the U.S. Psychologically, that was a most important factor. Replying, Healey said the Dutch and the Norwegians preferred to be mixed up with the U.S., and it was his understanding that the German Socialists wanted this, too. Those who insisted on having the weapons in Europe were generally looking to the ultimate release of a U.S. veto. Secretary McNamara said this was a difficult problem. Not only was mixed-manning with greater weapons dangerous. The fact was that the U.S. was redesigning the Minuteman and wanted to keep this fact from the USSR. With mixed-manning, it would be difficult to keep. This information was under tight control. Gordon Walker granted that the Secretary's argument on security was powerful, and then turned to the subject of equality with the Germans. He asserted that essentially equality was control and not in the manning arrangements. The system of vetoes proposed by the British took this into account. Healey then asked what the U.S. had in mind at Nassau when it agreed to assign part of its strategic forces under paragraph 6 2 and include Polaris submarines in the multilateral force. Mr. McNamara assumed that the undertakings involved a mixed-manned seaborne force in which British and U.S. Polarises would be included. Healey observed that the details were not spelled out in the communique, and as he read the agreement, it called for equal participation of U.S. and UK forces without reference to mixed-manning. Secretary Ball agreed that the British Government never agreed to join the mixed-manned force but it had clearly agreed to give that concept a free wind. This gave Healey the opportunity to talk about Nassau and particularly about the performance of the Tory leaders. He said the Labor Government was just catching up with the Nassau record, [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ]. He also thought it was unfortunate that the points of agreement at the meeting were not laid down more specifically. It was unclear to Healey how the national and mixed-manning concepts could have become so confused. Mr. Ball explained that the terminology was straightened out after Nassau and the terms “multilateral” and “multinational” were used to define the separate concepts. Mr. McNamara added, however, the presumption always was that the seaborne force would be mixed-manned. Healey then asked if the British contributed their Polaris submarines and V-bombers to the force, what would the U.S. contribution consist of. Mr. McNamara said it was entirely possible to think about putting in B–47s, 52s and 58s, although he wanted to ponder this more carefully and know more about mix-manning bombers. Gordon Walker commented that the NATO working group had already said that the mixed-manned bombers were feasible. Healey then remarked that the real aim was to produce a control system satisfactory to the non-nuclear powers and bring them into the operation so that they would familiarize themselves with the nature and the problems of the strategic forces. Physical contact with missiles alone did not seem to produce the necessary understanding—witness the example of the French. It was important to get down to the hard problems of nuclear strategy before this understanding was achieved. In other words, the most important point of the exercise was its educational value. And Healey doubted that its effectiveness was determined by the existence of mixed-manned surface ships. As far as he could tell, the power of the atom could even be learned from Pershings. Secretary McNamara disagreed and said the problem was far bigger. Moreover, there was a German public to be considered. Continuing on this same point, Healey wondered how much of the German problem was related to a misunderstanding of the U.S. willingness to drop its veto. He said he thought the Germans saw the mixed-manned fleet as one which the German element could come to dominate. Therefore, they were not prepared to accept anything less promising. By the same token, the British felt the persistence of the U.S. veto was an important factor and this had to be made clear to the Germans. Secretary Ball said he could not believe there was such a misunderstanding. The Germans knew the U.S. veto was a fact of life. And as for its relinquishment, he felt certain that they understood this could only be considered when and if Europe was unified under a single executive. Then there clearly would be a new situation and all would be obliged to take a new look at the agreement. Mr. McNamara said he had told Von Hassel quite categorically that the U.S. did not intend to give up the veto. Others could not trigger SAC. The U.S. could not be part of a force in which it did not have a veto. Healey insisted this was precisely the problem. The Germans saw in the McNamara-Ball statements reason to believe they might be on their way to a European deterrent without U.S. interference. He therefore felt strongly that the U.S. position in this matter had to be made as clear to the Germans as it had already been made to the UK and the USSR. Although Mr. Ball asserted the Germans understood this, Healey insisted that the European unification formula could spell the end of non-proliferation. Nuclear weapons then would be turned over under certain circumstances to present non-nuclear European powers. And the concept of a unified Europe was in itself an equivocation. The Secretary of State said he could not see the British point because in his mind he could not envisage a Europe that did not at least have a France and/or a Britain. The discussion then went back to the mixed-manned surface force with Healey contending that the Germans saw in this element a half-way measure to a European force without a U.S. veto. When Mr. Ball pointed out that Great Britain would in any event have its veto, Gordon Walker insisted there was a point beyond which one nation could not hold out against the others. Greater protection was needed and this would have to be a clear U.S. statement of its intention to retain its veto. Mr. Ball said that the U.S. did not want to take a position which said the U.S. would not give up its veto under any circumstances and thereby play right into the hands of the Gaullists. And Gordon Walker replied, “But if you don't, you raise hopes that should not have been raised.” Secretary McNamara wondered which Germans the British were talking about. Responsible German leaders (e.g. Von Hassel) with whom he talked clearly understood that the U.S. was not going to give up the veto and accepted this. The Secretary of State added that the Germans in fact had said quite frankly they saw the multilateral force as an element tying the U.S. more closely to Europe. Healey said there were at least two forces in Germany—those who wanted closer ties with the U.S. and those who wanted to separate Europe from the U.S. for whatever reasons. And the latter saw in the MLF potential bargaining power for themselves in bargaining with the USSR. When Secretary McNamara denied this was a position of responsible Germans, Gordon Walker retorted that one German who felt this way was Hallstein, who saw the multilateral force as the beginning of a European force which in turn would be an important element of a politically unified Europe. Mr. Ball thought it would be disastrous to let the impression get around that the Anglo-Saxons were trying to prevent a political Europe. Gordon Walker said he could see the problem of wanting to hedge the veto commitment for the political reasons stated. But the fact was that it would be difficult for Britain to join the force unless the U.S. position on the veto was clear. Mr. Ball said it was his feeling we were really talking about words and not substance. It was important to get the language correct and this the U.S. would try to do. Healey expressed concern about the attitudes of Germans conducting the multilateral force negotiations. They seemed to find it difficult to look at anything other than the original multilateral force proposals, and there was some fuzziness about controls. The danger was that if there was misunderstanding all around, strains within the Alliance would be increased with all that that implied. Secretary McNamara described his conversation on this subject with Von Hassel. He said he told the German Defense Minister that the multilateral force would be a substitute for and not an add-on to the U.S. nuclear strength with the Germans paying for something the Americans had been financing hitherto. Moreover, the U.S. would retain its veto. He also told Von Hassel the Germans had to assume responsibility for selling the concept to the Germans—that the Americans were only interested if the Europeans wanted it. The Americans would not do the selling job. (At this point Healey asked whether the American effort over the past months could be described as anything less than a selling effort.) Mr. McNamara went on to say that in reply Von Hassel told him categorically that the German Government [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. It was concerned that if Germany did not have a role in the multilateral mixed-manned force, elements within Germany would be pushing for more. In addition, Von Hassel expressed the Germans' concern about possible U.S. isolationism. They did not want to be left alone and felt the multilateral force would serve to tie the U.S. to Europe for a long time. Mr. McNamara felt certain there was no misunderstanding about this in Von Hassel's mind. Gordon Walker observed that he did not see a great rush of the allies going forward in a tremendous force to join the multilateral force. To this Mr. Ball replied that very few things are done by acclamation. The idea seemed good to us. The Germans felt it was important. The German problem is difficult and it was only prudent to consider the matter very carefully. Responding to Healey and Gordon Walker's assertions that the British proposals in fact called for German-UK equality by bringing Germany in the nuclear club, Mr. Ball reiterated that equality of Germany with the other Europeans was most important. This was the reason for the mixed-manned proposal. And redoing the concept now would be difficult. Gordon Walker thought the Germans would be very equal if the British put in the weapons they were proposing and agreed to share control. After all, control rather than manning was the measure of equality. At this point Secretary Rusk said he thought that over-emphasis on the veto seemed to throw the entire concept out of kilter. More than one nation would make the decision and the U.S. will be participating in the decision-making process. Gordon Walker then said he did not mind this at all if the U.S. would say it would always participate in the force. Mr. Ball then reminded the British that the prestige of the German Government was tied to the mixed-manned concept. If Great Britain stood aside, an unequal situation would be created. No matter what the British contributed to the force the important point was that they had to participate in mixed-manning. Healey wondered why the U.S. was pushing the British and not the Germans so hard. After all, the UK was offering to provide one-third of the power of the force which included a mixed-manned element. This was a higher share than was contemplated for the British in the first place. Sir Solly Zuckerman then intervened to raise the question of participation. He pointed out that any one element could trigger the rest. Command therefore was most important. If participation were subdivided there could not be command. Gordon Walker pointed out that in the British view they were making a great concession by giving the Germans control over what they put into the force. But Mr. Ball argued that if the British followed through on what they were suggesting they would be avoiding participation in something in which everyone else joined. Healey denied this again, enumerating the proposed British contribution of 4 submarines and 5 to 6 squadrons of mixed-manned V-bombers. Not everyone need mix in the fleet and in the V-bombers. Equality in effect—repeating Gordon Walker's earlier point—was not established by mixed-manning; equality was derived from control. As the President and the Prime Minister rejoined the group, Mr. Ball ended this phase of the discussion by emphasizing that there was a need to give the Germans full participation and this could only be accomplished by avoiding special participation arrangements for the British and others. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2460. Secret. The source text, dated December 10, bears no drafting information. The conversation was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. 2 For text of the Nassau communique, December 21, 1962, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637. 61. Memorandum of Conversation 61. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 8, 1964, 4 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Under Secretary of State Ambassador David K. E. Bruce McGeorge Bundy William R. Tyler Richard E. Neustadt The British Prime Minister The Foreign Secretary The Defense Secretary Lord Harlech Sir Burke Trend Sir Harold Caccia The Prime Minister opened the conversation by saying he had 19 points to raise in connection with the American paper and one general question to ask—was his assumption correct that the British paper 2 and the American paper entitled “Comments on the UK Proposal” (attached) were to be read together? (Secretary Rusk indicated that they could, but this would not imply a commitment by the US side.) Then, referring to the American paper, he wondered whether the phrase at the bottom of page 1 to the effect “any future agreement must be acceptable to the alliance” implied a readiness to accept a French veto. (Mr. Bundy said this was not the case.) On page 2, under the section on “Objectives”, he thought a third item should be added indicating that anything done in this context should not foreclose the possibility of an East-West detente. The Prime Minister said the British would have to reserve their position on paragraph 3 c. dealing with the surface fleet. He felt paragraph 3 d. lacked definition. Moreover, it was the British impression that the Nassau commitment required equal U.S. and U.K. contributions. The British felt further discussion was needed of the permissive action links. The Prime Minister reserved the British position on the “eventual mixed-manning of submarines.” He said the UK could not make a commitment to contribute manpower to the operation of a mixed-manned surface force and would have to reserve on paragraph 4 b. The Prime Minister asked for a fuller explanation of the phrase “a partial substitute” for programmed U.S. forces in paragraph 4 c. (The British subsequently accepted “substitution for part of” as an unambiguous and understandable word.) In connection with paragraph 4 d., he wondered about the firmness of the figure “not less than 200 missiles” and specifically how Blue Steel, V-bombers, and other British contributions might be counted against the total. As for paragraph 4 e., the Prime Minister said the British were in agreement but this raised the question of maintaining national communication with the submarines in the event the force was dissolved. This problem clearly needed further discussion and understanding. With reference to paragraph 5 on the possible contribution of U.S. strategic weapons he wondered which weapons the U.S. had in mind and whether the U.S. contribution would match the British. He reserved Britain's position on paragraph 7 dealing with command arrangements and the force's NATO connection. He said the British welcomed the first sentence of paragraph 8, but could not accept the second sentence. In their view, provision had to be made for a specific UK veto as well as a potential French veto. (Gordon Walker elaborated on this to say that however this was done, the countries having the veto had to be specifically named.) The Prime Minister said he was unclear as to what was meant by “France” in paragraph 9 (which called for periodic meetings of defense ministers). If this were to take place in the multilateral force context, Britain, by having given up its independent deterrent, would be meeting France on unequal terms. This made no sense. The entire paragraph should be dropped. If the suggestions dealt with periodic defense ministers' meetings outside the framework of the multilateral force, this would best be raised in another context. The Prime Minister said he was not sure what the phrase “a unified Europe” in paragraph 10 meant. There was no precise definition of this. Definition was important because the British were against U.S. surrendering its veto to several things that might pass for a unified Europe. More specifically, how would this qualification be phrased without suggesting that the U.S. would sell off its share, and thus vitiate its veto. In the last sentence of para. 10, the Prime Minister asked whether the words “new as of now” could be added to protect the British position. Without this qualification, the British might be placed in the category of a non-nuclear power at the time of the force's dissolution. (Secretary Rusk agreed there was no problem here. He said the language was designed to prevent the establishment of new systems.) In para. 11 a., the Prime Minister expressed uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase “these matters.” He presumed this meant the totality of both the U.S. and UK documents and comments. (The Secretary agreed it did.) And as for para. 11 b., he wanted the whole section deleted. As it now stood it put France above the UK. Replying to the Prime Minister's comments, the Secretary of State said that the proposed proviso concerning the possible frustration of an East-West deterrent had to be handled carefully. The multilateral force concept had to be dealt with in a context other than nonproliferation. The Soviets had to understand that this force could only be subject to the process of disarmament and could not be canceled out in a non-dissemination framework. The Secretary went on to explain that the question of the numbers of missiles and possible substitutions had to mean specifically the submarine Polarises—not free-falling bombs. Mr. Bundy added that the UK paper seemed to make it clear that the subs would replace the V-bombers and therefore both the subs and the V-bombers could not be added together. The 200 had to be Polaris missiles. Mr. McNamara agreed with the Prime Minister that direct national communication with the submarines was needed in the event of dissolution of the force. He assured the Prime Minister this and PAL could be handled so that the interests of the UK and the U.S. would be protected. At this juncture British Defense Minister Healey turned the conversation to the Nassau communique, asserting that the U.S. had agreed to an equal contribution with the UK. Unless this were done, the UK contribution would be difficult to sell politically. Replying to this, Secretary Ball said we had to be concerned with two concepts of equality—one with Germany which was essential and the other was equality with the U.S. which had to be brought into sensible focus. As for the Nassau commitment, Mr. Ball made the point that this present concept was far more ambitious than that envisaged at Nassau and therefore the Nassau communique could not be governing. Moreover, the U.S. was prepared to make a very substantial contribution to the surface fleet. Joining the argument, Mr. McNamara added that one had to look at the Nassau components as linked parts—requiring the U.S. and UK to join the multilateral force, without specifying the contributions but making it clear that the input would be seaborne. The clear implication was there would be British participation in the multilateral arrangement—the mixed-manned element. In connection with the same point, Mr. Bundy said there was a significant difference between the British problem and that of the U.S. The UK wanted to put its total strategic force in the hands of the Alliance. Therefore, it was to the British advantage to put the submarines into the new force. The British could put specific ships in with an irrevocable commitment. The U.S. could not follow suit and it was therefore not possible to insist upon an equal contribution. Since the ships involved would be a portion of the total U.S. force, the U.S. would have to be able to rotate them. The arrangement therefore must be asymmetrical. Moreover, the U.S. contribution to the force could not be part of an Anglo-American package; it had to be handled in a broader context. Healey was prepared to accept this rationale. He added, however, a U.S. contribution of submarines to the force should be equal to the British even though the terms of the assignment might be different. At this point the Prime Minister made some comments about the Nassau meeting generally, saying it was hastily and badly done. This time he hoped the nuclear issues were being handled more sensibly and perhaps the services of Neustadt would not be called for again. Going on to a discussion of voting arrangements, the Prime Minister made the point that the right of decision to fire the force was also the right of decision not to fire the force. Gordon Walker seized this opportunity again to explain the difference between nuclear and nonnuclear members of the force and to insist the British did not want to be locked into a European veto but had to have a veto all their own. This caused Mr. Ball to ask whether the British were not thereby denying German equality. Healey, ignoring this point, went on to stress that the nuclear powers had to retain their vetoes, otherwise nuclear proliferation would take place. Secretary Rusk ended this part of the discussion by saying that this problem of how the Europeans organized themselves had to be dealt with on the other side of the Atlantic between the British and the other Europeans. This brought the discussion back to paragraph 9 with Gordon Walker reiterating that the American proposal tended to give France a political advantage over the UK. Mr. Bundy denied this and asked rhetorically whether the British were prepared to accept a breakdown of communication with France. And after some more remarks by the British Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister said this particular problem could be resolved by dropping the paragraph entirely. Returning to the definition of a unified Europe, as used in paragraph 10, Gordon Walker reiterated it could be anything, including Fouchet's version—and if this were the case, the question of a European force without a U.S. veto was absolutely out of the question. Under Secretary Ball denied there was any fuzziness about the concept of a unified Europe. In political terms it meant the delegations of authority to a single political executive empowered to make decisions of peace and war. To deny that we would never give up the veto would imply we were against the unification of Europe and play directly into the hands of the Gaullists. The U.S. could not promise that it would retain its veto forever. It could make it clear that without a veto it would have no interest in maintaining its share of the force and feel free to withdraw its umbrella. (This pleased Gordon Walker and he said so.) The Prime Minister agreed Mr. Ball's point was most important, and added that the establishment of a new nuclear power via the European route was intolerable. Secretary Ball reiterated if the European force went European it would have to do so without U.S. warheads. But the important point was that we had to be responsive to the honorable and responsible Europeans. Secretary Rusk reminded the Prime Minister that this problem was already with us. France was a nuclear power without the U.S. or UK veto. And Mr. Bundy added we clearly would not have sovereign power over such nations; all we could do was make their enterprises more difficult. Healey said he had no problem with this point so long as the ideas just exchanged were properly spelled out. Turning to the German aspects of the case, Gordon Walker asked whether the Americans could not tell the Germans that the U.S. was not partial to any particular version of the multilateral force so that an honest German reaction to the surface fleet might be elicited. The Secretary replied the long history of the concept made it impossible to say at this juncture that specifics made no difference to the U.S. It was too far along for that. However, the U.S. had no objections to the British discussing this matter frankly with the Germans. Amplifying the Secretary's remarks, Mr. Ball said that the surface fleet had a number of purposes and to say that the U.S. was now indifferent would be tantamount to asserting that the conclusions reached over a long time were being disregarded. There was no question that the German views should be based on their needs and not on our desires. But there was no reason to believe their views as given to us were not so based. In this connection Mr. Bundy stressed the importance of giving the Germans a sense of the discussions taking place here in Washington so they could make sensible judgment about the concept and their commitment to it. Healey interjected to say that the past proposals had been acceptable only to the Germans. The new proposals would add the UK to the group of supporters. Indeed, this might well bring others along. Therefore, when these discussions are reported to the Germans, some sympathy should be shown to the UK proposals for, in fact, it is important the UK needs be met along with the German needs. Mr. Ball said the Germans really did not have many options. The alternatives to the mixed-manned surface force were the MRBMs which had been ruled and the Minutemen which had been ruled out. So were the submarines. Therefore, their only alternatives were ships and V-bombers. And the clear fact was that the V-bombers were obsolescent. Healey then insisted that it was difficult for Britain to participate in a surface fleet. Therefore, it was important to be sure that British participation was an essential German requirement and not merely something the Germans were stressing because they thought the Americans wanted it. Mr. Bundy said he could understand the British political problem, especially given the positions taken by the Labor Party when it was in opposition. But it was difficult for him to conceive that Britain, the “mother of sea power” could not recruit 100 technicians for the mixed-manned force. The Prime Minister took time out to say that the mixed-manned surface fleet issue could bring the Labor Government down. Even though the Tory Government had given equivocal support to this concept, the Tories were now ready to bring the Labor Government down on this issue. Therefore, the U.S. position was most important and the British attitude toward the force would be governed by the permanence of the American veto. Secretary Rusk reemphasized the need for a clear British exchange with the Germans. And the Prime Minister, picking up this point, said there ought not to be any impression anywhere of an Anglo-American fix. The Prime Minister then changed the line of discussion and told the President that he expected to have a problem with this broader issue next week when there would be a parliamentary debate on foreign and defense policy. (In passing, he commented caustically about the debate the Tories forced on him on the eve of his Washington trip.) He expected the talk to be rough, but promised to stand by the communique and “not to put a gloss on it.” 3 He assured the President his statement of the American position would be the same as that in the communique. But he also wanted to be able to discuss the British document handed over the previous day and wondered whether this would cause a problem. The Secretary of State said he thought it could, because it was difficult to debate publicly issues being discussed privately. The Prime Minister noted he would feel compelled to spell out some of the points covered in the communique and the Foreign Secretary added that the government would almost certainly be forced to discuss the U.S. veto. Mr. Bundy felt suitable language could be found. He thought this might be workable if the Prime Minister checked his proposed language with us before he used it in parliament. Saying he was thinking out loud, the Prime Minister told the President he would tell the Commons where the UK Government stood; that it had presented a comprehensive proposal; that he would stand on his earlier statements on the surface fleet and non-proliferation; but that he would emphasize that the problem was under discussion with the allies, and the British participation in the mixed-manned force was being reserved. He would also have to spell out the new British proposal but in his presentation would play down negative aspects and stick to the communique in describing the U.S. position. In any event, he would explain that all these proposals were subject to allied decision. There was a clear understanding at the end of this discussion that the Prime Minister would have his proposed language on this matter, particularly that dealing with the U.S. veto, cleared with the U.S. before he went before the Commons. [Here follow 2 pages of discussion on Vietnam.] Attachment 4 Washington, December 8, 1964. U.S. COMMENTS ON THE UK PROPOSAL OF A PROJECT FORAN ATLANTIC NUCLEAR FORCE 1. Preamble After review of our own views and those of our allies, and after particular consideration of the proposals of HMG for an Atlantic nuclear force, we offer the following comments relating to the establishment of such a force. These comments are designed to take account both of the extended discussions which have occurred since 1962 and of the new proposals of HMG. We believe that any successful plan must be responsive to the real requirements of as many members of the Alliance as possible. In this spirit, we emphasize that these suggestions are subject to discussion and revision in the light of the comments which will be sought from other interested governments. As the President and the Prime Minister have agreed from the beginning of these discussions, no agreements or commitments are being made in this first exchange of views. Moreover, the issues before us extend far beyond the interests of our two nations alone, and any future agreement must be acceptable to the Alliance. 2. Objectives We believe that any new arrangement of nuclear forces of NATO must meet the following objectives: a. To deter nuclear proliferation by making it possible for non-nuclear members of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in the ownership, management and control of NATO's nuclear forces through collective action and without the creation of new independent national nuclear systems. b. To strengthen the unity of the Alliance by providing for systematic and greatly increased collaboration and consultation in the nuclear field. 3. Specific Comments on the UK's Proposed Force We believe that it would be appropriate to have discussions with other interested NATO governments of a concept of an Atlantic nuclear force which might have the following components: a. Three or four Polaris submarines to be transferred to the force by the British Government. b. Such elements of the British V-bomber force as HMG is prepared to contribute. c. A Polaris surface fleet having substantially the characteristics—if not the size—of that contemplated in the discussions of the working group in Paris. This force should have a size adequate to the needs and interests of non-nuclear powers which wish to participate in it, but we are prepared to discuss reductions from the initial proposals in the light of other contributions now in contemplation. d. Such strategic nuclear forces as the United States or France might be prepared to subscribe. 4. Characteristics of the Force a. We consider it essential that all elements of the force be under a common command and control arrangement, including permissive action links. While the Polaris submarines could be organized at least initially on a basis of national manning, the eventual mixed-manning of submarines should not be precluded if subsequent studies indicate its feasibility and desirability. b. We also consider it essential to the success of this proposal that there should be a substantial UK contribution of manpower for the operation of the mixed-manned surface force, in order to insure that this arrangement commands the confidence of other participants. c. Creation of this force should be conceived not as an addition to strategic forces that would otherwise be provided, but as a partial substitute, since it is the current expectation that presently programmed US forces will be appropriately reduced as the new force comes into being. d. We believe that the new force, whatever its eventual components, should have a strength of not less than 200 missiles. e. All the weapons systems transferred to the ANF would be committed for the life of the force. In the event of dissolution of the force, submarines and bombers would revert to the national ownership of the respective contributing state. Missiles and warheads in the surface fleet would also be returned to the supplying country. f. We are prepared to consider a change in the name of the force, but we believe a decision on the name should be reserved to later multilateral negotiations. 5. Contribution of the United States Forces Should the concept discussed above prove acceptable to other allies, we would be prepared to consider a contribution to this new force of certain U.S. strategic weapons provided that discussions with other allies indicate a general desire for such a contribution, and provided that it can be made on terms which are practicable for the United States. 6. Non-Dissemination The treaty establishing the new arrangements should include undertakings whereby nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to acquire, or obtain control over, them. 7. Command Arrangements in Relation to NATO We take note of the suggestion that the Atlantic missile force described above might be assigned to a separate commander. We are also familiar with the strongly expressed view of other allies that this force should be under the command of SACEUR. We think that this question of command should be left open for discussion among all interested parties. 8. Voting Arrangements The agreement of the United States would be required in order to fire the force. The votes of the European members should be cast in a manner agreed to by them. The voting procedure could be revised only with the agreement of all of the participating nations. 9. Periodic Meetings of the Ministers of Defense In order to make more effective the present procedures for consultation among the Western Powers, we suggest periodic meetings of the Ministers of Defense. These meetings would be held on an informal basis, and would consider targeting policy, new nuclear and conventional weapons developments, nuclear dispersal plans, future force structure, resource allocation, and strategy. 10. Review Provisions We believe any agreement should contain provisions for review of the arrangements if (a) Germany is reunified; (b) a unified Europe is established, or (c) there is a major movement toward arms control or disarmament. As stated in 8 above, any new agreement would require the approval of all participants, and we note that in the case of the US any change in control arrangements would be subject to full Constitutional approval. The agreement should be so drafted that termination of the Force would not result in the creation of new national nuclear systems. 11. Future Procedure a. A meeting of representatives of interested governments should be held early in 1965. They should be asked to review these matters and to prepare recommendations for their respective governments. b. At an early stage in the development of these recommendations, and well before any final agreements are reached among interested parties, arrangements should be made for discussions with the Government of France. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2460. Secret. The source text, dated December 10, bears no drafting information. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 See Document 59 . A list of the questions, numbering 20 rather than 19, and the answers are attached to the December 15 memorandum from Bundy cited in Document 59 . 3 For text of the joint communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 615–616. 4 Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. 62. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 62. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 1 Washington, December 9, 1964. The President has asked me to make his position very clear to Lord Harlech, in order that there be no misunderstanding of the forebearance and restraint with which he conducted his discussions of the Atlantic nuclear problem with Mr. Wilson. I am doing this, and I shall explain to Lord Harlech that I am doing it at the direct request of the President. As I said on the telephone, 2 I believe it would be helpful for you to say these things to the Prime Minister, although not on the basis of a direct Presidential instruction. I think you are right in worrying about the temptations Mr. Wilson may feel in the heat of debate, and you are the one in the best position to give him a personal warning on this specific point. What I shall say to Lord Harlech at the President's direction is the following: 1. The President wants to be very sure that the Prime Minister does not misunderstand his position on the nuclear force problem. The President and Senator Humphrey are both political men and the President in particular knows what a close election is like. It seemed to them that it would be unfair to force an immediate decision, against his previous record, on a man who has been in power less than two months, with a four-seat majority and a very grave economic and financial crisis on his hands. The President therefore decided not to force the pace with the Prime Minister, but rather to allow his advisers to explain American thinking as clearly as they could within a framework which the President deliberately set as one of discussion and not of decision. 2. The President also recognized and understood the importance of giving the British a free hand in finding out for themselves the real position and convictions of the Government in Bonn. The Laborites have been telling us for a long time that we do not properly understand the Germans. There is every reason for the Prime Minister to satisfy himself directly on this point, and if we have been wrong in our estimate of the Germans, no one is more interested than we in finding out. 3. But by the same token, we hope that the British Government will take very seriously whatever they do find in their discussions with the Germans, and our own first impression, after a very frank and entirely open-ended discussion with Schroeder, 3 is that the British will find the Germans at least as firm on a number of basic questions as we have thought. 4. Meanwhile the President is gravely concerned by the risk that the Prime Minister may give others the impression that the U.S. has in any way backed off from its basic assessment of the situation as outlined in the paper of comments which was given to Her Majesty's Government on December 8. 4 The fact that the President himself did not press the argument was merely an indication of his desire not to force the judgment on the Prime Minister now. The President noted that the Prime Minister himself did not pursue the argument on specific points, and his assumption is that the two governments will eventually have to bring the matter to a decision after due allowance for discussions which are in prospect with others. 5. The President has asked me to emphasize particularly to the Ambassador the very great damage which could be done if the Prime Minister should take a line next week in the House of Commons that would make those eventual decisions more difficult. The President knows the temptations of debate, and he has already had one painful experience with a speech of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons. 5 If the impression should be created in the United States that the Prime Minister was trying to strengthen his position by seeming to have “won a victory” over Washington, the President would find it necessary to take a very different attitude toward this whole series of discussions. I will tell the Ambassador, as my personal judgment, that a man in the Prime Minister's position would be extremely ill-advised to run any risks of this sort with a sensitive and determined man like President Johnson, since the President has plenty of cards to play if this becomes a public contest. I shall tell Lord Harlech that the President has shown great restraint in these last days because of his concern to avoid any appearance of running a power play against a weak opponent. But if his generosity is misunderstood, I doubt if it is likely to last. McGeorge Bundy 6 1 Source: Department of State, S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182, Memoranda. Secret. 2 This telephone conversation has not been further identified. 3 Schroeder visited Washington November 23–24. In addition to several bilateral topics, he and Rusk discussed the MLF with Schroeder saying that Bonn would not accept discrimination against Germany in the MLF and stressing the need to conclude negotiations by March of 1965. (Memorandum of conversation, November 26; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 4 Attachment to Document 61 . 5 Presumably a reference to Wilson's November 23 speech. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 63. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 63. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 10, 1964. SUBJECT The Value of Your Meeting with Wilson 1. A couple of times in the last few days you have strongly expressed to me your doubts about the value of having Harold Wilson here. Since I think that this was without doubt the most productive and useful two days that we have had in foreign affairs since President Kennedy went to Berlin, 2 I would like to urge the opposite view for a minute. 2. Let me begin with the obvious negative fact that there is just no way in the world that a President of the United States can avoid reasonably regular visits from the Prime Minister of Great Britain. If you had said to Wilson that you were unwilling to see him in December, the reaction everywhere would have been strongly critical. You may feel that this is outrageous, given the difference between his position and yours, but it is a fact. Winston Churchill made it so. 3. There can be real inconvenience in these meetings, because there is no certain way of predicting what issues will come up. The Nassau meeting 3 was not set up to deal with Skybolt, which broke over its head because of the timing of our DOD budget. There was no such difficulty this time, because we knew that the Atlantic nuclear problem would be at center stage, but the handling of the matter was certainly very difficult. 4. In this situation the first achievement was to avoid a failure. You received a very strong recommendation to force Wilson to a decision, and you carefully walked around that and took a different and better course. This was a major achievement and it had several consequences: (1) We have had a very straight and honest talk with the British back and forth on the hard elements of the problem, and they have gone off to talk on their own with the Germans. This puts the ball back in the European court, and places you as the firm but patient leader of the Alliance. (2) You have laid basis for political education and political leadership with Congress as the progress of the enterprise justifies it. We have a major problem of communication with the Leadership and the relevant committees, but we have won time in which to go about it. (3) Perhaps most important of all, this meeting has forced discussions between you and your advisers which has for the first time given both you and them a clear understanding of the problem and the way you want it treated. (4) As a consequence, George Ball himself has reached the decision to reorganize the Department of State in this area, and no more important or constructive administrative decision has been made in the last 18 months in that Department. It is true that that decision should have been made a year ago, but it wasn't. It may seem strange that an internal administrative decision should have to wait upon a meeting between you and the British Prime Minister, but that is how this Government has worked for a generation. The President signals his real beliefs at his convenience, and this is the time that was convenient and right for you. If I had sent you a memorandum on the way to handle the MLF last August or September, you would quite properly have ignored it, and without clear proof of your own personal view, George Ball simply would not have acted. 5. From now on, it seems to me, the progress of this Atlantic negotiation will need your own continued personal command, and I will make it my business to make sure that the state of the play is before you at every stage and that every significant decision is signaled as far ahead of time as possible. 6. So, in sum, the Wilson meeting has not only been a modest success in its own right, but a turning point in the process by which you take the effective command of a major issue of foreign policy. This is quite a lot for two days—and I am omitting the fringe benefit that at least a hundred of your warmest political supporters were given a thank-you dinner of the most fashionable possible sort, because glamour is one thing the British still bring with them. Unrepentantly, McG. B. P.S. I am doing a separate memo on the exact negotiating position on this issue as I now understand it. This is simply an informal defense of the fact that we had a meeting at all. P.P.S. I am also doing a memo on what you might say about this on Saturday if you have a press conference; I think there is quite a lot. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 7. Secret. 2 June 26, 1963. 3 December 18–21, 1962. 64. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 64. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 15, 1964, 12 a.m. Secto 12. Following report of conversation between Secretary and De Gaulle is FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision on review. Together with Tyler and Bohlen Secretary called on De Gaulle today. He had with him Alphand and interpreter Andronikof. The conversation lasted for one hour and a half and was cordial and relaxed. Secretary conveyed to De Gaulle greetings from President Johnson which he received with pleasure and expressed his gratification at President's electoral victory. The conversation covered essentially two subjects: 1) Germany and its future, and 2) future defense of Europe and American role therein. Secretary told De Gaulle that President Johnson was very anxious that our two countries should have a clear exchange of views in order to clear up any misunderstandings and clarify any obscure points in the many complicated questions that were before them; that Secretary would like to speak about the present involvement, and particularly military presence in Europe, which stemmed from two different sources. One was responsibilities left over from World War II which was shared with France in regard to the unsettled business of Germany and Berlin. These obligations we felt would remain upon us as long as Germany remained divided and Berlin remained divided. The second reason was expressed in the NATO treaty which the U.S. had adopted in 1949 following the events in Czechoslovakia, the menace to Western Europe from rearmament of Eastern Europe, and certain indications that Stalin has given in regard to military conquests in Europe. This had been a big step for the U.S. to take and had been a reversal of previous policy of isolationism, but these commitments had been seriously meant and for a long term. Secretary said of course it was conceivable that at some date in the future Europe might be able to organize its own defense but that there had as yet been no signs, either in budgetary matters or in allocation or resources or in other fields, although at some point in the future it would be possible to discuss it. Secretary then asked De Gaulle if he could give his views in regard to the U.S. involvement in the defense of Europe. De Gaulle in his reply said he understood Secretary was speaking of two subjects: Germany and its future, and the future defense of Europe. In regard to Germany he said the U.S. had after World War I helped Germany to recover, had opposed reparations from Germany, and had been against the occupation of the Ruhr, and had helped Germany industry through investment, etc. U.S. assistance after World War II had been even more marked; Marshall Plan, stationing of troops in Germany and in West Berlin, and assistance in the involvement of West Germany in the Western camp. France had suffered much from Germany, had with perhaps greater caution accepted the reemergence of Germany as a natural phenomenon, particularly after World War II in the light of the Soviet menace, and had rendered modest economic, moral and even military assistance. France, however, was more alert to the long term dangers of German revival since it was true that an “unhappy” Germany was not dangerous, but a prosperous Germany began to develop ambitions which through her national heritage and geographic position could be dangerous. He said Germany was a matter of concern to all European countries, even including England. There were three questions of importance in regard to Germany's future development. One related to frontiers, in which France considered that the existing frontiers, of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, were just and should be the definitive boundaries of Germany. The second question was that of reunification. France was not opposed since this was logical and human, but it could not be done against the opposition of the East. The countries of Eastern Europe were against it and therefore it was not a current question. The third question was the German military power. Germany has conventional forces in NATO where they represented no danger to anyone, but the acquisition by Germany either directly or indirectly of nuclear power would not be acceptable to France, nor he felt to any other European country, certainly in the East, nor did he feel in the West. The advantage of any such development would be derisory whereas the disadvantages would be very great. On reunification, he raised the question of how this could be achieved. He said the policy which he attributed to John Foster Dulles of using positions of strength had not impressed the Soviets and had not brought reunification and was therefore abandoned. One other possibility, certainly opposed by the French, was West Germany going over to the Soviet side, and perhaps with a regime favorable to the Soviet Union some arrangement for reunification could be worked out. This was only a theory and not in his opinion a possibility. The third possibility was that at some point in the future the East, particularly Moscow, would agree on conditions relating especially to German military power which would lead to the reunification of Germany. This was not an unimaginable possibility but it might take a long while. In any event there seemed to be no other solution and in the meantime Germany would have to remain as it was. In regard to the defense of Europe, De Gaulle stated that the U.S. had indeed assured the defense of Western Europe in the immediate post-war years, for which thanks were due. He had already said so publicly and would say so again. But now no one in Europe believed in the imminence of a Soviet attack, nor he felt did the U.S. It was not considered likely that the Soviet Union, Brezhnev and Kosygin, 2 would launch an attack on Western Europe, nor that the West would attack the Soviet Union. In addition, the countries of Europe have changed. They have recovered their economic health, and certain countries, in particular France and potentially Germany, are beginning to acquire a sense of international responsibility. He did not speak of Italy or Great Britain, which are different cases. 3 France now is making nuclear bombs, although few in number, but Germany is trying through the MLF to get some control of U.S. bombs. De Gaulle said that the form, and he repeated the form, of the Alliance no longer corresponded to reality. The U.S. which had been the sole deciding voice in the Alliance earlier had made its own plans, placed troops in Europe, deployed tactical nuclear weapons, and had plans for escalation which would involve at a certain time under certain conditions, as yet unknown, the use of this nuclear power, but always on our choice. He said that he felt that the organization of the Alliance must be placed on a new basis. He recalled that earlier he had proposed to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan a change in the organization of NATO but it has produced no results. At present the Alliance was cracking at the seams, with France producing its own atomic weapons while Germany had none and England was less and less disposed to make the necessary outlay of expenses for the defense of Europe. He said that the MLF would destroy NATO as we knew it. It would no longer be the existing organization of the North Atlantic Treaty. Even if there was no MLF it would be necessary to remake the organization before 1969. At this point De Gaulle stated that it was not necessary to be integrated in order to be allied, citing in support of this view the fact that in 1962 France had rallied to U.S. support over the Cuban missile crisis although Cuba is not in NATO area. Secretary told De Gaulle he wished to comment on a number of his observations. In the first instance Secretary could tell him privately that we were in full agreement in regard to his position on the German frontiers. We had told the Germans that we had not fought World War II in order to become involved in World War III over German claims to lands in Eastern Europe. We were not stating our position publicly since the Germans hoped to be able to use it for bargaining purposes in an eventual peace conference, but if the Germans spoke about it publicly in Germany we might have to make our position public. In regard to reunification, we agreed that it would take a long time and we did not believe either in any policy of forcible reunification. We felt that too long a division would provide a fertile ground for the emergence of bad elements in Germany due to frustration. It was our hope that at some point in the future Eastern European countries would see that German reunification was really to their interest and that possibly, if coupled with some form of disarmament, might be more palatable to them. De Gaulle interjected here the comment that a divided Germany is a matter of concern but unified Germany is also a matter of concern. As to German force, we have a feeling that there are two ways in which a nation becomes involved in nuclear matters: 1) national control over national weapons, and 2) as a target. There are a number of nations in Europe that are targets to Soviet missiles and we felt they had a right to participate in certain aspects of nuclear matters and that this was what the MLF was trying to do. It was a means of preventing the Germans from developing in the future a national weapon. We had originally supposed that France, while not taking part, had no objection other European members taking part. It now appears that French objections are more specific. Also, we did not see the MLF as the first of a series of steps ending in national German nuclear capability. We felt that like the question of unification, to absolutely deny any German involvement in nuclear matters would bring into power the wrong kind of Germans. Finally Secretary said that while we did agree that in December 1964 there was very little chance of the Soviets initiating an attack we were not completely certain that such a situation would last. At the end of World War II we had demobilized our forces thereby possibly exposing Stalin to temptation. Two years ago had been the Cuban missile crisis, and about two and one half years ago the Berlin menace. We would like to observe further developments behind the Iron Curtain and the emergence of contacts with the West in similar matters before coming to the conclusion about the possibility of future crisis. De Gaulle replied that he agreed completely that while there were no grounds for fearing an attack at the moment this did not mean that there never would be. He mentioned in this connection China. He was in complete agreement that there was no basis in the modern world for any form of unilateral disarmament and that was why the French Government, at great expense, was developing a nuclear arm. It also was for this reason why the French Government felt that the maintenance of the Alliance was of great importance. It is true, he said, that the French had not taken the MLF so seriously in the beginning since they thought it was more or less in the nature of a military theme or a staff study, but that recently the Germans and ourselves, and he emphasized we were the only two that counted, had given the thing much more substance. He said the French fully realized we were retaining control of our bombs and it is our decision alone in regard to their use, but nevertheless the MLF would give the appearance of German participation; for example, targeting in the East which would have a bad effect in Eastern Europe and not too good in the West. He said if it had the advantage of assuring that Germans would never get the weapon this might be some compensation, but he said you know and we know that the MLF will not eliminate the German appetite but will in all probability increase it, and added that the U.S. might be able to prevent them from acquiring the bomb but could not prevent them wanting it. He said even more importantly it changed the entire texture of the organization of the Alliance which had been based upon the proposition of the equality of European countries under the protection of the U.S. and this would give the Germans a privileged position. The MLF would be disastrous for NATO. Secretary said in conclusion that he wished to assure President De Gaulle that never at any time either in its inception or subsequent development had the MLF been considered by the U.S. as aimed at France or in conflict with French interests. We had always understood that at some time in the future there would be discussions among NATO members on nuclear matters; that we had understood from previous conversations with General De Gaulle that they were not yet prepared for such discussions and that we had genuinely thought that France had no objection to the MLF. De Gaulle agreed that at some time in the future there would have to be such discussion on the coordination of nuclear weapons in time of war. He said they would be ready to discuss this in 1967 or 1968 at which time they would be ready to take up the changes in the organization of the Alliance if there was no drama or crisis at that time. The possibility of another meeting with De Gaulle was left open and will be determined tomorrow. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Leonid I. Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. 3 Couve de Murville had argued along similar lines in a conversation with Ball on December 2 during Ball's trip to London and Paris. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). 4 In a second conversation on December 16, Rusk and De Gaulle discussed the spread of nuclear weapons and Southeast Asia. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in Secto 26 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2534) 65. National Security Action Memorandum No. 322 65. National Security Action Memorandum No. 322 1 Washington, December 17, 1964. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance We now face very important discussions with our Allies on future plans for the nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance. I am sending you this memorandum to establish guidelines for this discussion. 1. Unless I give specific instructions to the contrary, I do not wish any American official in any forum to press for a binding agreement at this time. I wish to maintain the position established in our talks with Prime Minister Wilson—namely, that the U.S. is not seeking to force its own views on any European nation, but wishes rather to find a way of responding effectively to the largest possible consensus among interested European allies. 2. At the same time I expect American negotiators to maintain the position that no agreement can be made with the U.K. that does not take account of the legitimate interests of Germany, and that similarly no agreement can be made with Germany that does not take account of the legitimate interests of other European states. The American negotiators should continue to encourage direct discussion among Europeans, and in particular they should urge the U.K. to seek agreement with Germany and vice versa. 3. I wish all American negotiators to avoid public or private quarrels with France, and to maintain in public and private the following position: We are interested in reducing our differences with France; we will never support any proposal for a nuclear force which is in fact directed against France; we will not sign any agreement which does not contain open doors for France; nor will we make any agreement until after French opinion and French desires have been carefully and responsibly explored. 4. Any agreement we support must be a reinforcement to our basic policy of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We warmly support the inclusion in any agreement of strong undertakings to this end. 5. Our position on the American veto and on the European clause is as follows: “The United States takes the position that any charter for an Atlantic Force must provide for United States' consent to the firing of the nuclear weapons. If, however, major nations of Europe some day achieve full political unity with a central political authority capable of making the decision to use nuclear weapons, the United States recognizes that this will create a new situation in which reconsideration of various provisions of the charter would be appropriate. In any event, revision of the charter would be possible only with the unanimous approval of the members.” 6. Our present position on other issues is as stated on December 8 in the U.S. memorandum of comments (attached at A) 2 on the U.K. proposal, omitting the names of specific countries in paragraph 9, and leaving that paragraph in abeyance for the time being. 7. In my judgment, the principal advantages of any agreement will be: (1) that it will lead the U.K. out of the field of strategic deterrence and thus reduce by one the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength; (2) that it will greatly reduce the danger of any separate nuclear adventure by the Germans; and (3) that it will advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents. These three advantages are of great importance to the American public and to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is essential that they be established in any agreement. 8. The provisions of NSAM 318 (attached at B) 3 will remain in effect (except for the action in paragraph 6 which has been completed). 9. Finally, I find nothing in the position of this government or in the posture of the alliance which makes it necessary, from the point of view of the U.S. alone, that there should be final agreement or even agreement in principle within the next three months. I may take a different view on this in the light of new evidence, but this is my clear present position, and I wish all actions by American officials to be in conformity with it. If other governments for their own reasons find it important to reach early agreement, they will make their own efforts to this end, and in that case I do not desire that we on our side should drag our feet. But I do not wish anyone at any level to give the impression that we are eager to act on a short timetable, or are attempting in any way to force our own views upon Europe. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272,MLF #4. Secret. 2 Printed as the Attachment to Document 61 . 3 Not printed, but see footnote 3, Document 46 . 66. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 66. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, December 20, 1964, 11:18 a.m. 1152. We are making following points in response to diplomatic and other inquiries re our views on NATO Ministerial Meeting. 2 1. As Secretary said to press, NATO members are today more secure and more prosperous than ever before. This is measure of NATO success. Despite press hand-wringing over NATO decay, delegations except for French expressed importance of and need for NATO. 2. Contrary to expectation, meeting did not dodge contentious issues. Nuclear problem overshadowed all other matters, on and off the floor. 3. In routine review of international situation, consensus was that no immediate major change to be expected in post-Khrushchev Russia. Soviet-ChiCom rivalry in underdeveloped world believed likely result in sharper Soviet anti-West policy in those areas. Long-run effects of ChiCom nuclear shot assessed as highly important. 4. Press appears to have read too much significance into two military developments. First, it has tended to equate talk of future coordination of targeting of French force de frappe with that of other nuclear forces with agreement to participate in ANF or some similar integrated nuclear operation. Fact is that no firm agreement on French-US nuclear coordination yet reached and French remain wholly opposed to ANF. Second, German remarks at meeting re atomic demolition munitions (ADM's) [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] have given impression emplacement and use of such devices much closer to realization than is evidently the fact. While use of ADM's is prominent feature in recent German views on NATO strategy, subject is still under intensive study by US and German military as result McNamara-von Hassel November talks. 3 5. Discussions on ANF-MLF resulted in rough threefold division of positions. At one wing French did not conceal their opposition to this and other measures of Atlantic integration; on other side major ANF proponents defended its utility; middle group of Canada, Scandinavian countries and Belgium indicated they were satisfied with present situation. Latter group worried at divisive effect of ANF discussion outside NATO forum. Germans, Italians and Dutch pressed for mixed-manned surface force, in private discussions; together with UK and US they agreed tentatively on high-level multilateral meeting, perhaps at end of January, to work out general lines of ANF. 6. Debate on NATO strategy showed growing recognition all-out general nuclear exchange not suitable way of meeting crisis situations. Also showed increasing comprehension of need for flexible, non-nuclear response to most likely contingencies of unpremeditated, smaller-scale conflict. However French are still unyielding on trip-wire concept. Continuation of NATO Force Planning Exercise as agreed at meeting provides best means of bringing about modernization of NATO strategic concept. 7. Secretary's high-level talks with French produced better atmosphere, but little change in substantive positions. On other hand, Franco-German relations deteriorated as result French refusal to agree to quadripartite communique stressing time had come for initiative on reunification. (You will recall Germans issued communique stating French had not approved it.) In meetings, French were isolated on approach to NATO in general, and to some extent on strategic problems. Posts authorized draw on foregoing as appropriate. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Confidential. Drafted by Popper on December 19, cleared in draft by Schaetzel and in part by DOD, and approved by Tyler. Repeated to USUN and three military commands. 2 The 34th NATO Ministerial Meeting was held in Paris December 15–17, and while considering many issues, focused heavily on a review of the international situation in light of the fall of Khrushchev and on Cyprus. Briefing papers, NATO documents, telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation, memoranda of conversation, and miscellaneous documents are ibid., and ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2462–2472. For text of the final communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 507–508. A summary of the military questions discussed at the meeting was transmitted in CA–6521, December 24. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 3 Von Hassel visited Washington November 12 for a discussion of NATO strategy. In a summary based on a debriefing of Popper, who attended the talks, the Department of State noted that there was wide agreement on such general topics as flexible response, multiple options, and conventionality, but that on many specifics there were important areas of disagreement. (Memorandum, November 13; ibid.) 67. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 67. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, January 9, 1965, noon. 2547. Subj: MLF. At my meeting with Schroeder on Jan 7 I found him at a loss as to how next to proceed with the MLF. He felt that the US had lost interest in helping to facilitate reaching an agreement among the interested parties. In this connection he referred to the June 13, 1964 communique of the President and the Chancellor which envisaged signature of an agreement by the end of 1964. 2 No one appeared interested in calling the conference planned at the Paris meeting of the five countries December 15. 3 He had small hopes of achieving progress in the talks with Wilson here January 22 (he noted that Gordon Walker was not coming). He assumed that nothing important would happen until there could be a high level multilateral meeting. In reply, I repeated what I had told the Chancellor on my return from Washington. We have not lost interest in the MLF. The US, the Germans and others had developed a position concerning which the British and others had raised questions. In seeking a solution to the question of nuclear responsibility within the Alliance on as broad a basis as possible, we are willing to adjust our initial position in order to seek a wide consensus. In doing so we would insist that the interests of the Germans would be fully protected. We are not leaving the Germans to negotiate the matter out with the British. We are in this together. We hope that a multilateral meeting can be held soon. In the meantime, we do not wish to exert pressures or establish deadlines in reaching a consensus. We respect the legitimate interests of all concerned. We would not support any agreement directed against the French and believe they (French) should be kept fully informed on this matter. While we had no reason to think they could be persuaded to join an MLF, we wanted to keep the door open for them. There was some basis for believing they might at least acquiesce in an agreement reached by others. When the force de frappe became operational, there are indications of French willingness to coordinate in some way in its planning and targeting. 4 Schroeder's response was that it was very important for the US to correct the misimpression that it was no longer interested in achieving an MLF agreement. He was not specific on how this should be done but apparently had in mind high-level statements or press backgrounders. He concluded by saying that unless we exerted pressure on the British, he was afraid nothing would happen. Comment: Schroeder's statements, of course, were made without knowledge of the Secretary's January 7 comments on future MLF steps to Ambassador Knappstein (Deptel 1921). 5 The Secretary's reaffirmation of our interest in an agreement as well as in a Ministerial meeting will be welcome to Erhard and Schroeder. They will, however, continue to feel that significant movement will not occur without the US playing a more active role than seems we now appear to envisage in obtaining a consensus. There is a widespread feeling here in all circles—government, diplomatic and press—that the US has abandoned interest in the MLF—“that it is dead.” For this view there are several explanations. The FRG, always reluctant to take the initiative on the MLF, is now even more diffident after Schroeder's clash with Couve de Murville at Paris and the subsequent weakening of his position here. Secondly, the Germans doubt the utility of bilateral meetings and far prefer a multilateral forum. Thirdly, as Schroeder indicated above, they have almost no confidence that the British will agree to a consensus on MLF/ANF acceptable to the FRG without US pressure. One of the principal reasons for German concern is the feeling that we have left them alone to negotiate the matter out with the British. In this connection Healey's BBC interview of December 20 has given the Foreign Office further grounds for belief that the British are more interested in pushing non-dissemination and getting rid of their nuclear capability at a good price than preserving the basic principles of the MLF. Under these circumstances I feel strongly that we must do more to diminish the German fear that they are to be left alone to negotiate a viable agreement, while the US stands by passively awaiting the achievement of a consensus. I would appreciate it if consideration could be given urgently to the following: 1. A personal message from the Secretary to Schroeder reaffirming our continuing desire to achieve an ANF-MLF agreement; 2. Public reaffirmation of this by the President or Secretary or both; 3. An approach to the British stressing the importance we attach to a successful outcome of the Erhard/Wilson talks, which would permit convening a Ministerial meeting. In this connection we should, I believe, make it clear to the British that we and the Germans are not prepared to accept the ANF without radical change in the direction of the MLF. The impression is given here that the British think they have already won and, with our acquiescence, are merely waiting for the Germans to throw in the sponge. 4. Advice I can give the Germans with respect to their forthcoming discussions with Wilson. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, London, Rome, and The Hague. 2 For text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 29, 1964, pp. 992–994. 3 At this meeting, Rusk had told the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany that it would be a mistake to set a precise date for a Ministerial meeting to discuss the multilateral nuclear force although he thought they should aim for the end of January. The intervening period should be used for bilateral meetings to narrow the differences between the MLF and the proposed British ANF. (Secto 21 from Bonn, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 4 On January 1, the Department of State had informed its Missions in London, Bonn, The Hague, and Rome that further discussions on the ANF should avoid a split in NATO and that in particular discussion in the NATO Council would not be helpful. The Department also advised that it did not envisage further activity by the group of five that had met on December 15, but that bilateral conversations should take place. (Telegram 4113 to London; ibid., DEF(ANF)) 5 Dated January 7. (Ibid., DEF(MLF)) In his meeting with Knappstein on January 7, Rusk reaffirmed the U.S. interest in finding a solution to the nuclear force question, stressing that a consensus of at least German, Italian, and British views was necessary. Rusk added that it would be advantageous for the Germans to talk with the Italians and concluded that the forthcoming meeting between Erhard and Wilson would offer an opportunity for useful bilateral discussions. 68. Letter From Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Schroeder 68. Letter From Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Schroeder 1 Washington, January 13, 1965. Dear Gerhard: Ambassador Knappstein will probably have reported to you the conversation we had on January 7 which touched, among other things, on the future of the MLF. 2 As I stressed to him, our views have not changed. However, because of the misinterpretation which appears to have gained currency on the United States position, I thought I should supplement my talk with the Ambassador with a direct message to you setting forth, as candidly as possible, the way we see the situation on the MLF at this juncture. President Johnson believes that at this point in the development of plans for restructuring the nuclear organization of the Alliance, the United States should conduct itself so that what emerges will truly represent the views of the major potential European participants and cannot plausibly be challenged as resulting from United States pressure upon unwilling European allies. Congressional and public support for an MLF will depend crucially upon the attitude of our principal allies and upon the question as to whether it would divide or strengthen the Alliance. We are prepared to move ahead without France, but I know that neither you nor we want to move ahead on a bilateral basis. Drawing Britain and Italy into the party becomes, therefore, quite important. Unfortunately, indications as to the President's position appear to have been viewed by some as meaning that there has been a fundamental shift in United States policy, if not a loss of interest on the part of the United States in the problems the MLF was designed to deal with. I can assure you this is not the case. On the contrary, I believe that our position reflects the logical continuity of the policy we have pursued. We continue to attach great importance to the objectives which can be served by new nuclear arrangements in NATO: to strengthen and rationalize, on an Atlantic basis, the organization of the Alliance's nuclear effort; to provide a means for the principal non-nuclear powers to share, in a significant and effective way, the responsibility for their own nuclear defense, and to do this in a way which does not contravene, but rather reinforces the principle of non-proliferation, which we feel is becoming ever more important. In pursuing these ends, it is vital to find the means which meet the needs and aspirations of the greatest number, and particularly of the largest members of the Alliance. For some years, in response to Europe's desire for a changed organization in the nuclear field, we have sought specific European suggestions for dealing with the nuclear problem. We ourselves suggested the MLF as one possible approach. The British Government has now come up with an approach which we believe can, through negotiation, be accommodated to the principles we have been advocating in the MLF. In fact, in our view the ANF proposals can leave room for the MLF substantially as it was initially conceived. Moreover, a broader nuclear rearrangement, such as the British propose, introduces a new and important dimension in creating the possibility of the United Kingdom's divesting itself of its independent nuclear deterrent—the first step which will ever have been taken away from the direction of proliferation. There are, certainly, unresolved problems raised by the British ideas, and the United States has set forth its comments on these in its December 8 paper. 3 These comments continue to reflect United States views, and any report, rumor or impression on the contrary is untrue. The United States strongly hopes that the discussions now in prospect, particularly between Germany and the United Kingdom, will provide a synthesis of views that will make it easier for us to move forward with an arrangement supported by the Federal Republic, as well as the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and others. We have told the United Kingdom of the importance we attach to constructive forward movement and of the need for plans to be acceptable to the Federal Republic. While France may not agree to participate in the types of arrangements which are now under consideration, I think we all agree on the need for holding the door open for possible French cooperation with them. As our European partners progress in exploring this subject, in discussions with which we shall be in closest contact, we can jointly decide how we should proceed with the best prospects for success. I want you to know we attach great importance to these discussions, and we very much hope they will be pursued purposefully and with appreciation of the importance of the stakes involved. I hope these comments will help you as a background for the discussions you will be having with the British and Italians, which we see as preliminary to multilateral negotiations which should follow. While it will not seek to force a solution upon allies, it is important that you recognize that the United States is not at all neutral or aloof regarding these talks, and the significance of their successful outcome. 4 At his press conference on January 16, President Johnson was asked about the status of the MLF. After briefly reviewing the ANF proposal put forward by the British in December, the President stated: “We have made clear to the participating governments that we think it is highly important to develop arrangements within the alliance that will provide an opportunity for the nonnuclear members to participate in their own nuclear defense while avoiding the spread of national nuclear systems.” He “strongly” hoped that progress would be made to “allow us to move on to fruitful multilateral discussions.” For the full transcript of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 54–60. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but the telegram sending a copy to Bonn for delivery to Schroeder was cleared by Ball and Bundy and initialed by Rusk. (Telegram 1955 to Bonn, January 13; ibid.) A similar letter was sent to British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker on January 14. (Telegram 4338 to London; ibid., DEF(ANF)) On the same day, circular 1267 to the NATO capitals reiterated the substance of the U.S. position set forth in this letter. (Ibid.) 2 See footnote 5, Document 67 . 3 Attachment to Document 61 . 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. McGhee delivered the letter to Schroeder on January 15 and found him in a “grim mood.” Schroeder read the letter, stated that it was very useful, and expressed his satisfaction that the U.S. position had not changed from that stated in the December 8 paper. McGhee concluded that the letter was precisely what was required for Schroeder and could not have been better; however, part of the problem was public perception, and McGhee argued that the assurances made in the letter should be made public. (Telegram 2610 from Bonn, January 14; Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF)) 69. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 69. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, January 15, 1965, 9 p.m. 2643. Subject: Meeting with Erhard. In my one and a half hour meeting late today with Chancellor Erhard, on the eve of his visit with General De Gaulle at Rambouillet on Jan. 20, he dispelled any question that might have arisen that any serious misunderstanding existed between him and us—or any apprehension we might have had about how he would conduct himself during the meeting. 1) MLF The Chancellor opened by asking the interpreter to read an extract from the speech he had made in Berlin on January 12. “Soviet medium range rockets on the boundaries of this country are a reality. We have never demanded control over nuclear weapons, but we desire to be defended with the same weapons as threaten us. One may discuss the form or purpose of various possible organizations. The political and military reality, however, remains unchanged. We have therefore stated ourselves to be prepared—also because we feel threatened perhaps more than any other country in Europe—to carry our share of burdens and responsibilities.” This, he said, was his reply to those who questioned his determination to proceed with the MLF. It was, moreover, not just a question of the British, with whom he was prepared to negotiate next week, but also of the Italians and Dutch. Their views must be fully considered so that they will be willing to come along. He was also interested in the time element. As I knew, the Bundestag would recess on July 1 for the elections. There was in fact not sufficient time remaining for it to approve the MLF. He would like, moreover, to prevent the MLF, as a result of being a daily subject of conversation, from becoming an “apple of discord” during the campaign. He agrees with the President that the time element is not so important. However, the finalization of the MLF should not be delayed unduly. 2) Basis for meeting with De Gaulle With respect to his forthcoming meeting with De Gaulle, he did not expect the General to raise any serious issues. He does not believe that De Gaulle wants to sever France's friendship with Germany. He would be guided in the meeting by the following principles, which had been agreed to by the CDU Party meeting in Berlin. First, the Alliance must never renounce its integrated structure. Second, Germany cannot, will not and must not renounce the nuclear protection of the U.S. Third, no matter who raises the issue, he will never question the need for the continued presence of US forces in Germany. 3) NATO The Chancellor asked what we thought could be proposed regarding the reorganization of NATO which would be acceptable to De Gaulle. I replied that I know of nothing that would satisfy General De Gaulle, in his present attitude, that would also be acceptable to us. De Gaulle has removed most of the French members of the NATO staff, has withdrawn his naval forces, is against an integrated command structure, has opposed strategic planning in the Alliance, opposes incorporating the ANF/MLF in the Alliance, and indeed has indicated that he wishes to withdraw from NATO—not the Alliance—in 1969. I was unaware of any proposal of a positive nature that de Gaulle had ever made concerning the reorganization of the NATO. Perhaps the Chancellor could elicit such a proposal during his forthcoming meeting. 4) European political unity The Chancellor observed that both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had urged Europe to unite—that a united Europe would be easier for the US to deal with rather than separate countries. He was not sure, but he hoped during his forthcoming meeting with De Gaulle to move him to encourage increased political ties in Europe. He commented on the reference he had made to this question in his speech in Berlin. “What is important is that we be aware of and unified on the basic principles of how Europe should be brought together: Europe must embody a democratic form and must involve democratic responsibility.” What would be the US position if he and de Gaulle made progress in this regard? I replied that the US had consistently supported European unity efforts which will enable Europe to play its true role in an Atlantic partnership, contribute to an effective NATO, be open to other eligible countries and not diminish the progress made in the Community. We assumed that this meant the ultimate development of supra-national institutions, however, this did not now seem feasible in the light of De Gaulle's position. We had studied carefully the German political unity proposals and considered that, in the light of the realities of the present situation, they represent as good a proposal as could be made. Although we did not wish to give them the “kiss of death” with De Gaulle by approving them publicly, we wished him success in his discussions with De Gaulle on this point. 5) Future of the Alliance The Chancellor interjected at this point that De Gaulle seemed to draw a distinction between NATO as an organization and the Atlantic Alliance. It had been proposed (I am not quite sure he said actually by De Gaulle) that the present form of the Alliance might be succeeded by one starting with the European countries alone. Another alliance might then be negotiated between this Alliance and the US. I replied that this did not seem feasible and would not, I believed, be acceptable to us. An old-fashioned alliance including a number of European states and depending on unanimity for action would be an unwieldy partner for us to deal with. Until real political unity could be achieved, and Europe could speak with one voice, I was sure that we would not be willing to forego our present direct relationships with the individual European countries. 6) Nuclear coordination The Chancellor asked whether it might not be possible to work out some form of coordination between France's force de frappe and the other Allied nuclear forces, i.e. ANF-MLF and SAC. I replied that although we had every indication that De Gaulle would never agree to participate in the MLF, French MOD Messmer had indicated to SecDef McNamara an ultimate willingness to coordinate in some way the planning and targeting of the force de frappe with our Strategic Air Command. Perhaps some way could be found, either directly or indirectly, of coordinating it also with the ANF-MLF. He might wish to sound out De Gaulle on this question during his discussions. The Chancellor asked me when the force de frappe would be ready and particularly when the land-based and seaborne missiles which the French indicated they were developing would be ready. I replied that to the best of my knowledge the force de frappe itself, although not yet operational, would be by 1967. However, there would be no missiles ready until after 1970. In response to his question I assured the Chancellor that the Polaris missiles which we had proposed for the MLF had already been developed and could be ready in 1967. The Chancellor speculated that De Gaulle might, in his eagerness to develop his force de frappe quickly, ask for German assistance, say for the non-nuclear part. Might Germany not say that she would be willing to help if De Gaulle would integrate his force with the other NATO nuclear forces? Under such circumstances it might still remain French. I replied that De Gaulle had never given any impression that he would be willing to turn over control of his nuclear forces to anyone else—to the extent which would be required to justify outside assistance. If the force de frappe could really be integrated into the NATO as was proposed for the component parts of MLF, this might be worth considering; however, it did not appear realistic in light of De Gaulle's attitude in the past. 7) President Johnson's visit to Europe The Chancellor then turned to the question of President Johnson's proposed visit to Europe. I replied that although I did not know when this would take place and what the itinerary would be, I assumed that Bonn would of course be included. The President had stated in his State of the Union message 2 that he would be returning this year the visits of various European leaders. The Chancellor then referred to rumors he had heard that De Gaulle would insist on President Johnson making a separate visit to Paris. This, he thought, would be most unfortunate. It would create for him a very difficult situation. He would have no objection to the President starting a tour of several countries in Paris, out of deference to de Gaulle. When I queried on a purely hypothetical basis, he said that although less desirable he could live with the President making a separate visit to Paris after a prior visit to several other capitals, including Bonn. However, he did not think the President should visit Paris alone first. 8) Reunification initiative I referred to the report that the German Cabinet had in Berlin decided on a new reunification initiative. I recalled the background of recent events affecting this issue. Since the real problem for the Germans appeared to lie with the French, i.e., Couve de Murville had blocked the reunification initiative agreement among the four at the NAC meeting in Paris, I suggested that he take this matter up in his meeting with De Gaulle. The Chancellor replied that he believes that France will agree to an initiative. He said he “lived on the earth” and has no undue expectations of what can be obtained from an initiative. The Germans must not, however, agree to give up a whole list of things in return for unification and then find that there is no reunification. I commented that although the Secretary of State has made clear that we expected any new initiative to be a serious one, and that the necessary area of agreement must be found between the four before it is put forward, we did not expect a firm position in advance on all of the questions that would ultimately have to be decided. When the Germans had concluded what form of initiative they wished to put forward, we would be glad to join in giving consideration to it on a four power basis. Conclusion: The Chancellor said that he wanted me to assure the President that he would be very careful in his discussion with de Gaulle, not just because of the repercussions it would have in Germany but for the effect it would have on German relations with the US. He would do what he could to preserve French-German friendship, which he considered—and assumed we considered—a valuable asset. Germany could help smooth relations between France and the other Common Market countries. The Chancellor referred to the recent meeting between German Ambassador Knappstein and President Johnson. He appreciated greatly the assurances that the President had given. For his part he warmly reciprocated them. “Nothing has changed in the German position.” He values his “personal friendship with the President” and assured us of “Germany's continued commitment to the US.” Indeed, Germany would like to consider itself “our most faithful ally.” McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GER W–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London and Paris. 2 For text of the President's State of the Union Address, January 4, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1–9. 70. Memorandum of Conversation 70. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 18, 1965, 11 a.m. SUBJECT European Union: MLF/ANF PARTICIPANTS The Secretary The Undersecretary William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Ronald I. Spiers, EUR:RPM Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands Ambassador Carl W. A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador to the U.S. Foreign Minister Luns said that he was worried about the outcome of the Erhard visit to De Gaulle, and he would not be surprised if the result is a further step along the lines of the Fouchet Plan. The Netherlands is not very enthusiastic about the German proposals. Luns has made known to the Dutch Parliament that he does not favor the creation of a defense organ among the Six, since this could be a first move in a drift away from NATO. Saragat had agreed with this point when they discussed it in Paris. However, if Piccioni becomes Foreign Minister in Italy, Cattani's views on the subject will prevail, and he is “all for De Gaulle.” Also, since Spaak has changed his position substantially in order to get agreement with France, the Netherlands is now practically isolated. The Secretary asked whether Luns had any explanation for the drift in NATO toward preoccupation with trivial irritations, such as the contretemps about the Quadripartite communique in December and the difficulties about Wilson's trip to Paris. This trend gave us much concern. Luns said this was partly due to frustration but also to De Gaulle's methods. France had no enthusiasm for Schroeder and was always trying to weaken him. With Spaak it is a question of not knowing what he will do next. Recently there was a headline in a major Dutch paper reading: “Luns and Schroeder rebuffed in Washington.” This story came out of Paris and was printed even though his (Luns') talk with the Secretary had not even taken place. Turning to the MLF, the Secretary said that important elements in the U.S. will want to know that whatever emerges from the present discussions on this subject represents something Europe—with the exception of De Gaulle—wants. Otherwise it will not have much chance. Some are worried about the effect of the MLF on our relations with France, some about its effect on disarmament and East-West relations, and some are concerned about the size of the German role. These difficulties could be handled if the other participants make clear that this is something they want and which meets their problems. Luns said there is a malaise in Europe about this question, which had been discussed at a recent Dutch Cabinet meeting where concern was expressed about the impression of US “disinterest.” The Secretary said there had been a period of two or three weeks of extreme uneasiness in Germany, which we now thought was subsiding. We sensed a greater UK interest now in making progress on the nuclear question than had been evident during the NATO meeting. We hope that the Wilson-Erhard discussion will move the matter forward. Luns said that there was an impression that the prospects for success had changed. He recounted a talk with the German observer at the UN who insisted the MLF was “completely dead.” He had noted the President's statement yesterday, 2 and he now understood that US interest was unabated and continued strong. He personally had veered from his initial position on the MLF to become a supporter, but there were still divisions in the Netherlands. The Minister of Defense was concerned that the financing arrangements not result in a setback for the Dutch naval program. Luns asked our views on the time schedule for future discussion. The Secretary said we should look at this after the Erhard-Wilson talks. We did not want a big publicized Ministerial Meeting without some prior indication it can succeed. Erhard seemed to have relaxed somewhat on timing, and it now appears less likely that the Germans will insist on action before the election. However, it is still important that substantial progress be made before then or possible alternatives to the MLF will be debated during the campaign. We had become concerned about the new idea in Germany that non-proliferation should be reserved as a card for talks on reunification. Luns said that he was confused about the French “game” in this area. Couve had insisted that Germany cannot under any circumstances be allowed a nuclear force, but on the other hand says that nothing can be done about nuclear proliferation, which is inevitable. Couve says that the US invented the possibility of German independence in this field by talking about it. Luns, however, recalled the between-the-wars history of the question of German rearmament. He had recently pointed out to the Soviet Ambassador that it was a mistake to view the alternatives as the MLF or the status quo. Luns recalled that the Dutch had urged a full NAC discussion of this question. He had given this further thought in the light of the negative US, German and French reaction, and does not intend to press this subject. The Secretary said we thought there should be discussion in NAC at some later stage, after the views of potential participants have become more precise as a result of the present stage of bilateral talks. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Spiers, initialed by Tyler, and approved in S on January 28. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. The source text is labeled “Part II of III.” 2 See footnote 4, Document 68 . 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Regional Organizations 71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, January 18, 1965, 6:45 p.m. Topol 959. Ref: Polto 1037. 2 Discussions to date on Malta-NATO have resulted only in temporary informal arrangement for NATO Headquarters on island and reached no conclusion on ultimate form of Maltese political link to NATO, if any. We are not aware that Borg Olivier is seriously embarrassed now by presence of Headquarters and lack of NATO relationship. However, ambiguous situation can be exploited by Mintoff and very likely become issue this autumn when election campaign expected to get underway. Although there is no immediate emergency, it is only temporary lull of which NATO should take advantage. NAC discussions last autumn showed how confused and futile these can be in face of deadlines. They demonstrated also that there is no unanimity among NATO countries on Malta and considerable inclination to let matter drift. Our view of Western interest in area has not changed since last August (see Topol 267). 3 We hope NAC will reach consensus favorable to retention NATO Headquarters through some form of association with Malta. If made within reasonably early time, favorable decision would: (1) enhance Malta's link with West; (2) enable Borg Olivier to counter his critics; (3) forestall insistence on unrealistic demands on GOM or opposition—which could lead to hostile impasse. Although NAC discussion may not initially be productive, we think Malta-NATO relationship should be result of thoughtful and careful decision by Alliance members. Accordingly, if you think these comments persuasive, we suggest you encourage Brosio to call for PermReps' private discussion and if such meeting held, you may as appropriate draw on this message, Topol 267 of Aug 18, and subsequent messages this subject to try to convey to others need for deliberate consideration and action now while atmosphere tranquil, it being secondary whether matter pursued thereafter by Brosio and International Staff, through PermReps, or in NAC. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Confidential. Drafted by George S. Vest (EUR/RPM); cleared by Popper, BNA, and L/EUR; and approved by Schaetzel. Repeated to Valletta and Rome. 2 Polto 1037 from Paris, January 14, reported Brosio's concern that Malta might formally apply for NATO membership and asked for guidance on the question. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 31 . 72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk 72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 3, 1965. SUBJECT European Political Union—Information Memorandum Erhard and De Gaulle agreed at Rambouillet to resume talks on political union. With the Common Market's grain price issue resolved and the pace of the MLF/ANF negotiations altered, De Gaulle evidently feels emboldened to move now in the political field which, he said in Strasbourg on November 22, “is first of all the field of defense.” Previous Political Union Treaty negotiations—notably the Fouchet-Cattani negotiations of 1961–62—foundered on several key issues: British participation; federal vs. confederal forms and possibilities for evolution; and the competence of a political union in economic and defense matters, in view of the concern constantly expressed by all but De Gaulle that neither NATO nor the European Communities should be weakened. Proposals advanced late last year by Spaak, Erhard and Saragat manage with uneven success to skirt these and other once-crucial questions. All of the 1964 proposals envisage a pre-treaty consultative stage. Their starting points, except for the Spaak notion of an independent “wise men” group, are essentially confederal, and their emphasis is on gradual progress. Of these, Erhard's plan, with its generally inoffensive blueprint for slow movement toward political union (including defense) and strong call for strengthening the existing European Communities, probably offers the least controversial basis for a resumption of discussions. The Italian proposal, while generally less promising than Erhard's, except as regards an important role for the European Parliament, is also less precise on defense. In both respects it could be helpful to the other Five in standing up to De Gaulle. Erhard and De Gaulle apparently envisage a Foreign Ministers meeting of the Six this spring after a round of preparatory work at the senior official level (Cattani). If all goes well, there would be a “European summit” discussion during the summer. This could be explosive, especially if De Gaulle sniffs any possibility in the defense field of heading off the MLF/ANF. We must now deal with the situation in the light of two relatively new elements. First, there is the French attack on NATO which—if we accept what they say—is to be followed by their withdrawal from the organization in 1969. Second, there is the nuclear issue, particularly the October reversal of the French position on MLF. This suggests that defense policy may be more of a stumbling block to progress on political unity than had been assumed even in 1964. It also suggests that De Gaulle can, if he wishes, use the nuclear issue as a bargaining counter to gain acceptance of his views on political unity. European political unity poses an acute dilemma for the “good Europeans.” On the one hand, and for a variety of reasons, some (Erhard, Cattani and occasionally Spaak) feel that an initiative no matter how insubstantial is necessary to maintain momentum. On the other hand, another group who are in substantial agreement with Erhard and Cattani on the end objective and in opposition to Gaullist views (for instance, Hallstein, practically all Dutchmen and probably Schroeder), feel an initiative at this juncture would not only be futile but could in fact lead to erosion of the progress toward unity that has been made over the last fifteen years. This latter group would concentrate for the time being on strengthening the economic community. The Five are of course struggling with a basic contradiction, namely, how to reconcile the irreconcilable. They are for a degree of supranationality, the French are flatly against it; they want a federal structure, which the French oppose; they want to build institutions, De Gaulle wants to weaken the existing bodies and wishes to place the emphasis on policy agreements as a precondition to organizational arrangements; finally, the Five want a community open to the membership of others, which the French oppose. It remains our task to avoid the accusation of involving ourselves as a participant in such sensitive and involved internal European affairs. But at the same time the impact on our own interests of the decisions the Europeans arrive at will be substantial. The Five nations are working for solutions which they see as protecting their own and our interests. It should not be beyond our competence to make our weight felt by appropriate and unobtrusive means on the side of those who are working toward the kind of European unity which is favorable to our national interests and to the kind of Atlantic relationship we want. It would be unfortunate and contrary to our own objectives if in avoidance of direct involvement the “good Europeans” were to construe the U.S. attitude as indifference to their goal of working towards an integrated Europe in close partnership with the United States. I am attaching a paper prepared in EUR which summarizes the recent history of European political union and evaluates its significance to the United States. Attachment 2 EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION [Here follow the first 9–1/2 pages, which review the Fouchet-Cattani efforts at European political union in 1961 and 1962; Spaak's plan proposed at the WEU Parliamentarians meeting on September 9, 1964; the Erhard plan and the Italian plan, both floated in November 1964; and the impact of De Gaulle's statement on the subject at Strasbourg on November 22.] U.S. Concerns We have maintained a public posture of sympathetic interest in European political union but have generally withheld approbation or disapproval of specific plans. This has usually taken the form of comments like the Secretary's of September 10, 1964 that “the organization of Europe …is a European problem.” We were mildly taken with Erhard's initiative, essentially because it came from the Germans and contained an imaginative yet pragmatic scheme for Community progress, and said that it was “a constructive contribution to that achievement of European unification within the framework of Atlantic partnership which has long been and remains a central objective of United States foreign policy.” There was no need for an official reaction to Spaak's suggestions, and our reactions to the Italian plan were never solicited. When asked by the Six, the UK and others with some interest in the question, however, we have expressed our preoccupations more frankly. These preoccupations, briefly, are that we would be concerned if any such negotiations weakened rather than strengthened NATO, were to lead to an inward-oriented “small Europe” with the characteristic of excluding the British for all time, did not promote European integration by strengthening the existing European Communities, and if they ignored the crucial collateral policy of Atlantic partnership. On the actual form of political union, we have quietly supported generally “federalist” concepts and the democratization of Europe via increased Parliamentary powers, although we have made it clear that the decisions were for Europeans to take. The forthcoming round may be taken more seriously in Europe than any previous activity in this field. Our reactions will be solicited and our public statements carefully appraised. An especially sharp eye will be fixed on our reaction to the French aim of keeping defense affairs in the foreground, with the clear objective of frustrating the MLF/ANF idea. On their merits, the several plans aired to date add up to warmed-over Fouchet. There will doubtless be others. We must exercise care in commenting publicly and privately, but the organization of the Atlantic area is too important for us to appear to be indifferent to the outcome. Viewed in retrospect, our general endorsement of the Erhard effort was just about right. It kept us aloof from the actual form and direction of political union while putting us on record as favoring further progress toward European integration. Here we are for the moment on solid ground. If only because of its comprehensiveness, the Erhard Plan will have to be taken most seriously by the Six and would probably be first on the agenda. In the present European atmosphere, it also provides a sensible, common denominator basis for discussion. The French would have a difficult job trying to subtract very much from it, and the Netherlands and Belgium might be able to give it more substance. Our main concern at the start of the 1965 phase should properly be over the defense factor. Here the Italian formulation suggesting discussion on defense matters when necessary may provide pro-MLF elements ammunition for stalling De Gaulle. When it becomes feasible to do so, we should not hesitate to express our serious apprehension over any serious trend toward De Gaulle's approach. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel, Deane R. Hinton, and George R. Kaplan (EUR/RPM) on February 2. 2 Confidential. Drafted by Kaplan on January 28. 73. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to GATT, at Geneva 73. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to GATT, at Geneva 1 Washington, February 6, 1965, 9:46 p.m. 1443. 1. We are concerned over press stories (most recently NY Times international edition January 20) reporting US–EFTA “alliance” and implying changed US policy toward EEC. Pattern of stories indicates they may have been planted as part coordinated campaign. Although lacking confirmation, we have reason to believe one source may have been EFTA Information Office Geneva, whose new chief is imaginative, experienced publicist. We do not believe stories serve either our interests or those of EFTA countries. 2. “Alliance” is reportedly based on mutual desire of US and EFTA countries for successful Kennedy Round. We appreciate that this mutual desire exists and, in fact, it may be necessary as tactical measure for US and EFTA countries to isolate EEC on some issues, like disparities, on which success of Kennedy Round depends. However, any implication this tacit cooperation being formalized into “alliance” can only serve to defeat common objective which we share. It has effect of bolstering strength of minority in EEC which sees Kennedy Round as attempt to undermine EEC cohesion by dismantling CXT. Moreover some Europeans, such as Hallstein and Monnet, have been most vocal in support of Kennedy Round precisely because they see problem in political terms of US–EEC relation. Our theme has been and must remain that trade liberalization possible through Kennedy Round will benefit all participants. We must carefully avoid presentation of Kennedy Round as attempt by US and EFTA countries to gang up on EEC. 3. In addition to these vital economic considerations, there is no political basis for reports. We regard EEC as nucleus united Europe, which we support for sake European stability and Atlantic partnership. “Partnership” implies give-and-take relationship with inevitable disputes and differences of opinion. EFTA observers and others should not be led to make mistake of interpreting these differences as evidence of changed US policy toward EEC. 4. Drawing on para 2, Mission should take appropriate opportunity to make above points to EFTA officials, possibly including Figgures. 2 Other addressees may draw on this message at their own discretion. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EFTA. Confidential. Drafted by Joel W. Biller (EUR/RPE); cleared by Hinton, BNA, WE, OT, and Herter; and approved by Schaetzel. Repeated to Bern, Bonn, Brussels (for the Embassy and USEC), Copenhagen, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Paris (for the Embassy and USRO), Rome, Stockholm, The Hague, and Vienna. 2 Frank E. Figgures, Secretary General of the EFTA. 74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 74. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 4, 1965. I have discussed with the President the proposal in your memorandum of February 26 that letters be sent on ANF/MLF to the Prime Ministers of the UK, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. 2 I also discussed with the President the more modest alternative which you and I talked about on the phone—namely, oral messages to Wilson and Erhard. The President believes that neither Wilson nor Erhard is in any doubt as to his own basic position, and he thinks it is also very clear that unless the situation changes sharply as a result of the meeting in Bonn, it is very unlikely that there will be any prospect of agreement before the German elections. In this situation he thinks it is better to wait and hear what happens between Wilson and Erhard. Let me add, as a personal view, that I wonder whether we should not ask ourselves a few hard questions about the whole MLF concept before we agree to any serious multilateral discussion this spring and summer. I favor such discussions, but my own growing conviction is that the MLF as such is never going to be the right next step for the necessary number of nations all at the same time—at least not until we have made progress in some other way first. I therefore wonder if we should be giving close thought to other possibilities for nuclear coordination within the Alliance which may be more modest but which are also more likely to happen. I have mentioned this personal view to the President, and he has suggested that I raise it with you and Bob McNamara and George Ball for discussion. 3 McGeorge Bundy 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. Copies were sent to Ball and McNamara. 2 A copy of this memorandum is ibid. Copies of the draft letters are attached to the source text. 3 On March 4, Tyler told British Minister Michael Stewart that the President had decided not to send the letters. According to Tyler, “Stewart groaned and said he was really disappointed to hear this,” since there were some discouraging noises about the MLF coming from Bonn. (Memorandum of conversation, March 4; ibid., DEF(ANF)) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 75. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk 75. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 8, 1965. Here are some brief impressions of a very frank luncheon discussion with Patrick Gordon Walker in a small group at the Council on Foreign Relations today: 1. ANF/MLF . GW dismissed any prospects of reaching agreement. He said that we had killed and buried not only the MLF but the ANF by the position we had taken since December. He said the only hope would have been for us to continue to press the Germans, instead of which we had told the Europeans that they should work things out among themselves. This they were incapable of doing, and it was clear that Erhard was not about to do anything which would expose him to pressure from De Gaulle. He said that Germany would finally have to choose between De Gaulle and the United States, and that unless we held the German feet to the fire on this issue, we would be conceding the victory to De Gaulle. He said that the current Wilson-Erhard talks in Bonn would lead nowhere. [Here follows numbered paragraph 2, in which Tyler recorded Gordon Walker's comments on U.S. efforts to preserve order in Africa.] 3. BAOR . GW said that there was no doubt that HMG was going to reduce the UK troops in Germany. He developed a purely military rationale for this in terms of free world security requirements east of Suez. I raised the political factor, which he evidently found inconvenient and brushed aside. In general, his comments about the UK role with regard to Europe were (to me at least) disconcertingly irresponsible: “We are certainly not going to go on keeping huge forces on the continent of Europe,” he said, and added by way of explanation that to do so would be in conflict with British policy over the last four hundred years. Comment: I had the impression that the other people present at lunch (including Bob Murphy, Dick Neustadt, Ben Moore, Phil Mosely and Bob Blum) were rather put out by a certain overtone of sarcasm and flipness in GW's approach to these rather weighty matters. GW told me how much he had enjoyed and appreciated his talk with you in Cleveland, and I wonder whether he talked to you at all in the same vein as he did today. I rather fancy that today may have been a case of misjudging his audience, but if he reflected the inwardness of the Labor Government attitude on foreign affairs it is rather depressing. William Tyler 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(ANF). Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Tyler. A copy was sent to Ball. 76. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 76. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, March 11, 1965. When we last spoke on the telephone, I said that I would let you know how I got on during my visit to Berlin and Bonn which has just taken place. 2 As it turned out, it was a very good thing that my trip should have started with the visit to Berlin. This enabled me to make an act of presence in the city and to make a speech re-affirming British determination, together with our allies, to safeguard the freedom of the city. The demonstration and the speech acted as a useful curtain raiser and set the tone for my subsequent talks in Bonn with the Federal Chancellor. My talks with Erhard covered four main points: (1) The nuclear organization of the Alliance (2) Reunification (3) European problems including measures to improve the cohesion of the continent and bring EFTA and EEC closer together and (4) The offset agreement In addition I had a private session with him, as between two retired or reformed economists, on the British economic situation. This gave a chance for me to say what I thought about Rueff and all his works and for Erhard to say that he totally disagreed with De Gaulle about the gold standard. Erhard indicated clearly, without actually committing himself, that we could expect German support when we apply for our fund drawing later in the year. As to nuclear matters, it soon became very clear that whatever Shroeder's views might be, Erhard was not going to have anything to do with nuclear matters this side of the German elections. It is clear that the only way that Erhard can preserve his relationship with De Gaulle and the unity of his party is by putting nuclear matters on ice for the time being. When I told Erhard that I assumed he wanted the MLF and ANF to be a sort of sleeping beauty he did not disagree. The wording in the communique 3 represents the compromise between the British desire not to lose momentum and the German wish to forget about it for the time being. I would judge that there is no progress to be made on this until after the German elections. The one thing that the Germans were really interested in, again for electoral reasons, was some demonstration of public activity to which they could point on the re-unification front. I made it quite clear that, in practical terms, re-unification can only come as a result of a period of detente with the Soviet Union and could not be made a condition for detente: and in agreeing to remit the matter to the Ambassadorial Group, I was careful not to commit myself to any specific project. Although the Germans would like progress in time for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in May, they may be able to live with a minimum of demonstrable activity on the subject with their Western allies. On the economic organization of Europe, I found Erhard equally concerned as I was myself to prevent the further division of Europe by allowing the gulf between the Common Market and EFTA to widen. He is a strong proponent of liberal outward-looking policies, and, privately, indicated that as an economist, he did not think much of the present agricultural arrangements of the Common Market. It was however a price that had to be paid. I am myself instituting a study here of ways and means of mitigating the effect of present divisions and hope to come up with some useful ideas. We had some very tough sessions on the offset agreement but since you have yourselves virtually equipped the German armed forces, there does not seem to be much for us in that line. However Erhard undertook to issue a directive to his people to try harder and the fact of the directive was written into the communique. We shall give them a couple of months and then if necessary send the chief secretary, who is a very tough character, back to Bonn to re-negotiate the whole process. We left the Germans in no doubt that if we did not get satisfaction on this point, we should be forced to agonizing re-appraisals. All in all the talks were tough but constructive. The visit was well worthwhile and has, I hope, generated the right sort of atmosphere for the Queen's state visit in May. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9. Secret. 2 Wilson visited Germany March 6–9. 3 For text of Erhard-Wilson communique, March 9, see Europa Arkiv, Zeitschrift fur Internationale Politik, 1965, Dokumente , D 167–168. 77. Memorandum of Conversation 77. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 19, 1965. SUBJECT Dr. Walter Hallstein's Meeting with the President, March 18, 1965 2 PARTICIPANTS Aide du Chef Karl-Heinz Narjes Under Secretary Mann Ambassador Tuthill Mr. Bator Following an exchange of greetings, President Hallstein thanked the President for the government's hospitality, explained that he was in Washington not to transact business but for a general exchange of views, and that he was in the pleasant position of having nothing to ask of the President, except his confidence. (In an aside, and without naming names, he conveyed his sympathy for our problems in Vietnam and Selma.) The President affirmed his admiration for Hallstein's and the Commission's leading part in the adventure of European unification and conveyed his sense of President Hallstein's significant personal role in Europe. The President made the following specific points: —Despite the apparent U.S. preoccupation with currently acute problems, the United States has not lost interest in the Atlantic World and continues to be committed to the goal of European integration. Our policy has not changed since the Marshall Plan. —The U.S. has a continuing concern that Europe remain open and Atlantic-minded. The President particularly emphasized the importance of a successful Kennedy Round, with liberalization both in industry and agriculture. He hoped that the Commission would give the Six and Europe a strong and constructive lead in the negotiations. —The President has a strong interest in expanding peaceful trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviets as an important part of his policy of bridge-building. —We are determined to fix our balance of payments; there should be no doubt of the fundamental strength of the dollar. In the interim, we intend to be fairly tough about overseas capital investment. (The President made special mention of our large trade surplus, indicating that the problem has to do with our worldwide responsibilities and the capital account.) —On Atlantic nuclear matters, we will continue working for constructive arrangements without trying to impose any particular scheme on a reluctant Europe. The President expressed gratitude for Chancellor Erhard's wisdom on this matter and also on other matters of joint concern. He indicated that we shall be prepared to move forward in cooperation with our partners as soon as Europe seems ready, perhaps in the period following the German elections, and that he is reasonably optimistic that the British, after they settle down, will help to work out a mutually acceptable solution. Dr. Hallstein thanked the President for his views, especially on unification and partnership, sketched for the President the recent progress of the Community (merger, agricultural package) and promised that the Commission would do all it could to advance the Kennedy Round. 3 The meeting ended with a few minutes of private conversation between the President and President Hallstein. FMB 1 Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. Drafted by Francis Bator on March 19. 2 Hallstein visited Washington March 16–18. Memoranda of his conversations with Ball and Mann, April 16 and 18, are in Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC; memoranda of his conversations with Senator Fulbright and McNamara, March 17 and 18, are ibid., POL 3 EUR; memoranda of his conversations with Schaetzel, Rusk, and Vice President Humphrey, March 16, 17, and 18, are ibid., POL EUR-US, POL ASIA SE, and POL 15–1 US. For text of the joint communique issued by the President and Hallstein following their meeting, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, p. 295. 3 On March 29, EEC Commissioner Jean Rey also visited Washington. Memoranda of his conversations with Department of State officials on the Kennedy Round and monetary matters are in Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. 78. Memorandum of Conversation 78. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT MLF/ANF PARTICIPANTS UK Side Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart 2 Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office Michael Stewart, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., British Embassy R. S. Crawford, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office Michael Hadow, Counselor, Foreign Office J. N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary John Harris, Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary US Side The Secretary Ambassador Bruce William C. Foster, Director,ACDA William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary, IO Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary, P J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA Foreign Secretary Stewart said that in view of the current German attitude toward the problem, the UK is prepared to propose in the NAC that the Working Group resume its work in Paris and that all those interested be invited to participate (having in mind Canadian interest). Mr. Stewart said that the Working Group should take into account work already done as well as the British ANF proposals. He also referred to the NATO Secretary General's idea of dealing with the nuclear problem in the NAC. The Secretary expressed doubt that discussion in the full Council would advance the matter. Mr. Tyler said that the Secretary General might make a bland statement simply announcing the meeting of the Working Group but not opening the subject to discussion. Mr. Stewart said that the Germans are ready for resumed discussions provided that no conclusions are reached before their September election. Sir Harold said that perhaps at the first meeting officials might attend from those capitals wishing to send them. My Tyler commented that perhaps the Germans would consider this as giving too much prominence to the exercise. The Foreign Secretary said that there did not appear to be much progress as yet in closing the gap between the MLF and ANF. Sir Harold referred to the obvious differences of opinion within the German Government and the absence of a coordinated German position. In response to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Henderson said that there had been some modifications in the British ANF proposals since Christmas but no radical changes. He said that these proposed modifications had been given to the Germans and Italians as well as to us. The Foreign Secretary indicated concern that the Germans would want to have as little discussion of ANF as possible in the Working Group and instead would wish to emphasize the MLF proposals. In reply to Mr. Tyler's question, he said that in the British view the ANF in effect replaces the MLF. The Secretary said that we are frankly disappointed in the response to our efforts of the past five years to meet what we understood to be a European need in the nuclear field. We have tried to work something out in the Alliance to satisfy this need but have not had much success in finding a consensus among our allies. There have been complaints about our alleged failure to exercise leadership but the critics generally want us to lead the other fellow. We feel that we were led down the garden path by our friends in Paris. Up to four or five months ago France took the position that while it did not wish to participate it was not opposed to others doing so. Now, however, France has assumed the role of active opposition. We are not disinterested nor resigned but consider that we must know what will meet European requirements. We are prepared to pursue the matter in the Working Group to see if the consensus will emerge. The Foreign Secretary commented that the discussions in the Working Group should be as lively as German reluctance will permit. He reiterated his earlier comment that the Germans should be prevented from pressing the talks back to the MLF concept. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on March 31. The conversation was held in Rusk's conference room. The source text is labeled “Part 4 of 5.” 2 Stewart visited Washington March 21–24 at the suggestion of the British Government, primarily, according to the scope paper for the visit, to defuse left-wing Labour Party criticism of British support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. Memoranda of his conversations at the Department of State, March 22 and 23, and various papers prepared for the visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2481. No memorandum of his conversation with President Johnson on March 22 has been found. 79. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk 79. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Bonn, March 30, 1965. Dear Mr. Secretary: I have studied with interest your speech of March 6 before the Council on Foreign Relations in Cleveland. 2 One passage which particularly struck me was the reference, in the section on NATO defense, to our receptivity “If the European countries wish to play a larger role, possibly as a collective entity, in sharing the burdens and responsibilities of NATO defense.” Do I interpret this correctly to mean that we will, at some stage prior to the final achievement of unity, be prepared to accept within NATO the collective organization of European defense—non-nuclear as well as nuclear? Your statement would represent a truism in the event of true European political unity, when Europe must act as one. On the nuclear side, a possible consequence of such an interpretation would appear to be that we would also be willing to consider the creation of an independent European nuclear force prior to the achievement of final political unity. This might come about whenever the uniting nations were able to make the necessary arrangements among themselves to manage such a force. The force might embody what Europe itself could contribute—i.e., the force de frappe and, if the UK were to participate, the UK nuclear forces. If an ANF-MLF had in the meantime been created, it could also include the collective European share. If we permitted these steps to be taken in advance of unity, we would not only place ourselves clearly on the side of unity but might find that the exercise of building a European nuclear force had contributed powerfully, perhaps decisively, toward achieving unity. This is why I have always attached so much importance to our acceptance, in a forthcoming way, of a good “European clause” in the ANF/MLF negotiations. If we would make clear now that the way is open to the Europeans to create a European force, French arguments that only their force de frappe could act for Europe would no longer find support. On the conventional side, another possible consequence of your Cleveland speech would appear to be that we would be willing to accept not only the development of a common European defense policy, including strategy, but the creation of a European army. Reconciliation between European and American strategic concepts could probably be more easily accomplished under such circumstances than at present—where there exists a complete impasse on strategy within NATO. There should, moreover, be no particular difficulty in integrating U.S. and European Army representatives at the various NATO command levels—i.e., there is at present of course no actual integration of forces as such nor is this envisaged. Provision might be made for the Commander of the American forces and the Commander of the European forces to rotate as SACEUR. I realize, of course, that this is something for the future, since none of it will be possible until after De Gaulle. In my discussion on March 24 with Jean Monnet, reported to you in Embtel 3638, 3 he expressed gratification at the cooperation which has been achieved within the EEC in Brussels, which he felt has led to the development of cooperation in the economic field which is truly “European” —and which already projects into the political field. Although he does not believe it can be accomplished until after De Gaulle, he sees as necessary additional steps the development of similar bases for cooperation in the foreign policy and defense fields. I assume him to mean that this could be developed progressively, even before the accomplishment of political unity which would be its ultimate consequence. In the political field this could greatly facilitate our dealing with Europe on bilateral matters. It might also provide the only way to obtain any response to our repeated propositions, which you first made at the Oslo NAC meeting in 1961 and made most recently in your Cleveland speech—that Europeans should help us in facing the problems in the peripheral areas. A Europe even beginning to be united in the foreign policy field might be able to develop common policy toward such problems which could lead to common actions. The present proliferation and contradictions of such policies among the various European countries, on the other hand, almost certainly precludes such common action. As I indicated to you in my memorandum of last December 24, 4 I feel that the burden is on us to convince the Europeans that we are really prepared to see a united Europe which is sovereign in the defense field, including the nuclear field, provided this can be done in a way which is not inconsistent with our basic national security interests. Indeed, if we held the contrary view we could be accused of working against European unification. In my judgment unification will not come about, as an abstract proposition, prior to the development of common foreign and defense policies to supplement existing common economic policies. Unification will, in my judgment, come about only as a consequence of the development of such common policies. Even though progress will undoubtedly be delayed until after de Gaulle it is in our interest, I believe, to encourage now those who are willing to “wait him out”, to prove our willingness to work with a unified Europe if and when they succeed in creating it, and to be sure that our policies and actions in the meantime facilitate where they can, but in no case obstruct, the achievement of unity. Otherwise we could end up athwart the whole historic process of European unity. I would appreciate very much any comments you might have on the foregoing. 5 Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. 2 For text of Rusk's address on Atlantic policy, see Department of State Bulletin , March 22, 1965, pp. 427–431. 3 Not found. 4 A copy of this memorandum with an attached 5-page draft paper is in Department of State, S/MF Files: Lot 66 D 182. 5 In his April 12 reply, Secretary Rusk told McGhee that his remarks were suggestive rather than definitive and noted that the United States did not demand European political unity as a condition of progress in collective defense. The United States welcomed progress toward integrated European forces, but the major steps in this direction had to be taken by the Europeans. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 80. Memorandum of Conversation 80. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 20, 1965, 4 p.m. SUBJECT European Integration and Atlantic Problems PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Under Secretary Ball Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler, EUR Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt, American Ambassador to Italy Ambassador Lloyd N. Hand Mr. David H. McKillop, WE Mr. Richard Phillips, P Mr. Walker Givan, WE Italy Prime Minister Aldo Moro Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador to the United States Ambassador Attilio Cattani, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Egidio Ortona, Director General of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minister Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Embassy of Italy Minister Gianfranco Pompei, Diplomatic Advisor to the Prime Minister Mr. Sereno Freato, Counselor, Prime Minister's Office Mr. Corrado Guerzoni, Chief of the Prime Minister's Press Office Mr. Walter Gardini, Chief of Press Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister's reaffirmation earlier in the day at the White House of Italy's strong support for a genuinely united Europe as a source of strength for NATO and the Atlantic Community. 2 The Secretary praised Italian steadfastness in this regard, stating it has proved a constructive and stabilizing influence in Europe's search for greater cohesion. Quoting the Prime Minister as having said a restatement of American support for European unification would be a valuable contribution to this movement, the Secretary called upon Mr. Ball to outline current American thinking on this important subject. Mr. Ball reviewed the reasons why we have encouraged the principle of European unity as a means of assuring a strong, stable, peaceful Europe, with the capability, in an age of interdependency and indivisibility of defense, to play an effective role as an equal partner within the Atlantic Community. He commented on the appeal of De Gaulle for a more national approach to European problems, which the General dramatized in his press conference of January 1963. Since that time, the drive for European political integration has been checked by Gaullist concepts and tactics. Should they prevail, the achievement of a unified Europe and a dynamic Atlantic Community would be indefinitely postponed. On the positive side, Mr. Ball referred to the steady but less dramatic progress made in the economic field by the European Communities. This progress may lead eventually to the creation of European institutions needed to make the political decisions arising as a consequence of close economic integration. Mr. Ball referred to the existence of serious Atlantic problems, especially the threat of French withdrawal from NATO or proposals that would radically alter the basic NATO structure in favor of looser and less effective arrangements. He stressed the importance of an eventual solution of the problem of nuclear military sharing in the Atlantic Community, stating that the MLF proposal had been based on the collective approach. We believe such an approach is the safest as well as an equitable means to avoid proliferations of national weapons programs. Conceding that no real progress is possible in this field until after the German elections, Mr. Ball said a “hard look” at the problem would have to be made in the fall. This delay in the time-table, however, should not be regarded as a slackening of American interest in finding a solution to the problem of mutually satisfactory nuclear arrangements with the Atlantic Community. Concluding his remarks, Mr. Ball stressed the fact that an effective, strong and closely knit Atlantic Community is premised upon European unity. The Secretary stated he wished to make several observations. In considering any proposals the French may make for the revision of NATO, possibly even before 1969, it should be kept in mind that NATO has enjoyed freedom from attack only because NATO strength has been able to persuade Eastern Europe that an attack would be suicidal. Secondly, in any alternatives to the NATO countries working together in their common defense, which the United States thinks is the best approach, we will never agree to remaining in an alliance where we would continue to commit armed forces to Europe but where Europe would make military decisions involving these troops independently of the United States. The Secretary admitted there are vital, unavoidable problems before the Alliance that must be considered in an appropriate forum and before they become unmanageable. We must all be prepared to probe deeply into these problems and consult each other on our future defenses. The Prime Minister said that the Italian Government agrees completely with our views, including the vital role of NATO and the necessity of close ties with the United States. The French position has created uncertainties and problems for NATO, which should be vigorously tackled. NATO cannot be left to drift in the hope that things will arrange themselves. Italy will continue to search for solutions since the future of Europe and the world is dependent upon NATO unity. The related question of European unity has also been affected by the French attitude. But Europeans should not become discouraged or falter. They must continue to study the problems and hope that growing economic integration will held lead to unity. Italy has felt that informal consultations such as the proposed Venice meeting would be helpful even though the French have rejected the idea. As for the MLF or some form of common nuclear defense arrangements, the Prime Minister agreed that there can be no real progress until after the German elections. He said he would welcome our views as to whether we should push the MLF concept even if it meant great disruption and possible French withdrawal from NATO. He said that despite these prospects and domestic complications reflecting British views and fear of German predominance, the Italian Government accepts the MLF in principle. It, too, wishes to avoid new national nuclear capabilities, which would also help to allay domestic fears. Nevertheless, the French position should be studied and the repercussions considered since they could be fraught with political and psychological dangers. The Prime Minister wondered if these problems might be profitably considered at the May NATO meeting. The Secretary commented that our trouble with France dates back to our rejection of General De Gaulle's directorate proposal in 1958. We had done so because we could not accept the attempted direction of our other European allies without their consent. Now the General claims it is too late for a common policy and seeks a special position in Europe based on the force de frappe. The United States has overwhelmingly greater nuclear power than the French can ever dream of mustering, yet we do not claim a special position but rather hope for agreement on a common strategy. The Secretary doubted that the forthcoming NATO meeting, before the German elections and a clearer indication of French intentions, would provide much of an opportunity for going into these matters in depth. We have tried to sound out the French as to their specific intentions but so far unsuccessfully. He pointed out that we are not against change in NATO, but we do not yet know what the changes might be. We should, however, try to fix our ideas before confronted by a major crisis. As for French hostility to the MLF, our attitude does not depend upon French views, but we recognize the need of a broad consensus of support from the other important members if progress is to be made. The Secretary suggested, therefore, that we remain in close touch on this subject. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S and U on May 3. The conversation was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part IV of VI.” 2 A memorandum of the conversation at the White House at 11:30 a.m. is ibid., President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217; a memorandum of a second conversation with the President at 5 p.m. on April 21, during which Johnson reaffirmed his wish to be of assistance in fostering European unity, but also expressed his desire to avoid telling Europeans how to run their lives, is ibid. 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, April 29, 1965, 11:20 a.m. 3289. German Concern over US Views on NATO Strategy. Dept fully agrees with central point Embtel 3887 2 that main element of German concern on strategy, of which there have been increasing signs lately, is that in event of all-out Communist attack on central front US would not authorize use of nuclear weapons before aggressors have overrun large area of Germany. Agree also that concepts embodied in “flexible response,” etc., are taken as representing US disinclination to allow use of nuclear weapons to prevent FRG suffering severely. In view of some, US strategic thinking results in reduction deterrent effect Western military posture. We believe these difficulties stem in part from FRG's extreme dependence upon US nuclear strength for its security combined with its relatively limited influence over US defense planning, in part from feeling that geographic differences in US and German position inevitably lead to differences in judgment on questions such as timing for use nuclear weapons, and in part from insufficient realization that effectiveness of deterrence very much depends upon demonstrable ability to mount a plausible defense if deterrence were to fail. We have grave doubts that this situation can be substantially improved by further hortatory assurances. New statements of US determination or reiteration present commitments unlikely to contribute basically to easing of German anxieties. Present record already includes following: 1. US has, in Athens Guidelines and series of US–FRG strategy talks, made it clear that US intent is to meet Soviet nuclear attack with nuclear response and to meet massive conventional attack with whatever means necessary to repulse it, including nuclear weapons. 2. SACEUR's defense plans, which German officers participate in drawing up, accord with this basic concept and are not based on postponing use of nuclear weapons to last possible moment (as Krone suggested is US wish). 3. We have told Germans in recent talks that their ideas on question of nuclear weapons in limited zone should be studied carefully in connection with defense planning activities, although we have certainly not signed on to them. 4. We have always operated on basis that as objective matter US security is inextricably involved with that of Europe, and that loss of significant portion of European territory to Soviets would so tip balance of power that vital US security interests would be automatically involved. FYI: Fact remains, however, that it is impossible and indeed undesirable, in our view, to define with precision point at which nuclear weapons would be used in various contingencies (and even were we to do so, doubts would probably remain). We recognize our present inability to be absolutely precise either as to use of nuclear weapons in less than all-out attack with nuclear weapons or as to size of conventional option we believe appropriate for NATO, or as to precise changes we would like to see accomplished in present NATO force posture, contributes to fundamental difficulty we have with FRG. End FYI. Although we recognize US bears a primary responsibility for having initiated debate on strategy, we have come to conclusion that less we argue about abstract strategic question, the better. In our view, it is preferable to concentrate on practical aspects of NATO defense and to deal with underlying reasons for FRG anxiety as far as possible. Following are examples: 1. Defense Planning Activities . By focusing on concrete questions of NATO defense problem, as in present NFPE, we can, over time, hopefully secure a force posture that gives NATO wider range of defense options in Europe. This particularly so since we believe this objective need not entail significant increases in European defense expenditures, which we know will not be forthcoming in present political circumstances. Important improvements can be achieved by rationalization of forces even within present budget levels, giving NATO heads of government substantially greater flexibility in crises in choosing type of force to use in range of situations, all of which are not now foreseeable. Accordingly, US strongly supports NFPE activities, will seek its future strengthening and will in meantime continue to avoid “confrontation” or generalized debate on problems of strategy. 2. Improved Consultation Procedures . We hope forthcoming Defense Ministers' meeting will be first of series and, when supplemented by NFPE effort and by continued bilateral DefMin meetings, will lay basis for more intimate and wider-ranging exchanges of views on defense issues among principal Alliance members. This will be helpful in giving DefMins common background of information as basis for more convergent perspectives on defense matters. We hope it will be possible to follow up in months ahead on US December 8 proposal for restricted DefMin meetings at which highly sensitive subjects could be thoroughly and frankly discussed. 3. Nuclear Sharing . We continue to view as highly important measures for giving Germans and others confidence that NATO nuclear forces of adequate size are organized, used and deployed according to plans which they have large degree of influence in drawing up. These measures can result in wider sharing of nuclear planning and operating responsibilities and we would hope that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] such wider participation in planning and operating would reduce allied apprehensions re alliance nuclear problems. Present hiatus in ANF/MLF in no way indicates a reduced US interest in bringing allies more fully into nuclear planning and sharing process. We have solicited allied views on how this process might be given effect and we are ourselves constantly studying particular proposals to this end. However, we anticipate Germans and others will not want to pursue intensive discussions in this area until after September. Dept believes it is in material progress in areas such as these rather than in further repetitions of US avowals to defend Europe that will, in due course, serve as best, and indeed only basis for effectively dealing with underlying German concerns. Nevertheless, in further effort to meet problem, request your views on desirability of arranging for Secretary McNamara to talk with highly selected Germans during visit to Bonn. We would suggest you arrange restricted informal meeting of senior German officials (Luebke, if appropriate, Erhard, Krone, Von Hassel, Schroeder, et al), at which Secretary McNamara could informally discuss problem as he has done with number of German visitors to Washington. Conceivably Secretary McNamara and Von Hassel could meet with such group in guise of making report on their May talks. It is our feeling that this kind of authoritative and first-hand account could be far more valuable than many pages of written exegesis. We are also considering whether communiqué which might be issued after McNamara/Von Hassel talks should include brief reaffirmation of US intentions to help defend German territory by all necessary means in event of Communist attack. We are also, as you requested, looking at various public and classified statements issued on this subject, although we feel these statements of policy should be reasonably well know to senior German officials. Request your comments on above suggestions, which are tentative and would receive high-level consideration only if you strongly endorse them. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spiers on April 22; cleared by G/PM, GER, S/P, Schaetzel, and DOD; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Paris Topol. 2 Dated April 7. (Ibid.) 3 On May 4, McGhee replied strongly endorsing the idea of McNamara discussing NATO strategy during his May visit to Bonn and the proposal for a McNamara-Von Hassel communique. (Telegram 4351 from Bonn; ibid., DEF 1 NATO) 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 82. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 1 Washington, May 1, 1965, 12:29 p.m. 2200. Reftel Polto 1570, repeated Brussels 83; Deptel 2173 to Brussels April 26. 2 Spaak will of course wish to determine himself how best to handle the state of the Alliance and in particular De Gaulle's April 27 speech. In view of De Staercke's inquiry on behalf of Spaak you may say that I intend to deal with the matter in the following fashion: A public attack on or specific refutation of April 27 speech might well have the effect of strengthening rather than weakening the theses propounded. We note that press comment has been generally unfavorable. The most effective response to De Gaulle's statements will, in my view, be found in the clearest possible statements of what policies we and the Europeans favor. We expect to issue a high level statement on May 7. 3 Further, the meeting of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe in Berlin on May 8th and 9th, with Erhard attending the second day, should result in a further strong reiteration of the goals of European integration and Atlantic interdependence. Through authoritative restatement of these constructive policies, which clearly enjoy broad support in Europe, both officials and the general public, will draw appropriate conclusions. We have all been sensitive to the difficult situation confronting the German Government and have attempted to meet their desire to minimize direct confrontations with Paris. We intend to do our best to help the Germans on this score. With this in mind I do not expect to initiate at the London meeting a detailed analysis of the State of the Alliance. However, I believe that we cannot put off such an examination beyond the December Ministerial Meeting. At that time we should take specific actions looking toward modernizing and strengthening NATO. As indicated reftel we would take preliminary step in this direction at London; propounding certain questions for consideration in December and suggesting small expert group. You and Finletter should draw on the foregoing as you see fit. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(ANF). Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schaetzel on April 30, cleared by McKillop and Popper, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Bonn, London, Rome, and The Hague. 2 Polto 1570, April 29, reported that Spaak was concerned about the effect of De Gaulle's April 27 speech and wanted to know what Rusk believed should be done about it. (Ibid.) Telegram 2173 informed the Embassy in Brussels that if Spaak confirmed his desire to launch an initiative at the NAC meeting in May for a reorganization of NATO forces, he should be told that the time was not right since the NATO force planning exercise begun in 1963 was just beginning to bear fruit. (Ibid., NATO 3 UK(LO)) For text of De Gaulle's speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 434–436. 3 On May 2, the Department of State asked the Missions in Rome, Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow for recommendations on the content and temper of a statement that the President might make on the anniversary of VE-Day, May 7. (Telegram 2542 to Rome; Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR-US) The replies all stressed the importance of such a statement and the need to reiterate U.S. support for and commitment to Europe. (Ibid.) For text of the President's address, in which he outlined six pieces of urgent and unfinished business in U.S. relations with Europe and stressed the need to build a Europe reaching across the Atlantic, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506–509. 83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, May 4, 1965, 2015Z. 2 3238. NATO. When I asked General De Gaulle if his thinking on NATO had remained the same as he had expressed to the Secretary and me last December, 3 particularly in regard to timing, De Gaulle answered that his views had not changed; that he believed it would be necessary in 1969 to reexamine the North Atlantic Treaty. He said that he was in favor of an alliance with the US, with Great Britain and with Germany (he did not mention other NATO members), but whether in the same form as the present treaty he could not be sure at this time. He said for example he would have to “look at” the question of a council as he was not quite sure what a council would do. He then stated very clearly and definitely that any form of integration would have to go when the time came to review the treaty. He said that in France there would be no longer any troops or military installations not under French command, but that of course if Germany wished to have American and British troops this was their right. He mentioned that for other reasons France would probably wish to maintain some forces in Germany. He emphasized however again that all forces and installations on the territory of France would be under French command and French command alone, with the clear implication that there would no longer be any foreign troops on French soil. He said these changes in the NATO structure would not certainly be made this year and in any event, while not committing himself to any specific time except before 1969, that other allies including the US would be given plenty of warning and time to consider the French suggestions. I asked the General, since he had fought in two world wars, if he did not think that the allies, particularly in World War I, had not suffered a great deal from the absence of unity of command. He said possibly, but pointed out that in World War I the British and subsequently American troops had fought in France but, as he put it, had been under French law, i.e., that France had been in control of all actions on her soil. He said there would be no objection to various plans drawn up by headquarters to be put into effect when hostilities start, assigning one sector or another to different commanders, but he said that integration would be finished. I told him my impression of the NATO set up was that most staff planning was for future contingencies, and he waved this aside and said no, and under US control. Comment : While De Gaulle said nothing particularly new he was much more explicit in regard to the total elimination of any integrated structure in France. I had never heard him before state so flatly that all foreign military installations would leave the soil of France or else be under total French control. 4 Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn and London. 2 Beginning in May 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time-groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 3 See Document 64 . 4 Before discussing NATO, Bohlen and De Gaulle talked briefly about the differences between the United States and France on the future of Europe. President De Gaulle said that they were really not a matter of principle but of time. (Telegram 6237 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER) 84. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 84. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, May 9, 1965, 1103Z. 5415. For Secretary from Popper. Recognize that considerations of highest importance must have led to your decision to postpone your departure for NATO Ministerial. 2 Nevertheless, news will be received by most other delegations with disappointment and by some, including Secretary-General, with deep dismay. We know of course that Under Secretary will present US case on matters we wish to handle in NATO with fullest effectiveness. That is not the problem. It is rather that this sharp break from precedent comes at a time when the Alliance is under attack and when therefore Alliance morale is especially sensitive to what may seem to be signals of changing attitudes. Our friends in NATO take comfort and gain conviction from your presence and your presentation. Their private exchanges of views with you have a tonic effect. Conversely, your absence will inevitably be used in some quarters to support view that our interest in Alliance is diminishing. In future other Ministers may be impelled without the same justification to absent themselves from Ministerial meetings. Next year or two may be critical for NATO; it would be most unfortunate time for such a trend to gain ground. President's May 7 speech 3 has been extremely beneficial with our friends in Europe. To build on that foundation, hope you can plan a quick trip to attend as large a part of Ministerial meeting as possible, or at least make a brief appearance. It would be most helpful if the Under Secretary had some reassuring word from you to this effect which he could pass on to Secretary-General when they meet at noon Monday here. 4 Amb. Finletter concurs. Bruce 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 UK(LO). Confidential; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Because of the crisis in the Dominican Republic, Secretary Rusk initially told the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Ministerial meeting that he would not be able to attend the session. Rusk flew to London when the crisis eased, arriving on May 12. 3 See footnote 3, Document 82 . 4 Telegram 5416 from London, May 9, transmitted a letter from Secretary General Brosio to Rusk saying that he understood the “weighty reasons” that would keep the Secretary in Washington. At the same time, he stressed the great importance that Rusk's personal appearance would have, especially since the present situation in the Alliance was subject to misinterpretation by “ill-intentioned parties.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 S) On May 10, Under Secretary Ball met with Brosio to discuss the forthcoming meeting. Ball told Brosio that while it was not a good time for a searching discussion of the future of the Alliance, he did plan to raise the issue and suggest that a fuller discussion take place at the December meeting. Ball also told Brosio that the United States wanted Vietnam and the Dominican Republic mentioned in the final communique, and Brosio in turn reviewed the Cyprus situation. (Secun 4 from London, May10; ibid., NATO 3 UK(LO)) 85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 85. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 London, May 14, 1965, 10 a.m. Secto 19. Following summary of Secretary's conversation May 13 with NATO SecGen Brosio is uncleared. Noforn and subject to revision: 1. Ministerial Meeting . Brosio thanked Secretary for coming and said his presence on second day was decisive factor in making meeting successful. 2 In response to Brosio question about US tactics on communique paragraph re Vietnam, 3 Secretary said that French policy now so broadly recognized as peace regardless of consequences that neither US nor Asians much concerned about French attitude Vietnam. 2. NATO Nuclear Committee . Secretary explained that US slowed down activity MLF Working Group as accommodation to FRG and not to De Gaulle or Russians. Germans don't want to push subject before September elections and all interested participants want to keep discussions going in meantime. Brosio said he considering parallel activity, discussions of nuclear policy in NATO Nuclear Committee in June. Some NATO countries desire meeting and he thought France willing to participate. It would initially examine information available since discussions of 1962. He hoped US could contribute useful information. Secretary cautioned Nuclear Committee meeting might raise serious problems between Paris and Bonn and suggested most important that Schroeder be in full agreement before initiation such sensitive meetings, especially in light of possible talks between French and Gromyko on nuclear matters about which we and Germans have not been filled in. Brosio admitted that at moment Germans less keen than others, but had objected only on basis of possible conflict with ANF/MLF Working Group. Popper warned US has no great new array information available for presentation at a June meeting. Secretary referred to analysis of Peking possible second nuclear explosion, which would be reported NAC in any case. Secretary suggested that alleged differences on strategy between major NATO countries is more matter of politics and budgets than true military question. He did not despair that quietly over time apparent differences might be resolved. Brosio said it was for this reason he would shortly see Messmer about forthcoming Defense Ministers' meeting. He hoped in time common ground would evolve although not optimistic much more would emerge from DefMin's meeting than agreement for studies to continue. 3. State of Alliance . Brosio referred to Mr. Ball's suggestions for more intensive study of state of Alliance and asked how urgently we viewed problem. Secretary explained that last December De Gaulle had said French would make proposals for Alliance reorganization, probably in 1967 in anticipation of 1969 date. He now had impression French might be advancing timetable. Question therefore is do we wait and see what De Gaulle suggests or do we try to see what remaining members want. For example, do Europeans want to organize defense together with US or separately. In spite of prosperity, Europeans show no signs of being ready to pay for own separate defense. Finletter cautioned that, although we must prepare for serious French surprises, he doubted whether the Permanent Council was at this stage right arena for raising substantive discussion of state of Alliance. Secretary observed that when husband and wife talk of divorce, it is already too late. US does not want to push far-reaching over-hasty fundamental discussions but does wish to begin preparations where possible. Brosio thought his and Secretary's approach much the same. He agreed it was desirable to prepare the ground; however, it was better not to pin ourselves down too firmly about time and type of activity at this point. 4. Cyprus . Secretary said Greeks and Turks continuing to meet bilaterally and working on location further talks with Greeks preferring New York and Turks Paris. Brosio said Costopoulos 4 claimed Makarios had agreed to accept whatever two sides agreed upon and Secretary cautioned against over-optimism on Makarios. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2505. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vest and cleared by Popper. Repeated to Paris Topol and Bonn. 2 Records of the public, closed, and restricted sessions of the 35th meeting of the North Atlantic Council May 11–13 are ibid., Central Files, NATO 3 UK(LO). Copies of these records, delegation background and briefing papers, memoranda of conversation, and telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2503–2512. 3 For text of the final communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 439–440. 4 Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos. 86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 86. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, May 21, 1965, 7:53 p.m. 6051. Following is based on uncleared summary of conversation, FYI Noforn and subject to review: Calling at his request May 21, French Ambassador Alphand and Secretary had tour d'horizon in which Santo Domingo, Southeast Asia, ChiCom nuclear weapons and NATO were discussed along familiar lines. Alphand's remarks about French attitude toward NATO and its European neighbors of particular interest. Replying to Secretary's query re significance of Couve's remarks on NATO to Foreign Affairs Commission of National Assembly May 20, Alphand said General De Gaulle had told him that time would be ripe “next year” for discussion of revision of NATO. Secretary remarked that last December De Gaulle had mentioned 1967 as time for such discussion, which perhaps indicates French are accelerating time schedule. Alphand stated he hoped consideration of NATO revision could be handled by “silent diplomacy” and that agreement on changes could eventually be reached quietly and undramatically. Secretary pointed out GOF continues to stress NATO no longer corresponds to existing needs and world situation but does not state specifically how NATO should be revised to make it conform with changed circumstances. Secretary said it would be most helpful if GOF could give us its more detailed thinking on this subject. Alphand pointed out France in 1958 had put forth proposals for reorganizing the Alliance but had been rebuffed. Secretary smilingly commented that if France were able to obtain acceptance of its neighbors for those proposals, US would have agreed. Alphand retorted France different from its neighbors in two important respects: namely, it is a world power and has nuclear weapons capability. Secretary said he hoped emphasis France places on nuclear capability as status symbol would not encourage proliferation. Alphand said France hoped its neighbors would not achieve nuclear weapon programs for long time to come but in long run, proliferation probably inevitable. 2 In concluding talk, Secretary said he wished to stress we are in no way contemplating use of nuclear weapons in SEA; nevertheless we feel we cannot make commitment never to be first country to resort to nuclear warfare. In case US was faced with fighting 800 million people, use of nuclear weapons could be necessary to avoid being bled to death. Secretary emphasized however that we do not wish war with ChiComs nor do we seek excuse destroy Chinese nuclear capability. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Richard H. Davis (EUR). Repeated to London, Rome, Bonn, Paris for USRO, Brussels, The Hague, and Moscow. 2 On June 3, Ambassador Bohlen transmitted a lengthy telegram summarizing De Gaulle's intentions toward NATO. He suggested that in response to statements about France's unwillingness to propose specific revisions, De Gaulle would demand early in 1966 a firmer commitment by the United States under Article 5 and revision or deletion of Article 9, which provided for the North Atlantic Council. Since France expected these proposals would be unacceptable to the rest of the Alliance, De Gaulle would be given an excuse to terminate the treaty. Bohlen added that it was also clear France intended, by 1969 at the latest, to have no forces or installations on French soil that were not under French command and subject to French law. (Telegram 6843 from Paris; ibid., POL 1 EUR W–FR) 87. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 87. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, June 2, 1965, 7:27 p.m. 2412. Following points constitute guidance re “Select Committee of Defense Ministers” as proposed by Secretary McNamara at May 31 NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris: 2 1. Question of composition, terms of reference, time and place of meeting are matters for discussion among PermReps and Brosio in Paris. U.S. has suggested that composition be limited to four or five DefMins, since group will be unmanageable if too large. However, U.S. does not want to establish firm position on these points until suggestion has been considered by others and U.S. has had opportunity to study their comments and proposals. Committee would be ad hoc, not a permanent body. 2. Group—as suggested by U.S.—would have two principal agenda items: a) Examination of possible means of improving and extending Allied participation in planning for use of nuclear forces, including strategic nuclear forces. In course of its study, Committee would presumably examine present procedures, established after Ottawa meeting in May 1963, whereby non-U.S. officials participate in planning for use of nuclear forces committed to Alliance and make recommendations as to how these procedures could be improved; b) To work out technical means for fast and secure communications among NATO governments so that consultation is practical possibility in event of crisis in which use of nuclear weapons may be contemplated. Agreement that such consultations should take place is already established in Athens Guidelines of 1962. 3 3. Purpose of new proposal is to study how to provide greater degree of participation in nuclear planning for those desiring to participate, in line with general tendency of Allied thinking since Athens Ministerial Meeting in 1962. As McNamara stated, this is additional to whatever action may be taken re ANF/MLF proposals, not in substitution. Hence, Select Committee would not impinge on work of Paris ANF/MLF Working Group. 4. Select Committee will examine problems and make recommendations; it will not make “decisions” in its own right. Recommendations would presumably be considered at government level by all NATO members and might be discussed at future Ministerial Meeting of Alliance. U.S. recognizes that a committee composed of less than total membership of NATO would not take action binding on others not represented in it. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers; cleared by Popper, Schaetzel, G/PM, and DOD; and approved by Davis. Also sent to Paris for USRO and to CINCLANT for POLAD. 2 Records of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting, held at Paris May 31–June 1, are ibid., DEF 12 NATO. For text of the communique issued at the end of the meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , p. 440. 3 For text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the Athens North Atlantic Council session, May 6, 1962, see ibid., 1962, pp. 541–543. 88. Memorandum of Conversation 88. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 4, 1965, 12:30 p.m. SUBJECT Germany, France, and the Alliance PARTICIPANTS US The President Harry Obst—Interpreter German Chancellor Erhard 2 Hermann Kuesterer—Interpreter The President reaffirmed the determination of the US to keep the Alliance intact. He asked the Chancellor if he was familiar with the statement he made on May 7 3 in which he had made clear the determination of the US to support its Allies in Europe and had assured them that they could depend on the US. The President stressed that the US will stay in Germany and in Europe as long as it is needed. The Chancellor thanked the President for his May 5 and May 8 statements. 4 He affirmed that he and the German people agreed entirely with these views. The President said more in those two statements than General De Gaulle has said altogether. The Chancellor said that he would have to meet with General De Gaulle next week. There were serious differences between Germany and France on many issues, and, except for the EEC, they had virtually no common positions at this time. The President said he understood the problem and assured the Chancellor that he understood his difficulties with General De Gaulle. He said that he thought both the US and Germany should make their positions very clear to the General. The Chancellor replied he did not want a public quarrel or confrontation next week. The President affirmed that the US could rely on Germany more than any other partner of the Alliance. De Gaulle must be asked exactly where he stood, but the President agreed that this question might better be asked after the elections in September. This issue could not be postponed indefinitely, however, and especially not until 1969. The US was determined to preserve the Alliance, and, although it hoped that France would remain in it, at worst the Alliance could continue without France. The Chancellor said De Gaulle was very well aware of the Chancellor's position. De Gaulle did not really want a European Europe, but he knew that the Chancellor would not agree to anything that would disrupt NATO. The Chancellor repeated his view that a confrontation should wait until after the elections and assured the President that Germany would not be afraid to use hard language with De Gaulle. One problem was that there were still groups in Germany sympathizing with De Gaulle because of the Adenauer-De Gaulle friendship. In the past De Gaulle could always be certain that Adenauer would follow whatever he suggested. The President could be assured—and De Gaulle also knew this very well—that the Chancellor's attitude now was quite different and that this Chancellor would not just do what De Gaulle desired. Chancellor Erhard also assured the President that he was not at all worried or impressed by De Gaulle's bluff of flirting with Moscow. The President replied that the Chancellor was enduring De Gaulle just as reluctantly as he did, but that it might be wise to be patient until after the elections. After the elections it should be made clear to De Gaulle that NATO would continue with or without France. The President told the Chancellor he should bring forward any ideas he might have to further German reunification and any approaches that he might think feasible. He could be assured such suggestions would be listened to sympathetically. 1 Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. Drafted by Obst and Kent and approved in the White House on June 29. The conversation was held in the President's Office. The source text is labeled “Part three of nine.” 2 Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder visited Washington June 2–4 for talks on topics of mutual concern. Other memoranda of conversation and papers relating to the visit are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2520 and 2521. 3 See footnote 3, Document 82 . 4 Neither of these statements has been further identified. 89. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 89. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, June 10, 1965, 7:58 p.m. 2484. There have been repeated rumors that French may shortly ask US in effect to vacate certain military facilities in France. While we now suspect that such a request will be postponed until after the French elections in December we cannot be sure of this. The following guidance is therefore being sent against the contingency that the request will be made within the next few weeks or months. A French request of the US to vacate certain or all military facilities in France or place them under French command would be consistent with emerging policies of Elysee, and would probably be preliminary step to subsequent French move, which likely take place after French elections, to disengage France from NATO organization and specifically from integrated NATO military activities. Premature reaction (i.e. by pressing for immediate across-board confrontation on French intentions re NATO) to early French request to withdraw from certain military facilities could be harmful to our interests and to NATO. It could permit French to argue it was we and not they who were taking initiative to exclude France from NATO community, and thus to break up the Alliance. A reaction of this kind would also prevent us from engaging in essential systematic and intensive consultation with our allies to ensure that Alliance responds effectively to any French political attack, and emerges without unnecessary loss of strength. Moreover, while internal study already underway, US Government will need some time to study effect and cost of various ways in which we might act. (FYI. At later stage we may well wish use French request for removal facilities as basis for general confrontation, depending on timing, tactics, public presentation, etc. End FYI.) Accordingly, our present plan is to respond along following lines to any early official inquiry about US reaction to French demand, if made, for withdrawal of some or all American military presence from France: 1. Naturally we shall give careful consideration to any French request, with specific reference to: (a) the effect of withdrawal actions on the defensive capabilities of the Alliance and on NATO itself; (b) the relevant provisions of the legal arrangements under which the facilities in question are established in France; (c) the military effects and the cost of removing facilities from France and making the necessary alternative arrangements; (d) the consequences of any substantial change in the US military establishment in France as regards NATO as a whole. 2. The US would respond to a French request only after a careful review of these questions, and after such military and political consultation as might be required particularly with allies dependent upon supplies and services now furnished through France or allies whose territories might be affected by alternative arrangements. FYI: DOD study on LOC and other US facilities in France and their possible relocation is now underway. Conclusions this study available in several weeks. Only then could consultation with allies begin as a necessary precondition to relocation. Consequently, immediate or hasty response to any French request for withdrawal infeasible on practical as well as psychological grounds. End FYI. 3. Our allies should be left in no doubt that US commitment to NATO and determination to provide full political and military support remains unimpaired. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15–5 FR–US. Secret. Drafted by Leddy and Schaetzel; cleared by Ball, Thompson, and Kitchen; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris for USRO and POLADs SHAPE and EUCOM, Rome for Burris at Naples, and Bonn for Parelman. 90. Memorandum of Conversation 90. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 16, 1965, noon. SUBJECT France and NATO PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Mr. Leddy, EUR Mr. Schaetzel, EUR Mr. Popper, EUR/RPM UK Lord Hood, Deputy Under Secretary Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador Lord Hood stated that his previous conversations with the Under Secretary and with Mr. Leddy had disclosed broad agreement on our analysis of French intentions. 2 Both governments felt that we should use the rest of this year to prepare for steps we might have to take if and when the French acted, after the December Presidential election. We both considered that the implications of the French position for NATO were serious but not fatal, and that what the French might do with respect to NATO and U.S. facilities in France was more serious than what they could do through withdrawal of their forces from NATO commitment. We agreed that NATO could make alternative arrangements if it must, but that these would be less satisfactory than those we now had. Accordingly, we must try to deter De Gaulle from moving, if possible. Bribery and threats would be counter-productive. The right approach was to: (1) continue acting on the assumption that NATO would go on as an institution; (2) synchronize statements by allied leaders supporting NATO principles; (3) let it be known that we were taking the necessary precautions to meet possible French actions; (4) continue the momentum on NATO programs such as stepping up political consultation, the NATO Force Planning Exercise, and so forth, while maintaining an open door for the French; and (5) consider carefully any specific proposals made by the French. Generally, it was in our interest to seek to gain time by this largely declaratory policy, and against our interest to precipitate a crisis. Lord Hood continued that if this approach were correct, the next step would be to put the matter to certain of the allies. This could best be done when the Under Secretary went to Paris early next month for the special NAC meeting. The Germans, Dutch and Italians were most important in this respect; Lord Hood asked whether the US and the UK should not approach them jointly. The Secretary thought this would be bound to lead to leaks and would heighten the impact of the conversations; furthermore, it would provoke a reaction from those allies not jointly approached. He did not think we should engage in joint US–UK talks with others at this time. The Secretary noted that the French attitude created insecurity and nervousness, because of doubts regarding the status of the North Atlantic Treaty after 1969. He wondered whether it would not be advantageous for a number of us to state at the December Ministerial Meeting that we did not intend to avail ourselves of the privilege of denouncing the treaty. He asked whether such a step would provoke De Gaulle. Lord Hood thought not, depending on how it was done. He recalled the 1954 Nine-Power declaration at London, 3 in which the French participated, declaring that they regarded the North Atlantic Treaty as being of indefinite duration. The Secretary then asked whether there should be any more precise or more formal discussion with the French at this time. Lord Hood was inclined to think not: the French would hear of the exercise on which we were embarking, and we would stand ready to bring them into any discussions on NATO problems if they desired—as was the case in connection with the Select Committee of Defense Ministers. The Secretary agreed. Mr. Leddy explained that we planned to compare US and UK talking papers which could be used for exploratory bilateral discussions with other allies. He did not expect that there would be any substantial difference between the two papers, though difference of emphasis might later appear as to the time and occasion for a confrontation with the French. This might be particularly true after the German election, when we might desire to move forward on ANF/MLF negotiations even though that might produce a strong reaction. The matter could be left open for the present, however. Mr. Leddy added that FRG Vice Chancellor Mende had expressed the opinion to him that De Gaulle might be taking such a hard line on NATO in order to obtain a stronger French position in the organization. 4 It was agreed that there was no real sign that giving the French more of the important jobs or more authority would have any substantial result. Lord Hood suggested, and it was agreed, that we would exchange lists of actions we thought the French might take vis-a-vis NATO. It was also agreed that when the Defense Department study of the possible relocation of U.S. and NATO facilities in France had been completed, it should be discussed with U.K. experts. A meeting of legal experts in Washington might consider the legal problems which could be created by French action, and a regularly scheduled public affairs experts meeting in London, now scheduled for the second week in July, could look at the problem of public affairs policies on the French and NATO. The Secretary asked what it would be wise to say if the press inquired about rumors that contingency plans were being made for a French withdrawal from NATO. The consensus was that one could take the line that “contingency planning” was too dramatic a term, but that naturally statements made by the French required us to give some thought to the problems which might arise. Finally, the Secretary asked when and where the Winter Ministerial Meeting should meet in view of the French election. Lord Hood thought that the locale should remain Paris, but that the date might be changed. He suggested that the Under Secretary might discuss the matter with Secretary General Brosio in Paris next month, at the same time explaining the purpose of our bilateral contacts on the French problem. Mr. Schaetzel noted that we were seeking advice from Ambassadors Bohlen and Finletter on the subject. In the course of the conversation the Secretary asked how we should handle the problem of the new SHAPE Headquarters building. Mr. Schaetzel explained that our failure to send instructions to USRO, stating that we were preparing to move ahead with it, was holding up the development of a situation in which the French would be the only opponents of constructing a new building. The Defense Department now seemed to be ready to agree. Mr. Leddy believed that it would be useful for the situation to unfold in this way, so that we could make it clear that we were continuing a business-as-usual policy in NATO. Lord Hood agreed. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Popper, initialed by Leddy, and approved in S on July 6. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 Memoranda of the conversations with Ball and Leddy on June 15 are ibid., POL US and DEF 4 NATO. 3 For text of the Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, see Foreign Relations , 1952–1954, vol. V, pp. 1345 ff. 4 A memorandum of Leddy's conversation with Vice Chancellor Erich Mende at 10:15 a.m. on June 16 is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. 91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, June 21, 1965, 9:19 p.m. 6571. For Ambassador from Under Secretary. Ref: Embtel 7218. 2 I do not contemplate imprudence. We had a useful first conversation with Lord Hood with regard to NATO problems and he expressed a willingness to meet me in Paris for further conversation. I hope to have exploratory and totally non-committal conversations with other representatives who may come from other capitals for the meeting of the NATO Council. I shall also tell Couve, if I see him, that we are of course looking forward to any proposals the French Government may put forward regarding the revision of NATO although I understand the government is not expecting to make such moves until next year. The position of the United States Government at the moment is that we do not have definitively formulated views but are simply soliciting the suggestions of other governments in a very preliminary manner. I do not expect this matter to get into the public domain to any great extent. In the NATO session we held last March we were successful in maintaining a high degree of security. 3 If, however, the French Government hears rumors that we may be talking about the Alliance, tant pis. On basis our talks today with UK, German and Italian Embassies here and with Brosio through Finletter, probability is that NATO meeting will take place on July 13 instead of July 7; bilaterals would be scheduled for July 12 and possibly morning of 14th. This might enable participation of Schroeder and Fanfani at NATO discussions, which important in its own right. I have definite impression that both Foreign Ministers wish handle bilaterals themselves. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Ball. 2 In telegram 7218, June 21, received in the Department of State at 10:50 a.m., Bohlen “seriously” hoped that Ball would be “very prudent” in his bilateral discussions on the state of the Alliance during his presentation to the North Atlantic Council in July. The Ambassador also expressed his feeling that the United States might not be far enough along in its own thinking to have profitable discussions. (Ibid.) 3 Documentation on Ball's presentation to the North Atlantic Council March 31–April 1 on various international problems is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2484. 92. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and european Regional Organizations to the Department of State 92. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and european Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 29, 1965, 2000Z. Polto 1875. Select Committee (SC) proposal. Following highlights informal PermReps plus one meeting Brosio's office June 29 discuss creation SC. (Brosio felt it essential have such informal meeting smoke out others, particularly French on SC and make available more detailed suggestions than made at DefMin meet.) For this purpose I prepared statement (being forwarded by pouch) based on Dept Topol 1707 and Circs 2443 and 2412, 2 which was passed out at meeting. Before reading paper I mentioned fact that many PermReps had approached us to obtain more details SC proposal and therefore at suggestion SYG I prepared informal statement in effort be helpful, emphasizing meeting and paper both informal, that we did not wish to establish SC as new NATO institution but was merely a mechanism see how could obtain suggestions for better nuclear consultation. Also emphasized desire to [hear?] suggestions from others and hope that SYG would continue follow through in order expedite matter. Following are informal comments after paper read: Canada (Ignatieff) welcomed SC suggestion since Canada desired further discussion nuclear matters for long time and it essential come to grips with implications of Athens and Ottawa decisions. While all hope deterrent will work, must recognize this depends on the will to employ which means must consult in detail ahead of time to avoid misunderstanding and to know how and when weapons should be used if necessary. While suggestion SC will be helpful, NAC should continue nuclear consultations and any suggestions by SC must be subject to NAC approval. Ignatieff raised following points: 1. Not sure why it implied SC should only report to Ministerial meetings rather than regular NAC. 2. SC should probably be composed three nuclear and three non-nuclear powers. 3. SC should not be institutionalized. 4. What would be frequency of SC meetings and locale and the role of SYG in SC? 5. Nuclear consultations should build on Athens and Ottawa agreements. Ignatieff then suggested following topics for SC discussion: 1. Coordination of tactical weapons assigned NATO commanders. 2. Coordination use SAC weapons. 3. Coordination use future nuclear weapons systems, tactical or external. 4. Role of NAC in emergency situation in relation to above nuclear weapons. 5. Elaborate on Athens guidelines. 6. Improved communications. 7. Increase Allied roles in strategic planning (e.g. greater NATO role SAC, wider role SACEUR nuclear deputy, permanent consultative role Nuclear Committee). 8. How provide for greater role NATO governments in nuclear matters. (Ignatieff later circulated paper covering points—being pouched.) Belgium (De Staercke) agreed generally with Canadian points and welcomed SC suggestion. Endorsed idea meetings should be informal since wished make sure not reduce role of NAC which must make final decisions. He thought suggestion DefMins or regular Ministerial meetings would be only ones to discuss SC's suggestions incorrect, since this gave impressions NAC being denigrated—“There are not two councils, only one, and at some of its meetings FonMins present.” He asked for clarification what we had in mind in setting up working group and/or panels since it obvious DefMins will not be able to do detailed work. Expressed hope SYG would keep countries not on SC informed of developments and questioned suggestion US paper that SC have MC consult regarding purely military matters. De Staercke felt entire question although military was definitely more political than military and did not like give impression SC and military would make suggestions without full consideration by NAC as political body. He also asked how SYG hoped handle question. UK (Shuckburgh) welcomed SC and supported US statement which refined and defined McNamara's suggestion but made it clear that proposals were basically limited. Therefore he not sure whether Canadians' and Belgians' suggestions regarding broad questions to be discussed by SC were its role. He envisaged SC making procedural suggestions and not being a permanent body. Adding if SC only made basic procedural recommendations would not be difficult agree on limited membership, otherwise problem most difficult. SC would only make recommendations while NAC in permanent or Ministerial session would make decisions. Italy (Alessandrini) agreed with colleagues but felt his government would insist upon NAC as ultimate decision body and he wished to know what role SYG would be re SC. Germany (Grewe) welcomed SC proposals and remarked pleased hear US paper suggested working group or panels since obviously DefMins would not have time work out detailed suggestions. Recalled both Athens and Ottawa meetings were combined FonMin and DefMin meetings and underlined any consideration SC suggestions should be by NAC or combined Ministerial meetings. He wondered how limited suggestions of US paper could be reconciled with wider suggestions on SC made by Canada and Belgium but in any event he certain FRG would want to be sure NAC involved in any decisions and thought that before final SC suggestions submitted December Ministerial meeting draft they should be considered by NAC as political body. Netherlands (Boon) welcomed McNamara's initiative since discussion nuclear matters can come only if nuclear powers so desire. Thought it important first to draw up mandate SC. Said it essential make sure NAC has final decision and pointed out Alliance had never before used special category of Ministers other than FonMins to make decisions for it and therefore any final suggestions should be presented to Council meeting rather than DefMin meeting. He glad committee open-ended and his government will decide whether they would like to be on committee after mandate established since Dutch not convinced such important matter should be studied just by few. He too wished to know position SYG and hoped there would be no changes in usual NAC operations in connection with establishing SC. He closed with statement saying he welcomed these discussions and Dutch would decide later what final position would be. Greece (Palamas) welcomed suggestions, reiterated decisions must be by Council but gave green light to any agreed arrangements to work out procedural suggestions of SC. US (Finletter) expressed gratitude for responses and stated he agreed with most suggestions but felt personally that narrow interpretation given by UK was more in keeping with our suggestions than those raised by Canada and Belgium. He too impressed with the apparent unanimity expressed by others that paramount role of Permanent Council should be protected since it was a unique organization and should not be deprived in any way of its authority. France (Schricke) merely thanked us for further details but stated had no instructions. He added odd statement that Athens and Ottawa meetings were meetings of FonMins and not combined FonMin-DefMin meetings. No one commented. 3 SYG summed up by stating further informal meetings PermReps plus one discuss SC will take place after NAC meetings on July 7. He recorded general concern of all on paramount authority of NAC. Re role SYG, felt as chairman NAC, he should also chair SC meetings. Re Canada-UK dilemma suggested SC would study narrower aspects and make suggestions while broader problems brought up by Canada should be discussed in NAC. Finletter 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the NATO capitals. 2 Circular telegram 2412 is Document 87 . Circular telegram 2443, June 7, discussed the size and composition of the committee, France's participation, its relationship to other NATO bodies, a timetable for its organization, and its terms of reference, but added that the Department of State and Defense were just beginning to discuss what substantive questions the committee might want to address. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) Topol 1707, June 17, elaborated on the problems that the committee might consider, but again stressed that U.S. thinking was “preliminary and certainly not rigid.” (Ibid.) 3 On June 10, Finletter reported that the French seemed “generally favorable” toward going ahead with the committee, but subsequent conversations indicated their position would be determined on the specifics of the proposal. (Polto 1790 from Paris; ibid.) On June 30, at a lunch given by Brosio, the French Permanent Representative attacked the idea of the committee discussing the improvement of communications (beyond the competence of the Defense Ministers) and the use of nuclear weapons (a political question also beyond their competence). While Finletter argued that both questions should be studied by the Defense Ministers, he concluded that the final French position was still unclear, but the rest of the Alliance should be prepared to prevent the French from blocking the work of the committee. (Polto 1883 from Paris; ibid.) 93. Memorandum of Conversation 93. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 6, 1965, 4 p.m. SUBJECT EEC Crisis PARTICIPANTS United States Under Secretary Ball Mr. David H. Popper—RPM Mr. Walker Givan—WE Italy Sergio Fenoaltea, Ambassador, Embassy of Italy Mr. Rinaldo Petrignani, Counselor, Embassy of Italy The Ambassador thought Mr. Ball might be interested in a telegram he had received from Rome giving an “objective evaluation” of the EEC crisis. According to the message as read by the Ambassador, all institutions of the EEC, and all member governments except the French, had agreed on the package proposal of the Commission re: CAP, financing through a common external tariff and increased powers for the European Parliament. All had held fast to that position except Spaak who said Belgium could not accept new commitments as long as they had a caretaker government. A revised transitional arrangement proposed by Italy was supported by the Germans and Dutch but rejected by the French. It was true that the EEC Council had failed to meet the June 30 deadline as the French had wished, but this date had no “final value.” Nevertheless, according to the Foreign Office telegram, despite the pessimistic atmosphere created by the French, the Brussels discussions had been useful and had provided a basis for continuing activities in the Commission and the Council. The GOI wishes to continue these activities and all the more so since Italy has succeeded to the chairmanship of the Council. The GOI therefore hopes the other members will act according to a European line of conduct. Commenting that the telegram provided a “less dramatic” interpretation than did the press of events in Brussels, the Ambassador asked what the Under Secretary thought of French intentions. Mr. Ball replied that he assumed the French intended to forestall any supra-national elements from developing in the EEC. 2 Confronted with the January 1 deadline for a weighted-majority voting system, the French wanted leverage and calculated that this was as good a way as any to get it. In response to the question whether he thought the French were prepared to destroy the Common Market, Mr. Ball said the matter had now reached the poker game stage. It would seem that the French are counting on the other five to draw back. The Ambassador said he agreed and, speaking personally, he thought the French had the easier position. They can threaten to destroy the Common Market, which Italy and Germany are not free to do. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Givan on July 19, cleared by Popper and RPE, and approved in U on July 22. The meeting was held at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” 2 In a memorandum for the Secretary of State's staff meeting on July 7 Leddy reported: “The current crisis in EEC relations came to a head over a technical agriculture question but the real issue is supranationalism. When the EEC Commission interjected the latter issue into the forum, the French seized it for their own purposes. “The current internal EEC struggle is likely to last through this year withthe end result of De Gaulle getting about what he wants. Meanwhile the outlook for the Kennedy Round has been adversely affected by this development because of the inability of the EEC to proceed with its planned agricultural offers. “We are maintaining a public posture of non-involvement in this dispute.” (Ibid., ORG S) In a 1-page memorandum to President Johnson for his evening reading on July 7, Rusk gave the same summation and indicated that the Department of State was “sticking to a 'no comment' line.” (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) 3 On July 8, French Ambassador Alphand informed Secretary Rusk that the EEC crisis was serious and that since France had made concessions in the agricultural and industrial policy areas, it could not accept new and unanticipated conditions giving control of funds to the commission and supervisory authority to a parliament that represented no government. France would not seek to undo the progress that had been achieved up to June 30, but would freeze everything as it was, and Alphand offered no timetable on how long it might take to resolve the crisis. Rusk did not comment on the crisis except to say that press reports that it had been manufactured by the United States and the United Kingdom were “absolute nonsense.” (Telegram 147 to Paris, July 9; ibid., Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC) 94. Memorandum of Conversation 94. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 6, 1965, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Select Committee and Defense Common Market PARTICIPANTS Secretary McNamara Assistant Secretary McNaughton Assistant Secretary Leddy Ronald I. Spiers, Deputy Director, RPM Carl W.A. Schurmann, Dutch Ambassador Herman C. Jorissen, Counselor, Dutch Embassy Ambassador Schurmann said that he had a series of questions to ask about the Select Committee proposal which Secretary McNamara had put to NATO May 31. First, what exactly did he see as the task of this committee? Ambassador Schurmann recalled that initially the U.S. had emphasized the technical aspects of communications, but this emphasis may now have changed. Secretary McNamara said the objective was to determine how the desire for greater participation in nuclear affairs by other members of the Alliance might be met. In spite of all the discussion of this problem, none of the other members of NATO have come up with specific proposals, and all initiatives—he cited the Omaha liaison arrangements, the Athens Guidelines, the MLF and various papers analyzing strategic and military problems—have come from the United States. Apart from the French, who desire to see no changes made, no concrete suggestions have come forth. He accepted the desire for a greater degree of participation as bona fide. Unfortunately, however, there had been no effective forum for discussion of these problems. Every time these issues came up, there were fifty or sixty people around. Out of a discussion among a limited number in the Select Committee, plans for achieving a greater degree of participation may evolve. This was the primary objective of the Select Committee suggestion. The Committee would make recommendations to NAC and would not take decisions on its own. He did not want the discussion limited to technical aspects, but these aspects were important to begin with: unless the technical problems could be resolved, there was little point in further discussion. Ambassador Schurmann asked if the Select Committee would not infringe on the MLF Working Group. Secretary McNamara replied in the negative. The MLF Working Group was only concerned with this one narrow subject. There is no discussion in the MLF Working Group of the basic issue of how greater Alliance participation in nuclear affairs is to be achieved. This group is simply concerned with one facet of the approach to the problem. Even if the ANF/MLF comes into existence, it will not fulfill all of the needs in this area. The Select Committee and the ANF/MLF were complementary, not conflicting or mutually exclusive. Ambassador Schurmann asked about the French attitude on the Select Committee. Secretary McNamara said it was “positive, so far.” He had been pleased and surprised at the French reaction. Some people welcomed it whenever the French took a negative position, but he was not among these. We gain by unity, not division, in the Alliance, and he very much hoped the French would accept the proposal, which does not run counter to any of France's objectives. 2 Ambassador Schurmann asked what we would do if the French refused to participate. Secretary McNamara said in this event he would wish to go ahead with the Committee anyway. We should not dissolve the Alliance because France refuses to cooperate, nor deny ourselves the gains which can accrue to the rest of us from cooperation. Ambassador Schurmann asked if we had heard that the French will approve the Select Committee if the ANF is abandoned. Secretary McNamara said we would not accept such an exchange. These are unrelated questions. Ambassador Schurmann asked if the Committee would be ad hoc or permanent. Secretary McNamara said it would be purely ad hoc. Ambassador Schurmann asked whether it would meet in July. Secretary McNamara noted that there had been some talk of a meeting July 27–28, but it was premature to make final decisions, since preliminary questions had not been settled. Ambassador Schurmann asked about US views on composition. Secretary McNamara said membership was a matter for NAC to decide. We assume that the US and the UK will have to be members, since we are the ones that have the basic nuclear information. We hope France will join. There is a case to be made for German membership because of their majority military role in the Alliance. Our main hope was that the Committee will be kept small. So far we have been trying to work in far too large a group. Ambassador Schurmann noted that Italy and Canada had been mentioned as possible members. Secretary McNamara said that no Canadian authority had said anything to him about such an interest. He noted we were not in favor of an “open-ended” Committee. Secretary McNamara said he thought the Select Committee was the best way to determine just what the interests of the other countries were as regards participation in nuclear affairs and how to go about meeting these interests. He alluded to the MRBM problem and the problem of nuclear decision-making as representative questions. The MRBM problem has remained unsettled for three years, and he thought this was “disgraceful.” We have got to find a forum and a method to deal with problems such as these. We must get down to informed discussion. He emphasized again that it would not be the Select Committee's business to settle these questions but only to make recommendations to NAC. Ambassador Schurmann asked if we would be willing to discuss nuclear assistance to such countries as France. Secretary McNamara said he would be happy to see this placed on the agenda of the Select Committee. This was a perfectly legitimate subject to discuss. The basic point was that the US should not have to assume responsibility for all tough decisions, such as whether there should be MRBMs in Europe. “It's not my soil and not my money.” He felt the Europeans had a perfect right to ask the US for more information as a basis for more intelligent discussion. The Select Committee could serve this purpose. After that, the next step would be discussions and decisions at a higher level, perhaps in the Nuclear Committee. NATO, he felt, had so far been too heavy on procedure, and too light on substance. Secretary McNamara said there is a host of important questions that NATO is not acting on, partly because it is not organized to do so. The Select Committee can help. Ambassador Schurmann asked whether we would object to having a rotating member. Secretary McNamara said this could be useful if the Committee's life were extended. Some countries—the Scandinavians and Portugal—do not appear to want to be on the Committee; others may wish to participate, and rotation may be a way of meeting this desire without too much enlargement of the Committee. Ambassador Schurmann asked how we felt about Brosio's chairing the Select Committee. Secretary McNamara said he would be delighted and saw considerable merit in this. Ambassador Schurmann raised the question of the Defense Common Market. He asked whether we had “practical means” in mind to give effect to this idea. Secretary McNamara said we did not, that initially it would have to be worked out on a bilateral basis. He felt that if each NATO member could accept the principle of buying arms from the source of highest quality and lowest cost, “we would shortly develop” a common market. Another aspect would be to work out joint financing of major development programs, such as the US–FRG main battle tank program, which is a step forward and in which others may ultimately wish to join in. These programs can lead to standardization of major weapons systems within the Alliance. A common market would also involve freedom from duties and avoidance of artificial restrictions on development and production. Ambassador Schurmann asked if this concept would imply a larger share of the market for Europe. Secretary McNamara noted that Europe is not now competitive, and it will have to reorganize itself. There is no inherent reason why European countries cannot meet the “highest quality, lowest price” principle with proper organization and salesmanship. The problem now is that individual countries are attempting too broad a spectrum of production. This increases costs beyond competitive levels. European countries will have to specialize. We do not intend either to exert pressure or to subsidize on our own behalf, but we will compete. He felt European countries can become more competitive if they act correctly and that they will then naturally get a larger share of the market. We offer the advantages of the US mass market. However, painful economic and politically costly adjustments will be required, as was the case in the UK in canceling the TSR–2. Ambassador Schurmann asked if this will be worked out multilaterally. Secretary McNamara said he had given up on effectively approaching these problems through multilateral action. Mr. Leddy noted that after these questions had been worked out bilaterally, they can be taken to NAC and formalized. Secretary McNamara agreed. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers. The meeting was held in the Pentagon. 2 McNamara's hopes were not realized. At a North Atlantic Council meeting on July 7, the French Permanent Representative stated that France saw no useful purpose in the Select Committee. However, at that time France did not indicate whether that meant it would not participate in the committee or would attempt to block its establishment. (Polto 29 from Paris, July 7; ibid.) On July 12, Finletter reported that Couve de Murville had elaborated on this position, saying France would not object to the committee proceeding, but would object to Secretary General Brosio having any part in it. (Polto 47 from Paris; ibid.) 95. Editorial Note 95. Editorial Note On March 25, 1965, Under Secretary of State Ball sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara stating that he had for some time felt the need for a fresh look at U.S. policy toward Western Europe. To this end he asked Ambassador John H. Ferguson to organize a study of the problem. On July 9, Ferguson, who had been assisted by officials from the Departments of State and Defense and the White House, transmitted his 87-page report, “Europe and United States Policy,” to Bundy, McNamara, and Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR W–US) The report recommended the following courses of action with respect to collective defense: “A. Since France was likely to require that all integrated commands and combat forces not under French command be removed from France, the United States should consult at once with its other allies to make the necessary transfers in an orderly fashion. “B. The United States should proceed without delay in changes in NATO's structure beginning with military planning beginning with steps that were not subject to French veto. “C. Discussions of NATO strategy had taken up an inordinate amount of time at all levels of the alliance without narrowing the difference between Europe and the United States. Because of this the United States should inform the rest of the alliance that it would be prepared to use tactical nuclear weapons to prevent the loss of NATO territory beyond a limited area along its borders. “D. The problem of an alliance nuclear force was up in the air until the German elections had been held, but even following the elections neither the Federal Republic nor the United Kingdom was likely to take the initiative on this question. Therefore, in the fall the United States should hold private conversations with London and Bonn to reach agreement on the terms of some arrangement based on the principle of giving Germany an equal place to that of other European nations in whatever arrangement was decided.” On the matter of an integrated Europe, the United States should support steps that led to further coordination in political and defense fields, as well as those in monetary and production fields that would further integration. Finally Ferguson addressed the problem of Germany. In this part of the report the Ambassador stressed that finding an equal and adequate place for Germany in the Western structure was crucial. This included support for West German proposals for reunification. 96. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Finletter) to Secretary of State Rusk 96. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Finletter) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Paris, July 12, 1965. Dear Dean: I paid a farewell call on Couve this morning and it lasted much longer than I had anticipated. I have already reported by telegram on Couve's views about the Select Committee. 2 Couve roamed over a great many subjects. He asked what I thought was the basic difficulty between France and the United States. I said it was lack of communication. I said that the reserved and austere attitude of the General made it extremely difficult if not impossible to have full and frank interchanges of views. We then agreed that there were certain basic differences between France and the United States despite the overall, and we both hoped overriding, considerations of respect of the two countries for each other and the real liking between them. Couve acknowledged that it was extremely difficult to have the kind of full and free interchange with the General which was necessary. In this connection, however, Couve was distinctly negative on the idea of a meeting between the President and De Gaulle, implying his doubt that there could be any useful communication between the two men. Then coming down to the immediate issues, he said that the basic one was the nuclear issue. He said that the General had chosen the nuclear issue as the point on which to differ basically with NATO and that there was no possibility of a solution to this difference in points of view. He said that the problem centered on Germany. He said the United States believed that by the MLF device or something like it Germany's ambitions for nuclear arms would be controlled. He said France did not agree with that. France was more on the side of the Russians in that argument. France believed that once the Germans got an undivided joint interest in nuclear weapons, that would be only the first step toward the building of a German force de frappe. I replied that the most likely way of getting a German force de frappe was to deny her any joint and indivisible interest in nuclear arms, in which event as a matter of national pride she would be compelled to go out and get them on her own somehow. Continuing on this question, Couve volunteered that France did not intend to agree to any European nuclear force, jointly and severally owned, with Germany in it. France was logical, and if she did not think it would work in the Atlantic she did not think it would work in Europe. I then said what are you going to do about the German ambitions for nuclear weapons? Do you really think that Germany will continue to be the only country in the world which has relinquished its right to have such weapons? He said he thought that they would have to be obliged to accept this. He then continued that he felt the future lay in an arrangement between France and the UK which would set up a joint nuclear force. I asked him what he meant by that and he said he meant joint arrangements to consider strategy and possibly some joint institutions of two national forces de frappe: one British and one French. He said that he did recognize that there was the danger of a Rapallo deal by the Germans with the Russians. On the other hand, he was not badly worried about it because he felt that the Russians were never going to let any Germany, unified or not, have atomic weapons and that therefore we need not worry at all about a true Rapallo which would put an atomic Germany on the side of the Russians. I said wouldn't this leave things in a rather unsolved state? And wasn't it possible that a Germany denied by its Atlantic Allies and denied by its European Allies the right to have atomic weapons might become a very difficult customer to deal with? He said that he recognized this but there were certain questions which were insoluble. With best regards. Sincerely, Tom 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. 2 See footnote 2, Document 94 . 97. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 97. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 13, 1965, 2000Z. Polto 63. Subject: Bilateral discussions on French policy toward NATO. This is round-up on Under Secretary's bilateral talks on France and NATO with British, Germans, Dutch, Italians, Belgians and NATO SYG Brosio held on July 12–13. 2 No talks were held with Canadians in view inability FonMin Martin to come to Paris. Questions raised during bilaterals on subjects other than NATO-French issue are being reported by separate telegrams. Participants listed at end of cable. Under Secretary outlined preliminary US thinking, emphasizing that USG has not arrived at definite conclusions and before doing so wishes have views of other allies. Accumulating evidence available to us through various sources, including direct statement to us by De Gaulle and Couve de Murville, indicate that it virtually certain France will at some stage make proposals or take further specific steps designed to weaken or destroy NATO, especially its integrated military arrangements and political machinery. This French attitude toward NATO must be taken seriously, even though it is difficult to understand. Two world wars have demonstrated conclusively importance of creating an integrated military structure and forces in being in time of peace as means of preventing war. France of all countries should understand this. Nevertheless De Gaulle seems to want to replace NATO with series of old-fashioned bilateral military alliances. US of course has no interest in purely bilateral military commitments with France. An integrated NATO is important to the security of the US, but a bilateral commitment from the French outside of such an integrated Atlantic military structure would be of no value to us. In our judgment it is probable that the French will not make any serious move before the end of the year. It is uncertain when or how they will move, but given De Gaulle's broad objectives it is most important that the other allies engage in timely preparations for whatever may come. It is probable that De Gaulle's timetable for moving against NATO has been stepped up and that he may begin to take specific actions in 1966 rather than waiting until 1968 or 1969. He may put forward formal proposals for a drastic revision of NATO or he may take a series of steps designed to accomplish the same result piecemeal. The French have already blocked a NATO decision for a new SHAPE building in France. Other steps might be a request of the US and NATO to move NATO and US facilities out of France, including some or all of the US air base complex and some of communications. These actions could be taken simultaneously with other piecemeal policies such as using the French veto to prevent constructive developments in NATO, or increasing pursuit of the empty-chair policy. The French have tried to make it appear that 1969 calls for a basic review and reform of NATO. However, this is not the case. NATO continues indefinitely. The only significance of 1969 is that it is a date after which a member may withdraw. In short, it is not a NATO problem, but a problem of French policy toward NATO. The US is now engaged in thorough technical studies of what would have to be done if US and NATO facilities were to be removed from France. It is our best military judgment that NATO could continue as an effective and credible military deterrent even if the French should withdraw. Existing facilities in France would in this event, of course, have to be moved elsewhere, which would require specific agreements on physical arrangements with other NATO countries, including probably at least the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The US has no wish to provoke a confrontation with France on NATO. The best possible solution would be for France to decide to continue in NATO and to participate fully once more in carrying forward NATO objectives. If France weakens its ties with NATO, or withdraws from it, that will be the result of a unilateral French policy to isolate itself. Question of timing and tactics to be followed by the other allies in response to possible French moves is of great importance. If the French present to NATO specific and definite proposals for changing the structure, they should be considered carefully and on their merits. If, on the other hand, the French should make certain limited proposals, such as the removal of specific facilities from France, a decision would have to be made on whether this should be an occasion for requesting the French to explain their over-all objectives. The US is carrying forward the present bilateral discussions on an entirely private and informal basis. No doubt the French would learn of these talks. If they inquire, they should be candidly informed that the other allies are necessarily studying what they should do against the day when France might act to carry out objectives which it has made known publicly and privately in many ways. The US hopes that the other allies would study these questions and that in the fall, after the German elections, it would be possible to resume bilateral discussions. By that time the US would have completed its own studies on the military aspects. The foregoing presentation was used in each of our bilateral talks. Following are the observations on major points of the other countries concerned: [Here follow a summary of the British view, described as in substantial agreement with the U.S. assessment, the German position, described as in complete agreement with the U.S. presentation, and the Dutch ideas about four possibilities that France might choose; a report that the Italians and Secretary General were extremely concerned not to provoke the French, while the Belgians were generally in accord with the U.S. position; and a list of the foreign participants in the bilateral conversations.] Finletter 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the NATO capitals. 2 Ball was in Paris to brief the North Atlantic Council on the Dominican Republic crisis and U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Records of these briefings, papers prepared for his trip, and background papers for the meetings are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2523. 98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 98. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, July 15, 1965, 1:47 p.m. 72. In response to any official inquiries regarding the position of the US on the Common Market crisis and European integration generally, you may privately draw on the remarks of Under Secretary Ball (Polto circular 2) 2 in discussions with Foreign Minister Luns July 12 to the effect that the US is not talking publicly or privately about the Common Market crisis; that it is taking the position that this is an internal matter for the Six to handle; and that there should be no question that the US, after fifteen years of vigorous advocacy of a consistent policy, is abandoning its well known position on European integration. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Hinton and Leddy, cleared by Schaetzel, and approved by Leddy. Sent to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, The Hague, London, Rome, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Luxembourg, and Geneva. 2 Dated July 13. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2523) 99. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 99. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Atlantic Political-Military Affairs (Spiers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 1 Washington, July 26, 1965. SUBJECT U.S. Policy on Maltese Association with NATO The U.S. position is that NATO membership for Malta is not practicable because of the deep-seated objection of several of the Allies 2 and associated membership is undesirable because it would introduce a second-class status for which there is no provision in the treaty. Therefore our objective has been to persuade NATO to work out arrangements which would involve Malta in continuing close relationships with NATO and NATO countries. This is desirable because of the existence of the NATO base there and also, from a long-range point of view, to inhibit the development of an irresponsible non-aligned posture in Malta which could facilitate Communist designs. From August 1964 until this spring we pushed our NATO Allies towards this end without success, primarily because of the objections of France and the Scandinavians. After Prime Minister Borg-Olivier intimated to Brosio that he might be content with something along the following line, we took the lead, acting through Brosio, to persuade NAC to agree to a draft resolution which: (a) affirms the deep interest of the members of NATO in the security of Malta, (b) expresses the willingness of its members to consult with GOM whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of Malta is threatened, and (c) confirms the readiness of NATO members to examine at the request of GOM the possibility of establishing future arrangements with Malta. The Maltese now seem to want to haggle. Regardless of their attitude, it is most unlikely that NAC will agree to anything much more substantial than this particular resolution for the indefinite future. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 MALTA. Confidential. Drafted by Vest. 2 Leddy wrote in the margin at this point: “Why do they object?” 100. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) 100. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) 1 Washington, August 19, 1965. SUBJECT Today's Luncheon with the President Following is a summary of the discussion at the luncheon of particular relevance to EUR: In response to the President's inquiry, Mr. Leddy said that a major problem facing us in our European relations was how to deal with De Gaulle's attacks on NATO. It was almost certain that De Gaulle would move on this reasonably soon. The Department is preparing a position on how to deal with De Gaulle, which we would be presenting to the President very shortly. Once a position was established we would need to talk it over with our major European allies, other than France, after the German elections September 19. Our other allies will stand with us on NATO but it is important to have full consultations. Mr. Leddy also suggested that it might be useful to convey a kind of warning message to De Gaulle fairly soon. He noted that Under Secretary Ball planned to accompany Secretary Fowler on a trip to Europe early in September and suggested that perhaps the Under Secretary could call on the General and deliver a message from the President which would be “a shot across the bow.” This would come just prior to the General's press conference. The President said he would look at these matters when they came to his attention. Continuing, Mr. Leddy said that our position with respect to collective nuclear arrangements in Europe is unsatisfactory. US policy has gone up and down on this, and it was essential that a solid position be established in order to move it forward, which would take somewhat more time. The President made a general observation applicable to the nuclear as well as to other problems discussed at the luncheon dealing with the fact it was very important to assure Congressional support for important US policies before they were crystallized and carried forward. He felt that much more work needed to be done on this by the Department on the Hill and that otherwise we would find that we do not get our policies through. The President underlined the importance of effective public presentation of US policies and US successes. He felt the State Department was not doing a good enough job in this respect. The President welcomed diversity of opinion and viewpoint both within the Department and among the Agencies in arriving at a policy. Once the policy had been established, however, everyone should carry it out loyally and not seek to undermine it. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Leddy. 101. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 101. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, September 1, 1965, 0420Z. 533. For President and Secretary from Under Secretary. Following NATO portion of my August 31 discussion with General De Gaulle: 2 At the conclusion of our discussion of Southeast Asia, 3 I told General De Gaulle that I would like to review certain problems that we foresaw in connection with the Western Alliance. The American people had made a very serious commitment with regard to NATO. This was a commitment both to the treaty and the organization. The United States had become an active participant in NATO because of our reading of the lessons of two world wars. The first lesson related to the Alliance. Many Europeans—including members of General De Gaulle's government—had remarked that the United States had come too late into both world wars. We agreed with this statement. Had the United States been clearly committed to the defense of Europe in advance both of the First and Second World Wars, neither conflict might have occurred, and the world would have been saved two major catastrophes. But our commitment had not been clearly defined and the aggressor had, therefore, not been forced to take United States power into account. As a result of this experience the American people had made a great national decision. They had thrown aside the isolation that had marked a hundred years of our national history. They had made a commitment in peacetime to defend Europe from aggression. The second lesson from the two world wars was, in our view, that an alliance could not be effective unless it was reenforced by a combined or integrated command, by common planning, and by forces in being. After all, in the First World War it had taken four years to achieve the appointment of Marshal Foch as combined commander. In the Second World War the allies had suffered greatly from the lack of effective collective preparation. The American people would not, therefore, be able to understand a solemn commitment such as their commitment to NATO if that commitment were not reenforced by arrangements that gave reality to common defense. For that reason the NATO Treaty and the NATO organization were, in our view, inextricably linked, and it was very important that this point be clearly understood. This did not mean, of course, that all the arrangements were perfect or immutable. We were prepared at any time to consider any changes that might be proposed by any member of the Alliance. We recognized that conditions changed, and that it might be necessary from time to time to revise arrangements in order to accommodate to evolving conditions. General De Gaulle replied that we did not have time today to go into all the details of NATO. Anyway, the matter was not urgent. The treaty ran until 1969 and there was no reason to move quickly to change the organization. France and the United States were allied and it was natural that they should remain allied so long as the Soviet menace persisted. In his view, this menace would last for a considerable time to come. If the Soviet Union attacked France—or conceivably attacked even the United States—France and America would be in the war together. The French Government certainly did not intend to break up the Alliance. There would be a de facto understanding for common defense between the United States and France even if no signed treaty existed. The organization—as distinguished from the Alliance—was a different question. The organization had not existed at the time the treaty was signed. And since it was established, two major changes had taken place. The first change was the advent of atomic weapons. In 1949 there were no Soviet atomic weapons. But with the development of such weapons the United States could not be sure—nor could its allies—as to what the United States would do in the atomic field in the event of attack. The second change had been the vast transformation of the nations of Western Europe. They had moved from positions of weakness and dependency and were now reasserting their national personalities. France, for example, was no longer prepared to accept the principle of subordination—which was what was meant by integration—or the control of “foreign authority”, however amicable or friendly. General De Gaulle said that, so far as he was concerned, the Alliance would remain, but the organization was no longer suitable. It must be reexamined. He hoped this could be done in concert, but the United States should understand that France was not alone in this field. Other countries were beginning to feel the same way. The Germans, for example, were beginning to see, in the future, the need for an alliance without subordination. So far as France was concerned, he wanted to make it clear that there could be no foreign forces on her soil except those under French command. The French Government was making no proposals now. Later on it would not make proposals but it would lay down conditions. Those conditions would be made by discussions between the two governments—the United States and France. Such discussions would not involve Germany or the United Kingdom. The conversation had been running for a long time and I did not wish to protract it unduly. I stated, however, that I must make clear the position of the United States. We were not interested in domination. We were interested in efficiency. We wanted to make certain that the West would be defended effectively. The problem that preoccupied us was how we and our allies could organize our common defense in the most efficient manner. We felt that history had made it crystal clear that, to have an effective common defense, a consolidated or integrated command was necessary. Of course, the atom had brought about significant changes and we were deeply concerned about the unfinished business of how to prevent the proliferation of atomic power. We would be as disturbed as France by the development of a German national nuclear capability. But this did not mean that the problem of atomic management could be disregarded. In our view, nations that had historically played a great role in world affairs could not be expected to accept forever a situation in which they had no part in their own atomic defense. Yet the option was clear enough—either we permitted such nations to develop national nuclear systems of their own or we provided some kind of collective approach which would permit them nuclear participation without the need to develop their own national systems. With this in mind, we had proposed a collective arrangement in which the non-nuclear powers of Europe could participate, in the form of a multilateral force. Within the next few months it was going to be necessary for us to resume consideration of this matter. We were not wedded to any particular collective formula, but it seemed to us that some collective solution was necessary. All of this, I felt, had an obvious relevance to the NATO organization. I made it clear that we were prepared to discuss with France and our other allies any proposed changes that might make that organization more effective. If there were to be such a discussion we saw efficacy in not postponing it too long, since the operation of the present organization could be seriously impaired if too many unresolved questions were left pending. General De Gaulle replied that he felt the efficiency of an alliance would be seriously impaired if some members felt subordinated to others, which was the present situation of the NATO Alliance. So far as Germany was concerned, he must express a note of caution. We all knew that the Germans were a great people. Because they were a great people it was not possible to tell exactly what they would do. France had been prepared to sign a treaty of friendship with the Germans and to join with the Germans in the organization of Europe. But this did not mean that Germany could be accepted on the same basis as other nations with reference to nuclear matters. France had suffered from German invasions. Germany had been vanquished in the last war. German participation—whether partial or indirect—in the control of atomic weapons would certainly ruin any possible contacts with Soviet Russia or Eastern Europe. Germany, he insisted, was not in a “normal situation”. Therefore, it should not be involved in atomic matters. Such involvement would affect not only the Russians but also the French. France could not forget the past. I replied that we clearly had a difference of view as to the safest method of dealing with Germany in relation to the destructive power of the atom. I must point out that, in our view, the history of the last fifty years had demonstrated that German aggressiveness was stimulated by German isolation—by the feeling that Germany was not an equal member of the Western community—and that any discrimination or sense of grievance or inequality would play into the hands of demagogues. In our view we should try, in dealing with Germany, to eliminate any sense of discrimination and to provide the Germans with the feeling that they were equal members of the Western community. We should try to forestall the emergence of a drive for a German national nuclear system by giving the Germans effective participation in some kind of collective nuclear arrangement. I said further that while it was too late to discuss the question today, I must make it clear that the problem of atomic management remained unresolved. It was a problem of great concern to the United States and we would certainly feel it necessary to have further discussions with the French Government in regard to it at some future date. I thanked General De Gaulle for the courtesy he had shown and for the observation he had made. He concluded the interview by remarking that great powers have to choose between great difficulties. The United States was a very great power, and our choices, therefore, were exceptionally difficult. He wished President Johnson to know that France had sympathy for the United States and for him in the problems which they faced. 4 Reinhardt 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Paris and London for the Ambassadors and passed to the White House. 2 On August 25, President Johnson had written to President De Gaulle informing him that Ball was going to visit Europe and asking De Gaulle to receive him. (Telegram 865 to Paris, August 25; ibid., POL 7 US/BALL) 3 A report on the discussion of Southeast Asia was transmitted in telegram 532 from Rome, September 1. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 4 Following his visit to Rome, Ball returned to Paris, and on August 6 he paid a courtesy call on Couve de Murville. After discussing the situation in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, Ball and Couve talked about NATO along lines similar to the conversation reported here. Ball transmitted his account of the conversation in Secun 3 from Paris, September 6. (Ibid., ORG 7 U) In a September 1 memorandum to Bundy for the President's evening reading, Executive Secretary Read characterized the conversation as follows: “On the Atlantic Alliance we see no daylight. The Under Secretary made an effective and full presentation of our views regarding the need for continuing effective NATO machinery, including an integrated command system. De Gaulle's responses indicate no hope that he is likely to change his basic views. He merely offered the possibility that there would be no hurry in bringing about the changes that he wants. He was perhaps clearer and more emphatic than ever before in saying that there could be no foreign forces on French soil except those under French command, and that Germany should not be involved in atomic matters.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 74 D 164) 102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 10, 1965. 1. In his farewell conversation with Harlan Cleveland yesterday, 2 the President made a few comments on nuclear arrangements in Europe which remind me that we have unfinished staff work in this field. 2. Harlan opened the conversation by saying that he thought the most important element of his new job was to work on problems on nuclear sharing. The President cut in and said he had two particular concerns here—(1) that he did not wish to pick a quarrel unnecessarily with the Russians, and (2) that he did not wish to get pinned into any position which would not have Congressional support. He made it clear that before we adopted any new proposal or returned to any old one, we should be sure that we have a position which is understood and supported on the Hill. 3. We are evidently a long way from having any such position today. The general language which we have used since last December will not be sufficient in October. In the light of the President's opinions, I doubt if we can return—at least without very careful preparation—to anything like our MLF position of 1964. 4. For these reasons, it seems to me essential that we have an early and thorough discussion of this matter, and I will give you a ring to see how you think we should go about it. McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 8. Secret. Copies were sent to McNamara and Ball. 2 No other record of this conversation has been found. 103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, September 23, 1965. SUBJECT Hillenbrand Study on Nuclear Problems of the Alliance: 2 Information Memorandum I have the following general comment on the Hillenbrand study: The implications of a number of statements, in their collective weight, give the paper a tone and cast that I consider to be misleading with regard to the possibilities of some combination of ANF and MLF as a major component in a solution of the Alliance nuclear problem. Specifically: 1. The statement that the President has doubts about the ANF/MLF arrangement should be considered against the different tone of all official statements of policy approved by him—the December 8 Comments paper, NSAM 322, and the press conference of January 16. 3 2. The statement that Congress has voiced serious objections should be considered against the background of virtually no Congressional briefings on the NATO nuclear problem as it stands today. 3. The weight of references to opposition by De Gaulle and the Soviets should be qualified by a realization that these objections go to the root and principle of the idea of a stronger NATO rather than to any specific plan. 4. The statement of U.S. policy as one of firm opposition to mixed-manning of submarines is at variance with the NSAM 322 policy statement that it is not precluded. 5. The statement that the “ANF/MLF approach is incompatible with certain of our major objectives stated in Section II” is not documented and in my view not necessarily true in the case of any one of these objectives. In tone and emphasis there are other features of the study that tend in the same direction—specifically: 1. “Consultative” solutions are treated on the same plane as participation in weapons systems. This seems to me to overlook the fundamental distinction that consultation cannot be equated in its political efficacy with meaningful responsibility and that meaningful responsibility involves, as a minimum, a right by Europe to veto the use of a significant part of the Western deterrent if its proposed use is too much at variance with European concepts of timing, strategy or targeting. This inevitably means hardware. And, equally inevitably, it means a segment of hardware less than the whole U.S. deterrent, which we could not responsibly subject to such a veto. A consultative solution relating to the entire deterrent, however ingenious, is incapable of meeting these criteria. 2. Some of the specifics of tactics and timing, insofar as they follow from the premises I have criticized, seem likewise to downgrade the most promising approach to that of least promising. There is mention of a possible decision to “let the ANF/MLF concept die on the vine or keep it in reserve while moving ahead on some other arrangement”. There is mention of giving priority to overall aspects as compared to nuclear sharing. In my view both the Select Committee and the Paris Working Group should proceed in parallel with equal emphasis and with a business-like pace and purpose. Adjustments to overall tactics should be in timing of their reports, not the pace of their work. There is no danger that either group will run out of problems to consider. These relatively specific objections should not, however, obscure the fact that this study gives support to many of the major themes and ideas which have needed to be said by an interdepartmental panel. With only minor points of wording or clarification we could, for example, accept all of the summary conclusions as stated at the beginning of the paper. Its emphasis on German expectations regarding ANF/MLF will make good reading in other agencies, its stress on the need for U.S. leadership at the proper time is salutary; its stress on inter-relationships to the Common Market crisis, the UK financial crisis, and strategy on France and NATO is useful; its emphasis on a variety of parallel approaches as opposed to a single solution is realistic, as is its conclusion that no single preferred course need be decided now. Even in most specifics the judgments expressed are those this Bureau agrees with (utility of sharing R&D, need to deepen consultation on specific nuclear problems, doubtful value of European land-based MRBM's or US-based systems for political purposes, undesirability of new NATO strategic command, desirability of a NATO Defense Minister, desirability of a “political umbrella”). Most cogent of all, perhaps, is the support the study gives to US–UK–FRG talks to develop an overall approach as regards both substance and tactics on the inter-related economic, political, and military aspects of the Alliance problem at this juncture. In short, the report represents a useful contribution to thinking on the problem. My own tentative and general conclusions as to a course of action on the basis of a first reading of the Hillenbrand paper and the staff study prepared in the Department which you sent to Mr. McNamara on September 22, 4 are as follows: 1. First priority should go to scheduling and preparing for a series of US–UK–FRG bilateral and trilateral meetings on overall strategy and the inter-relationships of Alliance problems along lines set forth in my memorandum to you dated August 19, 1965 (copy attached). 5 We should seek approval of a scenario and schedule before the end of the month. 2. Suitable machinery (not too cumbersome) for preparation of positions should be worked out at an early stage. EUR might assume responsibility for development of positions within the Department and for coordination as appropriate with other departments. 3. The examination of positions and alternatives should include a hard look at mixed-manning of UK submarines as the key element in breaking the log jam on sharing and a German financial contribution to UK submarines. A breakthrough on this point could enable us to see our way through to practical prospects for a solution of at least the “hardware” component of the complex, and that is the central one. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret. Drafted by Baker. 2 The Hillenbrand Study or Report, transmitted to Under Secretary Ball on September 21, comprised a 12-page memorandum on the Atlantic nuclear problem and a 41-page paper on the nuclear problem of the Alliance with an annex and summary conclusions. A copy of the study, which is summarized in this memorandum, is ibid., DEF(ANF). 3 The December 8 paper is the Attachment to Document 61 . NSAM No. 322 is Document 65 . For a transcript of President Johnson's press conference on January 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 54–60. 4 Not found. 5 Not attached, but a copy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). 104. Memorandum of Conversation 104. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 27, 1965, 6 p.m. SecDel/MC/45 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1965 SUBJECT MLF and Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Mr. Emmett B. Ford, Jr. Dutch Foreign Minister Luns Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. J.A. de Ranitz Luns asked the Secretary whether the U.S. was still keen on MLF. The Secretary recalled that MLF was an attempt to respond to an initiative taken in Europe in 1960. Our temperature with regard to MLF largely depends on the current attitude in Europe. While there are those who say that we should take the lead, we can't lead if others are not willing to follow. Luns said that he still felt that if Germany were given possession of a nuclear deterrent we would be on the brink of war with the Soviet Union. The Secretary said that giving Germany a nuclear deterrent would also serve to break up NATO. He mentioned in this connection the fact that De Gaulle is seeking to keep Germany in a secondary position in Europe. Luns said he believed that MLF should not be abandoned. He looks upon MLF as a means of holding NATO together. The Secretary replied that MLF or something close to it is certainly necessary. He pointed to the long-range trend in German attitudes. Even Brandt had recently talked about not having a second-class industry. Given the attitude of De Gaulle on Germany, we would invite another Hitler in another ten years. The Secretary mentioned also that the leaders in certain European countries must consider nuclear weapons from an operational point of view or they will lose touch with reality. He mentioned the fact that some of these leaders tend to think of nuclear deterrent without giving any thought to what would happen to the areas which they are trying to defend in the process of nuclear exchange. Luns said that under no circumstances can we give the Soviets the impression that we will not use nuclear weapons but that there we must draw the line. The Secretary said it must also be remembered that the nuclear decision is probably the last decision which leaders in North America would ever make. The assurance lies in the megatonnage which exists in Germany. In this respect the Athens guidelines seem very realistic. Luns concluded that the MLF is a political instrument which will both aid us in preventing proliferation and serve to strengthen NATO. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Ford and approved by S on October 25. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 4.” Memoranda of conversation on NATO, the EEC, and a Dutch request for military and nuclear technology are ibid. 105. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 105. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, October 26, 1965, 12:42 p.m. CA–4576. Subject: NATO Secretary General Brosio's Visit, October 5–6, 1965. The following summary is based in part on uncleared memoranda of conversations. It is for information only and its contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. This airgram summarizes the principal subjects discussed during the recent visit to Washington by NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio. Mr. Brosio met with the Secretaries of State and Defense. He also met with other Departmental officers, including Under Secretary Ball and Assistant Secretary Leddy, and he stopped briefly at the President's office to exchange greetings after a talk with McGeorge Bundy. 2 The basic issues for discussion included: (1) France and NATO, (2) Nuclear Sharing, (3) Select Committee, (4) Infrastructure, (5) NATO Force Planning, (6) NATO Personnel, (7) Vietnam, and (8) the December Ministerial Meeting. The recurrent themes of the visit were France-NATO and the nuclear problems. In contrast to last year's visit which was his first to the United States as NATO Secretary General, this was a “working” visit with few formalities. 1. France and NATO Secretary General Brosio said he felt the French attitude had changed recently. It has been generally known before that the French were ready to stay in the Alliance, although they were dissatisfied with the organization. His impression was that France was now disturbed by the German position. The French had offered the Germans reconciliation and had felt they, in return, deserved German support, particularly for the force de frappe. When it became clear such support was not forthcoming, the French turned to the Soviets. The Secretary General was uncertain whether the approach to the Soviets was meant to put pressure on the Germans or was actually the first step for uniting Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. He said the Alliance could not wait for France but must move forward where possible. In conversations with Mr. Leddy and Mr. Ball, the Secretary General was worried that the French would try to keep US-French differences over NATO in the bilateral channel. It was made clear to him that the U.S. considered this to be a France-NATO problem and not solely a bilateral one. When the French make their proposals we would want to consult other NATO members at an early stage and work out with them how to handle the problem. He was told in general terms of the U.S. tentative studies and of our preliminary conclusion that it would be feasible to relocate facilities in the low countries, backstopped by bases in the UK, if this should become necessary. It would, of course, be expensive and take about three years to accomplish. There would have to be intensive consultation with our Allies before any moves could be undertaken. He was urged to look into contingency steps for facilities and activities under his own responsibility. Brosio asked to be kept informed of the progress of U.S. contingency plans and was assured he would be kept up-to-date. Mr. Brosio was glad to note the U.S. position remained that we would try not to provoke a confrontation with the French but were planning in order to be prepared for all contingencies. He was told we are ready to wait until the French wish to make suggestions. He replied that we would continue to press the French to come forward with their ideas. 2. Nuclear Sharing Secretary General Brosio sought reassurance that the U.S. had not abandoned the ANF/MLF concept and asked our views on its relationship to the Select Committee. He emphasized nuclear sharing was a central problem for the Alliance. He was concerned about the “German problem,” making clear he was convinced that Germany must share nuclear responsibility within a NATO framework, otherwise she would in time wish to develop her own capability. He was assured that we recognized that the NATO nuclear problem would not go away. We see ANF/MLF and the Select Committee as two activities, independently valid and parallel. We are still interested in the ANF/MLF or whatever variation will satisfy our Allies, particularly the Germans. We expect to know more about the situation after Erhard's visit to the United States. We agreed with Brosio that if the FRG did not have more of a voice in nuclear affairs, it would in time be driven toward a national nuclear force. In this connection, Brosio brought up the question of non-proliferation, saying there was no danger that either the U.S., Russia, or France would disseminate nuclear weapons information, that it would be easy for Russia to sign a non-dissemination pact as she had no intention of disseminating anyway. The problem thus was not one of dissemination but rather of inducing the Third World of non-nuclear states not to acquire a nuclear capability. Meanwhile all that non-proliferation could do would be to give the Soviets a chance to press to weaken the Alliance. 3. Select Committee This was discussed primarily with Secretary McNamara. Mr. Brosio stated his belief that the Select Committee would have to be constituted on a larger base than originally anticipated. He wondered if he should not chair such an “open-ended” group, although this might cause trouble with the French. In any event he believed the French would not participate. Mr. McNamara suggested that, in order to avoid a problem with the French, it might be better for the Secretary General not to chair the meetings. He suggested as an alternative a rotating chairmanship from among the Ministers of Defense. Brosio thought he would probably not attend but would rather send a member of the Secretariat to observe. He thought the French might just possibly attend Select Committee meetings if the ANF/MLF were not discussed. To this Mr. McNamara replied that, although we have no objection to the French being there, the agenda should be for the other members to decide and he could not agree to restrict discussion in order to bring the French in. Mr. Brosio agreed with this position. He urged that the U.S. come up with specific proposals to ensure that the first meeting would be a success. Mr. McNamara said the U.S. would work on an agenda and be ready for a meeting in the second half of November. 3 4. Infrastructure Brosio said he was having great difficulty in getting Europe to accept a larger share. He stated he did not think the U.S. should go below 25% in its support of NATO. He believed it would be impossible to persuade the Allies to agree to a formula which would give us less. He said if he could be assured we would not seek to go below a flat 25%, he would undertake to squeeze the British and the Germans and try to get acceptance of such a solution. This question was left to be worked out further in Paris between Ambassador Cleveland and Brosio. 5. NATO Force Planning Brosio noted that there are two questions—what the Ministers should decide in December and what the Allies are heading toward in the future. Mr. McNamara thought that force goals for years had been fictitious, particularly with reference to the logistical support aspect. He did not plan to raise the point at the December Ministerial Meeting that the BRAVO goals cost too much. His preference would be to change the goals to make them more realistic; an alternative would be to label them “Tentative Objectives” and to complement the statement of tentative objectives with the recommendation that the nations should report their plans to meet the goals in the qualitative as well as quantitative sense. Then Ministers could act on the data in May. Brosio defended the responsibility of the NATO military authorities to make honest recommendations which would naturally be more than what countries would spend. Furthermore, he pointed out that NATO does not have the political power to decide on goals other than those recommended by the military authorities. He asked about the relationship between the contingency studies and forces. Mr. McNamara said that the studies may show that the goals are not right or that the configuration of forces is not right. In his view, NATO plans were not adequate and he did not want studies limited to the flanks. The DPWG was doing important work and it should continue its contingency studies. 6. NATO Personnel Brosio asked that the U.S. and U.K. resolve between themselves which should provide the next Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure. He pointed out that this was a key senior staff position which he needed to settle so he could fill a number of important secondary posts as well. He hoped the U.S. would consider filling the secondary post of Deputy to the ASYG for Political Affairs which he thought was one of the most influential on the International Staff. He was told that we thought ours the better candidate and that we would discuss the problem with the British. 7. Vietnam Brosio was worried by the attitude of Europeans toward the American effort. He said his position was clear, that Alliance members should support the U.S. and that he intended to go on stating this position. He expressed concern at rumors that the U.S. might escalate the situation in Vietnam before long. He suggested it could be helpful to have further NAC discussions on this subject. This suggestion was welcomed, but with the proviso that there be no question of submitting American decisions in this area for NAC approval or veto. He was assured of U.S. willingness to discuss Vietnam at any time—on brief notice. 8. December Ministerial Meeting It was suggested that traditional arrangements for Ministerial Meetings wasted some of the Ministers' time and that it might be worthwhile for Defense Ministers to have private sessions while the Foreign Ministers review the international situation. Brosio said he would consider this suggestion. As for the general approach to France in the course of the meeting, he thought he and the Americans were in agreement. No one wanted to act in such a way as to invite a confrontation with the French and everyone, including the Canadians themselves, thought it would be undesirable to continue with the Canadian State of the Alliance initiative. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Julius W. Walker (EUR/RPM), cleared by Vest and EUR, and approved by Spiers. Also sent to USRO. 2 Memoranda of Brosio's conversation with Leddy and Ball on October 5 are ibid., DEF 4 NATO. Memoranda of his conversations with Rusk in New York on October 7 are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. No records of the conversations with McNamara, Bundy, and the President have been found. 3 On October 4, Rusk discussed the Select Committee with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin, who wanted to know how it might work. Secretary Rusk said that while the committee was not the ideal instrument for solving all nuclear problems, it would be useful in exploring some elements. Speaking frankly, Rusk then went on to address the state of the Alliance. NATO was, he said, “made up of minority governments, fragile coalitions, and brittle configurations. The governments of NATO are too weak to lead and too weak to follow. The United States has welcomed the election results in Germany not out of any favoritism for the political parties involved but because the German Government has been strengthened.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files, DEF 12 NATO) 106. Memorandum of Conversation 106. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 8, 1965, 11 a.m. SUBJECT France and NATO PARTICIPANTS Defense Secretary McNamara Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance Assistant Secretary McNaughton State Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Thompson Ambassador Bruce Assistant Secretary Leddy,EUR Mr. George Vest, Deputy Director, EUR/RPM JCS General Wheeler White House Mr. McGeorge Bundy Mr. Francis Bator NSAM A draft NSAM is attached which incorporates suggested changes as explained below. 2 Mr. McNamara thought that the NSAM should begin with a basic statement of objectives which would make it clear that any French actions taken against US installations in France or against NATO are in fact an issue between France and the rest of NATO and not between France and the US. It was particularly important that guidelines for the press should reflect this basic premise. Paragraph one of the attached NSAM embodies this idea. Mr. Bundy objected to the statement that we would consider Article V of the Treaty no longer applicable if the French ceased to participate constructively in the Alliance. He thought this was an empty threat and that we might as well face the fact that the French will assume that they have our protection regardless of what we say. If the situation deteriorates sufficiently, an Article V decision would be taken later at the top in the light of the circumstances; it should not be stated now, and perhaps appear in The Times . Mr. Ball thought it would be most useful to question the applicability of Article V since this was one of the few areas which might have some effect on the French people. He knew the Secretary felt strongly about this point. It was only reasonable that the French should not profit from Article V if they failed to live up to their NATO commitments under the other articles. The others mostly agreed with him, especially Mr. McNamara who said that if France no longer contributed troops, support facilities, etc., we should not be required to be on record as prepared to defend her. He would have considerable problems with Congress under such circumstances. Ambassador Bruce suggested alternative language which was acceptable to all and is paragraph four of the attached NSAM. General Wheeler was worried about the possibility that nominal foreign command might be accepted as a principle. This works very well in areas where the local people wish to make it work, for instance in Portugal, but the situation in France would be different and difficult. He accepted Mr. Ball's suggestion that the phrase “multilateral or formally bilateral” be added to paragraph 5c to cover the point. At Mr. Bundy's suggestion the phraseology in paragraph 6 was changed slightly for the sake of clarity to read “the United States should not make the first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO. …” Mr. Bundy said that although language should not be added to paragraph 8 at this stage, he assumed that the President would want to add something concerning his own responsibility for timing and tactics. The President is determined that France should not be allowed to push the US around, but he will want to play the large cards with France himself; particularly he will want to control what is said to the French and when. Mr. Leddy said he assumed that the language to be proposed by Mr. Bundy would relate to discussions with France and would not prevent discussion of contingency planning with others. Mr. Bundy confirmed this. With these comments the group approved the NSAM and the France and NATO paper. Force Effectiveness Mr. McNamara was worried that De Gaulle might force us to adjust to a peacetime arrangement which would endanger our wartime capability. He thought there needed to be more studies to check the degree of impairment which might result. There was still time to work on this. Mr. Ball said the most recent estimate is February for the French to lay down “conditions” and then offer to discuss them with us. General Wheeler mentioned that General Ailleret had told General de Cumont that the French want to retain NAC and the MC and an integrated command in Germany but abolish SHAPE and veto its establishment elsewhere, with the timing early next year. Mr. McNamara said that unquestionably the French attitude and actions would end up in a weakened NATO ability to exercise a conventional option. This is not logically required because even today, if Germany were attacked we would not fall back into France but would have to use nuclear weapons fairly soon. It would be useful to study and see if there are tactical situations in which the FRG is not an automatic shield between France and the Soviets. We can fight a war without France, but the prospect will lead people more and more to accept the likelihood of a “trip-wire” situation. General Wheeler agreed that, although it is militarily acceptable to think of NATO without France, this would have its effect on military concepts. Germany Mr. Ball suggested that De Gaulle would increasingly make the point that NATO does not apply to Berlin and would exclude the 1958 Ministerial Council decision. 3 The NATO-Berlin relationship needed to be looked at more carefully. Mr. McNaughton asked whether French troops in Germany are there as a result of World War II or of NATO arrangements. He felt that the legal factors here needed to be pinned down too. Mr. Bundy said that obviously the French would play their cards on the theory that the troops are in Germany as a result of the war since this is compatible with their ideas of independence, national sovereignty, less integrated NATO activity, etc. They seemed not to care about the effect their position would have on the Germans. Bargaining Assets Mr. Bundy observed that we seem to have a very skimpy bag of assets with which to threaten or bargain with the French. Mr. Ball agreed and recalled De Gaulle's viewpoints: We are natural allies; France does not need nuclear allies because he does not believe that today there is a threat of nuclear war; also he does not need allies with conventional forces because he considers France automatically protected by German geography. Mr. McNamara thought, since there was so little bargaining power in the military side of the Alliance, we should look at the European economic relationships for levers. Messrs. Ball, Leddy and Bator saw little chance. There might be disadvantageous counter-effects if the US tried to push into the EEC situation. The best hope was to attempt to stiffen Erhard's spine. Mr. Bundy expected that De Gaulle might try to blackmail the Germans by offering them a moderately acceptable EEC settlement if they would agree to diminish NATO relationship. Mr. Ball saw no sign of it yet. Ambassador Thompson said that although nobody could be sure how our allies would react as the pressures increased, one thing is certain—their disposition will be to try to keep France in the Alliance at a considerable cost, probably under terms which would be very difficult for us. Mr. Bundy said that, in dealing with our allies, we were going to have to probe delicately to find out what our real choices are, to discover whether the Belgians, divided as they are, are really going to be ready to accept new NATO responsibility in the face of French pressure. The Netherlands would be stronger as a government, but poorer geographically. Mr. McNamara reminded that one way to get Belgian support was money; i.e. to pay the Belgians for support services, to buy Belgian meat, etc. Mr. Bundy questioned whether the FRG is truly ready to look at the issues and make cold, hard decisions. Mr. McNamara thought it would be important to make it clear to the Germans that the result of French actions might be to weaken the NATO military setup so that the US would find it increasingly difficult to maintain the present level of US forces in Europe. In other words, the problem is not merely that the US may be pushed out of France and into Germany but rather that the conventional NATO strength would be so substantially weakened in the next two years that it would no longer be reasonable for the US divisions to stay in Europe. Mr. Bundy commented that, in spite of the military weakness which might emerge two years hence, he thought all the factors, political and otherwise, would lead the US to continue its present policy toward Europe. Tripartite Talks Ambassador Bruce asked how in the period ahead the US should try to exercise its power and with whom. He thought we would make no headway in the European context until we had worked out clear understandings with the UK and the FRG to which the other NATO members could subscribe. Mr. Bundy agreed and thought there should be another meeting of the group in the following week to go over the proper subjects for such tripartite discussions. 4 Mr. Leddy suggested that the subjects should be: (1) the long-term financial problem (pound support and troop maintenance); (2) the collective nuclear problem; (3) non-proliferation; (4) NATO and France; (5) East-West relations; and (6) German reunification. We would first sound out Stewart and Erhard. Then he envisioned high-level talks backed up by technical teams for each of the major subjects. He recognized there would be a problem of publicity. Timing should be sometime late in the winter. Mr. Bator suggested two other items for the list: (1) an Atlantic Arms Market and (2) the Liquidity Problem. Mr. Bundy said we should work out clear-cut US policies toward each of these areas in advance, something we do not yet have. We also have to keep in mind the cosmetic effect of this activity, which means there should be solid, hard talks separately with both the UK and the FRG before we go into triangular talks. Mr. McNamara approved trilateralism as a substitute for NATO as a means of concerting power. He thought we should try to use this technique wherever possible. He had already revised his ideas about the Select Committee in this regard, and was prepared to have any number join but use a tripartite group to coordinate and run it behind the scenes. Mr. Leddy warned that we should be prepared for problems with Italy. Mr. Bundy said he assumed we would be trying to carry through tripartite efforts in real terms while appearances would be played down as far as possible to take account of the pride of the other countries. Mr. Ball said that the UK Foreign Minister would be here for talks the following week. He and Mr. Leddy would see our Ambassadors from the NATO countries on October 25–26. Thereafter we would have papers prepared to get ready for tripartite conversations. Mr. Bundy said that it would be useful to have clear in our own minds in what order we wanted to talk about the various subjects. Then we could inform the Germans quietly before they came here. He particularly was interested in going further into the nuclear problem. Mr. McNamara suggested that Messrs. Ball, Mr. Bundy and himself should meet sometime in the following week on the nuclear problem. At Mr. Ball's request, Mr. Leddy explained a proposal which he thought might prevent a German national nuclear force and might also be acceptable to Congress. This would include a tripartite statement of principles presenting a collective nuclear force as part of an overall approach to non-proliferation, etc. The nuclear force would be commonly controlled, financed and operated, that is, mixed-manned. The weapons group would include the V-Bombers (mixed-manned), some US and the UK submarines (mixed-manned when no security risk would be involved) and a provision for mixed-manned surface ships in principle but with implementation to take place only when it is agreed surface ships are effective and relatively invulnerable. The force would be commonly financed, but if the necessary mixed-manning were not achieved in a given time, there would be a sliding scale for a reversion of costs. He agreed to send a brief paper explaining this idea to both Mr. McNamara and Mr. Bundy. Attachment 5 DRAFT NSAM SUBJECT France and NATO This NSAM provides the framework and guidance for further discussions with our Allies in dealing with prospective French actions against NATO. 1. The basic premise in the US consideration of this problem is that any French action taken against US installations in France or against NATO is in fact an issue between France and the rest of NATO and not between France and the United States. 2. The United States remains committed both to the NATO Alliance, as embodied in the 1949 Treaty, and specifically to NATO as an organization. 3. The US will not be willing to substitute for an integrated NATO a system of bilateral security commitments incorporating the substance of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. 4. If France should cease to participate constructively in the organization and activities of the Alliance, the US security commitment given in Article V will obviously have to be re-examined by the President, so far as it relates to France. 5. The United States, while remaining prepared to examine French proposals for reform of NATO, will develop its contingency planning with the other thirteen NATO Allies. In this regard, the objectives of US policy are: a. To carry on the common effort with the remaining Allies in NATO regardless of French willingness to participate fully in Alliance activities or French actions which would substantially impair NATO effectiveness. b. To maintain the defensive capability of NATO forces, including the viability of the “Forward Strategy”, and to achieve the optimum military posture attainable in light of French actions. c. To preserve the concept of integration, particularly integrated command and combined planning, in NATO. Modifications in existing relationships, multilateral or formally bilateral, which may be proposed by the French should be considered on their merits; however, the US will resist proposals which significantly impair the peace-time or war-time military capability of the Alliance. d. If forced by France to abandon facilities on French soil, to relocate those forces and facilities essential to the defense of NATO territory. e. To facilitate the ultimate return of France to status of full participating member of the Alliance. f. To achieve a common position through consultation with our Allies before any steps are taken in response to French action against NATO or US forces and facilities in support of NATO. g. To make clear to the other Allies that in addition to the defensive measures set forth in this NSAM the US is prepared to explore and cooperate in affirmative actions which strengthen the Alliance. 6. The United States should not make the first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO or US facilities in France, but should seek through continuing consultation with our Allies a common appreciation of French moves looking toward collective action when and if a confrontation with France becomes unavoidable. In these consultations we should be careful to make it clear that we are not endeavoring to organize the other NATO countries in a campaign to isolate France or to initiate action against France. 7. Priority should be given to examining contingency alternatives with our other Allies to determine how and when we should jointly respond to French moves. The primary purpose of Allied consultation should be to establish a consensus among the 14 that the French threat is real and that an understanding must be reached in principle now on the necessity for meeting this threat, if it develops, on a collective basis. Further specific discussions should be held on relocation problems with our Allies, with special attention to those countries most directly affected, e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, the UK and Italy. 8. The Department of State is responsible for coordinating US Government efforts on this problem. 1 Source: Department of State, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vest and approved in U on October 15. The conversation was held in Under Secretary Ball's office. 2 On October 4, Ball transmitted to Bundy the texts of a draft NSAM on France and NATO, dated September 25, and a 22-page paper entitled “France and NATO,” also dated September 25. Except for the changes noted in this memorandum, the September 25 draft NSAM is the same as the approved text attached here. (Ibid., POL 1 EUR W–FR) The draft was scheduled for discussion with the President on November 11, but he did not approve nor circulate it as U.S. Government policy. (Memorandum from Leddy to Rusk, November 9; ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265) 3 For text of the North Atlantic Council declaration on Berlin, December 16, 1958, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 , p. 560. 4 No record of another meeting of the group has been found. 5 Secret. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 1 Washington, October 21, 1965, 7:31 p.m. 490. Following highlights of Spaak-Secretary meeting of Oct 19 are based on uncleared memorandum of conversation 2 and should be considered Noforn: EEC—Spaak said principal objective now is to get French back to table. Oct 25–26 Brussels meeting of Five and Commission is first step. Purpose of meeting, in Spaak's view, is to make sufficient technical progress on agriculture to persuade French to reopen discussions. Not possible at this meeting to develop positions on questions of majority rule and Commission's powers as French have not made specific proposals on these political questions. Principal dilemma, Spaak said, is that Five do not know what De Gaulle has in mind. Spaak believes French will agree to meet, but not before 1966. In meeting with French, Five must present them with “reasonable proposals”—i.e., modified proposals on agriculture and willingness to explore in depth any French proposals on majority voting and role of Commission. If French decline to cooperate on this basis, Five should react and, difficult as it might be, proceed with EEC of Five. Spaak did not think, however, this eventuality would arise. NATO—Spaak said that again no one knew what De Gaulle had in mind, and that it important for Fourteen not to leave initiative in his hands, but rather ask French in responsible but firm manner what changes they envisage for NATO. Spaak questioned policy of waiting for De Gaulle to present proposals as one might conceivably have to wait for 3 to 4 years and Europe cannot hold together that long. (Davignon mentioned on another occasion that Spaak was thinking of asking about French intentions in terms of forthcoming December Ministerial Meeting.) The Secretary stated that NATO must continue with or without France, that US has been working on detailed studies on feasibility of proceeding without France if this is found necessary, that he hoped consultations on this subject with our allies could begin in November. The Secretary also pointed out the US has no interest in a series of bilateral defense arrangements as substitute for NATO and that we have so informed French. 3 In this connection he said that Congress and American people would not approve of any such arrangement as in US view European nations together are of interest from a defense standpoint, but France alone, for example, is not. Memcon being pouched. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 BEL–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Robert Anderson and Jay P. Moffat (EUR/WE) and approved by Leddy. Also sent to USEC in Brussels, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, The Hague, London, Rome, Bonn, and Luxembourg. 2 A copy of this 5-page memorandum of conversation is ibid., ECIN 6 EEC; separate memoranda of conversation on NATO and NATO and France are ibid., NATO 3 and DEF 4 NATO. 3 On October 19, Rusk informed Bohlen that the United States had no interest in a bilateral treaty with France and that while the United States opposed West German acquisition of a national nuclear deterrent, the Federal Republic of Germany must be accorded equality within the Alliance. (Telegram 1711 to Paris; ibid., POL 15–1 FR) Bohlen made these points in a conversation with Couve de Murville on October 21 (telegram 2182 from Paris, October 21; ibid., DEF 4 NATO) and in a brief discussion with De Gaulle during a luncheon at Rambouillet on October 28 (telegram 2337 from Paris, October 28; ibid.). 108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 108. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 8, 1965. SUBJECT Collective Nuclear Arrangements—the Erhard Visit From my recent talks in Germany 2 —with Westrick and Majonica among others—and with Birrenbach this morning, 3 I have no serious doubt about the real desires of the new German government regarding a “hardware” solution to this problem. (detailed memo attached) 4 They want Germany to participate, multilaterally with the US, the UK and as many other Europeans as they can get, in the common ownership, management and operation of a substantial strategic nuclear weapons system targeted on the Soviet strategic weapons aimed at Western Europe. They do not in fact believe, whatever we say, that “consultative” arrangements, whether through the Special Committee of Defense Ministers or otherwise, are enough. Their primary argument is that common ownership and management of a weapon will give them more real influence on United States nuclear decisions in Europe—even though they fully agree we should retain our veto—than any possible consultative arrangement which can be devised. I think they are absolutely right on this. I also think that giving the Germans, along with the Dutch, Italians and such others as will join, this enhanced participation in nuclear decisions regarding Europe, is the most prudent, safest course we can pursue in an uncertain future. Mac Mr. Bundy seems to be dead set against this course of action, notwithstanding the many earlier statements to the Germans by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and yourself that we are ready if they are. I suspect that Mac is mainly concerned about irritating the French. This is reflected in his memos on the subject. But the emerging French policy toward Germany (and toward NATO) is disastrous. If successful, it would destroy the concept of collective effort and restore nationalism as the norm. The worst thing we could do would be to let the French threaten us into following their own policies of division instead of cohesion. The French may flirt with the Russians in order to try to bluff the Germans out of a nuclear arrangement; but that is all. And the Russians will pull out the propaganda stops but in the end will be guided by a cold view of their national interest. Your position on this issue will be crucial. I know that you stand firmly on avoiding any commitment in a non-proliferation treaty which would preclude a collective nuclear force with German participation. But more than this is now required. In my judgment the understanding resulting from the Erhard visit will either make or break the collective nuclear project; and the decisions on the United States position may well be taken this week in Texas. I strongly hope you agree that the creation of a collective nuclear weapons system within NATO is in the long-term national interest and that you will take this position in discussions with the President and Secretary McNamara. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. A copy was sent to Ball. 2 Leddy visited Europe at the end of October and early November to participate in a regional officers' meeting and discuss nuclear sharing arrangements. 3 A 10-page memorandum of Kurt Birrenbach's conversation with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Mr. Bundy, and Leddy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. 4 Not printed. This 3-page memorandum listed recent statements by German leaders on the hardware solution to the nuclear problem. 109. Memorandum of Conversation 109. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 12, 1965. SUBJECTS 1. U.S. Policy Toward Common Market and EFTA 2. Kennedy Round 3. EFTA 4. EFTA and Economic Union 5. EFTA and Yugoslavia 6. Austrian-EEC Association 7. OECD Secretary General PARTICIPANTS Dr. Ernst Lemberger, Ambassador of Austria Dr. Gerald Hinteregger, Counselor, Embassy of Austria Dr. Thomas Klestil, Economic and Scientific Secretary, Embassy of Austria Deane R. Hinton, Director, EUR/RPE Arthur D. Foley, Officer-in-Charge, Austrian-Swiss Affairs Herbert Spielman, Economic Officer, Italian-Austrian Affairs Thomas W. Fina, Officer-in-Charge, EUR/RPE 1. U.S. Policy Toward Common Market and EFTA Ambassador Lemberger said that he wanted a clarification of U.S. policy in the light of the proposals made by Congressman Reuss and by senator Javits to re-examine U.S. policy toward the European Communities and the European Free Trade Area. He recalled that during his tenure in Brussels, he had found U.S. Ambassador Butterworth a warm supporter of the EEC but somewhat reserved about EFTA. 2 However, following the French veto of United Kingdom accession to the European Communities, Ambassador Lemberger thought the United States had become a little less ardent supporter of the European Communities. While the European Communities were still the United States's preferred vehicle for the attainment for European unity, he thought Ambassador Tuthill was more open-minded about the EFTA than his predecessor. Therefore, he wanted to know: 1) whether there had been any change in United States policy with respect to European integration, and 2) whether the United States felt that the Kennedy Round might have to be put off for a year or so. Mr. Hinton replied that there was no change in fundamental United States policy with respect to the European Communities, the European Free Trade Area or the Kennedy Round negotiations. On the other hand, our views did evolve realistically as the objective situation changed. It was clear that General De Gaulle did not share United States views on the type of Europe that we wished to see created. It was General De Gaulle's rejection of this type of Europe that had led to the present Common Market crisis. For tactical reasons, the United States had remained publicly silent and had taken relatively little private diplomatic action. This by no means meant a change in U.S. policy toward the European Communities. It was a matter of what tactic was best to avoid giving General De Gaulle an opportunity to exploit our support for the Communities. Statements by members of Congress do not necessarily express the views of the Administration. In the case of Congressman Reuss, the State Department had already replied to him saying that we did not share his appreciation of the situation and had very serious questions about the advisability of his proposed changes in policy. As for Senator Javits' speech in London, it seemed to mark somewhat of an evolution from Senator Javits' position three or four months ago. The most important aspect of Senator Javits' speech seemed to Mr. Hinton to have been that he now felt that the first priority for the United Kingdom was to seek membership in the Common Market at an appropriate moment. It was only if this renewed effort should fail that Senator Javits favored a return to his original proposal for a broad free trade area embracing the United States, United Kingdom and others. 2. Kennedy Round The Kennedy Round negotiations could by no means be written off. Mr. Hinton said that he had been optimistic about concluding them successfully when Austrian Foreign Minister Kreisky had been here. 3 His views had not changed. There were a number of signs from the French Government that it was interested in a successful Kennedy Round. One could never be sure, of course, that these signs were conclusive. But there were sound economic reasons that might well lead France to conclude at least a modest Kennedy Round. The great unknown was the attitude of General De Gaulle. There was evidence to support the view both that he would or that he would not favor a successful negotiation. This uncertainty remained even after our recent discussions with Sir Richard Powell. The UK view, otherwise, was also optimistic. The United States very much wanted successful conclusion to the Kennedy Round and we believed that there was some chance of achieving this goal whether or not the French return soon to the Common Market. If the French did return, it seemed quite certain that Germany and the Netherlands would insist upon a commitment for a satisfactory Kennedy Round conclusion. If France did not return soon, there was increasing readiness on the part of the Five to proceed to conduct Common Market business on an empty chair basis awaiting the French return. Since one of the first major issues that the EEC would have to face would be the Kennedy negotiations, there was some chance that the Five might proceed were they obliged to do so. In conclusion, while the French boycott of Community institutions had made the negotiations infinitely more difficult, they had not become impossible and the game would have to be played to the end. 3. EFTA Ambassador Butterworth certainly, accurately reflected the attitude of the U.S. Government toward EFTA. The U.S. was never enthusiastic about it, while it saw a great potential in the Common Market. The U.S. realized that the United Kingdom and Sweden conceived of EFTA primarily as a response to the EEC. It looked to the U.S. like a discriminatory trading block offering no compensatory political advantages. We thought then, and still think, that United Kingdom membership in the EEC was highly desirable and it was evident today that various members of the EEC who were once lukewarm to UK accession, now realized that it would have been highly desirable. France would never have been able to put the whole existence of European integration into doubt had the United Kingdom been a member of the European Communities accompanied, as was likely, by Norway, Denmark, Ireland and possibly Portugal as well. The United States never thought that states unwilling to move toward political unity should be members of the Common Market. It seemed, therefore, inappropriate for either Switzerland or Sweden to join. But the United States always recognized that Austria occupied a special position, had special problems, and deserved some special form of association. The passage of time had caused an inevitable evaluation in our thoughts about EFTA. First, the Seven had made such important progress toward reducing their duties that one could not easily contemplate a re-imposition of duties among them. Second, thus far the United States had enjoyed greater commercial benefits from EFTA than it had suffered commercial disadvantages. We still feared, however, that these disadvantages would become fully apparent only when EFTA had eliminated its final internal barriers. The United States and Austria have had similar economic problems vis-a-vis the Common Market. That was one reason that the United States was so interested in an early and successful Kennedy Round. Third, the United States was also fully aware and deeply appreciative of the excellent support which the EFTA member states have given the Kennedy negotiations. Their success would be best not only for the EFTA and United States, but for Japan and the developing economics as well. A purely European trade solution would be contrary to our interests and would not have our support. Ambassador Lemberger asked whether the United States still expected any of the political benefits from the Common Market which it had originally foreseen. Mr. Hinton replied that the United States Government's view, if there were one, would be that it was too soon to know. The play of forces in Western Europe was far from over. We should have to wait and see the eventual result. Speaking personally, however, he recalled that the principal reason for U.S. support of European political unity was in order to find a lasting solution to the problem of Franco-German relations and to the problem of German relations to the West as a whole. We felt that it was essential to give a democratic Germany a viable alternative to a return to nationalism. We felt that tying Germany to Western Europe could help to foster loyalty to a European ideal in place of a national one. The European Communities provided just such an opportunity. They continued to symbolize and to work in this direction. The obstacle to the successful pursuit of these policies was France. This was first evident in its veto of UK accession. The United States always felt that the Community structure tended to moderate nationalistic excesses. Until today, it had no proof of its hypothesis. But now that General De Gaulle wanted to free France of its Community obligations, to get rid of the pro-European leaders of the Community institutions and to change the system of majority voting, we had all too convincing proof that our contention was well founded. European political unity was not close. But we were not prepared to conclude that simply because of the French attack upon it, the objective had become unattainable. We had seen that the Five remained loyal to the Treaties and that they wished to keep the Community institutions alive. Of course, there were differing views on how this should be done. Whether the Five would attempt to do so by making concessions to De Gaulle now in the hope that France will mend its ways after his departure, or whether the Five would proceed without France would be seen in the next 6 to 9 months. The Kennedy negotiations and other commercial issues had given the impression of U.S. differences with the Common Market. But this was inevitable and in no sense suggested that our confidence in or support for these European institutions had at all diminished. The fact that the Kennedy Round had been delayed by the inability of the Common Market to negotiate did not reflect upon the Community institutions but rather upon the Government of France. We saw the Kennedy Round as a test of the liberal nature of Community trade policies. We were being patient and were waiting for the EEC to resume meaningful negotiations. We knew that the Government of France was in default of its obligations to the EEC partners and to its partners in the Geneva negotiations. But we were not walking out of the negotiations. We were waiting and hoped to be able to resume the negotiations in adequate time for their successful conclusion. Ambassador Lemberger agreed that one of the principal justifications for the EEC had been the achievement of Franco-German rapprochement. But he felt that the European Communities had shown, during the last 2 or 3 years, that they had exactly the contrary effect. The more closely the French and Germans were obliged to work on questions within the European Communities the more friction seemed to develop as the Germans felt compelled to make concessions, especially on agriculture, as the price of increased integration. It appeared to him that these frictions arose because of the Community. Mr. Hinton could not entirely agree. The friction within the Community seemed to him to stem from the decision made by the French to pursue a policy of strident nationalism. The cause for the friction was not the institutions but rather the unwillingness of one of the members to work easily with the others for the common good of the Communities. There has been an unfortunate breakdown in “Community spirit”. 4. EFTA and Economic Union Ambassador Lemberger said that EFTA fulfilled one of the major conditions that the United States sought in a European grouping that it was outward looking in its commercial policy. He felt that EFTA would not lead to political unity as this was not one of its objectives. But he did believe that it was moving toward economic union. The members had discovered that the removal of tariffs alone would not suffice. They were being obliged to follow the example of the Common Market in working for the harmonization of other factors, e.g. drawbacks, agriculture and standardization. At the same time, the EEC was moving away from its political goals. As a result, he thought that EFTA and the EEC were moving closer together and perhaps toward a common structure. Mr. Hinton agreed that the EFTA was evolving in this sense. He thought that greater EFTA policy coordination on technical questions was necessary. The case of the United Kingdom surcharge was a good example. But when experience had shown that the Six had great trouble in attaining this harmonization even when they were committed to it, motivated by a shared political vision, and had institutions to accomplish it, he doubted that the Seven could hope to do better. He doubted that the Seven had enough in common to achieve economic union. He thought the experience with United Kingdom's surcharge was fairly convincing evidence that the Seven were still very far from being ready to coordinate their policies. The case of Yugoslavia seemed to confirm this assessment. The U.S. welcomed the development of closer Yugoslav ties with the West and with EFTA, but if EFTA brought in Yugoslavia, would it not be more than ever difficult to go beyond more than loose policy coordination? If EFTA would achieve economic union, the U.S. would be delighted. But, it seemed to him that the limited type of economic policy coordination that was likely to be feasible for the Seven was far better suited to achievement within the OECD. The matters on which coordination might be attained—such as border taxation, standardization of nomenclature, patents, etc., were broader than EFTA. They were a matter of concern not only for all of the OECD countries but some of the Eastern European states as well. The U.S. had a very direct interest in these questions. Therefore, he felt that they could be more successfully dealt with in a larger forum. In resume, the U.S. was prepared to give its full support to genuine political or genuine economic union in Europe but if the relationship among the member states were to be a loose one, then he would hope that it would be at the Atlantic or free world level. 5. EFTA and Yugoslavia Ambassador Lemberger said that he expected the United Kingdom and Switzerland to push for favorable action on the Yugoslav approach. While Yugoslav relations with the EEC were stalled because of Yugoslavia's quarrel with West Germany, there was no such obstacle in EFTA. Although the official response from the Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting was not very forthcoming, this was primarily because the session was principally concerned with EFTA-EEC bridge-building. Ambassador Lemberger suggested that Sir John Coulson might be ready to explain EFTA Council thinking on the Yugoslavia question during his visit next week. 4 As for Austria, it had excellent relations with Yugoslavia and important commercial relations. There were neither political nor frontier issues between Austria and Yugoslavia. Austria was, therefore, very receptive to the Yugoslavia approach. 6. Austrian-EEC Association Mr. Hinton asked whether Ambassador Lemberger's observations about the EEC should be interpreted to mean that Austria had lost interest in association with the Common Market. Ambassador Lemberger said that Austria was still interested but that its negotiating partner was in limbo. In the absence of the French no meaningful negotiations were possible although Austria would continue to go through the motions. [Here follow 3 paragraphs of discussion on the choice of a new Secretary General for the OECD.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Fina. 2 W. Walton Butterworth was U.S. Representative to the European Communities August 1961–October 1962. 3 Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky visited Washington October 21–22. 4 EFTA Secretary General Sir John Coulson visited Washington November 18–19. Memoranda of his conversations, primarily devoted to the new Secretary General's getting acquainted with Mann, Herter, Leddy, and other U.S. officials, are in Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EFTA and FT 13–2 US. 110. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 110. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 16, 1965, 2016Z. Polto Circ 13. For Acting Secretary and Asst Secretary Leddy. My consultations Nov 11 and 12 in Brussels tended to concentrate on link between EEC crisis and “NATO and France” problem. In company with Amb Tuthill, I had opportunity to learn the somewhat varying reactions of four EEC Commissioners (Hallstein, Rey, Mansholt, and Colonna), Dutch PermRep Spierenburg, UK Amb Majoribanks and, in absence German PermRep, his Deputy, Boemcke. Amb Knight and I discussed same problem at length with Spaak, De Staercke and Davignon at lunch next day. On Nov 15 visit to Bonn subject also arose in meeting with Carstens. Foll observations are composite reaction to these conversations: 1. The two “crises” are inherently linked, in that French challenges to European Communities and to NATO stem from the same objection to operational international agencies, and must be faced during same time period. French have not linked the two explicitly, and were even at some pains to deny having linked them when Newsweek version of De Gaulle-Bentinck interview erroneously reported De Gaulle as having made the connection. But in interest politics of each of the Five, and in UK and US diplomacy, timing of French moves and reactions thereto deserves more explicit consideration than most of us have been giving it. 2. EEC crisis is more dangerous for Common Market than “NATO and France” issue is for NATO. Fourteen NATO partners can serve essential purpose of treaty (to defend Western Europe) if necessary without France. France has capacity to defect but not capacity to destroy main elements of present and prospective NATO, including integration of peacetime military planning. In EEC Five can, with sufficient will and persistence, stick together and present France with united front. But purposes of Rome Treaty cannot be served by Five acting for themselves, and none of Germany's partners will want to make permanent an arrangement in which Germany is by far dominant partner. For Five to stick together, therefore, is only an interim step which must lead either to (a) forcing France to cooperate after all, for reasons of its own economic interest; (b) luring UK (and presumably Scandinavians) to join Five in setting up a somewhat different kind of EEC, or (c) both. 3. None of the Common Market people with whom I talked seemed to have thought deeply about interaction of two crises. When asked about it, most of them (Mansholt was emphatic exception) expressed hope that we would not rock Common Market boat by pushing MLF-type proposals during next two or three months. If nuclear sharing project is pushed, they thought, it would give De Gaulle additional instrument for blackmailing Five—that is, he could somehow indicate he was tearing down European institutions because we were insisting on giving Germany control of nuclear weapons. Arguments for delaying nuclear sharing rest on assumption, which seems dubious, that EEC crisis will come to definitive break or definitive back-down by France within two or three months; but it seems unlikely that things will be that clear-cut that soon or, indeed, ever. In short, instinctive reaction of Common Marketers is predominantly opposed to raising new nuclear issues in NATO, but this reaction seems to me to be based more on instinct than on well thought-out reasoning. Yet one point Colonna made has merit: if you assume (as he does) that EEC crisis will come to a head very soon, it would be better for definitive break with France to come first in a fight between France and “Europe,” and only later in a fight with us about NATO nuclear issues. 4. As Amb Knight has reported, Spaak now feels very strongly against our going ahead with nuclear sharing proposal, on ground that this would play into De Gaulle's hands. He cheerfully conceded that his present view was not only judgment about what was good for Atlantic and European institution, but also, and especially a judgment as to the difficulty of keeping Belgium firm in an EEC fight with France, given tendency of French-speaking Belgians to accord France benefit of doubt. 5. German reaction from Carstens was to be unimpressed with link between EEC and NATO problems. Carstens argued we cannot fail to do what is necessary on NATO side while we await definitive break in EEC problem. Such a break, he thought, would require either French change of heart or British decision to join Five, and either development will take a good long time. Carstens thinks that British action may prove useful threat, but that in the end French economic necessities will tend to force a more reasonable attitude in Paris toward EEC. 6. Recommend that Dept provide all US Ambassadors concerned with its best analysis of this issue. None of us has whole picture, but we all need common basis for judgment about extent to which EEC consideration should be taken into account during very active NATO season which is now upon us. Such analysis also seems necessary as input into recommendations on NATO issues which will be considered by President during next few weeks. 7. My own preliminary reaction is that link between two issues is not particularly significant at level of general strategy—in other words, that we should go ahead and do what we think we need to do in Alliance without worrying too much about French objections. But at level of week-to-week tactics and timing, link may prove to be very important—that is, timing of each step we take in NATO should be considered in relation to timing of developments in European Communities, in order not to make things more difficult for Five than they are bound to be anyway. Amb Tuthill may wish to comment. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, and Brussels. 111. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) 111. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) 1 Washington, November 24, 1965, 1–3 p.m. Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are as follows: 1. European nuclear arrangements. The Ambassador raised this subject toward the end of the lunch—which is where he has usually raised the thing most on his mind in our past talks. The moment he raised the question, I told him that I was troubled by the lack of clarity in the Soviet position on ANF and MLF and other arrangements. Sometimes the Soviet Union seemed to be saying to us that it was only the MLF that was objectionable. At other times Soviet representatives seemed to be hostile to all possible arrangements, even those for simple consultation. The Ambassador parried by saying that the Soviet Union had a hard time telling just what we had in mind. He said that he had been unable to satisfy repeated requests from his government for an accurate account of purposes and meaning of the McNamara special committee (even his NATO colleagues in Washington had told him that they honestly did not know what it was all about). The Ambassador said that it would be easier for the Soviet Union to comment on our policy if it knew exactly what that policy was. He said that he knew there was a difference of opinion within the USG as between believers in collective weapons systems and believers in consultation. He said that he had the impression that there was not a firm decision in the USG and he implied that the Soviet Union could not express a fully defined position until it knew what it had to deal with on our side. I pointed out to the Ambassador that this position in turn created difficulties in Washington. We were determined to move ahead with necessary defensive arrangements, while at the same time we worked for the cause of non-proliferation. The Ambassador was certainly correct in believing that different kinds of arrangements were preferred by different groups here, but I pointed out that as long as it appeared that the Soviet Union was equally opposed to all arrangements, it would be hard for anyone in this government to believe the choice we made would have any effect on relations with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador said very earnestly that he understood this point and that for this reason it would be of the greatest value to the Soviet Government if he could have a wholly private and informal indication of the real plans and preferences of the USG as soon as they might be decided. He was sure that such a private indication of our position would be helpful, almost no matter what it was. The Ambassador cited as an example the announcement today of a 700-man reduction in our forces in Berlin. He thought that 24-hours private notice of this decision would have been most helpful in Moscow. I told the Ambassador that I understood the value of private communication. The Ambassador, on his part, assured me that the Soviet Union would have no interest whatever in using any such private communication to undermine our relations with the Germans—he said that he thought we worry too much about that, and that this simply was not the framework within which these matters were reviewed within the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government's concern about the Germans was real and deep, as he had told me often before. The Ambassador remarked that he had often been told by his friends in the State Department that Soviet protests in the nuclear field were merely another example of Soviet hostility toward NATO, and that he wanted me to understand that this was not the case. Of course, NATO was not a Soviet favorite, but the problem of nuclear proliferation and Germany was far different and much more serious. On non-proliferation, he added, the Soviet Government had exposed itself to severe criticism from quarters he need not name (I inferred China); that should prove its sincerity. I told the Ambassador that we understood the Soviet concern with Germany and that indeed we shared it. I told him that I could give him categorical assurance that there was no one in the USG who had the smallest intention of allowing the Germans to have national control of nuclear weapons, and no one who would support the Germans in any effort to use any German nuclear role as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union. The Ambassador indicated that he believed me, but he made it equally plain that his confidence was not shared in Moscow. My own private and personal conclusion from this extended exchange, the flavor of which I have not fully recaptured, is that we may well be able to win Soviet acceptance of any nuclear arrangement in the West which does not involve an immediate decision to build a new weapons system like the MLF, and which clearly avoids any increase in direct German access to the nuclear trigger. I believe that both the McNamara committee and the revised ANF now under discussion could meet this condition. I believe that Dobrynin is right and serious in his emphasis upon the value of early private communication with the Soviet Government when we know our mind on this matter. Since in fact no one now wants the MLF, I think we may well be able to make some money with Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly. In sum, I believe that what Dobrynin said on this subject may open the way for us to meet our NATO responsibilities and move at the same time toward an agreement on non-proliferation. At the very least, the Ambassador's position seems to me to reinforce the importance of the President's stated view that we should approach the problem of Atlantic nuclear defense with a full awareness of the concerns of the Soviet Government. (I should add that I told Ambassador Dobrynin that this was the President's position.) [Here follow 4 paragraphs of discussion on unrelated topics.] McG.B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Mr. Bundy, Vol. 17. No classification marking. On November 25, Mr. Bundy sent copies to Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and Thompson. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR) 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities 112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Communities 1 Washington, November 24, 1965, 4:25 p.m. Busec 135. For Ambassadors Tuthill and Cleveland from Leddy. Reftels: Ecbus 413; Polto Circ 13. 2 Reftels have provided useful insights into questions of relationship between Common Market and NATO crises and of how De Gaulle may combine them to advance his overall objectives. We would welcome further thoughts by you and other addressees, especially since question of how De Gaulle may as practical matter be able to put two issues together to his own advantage is at moment wide-open speculation. For time being we have thought it best to avoid attempting guidance from Washington to field proposed in Polto Circ 13, which would presume more wisdom that we in fact have. My own present thoughts on these questions follow, and I offer them tentatively: 1. Assuming, as I do, that (a) De Gaulle is serious in trying enhance French world prestige and power by disentangling France from both NATO and EEC limitations on his freedom of action in European, Atlantic and general international fields, and that (b) his genius for tactics remains unimpaired, I expect that he would try to mix NATO and EEC crises to extent he is capable of levering one against the other in order to give greatest net impulse to his total objective. Question is, what are practical possibilities open to him? 2. In EEC De Gaulle faces opposition of other Five which are united against his intent to destroy the integrity and powers of Commission and to alter drastically the present authority of Council of Ministers under the Rome Treaty, both of which institutional arrangements the Five consider essential to progress toward the political unity in Europe that they continue to cherish as ultimate objective. In NATO he faces opposition of all other European countries plus United States, none of which is prepared to disintegrate NATO and thus open the Pandora's box of American withdrawal, reversion to nationalism and total insecurity that could result. 3. What could De Gaulle concede to Five on EEC questions in return for concessions on NATO issues or vice versa without giving up his essential desiderata with respect to one or the other? He is the “demandeur” with respect to both. It is he who wants to alter radically both institutions. But in neither has he anything to offer in exchange except a mitigation of his demands. Conceivably he would be willing to compromise for time being his ultimate requirements regarding the EEC in return for support for a specific French program toward NATO. But the French have no specific program for NATO other than the overall objective of disintegration, and this is clearly non-negotiable with the Five. Conceivably also he could offer to relax his generalized attack against NATO if the Five would give him what he wants in the EEC. But the Five know that NATO can survive in integrated form without France. They are most unlikely to make concessions on matters vital to them in EEC when they know they are really safe on matters vital to them in NATO regardless of what the French do about NATO. 4. There remain four further thoughts which occur to me: (a) De Gaulle may attempt to do a deal with the Germans based on a French offer to “live with” the EEC (“minor” changes of course in the composition, power and “behavior” of the Commission and a “gentlemen's agreement” on majority voting after January 1, 1966), if Germany would agree to back off from any participation in a common NATO nuclear force. (This would in fact be merely a prelude to a later drive for French hegemony, with further attacks on the EEC being withheld only for the time being.) The Germans might be prepared to resist this deal, but I am not sure of their capability to do so without US and UK support. In any case the nuclear issue seems to me the main point at which De Gaulle may be likely to apply pressure in connection with the EEC. (b) De Gaulle may wish to make his foreign policy irreversible within a short time, say the next year or two. If so, he may make an all-out drive to change both NATO and the EEC drastically and, failing this, may withdraw from the NAT and blow up the EEC. He might move rapidly and “brutally” on both fronts. If this were to happen we would all quickly face a wholly new situation requiring the reassessment of US and UK policy toward the continent in order to preserve essential security, political and economic objectives in European and Atlantic relations. (c) The nuclear problem may have become so important and symbolic to the Germans that they might prefer to reach an early decision to go forward with a common nuclear force and thus present the French with a fait accompli. The German purpose would be to avoid French blackmail, which could be applied more easily during a period of uncertainty regarding any decision to form a common nuclear force. (d) Europeans could become so frightened of the prospect of being alone with Germany, so awed by De Gaulle, so doubtful of American constancy, so divided among each other, and so persuaded that a safe deal with the Soviets is possible that they would follow De Gaulle's vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. I often get frustrated in this job but I don't yet think that Europeans are that dumb. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Paris Topol and repeated to Bonn, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Ottawa. 2 Polto Circular 13 is Document 110 . In Ecbus 413 from Brussels, November 20, Tuthill said that he had little to add to the analysis transmitted in Polto Circular 13 on the relationship between the EEC crisis and that in NATO. He speculated that the EEC crisis would probably come to a head first and that the Five could not be counted on to confront De Gaulle unless there was a clear assurance that the United States could be counted on in NATO. The Ambassador concluded that the United States should continue to avoid any public involvement in the EEC crisis, but quietly let the Five know that it approved of the firmness and unity they were displaying. (Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC) 113. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 113. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 28, 1965, 1900Z. Polto Circular 19. Defense for Secy McNamara and Asst Secy McNaughton and JCS. Subject: Special Committee of Defense Ministers. Brief summary of November 27th meeting of Defense Ministers already sent in Polto Circ 18. 2 Full U.S. notes on meeting being pouched to all addressees. 3 This cable designed to give some highlights and sidelines of special interest. 1. We achieved our main purpose, which was to get special committee off the ground and divided into working groups of reasonable size for serious followup work. Immediate effect is public and private demonstration that Alliance is engaged in lively and serious endeavor, that this work has to do with enormous power already made available to Alliance by its members especially U.S., and that work is proceeding in spite of regrettable French abstention. 2. Advance arrangements for meeting worked well. All Ministers attending seemed reasonably clear what the meeting was and what it was not. Nobody tried seriously to convert meeting into a debate on collective nuclear force or on non-proliferation treaty. All procedural arrangements, including terms of reference of three working groups, were cooked ahead of time. With single Dutch exception, composition of working groups, with four nations on each, was also agreed by informal negotiation before meeting started. Moral: When we are reasonably clear what we want to accomplish, we can accomplish much of it by informal negotiation among PermReps. Dutch PermRep Boon strongly recommended his govt be flexible, but unfortunately was overruled. 3. Insistence of Netherlands DefMin De Jong, backed by Hague Cabinet decision, broke the consensus otherwise established on composition working groups. Result was working groups with five members rather than four. (Dutch position was thus characterized by UK DefMin Healey: “If working group had only four members it would lack its fifth wheel”.) Canadians, Turks, and Belgians, all objected to implicit Netherlands assumption that it could represent smaller nations as fifth member working group on nuclear planning. Resulting deadlock was not resolved in spite of much luncheon discussion and some telephoning to The Hague. Ministers finally withdrew into a private room and applied to otherwise insoluble problem the oldest form of collective decision making: selection by lot. That was how Turkey became fifth member of working group on nuclear planning. 4. Status of Special Committee is now clear: It is a committee of the North Atlantic Council, chaired by SYG, with three working groups responsible to it. Special Committee will report to Ministerial Council, but (contrary to hints in French press backgrounding) Council can no longer be considered as being seized with question whether there should be a Special Committee. It simply exists as ad hoc committee whose duration, while not permanent, is indefinite. Further arrangements on procedure, including such issues as chairmanship of and staff work for working groups, will be in hands of steering committee of PermReps. 5. Procedural bridges already crossed include: (a) Agreement that Brosio's report to Council in December will be agreed with steering committee of PermReps; (b) Date for next meeting already set for week of March 28, 1966; (c) Members of working groups are DefMins or Deputies designated by them. 6. Briefings by SACEUR Nuclear Deputy van Rolleghem and International Staff ExSec Coleridge were not a notable addition to meeting, though Coleridge at least was brief. Written briefings and military replies to handful of questions were descriptive rather than analytical. They implied that existing arrangements for planning, communications, command and control, were well in hand and did not analyze gaps or failings requiring Special Committee's attention. This contributed to feeling by several DefMins (notably U.S., U.K., and Germany) that leadership and staff work for working groups will have to come essentially from governments. 7. Secretary McNamara's presentation on nuclear stockpiles, including numbers of warheads in Europe by type, country of location, and nationality of delivery forces (but no information on yields of weapons in Europe), and his revelation of total numbers and yields of U.S. strategic forces, laid down a serious and impressive factual basis for Special Committee's work. Fact this information was made available, under security rules that enabled DefMins to use it in their own governments (on a “need-to-know” basis) added greatly to the sense that formation this Special Committee was an important moment in life of Alliance. It also indicated that U.S. really intends to consult more seriously with allies on nuclear questions that affect them. Neither during the meeting nor in informal conversations around its edges did we hear any skepticism of U.S. intentions in this regard. Secretary McNamara's backgrounder, using summary numbers for both NATO and U.S. stockpiles, should help carry same impression to press and public at large. 8. Apart from U.S. statement, most impressive contribution of substance was made by Denis Healey (UK). He forcefully described need for better political decision-making machinery by drawing from McNamara statement the conclusion that NATO arrangements contain “all the hardware we need for any conceivable purpose” and plenty of machinery at military level for release of weapons. But without better political arrangements, he said, both the power and the military release procedures are “irrelevant.” The enemy must know we are able to decide to respond, and allies must have the same confidence. He graphically described the kinds of questions that political Ministers would be bound to ask when death of millions their own constituents was at stake. Task of Special Committee, as Healey described it, was “to build the community of understanding among governments to the level of the community of understanding among their military advisers.” But he also implied that the military advisers were not asking the political authorities the right questions about nuclear warfare. 9. Healey came the closest to relating Special Committee to collective nuclear sharing projects. Describing the nuclear planning working group as a device “to consult on strategy involving nuclear weapons,” he said first task was work up realistic alternative plans for deployment and use existing nuclear weapons system, and face difficult issues about development future weapons systems. Only then, he said, can we consider “how to group existing or future weapons systems” in ways that involved collective ownership or control. It would, he said, be “futile” to do this before we know how nuclear weapons would be used. 10. Other statements by Ministers were both mercifully brief and of generally high quality. Von Hassel (Ger) said no country could depend entirely on decisions by others to ensure its own security, and made clear FRG does not consider steering committee as substitute for collective nuclear force. “Cannot do the job entirely by technical improvements,” he said. Costopoulos (Greece) put main emphasis on careful study of use of tactical weapons, emphasizing that veto by nuclear powers on nuclear use should be matched by responsibility of those in whose “sector” nuclear weapons were deployed and used. Turk DefMin Topaloglu, for whom PermRep Birgi was mouthpiece, presented a curious proposal to give advance authority to NATO commanders to use tactical weapons bypassing political consultation in an emergency—a proposal unlikely to be heard of again. Andreotti (Italy) made interesting proposal for a “political state of vigilance” as a form of alert to be decided and declared by NATO Council, a low-key alert designed to precede more far-reaching and alarming military alerts now contemplated by NATO procedures. Danish Minister Gram was silent except for brief justification Denmark's presence on committee. Belgian Minister Moyersoen was helpful during argument about composition of working groups, when he emphasized these groups would not have a life of their own but would be under parent Special Committee. 11. Hellyer (Canada) asked some perceptive and difficult questions about NATO procedures in event of an emergency. SACEUR had said he would look to North Atlantic Council for guidance on use of nuclear weapons. But Hellyer wanted to know whether a unanimity rule would apply in the Council on this subject. Could one country veto employment of weapons by a NATO commander? What if one or two countries failed to decide or unduly delayed their decision? What are the military implications of SACEUR having permission from some but not all of the NATO countries? Nobody answered these questions directly. In later discussion of NAC role in nuclear decision-making, it seemed to be the prevailing assumption that governments would make their own decisions in their own capitals, but NAC represented useful facility to pool information on nature of crises and to consult rapidly with other allies on their own reactions to and intentions in a crisis. 12. Next steps: PermReps will have to meet soon to clear up some of the issues of procedure that were left to them by the Ministers. In discussion with Secretary McNamara after meeting, we agreed that U.S. line on procedure for working groups should be to have one member of club assume the chairmanship (U.S. opting to chair working group on nuclear planning), and organize staff work to be done by governments. Thus in case of planning group, U.S. would draft papers, consult quite closely with U.K. and Germany in process, and call the full group in the latter part of January. Schedule for working groups can be readily arranged while Ministers are together here in mid-December. 13. All-in-all, this enterprise is well launched now. Our object will be to maintain sufficient momentum to keep it aloft. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, and the Department of Defense. 2 Polto Circular 18, November 27, reported that the meeting had established working groups on data and intelligence, communications, and nuclear planning with the United States and the United Kingdom members of all three. (Ibid.) 3 Transmitted in Polto A–276, November 29. (Ibid.) Attached to the notes were, inter alia, the text of McNamara's remarks to the meeting, the terms of reference for the working groups, and the communique issued by NATO after the meeting. For text of the communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , p. 453. 114. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 114. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 29, 1965, 2010Z. Polto 918. Pass to OSD for Secretary McNamara. 1. Tripartite dinner of DefMins preceding Special Committee (the three DefMins plus three PermReps) was significant mostly for being the first of its kind. It produced no notable political backlash; Germans apparently let it be known that von Hassel was dining with US and UK colleagues, but fact was not generally noticed by French press or foreign correspondents here. 2. A good part of evening's discussion was devoted to tactics for Special Committee meeting next day, and has been overtaken by reports (Polto Circulars 18 and 19) 2 on that meeting. Three Ministers were in full agreement on such issues as composition of working groups, their terms of reference, nature of report to Ministerial Council and other procedural matters. They also agreed that staff work for working groups would have to be provided essentially by governments. 3. Main substantive discussion was touched off by Von Hassel's reference to existing plans for use of nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara, strongly supported by Healey, told Von Hassel that in his judgment there exists no rational plan for the use of nuclear weapons now located in Europe. Only real plan is for their use in conjunction with, and if effect as supplement to, strategic weapons in SAC and Polaris. But their use in this mode assumed general nuclear war. Far more likely contingency was some form of limited war which raised question of selective use of nuclear weapons. But there is no realistic plan for selective use, and contingencies short of general war have not been thought through. Nor are there effective procedures for consultation at political level. Secretary McNamara summarized kinds of questions President and his advisers would be bound to ask (and Prime Ministers and Chancellors would ask too) before permitting military authorities use nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara said that allies had not even decided how and where arms should be used in Germany. 4. Healey chimed in by saying he had initially been somewhat skeptical contribution Special Committee could make. But the more he studied problems nuclear strategy the more convinced he had become that absence of rational plan for use nuclear weapons in situation short of general war was major problem facing Alliance. Special Committee was designed precisely to solve this problem. 5. Von Hassel seemed rather taken aback by all this, and kept protesting that he had thought that SACEUR had a plan for use of nuclear weapons in Germany's defense. The revelation that his colleagues representing nuclear powers were very dissatisfied with the present status of nuclear planning seemed to be a new and sobering thought to Von Hassel. 6. In general, neither Von Hassel nor Grewe contributed their share to tripartite discussion. My impression was that Von Hassel felt somewhat out of his league, because he lacked some of the fundamental knowledge and he had not thought as deeply about nuclear defense as US and UK Ministers have done. There may also have been a feeling of constraint and even embarrassment at the company he was keeping—that is, a consciousness that other allies would raise their eyebrows if they knew he was there at all. 7. In discussion with Shuckburgh today I found he also had been struck by von Hassel's reticence even at an intimate and informal dinner. 8. Ministers tentatively agreed that same six (DefMins and PermReps) should have dinner together again December 13th, night before opening of NATO Ministerial Council. 3 Location this time will be at Schuckburgh's house. This arrangement was made on explicit assumption that neither DefMins nor NATO PermReps would be involved in traditional quadripartite dinner of FonMins that same evening. Dept please confirm whether this assumption is correct. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Bonn and passed to OSD. 2 Document 113 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 The second tripartite Defense Ministers meeting spent the majority of its time on arrangements for and the program of the Special Committee, and the Embassy in Paris described it as “relaxed, amicable, and businesslike.” (Telegram 3379, December 14; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, December 9, 1965, 9:48 p.m. 2609. NATUS. Embassy for Crawford and James. Refs: Polto 827, Bonn 1500. 2 Joint State/Defense message. Reference is made to Ambassador Cleveland's comment in reftel on the need for candor in explaining adjustments in US force strength in Europe to our NATO Allies. We appreciate the difficulties occasioned in reconciling our present policy of unequivocal commitment to hold the line on our NATO committed forces with recent minor adjustments in those forces we have had to make and agree that we should avoid to extent possible further categoric statements on the maintenance of present composition and number of our forces. The adjustments we have made in our NATO forces are thus far minor and demonstrably in line with NATO-wide practices as developed over the years. If we raise the issue at the Erhard level we will be calling special attention to nothing more than minor changes in our NATO forces; a circumstance which would almost certainly be taken as a warning of drastic cuts yet to come. We have no evidence that the NATO governments are troubled by our recent record of force adjustments because of the Vietnam demands; but we know no better way to stimulate European nervousness than to try to anticipate the unpredictable in the interest of candor. To attempt to “explain” our NATO force adjustments to Erhard or any other NATO leader would, we believe, be taken as such a hint of impending substantial force changes, thereby prejudicing the chances of successful negotiations on the military future of the Alliance. Against this background what is required is to draw no special attention to our force adjustments in Europe—even at the cost of leaving a few things unsaid. Meanwhile, it may be possible to move on with the important questions of nuclear sharing and its relationship to conventional force levels in Europe. We therefore subscribe to Bonn's recommendations that we should make no effort to explain our minor force changes to Erhard. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. Drafted by William B. Bader on December 8; cleared by Spiers, Kitchen, Johnson, Finn, G/PM, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn. 2 Polto 827 from Paris, November 20, recommended that Chancellor Adenauer be told candidly that the minor adjustments to special units in Europe did not affect the U.S. commitment to the continent. That way, when such force changes took place in the future because of the situation in Southeast Asia, the Germans would not get “a bad case of jitters.” (Ibid.) Telegram 1500 from Bonn has not been found. 116. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 116. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 14, 1965, 1810Z. Secto 8. Department also pass to Defense for OSD/ISA. Following based on uncleared memcon 2 FYI Noforn subject to revision on review: SecGen Brosio called on Secretary afternoon Dec 13 for general discussion NATO meeting. Principal points made by Brosio were: (1) His strong desire convey to Secretary European concern possibility further escalation Vietnam situation and diminution US commitment Europe. In this connection Brosio expressed view Europeans ought increase defense efforts to allow US and Western world in general greater flexibility. (2) France-NATO. Brosio expects no clear French proposals re NATO, looks instead for bilateral pressures on us which he thinks should be regarded as problem of whole Alliance. Brosio stressed need for close study procedural aspects France-NATO problem in search of approach avoiding overt 14–1 split with isolation French. He particularly critical De Gaulle's flirtation Moscow to weaken FedRep. Brosio expects no softening French position result elections. Secretary emphasized Vietnam, which he told Brosio would dominate his speech at Ministerial Meeting. 3 In speech he would emphasize relevance Vietnam to NATO concerns and call on member nations examine problem from standpoint national interests, considering effect on them if US failed honor Vietnam commitments. Secretary emphasized that Europeans should not see present situation in terms of US choice between Atlantic and Pacific. He pointed out US could not meet commitments in Atlantic without also meeting them in Pacific. Other matters: (1) Secretary told Brosio Tad Szulc story New York Times Dec 13 re Spain-NATO was devoid of substance. (2) In exchange views on recent Soviet developments, including increase military budget, Reston interview with Kosygin, resignation Mikoyan, 4 Secretary down-played significance, pointed out US had already increased military budget for Vietnam by as great percentage as Sovs now intended do, and that this would look small by comparison with what US would do in January. Secretary and Brosio agreed Kosygin and present collective leadership fundamentally not greatly different from predecessor and, if anything, more orthodox than Khrushchev. (3) Brosio said he would defer raising agenda item on Cyprus pending arrival of Greek and Turkish FonMins from New York. Thought matter would come up late Wednesday. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, London, Madrid, Bonn, Athens, and Ankara. Rusk was in Paris for the 36th North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting December 14–16. 2 The memorandum of conversation, US/MC/6, is ibid., NATO 3 FR(PA). 3 A copy of Rusk's speech on the international situation, December 14, is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2574. 4 On December 9, the Soviet Union announced that Anastas I. Mikoyan had resigned as President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet for reasons of health. 117. Editorial Note 117. Editorial Note British Prime Minister Wilson visited Washington December 16–18, 1965, primarily to discuss British defense commitments and Rhodesia. In a private conversation with President Johnson at 5:15 p.m. on December 16, the following exchange took place on nuclear sharing: “The Prime Minister expressed warm appreciation for the attitude of the President a year ago on the MLF. When he came here for those discussions he had not known what to expect. He had understood that he would be faced with a ultimatum. Instead, we had acted with reason and with judgment and he thought that events had confirmed the wisdom of that position at that time. He thought all would now agree that it might not have been wise to move ahead rapidly with the MLF a year ago. “The President reminded Wilson of the differences of judgment of the year before with respect to the attitude of the Germans on nuclear matters. He reminded the Prime Minister that the British had then said that the German desire was unreal and had been stimulated by the American proposals. The President had suggested that the British go and test German sentiment. Now a year had passed; what did the Prime Minister think now? The Prime Minister replied, as he had to Ball and McNamara in London, the British were still willing to support their own ANF proposal. They would put their submarines in if the Americans would put submarines in, and then the Germans could pay for a part in the undertaking. He thought it was all a bit unreal and he did not think we needed as many missiles as we already have in the Atlantic area. He himself thought we ought to consider using the British Polaris as part of some international security arrangement east of Suez. But he was ready for more discussion on the subject.” (Record of meeting by McGeorge Mr. Bundy; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2567) 118. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 118. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 18, 1965, 2035Z. 3491. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting. The meeting of NATO Ministers has been reported in detail, for the record. 2 The European publicity on your comments and those of Secretary McNamara has also been fully and professionally covered through USIS. This cable is designed as a summary analysis of what happened here this week. 3 1. The Alliance This Ministerial session both summarized and confirmed the process of “getting the Alliance moving again” which has been going on throughout the autumn. A. The new five-year force planning system is a major “reform of NATO.” B. The prospect of nuclear consultations in the Special Committee of Defense Ministers and its three working groups obviously is developing a good deal of interest, and is regarded as forward movement by both friends and foes of farther-reaching nuclear sharing projects. C. We have escalated the Allied mobile force from haggling over finances to fundamental reappraisal by NAC, with the presumption of proceeding to do what needs to be done on a “less than 15” basis if necessary. D. We have begun to relate the NATO thinking about arms control to the thinking about NATO force planning. E. In short, we have begun a vigorous effort to make more rational use of something like the level of defense expenditures now available to the Alliance. Whether that level rises or falls will depend more on what happens in the outside world than on what NATO Ministers and officials say to each other. 2. There were of course two ghosts at the feast: France and Vietnam. The spectre of French obstruction was exorcised with comparative ease. Your presentation on Vietnam was part of a fundamental shift in the terms of the transatlantic dialogue on the non-NATO responsibilities of NATO members. 3. France. (A) The frustration of Couve's effort to end the Special Committee next spring can be traced only in part to the reluctance of the French Government to have a major public row with its traditional allies a few days before the run-off election. 4 It can also be attributed to the fact that nearly all the Allies, and most French Ministers and officials too, have concluded this fall that a NATO without France is a practical (if inconvenient) proposition. (B) French bargaining power is not very strong with Allies who are increasingly willing to leave the French chair vacant and go ahead on moves to strengthen NATO. The British understand this clearly. The continental Allies sense it too; hence their stiffened posture both in Brussels and in Paris. And the French are increasingly aware of it. The results of the first round in the French elections can be read as providing some mild evidence of this—though Atlantic issues never loomed large in the campaign. More explicit evidence is to be found in Couve's willingness during the Special Committee argument this week to settle for a one-day victory claim followed by a quiet capitulation which did not wholly cancel the impression of French leadership created in French media the first day. (C) The Ministerial Meeting provided several useful tests of the French bargaining position. Couve's fancy footwork tended to obscure the fact that his attack on the Special Committee was half-hearted and his original statement full of prepared positions to which he could retreat. On two other issues the French did not even bother to challenge positions with which they are known to disagree. They agreed to tentative force goals which carry NATO into its twenty-first year, beyond the magic date of 1969 which De Gaulle has mentioned so often. They did not speak up on the mobile force, although they had put into a recent military committee report an explicit objection to a statement that the mobile force was important for the defense of NATO's flanks. And when the French tried to rally the other NATO countries against a German request for NATO backing against Soviet attacks, they gave up when they found even the Norwegians would not join them. (D) We have of course not heard the last from the French Government on the duration and functions of the Special Committee, and we are not even at the beginning of the story of French attempts to “reform” NATO and reduce the American military presence in France—assuming De Gaulle is re-elected Sunday. 4. Vietnam and China. Your stated concern about Vietnam, which was extended far into the future by Sec. McNamara's remarks on China, formalized and dramatized for our allies and the world the attitude at which we have been hinting for the past three months. (A) On Vietnam in the short run, there is grudging acquiescence that the United States has no honorable alternative to its present course, and we get an increasing playback of the notion that U.S. fidelity to its Far Eastern commitments is important to Europeans protected by the U.S. commitment here. (B) But apart from a verbal dividend here and there, such as Spaak's impressive statement on Belgian TV December 14, the sources of physical aid to South Vietnam do not leap to the eye. But continuing emphasis may produce a somewhat large non-military presence from Europe, which is something. (C) Ministers can hardly have failed to get the point that increasing requirements for U.S. effort in Vietnam are bound to have some impact on U.S. deployment of NATO support forces. As practical political leaders they can see that with growing U.S. casualties in Vietnam, American opinion will be increasingly impatient with a detached European attitude toward our commitment in Vietnam while they press us to honor every scruple of our pledge to them. (D) When and if we have to move sizable units out of Europe, it will be important to have made, vigorously and continuously, the point that the only way Europeans can prevent our increasing Far Eastern efforts from degrading NATO is to join that effort themselves. This meeting was an excellent start in that direction. (E) The expressed interest of European Ministers in the conditions for peace has one meaning we should think about. Real military participation by Europeans in the Far East would I believe require a major change in the international framework of the defense of South Vietnam—at a minimum, a system of mutual international commitments that enable other substantial participants in the war to participate in decisions about bombing and peace negotiations as well. (F) When it comes to the longer-run threat of a more powerful Communist China, the assembled Ministers were certainly not stirred into eager acceptance of responsibilities beyond the NATO defense area. But the eloquent and serious expression of U.S. concern has been planted deep in some European political psyches. (G) From conversation around the edges of the meeting this week, I would judge that the most important thing that happened here was to bring home to governments a central fact about the next few years of international relations: that the United States would increasingly judge its bilateral relations with other nations by reference to the degree to which those nations feel responsible for joining us in building a dependable system of peaceful change in the more turbulent parts of the world. Most Europeans have in the first half of this decade started economic aid programs as partial recognition of this responsibility. I suppose it will take the second half of the 1960s to bring them fully into the peacekeeping business, and perhaps longer than that to find the formula for associating them with our determination to teach the Chinese Communists that military militancy doesn't pay. (H) To convert our continental allies from affluent protectorates to active participants in policing world order beyond Europe will be uphill missionary work for some time to come. But I suspect that more than one Foreign Minister will be ruminating on your throw-away comment Thursday morning, that in a world where Chinese Communists have long-range missiles, NATO has to begin worrying about a “Western flank” in the Bering Sea. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Secret; Priority. Repeated to the NATO capitals, Saigon, and USUN. 2 U.S. Delegation records of the 36th NATO Ministerial Meeting, held at Paris December 14–16, 1965, including remarks by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara on December 14 and 15 respectively, memoranda of conversation, position papers, reports on the sessions, NATO documents, and telegrams to and from the delegation, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2574–2583. 3 On November 10, in a telegram to the posts in the NATO capitals, the Department of State transmitted its views on the Ministerial Meeting. Stressing that the United States did not want a confrontation with France on fundamental issues, the telegram emphasized that because of the atmosphere of uncertainty about the future of the Alliance it was necessary to give the meeting a positive air to bolster confidence in NATO. (Telegram 886 to Paris; ibid., Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA)) In an appraisal of the meeting on December 22, the Department of State noted that this aim had been met and two additional purposes fulfilled: 1) progress was made on several important pieces of Alliance business, and 2) Rusk had clearly conveyed the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam as well as the view that Vietnam was important to the Alliance. The Department concluded that the meeting could be described as a successful holding operation for all parties, but with significant procedural movement on some of the Alliance questions. (Circular telegram 1202; ibid.) 4 The Embassy in France sent a more detailed report on the French efforts to limit the Special Committee in telegram 3444 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid.) 119. Memorandum of Conversation 119. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 20, 1965, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Nuclear Sharing PARTICIPANTS The President Chancellor Ludwig Erhard 2 Ambassador Hand Heinz Weber, FRG interpreter Harry Obst, State Department interpreter The President assured the Chancellor that as long as he was in his job and the Chancellor in his, the Chancellor could be assured that there would be a frank and full exchange of views, hopes and expectations. In 1966 Chancellor Erhard would be in on the take-off, the flight and the landing. Chancellor Erhard replied that was wonderful and very clear. The President could rely on him equally and could have fullest confidence in Germany and the German Government. The Chancellor did not think that the outcome of the French elections had injected a new element into the NATO crisis. The friendship between the US and the Federal Republic was the real foundation of NATO. The Chancellor reminded the President that Germany was the first nation to renounce the use of ABC weapons. Germany was looking for a peaceful solution. The FRG did not want national control or national possession of nuclear arms but wanted some multilateral, integrated system. The Chancellor said he understood that whenever there was a development which would bring Germany closer to reunification—which could only be achieved with the aid of Germany's friends and in a peaceful way—at that point Germany would have to make certain concessions regarding borders and other matters. The Chancellor would also be willing to discuss at length any nuclear sharing plan for a reunited Germany. He was looking at the problem without any illusions. The Potsdam Agreement could not stand forever but as long as it was unchanged the FRG wanted to examine closely any steps and talk about anything that would move the country towards reunification. The Chancellor assured the President that neither the German people nor he himself were rigid in their attitude. The President replied that when looking at a situation, he was always trying to put himself into the other fellow's shoes. He believed he knew how the Chancellor felt; he knew of the pride of the German people in their accomplishments, of their hope for peace, and their desire to be good neighbors. He personally was not obsessed by any fears about the German people or their attitudes. But he could also understand how the English, for instance, might feel differently. He had told Mr. Wilson that he was neither a broker nor a dominator but that he believed he could understand how the citizens of Great Britain and Germany feel. He begged the Chancellor to tell him what he needed to take home to his people. He could not understand, however, why with all the power of NATO and the United States defenses, Germany would want to have nuclear submarines of its own. He could not understand why the Germans would want to buy something that the United States had already paid for, when Wilson and Erhard and President Johnson all trusted each other. He was committed to the defense of Western Europe for otherwise he would call US troops home tomorrow. If the Germans wanted to spend a lot of money and the United Kingdom wanted to make contributions, however, he would certainly be willing to listen to their suggestions. How final action would be taken was not really important, but it was acting that counted. He had told Mr. Wilson that he would listen to his suggestions regarding submarines or other campaign promises but had added that he would listen to Chancellor Erhard first before agreeing to anything. He asked the Chancellor to comment, since the Chancellor knew the German people better. The President could not judge from what he reads in the newspapers, but he wanted to assure the Chancellor that his problems were also the problems of the President. The Chancellor replied he thought the present position of NATO was somewhat unstable and that there might be a closer integration of NATO allies in the nuclear field. This had nothing to do with distrust, however, and he did not think anybody was worried. The President holds the last word in nuclear decisions. The Chancellor thought there were too many differences among the fifteen partners at the NATO talks in Paris. Each one wanted to state his own case. If a multilateral solution could be found, with limited participation at the onset, the other partners could then gradually join it. The Chancellor said he believed such a closely-knit multilateral system would provide more of a deterrent vis-á-vis the Soviets. The FRG did not of course want to shoot. Nuclear sharing was, moreover, not only a military question but also had political implications. De Gaulle had once said that a nation protected by others with no say of its own could not regard itself as truly sovereign. The Chancellor was the last one to believe that President De Gaulle's pronouncements were the ultimate wisdom, but he saw some truth in this particular statement. The United States, Great Britain and Germany should get together and find a basis for multilateral arrangements. At a later date the Italians and the Dutch might join. Some form of nuclear cooperation might be found which gives more emphasis on defense matters to the European Community without disrupting the US defense structure. The Chancellor emphasized that Germans realized they were affected by US efforts elsewhere in the world, for instance in Viet-Nam. The FRG realized the heavy burdens the United States is bearing. What happened outside of the NATO territory was also of concern to the FRG. The FRG was considering how it might contribute more in the future. With the rapid rise of technological development in China, the Russians might one day start looking East and there might be an opening or a possibility for peacefully settling the question of German reunification. The Chancellor said that many find non-proliferation attractive, but agreement on non-proliferation presupposes agreement on nuclear sharing. It was impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a nuclear deterrent—this was the position of the German political parties. The FRG was not so much afraid of the ICBMs but was concerned about the MRBMs. There were supposedly about a thousand of them targeted on West Germany and Europe. The question was how Europe could protect itself against them. The Soviets also had mobile rocket units with a range of about 1,200 miles. The Chancellor said a fully integrated system would be the best solution. It would prevent Germany from taking the lead, even in the hypothetical event that some criminal—as had happened once before—would come to rule the Federal Republic. Such an integrated system, especially if it were coupled with a unified Germany, would also be in the Soviet interest. The Chancellor said some nuclear scientists had told him that in the not too distant future nuclear weapons could be produced much more cheaply and technological aspects mastered more easily, so that many smaller countries would be able to afford nuclear weapons and might actually find them cheaper to maintain than conventional forces. With this in mind, a system could be worked out in the future which would allow as many countries to get inside an integrated NATO system as would want to take part. Non-nuclear powers could elect to participate or not. In this way there would be no discrimination. Each country would make its own decision. In summary, such an integrated force was the best guarantee of peace. The President responded that with regard to non-proliferation he did not see how much could be accomplished as long as the Viet-Nam problem was in the way. He would discuss this thoroughly with the Chancellor's government, however, in conjunction with the Chancellor's nuclear sharing ideas. The President said he sometimes thought the best solution would be for the British to get rid of their submarines, give up their own nuclear deterrent and let the United States, which is committed to the defense of Europe, assume all its defense alone. [At this point, the Chancellor gave the President a draft plan on nuclear sharing.] 3 The Chancellor explained the nature of the paper and asked the President to read it and give him his comments during their next meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting the Chancellor said that he would like to pursue further the subjects of nuclear sharing and non-proliferation and that he and the President would stay in touch with each other on these matters. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst and Puhan. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part I of IV.” 2 Chancellor Erhard visited Washington December 19–21 for discussions of topics of mutual concern. 3 Brackets in the source text. A copy of the draft plan was attached to Document 121 but is not printed. 120. Memorandum of Conversation 120. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 20, 1965, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Nuclear Sharing PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary The Under Secretary Ambassador George C. McGhee FRG Foreign Minister Schroeder State Secretary Carstens Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein It was agreed that they should discuss first the question of nuclear sharing, which had been raised in the discussion earlier in the day between the President and the Chancellor; 2 the Secretary emphasized that we should not make another false start in nuclear matters. The proposal put forward by the Chancellor should be discussed thoroughly between the US, UK and FRG governments before a new step was taken. The Secretary asked Schroeder whether or not the German paper which the Chancellor presented to the President constituted an adequate basis for such a discussion. Schroeder did not seem to think that the actual paper itself could constitute such a basis. He urged that careful thought be given to the presentation to be made to the UK, Italians and Dutch on this subject. Two lines of argument must be developed, one for internal use between ourselves, and another for anti-propaganda use against the Soviets. It was first necessary for the US and German governments to reach agreement. The Secretary responded that this raised a problem. When UK Prime Minister Wilson was here last week he had wished to reach some agreement in principle on this question. However, we had advised him that we thought it best to wait until we could talk to the Germans. It is now also hard for us to agree bilaterally with the Germans. Somehow tripartite US, UK and German talks must be precipitated. He thought it possible that such discussions could result in agreement. There would be a distinct advantage in the UK putting its nuclear forces into NATO. The US Government might also be willing to follow with some type of contribution to a collective system. He suggested that the present anti-nuclear sharing propaganda campaign could be blunted if only existing weapons were to be used in the system. Schroeder responded that, since his visit to London, he believed that a cornerstone to any possible multilateral force should be the British ANF. The UK nuclear force, however, should not be put into NATO before a combined force was created, after which the combined force itself could be put into NATO. From the German point of view the US MLF proposal was the best system which had been presented to date, i.e. it was mixed-manned, subject to joint use, etc. Perhaps it is these very qualities which have rendered it unacceptable to others. The Germans understand this. They are thinking now only in terms of the UK Polaris submarines, which will be coming out between now and 1969, the US Polaris, perhaps the V-bombers, perhaps the next generation of Pershings, and even the F–111s. He indicated that he would be willing to show the paper the Chancellor had submitted to the UK. The Secretary raised the question as to whether it would be possible to assign such a force to NATO without the approval of the French. Schroeder replied that the German Foreign Office experts had concluded that this was possible. The Secretary agreed with Schroeder that the UK contribution should be made after, not before, the combination of the force. The UK could give consideration to its own contribution. The Americans and the Germans must not, however, in the meantime, pre-sent any final decision to Wilson. The Secretary pointed out in this connection the present de facto situation affecting German participation in nuclear matters. Germany has, in fact, an equal voice in nuclear decisions within the Alliance just as it does in decisions affecting conventional forces. Although Germany is without a formal veto over US nuclear weapons in Germany, the de facto situation is that we cannot operate in the Federal Republic without their approval. Due to the presence of one quarter million American troops in Germany, it would, moreover, be difficult or impossible for us not to become involved in the event of hostilities on German soil. Under Secretary Ball said that in his view the Germans should communicate in some way directly with British Prime Minister Wilson. Unfortunately it would not be possible to arrange tripartite talks. The Italians, Dutch and others would be quite concerned. Perhaps an exchange of letters between the Heads of Governments, i.e. between the President and Wilson, and between Erhard and Wilson, would be the best way. Schroeder said then that he had at noon today agreed with Secretary McNamara that no new additional nuclear forces are required. Germany relied on the US entirely, under the terms of the Athens guidelines, in the case of both nuclear weapons in Germany and the US nuclear deterrent. Germany wished, however, to share in the “handling” of nuclear weapons. It was not any question of lack of confidence in the US. Bilateral relations between Germany and the US are extremely close. Communications can easily be made back and forth through visits of Ambassadors, without arousing any notice. It is, however, harder to bring a third country into such a collaboration. The Secretary suggested that the Defense Ministers meeting planned for Washington in January might be a good place to advise the Italians and Dutch about plans for a multilateral nuclear system. In the meantime, letters can be written by the President to Wilson and by Erhard to Wilson. Schroeder raised the question of contacts with the Italians. Carstens mentioned that they would be in his office day after tomorrow and that he must know what to say. Knappstein referred to the fact that the Italian Ambassador to the United States was breakfasting with him the same day. What would he tell him? Fanfani would be in Washington Wednesday. What should he be told? Schroeder commented that Fanfani was not the best contact possible within the Italian Government. Others would have a more sympathetic view toward a multilateral nuclear system. Carstens suggested that three of four points might be isolated from the German proposal for disclosure to interested governments: (1) The fact of the force. (2) That it would be subject to common decisions. (3) That no emphasis is being placed on any particular type of weapons for inclusion. In conclusion, the Secretary said that in his talks with the Chancellor at lunch today, 3 the latter had agreed that we must act and not just talk. He advised that the American side would first discuss the matter among themselves, and with the President, before the meeting between the President and the Chancellor and others this evening immediately following the dinner. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by McGhee. A more detailed memorandum of this conversation, drafted by William D. Krimer, is ibid. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 2 See Document 119 . 3 A 3-page memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. 121. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 121. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, December 23, 1965. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have just completed a day and a half of meetings with Chancellor Erhard in which we have had a good opportunity to talk not merely about the problems presently occupying the German leaders, but also the need for the Federal Republic to play a role in world affairs more nearly commensurate with its resources. In the course of our discussion the Chancellor presented the case for Germany's participation in some form of collective nuclear defense—a question on which his Government is placing considerable emphasis. In order to make clear the nature of the German interest he gave me a memorandum, a copy of which, with his permission, I am enclosing. 2 As you will note, the Chancellor has come down squarely on the side of a “hardware solution.” I know of your own reservation about this matter and I have taken them into account in my discussions with the Chancellor. I have explained to him that the point of greatest importance was for the three of us to reach an agreement that could form the basis for the possible participation of other powers. The proposals presented by the Chancellor will give me some problems with Congress, and I am sure they will not be easy for you. But what is essential is a stable and healthy Germany that can play a constructive role on the side of the West. On balance it seems to me that you and I should make a serious effort to respond to the German proposals as the Chancellor has broadly outlined them in his memorandum. The nuclear force he describes would appear to fall within the broad framework of your ANF proposal. Unlike the MLF, it would not contemplate the creation of a new weapons system. From our discussion, it would appear that the Chancellor and his Ministers have been generally thinking in terms of an assignment by the United Kingdom of its Polaris submarines and a matching contribution of Polaris submarines by the United States. These submarines would form the basic elements of the force, which might be added to later. It is our impression that the questions of mixed-manning, veto rights, and a “European clause” can be worked out in a manner consistent both with your requirements and ours. I think it important that we move ahead on this expeditiously since the matter has been so long in limbo. I would hope, therefore, that Ambassador Bruce might have a talk with you when he returns to London about the middle of January. He will bring with him suggestions as to the best way to carry on the necessary discussions among our three Governments in as quiet a manner as possible. Meanwhile, I should greatly appreciate your comments on this development. 3 Let me say again how good it was to see you and how much pleasure and profit I derived from our conversations. We must keep closely in touch. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294. Secret; Nodis. 2 Not printed. 3 On January 5, 1966, Wilson replied thanking the President for this letter and saying that he had also received a message from Erhard who was pleased with his talks in Washington. Wilson agreed that some of the German proposals would raise difficulties for both the United States and the United Kingdom, and that they should receive expeditious treatment. The Prime Minister went on to express his pleasure at the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group of the NATO Special Committee, which would help Erhard pre-sent the German position on nuclear problems. Wilson concluded by telling the President how glad he was to hear that the creation of a new weapons system was no longer contemplated. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262) 122. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State 122. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State 1 Brussels, December 30, 1965, 1650Z. Ecbus 525. Ref: Circusito 293. 2 Joint Mission/USIS. Up until the outcome of NATO Ministerial Meeting and Erhard visit to Washington, there was clear and growing belief that U.S. was losing interest in Europe and Atlantic partnership. Four general lines were stressed: A) Washington, tired of European internal squabbling, was in process of soft-pedaling 20-year policy favoring European integration and reluctant to take further initiatives to revitalize Atlantic partnership idea; B) War in Viet-Nam occupies America's full time and attention and U.S. therefore interested only in peace and quiet in Europe; C) Washington, intent on detente with Soviet Union, prepared to make great concessions at Europe's expense, to come to terms with other superpower; and D) U.S. unwilling to confront French on important issues of NATO or nuclear problems and Europe would do better to accept maximum of De Gaulle's theses on organization of Europe rather than confront De Gaulle without U.S. support. Lack of authoritative reaffirmation of U.S. policy toward Europe and Atlantic partnership in troubled period after June 30 EEC crisis contributed much to foster this uncertainty and doubt. It was reinforced by press judgments such as: Europe Bulletin , November 9, “ … absence of clear indications from Washington” as to its support of Rome Treaty encourages those who “would make the whole of Europe into vast free-trade area excluding agriculture.”, and Le Monde , Washington correspondent Alain Clement on November 21, “At present point of stagnation in American foreign policy, Mr. Johnson's only choice is between a sweeping movement, or sinking into bog of somnambulistic routine … the weakness of his intermittent leadership in this important field is largely responsible for the weakening of American authority abroad.” Mission was also much troubled by extent to which this feeling was expressed privately, but almost without exception, by participants in European Parliament session in Strasbourg November 23–26. This mood so deep seated that returning leader grantees generally express surprise at real extent U.S. interest in and support for Europe. Even among those in Commission who have formally expressed to us their belief that official U.S. silence on EEC crisis was prudent and welcome, qualifier began to creep in that U.S. should, without involving itself in crisis, restate clearly its general policy on Europe before it was too late. In addition to results of French elections, which have had their own impact on European political opinion, U.S. handling of NATO Ministerial demonstrated clearly that U.S. prepared to stay in Europe and develop and improve existing structure without reference to French intransigence. Secondly, reference in Erhard visit communique 3 to support for European unity was most useful, but unfortunately not picked up in European press as far as we aware. Both these developments have had helpful effect, but are not in themselves by any means adequate, in Mission judgment. What is needed is statement in context which will attract widespread attention in Europe. This suggests to us that significant portion of President's State of Union address must effectively treat these Europeans concerns and reaffirm our policy towards and our role in Europe lest this adverse trend of opinion be resumed. 4 Fessenden 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W–US. Limited Official Use. Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Luxembourg for the Embassy and USEC, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rome, and Geneva and passed to USIA. 2 This telegram, December 17, noted the growing appearance in the Western European media of the line that the United States was tired of European squabbling and preoccupied with Vietnam, and asked for a report on significant developments on the subject. (Ibid., POL EUR W) 3 For text of the joint Johnson-Erhard communique, December 18, see Department of State Bulletin, January 10, 1966, pp. 50–51. 4 For text of the State of the Union address, January 12, 1966, in which President Johnson briefly mentioned that the United States would take new steps to help strengthen the unity of Europe and the Atlantic community, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 3–12. 123. Memorandum of Conversation 123. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 30, 1965, 3:45 p.m. SUBJECT Italian Protest Concerning Tripartite Defense Minister Meetings PARTICIPANTS United States The Under Secretary Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE Mr. Jacob Myerson, Special Assistant, U Italy Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Mr. Rinald Petrignani, Counselor, Italian Embassy Ambassador Fenoaltea called on the Under Secretary on December 30 to protest vehemently that according to a Le Monde article of December 15, the Defense Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany had had a second tripartite dinner meeting hosted by the British NATO Permanent Representative, Evelyn Shuckburgh, December 14 during the NATO ministerial meeting. Referring to the first such dinner hosted by Ambassador Cleveland on November 27 during the Select Committee meeting, Fenoaltea said he had accepted the explanation that the first occasion was “more of a dinner than a meeting” and did not constitute any institutionalized procedure. The fact, however, that the second dinner held with the British rotating as hosts seemed to indicate clearly that the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany are establishing a clandestine tripartite steering committee in addition to the three Working Groups of the Select Committee. 2 Ambassador Fenoaltea then gave a charged review of the reasons why any such U.S.-U.K.-German maneuver represented a tragic mistake not only insulting to Italy but capable of producing most serious repercussions there. These included weakening the pro-NATO, stabilizing Italian Center elements, strengthening extreme rightist and leftist groups, creating anti-U.S. feeling while enhancing Gaullist appeal to the Italians, and destroying sense of Italian community of interest with the West Germans. Ambassador Fenoaltea added that the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy form natural pillars upon which integrated Europe would eventually rest and to exclude Italy, was like cutting off a leg from a four-legged table. Emphasizing that tripartite trysts also violate the spirit of a commitment made to Italy in connection with its membership on the Select Committee, Ambassador Fenoaltea declared: “These tripartite dinners must stop!” Under Secretary Ball replied that frankly he was unaware of the second dinner but agreed with Ambassador Fenoaltea that any policy of building on a tripartite base would be a great mistake and contrary to U.S. policy. Replying to Ambassador Fenoaltea's assertion that this problem involved a most important foreign policy issue, the Under Secretary said that he would take the matter up with Secretary McNamara and reassured the Ambassador that it is not our intention to proceed on a tripartite basis. Ambassador Fenoaltea thanked the Under Secretary for his assurances, adding that he, too, might wish to talk to McNamara about the matter on some appropriate occasion. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop. The conversation was held in Ball's office. 2 Regarding the first and second tripartite Defense Ministers meetings, see Document 114 and footnote 3 thereto. 124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 124. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Mr. Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 17, 1966. 1. I should report a conversation between the President and David Bruce last week, 2 because of the light it throws on the President's current thinking about Atlantic nuclear policy. 2. David asked the President for guidance in the light of the exchange with Harold Wilson in which the President said that Bruce would be prepared to pursue the subject on his return to London. 3. The President expressed his own support for a solution in which the British would put in some submarines, and we would put in some submarines, and the Germans would put in some money. He forcefully stated his belief that it is necessary to keep the Germans with us so that they will not get cut loose and become dangerous again. 4. At the same time the President explicitly rejected David's suggestion that he make a firm decision now to do all that might be necessary to bring about British agreement to this course of action. The President is not ready at this time to make a hard issue of this question with the British. He believes that discussion should continue in an effort to see whether agreement can be reached between the British and the Germans without strong U.S. pressure on either one. 5. My own impression is that the President is sympathetic to the German desire for a “share,” but strongly aware of the opposition which such an arrangement might produce among important groups here and abroad. He wants to go ahead with it if agreement can be reached by the normal process of negotiation and discussion, but he is not willing to apply pressure at this stage. 6. The President and David agreed that Bruce should report orally to the Prime Minister that these matters are still under discussion here and would be discussed further after your return from Asia. Bruce will also indicate that he should have more to say after his next visit to Washington, which comes at the end of this month, in connection with the Cabinet-level discussions on the British Defense review. 3 7. I report this to you because there continue to be members of this Government on both sides of this question who instinctively and insistently press their own preferred tactics without making sure they are in line with the President's thinking. We have paid a price for this kind of pulling and hauling before, and we ought to try to avoid it this time. McGeorge Mr. Bundy 4 1 Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217, WH/Mr. Bundy 1965. Secret. A copy was sent to Ball. The source text is attached to a January 17 memorandum from Mr. Bundy to Ball, which stated that since he and the Under Secretary had a longstanding difference on the MLF question, he wanted Ball to have as precise a statement of the President's position as he could manage. 2 Bruce talked with the President at 11:15 a.m. on January 14. His summary of the meeting accords with the one presented here although he adds that Johnson instructed him “to hold the 'PM's feet to the fire' on previous statements of his willingness to negotiate on ANF.” (Ibid., Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 3 On January 20, Bruce explained to Wilson why no message had come from the President on nuclear sharing. As instructed he reminded the Prime Minister of his offer to negotiate on ANF, and Wilson replied that he was ready to do so if the United States wanted to. (Ibid.) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, January 27, 1966, 2:37 p.m. 1813. Ref: Bonn 2185; Ecbus 639. 2 Kennedy Round Agree that Germans should have immediate and authoritative response to their query as to what US position would be on Five negotiating for Community. You are therefore authorized to inform Germans at appropriate high level as follows: US is negotiating in Kennedy Round with Commission acting on behalf of Community. Whether Commission's instructions come from Six member States or from Five acting for Community is internal matter for determination by EEC members involved. If Five decide to give Commission instructions enabling it to resume effective participation in KR, US would be prepared to proceed with negotiations on that basis. It is important that it not become known that that we have responded to Germans just prior to Luxembourg meeting. You should therefore ask Germans to keep fact of our response in strictest confidence. Other addressees may in their discretion state this position if asked. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Thomas O. Enders (EUR/RPE); cleared by STR, EUR/RPE, E, U, and the White House; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to Brussels for the Embassy and Busec and repeated to Rome, The Hague, London, Geneva, Luxembourg, and Paris. 2 Telegram 2185 from Bonn, January 26, reported that although the EEC discussions at Luxembourg had been conducted in a good atmosphere, the French had so far conceded nothing. It added that a German official had asked “unofficially” what the U.S. position would be on negotiating with the five members of the Community who were in agreement. Ecbus 639, January 27, stated that the Germans ought to know the U.S. position on negotiating with the Five before they returned to Luxembourg and recommended that Washington say the United States was negotiating with the EEC whether its instructions came from all its members or only Five acting for it. (Both ibid.) 126. Memorandum of Conversation 126. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 27, 1966, 11:55 a.m. SUBJECT UK Defense Review—NATO Area PARTICIPANTS US State Secretary Rusk Under Secretary Ball Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Assistant Secretary Leddy Deputy Assistant Secretary Kitchen Colonel Lindjord Defense Secretary McNamara General Wheeler Assistant Secretary McNaughton White House Mr. Bator American Embassy, London Ambassador Bruce Mr. George Newman UK Foreign Secretary Stewart Defense Secretary Healey 2 Sir Patrick Dean Field Marshal Sir Richard Hull Sir Henry Hardman Sir Bernard Burrows Sir Solly Zuckerman Admiral Henderson Mr. C.M. MacLehose, FO Mr. P.D. Nairne, MOD Mr. G.G. Arthur, FO Mr. E.J.W. Barnes, FO Mr. F.W. Armstrong, MOD A/Cdre. Maynard, MOD Mr. M.N.F. Stewart Mr. D.V. Bendall Mr. K.T. Nash Mr. Rusk said he had to leave for a brief engagement but suggested that the meeting proceed to a discussion of NATO, and commented that he believed our positions were quite close together in this area. Mr. Ball considered that the problem of forces in NATO was in many ways more political than military in nature. He believed we all feel that some reductions in Europe would be possible militarily, but that the beginning of reductions might unravel commitment by others. This was our principal concern here. Mr. McNamara suggested that we face a combined military and political problem. The FRG military force structure was unsatisfactory and their defense budget was inadequate. He did not believe the US and the UK were justified in going on with their contributions to the defense of Europe unless the FRG changed the direction of its decisions of the last 9 months. The FRG had a paper army, the real “stage army”. We were willing to tolerate myths for a time after the German forces were organized in the 1950's, but not indefinitely. He said the German commitment is 12 divisions; they have only 240,000 men to man these divisions plus all their supporting elements, infrastructure, etc. The US would have 600,000 to 800,000 men to provide a 12-division force. There have been two defense budget cuts in the FRG in the last few months. The weakness of the German army means that there is a physical danger to the flank of the US Seventh Army. Mr. McNamara continued that, a few months before he died, President Kennedy said he would not accept for another year this relationship between the inadequate German force contribution and ours. The situation is worse now than it was then. A solution requires two actions: first, a modification of our force structure, and second, a substantial increase in the FRG financial and force contribution. There is a serious political problem in that the FRG is very unrealistic in their reaction to modifications in allied military forces in Germany. If we withdraw a battalion, it is taken as an indication that we are modifying our political commitment. There must be changes in force structure, as technological advances justify change. This would mean lower foreign exchange costs for us. He noted that such a change would also be beneficial to the FRG because they would have less to offset if some of our forces were withdrawn. Realistically the FRG cannot continue indefinitely to provide a full offset. Mr. McNamara said he did not want to see a military weakening of NATO, but he also did not want to see unnecessary forces and related foreign exchange costs. There is a need for a more realistic FRG appraisal of the military effects of force modifications. He believed the British could withdraw some air force units to be based in the UK and that the US could also, but we would need to get the FRG to support this politically. He noted that the Belgians and others are waiting for an excuse to cut their own military expenditures, and a chain reaction could set in with cuts in Italy, the Netherlands and further cuts in the FRG itself. Such a reaction could be triggered by FRG statements that the US and UK are reneging on their commitments. Mr. McNamara did not believe the political leaders in the FRG had been well advised by their military leaders on our strength and their own weaknesses. He suggested that General Wheeler and Field Marshal Hull should work on their counterparts in the FRG. Chancellor Erhard did not know that he had a paper army and an absolutely inadequate defense budget. Mr. McNamara said we must do part of this task through military channels and part through political channels. He noted many signs that the FRG was moving away from their offset agreement with us. The Germans do not believe they need larger forces, and do not understand the relative strength of our forces and the weaknesses of their own. He urged that the British talk bilaterally with the FRG on this problem and indicated that the US would also do this. Mr. Healey thought an adult education task confronted us but we could not wait for it to take effect. He suggested that political pressure must supplement the education program. He noted that 18 months ago the FRG looked like the best place for the British to make savings in their military expenditures, including foreign exchange. They found, however, that redeploying forces to the UK would involve a large budgetary increase to provide facilities for the forces. Also, the British could not disband forces they might take out of the FRG because they now serve as part of the UK strategic reserve. He noted again that while the Defense Review has been going on, British military tasks have increased. Mr. Healey said to reduce the BAOR would make it appear that the UK was opting for outside Europe rather than into Europe. It was hard for the British to pressure the FRG, but if no foreign exchange savings could be made, the British would be forced to make cuts in their forces in Germany even at the budgetary expense of building facilities in the UK. Mr. McNamara suggested that we get the following message to the FRG: First, tell them through military channels that their political leaders need to be educated concerning the weakness of their forces, a situation we cannot continue to tolerate. Second, tell them that their defense budget must go up, which should result in more procurement, some of which should go to the US and UK as offsets. Mr. Stewart said we both have a strong interest in getting a more realistic FRG view. He made reference to the proposal to the Permanent Council of NATO for a study of comparative balance of payments costs. Mr. McNamara commented that he was not optimistic on this; NATO studies do not usually lead quickly to agreements. He noted that both the British and the US need results in a matter of months, and suggested further bilateral action. Mr. Stewart added that although it was an immediate problem it will also be a continuing problem. Mr. McNamara agreed and said he did not oppose the idea of a NATO study. Mr. Healey said all this arises at a point in time when we expect a De Gaulle initiative or “deinitiative”. He raised a question as to whether we should not do more bilateral contingency planning now regarding actions the French might take. Mr. Ball saw no objections to “invisible discussions,” but stated the US did not want to create the appearance of an Anglo-American cabal in NATO. Mr. Leddy said information on possible French moves has varied; at one point it was thought the French might take some initiative in March, but now it seems more likely that it will be June. He suggested that the French will probably not wish to mix the NATO problem and the Common Market problem. Mr. McNamara pointed out we need to avoid the impression that we are collaborating against the French; in addition, the problem is not really a complicated one. Because of the danger of leaks, and because the problem is not complicated, we are reluctant to undertake bilateral contingency planning. Mr. Ball saw the problem as being somewhat academic unless we also go to the Belgians and the Dutch concerning alternative sites. With the extreme sensitivity of the French and their disposition to use for their own ends any appearance of a US/UK initiative, it appeared unwise to push bilateral planning now, at least until French actions seem clearer. Mr. Stewart said it is also possible that as a consequence of the election results De Gaulle may speed up his timetable. It would be good for other NATO nations and for France to realize that we could carry on if necessary without France. Mr. Ball commented we have had bilateral discussions with several NATO nations, and they all seem agreed to carry on in NATO without France. The problem is one of preparing to adjust to unknown French demands but discussions of specifics such as relocation of lines of communication, headquarters, etc., are almost too sensitive to get into now. Mr. McNamara suggested we leave this problem for another thirty days and consider it again when Mr. Healey returns in February. Mr. Healey agreed but commented he was worried that we were trying to handle a series of interdependent problems independently. The Special Committee, the German defense budget, etc., are all related to French attitudes. He was not confident that this was a fully integrated operation. Mr. Leddy said there are two possibilities: first, we could have quiet bilaterals now on the NATO posture, assuming the French make a move, but without provoking them; second, we could delay detailed contingency planning until we know more about French intentions. Mr. Ball then suggested that the press people might be brought in at this point to decide what should be said to the press. Mr. Healey said it would be helpful if we could say that the US reaction was not one of shock. Mr. Stewart agreed. Mr. McNamara asked whether the British would say that they intended to keep a world role. Mr. Stewart replied this was their intent. (There was a discussion of a draft memorandum for the press that had been prepared by Mr. Leddy.) 3 Mr. Healey observed that the UK was faced with the ghastly problem of trying to present the Defense Review at home as a bold new look but at the same time reconciling this with the requirement not to “pull down the pillars of the temple” overseas. Mr. Stewart suggested that information to the press should start with a UK statement on maintaining their world role followed by a statement that they must consider how this is related to UK resources. Then there should be a statement that some adjustments will be required but that major economies can be achieved without loss of strength. Mr. Healey stressed the need to avoid giving the Australians the impression we are ganging up on them. Mr. Stewart thought the meeting today should be portrayed as the beginning of a process which would proceed further in Canberra. Mr. Healey said he would like to indicate that the US is satisfied with the broad picture presented by the British and that there would be a long period of cooperation in working out details. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Top Secret; Exdis; Noforn. Drafted by Lindjord and Newman and approved in S on March 7 and in U on March 1. The conversation was held in Rusk's conference room. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 5.” 2 Foreign Secretary Stewart and Defense Secretary Healey visited Washington January 26–28 for a review of British defense commitments. 3 Not found. 127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 1 Washington, January 28, 1966, 3:51 p.m. 948. Ref: Ecbus 631. 2 Believe French have consistently seen interrelationship between EEC crisis and NATO. They probably calculate that resolution EEC crisis on their terms, thereby weakening German position in particular, would facilitate moves to restructure alliance system more to their liking. Therefore, they would wish to deal separately with each problem from tactical standpoint and movement on EEC crisis would have to come first. We had anticipated French actions on NATO after French elections, and formation of new government, probably in spring 1966. Earlier French reckoning may have been that EEC “crisis” could be resolved by early spring, thus opening way to moves on NATO. Firmness of Five on EEC crisis and De Gaulle's electoral set back, however, have led to delay. French pressure now to move fast on “EEC crisis” and use of shock tactics like “calendar” at Luxembourg Jan. 18 may be based on judgment that firmness of Five can be shaken and resolution of EEC crisis be obtained on French terms by early spring, which would permit moving on NATO by late spring or early summer. Firmness of Five and concomitant drawing out of EEC crisis for several more months might deter initiation of French action on NATO (Paris 4362) 3 or lead them to reassess their tactics with respect to both EEC and NATO. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by LeRoy F. Percival (EUR/RPE); cleared by McKillop, Hinton, GER, and RPM; and approved by Schaetzel. Also sent to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Rome, Bonn, Luxembourg, and The Hague and repeated to London. 2 Ecbus 631, January 24, discussed problems and positions that would occur at the second round of the EEC meeting at Luxembourg and noted that Couve de Murville seemed to be under increased pressure from De Gaulle to get an early settlement of the crisis, albeit on French terms. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 4362 from Paris, January 26, reported that officials in France and the French press agreed that De Gaulle did not want to deal with the EEC and NATO crises at the same time, and would probably not move on the latter until the Common Market problem was solved. (Ibid.) 4 The EEC meeting at Luxembourg January 28–29 adopted a compromise resolution (the Luxembourg Compromise) which reduced the autonomy of the EEC Commission and ended the French boycott. In a circular telegram to all EEC posts on January 31, the Department of State sent the following statement as guidance to queries about the U.S. position on the resolution of the crisis: “American support for a united Europe working in close partnership with the United States is a well-known policy consistently followed by this Government for over fifteen years. “We are therefore extremely pleased that the European states concerned appear to have successfully surmounted the crisis in the Common Market and we look forward to getting on with renewed vigor with our common task of negotiating trade liberalization in the Kennedy Round.” (Circular telegram 1445; ibid.) 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, February 2, 1966, 7:25 p.m. 1865. Ref: Embtels 2275 and 2266. 2 For Ambassador from the Secretary. Obviously the United States has a fundamental interest in good relations between France and Germany. We ourselves have been drawn into two world wars that had their origins in Franco-German hostility. It would be a great thing for us to be able to say once and for all that war between France and Germany was unthinkable—after all these centuries. That does not mean that we are interested in good Franco-German relations “at any cost.” The crisis in Europe results from French efforts to promote the supremacy of narrow French nationalism over the common interests of the others. Because the Five have recognized that the attempt by Paris to emasculate the EEC was against their own economic and political interests, they have been able to make progress in settling the Common Market crisis. If the Five continue to hold the line there is a good chance that the French will retreat further and progress toward European integration can again resume. We have thus far scrupulously avoided taking sides in this intra-European controversy. At the same time we have continued to reaffirm our convictions that European unity and Atlantic partnership are essential to long-range stability in the West. A decent Franco-German understanding lies at the heart of European unity but centuries of experience have shown that it can be achieved only in the context of a larger European arrangement, and not through a bilateral agreement between two ancient rivals on whom history sits heavily. This is sound policy and we should continue to pursue it. Any suggestion to the Germans that we favor concessions to French nationalist ambitions either in the European or NATO contexts would discourage a process that so far seems to be producing useful results. Certainly, we have nothing to gain and a great deal to lose by encouraging accommodation with a French policy which, if successful, would fragment Europe and divide the Atlantic world. The present French leadership responds to firmness and exploits any whisper of weakness. Its national policies run athwart our own conceptions of how Atlantic power can be best organized and Western interests secured. We should not display any lack of confidence in our own positions or any willingness to compromise them in the interests of a transient amity between France and Germany—and this applies to nuclear and offset arrangements, as well as other elements of policy. For all these reasons we should avoid making any suggestion to Erhard that he should try to improve his relations with President De Gaulle by concession or accommodation to French demands. Certainly there is no harm in suggesting the utility of Franco-German collaboration on such matters as the improvement of relations between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. But I have some misgivings about your talking with Erhard in terms of general and necessarily rather vague principles that could lead to inferences of ambiguity as to our own policies or intentions. It would seem better to direct such a conversation to particular questions directly affecting the relations between our two countries. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ball and approved by him for Rusk. Repeated to London and Paris. 2 Telegram 2266, February 1, suggested that the growing estrangement between France and West Germany would have serious consequences on the stability of Western Europe, but added that it was easier to define the problem than to know what the United States could do about it. McGhee concluded that it would be best “discreetly” to support Bonn, particularly in areas where no vital U.S. interests were involved. Telegram 2275, February 2, referring to telegram 2266, added that Erhard's visit to De Gaulle February 7–8 might further the growing gap. Since he had an appointment with the Chancellor prior to the meeting, McGhee asked for authority to indicate U.S. interest in French-German relations and encourage the Chancellor to achieve a positive atmosphere during his meeting with De Gaulle. (Both ibid.) This view was supported by Bohlen on February 3. (Telegram 4578 from Paris; ibid.) 3 On February 4, Bohlen expressed his agreement with this telegram, saying that good French-German relations should not be purchased at any price, but stated that the United States should have on the record with Erhard a clear expression of where U.S. interests really lay. (Telegram 4620 from Paris; ibid.) 129. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk 129. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Bonn/Bad Godesberg, February 7, 1966. Dear Mr. Secretary: I appreciated receiving the frank comments in the Department's telegram No. 1865, 2 but was frankly a little surprised. You seemed to have read into my telegrams 2266 3 and 2275 4 views which I had not meant to put there. This letter is intended, therefore, to clarify several points on which there appears to have been misunderstanding. I did not intend to suggest in the referenced telegrams that we seek to improve German-French relations “at any cost”, nor that we urge upon Erhard that he try to improve relations with De Gaulle by “concessions or accommodation”. Neither did I wish to recommend that we permit or urge the “compromise” of any policy consideration important to us, including what we really want to come out of the NATO nuclear sharing affair and our offset agreement with Germany. Indeed, one of the arguments in the reference telegram was that, since no accommodation on important outstanding issues between France and Germany is now possible, emphasis should be placed on atmospheric and secondary policy considerations. I share the view that De Gaulle cannot be permanently bought by such concessions, which would merely enhance his appetite. On the other hand, it will be easier for the Germans to stand firm on important issues if they have a good record of meeting the French half-way on the less important ones—where there would be justification, irregardless of whether De Gaulle or someone who sees Europe as we do, was President of France. I agree that the apparent victory achieved by the Five over France at Luxembourg is an isolated illustration of the fact that De Gaulle will change his attitude when he comes up against a stone wall. There can, however, be no permanent solution to the European problem through the Five. Germany cannot take the place of France, nor the Five the place of the Six. The other four cannot live with Germany alone for deep-rooted historical reasons. Until the time actually comes that Europe can be enlarged to include England and others—which does not now appear likely—the Five, and particularly Germany, are thrown back on the necessity of dealing with France. I agree that the ultimate resolution of the relations between Germany and France, as between all of the European countries involved, should lie in a multilateral context. This has been the thrust of American policy in the entire post-war period. French-German relations, however, because of their very weight among the Six, and historic French-German rivalries, assume a significance far beyond that of other European bilateral relations. We cannot fail to recognize, moreover, that, largely as a result of De Gaulle's and Adenauer's efforts, French-German relations have been deliberately lifted out of their multilateral context. To use a physical term, they have become polarized. The attractive polarity which was first thought to exist between the two countries and which, had it progressed at the same pace as the development of unity efforts generally in Europe, might have contributed to European unity, has now become a repellent or reverse polarity. It constitutes a new drag on European unity, and must, I believe, be dealt with. The question I raise is not one of “taking sides”, either as between Germany and France or the Five and France. Everybody knows which side we are on without our saying so. Indeed, we did not hesitate to advise the Five privately about such matters as the importance of the Commission, which was one of their disputes with France. The question I raise is rather one of seeking to remove ourselves, without sacrificing our own vital interests, as one of the sources of aggravation between Germany and France. It is not a question of paying for a transient friendship between Germany and France out of those vital interests, but of avoiding the defeat of our own concepts of a long-range partnership with Europe by actions which, in themselves, could foreclose the possibility of European unity. Naturally, we should not under any circumstances “encourage French nationalistic ambitions or accommodation with French policies which would fragment the Atlantic world”. However, it is not only French ambitions, but the deteriorating French-German relationship itself, which could result in this fragmentation. De Gaulle may be in for a long time, and it is entirely possible that he could, in his present mood, drag French-German relations to a low point of no return. There are many contradictory elements underlying the concept of European unity and the Atlantic partnership. If we are to succeed in both, I believe we must not let one get ahead of another. Compromises must be effected all along the way. An uncompromising Atlanticist attitude which leaps over Europe altogether, such as that van der Beugel proposed at the Bilderberg Meeting in Como last spring and which was turned down unanimously by the Europeans present, could I believe only end in our failure on both counts. Given these considerations, I would, as indicated in my telegram 2343, hope that further consideration could be given to the broader reconsiderations on Franco-German relations made in my 2266. The problem is a serious one requiring, I believe, our closest attention. Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W. Confidential. 2 Document 128 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 128 . 4 Dated February 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W) 130. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 130. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, February 10, 1966, 7:25 p.m. 1515. For Ambassadors from Leddy. Subj: NATO-France Problem. Section II of II. Following is draft paper referred to in Circular 1514: 2 1. Basic premise in U.S. consideration of this problem is that any French action taken against U.S. installations in France or against NATO is in fact an issue between France and rest of NATO and not between France and U.S. 2. U.S. remains committed both to NATO Alliance, as embodied in 1949 Treaty, and specifically to NATO as an organization. 3. U.S. would not be willing to substitute for integrated NATO a system of bilateral security commitments incorporating substance of Article V of North Atlantic Treaty. 4. U.S., while always prepared to examine on their merits French proposals for reform of NATO, wishes develop its contingency planning with other thirteen NATO Allies. In this regard, objectives of U.S. are: a) To carry on common effort with other Allies in NATO regardless of French willingness to participate fully in Alliance activities or French actions which would to varying degrees impair NATO effectiveness. b) To maintain defensive capability of NATO forces, including viability of “Forward Strategy,” and to achieve optimum military posture attainable in light of French action. c) To preserve concept of integration, particularly integrated command and combined planning, in NATO. Modifications in existing relationships, multilateral or formally bilateral, which may be proposed by French should be considered on their merits; however, U.S. will resist proposals which significantly impair peacetime or wartime military capability of Alliance. d) If forced by France to abandon facilities on French soil, to relocate elsewhere those forces and facilities essential to defense of NATO territory. e) To facilitate ultimate return of France to status of full participating member of Alliance. f) To achieve common position through consultation with our Allies before any steps are taken in response to French action against NATO or U.S. forces and facilities in support of NATO. g) To assure other Allies that in addition to defensive measures described here, U.S. is prepared to explore and cooperate in measures which strengthen Alliance. 5. The Allies other than France should not make first move in anticipation of possible French actions against NATO or U.S. facilities in France, but should seek through continuing consultation among themselves common appreciation of French moves looking toward collective action when and if confrontation with France becomes unavoidable. 6. Primary purpose of Allied consultation should be to establish a consensus among fourteen that French threat may be real and that understanding should be reached in principle on necessity for meeting this threat, if it develops, on collective basis. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by Spiers. Sent to London, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, Bonn, The Hague, Rome, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, and Luxembourg. 2 In circular 1514, February 10, Leddy noted that there was a growing need for a draft paper to form the basis of discussion with the allies if De Gaulle laid down conditions for the U.S. military presence in France or made proposals regarding NATO in the next several months. Leddy proposed that Rusk give this paper initially to the Common Market members of NATO and the United Kingdom as a preliminary statement of U.S. thinking. Leddy also reported that this paper was a sanitized text of the NATO-France paper prepared in the fall as a draft NSAM (see Document 106 ) and asked for comments on the draft. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 3 With the exception of Ambassador Bruce, who thought the tactics for consultation seemed sensible, the Ambassadors to whom this paper was transmitted all expressed concern that it was jumping the gun or might entail a greater risk of confrontation with France. (Telegrams 3789 from London and 642 from The Hague, February 11; telegrams 4903 and 4921 from Paris, 2427 from Bonn, 981 from Brussels, and 2012 from Rome, February 14; ibid.) 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 131. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, February 18, 1966, 7:51 p.m. 2063. From Leddy. Subj: EmbTel 2492; rptd Geneva 192. 2 I plan to discuss your proposal with the Secretary or the Under Secretary when they have had an opportunity to study it. Meanwhile, my own feeling is that this matter is best left alone for the time being. Chancellor Erhard made known the clear views of the German Government in the memorandum which he left with the President. The President promised that the United States would discuss the German memorandum with the British and authorized Ambassador Bruce to do so. These discussions have not yet taken place for a number of reasons. Various consultative approaches, as you know, had been very thoroughly studied here, with the help of Embassy Bonn, prior to the Chancellor's visit. To revert at this point to a consultative proposal would in my view be tantamount to rejection of the German memorandum even before the discussions which we promised to hold with the British were begun. This is not to say that some nuclear consultative arrangement may not eventually emerge from the discussions going on in the Special Committee. These discussions have just started and will undoubtedly continue over a period of at least several months. It is entirely possible that they will result in recommendations for an effective system of nuclear consultation, which would be all to the good and which, in my view, has an importance quite independently of the idea of a collective nuclear weapons system. But for the U.S. at this juncture to come forward with a consultative system as a substitute for the German proposals in a probably vain effort to satisfy the Soviets on non-proliferation would, I am afraid, constitute a breach of faith with the Germans. I have not commented on the specifics of your proposal, which raise a number of questions, since, as I say, I feel strongly that the matter should be left alone for time being. In view of Ambassador Bruce's responsibilities for following up the German memorandum with the United Kingdom, I am repeating your cable and this message to him. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by Spiers. Repeated to London for Ambassador Bruce only and Geneva for Foster and Timberlake only. 2 In telegram 2492, February 16, McGhee proposed the creation of a small NATO nuclear consultative committee consisting of the United States, France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, which would be a substitute for a multilateral weapons system and would assist the U.S. President and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, with respect to the planning and use of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed for the defense of Europe. (Ibid.) 132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, February 18, 1966, 7:52 p.m. 4020. NATUS. For Farley from Cleveland. Meeting of Nuclear Planning Working Group went extremely well. 2 Ministers had done their homework, partly on the special flight together Wednesday. Discussion around table among them achieved an intimacy and a relevance quite out of the ordinary for international meetings, especially on so complex a subject. It quickly emerged that there was a consensus on the adequacy of existing strategic nuclear forces, though perhaps there were still some questions about whether more of the total force should be in Europe (the “MRBM issue”). It was therefore decided to try to capture and record this consensus as part of the concluding action document which sets forth the Working Group's future program of work. As you will see from the agreed conclusions (in separate telegram), 3 work program for next two months places considerable responsibility on Deputies in Paris, and implies sizeable analytical tasks both in Washington and in SHAPE. Please arrange early date for me with General Lemnitzer for discussion of where we stand on Special Committee work and discussion of how Working Group III Deputies can best work with SACEUR. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by Spiers. Passed to SACEUR. 2 The Nuclear Planning Working Group of the NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers met in Washington February 18. For text of the press release issued at the conclusion of this first meeting, see Department of State Bulletin , March 7, 1966, p. 368. 3 Circular telegram 1573, February 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) The agreed conclusions accepted that the size of NATO strategic nuclear forces was adequate to deter a large-scale Soviet attack, but there appeared to be no way to prevent unacceptable damage to the West from an all-out nuclear exchange. The Defense Ministers also instructed their Deputies to prepare studies for further consideration on tactical nuclear forces and participation in nuclear planning by non-nuclear Alliance members. 133. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 133. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, undated. As you leave for Moscow, I want to share my thoughts with you on one further problem that you have occasion to discuss with the Russians. This is the problem of relations between the negotiations on non-proliferation and our efforts to get an agreed Atlantic nuclear policy. I think we have to walk a careful line between contending groups which would give one or the other of these related problems an overriding priority. The Soviet Government continues to assert that any form of cooperation with Bonn in the nuclear field is dangerous. While this position may in part reflect a genuine concern about the Germans getting control over nuclear weapons, it is also plain that the Soviets are seeking to use the issue as a means of causing trouble in the NATO Alliance. The main point of Soviet tactical pressure in the coming weeks is likely to be the language of the non-proliferation treaty. They will be pressing for language which would bar what they call “access” to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. Their evident purpose is to foreclose the possibility of nuclear arrangements in NATO which would involve the Germans more intimately in the business of nuclear defense. We are inclined to think that the best way to counter the Soviets on this—and to get on with a constructive treaty—is to focus discussion on the true meaning of proliferation, and, at the same time, to convince Moscow that we will not sign a treaty which would rule out NATO nuclear arrangements which would not, in fact, involve proliferation. In our new draft treaty, we have suggested that proliferation results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national control, or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. In addition, there should be no increase in the number of states and organizations which have control of nuclear weapons. In general, the draft represents an attempt to come to grips with the real problem of proliferation without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear members of the Alliance. In any case, I think it most important that we not let the Soviets maneuver us into a position which would arouse strong and honest resentment in Germany. To let them do this would be no service to the cause of non-proliferation, since it would increase the very dangers that the Soviets constantly stress. The Soviet Government is surely not blind to one further aspect of this matter—namely, that there is on this issue, a pronounced difference of emphasis between your public opinion and ours. They are bound to see advantage in trying to exploit that difference to set us against one another. We must be careful not to fall into that trap. My own view is that we should keep an absolutely even handed view of these twin problems. A sound non-proliferation agreement and a sound Atlantic nuclear policy are in truth mutually consistent and reinforcing. I do not accept the argument that we must finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty. But I think we should equally reject the notion that we can push aside the Alliance problem now, and go along with a treaty which would rule out, or drastically narrow, possibilities for a NATO nuclear arrangement which would not result in proliferation. On non-proliferation, we can meet the legitimate interests of the Soviet Government because they are the same as our own. But we must not let the Soviet use this most important issue to undermine German confidence in our willingness to treat their nuclear problem seriously and constructively. This course naturally tempts some in Moscow, but it is no more in the Soviet interest than in ours. I thought it would be useful for me to give you this indication of my own thinking, because of the great advantage which comes to us both when we stand together. I hope you will have a good trip and I send you once again my best wishes for success in your effort to get Soviet help in reconvening a Geneva Conference. 2 I am doing what I can to keep the public discussion here from complicating your task, but it is an understatement to say that I do not control it completely. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “The following message was transmitted directly to Prime Minister Wilson from President Johnson on February 20, 1966.” A copy of the message was transmitted to London in telegram 4853, February 20, for Bruce's information. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262) 2 On February 26, following his return from Moscow, Prime Minister Wilson reported that the 3-day visit was “hard pounding.” He noted the Soviet obsession with the prospect of Germany obtaining access to nuclear weapons. In this regard, Wilson told the President that he had assured Moscow of his and U.S. opposition to German or European independent nuclear deterrents and that nuclear sharing within NATO or an MLF/ANF force was the best means of meeting legitimate German demands. The Prime Minister concluded that he had probably not convinced the Soviet Union, but had given it something “to chew over.” (Ibid.) 3 Printed from and unsigned copy. 134. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 134. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 2, 1966. ITEMS FOR EVENING READING [Here follow Items 1–4. Item 1 summarized Rusk's briefing of Congressional members on Vietnam. Item 2 reviewed the briefing of the Foreign Relations Commission of the American Legion. Item 3 briefed the President on testimony on Panama before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Item 4 discussed shipping to North Vietnam.] 5. Imminence of French Action Against NATO —Action against NATO outlined last September by De Gaulle to me now seems about to be taken by France. In addition to indications from good contacts in the French Government and an outline of the position by de Leusse, French Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, 2 there has been a leak to the Reuters correspondent in Paris. French actions will presumably include denunciation of bilateral agreements, particularly with respect to American agreements covering our facilities in France; a withdrawal of French military personnel from all NATO establishments with the possibility of the early transfer of SHAPE Headquarters out of France; and, finally, new arrangements with Germany so that French divisions can remain in Germany under auspices other than NATO. We are advising Bohlen tonight that if he is called in by the French Foreign Minister before we can give him further instructions he should say that the French action raises the most serious questions affecting the relations of the two countries and that he must seek immediate instructions from his Government. 3 This will give us time to examine the specific French demands. We will probably wish to bring back Ambassadors Bohlen and Cleveland for consultation. I will call in Ambassador Lucet tomorrow morning, report to him the information we have received about the actions France contemplates, and stress the extreme gravity of these actions and the effect it is bound to have on the relations of the two countries. 4 George W. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. 2 Pierre de Leusse reported this at a NATO Permanent Representatives luncheon on March 2. (Telegram 5412 from Paris, March 2; ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 3 This instruction was sent to Bohlen in telegram 4249 to Paris at 8:28 p.m. (Ibid.) 4 Ball called Lucet in at 11 a.m. on March 3 to deliver this message. A summary of their conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 4255, March 3. (Ibid.) A shorter version was sent to the President in a March 3 Evening Reading Memorandum from the Department of State. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) 135. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 135. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, March 2, 1966, 8:27 p.m. 1644. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. I transmit for your background and guidance the following commentary on US policy as it relates to France, and the distinction that should be made between the foreign policy of President De Gaulle and our continuing friendship, courtesy and respect for France and French officials: The election of President De Gaulle for another seven-year term is a suitable time to review US policy toward France. He is opposed to basic US objectives, such as a strong NATO, a unified Europe and US efforts to maintain freedom in South Viet Nam. These strongly held, personal views of President De Gaulle are unlikely to change. They are largely based on his messianic belief in the glory and importance of France, and thus are not subject to reasoned argument. Attempts to propitiate President De Gaulle are unlikely to succeed and would probably only serve to increase the level of his demands. Policy toward President De Gaulle cannot be considered in isolation. It is and must remain an integral part of our over-all foreign policy. While it would be possible to devise a US policy which could bring about an accommodation with President De Gaulle, this would require abandonment or modification of major US objectives. Such a price is far too high to pay, particularly in view of the recent evidence that President De Gaulle does not presently have majority support in France for many of his policies. The US should make no substantial concessions to the policies of President De Gaulle, but should pursue whatever policies it finds appropriate, irrespective of his position. In arriving at decisions on over-all US policy, little weight should be given to Gaullist views. We should operate on the assumption that President De Gaulle's leadership of France is temporary, and that he will be succeeded by a government more responsive to public opinion, hence more favorable to NATO, to a United Europe and to the United States. However, in arriving at important policy decisions we should give due weight to basic French views and interests as opposed to President De Gaulle's personal predilections. It may be difficult to sort things out in this manner, but we should make the attempt. While continuing firmly on our course in spite of President De Gaulle's views, we should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, to President De Gaulle personally, and to all French government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation. They cannot be effective, will only irritate President De Gaulle and make him more difficult to deal with, and are likely to cause French public opinion to rally to his side against the US. If President De Gaulle insists on the removal of US forces from French soil, we should accede gracefully and should move promptly to consider repositioning our line of communications elsewhere. Attempts to dissuade President De Gaulle or to obtain various concessions would seem to be unwise, although it would be helpful if France would maintain the LOC in a caretaker status. If France should decide to pull out of any active role in NATO, we should not replace our NATO tie with France by any bilateral agreement. Any such agreement would make it much more difficult for France to return to the fold at a later date and might set a pattern that could undermine the whole NATO structure. In the event of a French withdrawal, we should support the continuation of the NATO organization without France. We should maintain our support for the Common Market, taking care that we do not seem to take the lead in any effort to isolate France. If France is to be isolated, it should clearly be by her own doing and not as the result of American efforts. In the event of French withdrawal from NATO, the Common Market or other international bodies, it should be made very clear to French public opinion that there is an empty chair always ready and waiting for France should she decide to return. This could be of major importance in maintaining the friendship and confidence of the French people as opposed to President De Gaulle and his personal followers. We should continually work to preserve this basic friendship despite any annoyance with President De Gaulle or his government. Finally, President De Gaulle's growing fear of Germany, plus his desire to cast France in a leading world position, may induce him to go to unusual lengths to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. This would be particularly likely if France should withdraw from NATO or substantially loosen her ties to the other Common Market countries. We should always bear this possibility in mind. If it comes about, we should react calmly and philosophically, based on circumstances at the time. In summary, we should continue quietly and firmly on our course, ignoring Gaullist objections but always showing respect and friendship towards him and the French people, while awaiting the day when a more friendly and cooperative government comes to power in France. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 FR–US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy; cleared by Ball, Thompson, and Bator; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Brussels for USEC. 136. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 136. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 7, 1966. 5561. Couve opened our conversation by saying President De Gaulle had asked him to deliver letter to President Johnson 2 to me and was sending information copy to Lucet (original was handwritten by De Gaulle). He added this was to make approach more formal (“plus solonnel”). He said purpose of letter was to make clear De Gaulle's intentions and position. He added similar letter would be written to certain others (British, Germans and Italians) during this week. After reading note, I asked if this represented denunciation of agreements. At this juncture Couve simply replied letter is to inform us of French intentions. Couve went on to say that French have told us before that they would inform us of their plans in March 1966 but this did not mean intention to effect plans then but to give sufficient time before 1969, so plans could be made tranquilly (“tranquillement”). He said French position had been agreed on for long time. He said some thought French had changed position because of forthcoming elections and he said Lucet now reported from Washington we thought it was to act before Moscow trip. He concluded this was childish (“enfantillage”). Couve then repeated other leaders would receive similar letter later in week but U.S. as leader of Alliance approached first. He stated next week all fourteen governments would receive diplomatic note which would spell out in more detail French plans. He pointed out U.S. most concerned with NATO while three countries—U.S., Canada and Germany—concerned with bilateral arrangements but he quickly added Canada was minor problem and German agreements were satisfactory as no German commander was involved. U.S. bilateral agreements, and he listed five principal ones, were, however, important. I asked again if this were denunciation or proposal for negotiation. Couve said both and neither but admitted he failed see a priori how we could agree. I pressed again asking if it were French position that all U.S. troops should leave. I noted we had many installations here and this letter really offered nothing, and sounded like a denunciation. Couve said yes if we wished (“oui, si vous voulez”) i.e. it was denunciation. Couve reiterated letter was to inform us of French plans and French had been saying this for years. I pointed out General had always spoken of reforms to NATO and had indicated on February 11 3 he would discuss this problem with me before action. This action I said represented decision without any consultation with us or the allies. I said it would be problem in Franco-American relations and in the whole Western security concept. Under Secretary had made it clear to General De Gaulle in August 1965 4 that we considered North Atlantic Treaty and organization as a whole and on this basis U.S. had made Article V commitment. I added that in order to make clear that our commitment under Article V was serious and in effect 100 percent we had supported the set up of the organization, had stationed a considerable quantity of troops on European soil in order to reassure our allies. I added I wondered if it were possible to accept thesis of an alliance emptied of content and I wondered if this were not even a violation of treaty. This was also a juridical question I noted which was under study in Washington. I thought the consequences of the French action would be immediate and clear, for example, it would be impossible to leave nuclear warheads with French forces in Germany if they were not earmarked for NATO. Couve stated Under Secretary had already made similar points to Lucet. 5 He said France had always said she would not denounce the treaty in 1969 but for her part felt it should continue. He interpreted U.S. position as meaning we must keep not only treaty but all its accretions since 1949. Treaty when ratified by U.S. and French Parliaments in 1949 not at all now what it was then. Alliance was not automatic in principle, Couve noted. French, however, say treaty should continue even though world situation not what it was in 1949. France wanted an agreement on these issues but it seemed impossible to obtain. He said we seemed to think Article V was unilateral commitment but said only case when it arose since 1949 was in Cuban case of 1962, when France had stated her intention to carry out obligations. I pointed out to Couve that Article V had never entered into the Cuban crisis nor had it been mentioned by General De Gaulle when he assured us of his support. He did not pursue this subject. Couve then added this seemed odd procedure where U.S. was already discussing Article V commitments with France's other partners behind her back. If an attack came, he said, it would not be against France but probably against FRG and here we were pushing France towards neutrality in such a case. He wondered if all of our military paraphernalia here was not useless anyway. I repeated we did not want an empty alliance. Couve referred again to formal French undertaking in Article V. Couve said we could interpret French step as we wished. I said French move looked very much like a step in direction of neutrality. I spoke at some length about integration problem in NATO and pointed out absence of integration in peacetime and consequently of any danger France could be dragged into war against her will. I told Couve that I didn't think there was anybody in the U.S. Government and probably in other allied governments who seriously believed basis on which French action was presented, publicly, pointing out that there was no integration in peacetime and consequently no danger of France being dragged into a war through an integrated mechanism that did not exist. Couve asserted that France wanted to work out wartime accords and SHAPE and AFCENT integrated headquarters are located on French soil. I concluded the conversation by telling him that this was a very serious action the French were undertaking and would have a very bad effect in the U.S. I said we did not consider that the hard elements of the Soviet situation had really changed in the last five years, that the Soviets continued their military preparations, were still a dictatorship where policy was made by a small group of men, were keeping Germany and Berlin divided, and reminded him that less than five years ago we had been forced to send troops to Europe to reinforce the Berlin position. Couve interrupted to say that we had not found the French had backed down on Berlin. On leaving I told Couve that I was very saddened by this news, I had been one of the individuals involved in the creation of NATO and I was particularly aware of the amount of effort and devotion which had gone into the creation of the Atlantic defense community which France was now leaving. It was agreed to say to the press only that we had met and Couve had given me a letter from De Gaulle to President Johnson. There is to be no discussion of contents. Incidentally, Couve started the meeting by denying vigorously that the Foreign Office had leaked it to Le Monde, which leaves only the Elysee as a possible source. 6 Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. The source text has no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:11 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Document 137 . 3 On February 11 at the State dinner for the diplomatic corps, Bohlen had spoken briefly to De Gaulle who stated that France desired to maintain the Alliance but change its organizational structure. (Telegram 4853 from Paris, February 11; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 See Document 101 . 5 See footnote 4, Document 134 . 6 In telegram 5562, March 7, Bohlen commented that De Gaulle's letter was a clear denunciation of all agreements with France concerning French participation in collective military defense arrangements and represented the “harder line” under discussion within the French Government. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 137. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Johnson 137. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Johnson 1 Paris, March 7, 1966. Dear Mr. President: In three years our Atlantic Alliance will complete its first term. I am anxious to tell you that France appreciates the extent to which the solidarity of defense thus established between 15 free peoples of the West contributes to assuring their security and, especially what essential role the United States of America plays in this respect. Accordingly, France intends from now on to remain party to the Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. This means that except in the event of developments which might occur in the course of the next three years to change the fundamental factors of East-West relations, she will be in 1969 and thereafter determined even as today to fight at the side of her allies in case one of them will be the object of unprovoked aggression. However, France considers the changes which have taken place or in process of occurring since 1949 in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, as well as evolution of her own situation and her own forces no longer justify insofar as that concerns her the arrangements of a military nature adopted after the conclusion of the alliance, whether in common under the form of multilateral conventions or whether by special agreement between the French Government and the American Government. It is for this reason that France proposes to recover the entire exercise of her sovereignty over her territory, presently impaired by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by constant utilization which is made of her air space, to terminate her participation in “integrated” commands and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of NATO. It goes without saying that for the application of these decisions she is ready to arrange with the governments and in particular with that of the United States, practical measures which concern them. In addition, she is disposed to have understandings with them as to military facilities to be mutually accorded in the case of a conflict in which she would be engaged at their sides and as to conditions of cooperation of her forces and theirs in the event of common action, especially in Germany. On all these points, Dear Mr. President, my Government will therefore be in touch with yours. But in order to respond to the spirit of friendly candor which must inspire the relations between our two countries and, permit me to add between you and me, I have been desirous firstly to indicate personally to you for what reasons, for what purpose and within what limits France from her viewpoint believes the form of our alliance should be modified without altering its basis. I beg you to accept, Dear Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration and the expression of my most cordial sentiments. 2 C. de Gaulle 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 5559 from Paris, March 7, received at 2:45 p.m. and passed to the White House at 2:59 p.m. (Ibid.) This letter is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 317–318. 2 On the evening of March 7, Ball delivered to Lucet the following brief response from the President: “I have read with care your letter of March 7, 1966. “I am immediately bringing your views to the attention of our other allies. Since the course you propose to take so seriously affects the security and well being of not only the French and American people but all the people of the NATO Alliance, I am asking for their comments. “I would be less than frank if I did not inform you that your action raises grave questions regarding the whole relationship between the responsibilities and benefits of the Alliance.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 318) Later that evening, President Johnson wrote to Prime Ministers Wilson and Moro and Chancellor Erhard enclosing copies of De Gaulle's letter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 138. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 138. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 7, 1966, 10:25 p.m. SUBJECT Your Further Response to deGaulle A further response to deGaulle will raise one central question on which your advisers may disagree. The key to deGaulle's letter is the distinction he draws between (1) his obligation under the treaty to go to war in case of an unprovoked attack on an ally and (2) the organizational and command arrangements which are not strictly a part of the treaty but have grown up since 1949. He says he will support (1): the treaty obligations, but is against (2): the peacetime organizational arrangements. Everyone is agreed that we must tell deGaulle that we and our other allies are determined to preserve an integrated NATO structure with or without France. The question is whether we should go further and tell him that if he won't play his part in the organization, France will no longer enjoy the protection of the treaty. This would flatly deny his basic distinction between the organization and the treaty. On its face, this is an appealing line: —it satisfies one's sense of elementary justice: why should any nation profit from the treaty without sharing in the work? —it might convince sensible Frenchmen that the General has gone too far, and is risking French security; —it would provide a strong defense against critics at home who think it is high time we stood up to deGaulle. But there is another side to the coin. It is a fact of geography that a U.S. threat to deprive France of our protection is at best barely credible and at worst, just plain silly. It is like threatening to abandon Kentucky in the face of a land attack by Canada. It is hard to do unless one is prepared to throw in Ohio. If we are going to defend the Germans against the Russians, we cannot help but defend France too. The alternative is not to appease deGaulle. He is clearly not appeasable. And there is no question that we must reaffirm our continuing commitment to an integrated NATO, and to do what is necessary to make good on that commitment—with an empty chair always waiting. But we could by-pass, for the time being, the question of the security guarantee under the treaty, neither reaffirming it nor threatening to withdraw it . My guess would be that this second approach is more likely to gain us the solid allied support we need. To the other Europeans, relations with France are a sensitive political issue. In a confrontation, we will be in trouble unless it is clear, not only that the provocation comes from Paris, but that the U.S. is not over-reacting. There is no question that a cool approach will draw some fire at home. We will be accused of letting the French get away with murder, and still promising to protect them. But even in terms of domestic politics, I think it as likely as not that we will be safer than if we try to drum France out of the treaty on terms that are legally questionable and militarily meaningless. This would make us vulnerable to the more serious charge that our inflexibility helped to destroy NATO. Perhaps, in the end, deGaulle will behave so outrageously as to force us to take a hard line even on the treaty. But for the time being, there is a strong case for limiting our response to a positive reaffirmation of our commitment to the organization, and not escalating the argument to the question of treaty commitment. (Even under this option, we will be able to take some very tough steps. For instance, I am inclined to think that we should withdraw our nuclear support from the two French divisions in Germany as soon as deGaulle actually withdraws these divisions from NATO command.) Before making up your mind, you should hear both sides of the argument in much greater detail. I am afraid that State's entirely natural irritation with deGaulle predisposes them to take a very hard line. If you wish to have the full range of choices spelled out, it will take an instruction from here . You might wish to speak to the Secretary of State yourself. Alternatively, Komer and I can let State know that you want to be given a wide range of choices, especially on the question of the security guarantee under the treaty. FMB I have called Rusk; you follow up with Ball and Leddy 2 Komer/Bator should instruct State. Take no action Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Box 177, France-NATO Dispute, Vol. I. Secret. 2 There is no indication on the source text which of these options President Johnson chose. 139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 139. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, March 8, 1966, 6:40 p.m. 1646. Deliver Amb. Cleveland by 8 am, March 9. NATUS. Ref: Paris 5541 [ 5561 ]. 2 1. Formal receipt De Gaulle letter to President 3 requires US take cognizance in NAC of French position on NATO and on US installations in France. De Gaulle letter itself is not bill of particulars, but general declaration of policy and intentions putting US on notice of French terms of reference for discussions to come rather than initiating those discussions. Immediate focus must therefore be on tone and content President's reply rather than premature implementation specific contingency plans. 2. In dealing with situation, US objectives are: a. Communicate seriousness with which US views potentialities of situation. b. Leave no doubt as to our view that entire Alliance involved. c. Make clear that Alliance business can proceed regardless of France. d. Retain maximum flexibility to deal with specifics of situation as they may later develop. 3. Department believes that NAC meeting March 9 would make sham of Council if no cognizance were taken of De Gaulle letter. At same time, Dept unwilling commit self specifically to NAC as principal forum for future Alliance consultation on all aspects situation as it emerges. (De Gaulle letter strongly suggests that France will remain at Council table.) Time, moreover, prevents obtaining assurance that other Allies will be ready at March 9 NAC to espouse any sharply defined US position. 4. In order meet objectives of Para 2 above, you are therefore instructed consult with Roberts prior March 9 NAC, handing him text of De Gaulle-JOHNSON letter and seeking his support for following line at meeting: a. Roberts would open meeting by announcing he is informed that certain members of Alliance have received communications from Government of France of serious concern to entire Alliance. Roberts then would call upon you to speak. You should make following statement: “My Government has instructed me to inform the Council that it has received a communication from a government signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, the Government of France. This communication raises serious questions for the Alliance. My govt will wish to consult its Allies re the general views of the French Govt as expressed in the communication and re the specific concerns of the French Govt when they are made known, since the questions raised are of vital interest to all of them.” b. Roberts would then call upon any other PermReps who are prepared to make statements. When such statements have been made, Roberts would propose that Council move on to formal agenda, including Vietnam briefing, thus preserving the appearance of business as usual. 4 5. FYI. We do not wish to take a decision to make NAC the immediate focus of further consultations on the developing French/NATO problem, particularly since France itself is a participant in the NAC. At the present point, this subject is a matter of communications and discussions at highest levels among capitals and for time being we wish to retain option of proceeding in this manner. End FYI. 6. With respect to meeting, we understand De Staercke has called for Friday to discuss UK draft declaration, 5 you should be aware of our strong desire to let the British take the lead on this question. As you know, we are prepared to accept the declaration as it stands. 7. Foregoing instructions take account of Cleveland telcons with Secretary and Under Secretary. 6 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Richard W. Boehm (EUR/RPM) on March 7; cleared by Spiers, Leddy, and Thompson; and approved by Ball. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Document 136 . 3 Document 137 . 4 At the NAC meeting on March 9, Cleveland made the statement along the suggested lines at the invitation of acting Secretary General Roberts. All of the other delegations agreed that the French proposal was a matter of common concern which required consultations. (Telegram 5641 from Paris, March 9; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 5 On March 7, the British Ambassador discussed the continuing validity of NATO with Rusk and gave him a draft declaration by the 14 NATO governments confirming this view. (Circular telegrams 1691 and 1692, March 8; ibid.) The draft declaration was discussed at meetings of the 14 Permanent Representatives on March 11, 12, and 14, and finally approved on March 18. For its text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 321. 6 A memorandum of Cleveland's telephone conversation with Rusk at 12:50 p.m. Washington time on March 8 is in Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192. No record of Ball's conversation with Cleveland has been found. 140. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 140. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, March 10, 1966, 6:57 p.m. 1731. Paris NATUS. Subj: NATO Crisis,EEC and Kennedy Round. 1. Following is Department's preliminary thinking for your guidance and comment. 2. De Gaulle and possibly one or more of Five at some point may attempt to use the European Communities as a hostage in evolving NATO crisis and, realistically, positions taken in one context will to some extent be related to other. We assume, however, that the Five share our hope that the NATO crisis can be kept separate from the EEC insofar as possible. This in no way implies that US not prepared meet NATO crisis squarely in security context, but hopefully both internal and external work programs of the European Economic Community, specifically including the Kennedy Round, will be carried forward as rapidly as possible. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Hinton and Schaetzel and cleared by Ball, Thompson, McKillop, Finn, Vest, E, and STR. Sent to Bonn, Brussels (also for USEC), The Hague, London, Luxembourg (also for USEC), Paris, Rome, and Geneva. 141. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 141. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 11, 1966, 1915Z. 5750. Alphand received me this afternoon at 5:30. De la Grandville was present. He handed me the memorandum, 2 which will be following in succeeding telegrams, both French version and English rough translation. 3 After I had read the memorandum, I very briefly repeated to Alphand what I said to Couve de Murville 4 in regard to (1) absence of consultation for so serious a step; General De Gaulle's rather general vague remarks could not be regarded in this light, particularly since not forthcoming in reply to questions. (2) That we did not agree that the situation had changed in such a basic manner as the French Government professed; Russia basically remained the same in its political set up, ideologically, and in continuous military preparation; Germany and Berlin remained divided, meaning that Berlin at anytime could set off another crisis. (3) It was difficult for us to believe the basis on which this action was taken since there was in effect no integration of command in NATO; genuine integration of European armies had been refused by French in 1954, and since there was no integration there could be no subordination, and France had in effect without any attempted interference from allies pursued her own military policy for a number of years. There really was no danger of France or any other European country being drawn into a war in Asia through the operation of NATO mechanism. Alphand made briefly, and in a semi-halfhearted manner, standard replies. On the first point he said we had known for some time that France was opposed to integration, that this time had been selected in order to give plenty of time before 1969 to work out the practicalities of the decision. He said we might have different views in regard to Russia, but no one could deny that the general world situation had changed since 1950, to which I replied that the growth of Soviet nuclear power, which was more in their favor than in ours, would seem to imply more cooperation rather than less. I then asked Alphand whether or not a reply was expected to this memorandum, who was to take the initiative, where and in what manner the discussions would be conducted. He said he could not tell me that nor could he give me any indication as to the timing, but obviously it will not be in the immediate future. In fact Alphand's replies were so vague on this point that I had the very strong impression that the French have really not thought through any of these questions. In conclusion I mentioned to Alphand that I had noticed in the French press there were continuing statements that the U.S. had rejected French proposals to discuss Franco/American pacts on a bilateral basis. I pointed out that this was not true, and referred Alphand to my conversation with him on February 25 (Embtel 5243); 5 and that De Gaulle's letter 6 did not propose any specific negotiation. Alphand was quick to “assure” me that this did not come from the Quai d'Orsay but felt that impression had been received from manner in which the American press treated the President's reply. 7 I said that, as he knew, the President's reply did not make any reference to form of negotiation one way or the other. Comment: I find the memorandum very little more explicit than the letter although it does state that Headquarters SHAPE and AFCENT when French withdraw will have to leave France, and it is plain to us, helped by other background knowledge, that there is nothing to discuss in regard to bilaterals except the modalities of departure and turnover. I think the whole handling of the subject, including the letter, and particularly the memorandum, shows with what haste the entire operation was conducted from the French side. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and passed to the White House. 2 Document 142 . 3 The French text and the Embassy translation were transmitted in telegrams 5749 and 5757 from Paris, March 11, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 4 See Document 136 . 5 Dated February 25. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 6 Document 137 . 7 See footnote 2, Document 137 . 142. Aide-Mémoire From the French Government to the U.S. Government 142. Aide-Mémoire From the French Government to the U.S. Government 1 Paris, March 11, 1966. AIDE-MÉMOIRE For some years the Government of France has noted on numerous occasions, publicly as well as in conversations with allied governments, that it considered that the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty no longer responded, as far as it is concerned, to the conditions which prevail in the world at the present time and which are fundamentally different from those of 1949 and the following years. Indeed, the threats weighing on the Western world, in particular in Europe, and which had motivated the conclusion of the treaty have changed in nature. They no longer present the immediate and menacing character that they presented formerly. Further, the countries of Europe have reestablished their economy and consequently have regained resources. In particular, France is equipped with an atomic armament the very nature of which excludes that it be integrated. In the third place, the nuclear equilibrium between the Soviet Union and the United States being substituted for the monopoly possessed by the latter, has transformed the general conditions of the defense of the West. Finally, it is a fact that Europe is no longer the center of international crisis. This (center) has moved elsewhere, especially to Asia, where the ensemble of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance is obviously not implicated. This evolution does not in any manner lead the French Government to call into question the treaty signed at Washington April 4, 1949. In other words and except for events which, during the coming years, might come to modify in a fundamental way relations between the East and the West, it does not intend to avail itself in 1969 of the provisions of Article 13 of the treaty, and considers that the alliance must continue as long as it appears necessary. This being affirmed without equivocation, the problem of the organization is posed, that is of all the agreements, arrangements and decisions taken after the signature of the treaty, whether multilateral or bilateral in form. The French Government considers that this organization no longer responds to that which appears to it to be indispensable. Doubtless one could conceive that a negotiation would be undertaken to modify by common agreement the arrangements in force. The French Government would have been happy to propose it if it had had reason to think that it (the negotiation) could lead to the result which it (the French Government) has in view. Everything unhappily shows that such an undertaking would lead to failure, the partners of France seeming to be, or declaring themselves, all in favor of the maintenance of the status quo, if not of the reinforcement of everything which, from the French point of view, appears henceforth unacceptable. Consequently, France is led to draw the consequences of the situation, that is, to take for itself the measures which seem to it to be indispensable and which are in no way incompatible with its participation in the alliance nor with its participation, if such should be the case, in military operations at the sides of its allies. Already, in the past, the French Government has taken some measures of this nature for its naval forces attached to NATO both in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic. It is now a question of its land and air forces stationed in Germany and which are assigned to the allied command in Europe. France proposes to put an end to such assignment. This decision will lead to its simultaneous withdrawal from the two integrated commands its forces are attached to, and in which it participates in the framework of NATO, that is, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the Central European Command, and, for the same reason, the transfer, outside of French territory, of the seats of these two headquarters. The application of the ensemble of these measures obviously raises numerous problems, which the Government of France is ready as of now to discuss with its allies and in particular with the United States of America. There will be reason to examine the liaison which would be established between the French command and NATO command, as well as to determine the conditions in which the French forces, particularly in Germany, would participate in time of war, if Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington was called into play, in military actions in common, both with respect to the command as well as with respect to the operations themselves. This supposes in particular that the French land and air forces presently stationed in Germany will be maintained there under the conventions of 23 October 1954, which the Government of France is for its part disposed to do. Further, there will be reason to consider the problems which might be posed for France with respect to the Military Committee and the Standing Group, including the liaison to be established, if necessary, between these organisms and the French command. Such are, in broad outline, the actions the Government of France envisages, as far as it is concerned, in order to adapt the modalities of its participation in the Atlantic Alliance to the new conditions. It is ready to engage in discussions on the practical conditions for the application of these measures and hopes that adequate arrangements can be brought about by common agreement among all of the allies. The multilateral problems are not however the only ones posed for the United States and France. The two countries have indeed concluded in the past a series of bilateral accords still in force, which are the following: Depots of Déols-La Martineries The placing at the disposition of American forces of certain airfields and installations in France Line of Communications American Headquarters at St. Germain Pipeline. The Government of France considers that these accords in their entirety no longer respond to present conditions, which lead it to recover on French territory the complete exercise of its sovereignty, in other words to no longer accept that foreign units, installations or bases in France are under the command in any manner of authorities other than French. It is ready to study and, possibly, to arrange with the Government of the United States the practical consequences which flow therefrom. The Government of France is prepared, further, to engage in a discussion on the military facilities which could be placed at the disposition of the Government of the United States on French territory in the event of a conflict in which one or the other countries would participate by virtue of the Atlantic Alliance. These facilities could be made the object of an agreement to be concluded between the two governments. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, NATO Documents. No classification marking. For a similar translation, which also indicates how this aide-memoire differs from the ones sent to the other NATO governments, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 318–321. 2 On March 25, the United States transmitted a 3-page response stating that it would await clarification of the French position on these agreements. For its text, see ibid., p. 324. On March 29, the French Government transmitted memoranda to the United States and the other 13 NATO allies detailing the steps France intended to take to remove itself from the NATO military structure. For texts of these memoranda, see ibid., pp. 324–326. 143. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 143. Memorandum From the President's Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 16, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Do we want a full-blown war with De Gaulle? Bator will be sending a brief for the session tomorrow, but this matter is of sufficient gravity that I want to weigh in too. In presenting you with a series of last-minute tactical decisions (a letter here, a statement there), we may be showing you only the trees and not the forest, with risk that we end up backing you into a war you may not want. For example, a cardinal issue in the draft thrust before you this morning 2 is not just its tone but what certain key phrases in it imply. We all have the natural impulse to get back at De Gaulle, and to explain to the French people why he is wrong. But the draft goes much further when it says that we not only intend to continue our past NATO policies “but to urge extension of these principles of common and joint preparation wherever they can be usefully applied” (p. 5), and that you dedicate us not just to preservation of NATO but “to the creative task of strengthening it …” (p. 6). This is not just rhetoric. As Dean Acheson told you, his group feels that we must seek to strengthen NATO by something new , so that we don't end up with “the same old NATO slightly weaker” (without France). 3 In short, the best way to stop De Gaulle is to beef up the alliance—make it more integrated rather than less. This is great stuff if we can do it. But will it work? Before we announce that we're going to the precise opposite direction from De Gaulle, let's first look at “how.” To my knowledge, the only “new” idea we have for strengthening the alliance is the well-known MLF (or the UK variant—ANF). Query—is this proposed new strengthening of NATO simply an opening for a new push on MLF? ANF/MLF has many advantages—you've heard the arguments. Moreover, the NATO country most spooked by Gaullists wrecking will be West Germany. What better way to reassure Bonn than to give it a finger on the nuclear trigger, or at least a greater sense of nuclear participation? Bonn itself is already talking up this line. But there may also be real disadvantages which need full airing before we jump. That France's withdrawal from the NATO structure inevitably enhances Germany's role will worry many allies—Scandinavians, Italians, Benelux, UK. They may not be so eager to see a US/UK/German combination, without the continental counterbalance of the French. Second, what we all fear now is new French initiatives toward the USSR . There are few issues in which Paris and Moscow might see a greater common interest—or one more popular in Europe—than in opposing a nuclear role for Bonn. So taking this road toward strengthening NATO may help bring about precisely what we want to avoid. Third, and not least, does a political crisis in Europe help or hurt us at home? Exerting firm leadership of the Western Alliance is one thing, but what if all it leads to is a great ruckus with little concrete result? We already have one war in Asia, and I can see the Europe-firsters clamoring that Lyndon Johnson is leading us into trouble on both flanks. Don't we also risk Republican charges that we're losing two wars instead of one? Finally, can we win a war with De Gaulle just now over more integration vs. less? I doubt it. He's just been elected for seven more years and nobody believes we can get him to reverse course—whether what he's doing is popular in France or not. Even to try may risk splitting NATO further by giving play to all the latent centrifugal tendencies in Portugal, Norway, Denmark, Turkey and Greece. Can we afford to have yet others play the same game as De Gaulle? Indeed, the lessons of recent history all suggest that we stop, look, and listen before flinging down the gauntlet to De Gaulle. He may well be right in thinking he has us in a spot where we can't react vigorously—let's not underestimate him. Isn't he dead right in appreciating that the threat of Soviet aggression is less and that he can thus get away with more? He also has a receptive European audience for his mischievous contention that we might drag NATO into a larger war emerging from Vietnam. Nor should the basic merit of our own grand design for European integration blind us to the likelihood that moving it further forward may be an uphill fight till Britain decides to enter Europe or De Gaulle passes from the scene. So before answering State's clarion call to propaganda battle, you deserve to be convinced that it's one we can reasonably expect to win. If not, it may be wiser to outwait De Gaulle—while limiting the damage he can do. This alternative calls for a firm defensive stance whereby the rest of NATO proceeds with business as usual, while reserving an “empty chair” till France outlives De Gaulle. To thus prevent NATO from slipping backward may be the best that we can hope for just now. The real problem, as always, is not France but Germany—and the more we agitate the alliance the more we may bring this potentially divisive issue to the fore. This memo deliberately accentuates the negative, and my worries may be overdrawn. But our staff job is to give you both sides of any story—and to show the options if others don't. In any case I see no reason for precipitate action on a letter or a statement; this matter could well stand mulling over for a week or so. Counsels of caution need not be those of cowardice. 4 R. W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert Komer, Box 2, Memos to LBJ. Secret. 2 No record of the meeting with the President at 11:05 a.m. on March 16 has been found. An agenda for it notes that there would be a report on the diplomatic situation and a discussion of the following five issues: 1) relocation of military facilities, 2) French forces in Germany, 3) U.S. nuclear support for French forces in Germany, 4) France and the treaty, and 5) the general U.S. attitude toward France. (Ibid.) Although the draft under reference has not been found, it was probably a draft of Document 146 . 3 Dean Acheson headed a U.S. interdepartmental group that reported to Ball and was tasked with drafting a reply to De Gaulle's letter. The particular conversation under reference here has not been further identified. 4 At 9:10 p.m. on March 16, Bator wrote a memorandum to the President for his meeting the following day on NATO and France. After reviewing the outstanding issues, he concluded that Komer's memorandum was excellent. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Box 177, France-NATO Dispute, Vol. I) The President, Rusk, Ball, Acheson, Bohlen, Leddy, Bator, Komer, Cyrus Vance, Clark Clifford, and Jack Valenti met at 5:40 p.m. on March 17. The only record of this meeting is Valenti's handwritten notes, which indicate that agreement was reached on the text of the reply, that some discussion of the best time of the release of the 14-nation declaration occurred, that the President was concerned about reaction in Congress, and finally that initial thought was given to the five points outlined in the agenda for the previous day's meeting. (Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Jack Valenti Notes) 144. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 144. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, March 17, 1966, 12:22 p.m. 1790. Ref: Cirtel 1731. 2 There is some evidence that the French may attempt to revive in one form or another Fouchet-like proposals for political consultation among Six. The French could suggest this as a means of dealing on European basis with the current NATO crisis. De Gaulle and Erhard, prior to the recent French moves against NATO, touched on this matter which was followed by general but favorable statements by the Chancellor regarding new political consultation initiatives among the Six. In the current situation any step in this direction seems to us contrary to the real interests of the Five and of the United States. Our prime objective is to maintain the unity of the fourteen in the face of the French assault and to try to limit spillover to the European Communities as indicated reftel. Separate discussions among the Six regarding political matters and particularly NATO could be used by the French as evidence of disunity among the fourteen and would encourage centrifugal forces already at work on several of the other members of NATO. It might also hasten moment of EEC involvement with adverse implications from US point of view. We recognize that in the first instance this is a matter for the Six to decide among themselves. However, in answer to inquiries or in discussions with officials where your relations are such that our points can be made discreetly the foregoing should be used as an expression of US views on this issue. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel on March 15; cleared by Leddy, Thompson, and RPE; and approved by Ball. Sent to Bonn, Brussels (also for USEC), Geneva, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris (also for USRO), and Rome. 2 Document 140 . 145. Memorandum of Conversation 145. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 17, 1966, 3 p.m. SUBJECT NATO-France PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary The Under Secretary John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR George S. Vest, Deputy Director, EUR/RPM UK Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador, Embassy of Great Britain David Bendall, Counselor, Embassy of Great Britain Sir Patrick said that Dean Acheson, at lunch on March 16, had mentioned his ideas about what should be done about the NATO-France situation, emphasizing that these were purely personal. 2 The Ambassador said he knew that Mr. Acheson was now advising the Department and would be interested in knowing to what extent the U.S. views parallel Mr. Acheson's. By way of prelude, he emphasized that the UK was still anxious to get the work of a 14-nation planning group under way in Paris, especially now that the French seem to be acquiescent about letting the fourteen, so long as they were not formally organized, use International Staff services. The Secretary said that Mr. Acheson was working closely with the Department and he was familiar with his ideas. He, himself, thought that the NAC could usefully carry on some work. Particularly the fourteen might: (a) do contingency thinking about French agreements with NATO itself; (b) consider if both SHAPE and NATO Headquarters should move and where, and, if so; (c) consider how to reduce the present NATO staff to make it more efficient (Sir Patrick interjected that the UK would certainly agree with that); and, (d) consult together on replies to the French aide-memoire. 3 Mr. Ball explained that the U.S. is thinking along the lines of a very simple reply which would acknowledge the receipt of the aide-memoire, take the position that we do not interpret it as representing decisive action, and note that we are awaiting further clarification from France. Mr. Leddy thought we should seek to coordinate texts among the fourteen but not spend time trying to work out identical texts. The Secretary said that the work which the NAC might do at this stage was less important than the hard studies which the major powers should undertake at once. The U.S., UK, Germany and Italy should study the major issues, should exchange views with one another, and then they would be in a position to provide leadership to the remaining members of the fourteen. He thought Mr. Acheson's comment was very much to the point that we are in fact losing France from the Alliance and must, therefore, search for ways to make the Alliance stronger. Among the areas of opportunity which open up, the first, he emphasized, is nuclear sharing. If De Gaulle comes forward with a nuclear guarantee for the European Allies, we should be in a position to move promptly to a nuclear sharing agreement to demonstrate a stronger Alliance. Some of the other areas which we need to study closely are: (a) Foreign exchange. We need to look at the offset problem against the general proposition that defense arrangements should not create unfair burdens. (b) Location of NATO Headquarters. (c) Attitude toward German reunification. In that connection, he called attention to the March 17 report from Paris that Zorin 4 had said the Soviets are interested in a non-aggression treaty with the French and a reciprocal relaxation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could follow. This raised a question, he said, whether it was likely that Zorin would make such far-reaching remarks if there had been no prior contacts between France and the Soviets. (d) Status of the Standing Group and Military Committee. While looking at these, perhaps it was time to look into the idea of a Defense Minister or perhaps a Political Minister for NATO. (e) What about the practice of unanimity in NAC? How could NATO procedures be arranged to avoid a French veto? The Secretary said that we would be studying these and other questions of substance and hoped that all the major Allies would consider these matters so that together they could move them forward within the Alliance as a whole. Sir Patrick said that London would be thinking hard about such questions and there was, he thought, general agreement about the need to approach the major problems in this manner. But, of course, the UK would want the fourteen to carry on their own work during the coming weeks. He recognized that the nuclear subject was touchy business. He did not disagree when the Secretary commented that Chalfont 5 was probably right in his thinking that the West ought to act on the NATO nuclear problem and get it out of the way and then we might be in a position to make progress with the Soviets on non-proliferation. Sir Patrick asked how the U.S. thought we should organize the necessary high-level consultation between the major Allies and asked if we had in mind ad hoc meetings. Mr. Ball said that we were thinking of continuing to operate on a bilateral basis with exchanges of papers. In the meantime, when he met with the NAC on Vietnam on March 29, he would discuss further with Shuckburgh the kind of work which the fourteen could properly carry forward. Mr. Leddy cautioned that as we go on, we must take care to disabuse the press that a triumvirate or quadrumvirate is developing. In that connection, he wondered whether the Ministers would tackle the major issues at the June Ministerial Meeting or maybe earlier. The Secretary thought some issues might not wait until June, but, at the same time, he did not favor having a meeting of Ministers before June. In the course of a few remarks on the coming election, Sir Patrick said that the Government would firmly support NATO along the lines of the proposed declaration. The Secretary said he hoped that they would tone down criticisms of the Germans. (The Secretary had to leave at this point.) Sir Patrick told the Under Secretary that if the British were to talk about the NATO nuclear problem, they would certainly want to talk about the offset problem at the same time. Mr. Ball said that one could be helpful to the other and he thought it useful to examine them together in a larger context. Mr. Bendall said there was a fundamental policy decision on which the major powers needed to agree—what is to be the basic premise towards France—a hard exclusive policy or one which looked for ways to facilitate the maximum French association with NATO? Mr. Ball said we should try to avoid French bilateral arrangements. Mr. Leddy commented that the critical problem is the French forces in Germany. Of course, there are other considerations. He mentioned NADGE, and Sir Patrick added there would be the basic matter of security. Mr. Ball concluded that it would create a significant political disadvantage for us all if the French stayed in the FRG on a special basis; we are looking especially carefully at this question. Sir Patrick said London would study these and other problems in the coming days and he hoped that the U.S. and UK would be in a position to exchange ideas and notes before long. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted on March 18 by Vest and approved in S and U on March 22. The conversation was held at the Department of State. A summary of it was transmitted to London in telegram 5480, March 18. (Ibid.) 2 A summary of the points made to Sir Patrick was sent to Rusk by Acheson on March 17. (Ibid.) 3 Document 142 . 4 Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to France. 5 Lord Chalfont, British Minister of Disarmament. 146. Letter From President Johnson to President de Gaulle 146. Letter From President Johnson to President de Gaulle 1 Washington, March 22, 1966. Dear Mr. President: On March 7 you wrote to inform me of the general course of action your Government proposes to follow with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization and arrangements which have been set up to serve its purposes. 2 The course you propose will so seriously affect the security and well-being of citizens of all the allied states that I felt it imperative to seek the counsel of the other Treaty members before replying in detail. I should like now to set forth what seem to me the fundamentals of this matter. Let me begin with the American conception of the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance it creates. Under our Constitution, that Treaty is the law of the land. Like our Constitution, it is more than a legal document. It is the outward and visible form of a living institution—not an alliance to make war, but an alliance to keep the peace. For nearly two decades this alliance has assured the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. It has greatly reinforced stability throughout the world. The Alliance, in our view, reflects two important propositions. The first is that if war should come to the Atlantic area, we must fight together—and fight effectively. The second is that if we act together for the common interest during peace, war will not come. The organization designed to carry out both these propositions, NATO, became in fact an Organization for Peace. To that Organization, which grew significantly out of France's own needs and urgings, France and many distinguished Frenchmen have made an inestimable contribution. The Organization combined the contributions of the member nations into a common instrument for deterring war by preparing together to meet aggression if aggression should occur. I have no doubt that deterrence resulted not only from the military coherence achieved but also from the political unity of purpose it exemplified. If the dissolution of the former casts in doubt the latter, as it inevitably will, I fear that those who draw hope from Western disunity will be much encouraged. As you say, conditions have changed since 1949. They have greatly changed for the better, due significantly in my opinion to our combined efforts under the Treaty. But should our collective effort falter and erode the common determination which it reflects, the foundation of the present stability would be undermined. In your letter you restated the firm commitment of France to fight beside her allies if any member of NATO should suffer unprovoked aggression. I respect that pledge. But we believe more is needed to achieve effective deterrence and to maintain peace in the North Atlantic area. I am puzzled by your view that the presence of allied military forces on French soil impairs the sovereignty of France. Those forces have been there at French invitation pursuant to a common plan to help insure the security of France and her allies. I have always viewed their presence as a wise and far-seeing exercise of French sovereignty. For our part, we continue to believe that if the Treaty is to have force and reality, members of the Alliance should prepare the command structures, the strategic and tactical plans, the forces in being, and their designation to NATO in advance of any crisis and for use in time of crisis. NATO arrangements should reflect the technological and strategic imperatives of our age. Readiness to fight instantly under agreed plans and procedures, worked out and practiced in peacetime, adds immeasurably to our common strength. We will continue our past policy of full participation and cooperation in NATO. We believe the member nations, working within the Alliance with one another, should adapt to whatever organizational arrangements the needs of the hour may require. I do not consider that such participation and cooperation involves any impairment of our own sovereignty—or that of any of our allies. In my judgment it reflects the exercise of sovereignty according to the highest traditions of responsible self-interest. The North Atlantic Treaty commits its signatories to assist any member subjected to armed attack within the areas specified. Governments, of course, must fulfill their commitments in accordance with their own constitutional procedures. But commitments should be honored as effectively as peacetime preparation can assure. It seems to me essential, therefore, that all members of the Alliance be prepared to act in any emergency through their mutual organization and in accordance with mutual plans. Reliance in crisis on independent action by separate forces in accordance with national plans, only loosely coordinated with joint forces and plans, seems to me dangerous for all concerned. It has proved disastrous in the past. The other fourteen member nations of NATO do not take the same view of their interests as that taken at this moment by the Government of France. The United States is determined to join with them in preserving the deterrent system of NATO—indeed, in strengthening it in support of the vital common purposes of the West. We do not intend to ignore the experience of the past twenty years. Indeed, we find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to Western security and development, will long remain withdrawn from the common affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old friend and ally her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. No classification marking. The source text bears no drafting information. A notation on a covering memorandum states that the original was handed to Ambassador Lucet on March 22. The letter is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 321–323. 2 Document 137 . 147. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 147. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 22, 1966, 2244Z. 6118. NATUS. Subject: NATO and France. 1. PermRep lunch today featured an adversary proceeding between de Leusse and everyone else present (US, UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Brosio). 2. It started when Brosio asked De Leusse why French newspapers were reporting French Government expects substantive replies from the fourteen recipients of French aide-memoire. De Leusse said French on their side were baffled by absence of response, expecting at least some of their allies would want to ask questions about the stated French intentions. 3. Brosio and PermReps of UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium and U.S. all asked De Leusse in various ways why he expected to receive in reply to French note anything but a polite acknowledgment and a reiteration of the principles already published in fourteen-nation declaration. De Leusse kept repeating French assumption that allies would express their curiosity about “modalities” of carrying out French “decisions.” French would then satisfy curiosity by indicating timing and other conditions for French withdrawal from NATO and NATO withdrawal from France. 4. We asked De Leusse repeatedly what question he would suggest we ask, that he would be in a position to answer. He conceded that any question we asked (for example in tomorrow's NAC meeting) would have to be answered by saying he did not know the answer. 5. We told De Leusse it was reasonable to expect allies to reply to the note but fanciful to expect them to ask substantive questions in reply. 6. This theme—that French were entitled to a reply but not to an answer—was picked up by most of the others. De Leusse said in absence of replies to French note, General De Gaulle would probably start ordering actions to be taken. 7. This led to a frank discussion of the various avenues of action open to the French. Brosio, with interjections from others, produced the following categories: (A) Withdrawal of French officers and other military personnel from “integrated commands.” There was general agreement that French could and probably would do this first, since it requires no real consultation with anybody. However, de Leusse made sharp distinction between “Generals” and “telephonistes,” saying that French purpose was not to paralyze NATO activity and implying French may leave some service personnel, particularly in the communications field. (B) Withdrawal of commitment of French ground troops and air squadrons to NATO. This was an action French can take without consulting anybody. However, it clearly would require countervailing action on the part of other governments (for example, US decision about nuclear weapons available for French troops, and decision by Germany and other allies about whether France has the right to station forces in Germany if they are not committed to NATO). (C) Eviction of SHAPE and AFCENT from French soil. Here French Government is no longer giving orders to Frenchmen but to officers and officials of other governments. Unless France has in mind physically ejecting SHAPE and AFCENT staffs (“You really can't treat us as if we were Formosa's UNESCO delegation,” said Brosio), this action will require some negotiations about dates, ultimate size, cost-sharing, and the like. (D) Bilateral evictions, notably of U.S. and Canadian installations. Here, too, France has to negotiate with other nations unless it is prepared to use its gendarmerie. 8. In discussing these categories, particularly (C) and (D), other PermReps including Cleveland kept emphasizing the narrow limits within which French Government could unilaterally make decisions that would be binding on its allies. Essentially the line drawn in the discussion was between actions in which the French Government is ordering Frenchmen around, and actions in which the French Government proposes to affect the lives, functions, or locations of non-French personnel. 9. Woven into this long dialogue were frequent references to financial implications of prospective French moves. At one point Cleveland said, and De Leusse in effect agreed, that French Government could not make “decisions” to increase the amount of money budgeted and appropriated by allied governments for NATO and European defense purposes. Decisions on sharing costs of French moves must obviously be negotiated and agreed to by Ministries of Finance of all allied governments, unless France “decision” had attached to it a check for the full additive cost it would entail. Other PermReps chimed in with some alacrity on the same theme. 10. De Staercke (Belgium) raised some even more fundamental questions, which were not thoroughly discussed. He said essential issue was degree to which other allies need feel obliged to worry about the defense of France, in view of the French declaration of intentions. There would be Belgians, he said, who would advocate Belgian neutrality under these circumstances; the larger nations in NATO would have to act with a certain sense of responsibility, but perhaps the smaller nations could show what nuisance value they still retained in relation to France. He raised particularly the question whether the NATO air defense system, which provides early warning information to French defenses, including the force de frappe, should perhaps be withheld from France unless reasonable attitude was shown on such issues as use of French air space. 11. Dialogue on this subject was not fully engaged, which was just as well since De Staercke was overstating his case in the heat of discussion. 12. Comment: De Leusse will probably report to Quai that French can expect replies but no real answers to French aide-memoire. All PermReps present seemed to be clear that it did not make sense for allies to do anything but acknowledge French note at the same level of generality in which it is written, and await further “precisions” from the French side. Several of his colleagues were very frank in telling De Leusse that De Gaulle could not escape taking the initiative in making detailed proposal to open the negotiations on specific issues. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) 148. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) 1 Washington, March 23, 1966. These are my notes on the meeting of Maurice Schumann and Ambassador Lucet yesterday with the President. Needless to say, they will be closely held here. 2 Schumann. The question at issue regarding NATO is not the alliance itself but only the form of the alliance. France will remain in the alliance. The President hoped that nothing would be done to weaken the alliance. The basic views which the US held regarding NATO at the time of its formation still prevail and most of the other members agree. He regretted the stand which France is taking on NATO and hopes that French views will change. The French position will make the road more difficult for the US which is trying to help all over the world. Our governments do not always see matters alike and this is only natural, but he wished that General De Gaulle did not feel the way he does about working within the alliance. Apparently the General has charted his course. For its part the US is determined to remain steadfast in pursuit of NATO objectives. There will be need for reforming, re-grouping and re-evaluating. We hope that this can be done with a minimum of inconvenience and discomfort. The President said he always turns his cheek and never hits back. He did not feel that the US was in any way violating French sovereignty and if the French felt that we had, we would simply have to accept that this is their view. Schumann said that the French never claimed that the US was violating French sovereignty. The French only want a new structure of the alliance, which would restore French sovereignty. There is no intention to weaken the alliance or to forget the common goal. He thought that France would become an even more efficient partner not only as illustrated by French support in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, but also by helping the West, especially the US, in reaching a better understanding with the East. No new alliance is envisaged. France might well be useful, for example, in achieving a solution of the German problem. In Schumann's view there should be no loosening of the military alliance itself. He said that if cooperation is not extended to the nuclear field, it would not be effective. But there should be no loosening of military ties. In time this intention of the French would become clear. The President referred to the letter which he had just sent to President De Gaulle and which Schumann had read. 3 The President said that if it was simply a question of improving the NATO organization, that would be all right. But the French appear determined to go it alone and that would simply create more problems. The other 14 should see to it that NATO remains intact, if possible get even closer together and keep people from feeding on dissension. Schumann said that collective action was one thing but integration was another. (There was a brief discussion of a possible meeting of NATO parliamentarians in Paris in the Fall.) Schumann said that the basic French commitment was covered in the NATO Treaty; and then made a vague observation to the fact that a good deal of cooperation was needed outside the NATO area. Schumann said that he looked forward to a Franco-American summit meeting and invited the President to come to Paris. The President replied that when De Gaulle was here for the Kennedy funeral he thought there would be an opportunity for the General to return to the United States some time later for talks but that he understood that the General did not feel able to do this for a reason which he never fully understood. The President went on to point out that the French action would inevitably have a distressing effect on the American people. We were very close to the French whom we regarded as our friends, and anything like the current development of France's pulling away from us and the other allies would certainly have repercussions in the United States. The President said that he personally would not add gasoline to the fire. Schumann said that France was not adopting a course away from the US. But there is now a new France built on a new economic foundation of financial stability. The French appreciated America's help during the war and through the Marshall Plan and through its initiative in creating NATO. But now France was more special and more important than it used to be. The President welcomed the importance of our friends, but this was no reason for going it alone. We can still be important and act collectively. Schumann, quoting the Animal Farm, observed that some are more equal than others. The President said that what has made us important is our standing together. Schumann replied that France would not leave its friends. The President then pointed to the last sentence in his letter to President De Gaulle and asked Schumann to remember it: “As our old friend and ally her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role.” Schumann said the President should not feel that there is any chance that French policy will change. It is “irretrievable.” Mitterand, the only possible opposition leader to De Gaulle, had in effect criticized the General for not going further by advocating the elimination of both the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact. He said that everybody in France feels that the time has come for a reappraisal of the alliance, even though everybody in France supports the alliance. The President said that it is one thing to readjust, to adapt, to perfect, in order to meet conditions; but it was another to take a different road alone. The President said he has known how De Gaulle felt on certain organizational matters and such questions might be arranged. But there was no need to say the US was violating France's sovereignty and must get out. This development could blow up the whole arrangement. He hoped that it will not. He hoped that France would come back. For the moment things will be very difficult. He watched this development taking place not in anger, but in sorrow. He hoped that nothing that he had done personally had contributed to it. It was a fait accompli before he came on the scene. The President said that he assumed De Gaulle speaks for the French people. He regretted the French action, but was helpless to do anything about it except to unite the 14. Schumann then referred to General De Gaulle's memorandum to Washington and London in 1958 regarding a NATO Directorate of three. 4 The President said he recalled that. Certainly organizational improvements could be made in NATO to help in overcoming General De Gaulle's distaste for present arrangements but drastic actions are not called for. Schumann said that since France would remain in the alliance even after 1969 some adjustment would be inevitable. The President said that whatever course France may take, and however distressing this course may be, he was convinced that the French people would be there when the chips were down. Schumann agreed. But, the President added, we shouldn't have to suffer meanwhile. We ought to be able to get along in prosperity as well as in crisis. He asked Schumann to convey to his colleagues the high regard and affection of America for the people of France. He thanked General De Gaulle for sending us Ambassador Lucet although we were, of course, sorry to see Ambassador Alphand leave us. He thought that General De Gaulle had been good for France and the Free World even though we disagree with what he is doing. John M. Leddy 5 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 216. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. In a memorandum to Rusk, March 23, summarizing the conversation, Leddy noted that it lasted about 30 minutes. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 70 D 209) 2 Memoranda of Schumann's conversations with Ball on March 22, and with Rusk and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, all along similar lines are ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. 3 Document 146 . 4 See Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 82 – 83 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears the typed signature. 149. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 149. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, March 29, 1966. [Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Confidential; Nodis. 4 pages of source text not declassified; under United Kingdom legislation, official records can normally only be made available 30 years after their creation.] 150. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 150. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 31, 1966, 1640Z. 6415. Now that the full French program on NATO (with certain ambiguities in regard to the French troops in Germany) and on American bases has been fully exposed, I believe a certain number of conclusions in regard to De Gaulle's policies and actions in this field might be worthwhile, in particular for those who might be briefing for background press or other sources of public media. I would not recommend that any of this be used for attributable briefing: 1. It is perfectly apparent that De Gaulle never had any intention of engaging in any negotiations with the US or his allies for a “reform” of the NATO organization. A check of the record shows that American officials, from President Kennedy (to Couve de Murville), to the Secretary, Ball, and myself, all had on a number of occasions asked De Gaulle exactly what he wished to do in regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Practically on every occasion he said it was too soon to be discussed, but that we would be informed (sic) in good time. De Gaulle obviously was engaged in deliberate utilization of “Ruse” (one of his favorite gambits in international affairs). Therefore, there is not the slightest validity to the statements of Lippmann, for example, or any other correspondent to the effect that if differently handled we might have produced certain modifications of the organization which would have kept France in. What De Gaulle wanted, and finally achieved, was his total withdrawal from all multilateral aspects of NATO organization while attempting to create the illusion for French and European opinion that he is faithful to the Alliance. 2. The questions as to De Gaulle's motivations as to timing are still subjects of discussion in Paris. I have yet to find a Frenchman, even a Gaullist, who can give you a satisfactory explanation why De Gaulle, contrary to the general essence of his press conference of February 21, chose to precipitate matters and above all to treat matters of NATO and US bases at the same time and in the same communication. The best guess is as follows: De Gaulle wished to have the matter settled from the point of view of decision well before the probable date of elections in February/March 1967. He probably recognized that the continuance of the Gaullist majority in the Assembly was not certain and may have felt that a rebuff in these elections might make it very much more difficult for him to do what he wished to do in regard to NATO and the American bases. In any event, he most certainly wished to have the matter disposed of and no longer an issue by the time the electoral period came around. It is probable that his change of tactics, which led him to accelerate the process, was due to his sudden realization that had this been announced after his visit to Moscow he would have been open to the charge, and many French would have believed it, that he made a deal at the expense of his allies with the Soviets. In De Gaulle's eyes it is one thing to betray the Alliance under his own steam but another to do it in collusion with an enemy. 3. This has been virtually one hundred percent De Gaulle's own idea. From the scattered bits of information we have obtained in regard to the handling of this it is apparent that the Quai d'Orsay, and to some extent the Defense Nationale, disagreed with De Gaulle's timing and handling of the matter. It is doubtful if without De Gaulle there would have been any such move in French Government to pull out of NATO so completely as he has done. It is an interesting sidelight on the future of affairs in Gaullist France, where one man can literally dominate not only the policy itself but its execution in the most minute terms without any serious reference to any other body or Parliament. In this connection, it might be mentioned, however, that under French law the denunciation of these agreements and their termination do not require assembly approval. 4. There is absolutely no chance of changing De Gaulle's mind or modifying his ideas. The only possibility would be to bring about a set of conditions in the Alliance which might affect his future operation of policy. 5. In effect, we (and the other members of the Alliance as well as other nations of the Western world) have a confrontation between two diametrically opposed ideas concerning the conduct of foreign relations in the modern world. On one hand De Gaulle is fanatically a proponent of the idea of independence; that the nation-state is the sole enduring, viable entity in international relations; that this entity is uncompromisable and multilateral arrangements tend to limit its freedom and independence. On the other hand is the concept espoused by the US and other states in the modern world which considers all nations, even the most powerful, as inter-dependent in their relations with other like minded, particularly allied, states. It is not necessary to pursue the two different lines in too great detail since the consequences are obvious. It is only that the recent actions against NATO, while not the only ones, are the most open and manifest expressions of de Gaulle's idea on this subject. 6. It is obvious that there is not much that we can do except to endeavor to keep the Alliance together to make the necessary physical transfers, and to do this with calm and avoidance of over dramatizing the issue, which would be greatly to De Gaulle's liking. There is also the very important question of the reaction of French public opinion, which at the moment is still confused and not too clear as to the issue involved and the gravity of De Gaulle's actions. It would seem to me, and this is the view at least of a number of experienced diplomats in Paris, that there are three points in this procedure which concern, or will concern, French public opinion, they are: (1) the isolation of France in the diplomatic and military sense, (2) the increased weight of Germany in military matters, and (3) the effect on the future of Europe, and particularly the Common Market. It seems to me in conclusion that it is extremely important that we should be very careful to avoid giving the Gaullists any reason, which they are obviously now looking for, to state that the US is attempting to intervene in French domestic affairs, particularly in connection with the forthcoming parliamentary elections. Therefore, any moves that we make, for example to increase the information program as recommended from here, should be done very discreetly and no action, except those of the government in connection specifically with NATO and bases, should be carried out in such a way as to emphasize the importance of France. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 151. Memorandum of Conversation 151. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 4, 1966, 6 p.m. SUBJECT France-NATO PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara U—Mr. Ball S—Mr. Acheson EUR—Mr. Leddy 1. US Response to French aide-memoire The State draft of the US reply to the French Aide-Mémoire of March 29 was approved with the addition of a clause at the beginning of the third sub-paragraph of numbered paragraph 5, making it clear that the US intends to remove its facilities from France as promptly as possible in view of the attitude of the French Government. 2 2. Relocation of NATO and US Facilities It was agreed that the North Atlantic Council should move from Paris and that the NATO military headquarters should be co-located with the Council. It was agreed that the Defense Department should assume the responsibility for preparing promptly a total plan embracing: (a) Relocation of all NATO and US bilateral elements in France, taking account of the need for co-locating the NAC and the military headquarters; (b) The reorganization of the command structure, having in view the creation of a “Supremo” with command and planning functions over all NATO elements, in lieu of the present separate commands of SACEUR, SACLANT, etc; and (c) Assurance of civilian control (via NAC and the Secretary General) over the military elements. 3. French Troops in Germany It was agreed that: (a) If Germany is prepared to insist that French troops may remain in Germany only under existing arrangements and will have to withdraw if the French proceed to decommit these forces from NATO, the US should fully support the Germans and do nothing to dissuade them: (b) If, on the other hand, the Germans wish to find some new arrangement which would permit the continuance of French forces in Germany, the US should urge them to incorporate in these new arrangements effective safeguards assuring their use in accordance with NATO requirements and an adequate quid pro quo giving to the other allies in Germany facilities in France such as transit and overflight rights. State was assigned the task of preparing a position paper along the foregoing lines. (c) It was agreed to explore the possibility of initiating US-UK-German discussions on this problem at the Foreign Ministers' level, possibly in Washington, at an early date. Alternatively, a special US representative might be sent to Bonn for the purpose. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) 2 For the final text of the U.S. reply, see Document 154 . 3 The participants in this conversation also discussed nuclear sharing. Acheson stressed that the problem had to be settled on the basis of a U.S., British, and West German agreement. The President should decide what he could live with and then authorize the Secretary of State to meet his British and German counterparts to insist on an agreement. Acheson's views were approved, and Secretary Rusk agreed to pursue the matter with the President. (Memorandum of conversation, April 4; ibid.) 152. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State 152. Telegram From the Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State 1 Brussels, April 6, 1966, 1708Z. Ecbus 894. NATUS. Re Depcirtel 1731. 2 Subj: Relationship of EEC and NATO crises. Below are Mission's comments on relationship EEC and NATO crises, analysed from point of view of French and of Five, followed by conclusions re U.S. posture. French. If French tactics are based on rational evaluation their own interests—not necessarily a safe assumption—it is clearly very much in their interest to keep NATO and EEC crises apart. This means that French have every reason for wanting to avoid blow-up in EEC while they are fomenting major crisis in NATO. There are at least two reasons for this. Looked at from point of view of Moscow trip, it is obviously in De Gaulle's interest to play a disruptive role re NATO alliance but, by same token (if he wants to maintain pretension that he is somehow speaking for Europe) to avoid an EEC crisis. Furthermore, De Gaulle's capitulation at Luxembourg showed he recognized that Europe is indeed a popular issue in France which he has to reckon with. Community sources French nationality tell us that there is increasing recognition among affected interest groups in France that De Gaulle's NATO policy will adversely affect French EEC objectives. If this analysis is correct, it is clear that pressure is on France, not Five, to be conciliatory on EEC matters. This, by the way, is the exact opposite of the conclusion reached by Luxembourg economic official reported in Luxembourg's 254 to Department. 3 It does, however, represent overwhelming view within Commission and of at least two PermDels (Dutch and German), who have explicitly stated position along these lines. Results of Council meeting April 5 would seem to confirm that French recognize burden is on them to prevent crisis in EEC. They appear to have pulled back from their earlier insistence that absolute priority must be given to settlement of agriculture financing. Five. Basic issue which the Five will be wrestling with as NATO crisis develops and becomes more acute will be extent to which they want to move forward in the EEC with a Gaullist France which is pulling out of the whole Western political and security structure. There are signs of this basic concern, such as Luns' comments in the meeting of the Fourteen in Paris March 29 re the NATO crisis affecting the EEC and the view attributed to Schroeder that agriculture financing should not be finally agreed until De Gaulle returns from Moscow. However, although there is a realistic assumption that evolving NATO crisis cannot help but affect EEC, there is heavy support within Five for not invoking the NATO crisis in the EEC, and for moving ahead with Community business in order to enmesh De Gaulle more and more in European integration and preserve the Community structure for the post-De Gaulle period. This does not at all mean making one-sided concessions to the French on what they want (agriculture financing), but rather an insistence upon meaningful parallel progress on Kennedy Round and other items of interest to Five. U.S. Active U.S. intervention here is clearly undesirable. However, we should at least attempt to clarify our own views. Mission feels that our preference should be for approach which Five are evolving: i.e., to extent possible, balanced progress on internal Community issues and Kennedy Round, with these issues considered on their merits and no conscious effort made to link EEC and Kennedy Round with NATO crisis. We must, however, also recognize that evolving NATO crisis is bound to affect developments in EEC, especially if as we expect political temperature will mount in NATO crisis. We for our part must not give impression that we regard NATO crisis as a technical, easily compartmentalized affair. Major conclusion we draw from present situation is that, given fact that de Gaulle, in [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] words, “cannot tolerate” an EEC crisis between now and French elections, we have an exceptional opportunity to make progress on our key economic programs. This applies in particular to Kennedy Round, which fortunately has become a major Community issue. An exception to this is monetary reform, which unlike Kennedy Round is not at center of Community bargaining. But on other issues like Kennedy Round which are intimately related to European unity, French will be very much on defensive until after their Parliamentary elections. I believe we should take this very much into account and exploit this tactical position by planning with our friends to seek maximum progress during next year on those issues that are disdained by the General as “grubby” economic matters, but which, he seems to realize, could become politically embarrassing for him if his failure to permit progress led to a new EEC crisis. Tuthill 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, Geneva, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris, and Rome. 2 Document 140 . 3 Not found. 153. Memorandum 153. Memorandum 1 Washington, April 9, 1966. MEMORANDUM FOR GUIDANCE OF MR. McCLOY IN HISDISCUSSION OF FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY The Problem In its aide-mémoire of March 29, 2 the Government of France stated that the assignment to NATO of “the French ground and air forces stationed in Germany” will end on July 1, 1966. The French Foreign Minister has advised both the United States and the German Government that France would leave these forces in Germany if the German Government wanted them. The agreement between France and the United States by which U.S. nuclear weapons are stockpiled for the use of French forces in Germany is by its own terms in effect only while those forces are committed to NATO. The question of French forces in Germany is primarily of political significance and not one of major military consequence. The United States is in a position to influence, but not determine, the settlement of this question. How should the United States exercise its influence, and in what direction? German Position: The German Government released a statement on April 6 which states: a) Germany intends to adhere to an Atlantic defense system based on peacetime integration. b) The Government intends to discuss the complex of questions, including that of the presence of French forces in Germany, in the appropriate NATO forums with all the other NATO partners. c) The Government regards French troops in Germany as an important element of the common defense and accordingly they should assume a clearly defined mission in the framework of the common defense of NATO and work together, in a way to be agreed, with NATO forces. d) In reaching an agreement on the stationing of French troops in Germany, all the possibilities of the Franco-German Treaty are to be used after coordination with the American and British governments as well as other NATO governments. This will be done on the understanding that the rights and obligations involved in the relationship of the Federal Republic to these other partners will not be affected. e) The goal of all efforts must be to maintain in full effectiveness the functioning of the Alliance in the interest of all partners. f) The German F.O. added orally “that the Cabinet, in addition to approving the public statement, had taken certain other decisions …. A) That if the French withdrew their forces from NATO their right to station troops in Germany must in some way be ended; B) that the same principles must apply to French troops in Germany as to German troops in France; C) other aspects of the status of forces of French troops in Germany must be agreed.” 3 These principles apparently indicate the sort of agreement under paragraphs (c) and (d) above upon which the Germans would insist. In other words, in some way or other the French troops in Germany must come under NATO command in time of war, and assume a suitable task in time of peace and suitable participation in planning and liaison. (See Bonn's 3177 and 3140.) 4 The Germans appear firm on this. The British Position: As reported by the British Ambassador in Bonn's cable from Ambassador McGhee, it is: a) Their “overriding interest is not to disturb the framework of the 1954 agreements”. b) “Satisfactory arrangements must be worked out for the French to revert to NATO command in wartime. This should not be dependent on unilateral French decision.” The United States Position: In the discussions in Bonn the United States representative should support the German Government position as stated on Pages 1 and 2. Since the issue relates to the conditions upon which French troops remain on German territory, the German Government must play the primary role. The United States, however, has a strong interest in this issue which affects the security of a large number of its troops and the integrity of the arrangements under which they are stationed in Germany. The U.S. representative is not authorized to agree to any position or formula which does not include (a) the same undertaking by the French Government as by other governments having troops in Germany to place its troops in Germany under command of the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, in the event of conflict involving any of the Allied forces stationed in Germany; and (b) an undertaking to engage in planning so the forces can be used effectively in time of war. He should further point out that although the immediate conference deals only and in a preliminary way with the question of French troops in Germany, no final settlement of this question should be reached independently of a settlement of the air problems. These include the part to be played by French forces hitherto assigned to the air alert and air defense for Germany as well as the necessary rights for all the Allies to overfly France. Negotiating Procedures 1) Joint positions should be developed initially among the U.S., UK, and FRG. No final position should be taken without consultation among the fourteen. 2) Discussions will take place in Bonn and a special mission headed by Mr. John J. McCloy will be sent from Washington for this purpose. Discussion French forces in Germany presently consist of air and army units comprising about 76,000 personnel. The air units are principally two wings of strike aircraft of two squadrons each, and two Nike Missile Battalions. The army forces comprise two divisions which include two Hawk AAA Battalions. The French forces are almost reserve divisions, far back from the line and not effectively trained, manned and equipped by U.S. standards. What military value they have is very dependent upon French willingness to put these forces under common command in wartime, engage in joint elaboration of defense plans in peacetime, to cooperate in common post and field training exercises. French forces in Germany in a completely “unattached” condition and without the assignment of U.S. nuclear weapons would have a minus military value if any. France's right to maintain its forces in West Germany derives not from NATO arrangements but from a series of agreements dating back to 1945. For example, the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the FRG of October 23, 1954, confirms the French right to maintain its troops in the FRG up to the levels France had there at the time of West Germany's entry into NATO (i.e., approximately the same as now). Thus, even if France should cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, France can argue that it retains the basic legal rights to maintain troops in Germany. However, the response can be made that, under the complex of the arrangements reached in 1954, the requirement of commitment of troops in Germany to SACEUR is legally binding throughout the FRG and the French forces are subject to that legal requirement. The French, however, have put the question of the maintenance of their forces in Germany directly to the Germans as a matter of a new agreement, and legal considerations are not likely to arise at the outset. If later on France asserts a right to retain troops as an occupying power, the reaction in Germany will be violent. 1 Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to an April 10 memorandum from Ball to the President, which states that both the Departments of State and Defense agreed on the language in the memorandum. In a telegram to the President on April 11, Bator referred to the memorandum as the “draft Ball-Acheson instruction” and noted that it was perhaps tougher than Johnson might have wished. (CAP 66158; Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3) 2 See footnote 2, Document 142 . 3 On April 6, Foreign Minister Schroeder wrote to Rusk along these same lines and suggested that the talks be held at Bonn. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) On April 8, Rusk thanked Schroeder for the German statement on the French forces, agreeing to hold them in Bonn and naming McCloy as U.S. representative. (Ibid.) 4 Telegrams 3177 and 3140, April 6 and 5 respectively, summarized preliminary talks with the Germans on the question of French troops in Germany. (Ibid., DEF 6 FR) 154. Aide-Mémoire From the U.S. Government to the French Government 154. Aide-Mémoire From the U.S. Government to the French Government 1 Washington, April 12, 1966. AIDE-MÉMOIRE The Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of an aide-memoire from the Government of the French Republic on March 29, 1966. The United States Government has been and will continue to be in consultation with its other Allies in NATO on the questions to which the actions of the Government of the French Republic give rise, and which affect the security of all members of NATO. The United States Government takes note of the view expressed by the French Government that the measures it proposes to take are made necessary “because of the impossibility of amending, by mutual agreement and under satisfactory conditions, the provisions in force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” The United States Government calls the attention of the French Government to the fact that the drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty recognized that changes might occur in the factors “affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area.” They, therefore, provided, in Article 12 that, after ten years of the operation of the Treaty, any Party should have the right to request a consultation of the Parties “for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty.” The United States Government recalls to the French Government that, having in mind Article 12, it has, like many other NATO Governments, over the past several years invited the French Government to submit any proposals it might have for the revision of the Treaty or the Treaty Organization. Moreover, it has assured the French Government that such suggestions would be given the most careful consideration. The United States Government cannot, therefore, understand the basis upon which the French Government has concluded, without consulting the other Parties to the Treaty, that it is impossible to amend the NATO arrangements and that it must act unilaterally. The United States Government calls attention to the fact that the Declaration of Fourteen of the member countries dated March 18, 1966, was issued only after the French Government had given notice of its intentions to act unilaterally and without advance consultation. The United States Government takes note of the intention of the Government of the French Republic to terminate the assignment to the Allied Command in Europe of the French ground and air forces stationed in Germany on July 1, 1966. In doing so, the United States recalls that all forces stationed in the area of Allied Command Europe were, by agreement, to be placed under the authority of SACEUR, in conformity with the 1954 London Final Act and the subsequent NATO Council resolution to implement Section IV of the London Final Act. Furthermore, the Government of the United States wishes to inform the Government of the French Republic that upon the termination of such assignment the Agreement dated September 6, 1960, between the United States and France regarding the NATO Atomic Stockpile of Weapons in Germany for Support of the Utilization by French Forces Assigned to NATO would, by its own terms, cease to have application. The United States Government further notes the intention of the Government of France to withdraw French personnel assigned to NATO commands, also to take effect July 1, 1966, and from the NATO Defense College after July 23, 1966. The aide-mémoire states that “the withdrawal of the French elements assigned to the Allied Commands and to the NATO College entails the transfer of the headquarters of these bodies outside of French territory;” and that the French Government believes that the transfers “might be completed by April 1, 1967.” On this alleged basis, the French Government has denounced the Paris Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters of August 28, 1952, to take effect on April 1, 1967. It is not clear to the United States Government why the intended withdrawals of French personnel should entail the removal of NATO headquarters from France by April 1, 1967. This entire subject is now under study among the other North Atlantic Treaty Allies. Accordingly, it has not been determined when withdrawal of Allied Headquarters would be accomplished. Consultations on this subject will be necessary and it is the hope of the United States Government that all Governments will approach further discussions of this matter in the spirit of Allies seeking to reach agreement with minimum adverse effect upon the security of the North Atlantic area and with as little mutual inconvenience as possible. The aide-mémoire further states the desire of the Government of France to terminate United States military activities under certain bilateral agreements freely entered into between France and the United States. These agreements provide that they shall remain in force for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty unless the two Governments by mutual consent decide beforehand to terminate them. They include the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951; the Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952; the United States Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953; and the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953. The United States Government cannot agree with the suggestion of the French Government that April 1, 1967 “would be appropriate for completing the necessary operations” with regard to the transfer of personnel and installations involved in these agreements, but, on the contrary, believes that such precipitate action could jeopardize the security interests of all members of the Alliance. It notes, moreover, that the System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958, between the United States and France, provides that, if one party should wish to modify its terms, the parties will consult, and that, if they are unable to come to agreement within one year, that agreement may be terminated effective after a period of one additional year. The United States Government expresses the view that since this method of adjusting the position of the parties was considered to be desirable when the System of Communications Agreement was concluded on December 8, 1958, it remains so today and might appropriately be availed of in consideration of the bilateral agreements concluded earlier, which by their terms continue for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty. Accordingly, while the United States intends to remove its facilities from France as promptly as possible in view of the attitude of the French Government, the United States Government would be prepared to give its consent to the termination of the agreements referred to above only on the condition that there be applied to all such agreements the provisions of consultation and termination set forth in the System of Communications Agreement. The United States Government is prepared to explore with the French Government the question of future United States military activities in France, together with arrangements for the use of essential facilities, and mutually agreed conditions for the orderly withdrawal of those facilities that are not to remain in France. In this connection, the United States Government notes the willingness of the French Government to make special provision for activities authorized by the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951 and the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953. United States activities under these Agreements between France and the United States have been and continue to be in support of the North Atlantic Treaty. Accordingly, it will be necessary in this case as well for the United States Government to seek the views of its other Allies with regard to this aspect of consultations with the Government of France. The Government of the United States notes that the French Government is prepared to begin conversations regarding mutual facilities which might be made available in the event of an armed attack within the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finally, the attention of the French Government is called to the fact that its actions in withdrawing from, abrogating or repudiating existing agreements will entail financial problems and responsibilities that must be taken into account in any discussion of these actions. 1 Source: Department of State, President's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. No classification marking. The source text bears no clearing or drafting information, but the aide-memoire was discussed with the other 14 NATO allies excluding France on April 7 and sent to the President for his approval on April 8. (Memorandum from Ball to Johnson, April 8; ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 328–330. 155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 155. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 11, 1966. SUBJECT The Nuclear Problem in NATO The crisis in NATO resulting from the French defection seems almost sure to bring the problem of nuclear-sharing to the fore. In fact, the Dutch Ambassador has called at the Department to urge that it be taken up again since France has made discussion possible, and Erhard spoke to George Ball about it ten days ago in Germany. The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest some considerations you might want to think over while you are away. When you come back perhaps Bob McNamara, Ball, Acheson and I might talk with you about them. I enclose a thumb-nail history of the problem, 2 beginning with 1960 and ending with the latest correspondence between you, Erhard and Wilson. The major issue of how the West should handle the nuclear weapon in its common defense has gone unresolved for five years for a number of reasons: —The Germans have been uncertain as to how far they might safely claim a nuclear role without antagonizing others, especially France. This has led observers to interpret German desires variously, depending in part on their own predilections. —The British have been playing a game. They have been for abandoning their independent nuclear weapon in principle, but against it in practice. They have talked of equality for Germany but have been unwilling to give it. They have advanced the ANF as a substitute for the MLF; then backed away from their own proposal. —We ourselves have had to face divisions and uncertainties among our Allies; concern in Congress that a nuclear-sharing proposal would fracture rather than cement the Alliance; and the controversy over non-proliferation. Of course, the Soviets have blamed, and will continue to blame, the failure to conclude a non-proliferation treaty on Western desires to help Germany “proliferate”. We have asked ourselves these questions: 1. Is an early settlement of this problem more desirable than postponement of it? We think the balance is in favor of an attempt to settle it, because delay keeps open the argument between a hardware solution and other solutions and prevents progress toward any solution. The continuance of this problem helps the Russians make propaganda on the proliferation issue. It is building up an issue between the British and the Germans; Chet Holifield believes that the present crisis in NATO creates a possibility of bridging German-British differences in such a way as to minimize Congressional difficulties. 2. Is it possible to approach this issue without posing a direct confrontation between a “hardware solution” and “consultation” only? We believe this can be done as we outline below. 3. Should we urge the British and Germans to sit down with us and talk this matter out over several days and at a cabinet level? We believe that in such a talk we could narrow the differences by shaking out the purely bargaining points and by putting into the discussion what the U.S. could and could not do. Our own views may modify the ideas of both of the others on the value of some of their own positions. For instance, whether we would or would not support a “European clause” would affect both the German and the British positions. 4. The procedure and plan we would like to discuss with you would be along these lines: To propose tripartite talks in Washington between the Foreign Ministers with military advice. Bob and I would propose to work together in these discussions. We think it would be better if Schroeder, rather than Von Hassel spoke for Germany, and Stewart rather than Healey for the UK. To discuss at the same time, and not necessarily as alternatives, some form of ANF and a development of the McNamara committee which has made a good start. To bring British and German ideas closer together and to reduce our own Congressional problem we might try putting together the framework of the ANF and the consultative committee. But we might try a more firm type of assignment of the submarines to a NATO Supremo rather than purchase, and, instead of a European clause, a more realistic commitment to review the whole nuclear situation when Europe achieved some further degree of unity. It is rather fatuous to cause trouble here over a European clause while De Gaulle is vigorously engaged in destroying any immediate prospect of movement toward unity. We might also try to step up the possibilities of the committee. Fritz Erler, a very sensible German Social Democrat, talks somewhat vaguely of a European influence on the American deterrent going somewhat beyond planning. He does not want to interfere at all in the decisive power of the U.S. President over firing. The participation he appears to want is in the continued creation of weapons systems which a President can fire, including, perhaps, some European production or development work on some of the necessary components. This, plus participation in planning military strategy and some real political strategy in Europe, seem to him to go to the heart of the matter. An exploration along these lines seems to us to offer promise. The idea would not be to prepare a detailed plan which the Europeans can then unite in criticizing but to devise a path we can gradually unfold to them as a way of escape from their own deadlock and frustration. These are only preliminary graspings for a line to be taken. When you have a chance to mull them over, we would like to talk with you further in more depth and to obtain your guidance. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it is attached to an April 12 memorandum from Bator to the President, which stated that it was an excellent exploratory memorandum, which had Acheson's support. Bator added that the procedure and suggested plan in paragraphs 2 and 3 offered a real opportunity to break the existing impasse and would provide a good basis for a reply to Prime Minister Wilson's letter ( Document 149 ). 2 Not printed. 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, April 17, 1966, 1730Z. 3321. Subj: McCloy talks—meeting with the Chancellor. NATUS. 1. McCloy met this morning for more than an hour and a half with Chancellor Erhard for a discussion of the French troop problem. Also present on the German side were Schroeder, Von Hassel, Westrick and Carstens. The Chancellor's general approach was firm—as he put it, “Hard if need be” since if De Gaulle were allowed to keep his troops in Germany without commitment while retaining their present status, Germany would suffer a serious defeat with adverse consequences for all of Europe. He showed concern, however, about the strength of public support for a firm policy in the US and among the 14 in general. The Chancellor's judgment was sober. He thought that De Gaulle probably would not accept the conditions which the Germans, in coordination with their allies, would have to set for the retention of French troops in the FRG. The following account is based on an uncleared memorandum of conversation which will be pouched to the Department tomorrow for transmission to McCloy. 2. In opening the conversation, Erhard said that he had followed with the closest attention the trilateral and bilateral meetings which McCloy had held in Bonn and was in full agreement with the general conclusions reached. 2 Referring to his earlier talk with McCloy at the Bilderberg conference in Wiesbaden, Erhard said that we must take a very clear—and, if need be, hard—position vis-a-vis the French. “We Germans see no other way out.” It was unprecedented in the post-war period for a Western European country to openly violate its solemn agreements. He thought the situation comparable to that which prevailed at the time of the Munich crisis in 1938. He did not wish to compare personalities, but if we do not stand together at this time the world could go apart. In the case of NATO, maximum cohesion and unity is now required. The Chancellor stated, with emphasis, that it is not only the right of the FRG but its duty not to hesitate in the face of the situation brought about by De Gaulle. It was necessary to draw the necessary consequences no matter how much it might be hoped that De Gaulle in the end would accept a sensible solution. 3. McCloy then outlined for the Chancellor the US views as he had done previously for Schroeder (Embtel 3305). He stressed that De Gaulle by his actions had undermined two basic aspects of NATO—(1) its credibility and (2) its provision of equality for Germany. He was stimulating nationalism which would breed more nationalism. We are left with something of a makeshift. The spirit which led to such major accomplishments in the past as the Marshall Plan, NATO itself and the defense of Berlin has been contaminated. De Gaulle now seeks the primacy of France rather than equality among Europeans. McCloy noted that it would require a high order of statesmanship to preserve NATO. The first test would perhaps be the issue of French troops in Germany. He thought that it was clear from the talks during the past two days that the Germans, British and ourselves were in agreement that if the French troops can play a useful military role it is desirable that they remain. If arrangements are not possible which would assure this, however, they could become a military liability. The President and the Secretary of State had come to the conclusion that the United States should support any position taken by the FRG that recognized the seriousness of the situation and provided an adequate response to the French. The FRG must itself decide the position it wishes to occupy in Europe. We are not thinking in terms of forcing the FRG toward any policy or decision. We only wish to make entirely clear that the FRG has full US support. 4. Erhard expressed satisfaction with this US position. He said that Germany can only accept the presence of French troops under conditions that are satisfactory with regard to their status and their military role. He thought that De Gaulle is also in a difficult position. The General can hardly accept the German conditions for the retention of French troops without going back on the principles underlying his attack against NATO. On the other hand if we hold firm, De Gaulle will not find it pleasant to withdraw his troops. Either way, he will in effect suffer a defeat. The Chancellor thought that De Gaulle at present was playing a poker game. The German side cannot back down on the conditions for the retention of troops, conditions which he thought were those wished by all the other NATO powers. 5. The Chancellor then asked concerning public opinion in the US. Would there be a tendency among Americans to query whether it was worthwhile to bring about a deterioration in Franco-German relations and a weakening of NATO simply because of questions of form and legality? For him there was no question but what the Fourteen must remain firm. If together we do not face the present situation, “we shall not be worth much in the future”. If De Gaulle should be permitted to retain his forces in the FRG uncommitted but with undiminished status this would be a defeat for Germany. The question for Erhard was up to what point would the Fourteen stand firm. What will be the effect of public opinion? 6. McCloy replied that there would be elements in the US who would indeed take the attitude that the issue posed by the status and task of French forces was not of sufficient importance to risk a break with France. Others would be disturbed by the increased status in the Alliance which Germany would attain with France's withdrawal. Still others would say that the situation in Western Europe was so hopelessly complicated that the best course would be to try to reach an agreement with the Soviets. None of these, however, represented the prevalent attitude in the US. McCloy thought that the American public generally recognizes the stubborn and obdurate attitude of De Gaulle. They feel that our general policy in Europe in the post-war period has been right and they do not like to see the basis of this policy attacked by the French. There is no serious body of public opinion at all in America which would favor a deal with the USSR. 7. Erhard asked if McCloy was convinced that the British would “Join up and stand with us through it all”. McCloy replied that he did not personally know Wilson very well but felt that in the trilateral discussions, Roberts had presented a very good British position. Somewhat later in the conversation Erhard returned to this point and said he wished to make clear he had no doubts as to British loyalty to the Alliance. He has posed the question only because it was so important that the three powers be united if the impression of a bilateral US-German approach was to be avoided. The Chancellor thought this important for the other members of the Alliance. Schroeder interposed that he intended to make a special effort to get to the Dutch and Italians in view of the helpful roles they had played at Brussels (the Italians with a grain of salt, he added). 8. Erhard then recalled that at Bilderberg McCloy had told him that the US has 90,000 overflights annually over France. If it comes to the worst and De Gaulle threatens to withhold permission for these, how can the situation be handled? McCloy said that he had talked with the military men and there was no doubt that the overflight problem caused concern. With modern planes much elbow room is required. The matter is troubling but McCloy did not think our military considered this a determining factor in the situation. An alternative would be found even though, to use the term Schroeder had used in an earlier meeting, it would have to be a makeshift. Moreover, McCloy thought the French were perhaps overplaying their unconcern about possible exclusion from the early warning system. He accepted Schroeder's view that De Gaulle may not approach this problem from what we would consider a rational basis; but he still felt that the French position was a little “over studied”. Overflights contributed directly to the security of France, a fact which the French cannot completely overlook. 9. Erhard next asked if McCloy thought the financial demands that would be made against the French for the removal of NATO facilities and possibly for debts to the US arising from the war would be of any political value. McCloy said he thought probably not. No one really expects that the French will pay. The idea of reviving old war debts would hardly impede De Gaulle from his present plans. We could in theory claim all the military equipment given to France under the MAP. On the whole, however, McCloy thought that the only two things that would influence De Gaulle were (1) the solidarity of the Fourteen and (2) public opinion in France. Erhard commented that French public opinion seemed to have been more united against de Gaulle on the EEC question than on NATO. McCloy agreed. Erhard then again reiterated that the Germans will not give in to De Gaulle on basic issues. They would do everything to avoid an impression that the FRG was acquiescing in a revival of French occupation. For this reason he felt that the greater probability was that it would not be possible to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with the French. 10. In response to the Chancellor's question as to the President's attitude, McCloy said that while he had not had an opportunity to speak directly with the President, the President had personally concurred in the US decision to support fully a strong FRG position. 11. Erhard commented than anyone who knows De Gaulle—as McCloy and he did—realizes that the General is capable of anything. One has to be prepared for the worst. Suppose, he said, we are not able to reach agreement with the French but the French forces stay anyway. What do we do? Schroeder laughingly interjected that the Germans would cut off the electricity, water, etc. Slightly more seriously, Schroeder said that before it reached this point De Gaulle would “mobilize his fifth column in Germany”. Erhard brushed this aside by saying that the fifth column wasn't very big any more. 12. Turning to the question of the 1954 agreements, Erhard said that he understood there was general unity that these agreements constituted one entity. McCloy said that the US Government was prepared to support the FRG in this position although the legal situation was a complex one. Schroeder added that the British were a bit more differentiated in their attitude because of their concern for the status of Berlin and the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets. Erhard considered this a very decisive question. If we were to allow others to split up the 1954 agreements we would be “giving trump cards to De Gaulle”. McCloy agreed on the importance of this point and noted that it would be studied in the working group. Schroeder—directing his comments to the Chancellor—said that he thought the simplest and at the same time most persuasive argument was that the withdrawal by France of its forces from NATO commitment inevitably affects the status of their presence in Germany. 13. When the question of possible effect on Live Oak of French actions came up, Erhard said that he could not imagine that De Gaulle would withdraw from all of the powers and rights which France has as one of the victorious powers. He asked in this connection whether McCloy felt that the Soviets take De Gaulle seriously. McCloy replied that the Soviets were intent on exploiting divisions in the West and would utilize France for purpose. In the end, however, they were basically interested in real power. Turning to Schroeder, Erhard asked whether the FonMin had thought of the possibility that De Gaulle might propose a special meeting with Erhard prior to the Moscow trip in order to “put on the thumb screws”. Schroeder said that he had thought of it but that “given De Gaulle's overriding interest in scenic effect”, he doubted that he would come to Bonn before going to Moscow, and Bonn would be the site of the next Franco-German heads of government meeting. De Gaulle wished to go to Moscow, Schroeder said, with the stage clear. 14. Erhard's final question was when would the US Government enter into bilateral talks with France regarding our bases there? McCloy said that he did not know precisely. Our general disposition is not to refuse to talk about withdrawing our troops. We have no desire to keep troops in France longer than is necessary if the French oppose them. He had the impression that the legalistic position taken in our reply to the March 29 French aide-memoire was partly a bargaining ploy. We did not intend to drag things out indefinitely. The conversation ended with the Chancellor asking McCloy to convey his warm greetings to the President. Hillenbrand 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38–6. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin. 2 McCloy met privately with Schroeder on April 15. This meeting was followed by a meeting of U.S. and West German delegations. (Telegrams 3305 and 3306 from Bonn, April 15 and 16; ibid., DEF 4 NATO and POL 38–6) Later on April 15, Schroeder and McCloy met with British Ambassador Roberts and a second trilateral meeting took place on April 16. (Telegrams 3307, 3312, and 3316 from Bonn, April 16; ibid., DEF 6 FR and POL 38–6) These meetings resulted in the formation of a Bonn Working Group to discuss the question of French forces in Germany and report to their Ministers. The approved report would then be submitted to the other NATO Allies. 157. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson 157. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 17, 1966, 11:15 a.m. SUBJECT Atlantic Policy On the basis of State Department papers you have been considering the issue of French troops in Germany and the framework for our response to Wilson on the nuclear question. You have also had available Francis Bator's observations. At the moment, I can, perhaps, be most helpful by setting down a few fundamental ideas which I believe are relevant to these matters in particular and the Atlantic crisis in general. 1. The maintenance of an integrated NATO capable of continuing to deter Moscow is fundamental . Given Soviet missile and conventional capabilities, it is truly a mortal issue. Here I believe Mr. Acheson is wholly correct. It is not a question of clinging to outmoded ideas of the late 1940's: it is a question of whether we and the Europeans have learned the lesson of two world wars and the whole sweep of modern history. 2. In order to maintain the political base for this deterrent—under French attack—the U.K. and Germany must be brought closer together . This is the way to look at the nuclear issue. We need to sit down with the U.K. and Germany and quietly guide them to a well-balanced package. The first requirement is tripartite talk; but we should not deceive ourselves that anything will emerge unless we push them tactfully towards a package, including, in particular, the nuclear issue and the defense of the pound. 3. On the nuclear issue I have no pet formula . I am clear, however, on two things: a. at the moment the Germans do not have the political and psychological base to foreclose a hardware option once and for all, without a major concession from Moscow in the direction of German unity; b. we ought to put our best thought and imagination into designing a lively nuclear consultation club, hardware or no hardware. The design and negotiation of this consultation club are first priority business on which the whole town agrees. 4. We ought to do nothing that need not be done to make Franco-German relations worse than De Gaulle has made them . We ought to understand with sympathy the German desire to keep as much going as possible between France and Germany. But we also ought to be clear about two other matters, to the Germans as well as among ourselves: a. It is Paris, not Washington, that is pressing on the Germans a choice between France and the U.S.; b. Franco-German friendship can only thrive in larger clubs—like the European Common Market and NATO. It will not work on a bilateral basis, except student exchanges, etc. 5. We ought to accompany the NATO reorganization with as many forward-looking measures in the Atlantic as possible . The case for keeping NATO is widely understood. But there is also a correct feeling that we need: a. More partnership in the Atlantic on issues like money, aid, space, modern technology, Great Society issues, political consultation, etc.; b. More East-West bridge-building by Atlantic nations: trade, cultural contacts, etc. We should not become so overwhelmed with the difficult details of moving NATO, negotiating with the French, facing the issues of French troops in Germany, that we fail to give the whole enterprise a new forward look. Planning is under way; but, unless you insist on its being given a priority equal to other matters, it may be pushed aside as window-dressing. It is more than that. It may determine how positively European parliaments and public opinion react to the new NATO package as a whole. Indeed, the same may be true in the U.S. 6. I shall, of course, be prepared to comment on specific points and issues as they come forward for your decision. At this time, I thought these broad observations might be helpful. 7. My only operational proposal is this: that you budget for a small, carefully prepared meeting on the nuclear question shortly after your return to Washington . The town needs your guidance. I believe I can lay it out for discussion in an orderly way. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret. 158. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 158. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, April 22, 1966, 1720Z. 7054. I saw Couve de Murville this afternoon at five o'clock and he delivered to me the French reply to our aide-memoire of April 12 (text in telegram to follow). 2 I read the reply and told Couve that I was disappointed that the French Government had not considered it suitable to accept the suggestion we had made for the termination. I said this suggestion would have provided a legal basis for the common consent provided for in the agreements as well as certain additional time to complete practical measures. I added that following my visit this week to some of our bases in France I could tell him that it would be physically impossible to complete the closing of the bases within the time fixed. Couve said that they were not denouncing the agreements, to which I replied that I thought we should not have a play on words since in effect they were terminating the agreements by unilateral action whereas the agreements specifically provided in four of the cases for their termination by mutual consent if they concurred before the expiration of the treaty. I told him I did not know what the American reaction would be but I could only take note of the fact that his government was in violation of the terms of the existing agreement. I also told him that we could not accept the one year date fixed in the French memorandum and if we did negotiate it would have to be under some form of juridical protest in regard to this date. Couve said that the date was of course something that could be discussed and that it was not intended to be an absolute fixed date in all cases. I repeated what I had said previously. I pointed out that the reference to military authorities in suggesting Paris as a locale might give the idea that it was a French proposal that it should be a military discussion. Couve said no, this was definitely not the case and the only reason the military had been mentioned was to underline the fact that there were competent American military on the spot here in Paris. He said what they envisaged from their side was Beaumarchais and de la Grandville. I told him that we wouldn't have any ideas as to our negotiating team until we had accepted the idea in principle. Couve then asked me what did I think about publishing the aide-memoire and I said as a personal opinion I thought it would be desirable to publish it since there had been a great deal of speculation in the French press as to its contents, some of which had been very close to the mark. Couve said it was immaterial to them whether it was published or not and he had only thought there should be an end to the “polemics” in the press. It was agreed that the French would publish on Sunday for Monday morning papers unless the Department has other ideas, in which case we will notify the Foreign Office over the weekend. If we hear nothing the French will go ahead with the agreed arrangement. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and passed to the White House and USIA. 2 The French text and the Embassy's translation were transmitted in telegram 7053 and 7055 respectively, April 22. (Ibid.) For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 336. 159. National Security Action Memorandum No. 345 159. National Security Action Memorandum No. 345 1 Washington, April 22, 1966. MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Nuclear Planning The President wishes to have developed recommendations for enlarging the participation in and understanding of nuclear planning by both the political and military authorities of our major NATO allies. Two alternative approaches should be considered: one which assumes the creation of a “NATO Nuclear Force” and one which does not. Among the possibilities examined should be the creation of a permanent body of restricted membership within NATO with functions including both intensified consultation and the direction of U.S. and U.K. nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles assigned to NATO and/or collectively owned. The proposals should cover the full range of activities involved in planning for the operation of existing forces and the development of future forces: intelligence, deployment, targeting, considerations affecting use at times of crisis, research, development, production and budgeting, etc. The primary operational focus of these arrangements should be the defense of NATO territory. For purposes of this exercise, it should be assumed that any “NATO Nuclear Force” Plan which later may be agreed upon will not include: a. Mixed-manning of submarines; b. A surface fleet capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The following matters should be addressed, in addition to functions: 1. participation or membership; 2. location; 3. financing; 4. probable U.K., German, French, other NATO and Soviet reactions; 5. appropriate U.S. negotiating strategy and procedures for its execution. The President also wishes to have developed other forward-looking proposals that would increase the cohesion of NATO and the North Atlantic community. These should embrace two kinds of measures: a. Military and non-military programs affecting primarily the affairs of the Free World; b. Constructive political, diplomatic, and economic initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The President wishes to have these proposals ready for review by Thursday, May 12. W. W. Rostow 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316. Secret; Nodis. Rostow sent a draft of the NSAM, dated April 18, to Johnson attached to an April 21 memorandum. In the memorandum, Rostow stated that he, Rusk, McNamara, Acheson, Ball, and Bator all agreed on the need to concentrate on nuclear consultation. However, McNamara believed that a European clause contained in the draft should be excluded. (Johnson Library, Papers of Francis Bator, Box 28, Nuclear Role for Germany) Apparently the draft was discussed at a meeting at the White House on April 21, since the European clause was deleted and the second paragraph of the text printed here was added. 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, April 29, 1966, 1350Z. 3507. Subj: NATO, France and Germany. Ref: Paris' 1133. 2 For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. 1. I welcome the expression of views in reftel on the effects of the France-NATO crisis on Germany. The possible consequences outlined in the reftel would clearly represent the most desirable outcome. It is to be hoped that events will follow such a course. No doubt Germany's role will be enhanced by De Gaulle's recent actions, and it will be a challenge for US policy in the period ahead to encourage Germany to play a responsible role in the Atlantic Alliance and in Europe. At the same time, there remains in Europe a deep distrust of Germany. Nor must we close our eyes to the possibility that other, less desirable consequences could derive from a NATO-wide confrontation with France—in which the FedRep is called upon to play a key role. 2. Two points in this respect will bear particularly close watching. One is the effect on the FedRep's European policy—if an estrangement with France should occur. If the present confrontation results in a withdrawal of French forces from the FedRep, German public opinion will not react with exhilaration. Many will see in it a defeat for the carefully nurtured German-French friendship—and for Europe. Many will ask themselves with whom Germany could now seek to build Europe. After dinner last evening Min Westrick, State Sec Von Hase, and Baden-Wurttemberg Min Pres Kiesinger all expressed dismay at the possible withdrawal of French troops. They greatly fear the political consequences of a French withdrawal, which they seem to feel is now quite possible. 3. If as a result of a French-German rift, European unity seems increasingly less attainable, there will inevitably be a tendency here, as we have pointed out, to turn more actively toward the other elusive goal of German policy—reunification. The problem which would then confront us—as well as Germany's other partners—is the extent to which we can in fact help Germany to attain this goal. In this game, key cards are held by the other side. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to London and Paris. 2 Telegram 1133, April 26, suggested that West Germany would be tempted to take advantage of the present crisis in NATO, but the fact remained that De Gaulle was forcing it to take positions that it would not have asserted on its own initiative. (Ibid.) 161. Memorandum from President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 161. Memorandum from President Johnson to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, May 4, 1966. I would be grateful if you would make it known that I wish the articulation of our position with respect to NATO to be in constructive terms. I see no benefit to ourselves or to our allies in debating the position of the French government. That government has made known its position. Our task is to rebuild NATO outside of France as promptly, economically, and effectively as possible. In so doing, we shall develop (as outlined in NSAM 345) 2 proposals which would bind the Atlantic nations closer together; support, as best we can, the long term movement towards unity in Western Europe; and exploit the possibilities for easing East-West tensions. Our discussions of the NATO problem should focus on the positive lines of action in which we are engaged. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Nodis. 2 Document 159 . 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, May 13, 1966, 1 p.m. 6002. Paris' 7712. 2 Question of whether we will make a written or oral reply to French memorandum of April 22 is still under consideration here. French Embassy reps have raised question of our reply with us from time to time. We have made following points: 1. In fact negotiations with France on issues relating to France/NATO problem are underway, e.g. discussions with De Leusse on such issues as support personnel for NATO headquarters. Exchange of notes we have had with French as well as note from FRG on question of French forces in Germany 3 in themselves represent negotiations, all of which does not need to take place around a table. 2. US is not yet prepared either in terms its internal decisions or in terms status of its talks with other Allies to begin any required conversations relating to removal of US facilities from France. Nevertheless, we have advised French that we intend to withdraw these facilities as soon as possible. 3. US has made a proposal whereby US/French bilateral agreements may be terminated by mutual consent. What has prevented negotiation on this particular question is lack of any French yea, nay or counter-proposal. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on May 11; cleared by Beigel, Acheson, Ball, and Thompson; and approved by Schaetzel. Repeated to London and Bonn. 2 Telegram 7712, May 11, asked if there were any special reason for delaying a reply to the French memorandum of April 22 (see footnote 2, Document 158 ) and noted that the delay was beginning to hurt the United States in French public opinion. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 3 For text of the German note, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 340–342. 4 No formal reply was ever given to the French memorandum, and in telegram 7920 from Paris, May 19, Bohlen replied that the line taken in telegram 6002, as it applied to multilateral negotiations with the French, seemed “just right.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) On May 27, Rusk called in Ambassador Lucet and asked specific questions about the bilateral agreements with France. (Circular telegram 2352, May 27; ibid., POL FR–US) On June 1, Bohlen was informed that these questions constituted the U.S. reply to the April 22 aide-memoire. (Telegram 6321 to Paris; ibid.) 163. Memorandum by Dean Acheson 163. Memorandum by Dean Acheson 1 Undated. BROAD LINES OF APPROACH TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE IN NATO CRISIS In approaching any negotiation it is important to understand clearly the relationship of the parties. Are they seeking a common object and sparring for compatible individual advantage—as in a horse trade? If so, bargaining is the avenue to agreement. If, however, one has taken a position from which it will not recede, and from which it cannot be forced to recede, there is small room for negotiation. In the past weeks the French government has been at pains to demonstrate the latter is its attitude towards NATO. It will not discuss its decisions that French troops must be withdrawn from commitment to NATO command and French officers from service in NATO commands. Similarly its demands that all NATO and U.S. command headquarters and all U.S. troops, facilities and supplies must be withdrawn from France are not subject to negotiation. All that can be discussed are “practical measures” for carrying out these decisions, a deadline for which the French government has arbitrarily set. Even the French Ministry of Defense admits that so far as NATO facilities and headquarters are concerned these dates cannot be met. The USG has responded that its troops and facilities will be withdrawn from French territory as soon as this can be done without prejudice to military security. There are no negotiations required about withdrawal. The USG has offered to negotiate the amendment or cancellation of the agreements under which the facilities were established. It has not been thought compatible with the dignity of the USG to accept unilateral cancellation of agreements made for the life of NATO. Nor has acceptance of unilateral cancellation seemed appropriate when the GOF simultaneously offered to discuss new agreements about reentry into France in time of war. The French government has not answered the offer to negotiate the agreements. The draft aide-memoire submitted by you to the President 2 seeks to make the record clear on this important point, without haggling about our withdrawal. What Can Be Negotiated and Its Importance The impressive fact is how little of any real importance is open to negotiation in the France-NATO crisis. The indisputable fact is that France wants everything French out of NATO, and everything NATO—especially everything American—out of France. This, if one may say so, poses a rather clear cut issue. In the political field it is paralleled by another equally clear cut difference. As was made clear to Senator Church in Paris recently, 3 the French government wants a European settlement by Europeans, i.e., by “the underlying reality of Europe … Russia in Eastern Europe and France, England and to a lesser extent Italy in Western Europe … the other countries of Europe were so much dust ….” The agreement would seek a “reunited Germany without nuclear arms and the withdrawal of foreign forces from such a Germany, including, of course, military forces of the United States.” To most Western Europeans simple mathematics makes this appear as Soviet domination of Europe. Our allies have not seen this issue of policy as a misunderstanding which can be talked out. The parties are not separated by details. They are poles apart. The NATO Fourteen, to be sure, have matters which must be talked out with the French; but they are of relatively minor importance. How insistent will the French be in pushing a hurried evacuation of NATO establishments? In limiting NATO overflights? In pinching off the flow of oil across France? Is it in the interest of NATO to cloak the withdrawal of France from the Alliance? How valuable is French liaison with the NATO commands, and how much reliance can be placed on an agreement to use French facilities in time of conflict. The matters which stand out from the mechanics of leaving France are: 1) The presence of French troops in Germany. 2) Allied overflights through French air space. 3) Continued transportation of oil across France. 4) Reentry rights into facilities in France in case of war. There is also a matter which concerns chiefly the United States—the termination of valid bilateral agreements. 1) The presence of French troops in Germany The presence of all foreign troops in Germany is governed by a series of agreements of 1954, one of which requires their being committed to NATO command in case of conflict. The French government has given notice of the cancellation of this commitment so far as their forces are concerned (two and one- third divisions and some air units) on July 1st. Both the Germans and the other allies have seen the issues raised here by the French as primarily political rather than military. The Germans have accordingly informed the French, with the unanimous concurrence of the other thirteen allies, that the continued presence of French troops in Germany would be welcomed provided a new agreement was reached regarding their mission and their commitment to SACEUR command in the time of conflict. To make this specific the note proposed that the transfer of command take place when all other troops in Germany should have come under SACEUR's command. This proposal was to resolve the ambiguity introduced by the French interpretation of the NAT as committing them to defend against “unprovoked” attack. Both French and German positions may be negotiable. Despite dialectical form, the heart of the allied position is that unless troops in Germany are unequivocally there on a joint allied defense mission under the treaty, their status reverts to occupation forces in what General De Gaulle described to Senator Church as a defeated and divided country. The divisive effect of such a result is a net loss to the Alliance. On the basis of current intelligence, the GOF is discussing this week whether or not to negotiate this matter. Apparently it would wish in any event to withdraw the troops after the February–March French elections. It may decide to do so during the summer. 2) Allied overflights through French air space The right to conduct military overflights in France is of very substantial importance to us and the Alliance. Without the use of French air space NATO air communications between Northern Europe and the Mediterranean area are possible only by following a long and wasteful route over the Atlantic. The right to continue training flights over France is equally important, since air space over Germany, the UK and the Benelux countries is not as suited for such flights because of traffic congestion and recurrent bad weather. Aware of this, the French have reduced overflight agreements with the U.S. and other NATO countries to a month-to-month basis. French need to overfly other NATO countries and to have access to information from the early warning system should provide the Alliance with strong bargaining position in negotiating continued overflight rights. Without such information and overflight rights the Force de Frappe would lose whatever credibility it now has. However, reports of General De Gaulle's discussion of this matter indicate he rules out the possibility of a Soviet attack on Europe, and hence regards of little immediate value French access to air defense information and foreign air space. Nevertheless, the situation itself puts some pressure on the GOF. To take an extreme position would be inconsistent with that of an ally. It would suggest more neutrality or hostility. This together with the keener appreciation of the situation held by the French military may maintain tolerable overflight rights. 3) Continued transportation of oil across France The last French aide-memoire, while contemplating ending the flow of oil across France through our pipeline to U.S. forces in Germany, indicated some realization of the high-handedness of this action. It suggested France might not insist upon terminating use in one year. This action is so outrageous as to warrant a rather full and public exploration of the grounds put forward as justification for it and a claim for just compensation for the nationalization of the facility. The aide-memoire recently forwarded to the President lays the foundation for this. 4) Reentry rights into facilities in France in case of war The GOF has offered to discuss this subject with the interesting qualification that it cover only situations in which both nations are at war. Since the only wars concerned are those which involve action under Article 5 of the NAT, the qualification indicates awareness of the possibility that the U.S. might be at war in Europe when France might not be. This qualification ought to be plumbed to see how firmly it is held and what it may mean. If significance is attached to it, the value of reentry rights obtainable is much diminished. One would certainly not be justified in placing much reliance on them in planning for the security of our large forces in Germany. Nevertheless, they would be worth negotiating to have a framework of agreement regarding, and possibly custodial forces maintaining, some facilities which another French government might make really useful. The exercise of negotiating the agreement, therefore, could well be worthwhile, as was the negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty. One can never tell when a document of this sort can come in handy. The United States would not be justified in making any concessions of importance to get it. Dean Acheson 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Attached to the source text are a transmittal memorandum from Acheson to Rusk, May 13, and a memorandum from Rusk to the President, also dated May 13, saying that the memorandum had been prepared at Rostow's suggestion and that he and McNamara agreed that it formed a good basis for further guidance on negotiations with France over NATO. 2 This particular draft has not been further identified. 3 Senator Church's conversation with De Gaulle on May 4 was summarized in telegram 7498 from Paris, May 5. (Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR W) His May 19 report to the President on his discussions with De Gaulle, Erhard, Wilson, and other European leaders is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, Vol. 3. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 164. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, May 17, 1966, 7:43 p.m. 2255. Subject: Spain, EEC and NATO. 1. Spanish Ambassador called on Under Secretary Ball May 16 to present aide-memoire re Spanish aims in Europe. 2 2. a. Ambassador said Spain seeks join in Common Market and in Western defense organization with full rights. Need for early action on application to EEC arose from growing Spanish trade deficit with Six. This caused by rising imports permitted by trade liberalization to conform to GATT and by increasing level EEC protection against Spanish exports as EEC customs union takes effect. Noted latest EEC Council decisions this regard. b. Spanish efforts to attain membership thus far delayed and obstructed for political reasons by Italy, Belgium and Netherlands motivated by ideological and sentimental considerations. Their opposition injurious to Spanish interests. c. Unless progress made on Spanish admittance to EEC, Spain would be obliged resort to discriminatory measures. This would include invocation GATT safeguard clauses for developing countries and refusal military and other facilities to states opposing Spanish admission to EEC. d. Germany understands that its access to Spanish facilities depends on support for Spanish participation in EEC. French also helpful. But Italians incomprehensibly opposed. Spain has assumed burden Italian defense by accepting Polaris missiles at Rota allowing withdrawal IRBM's from Italy. Yet, in return, Italy has extracted excessive commercial benefits within EEC which harmful to Spain. e. When NATO reformed Spain would hope to be associated in some way with new organization. 3. Spanish aide-memoire concluded that “Spanish Government is not requesting special action from USG.” But hoped USG would express support for Spanish inclusion in EEC to Community and support member governments acting on Spanish behalf. Spanish Ambassador added, speaking personally, that he was sure Spanish ForMin wished US would speak forcefully to Italy. 4. Under Secretary assured Ambassador of US concern for Spanish problems and recalled that US as well has difficulties with EEC agricultural policies. However, he was non-committal on specifics of Spanish demarche and avoided stating any US position on Spanish link with EEC. Under Secretary cautioned Spanish Ambassador that US would wish to give most careful consideration to Spanish aide-memoire. We were convinced that any intervention likely to provoke adverse reaction in view well-known sensitivity of Six. Noted that in view of current NATO crisis and problems in NATO/France relations these sensitivities likely to be heightened. 5. Comment: Department by no means clear from Ambassador's presentation and reports from addressee posts precisely what Spanish actually trying secure in relations with EEC—whether full membership, association as provided in Art. 238 Treaty of Rome, limited association on Austria model or some other commercial type relationship. 6. Posts should carefully observe same prudent and non-committal position re Spanish relation with EEC that Under Secretary took with Ambassador. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 SP. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas W. Fina (RPE) and Jacob M. Myerson (U), cleared by McKillop, and approved and initialed by Ball. Sent to 14 posts in Western Europe. 2 A memorandum of Ball's conversation with Ambassador Merry del Val to which is attached the aide-memoire is ibid., ECIN 6 EEC-SP. 165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson 165. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 18, 1966. SUBJECT NATO NATO is the next big item on the foreign policy agenda: —Erhard will be seeing Wilson on May 23, and we should decide whether you should reply to Wilson's long letter before then; —On June 6–8, NATO foreign ministers will be meeting as a group for the first time since De Gaulle made his move. We have been working with Thomson on a draft joint statement you should see before it becomes final. In the meantime, —Bob McNamara will be sending you his recommendations on relocation of NATO and U.S. facilities in a few days. 2 —On French troops in Germany (the hottest near-term political issue), the U.S.-UK-German working group in Bonn has circulated to the Fourteen its report on how we should negotiate. 3 It suggests a fairly tough initial line, and we shall have to decide what fallback position to take and when, in the light of a French reply which will come soon. —On other defense arrangements with France (overflights, the oil pipeline, wartime re-entry) we have a draft aide-memoire 4 which we have held at State's request until we could get your guidance on the general negotiating position. —Under Dean Acheson's chairmanship, State and Defense have been working hard on the nuclear issue, and on constructive proposals for the Alliance, in response to NSAM 345. 5 The nuclear part of the package will be ready at the end of the week. —You should consider a major speech on European policy before De Gaulle goes to Moscow (June 20). Many Europeans (including Lecanuet) 6 have suggested its wisdom at this stage. How we play our hand during the next several weeks will not only help determine the future shape of the Alliance, but will seriously affect German and European politics, and might even affect our own. We will need Presidential guidance specifically on: (1) our negotiating position on French troops in Germany, (2) whether to send another aide-memoire on defense arrangements to the French, and (3) our overall negotiating stance. There is a further reason for early Presidential involvement. Some of your advisers—notably Acheson and Ball—are a bit shellshocked from newspaper stories suggesting that they are at odds with you. This is bad business for us and makes the Europeans, particularly the Germans, uneasy. Your giving them a day in court, and then your personal guidance, should permit us to be—and appear to be—a united and purposeful government. Procedure At Tab A is a tight, crisp memo by Dean Acheson 7 which Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have agreed should serve as a basis for discussion with you. It covers all the major issues, but does not attempt to lay out negotiating strategy or tactics. After reading it—you will wish to read it in full—and perhaps an in-house session with the two of us, we recommend an early extended meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Ball, Acheson, et al. (One topic for discussion would be the draft aide-memoire at Tab B.) The rest of this memo contains our thoughts on what might be the agenda for such a meeting: (1) U.S. objectives in the NATO crisis; (2) De Gaulle's objectives; (3) our public position vis-a-vis De Gaulle; (4) our negotiating position on French troops in Germany; (5) whether to send an aide-memoire or communicate our response in some other way; and (6) general negotiating instructions. 1. U.S. Objectives There is little disagreement on essential U.S. interests. We must try to: —maintain an effective integrated deterrent, providing for the security of U.S. and Allied forces in Europe; —maintain solidarity among the Fourteen. (This requires that our position vis-a-vis the French appear to the others as reasonable on its merits, while generating sufficient realism and determination among the Fourteen to face the expensive problem posed for us by De Gaulle's high-handed and disruptive decisions. It also requires that we continue to make clear our commitment to an evolving constructive NATO, which can serve as a base for a policy of bridge-building to the East.) —minimize the strain on German politics by (1) helping Erhard resolve the French troops issue along lines most acceptable in terms of long-run German politics, and (2) by making generally clear that they can count on U.S. support when they want to be firm, and on U.S. understanding for any efforts to keep the Franco-German rift to a minimum; —impose a price on De Gaulle, while leaving an empty chair for France. (Punishing De Gaulle verbally is not serious or useful business. But it is essential for our security—and for the negotiation—that we be (and appear to be) capable of mounting an effective integrated deterrent without France. He remains, despite his stance, politically vulnerable in his domestic politics to isolation from the rest of the West.) 2. What De Gaulle is after How he actually will play his hand we don't know. He evidently wants maximum freedom of action and yet appear to the French people to have the protection of the Alliance. Much depends on what he gets or doesn't get in Moscow, and on the unity of the Fourteen. His operational goals in relation to NATO are probably somewhere on a spectrum bounded by: (a) a neutralist position: with French troops out of Germany; France out of NATO; and no special defense arrangements with the U.S. or other Allies; and (b) a diluted NATO: where France keeps her troops in Germany; maintains her membership in NATO planning groups and early warning network; permits allied overflights; and NAC remains in Paris. During his Moscow trip, it is a fair bet that he will try to get the Russians to hold out just enough of a promise of movement toward German unity to bedevil German political life without cutting the ground from under Ulbricht. If the Russians don't play, he is more likely to opt for a diluted NATO and against a neutralist position. What is clear, irrespective of what happens in Moscow, is that as a negotiator he will go to great lengths to be in a position of granting favors and not asking them. 3. The importance of how we look The safest bet is that except on overflights, the French will be unreasonable and negotiations will be unsuccessful. The issue which is not addressed in the Acheson memo is what posture we strike in testing De Gaulle's intentions. Here there is a difference of emphasis among your advisers: —Sect. Rusk, Ball, and Acheson believe that we must, both in public and private, talk about the serious consequences of De Gaulle's unilateral decisions, and to take a fairly hard line. Their reasons are: this is an expensive, difficult business he has imposed on us, and if we fudge over what he has done, the European (and perhaps U.S.) public, parliaments, and Congress will not put up the resources to maintain an integrated deterrent. The Italians and Danes, for example, might slide away towards detached positions; and the Germans might move towards bilateralism vis-a-vis both Paris and Washington. —Sect. McNamara doesn't want to argue with De Gaulle much, but simply get on with the job of building an integrated, streamlined deterrent without France, negotiating in the quietest way possible. —Bator has (in Rostow's view, correctly) emphasized for some time the need for us to take positions which (1) do not get beyond what Erhard can manage in domestic politics, and which (2) do not unduly strain political life in other NATO countries. He wants to be sure that, if De Gaulle will not accept those minimum conditions which we and the Germans must really insist upon, it will be clear to the world that De Gaulle alone is responsible for the breakdown—that the monkey is on his back. The State Department has tended to take positions a bit harder than those we could live with and let others water them down in negotiation. The other way to play it is to state positions closer to the minimum; hold to them; and avoid the charge of being unreasonable with De Gaulle. The State Department should be heard attentively, because they are on the firing line. But Rostow's net view (in which Bator concurs) is: —We probably will not be able to avoid some public discussion of De Gaulle's position, given Church, Fulbright, etc.; but that discussion and statements of our differences should be precise and temperate. —The key to the negotiation is action to put NATO in a position where it can live and operate with or without France. —We are strong enough to state moderate positions and hold to them in negotiations with both France and our Allies. The balance here is so delicate that each key issue must be looked at separately. 4. French troops in Germany—how we negotiate As you know, until now the French troops (2–1/3 divisions and some air units) have been committed to NATO command in time of crisis. De Gaulle has said that this commitment will end on July 1. The Germans maintain that commitment destroys the legal basis for keeping French troops on German soil. Whatever the legal case, French presence without a new agreement is unacceptable as a matter of German politics—it would smell of occupation . The Germans—with our full support—have told the French that their troops are welcome to stay “provided a new agreement is reached regarding their mission and their commitment to SACEUR command in time of conflict.” This condition is subject to several interpretations—the key is what we mean by “commitment” and whether we really mean SACEUR command (as opposed to some face-saving, common but two-hat command arrangement). The joint U.S./UK/German negotiating paper (which is now in the hands of the Fourteen) takes a tough initial line—insisting that the French publicly undertake a commitment to assign these troops to NATO when those members of the Alliance with troops in Germany agree that a state of emergency exists. He is thus asked to give up a veto which he now holds as a full member of NATO and to undertake a commitment formally tougher than, for example, ours. On the other hand, the question is posed because of the unilateral actions he has taken. Nobody thinks De Gaulle will agree to this; it is meant as an opening tactic from which we are willing to retreat. The question is how and when. (The “when” is critical because it was agreed between McCloy and the Germans in Bonn that a new German-French agreement must be under negotiation by July 1, or the French must begin withdrawing their troops.) The outlines of a reasonable fall-back position are fairly clear . We would ask De Gaulle to commit France: (1) to a meaningful military mission for the two divisions; (2) to join in peacetime planning and joint maneuvers; (3) to place her forces under common command in time of crisis; (4) to reaffirm Article V of the Treaty (the mutual security provision) without any qualification. The ball is now in the French court. Our intelligence indicates that De Gaulle will ignore our maximum conditions and inform the Germans he will remove his troops by July 1, 1967. He will try to blame the Germans—and us—for not making an agreement, and strengthen rising domestic pressures on Erhard to soften his line. Whatever he does, we must avoid being subject to the charge that we presented impossible conditions to the French and that De Gaulle's negative response is justified. It must be understood that our initial offer is just that. The operational questions are: —whether we let a confrontation build in this matter between now and July 1; or —whether we indicate to the French that we could live with something short of the initial proposal; —and, if so, by what route we put on the record that our proposal was not a final proposal, and that it is De Gaulle (and not the Germans, U.S., UK) who is being unreasonable. Operationally, we must await the French reply and then consult closely the Germans and others. 5. Whether to send the aide-memoire The Aide-Mémoire is a formal list of sharply stated specific questions and legal positions having to do with overflights, wartime re-entry, use of our oil pipeline across France, etc. The issue is not whether these questions get asked, but how —whether we ask them in a formal aide-memoire, which will be in the papers the next day, or through private Rusk/Lucet or Bohlen/Couve conversations based on an informal list of questions. The status of these defense issues varies. On overflights, we may be able to strike a straightforward bargain: overflights in return for continued French access to NATO air defense information and air space. The pipeline issue is tougher (and is discussed in detail in the aide-memoire). However we handle it, we will probably want to make our own separate alternative arrangements. The question of access to French facilities in wartime is also cloudy, but probably worth trying to negotiate. (In each case—and whatever bargain we strike—our military planning will have to be hedged for the possibility that the French will not perform.) The issue of whether to send the aide-memoire comes down to whether we want another public show of our legal position or a quiet clarification —knowing throughout that we are unlikely to be satisfied whichever tack we take. The two of us would vote for the quiet approach; but before making up your mind, you should hear the case for the aide-memoire from Sect. Rusk, Ball, and Acheson. 6. General negotiating instructions After going through these papers and hearing the arguments, you will wish to give marching orders on our general negotiating position. We would suggest that, in a Rusk/McNamara, et al, meeting, you make clear that: (1) in our public position you want to minimize any suggestion of a direct Washington/Paris confrontation; (2) if public exposition of our differences is required, it should be in terms of an integrated military alliance versus bilateralism or fragmentation of the West; (3) you do not wish the U.S. to be in a position of begging anything of the French; (4) we should proceed with the Allies to plan the prompt movement of people and equipment out of France; (5) on French troops in Germany, you wish us to be exactly as sturdy as Erhard, but we should not push him into positions that are costly in terms of his domestic politics unless he is pressured by his Gaullists into positions which would endanger the security of our troops, or the integrity of NATO command arrangements; (6) with respect to Allied overflights and French access to Allied communications and intelligence, we should indicate our hope that both can be maintained; but our planning should be based on the possibility that we shall have to operate without overflights; we should make clear to the French that we regard these two as an inextricable package; (7) with respect to the NATO oil pipeline, we should plan for a capability sufficient to help defend Western Europe without reliance on the French, while seeing what we can negotiate after De Gaulle's return from Moscow; (8) without public acknowledgment, our plans and actions should convey that we are moving to maintain an effective collective defense without France, while trying to make fair and even-handed arrangements to keep France in a close working relationship with the Alliance. Our willingness to do without the French—and our actions which indicate our preparedness to do without them—constitute our best negotiating cards, given De Gaulle's sensitivity to “isolation”; but in fact as well as in posture there is enough ambiguity in De Gaulle's commitment so that it would be imprudent to be dependent on France, during his time, in a period of crisis or conflict. Walt FMB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Box 7, Vol. 3. Secret. 2 A copy of McNamara 's recommendations, dated May 25, which stated that the Department of Defense was prepared to move U.S. personnel and facilities out of France as promptly as practicable, is ibid., Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 28, NATO Bilateral Negotiations. 3 A copy of this report was transmitted in telegram 3661 from Bonn, May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 4 This draft of the aide-memoire is attached as Tab B to the source text, but is not printed. 5 Document 159 . 6 Jean Lecanuet, French Senator. 7 Document 163 . 166. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 166. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 1 Washington, May 19, 1966. [Here follow 2 paragraphs on unrelated matters.] Met George Ball and Dean Acheson this afternoon to talk over an informal agenda for our meeting with the President. Dean will argue in favor of his draft aide-memoire to the French; 2 George will propose the text of a letter to Prime Minister Wilson to be delivered prior to the Erhard visit to London on Monday. 3 We reported to the President at 6 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. Those present were Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Acheson, Bruce, Moyers, Bator, Rostow. The first matter considered was the proposed letter to Harold Wilson; the import of it was to warn the PM not to be too exacting in his attitude toward the Germans next week, and to avoid freezing policy on the nuclear sharing issue. It was decided to amplify the message in a redraft, but the President approved the underlying principle. Next, Dean Acheson was asked to comment on his memorandum concerning matters that might be raised in negotiations with France over NATO. 4 Dean felt the most important ones were: (1) The presence of French troops in Germany; (2) Allied overflights through French air space; (3) Continued transportation of oil across France; (4) Reentry rights into facilities in France in case of war. The termination of valid bilateral agreements between the United States and France, denounced unilaterally by France, concerned us but was not an alliance affair. Acheson believes there is probably not much to be gained substantively in negotiating these items, but we should at least go through the motions, and establish a record. Consideration of this paper spilled over into discussion of a draft aide-memoire suggested as an answer to that of the French Government sent us on April 22, 1966. The President must have been primed in advance to object to it, for his first comment was he wanted nothing of this sort committed to writing, since he would find it reproduced in the New York Times , and elsewhere, before its delivery in Paris. This led him into what seemed to me a wholly intemperate attack on United States officials who had assailed President De Gaulle for his NATO stance. I confess I was not sufficiently familiar with what Max Frankel, Ben Welles, and other journalists cited by him have written to judge whether there was any real basis for LBJ's criticism of officials' speeches and testimony before Congressional Committees. I do, however, believe LBJ's hypersensitivity to newspaper gossip is disturbing, unwise, and undignified. It is never difficult to ignite the Acheson powder magazine, and the President's spark set off an explosion. Dean said he resented the President's inferences about his own statements, as well as what he had said about George Ball. Acheson was furious, so was the President. Ball asked whether LBJ had ever read George's speech to which he had referred as injudiciously attacking the General. 5 The President said he had not, but his policy was that no one in the Administration should contravene his orders about being scrupulously polite in references to the General. The fat sizzled in the fire for quite a time. Dean Rusk tried diversionary tactics, and McNamara finally intervened effectively with a discourse on military complications in NATO. Acheson visibly seethed in silence; LBJ looked like a human thundercloud. It was an unpleasant experience. Eventually, the question posed by the paper was resolved by compromise; Rusk will talk about it with Couve de Murville at Brussels in early June. I responded to a Presidential inquiry with reflections on what I thought were the cardinal problems raised by the French defection from NATO. [Here follow 10 paragraphs on unrelated matters.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 2 See footnote 4, Document 165 . 3 A copy of this draft, which is generally the same as Document 168 , is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. 4 Document 163 . 5 For text of Ball's April 29 speech, see Department of State Bulletin, May 16, 1966, pp. 762–768. 167. Memorandum of Conversation 167. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 20, 1966. SUBJECT President's Conversation with Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium—NATO PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side: The President Ambassador Knight Ambassador Symington Mr. Rostow Mr. Bator Mr. Stoessel Mr. Toumayan (interpreter) Belgian Side: Foreign Minister Harmel Ambassador Scheyven Viscount Davignon, Chief de Cabinet of the Foreign Minister The President said he was delighted to welcome the Foreign Minister to the United States. He hoped he could reciprocate the hospitality which he had received in Belgium. 2 The Foreign Minister said that it was a great privilege for him to salute the President on behalf of his country and he was greatly appreciative that the President had found it possible to receive him. He noted that he had had useful conversations with Secretary Rusk, Mr. Ball and other officials, which were very important in view of the preparations for the NATO Ministerial meeting to be held in Brussels in June. 3 The Foreign Minister continued that he attached great importance to the President's declaration of May 3 concerning relations with Europe. 4 He believed that an integrated defense has been essential in the past and will remain so for the future. He hoped that it would be possible to have an integrated defense among the 15 partners of NATO, and he wished to stress the number 15. However, if this proved to be impossible, then the remaining 14 should continue to adhere to the concept of integration. The Alliance should be organized so as to be effective in an operational sense; if it were not, it would be simply a paper alliance and it might be better not to have it. The Foreign Minister said that another thought expressed by the President on May 3, which was very close to the views of Belgium, was that the moment has come to develop, within as well as outside of the Alliance, humanitarian and cultural ties between Eastern and Western Europe. He was very happy to know that the President was thinking along these lines. The President responded that he concurred heartily with what the Foreign Minister had said, and he welcomed the opportunity to reiterate his interest and deep concern regarding all developments in Europe. The President was glad that the Foreign Minister had such strong feelings about the necessity for the Allies to remain united on the basis of the 15 members, if possible, or of the 14 members in any case. The President hoped that the forthcoming Ministerial meeting in Brussels would be a fruitful one, and he knew that the Foreign Minister would play a leading role in its deliberations. The President emphasized the need in this critical stage for complete understanding and unity among the Allies. The President said that he believed it was bad manners to speak harshly of De Gaulle or engage in an acrimonious exchange with him. However, this should not be construed by anyone as a lack of concern on his part with De Gaulle's policies. This had been expressed in many ways and the American people today feel more strongly than ever about the need for unity. The President deeply regretted the divisions and difficulties in the Alliance. We should not brood about these, however, and it was good that the 14 wished to join together in adversity. He hoped that a strengthening of the Alliance would result from the June meeting. The President inquired as to the Foreign Minister's thoughts concerning De Gaulle's forthcoming visit to Moscow. He, himself, did not know what would come of it, although he doubted if the 14 would get much solace from the visit. The Foreign Minister replied that he had asked a number of European statesmen about De Gaulle's motivations, but in vain. We shall see what happens. But in any case, he did not believe that external events should govern our acts in the Alliance. He felt it was our duty to solidify the Alliance and to seize the opportunity of the Brussels meeting for this purpose. In response to the President's inquiry as to his views concerning the question of French troops in Germany, the Foreign Minister said that the matter had been posed by the German note in very precise terms, but the recent French reply seemed to evade a response. 5 He thought that the matter should be clearer by the time of the meeting in Brussels. The Foreign Minister commented that he would prefer to take up the problem of the Alliance in its entirety rather than focus on the presence or absence of French troops in Germany. The President asked the Foreign Minister's views regarding the relocation of SHAPE and the North Atlantic Council and wondered what popular and political reactions might be if these installations were located in Belgium. The Foreign Minister responded that it would be well to consider the problem in the context of the overall situation of the Alliance. Moreover, before giving its answer, Belgium would wish to be assured that the other Allies were united in their views. He thought this could be confirmed at Brussels. In any case, his own belief was that the political and military organs of the Alliance should not be separated but should be located close together as they had been in France. This should hold true regardless of the country of location. The Foreign Minister noted that he understood from Brosio, the Secretary General of the Council, that the Council was now looking in the direction of Benelux for a relocation site. It would be necessary for the Benelux countries to consider the technical as well as the political ramifications and this was already under way. Although the Benelux study had not been completed, the Foreign Minister could say that his view was that, if it appears it is the duty of the Benelux to accept the NATO installations, he could not see how the Benelux could fail to fulfill such a duty. The Foreign Minister said the first results of the investigation into the reaction of public opinion in Belgium to the possibility of relocating the NATO installations in Belgium had been positive. So far as the political side is concerned, the Foreign Minister had consulted with the leaders of the majority and minority parties just before coming to the United States and their initial reactions had not been unfavorable. The Foreign Minister noted that he had agreed to consult his Benelux colleagues before taking further action on this matter and he asked that the friends of Belgium “trust her” for the few remaining weeks prior to the Brussels meeting. He stressed that he did not wish to receive an official bid concerning the relocation of NATO installations before the Brussels conference. In closing, the President once again mentioned his high regard for the Foreign Minister's leadership. He said that he was dedicated to the preservation of peace and the security of the Alliance and he hoped that progress could be made at the Brussels meeting. He appreciated very much the Belgian attitude of cooperation and support, which was so important in the present difficult times. 1 Source: Department of Sate, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel. The source text is labeled “Part I of II Parts.” A summary of the discussion, which was held at the White House, was transmitted to the NATO capitals in circular telegram 2292, May 21. (Ibid., POL 7 BEL) 2 JOHNSON visited Belgium in November 1963. 3 A summary of these conversations was transmitted to the NATO capitals in circular telegram 2297, May 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 BER) 4 For text of Johnson's statement on May 3, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 475–478. 5 For texts of the May 3 German note, and the May 18 French reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 340–343. 168. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 168. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, May 21, 1966, 0005Z. CAP 66307. President to Prime Minister. I have given further thought and study to the problems posed for us by General De Gaulle's decisions and I hope to send you my thoughts on these matters in the near future. Meanwhile, Dean Rusk and George Ball have had a good visit with George Thomson 2 and I think we are in basic agreement as to how to proceed. As you may have noted in my talk on the occasion of the Polish millennium, 3 I share your view that we should actively explore possibilities for the east from our Atlantic base. I know Chancellor Erhard will be visiting you next week, and your talks can be very important: taking account of the comments in your letter of March 29, 4 I would like to make several points that may be relevant to those talks. The heart of the matter is this: so long as France and Germany were working closely together to build an integrated Europe there was some assurance of stability in German policy and attitudes. Now that France is no longer taking part in this joint effort—and, indeed, placing heavy pressure on German political life—there is grave danger that the Germans will over time feel that they have been cast adrift. A growing sense of uncertainty and insecurity on their part could lead to a fragmentation of European and Atlantic relations which would be tragic for all of us. On our part, we cannot risk the danger of a rudderless Germany in the heart of Europe. On the other hand, any exaggerated bilateral relationship between the United States and Germany offers many disadvantages. I believe, therefore, that it is imperative for our three countries to stay as close as possible to each other. On that basis Europe and the Atlantic world can be rallied. Such a relationship will be healthy and lasting only if it is based on the concept of German equality with the other major European countries. We have seen before an attempt to keep Germany in second class status. It failed then and it would fail again. In this circumstance, we should make a special effort to maintain the closest unity of action with the Germans during the coming months of tension. I am sure, therefore, that it would not serve our common interests now to try to press the Chancellor to accept a nuclear solution that he might consider at variance with the concept of equality. As you know, the United States did not invent the nuclear issue. We have simply tried to respond to concerns expressed by others. These concerns first became evident when, in December 1957 the NATO heads of government agreed that missiles of strategic range should be placed at the disposal of SACEUR. Both your government and mine saw serious disadvantages in national land-based deployment of these missiles. That is why the proposal for a joint sea-based force was first developed. The British Government stated in December 1962 that they would “use their best endeavours” in closest consultation with our NATO allies to develop a multilateral sea-based force. In December 1964 you put forward the alternative proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force. I agreed that this should be fairly and fully discussed among the interested countries. We used our best efforts to guide German thinking along this line. A year later Chancellor Erhard gave a memorandum reflecting German views which went a long way to meet your proposals. 5 Against this background, it seems important that we not leave the Germans under the impression that we have shifted our views just when they were moving towards us or that we do not take the Chancellor's proposal seriously. I do not mean at all that I am wedded to any particular solution to this problem. We are doing staff work over the whole range of options. We should not foreclose any of them. I hope this will also be your view and that none of our three governments will freeze its position until we all discuss this question more fully. It seems to me that what is at stake in all of this is a political question of the deepest moment: Germany's relations with the West. In the context of the present crisis, the pressures on the Germans it has already generated, and the likelihood that those pressures will increase as French diplomatic maneuvers add further confusion, we must all keep together. In the long pull, I am sure that the one best hope of stability and peace lies in the inclusion of Germany in a larger European unity, in which any latent nationalistic drives can be submerged. I am sure, also, that you and your country hold the key to this possibility and that you can play a role of great leadership in Europe. When all is said and done, no one has come up with a better formula than that of European unity and Atlantic partnership, and I doubt that anyone will. Sincerely, End of message. 6 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information, but a shorter draft is attached to a May 19 memorandum from Ball to the President. (Ibid.) 2 Thomson visited Washington May 16–17 primarily to work on a draft aide-memoire that the NATO Allies would send to France on the future of the Alliance. The text of the resulting draft was transmitted to the NATO capitals in circular telegram 2258, May 18. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 3 See footnote 4, Document 167 . 4 Document 149 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 119 . 6 On May 26, Wilson sent the President a 3-page summary of his talks with Erhard, which he said went “very well indeed.” The Prime Minister also expressed his agreement with the need to maintain the closest unity of action with the West Germans in the difficult period ahead. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262) 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, May 23, 1966, 4:05 p.m. 3184. NATUS. Please deliver following letter from Secretary to Schroeder: “Dear Gerhard: I have been giving consideration to what we might most usefully attempt to accomplish in the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels. 2 The fourteen Ministers will, of course, be meeting separately on June 6 prior to the formal opening the next day. We hope that it will be possible in this meeting to get some basic decisions made on relocation of SHAPE and AFCENT and hopefully on the types of reorganization of NATO military structure which we might seek. I intend to stress strongly the US desire to move the North Atlantic Council from Paris, preferably to Brussels, due to our conviction that it must be collocated with NATO's higher military direction. I hope that we can all do some preliminary work on the few of our colleagues who still seem to be reluctant to face this issue, so that a decision in principle can be made at Brussels. We have had extremely good meetings with George Thomson and Foreign Minister Harmel during the course of this past week. I found the attitude of both a cause for encouragement, and the aide-memoire produced by the British 3 can be a useful vehicle for reaching decisions at Brussels. I would like in my own remarks at Brussels to stress the theme that NATO should be developed further as an instrument for moving towards settlement of East-West problems. As some observers have pointed out, De Gaulle's challenge to NATO is, in one important respect, based on the presumption that he, acting alone, can do more to promote European detente than can NATO and that NATO in fact, in its present form, is an obstacle to the promotion of more favorable East-West relations. I consider this a most dangerous view. As you know, I believe that it is only by the Western nations acting in concert and by continuing to keep our defenses credible that the conditions for ultimate solution of East-West difficulties can be enhanced. We must, of course, be careful to combat the impression that NATO is merely a military Alliance, that its hour of need has passed and that defense of NATO is simply defense of the status quo. Therefore, I think we should demonstrate publicly at Brussels that NATO has an equal concern in moving towards improvement of relations with the East and that NATO, as an organization, is seeking an expansion of its political role in augmenting East-West contacts. I do not myself believe that there are major opportunities close at hand for securing fundamental changes in East-West relations or that the time is ripe for presenting basic new proposals. It will continue to be a slow and gradual process, but we should continue to work at it. I feel quite keenly that one of our needs in the present crisis is to combat impressions of 'immobilisme.' NATO, if it is to survive and flourish, must demonstrate increasingly its capability to serve as a serious forum for the consideration of new approaches to the problems which still beset our common relations with the Communist world. I believe it would be useful if a number of us could strike this theme in our remarks at Brussels, and I would welcome your views on this question. 4 Sincerely, Dean Rusk“ Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Spiers; cleared by Ball, Acheson, Schaetzel, and GER; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris. 2 On May 21, the Department of State transmitted to the other NATO capitals its basic position for the Ministerial Meeting. The positions outlined here are the same as those transmitted on May 21. (Circular telegram 2296; ibid.) 3 See footnote 2, Document 168 . 4 On May 27, Schroeder replied that he shared Rusk's views, particularly on the role of NATO in resolving East-West problems. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) 170. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 170. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, May 27, 1966, 7:28 p.m. 2349. 1. Jean Rey of EEC Commission, exuding optimism, concluded useful Washington visit with general exchange views with Secretary and Under Secretary. Following based on uncleared memo of conversation 2 subject to change, and is FYI and Noforn. 2. Secretary and Ball assured Rey there should be no question about changes in our policy and attitude toward Europe. We would welcome unified Europe conveying sense of dynamic momentum and generating ideas for facing future in close partnership with US. Ball pointed out American voices are heard urging abandonment support for European integration as dream which had not worked, in favor of thesis that better policy would be detente from Atlantic to Urals and acceptance of perpetuation of traditional role of national states. Nevertheless, US continued to believe that most effective, most stable and most promising American approach to Europe was support for unification movement in which UK would play full role. He and Secretary asserted overriding US interest lay in pursuit concept Western unity and not in return to divisive nationalism of other days. 3. Rey expressed satisfaction with these views and pointed out that EEC crisis had proven that Community idea was stronger than individual national states. He noted crisis ended and France returned to Brussels when Five demonstrated Treaty and Community would go on with or without France. He added that recent agricultural financing decisions were most far-reaching steps in integration process to date and that growing strength of Community was also demonstrated by its power of attraction for EFTA states, particularly UK where remarkable evolution in Labor view had taken place. 4. In reply to Secretary's question as to whether EEC and KR matters could be insulated from NATO crisis, Rey remarked that Commission had been concerned by this issue in March but that six governments were agreed that effort should be made to keep matters separate. He said this had been an issue in Germany where Schroeder had argued that it politically impossible to agree on agricultural financing involving large benefits for France at same time French were attacking NATO. However, Erhard, on Schmuecker urging, had taken position that “temporary NATO crisis” should not be allowed to endanger “permanent European Community”. Rey added that situation could of course change if French went too far, for example during De Gaulle visit to Moscow. 5. Secretary asked if Commission and member governments understood time pressures on KR and political importance of concluding negotiations well before expiration TEA. He said he regularly stressed to other Foreign Ministers success was essential if US and Atlantic nations were to sustain policies of trade liberalization. Failure would raise major political questions. Rey assured Secretary that point was fully understood by all Community members and said no one was disposed to challenge deadline for conclusion negotiations by end February 1967. He expressed confidence that EEC decisions would be taken before end of July which would permit conclusion of negotiations in six months of intensive work beginning September 1. 6. Rey also told Secretary how impressed he had been with Secretary Freeman's exposition of US agricultural policies. While there had been doubt in Europe about US policy towards agriculture in KR, Freeman had correctly pointed out situation in which US giving massive food aid to LDCs while others, including EEC, closed commercial markets would be impossible. Rey said Freeman's clear statement would be most useful to Commission in upcoming agricultural ministerial discussions of EEC grains proposals. Secretary emphasized that if peace preserved world food problem would be most important single preoccupation of coming years and that it was essential Europeans also pitch in since neither US nor LDCs could fill gap by themselves. Rey agreed. 7. Rey also expressed satisfaction with indications that movement to reconcile Western differences over trade preferences is developing, mentioning abandonment of Brasseur Plan by Europeans and hints that US in OECD was adopting more flexible position. Under Secretary said it seemed to him perfectly possible that over time common position on preference problems could emerge. Excepting special Nigeria case, he thought regional preference systems were eroding and he sensed that general view was developing that to extent preferences were desirable at all, they should be non-discriminatory. While Rey cited need for common position before UNCTAD II, Ball was noncommittal on timing of any eventual agreement. 8. Details of conversations with Governor Herter and others on KR issues will be reported separately. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Confidential. Drafted by Hinton, cleared by U and E, and approved by Schaetzel. Sent to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, and Geneva. 2 Not found. 171. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 171. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 28, 1966 2 . SUBJECT The Nuclear Problem in NATO This paper responds to the nuclear portion of NSAM 345. 3 A later paper will deal with other aspects. We propose, as a first step, tripartite talks in Washington between the U.S., British and German foreign and defense ministers to narrow differences and, if possible, determine a program each will support. Such discussions will take place in a climate set by the French crisis in NATO, and by the increasing grasp of the realities of nuclear warfare resulting from Working Group III consultations. In the February meeting, Working Group III agreed that sufficient strategic forces exist for deterrence, but that if used they cannot protect NATO countries from unacceptable damage. In the April meeting, the Working Group agreed that enough tactical weapons are on hand, that tactical nuclear war in NATO Europe requires more study and planning, and, most significantly, that it is “difficult to predict whether it would be of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in aggression less than general war in Allied Command Europe.” This is the first real allied appreciation of the problems associated with the use of nuclear weapons. Further study will reveal to the Working Group the gaping holes in all strategic options. 1. The threat of instant and massive retaliation is a deterrent, but in execution may be virtually suicidal. 2. The conventional defense—that is, a non-nuclear defense adequate to require an enemy to mount so substantial an attack as to assume the onus of nuclear war—by reason of recent events, seems less attainable than heretofore. 3. Tactical nuclear war, as Working Group III concluded, is full of uncertainties. Further study may produce elements which both strengthen defense and remain controllable, such as nuclear demolition defenses, air defenses, and antisubmarine tactics, used in friendly territory or at sea. Other similar tactical nuclear plateaus may emerge. All such measures, however, have obvious limits of effectiveness. 4. The war at sea, based on naval blockade, is feasible and has political leverage, but cannot in itself apply sufficient pressure to stop land operations. Perhaps, in time, a coherent strategy can be built on some combination of the conventional defense, tactical nuclear weapons, and the war at sea. The combination of the NATO-France crisis, and the developing realization of the strategic uncertainties listed above, raises the possibility of allied—and particularly German—concerns during NATO negotiations with the French and during the course of the Working Group studies. It is important, therefore, to develop now as comforting a common goal as possible, and to produce a sense of movement toward it. This is the primary purpose of the measures proposed in this paper. The enclosures outline: (1) NATO nuclear consultation measures without a NATO Nuclear Force, and (2) alternative possibilities for a NATO Nuclear Force. 4 Neither contemplates initial French participation, but could provide for France to join when and if she wished. We hope for a Presidential decision authorizing discussions with the British and German ministers, and an indication from the President of what proposals the U.S. representative may put forward at such a conference. Dean Rusk Robert S. McNamara 5 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information, but in a May 24 memorandum to Ball, Acheson reported that the memorandum was written under his direction, cleared with the Department of Defense, AEC, and JCS, and that McNamara had suggested a number of changes that had been incorporated into the paper. 2 McNamara's signature is dated May 24; Rusk's May 28. 3 Document 159 . 4 Neither printed. 5 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 172. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk 172. Letter From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Paris, June 3, 1966. Dear Dean: In the hopes that it might be useful to you in connection with the Brussels discussion, I am giving you here a very stark outline—perhaps a little too stark for telegraphic reporting—of what I believe de Gaulle generally has in mind. Bits of this have already been reported, but I am trying to set it forth in simple outline. As you know, any analysis of De Gaulle requires a great deal of guessing, and the only thing you can hope for is that it is knowledgeable and reasonably intelligent. The following summation is based upon everything I have been able to find out, both by reading and talking, around here about De Gaulle's policies. De Gaulle is in a hurry because he realizes that he has not many more years of activity as President of France and therefore is telescoping, perhaps dangerously, some of the stages of a policy which I think he has had in mind for years and years. From his writing it is apparent that he always envisaged the emergence of Europe after the war as a third power center in the world to match the United States and the Soviet Union. He considers that the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, at best were conceived under different circumstances, were at worst even in error at the time of their creation. He obviously takes in his public utterances the former position, but his purpose now it seems to me very clearly is a desire to destroy the “ideological blocs”, whatever cause may have been their coming into existence, because they now constitute one of the obstacles to the creation of Europe as a whole. He had started this process by proceeding against the organization for I believe tactical, political reasons, since it has been advantageous to him domestically to present France as faithful to the alliance although withdrawing from the organization. I do not believe we should be for a minute fooled by this attempt to carry water on both shoulders. In the first place, De Gaulle in his letter to the President has seriously modified French obligations to Article V through the use of the “unprovoked” aggression formula. Also, as you know, we have reported information from a reliable source that De Gaulle's original intention was to denounce the treaty but was dissuaded from this step by Pompidou 2 and Couve de Murville. There is a high degree of probability that after the elections in March, particularly if they turn out as he hopes, De Gaulle will go further and announce his determination to withdraw from the treaty in 1969. De Gaulle obviously hopes that the example he has set in regard to NATO will over a number of years be followed by similar actions in regard to the Warsaw Pact, although he must realize that the control in this instance lies completely in the hands of the Russians and that the Romanian frolics do not really have much effect on the military situation of Europe. The real danger in my view of De Gaulle's policy is its effect on Germany. As you know better than I do, the Germans are [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] sensitive to shifts or changes in Western attitude, and De Gaulle's anti-German line and wooing of the Soviets has certainly not passed unnoticed in Bonn. It seems to me therefore that the real ultimate danger of his policy, if consistently pursued, would lie theoretically in the possibility of provoking another Soviet-German deal. If the Germans became discouraged by the attitude of Western support, and I must mention here my doubts as to the line used in NATO for East/West “detente”, and became convinced that everybody was rushing to ingratiate themselves with Russia, it would not be too long in my opinion before some [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] German nationalist of the type of Strauss 3 began to indulge in a little secret footwork with Moscow. I am sure you will agree that one of the cardinal principles of Soviet foreign policy has always been the advantages to the Soviet Union of an arrangement with Germany. However, on the other side I must likewise state my conviction that it lies within the power of the U.S. and our allies to prevent De Gaulle's policy from coming into fruition. It is very doubtful if he will get much satisfaction from Moscow, and given the nature of De Gaulle he might do another switch and begin to pursue a more anti-Soviet policy. The great fallacy in my opinion of De Gaulle's policy is his belief that France is important in Soviet eyes. This of course is not true and I would see no problem for the Russians in ditching De Gaulle for the sake of an agreement either with Germany or the United States. I hope you will excuse my putting this down for you, but as I say I thought it might conceivably be helpful. As you see, it involves a good deal of speculation, and I would prefer to do it in this form. Sincerely, Charles E. Bohlen 4 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, Rusk. Confidential; Personal. 2 Georges Pompidou, French Prime Minister. 3 Franz-Josef Strauss, former West German Defense Minister. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 173. Memorandum by the Acheson Group 173. Memorandum by the Acheson Group 1 Undated. MEASURES TO INCREASE THE COHESION OF NATO AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY This paper responds to that part of NSAM 345 which directs the development of proposals to increase the cohesion of NATO and the North Atlantic community. Introduction The most dangerous ultimate outcome of the disintegrating forces set in motion by French secession from NATO would be a similar shift of Germany from integration with the West to political and military unilateralism. Measures designed to deal with the French defection should therefore aim at or be consistent with enhanced German integration in NATO and the West; they should prove the worth of NATO, especially to the Germans, and strengthen the cooperative relations within and through the organization. While the European Community is not the subject of this memorandum, its existence as a vital constructive force in Europe and its future prospects are closely related to the goals of this memorandum—particularly the maintenance of an institutional framework within which Germany can live. The Common Market has withstood De Gaulle's assaults. In time England will surely become a part of this Community. In the meantime, while we defend and strengthen NATO we must also give continuing U.S. support to the European Community and the cause of a united Europe. I NATO's Principal Political Function—Preparation for Settlement in Central Europe. Since NATO military forces and U.S. nuclear support have greatly lessened the threat of military attack, NATO's cohesion will rest quite as much on its political basis. In short, NATO is not merely a military structure to prepare a collective defense against military aggression, but also a political organization to preserve the peace of Europe. More specifically, as long as the German problem remains the chief danger point, the basic political function of the alliance is the collective management of the German-Soviet relationship in the unsettled Central European setting that emerged from World War II. In this function the Federal Republic should participate as a confederate, and not a ward, of the other allies. A multilateral system of military integration in peacetime, embodying the whole of the German military forces, is a prerequisite for exercising this function. Emphasizing, clarifying, and implementing NATO's political function is central to its cohesion during the present strains. The first step is to bring home to the NATO allies the need for an agreed NATO policy regarding the division of Europe and the division of Germany. Europe is full of demands for a political initiative, for not leaving the field of East-West relations to General De Gaulle, for a detente with Eastern Europe. But there is very little understanding that all this is meaningless unless action stems from an agreed policy for healing the division of Europe and Germany on a sound, equal, and lasting basis. The object of policy should not be to devise a settlement. Fifteen years of meetings have proved that impossible. The object should be common action to improve the environment which could make discussion of settlement meaningful and not merely a move in a propaganda war. This suggests a look at the existing environment. 1) Present Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union The last ten years have been a period of change. But academic experts and governmental officials agree that the Eastern European countries are still Communist regimes, wedded to their political theology, unwilling to lose political control, and facing serious economic difficulties. These countries are filled with suspicion not only of the West but of one another. Thus, while undeniably there has been change, it is significant more in terms of what previously existed than in comparison with change in any of the Western nations. Then there is the special problem of East Germany. The GDR has the highest standard of living of any of the Eastern European states. It is the Soviet Union's most important trading partner and supplies advanced industrial exports. The twenty Soviet divisions in East Germany, and their line of supply across Poland, are the keystone of Soviet political and military hegemony over Eastern Europe. In a word, the status quo in East Germany is a vital national interest of the USSR. An active U.S. and Western European policy towards Eastern Europe has both limitations and traps. 2) Cautions Regarding Approach Approach to this complicated problem requires realistic appreciation within the United States and among our Allies of the probabilities and tempo of change in attitude of the East and, more particularly, of the narrow limits of change imposed by the facts of the situation. In Eastern Europe certain individuals and groups are cautiously trying to loosen dictatorial controls, while each of the states is attempting with varying degrees of success to lessen dependence on the Soviet Union. Western fanfare or the spotlight of public approval turned on these individuals and groups, rather than helping them, is more likely to end their efforts. Furthermore, a more liberal Western policy ought not to be identified too closely with NATO. The NAT is a military treaty. A more flexible Western policy will be vulnerable to Soviet attack and Eastern European suspicion if this policy and NATO are tied together. At every stage in policy making and execution scrupulous attention must be paid to German interests and sensitivities. The Germans will be difficult, at times irrational, and slow to move. They are, after all, in the difficult position of being under attack by De Gaulle and feared by their weaker Western neighbors. To be insensitive to German views, or to override them, would sacrifice a vital Western interest. As we have seen in the past, many of the Western nations (particularly the Scandinavians and the British) fail to see the intransigence of the East, look upon the Germans as the obstacle, and often seek solutions at the expense of German interests. Finally, the dangers that detente will become the current foreign policy fad are considerable. To our allies it could be, at the beginning, an excuse for even more inadequate defense contributions, and, ultimately, a bitter and disillusioning let down. To the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states it might appear as a more suave attempt at “roll back” by dividing and weakening our opponents. This would be a misfortune since it would defeat the purpose of the policy and open us to an effective propaganda charge that the U.S. lags behind its allies in opening peaceful intercourse across the division in Europe. 3) Suggestions for Improving the Environment in Central Europe Attached at Tab A 2 are a series of suggested steps that may improve the Central European environment. They obviously vary in importance and merit. Their importance, after they have been culled over, may be, first, in the cumulative effect upon our NATO allies, and especially upon the Germans, as an earnest of an attempt to work seriously upon the Central European and German problem. This may help to offset the disruptive effect in Germany of the French attitude following the Moscow visit. The more long-term effect may be in creating a better environment for a step-by-step approach to ending the division of Europe. [Here follow Parts II, III, and IV. Part II discussed the disparity in technology between the United States and Europe, Part III reviewed the idea of a NATO military payments union, and Part IV suggested that by September, when most of the decisions had been taken to respond to the disruptive actions of France, the President should make a major address expressing the continuing U.S. interest and participation in NATO.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Attached to a June 3 memorandum from Vance and Ball to President Johnson, drafted by Acheson, which states that this memorandum is the final response to NSAM 345 ( Document 159 ). 2 Not printed. 174. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 174. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, June 6, 1966. Secto 54. Eyes only for the President. We have had our first and crucial day with the 14 and I am happy to report that “the family of 14” remains together. Paul Martin, looking over his shoulder at Quebec, was our most difficult problem. But we succeeded in reaching decision on relocation of NATO military headquarters to Benelux, subject to Belgium's necessity to take it up with their Parliament before a final decision was concluded. But Belgium promises a “large majority” in the Parliament on this issue. On the possible transfer of the North Atlantic Council out of Paris, we indicated that that question would be finally decided on the basis of the interests of NATO itself. If in the weeks and months ahead during a series of negotiations with the French, and after De Gaulle's visit to Moscow, they want to turn toward more cooperation, we have some leeway. On the other hand, continued difficulty on their part will mean that the others will insist upon moving NAC out of Paris. Exact texts are coming by other telegrams. 2 I definitely am coming back by London after I leave Bonn next Thursday afternoon. That means I will not reach Washington before the end of the day on Friday Washington time. Will be glad to have from you or George Ball any additional points I should take up with Wilson beyond the main one on which I am fully briefed. Have not yet seen Couve de Murville but am having a quadripartite dinner with him later tonight. 3 We are doing our best to get across to the press that the 14 have had a good day in making decisions with genuine solidarity. Their usual skepticism and nose for differences may not clench the point but I can assure you that the 14 Foreign Ministers are deeply satisfied with what was accomplished in our opening session. I have strongly emphasized that our job is to do what is good for NATO and not to engage in retaliation or a vendetta against De Gaulle. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:28 p.m. 2 The Fourteen met in the morning and afternoon of June 6 to discuss changes in the organization of NATO. The U.S. Delegation transmitted reports on these meetings in Secto 51 and 59 from Paris, June 6. (Ibid., NATO 3 BEL(BR) and DEF 4 NATO) At the beginning of the afternoon session, they adopted a set of decisions that transferred NATO military headquarters from France, extended an invitation to Benelux to provide a new site for SHAPE, moved the NATO Defense College to Italy, and abolished the Standing Group. The Fourteen also agreed to study a number of other problems associated with the move from France. The text of the decisions was transmitted in Secto 52 from Paris, June 6. (Ibid., NATO 3 BEL(BR)) 3 A memorandum of the conversation at the quadripartite dinner, US/MC/3, which was largely devoted to East-West relations and Germany, is ibid. 175. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 175. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, June 8, 1966. Secto 94. For President, Acting Secretary, and Secretary McNamara from Secretary. NATUS. Subject: French forces in Germany. The delegation is reporting several successive chapters in the story of negotiations among the Fourteen and with Couve de Murville on arrangements for negotiating the issue of French forces in Germany. 2 The significant developments are these: 1. The Fourteen stuck together past the point of breaking with the French on a fundamental issue of substance, disguised as an issue of procedure. 2. After Couve had tested their ability to stay together, and found they really were prepared to break on the issue of NATO cooperation and command arrangements for the French forces in Germany, Couve retreated to the extent necessary to get a procedural agreement at this conference. This object lesson in dealing with French diplomacy is similar to the lesson learned from the Common Market negotiations of last winter. 3. In the process, Schroeder made what I believe is the flattest and least equivocal statement of the limits of German interest in an arrangement with the French on their troops in Germany. The essence of the matter as Schroeder sees it is that if German troops must be integrated into NATO, the French troops have to have some formal relationship to the NATO system, else the discrimination against Germany on its own soil is just too big for any German Government to swallow. 4. Paul Martin of Canada continues to be the most difficult of my colleagues on all dealings with the French. On the issue of moving NAC out of Paris, he urged Couve to make clear in the Ministerial Council that France wants NAC to stay in Paris. (Couve did not go as far in doing so as Martin wanted him to.) On the French forces in Germany, Martin again showed signs of being more Royalist than the King. Although Martin has sporadic support from Danes, Italians, and even Belgians, the issues with those others are probably well within our negotiating range. Martin's view is a very special case, with which the professionals in his own delegation seem unhappy. This may require some special bilateral attention in the weeks to come. 5. At this point, my guess is that we will only be able to get a satisfactory arrangement on French troops in Germany by playing a very tough diplomatic game, keeping the Fourteen tied together through intimate and continuous consultation, and making it very clear that we (together with the Germans and the British) are prepared to face the prospect that the French might end by pulling their forces out of Germany. This is not because we ourselves want this result; but the issue is not one on which the French should be enabled to break up NATO. Much additional evidence has come out of this meeting that France is seeking a position which will permit her to stand aside in a crisis. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:48 p.m. 2 The four chapters were transmitted in Secto 88, 90, 91, and 95, June 8. (Ibid., DEF 6 FR) 176. Memorandum of Conversation 176. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Bonn, June 9, 1966, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT French-NATO Issue PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary of State Ambassador George C. McGhee Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs FRG Chancellor Ludwig Erhard Gerhard Schroeder, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Ludger Westrick, Minister for Special Tasks Von Hase, Press Chief Karl Carstens, First State Secretary, Foreign Office Horst Osterheld, Foreign Affairs Adviser The Chancellor thanked the U.S. for the support given Germany in the NATO crisis up to this point. He hoped that we could continue together to a successful conclusion. He posed this question to the Secretary: “How do you evaluate the prospects for both the bilateral and multilateral negotiations with France?” He did not wish the bilateral German-French negotiations to occupy the center of the total negotiation. Secretary Rusk replied that France has posed for the NATO a far-reaching problem. They have not attempted to look into the future in order to improve NATO—instead they have retreated 100 years to policies which have in the past led to disaster. We will be dealing with the French on many issues ranging from French troops in Germany to the continued use of the NATO pipeline in France. The question he wished to raise with the Chancellor is, “Why De Gaulle does what he does. We know what he does, but why?” If De Gaulle is deeply dissatisfied with the present situation, serious problems lie ahead for us. Does the Chancellor have any thoughts on this? The Chancellor replied that De Gaulle talks of Europe—however, he considers the Europe of the six to be useful only in its economic and financial significance—not in any political sense. Moreover, he does not consider these or the remaining countries of Europe, including the EFTA countries, in terms of any European confederation. He seeks only a Europe under French hegemony. He has in the past tried to persuade Germany to join in forming such a Europe. However, Germany considers that this would be an act of treason against Europe. It is clear that De Gaulle wants to get the U.S., at least U.S. influence, out of Europe. He will seek in Moscow a protectorate of the Soviet Union and France over Germany. Secretary Rusk rejoined that the U.S. considers itself European—indeed, more European than most Russians. He considers that the 14 have in Brussels agreed to “continue what we need to do.” France is not an important world power—in Europe it ranks fifth, fourth and third, respectively, in population, wealth and military forces. France is not in fact important enough to force the future of the 450 million people of the Atlantic area to its will. Let De Gaulle react as he chooses. He must not interfere with our getting the job done. Erhard agreed, but said that he was anxious not to see Franco-German friendship shattered. Germany must live with France. What did the U.S. people think about the importance of France? Secretary Rusk said that in a recent poll in America 76 percent of the people were for NATO, 6 percent against; 74 percent were against De Gaulle's policy, 6 percent for. This illustrates the attitude of our people towards De Gaulle and NATO. What concerned him was that through the division of NATO we are missing an opportunity to take advantage of the widespread disarray now existing in the Communist world. Erhard replied that this was exactly the German attitude. The question is: Should we come to terms with De Gaulle or not? The U.S. and U.K. are, for example, not interested in the terms granted the French for the stationing of their troops in Germany, since both have troops here on the same basis. Would the U.S. and the U.K. put up with France being given a favored position? (The Chancellor appeared to be asking this question half seriously—half rhetorically.) The Secretary replied that he could tell the Chancellor in great confidence that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told him yesterday in Brussels that the French Air Forces will be withdrawn from Germany. 2 This was because their reaction in the event of hostilities would be automatic, which the French want to avoid. We should not retreat from the positions taken during the McCloy visit to Bonn 3 —nor in the subsequent decisions taken by the 14. Let's see what it is that De Gaulle offers. The U.S. fully understands that Germany does not wish to have occupation troops in Germany. We do for our part, however, have a very real military interest in the status of other troops in Germany. We need to know what the French troops will do in the event of war. In the Secretary's judgment De Gaulle will probably not accept automatic involvement—or foreign command—in the event of war. Erhard said that he was glad to hear what the Secretary had said. Germany's defense, one might say, consists of various layers. It is impossible to organize unless all elements know what the others will do. He is not optimistic that we will be able to reach agreement with De Gaulle on the troop issue. When thinking of whether or not to make concessions—we must remember that NATO must not only deter but be in a position to fight. The Secretary said that we must not show an anti-French attitude—but should proceed quietly. Couve had yesterday given evidence that he would retreat when challenged. He didn't know what would come out in the end. The Chancellor asked how the U.S. expected to come out in its own bilateral negotiations with France. The Secretary replied that we would be delayed beyond the time limit set by the French in moving some of the big installations we had in France. He did not believe, however, that they would be confiscated by the French. In dealing with the oil pipeline, for example, we want to be sure that oil will come out of the other end when we need it. The Chancellor referred to De Gaulle's forthcoming visit to Moscow. He was not concerned as to the outcome, since he could see no possible “joint line of policy.” De Gaulle wants “to have his back free” in negotiating for the future of Europe. Erhard said he particularly feared, in this connection, the “softening up” of Europe. He was glad to know that his own Foreign Minister had spoken in Brussels against a NATO-Warsaw Pact discussion. He considered that this would be dangerous. What were the Secretary's views? Secretary Rusk replied that there had been no official discussion of the De Gaulle visit between U.S. and the French. Couve had, however, in his personal discussions with the Secretary, promised that there would be “no surprises.” The Soviets are not likely to value very highly French ability to deliver in any agreements made. As he had said in the recent NAC meeting, America would expect to be present in any negotiation for the future of Germany and Europe. We are in Europe and we have interests here, and we will play a role in any negotiations about its future. The Secretary commented that the upcoming negotiations between NATO and France are likely to be very tough. The Chancellor asked if he has any timetable in mind for these negotiations. The Secretary replied that the French troop issue was perhaps the most important. It would tend to set the timetable. If this drags on interminably, a very unfavorable impression will be created. The Chancellor commented that the bilateral German talks with the French will involve only legal questions affecting the status of the French forces. No agreements on these matters would be finally approved except in agreement with the 14. The Secretary replied that the real trouble in Brussels was with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin and the Danes. The five nations named to negotiate with the French on the troop issue are a solid group. If they stick together, he believes we will prevail. There may be troubles along the way, but not in the final stages. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on August 12. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 11.” 2 No record of this conversation has been found. 3 See Document 156 . 177. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 177. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 10, 1966, 0802Z. 8632. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting—atmosphere at end of meeting. Ref: Brussels Secto 102, Secto 105. 2 1. At conclusion of tense two day confrontation between French and Fourteen, and after agreement reached on major substantive issues, atmosphere in communique session June 9 bordered on bonhomie. Bracketed words and sentences, which on other occasions might have produced fireworks, were abandoned in an atmosphere approaching gayety. It was as if French and Fourteen, having broken on key issue of French troops in Germany and subsequently reaching compromise, were eager to show their ability to agree on traditional issues of kind dealt with NATO communique issued by the Fifteen. 2. In marked contrast to the French behavior in the communique drafting session during the previous two days, when French representatives fought hard to reduce or eliminate reference to Soviet strength and aims, De Leusse and (when he arrived later) Couve lost no time in removing French reservations on language indicting “the basic aims of the Soviet Union” and recalling NATO's repeated moderation when faced with provocation and hostile actions. Effect of earlier French moves had been to imply main European problems were non-European hegemonies, that tensions arose almost equally from US and USSR, and that European instability was mainly traceable to Germany. French Delegation voluntarily lifted reservations in both instances (paras 6 and 7 Secto 102 from Brussels) without waiting for appeal to do so. The result was a significantly stronger and more realistic communique. 3. When the Secretary opposed reference to NAC study of Danish idea for an European security conference, together with disarmament and non-proliferation, Couve was quick to support the US. He agreed with the Secretary that it was dangerous to raise false hopes in this area. Fanfani and others also supported deletion and the reference (in para 11 of communique) was dropped. (See Brussels Secto 105.) 4. Finally, the para concerning the report of the Chairman of the Special Committee contained alternative bracketed versions; the longer one described the nature of the committee's work. Couve appealed for the shorter alternative which merely states that further report will be submitted in December. The shorter version, he said, would be “more agreeable” to the French Delegation. The Secretary said since French had withdrawn several reservations in course of meeting, US would follow Couve's example and longer alternative was dropped. French had asked for this deletion ahead of time, and had been told our attitude would be influenced by how discussion went on communique as a whole. 5. Even though Brosio is not the world's most decisive Chairman, the whole communique was edited and agreed by Ministers in just one hour, which may be a NATO record. Both French and Fourteen thus made considerable effort to end a ticklish meeting, which did not narrow the substantive gulf between them, on a note of personal and professional good fellowship. The resulting press play is largely devoid of extreme claims of diplomatic victory and defeat. Le Monde 's headline this afternoon is a reasonable summary: “The Atlantic conference witnessed neither a trial of France nor the disintegration of NATO's Fourteen.” Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Secto 102 and 105, both June 8, reported the details of the North Atlantic Council sessions devoted to drafting the final communique. (Ibid.) For text of the communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 344–347. 178. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson 178. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant and Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow and Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 22, 1966, 7:15 p.m. SUBJECT Agenda for NATO/Europe Meeting at 1:00 p.m., Thursday, June 23 The purpose of the meeting is for your advisers to report on the work and recommendations of the Acheson group on NATO nuclear arrangements and on new initiatives in the Alliance. (Copies of the reports are at Tabs A and B.) 2 1. NATO Nuclear Arrangements — You might ask Mr. Acheson to summarize the conclusions and recommendations of the nuclear study . He will recommend that: (a) you instruct Rusk and McNamara to explore with the British and the Germans how we might proceed with institutionalizing consultation and with assigning more strategic nuclear forces to NATO ; (b) for the time being, we leave open—without prejudice—the question of a “collective force”. (These recommendations reflect agreement between State and Defense and seem to us just right.) —After hearing out Mr. Acheson, you will wish to ask for the Secretary's views, especially on timing and tactics in the light of the Wilson and Erhard visits this summer. —You might instruct us to incorporate the above instructions in a draft NSAM. 2. Constructive Initiative in Europe (Copy of the report is at Tab B; memo summarizing it is at Tab C) 3 —Again, you will wish to hear out Mr. Acheson. He will make some general points on the U.S. stance in Europe and end up with a long list of specific proposals for strengthening NATO and for bridge-building. (You might wish to glance again at the headings in the paper at Tab B, Annex A.) —You might ask the Secretary to have each proposal properly staffed for final Presidential decision. W.W. Rostow Francis M. Bator 4 Attachment 5 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, 1:15 P.M., THURSDAY, JUNE 23 6 TALKING POINTS I. The Nuclear Problem in NATO 1. Recommendation to President: a) Sec State & SECDEF initiate tripartite discussions with FRG & UK. b) Objective: find a program all 3 can support. c) Authorized to agree to “Consultation” and “Assignment”. d) On “collective force”, U.S. position: (1) await experience with consultation and assignment; study & discuss collective force in interim, (2) U.S. meanwhile takes no action to prejudice collective force (i.e. non-proliferation terms), or which diverge from concept of German equality. 2. Consultation: a) Make “Special Committee” permanent, and open-ended, to be principal committee on nuclear affairs. Meet once or twice a year. b) “Nuclear Planning Group” to be single permanent replacement for 3 present working groups. U.S., U.K., FRG, Italy, & 1 rotating. (Perhaps need another committee to console non-members.) 3. Assignment: a) Additional forces: Minutemen B–52's (with tankers) Polaris Submarines ( Note : JCS DO NOT AGREE WITH SUCH ASSIGNMENT; REASON: ENTERING WEDGE FOR ALLIED CONTROL OF GENERAL WAR FORCES.) b) Assignment Terms: Assignment without withdrawal rights for fixed or indefinite term. 4. Collective Force: a) Not now recommended. b) Could perhaps discuss pure V-bomber collective force, owned and manned internationally (i.e. integrated). Advantages: a. Cheap. b. English bombs (less Congressional concern). c. Intrinsically experimental (V-bombers wear out in 7 years). d. Meet stated German needs. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis Bator, Box 28, NSAM 345. Confidential. 2 Printed as Documents 171 and 173 . 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 5 Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information. 6 No record of the meeting with the President on June 23 has been found. Rusk's Appointment Book notes that he, Ball, and Acheson attended from the Department of State. (Johnson Library) 179. Memorandum of Conversation 179. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 25, 1966. SUBJECT Troop Reductions PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State In a conversation with the Ambassador today, I referred to the press reports about possible Soviet troop reductions. Dobrynin said he had nothing official on this but indicated that a reduction was quite possible. He asked if I thought that we would be interested in any reduction by way of mutual example. I pointed out that the question of whether or not the French troops would remain in Germany was still open and there might be a considerable reduction there if the French and Germans did not succeed in working out arrangements for them to stay. Dobrynin indicated his view, which he said was based on informal talks with the French and other reports, that it was almost certain that a way would be found for the French troops to remain. I said I also had no specific information, but I did not think that it was at all certain. The Ambassador asked if I thought a troop reduction on our part in Germany would cause much of a political stir here. I replied that as on most matters, there would always be some division of opinion, but I did not think that this was the kind of thing that would stir up much public interest here. On the other hand, with all the problems that NATO now had, it did not seem to me a very good time for us to be thinking about such a matter. He said he could understand this. On the other hand, I said that my personal view was that the Soviets did not need twenty divisions in East Germany. I said that one problem, of course, was that our troops would have to come all the way across the Atlantic, whereas theirs did not have so far to go. Dobrynin said the Soviets had raised this subject many times and indicated that he thought his Government would be quite prepared to carry out reductions on the basis of mutual example. He indicated that in his view a mutual reduction need not necessarily be on a one-for-one basis. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S–I Files: Lot 79 D 246. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL and S/S on June 25. 180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Germany 180. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Germany 1 Washington, June 27, 1966, 4:05 p.m. 2546. Paris for James and Crawford. Subject: US Nuclear Weapons for French forces in FRG. NATUS. For Bonn: You should inform foreign office soonest of text of aide-memoire contained below as well as substance of oral message to accompany its delivery, the schedule of consultation and delivery as outlined, and instructions on nature statement Cleveland to make to Fourteen. For Cleveland : You should inform Fourteen on June 29 of text of aide-memoire and oral message. You should recall that withdrawal of US weapons was foreseen in US aide-memoire of April 12, 2 contents of which were discussed with the Fourteen prior to its delivery. In response to any inquiries as to effect of withdrawals on SACEUR's nuclear capability you should reply that US does not propose to diminish this capability. Replacement of nuclear-capable French units in Germany will naturally have to be discussed among the Fourteen, although possibility should not be excluded that discussions on new role and mission of French forces will result in relationship to NATO such as to lead US to consider resumption atomic weapons support. For Bohlen : 1. Following prior notice to FRG and to Fourteen as described above you should on June 30 deliver to Foreign office following aide-mémoire: Begin text : The GOF has stated its intention to withdraw French forces in FRG from NATO command as of July 1, 1966. As the United States pointed out in its aide-memoire of April 12, 1966, if these forces are so withdrawn, the US-France-NATO Atomic Stockpile Agreement of September 6, 1960 will cease by its own terms to have application. The Government of France should also be aware that in this eventuality certain portions of the US-France Agreement for Cooperation in the Operation of Atomic Weapons Systems of July 27, 1961 also will cease by their own terms to apply on July 1. Therefore, assuming no new or interim arrangements will have been made by that time which would permit continued US atomic support for these forces, the practical measures which would necessarily have to be taken are as follows: a. The US nuclear weapons currently made available for possible wartime use by French forces in the FRG will cease to be so available and will be withdrawn. b. The transfer of US atomic information under the US-France Agreement of July 27, 1961, hitherto furnished in consideration of the assignment to NATO of French nuclear-capable forces will be suspended. These measures follow from those terms of the two aforementioned agreements which envisage commitment of French nuclear- capable forces to NATO. Accordingly, they do not reflect any intention on the part of the USG to terminate these agreements. The question of possible future United States support of French forces in the FRG will depend upon the role and mission of such forces and their relationship to NATO. With further regard to the Agreement of July 27, 1961, the USG, in the interest of the continuing fulfillment of the respective responsibilities of the two Governments under that Agreement, desires to arrange in the near future for a visit of a US Security Working Group to review the implementing procedures of the agencies responsible for the protection of documents and information provided under the Agreement. In order to facilitate such a survey, the USG requests the GOF to furnish to it a report through normal channels listing all unit holders of US atomic information as of June 30, 1966. End text . 2. You should inform the foreign office orally that details on the withdrawal of weapons will be made available to French Commanders through USCINCEUR and necessary cooperation worked out at that level. Further information on the Security survey will be provided French Government at their request. You may state, however, that similar surveys are made from time to time of other countries pursuant to relevant bilateral Agreements for Cooperation, and that in the case of France none has taken place since the review made in 1960 prior to the conclusion of the 1961 Agreement. 3. We envisage informing press of general substance of aide-memoire in low key manner after delivery, emphasizing points suggested for Cleveland presentation to Fourteen above. We would not propose to release text unless this subsequently proves to be necessary to correct possible misunderstandings. Press guidance will follow. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM); cleared by Schaetzel, McNaughton, Legal Adviser Leonard Meeker, WE, RPM, G/PM, and AEC; and approved by Ball. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Document 154 . 181. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 181. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 27, 1966. SUBJECT Bilateral Negotiations with France on Reentry Rights and Facilities Ambassador Lucet, in his June 6 talk with Mr. Ball, 2 said France is ready to discuss and to conclude an agreement with the United States on the wartime use of facilities in France. Discussing reentry rights—under what circumstances, with what rights, and into what facilities we can reenter—will enable us to determine whether and to what degree France will agree to reentry provisions that are dependable in crisis and operationally adequate. Such a determination is essential in military planning in order to assess the risk of relying on France. Perhaps more important, it will give the United States and its thirteen allies a gauge to measure the degree, if any, to which the French Government is willing to cooperate in an emergency. Properly handled, it should clarify thinking and unify action. The normal way to conduct such a negotiation would be to ask the French Government to grant the United States, in case of emergency under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, the rights covered in our bilateral agreements in the manner provided therein. This would provide the French with an opportunity, if they desire it, to narrow the rights offered, which this Government can then appraise. If you concur, I therefore propose to commence conversations with the French on reentry rights and facilities as soon as our representative is prepared; we have consulted with our allies and have coordinated the timing with other negotiations between the fourteen and France and the FRG and France. Ambassador Bohlen should be our representative to conduct the talks; I plan to call him in to discuss the problems in detail, both with the State and Defense Departments, to instruct him generally in accordance with the attached Memorandum of Guidance, which can of course be modified in light of subsequent developments, and to reinforce him with the necessary experts. Secretary McNamara has approved both this Memorandum and the enclosed Memorandum for Ambassador Bohlen. George W. Ball 3 Enclosure 4 MEMORANDUM OF GUIDANCE FOR AMBASSADOR BOHLEN IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON REENTRY RIGHTS IN NATO EMERGENCY The Problem Evacuating U.S. military personnel and installations in France, in response to the French aide-mémoire of March 10 [ 11 ], 5 will degrade somewhat our military posture in Europe, and will also impose substantial financial loss. Such reduced effectiveness and financial loss can be limited if the French will agree to dependable and timely rights of reentry and operation, effective in time of NATO emergency, into bases and facilities that are adequately maintained and supplied, and with the rights of access, movement, transport, communications and personnel status needed to allow immediate operations. On the other hand, if the Government of France should refuse reentry and operation provisions which are sufficiently reliable for the U.S. to depend on them for the support of forces in combat, the agreements that might be reached would be hollow. In this case, we should establish conclusively, both to our own satisfaction and that of our allies, that meaningful reentry agreements are not possible under the present French policies. Objectives To conclude satisfactory agreements with France for reentry and operation rights to bases and other facilities in France for U.S. forces, in case of NATO emergency. Failing that, to make clear to the NATO countries how and where French policy makes agreement useless, and the magnitude of the resulting losses. Basic U.S. Position If agreements reached between the U.S. and France on the reentry and operation rights are to be dependable, they must include: a. Timing and Nature : The facilities are needed, fully operational, when hostilities commence. The use 6 of the bases and installations placed at the disposition of the U.S. Government by the Government of France was, by the Dillon-Bidault Agreement, made in time of emergency “a matter for joint decision by the U.S. and France in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.” The reentry and operating rights sought, however, should become effective at the time the NATO commands whose missions depend upon the availability of the facilities assume an operational status. The rights must include access, communications, transport, nuclear transit, overflights, status of forces, etc., as appropriate. b. Conditions : rights must apply to any NATO crisis. c. Facilities: required facilities must be identified, available, stocked and maintained. The right to construct new facilities after war commences is worthless. Anticipated French Position The following elements of the French position have emerged: a. Termination of the existing U.S.-France bilateral agreements 7 by “mutual consent.” b. Initial discussions to deal with an overall wartime reentry and utilization agreement, to be followed by a series of technical agreements covering the facilities that would be made available to the U.S. in time of war. c. There is no reason to oppose continued use of the pipeline, but its operation should be under unilateral French control at all times. d. No stocked storage depots will be permitted in France. e. Reentry rights will be restricted to “a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance.” f. Reentry rights will depend on a decision by the French Government taken at the time of the emergency. 1 Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis. 2 No further record of this conversation has been found. 3 Ball signed for Rusk above Rusk's typed signature. 4 Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information. 5 Document 142 . 6 The history of the Dillon-Bidault Agreement makes clear that the “use” of facilities in France relates only to use for launching air attacks with nuclear weapons. The agreement asked for and given was described as “a U.K.-type of assurance” (i.e., President-Prime Minister exchanges on use of U.K. facilities at which U.S. nuclear weapons are maintained; the U.K. is entitled to be consulted before the U.S. uses such weapons). [Footnote in the source text. The Dillon-Bidault agreement, signed on April 8, 1954, at Paris, confirmed assurances given by the French Government that the use of French bases and installations would, in time of emergency, be a matter for joint decision by the United States and France.] 7 (1) Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951; (2) Paris Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952; (3) United States Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953; (4) Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953; and (5) System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958. [Footnote in the source text.] 182. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 182. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 28, 1966, 2014Z. 9209. NATUS. Subject: Negotiations with France. 1. With three negotiating sessions with France behind us (NAC June 15, 21 and 28), 2 we are clearly reaching point where we must decide where we go next. Although we have another session scheduled for July 5, we have probably approached limit of what we are going to get from De Leusse. 2. De Leusse's answers to the five questions, at the special NAC this morning, were prepared without detailed clearance with Couve or Gen. De Gaulle in Moscow. It is not therefore clear whether we can take them at face value. But if what De Leusse said this morning (essentially confirming what he told me last week—Paristel 9091 Exdis-Notal) 3 turns out to be what the French Government means, we have turned a significant corner in the negotiations. 3. Despite De Leusse's insistence this morning in answer to questions posed June 21 (Paristel 8976), 4 that answers would have to be found by military commanders, he did address himself rather responsively to what the Fourteen consider political questions in a clearly political forum. 4. It appears from De Leusse's answers that the French do want to retain troops in Germany, and to work out some reasonable basis for their remaining there. The only such basis is, of course, that they be related to the rest of the NATO forces in the central region of Allied Command Europe. De Leusse's replies indicated that the French Government would explicitly accept tasks and missions that would be related to NATO forces, would promise to fit French forces into NATO command structure in time of war, would participate in Council decisions on NATO crisis alerts, and would cooperate “increasingly” in time of peace, when troops would be (like those of other nations) under national command. 5. De Leusse was careful at every stage to speak of these matters as perfectly natural and hardly worth mentioning, and to repeat that these are really matters for detailed negotiations between French Chief of Staff and SACEUR. But even with these caveats, the sum total of De Leusse's statement was a far-reaching admission that (except for air defense) France would be prepared to work with NATO in something like the same patterns of cooperation which the rest of us practice. The main difference is that they will not use NATO terminology in describing the cooperation, and will advertise more loudly than the rest of us do the national dedication which we have in fact all reserved to our own governments under the treaty, the Council's decisions, and the NATO alert system. 6. If De Leusse's answers stick when the Moscow delegation gets home, we will be in a position soon, perhaps next week, to move on to the next stage of these negotiations. In that stage,SACEUR and the French Chief of Staff might be asked to develop agreed answers to certain specific questions, reporting back to the Council. For this purpose, I assume that political direction to SACEUR will have to be developed in the group of Fourteen; the French will be giving political guidance to General Ailleret, and they cannot very well be on both sides of the negotiation at once. But we might well work out in the Council, after preliminary caucusing in the Fourteen and consultation with General Lemnitzer, an agreed set of assumptions and questions to which the military talks would address themselves. We are drafting the kind of NAC paper we have in mind and will submit it by cable soonest. 7. We have assumed that De Gaulle would want to keep some French troops in Germany, at least until after the Parliamentary elections, so that it could not be said that the consequence of Gaullist policy was to remove the French foot from Germany's head. It seems more likely this week than previously that this analysis is correct. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin. 2 In the first and second meetings, French Permanent Representative De Leusse insisted that the question of French troops in Germany was military and not political. At the third meeting on June 28, De Leusse in effect recognized that some of the issues involved were political and repeatedly stressed that France was willing to subordinate its forces to Allied command in wartime. (Telegrams 8976 and 9205 from Paris, June 21 and 28; ibid.) 3 Telegram 9091 from Paris, June 24, described a “long and interesting conversation” with De Leusse that revealed the French were aware of difficulties of reconciling De Gaulle's insistence on bilateral political negotiations with the fact that both Germany and the United States considered bilateral negotiations closely connected to the negotiations between France and the rest of NATO. (Ibid.) 4 Not printed. (Ibid.) 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, July 2, 1966, 1610Z. 83. Eyes only for Amb Foster. Subj: German attitude on nuclear sharing. 1. During the visit of Amb Foster to Bonn over the last two days, he had many useful discussions with the highest German authorities on various disarmament issues, which are being reported separately. Of particular value, however, was his probing of the German attitude on nuclear sharing. In his meetings with FonMin Schroeder and DefMin Von Hassel, reported in Embtels 84 and 85, 2 he sought without indicating any change in US policy toward a “hardware solution” to the problem, to determine what the real German position on such a solution is. 2. As might have been expected, both Schroeder and Von Hassel held firm in asserting that the Germans still seek a “hardware solution.” The extent of which this view is shared by others is not known, however, there is no one else in the CDU/CSU Fraktion who takes a very positive line on the issue except Deputy Kurt Birrenbach—whose views are well known to us. Recently, however, he told me confidentially that the “hardware solution” was his second choice—his first being the traditional SPD position of seeking participation in planning and decision—recommending—not just for nuclear forces under SACEUR but SAC. 3. The SPD at its convention in Dortmund on June 1–5, of course, rejected the MLF concept and the FDP has never endorsed it. It is believed that Chancellor Erhard has little independent conviction on the issue. However, he has in the past followed Schroeder and Von Hassel's line. One middle rank FonOff official, following Foster's meeting with Schroeder, asked us pointedly why Foster had not pressed Schroeder harder on the ANF-MLF, shrugging his shoulders in dismay. Von Hassel, in his discussions with Foster, had indicated a willingness to give up a “hardware solution” but only under certain circumstances, i.e., that the McNamara committee evolve into an acceptable basis for planning and crisis management in the nuclear area, backed up by sure and instant communications. 4. The following are believed to be the motives underlying Schroe-der and Von Hassel's attitude. I believe that Amb Foster, with whom I discussed this analysis in general would agree. This is, of course, in addition to Schroeder and Von Hassel's natural desire as political leaders not to have to admit the failure of a project with which they have been so closely associated. A) The “hardware solution” now has a certain status. It results from a US proposal to Germany which Germany accepted, and even though it has not yet come into being we have not withdrawn it. We admitted during the Chancellor's visit to Washington last December 3 that the proposition was still on the table subject to discussions with the other countries involved—which have of course never materialized. The Germans, as von Hassel indicated to Foster, are not now pressing for a decision. They are in the position of having been accepted as being qualified for membership in a hardware-owning organization, which they consider has already brought them a certain prestige and bargaining power. In a sense, they have for the first time been recognized as first class nuclear citizens. Since the ultimate success of the project seems doubtful, they would prefer a continuation of the present situation to a “showdown.” As I understand, Birrenbach told Foster this morning that this option must be kept open until a European nuclear option can be tangible enough to take its place. If the hardware approach were abandoned, the Germans would lose the present symbolism and potential for bargaining which it provides—even in limbo. B) I believe that both Schroeder and Von Hassel also see in the “hardware solution” a hedge against the uncertainty of the future. NATO may change drastically in its organization or policy. Technical changes may upset the balance between conventional nuclear defense, or between defense and offense in either category. There may be a drastic change in US policy, i.e. an isolationist government may come into power. Under such circumstances, the Germans are reluctant to commit themselves, especially to their implacable enemy the Soviets, in a way which would tie their hands in the future. Many Germans have always had in the back of their mind the possibility that they could in extremis make a nuclear deal with the French comparable to the one they have with us. By 1970, moreover, the French should have quite a respectable nuclear force. C) Another probable Schroeder-Von Hassel motivation is a conviction on their part that participation in a “hardware solution” puts them on the inside for future developments. For example, once such an organization had been developed, if a new weapon is developed, the Germans would naturally be in on it. They would be in on any extension of the powers or scope of the initial organization. D) Both Von Hassel and Schroeder, although they would of course not admit it directly to us, undoubtedly value the bargaining power of their present position—both vis-a-vis US and the Soviets. With US it can perhaps be traded in to assure that something suitable comes out of the McNamara committee—which Von Hassel has indicated he is not yet sure will produce the desired end result vis-a-vis the Soviets, the Germans would hope to gain at least some way station on the long road toward reunification. E) Schroeder and Von Hassel, moreover, undoubtedly feel that they are under no pressure to abandon the “hardware solution” because there are many other unresolved differences blocking a non-proliferation agreement, including that with the Indians. In the event nuclear sharing should become the sole remaining obstacle, they would likely find themselves under unbearable pressure to yield. However, there is ample time to make the required concessions and the probability is that it will not be necessary at all. F) Schroeder and Von Hassel may conclude that German influence under a “hardware solution” would be greater than in a consultative arrangement, since they would be in a position to buy a proportionately larger share than some of the smaller European countries involved. This may, moreover, see in a hardware approach the ultimate solution of their offset problem. Buying into a nuclear weapon system could absorb a large proportion of the offset payment for several years. Comment : I assume that it is our present policy to so steer the outcome of the McNamara committee [so] that a nuclear consultative organization will be created which, at least for the time being, will satisfy German nuclear ambitions. If this is the case, I hope that the recommendations which will go forward to the NAC in its December Ministerial Meeting will be broad enough to take this requirement into account. From the German viewpoint, the scope of the new group's final decision—recommending powers should include not only nuclear forces under SACEUR but our own SAC. This latter extension has never troubled me since, in such circumstances, I believe the President would want to know the attitude of Erhard, in whose country his troops are or may be fighting, before making a final nuclear decision. If we are willing to go this far, I believe that we could swap off such a result to the Germans for an agreement to forego a “hardware solution” for the foreseeable future. It might be desirable, however, to endow any new consultative committee with standby powers which could ultimately provide an umbrella for such a solution. This would give us the needed flexibility in arranging the nuclear affairs of the Alliance in the future, and permit the Germans to retain their status as acceptable and potential nuclear part-owners. The obstacle such a development might create with the Soviets achieving a non-proliferation agreement, might be overcome if provision could be made in the agreement that the Soviets have the option of withdrawing from the agreement—in the event that a new nuclear force is created—even one which we could easily prove did not constitute proliferation. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Geneva. 2 Both dated July 2. (Ibid., DEF 18–3 SWITZ(GE)) 3 See Document 119 . 184. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 184. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 5, 1966, 0947Z. 108. Ref: Deptel 7056. 2 It seems to me that the French in attempting to do the delicate balancing act between departure from NATO and remaining in Alliance are confronted with a genuine dilemma. In order to give effect to their fallacious premise concerning integration, the French have recently made it clear that they do not intend to return to integration via the back door and are obviously reluctant to maintain in substance the previous command relationship, for example in regard to the French forces in Germany, as existed prior to French action. On the other hand it is extremely difficult to see how any formula for command relationship in time of war with SHAPE, which would have any validity and acceptability to the Fourteen which would not in effect merely repeat what had previously existed. It is our understanding that De Gaulle wishes to have the theoretical possibility in some instances, and the actual possibility in others of a purely French decision in regard to French participation in a war. In a number of cases, such as sudden massive Soviet attack on Europe, the question is completely theoretical and French reaction would be almost instantaneous. However, in others, notably in the case of some Soviet action in regard to Berlin, De Gaulle might choose to interpret Soviet action as resulting from some U.S./Soviet clash in the Far East and decide that France should remain neutral. Another similar situation might arise if there were a revolt inside any satellite area, particularly East Germany, in which France might disagree with her allies. In actual fact these contingencies were covered in previous NATO arrangements whereby, except for air defense, General Lemnitzer had no command over any existing forces and would only receive command as a result of positive and conscious action by governments concerned. It is of course true that De Gaulle apparently sees in anything that smacks of automatism a danger of involving France by momentum, perhaps against her will and her interests, but this is very thin and it merely means that France would be in a worse position to hold out against the rest of the Alliance before rather than after withdrawal from NATO organization. This message is to point to a problem which may become more important as time goes on. It does not appear from our conversations with French officials, notably my last talk with Couve de Murville (Embtel 8915) 3 that this problem i.e., how to reconcile membership in Alliance with absence from organization, has either been thoroughly studied or decided. It is probable that De Gaulle, with the preparations for his Moscow trip, has not himself seriously considered it. However, he will undoubtedly have to examine this problem carefully now and reach a conclusion thereon in a relatively short time. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Ottawa. 2 Telegram 7056 to Paris, June 30, transmitted the Department of State's preliminary thinking on the phasing of negotiations between the French and the 14 NATO states. The telegram also noted the hope that the U.S.-French talks on re-entry could begin early in July. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 8915 from Paris, June 18, reported that Couve de Murville had confirmed in a brief conversation that France had no national interest in maintaining troops in Germany but would be prepared to leave them there for the sake of French-German relations. (Ibid.) 185. Memorandum of Conversation 185. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 5, 1966. SUBJECT French Bilaterals PARTICIPANTS The Acting Secretary Secretary McNamara Mr. Acheson Mr. Rostow Mr. Schaetzel Mr. Acheson said that he wanted to be very sure about the decision the President was alleged to have made with respect to the memorandum on bilateral negotiations between the United States and France, a decision he understood had been made at lunch on Thursday, June 28. 2 Mr. Rostow said the President's decision was clear, a point confirmed by Mr. Ball, which was to approve the memorandum. The President had raised specifically the question as to whether the U.S. would have any interest in any facilities in France if we were not sure of their availability. Secretary McNamara on that occasion said “No, not if we had to put a nickel into their maintenance.” The President approved that position. In further discussion Mr. Acheson pursued this point, saying that we would clearly encounter in the future the suggestion that anything we got from the French “would be gravy and that we should be willing to compromise to get it.” Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Rostow repeated that this was precisely the question on which the President had ruled. Secretary McNamara emphasized that any contingent rights would of course cost us money. Mr. Acheson said that he was having trouble with people in both Departments who were wavering and seemed to be interested in seeking some compromise. Secretary McNamara said in this connection that an alternative version of the memorandum for the President had come to him, but he had rejected it. There should be no question about his position or therefore about the position of the Defense Department. He went on to say that he looked upon the bilateral negotiations as a probe urgent and necessary to test French intentions with respect to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. He expected nothing to result from it. Mr. Acheson said that he would subsequently be in touch with Secretary McNamara, the purpose of which would be to go over the supplementary instructions to Ambassador Bohlen. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Schaetzel and initialed by Acheson. 2 The memorandum is the Enclosure to Document 181 . The reference should be to the luncheon on Tuesday, June 28. No other record of the luncheon has been found. 186. Memorandum From Dean Acheson to Secretary of State Rusk 186. Memorandum From Dean Acheson to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 14, 1966. SUBJECT Tripartite Talks on the Nuclear Question: Action Memorandum The memorandum which you and Secretary McNamara sent to the President in response to NSAM 345 2 envisages early tripartite talks on the nuclear question among the foreign and defense ministers of the UK, FRG and the United States. I would suggest the following course of action in pursuing these discussions. During the visit of Prime Minister Wilson, you or the President might refer to suggestions for tripartite discussions of the nuclear question in the President's letter of May 21 3 and indicate that with the completion of some internal US policy consideration of this matter, such discussions would seem to be timely. The same suggestion could be made to Chancellor Erhard during his visit in August or by letter if the visit is postponed. In describing the framework of the talks and providing assurances to Erhard, we might indicate that the US policy review reaffirmed that the US would take no action which would prejudice later decision to create a collective force. We might suggest that the tripartite talks be conducted primarily by the Foreign Ministers of the UK, the FRG and the United States in connection with other meetings which bring the three together. The UN General Assembly in September, the tentative October meeting of NATO ministers, or the regular December NATO Ministerial Meetings might provide such opportunities. Defense Ministers of the three governments would be associated with the talks when brought together by either the Special Committee or NATO Ministerial Meetings. As a starting point in preparation for such discussions, and to provide continuity, we might propose that Mr. Ball or State Department Officials designated by him, discuss the question with the UK and German Ambassadors beginning in mid-September, or earlier if possible. The scope of the talks should be defined broadly as covering the range of possibilities in the Memorandum for the President on the nuclear problem prepared in response to NSAM 345, and should be conducted on the basis of the directives to be set forth in the NSAM on this subject which is now in preparation in the White House. Recommendations: 4 1. That you approve this general course of action. 2. That you authorize EUR to coordinate the development of positions for such discussions. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. Drafted by Baker. 2 Documents 171 and 159 . 3 Document 168 . 4 Rusk initialed his approval of both recommendations on July 15. 187. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 187. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 19, 1966, 2009Z. 919. NATUS. Subject: Negotiations with France. Reference: Paris 827. 2 1. De Leusse (France) in special NAC today made formal opening statement in which he said France could not discuss Fourteen's paper on assumptions. He described Fourteen's interpretation of France's position as “more or less distorted”. Question was simply one of continuation or cessation of stationing French forces in Germany. Questions had been defined in Brussels and could usefully be discussed only by military authorities. While there was no objection to an exchange of views in the Council this had taken place and it was now appropriate to charge the military authorities with undertaking a concrete conversation. The French Government would have no objection at the proper time to submitting to the Council for its approval the conclusions of these conversations. (Full text of this statement by septel.) 3 Later in meeting in response to questions De Leusse softened “could not enter into discussions” to “difficult to discuss”. Immediately after opening statement he proceeded to discuss document by explaining French position on assumptions D and E (command and alerts) by quoting from his statements at the June 21 NAC. 4 In a subsequent intervention, he rehearsed briefly France's position on all seven assumptions. Finally, he did not refuse when Brosio requested him to seek authority to try to reach understanding with the Fourteen along the lines of the assumptions. 2. All who spoke said that De Leusse's statement created a new situation which would have to be studied in capitals and instructions sought. Consensus of personal views expressed was that stage described in para 4(D) of Brussels communique 5 which specified agreement on political matters in NAC prior to military level discussions had not been reached. Upshot of meeting was that Brosio requested de Leusse to ascertain whether he could discuss the ideas in the assumptions with the Fourteen with a view to reaching an agreement on the political level. Otherwise, Brosio thought that the Council in permanent session would have reached an impasse and that the situation would have to be considered by the Ministers as provided in para 4(E) of the Brussels communiqué. Comment : Brosio does not seriously intend to bring this issue to a head during the summer. 3. Highlights of discussion were as follows: 4. Cleveland said his instructions did not cover the situation created as the result of De Leusse's statement. The U.S. did not contemplate moving to military level discussions with no agreed indications from the political level as to assumptions. Without agreed guidance from the political level, the military level would not know on what basis to discuss concrete arrangements. 5. Grewe's (FRG) preliminary impression was that there was not much difference in substance between Fourteen's assumptions and De Leusse's statements. He appealed to de Leusse to try and reach agreement with the Fourteen and reduce it to writing. De Leusse in his reply did not fully close the door on this suggestion. He said that he had used the word “difficult” in his opening statement in describing discussion of the Fourteen's paper and noted that he had talked about two points. 6. De Staercke (Belgium) said that the Fourteen's paper was not a treaty but an attempt to reduce to writing the Fourteen's understanding of France's general position. Neither France nor the Fourteen had the right to define positions “ex cathedra” and expect them to be accepted by the other. He supported appeal for negotiations. 7. Shuckburgh (UK), Alessandrini (Italy), Boon (Netherlands) and Birgi (Turkey) all supported idea of French and Fourteen trying to work out agreement on assumptions. Shuckburgh observed that the form of the paper was less important than its contents. As originally drafted it was a statement of assumptions by the Fourteen as to the position of the 15th. An understanding between France and the Fourteen could be expressed differently, for example as a statement as to what the Fifteen understood to be the position of France. 8. Full text De Leusse opening statement in French follows by septel. Another septel reports Cleveland's private talk with De Leusse after NAC meeting, with our comments. 6 Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Berlin. 2 Telegram 827, July 18, reported that Brosio's conversation with De Leusse that day about a paper on assumptions, which had been given to De Leusse on July 13, had proven disappointing since the latter, acting under instructions, could not accept it. (Ibid.) A copy of the paper, which was to serve as the framework for talks on French forces in Germany, was transmitted in telegram 465 from Paris, July 11. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 913 from Paris, July 19. (Ibid.) 4 See footnote 2, Document 182 . 5 For text of this communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 344–347. 6 Telegram 918 from Paris, July 19, which reported that the Alliance still did not know whether De Gaulle wanted French forces to stay in Germany badly enough to agree to a reasonable arrangement for their cooperation with NATO. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2) 188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 188. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Solomon) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Stoessel) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, July 19, 1966. SUBJECT A Presidential Push on Wilson toward U.K. Membership in the Common Market—Information Memorandum E and EUR have endeavored to examine in some depth the implications of a hard pitch by the President to Prime Minister Wilson urging the U.K. to announce its willingness to sign the Treaty of Rome and to accept the legislation enacted by the Community institutions in the past seven and a half years. The issues are incredibly complex and the staff papers attached to this memorandum 2 reflect in some degree this complexity and our confusion in sorting out the issues. We have come out with roughly the following conclusions. 1. On balance there are advantages in reiterating at the highest level the American view that Britain's future lies in Europe. These advantages however are largely in terms of political gamesmanship and in clarifying, if clarification is needed, the American view. 2. We think it likely that if such an approach were made by the President, the Prime Minister would reply with an eloquent exposition of his domestic and foreign problems meant in essence to demonstrate that he is right in his present course of probing for an opening into Europe, protecting his negotiating position and trying to put the British economy on an even keel. It is possible, however, that upon reflection a clear statement by the President would eventually influence his course of action. 3. If Wilson were to accept the President's advice, we think it highly unlikely that General De Gaulle would permit his entry into the Common Market, and we suspect that the French argument about the economic dangers for the Community in pledging “mutual support” for sterling is gradually having a debilitating effect on the political will of the Five to welcome Britain. 4. In the highly unlikely event that something tangible happened, the possible preconditions for adaptation of the British economy to the Common Market, which might include devaluation, would have substantial adverse effects (probably $500–850 million per year) on the U.S. balance of payments position. Moreover, initiation of serious negotiations before the Kennedy Round is concluded could be the death knell of that enterprise. Some negotiations by the U.K. and EEC are inevitable, simply because of the technical features of the Treaty of Rome on such subjects as voting in the Council, budgetary shares and even membership in the Commissions. 5. In the long run the political gains from U.K. membership in the European Communities are in our interest. As in the short run, an unequivocal British willingness to join the Communities would significantly strengthen the Five in dealing with Gaullist France and indirectly help the Fourteen hold NATO together, whatever the French do. The attached working papers, while generally compatible with these conclusions, also reflect significant differences of view. The assumptions about whether Britain would or would not need to devalue are particularly critical, and the estimated effects on the U.K. and U.S. balance of payments from a devaluation of sterling must give one pause. We estimate that the short-run economic costs of EEC entry to the U.K. would be very high and might require devaluation as a prelude to entry.EEC entry would cost the U.K. balance of payments as much as $800 million per year over the long run. A 10 percent devaluation supported by internal deflationary measures could gain them at least $1.5 billion annually in the short run and $1.75 billion in the long-run. On the other hand, in the light of the reportedly Draconian deflationary measures about to be taken by the U.K., there is still some reason to hope that, if Wilson were prepared to withstand the increased political pressures associated with rigorous deflation over an extended time period, Britain could adapt to the Common Market without devaluation. Success for these measures would diminish the objective economic problem and make French opposition to U.K. entry more difficult, but it would not be decisive in eliminating the basic French political veto on U.K. admission. Note 3 I can't quite go along with the pessimistic tone of these conclusions. Also, paragraph 4 neglects to point out that the adverse impact on the U.S. balance of payments of a British devaluation would still be more or less the same no matter how the U.K. gets into balance of payments equilibrium. I do believe, however, that a public announcement, as distinguished from private feelers, of U.K. determination to enter the Common Market would injure the Kennedy Round at this time. A.S. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Hinton. 2 None of the seven attached papers, designated A–G, is printed. 3 This note by Solomon is in a different typescript from the rest of the memorandum. 189. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 189. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 26, 1966, 2018Z. 1280. Subject: Nuclear Planning Work Group—July 26 meeting. Ref: Dept 11919, Paris 1153. 2 1. The third Ministerial Meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group was held in Paris July 26 with Secretary McNamara in chair. Ministers agreed to charge the Deputies with preparation of specific proposals for permanent NATO bodies to carry on the work of SPECOM and the NPWG to be considered at next NPWG meeting in Rome September 23 and 24. (For text of agreed minute and communique see septels.) 3 2. Although there was agreement on general lines of U.S. approach (State 11919), Ministers were not now prepared to take specific decisions on composition of permanent bodies or commit themselves to submitting final recommendations in December. 3. Topaloglu (Turkey) made strong pitch for membership criteria for Nuclear Planning Group along lines his July 24 talk with Cleveland (Paris 1153) which confirmed that one of most difficult problems we face in establishment of permanent bodies will be that of composition. 4. Healey at breakfast with Secretary McNamara July 25 accepted U.S. draft minute which included in mandate of new nuclear planning group future discussion of joint or collective nuclear weapons systems (para 5C State 11919). However, during meeting he suggested without notice the deletion of this provision with the understanding that its omission did not exclude discussion of hardware in the NPG. Healey said that some (he implied this did not necessarily include him) would maintain that any future discussions of hardware should take place among Fifteen. In addition, some Ministers in UK would argue that creation of NATO restricted group on nuclear planning should be the occasion to abandon discussion of collective hardware. Von Hassel quickly caved and agreed to deletion provided record of meeting showed matter could be raised in new restricted group. When Secretary McNamara pointed out only international record of NPWG was agreed minutes, the wording in para 4B was amended to include “among others,” to make it clear that the three subjects to be considered by the NPG are not exclusive. Our understanding of this legislative history is that “hardware” projects are clearly to be discussable in the new planning group. 5. Brosio made a strong plea that the new bodies be chaired by himself when meeting at Ministerial and PermRep levels and that the staff support be provided by a new unit within NATO International Staff. Brosio argued that to do otherwise would weaken the integrated NATO organization and run the risk of creating the impression of an alliance within the Alliance. Secretary McNamara gave his view that progress in the first instance depended on the development and consideration of national views on these important matters. Later, there could be an effort to see which of these views all allies could share with a view to developing a consensus or common doctrine. Brosio said NATO was an instrument for the expression and reconciliation of national views and saw no contradiction between his proposal and Secretary McNamara's view. He recognized that nuclear decisions would be taken by heads of government consulting directly rather than in NAC. Healey thought that nuclear matters were better discussed initially in small group but he foresaw a stage at which the views of the Nuclear Planning Group would become the concern of NATO as a whole. The questions raised by Brosio were among those given to the Deputies for further study. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Telegram 11919, July 20, transmitted the draft of a minute on the Nuclear Planning Working Group. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) Telegram 1153, June 23, transmitted the substance of a conversation between Turkish Permanent Representative Birgi and Cleveland. (Ibid., DEF 12 NATO) 3 The text of the agreed minute was transmitted in telegram 1290 from Paris, July 26. (Ibid.) For text of the communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 362–363. 190. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 190. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 29, 1966, 1536Z. 1461. NATUS. Personal for the Secretary. 1. As we deadlocked in negotiations with France on French troops in Germany this week, I took some soundings among my colleagues as to why the French had in the end assumed so unyielding a position in the face of our efforts to establish a political basis for Lemnitzer-Ailleret talks. 2. The first reason given by everybody was Chancellor Erhard's performance during the General De Gaulle visit to Bonn. He was evidently so anxious to please his guest and to have something that looked like a political success after a disappointing provincial election, that he must have given De Gaulle the impression that the Germans would never invite the French troops to leave, no matter what. As long as De Gaulle thinks he has the Germans hexed, he is entitled to assume that he does not need to permit serious discussions with the Fourteen about such issues as the mission of those forces, command arrangements in wartime, coordination in emergency alerts, and cooperation in peacetime exercises. 3. In these circumstances, I think it is important that this subject be promoted to a pretty high priority in the President's discussions with Erhard during the latter's visit to Washington next month. If we can help with the staff work to this end, I hope you will let me know. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Exdis. 191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, August 6, 1966, 2:25 p.m. 23304. NATUS. Ref: Paris 1801. 2 You should inform next meeting of 14 of status US bilateral discussions with France along following lines: (1) Two meetings have been held at sub-ministerial level to identify problems relating to withdrawal of US forces and materiel from France. US indicated that while it did not accept deadline of next April 1 for such withdrawal, it nonetheless is planning removals as rapidly as feasible. It was made clear, however, that a period beyond April 1 will be required to complete removals of logistics facilities. These discussions are to continue as US relocation plans are completed. (2) Two meetings have also been held at ministerial level regarding right of re-entry by US forces and materiel into military facilities in France at time of a NATO alert, or in other circumstances such as Berlin crisis. French side made clear no US military personnel or stocks could remain in France in peacetime. They will seek clarification whether exception could be made for pipeline operation. Couve further made clear that his instructions were that no re-entry would be possible except after declaration by war by France. He was willing to seek clarification whether France might agree to re-entry on occasion of NATO alert in which France participated. This will be subject of further discussion in September. US indicated that it would wish utilize certain airfield, depot and communication facilities as well as pipeline in time of emergency so they would be fully operational in event of hostilities. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 FR–US. Secret. Drafted by Beigel; cleared by Getz, Stoessel, U, and OASD/ISA; and approved by Vest. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Telegram 1801, August 5, asked for a summary of the status of U.S.-French bilateral talks. (Ibid.) 192. Letter From Foreign Minister Schroeder to Secretary of State Rusk 192. Letter From Foreign Minister Schroeder to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Bonn, August 8, 1966. Dear Dean, I am writing to you today about certain press reports alleging that the United States Administration intends to reduce the number of American forces in Germany. Some of these reports are said to stem from background information given to journalists by American officials, reference being made among others to a talk between Mr. McNamara and Herr Gillesen of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . I do not know whether such conversations actually took place, and even less whether their contents have been accurately reproduced by the journalists, nor is there any need for me to tell you that my own judgment has not been influenced by these press reports, but I have the feeling that these apparently quite numerous background talks about American troops in Germany do not do American-German relations any good. It is inevitable that such statements, however carefully phrased, are given a sharper and more sensational accent in the press, which of course has a particularly detrimental effect on a matter of such delicacy. Meanwhile, Herr von Hassel has told me about his Paris talks with Mr. McNamara who, I was pleased to hear, dissociated himself from the press reports and stated in particular that the 15,000 or so troops withdrawn from Germany would be replaced by the end of the year. But I wonder all the more whether it would not be better to refrain altogether from giving to the press such intensive background information on the question of American troops in Germany, since it is obviously not possible to achieve the right and intended effect by means of such talks. In my opinion this matter can only be dealt with satisfactorily if our two Governments exchange their views very frankly and confidentially in as small a group as possible. I hope that the Chancellor's visit to Washington at the end of September will offer an opportunity for it. I am, dear Dean, very much looking forward to seeing you again on that occasion. 2 With kind regards, Yours, Schroder 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Nodis. Translation. The German language original is attached to the source text. 2 On August 8, Rusk sent a short 2-paragraph reply in which he expressed appreciation for this letter and said that the subject of American troop levels should be discussed during the Chancellor's forthcoming visit to Washington. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Schroeder signed the German language original. 193. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 193. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 11, 1966. SUBJECT Further Reply to Erhard Letter of July 5: Two Major Decisions You will recall that you instructed George McGhee to acknowledge Erhard's letter (at Tab A) 2 and to say that you would need time to study it before replying in detail. (Before deciding on how to reply on offset, it made sense to see how the Chancellor's rocky politics and economics shaped up.) There is now a case for an extended answer, but your advisers differ on what kind of a pitch we should make on offset, and what we should say about the nuclear sharing/non-proliferation issue. The differences reflect basic questions concerning our objectives in Europe which only you can decide. Issue No. 1: Nuclear Sharing vs. Non-proliferation Erhard's letter implicitly asks you to reconfirm that we will not exclude “establishing in the future a joint integrated nuclear force” in order to buy a non-proliferation agreement. A full-dress reply which does not explicitly do that, would almost certainly result in another Erhard inquiry within 48 hours. On the other hand, unless you have made up your mind to stay with the present policy on non-proliferation, you will not want to repeat the assurance he wants. You know the positions of your advisers on this. Secretary Rusk, Ball and Rostow would vote for a strong reconfirmation of our earlier position. (Walt will file his own views in detail.) 3 I do not know how Bob McNamara would vote. (In the past, he has been against the so-called European clause, but not against keeping open the option of a joint force with a U.S. veto.) Moyers 4 and I would vote against reconfirming the present position until you have decided whether to test the Russians in Geneva (though Bill and I would differ somewhat on tactics). My suggestion would be that we avoid this issue by not sending a full, extended reply—except perhaps on offset—but rather a short note saying that you plan to discuss the various points raised in Erhard's letter in September. Reaffirm previous position (hardware option to remain open) 5 Avoid issue by not sending a full, point by point reply Wait with the decision—and with any detailed reply until you, Rusk, McNamara, Moyers and Rostow are all back in town and can talk it over Speak to me Issue No. 2: Offset The tactical question is whether (1) to send Erhard a hard warning now that we will have to cut back troops if he does not come through with a new 100% offset deal (to follow the present one, which runs out in June 1967); or (2) simply to ask Erhard not to foreclose a renewal of the full offset before his September visit, and ask him, in the interim, to explore with us and the British a modified version of offset which would avoid the payments drain but give the Germans some extra options (buying goods other than weapons, and perhaps even buying long-term U.S. securities). The tough language on offset at Tab B is McNamara-Rusk product, 6 which, however, predated some of the recent evidence of Erhard's political difficulties. McNamara still wants to go ahead with it. George Ball and George McGhee are against. I do not know about Secretary Rusk. The tactical issue hinges on a fundamental question of our objectives: 1. Do we want to use financial pressure to maneuver the Germans into asking us to cut troops? If this worked, it would permit us to shift to a more economical military posture (dual basing, airlift, etc.), with minimum resistance from the Chiefs and their allies on the Hill. 2. Or , do we prefer to try for an arrangement which would: (i) give us the time needed to work out with the Germans and the UK an agreed position on what kind of a reduction in U.S.-UK forces in Europe would make sense in military terms; (ii) avoid large-scale U.S. troop cuts during the interim (perhaps 2–3 years), and minimize British troop cuts; (iii) still protect our balance of payments (though somewhat less so than sharp troop cutbacks). In general, sending a tough letter now along the lines of Tab B, corresponds to the “get the Germans to invite us out” strategy. Sending a gentler one fits with the second “trying to work it out” strategy. The Line-Up Bob McNamara and Joe Fowler would vote for a tough letter. I would surmise—you will want to get his views in person—that Bob believes the best way out of big, unnecessary troop commitments in Europe is to insist on a 100% weapons-offset, regardless of German politics. This would maximize pressure on the Germans to build up their forces (using weapons bought from the U.S.). And if the heat gets too great, and Erhard refuses, we will have set the stage for a cutback. On tactics, Bob would argue that the only hope of getting to Erhard in time to affect his '67 Defense Budget is to hit him now. (If the economies the Chancellor plans are carried out, it is clear that he will not have the money to keep offset at present levels after June 1967, either for us or the UK.) Ball, Rostow, McGhee—and, Ball believes, the Secretary—would vote for a gentler letter. So would I. —We do not believe there is an appreciable chance of getting Erhard to increase his defense budget this summer. He is in the middle of a major parliamentary fight for an anti-inflation/spending-reduction program. (By next winter, if inflationary pressures ease, he will be in a much better position to raise some extra money for defense.) —More fundamentally, we believe that major shifts in U.S. security policy in Europe should be based in the first instance on political/military factors. To base such shifts on money would confirm the impression that NATO is falling apart, that de Gaulle is right in saying that the British and Americans are unreliable and care more for their pocketbooks than for the safety of Europe. Further, unilateral U.S. troop cuts would reduce our assets for an eventual mutual-withdrawal bargain with the Soviets. Most important, it could seriously unsettle German politics—with unpredictable results. (Erhard is already in trouble, mainly because of his inflation problem. Latest poll results show his unqualified support down from 44% in April to 30% in July.) There is no question that the gentler strategy would delay a shift to more economical troop deployments, and it might bring on a tougher battle with the Chiefs when we do shift later. But it would avoid the appearance of the financial tail wagging the security dog, and avoid hitting Erhard when he is down. Moreover, we do not believe that the gentler strategy means giving up on a serious offset deal. There are good alternatives to a straight weapons offset. Additional Bator Comments . Underlying my own strong vote in favor of the softer strategy are two further judgments: 1. If we are going to take risks with German politics, I would vote that we do so in connection with nuclear-sharing/non-proliferation, rather than with offset and U.S. forces in Europe. I do not believe we should risk frustrating the Germans on both counts. Frustrating them on either one is risky—George and Walt would say much too risky. I think it worth trying to get Bonn to give up on hardware in order to test the Russians on non-proliferation—though I would do it more slowly and gently than I think Bill Moyers would. But I entirely share the Ball-Rostow view that a harsh strategy on both fronts would lead to really serious trouble in Germany. 2. It would be a very poor trade for us to take serious risks with the stability of German and alliance politics, and hence with our security position in Europe, in order to make marginal gains on our balance of payments. Given time, I think the gentler Ball-Rostow-Bator strategy would lead to a broader version of offset, good enough to protect our balance of payments. But even if that is wrong, and the result is a marginally greater balance of payments drain, that is a risk that, in my judgment, is worth taking in order to protect our basic security and political arrangements in Europe. By taking more of a chance on our balance of payments—and on the UK balance of payments, so as to hold the British in Europe and East of Suez—we very marginally increase the chance that, in the end, we will face a run on gold. As you know, I do not share the view that such a run would be the end of the world—as long as it is not within a few months of an election. Far from it. The present international money rules place a preposterous burden on the U.S. By moving with speed and skill, following a stoppage of U.S. gold sales, we could, within a few months, negotiate new rules which would make far more sense all around. Because of our economic strength and trading position, our negotiating leverage would be enormous. This is not to recommend that we stop gold sales tomorrow. It does suggest that we should not take serious risks with the stability of the Atlantic security system, and the so far successful effort to build Germany into the Western community, in order very marginally to reduce the chance that we will have to stop selling gold to the French at $35 an ounce. Choices Alternative 1 : Wait with this decision—and with any extended reply—until you, Rusk, McNamara, and Rostow are all back in town and can talk it over. (Bob would worry that the delay would reduce the chances of influencing Erhard's budget. The rest of us do not believe there is a chance of any letter causing Erhard to pull apart his anti-inflation package in the middle of a tough parliamentary fight.) Alternative 2 : If you decide now in favor of the tough (McNamara) strategy, we will send up a cleared draft reply incorporating the offset language at Tab B. (Before making that decision, you may wish to talk to Secretary Rusk, George Ball, and Walt.) Alternative 3 : If you have doubts about the tough strategy, but do not wish to wait with a decision, you will wish, before finally making up your mind, to hear out Bob McNamara as well as Rusk and Ball. You could have a small meeting tomorrow (Friday)—Bob leaves at 3:00 for a week. Or you might telephone Bob. Wait 7 Follow tough McNamara approach Follow Ball-Rostow-Bator approach Set up meeting Friday (August 12) Speak to me Next Step If, after having heard out McNamara, you decide against a tough letter it is important to start a State-Defense-Treasury-White House exercise to prepare an alternative strategy on offset and troop strength for use in U.S.-UK–FRG talks. Approve 8 Disapprove Speak to me FB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 10. Secret. Another copy of this memorandum is dated August 12, 12:45 a.m. (Ibid., Papers of Francis M. Bator, Meetings with LBJ, 8/24/66, Box 17) 2 Not printed. 3 Not found. 4 Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President. 5 None of these options is checked. 6 Not printed. 7 This option is checked. At the end of Alternative 1, Bator wrote: “We will gamble on waiting. Draft letter asking him to be ready to discuss in Sept. and to sit on budget.” 8 This option is checked. 194. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson 194. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson 1 Bonn, August 11, 1966. Dear Mr. President: Although the United States Embassy in Bonn has already been given a detailed report on President De Gaulle's visit to Bonn 2 I am anxious to give you my personal impressions. As you know, I had two rather long talks alone with President De Gaulle, as well as a discussion in a wider group. We dealt with questions concerning his visit to the Soviet Union, the German problem and European affairs. However, our exchange of view naturally centered on the Atlantic Alliance and especially the consequences which France's decision last March to withdraw her troops from NATO command has for us all. On this point General De Gaulle said that France wanted to remain the ally of her allies. Nor had he, he said, left any doubt in his discussions in the Soviet Union that France will remain on the side of the West. She simply wanted to withdraw from integration and wished to regain her complete freedom of decision. She would, however, fulfill her commitments, especially those flowing from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. France would fight on the side of her allies in the event of an attack on a partner of the Alliance. President de Gaulle felt that in order duly to prepare for any such joint operations, the French General Staff should elaborate with the NATO-Headquarters plans for all conceivable cases of possible military co-operation. Whilst confirming that these problems would have to be resolved not bilaterally but within the framework of the Alliance, he nevertheless repeatedly underlined the fact that the decision regarding the use of French troops in an emergency would have to be taken by the French Government. As regards the presence of French troops in Germany, President De Gaulle repeatedly stressed that he would leave French troops in Germany only if that was what we wanted. He would withdraw them at any time we wished, whether now or later. On the matter of the legal questions involved in the stationing of French troops in Germany, we agreed to continue the negotiations already begun. It was clear from our talks that De Gaulle rejects any automatic commitment in the event of military operation, but he wishes to remain in the alliance of the free nations of the West. On the other hand, he stated that he would in any event leave his troops in Berlin, thus maintaining the joint responsibility for Berlin. On all these points I explained the German standpoint, with which you are familiar, and again impressed upon President De Gaulle the reasons why we wish to preserve integration and our close ties with the United States. To sum up I would say that our talks helped to clarify our mutual positions, which, I hope, will have become even more distinct by the time I come to Washington at the end of September. Then we shall be able to discuss this matter thoroughly, and also any other questions of particular interest to the United States and Germany. May I say that I am very much looking forward to our meeting, and that my thoughts are often with you in this troubled period you are going through. With the expression of my high esteem, Sincerely yours, Ludwig Erhard 3 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret. Translation. The German language original is attached to the source text. 2 De Gaulle visited Bonn on July 21. 3 Printed from a copy that indicated Erhard signed the German language original. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State 1 Brussels, August 19, 1966, 1536Z. 850. NATUS. 1. Perusal of Paris 2209 and 2266, 2 the latter reporting on a lunch-eon session at which assembled acting PermReps went to work on their Belgian colleague to convince him that GOB “not doing right by SHAPE”, compels me to refer addressees' attention to Brussels 763 and 765 3 in which I reported a conversation with PriMin Vanden Boeynants re SHAPE relocation. 2. In particular I wish to refer to Vanden Boeynants clear warning of serious consequences should Belgium's allies support at govt level positions expressed to date by SACEUR and other military officials and which in Belgian eyes are not essentially based on military considerations. 3. I also wish to highlight PriMin's statement to me that he and Belgian FonMin Harmel, in conversation held in PriMin's office on Saturday, June 4, had clearly and unequivocally informed NATO Secretary-General Brosio that while Belgium willing to host SHAPE, Brussels and immediate Brussels area would be excluded as relocation site. 4. I believe the GOB can be faulted for not having offered more than one site for SHAPE and for having demonstrated a rigidity, and perhaps an inordinate stubbornness, following early reports of SACEUR's dissatisfaction with Casteau site. The Belgians likewise have, I think, tended to minimize communications problems related to the establishment of SHAPE in the Casteau area, and not adequately to recognize this as a valid military consideration. I understand de Kerchove in his discussions at Paris today will indicate that the GOB would be prepared to offer a second site but that this could not be in the Brussels or other urban areas. If, in fact, the Belgians do put forward an alternative site to Casteau, I believe it would be out of recognition that their position has been unduly rigid. 5. I might add that, in my view, the rigidity which Belgium has shown in sticking thus far to the Casteau site for SHAPE can to a degree be related to a feeling within the govt that its views on the location of other headquarters (AFCENT and EUCOM) are not being given serious consideration. They believe events are justifying their fear that the military preference will in each case be supported from the political side. 6. What I do not quite understand are the suggestions emanating from meetings in Paris that, in refusing to agree to a location for SHAPE in the Brussels area, the Belgians are in some way guilty of bad faith and are being arbitrary and politically weak-kneed. The PriMin's unequivocal statement to Brosio should have made clear to all concerned that the Brussels area was out. FonMin Harmel made this point also in reporting to Parliament following the June NAC Ministerial on Belgian agreement to host SHAPE. The Embassy has consistently reported this as a fact of life here. Knight 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, London, Paris for Crawford, Rome, and Luxembourg. 2 Telegram 2209, August 17, reported that the relocation of NATO had become a political rather than technical issue within the Alliance. Telegram 2266, August 18, summarized a meeting of Permanent Representatives at which the majority took the Belgian Representative to task for not being more forthcoming on the question of relocating SHAPE. (Ibid.) 3 Both these telegrams, August 12, reported complaints by Belgian officials about the manner in which the relocation of SHAPE was being handled, especially by the military. (Ibid.) 196. Memorandum of Conversation 196. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966. SUBJECT deGaulle and NATO PARTICIPANTS United States The President Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth Rufus Z. Smith, Director for Relations with Canada Canada Prime Minister Pearson Ambassador A. E. Ritchie H. Basil Robinson, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs (The President met with Prime Minister Pearson on the occasion of his participation in a cornerstone laying ceremony at the Roosevelt Campobello International Park on Campobello Island, New Brunswick. He was the luncheon guest of the Prime Minister at Rossmount Inn in the little town of Chamcook, N.B. The lunch was preceded by approximately an hour and a half of serious conversation in a parlor of the Inn set aside for the purpose.) At one point in the conversation, the Prime Minister asked the President how he was handling deGaulle, to which the President responded with a smile, “I get out of the box when he starts winding up. I'm betting on outliving him.” The Prime Minister commented that Canada was anxious that nothing be done which will make more difficult the ultimate establishment of better relations with France. The President responded that he himself had been very careful never to respond in kind to deGaulle. In fact he had never said one unkind word about deGaulle and he stopped American bureaucrats from doing so whenever he caught them. He added, however, that when we are told to get out, we simply have to get out. The Prime Minister agreed, noting that this had been particularly hard for the Canadians to swallow, especially since Canadian forces would be moving to Germany. The special historic relationship which the Canadian nation had with France and the memories of Canadian involvement in the two wars against Germany made this an especially hard blow. Nevertheless, emotion was no basis for policy, although at one point he had not resisted the temptation to say to the French, “Do you want us to move out our hundred thousand dead, too?” In sum, the Canadian Government believes we should not make it easy for the French to pull out of NATO. The President remarked that he could understand and appreciate the special feeling Canada had for France. The Prime Minister went on to say that, looking to the future, he believed the Europeans should do more themselves. They should carry a greater share of the burden of their own defense. The President did not take direct issue with the Prime Minister's observation, but asked who among the Europeans will do more? Wilson? Erhard? The Italians? They simply won't. What worried him most is that we might do less and they won't do more. This would be frightening because, by tempting the aggressor, we could cause World War III. In any event, he was not going to try to dominate the Alliance. The Prime Minister responded that he had not been suggesting that the US should pull out wholesale. He noted that Canada had had an opportunity to pull out when the French had asked them to leave France, but the Canadians had resisted this temptation. He was only suggesting that the British, for example, could involve themselves more in the defense of Europe and ought to give up trying to play the role of nineteenth century imperialists. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved by the White House on August 30. The meeting was held at the Rossmount Inn. The source text is labeled “Part 6 of 9.” 197. Briefing Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 197. Briefing Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 23, 1966, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Your Meeting This Afternoon at 6:30 on German Offset and U.S. and UK Forces in Germany We need your instructions on two related issues: 1. What should we do to dissuade the British from rushing ahead with sharp cuts in their forces in Germany (men and stocks) in a way which would probably start an unravelling process in NATO and increase domestic pressure on us to follow suit? (So far, our stance vis-a-vis the British has been: (i) you must not cut; (ii) we wish you luck with your offset with the Germans.) 2. What should we do about our own offset with the Germans? The present arrangement runs out in June 1967. We owe Erhard replies to his recent letter on his talk with deGaulle, 2 and also to his earlier letter which asks that we not connect troops and offset, and that payments for other than weapons be counted. 3 (If we send Erhard a full reply, you will also need to decide how to respond to his implicit request for a new U.S. pledge that we will not exclude “establishing in the future a joint integrated nuclear force” in order to buy a non-proliferation treaty. A full-dress reply which does not explicitly give him that reassurance would almost certainly result in another inquiry within 48 hours.) Issue No. 1: What do we do to slow down British troop cuts? There is agreement among your advisers that it would be useful: —for George Ball and Cy Vance to go to London later this week to make the case against hasty cuts; —perhaps to offer marginally to increase our stationing expenditures and weapons purchases; —offer to join the UK–FRG “mixed commission” of foreign/defense/finance ministers which is supposed to prepare a report on UK troops and offset. Hopefully, the above steps will delay a final decision on UK cutbacks at least for the next several weeks. And they could be used to rebut newspaper talk that an unravelling of NATO is certain and imminent. But they are a stopgap. If we are to stop the unravelling, the key lies in our management of our offset issue. Issue No. 2: The U.S. Offset Specifically, are we willing to change our “no weapons offset/no troops” tactics and offer to: —put our offset renewal on the agenda of the “mixed commission?” (An offer to join to discuss only the UK offset is likely to be regarded as patronizing rather than helpful.) —explore with the UK and the Germans a modified version of offset which would protect our payments but give the Germans some extra options (buying extra goods other than weapons, and, most important, buying long-term “offset-bonds”, perhaps in the context of some multilateral defense payments arrangement)? The tactical issue hinges on our choice of objectives: 1. Do we want to use financial pressure to maneuver the Germans into asking us to cut troops? If this worked, it would permit us to shift to a more economical military posture (dual basing, airlifts, etc.), with minimum resistance from the Chiefs and their allies on the Hill. 2. Or , do we want to try for an arrangement which would (i) give us time to work out a US-UK–FRG bargain on cheaper deployments (and perhaps FRG increases) which make military sense; (ii) avoid large-scale U.S. troop cuts during the interim (perhaps 2–3 years), and minimize British troop cuts; (iii) still protect our balance of payments (though somewhat less so than would sharp troop cutbacks); (iv) set up a multilateral defense payments club where finance ministers will confront foreign and defense ministers on a regular basis. (This would partially bridge the unhealthy gap in Europe between people responsible for money and those responsible for defense and foreign relations.) In general, staying with our present tactic of threatening to cut back troops if the Germans don't come through with a new 100% weapons offset corresponds to the “get the Germans to invite us out” objective. Putting our offset on the agenda of the mixed commission and offering to explore a multilateral offset arrangement, with more options for the Germans, corresponds to the second “trying to work it out” objective. The Case for Staying with the Present Tactics: The quickest way to cut unnecessary U.S. troops in Europe is to insist on 100% weapons offset, regardless of German politics. This would maximize pressure on the Germans to build up their forces, using weapons bought from the U.S. And if the heat gets too great, and Erhard refuses to renew the offset at the current level—as is now almost certain—we will have set the stage for a cutback. This would enable us to shift to a more sensible military posture, save us budget money, and protect the balance of payments. The Case Against Present Tactics: In achieving the above objectives, the current line will maximize the international political costs: —The Germans will not agree to another 100% weapons offset at the present levels. If we make the threat, we will have to carry it out or back down. (Erhard is in political trouble. The latest polls show his unqualified support down from 44% in April to 30% in July. He is not going to be able to pull apart his anti-inflation package in the middle of a tough parliamentary fight to increase his defense budget enough to cover a 100% weapons offset.) —U.S. troop cuts, explicitly for financial reasons—and on top of BAOR cuts—will be seen as evidence that NATO is falling apart and that deGaulle is right in saying that the British and Americans care more for their pocketbooks than for the safety of Europe. —We will have given away some of our assets for an eventual mutual withdrawal bargain with the Soviets. —Most important, there would be a serious unsettling effect on German politics, with unpredictable results. (It is not at all inconceivable that peremptory U.S. cutbacks could topple Erhard, perhaps leading to a Gaullist German Government.) —Over a couple of years, we could be faced with a disintegration of our postwar security arrangements in Europe, a hostile France, an alienated and deeply neurotic Germany, a bankrupt and isolated Britain, and a rising tide of Gaullist hostility to the U.S. A Possible Way Out: There is a reasonable chance that we could shift to more economical deployments and provide acceptable protection for our balance of payments without taking such large political risks . The key lies in taking the time needed to make the shift by consensus rather than fiat. To achieve this, we need to set in motion a process designed to produce U.S.-UK–FRG agreement on an allied defense posture in Europe which will provide deterrence and the insurance of a reasonable conventional option. Our joining the “mixed commission” would be a very good start. At the same time, we will continue to need balance of payments protection. For the time being at least, that means no sharp cut in German offset money. The key to that—at least a necessary condition—is to give the Germans more options—enlarge the number of ways in which they can provide offset. This does not mean that we should reduce our pressure on them to buy weapons—for good military reasons. It does mean that, in addition, we must find ways to ease the political strain on Erhard of raising offset money (e.g., allow the Germans to purchase long-term offset bonds, perhaps financed outside their budget). In my judgment, the multilateral payments union proposal, which has been in staff preparation for some time, is the most promising possibility. Procedure Before making up your mind, you will wish to hear the views of all your advisers. (In the past, McNamara has been in favor of staying with our present hard line on offset. Ball has been for a shift. I do not know about Secretary Rusk.) As is clear from the above, my own vote would be for a shift in tactics to the second, “trying to work it out” option. If you should decide that way, you might wish, at the end of the meeting this afternoon, to instruct us as follows: 1. Ball and Vance should go to London and tell the British that we are prepared: —to join the “Mixed Commission”; —to put our offset renewal on the agenda; —to try to work out with them and the Germans a scheme which will enlarge the ways in which the Germans can provide offset, yet protect both UK and US payments. 2. We prepare a letter from you to Erhard, thanking him for his report on deGaulle and, on offset, telling him the same things Ball-Vance will say to the British. (We could say nothing about nuclear sharing/nonproliferation, and say that you plan to discuss all other outstanding issues when he is here in September. Or, if you have so decided, we can give him the reassurance he wants. This would tend to lock us in on nonproliferation.) 3. A group consisting of Deming, Solomon/Leddy, McNaughton/Enthoven, and Bator should get to work on a multilateral payments plan which would both widen the Germans' options and protect U.S. and UK payments. This group should initially report to Secretaries Rusk, Fowler and McNamara. FB 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Meetings with LBJ, Box 17. Secret. Attached to an August 23 memorandum of transmittal to the President and to a memorandum suggesting how the meeting at 6:30 p.m. might be organized. The meeting was not held on August 23, but the following day at 6:30 p.m. A last minute memorandum from Bator to the President and his indecipherable notes on the meeting are ibid. No other record of the meeting has been found, but Document 198 indicates what happened. 2 See Document 190 . 3 Dated July 5. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) 198. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 198. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, undated. I have become increasingly concerned during the past few weeks about the dangers of an unraveling in NATO which could easily get out of hand. With your urgent need to save foreign exchange in Germany, Erhard's budgetary and political difficulties (not to speak of his problems with his brass), my problems with our German offset and with the Congress on troops in Europe—all against the background of the General's antics—there is danger of serious damage to the security arrangements we have worked so hard to construct during the last 20 years. To you, I don't have to spell out the possible political consequences, especially in Germany. And while I would not think it likely that our Russian friends will develop itchy fingers, one cannot rule it out. In any case, it would be foolish to run down our assets vis-a-vis Moscow without some quid-pro-quo. It seems to me that the essential step, if we are to hold things together, would be for you, the Germans, and ourselves to get to work immediately to find a solution that would be equitable, meet our respective political requirements, and fully cover the defense needs of the Alliance. I propose to write to Erhard this afternoon 2 —before his budget meeting tomorrow—to suggest that the U.S. join the FRG and the UK in an initial exploration of this entire range of issues: force levels, deployments and the sharing of the foreign exchange burden. I would think that such an exploration should involve our Ministers of Finance, as well as of Foreign Affairs and Defense. And, of course, it would have to be followed by thorough consultation with all our Allies in NATO. I know that not all of your decisions can await the outcome of such a tripartite exercise. But I very much hope—and I will put this hard to Erhard in connection with his budget—that we will all try to avoid any decisions during the next several weeks which would unduly narrow our choices. David Bruce will be in touch with you about this proposal in the near future. In the meanwhile, I hope, my good friend, you are having a good rest on your island. After some strictly nonpolitical speech making in the West, I hope to spend Saturday and Sunday at home in Texas observing, as I told the press yesterday, the results of 58 years of very pleasant existence. 3 With warm regards, Lyndon B. Johnson 4 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Nodis. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “President sent following message to Prime Minister August 26.” Another copy of the message indicates that it was sent to Bruce for his information in telegram 37597, August 30. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272) 2 The message to Erhard was actually sent on August 25. (Ibid.) 3 In his August 29 reply, Wilson stated that he shared the President's concern and would be happy to agree to tripartite talks. Because of his “major concern” to safeguard sterling, however, he wanted to reach an agreed Anglo-American position so the Germans could not play one country off against the other. (Ibid.) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 199. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Rusk 199. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 1, 1966. SUBJECT Informal Conversations with Senators Kuchel and Dirksen regarding Senator Mansfield's Resolution Calling for a Reduction of US Forces in Europe 2 —Information Memorandum Senator Kuchel: I had a good personal talk with Senator Kuchel this morning regarding the Mansfield resolution, explaining that we had not been consulted on its contents, timing, or indeed its introduction on the floor of the Senate. I said the resolution was a very bad one and would create major problems for us in NATO which was already suffering from General De Gaulle's withdrawal. Furthermore, it would cause difficult problems for Chancellor Erhard who would be visiting the US later this month. I explained that for several months at closed NATO meetings, you and other US representatives have been stressing the theme that there cannot be a double standard whereby the US is expected to meet agreed force goals but other NATO members need not meet theirs. The introduction of this resolution would most certainly be exploited by the Gaullists to prove their contention that the US was not dependable and also lead to charges of unilateral US action that further undermined NATO. Finally, the resolution would not be a helpful backdrop for the talks you would be having with Gromyko in New York later this month at the UN General Assembly. 3 With respect to Senator Mansfield's suggestion that the resolution be put on the consent calendar with no committee hearings, I pointed out that the April 1951 resolution, calling for the sending of troops to Europe, 4 had been considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee and that there were over 800 pages of published testimony of those Committee hearings. I summarized by saying that the resolution was damaging to US national interests. While under any circumstances it would be damaging because of its timing, the resolution was even more harmful because it made absolutely no reference to NATO consultations or to a reciprocal reduction of forces by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Senator Kuchel said he agreed and did not like the resolution. He thought it absurd that the sponsors had not mentioned NATO consultation and also required the Soviet Union to reciprocate by reducing their forces in Eastern Europe. He said that while the Department might not have been notified by Mansfield, he had assumed from what Mansfield said while introducing the resolution that the President had been fully consulted and had not disapproved. I said that while I could not undertake to speak for the President, I personally felt certain that the President had not been consulted on the contents or the timing of the introduction of the resolution. Senator Kuchel said that it was also absurd for the sponsors to ask that the resolution be put on the consent calendar. It was particularly nonsensical to suggest that this resolution, which was one of great import, did not need to be examined by committee when as a general practice the Senate referred the most trivial resolutions to committee and the original 1951 resolution had been thoroughly aired in committee. The Senator said he wanted to help and asked whether on a personal and private basis there were any Administration papers or remarks that I could pass to him without attribution. I replied that my conversation with him was personal and that while there were no papers that I could give him, I did want him to know our views because of the serious damage to our national interests that passage of the resolution might entail. Senator Kuchel said he fully understood and appreciated very much my call. He was determined to see the resolution be sent to committee and he would try to be helpful in defeating or modifying it. He suggested that we have another talk the middle of next week if there were any new developments. Senator Dirksen: I also talked to Senator Dirksen along the same lines as I had talked to Senator Kuchel, stressing the damage that the resolution could do in our relations with NATO and the Germans and the comfort it could give to the Soviet Union which would not fail to exploit it along with other elements unfriendly to the US such as the Gaullists. Senator Dirksen said he agreed. He had met with his Republican colleagues this morning on this subject and enjoined them “to stay off this resolution” and not to hold any press conferences on the subject. He would renew this advice. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur. The source text bears the notation “for Pres Evening Reading.” Copies were also sent to Ball, Leddy, and Johnson. 2 For text of the Mansfield resolution (S. Res. 300), August 31, see The Congressional Record, 1966, Senate , p. 21442. 3 At his September 8 press conference, President Johnson addressed the question of troop strength in Europe, saying that he was aware of the sense of the Senate on this issue, but that it could not be solved by Senate resolutions. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , pp. 998–999) 4 S. Res. 99, 82d Congress. 200. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 200. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, undated. I fully understand your anxiety to complete the steps necessary to deal with your balance of payments problem. We put the safeguards of Sterling high on our list of priorities and, as you know, I admire the sturdy measures you have taken so far to put your house in good order. Yet, as we have found out in this country, steps to stop the outflow of foreign exchange must always be measured against the cost in terms of defense and foreign policy. Thus, I am concerned that the proposals you are considering with respect to the BAOR be carefully handled or they may start the unravelling of our Western defenses. De Gaulle's abrupt action in pulling his own forces out of NATO was a brutal blow at the solidarity of the Alliance, and there could be great danger from further withdrawals that are not related to a common plan. Above all, we must avoid any actions that might tend to make the Germans feel they were not full partners on the team. Erhard is in deep trouble and the political situation in Germany today is anything but healthy. It is essential to both our countries that we show sensitivity to German opinion which seems more and more confused and apprehensive. For that reason I would think it unwise for us to hold bilateral talks in advance that might lead the Germans to believe that we were preparing a fait accompli. Of course, during the tripartite talks there will naturally be bilateral exchanges among those taking part, and we will be ready for such talks at the earliest feasible time. 2 Meanwhile, I hope very much that you will not press the NATO discussions too vigorously. It could greatly complicate the problem if plans were rigidly worked out within the NATO Council before we had a chance for quiet talks among our three Governments. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret; Nodis. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “Message from President to Prime Minister September 1, 1966.” 2 On September 7, Ball talked with high-ranking officials in London and quickly reached agreement on holding tripartite conversations subject only to West German agreement that such talks would not prejudice the British timetable on accomplishing savings on their BAOR commitment. (Telegram 1924 from London, September 7; ibid., Central Files, ORG 7 U) 3 Printed from an unsigned copy. 201. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 201. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, September 3, 1966, 1320Z. 2767. NATUS. Subject: The FRG position on French troops in Germany—political aspects. 1. In the forthcoming meeting between the President and Chancellor Erhard, the multilateral issue of the role and mission of French troops in Germany will undoubtedly be at the center of the discussions about the future of NATO. Since April the U.S. position on French troops has been tailored to that of the Germans. We have supported them in the clear stand outlined in the FRG declaration of April 6, the German aide-memoire to the French of May 3 and the May report of the Trilateral Working Group. Since De Gaulle's visit to Bonn in July, however, German support for this position has come increasingly into question. 2. As I understand it indirectly from his Ministers, the Chancellor considers that he made no concession to De Gaulle on the mission of the French during De Gaulle's visit. He believes he made it clear that this was to be left for determination by the Fourteen and France. No one whom I talked with, however, was present at the private meeting between Erhard and De Gaulle and there is presumably no record. The fact is that regardless of what Erhard thinks he did or did not say, his own statements at the time of his meeting with De Gaulle, as amplified by his chief press spokesman, provided a solid basis for the French interpretation that the troop issue was in effect settled at that meeting. The German press virtually unanimously reached the same conclusion. The public impression of the outcome of the meeting—especially since it has gone unchallenged for weeks—is probably as important in shaping the final German position as are the Chancellor's second thoughts in private about what he did at the meeting, or what Schroeder can do to convince him to take a strong position on the mission of French forces in the future. 3. Nor was the important change in the German position at the Erhard-De Gaulle meeting solely a question of atmospherics. All parties here agree that the bilateral issues involving the status of the French forces have ceased to be an obstacle to their continued presence. Perhaps more important, the German Government formally and publicly established another basic reason in addition to the military one for the continued presence of the forces; namely, because they serve as a symbol of close Franco-German political cooperation. The pre-eminence accorded to this political reason for the French presence, and the scant attention paid to the military mission of the forces, has had the clear practical effect of subordinating the military aspects of the issue to the political. 4. This development represents a clear victory over the FonMin for those within the CDU/CSU who are against a hard line toward France. The turning point came in a party meeting on July 18, called by Erhard at the initiative of Strauss. At that meeting Barzel, Heck, Gerstenmaier and Krone reportedly gave strong support to Strauss' insistence on a retreat from the Schroeder position, and won the Chancellor over. 5. Carstens had told me (Embtel 2369) 2 that he is confident the instructions the Chancellor would give Schroeder on the military aspects of the French troop presence in the multilateral negotiations in Paris would make a firm stand possible. He did not, however, give me the impression that he really believed this. Schroeder was able to get from Erhard in April the kind of instructions he desires—only to have the Chancellor abandon them suddenly in mid-July. It seems doubtful that Schroeder would be willing to jeopardize further his own position in view of the risk he would run of suffering a second reversal at the hands of Strauss and a clear majority of the most influential leaders of the party. The Chancellor is even weaker now politically than he was in mid-July. Von Hassel, who was never more than a lukewarm supporter of Schroeder on the French troop issue, is now largely neutralized by grave troubles of his own and also seems (Embtel 2591)/2/to have weakened on the troop issue. All these considerations would seem to argue against Schroeder making a determined fight for a firm line. 6. It can be argued that the Germans may be willing to take a firmer stand in the multilateral deliberations on the military mission of the French forces than they did on those questions on which they had to confront the French alone, especially if the rest of the Fourteen stand firm. In the last analysis, however, even the multilateral issue becomes more of a bilateral one. French troops are in Germany, where they have been for twenty years. If they fought it would, in the first instance, be in the defense of Germany. Moreover, the sole effective sanction for French noncompliance with Allied wishes on the troop issue—a notice of eviction—can only be imposed by the Germans. This will doubtless already have occurred to the German Government. I consider it interesting that even while Carstens tells me (Embtel 2369) that the German position on the multilateral issue remains unchanged, he is already preparing a fall-back position on the question of political vs. military negotiations. 7. I conclude that the German Government does not have the strength for a hard confrontation with France on the issue of French troops in Germany. With the issues of status of forces and of French air and air defense units now largely removed from the arena, the main point to be resolved is the mission for the French ground forces in reserve. This does not, in German thinking, pose any great problem. I believe, therefore, that the FRG may seek ways to retire as gracefully as possible from its position concerning the military mission of these forces. In the end it may be prepared to settle for De Gaulle's general assurances—already given to them very forcefully—that France will honor its Article V commitment. 8. On the assumption that this problem will not be tackled meaningfully by the Fourteen before the Chancellor goes to Washington and that we still attach importance to a clear definition of French roles and mission, the question arises as to what can be done in the light of the above. I myself doubt that we can persuade the Chancellor to adhere to his firm policy of April and May. If we tried this course and won out we would, I believe, be subjecting both Erhard and ourselves to grave risks. We might in such case well have to bear the responsibility for causing the withdrawal of French troops from Germany—or Ehrard's demise as Chancellor. If we lost, our standing as the leader of the Alliance would be adversely affected. 9. I conclude that we should stick to the line of action we initiated in March; that is, we should not get out in front of the Germans on the issue of French troops. In talking to Erhard and Schroeder, we can re-emphasize the importance of firm policy. However, we should also state that we will defer to their judgment, the final analysis we consider the problem to be primarily a German one. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret. Repeated to London and Paris. 2 Not found. 202. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson 202. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson 1 Bonn, September 7, 1966. Dear Mr. President, Thank your very much for your letter of 25 August 1966. 2 I have noted with great interest your proposal that the problem of the armed forces, deployment and sharing of the foreign exchange burden, which will have to be met from the middle of next year, be examined at a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affaires, Defence and Finance of the United States, Germany and Great Britain. I, too, am greatly concerned about this and connected political and military problems. They are of considerable importance to the Alliance, whose preservation and consolidation is the common aim of our two governments. In any event the conference you proposed will have to be thoroughly prepared and its possible effect on the Alliance carefully examined. I suggest that, during my forthcoming visit to Washington, we include your proposal in a comprehensive discussion of the future of the Alliance and long-term planning for the defence of Europe. The proposals to be submitted by the Anglo-German mixed commission, whose work will conclude in mid-October with a meeting of the competent German and British Ministers, will also have a bearing on the solution to the problem of off-setting the foreign exchange cost of Allied troops stationed on the continent, and hence on any examination of this problem by the three powers. Your advice and support will be of especial value to me in the present difficult situation. I am looking forward to my visit to Washington with great pleasure, with cordial good wishes, yours sincerely, Ludwig Erhard 3 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Geheim (Secret); Exdis. 2 See footnote 2, Document 198 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Erhard signed the original. A typed note below Erhard's signature reads: “Original des Schreiben folgt mit naechstem Kurier.” 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, September 8, 1966, 3:10 p.m. 42890. Subj: Your 2879 and 2883—telecon with Leddy. 2 For the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Schroeder discloses appalling lack of understanding of problems raised by proposed British action. Germans must be made to understand in unequivocal terms that unless we act immediately in concert with the FRG the British will be irrevocably set on a course of conduct that will result in substantial withdrawals from the BAOR. The result would put enormous pressure on the United States to make corresponding withdrawals and a process of unravelling can be started, with critical consequences. It is totally unrealistic to postpone starting these discussions until after the Chancellor's visit since the pressure for action in Britain due to instability of sterling cannot be dealt with in a leisurely fashion. The British have now agreed to participate in trilateral talks on the condition that they be held immediately (i.e. next week) so as not to postpone the target date of October 13 for completion of the work of the Anglo-German Commission, by which date they are determined to have “results.” The US has proposed trilateral talks not for the purpose of “ganging up” on Germans but because offset and force level (including logistic backup) questions can no longer be considered separately or bilaterally. Re “ganging up” argument you should note we have already suggested to British they should take account of some $20 million annually of balance of payments savings they will obtain through transfer of US air squadrons from France to UK and reduce their German offset demands by that amount. Conceivably similar savings could be found. It would be our strong hope that out of trilateral discussions practical arrangements can be worked out on both questions of finance and force levels which will be acceptable to all three countries and preserve essential NATO security requirements which we are convinced will otherwise be endangered. The US is prepared to come to trilateral talks with suggestions for consideration to accomplish this end result. NATO would of course be consulted on any force level questions but it is of utmost importance that three countries be in agreement on them. Accordingly, you should in your forthcoming talk with Erhard do your best to persuade him to agree to commencement of trilateral talks next week in view of serious dangers which would result from delay. 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to London. 2 Telegrams 2879 and 2883, September 8 (received in the Department of State early in the morning of September 8) reported that Schroeder showed no sense of urgency with regard to trilateral talks and still preferred to postpone them until after Erhard visited Washington at the end of the month. (Ibid.) The telephone conversation has not been further identified. 3 On September 9, McGhee reported that after 1–1/2 hours of “hard discussion,” Chancellor Erhard, on the basis of the U.S. evaluation of the threat of a British troop withdrawal from Germany, agreed to reconsider his opposition to trilateral talks. (Telegram 2951 from Bonn; ibid.) 204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, September 16, 1966, 1:41 p.m. 48337. NATUS. Ref: Paris 3048. 2 Subj: France-NATO—The Constitutional Question. We agree fully with your proposition that it would not be productive to seek early consensus among Allies on future form of France's relationship to NATO and NAC. As you rightly put it, that relationship will evolve as sum of series of decisions, agreements and disagreements over coming months. At this stage it is not clear what would be most advantageous form for a continuing relationship. In meantime we do not want US to become involved in either stirring up others or working toward crystallization in formal relationship between Fourteen and NAC. Formalizing a new definition of relationship between France and NATO would be out of question in near future and we think for December Ministerial Meeting. Primary factor of importance is to maintain formula for relationship which emerged from Brussels, i.e. Ministers “assume that France does not claim the right to call in question decisions on policies on which she has renounced participation.” Precedent exists in way NAC has functioned, with Iceland totally quiet on many matters because it makes no military contribution and indeed Luxembourg saying little because of its very limited area of activity. France is effectively moving toward role rather like Iceland. Since she seems to be moving to limit herself, there is no reason for us to push. It is premature to try to draw distinctions about future constitutional role of NAC. Treaty says it is established “to consider matters concerning the implementation” of the Treaty without limitations on its competence. Fourteen is ad hoc group and remains to be seen what will be its continuing role and whether or not it is transitory. We welcome fact that Brosio has assumed chair of Fourteen and that France has withdrawn from Military Committee. Both developments will contribute to more businesslike conduct of NATO affairs. In course of that process Brosio and PermReps of Fourteen will need to be on guard to ensure in NAC and other areas of common activity that France participates, is silent, or absents itself as its own activities make appropriate, but it should not be accepted that France could block NATO business in which it does not participate. In short we would like to let matters develop further before we try to foreshadow long-term constitutional changes such as having Fourteen meet regularly as the Council on military questions. Needless to say we should continue to give internal consideration to this important problem. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Vest and Leddy on September 15; cleared by Ball, RPM, L, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Dated September 5. (Ibid.) 205. Memorandum of Conversation 205. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 19, 1966, 5 p.m. US/MC/5 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1966 SUBJECT Relocation of NAC (Part I of V) 2 PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Mr. Bertus Wabeke, EUR Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter Foreign H.E. Amintore Fanfani, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Egidio Ortona, Secretary General of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs H.E. Piero Vinci, Italian PermRep to the UN H.E. Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador to the US Following a brief discussion of a paper submitted by the Italians on the technological gap between the US and Europe, 3 the Secretary raised the issue of the relocation of NAC. The Secretary recalled that at the Brussels Meeting he had expressed a strong preference for keeping NAC and SHAPE together. Since then the attitude of the French towards NATO has been clarified in many directions: they have withdrawn support of military budgets; 4 they have placed severe limits on coordinating policy on French troops in Germany; they have stated that not one ton of NATO supplies is to remain in France; they have given no assurance that the pipeline can continue to function. The basic explanation for this attitude would appear to be that De Gaulle wants to be able to stand aside from NATO in the event of a crisis. Should this happen and NAC remain in Paris, this could be embarrassing to the French and cause difficulties for NATO. On balance, therefore, the Secretary favors moving NAC out of Paris. The Secretary suggested that such a decision might be taken by the PermReps, obviating the need for a Foreign Ministers Meeting. The Secretary stated he would discuss the matter with the Canadian and Danish Foreign Ministers and explore if a consensus exists. It is preferable that NAC move of its own volition rather than be thrown out. Minister Fanfani stated in reply that he had never questioned the need for SHAPE and NAC to be located together. He had merely wanted to defer the decision in order not to cause bitterness on the part of the French. This, however, was now a thing of the past. As to procedure, he recalled that he had sent a telegram to Paris suggesting that the 14 Standing Members continue to meet and decide on a proposal to submit to the Ministers. While Italy would not object if the 14 PermReps were to take the matter into their own hands, Fanfani emphasized that once the decision to move had been taken, the Allies should get out of Paris promptly, preferably before December. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Confidential. Approved in S on September 23. The conversation was held in the Secretary of State's suite at the Waldorf Towers. 2 Parts II–V dealt with Vietnam, nuclear fuel, disarmament, and U Thant. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 83) 3 Not found. 4 On September 7, de Leusse announced that France would contribute to the NATO general military budget. (Telegram 3123 from Paris, September 7; Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6–2 FR) 206. Memorandum of Conversation 206. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 23, 1966, 5 p.m. US/MC/33 SUBJECT European Security (Part II of II) 2 PARTICIPANTS Adam Rapacki, Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic Jozef Winiewicz, Deputy Foreign Minister Tadeusz Strulak, Polish Foreign Ministry The Secretary Thomas Niles (notetaker) Cyril Muromcew (interpreter) After a lengthy discussion of Viet Nam (separate Memcon), Rapacki said that he would like to discuss the question of European security. He referred to recent press articles which argued that the reduction of the U.S. presence in Europe “to unknown limits” as a result of events in Southeast Asia would be welcomed by the Socialist countries. According to Rapacki, the writers of these articles must feel that the Socialist countries are “politically naive” and he stated that Poland is interested in “constructive” United States influence in promoting the peaceful development of Europe. He asked, rhetorically, how long the European situation could remain isolated from the world-wide trend toward increasing tensions. He observed that the relatively calm conditions in Europe were deceptive and could not last. According to Rapacki, the Southeast Asian situation could well have an adverse effect on conditions in Europe and, furthermore, none of the real dangers for European stability had been removed. In this regard, Rapacki repeated the traditional Polish charge that revanchist elements in the FRG are gaining strength and are showing an increasing desire for nuclear weapons to use in pressuring the “German Democratic Republic” and forcing a revision of European frontiers. In his only comment during the meeting, Winiewicz observed that the FRG wishes to “swallow” the “GDR.” Rapacki stated that collective security measures are necessary to avert the danger posed by the FRG and the United States has a role to play in these efforts. Rapacki referred to Poland's 1964 proposal for a European Security Conference 3 and said that intensive contacts with countries in both Eastern and Western Europe had led to some progress toward holding such a Conference. According to Rapacki, the Europeans generally agree that a Conference would be useful, but he acknowledged that much preparatory work was necessary. In his view, the Conference would consider the basic question of guaranteeing the security of individual states. With this obstacle out of the way, increased economic cooperation among European states would develop naturally. Political questions would be taken up only at the end of the process of normalization. Rapacki stressed the importance of European and world-wide non-proliferation agreements in ensuring peace. He mentioned the problem of NATO consultation on nuclear weapons and said that Poland was particularly concerned that these consultations should not lead to giving non-nuclear powers a voice in the use of nuclear weapons. He also emphasized Poland's interest in the reduction of conventional forces and suggested that a collective renunciation of the use of force in changing the status quo would be useful. In reply, the Secretary stressed that the United States was “utterly and completely” opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He cited our refusal to assist the French nuclear weapons program, with its consequences for US-French relations, as proof of our determination not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology. The Secretary pointed out, however, that the Warsaw Pact could not have a seat at the NATO table with a veto over NATO matters. When Rapacki expressed surprise at this statement, the Secretary said that some of Gromyko's objections to NATO procedures appeared to require a veto over NATO decisions. The Secretary said that the United States welcomed increased East-West contacts and informed Rapacki that the Administration planned to reintroduce the East-West trade bill early in 1967. He observed that the question of holding a European Security Conference was well worth discussing and stressed that the United States must be present when the great political problems of Central Europe are discussed. Rapacki asked whether the United States was really interested in these problems and said that our lack of interest in the Polish proposal for a Conference indicated that we were not. The Secretary pointed to our involvement in two world wars which originated in Central Europe as proof of our interest. He said that extensive preparations were required before a European Security Conference could be held since a conference which fails is worse than no conference. The Secretary expressed an interest in discussing this and other questions with Rapacki if time permitted before his return to Poland. Rapacki said that he planned to remain in New York through October 4 or 5 but that Winiewicz planned to stay somewhat longer. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Niles and approved in S on October 4. The meeting was held at USUN. The time of the meeting is from the U.S. Delegation's chronology of Secretary Rusk's participation in the General Assembly meetings. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 71) 2 A memorandum of Part I of the conversation, on Vietnam, is ibid., CF 83. 3 Presumably reference is to the Gomulka Plan of December 28, 1963. 207. Memorandum of Conversation 207. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 26, 1966, 11 a.m. SUBJECT Offset and Troop Levels PARTICIPANTS Chancellor Ludwig Erhard President Lyndon B. Johnson Mr. Kuesterer (German interpreter) Mr. Obst (American interpreter) The President welcomed the Chancellor and suggested the Chancellor give him a summary of his thoughts to begin the conversation. The Chancellor started out by saying the two were meeting at a difficult time in the world. There was much uncertainty. He and the President were personally involved in many difficulties. There were always people searching for somebody to put the blame on, but both of them were used to that by now. The public was expecting some progress out of these talks. He was hopeful that progress would be achieved. He wanted to assure the President that his Government would stay on course and would continue the very close cooperation with his American friends. These close and friendly ties were a stabilizing factor all around the world. There were some trends in Germany to lean closer to France. He was convinced that Franco-German reconciliation was important for Europe as otherwise there could be no progress on the road to economic and political unity of Europe. Those that wanted to lean more towards France and away from the United States were in the minority but they made a lot of noise and the number of them were to be found right in the Parliament. He did not believe in a bilateral arrangement with France but all the free European countries should get together as one unit. There were two big issues the two should talk about which could not be exhausted in this initial conversation. First, there was the offset problem with a deadline coming up on the 30th of June. A new formula would have to be found in a follow-up agreement at that time. Secondly, there was the question of the US troops stationed in Germany. Their presence was the best protection and guarantee for German security. On both these points he felt sure solutions could be found that would be useful to the United States and practicable for the Germans. Such solutions would have to be connected with the general aspect of the strategy of defense for Europe. Technical changes had taken place and also changes in philosophy. These had injected an element of uncertainty and insecurity. There was no lack of trust in the United States but the German people wanted to know where exactly they stand at this point in terms of security, how they would be protected in the event of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. They would have to know which voice they would have in nuclear strategy. Nobody was expecting a “hardware solution” any longer. What was needed and desired was a common solution under NATO. As affirmed in the Peace Note, Germany had renounced the right to produce ABC weapons nor did they want national control of such weapons. However, there was an arsenal of MRBMs in Eastern Europe as well as mobile launch facilities threatening Western Europe. The question was where the Germans' voice would come in on the spectrum that might range anywhere from 0.1 to 100. And the point to be chosen would have to be believable to the public. He believed both questions (offset, troops) were soluble. He was under great pressure because of the reports circulated by the press and the public opinion generated by it. He knew the President had similar problems. It would be advisable, therefore, for them to put things into a clear language. He had had a two-hour discussion in depth on the previous day with Secretary Rusk and Under Secretary Ball where a lot of ground had already been covered. 2 He did not know if the President had been informed of this meeting. The President said no, he had not been informed yet. He had only come back to Washington late yesterday. The Chancellor stated that he had expressed his willingness to engage in tripartite talks if they should be necessary, but he thought the bilateral talks should first continue. The President could be assured of the continuing loyalty to the Alliance and deepest friendship of the German people. The President replied he respected greatly the leadership of the Chancellor and he had a great personal affection for him. He generally agreed with all the Chancellor had just said. This was a critical time in the world and both countries were in a serious situation. He was anxious to help the Chancellor wherever he could. He was sure constructive solutions could be found. He was anxious to hear and interested in any ideas the Chancellor might want to expound. The Chancellor said that not only he himself but all the Germans knew how much they owed to the United States. They were deeply appreciative of the American sacrifices for freedom in Viet-Nam. The German Government wanted to again review how much more they could do to support the US in Viet-Nam. If it was not for the firm stand of the US there, the insecurity, for instance in Berlin, would be much greater. The loyalty of the US to its commitment as demonstrated in Viet-Nam was a beacon of hope to the Germans and deeply appreciated by them. He hoped the President would not misunderstand him but he wanted to say that a different German Government that might succeed his Government may not show the same loyalty and determination to cultivate close ties with the United States. Though such a Government would not turn its back on the NATO, it might, however, contribute to at least a moral loosening of the NATO ties. He hoped the President would not misinterpret this remark. He was not concerned about himself but was only thinking of the common good for the two countries. With regard to the offset problem, which he knew had played a big role in the US balance of payments situation, he wanted the President to understand that the Government found itself in a very difficult situation. The steep economic growth curve of the past had flattened out. Germany had made financial commitments in the past counting on the continuation of such growth. They had now been forced to make serious reductions in their forthcoming budget. The situation was so bad that about thirty existing laws calling for certain expenditures would have to be changed, though they had already been passed and approved. One could imagine what the reaction would be in Parliament and in public opinion. The Government had been forced to propose a stabilization act which was just taking effect. There were some hopeful signs for the future. Prices showed a trend of stabilizing in the recent past and the exhausted capital market showed some signs of recovery. However, out of the current budget it would not be possible to fulfill all financial obligations under the current offset agreement to the full amount . This did not mean that Germany would not stand by its promise. The whole amount would definitely be honored in full. What was needed was just some easement for the current time. The Central Bank was contemplating certain possibilities, as far as feasible under the limitations of the Central Bank Act. Under the current two year agreement $450 million in treasury bills would have to be purchased still this year. The FRG could pay $250 million of this amount still in 1966. This would leave $650 million still to be paid by June 30, 1967. This problem might be tackled in a business-like way. A businessman finding himself in unexpected cash difficulties may sometimes ask to pay with a note. This would not necessarily make him any less trustworthy. He wanted the President to understand that the FRG would of course pay as much as at all possible by July 1, 1967 out of their budget as well as other available sources. Any remainder would have to be carried into next year's follow-up agreement. The military budget would be raised proportionately next year. The attitude of the FRG towards the American dollar had shown their goodwill. The FRG had bought $750 million worth of Roosa Bonds, had raised the swap-line from $250 million to $400 million, had not sold any dollars or bought any gold since 1962. The trade balance, apart from the offset payments, was showing a favorable balance in the amount of $800 to $900 million a year for the United States. Private US investment in Germany had risen from $50 million to $250 million over the last six years and no change in the generous German attitude in this field was anticipated. He was just mentioning these data to illustrate the basic goodwill and sympathetic attitude of the FRG. The President might recall that the German Government paid some war debts off ahead of time to help the American position. As far as the amounts in question here were concerned it should be easy to find an agreeable solution acceptable to both sides. A new agreement on July 1 could settle any remaining questions. The President asked the Chancellor to tell him something about the nature of the new Stabilization Act. The Chancellor explained the reasons for the necessity of this Act and its basic provisions to the President and volunteered to send him a copy of the Act if he should be interested. The President said yes, he would appreciate getting a copy of the law. He said he agreed with the Chancellor that the two points he had singled out (offset, troops) represented the critical area in the current relations between the two countries. If anything, his problems were even more severe than those of the Chancellor. It was not quite clear to him what the essence of the Chancellor's remarks was. In the past he had always taken the German word for granted. The US situation in this respect was serious enough even if the Germans would keep their commitments. Maybe some of them could be covered by non-military purchases. If the Germans could not keep their commitments it would put them in a very serious and disconcerting position. He would have to look at this very carefully then. This would just nullify the existing agreement. The Chancellor was aware of his problem here with regard to the troop situation. This was very disheartening to him. However, he would try to be as flexible as possible. Did the Chancellor mean to say he could not fulfill his obligations through military purchases alone or did he imply other things were to be included like buying bonds? Or not at all? How could he (the President) defend himself if the Chancellor was not meeting his commitments? On troops, it might be easier to find a solution. Certain reductions could be made, if the Chancellor was willing to take the lead. He asked the Chancellor to specify exactly what he could not do this year. Could he not do anything in space cooperation and bonds either? The Chancellor pointed out that in the overall foreign exchange position the US showed a favorable balance of about $510 million a year, despite the support of troops on German soil. To the FRG this was not so much a balance of payments problem as a serious budgetary problem. The FRG was determined to fulfill the offset agreement to the last dollar. All that was asked, and he hoped the President would understand this, was a prolongation for a certain amount at the current time. A new agreement could specify how the rollover would exactly be paid and it would be paid just like that. He would check and see if more could be paid by July 1 through inclusion of purchases of computers, space equipment and items of a similar nature. He regretted it very much if the impression arose on the outside that maintenance of US troops in Germany was directly connected to the German financial payments. In the past this matter never presented any problem. The FRG had to build an army from scratch. But now the process was completed, the defense needs are lower, and the two ends did no longer fit. Another possibility might be to free through the Central Bank, if this turned out to be feasible, $220 million in postwar aid, bearing an interest rate of 2.1 percent, and falling due only in 1989. This might be paid this year and, of course, would not be deducted from the total offset obligation. This, together with the $250 million previously mentioned, would allow the FRG to buy $470 million worth of bonds. The President reiterated his disappointment about a German commitment not being truly honored. He said he had been able to always completely count on the German word in the past. This was now putting him in deep trouble. He did not want to be arbitrary with the Chancellor, but if he could not keep his word it would seriously aggravate his own position, financially and otherwise. He suggested both sides refer this to their experts (Bank, Defense, Treasury) to see what proposals they could come up with. He understood the Chancellor's problems. He wanted to be a true friend to him. However, he did not want to see a situation created that might have regrettable results for both of them. He did not want to be too inflexible. Otherwise he might win the argument but lose the sale. The Chancellor replied it was bitter for him to hear the President say he could not trust the German word. The President had no reason to doubt the German sincerity and loyalty. The FRG was not unilaterally saying it would not pay or would not stand by its promise. The agreement would be honored to the last penny. Only some easement in time was asked. The FRG would make every effort to pay as much as at all possible by July 1. He would never break a promise. The President had no reason to doubt the German sincerity. The past had shown their ties of friendship to be very close and these two items should and would not interfere with this. The President suggested they join the other members of the delegation in the Cabinet Room and take the matter up with them. The Chancellor agreed to this and added, as long as they were still alone together, he would like to pronounce another very special request. He would like to very warmly invite the President to come for a visit to Germany at a time that would be suitable to him. Next spring might be a good time. The President could not at all imagine how much this would mean to Germany. It would disperse a lot of doubts. He was certain he would get a tremendous spontaneous reception. Such a visit should be extremely valuable to both countries. By modern standards it had been a long time since an American President had visited Germany. Such a visit would make some problems in Germany a lot easier to solve and would make the German people more willing to make sacrifices for the common cause. It would be a great thing for both countries. The President thanked the Chancellor for the invitation. He said he would think about it and suggested they now join the rest of the party in the Cabinet Room. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House on December 2. The meeting was held at the White House. Chancellor Erhard visited Washington September 24–27. 2 A memorandum of Erhard's conversation with Rusk at 4:30 p.m. on September 25 is ibid., DEF 12 NATO. A memorandum of their conversation at 10:30 a.m. on September 26 is ibid., FN 12 GER W. 3 A 2-page memorandum of conversation in which the Chancellor and the President briefed their senior advisers is ibid. For text of the joint communique, issued on September 27, which recorded the agreements reached by the two sides and summarized their discussions, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 403–406. 208. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 208. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, undated. I had a strenuous but useful meeting with the Chancellor. As you know, he has now agreed to join with you and ourselves in a tripartite review—to begin promptly—of the entire range of relevant questions: the nature of the threat; strategy, force levels and deployments; burden-sharing; and foreign exchange neutralization. I have in mind asking John McCloy to represent me in these talks. I would very much hope that you could name some public figure of comparable stature and objectivity. In connection with the points you made to me in your note of August 29, 2 let me say that I can certainly understand why it may be necessary for you to announce in mid-October your determination to reduce by some 33 million pounds the foreign exchange drain associated with the BAOR. However, I am sure you will understand why I must emphasize again the importance of avoiding public commitment to troop cuts and drawdown of stocks until we have completed our tripartite talks. Otherwise, these talks will lose credibility and political usefulness in all three countries and throughout the Alliance. (None of this, of course, arises in connection with the 8 million pounds of the 33 million pounds which would not involve reductions in either troops or stocks.) In your shoes, I would certainly not back away from the savings target. The question is only whether it would be possible for you to say that the steps by which HMG will realize these savings cannot be decided until the completion of the tripartite discussions. I myself have every intention of insisting that we complete these discussions by mid-January. This should give you time to make whatever moves will be necessary to achieve your savings target in your fiscal year beginning April 1, 1967. You will not be surprised, incidentally, that the newspaper reports on what was agreed between myself and Erhard are, as usual, thoroughly mixed up. Specifically, we in no sense agreed, either explicitly or tacitly, to the German proposition that there would have to be some fixed upper limit to the amount to foreign exchange neutralization after June 30, 1967. Our position was—and is—that the question of future offset will have to be thrashed out thoroughly in the tripartite discussions. (Your people will of course have made available to you the communiqué.) If we make the tripartite procedure work, it can help us hold off the pressures on each of us, including Erhard, to do things which would badly damage NATO and the Western position in Europe. Indeed, it can give us a start in reconsolidating the Alliance for the longer pull—and on a more sustainable basis—until the day when the French will be ready to rejoin the fold. And, if we fail to make it work, I am afraid we are in for serious trouble. Thank you for your letter on Rhodesia. 3 I will give you my views in detail within a few days. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. A typed note at the top of the source text reads: “Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson sent October 1, 1966.” 2 See footnote 3, Document 198 . 3 Copies of this September 28 note and Johnson's October 18 reply are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. In his October 7 reply, Wilson thanked the President for his report, but stated that a delay until January 1967 offered no prospect of achieving the full measure of the British savings. The Prime Minister proposed to accelerate the schedule, having the talks completed in time for the December NATO Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid.) 209. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 209. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, October 5, 1966, 8:25 p.m. 60472. Tosec 77. Following based uncleared memcon, 2 FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review. Points covered in Secretary's post-luncheon conversation with French Foreign Minister on October 3 regarding NATO matters were as follows: 1. Secretary said he had impression French did not wish have any arrangements which would prejudge in advance position they might take in event of war and it is therefore hard to see how NAC could count on functioning effectively in Paris in wartime. He asked how French could guarantee this. Couve, in response, wondered why same question did not apply to location in some other country. Secretary replied that other members have not brought into question their readiness to take common action, and that rest of us have made arrangements on basis of contingency that we will act together. Couve said French are prepared make arrangements in event we go to war together and could not understand how this differed from previous situation. 2. Foreign Minister said he did not dispute right of NAC to move to Brussels if they wished do so. Secretary said that if in wartime NAC is cut off from communications with military commands, its position would be difficult. He said we operate on assumption Belgium and Netherlands will join together in common action in event of war. Couve said this was “psychological analysis” and if this is case then NAC should go to Brussels and France would make no objection. Secretary thought question of NAC relocation would be settled during next thirty days. Couve repeated that problem did not lie with France regarding NAC relocation. 3. Foreign Minister felt current discussions academic since there would be no war in Europe. Secretary differed in recalling that we had very close call only four years ago over Berlin crisis and wondered if four years is long enough to be sure about Soviet intentions. He said that if NATO breaks up this might stimulate USSR to draw wrong conclusions and to provoke another crisis. Couve said NATO must readjust to meet changed conditions and Secretary asked whether there have been real changes or illusions of change. Couve thought stabilizing element of nuclear standoff between US and USSR became apparent during Cuban crisis and that this is basis for equilibrium in Europe rather than existence of NATO. 4. Foreign Minister said question of arrangements to be made in event of war is in French view not urgent and does not have to be settled now. He said we can wait to see how things develop in NATO particularly from psychological standpoint. He said same would hold true concerning French military presence in Germany. 5. Secretary recalled Couve had said in Brussels that French air defense units must be withdrawn from Germany since they could lead to automatic French involvement in war. Foreign Minister had said this did not apply to ground forces and French were indifferent whether latter forces remained in Germany or returned to France. Secretary noted situation with our troops is quite different. Couve acknowledged this true but said this was statement of fact, not of legal situation. 6. On US facilities in France, Secretary said he wished make clear we never accepted April 1, 1967 date as compelling with regard to our withdrawals. While we will get out of France as soon as possible there will be some material not removed until after April 1. Couve said this has been clear all along. Secretary also said we make complete reservation regarding financial aspects of relocation in addition to those provided for in US bilateral agreements with France. Couve said he noted US position, although this position of course did not commit France. 7. Foreign Minister recalled his discussion with Bohlen 3 about civilian control of US pipeline in France in peacetime and said arrangements for wartime use could only be made when time comes. Secretary said that arrangements to use facilities in France if made only when war comes would be too late, and that arrangements must be made in advance if they are to be effective. Couve reiterated unwillingness of France to make wartime arrangements in advance and said if France decides to go to war all this can be arranged. Secretary postulated that it may be easier for US forces to secure oil through neutral countries in wartime than through France. Couve doubted it would be any easier in wartime to secure oil through Sweden or Switzerland than France. Couve thought pipeline question could be left open regarding possible wartime use and only present question is therefore that of periodic US inspections of French management. 8. While peacetime use of pipeline and telecommunications would continue into wartime unless operation stopped by French, Bohlen pointed out this not case with other facilities which would have to be prepared in advance to be useful. Foreign Minister wondered how any country could agree to our use of facilities without that country having declared war. Secretary said we operate on basis of common assumption with other countries as indicated in point 1 above. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Beigel and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to USUN. 2 Not found. 3 The discussion under reference here has not been further identified. 210. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 210. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, October 7, 1966, 1930Z. 5117. NATUS. Subject: NAC Relocation. 1. Long restricted meeting of the Fourteen under Brosio chairmanship today provided a first full dress discussion of NAC relocation. Full report will follow. 2 Highlights in this cable. 2. Meeting provided snapshot of present state of thinking of every member of Fourteen. A. US, Netherlands, UK, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg and Iceland clearly favor a decision to move, and would be willing to have decision made at PermRep level. B. FRG, Norway and Portugal are ready to go along with majority; Norway is relaxed upon how decision is taken, Portugal leans toward and FRG favors a formal confirmation at Ministerial level in December. C. Canada and Denmark are not yet ready to make the substantive decision, and strongly favor decision taken at Ministerial level in December. 3. Arguments used by those who want to act soon were mostly familiar: need for propinquity to SHAPE and collocation with Military Committee; need for assured communication; need for decision before December to avoid undue political significance of having December meeting in Paris; need for NATO headquarters to flourish in simpatico atmosphere; need to maintain credibility NATO deterrent and determination vis-á-vis the Soviets. 4. One argument not previously stressed was high economic cost of further delay in deciding to move. Point (stressed by Netherlands, Norway and UK) was that if we stay in Paris after SHAPE, AFCENT, and other agencies move out, we will have to set up new communication channels which will then have to be duplicated by later move to Brussels. An early decision to move might obviate some of the duplicate expenses. 5. Next session on this subject will be Thursday Oct 20. Hope of SYG Brosio and most PermReps is that today's demonstration of overwhelming majority sentiment for relocating NAC will soften position of Canada and Denmark, whose representatives here do not yet even have authority to discuss the substance of the question. 6. We will continue to press for early decision to leave Paris and move to Brussels. (There is no objection to Brussels as new site, once decision to move is agreed.) We can then afford to demonstrate some flexibility in procedure whereby decision is somehow formally taken at Ministerial level. But meanwhile our interest lies in driving toward a consensus on the substance, reserving procedural flexibility for the moment when it is needed to bring the Danes and Canadians aboard. 7. My guess is Danes will be more impressed with the near consensus already reached to move than the Canadian Foreign Minister will be. If Chalfont heard Danish Prime Minister Krag correctly, there may already be the basis for softening the line in Copenhagen. In any case, it is now clear that Danes and Canadians are only real holdouts. 3 Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 17–1. Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Telegram 5236, October 10. (Ibid.) 3 By October 19, the countries in doubt had lifted their reservations of moving the North Atlantic Council, and one week later a draft resolution including the move to Brussels was accepted by the French. For text of this resolution as approved at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 16, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 379. 211. Editorial Note 211. Editorial Note On October 7, 1966, President Johnson addressed the National Conference of Editorial Writers at their conference in New York. In commenting on the European situation, the President stressed that the United States and its European allies must move ahead on three fronts: “First, to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances. Second, to further the integration of the Western European community. Third, to quicken progress in East-West relations.” The President then outlined what steps needed to be taken on each of these fronts. For text of his remarks on this occasion, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , pages 1125–1130. 212. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 212. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, October 22, 1966, 1444Z. 6007. NATUS. Subject: French forces in Germany. 1. Position on French forces in Germany is briefly this: A. French have clearly run out on the arrangement worked out between the Secretary and Couve de Murville, and confirmed by all fifteen Ministers, at Brussels in June. French now insist that talks on French forces in Germany be conducted only by military commanders; there is no indication they would ever (even after report from the commanders) be willing to negotiate in the Council the “mission” of those forces, which they regard as solely a decision for French Government to make. B. FRG has abandoned (without due notice to us, by the way) the joint strategy we worked out with them for a preliminary agreement with French in NAC. Germans are quite prepared for talks between SACEUR and General Ailleret, without any political preliminaries at all. C. The only conceivable way to budge French from their position would be for FRG to be clearly willing to invite French troops to leave Germany unless they are satisfactorily related to NATO. Erhard is clearly in no position to do any such thing, and said as much to De Gaulle at their last meeting—or so the French believe. D. There is no prospect that SACEUR can settle this matter with the French unless the Fourteen instruct General Lemnitzer to accept whatever General Ailleret has been authorized to offer, and that is not a position in which the Alliance should place its Supreme Commander. E. In these circumstances an agreement with France that gives these forces a NATO character, even tentatively and tenuously, is not achievable. 2. Our options are therefore in a very narrow range indeed. We can either a. Pretend that these troops might somehow be related to NATO even though the French won't say just how, in order to help the Germans pretend that they are not there as purely French national troops under French national control; or b. Do nothing in NATO, and thus invite a bilateral side agreement between FRG and France to keep the French troops in Germany anyway. 3. A bilateral agreement outside of NATO is so damaging to so many of our objectives in Europe, and regarded as so dangerous by all our allies, that let's pretend alternative a is the least worse. 4. I see no use at all in prolonging the agony at the political level. If we delegate the problem to the military commanders with instructions to report back to the Council, we will just have to recognize in a month or so (or perhaps at the December Ministerial Meeting) the facts of life as set forth above. Therefore, let's end these “negotiations” now. 5. There is a simple and effective way to do this. The Fourteen can draft a short instruction to SACEUR, saying in effect: a. We have listened carefully to what French representatives have told us, on several occasions, in NAC. b. We derive from these French statements the conclusion that the French troops in Germany might in some future circumstances be associated with NATO in the defense of Western Europe. c. In view of this possibility, SACEUR should maintain continuous liaison with the French military authorities for discussion of any plans and preparations which may be appropriate to the circumstances. 6. This would not require SACEUR to try to reach agreement with General Ailleret on any particular subject at any particular time. They would not be required to make joint recommendations to NAC. If General Lemnitzer felt the need for further political guidance on particular problems that might arise in his liaison relationship with the French Chief of Staff, he would repair to the Fourteen for such guidance. 7. The desire to get rid of the problem for this month, even if it has to come up again later, is now so great among the Fourteen that the procedure in paragraphs 5 and 6 may not be saleable at this stage. (It could also be used later on, if the military commanders first try and fail to arrive at an “agreement”.) But in my judgment it is so much better than dragging on through a predictably humiliating non-negotiation, that I recommend I be authorized to try it on for size the next time the Fourteen take up French forces in Germany. If it cannot be sold at this stage, then there is no alternative to going ahead with SACEUR-Ailleret talks ad referendum to NAC, and I should be in a position as fallback to go along with the majority that already wants to take that next step. 8. Since Secretary was personally involved in the Brussels arrangement from which his French colleague has now “withdrawn”, I am repeating this message to Manila for his attention. 2 Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Manila for Secretary Rusk. 2 On October 25, in a telegram approved by the Acting Secretary of State, the Department of State agreed that there was no longer any use in prolonging the matter of French troops in Germany and authorized direct talks between Lemnitzer and Ailleret. (Circular telegram 72261 to Paris and Bonn; ibid.) 213. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 213. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, October 22, 1966, 1700Z. 6006. NATUS. Subject: McCloy briefing on trilateral talks. 2 1. In informal atmosphere at Cleveland residence, McCloy gave candid informal account of his mission he has been given by President and of just-concluded two days of trilateral talks in Bonn. Present were Deputy SYG Roberts of Fourteen, and PermReps except Portugal and Turkey represented by Charles, as well as State Department Counselor Bowie. French PermRep was not invited. 2. Half hour of lively interchange that followed was carried by De Staercke (Belgium), Alessandrini (Italy), and Boon (Netherlands) by now, ghost of tripartite directorate has been exorcised, but exclusion from even ad hoc temporary tripartite group is clearly underlying cause of Italian pique. Main burden of complaint was that three, however worthy their motives—and candid persuasive McCloy presentation left no room for innuendos on this score—had constituted themselves a “self-appointed group” (De Staercke's phrase), without prior consultation, to do what all members of NATO had an interest in, and what NATO was created to do and was actively undertaking in current force planning exercise. Thus, action of three implied lack of confidence in NATO and their partners, condemned NATO force planning exercise to ineffectuality until results of trilateral talks were in hand, and all this quite unnecessarily since NATO if only it had been asked could either have done itself the job that the trilateral talks were seeking to do on an urgent basis, or could have established the group of three with a formal NATO blessing. 3. Grewe was most helpful in emphasizing that Germans could not have accepted decisive talks with US and UK on offset problems without also embracing broader issues of strategy and force levels. He challenged his colleagues to show what real alternative procedure there was to that chosen by three. Shuckburgh was more cautious, reiterating familiar UK points about need for quick conclusion of trilateral talks and for close ties between these talks and NATO work. He did, however, quietly counter Dutch argument that NAC could have done what trilateral talks are designed to do, by pointing out that UK this year has twice brought its financial and budgetary problems of troop maintenance into NAC without noticeable results either from “Callaghan study” or recent Annual Review committee study. 4. McCloy with help from Bowie good humoredly but firmly reiterated that US had launched trilateral talks to meet what it continued to feel was clear and pressing financial problem in US and UK with political overtones which ran real risk of producing extremely dangerous attrition of NATO defense posture and required extraordinary and rapid action to cope with it. They insisted that US and its partners in trilateral talks had need to clear their minds jointly and stave off possible unilateral or bilateral actions that would indeed present Alliance with fait accompli. Trilateral talks would be conducted with full opportunity for SYG to participate and SACEUR to make his voice heard, and results would be put to NATO as whole, beginning with report at December Ministerial Meeting. 5. Cleveland said he thought the comments by his colleagues on trilateral procedures (in meetings of Fourteen and at this informal session) had been clear and forceful, and had adequately registered the reaction of some of our allies, for future reference. But problem now was to get on with deciding just how work in NATO between now and December would be meshed with trilateral talks, and how results of trilateral talks would be fed into preparations for NATO's December Ministerial Meeting. He hoped that at meeting of Fourteen on Monday and thereafter further postmortems on procedures already adopted could be held to a minimum, in favor of practical discussion of what NATO is going to do about undeniably important and urgent matters of substance. 6. Most PermReps remained silent, letting Belgian, Dutch and Italian carry dialogue. (Canadian PermRep Ritchie made one brief remark along the same line.) But after meeting Kristianson (Norway), Palamas (Greece) and Reuter (Luxembourg) indicated separately that they thoroughly agreed we have had enough catharsis, and time for some accelerated force planning was already overdue. There were many expressions of great appreciation for McCloy's willingness to stop by Paris to conduct this briefing. 7. Comment : McCloy stop here was clearly a most valuable action. His full and detailed account of what he is doing for the President and what the trilateral talks will try to accomplish will be a reference point in future NATO discussions. He made it transparently clear that neither he nor US has any purpose other than to strengthen Alliance on basis of realistic assessment of current political-military situation and financial and budgetary possibilities. 8. Brosio will report to Fourteen October 24 and will undoubtedly introduce his resolution (Bonn 4814). 3 While we should not take lead, I believe it would be wrong for us to raise any objection in principle to SYG's resolution, and we should go along with it if others find it useful. As result of Bonn meeting, trilateral talks have set their own schedules and procedures, and Brosio's resolution will in no way hamper us. Text on Bonn 4814 should be modified however to conform with hard-fought Bonn communique language 4 to effect three “would report on their discussions”, rather than “convey the results of those discussions” before December Ministerial Meeting. We would plan to support Brosio's alternative of making this a DPC resolution which would finesse question of French role in NAC on force planning. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 On October 11, the White House announced that the President had appointed John J. McCloy to be the U.S. representative to the trilateral (U.S., British, West German) talks that were envisioned in the Erhard-JOHNSON communique of September 27. For text of the announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , p. 1139. At meetings in Bonn October 20–21, McCloy, German State Secretary Karl Carstens, and British Minister George M. Thomson defined the organization and future work of the group and agreed to keep the NATO Council informed of the progress of their meetings. (Telegrams 4800 and 4827 from Bonn, October 20 and 21; Department of State, Central Files, FN 12 GER W) McCloy reported on the talks in telegram 4832 from Bonn, October 21. (Ibid.) 3 The telegram and the text of the resolution have not been found. 4 Transmitted in telegram 4827. 214. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 214. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, October 28, 1966, 8:30 p.m. 75415. NATUS. Subj: NATO and France. For Ambassadors Cleveland and Bohlen from Leddy. 1. Now that we have been working out new relationship between NATO and France for the past eight months, I think it would be helpful to have agreed picture of situation. I would appreciate your comments on scene as we see it: NATO 2. De Gaulle has given clear instruction that France is to disengage from all NATO military activities with few exceptions such as early warning activities which he is willing to tolerate as sop to French military. He is willing to have General Staff talks between France and NATO military authorities as well as permanent French military liaison missions to NATO military components, which will be empowered to exchange information and arrange for communications but will not be empowered to enter into arrangements or undertake engagements which might compromise French ability to remain neutral if it so chooses in event of war. On political level France remains a party to the Treaty and member of Alliance represented on NAC and other non-military activities. For public consumption, it is “an ally of its allies,” even though it has undermined the confidence of both its NATO and WEU allies in sincerity of its undertakings. This posture should be adequate to get French Government through next parliamentary elections without any serious domestic questions being raised on French relations with NATO. 3. Rigid French position has finally brought back to reality those Allies who put primary value on maintaining French association at whatever cost to Alliance. Thus pace of decisions has increased. Major steps taken or underway to date are: a) NAC will move to Brussels, SHAPE to Casteau in Belgium, AFCENT to Maastricht area in Netherlands. The Military Committee is expected to follow NAC to Brussels. b) French forces will remain in Germany. Germans clearly want them to remain and need multilateral cover for Franco-German bilateral on facilities.SACEUR and General Ailleret will discuss technical arrangements to relate French and NATO military activities and report to their Principals. France proved unwilling to implement pertinent portion of Brussels Ministerial communique of last June and was unwilling even to agree that, once it had declared war under Article 5 of the Treaty, French forces would serve in the NATO military framework. c) NADGE is major exceptional activity which Fourteen and France have preliminarily agreed to carry through. Fourteen want France's financial contribution. France wants early warning intelligence. Project would be operable without French stations. 4. There remain a number of areas to be clarified, negotiated or decided: a) The “constitutional question” of continuing French role in NAC and its subsidiary bodies, and how we deal with this at the short and medium term. Our general position has been to let French initiate own withdrawals (which being rapidly done) and, where they remain, to assert principle that France is not permitted to negate or stop work from which it has withdrawn. The Fourteen is now considering a proposal by which the DPC, without France, would have broad responsibilities as Board of Directors for NATO defense activities. b) Terms of French participation in certain NATO military support agencies such as NATO Supply Center, SHAPE Technical Center and SACLANT ASW Research Center. c) Possible relocation of those military support agencies now located in France such as Hawk NPLO, NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization, and AGARD. d) French financial participation in selected activities which fall under the military budget and future infrastructure projects. While France is withdrawing from such activities and projects, it has indicated interest in participating selectively. We have under consideration proposal to increase percentage price to French since they would be choosing only nationally useful programs. e) French financial liability arising from French unilateral abrogation of agreements, which forced US and NATO withdrawal from France. f) Overflights of French territory. France continues to permit these on monthly basis, but will give no firm assurance about policy in time of crisis. Fourteen agree it is better to proceed on this basis than to precipitate issue which might lead French to reduce degree of cooperation. 5. In sum, major relocations and decisions of principle have now largely been taken; there remain number of lesser points to be worked out, chiefly in liaison and financial areas. There will be no definitive overall France-NATO arrangement, but series of agreements and understandings is emerging which cumulatively and pragmatically have already clearly defined France's relationship to Fourteen as “neutral” nation which will not accept commitments of any nature which hamper its freedom of decision. 6. We expect that it will take good part of next year to wrap up loose ends. French actions since de Gaulle announced public withdrawals last spring have already resulted in more extensive withdrawals than originally anticipated by many Allies. This is particularly evident in such areas as French abstention from the Military Committee and French treatment of the problem of mission of French troops in Germany. We would expect in general that future actions by both France and the Fourteen will result in even more complete French divorce from the military side of the Alliance. Unknown, at this point, is degree to which France may restrict its own participation in non-military, and especially political, activities of the Alliance. French abstention from POLAD report on East-West relations may be straw in the wind. France-US 7. Bilateral discussions have been held with French regarding withdrawal from facilities in France during which (a) we have reaffirmed we do not accept April 1, 1967 deadline for withdrawals, (b) French have reiterated they are prepared recognize problems we have that will stretch out our withdrawals but ask that we inform them fully regarding our plans, (c) French have cooperated in enabling special measures and workers to be introduced to move stocks, and in allowing schools to complete this academic year with continuation of appropriate support facilities. 8. Separate bilateral discussions have been held between Ambassador Bohlen and French Foreign Minister in which French have made clear that: a) They are unwilling for any US equipment or military personnel to remain in France even under French control. b) They are willing to permit continued US use in peacetime including time of crisis of petroleum pipeline and telecommunications facilities under French management, and are awaiting our response to this offer. c) They can give no assurance regarding continued use of pipeline and telecommunications facilities, or re-entry into any other facilities in event of war. d) They willing to consult regarding possible re-entry into other facilities should new crisis arise. e) Any re-entry into facilities will depend upon French national decision at time of crisis or in event of war, and no assurance can be given regarding French position in advance. It is apparent French wish to be in position to exercise option of avoiding any involvement. 9. Although De Gaulle is not likely to revive notion of withdrawing from North Atlantic Treaty prior to March 1967 elections, he will continue to disentangle France from any bilateral or multilateral military relationship with US in order to retain maximum flexibility in exploiting Viet Nam situation, enhance French role in Europe at expense of US, and ensure full French freedom of action in event Viet Nam conflict develops into general war. French relations with US in private sector will continue on normal basis with constantly expanding trade, travel and other relations. French will seek correct and friendly government relations on all strictly bilateral questions. In military field, US expects to complete its bilateral reentry discussions with French and submit report to Fourteen during next month. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel, Vest, and Getz; cleared in L/EUR and EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 215. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 215. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, November 11, 1966. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 15. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified; under United Kingdom legislation, official records can normally only be made available 30 years after their creation.] 216. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 216. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, November 15, 1966. I am immensely heartened by your courageous announcement about joining the EEC. Your entry would certainly help to strengthen and unify the West. If you find on the way that there is anything we might do to smooth the path, I hope you will let me know. The report from John McCloy on the Trilateral talks is encouraging, despite the real difficulties we still face. Thomson made an excellent contribution. 2 I am hopeful that we can get a genuine return from this exercise—militarily, politically and financially. The immediate snag, which Carstens confirmed, is the inevitability of delay on the German side. While they can fruitfully continue to work with us in the Trilateral Group, it would be impossible for them to reach a responsible government position on these matters in time to keep the present schedule. We should surely give the Germans a chance to get themselves a government. I know we agree that we must move together in order to maintain NATO as a credible deterrent and as a stabilizing influence, especially in Germany. Your presence in Germany is as important to us as your presence in the East, which I assume remains as we last discussed it. I understand, as you know, the importance to you of being able to justify a change in your announced program, in view of the pressures inherent in your difficult but promising policies of economic adjustment. Would it help if I placed in the United Kingdom in the near future $35 million in orders beyond those already agreed to? I think I could do so on assurance from you that you will stay with us and the Germans in completing this fundamental review of the military, political and financial basis for the US–UK presence in Germany, making no change in your troop and supply dispositions there until after the completion of the review, and then that you will concert with us on any such changes in the light of that review. This procurement would supplement the accruals of dollars to you associated with the recent shift of our forces and installations to Britain from the Continent. I may get some heat from Congress on this, and cannot move definitively until I have talked it over with some of my people on the Hill. I think I can persuade them to go along on the basis outlined here. McCloy and our government officials are working on plans to handle deficits that result from the presence of our troops abroad through a multilateral clearing arrangement that should help neutralize balances, and contribute to an ultimate resolution of the monetary problem. That may take some time to negotiate. If successful, such an arrangement should help to satisfy some of our critics in Congress, and move the Germans to accept their own proper responsibilities. I cannot stress too strongly the need for progress towards more equitable patterns for dealing with the various responsibilities we all bear throughout the world. As we both know, some of the criticism I get here on the subject is justified. And, as you can imagine, the new Congress will not be easier to persuade than its predecessor. I very much hope that the arrangements proposed here will help you to join us in keeping this exercise on the tracks. Let us keep in close touch on this. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. Bruce was informed of the message in telegram 85292 to London, November 15. (Ibid.) 2 The second round of trilateral talks took place at the Department of State November 9–10, with McCloy, Thomson, and Carstens again representing their countries. In this round they discussed questions of military capabilities, the defense burden, and the foreign exchange problems resulting from the stationing of troops in Germany. Summaries of the meetings were transmitted to Paris in telegrams 82537, 83122, and 83129, November 10. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W) The text of an agreed tripartite minute, which outlined the steps necessary to deter aggression, was transmitted to Paris in telegram 83128, November 10. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO) For text of the communique issued at the conclusion of the second round, see Department of State Bulletin , December 6, 1966, p. 867. 3 Printed from an unsigned copy. 217. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 217. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, November 18, 1966, 9:21 p.m. 87996. NATUS. Subj: Brosio Visit to Washington. 1. NATO Secretary General Brosio visited Washington Nov 16–18 for informal discussions. He met with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Under Secretaries Katzenbach and Rostow, Mr. McCloy and Assistant Secretary Leddy, among others. 2 2. Following are highlights of discussions in Department based on uncleared memoranda of conversation, FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision on review. 3. Organization of December Ministerial Meeting. Brosio and US participants agreed appropriate arrangement of agenda items would be necessary so as to clearly delineate business to be considered by the Fourteen Ministers (meeting as Defense Planning Committee) and business to come before the full Ministerial Council with French present. Secretary Rusk expressed preference for following order: First half-day, the full Council for ceremonial opening and to begin traditional tour d'horizon; afternoon of first day and morning of the following day, meeting of the Fourteen Ministers as DPC; afternoon of second day and, as necessary, morning of third day full Council to resume deliberations. 4. Foregoing was discussed on assumption that Special Committee would meet in Paris just prior to Ministerial. One of main points emphasized by Brosio was the SPECOM report to Ministers should be addressed to DPC. He made clear his view that this procedure should be followed both on organizational aspects of SPECOM and on political consultation aspects growing out of Italian proposal. In Brosio's view it is important to watch the precedents now that NATO has found pragmatic solution to “constitutional problem” arising out of French withdrawal. Therefore he considered it important that DPC take decisions on Special Committee, leaving it up to French to raise any questions they wish in full Council. We expressed preliminary agreement with this view. 5. East-West Issues in NATO. Brosio repeatedly emphasized his belief that, while NATO powers should do what is possible to improve atmosphere of relations with Eastern Europe and USSR, NATO work on matters of interest to Germany should parallel further progress on detente. He considered this absolutely essential for stability of Europe and Atlantic area. 6. On specific matters now under consideration in NATO, Brosio noted that NAC consideration of POLADs report is now well advanced; that, in his opinion, UK proposed declaration on Europe is not apt to give significant results but also not apt to cause great problems. He indicated there would be problems with some of the Fourteen on a special Declaration on East-West relations, primarily because of French reservation. He thought more likely result would be a section in the regular communique. US pointed out that French might well reserve even on communique language in this area and that we did not wish now to foreclose possibility of a special NATO Declaration in December or subsequently. 7. France-NATO Problems. In addition to French attitude on East-West issues (which he regretted), Brosio also commented on general French policy. He expressed personal view that French policy is incompatible with spirit of the Alliance on two fundamental points: (a) its interpretation of Article V of the Treaty, and (b) De Gaulle's concept of “Atlantic to the Urals” which implies inclusion of USSR in Europe and exclusion of US from European affairs. He nevertheless stressed view that it would be most unwise and dangerous to push showdown on this point. Wiser course was pragmatic approach that has been followed to date. 8. On French forces in Germany, Brosio thought French Government was in no hurry and would be prepared to let Ailleret-Lemnitzer conversations proceed at leisurely pace. He did not believe this should be an issue at Ministerial Meeting. 9. NATO Force Planning. Brosio recalled that NATO had accelerated force planning. He expressed view that, given problems in trilaterals (notably German political situation), NATO should probably slow down its effort somewhat but in framework of present accelerated timetable; i.e. not returning to previous schedule. 10. On general question of force levels and defense burdens, Secretary Rusk and other US participants emphasized to Brosio the increasingly difficult character of our domestic political problem. Essentially two points were made: (a) especially at time when US is carrying heavy burden for free world in Vietnam, US Congress and public opinion is increasingly restive at European failure to carry its share of the load in defense of NATO area; (b) European governments seem to be speaking with two voices. Foreign and Defense Ministers are anxious for US to keep up its military strength. Finance Ministers and central bankers keep urging us to correct US balance of payments problem. There needs to be a better link in Alliance affairs between political-military issues on one hand and financial and monetary issue on the other. 11. Special Committee. Reviewing difficulties in deciding on composition of Nuclear Planning Group, Brosio said he had recently received reply to letter he sent Luns urging more flexible Netherlands position. Reply hinted at some give in Dutch attitude but was couched in such terms that Netherlands could move in any direction it wished at Ministerial. The Turks remained a problem because they wanted a seven-member NPG. In Brosio's view Canada was most difficult problem of all. Canada did not even accept the principle of four permanent members for NPG unless Canada were included. Problem in Brosio's view is essentially political and psychological. Despite validity of Canada's claim to play a significant role in NATO nuclear affairs, another European country is needed in NPG to build in balance to Germany. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by Springsteen and Vest, and approved by Leddy. 2 Memoranda of Brosio's conversations with Rusk, Katzenbach, and Eugene Rostow on November 17, and with Leddy on November 18, are ibid., DEF 4 NATO. A memorandum on his conversation at the Department of Defense on November 16 is ibid., DEF 12 NATO. A memorandum of a conversation between the Secretary General and Leddy on November 16, is ibid., NATO 3. 218. Letter From John J. McCloy to President Johnson 218. Letter From John J. McCloy to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 21, 1966. Dear Mr. President: I have completed the review of our NATO policy which you asked me to undertake in your letter delivered to me on October 7. 2 I enclose my report herewith. Within the time available, I have sought to obtain and analyze as much data and thinking in the Government bearing on the problem as I could. In doing so, I have had the full cooperation of the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, as well as many other officials of the Government who are charged with responsibilities related to the subject of my inquiry. They have made available many studies and reports bearing on my report, prepared in their Departments and Agencies. Members of their staffs have assisted in various ways, including preparing special studies for my benefit. I have been much impressed with the dedication of the staffs and the quality of their work. Without this help it would have been quite impossible to carry out the assigned task. For all of this assistance, I am very grateful. In the course of my studies, I have found unanimity among all the responsible officials that NATO is vital to the security of the United States, and I have proceeded on that assumption. In conducting my review, I have confined myself essentially to the strength of the ground and air forces of NATO for the Central Front as the question of United States force levels is related to such forces. Accordingly, I have not dealt with naval forces or those which have been committed to the northern and southern flanks of NATO. During my consideration of these matters, there occurred the collapse of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, an event which complicated an already complex task. Representatives of the German Government have continued to cooperate fully in an exchange of views and data, but the lack of a government in Bonn may delay our progress considerably. Insofar as any decisions by the Federal Republic bear on fiscal matters, it may, therefore, be some time before we can complete our tripartite review. Indeed, for the same reason, my own report to you on this aspect of our study cannot be as definite as it might otherwise have been. To present my thoughts to you as simply and briefly as possible—and in a manner that I trust will assist decision-making—I have led off with: Conclusions and Recommendations This section is backed up by six analytical sections 3 which explain how and why I reached my conclusions: A. The Need for NATO B. NATO Strategy and Forces C. Military Effects of Force Changes D. Political Effects of Force Changes E. Balance of Payment Issues F. The British Situation From the many studies prepared for me by various agencies of the Executive Branch, I have selected six which I consider important enough to warrant your personal attention. They are separately bound as Annexes to this report: 4 Annex I: The Tripartite Report (Final) of Working Group I on Warsaw Pact Capabilities Annex II: The Tripartite Report (Draft) of Working Group II on NATO Capabilities Annex III: The Tripartite Report (Draft) of Working Group III on Balance of Payments Effects Annex IV: Special National Intelligence Estimate Annex V: Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency Annex VI: Illustrative Concept for Brigade Rotation. To facilitate early consideration of this report, I am sending copies to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense, with an additional copy to the latter for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will be available, of course, to discuss the report whenever it suits your convenience. I trust that you are feeling well after your operation. Respectfully, John J. McCloy Enclosure 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions: 1. NATO continues to be indispensable for European security and stability—interests vital to the US. (Section A) 2. The strategy of flexible response, backed by adequate conventional, as well as nuclear capabilities, is essential for balanced defense and effective deterrence under present conditions. (Section B) 3. Existing NATO conventional forces for the Central Region are adequate in size to support a flexible response strategy, though certain imbalances and deficiencies need correction. (Section B) 4. Any material reduction in US forces will probably trigger Allied force cuts. The cumulative effect could reduce substantially NATO conventional capability to support a flexible response strategy and lower the nuclear threshold. While the effect of such cuts on the deterrent cannot be assessed with precision, they could enhance to some degree the risk of Soviet pressures or actions at lower levels, especially in view of the growing Soviet strategic nuclear strength. (Section C) 5. With our existing capacity for deploying forces from CONUS to Europe, the time required to return any forces withdrawn to the US would make them much less effective than forces in place in Europe in terms of the flexible response strategy and the deterrent. The time required to deploy ground forces can be substantially reduced during the next several years by major expenditures for duplicate equipment, facilities, and necessary readiness. With such improvements, reinforcement would still take at least three weeks. (Section C) 6. Politically, any material withdrawal of US forces from Europe, in its present unsettled state, would seriously increase the risks of NATO disintegration and reduction of US influence in Europe. (Section D) 7. The extent to which Germany will be prepared to provide future offsets for US military expenditures in Germany will be uncertain until a new German Government gains a solid footing. The prospects for offsets should be improved by—(a) relating their amount to the net foreign exchange gain to the Federal Republic from the US military expenditures in Germany; (b) expanding the forms of offset to include non-military purchases, as well as neutralizing by financial means; and (c) relating the offset obligations to the state of the US and German balance of payments. (Section E) 8. The US has an interest in the continued maintenance of UK forces in Germany for their effect on the cohesion of NATO and the position of the UK in Europe. (Section F) Recommendations: 1. I recommend, for the political and military reasons outlined, that the US should not withdraw any significant forces from the Central Region in Europe under current conditions. 2. I recommend that the US explore with the Government of the Federal Republic new arrangements to neutralize balance of payments effects of US expenditures in Germany: (a) to the extent of net gains to the German balance of payments; (b) by means of military purchases, other additive purchases, and appropriate financial devices; and (c) subject to the general state of US and FRG balance of payments. 3. I recommend that the US explore with the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany how the UK can be enabled to retain on the Central Front its present level of forces. 4. I recommend that the US continue to encourage its NATO Allies to provide reasonable stocks, equipment, support and reserves for forces in conformity with a flexible response strategy. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, U.S. Forces for the NATO Central Region, Box 39. Secret. 2 Not found. 3 None of the sections is printed. 4 None of the annexes is printed. 5 Secret. 219. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 219. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, November 22, 1966. 4243. For Secretary and McCloy from Under Secretary Rostow. 1. After day's discussions with British Ministers and officials ending in meetings with Callaghan 2 alone and then with Wilson and Callaghan together in which all points in three messages between President and Prime Minister 3 were intensively canvassed, Prime Minister authorized me to tell you that he accepts the President's proposal ad referendum to the Cabinet on the understanding (a) that “concert” means we move together but does not give us a veto, and (b) that Britain is now committing itself to a delay of about six months. Beyond that point Wilson insists that Britain would not settle for anything less than full coverage of its exchange costs in Germany. Wilson expressed hope US procurement would not be for petroleum—with its high import content—and Callaghan urged us if possible to put orders that would create employment in Britain. 2. I made clear US cannot promise that trilateral talks will come out with recommendation for troop and stock withdrawals. I expressed hope we could wind up the trilaterals within six months, but said that difficulties inherent in the talks made a strict timetable impossible. I warned Wilson it might be damaging or impossible to insist on 100 percent coverage. 3. Wilson said he could go ahead on this basis and would reply to President after Cabinet decision. We agreed this arrangement should be kept secret for present. US and UK should work out time and mode of announcement, which could well be made at NATO Ministerial Meeting next month. 4. Callaghan particularly helpful in final discussions. 5. Report on meeting with PM and Callaghan follows in separate cable. 4 Bruce 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:08 a.m. 2 James Callaghan, British Minister of Finance and member of the Privy Council. 3 The three messages are Document 216 and an exchange of messages on November 18 and 19. In his November 18 message, Wilson thanked the President for his offer of $35 million and suggested that since Rostow was visiting London the next week, he might be used to iron out the details. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) In his November 19 letter, President Johnson agreed to having Rostow discuss the problem, but reminded the Prime Minister that any arrangement would have to be approved by Congress. (Ibid.) 4 The detailed report was transmitted in telegram 4272 from London, November 22. (Ibid., Central Files, FN 12 GER W) 220. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 220. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 24, 1966, 1827Z. 7885. During my call at the Elysee today I asked De Gaulle if there was anything he could tell me as to his view of France's relationship to the Alliance and NATO in the coming years. He said he envisaged France's relations with NATO becoming “more and more difficult” as time passed. He said the organization of the Alliance had been set up to deal with the threat of war but it was not to be expected that this semi-state of mobilization could be carried on when the threat of war was visibly diminishing. However, he said that France would remain in the Alliance since the danger had not been totally eliminated, and there was also he added the question of Germany: it was preferable to have Germany inside a Western Alliance. In his view however he felt that NATO as an organization would be progressively weakened as time passed and as the danger receded. He repeated when I raised again the question that France had no intention of withdrawing as matters now stood in the world. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and Bonn. 221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 1 Washington, November 26, 1966, 10:30 a.m. 91669. NATUS. Ref: A. Brussels 2421 rptd Paris; being rptd Bonn London & Moscow by Dept; B. Brussels 2429. 2 Subj: NATO Ministerial Meeting—Study on Future of Alliance. 1. Primarily as result of Belgian initiative with US (reftels), Dept has been considering desirability and feasibility of NATO Ministers in December commissioning a major study on future of Alliance. Briefly, US like many European countries is concerned with need to articulate up-to-date role for the Alliance; to assure its continued relevance to improved East-West relations in line with the President's October 7 speech; 3 and, against background of French withdrawal and approach of 1969, to assure continued governmental and public understanding and support for goals of Western cohesion and deterrent strength of Alliance. 2. Tactically, we prefer that initiative on this problem come from Europe. Belgian suggestion is most helpful from this standpoint. As to content, we believe any new study should concentrate on political and non-military side of NATO and Atlantic policies. 3. We are convinced that questions of strategic doctrine, force levels and deployment, and nuclear planning should continue to be handled in existing framework. A new study might take note of NATO progress on these issues to provide balance and necessary background for a report to Ministers. Terms of reference should not however provide for any independent substantive study of these matters. 4. Among the many problems in formulating and getting underway a study on future of the Alliance is method and timing of approach to Germans. Immediate question is whether in time remaining before the December Ministerial meeting, the existing German Government or a new one can take decision to go along with study. If not, it might be better simply to have ideas advanced in December with final decision to be taken subsequently by the Permanent Council or by Ministers in the spring. We think it highly unlikely study could be a success without full German cooperation from the outset. 5. In light of Belgian suggestions and our own thinking we have concluded that a NATO decision in December or subsequently might embody the following elements: a. Ministers should ask Brosio and the Permanent Council to undertake a thorough study of broad policies, activities and organization relating to NATO's non-military functions. In part this would be a follow-up to existing work on East-West relations. b. The study should be completed in time for action to be taken at the December 1967 Ministerial meeting. We doubt that work of this scope and importance could be gotten underway and completed in time for Ministerial consideration next spring. c. Brosio and the Permanent Council could be assisted by senior officials from capitals and, subject to limits explained below, by consultation with independent experts or public figures having a suitable background in Atlantic and international affairs. As a variant of this idea, creation of a special commission might be envisaged. Membership in such a commission would be open to all NATO countries. Governments could designate either special representatives or their NATO Permanent Representatives to sit on the Commission. d. The work might be organized under several main headings. The following seem logical to us but we recognize that other variations may be preferred. (1) Improving East-West Relations. This might be essentially a development from the present NATO exercise. It would concentrate on such areas as contacts, cultural affairs and economic relations—with a view to seeing how these could be handled so as not only to improve East-West relations but also encourage constructive change in the East. Independent experts could be helpful on these aspects. (2) European Security and the German Problem. This field must be reserved to governments and take due account of quadripartite responsibilities. Therefore outside experts should not be used for this part of the study. (3) General Atlantic and European Relations. Work in this area could concentrate on such things as a restatement of the principles of Atlantic cooperation and their relationship to Western European unification. Independent experts and public figures might be consulted on these issues. (4) Organization of NATO. Under this heading there could be a reexamination of Alliance machinery in light of recommendations made under the three preceding headings. Outside advice could also be sought on these matters. 6. For Brussels: As follow-up to Under Secretary Rostow's talks with Harmel (reftel B), please inform Belgian Govt that we are grateful for ideas in Belgian memorandum; that our study has resulted in tentative points outlined in para five above which have been developed with benefit of Belgian ideas; and that we assume they will be taking soundings with other key NATO countries. You should also make clear we will probably be talking with others informally to clarify our own views. We wish to emphasize however that any such discussions would not involve preempting this important Belgian initiative. Please ascertain whether Belgians see any problem in our referring to fact they have raised subject with us and noting that they may be making a proposal in connection with the Ministerial. Meanwhile, we shall be giving further thought to entire subject, including the detailed points in body of Belgian memorandum. 7. For Bonn and London: As soon as we have results of approach to Belgians we expect to take soundings with UK and Federal Republic. 8. For USRO: We hope to provide guidance for action with other NATO delegations as soon as we have results of soundings with Belgium, FRG and UK. Meanwhile, we think it important to avoid any general NATO discussion of matters covered in this message. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Vest,INR, S/P, and four offices in EUR; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, and Moscow. 2 Telegram 2429, November 23, reported that at a luncheon for Rostow, given by Foreign Minister Harmel, the discussion centered on the Belgian proposal for a study of “whither NATO.” (Ibid., POL 7 US/Rostow) Telegram 2421 transmitted the text of the Belgian proposal that examined the current problems of the Alliance in light of De Gaulle's actions in the spring of 1966 and suggested areas that could be profitably explored dealing with the future of NATO. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) 3 See Document 211 . 222. Memorandum of Conversation 222. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 1, 1966. SUBJECT Italian Membership in NATO Nuclear Planning Group PARTICIPANTS Italy Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Mr. Rinaldo Petrignani, Counselor, Italian Embassy United States The Secretary William B. Dozier—EUR/AIS Ambassador Fenoaltea said that he wished to raise very briefly the question of composition of the Nuclear Planning Group. The matter will have to be decided within the next two weeks and he wanted the Secretary to understand fully the vital importance to the Italian Government of obtaining permanent Italian membership in the NPG. The Secretary was of course aware of the great difficulties that would be caused in Europe by a decision which upset the balance among major countries of Western Europe. The Ambassador stated that three years ago, when the question of possible expansion of the NATO Standing Group was under consideration, he had been given firm assurances here that the group would not be expanded to include Germany without also including Italy. In the present circumstances in Europe and in light of the current domestic political scene in Italy it is now even more important that Italy receive the same status as the other major NATO members. The Secretary said that he was well aware of Italian views on this matter and wished to reassure the Ambassador that there had been no change in the U.S. position of firm support for Italy as a permanent member of the NPG. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Dozier and approved in S on December 3. According to Rusk's Appointment Book the conversation was held at 2:35 p.m. (JOHNSON Library) The source text is labeled “Part I of III.” 223. Scope Paper 223. Scope Paper 1 Washington, December 7, 1966. NATO/G–3 The Political Atmosphere The December 1966 Ministerial Meeting will take place in an atmosphere of transition and ferment. Western Europe remains a collection of relatively weak sovereign nations. While economic progress continues, the move towards political unity has been stalled, and each nation seeks to maintain a balance in its immediate environment, avoid entanglement in global problems and ensure its security. The traditional European leaders (a neutralist France, a weak, self-centered UK and a Germany governed by an untested coalition) are unable to provide reassurance to the other Alliance members. The latter are uneasy about the evolving balance of power (i.e., read Germany) in Western Europe, unready to abandon NATO's security but unwilling to contribute a larger share to its defense effort, uneasy about the US commitment to the Alliance and our increasing involvement in Viet Nam, and interested but uncertain about how to capitalize on the apparent detente in East-West relations. The Alliance Despite these uncertainties the Alliance in 1966 has met De Gaulle's challenge. The Fourteen, who formalized their determination to maintain NATO at the Brussels Meeting in June, have in large part sorted out the France-NATO relationship. They are prepared to have France participate in NATO activities so long as she pays her share and does not try to obstruct the others. But France has effectively bowed out of almost all military aspects of the Alliance and in the process has made it increasingly clear how tenuous is her claim to be “the ally of her allies” and how determinedly she is bent on an independent course tantamount to neutralism. As a result of the French position, the Fourteen recognize more clearly the benefits provided by NATO for which De Gaulle offered no substitute: (a) security (the Soviet machine is still there and NATO's joint defense effort is the only effective protection against possible Russian encroachment or blackmail); (b) Western European political stability (this looks ever more precious to them in the light of the recent German political shifts); and (c) political influence (they see the NATO consultation process as their best hope of securing US attention to their interests and objections, and indeed Russian respect for them). An evidence of this need for and support of NATO is the fact that they are now prepared to take the decisive forward step to make the Special Committee on nuclear planning into a permanent NATO institution (the NATO Defense Affairs Committee) in spite of past French opposition. Nevertheless, there are serious strains in the Alliance. European confidence in a solid US commitment to NATO has been weakened not only by De Gaulle's unremitting attacks and innuendoes, but also by events in the US like the Mansfield Resolution 2 and the periodic Washington intimations linking withdrawals to manpower needs in the Pacific or balance of payments. At the same time the detente atmosphere has fostered heavy public and parliamentary pressures to relax NATO defense efforts. Some nations (such as the UK and Belgium) are already looking for ways to rationalize defense reductions. Others are prepared to follow. NATO strategy and force levels are under scrutiny in the Trilateral talks as well as in NATO force planning studies. Further progress in both areas is delayed until the US, UK and the new German government are ready to take some vital policy decisions. The East-West Aspect The atmosphere of detente has also spurred the NATO nations to an intense and occasionally uncritical pursuit of improved East-West relations. Thoughtful examination within NATO during 1966 of bilateral activities and future possibilities revealed a considerable variety of views. The Scandinavians and Belgians were optimistic as to possibilities of future developments. The Greeks, Turks and Germans viewed the situation with considerable reserve, feeling that the attitudes of some of their Allies underestimated the continuing Soviet threat as a bar to detente. The French have disassociated themselves from any concerted NATO position. In essence, the Allies recognize NATO's real value and indispensability as long as the basic problems of peace and of European security and German reunification have not been resolved—but they are searching more insistently for ways to adapt NATO to changing conditions and enlarge its usefulness. US Objectives Our general objectives at the December Ministerial Meeting will be: a) to present the picture of an Organization and of an Alliance which has surmounted its crisis with France but which will continue to accept French cooperation to the extent this does not damage essential NATO interests. b) to demonstrate that the Fourteen are going ahead in a businesslike manner, modernizing NATO to meet their needs—in the defense structure, in the nuclear field and in the area of communications and crisis consultation as well as in the non-military fields. c) to demonstrate that, in spite of a reduced probability of war in Europe, the nature of the Soviet threat still calls for an effective NATO. d) to evidence that a strong Alliance is an essential prerequisite to the attainment of a genuine detente and an equitable settlement in Europe. e) to support European efforts to study the future organization and activities of NATO. Organization of the Meeting As a result of a “constitutional” arrangement which was recently agreed in NAC, the Fourteen, sitting as the Defense Planning Committee, conduct the Alliance's military business and the Fifteen conduct its non-military business. Thus in December for the first time in NATO history business will be formally divided between these two groups, meeting at the Ministerial level. Work of the Council of Fourteen (DPC) Specifically we hope that the Ministers of the Fourteen will accomplish the following: 1. Note the favorable progress made since last June in resolving the France-NATO relationship. We are midstream in relocating SHAPE, AFCENT and the NATO Defense College. NATO has taken the last remaining major relocation decisions, to move the Military Committee and the NAC to Brussels. Some Ministers may wish to examine the details of financing and timing for moves; the actual work would normally be left to the Fourteen PermReps. At this point there appear to be no tendentious issues with France on matters relating to its withdrawal from NATO. Politely and publicly, NATO is leaving France. 2. Approve the Special Committee reports which (a) would make the Special Committee and six-nation Nuclear Planning Group into permanent NATO institutions for nuclear consultation, and (b) set in train arrangements for improved data exchange and communications and for crisis consultation. This will be a major accomplishment and dramatic evidence that the NATO nations are moving to give substance to their common interests in the nuclear area—in spite of past French objections and the deep-seated reservations of NATO nations about smaller or inner groupings. 3. Note the report of the US–UK–FRG Trilateral talks and recognize that the original time table for winding them up, mid-January, has slipped. Any concern by Ministers over the slippage should be balanced by relief that the UK is willing to defer precipitate action with regard to the BAOR and by the recognition that this interim trilateral report is sufficiently comprehensive to permit the regular NATO force planning to proceed in phase. 4. Provide the necessary guidance for the NATO military authorities to push on with their studies and activities on aspects of strategy and force posture, looking toward a full examination of these matters at a special Defense Ministers' meeting in the spring or at the next regular Ministerial meeting. 5. Express their interest in and support for the DefComSat proposal which NAC is now studying. It will not be ready for final action at the Ministerial. Work of the Council of Fifteen We hope that the Ministers of the Fifteen will undertake the following: 1. Consider thoughtfully Belgium's proposal for a NATO study on the political future of the Alliance and instruct Brosio and the Permanent Council to work out and recommend to governments procedures for a productive study. It would be premature to expect a more decisive response at this stage since the Ministers will have had little or no time to consider the fundamental objectives and potentialities of this initiative. 2. Welcome Italy's proposals in NATO for dealing with the “technological gap” and encourage her to refine her ideas. 3. Endorse the Permanent Representatives' report which examines possible initiatives looking toward improved East-West relations. The French are expected to abstain, being opposed in principle to any evidence of concerted Western “bloc” activity. 4. Stress as fundamental to the East-West problem that (a) Western strength and cohesion is a precondition to improved East-West relationships, (b) progress toward detente and progress towards the solution of the German and Central European problems are complementary objectives, both of which we support, and (c) the foregoing are a part of the determined search for ways to build a “surer foundation of mutual trust” between East and West which the President advocated in his speech on October 7. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 115. Secret. Drafted by Vest and cleared by Hinton, McAuliffe, Myerson, Springsteen, and Leddy. Prepared for the December 14–16 NATO Ministerial Meeting. 2 See Document 199 . 224. Memorandum of Conversation 224. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 9, 1966. SUBJECT Tripartite Talks on Troop Strength and the Offset Problem PARTICIPANTS Senator Mike Mansfield Under Secretary Eugene Rostow Assistant Secretary Douglas MacArthur Under Secretary Rostow opened the conversation by briefing Senator Mansfield on the tripartite talks on the NATO troop strength and offset problem in Germany being conducted for the United States by Mr. McCloy. He explained why, if we were to avoid the danger of a serious unravelling of the NATO Alliance, it seemed necessary to authorize $35 million of additional defense procurement in the UK in order to gain necessary time to study this entire problem and reach a sound conclusion with the British and Germans, both of whom have a serious domestic problem He also explained some of the possibilities we are exploring to neutralize the adverse balance of payments effect of troops abroad as well as the commitments that Britain would make in return for our additional procurement. Senator Mansfield listened impassively and at the conclusion of Under Secretary Rostow's presentation said that the resolution which he had put forward in the last Congress calling for a reduction of our forces in Europe was a very serious one and had widespread appeal in the Congress. He pointed out that we are the only NATO country that is meeting its commitments, except possibly for some withdrawals for Vietnam, and that he had offered the resolution not just for financial and balance of payments reasons, important as they were, nor because of Vietnam. Basically he felt there were clear indications that fundamental changes had taken place and that the continued presence of so many American troops in Europe 20 years after the war was beginning to grate on the nerves of Germans and Europeans outside of government. He felt in terms of our own overall political and security stance the time had come to make a reduction in forces. Senator Mansfield said that his resolution in no way weakened the President's hand since it left to the President the judgment on the extent to which there should be U.S. troop reductions as well as the timing. He believed his resolution actually strengthened the President's hand in these matters rather than weakening it. Insofar as the proposed arrangements with the British to place $35 million of additional defense procurement are concerned, he did not think it was a good idea to “subsidize the British” unless the end result would strengthen our overall security arrangements and the position of the dollar and the pound sterling—as a result which he obviously considered very dubious. He concluded the conversation on this subject by saying cryptically that he appreciated being informed and thought “we understand each other's viewpoint on this matter.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by MacArthur. Copies were sent to Leddy, Kohler, Bowie, Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, and S/S. The meeting was held in Senator Mansfield's office. 225. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 225. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 10, 1966, 1953Z. 8923. NATUS. For Secretary McNamara from Cleveland. Subject: Nuclear planning—first steps. 1. The Alliance will be taking a step long past due, assuming the Rome report 2 secures Ministerial approval next week. NATO, through the DPWG, has made good progress down the road toward rational and meaningful planning for conventional forces. The pressing need has been to extend this systematic approach to problems which have faced us for a decade in the nuclear field. By establishing a small and flexible nuclear planning group, NATO will have, at last, machinery which will enable Ministers to grapple with the substance of Alliance nuclear planning and policy. 2. In the NPG's first year, no task is more urgent or important than to begin to fill in great void which surrounds question of the role of 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe and their proper relation to external and conventional forces. Our objective is to strive for some understanding, and hopefully agreement, about what kinds of nuclear weapons are needed in NATO, in what amounts and for what purposes. 3. In our view, a good approach would be to divide the problem of the role of NATO's nuclear forces into its strategic and tactical components. Putting the NPG to work simultaneously on both the strategic and tactical phases of these problems would avoid distortion inherent in focusing on one aspect alone and would permit development of a coherent view of the appropriate balance and mix of NATO's nuclear forces and their relationship to external strategic forces. 4. In the strategic category we would envisage the NPG starting out on ground already prepared by Working Group III and going on to a thorough examination of the targeting politics, tasks and objectives of NATO strike forces. By taking advantage of consensus already developed in Working Group III concerning SACEUR's scheduled program, there would be good chance that NPG could produce an agreed NATO targeting and attack policy at an early date. Such a prompt outcome would not only establish prestige of NPG (thereby undercutting FRG doubts about its value) but would also in another way demonstrate Alliance is up to date and vital. 5. On the tactical side, we would see the NPG beginning with studies of the possible use of battlefield nuclear weapons (tubes, missiles, aircraft) and of denial and defense nuclear weapons (AA, ASW, ADM). This ground-up approach to tactical systems has the advantage of immersing NPG at outset in systematic examination of some problems of principal concern to its members. It would also lead to more informed and orderly consideration of such problems as selective use, command and control, rules of engagement, special release procedures, contingency studies, etc. 6. We understand that as soon as NPG formally comes to life (which should be next week) UK intends to raise question of the first steps to be taken. To get off to a brisk start, and in the right direction, it would be useful to arrange toward end of Ministerial Session a meeting of the six Defense Ministers who will be participating in NPG during 1967. 7. There may be political obstacles that make this too difficult. The six ministers can hardly meet (even if there is already a firm gentlemen's agreement) until they have been formally selected by the (probably twelve-member) NDAC. Since Brosio is chairman of both NDAC and NPG, he needs to be present especially the first time each body meets; yet he will be chairing North Atlantic Council during this period. Probably we can and should do nothing about this idea until the SPECOM report has been considered and approved; backfield in motion might draw penalty of resentment. But once action is taken hopefully in final form at DPC Wednesday, then we can see whether the formalities can be sufficiently complied with to enable us to get to work on the substance of a work program. 8. We have some specific suggestions for work program (following general line in 2–5 above), for discussion with Secretary McNamara when that moment comes. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. 2 Reference is to DPC/D(66)39, “Suggested Improvements for Nuclear Planning,” a report of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 113) 226. Summary Notes of the 566th Meeting of the National Security Council 226. Summary Notes of the 566th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, December 13, 1966, 12:10 p.m. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Acting Secretary Katzenbach: Summarized the State Department paper. (copy attached) 2 We cannot take a deep breath and relax, because many problems are ahead of us down the road, such as: The organization of a permanent nuclear consultative group, The NATO study proposed by Belgium which France will oppose and which may not come out to be very much, and The technological gap, the nature of which is not clear. At a forthcoming NATO meeting in Paris next week, we do not expect dramatic developments or any major crises. Secretary McNamara: The Nuclear Planning Group, which we are developing, meets the needs of our allies, especially Germany. It will more closely tie in Germany with the U.S. and the U.K. in the nuclear field. It will end talk of the Multilateral Force. As for tripartite discussions, it is doubtful that the Germans will present a proposal acceptable to us and to the British with respect to the troop offset problem. This means that there will have to be a relocation of U.S. and U.K. forces. We must act to keep the British from suddenly withdrawing U.K. troops. As to the relocation of our forces outside France, 90 percent of our personnel will be out by April 1. The remainder will be out by mid-summer. The cost of getting out of France we do not yet know. The President: Let us get out rather than be pushed out by De Gaulle. Secretary McNamara: Estimates of the cost of getting out range from $175 to $275 million. Some 75,000 Americans, plus 14,000 French civilians on the U.S. payroll are involved. Foreign exchange costs to us may drop from $175 million to $100 million, a yearly saving of about $75 million. The President: Expressed general agreement with the State Department paper. We should get out of France as quickly as possible. If we cannot meet the French deadline for withdrawal, we should avoid a public fight about it if we can. As soon as our team returns from the Paris meeting, they should report their evaluation of whether the 14 NATO powers can hold together. Assistant Secretary Leddy: We should await the results of the McCloy mission sometime in mid-January to make up our minds on the level of U.S. forces remaining in Europe. We must be very careful of the political effect in Europe off any withdrawal we make. We must reach an agreed government position on whether we think the allies are carrying their fair share in relation to what we are doing. This position will be essential in defending our policy domestically. Acting Secretary Katzenbach: The allies' view of the Soviet threat is such that they are not willing to make adequate force contributions. Our allies face the difficult problem of not wanting to accept de Gaulle's solution but not wanting to pay for a NATO solution. The President: Recent French, British and German actions make clear that they are looking inward. We can't get the American people to support our NATO policy when they see the actions taken by the French, British, and Germans. We are fast approaching a day of reckoning. Our recent elections make this quite clear. Our policy must take into account the diminishing support of U.S. citizens for the present level of our forces in Europe. We should do our very best to comply with De Gaulle's request that we leave—even if it means putting men in inadequate housing during winter. We should try to get through to the Germans to convince them of the necessity of offsetting a greater amount of our expenditures in Europe. The serious nature of the problem we face in maintaining support for NATO must be conveyed to the allies. They must understand that the demands on us to meet home front needs are serious—that we are facing a budget of 142 billion with revenue estimates of 120 billion. The labor unions are going to get raises and U.S. Government employees merit salary increases. Expenditures for the poor in the U.S. have increased tremendously since the Kennedy Administration. We are now very near a debt limit. The Vice President: The NATO alliance is vital. However, changes are necessary. The dissolution of the alliance means the loss of our diplomatic cards in dealing with the Russians. We must talk to Congress every chance we get about the continuing but changed NATO structure. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 2 Printed as Document 223 . 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, December 13, 1966, 8:25 p.m. 102104. Ref A—Paris 8954; 2 Ref B—Paris Nodis 9004 and State 100646. 3 For Secretary and Amb. Bohlen from Leddy. I have had only the briefest opportunity to discuss these matters with Defense but thought you might like to have my personal views in the event the question is raised during Secretary's stay in Paris. 1. As suggested in paragraph 1 of reftel A, I believe it would be highly desirable to sell the French the equipment and installations on various air bases in France wherever such sales would be to the economic advantage of the US. This would give us a dollar return and might also speed up our time of departure from France thus helping us to meet the April 1 date. As Secretary McNamara will no doubt inform Secretary Rusk there is an intense interest here in getting out as soon as possible and avoiding any disagreement with the French over US delays. 2. Frankly, I see no advantage and some clear disadvantages in attempting at this moment to re-engage the French in a discussion of US use of military facilities in France. We may be certain that if they have to foot the bill they will in fact maintain only such facilities as they intend to use in any case. Presumably if France is at our side in an emergency or hostilities we would at that time be permitted to use these facilities. If we now suggest that we have an interest in their maintaining specific facilities they might very well demand some payment from us, such as, for example, free or cut-rate sales to them of existing equipment and installations on the theory that these facilities are of potential use to us even though in fact they had decided to keep these facilities for their own purposes. Finally, protracted discussion of this subject with the French could lead to additional delays in our departure and possibly a further exacerbation of our relations on this entire question. 3. The disadvantages cited in paragraph 2 would not necessarily apply at a later stage after we have left France and have sold them whatever equipment and installations we jointly decide upon. At that point we could simply present them with a list of the facilities which they had already decided to maintain and to which we might want access, with their approval in time of emergency or hostilities in which they concur, simply in order to facilitate planning. An approach at this later stage would avoid presenting them with an excuse for demanding payment and would not engage us in a request for some “commitment” on their part. It would also avoid political disadvantages mentioned at end State 100646. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Leddy. Rusk was in Paris for the NAC Ministerial Meeting. 2 Dated December 12. (Ibid., DEF 12–6 FR) 3 Telegram 9004, December 12, has not been found. In telegram 100646, December 10, the Department of State agreed with Bohlen's analysis, which stated that De Gaulle was being unrealistic in hoping France could remain aloof from any hostilities that might take place in Europe. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) 228. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 228. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 14, 1966, 0236Z. 9061. Secto 57. Subject: NATO Ministerial—Bilateral with NATO Secretary General. Following is uncleared FYI, Noforn and subject to revision on review. 1. Secretary met December 13 with NATO Secretary General Brosio accompanied by Bacchetti (NATO International Staff). In addition to Secretary, Rostow, Cleveland, Springsteen and Vest were present from U.S. 2. Nuclear Planning Group membership. Brosio was worried about Dutch attitude and uncertain whether exhibition of bad temper resulted from grudges against U.S. or was pre-meeting tactics. Luns inconsistently on one hand had said that Dutch might not even want to participate in NDAC and on the other had suggested need for a basic three-year tenure as minimum time in which NPG member could do meaningful work. Secretary said we prepared to proceed without Dutch if necessary. He was ready to talk to Luns but thought others like UK and Brosio could be more helpful in influencing Dutch. Brosio agreed and said he would probe extent of German interest (which influential factor with Dutch always), talk to Dutch PermRep and press British to use their influence. Brosio said he had urged Martin, who had agreed, to talk directly to Luns and try to settle first year's position between two of them. Brosio asked whether U.S. insisted on six or would go to seven if that was the only way to have committee. Secretary preferred to wait and see what situation required. 3. Belgian initiative for study of Alliance. Secretary reviewed Belgian resolution and said we should avoid phrase “state of Alliance,” which implies it not in good shape, and use term “tasks of Alliance.” Re Belgian draft resolution, he preferred term “situation in Asia and Pacific” to term “situation in Southeast Asia” and thought there should be additional item “the continuing problem of organizing a durable peace.” He made point that U.S. would prefer to have SecGen and Council arrange with governments for an inquiry. This would invite higher political representation from capitals than PermReps although he did not exclude that activities should take place at the NATO Council table. 4. communique. Brosio said that French PermRep de Leusse on personal basis had suggested single communique which would report work of DPC and of full NAC and conclude with statement that French did not participate in or associate themselves with DPC paragraphs. Secretary underlined importance of having clear commitment from the French by the time meeting got underway that both Parts could appear in one document and that SecGen's rep could brief press at conclusion of DPC discussions. If the French gave no guarantee, then Fourteen should put out own written report. Brosio agreed and suggested that at the beginning of DPC session Ministers should appoint a communique drafting committee as usual to prepare paper which could either be incorporated in single final communique or be issued at close of DPC business, dependent on needs. (See following bilateral tels re this subject.) 5. NAC relocation. Brosio said most nations favored building permanent new headquarters in Brussels but disagreed on interim arrangements. Choice was to lease Tour de Namur, build prefabricated tempo in Brussels, or stay in Paris until permanent building available. There was some opposition to leasing Tour, but cost of building tempo would be more than rent of Tour and he thought Tour was least bad solution. Secretary said U.S. would defer to combined judgment of SecGen and Belgians, and if he recommended Tour lease, U.S. would support him. Brosio said he hoped to work out harmonious conclusion with those most discontented. He did not want to spill blood. He recognized U.S. desire to leave Paris. 6. Italian proposal for technological gap. Brosio explained he had prepared resolution which would refer the problem to NAC. Italians were checking this with Germans and French. He hoped this would meet general acceptance since his treatment would not prejudice division of future tasks between NATO and other organizations. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR (PA). Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 229. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 229. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 16, 1966. 9261. Secto 103. Personal for the President. The NATO meeting has gone well. We may have a minor Donnybrook over the communique later today because of French attitudes. 2 However, the work of the Fourteen has gone in a businesslike fashion with a maximum of solidarity and without static from the Danes and Canadians who have in the past been unwilling to accept the consequences of France's withdrawal. I gave the Council some “old-time religion” on Vietnam 3 and believe that we can get some additional assistance from Germany, the Netherlands and some others but this must be developed bilaterally in capitals. I hit George Brown pretty hard on the point that they have the same treaty commitment that we have to “meet the common danger” in Vietnam. I intend to press them very hard for more participation but they will probably act like scared rabbits in the face of their domestic political situation. One of the most important developments here has been Willy Brandt's reaction to non-proliferation. The present German Government is ready to forget “hardware” and Brandt told me to forget the European clause. I am giving the latest Russian text of Article One to the NATO members of the Geneva Conference (UK, Canada and Italy) and will also show it privately to the Germans. Brandt made a major impression on NATO in demonstrating that the new German Government will not be bound by the rigid theology of the Adenauer period and is prepared to probe the possibilities of better relations with Eastern Europe, including the East Germans. This may not move us forward but twenty years of hostile confrontation has not done so and I believe that we should give them a chance to find out whether another approach might produce more results. I was glad to hear from Bob McNamara that you wanted to get as many of our people and as much of our equipment out of France as possible prior to De Gaulle's deadline. This seems to me to be the dignified attitude which we should take in the face of an outrageous decision taken without the slightest consultation with us. I am trying to get details but the Norwegian Foreign Minister told me, with some astonishment, that recent public opinion polls in Norway showed that you were head and shoulders above any other world leader in the esteem of the Norwegian people. This does not astonish me but he obviously was surprised and pleased. I am also trying to get details of recent Japanese polls showing that the US is way out in front of countries most respected and admired by the Japanese people and that Peking has moved into first place among their dislikes, now surpassing the Russians. Fanfani expressed to me personally his great appreciation to you for the strong support you gave in your October 8 [ 7 ] speech and otherwise to his initiative on the technological gap. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears no time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:30 a.m. 2 U.S. Delegation records of the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Paris December 14–16, including summaries of the meetings, briefing papers, telegrams to and from the delegation, and memoranda of conversation, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 109–119. For text of the final communique, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 376–399. 3 Rusk's report on the international situation, including Vietnam, was transmitted as an enclosure to CA–6368, December 17. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA)) 230. Memorandum of Conversation Between John J. McCloy and Chancellor Kiesinger 230. Memorandum of Conversation Between John J. McCloy and Chancellor Kiesinger 1 Bonn, December 16, 1966. I saw Kiesinger and spent 2–1/4 hours with him. I told him that I had seen the President at his ranch in Texas and that I had told him I would take the first opportunity after the government had been formed, and it had had the opportunity to discuss the direction of its foreign policy, to talk with the new German leaders. It had been impossible or impractical to talk with him on the occasion of my last visit to Germany while the new government was being formed. I told him I was now in Germany for a short visit and I was glad to have this opportunity to discuss with him his intentions regarding the direction of the new German government's policy and to get his thoughts on how he viewed United States policy. I emphasized that though I was still engaged in the tripartite discussions, I was here now only as one who had a deep interest in the future of Germany and its good relations with my own country; I expected to report to the President my talks with him and with other German leaders but there would not be the general diplomatic reporting of my visit. He said he was most happy to have the chance to sit down and talk over the new direction of things as far as it was now possible to do so. I told him of my general instructions from the President on the tripartite mission and I briefly outlined to him the basis on which I had been appointed referring to the threat of British withdrawal of troops and the need for a reappraisal of the NATO situation; its strategy; its force levels and the sharing of burdens. We now had a brief respite before the discussions resumed and I was taking advantage of my visit to Germany to have from him, as best he could now give it, the direction of German policy and what he hoped that the United States' direction would be in relation to it. I added that I thought his recent statement of policy had been excellent and that it had had a good reception in the State Department and generally in the United States. Since it had been frequently announced that the new government would endeavor to make constructive advances in regard to France. I thought it well to emphasize again that good relations between Germany and France were not only consistent with United States policy but a matter of deep concern on the part of the United States. Two world wars and tensions between Germany and France had been the result of poor relations, the effect of which had been to involve the United States in European affairs in a large way and we rebelled at the idea propounded by French propaganda that we stood in the way of good Franco-German relations. I said that the United States could only be relieved and pleased if those relations were placed on a permanently constructive basis. This had been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy since the end of World War II. It was true in Schuman's time and it is true in De Gaulle's as well. There was one thing we did wish to clarify however and that was the attitude of Germany toward NATO. We could only read General De Gaulle's intention as one of distinct hostility to NATO. While we were not seeking to place ourselves between France and Germany, we did believe we were entitled to know which stood first in his mind, i.e., adherence to NATO or in the attempt to improve relations with France, less emphasis on NATO and the principles on which it was built. We had put a great deal of energy and resources into the concept of collective security in Europe through NATO. It had been successful and we believed it still had great validity; it was based on the concept of equal partnership of all the participants, including Germany. If the new German government was prepared to sacrifice the unity of NATO in favor of a new relationship with France, we ought to know as it would affect our whole position as a NATO partner. People were talking about new directions of policy, more “modern” approaches to European security; less adherence to the United States. Was there any suggestion in his own thinking which involved any new relationships affecting Germany's position in NATO? He said he wanted to respond to this question very emphatically. The coalition of which he was the leader representing over 2/3rds of all the Bundestag votes adhered strictly to the concept of European collective security which NATO represented—and more than 2/3rds of the country as a whole took the same view. This was a basic principle. NATO had to be developed, not retarded, in accordance with the requirements of the time. In his recent statement he had said this. He had said no more about NATO in his statement than this but this was not because of any lack of interest in NATO but only because he did not want to burden his first statement with details of military affairs and he wanted to emphasize in his first statement Germany's great desire to get along well with all nations and not place too much emphasis on Europe alone. He wanted me to know and the President to know that the position of France in respect to NATO had not the slightest effect on Germany's attitude to NATO. He repeated this several times. He had been one of the strongest proponents of the preamble to the French treaty which had stressed the priority of NATO and he did not withdraw from the position in the slightest degree. What concerned him was how to effect good relations with France at the same time making perfectly clear his adherence to and dependence upon NATO. It required some thought how best to proceed with these objectives in mind and he was not at this moment clear as to what he could do to insure the accomplishment of both objectives. He said he and all Germany urgently desired to keep United States troops in Germany on the basis and in the amount they were here now. If reduced he would be most unhappy and Germany would have to think of an equivalent substitute because the threat from the East had not disappeared. He had stressed in his statement that Germany had in the past been overly preoccupied with its own problems and had not acted as if it were aware of the problems of its allies. Germany was not now in a position where it had to be solely occupied with its own problems. It was a member of the Alliance and had to take into account the preoccupations of its partners as well. The United States was beset with problems of which Germany had to be aware and Germany had to be more understanding in respect of them. Germany was no longer in the position of the young girl in love for the first time who sought daily some new assurance from her lover of his undying affection. Its task was to help create a real and dignified partnership with the United States and not seek repeated assurances of United States commitments as a member of the Alliance to the security of Germany. “We take this for granted and intend to act accordingly,” was the way he put it. He deplored the French defection and was sorry for it but we had to put up with it, make the best of it and to look now for the practical adjustments required by it and not merely deplore the past. It might be presumptuous of him to hope that Germany might be of some help in trying to bring about some better understanding with France on matters of military security and between United States, NATO and France than had thus far been practical, considering the French attitude. He did not have anything specific in mind and it might only be wishful thinking on his part but he intended to give the matter thought and try to accomplish something to improve the arrangements with France in regard to defenses in case of trouble and generally between France and the United States. He hoped there was a role Germany could play along these lines. It was, at least, worth a try. The need was now to strengthen NATO. There was no justification either for security reasons or for the inability to achieve the reunification of Germany to suggest any withdrawal or weakening of NATO. It had not been the objective of NATO, in the first place, to achieve reunification and he did not share the view of some of his compatriots that NATO had been a failure because reunification had not been achieved. NATO had been a resounding success but it needed nourishment. There were some who once thought Germany ought to withdraw from NATO in order to advance reunification; this was a thing of the past, and no one in his right mind could think the Soviets would be the more induced to grant reunification if NATO were to go or Germany were to withdraw from it. He did feel that some relaxation of tensions might help in the long struggle for reunification but he was under no illusions respecting Soviet intentions in this respect. He was not concerned over any detente with the United States and the Soviet Union. He was in favor of it but one thing must be clear; the detente must not take the form of cementing or acquiescing in the status quo. Germany did look toward eventual reunification; it would not be a self-respecting nation if it did not constantly seek to bring it about. There was no possibility of any acceptable Soviet proposal for reunification coming about in the reasonable future. There were some fears that a detente with the Soviet Union on the part of the United States would embody an acceptance of the status quo. This was not his worry as he was aware that the United States had been the first to declare for the reunification of Germany and had been the most steadfast adherent of it. He was less confident of France. [Here follow 6 pages of discussion of unrelated topics.] John J. McCloy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 17. No classification marking. The meeting was held at the Palais Schaumburg. 231. Record of Meeting With President Johnson 231. Record of Meeting With President Johnson 1 Austin, Texas, December 17, 1966. PRESENT Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Katzenbach Ambassador Harriman Ambassador Lodge Ambassador Goldberg W. W. Rostow [Here follow 4 pages of discussion of Vietnam. The President asked Secretary McNamara to report on the bombing situation in North Vietnam and the NATO meeting. After his brief report on Vietnam, McNamara turned to NATO.] As for NATO, the 14 met without France and proved they could do a substantial amount of business. The Permanent Nuclear Committee was set up after a year and half of work. The task was to drive it forward fast. He discussed with both Brosio and Cleveland how this must be done. It is important work. This will reduce the German pressure for a hardware solution to their nuclear role. Brandt said the hardware issue could be set aside; but there was disagreement in the German government. Brandt also believes the Germans will not stand in the way of non-proliferation agreement; although there will be dissension within the German government. The Foreign Office will suffer greatly from Carstens movement to the Ministry of Defense with Schroeder—Carstens being the “best European diplomat we deal with.” On the offset issue, there was considerable evidence that the Germans would find it difficult to offset fully. He didn't discuss the shortrun issue but did talk with Schroeder on the long-run issues—after June 30, 1967. Schroeder was depressed about both the future size of the defense budget and the problem of offsetting by other means U.K. and U.S. expenditures in Germany. The U.K. insisted that it would act on or before June 30 unless its foreign exchange expenditures in Germany were fully offset. Aside from the Nuclear Committee, a second constructive development was the agreement to proceed with realistic force planning looking ahead 5 years. The finance and military authorities will work together to achieve that realism. The Belgian proposal for complete review of the future of NATO was accepted. It was not clear, however, whether this would include military as well as non-military matters. The U.S. preferred that it confine itself to the non-military aspects of NATO. It was also not clear what the fate would be of the idea of Europeans joining together to achieve a consensus within NATO which they would then discuss with U.S. Secretary McNamara believed this not in the U.S. interest in military affairs. [Here follow 1–1/2 pages of discussion of U.N. matters.] W. W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Box 3. Top Secret. Prepared by Rostow on December 19. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 232. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 232. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 17, 1966, 1733Z. 9350. NATUS. Subj: NATO Ministerial Meeting—summary and appraisal. Newspaper reporting on NATO Ministerial Meeting this week suffers from the usual myopia of the Paris bureau. And our delegation reporting is necessarily so voluminous that it has strained the attention span of most of our addressees. It may therefore be useful to summarize what we think happened here this week. 1. The Fourteen, glued together now in a formal way as a Council level Defense Planning Committee (DPC), went ahead in a business-like way to make a series of important decisions about NATO defense system. Specifically: A. They established the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) and its seven member Nuclear Planning Group. (The New York Times locally is unhappy because they used a Paris dateline to predict a six-member committee though we told them to be cautious.) Since the Germans at Brandt's level are relaxed about “hardware” and even the much debated “European clause” in nuclear defense affairs, this means that for the time being at least we can stop debating how to cut the allies in on nuclear matters, and proceed systematically to do so. B. They laid the doctrinal basis for a system of communications and data exchange that could make a great deal of difference in meaningful consultation among governments in time of diplomatic or military crisis. C. They agreed (subject still to a Portuguese reservation which is not crucial) to common funding of future exercises by the ACE mobile force. D. They approved, on schedule, the first stage of a NATO communications satellite program—an R&D link between SHAPE's new headquarters and AFSOUTH in Naples. 2. The Fourteen got back to the subject of strategy, which has been taboo in NATO since the mid-1950's because France was not willing to abandon formally the doctrine of instant massive retaliation. Now, the DPC, Military Committee, and NATO commanders, newly and fruitfully related to each other, are engaged in a fundamental new look at NATO strategy as related to forces and budgets. As a result of trilateral, NPG and DPC “studies” (in this business, the word “studies” is a euphemism for inter-governmental negotiations about strategy and military policy), we should be able to develop during 1967 a thorough-going revision of the concepts for NATO military and force planning, and base on them NATO's first real five-year plan. There will be many disagreements, and on some points we may never achieve unanimous consent even without France. But a great deal of fresh air has been let into NATO through the force planning exercise, and it was blowing freely here this week. (The chief uncertainty in NATO defense plans is still the United States of America. The decisions we make about our own forces, and the time scale in which they are carried out, will make or break the NATO defense system. Decisions by others, notably the British and the Germans, are also important in themselves, but their greatest significance lies in the way they affect US domestic support for our NATO commitment.) 3. The NATO-France issues were not front and center in this conference. On the defense side, of course, the group of Fourteen was in unembarrassed charge of the proceedings. The “boundary line” between France and NATO has been largely drawn, and never even needed to be discussed by Ministers. It seemed earlier that we might find the French defecting to some extent from the political side of NATO using the discussion of East/West relations as the proximity fuse. But, French apparently decided that it did not serve their interest to pick a fight on the basic issues—which are whether NATO has a role to play in working toward East/West detente and whether NATO members of the Alliance should try to develop a common line to guide their pluralistic approaches to the Eastern Europeans. Thus, Couve de Murville did not press the objection that had been made at lower levels to the report by the Permanent Council on East/West Relations 2 (which clearly projects a NATO role). He also did not interfere with, and indeed agreed to, the Belgian proposal for studying the future tasks of an Alliance that clearly proposes to be in business after the magic 20-year deadline of 1969. The French also raised no problems about NATO picking up for action the Italian initiative about technological cooperation. In short, the French delegation clearly had instructions not to recreate on the political side the French-NATO split which is already a fact of life, expressed in institutional arrangements, on the defense side of Alliance affairs. An indication of resulting atmosphere was sardonic question by de la Grandville when the communique committee was discussing the Belgian initiative. He called attention to the provision in Belgian resolution that Europeans should consult with each other within the framework of the Alliance, and asked with a show of virtuous incredulity “does that mean we are going to consult about these matters without the presence of our American friends?” 4. It should be possible to make something important and interesting out of this Belgium initiative. We have insisted here that this is not “just another study,” but that it can become a serious effort by governments, with the participation of responsible political executives from capitals, to reformulate our collective aims in a way that fits the increasing fluid international situation, and is more likely to appeal to the generation that does not remember why we got into an Atlantic Alliance to begin with. 5. There can also, in our view, be considerable nourishment in a North Atlantic Council process on technological cooperation which takes both an internal look at what NATO itself can do, and an external look at whether the diverse bilateral arrangements and international organs which supposedly cover this field are concentrating on what most needs to be done to get results. In particular, the drive for more and better technology in Europe can perhaps be channeled into more support for a (wider) Common Market in Europe. 6. The reaction to our continuing stress on the responsibilities of NATO countries outside the NATO area was distinct change from a year ago. Then, the idea that Europeans should worry about world order (by which they thought we meant Viet-Nam) was actively resisted, in private conversation if not formal statements. Today, the Europeans are less excited about the Viet-Nam war, more impressed by the fact that it does not seem to be inhibiting all forms of US–USSR cooperation (outer space treaty, non-proliferation), generally certain that American power is committed and that Hanoi cannot win, and less convinced that the war is bound to escalate into a general conflagration. Moreover, Chinese Communist behavior in the past year has reduced current support for detente with China, and increased longer term worries about Chinese capacities and intentions. We may be several years from the time when the major European countries will be willing to invest time, effort, and money in post-colonial external policies. But a sluggish trend away from the post-war pattern of regional isolationism is already visible to the naked eye in the politics of most European countries. By-product and evidence of this trend was the almost total absence in this NATO meeting of official criticism of the US role in Viet-Nam—except, of course, by the Foreign Minister of France. 7. There was a brief flurry about NAC relocation when the Germans (with more or less Canadian, Danish, Norwegian and Portuguese support) suggested NAC remain in Paris until a permanent building could be built in Brussels. But they added the proviso that next year's December Council session should be held in Brussels. When the Germans put this to the French, Couve said NAC was welcome to stay in Paris but could not then treat Paris as a forbidden place for NATO Ministers to meet. The stay-in-Paris movement thereupon collapsed, and permanent and provisional sites were readily agreed. If we can avoid forming too many committees on the subject, NAC should move to Brussels by the end of next year. 8. All in all, this meeting produced more action, less conflict, and a more definite pattern for the future than even NATO's well wishers had assumed. The balance of benefits and disabilities which may be produced by combining a more cautious France, a more robust Germany, an impecunious Britain, a less obstreperous Denmark, and a Greece and Turkey seriously seeking a basic accommodation, cannot yet be predicted. But through basic collective process, in the Fourteen on defense and the Fifteen on detente, we will learn much about the opportunities, and will have to be in a position to take advantage of them in carrying out the mandate in the President's October 7 speech. That mandate is for continuing US interest and activity in Atlantic, and therefore in European, affairs. There is always an inherent danger our leadership will show too much, though on this score the recent NATO Ministerial Session was outstanding: so many of our ideas were blended with those of other nations in the advance preparations and this week's corridor consultations, that nobody was heard to complain about US “lecturing”, nobody objected to the trilateral talks, and the word “ hegemony” was not even used by press spokesmen in those semi-public gripe sessions called “backgrounders”. In any case, our impression is that most thoughtful Europeans are worrying less about the continuity of US leadership than about its discontinuance due to US domestic pressures. The best way to deal with this nameless fear seems to be to advise our European friends to read the President's October 7 speech again, and to note the evidence, in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, that the USA means what the President says. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 FR(PA). Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Moscow. 2 A copy of this report is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 115. 233. Memorandum of Conversation 233. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 10, 1967. SUBJECT US Policy in Europe PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, Carl Schurmann, Ambassador of the Netherlands Mr. Petrus Buwalda, Counselor, Embassy of the Netherlands Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Counselor Jay P. Moffat, Netherlands Affairs Ambassador Schurmann referred to the widespread impression that the US no longer actively supports European unification. Mr. Bowie described our policy as essentially unchanged. Our capacity to influence events in Europe, however, has perhaps waned somewhat, and it is hard to know what can effectively be done. There continue also to be many complicating factors, for example confusion about UK and FRG desires and policy. We consider it necessary for the Europeans to get together. The Ambassador said the Dutch are in a dilemma, having opposed the Fouchet Plan in the past. Should they now be persuaded that half of a loaf is better then none? Mr. Bowie said that in hindsight it might perhaps have been wise to have agreed to the Fouchet Plan originally. The Ambassador noted that the FRG is now a more effective counter-weight to France and the UK might enter the EEC. Mr. Bowie alluded to various European charges that the US seeks to dominate Europe. Understandably, we are sensitive to such charges and may thus appear to some to show less interest in Europe, while this in fact is not the case. For us to deal with problems in many fields, e.g. the so-called technological gap, a coherent and active European entity is essential. The Ambassador commented that the Netherlands does not fear US domination. Rather it hopes to avoid a Europe united under a potentially aggressive France, hence Dutch support for UK entry into the Six and close ties with the US. The Ambassador hoped UK entry would prove possible and said the Five should bend every effort to make it hard for France to say no. The UK could help by reiterating acceptance of the ground rules and not overstressing their “special relationship” with the US. Mr. Bowie commented that this relationship has always inspired a certain mystique and perhaps the British have stressed it for lack of an alternate policy. Ambassador Schurmann noted that the declining UK role in the Far East and the essentially pragmatic personalities of the present US and UK leaders combined to dilute this relationship. Mr. Bowie added that as a practical matter the UK would be wise to turn an ability to talk to us into a European asset, providing itself a greater role in a unified Europe. Mr. Bowie explained that the trilateral talks are suspended while the new German Government arrives at a position, perhaps in three or four weeks. The Ambassador asked about Senator Mansfield's views on Europe. Mr. Bowie said he expected the Senator to continue to push his viewpoint, which reflects many not necessarily congruent attitudes of discontent concerning our European policy. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR W–US. Confidential. Drafted by Moffat and approved by S/C on January 30. 234. Record of Meeting 234. Record of Meeting 1 Chequers, England, January 21, 1967. RECORD OF MEETING AT CHEQUERS ON SATURDAY, 21ST JANUARY, 1967 PRESENT Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr. Secretary Fowler Mr. Deming Mr. Bator Sir William Armstrong Sir Denis Rickett Mr. Ryrie (Secretary) [Here follows 1 page of discussion on monetary policy.] Britain and the Common Market The Chancellor of the Exchequer said the signs from Paris were that the French might judge whether the U.K. was sufficiently “European” for membership of the Common Market by the extent to which the U.K. was willing to be anti-American, particularly on international monetary questions. He wished to make it clear that in order to get into the Common Market we were not willing to line up with France alone on these matters. The Prime Minister might talk in Paris about such things as the possibility of a common European currency however; and there was a danger that what he had said might be misrepresented in the French press as meaning that he had accepted the General's point of view on various matters. He asked Mr. Secretary Fowler not to believe all he might hear from Paris about this. The Chancellor's own view was that the odds were against success in the British effort to gain entry into the Common Market. Some work was being done in London, on a purely hypothetical basis, on the possibility of an Atlantic free trade area as an alternative and he wondered whether at some stage it might be useful for the two Treasuries to carry out a joint factual study of this question. It would, of course, be important to keep this secret. Mr. Secretary Fowler and Mr. Bator expressed the view that in the event of a deterioration in the prospects for eventual entry, this subject was bound to receive attention in Washington. But they thought the time was perhaps not yet ripe. In any case, there was always the risk of a leak in Washington if an Anglo American study were undertaken and this could be very damaging when the U.K. was still directing its main effort into gaining membership of the E.E.C. The outcome of the Kennedy Round discussions later this year would also have important bearing on the question. More generally, if the present U.K. negotiations with the Common Market was unsuccessful there might be advantages in not seeking to define the alternative courses of action too sharply at any rate for some time. The U.K. might think it better to adopt a policy of waiting it out, in order eventually to obtain the objective of entry in the E.E.C. The Chancellor of the Exchequer acknowledged that this might be a possible policy, but pointed out that it would be psychologically difficult and perhaps damaging to confidence in the prospects for the economy. He thought there might be advantage at that stage in having some alternative under examination. It was agreed that this subject could be discussed further, informally, during the Chancellor's visit to Washington in February. [Here follow 2 paragraphs of discussion on international liquidity.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 25, Europe, 2 of 2. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. 235. Memorandum of Conversation 235. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 8, 1967, 3 p.m. SUBJECT NATO Problems PARTICIPANTS Americans The Secretary Under Secretary Deming, Treasury Department Under Secretary Rostow Counselor Bowie Ambassador McGhee Assistant Secretary Leddy,EUR Mr. Fisher, ACDA Assistant Secretary McNaughton, Department of Defense Mr. Bator, White House Mr. Norwood, STR Mr. Puhan, EUR/GER Mr. Johnpoll, EUR/GER Germans Vice Chancellor Brandt Egon Bahr, FRG Foreign Office Ambassador Knappstein, FRG Embassy Minister von Lilienfeld, FRG Embassy Counselor von Staden, FRG Embassy Dr. H. Arnold, FRG Foreign Office Mr. Ruhfus, FRG Foreign Office Mr. Schultz-Boysen, FRG Embassy Mr. Weber, FRG Foreign Office Mr. Soenksen, FRG Foreign Office On NATO, the Secretary said that we feel reassured by the solidarity of the Fourteen in moving forward with integrated forces. Our own 200,000 troops on the central front are fully integrated and we have been thankful for the solidarity of the Fourteen in moving toward integration. We attach great importance to developing a common view on the nature of the threat, what we should do about the threat, and an equitable and reasonable sharing of the burden. We would be most concerned over the chain reaction from unilateral actions such as rumored reductions by the UK, Luxembourg, and Belgium. This would have an adverse effect on our own ability to meet NATO requirements; it would add to the feeling over here that Europe bases its own action on detente, but wants us to base our action on confrontation. Secretary Rusk referred to newspaper headlines which could give the false impression that Viet-Nam pre-occupies us to the exclusion of everything else. The Secretary said that he had spent his first two years in office as a “Berlin expert”, with the possibility of war with the Soviet Union always present during that period as a result of Berlin and the Cuba missile problems. The Secretary said that we are, as a Government, much occupied with NATO, East-West relations, and other major European problems. The President spends more time on these problems than on the relatively straight-forward problem in Viet-Nam. The Secretary said that we had needed advice from our friends on things we should be doing in Europe, and said that he hoped Brandt would feel free at anytime to offer us advice. Brandt reminded the Secretary that during a recent television interview for the American Broadcasting Corporation, he had been asked what he intended to take up with us in Washington; and that he had replied that one thing he did not want to do was to act like a girl who constantly has to be reassured by her boyfriend that he still loves her. Brandt said that on NATO the Federal Republic is in favor of going on with integrated forces. He said that on the British problem, the Germans will have to see what they could do to contribute to a solution; the Germans want British troops to remain both for military and political reasons. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S and M on February 17. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room. The source text is labeled “Part 4 of 10.” 236. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 236. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, February 11, 1967, 4:07 p.m. 135657. NATUS. Ref: Brussels 3873 (Notal). 2 Subject: Study on Future of the Alliance. 1. Belgian representatives Davignon and De Staercke met with Under Secretary Rostow February 10 to discuss follow-up to Ministerial resolution re study on future of the Alliance. Other participants for US were Cleveland, Bowie, Springsteen and Department staff members. Belgian Ambassador Scheyven and his staff also present. 2. Highlights, which follow, are for addressees info. Posts should take no initiative. They may draw on content this message if queried re US thinking. Matter should be handled with care, however, since Belgians are continuing to take the lead in moving ahead on this subject. 3. Discussion, purpose of which was to explore respective positions in advance of February 15 NAC session, took as point of departure latest Belgian paper (reftel). Exchange of views brought out considerable common ground between ourselves and the Belgians re (a) desirable next steps in NATO and (b) overall goals for the study. Specific subjects covered were: 4. Confirmation that NATO countries will remain in Alliance after 1969 . We agreed with Belgium's objective in seeking political recommitment to Alliance. We thought it important nevertheless to avoid raising questions of new commitments for fixed period of years or any actions requiring parliamentary ratification. US side considered more useful approach would be to have the study document the continuing long-range need for NATO in terms of purposes (e.g. achieving and maintaining East-West settlement). 5. Belgians showed much interest in this approach. They maintained however that some clear declaration is required at end of the study to strengthen hand of Alliance supporters in Belgium and other countries as 1969 approaches. Both sides recognized this point need not be raised for action at present stage although Harmel plans to refer to it in his remarks at NAC. Rostow made clear U.S. receptivity to appropriate declaration at end of study. 6. Procedure for the study . Belgians outlined their two-stage proposal envisaging broadly: (a) study on improvement of Permanent Council's work methods between now and June; (b) factual examination of international situation as it relates to the Alliance, also to be ready for June Ministerial meeting, and (c) establishment in June of open-ended group of governmental representatives. Latter would do main substantive work of defining future Alliance tasks and preparing political report for Ministerial action next December. 7. Davignon and de Staercke emphasized that, while Belgian approach partly motivated by practical considerations, chief concern is tactical. They wish to avoid frightening off any hesitant governments by introducing politically-charged questions in first stage. They are also anxious to give French as small a target as possible until the exercise is well under way. 8. Belgians would however seek to have factual examination shaped so that main political issues of concern to Alliance members would emerge logically. This they believe would make it more difficult for NATO members to refuse to go along with examination of policy issues in second or substantive stage. 9. While recognizing advantages in Belgian approach, we queried whether it is necessary or even desirable to await June Ministerial to establish substantive group. Rostow stressed importance of taking last December's Ministerial resolution 3 as firm decision committing governments to participate. He saw potential danger in requiring new Ministerial action in June to set up second group after factual examination is concluded. 10. Conclusion was that we might use February 15 meeting to try for earliest possible NAC action embracing following elements. A. Decision to implement December resolution by establishing open-ended group under Brosio's chairmanship with flexible procedures. Membership would be at level each government decided. (We would urge periodic high-level participation from capitals for at least the key countries.) B. Group would be charged with preparing factual examination of the international situation as it affects the Alliance for interim report to Ministers in June. Same body would then proceed with policy exercise to define tasks of the Alliance and procedures for carrying them out for next December's Ministerial with no break in continuity; i.e., one NAC decision now would take care of both stages in Belgian proposal. C. NAC would ask Brosio to commission an independent management study on means to improve the organization's operations. Permanent Representatives would participate in this exercise. 11. European Caucus . Belgians made clear they are still much interested in some system for consultations among European NATO members. They have decided to soft-pedal matter for the present, however, hoping arrangement will emerge naturally in course of the study. Rostow made clear that US remains sympathetic to aim of Europeans consulting together in Alliance framework. 12. Content of Study . Both sides considered it important soon to begin quiet exploration of political topics that might be considered in study's second phase. We mentioned various examples of questions involving Alliance members directly (e.g. European security problems) and issues outside Treaty area (e.g. Middle East arms and security aspects of the food crisis in Asia). Belgians several times mentioned China as illustration of problem external to NATO but which clearly concerns Europeans via impact on USSR. 13. As to method, Belgians like ourselves thought NATO might profit from McNamara Committee's experience. Instead of abstract study of procedures for improving political consultation, we would aim at series of “model” or “practice” consultations. These substantive exercises, useful in themselves, would give basis for general recommendations at end of the study. 14. In addition to improving consultation arrangements, US and Belgian participants agreed study might also embrace such other issues as strengthening NATO Parliamentarians and improving NATO information policy. 15. Summary of Brosio's paper (Paris 12187) 4 just received and therefore did not figure in talks with Belgians. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by McAuliffe and Springsteen, and approved by Eugene Rostow. 2 Telegram 3873, February 9, transmitted a translation of an aide-memoire that outlined Belgian thinking on how to proceed with the study on the future of the Alliance. (Ibid.) 3 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 379. 4 Telegram 12187, February 10, transmitted the text of PO/67/89, a tentative outline on the substance and procedure for the study of the future of the Alliance. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO) 237. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 237. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 23, 1967, 10:45 p.m. SUBJECT Agenda for Meeting of U.S. Position in Trilateral Negotiations 12:30 PM, Friday, February 24, 1967 (Messrs. Rusk, McNamara, Deming, Eugene Rostow, Bator) At Tab I is my memorandum laying out the issues. At Tab II (inside the attached book) is a long and important joint paper from Rusk, McNamara and Fowler; you will want to read it before making a final decision. At Tab III (also in the book) is McCloy's comment on the joint paper. 2 Procedure At the meeting tomorrow you might open by asking Rusk and McNamara to summarize for you the three alternatives: 1. No cut (McCloy's preference); 2. Rotation of 1 division and 3 air wings (Rusk's recommendation); 3. Rotation of 2 divisions and 6 air wings (McNamara's recommendation). You might then want to ask for comment from both Rusk and McNamara with respect to consequences for: 1. military security; 2. possible troop reduction bargain with the Russians; 3. alliance politics and our relations with the Germans; 4. balance of payments and international money; 5. the UK-German problem. My memorandum at Tab I has a section on each of these, as well as a section on the domestic political consequences. At the end of the meeting , you may or may not want to give us a decision, especially since you will have had so little time to study the papers. If you decide in favor of no cut or a cut of 1 division (Rusk), you may want to have a further talk alone with McNamara. If you decide for a 2-division cut, you may want to do the same with Rusk. In either case, it will be important for Rusk to bring McCloy over for a private session with you before your decision is absolutely final. This is important whether or not we want McCloy to continue as the U.S. negotiator. (As you know, he is ready to carry on if you decide on a 1-division cut. If you decide in favor of cutting 2, I believe he will want quietly to withdraw. If we manage that gently, I do not think his possible withdrawal should be a serious consideration in your decision.) I am sorry my Tab I memo is on the longish side. (I also apologize for the papers being this late; the joint memorandum was literally not finished and agreed on until early evening.) However, I believe this decision will cast a very long shadow on our relations with Germany and Europe, with consequences for domestic politics. It is a tough apples-or- oranges Presidential decision, on which your advisors can only give you their honest judgment and stand by for your instructions. 3 Francis M. Bator 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 17, 2/24/67 Meeting with the President. Secret. 2 None of the Tabs nor the attached book was found with the source text. A copy of Bator's 8-page memorandum is ibid. No copy of Tab II has been found. A copy of Tab III is ibid., Box 18, Trilaterals with LBJ. 3 Other than notations in the President's Daily Diary and Rusk's Appointment Books, and some indecipherable notes by Bator (ibid., Box 17, 2/24/67 Meeting with the President), no record of the meeting at noon on February 24 has been found. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 238. Letter From President Johnson to John J. McCloy 238. Letter From President Johnson to John J. McCloy 1 Washington, March 1, 1967. Dear John: In my letter of October 7, 1966, 2 I asked you to prepare for me, in connection with the Trilateral review, recommendations on measures needed to adjust the Atlantic Alliance's strategy and forces to new conditions. This you did in the report you transmitted to me under cover of your letter of November 21, 1966. 3 I have now had the benefit of the views and advice of Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Fowler. I much appreciate your readiness to continue our discussions with the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany in the forthcoming Trilateral talks and ask that you conduct these talks in accordance with the following: 1. Our general approach to the Trilateral negotiations involves three interrelated factors: —Force levels should be determined through agreement among the Allies on the basis only of security considerations, broadly construed; —Germany should decide what levels of procurement in the U.S. and Britain it wishes to undertake in order to bring its military forces up to appropriate strength levels; —Simultaneously, the Allies should deal with the remaining balance of payments consequences of allied troops stationed in Germany by cooperation in the management of monetary reserves or by other agreed means. 2. It is important for me to know (i) the results of further consultations with the FRG, the UK, and our other NATO partners on the security issues involved; (ii) UK plans for troop reductions or redeployment and the plans of other NATO governments; (iii) the proposals of the FRG with respect to balance of payments neutralization and reserve-management arrangements. It is my view that any agreements on force levels reached in the Trilateral discussions are to be considered and confirmed in NATO, to assure that the decisions will have broad Allied support. 3. Further, in order to make clear to the German government that the financial negotiations with the Bundesbank touch on matters of the greatest political and economic concern to the FRG, you should tell the Germans at a high political level that: (i) The President is determined not to jeopardize the security of the Alliance. The NATO nations cannot afford to sacrifice basic security for financial reasons. (ii) We are seeking an understanding that, just as security is a common problem which can only be solved by cooperation so are the monetary difficulties created by security efforts a common problem which can only be solved by cooperation. Allies should be willing to cooperate in both fields. (iii) In the absence of a financial solution, and especially in the light of the large German payments surplus, Congressional and public pressure would be intense, and the Germans should recognize that the situation might get out of hand. 4. Because we want to avoid a drastic cut in the BAOR, I request that you assist us in preparing for my review a discussion of the options open to us for breaking the UK-German deadlock on money in such a way as to reduce the likelihood of such a cut. I know that you will keep me and the Secretary of State informed on the course of your discussions and I can assure you that we will try to respond promptly to questions requiring decisions as the talks proceed. We are grateful for this additional public service on your part. 4 Sincerely, 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 18, Trilaterals March–April. No classification marking. Drafted by Rusk and Rostow. 2 Not found, but see footnote 2, Document 213 . 3 Document 218 . 4 These instructions were the subject of a meeting with McCloy from 10:45 to 11:40 a.m. on March 1, which also included Rostow and Bator. At the meeting, McCloy told the President that the instructions reflected a new situation, noting in particular that they contained nothing on troop cuts and seemed to focus primarily on the BAOR situation and money. (Memorandum for the Record; Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Box 18, McCloy Meeting with the President, 3/1) Later on the same day, the Department of State summarized the instructions for the Embassies in Bonn and London. (Telegram 146943 to London; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W) 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 239. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 239. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, March 6, 1967, 6:50 a.m. CAP 67110. Herewith McCloy wades into Kiesinger precisely as instructed and Kiesinger ticks off each of the painful elements in his political position, but comes out positive, in principle. The German Cabinet meeting of March 15 emerges as crucial. Subj: McCloy's meeting with Kiesinger—trilateral talks. 2 The following is a memcon, cleared by Mr. McCloy, of his and Amb McGhee's conversation with Chancellor Kiesinger March 4 at Stuttgart: The meeting had been requested with Chancellor Kiesinger to enable Mr. McCloy to report on the results of the trilateral meeting that had been held on the preceding day in London. 3 The meeting was held in the guest house of Dr. Scheufeln in Stuttgart. 1. Mr. McCloy advised the Chancellor that he had before the trilateral meeting met twice with the President in Washington. One of these meetings included the leaders of the Congress. 4 During these meetings, the question of US force levels in Europe had been fully discussed. 2. Mr. McCloy said that he first wished to make reference to the Chancellor's press conference with CDU/CSU publishers held on February 27. The original version of the conference, as received in Washington, had created a strong reaction. The President himself had been concerned at the reported remark about “complicity” between the US and USSR in putting forward the NPT. Difficulties are created when heads of government appear to be critical of each other. The President resented the implication that we had gone behind the backs of our allies or that we were attempting to substitute a US-Soviet understanding for NATO. We were doing our best to help NATO recover from the French blow. We are against massive withdrawals of troops from NATO and are doing all we can to hold the line on force levels. 3. In the meantime, there are strong domestic pressures particularly in Congress, for large-scale US troop reductions. Although these stem from a variety of motives, there is the feeling that Europe is not bearing its fair share of the burden. The President wanted him to advise Kiesinger that he wanted something as a base from which to fight to maintain the US position in Europe and would do so, provided he had some room to maneuver. If others will do something, we will not be found lagging behind. The President had recounted the substantial forces that the US had committed to the defense of Europe. He was determined that we should not endanger the future of NATO. Various of the Allies seemed to be “trampling each other” in being the first to withdraw forces. The President had asked him to assure the Chancellor that in his view decisions with respect to force levels should be made on a multilateral basis, involving NATO as a whole. They should not be determined by the financial and budgetary problems of individual countries, but rather on the basis of security. The President needed reinforcement for his position. 4. The President hoped that the Chancellor would understand his problems, just as he tried to understand Prime Minister Wilson's and the Chancellor's problems. Public disputes between the three are not helpful. The President thought his conversation with FonMin Brandt, 5 during the latter's recent visit to Washington, had revealed a desire to reach common positions and policies in a constructive way. The President had pointed out that there had been many consultations with the Germans in recent months, perhaps more than with representatives of any other country. 5. Chancellor Kiesinger interjected to say that it had not been his intention in the press conference in question to criticize the US Govt. He said that we, and he had stressed the “we” to make it clear that he meant both the US and Germany, have in recent times been mainly discussing matters in dispute between us. When he mentioned the word “complicity,” in describing the origins of the NPT, he had done so smilingly. He, moreover, immediately shifted to the words “common responsibilities”. It was understandable, in the light of their special nuclear responsibilities, that it is the US and the Soviets who must initiate such a treaty. He believed that consultations might have been started earlier; however, it was partly the fault of the Germans. The German Cabinet had known that an NPT was pending but had failed to raise the question with the US. 6. McCloy replied that, although he had not come to Germany to discuss the NPT with the Chancellor, he was, of course, deeply interested in it. He reminded Kiesinger that he is a member of the President's Disarmament Advisory Committee. The fact is that the US and the Soviet Union had been discussing an NPT for many years. There was, however, little for the US to raise with its allies until we had some evidence that there was a possible breakthrough with the Soviets. He himself had always pointed out that the US must consult with the Germans at the very first opportunity, in view of the importance that an NPT would have for Germany. Perhaps both sides had been at fault. However, he particularly deplored such emotional statements as that reportedly made by Adenauer to the effect that the NPT was the Morgenthau Plan squared. Kiesinger interjected to say that he strongly disapproved of the Adenauer statement and had told him so. 7. In returning to the discussion in the trilateral committee on force levels, Mr. McCloy said he had told the committee that he considered that the West was in a critical situation. We must stop derogating NATO. We must do something positive to reaffirm our faith in NATO. In his private discussions with British Representative Thomson and German Representative Duckwitz, he had outlined the options open to President Johnson. The President is seeking a basis for a decision on force levels. British PriMin Wilson had told McCloy that if the financial side could be covered, he would not reduce British forces at all. It is not possible, Mr. McCloy said, to separate the question of US and UK force levels. A massive withdrawal by the UK would have an important bearing on the ability of the US to maintain its troop level. Perhaps all involved could give a little to the end that there would be no withdrawals or such insignificant withdrawals that it could be taken as a renewal of faith in NATO. 8. Duckwitz had asked Thomson how many forces they would withdraw if the Germans paid no offset, to which Thomson had replied that the withdrawal would be massive, over half. Duckwitz had then asked him what the British would do if the Germans renewed their Petersberg offset offer; would they limit their withdrawals to a brigade? This Thomson said he could not agree to. There would be too large a gap. They would be forced to withdraw more. 9. McCloy had assured Thomson and Duckwitz that the US was prepared to move from its previous rather tough position on arms sales during the Erhard era. The Germans can in the future buy arms wherever they like, although we assume that they will still need some US arms and would like to know the general level of these needs. The rest of our foreign exchange losses, resulting from our troops in Germany, we hope to have neutralized through financial transactions with the Bundesbank. Thomson had pressed Duckwitz for some indication as to what the Germans would be willing to do, however Duckwitz had insisted that there would be no decision until the German Cabinet meeting on March 15. McCloy said that he had interpreted Duckwitz to imply that the Germans could accept the removal of one of the six British brigades. Thomson made it clear that the British problem was only a financial one, and that he hoped it would be necessary to remove no more than a brigade. 10. Thomson said that there was little the British could accept in terms of financial neutralization. Their short-term indebtedness was too great. They might, however, be able to offset a portion of their foreign exchange costs in this way. He asked McCloy why the US could not let Germany spend some of their US credits for arms purchases in the UK. McCloy had replied that he did not consider this possible, because German advances had already been incorporated into the US balance of payments and allocated against necessary procurement plans. 11. McCloy said that the US would like to know what the Germans can do, both with respect to the US and UK offset payments. The US is in a difficult position, because the UK had accused us of delaying the resolution of this problem by our proposal for the trilateral talks. He knew of the independent position of the Bundesbank, but he hoped that the Chancellor would use such influence as he has to assure that the Bundesbank cooperated in some type of financial neutralization of our foreign exchange losses. The UK can not hold the line much longer. The US President is under great pressure from the Congress, however, he can hold the line if given some significant support from our allies in Europe. He hoped that progress could be made in the next trilateral meeting scheduled for March 20. In conclusion McCloy said that the President has asked him to tell the Chancellor that he should not hesitate to take up with him directly, any matter arising out of our relations that troubles him. 12. In response, Kiesinger said his experts had advised him that the British were determined to reduce “massively” in any case. This impression had been confirmed to some degree by the statements made by Wilson during his Bonn visit when he referred to the necessity of a “surgical operation,” after which he trusted there would be no hard feelings. The British White Paper on defense had also seemed to point to this. Moreover, they had been hearing US rumors to the effect that McNamara was bent on reducing forces substantially and there was always the threat of the Mansfield resolution. 13. This was one aspect of the situation. Another was the fact that German finances were in a “miserable mess”. The Minister of Defense had told him that there was really very little of value to the FRG in the way of military equipment which the UK had or could readily produce. The FRG had in October suggested the Petersberg compromise of some 350 million DM, plus some possible additional amounts. The new government had, however, found there was no money—Strauss insisting that there was none at his disposal. The combination of all these factors presented great difficulties. He hoped that decisions could be made at the Cabinet meeting scheduled for the middle of March. Kiesinger said that the position McCloy had taken in London had been very helpful, and that he would “try to find a way”. 14. Kiesinger then said that he hoped the President would understand how his use of the term “complicity” had been completely misinterpreted. He referred to the attempts he had made to correct the misimpression that the first reports of his talk had made. Amb McGhee intervened to say that he had cabled to Washington, pointing out the series of steps the Chancellor had taken to put the proper interpretation on his statement. Kiesinger said he fully understood and applauded the objective of reducing tensions on the East-West issue 15. The furthest thing from his mind had been to suggest that the US had any ill purpose in relation to Germany in seeking a non-proliferation agreement. There were a number of motivations behind the proposed agreement. From the point of view of the US, he was certain the purpose was to avoid atomic war and the dangers inherent in the indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear weapons. He recognized the “special relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union which their responsibilities as the world's greatest nuclear powers imposed upon them”, yet he was quite certain that the Soviet Union had other motivations than those of the US. Fundamentally, the Soviet Union wished to keep Germany down, and he felt that the purpose of the agreement was directed primarily against Germany. 16. He wished that Brandt, when in Washington, could have discussed with the American authorities the real motives and rationale of the US in regard to the agreement, particularly in the light of Soviet motivations. Brandt had not developed this concern of Germany. Kiesinger felt it would have been much better if this fundamental question of policy could have been discussed and weighed before the matter had been taken up with the Soviets. The matter involved fundamental policy of vital concern to Germany, and he would have wished that the reasoning behind the agreement and our putting it forward at this particular time with an expression of the need for haste could have been better explained. There was a real international policy issue involved. He did not, however, place the full blame on the US for the manner in which the question had been raised. Everyone knew that a desire to reach a non-proliferation agreement was prevalent, and there had been indications that approaches were probably being made by the US to the Soviet Union. This should have been enough to prompt the Erhard govt to raise the matter at an early date with the US Govt, instead it had been allowed to come to a head at a particularly unfortunate time. Kiesinger thought that, in this respect, both of us were to blame. The matter had been blown up into a real political issue in Germany. Even such a devoted pro-American as Birrenbach had been greatly disturbed about it. If it had been handled differently, public opinion could have been better prepared and a better understanding of the motivation of the US could have been achieved. 17. Kiesinger emphasized his deep concern for the welfare of the Alliance. “I want to strengthen NATO.” In response to De Gaulle's efforts to induce him to take steps to weaken NATO, he had told him very clearly that it was firm German policy to maintain and strengthen NATO. He had told De Gaulle that he must understand this. There was a rising feeling, however, in Germany, that something had “gone wrong” with the former pattern of good relations between the US and Germany. This was accompanied by a feeling that NATO was in danger of developing into a sort of “shell with no real spirit left in it.” There were elements in the NPD Party attempting to exploit an anti-American feeling. This was an utterly new development in German politics in the postwar period. He did not believe the move would succeed and did not attach too great importance to it, but for the first time in the history of the FRG there had been a public outcry against a proposal put forward by our US allies. 18. There had been some indication that the NPD had been losing ground in Hesse and Bavaria since the elections, but he could not say that in future elections the NPD might not have some measure of success. Adenauer had done harm to US-German relations by his likening the non-proliferation agreement to the Morgenthau Plan squared, as had van de Gruben by likening it to Versailles. Kiesinger had received a letter from Adenauer complaining about the agreement, to which he had replied very strongly. Yet there was no doubt that some damage had been done. The non-proliferation situation, coming on top of the question of offsets and the fall of Erhard after his unfortunate Washington visit, had constituted the last drop which made the barrel overflow, at a particularly difficult period in the life of the new government. 19. We must realize, Kiesinger said, that it was one thing for Germany to declare among its allies that it renounced the manufacture of atomic weapons, but quite another thing to ask Germany to enter into a binding agreement with its major adversary, limiting even further its capabilities in the nuclear field. This took more doing, and public opinion should be prepared for it. The brutal statement of Kosygin in London to the effect that Germans had to take the agreement and like it, added fuel to the flames. (Kiesinger had taken pains to obtain the exact text of Kosygin's statement and the actual text was even harsher than that reported.) The argument that it was all intended to keep countries like Israel and India from getting the bomb was not particularly convincing to the German people, when they all understood the Soviet motivation behind the agreement. 20. Even though no lesser a man than Adenauer had called the agreement a Morgenthau Plan, Kiesinger did not despair of reaching an acceptable text and he added, “I think we can come to agreement.” Apropos of his relations with France, we wanted to dispel the idea that either he or Germany was hypnotized by De Gaulle “like a rabbit by a snake.” They did seek to pursue a continential policy of a constructive character, but without in any way separating themselves from their overseas allies. He used the expression that he was “constantly attempting to keep France from going sour.” 21. He fully realized the need for “allied heads of state” to refrain from criticizing each other or their government's policies in public, but when Kosygin made his attack on Germany from British soil not one word was said in public repudiation of it. The only statesman in Europe who had responded to such attacks from allied soil (in this case by Podgorny) was Saragat. We can be sure that if anyone from the other side made any such statements from German soil against the US or any other ally, Kiesinger would immediately and emphatically denounce it. McCloy referred to his statement in London to the effect that he deplored the fact that no replies had been made by allied host countries, when attacks had been made from their soil on another ally. Kiesinger repeated that it was his wish to reclarify the whole atmosphere, and to this he would apply his best efforts. 22. Kiesinger also referred to the recent British statement regarding the Oder-Neisse line, presumably by FonMin Brown, and to a statement made to Kiesinger by Wilson on his recent visit to Bonn. Wilson had said that he felt British-Russian relations had reached a high water mark, when he had indicated to the Soviets that he was in favor of the Oder-Neisse line. We must realize how difficult it was for any German leader to acquiesce in any such sentiment. Perhaps this might be dealt with at some future time in a new context, but any German who now publicly accepted the Oder-Neisse line would have a “terrible record” with the German people. When Mr. McCloy referred to the fact that he had once advocated the acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line in return for reunification and free elections, Kiesinger replied that he had recalled this and he sometimes had “sleepless nights” wondering how he would handle such a proposal as this if it came up. 23. Kiesinger also said that he wanted to dissociate himself completely from any criticism cast against the US, or against NATO, on the ground that neither had done anything to bring about German reunification. This was totally unfair and the failure of reunification was certainly no fault of the allies, and particularly not of the US. Kiesinger stated that he had the feeling that Germany's attitude toward its allies had not been made as clear as it might have been, and in this respect he referred to Wilson's anxiety to have the FRG bring heavy and extensive pressure on De Gaulle to force acceptance of British entry into the Common Market. Germany was most anxious to have the British come in, but he felt that heavy pressure from Germany in the form of a demand on France would not be conducive toward achieving the desired result. This does not mean, however, that they were lukewarm on this issue. 24. Mr. McCloy asked what attitude he might take if the US reduced its forces by one division, with rotation, emphasizing that the President had made no decision whatever in regard to force levels and that he was asking solely for his own information. Kiesinger replied that it was an interesting suggestion, but that he was not a military man and could not say what effect it might have. He would be prepared to give more consideration to the suggestion if the question ever came up. 25. Mr. McCloy concluded by saying that, although our position was not to insist on specific agreements in regard to military offsets, we would have a very hard time of it if, as Strauss had suggested, Germany might commence the purchase of military equipment in France. This would have the effect of reducing our offsets in favor of France, whose troops in Germany were now uncommitted to NATO, while ours were, and while the major deterrent in support of German security lies overwhelmingly with the US. Kiesinger replied that this was not being seriously contemplated. Some suggestion had been made that this might be possible in the 70's, but no such moves were now in prospect. Comment: Kiesinger gave the impression of sincerity and real friendship for the US throughout the talk. He seemed to have a full awareness of the President's difficult position, and the fact that the President needed to gain all the information he could before he could make a final decision. Kiesinger said that he would do his best to cooperate. He asked particularly that McCloy convey his regards and good wishes to the President. McGhee. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, General, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 9:25 a.m. 2 From this point, the telegram is a copy of telegram 10266 from Bonn, March 5. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W) 3 McCloy reported on his talks with Thomson and Duckwitz on March 3 and 4 in telegrams 7113 and 7117 from London, March 3 and 4, respectively. (Ibid.) 4 No record of this meeting has been found. 5 No record of this meeting has been found. 240. Record of Meeting 240. Record of Meeting 1 Washington, March 8, 1967, 12:45 p.m. RECORD OF PRESIDENT'S MARCH 8 MEETING WITH MESSRS. RUSK, McNAMARA, FOWLER, McCLOY, WALT ROSTOW, AND BATOR McCloy reported on the status of the trilateral negotiations. He said the main problem was the UK-German gap. The UK was prepared to take less than a 100 percent offset and would accept some financial neutralization. However, there was still a $40 million shortfall between the UK's demand and the FRG's offer. Kiesinger would have his critical Cabinet meeting on March 15. Ambassador Duckwitz had suggested that a letter from the President to Kiesinger before this meeting could have an important effect in getting the Germans to improve their offer. McCloy said there were two issues: (1) what we were prepared to do on our force levels in Germany, and (2) what, if anything, we were prepared to do to help close the $40 million gap. The President asked for Secretary McNamara's view on the second issue. Secretary McNamara replied that he did not favor the US picking up any of the gap. Secretary Fowler agreed. The President asked if a deal could be worked out on the following lines: —the US to cut one division; —the UK to cut only one brigade; —the Germans and British to split the $40 million gap. McCloy said that the last of these would not work; it would be necessary for US to pick up some of the $40 million shortfall. He thought we could do this by rotating some of our air wings to the UK instead of to the US. The President instructed his advisers to get together and work out the figures on the $40 million gap, suggesting ways in which the US could help bridge part of it. He emphasized that he would not agree to having the US fill the entire $40 million gap. 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security Council Histories, Trilateral Negotiations, Book 2. Secret. The time of the meeting is derived from two memoranda by Bator: one to the President at 9:45 a.m. on March 8, in which Bator noted that this could be a “crucial” meeting and asked how it should be organized, and a second at 10:45 a.m., which outlined the issues as summarized by McCloy here. (Both ibid.) 2 The President met again with his advisers at 4:15 p.m. on March 9. No record of this meeting has been found, but Bator prepared a memorandum for the President saying that he was working on a list of ways the $40 million gap could be filled, but that it would require real U.S. money. (Ibid.) 241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, March 11, 1967, 12:03 a.m. 153411. For the Ambassador. Please deliver following message immediately from President to Chancellor Kiesinger. Follow form and style discussed in Leddy-Hillenbrand telecon. 2 Signed original will be delivered Ambassador Knappstein ASAP. Text follows: “Dear Mr. Chancellor: I very much appreciate the thoughts you expressed to Ambassador McGhee on February 22. The warm friendship between our two countries is a source of great strength, not only for our own peoples but for the entire world community. I want you to know that this Government will extend every effort to maintain a close and confident working relation with you and your associates. I want to thank you for receiving John McCloy, who has given me a full report of his good talk with you. And thank you also for your kind greetings. The enterprise in which Messrs. McCloy, Duckwitz and Thomson are engaged is of great importance to the future of the Atlantic Community we have all worked so hard to fashion. It comes at a time when many NATO members are under strong political and economic pressures which could jeopardize the broad objectives of the Atlantic Alliance. I am strongly of the opinion that NATO troop deployments and other security arrangements should only be altered when and if the security situation permits. I hope that each of us will put first things first, and not allow the growth and consolidation of a strong Atlantic Community to be damaged by excessive concern with our own short-term difficulties in disregard of the broader common interest. This is why the United States position in the trilateral talks has rested on the three interrelated principles which Mr. McCloy has already discussed with you: First , the level of forces in Europe should be determined by agreement among the Allies on the basis only of security considerations, broadly construed. Second , it is for the German Government to decide what military procurement it wishes to undertake in the light of its commitments to the Alliance. Third , the Allies should deal at the same time with the remaining problem of neutralizing the foreign exchange consequences of troop presence in Germany by cooperation in the management of monetary reserves and other financial arrangements. We recognize that the simple offset concept—an advance agreement for military purchases of prescribed amounts to offset the foreign exchange costs of U.S. troops in Germany—can be superseded by arrangements appropriate to the full range of military and financial relations which form the solid core of the Atlantic Community. It is our strong hope that all of us will be able to move toward a new basis of continuing financial cooperation which will both strengthen the international monetary system and provide a firmer foundation for the troop deployments essential to mutual security. I am encouraged in this respect by the results of preliminary talks between our representatives and those of the Bundesbank. As you know, the arrangements between the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom regarding the BAOR are also closely related to the constructive handling of our own problem. A major BAOR cut at this time would have damaging consequences for the security of us all. Because of the especially difficult economic circumstances of the U.K., arrangements on the U.S.-F.R.G. pattern would be inadequate. German purchases inevitably play a greater role. In review of your own budgetary problem, your willingness to try to find ways to deal with the British problem is a real contribution to Alliance solidarity. With imaginative efforts all around, I feel we can jointly work out a constructive solution. Mr. McCloy will be communicating our ideas in more detail to Messrs. Duckwitz and Thomson. Mr. McCloy will also be discussing our views on the question of force levels and deployments. I know you appreciate that I am under great pressure from the Congress and public opinion to reduce our forces in Europe substantially. Some have urged a withdrawal of two divisions and others even more. I am myself determined to hold the line against any steps which would significantly weaken NATO. I am convinced that a limited rotational plan, which Mr. McCloy will explain, can satisfy NATO's security requirements. This, together with a maximum effort by our NATO Allies and a successful outcome of the trilateral talks over-all will greatly help me in handling the pressures here at home. A second matter is the problem of international liquidity and the current negotiations in the IMF and the Group of Ten. Rapid progress is needed this spring and summer to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. Specifically, we believe that, by the September meetings of the Bank and Fund, there should be agreement on a contingency plan for the creation of new reserves. We intend to press for such agreement even in the face of some resistance on the part of a few countries. With so much at stake, I hope we can count on your support. Finally, I would like to mention the question of a non-proliferation treaty. You may be certain that we are examining your comments on the draft text of a treaty with utmost care. As Secretary Rusk assured Vice-Chancellor Brandt, the current draft has not been agreed upon with the Soviet Union, but only reflects our explorations regarding a possible basis of agreement. We have made quite clear to the Soviets our intention to consult with our Allies before reaching any agreement. We intend that these consultations be thorough and are prepared to take the necessary time for the purpose. I hope that the talks which Ambassador Foster has had with your government have been useful in advancing us toward a common viewpoint. You can rest assured that we will make every effort to work out formulas which the Federal Republic and our other Allies will find acceptable. I know that the non-proliferation issue poses difficult problems for you. However, in my judgment, an equitable treaty would be a most important step toward the larger goal of bringing all nuclear weapons under effective control. In the terms in which you expressed your concern to Ambassador Foster, I think the treaty is indeed imbedded in the common interest of our two nations. Mr. Chancellor, I hope this letter will be the first of many communications between the two of us. The strong bonds between the United States and the Federal Republic have linked our countries in a broad spectrum of important and complex endeavors. I consider it of great importance that we maintain a frank and open correspondence through which we can exchange views, impressions, and ideas. In particular, I very much hope that your schedule will permit a meeting with each other on a not too distant date. I know that your burdens are heavy and your time limited, but I hope that we may be able to find agreement on the date, time and place. Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending our warmest greetings and best wishes to you and your family. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson“ Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy and cleared by Bator. 2 No record of this telephone conversation has been found. 242. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and John J. McCloy 242. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and John J. McCloy 1 Washington, March 15, 1967. John McCloy called at 8:30 a.m. today with the following report. 2 1. The British reversed their previous position and accepted ₤7 million additional being spent by the U.S. as a result of transfers from France. 2. They did not accept F–111 acceleration. 3. They accepted ₤6 million of the ₤12.5 from the old deal as a contribution to closing the gap. 4. They are prepared to settle for an additional ₤5–7 million as opposed to the old ₤14–15 million figure. 5. McCloy feels we should act quickly to meet this and to meet it on the high side; that is, at ₤7 million rather than ₤5 million. The balance the British are prepared to swallow via neutralization and slippage. 6. McCloy agreed that, aside from the Germans deciding today to go to ₤41 million, the critical issue is to drive forward now: —To put the whole deal back into NATO context; and —To find a longer term basis for neutralization arrangements, including expanded German military and other purchases in the U.K. 7. In talking with Duckwitz McCloy made it clear that the deal involved: —German generosity to the British; —A British cut of not more than one brigade; —A U. S. rotation of not more than one division. 8. McCloy believes that we have come to a good moment because the Germans are realizing there is not much to be gotten from Paris and the process of opening up to the East will be slow. Therefore, they probably are more ready than even a few weeks ago to think of tightening up the West as a basis for their policy. The outcome of the French election may have helped marginally. 9. As for means of meeting the British gap of, say, ₤7 million, McCloy feels that whether it comes from additional U.S. military expenditures in Britain or from some of the German funds already committed here is a matter of indifference. He does believe, however, we should move promptly. 10. Finally, McCloy noted that the European press is beginning to talk intelligently for the first time about the problem; that is, saying what NATO needs is a foreign exchange neutralization plan rather than a military offset plan; and it needs this on a long term basis. WR 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. 2 McCloy reported separately on the resumed talks in telegram 7391 from London, March 14. (Ibid., DEF 1 EUR W) 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, March 21, 1967, 9:59 a.m. 159094. NATUS. Subject: Trilateral Meeting, March 21. 1. Trilateral March 20 meeting was taken up with statement by German Principal on decisions affecting UK offset which were taken by March 15 meeting of German cabinet, and by response of British Principal setting forth UK position in light of these decisions. 2. Duckwitz (FRG) read prepared statement that, in light of March 15 FRG cabinet meeting, he was authorized to propose following as Germany offset contribution to UK for British 1967–1968 fiscal year: (a) FRG undertakes to make DM 200 million available for military procurement and services in UK, of which DM 50 million would be placed by end December 1967, and balance by end March 1968 if necessary through prepayment; (b) German public purchases in UK during same period of “at least” DM 200 million, which FRG would endeavor to increase if possible; and (c) foregoing offers are based on FRG assumption that UK forces in FRG would remain at about present level during British 1967–1968 fiscal year. Duckwitz also noted cabinet action to approve Bundesbank-Federal Reserve bond purchasing arrangement. 3. Duckwitz's statement continued with following observations on force levels: (a) FRG shares US view that force levels in Europe should be based on security considerations only; (b) FRG regards current force levels in Central Region as “about adequate but are also necessary to ensure the security of the NATO area in accordance with principles” of the Trilateral Minute of November 10 on conventional forces; 2 (c) FRG believes that a force withdrawal could be justified only if there were changes in present strategic situation, primarily as result of Warsaw Pact withdrawals from Eastern Europe including East Germany; (d) FRG view that withdrawals or redeployments can have important political impact on the Alliance; and (e) results of Trilateral Talks should be put into NATO force planning forum and reflected in NATO five-year force plan to be adopted by Defense Planning Committee next December. 3. Thomson (UK) welcomed FRG cabinet decisions which he noted have effect of restoring FRG offer of last October, but pointed out that even so there remains a gap of 15–17 million pounds in covering BOP costs of British forces in FRG now running at 82 million pounds annually after taking into account recently achieved administrative economies. He said HMG could not accept this gap without some force reductions. If FRG could agree to following “conditions,” HMG could limit its reduction in relation to 1967–1968 fiscal year (April 1, 1967–March 31, 1968) to one brigade group, with implementation not to begin prior to January 1, 1968: (a) achievement of some progress in British-FRG discussions now under way in Frankfurt for a bond purchasing arrangement similar to US–FRG arrangement; (b) joint undertaking by FRG and UK to exert their best efforts to achieve an additional German contribution of DM 50–100 million, through use for German commercial purchases of FRG funds now on deposit in UK, and through FRG encouragement of German civil public purchases; (c) FRG and US support of British approaches to WEU and NATO for relief from present UK obligation on maintaining forces on Continent; Thomson stressed HMG view it would be appropriate to use this occasion to relieve UK altogether from its unique and unilateral treaty obligation; and (d) possibility of further British withdrawals in fiscal year 1968–1969 would be judged in light of offset arrangements achieved for that year. 4. McCloy (US) recalled USG desire to base force levels on security needs alone, and expressed dismay at prospect that, if this not done, Trilateral Talks would have achieved only transitory results. He, therefore, considered inappropriate approaches to force levels couched in terms of “conditions.” 5. Duckwitz questioned Thomson's figure of 82 million pounds for current BOP costs of British forces in Germany. He thought amount should be 75 million pounds, to accord with amount cited in DM in joint communique issued last October at close of British-German Ministerial Commission on offset. Figgures of British Treasury pointed out latter amount as used in communique had included proposed saving of 7–8 million pounds which HMG had in mind making through reductions in logistical stocks but had “adjourned” in response to Allied reactions. 6. Thomson pressed Duckwitz for early reaction to British position he had stated. Duckwitz and Harkort were reluctant to respond at this meeting but seemed indicate readiness to consider recording in public joint statement British-German willingness to make best efforts towards maximizing German purchases in UK at levels higher than cabinet approved offers. Duckwitz wished be assured, which Thomson did, that FRG would not be held accountable for any shortfalls between targets cited in such joint statement and cabinet approved undertakings. 7. Principals agreed that Report on “Reinforcement of Central Europe in an Emergency” resulting from March 15–16 meeting of Working Group II, should be conveyed to Brosio for attention of NATO force planners. However, they agreed that Brosio should not give force planners Part B of that paper, concerning “Military Factors Involved in Any East-West Force Reduction,” inasmuch as latter part is preliminary only. Further, they agreed Brosio should be asked to respond to queries from other NATO members re Trilateral consideration of latter subject to effect that nothing in depth had yet emerged and hence there is nothing to report. 8. Talks to resume morning of March 21. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR W. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Michael R. Gannett and approved by McAuliffe. Also sent to London and Paris. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 244. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, March 30, 1967, 1233Z. 11427. Vipto 23. Pass White House for the President. Subj: Vice President's visit: March 29 meeting with Brandt—European relations. 2 (Following is approved record of conversation) 1. Vice President said that Europe had changed a great deal in the past few years, but one thing that had not changed was strong U.S. support of European unity. What we sought was a full and equal partner, working in concert with U.S. 2. President had told him before leaving Washington, Vice President said, that he was authorized to say that (1) President was ready to meet his full NATO commitment if others did, and (2) that he looked with strong favor on developing political and economic unity in Europe. Vice President called attention to his own March 5 speech at Fulton, Missouri, in which he said that Atlantic cohesion remained a necessity. The building of a strong and positive Alliance did not preclude better East-West relations; it was a necessity for them. The U.S. also looked with favor upon a closer French-German association. Friendship between France and Germany was vital to a better and stronger Europe. There was nothing wrong with such an association between nations so long as it did not become separatist and inward. 3. Brandt agreed with this. He said that there were two sure talking lines which would bring enthusiasm from the German people: one of them was the need for peace with the East; the other was the need for French-German reconciliation. Such reconciliation, he said, was not a matter of governments. Even bad governments would not be able to destroy it. It was an expression of desire of French and German peoples. It was not a matter of choosing between France and United States. France must always remain a friend. The United States would always remain Germany's strongest and most important partner. 4. Our interest in Europe is what it was and more, the Vice President said. Our task now is to consult and work even more closely together. Brandt suggested that Vice President mention to Chancellor Kiesinger the President's assurances re NATO and European unity. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Vice President Humphrey visited Europe March 28–April 8. A complete set of the reporting telegrams and memoranda of his conversations is ibid. 245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, April 6, 1967, 4:13 p.m. 168946. NATUS. Joint State/Defense Message. Subj: NATO Consultation. Ref: (a) Paris 14574; (b) Paris 14402. 2 1. This message deals first with question of French participation in NATO consultation and second with further study of consultation and procedures. 2. We believe that regardless of how one divides stages of phases of consultation, general approach should be to encourage as much French participation in consultation as possible. We concur your view that any attempt get French to accept Athens Guidelines or other arrangements made in NPG/NDAC would be exercise in futility and might cause French and Fourteen unnecessary headaches. There should be clear understanding among Fourteen that France would not be allowed to inhibit discussions or decision-making at any point in time of consultation cycle. Should France have different views from its Allies, the Fourteen could note them and go on with the task at hand. 3. This policy could also be applied to French participation in studies on procedures for consultation. France could participate in studies to the extent it desired but would not be allowed to impede the progress of such studies. This of course implies NAC as venue for studies, but we believe that Fourteen should first develop an agreed position on dealing with possible French obstruction, e.g., be prepared if French obstructionism develops to move studies back to DPC 4. We believe that it would be sufficient for Fourteen to reach agreement on this general approach without further elaboration and without asking the French for any assurances that they will not attempt to inhibit such consultation. 5. Foregoing comments should not be interpreted as disagreement with your procedural suggestion in para 8 of Paris 14402. We agree that major effort should be to: (1) make concrete improvements in Alliance's consultation capability, and (2) utilize this capability more fully. We also agree that prolonged study of consultation in the abstract is not very promising. However, we understand some other Allies and Brosio value such studies more highly than does the US. We do not wish to create impression by taking strong stand against further studies that US either lukewarm about consultation or reneging on Ministerial commitment. We, therefore, agree that if strong sentiment develops for pursuing study tasks set forth in DPC/D(66)32 3 further, US should acquiesce. 6. We recall that Ministerial decision on follow-up studies was that DPC in permanent session would decide which body should carry out these studies (para 1C Paris 9137). 4 We believe such studies could be undertaken by either NAC or the DPC. Where subject matter is appropriate, NPG or NDAC could take cognizance. Specifically, NPG is charged with developing plans and procedures for reaching crisis decisions involving potential or actual use of nuclear weapons (e.g., host country consultation). Other studies should attempt not to duplicate this effort. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 8–2. Secret. Drafted by Getz and Palmer, cleared by OSD/ISA and EUR, and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Telegram 14574, March 21, reported a discussion of consultation among the Fourteen. Telegram 14402, March 18, summarized Brosio's views on consultation with France. (Both ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 Telegram 9137, December 15, 1966, summarized a session of the DPC on December 14. (Ibid., NATO 3 FR(PA)) 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, April 7, 1967, 4:13 p.m. 170596. NATUS. Subject: Nuclear Planning Group, April 7, Agreed Minute. 2 1. At their first meeting, Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group considered matters related to: (a) Strategic nuclear forces—including Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABMs). (b) Tactical Nuclear Forces—including Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs). (c) The role of Host Countries in the planning, storage and release for use of nuclear weapons. Strategic Nuclear Forces. 2. The Ministers reviewed the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, and examined the present and prospective increases in the rate of deployment of Soviet ICBMs that had become apparent since the discussion in the Nuclear Planning Working Group in Washington in February 1966. They agreed that the existing and programmed strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance remain adequate for deterrence of large-scale attack by the Soviet Union. They noted further that there appears to be no way to prevent unacceptable damage to the West from a general nuclear exchange. Anti-Ballistic Missiles. 3. On the basis of a detailed US briefing on anti-ballistic missiles, the Ministers concluded that, just as the US can be expected to react to ABM deployments in the Soviet Union by improvements in offensive missile forces, the Soviets could be expected to react similarly to ABM deployments in the West. This would greatly increase defense expenditures on both sides without improving the security of either, thus casting serious doubt on the value of ABM deployments against large-scale attack. In this connection, the Ministers expressed their appreciation of the willingness of the United States Government to consult closely in NATO with its Allies. They agreed on the importance of the proposed US discussions with the USSR in an effort to avoid escalation of the strategic arms race. 4. The Ministers asked the Permanent Representatives to study, with the assistance of the NATO military authorities, the implications of anti-ballistic missiles for the NATO Allies of the United States. Specifically, the study should consider the political and military consequences of: (a) No deployment of ABMs by NATO countries; (b) Deployment of ABMs in the US only; and (c) Deployment of ABMs both in North America and Europe. Tactical Nuclear Forces. 5. The Ministers also reviewed the conclusions on tactical nuclear forces reached by the Nuclear Planning Working Group at its meeting in London on 28th/29th April, 1966. They discussed a paper regarding these conclusions submitted by Italy and a paper submitted by Turkey on the use of Atomic Demolition Munitions on the South-Eastern flank. They accepted that tactical nuclear weapons available to SACEUR and SACLANT appear to be sufficient in quantity, but felt that both the mix of weapons and the circumstances in which they might be used required further detailed study. 6. In considering the role of tactical nuclear weapons the Ministers concluded that they constitute an essential element in a policy of deterrence by the threat of escalation. Since the advantages to the Alliance of initiating the use of tactical nuclear weapons would vary according to the terrain and the circumstances, Ministers stressed the importance of developing practical plans for the possible use of such weapons in particular circumstances in various areas of Allied Command Europe. Plans of this kind are particularly important since uncertainties, including the question of possible Soviet responses, make it difficult to predict when it would be of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to an aggression less than general war. 7. The Ministers felt that developments since SACEUR's Scheduled Program was originally prepared have made it desirable to reexamine it as a basis for threatre nuclear operations. They propose to work toward the development of theatre plans for the most effective use of nuclear forces, with special reference to air forces capable of performing both conventional support and nuclear strike functions. 8. Ministers agreed to the following further studies relative to the use of tactical nuclear weapons (including very low yield weapons) in the Center as well as in the South. (a) Studies, including consideration of political and military factors, of the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in various contingencies (1) in the Central Region and (2) in the Southern Region; such studies should include the use of war-games techniques. (b) Based on such studies, development with the Military Committee and SACEUR of a concept for the use of theatre nuclear weapons, within which military commanders would develop detailed plans for the employment of such weapons for deterrence and defense in various contingencies. (c) Development by the Military Committee and SACEUR for NPG consideration of plans for Atomic Demolition Munitions both in the Central and Southeastern regions of Allied Command Europe. (In view of the special features of ADMs, Ministers agreed that the studies to be undertaken on their possible use and on possible special release procedures should be carried out separately from those on the use of other tactical nuclear weapons.) Role of Host Countries. 9. The Ministers considered a paper by the Federal Republic of Germany on the role of host countries with respect to planning, storage, and release of nuclear weapons. They agreed that: (a) There should be more effective arrangements for national participation in military nuclear planning. The Secretary General will arrange, with the assistance of the Military Committee, to present to the Nuclear Planning Group a proposal to make such participation possible. (b) Host countries should have adequate information concerning the stockpiling of weapons in their territory. The Federal Republic and other interested countries were asked to specify the kinds of information they would require on this subject. (c) On arrangements for release of nuclear weapons, the Ministers asked their Permanent Representatives to consider possible types of arrangements and report back at a later meeting. Next Meeting. 10. Ministers agreed that the next Ministerial Meeting should take place in Ankara in September 1967. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Newlin, cleared by Baker, and approved by McAuliffe. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 For text of the communique of this April 6–7 meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 285–286. 247. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Secretary Brown 247. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Secretary Brown 1 Washington, April 18, 1967, 8 a.m. SUBJECT UK Entry into EEC The Foreign Secretary said that the British Cabinet will probably take a positive decision in about the next two weeks to apply for British entry into the Europe Economic Communities. The debates in the Parliamentary Party so far have gone much better than had been hoped. There was a larger majority in the Parliamentary Party in favor of entry than in the Cabinet. There is no real political problem about this and the House of Commons will certainly approve. The British would like to take their Cabinet decision about May 4. They will have to announce it publicly and would aim for Parliamentary debate straight away. Immediately after the Parliamentary debate they would submit their application to the EEC. Since vacations begin in July the British must apply by May in order to accomplish something before the vacation period. The House recesses on the 12th of May for two weeks. Brown will be in Moscow the last week of the recess and then immediately after his return Prime Minister Wilson goes to Canada for Expo '67. Unless they take their decision the week before the recess the application would not get in before June and after the Rome EEC Summit Meeting, a situation the British wish to avoid. If the Kennedy Round is not out of the way the British could wait until May 8 at the latest. They wondered whether submitting their application while the Kennedy Round is still in process might give the French a handle to create difficulties and possibly torpedo the KR. The British don't think so but would like to check with us. Mr. Leddy thought that coming so close to the end of the KR it seemed unlikely the British application would affect it adversely. However, he asked for time to check this point with others and promised to get a message to the Foreign Secretary before his departure. (After discussing the question with Assistant Secretary Solomon and Mr. Bator of the White House Mr. Leddy informed Ambassador Dean that we hoped the UK would target for May 8 rather than May 4; that at the moment the KR was in a state of semi-crisis; and that he thought it might be a good idea for the UK to take another look at the status of the KR about May 1 and talk with us again to see whether there was likely to be any problem.) The Secretary asked whether there was anything we could do to help the British. We had been remaining quiet because we felt that any open support by us would simply be counter-productive. The Foreign Secretary said, “not now,” but later perhaps we could help to stiffen the Germans a bit. Some of the Germans are so desirous of re-creating Franco-German amity on the basis of the '63 treaty that they may need a little bolstering at the right moment. Contrary to press reports the Germans have not urged or suggested to the British any delay in their application. In response to a question, the Foreign Secretary said the British were preparing a short, simple and clean application. There will be no conditions in the application but these will be made clear in a statement to be made in the House of Commons after the British Cabinet decision. He did not believe these “conditions” would provide the General with a basis for exercising another veto. While there are divided opinions in Britain on this question the majority of British officials believe that the General will not be able to veto their application either at the beginning or during the course of the negotiations but that the French will try to stall and protract the negotiations as long as possible. The Foreign Secretary said that at his last meeting with General de Gaulle he had the impression the General was very uncomfortable about France's isolated position on this question. The Secretary said that if the US could help at any time that the British should let us know. He suggested that in the statement to the House of Commons a word other than “conditions” might be used (the Foreign Secretary agreed). He expressed the hope that when the British got into Europe they would do something to end Europe's isolation from the rest of the world. Europe's attitude seemed to be one of exclusive concern with their own problems and indifference with respect to everything else. He had tried to stimulate NATO's interest in the Middle East and Africa, which were right next door to Europe, but to no avail. The Foreign Secretary said that the British have this very much in mind but that obviously for the moment they were not going to advertise it. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Leddy. The conversation was held in Rusk's dining room. 248. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator Mike Mansfield 248. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator Mike Mansfield 1 Washington, April 21, 1967. Dear Senator Mansfield: The attached memorandum contains replies to the questions raised in your letter to me on April 14, 1967. 2 As you know, I shall be out of the country on April 26. I have therefore asked Mr. Katzenbach to represent the Department of State at the hearing. In replying to your questions, I should like to make an introductory comment on allied force levels in Europe. I start with the premise that our forces should be stationed abroad only for reasons of national security, and that they should be withdrawn only if considerations of security justify such a move. In this connection we should keep in mind that all troop withdrawals are politically sensitive signals, and their significance can be misconstrued. The national interests of the United States continue to require a strong Atlantic Alliance, and a strong and balanced NATO force under integrated command in Europe. It would be unthinkable for us to risk the loss of Western Europe, or the loss of its independence. While the deterrent strength of NATO, and the pressure of events in the Far East, have led the Soviet Union to pursue a relatively mild course in Europe since 1962, the military strength of the Warsaw Pact Powers deployed in Eastern Europe is formidable, and rising. We can hope that the Soviet Union has come to accept the principle, at least for Europe, that unilateral change by force in the frontiers of the two systems is a danger to world peace. But in my view, we must not dismantle defenses which have been, and are, so successful until we have something more tangible than hope on which to base a policy of detente and coexistence. Even if the change in the Soviet political posture were far greater than any of us can now predict, there would still be a need to balance Soviet military preponderance in Europe. In the hands of any Soviet Government, military preponderance could be used as political leverage in a way which could damage our many interests in cooperation with Europe. In the nuclear age, the United States is the only NATO power with strategic resources to match Soviet military power. Strong American forces on the ground must be the core of a non-nuclear defense of Europe. Without such a rallying point for Allied strength in conventional forces, all the advantages of our posture of flexible response would be lost. The presence of our forces in Europe under NATO has also contributed to the development of intra-European cooperation. Much progress has been made. But without the visible assurance of a sizeable American contingent, old frictions may revive, and Europe could become unstable once more. Yours sincerely, Dean Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. 2 The attachment is not printed. Mansfield's letter asked for a summary of the trilateral talks and a reply on what political and military purposes the current level of U.S. forces in Europe served. (Ibid.) 249. Final Report on Trilateral Talks 249. Final Report on Trilateral Talks 1 London, undated. Representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have now completed the task assigned to them and submit this report as a record of the results of the talks. I The three representatives held a total of six formal sessions on: October 20–21, 1966; November 9–10, 1966; November 28–30, 1966; February 27 and March 3, 1967; March 20–21, 1967; and April 27–28, 1967. They also consulted informally a number of times; and they were assisted by several Working Groups. The Secretary General of NATO or his representative attended all of the formal sessions. A representative of SACEUR attended some of the Working Groups. II In addition to the Working Group reports, the talks have resulted in the following agreed documents (attached hereto): 1. Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces (9 November 1966). 2. Agreed Minute on UK–FRG financial arrangements and United Kingdom forces (21 March 1967). 3. United States aide-memoire on additional purchases from United Kingdom (21 March 1967). 4. Agreed Minute on US–FRG financial arrangements and United States forces (28 April 1967). 5. Agreed Minute on procedure in NATO and WEU (28 April 1967). III It is understood that the carrying out of the agreed financial arrangements will be handled through regular channels and that the further discussions of the issues relating to forces will be carried on through NATO procedures. IV It is recognized that the balance of payments consequences resulting from the stationing of forces abroad for the common defense continue to pose a problem for joint attention. Thomson Duckwitz McCloy 2 Attachment 1 Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces 3 1. In order to deter aggression, the Alliance needs a full spectrum of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces. 2. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, with their ability to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack, constitute the backbone of NATO's military capabilities. 3. The tactical nuclear capabilities of the Alliance constitute an additional necessary component of the deterrent. 4. The Alliance needs sufficient conventional forces to deter and counter a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by confronting the Soviets with the prospect of non-nuclear hostil-ities on such a scale as to involve for them a grave risk of escalation to nuclear war. 5. On the Central Front, the present level of NATO forces appears to be adequate for this purpose but the question of imbalances in these forces remains to be discussed. 6. The question of where these forces should be located remains to be discussed in the light of the prospect of political and military warning, ability to react, capacity and speed of reenforcement, economic considerations and the political impact of any new deployments on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Attachment 2 4 AGREED MINUTE This minute applies only to year 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968. The German Government will make purchases in the defense sector from the UK of the value of DM 200 million in the financial year April 1, 1967 to March 31, 1968. The German Government will endeavor within the limits of its possibilities to reach DM 250 million for public procurements in the civilian sector in the same period. The British and German Governments will use their best endeavors to promote commercial purchases with a view to reaching accountable payments of up to DM 100 million in the same period. The remaining funds, not yet contractually committed in the DM 94 million account will be used for this purpose. The undertakings in the three preceding paragraphs are based on the assumption that the principles of the agreement of 1964 as extended by the Protocol of 1965 and the decisions of the Anglo-German Joint Committee continue to apply. The two Governments will now enter into a new agreement on the above basis. Subject to the agreement of WEU, the British Government will withdraw one brigade group (about 5,000 men) from Germany to the United Kingdom during the first quarter of 1968. This brigade group will remain earmarked for assignment to NATO. Apart from the physical implications of its change of location, there will be no change in its relation to SACEUR. In addition, and on the same basis, the British Government would propose to transfer to the UK two squadrons of the 2nd Tactical Air Force. When the British Government make the necessary application to WEU, the German Government, taking account of the balance of payments arguments advanced, will use its best endeavors to ensure the success of the application as being the only solution which has been found in the tripartite talks. The US and German Governments will similarly support the agreed position in NATO. These understandings are contingent on the completion of satisfactory financial and force level arrangements between the United States and the FRG and UK in the Trilateral Talks and will become effective only in conjunction with such related arrangements. Attachment 3 5 Washington, March 21, 1967. AIDE-MÉMOIRE The Department of State confirms the statement made by Mr. McCloy to Minister Thomson on March 20, 1967, to the effect that the United States Government is prepared—as a contribution to the satisfactory conclusion of the Trilateral Talks on force levels and balance of payments effects—to increase its military orders and payments to the United Kingdom by the amount of 7 million pounds in the period April 1, 1967 to March 31, 1968. The orders and payments would be additional to those undertaken under the $325 million arrangement, and additional to those undertaken under the special $35 million arrangement agreed in December 1966. They would be subject to the same terms as transactions under the $325 million and $35 million arrangements. United States experts are prepared to discuss the modalities of these new transactions with their British counterparts in the immediate future. This offer is predicated on the assumption that the three governments can reach a satisfactory agreement on the level of forces in Germany. Attachment 4 6 US–FRG MINUTE I. US Rotation Plans 1. The United States proposes to redeploy from the FRG to the US up to 35,000 military personnel. The ground and air units affected, whether at their US or FRG bases, will remain fully committed to NATO. 2. Army. The plan for the Army is as follows: a. The US Army division involved will be the 24th Infantry Division. b. At least one brigade of that division will be in Germany at all times, at the current location of the division. Consideration will be given at a later date to restationing the units, if the availability of facilities permits, to place them closer to their assigned emergency defense positions. c. The other two brigades and an appropriate share of divisional and non-divisional support units—totalling approximately 28,000 (i.e., slightly less than two-thirds of a US division force)—will be removed from Germany to the United States. Precisely which support units will be redeployed has not been decided. US military experts are ready to work with German military experts to find ways to avoid weakening combat support units. d. Once a year, all three brigades will be in Germany for exercises involving the entire division. e. The rotation plan provides that the three brigades would succeed each other in the FRG, each brigade in turn remaining in the FRG on TDY for a period of six months. f. Forces redeployed to the US will be maintained in a high degree of readiness, and equipment will be maintained in the FRG in sufficient quantity and readiness to ensure that the forces can be redeployed to Germany within 30 days. The US Government will strive to shorten the time requirements for the deployment of ground forces as much as possible below 30 days. 3. Air Force. The plan for the Air Force is as follows: a. The three tactical fighter wings, totaling 216 aircraft, now based in Germany are involved in the plan. b. 120 of the 216 aircraft will be in Germany at all times. They will be located on two or three bases, with the remainder of the four bases maintained as DOB(S). c. 96 of the aircraft (and up to 6500 men) will be redeployed to the US. d. All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a year for exercises. e. Under the rotation plan, 120 aircraft (five squadrons of 24 each) would be permanently stationed in Germany, and the remaining 96 dual-based aircraft would rotate to Germany for exercises once a year. f. The aircraft in the US will be at a high degree of readiness to assure their deployment to Europe within 10 days. The US Government will strive to shorten the time requirements for the deployment of air forces to 5 days. 4. First movements under both plans will not take place before January 1, 1968, and the plans may be in operation as soon as June 30, 1968, but in no event before the US is ready to meet the criteria described above. 5. The United States will return its rotating forces to Europe whenever the situation requires. In addition, the US Government is ready to negotiate a plan under which NATO countries, including Germany and others as well as the US, furnish the assurance that comparable actions will be taken, including, for the part of the US, redeployment to Europe of its rotating forces during a period of political tension and no later than at the time of the announcement of the alert phase “military vigilance” for the Central Region by SACEUR. 6. The US does not consider that the international situation justifies any further redeployments. The US believes that significant reductions of allied military strength should be part of a balanced plan for reducing military strength in both East and West or as a consequence of other major shifts in the security situation and should be made only after full consultation among the allies. The US is prepared to participate in a multilateral determination of what the NATO force levels should be. 7. The two governments agree that the DPC is the best forum to consider: a. How agreed redeployment of US and UK forces should be handled for the purpose of inducing possible Soviet responses and, b. On what basis the NATO Allies should be prepared to consider reciprocal reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. II. Financial Arrangements Financial arrangements to deal with the balance of payments effects of US military expenditures in Germany have been developed between the US and German Governments and between the German Bundesbank and the US Treasury. Principles Governing the Period, July 1, 1967–June 30, 1968 1. Germany decides what levels of procurement of military goods and services in the US it wishes to undertake. 2. It is recognized that the total of the prospective German military purchases does not match the US foreign exchange expenditures in Germany for military purposes. 3. As to the remaining balance of payments consequences of the US troops stationed in Germany, other means, including cooperation in the management of monetary reserves, have been agreed. German Military Purchases in the US, July 1, 1967–June 30, 1968 1. The German Government intends to continue procurement of military goods and services in the United States on a scale significant in relation to the German defense effort. Such procurement will be made in the light of German military requirements and budget capabilities, given the availability and economic advantage of procurement items in the US. 2. The two governments will continue the regular military and financial consultations between their appropriate ministries, which in the past have served as a means for determining potential German military procurement in the United States. Central Bank Arrangements, July 1, 1967–June 30, 1968 The two governments noted that the Bundesbank will invest during the period July, 1967, through June, 1968, a sum of $500 million in special, medium-term US Government securities, which will be a real import of capital into the US. Other Central Bank Arrangements The two governments noted that in a recent letter addressed to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, accompanied by a letter of approval by the German Government, the Bundesbank explained its continuing practice in recent years of not converting dollars into gold from the US Treasury. The Bank stated its intention also in the future to continue this policy and to play its full part in contributing to international monetary cooperation. Future Procedures 1. It is understood that there is no need to describe these specific financial arrangements in NATO. However, it is recognized that it will be necessary for the parties to describe these arrangements as questions are posed in other existing international forums where subjects of monetary cooperation arise. 2. Specific publicity will be coordinated between the US and the Bundesbank with respect to the Central Bank arrangements. Attachment 5 7 AGREED MINUTE ON PROCEDURE IN NATO AND WEU The three governments have agreed on the following procedure for putting to NATO and WEU their proposals arising out of the Tripartite Talks: NATO The British Permanent Representative in the Defence Planning Committee will, within the framework of the Tripartite Agreed Minute of 21 March, outline in general terms the financial arrangements made between the German and British Governments and put forward a British proposal, subject to the agreement of WEU, to transfer to the UK one brigade group and one helicopter squadron in the first quarter of 1968, emphasizing that these forces would remain committed to NATO. The US Permanent Representative will outline in general terms the financial arrangements agreed between the German and US Governments and will describe the US proposals for redeploying certain of its forces committed to NATO. The two Permanent Representatives will offer to provide such further information on their force proposals as their allies may request and will say that their governments will be explaining these proposals in greater detail in the course of the NATO Defense Planning review. The German Permanent Representative, in his statement, will confirm his government's concurrence with these proposals. The US and British Governments will make available detailed information as required to SACEUR through the appropriate channels. The three Permanent Representatives will propose that the DPC should discuss how these proposals could best be exploited to promote reductions of Soviet or Warsaw Pact Forces in Eastern Europe. Public announcement of the proposed moves should follow as soon as possible on the communication to NATO. WEU At the same time as the communication to the DPC, the UK Permanent Representative will inform the WEU Council of the arrangements made and the proposed move of forces. The German Permanent Representative will support his British colleague. The formal agreement of the WEU Council will be sought as soon as possible thereafter, in time to enable moves to begin on the 1st January 1968. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Francis M. Bator, Trilats, April–May 1967. Confidential. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 3 Secret. 4 Confidential. 5 Confidential. 6 Secret. 7 Confidential. 250. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 250. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, May 2, 1967, 8:14 p.m. 186605. BUSEC. NATUS. CEDTO. Subject: UK Application to Join EEC: Wilson Announcement May 2, 1967. Ref: State Circular 131558, February 3, 1967. 2 1. Wilson announcement of HMG intention formally apply for membership European Communities inevitably of major interest to USG. Nevertheless, we must continue maintain low visibility position. Addressee posts should be guided by following supplement to guidance of February 3, 1967 referenced above which continues reflect USG position. 2. President's October 7 statement remains basic, most recent and most authoritative enunciation of US policy regarding broadening of European Communities. 3. We note that Wilson in statement to Commons May 2 placed new stress upon UK political goals in a united Europe. This recognition of basic political nature and objective of European integration seems to us important and constructive new element in UK position. 4. As previously instructed, addressee posts should treat UK decision in low, unemotional key so as to attract minimum diplomatic or public attention to US in UK-Community negotiations. If asked about relation of UK bid to Kennedy Round, you should reply we see no reason to believe there is or should be any direct relation between need for urgent conclusion of Kennedy Round and longer term prospects for negotiations on British entry. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Fina; cleared by Hinton, EUR, E, STR, and BMI; and approved by Springsteen. Sent to 15 Western European posts. 2 Circular telegram 131558 provided guidance for what the United States said publicly and what it told certain countries but not others, and listed the issues that still needed to be examined. (Ibid.) 251. Summary Notes of the 569th Meeting of the National Security Council 251. Summary Notes of the 569th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, May 3, 1967, 12:30 p.m. Problems ahead in Europe Secretary Rusk: The hearing on the Mansfield resolution calling for U. S. troop re-deployment from Europe went well. 2 The Committee will not now press for adoption of the resolution. The President, arriving at 12:50 P.M., said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the problems we face down the road in our relations with Europe. Other meetings will discuss three issues of key importance which are not to be taken up today, i.e., the Kennedy Round, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the European financial discussions. Under Secretary Katzenbach: The State Department paper (copy attached) 3 is candid in discussing problems and possibilities. Many of our difficulties are financial or economic. We need a detailed study of whether mutual troop withdrawals from Europe are in the U.S. interest. General Wheeler: The Joint Chiefs are reviewing their earlier study of mutual troop withdrawals. Under Secretary Katzenbach: It is necessary for us to convince Europeans that they must increase their economic assistance to the Third World. The current NATO study is turning out to be interesting. A further study must be made of the problems of British admission to the Common Market. We are “living with” the problems which arise out of the desire of European states to play a larger role. The President: Chancellor Kiesinger made a point about a greater consultation with the United States. He said the quantity of information exchanged is adequate, but the quality is not. We should study closely the choices available to us which are pointed up by the current NATO review. Secretary McNamara: The quality of our consultation on nuclear matters with our allies has been poor for the last ten years, but we are improving it. Secretary Fowler: The State Department paper is discouraging. In addition, it overlooks our major problem, i.e., can we live with actions which our European allies are taking in the field of financial affairs? Is it possible for us to reach a rational financial accommodation with the Common Market? Can we halt a process which during the last eight years has led to our reserves going down and theirs going way up? We are carrying on constant consultation with our NATO allies but this isn't producing a solution. France is trying either to expel us completely from Europe or at least to diminish our power there. The French may even use the Common Market to achieve this objective. We must face up to the problem of how to make a coordinated effort in which all U.S. departments and agencies participate to induce Germany and Italy to separate themselves from the French effort to use the Common Market against the United States. Treas-ury views on this problem will be presented in a paper for circulation to the Council. The President: On our recent European trip 4 we spent a great deal of time on this problem and we will continue to do so. However, it is doubtful that acceptable solutions can be found. Secretary Fowler: The French have been trying to use the Common Market structure for the past five years in an effort to diminish our economic, political, and military influence. This French effort in Europe affects our ability to be effective in other parts of the world. The President: The Vice President has been working on this problem. Perhaps he has views on how we go about finding a solution. It is doubtful that the Europeans will agree to arrangements offsetting the cost of U.S. divisions now deployed in Europe. The Vice President: Europeans have rejected the world after the loss of their colonies. They resent U.S. power. detente is what they want. Their young people are causing many problems. The Soviets are still actively seeking the dissolution of NATO. We should review carefully our exchange of persons program. Its emphasis should be on the young. No one over 40 should be brought to the United States under the program. We should get the Europeans involved in conferences on subjects other than foreign policy; for example, Interior Secretary Udall's participation in the conference on air pollution. The conference on mass transportation is another example. We should organize conferences which approach problems on a functional basis; for example, low income housing, education, urban affairs. The Europeans are selfish. We should challenge them to participate in the world outside their borders. We must keep pounding at them on this problem. The President: We are doing this. Only the press is saying that we are overemphasizing Asia and are oriented toward Asia. Special missions have been sent and should continue to be sent to Europe. Under Secretary Katzenbach: We must involve the people of Europe and get the public to put pressure on their governments. Secretary Fowler: It is not enough for us to limit our activity to discussions by U.S. Ambassadors at the top level of foreign governments. The President: We should not be so defensive in our approach. We should tell the Europeans of our problems and of their responsibilities. The Vice President: All legislative delegations going to Europe should be carefully and fully briefed to ensure that what they say fits in with our policy objectives. The President: The study we are making of mutual troop withdrawals should clearly spell out the choices we have. How can we persuade Europe to contribute more to the defense effort and how can we persuade our Congress to support our current participation in NATO? Should we call a conference on how to distribute fairly the cost of maintaining NATO forces with a view to getting firm commitments from our European allies? A showdown in this country is coming soon. What do we do if the Kennedy Round negotiations fail, if our trilateral financial discussions do not produce a satisfactory solution, and if NATO study does not produce a satisfactory solution for the future of NATO? USIA Director Leonard Marks: USIA has a serious problem communicating with Europe. The European press is hostile, especially the Agence France press. How do we counteract this hostility? We now have 50 percent fewer people stationed in Europe and are spending only $7 million in the European area. One way would be to create events which would attract attention. We could send personalities to Europe who would command the news. The Vice President and others should be sent on trips to Europe. Ambassador Goldberg: The Europeans are causing problems for us in the United Nations. We no longer have a solid bloc of western allies behind us. The British are OK but the Italians are tottering in their support of us. Canadian support is poor. The view of the European delegations to the United Nations is that the U.S. is neglecting Europe for Asia. They complain of only being informed rather than consulted. We need to caucus with them often and to arrange ways of getting them more involved. Mr. Rostow: Europe is neglecting the world. It is in an isolationist cycle. We should get one of our Senators to make this point in a major speech. The President: While agreeing with the sentiment expressed, what we need is a solution. A substantial part of my time is spent dealing with Europeans. We have sent our leaders to Europe—the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, and others. There has been a very large exchange of information. Even with all of this, all the Europeans say they are neglected. What we need to do is to find a solution. We must find a way of getting them to make a larger contribution to the cost of NATO defense. Secretary Rusk: The recipients of our aid must be more active. The point of diminishing returns has set in on our begging for others in Europe. Secretary Fowler: The action of Europeans in the International Development Bank is an example of their attitude. Henceforth, they should participate in decisions in the Bank on the basis of their financial participation. The President then turned the discussion to Senator Mansfield's concern that the United Nations is unable to do anything about the war in Vietnam. Secretary Rusk summarized the pros and cons of United Nations action, taking the same position he has in the past. Ambassador Goldberg reviewed the past history of the proposal to involve the U.N. and the difficulties which have arisen. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 2 For a transcript of these hearings, April 26 and May 3, see Hearings Before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session. 3 Dated April 17, this 10-page paper examined the general state of U.S.-European relations and the specific questions of: 1) British entry into the EEC, 2) the British financial problem, 3) the political side of NATO, 4) U.S.-Western Europe and the Third World, and 5) the USSR and Eastern Europe. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318) 4 President Johnson visited Germany April 23–26 for the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer. 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, May 10, 1967, 7:22 p.m. 191860. Deliver Ambassador Cleveland 9:00 a.m., May 11. NATUS. Joint State/Defense Message. Ref: Paris 17787. 2 Subject: Mutual Force Reduction. 1. We agree generally with your approach to question of mutual force reduction. Expression of continuing US interest in this matter and proposal to locate study of force reductions within framework of force planning processes seems good method of beginning tentative consideration of this important subject. Obviously political and arms control aspects will also have to be given prominent consideration as you suggest in para 7 reftel. We hope, as you suggest, it will be possible to work out an agreed approach to study of mutual force reduction in anticipation of the December Ministerial meeting. 2. We also agree British should clearly understand there will be no approach to the Soviets at this time on question of reciprocal reductions and that if they raise the matter they will be speaking absolutely for themselves. Rather than attempting to make preconditions as suggested para 3 reftel, we would prefer you make points in context of DPC discussion. 3. In this connection and in connection with the matter of working out reductions with the Soviets which you raise in paragraph 7 of reftel, we believe that for a number of reasons the Soviet Union does not favor formal negotiation at this time. As recently as February, Kosygin in a conversation with Wilson made settlement of European frontiers a prerequisite for mutually agreed reduction of forces. This was an entirely new precondition. Other high Soviet officials (FYI. Abrasimov to McGhee, March 17, 1967. End FYI.) have indicated that the USSR would wait for deeds not words as regards reciprocal withdrawals and that Soviets would withdraw troops from East Germany only after a Western reduction. While no Soviet reduction appears imminent, we believe, nevertheless, that the “mutual example” approach is more promising than any public or private approach directed specifically at the USSR which would make any subsequent Soviet reduction appear to be collaborative with the United States or with NATO. From our point of view avoidance of formal approaches to the Soviets offers greater prospect that they will, in fact, make some reductions in the future once they can be dissociated from specific US and UK actions. 4. Any studies undertaken, of course, as suggested in paragraph 6 reftel by force planners would concentrate on the political and military effects of any changes in Soviet force levels. Possible Western redeployments could be designed to fit into this evolving process in such a manner that the relative Western strength in relation to Soviet strength in Europe would not be impaired. (And, in this connection, we agree with the point in middle your paragraph 3 that US/UK redeployment now under discussion are not reductions. This does not mean that Soviets cannot respond by redeployment of their own.) 5. We see no objection to French participation in the exercise on ad hoc basis as you propose, although we remain skeptical that they will in the long run make a positive contribution to any multilateral effort to reach agreement on force levels. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Romine; cleared by Kohler, McAuliffe, Springsteen, McNaughton, G/PM, and EUR/SOV; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Moscow, London, Bonn, and Brussels. 2 Telegram 17787, May 8, reported that initial DPC discussion of mutual force reductions had been set for May 11, transmitted some suggestions on the question, and requested instructions. (Ibid.) 253. Memorandum of Conversation 253. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 19, 1967. SUBJECT British Entry in the EEC PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Charles Lucet, French Embassy Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR Woodward Romine, French Affairs Ambassador Lucet stated that he wished to discuss a number of items, particularly De Gaulle's press conference, 2 the most important part of which was the UK application. He said that De Gaulle naturally had been obliged to speak of the very difficult problems which must be solved before the UK could enter the Common Market, and that both Wilson and Brown were aware of the General's thoughts on these matters. Mr. Leddy said it seems to him the General had spoken more strongly in 1967 than in 1963 on the subject of UK entrance. Ambassador Lucet replied that in 1963 there may have been some British misunderstanding about the French position. Macmillan may not have been entirely clear about the General's thoughts, but this time the British knew what the General was going to say. Ambassador Lucet continued that the problems of agriculture and the Commonwealth are perhaps the most difficult. Mr. Leddy commented that the British had, he thought, accepted negotiation on the agricultural question. Ambassador Lucet said that not just France has difficulties with the British on agricultural and “technical” matters, but France is more willing than its partners in the EEC to speak openly about them. The Italians, he stated, could in no way make concessions to the British on agricultural questions. British membership, he said, is not for today, not for 1967. The only solution seems to be to find some formula for British association or to postpone consideration of British entry. Mr. Leddy commented that De Gaulle in his defense of the Common Market sounds like Jean Monnet. Ambassador Lucet replied that De Gaulle has always believed in the Common Market and is very close to Monnet's views on this matter, but that he simply does not want Mr. Hallstein as the Prime Minister of Europe. Ambassador Lucet said that the conclusion of the Kennedy Round was a great success. The French, and particularly Couve, have always wanted this negotiation to succeed. It is a revolutionary step in which we have made an agreement on grains and food aid. Mr. Leddy agreed that the results of the Kennedy Round were a great success and recalled that the food aid plan was a French idea. Ambassador Lucet said that with the great cuts in tariff in France, “We will all be driving Cadillacs.” Returning for a moment to De Gaulle's press conference, Ambassador Lucet said that he did not care for the Reston article in the May 19 New York Times commenting on the press conference. He was offended by Reston's facetious remark to the effect that the General disagrees with the British opinion that the Americans are really members of the human race. Mr. Leddy replied that Mr. Reston is very tough on everyone from time to time, not just General De Gaulle. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 6 EEC-UK. Confidential. Drafted by Romine. The source text is labeled “Part I of III.” 2 On May 16. 254. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 254. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 25, 1967. SUBJECT “Problems Ahead in Europe” You will recall at the NSC discussion of the State Department paper “Problems Ahead in Europe” 2 I criticized the paper as being incomplete and inadequate and asked for permission to submit a supplementary paper as a part of the educative enterprise for those concerned with military, political, economic and cultural relationships with that part of the world. The principal point of my criticism was that the listing of specific problems we have with Western Europe included such things as “(1) U.K. Entry Into EEC. (2) U.K. Financial Problem. (3) Political Side of NATO. (4) U.S., Western Europe and Third World.“ but omitted any treatment of what I believe to be at least a major specific problem with Europe—particularly the Common Market—namely, what I shall term “The Financial Problem”. I raise this question in a National Security Council context because the financial problem grows out of the disparities in burden-sharing relative to financial strength which result from political, diplomatic and military arrangements. In essence, I am appealing to the other parts of the Government [that] we give a far higher priority to the importance of viable financial arrangements with Western Europe, particularly the Common Market, in all military, political, economic and cultural activities. It is my conviction that this financial problem with Western Europe is our Achilles heel which, more than any of the specific problems listed in the State Department paper, are a threat to our position in Western Europe and the effectiveness of our foreign policy in dealing with it. Accordingly, I have taken the liberty of preparing the attached paper on the financial aspects of U.S.-European relationships 3 —again for the same background purposes that the previous paper was circulated. The principal menace to our position in Western Europe, in my judgment, is the desire of the French, under deGaulle, to expel us as a practical matter from Western Europe. The principal tools which are being employed to achieve that result are blocking measures to achieve a better multilateral sharing of responsibilities by the Common Market partners while the U.S. follows a course which it cannot afford much longer. If the U.S. is to be effective in partnership with Western Europe and we are to avoid a two-bloc system in the Free world, the relative burdens must be attuned to financial viability. The purpose and thrust of our major political and diplomatic effort must be to effect a more viable and durable financial partnership than our diplomacy has provided in the last decade since the Common Market was established. Henry H. Fowler 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Box 2. Secret. 2 See Document 251 . 3 Not printed. 255. Memorandum of Conversation 255. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 2, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–1:15 p.m. SUBJECT UK and EEC PARTICIPANTS Americans present : Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury (part time) Secretary of Defense Ambassador Bruce Mr. Walt Rostow (part time) EUR—Mr. John M. Leddy Mr. Francis Bator (part time) S/CPR—Mr. James W. Symington British present : Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson, Head, British Defense Staff Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Advisor T. T. Brenchley, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office Donald Murray, Head, South East Asian Department, Foreign Office A. N. Halls, Principal Private Secretary to Prime Minister A. M. Palliser, Private Secretary to Prime Minister T. D. Floyd-Hughes, Press Secretary to Prime Minister UK and EEC Mr. Bator raised this question. Answering the Secretary, Sir Burke Trend said that the British side had nothing more on the Rome Summit meetings of the Six than had appeared in the papers. The 5 seemed to be taking the problem more seriously than before. He personally was not as pessimistic as some over De Gaulle's negative remarks at his last press conference, which seemed to him defensive. The Secretary observed that the second British application, which was simple and clean, would be harder to resist than the first. Mr. Leddy thought that De Gaulle would not be able to veto the start of negotiations over the strong support of the 5 but could spin them out. Sir Burke Trend wondered aloud about how long the negotiations could go on but made no estimate. The Secretary said that the US had been quiet in public about its support for British entry. He asked whether we should continue this policy. Sir Burke Trend said yes. The Secretary said we realized that in this process the British might have to “cock a snoot” at us from time to time and we understood this. Secretary Fowler added “but don't sell us out on the liquidity problem.” Mr. Rostow said that German Finance Minister Strauss had been impressed by the argument that British membership in the EEC would bring with it a great contribution in the technological field; this might be Britain's strongest card. The UK side observed that the technological argument was simply another way of spelling out the advantages of a large market. Sir Solly Zuckerman referred in this connection to a recent Department of Commerce article on “Innovation” which was having a very powerful effect in Europe in reinforcing the Common Market idea. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Leddy and approved by the White House and S on June 14. The conversation was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The source text is labeled “Part IV of IV.” 256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 256. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, June 8, 1967, 9:16 p.m. 209519. NATUS. For Ambassador Cleveland from the Secretary. USRO deliver Cleveland by 8:30 a.m., Friday, June 9. Ref: A. Paris 19972, B. State 208534 Circular. 2 Subj: NATO Ministerial Meeting and the Middle East. This message provides guidance requested for June 9 NAC meeting: 1. We are in general agreement with your views as reported reftel A, paras five and eight. We continue to believe there will be need for continuing NATO consultation on Middle East situation and that the proc-ess should begin with next week's Ministerial meeting. Thus, at the meeting our aims will be (a) to establish clearly the major interests of NATO countries in the immediate Middle East situation and in relation to long-range stability and development of the area; (b) to obtain Ministerial agreement, or at least informal understanding, re need for quiet continuing NATO consultation on these problems; (c) to seek consensus on goals and methods of such consultations. Aside from obvious, intrinsic importance of Middle East problems, NATO consultations would represent major practical supplement to efforts underway in Future of Alliance Study. 2. Re NATO interests in the Middle East : Although many of these are obvious, believe it useful for Ministerial discussion to establish a clear record on this point. Consequently, recalling the Secretary's emphasis on dangers of Middle East situation last December, we would expect to bring out such points as the following. These take on added urgency in light of current crisis: A. Geographical proximity to NATO area. B. Consequent vital European and North American interest in peace, stability and regional development in the Middle East. C. Strategic elements in relation to NATO area such as sea communications, overflight privileges, and petroleum resources. D. Importance of the Mediterranean to the Alliance. E. Arms supply problems and the need to find means of avoiding future competitive arms buildups. F. The link between foregoing points and Western relations with the Soviet Union. We recognize that East-West relations may be a good starting point to lead into questions of NATO's interest in the Middle East. Point we wish to get across, however, is that there are also other important reasons for Western concern with the area. 3. Re need, goals and methods for consultations : NATO as an institution should have no action role vis-a-vis the Middle East. Such a role would be undesirable in East-West context; in terms of responsibilities of other bodies (notably UN); and in terms of Arab and “third world” attitude toward NATO and its members. This circumstance in no way detracts from need we see for close Western coordination on positions NATO countries will be taking in the UN and bilaterally with third parties. At same time, all of above factors highlight need for maximum secrecy re fact and substance of NATO consultations on Middle East. 4. An analogy can be made with NATO consultations on disarmament problems where the negotiating forum is the ENDC. Arrangements for continuing discussions on Middle East in NAC can create basis of support for Western positions at the UN. They can help assure full understanding of the interests of individual Alliance members and reduce risks that any of them might be working at cross purposes. Also, should a future crisis occur, NATO machinery would already be tuned up and could be used quickly if desired. Events of past few weeks have shown that, once crisis is upon us, it is too late to try and crank up special machinery for Alliance consultations. 5. As to the arrangements themselves, we have concluded that we should probably not seek agreement on creation of special group with formal terms of reference now. Desirability and possibility of such a step can be examined later. Rather, we lean toward your idea (reftel A, para eight) of urgent ad hoc consultations in framework of Permanent Council. This would presumably take care of chairmanship problem automatically; i.e., Brosio would preside. We do however attach importance to two elements: (a) understanding that participation is open-ended in sense that others can go ahead even if some countries should not wish to attend; and (b) policy-level officials from capitals can attend as necessary. 6. As we see it, foregoing approach would have several advantages. It reduces negotiating difficulties and time that would be required in attempting to get agreement on formal group, whether embracing full NATO membership or not. Keeping matter in framework of Permanent Council should help in reducing publicity as we have succeeded in doing with periodic NPT discussions. 7. Re tactics : We would prefer that Brosio or some other national delegation sponsor proposal along foregoing lines. If this cannot be arranged in time available, however, you should indicate our intention to make the proposal. In any case, you may expose our views on basis this telegram. Appreciate your urgent recommendations for US tactics at the Ministerial in light of June 9 NAC discussion. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by NEA, RA, Eugene Rostow, Leddy (in draft), and Springsteen (in draft); and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, USCINCEUR, SHAPE for POLAD, and EUCOM for POLAD. 2 Telegram 19972, June 7, reported the NATO Permanent Representatives' concern about the Middle East crisis. In paragraph 5, Cleveland added that he had not suggested any particular consultation process, but had emphasized the need for “open-endedness” and the possibility of including special policy officers; paragraph 8 noted that policy toward the Middle East should be framed with particular reference to East-West relations. Telegram 208534, June 6, provided a preliminary assessment of the questions that the Middle East crisis raised for NATO. (Both ibid.) 257. Memorandum of Conversation 257. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 9, 1967, 4:06 p.m. SUBJECT Kennedy Round, EEC Development, Trade Policy, UK Accession to EEC PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Jean Rey, EEC Commissioner for External Relations M. Rifflet, Chef de Cabinet to M. Rey Ambassador Schaetzel, U.S. Representative to the EEC LeRoy F. Percival, Jr., Deputy Director, EUR/RPE The Secretary congratulated M. Rey on his selection as President of the new Commission of the European Communities and congratulated him on his efforts to achieve a really successful Kennedy Round. He said the U.S. was pleased with the outcome though undoubtedly there would be “guerilla” attacks by protectionists and special pleaders on some aspects of the settlement. He added that the political consequences of a failure would have been catastrophic. Rey agreed and said protectionist forces would have gained the upper hand and undone all that has been accomplished in freeing world trade and economic growth. The Secretary agreed and said protectionist forces will seek to prevent further movement in trade liberalization. He explained that President Kennedy had sought the TEA on the ground that just to get the Trade Agreement Act renewed was such a fight so why not have the fight and get legislation which it appeared more worthwhile to seek legislation which was much more significant. Rey said he realized we would have a fight on the Hill over ASP and therefore the Community had told its people and industries to keep quiet and not agitate the matter. Rey said the farm lobby pressures in the Community had great political impact but would be reduced in his opinion as the modernization of agriculture proceeded to oblige more and more farmers to leave the land. The Secretary commented that we had strong pressures from the Hill on many matters. He explained that for the first time we had trouble on NATO as a result of the Mansfield Resolution backed by the Democratic Policy Committee to withdraw troops from Europe. This was now stopped but the onslaught had occurred because of our extensive commitments in Vietnam and concern that there was a double standard in NATO on defense contributions. Rey commented that Europe needs to have a more united view to present in partnership to the United States. French behaviour has damaged NATO and Atlantic cooperation but he was confident this was temporary. The Secretary said Europe should become more outward looking and play more of a world role. Rey replied that had the Community not been preoccupied with its internal problems, it could have played a role in seeking to improve Arab-Israeli relations. It has the means. If it could only advance toward political unity, its world role and responsibilities would be enhanced. He hoped that now that the Community has resolved many major internal problems, it will increasingly take a responsible outward looking role. In this connection, he said we needed a common position for UNCTAD II on trade with LDCs. The Secretary recalled the President's Punta del Este statement 2 and said, “We've moved.” Rey replied that the Commission would make a general preferences system proposal to the Council of Ministers in the fall. He thought we could achieve a “rapprochement” of positions. The Secretary commented that it took a lot of consultation on the Hill before this statement could be made and explained U.S. Constitutional procedures. The Secretary mentioned the NPT and the safeguards issue. Rey said he was not familiar with the details. He planned to see Chairman Seaborg in the morning. The Secretary asked if the UK would get into the Common Market. Rey said “yes.” The French were pursuing delaying tactics. In his opinion, they were not prepared to stop negotiations. He expected that the procedure under Article 237 of the Rome Treaty would be followed. If the advice of the Commission is requested as provided for, the Commission will undoubtedly take the position that it must talk to the British. He guessed the Council would approve and doubted they would veto. The Secretary asked if the U.S. should remain publicly silent on this matter. M. Rey responded with an emphatic “yes.” The Secretary commented that Mr. Wilson might at some point “cock his snoot” at the U.S. for De Gaulle's consumption. Rey thought he might but commented that more and more high level political figures in France realize one cannot say unite Europe and then pursue divisive policies. He said the General was really showing signs of age and his Ministers in many cases were already thinking differently and looking toward their political futures. The evolution of French policy was interesting. In 1964, France tried to destroy the Community. Now it is playing the game. At the time of the Dillon Round, the General saw Rey on television and is reported to have said, “Who is that man who speaks in the name of France?” At the Rome Summit, he said, “Congratulations, Mr. Rey, you have succeeded.” He added that French cooperation in the last days of the Kennedy Round negotiation was striking. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 13–2 US. Confidential. Drafted by Percival and approved in S on June 14. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. Memoranda of Rey's conversations with Bator, Leddy, and Owen, all on June 9, are ibid., EEC 3, ECIN 3 EEC, and FT 13–2 US. 2 For text of this statement, April 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , pp. 444–446. 258. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 258. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 17, 1967, 1845Z. 20323. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting: Evaluation. 2 1. After two days reflection, post audit of all reporting cables, and a talk with SYG Brosio, I think the most striking thing about the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Luxembourg was that for first time in two years Ministers did not need to spend most of their time gluing NATO together. Government delegations and attending journalists alike seemed to assume that NATO is here to stay. So diplomats were not talking and journalists were not writing about collapse, anemia, demise or disarray. Instead, they were able to concentrate on major issues of foreign policy in which allies share common interests—though not common opinions. Mid East Crisis and the UN 2. The Mid East crisis of course dominated both private discussions and public briefings. There seemed no doubt in anyone's mind that NATO Ministers should be discussing Middle East crisis, and that NAC should continue to consult about it. Brosio's summation made clear distinction between action in US and bilateral channels, and NAC as the “place where allies should consult among themselves”. Even if some members do not intend to reach common policy, he said, there should be as much consensus as possible in an attempt to avoid “open conflict”. Secretary's emphasis on possibility of different allies being useful to Middle East peace-making in different ways (e.g., some with Israeli, some with some Arabs, some with other Arabs, some with Soviets) was well received and even drew an endorsement from Couve de Murville. 3. Ministers' diagnoses of origins Middle East conflict were strikingly similar. There was clear consensus that U Thant had acted rashly and unwisely, and had helped bring on conflict; that while Israeli military victory was only the beginning of extremely difficult problems, these problems were not a patch on the problems that would have been created for most allied governments if the fighting had gone the other way; that domestic opinion in NATO countries greatly favored Israel; and the Soviet miscalculation was enormous in providing sophisticated machines without developing the sophisticated military men to use them. No one at Luxembourg thought anything but loud noise would come out of an emergency session of the General Assembly, but there was grudging admiration for Soviet tactical skill in selecting a forum in which they could embarrass Western nations while they themselves could look as if they were doing something big for their Arab friends. 4. But when Ministers moved beyond diagnosis to prescription, the consensus was limited to agreement that their representatives should keep consulting. Even on approach to the emergency General Assembly, skepticism about what the UN could accomplish did not prevent governments as varied in their basic opinions as France, Portugal and Denmark from predicting they would have to vote for convening of UNGA (Luxembourg 492). 3 5. A recurring theme at Luxembourg was the threat of UN's peacekeeping function which seems inherent in U Thant's action on UNEF. Canadians and Danes, who are traditionally most reluctant to be seen consulting NATO allies on UN problems, were clearly troubled by UN's peacekeeping potential, willing to discuss it quite frankly, and (along with Greeks and Turks) anxious to get allies' endorsement of continuing UN presence in Cyprus. Fate of UNEF has clearly been a real jolt to UN's best friends and supporters in the West, with full effect not yet predictable. Franco Nogueira (Portugal) of course tried to convert this disillusionment into a general vote of no confidence in the UN as peacekeeping agency, but tactical result was only to rally other Ministers to UN support faute de mieux. 6. Everybody (including French) regard the old “France-NATO” issue as a thing of the past. All comments on NATO defense matters reflected satisfaction with the organization's success in growing past the crisis of French withdrawal, institutionalizing Les Quatorze, and moving rapidly to develop modern force plans, nuclear strategies, and crisis management techniques. But on the political side, this Luxembourg meeting provided the first important test of what French Government means by staying in the Alliance while withdrawing from NATO. Evidently it means exchanging views with allies but avoiding both the reality and the appearance of common Western actions or policies. 7. Adamant French opposition (Paris 20205) 4 to communique language on the Middle East which all other members (and French representatives in communique drafting committee) regarded as unexceptionable, could have provoked a kind of constitutional cirisis about NAC consultation, if we had carried it that far. When he left Luxembourg before communique session, Couve de Murville left in the French chair an instructed delegate with no authority to negotiate the disputed language. It was a hard and uncomfortable row for Jean de la Grandville to hoe. He had the unenviable assignment of explaining why the French Government would not agree to say that all NATO allies “seek good relations with all countries of the Middle East”. The reason this inoffensive morsel stuck in the French Minister's craw was apparently his unwillingness to associate French efforts to woo Middle Eastern countries with parallel efforts of others, notably US and UK, with whom some Arab countries have just ruptured relations. But French representative could not very well say this, and his resulting efforts to skirt the issue yet stay with the instructed position made for a sticky hour and a half of debate. 8. French position on this seems however to be in line with “independent” position French were taking in OECD Petroleum Committee last week, with French behavior re special UNGA, with Couve de Murville's speech to National Assembly June 15 (reported by Embassy in Paris 20240),5 with the more or less embargo of arms to Israel, and in general with De Gaulle's pursuit of “disinterested path” (Paris 20242) 5 in Middle East crisis. French unwillingness to be associated with anything that looked like a common policy, even an inoffensive one, was carried to the point of risking a break in Ministerial NAC; toward the end of the marathon communique session June 14, French Delegation checked with Couve in Paris and received instructions to stick to the position even if that meant the session had to adjourn without an agreed communique. 9. French intransigeance and unwillingness even to discuss compromise language incensed other delegations, though everybody was rigidly polite, and most of the remaining Ministers (Paul Martin was a notable exception) remained on the sidelines. Brosio was and still is furious. We pressed De la Grandville far enough to reveal the full enormity of French position; the process was not without its entertaining moments, as when we suggested simply footnoting a French objection to the sentence about allies seeking good relations with all Middle East countries. Eventually, because issue was non-negotiable, we stopped negotiating and accepted a Fanfani “compromise” which removed the offending sentence. Thereafter a number of Ministers who had been silent came over to thank us for pressing the issue, and to express their shock and dismay at what the little debate had revealed about French willingness to withdraw in practice even from political side of the Alliance. Krag (Denmark), [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] was particularly vociferous to Brosio and myself afterwards in denouncing the French position and tactics. 10. At last December's Ministerial Meeting Couve carefully avoided drawing this kind of issue on a question of political consultation (the East-West relations reports). Incident at Luxembourg meeting must therefore be seen as first substantial skirmish on the new NATO-France issue, about the nature and outcome of political consultation in the Council. Non-Proliferation 11. Discussion of NPT was carried on in “private meeting” of Ministers, which meant that only 50 people were present. Discussion at that meeting, and Fanfani's comments at luncheon afterwards (Paris 20212) 6 seem to indicate some change in the atmosphere about NPT. Italian and German Ministers both were at pains to emphasize support, not only for principle of non-proliferation, but for a treaty. Neither Brandt nor Fanfani mentioned the idea of limited duration for an NPT; and Brandt put his main stress on the balance of obligations—an issue which, like the earlier German concern about discrimination in peaceful nuclear development, should be readily negotiable. 12. From public and private comments by several Ministers, it is clear that Middle East war has forced everybody to think hard about non-European reasons for NPT. We heard other delegations repeating Secretary Rusk's speculation whether losing side in such a regional war could be expected to accept defeat without using nuclear weapons if it had any; and George Brown made essentially the same point in his press briefings. 13. Without trying to predict outcome of rough passage still ahead on NPT, it certainly seems that our investment in patient and extended bilateral and NAC consultations has paid off both in helping some Italian and German leaders to neutralize NPT opponents within their respective cabinets, and in producing more vigorous and vocal support Ger NPT from the other NATO governments than we had previously been able to count on. East-West Relations 14. The forecast in Paris 20055, 7 that Western disappointments, Soviet hardening, and Soviet role in Mid East would sober the more avid East-West detente buffs, was borne out in Ministerial statements at Luxembourg. There is still quite a wide spectrum of opinion, with Scandinavians, Canadians and British most hopeful that Soviets want peace and Germans, Dutch and Greeks most skeptical. But the whole spectrum has discernibly moved over toward pessimism about Soviet motivations, so that those Ministers who spoke of detente in hopeful manner felt constrained to balance their comments with emphasis on maintaining the NATO deterrent as well. Even the French, whose official line has been that detente was so obvious that integrated Western military strength is no longer relevant, have taken to endorsing Western defensive strength for its role in encouraging Soviets to co-exist peacefully in Europe. 15. Against this background, Brandt's speech to the North Atlantic Council raised the steadiest voice of any European Minister. FRG, he said, would persist in a policy of gradual rapprochement with the East. Highlights of his contribution to the meeting were announcement of Kiesinger's letter to Stopf; 8 his embracing of US terminology by calling for NATO to pay attention not only to crisis management but to “management of detente”; and his successful effort to have Council declare itself against discrimination among allies in moving toward detente. Latter point was another that provoked argument with French in final communique session but French eventually accepted a formulation in which Council did not come out against “discrimination” in detente but instead “recorded its view that the detente should be extended for the benefit of all members of the Alliance.” 16. On the whole, therefore, the idea that NAC should use consultation to keep track of political contacts and coordinate so far as possible policies of member countries in improving East-West relations, an idea that seemed quite exotic to some a year ago, is now rather widely accepted—though with obvious mental reservations as far as France is concerned. And the increased realism about the Soviet military threat and political intransigeance should make it less difficult to fashion allied approaches to East-West relations that stay one clear step ahead of the Soviets on the road toward European settlement, without getting sentimental about it. Technological Gap 17. The paper on technological cooperation, 9 the “Fanfani initiative” of last December, was handled routinely but with general sense of satisfaction that the special group had successfully removed the political controversy from a potentially divisive trans-Atlantic dialogue. The striking thing about this exercise is that when governments had to think deeper and harder about the nature of the problem, they stopped talking about what America should do to expiate its guilt for being ahead, and started talking sense about what Europe could do about the fact that it is behind. Future of the Alliance 18. According to plan there was no substantive discussion of the study of the future tasks of the Alliance (Harmel exercise). The many references to the Harmel study emphasized the importance of searching and wide-ranging review; but they also tended to define more explicitly the basic assumptions on which the subgroups are already working—that the Alliance needs to maintain credible deterrent for the indefinite future; that the process of detente cannot safely be left to individual Western initiatives and Soviet divisive tactics; that NATO must be deeply concerned, though in a non-operational fashion, about situations outside NATO defense areas such; and that broader and franker and more intimate political consultation is always part of the mix of actions required to pursue and protect the common interests of NATO allies. 10 Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 LUX(LU). Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, USUN, Moscow, CINCLANT for POLAD, Vienna, Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Sofia, Budapest, Warsaw, CINCEUR for POLAD, SHAPE for POLAD, and the Department of Defense. 2 Documentation on the 39th Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council June 13–14 at Luxembourg, including telegrams to and from the U.S. Delegation, verbatim records of the sessions, memoranda of conversation, and briefing papers, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 186–192. For text of the communique issued at the end of the meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 307–309. 3 Dated June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 LUX(LU)) 4 Dated June 14. (Ibid.) 5 Dated June 15. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB–ISR) 6 Dated June 15. (Ibid., NATO 3 LUX(LU)) 7 Dated June 9. (Ibid.) 8 On June 14, Kiesinger rejected Premier Willi Stoph's invitation for talks in East Berlin. 9 The resolution on technological cooperation is attached to the communique. 10 In circular telegram 212575, June 19, the Department of State commented that its impressions generally coincided with those expressed here. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 LUX(LU)) 259. Memorandum of Conversation 259. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 11, 1967, 1 p.m. SUBJECT FRG Troop Levels; Chancellor Kiesinger's Visit PARTICIPANTS President Johnson FRG Ambassador Knappstein Mr. Harry Obst, Language Services (interpreter) Ambassador Knappstein told the President that he had a message which he had just received from Chancellor Kiesinger. The Chancellor wanted the President to know that there has been no decision to cut troop levels, just a reduction of the military budget in terms of money. He wanted to assure the President that he will make no important decisions on foreign policy without first consulting with the US. He accepts the President's invitation to come to Washington and accepts the dates of September 12–13. He would write the President a personal message the same day. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 GER W. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved by the White House on July 13. The meeting was held at a luncheon at the White House. 260. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the British Assistant Under Secretary of State (Watson) 260. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Kohler) to the British Assistant Under Secretary of State (Watson) 1 Washington, July 13, 1967. Dear Adam: I have delayed a reply to your letter of June 14, 1967 2 not only because of some well-known international events, but also because I wanted to give careful consideration to the points which you raised. We are just beginning to work on my report, 3 and some of these views are quite preliminary. Thus, I think it will be useful to continue to exchange views with you and others over the coming weeks. Inevitably your report is going to have a somewhat different focus than mine. I will be concerned primarily with defense problems and with the medium term—that is the period in which we will be hoping for forward movement in East-West relations, but not expecting any fundamental changes in Soviet policy and in European security arrangements. I assume that your report will be concerned more with political strategy and actions and also will consider longer-term policies. Nevertheless, I agree there will be much common ground covered, and it will be useful for us to know what assumptions the other is making. I agree with a great deal of what you say in your letter. Certainly one of the principal changes in the relations of the Alliance with Eastern Europe in recent years is a limited and rather selective relaxation of tensions. Despite this trend, I fully agree that relationships with the East will not be easy in the next few years. We can expect new relationships to develop slowly and unevenly. However, we must expect more diplomatic contacts between East and West than we have had in the past, and for this reason, I agree that we should do what we can in NATO to assure that members are fully cognizant of the impact on the security and political cohesion of Western Europe, of the progressive effects of these contacts and thus, where possible we should coordinate our efforts. I also agree with you that the existing NATO machinery and the practice which we have had already in consultation in NATO provides an asset on which we can build. It is important that bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe be supplemented by multilateral exchanges within NATO which will give all of the members of the Alliance an over-all picture of where we stand in our relationships with the East. While NATO has a significant role to play, there will be limits on how far it will be possible and desirable to coordinate East-West contacts in NATO. It will be more important (and also more difficult) to coordinate some actions than it will others. I see no way of defining theses limits precisely in advance, but we should be able to establish some benchmarks. I hope that you plan to consider in your study what actions will be particularly important to coordinate, and what the feasible limits may be on consultation about East-West contacts. For our part, we are prepared to engage fully in such consultation, and hope that others will take a similar view. While I do not think we disagree on the military importance of the Alliance and the continued role of deterrence, I would give this somewhat greater emphasis than you do. It seems to me that the maintenance of an adequate deterrent remains fundamental to our relationships with the Communist states of Europe. Whatever progress we have made toward relaxation of tensions has been in large measure a result of the fact that the Soviets have concluded that military pressures will not serve their ends in Western Europe. They have reached this conclusion because the West has maintained adequate military strength and political cohesion and the two go together in my view. I believe that maintenance of an effective deterrent continues to be essential as we gradually develop new relationships with the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe. And I am concerned that this may be forgotten as NATO inevitably moves toward greater emphasis on developing relationships with the East. Even now, there seem to be dangerous, albeit understandable, tendencies to weaken our military forces. I am particularly concerned by the pressures to reduce the non-nuclear forces of the Alliance at a time when the Soviets are building up their strategic capabilities at a rapid rate. While we do not yet fully understand the potential implications of emerging strategic parity, I think it behooves us to maintain and improve our present non-nuclear capabilities until we do understand these implications more fully. For this reason, I have included, as one of the central themes of my report, a discussion of the relationship between deterrence and detente. I think that it is important to try to set forth in the report just what detente is all about, what it means to NATO, and what we can expect in the future. While I agree that we should not attempt a “Webster definition” of detente, I think we should try to set forth as explicitly as possible what we believe to be the Soviet objectives with respect to detente and what our own attitudes should be. Certainly the respective objectives of East and West continue to be fundamentally different. It also is quite clear that different members of the Alliance have different views of what detente means. For example, some of our allies, while wishing to extend their own relationships with Eastern Europe, are concerned by some of our dealings with the Soviet Union, for example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While there clearly will be differing views of detente, as each member of the Alliance has a somewhat different perspective, unless we can have some measure of agreement on what detente means, then I do not see how we can devise any sort of a coordinated approach to our contacts with the East. In my own view, the Soviets have in recent years come to see relaxation of tensions as meeting their own national interests. They hope, by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance, divide the states of Western Europe, and in particular, to isolate the Federal Republic and open up differences between Western Europe and the US. To some extent, they have been successful in this policy. In my view, the long-term Soviet objective is to reduce US influence in Western Europe and eventually remove the US presence from the continent. They hope to convince us that NATO is no longer relevant and that a US military presence in Western Europe is no longer required. A recognition of these Soviet objectives does not mean that we should abandon our efforts to improve East-West relationships. In fact, detente provides opportunities for the West as well—important opportunities to open the societies of Eastern Europe and weaken the influence of the Soviets in these states; also to promote the evolutionary process inside the Soviet Union itself. With the above in mind, I intend that my report, in any event, will proceed on the following assumptions: 1. Deterrence is still very much relevant to NATO. It requires a balanced mix of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and continuing efforts to improve the capabilities of these forces, particularly in view of rapidly changing technology. 2. Quite aside from the need to deter, and NATO's role in this, I see a continued long-term need for a strong coalition military force to counterbalance Soviet military preponderance on the Continent. Without such a counterbalancing force, which NATO members would be unable to provide acting individually, Soviet military superiority would be a source of political leverage and influence for application in Western Europe. NATO neutralizes this important potential. I consider this a vital function for the long run. 3. The present detente is limited. It involves risks as well as opportunities. The Soviets have not abandoned their basic objectives. They continue to seek means of dividing the members of the Alliance and removing the US presence in Europe. They continue their bitter hostility to Germany and their opposition to German unification on any basis that would be acceptable to the West. At the present time, they see a purposeful and selective relaxation of tensions as serving these objectives. Therefore, while seeking to take advantage of the opportunities offered by an improving East-West atmosphere, we must parry Soviet efforts to use detente for their own ends. 4. There is a need for the NATO members to harmonize their approaches toward Eastern Europe. We cannot expect to achieve, nor should we seek a monolithic NATO policy toward East-West relationships, but at least we can expect NATO to serve as a clearing house which will help to provide each member of the Alliance with an over-all view of the state of East-West relationships, and reduce the risks of the NATO governments working at cross purposes with each other. 5. There is a need also to coordinate arms control and disarmament policies. We should attempt to establish some agreement on the relative feasibility of various arms control measures and the priorities we attach to pursuing each. 6. NATO continues to be very much relevant to the current situation in Europe. This is true for at least two reasons. First, because the maintenance of a deterrent is still essential, and because deterrence requires not only adequate military strength, but common objectives and resolve. The deterrent can be weakened as readily by political differences between the members of the Alliance as it can by reductions in the physical capability of the forces. Secondly, NATO is relevant because, as contacts between East and West expand and proliferate, we need even more than we have before a forum in which we can exchange views and consult about specific policies and actions. 7. Finally, while this is less directly relevant to defense policy, an essential element for genuine and lasting accommodation and maximum long-range change in the Soviet society is the economic strength, political cohesion, and social progress of the Atlantic nations. The greater is our progress and unity in the West, the more will the USSR (and Eastern Europe) be drawn away from an anachronistic ideology toward genuine cooperation with the West. Security for the members of NATO has always been based on two fundamental propositions. First, the maintenance of adequate military strength. Second, a willingness to seek agreements with the East which would genuinely reduce the risk of conflict. In the early years of NATO there were relatively few opportunities for agreement. Therefore, the primary emphasis in the Alliance was on the coordination of effective military strength. In recent years, some opportunities have developed which have permitted the reduction of tensions. This does not invalidate the need for military strength, but it does force upon the NATO members the need to consider together opportunities for reducing tensions and how we should deal with these opportunities. This adds a new dimension to NATO's business. It seems to me that a principal task before the Alliance is to find better means of consulting about the security issues that confront us. While our principal objective remains the security of the North Atlantic area, this now involves, to a greater extent, questions of political tactics and actions as well as military issues. There is a greater risk of disagreement amongst us because there are more choices to be made and greater room for maneuver. In this environment, it seems to me that maintenance of the NATO organization as a locus for consultation is more important than it has ever been. I know of no better way to improve the procedures of consultation than to use them more intensively. The existing institutions of NATO at least provide the point of departure. Best regards, Sincerely, Foy D. Kohler 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Leon Sloss (G/PM) on July 12. 2 Not found. 3 Kohler and Watson were rapporteurs for two of the groups working on various aspects of the Harmel study. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Kohler signed the original. 261. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk 261. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, July 20, 1967. SUBJECT Comments on German Situation—Information Memo Last week I spent Friday and Saturday in Bonn to pursue the talks with the Germans on European Security and East-West relations, as you and Mr. Brandt requested at the NATO Luxembourg meeting. While there, I had a chance to talk at some length with Brandt, Strauss, Carstens, Schutz, Diehl, and Ruete of the Foreign Office, and with Martin Hillenbrand and others in our own Embassy. Since my return, George McGhee has sent in a number of reports on the views of key figures which you have doubtless seen. Hence, I will limit myself to interpretive comments: I. German Military Program On the military budget, it was quite clear from Strauss and Brandt (as McGhee has since reported that, contrary to Schroeder, the Cabinet has decided only on the military budget , and has not cut back from existing spending levels but in essence has adopted them as a plateau until 1971 (the four percent average increase will about take care of salary raises and inflation). The decision about how to adjust the future military program is still under study. Aside from the budget, several other factors have opened the issue of the size and structure for the Bundeswehr. (1) Many German officials are convinced the U.S. is changing its military posture in Europe. They think (a) our redeployment plan is only first stage of cuts in our total strength, and (b) our aim is to take strategic nuclear weapons out of Europe, leaving tactical weapons. Hence, they begin to ask whether so many tactical nuclear weapons on their soil is a good idea. They do not doubt the U.S. interest in keeping Europe from Soviet control but wonder whether the U.S. is moving toward a strategy which would avoid direct U.S.-USSR confrontation in any European war. (2) They are genuinely concerned whether the present structure is the most efficient set-up for using resources devoted to defense, in view of the high cost and scarcity of specialists, and failure to utilize the large numbers of trained people, without an adequate reserve system. Some are considering whether they would not do better with a more professional cadre or core, which would be supplemented by a better reserve system, able to mobilize in four or five days. (3) Another element in their thinking is much vaguer. Brandt and others are wondering how to relate changes in Western (and German) defense forces to East-West aims. Should the Germans emphasize a defensive capacity as opposed to ability to respond to attack by counter offensive? Would smaller forces contribute to detente? There are, of course, counter pressures. Schroeder wants to maintain the present structure, if possible, even if it means cuts in men rather than materiel. Kiesinger will probably try to keep present force levels even at the expense of equipment because of nervousness about U.S. reaction. Brandt will probably be torn between the demands within NATO and the appeal of cuts of welfare-oriented SPD and for East-West policy. In my view, it is quite possible that some reshaping of the Bundes-wehr toward a smaller highly trained force, with an efficient reserve system, might actually improve the German contribution to flexible response. Hence in resisting unwise cuts for political reasons, we should not inhibit a serious review and possible revision which makes military sense. II. East-West Relations The recent comments of Brandt and Kiesinger on the future status of Germany between East and West do not reflect, I think, any concrete plan or long-term policy Ruete said the Foreign Office knew of no specific basis for them and was itself trying to get clarification. This does not mean Brandt does not have ideas from other sources. I have the impression that this general area is much more confused in German thinking than we may assume. Several people stressed that the German public generally, and younger people in particular, are impatient on what they consider to have been rigidity in past German policy, especially on East Germany. Therefore, it is thought to be politically profitable to be or appear more flexible and thinking new thoughts. Thus, competition between the Coalition parties and even within them on Eastern policy engenders movement. Yet none of the Germans I spoke to thought there was any new or short route to unity, and much of the focus is on “humanizing” relations with East Germany, and conditions within it. Thus, present ferment and confusion seem likely to continue. Strauss stressed the link between German unity and European unity. In a recent talk to a refugee convention, he told them that a fragmented Europe will never permit Germany to be reunited, and that anyone who says otherwise is misleading them. The “classic” policy of France, Britain and Russia vis-a-vis Germany had been that a united Germany would be out of proportion. In his view, only a unified Western Europe would change the balance of forces and the classic European approach to the German problem. British entry into the European Community would serve this purpose and also give Germany more choices than with only France. III. Attitude Towards France and UK De Gaulle had just been in Bonn when I visited. He had been very gracious to Germans and even very bland about the U.S. forces on the Continent. He had gone all out to oppose UK entry. If the UK came into Europe, this would have dire consequences, in continued US domination of Europe, in indefinite postponement of German unity, and in radically changing the character of the European Community. To become eligible in the long future, Britain would have to totally change its traditions, outlook and commitments abroad (such as Hong Kong and Singapore). De Gaulle said he had made these points to Wilson. Though Wilson made no comment, he was thinking (De Gaulle said) that “after De Gaulle” things would be different. De Gaulle commented, “Maybe so, but it isn't sure”. This puts the Germans into an awkward spot. They don't want to jeopardize their own relations with France or to break up the Community. Yet they really would like to see Britain in, to add weight to Europe and provide technology. IV. Relations with U.S. On relations with the U.S., the Germans are also concerned (or confused); (a) they suspect that the U.S. is pulling away from Europe (based on U.S. force withdrawals, reducing strategic weapons, our relations with USSR, especially NPT) and they must take account of this; and (b) they want to put a little distance between themselves and U.S. for a variety of reasons. The Germans know their security depends on the U.S. umbrella. They are satisfied we are committed to the defense of Europe. But they are uncertain what kind of strategy we may be moving to. NATO as an integrated force and a mechanism for policy coordination clearly seems shaky to them, but they do not have proposals or ideas for improving it. They put more stress on bilateral consultation and possibly stronger European ties—without knowing how to achieve them. V. Domestic Political Question The pressures to keep the Coalition together are pretty strong at this point, as the budget crisis showed. The CDU feels it is benefitting by having the Socialists to share some of the current onus of unpopular decisions; Kiesinger has succeeded in grabbing credit for the more popular actions. The Socialists have the unhappy feeling that the CDU is getting more benefit out of the partnership than they. But they enjoy being in office and some feel that the changes which have to be made can better be made by both. VI. Conclusions (1) The ferment in German thinking seems certain to continue. The efforts to foster evolution and better relations with Eastern Europe (including East Germany and the USSR) are likely to promote probing and attendant confusion at this stage. The competition between the parties and political figures is likely to produce comments and proposals which have not been thought out. (2) Specific results are likely to be very sparse and slow. In Eastern Europe, East Germany and the European Community, any constructive changes will take substantial time. Hence, the Germans are likely to be frustrated for some time. To some extent this frustration is likely to be focused on us just because of our predominant size and power. (3) The German review of its defense structure could be constructive. One result could be to improve the capacity of the German forces for conventional response and perhaps reassure its Eastern neighbors somewhat. But if made too fast or unilaterally, changes risk undermining NATO collective defense and mutual trust. (4) Hence, the concerting of Western policy, especially in the military field and East-West relations, is of extreme importance so that any actions or changes will be generally agreed and understood. To minimize distrust and doubts, it is essential to consult candidly and frequently. The Kiesinger visit can mainly serve this purpose. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Confidential. Drafted by Bowie and initialed by Rusk. 262. Memorandum of Conversation 262. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 14, 1967. SUBJECT European Isolationism PARTICIPANTS Switzerland Willy Spuehler, Chief, Swiss Federal Political Department Felix Schnyder, Ambassador of Switzerland Charles Muller, Counselor, Swiss Embassy Walter Jaeggi, Press Chief, Swiss Federal Political Department United States Secretary Rusk John S. Hayes, Ambassador to Switzerland Arthur D. Foley, Swiss Affairs, Department of State Cyril Muromcew, Interpreter The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister felt that De Gaulle is preventing European integration. Is Europe becoming isolationist? Spuehler said that we have seen the French resist the entrance of Great Britain into the Common Market and it will take time to admit Britain, but Spuehler said that he feels that integration will go ahead. The European Common Market is only one of the problems involved in European integration. Switzerland is positive on this subject, but can only maintain its position if it can preserve its neutrality and safety. The Secretary said that we are concerned about a possible trend toward isolationism in Europe. Isolationism in Europe would mean isolationism in the United States. Scratch an American and you will find an isolationist, he said. Our involvement in world affairs since World War II has been an act of will contrary to the general sentiments of the American people. During the last few months, while the United States has been engaged in Viet-Nam and maintaining its forces in NATO, Great Britain has declared that she will pull back from Southeast Asia in the 1970's, Germany is talking about reduction of its defense budget, and no serious attention was paid in Europe to the Arab-Israeli war, although the Near East is only 30 minutes away by plane. Europe is also indifferent to events in Africa. The Secretary cited the Congo as an example. The situation in the Congo meant possible danger to most European governments, but only Switzerland and the United States acted in the Congo, the Swiss through the International Committee of the Red Cross. The United States sent three planes to the Congo to support the central government. The Italian Government asked us to keep our planes there to assist in the movement of Italian citizens. When we suggested that the Italians should send their own planes, they said they would not do so. These examples, the Secretary said, could be multiplied. European security and prosperity have led to laziness. The Secretary said he is saying this briefly and making perhaps an extreme case, but he wishes to make a point—the United States are not mercenaries for the whole world as some Europeans seem to think. Spuehler said he understands the Secretary's viewpoint. The United States are not mercenaries and are not going to be the policemen for the whole world. The Foreign Minister noted that he sees a softening of alliances in the East as well as the West. The Secretary replied that peace makes alliances weaker. This is a natural development. But, he said, let us not forget that five years ago Khrushchev threatened President Kennedy with war in Europe over our position in Berlin. The countries of Eastern Europe have not been converted, the Secretary said. Both sides have perhaps become more prudent, especially since the Cuban missile crisis. The Secretary said he is not bothered by the slackening of alliances as long as they are available in time of crisis. Some Europeans think that they can stand between the United States and the Soviet Union. They believe that Europe is an innocent bystander in the Moscow-Washington struggle. These Europeans feel that, if Europe could pull out, the issue would become one between Moscow and Washington only. But Europe is not an innocent bystander, because Europe is the issue. The United States is not going to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic; the safety of Europe is the issue. Europe is not a third world; it is the main problem. Spuehler said he shares the Secretary's views. Europe, he said, could never stand up against the Soviet Union without U.S. backing, and this is the thinking in Switzerland. The Secretary observed that the United States for 20 years has been a minority of one in COCOM which has been attempting to limit trade in strategic commodities with Communist countries. Now that we have agreed to expand our trade with Eastern Europe, the Western Europeans say that we have entered into a conspiracy with Moscow. Our Eastern European trade is insignificant. Twenty-six percent of Eastern European trade is with Western Europe, and only 1.6 per cent is with the United States. But the Administration's legislation to improve U.S. trade with Eastern Europe is seen as part of this conspiracy, when all we are doing is following the West European example. Spuehler asked if the United States would support greater trade with Eastern Europe. The Secretary replied that we have no objection to this. He observed that some of Western Europe's objections to our attempts to increase trade comes from a reluctance to face U.S. competition in Eastern Europe. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–3 EUR. Confidential. Drafted by Foley and approved in S on August 17. The source text is labeled “Part 3 of 3.” 263. Memorandum of Conversation 263. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 15, 1967, noon. SUBJECT The President's August 15 Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger PARTICIPANTS Foreign Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Heinz Weber, German Interpreter United States The President Mr. Harry Obst, Interpreter After an exchange of pleasantries; The President said that he was aware that the Chancellor had a budget problem and so did he. The last sixty days, in addition to the budget problem, had called for a number of critical decisions. Among them had been the railroad strike for which it had been necessary to pass legislation that was upsetting “the labor people”. The Middle East crisis had developed suddenly and it had been very difficult to obtain a cease fire but at least a temporary solution had now been found. Then Chairman Kosygin, without any forewarning, had decided to see him. He had not wanted to go to New York because of the presence of people at the United Nations from communist countries, Arab countries and Africa, and Mr. Kosygin had not wanted to come to Washington. We then agreed to meet in Glassboro. He said the Chairman and he had discussed primarily the Viet-Nam problem. He believed that the Soviets would have liked to see the matter settled but it seemed they did not have sufficient “horse power” or influence to bring to bear on Hanoi. They also had talked in some detail about the situation in Venezuela where some communist agitators had been captured. They had a “straight” talk on the matter and he found the attitude shown by Kosygin “quite satisfactory”. They had talked about avoiding the establishment of an antiballistic system which would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Kosygin had agreed to talk about this matter but no date was set. He had suggested to Kosygin to table the NPT without Article III. He could not get an agreement on this at that time but this week it looked as if the Soviets were ready to proceed on this matter. The Soviets had informed us at 5:30 a.m. that they were ready to table the draft leaving Article III blank and leave the discussions on that Article to the future developments. He believed this would actually happen this week or next. He did not really know why they suddenly showed this willingness; maybe they looked for some positive result for their 50th anniversary; maybe they wanted to make up for their flop at the United Nations. After the hectic Middle East discussion at the United Nations there had been a disturbance in the Congo. He had sent over three planes mainly with the thought in mind to have them ready in case it was necessary to evacuate Americans in that area and if this was not necessary to help the established government in their efforts to put down the rebellion. This was the first time the United States had intervened on behalf of a black government. For that reason he considered this an important move which, however, had brought about some consternation on the domestic scene. This was followed by the race riots in Detroit and other cities. They had not been as bad as similar riots in India, Latin America and other parts of the world but had been very unusual for our country. President Roosevelt had had the same problem during his administration. The President then turned to the budget situation. He explained in detail the components that added up to a total deficit of about $30 billion. In that context he mentioned General Westmoreland would need about 200,000 more men in Viet-Nam, as he thought that now was a good opportunity to “try to wind up this thing.” Sixty-five thousand of those will be supplied by South Viet-Nam, 45,000 by us and the rest by the Koreans and the other allies. However the United States would have to pay for almost all of them. He said he was trying to cover the deficit by borrowing about one-half of it, cutting the deficit part of the expenditures by one-fourth and raise the other one-fourth by means of a surtax. If he would have to go into the capital market to borrow all of it, it might drive interest rates up as high as 12 percent and cause a dangerous inflationary spiral. This was a time when cities and other public authorities were borrowing heavily for all sorts of projects which had put an additional strain on the capital market. He hoped he could avoid that situation. However, some votes in congressional committees had not come out in his favor. His financial problems were compounded by the fact that his public opinion poll showed him at an all-time low of 39 per cent. The Chancellor told the President not to be too concerned about the public opinion polls. Polls in his country about the popularity of the CDU Party generally showed a low about one year before any election, but they had always won the elections. The President replied he found the Chancellor's remarks very encouraging but he still preferred to see a more favorable poll. He did not think that he had made any major political mistakes, but there were groups inside his Party and others that had different views on matters like Viet-Nam and he has not been able so far to make them go along with his opinion. The President emphasized that he would keep the Chancellor fully informed, as he had done in the past with Mr. Erhard, on all U.S. activities around the world that could significantly affect the world power structure. He could not repeat that often enough. He was willing to talk about the NPT in detail and listen to any suggestions that the Chancellor might have in the matter. With regard to the troop level he could promise the Chancellor that he would do anything in his power to hold the line if the Chancellor would do the same. He would not ask any favor of the Chancellor that he would not readily grant himself. After the visit of McCloy and his visit to Bonn he had allayed domestic fears on Germany. Then had come from Bonn the leak about troop cuts and it had led to a severe reaction in the Congress which had taken revenge by such actions as a substantial cut in his foreign aid request. The Chancellor told the President that he tried to keep up with events in the United States. He was fully aware of the President's domestic problems. He could not see where the President had made any major political mistakes that might account for his low rating in the polls. He believed that whenever a nation was plunged into a serious crisis people were quite ready to follow and support the Government's policy in the beginning but after some time and after the real difficulty became apparent and people could not see the end or a satisfactory solution in sight people had a tendency to get nervous and discouraged. This is why he had been so angry by the remark by Defense Minister Schroeder that the FRG would have to cut their Armed Forces by 60,000 men. This simply was not true. It had never been considered by him or his government. The Chancellor then explained that the proposed cuts were only in planned increased defense spending. In fact military spending would still go up by 1.1 per cent in 1968, by 7.5 per cent in 1969 and by 6 per cent in 1970. He then explained his attempt to introduce a “medium term” financial plan covering a five year period. He also explained that this year's reduction in defense expenditure planning was not just a result of economic reasoning, but that the top military men had tried for a long time to achieve more “realistic planning” in the Defense Ministry. They felt that the planning of the MOD exceeded what they could hope to get allocated in the national budget. They finally had agreed on the modification of planning just two weeks before the fall of the Erhard Government. In his talks with Defense Minister Schroeder last week they had decided that if a cut in personnel (the Chancellor did not specify here whether military or civilian) had to be made it would not exceed 15,000. This decision would only be made later in the course of the year. He personally would hope there would not be need for any cuts at all. The President replied he believed that force levels should be maintained if at all possible. Europe would need all the military forces at its command in order to remain secure during the uncertain period that lay ahead. He would do anything in his power to preserve the strength of the Alliance. He did not want to be the architect of the dismantling of the Alliance. He would hold the line if Kiesinger could hold the line, but if the Chancellor had to make a reduction he would be forced to make a proportionate reduction in the face of pressure from public opinion and from the Congress. They would have to stand arm in arm. The President complimented the Chancellor on his skillful handling of the improvement of relationships with East European countries. He believed the Chancellor was moving in the right direction. The President then repeated with great emphasis that all available forces were needed to guarantee the security of the Alliance and that every effort should be made to retain the present strength. The Chancellor said it was his view and that of his government to strive to maintain the present strength of the armed forces. He also believed that this was important to the security of the Alliance. Keeping up the necessary strength was not in any way in conflict with the policy of detente and the pursuit of peace. However, one would have to be careful not to confront the two military apparatuses facing each other with additional political tension, as this could lead to an eventual explosion. While keeping the military balance on the same level one should instead try to decrease the tension and keep it as low as possible. News media and some people had made it appear as if the FRG policy was one of aiming at the reduction of force levels; this was far from the truth. The President interjected that if the members of the House and the Senate were asked by how much they thought Kiesinger was trying to cut his armed forces, about 90 per cent of them would say by 60,000 men. The President then dwelt in some detail on the problems posed by inaccurate or slanted reporting in the news media as well as differences in language and national customs. He quoted as an example some misinterpreted statements of Prime Minister Ky that had appeared on television and in the press. He said that just one misunderstood word often could distort the picture significantly. In the light of this it was all the more important that the men at the top had complete trust and confidence in one another and that they would not do anything that would affect the position of the other without frank and full consultation. It should be the same kind of process as between two brothers running a business jointly. He believed this was the best way for the two men to work together. Did the Chancellor agree to that? The Chancellor replied the President could be assured of that. He could also be assured that what he had just told him about defense matters was true and correct. The Chancellor cited a public opinion poll taken in Germany which showed that the percentage of people there favoring closer cooperation between Germany and the United States had risen from 42 per cent in January of this year to 71 per cent in June of this year. The Chancellor then spoke about the Franco-German relationship. He said it was almost a miracle that after centuries of warring and fighting with each other a Franco-German friendship had been established. He was trying to continue the course begun by Schumann and Adenauer. During his recent talks with General De Gaulle in Bonn he had tried to provoke the General into a clear statement of his views on the United States. He had found them less harsh than expected on some counts. De Gaulle had said publicly during his visit and emphasized even more strongly in private that he believed that it was useful to maintain the present military strength and that the United States and France had been connected by a long and natural friendship. France wanted to preserve that friendship and wanted to preserve the Western Alliance at least until such time as the relationship with the Soviet Union had completely changed. De Gaulle also said publicly that he would not object to the physical presence of U.S. forces on German soil and had added privately that not only would he not object to them but he found their presence desirable. (The Chancellor said he hoped he was not committing any breach of confidence by relating this private remark to the President.) In response to Kiesinger's question why De Gaulle was using such harsh language about the United States the General had answered that this was not so much directed against the United States but was addressed to the French people to exhort them not to give up their French identity for a life of comfort in the Atlantic Community. The Chancellor remarked that he would interpret the remark of De Gaulle “until the relationship to the Soviet Union had completely changed” to mean that he would not leave the Alliance in 1969, as it was not likely that a complete change could occur by that time. On the question of British entry into the Common Market he had found De Gaulle to be “stubborn”. He did not believe that much of a change had taken place in his attitude on the matter but maybe in the long run public opinion and other pressures would bring him around to reconsider his position. De Gaulle also had told him that he believed that the only danger from the Soviet Union was a military danger. He did not think that the communists in the countries west of the Soviet Union were any longer true allies of the Soviet Union. The Chancellor made clear that he did not share this view, and the President said he did not either. The Chancellor stated that he thought the Soviet Union, though not talking much about China, was thinking about the problem of China all the time. The President agreed with this view. The Chancellor repeated that he thought De Gaulle's attitude during their last meeting had been more relaxed than during their meeting in January. He had seemed to acknowledge the existence of differences between the two men rather than to balk at them as he had done in the past. He had ended their conversation by telling the Chancellor a story about two men that had gone out to hunt for a treasure. After a long journey, hardship and disappointment they finally had to give up their attempts without finding the treasure. Instead, however, they had found a much more valuable treasure: friendship and understanding. The President thanked the Chancellor for his comment on General De Gaulle. He said he was impressed by the progress and stabilization achieved in France under the General's leadership. This stability had had a good influence on the rest of the world. He did not quite know why De Gaulle sometimes found it desirable to use such sharp language. Maybe by age he still felt more closely attached to another era, the era of Church-ill and Roosevelt, and maybe he remembered too much the attitudes of President Kennedy and Macmillan toward him. As far as the President was concerned he made a policy of consciously refraining from negative statements about De Gaulle. Whenever he was being hit by the General he was just turning the other cheek. In four years he had not said one bad thing about him. He (the President) was interested in seeing European unity maintained and he did not want to add to any seeds of dissension. He believed that if the chips were down De Gaulle would stand by the United States, as he had done during the Cuban crisis. This action the President had not forgotten. The Chancellor, returning to the question of British application to enter the EEC, stated that some decision would have to be made within the EEC during this year with regard to Britain's application. His Government had made clear to Mr. Wilson, and during the Rome meeting, that they favored the British proposal. He had suggested that the Chiefs of the six governments meet again toward the end of this year to discuss the matter. However, he could only go so far in pushing the British case. He could not act like “a bulldozer”. That would make the General only more stubborn. The President said that he did not think De Gaulle knew how much respect the President had for the French people and how much confidence he had in General De Gaulle. He thought the Chancellor could be helpful to the United States as a sort of mediator in his talks with De Gaulle. The Chancellor replied he would be glad to try to mediate and harmonize wherever possible. He considered his last meeting with De Gaulle (about June 12) as the most important. With regard to the then just erupted conflict in the Middle East De Gaulle had expressed his concern about the possibility that Israel might not want to relinquish the conquered territory. The President interjected that he was concerned about the same matter. The Chancellor said he believed De Gaulle was honest and serious when he told him during the meeting that his foremost concern was peace for France and peace for Europe. The German people had been confronted with a moral option at the beginning of the Middle East crisis. He (Kiesinger) was happy that they had opted almost unanimously for Israel. He thought this had proved again that the rumors and press stories about a resurgence of neo-nazism were false. The President stated he was often confronted with the problem of having an image distorted by half a dozen newspaper people or other media, probably at times with the intent to further the interests of certain groups. He said since their interests were one and the same they should never fight each other. If he and the Chancellor could stand together it would be an essential contribution to stabilizing the world situation. A closer United States-German cooperation would be in the best interests not only of the two countries but would be of benefit to all of Europe. He did not think that it had made any sense for Germans to fight Americans in two big wars as they both hailed from the same stock. Returning to the Middle East crisis the President said that in his meeting with Foreign Minister Abba Eban on May 26 2 he had tried hard to discourage any aggressive move on the part of Israel and had tried to assure Mr. Eban that according to United States intelligence information the Arab buildup was of a defensive nature and did not point to an imminent Arab attack. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] The Chancellor thanked the President for informing him on this meeting and the position taken by the United States in the Middle East conflict. He said he had found this information extremely interesting. The meeting then broke up about 2:00 p.m. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 68 D 475, CF 37. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst and approved by the White House on October 4. The meeting was held at the White House. Kiesinger visited the United States August 13–19. 2 A memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume XIX. 264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, September 6, 1967, 1648Z. 32570. NATUS. Ref: (A) State 8514 Circular; (B) Paris 2756. 2 Subject: Future of the Alliance Study. 1. Department has been reviewing status of Future of Alliance Study in preparation for four sub-group meetings scheduled for September and early October, and meeting of rapporteurs scheduled for October 12–13 in England. With this timetable, we would envisage meeting of Special Group principals at end of October. Purpose this message is to summarize our views at present stage for background of addressee posts. Action with representatives of other countries should be taken only by the US participants in the Study. 2. We continue to attach major importance to speediest possible completion of sub-group reports; to encouraging rapporteurs to submit substantive, well-written analyses and conclusions; and to avoid at sub-group level negotiated language representing lowest common denominator of fifteen national positions. Thus, we continue to adhere generally to views outlined in reftel A. 3. Beyond foregoing points, however, we consider aims should be (a) that Ministers receive for action in December a brief, substantive paper covering the four sub-group reports; and (b) that there also be a brief public document emanating from the Ministerial Meeting designed for maximum public impact. 4. While development of tactics in connection with these aims will depend importantly on developments between now and mid- October, it may be that, in connection with their October 12–13 meeting, rapporteurs themselves can do much of drafting of proposed covering report for Ministers. They should make it possible for Special Group principals subsequently to concentrate on resolving any outstanding substantive differences. Alternatively, covering document for sub-group reports might have to be drafted in Special Group or by PermReps and International Staff acting under its guidance. Our preference, however, would be for first approach indicated above. Similarly, there is question whether US would favor public release of this document or whether published report should be written separately. We incline to latter view but will take final decision later. Our decisions re tactics and procedures will depend importantly on our reading of likely problems with France and certain other countries. 5. Major point on which we are now clear is that public document, at least should be a short summary of major findings and conclusions with minimum of analysis and factual material. These might be included in December Ministerial communique or issued separately. In order for our approach to have best chance of success, all basic ideas should be built in at sub-group level. This means that, in addition to clear statement and rationale for indefinite continuation of the Alliance (including such things as integrated military system, substantial forces, careful balance between detente and deterrence, and general need to strengthen political consultation and policy coordination), we need at least one major clearly-defined substantive or institutional proposal relating to future tasks of the Alliance from each of the sub-group reports. 6. It is these latter, in our judgment, that will have greatest impact on official and public opinion in NATO countries; serve to demonstrate that Alliance is looking to the next decade; and provide indispensable counterpart to fundamental points about Western strength and cohesion that are relatively undramatic but must be clearly reiterated and endorsed in final report. 7. We have tentatively identified following points, additional to those cited re maintenance of strong Alliance, that US participants should endeavor to assure stand out as specific proposals or conclusions in sub-group report. A. Sub-Group One (East-West Relations) . In addition to providing defense and deterrence for the indefinite future, a principal Alliance task for the late 1960s and 1970s will be to come to grips with the problem of East-West security arrangements in Europe. This includes problem of division of Germany and Berlin. Closest understanding and coordination among Western countries desiring to contribute to resolution these basic issues will be required prior to initiation of discussions between East and West. While solid understanding is desirable among governments having special responsibilities for German question (US, UK, FRG and France), there must also be broader agreement within the Alliance. This means investigation on continuing basis of all substantive issues of European security, in all their ramifications, as well as consideration of procedural approaches to East-West negotiations. This should be undertaken by a special group responsible to the Council, and might well take form of a major continuation exercise deriving from the Harmel Study. B. Sub-Group Two (Inter-Allied Relations) . We think most useful idea to come out of this group would be one aiming at better balance in the Alliance as between Western Europe and North America. While US would not want to take the initiative in pushing the idea in formal meetings, US participants should endeavor to stimulate Belgium or some other country to put in appropriate proposal for increased European cohesion in the Alliance framework (i.e., a development of the Belgian idea for a “European caucus”). Such a proposal could relate to the principle of advance discussions among all or some European members of the Alliance on subjects for political consultation in NAC. For various reasons it may not be possible to refine a proposal in the Harmel Study context by December. It would nevertheless be very useful for the idea to be advanced as clearly as possible with appropriate language to make clear that objective is to improve Western European cohesion and cooperation on broad framework of Atlantic cooperation. C. Sub-Group Three (Defense Policy) . Report for this Sub-Group, for which US has drafting responsibility, will include, in addition to emphasis on Alliance strength and cohesion, proposal for emphasis on disarmament and arms control matters. Specifically, it will suggest creation of improved machinery for the Alliance including a new Council-level, reinforced committee, strengthened international staff capability in this field, and increased utilization of defense planning procedures to advise on military implications of disarmament measures. D. Sub-Group Four (Problems Outside the Treaty Area) . Most important specific idea we would like to see emerge from this Sub-Group's work is need for intensification and greater flexibility of NATO consultations on problems beyond the Treaty area. Thus, in addition to stressing need and right of Alliance members to harmonize policies on world-wide issues, the report should clearly establish the principle that groups consisting of less than full Alliance membership can meet under NATO auspices to consult on selected international questions. Rather than a permanent new committee or committees, we might seek to establish general criteria to govern creation of ad hoc groups to consult on specific issues as they arise. Most important criterion in our opinion should be that consultations take place among countries (a) that express a definite interest in problem under discussion and (b) are prepared at least to contemplate possibility of harmonized national policies and shared responsibilities. E. General . Beyond the above specific ideas, we would also like to see another basic thought expressed in final report. This would be strong statement that, much more than in past, NATO bodies should serve as meeting place for senior officials from capitals. Purpose would be to supplement work of Permanent Delegations with frequent exchanges among officials in main stream of policy formulation at home. Analogy can be made with OECD practice in this regard. This point is applicable particularly to sub-groups one and four but may also apply to other fields. There is notably example of NPG/NDAC which already represents substantial step in this direction. 8. In addition to foregoing major points, there are perhaps limited number of other specific initiatives that should be reflected in final summary and published version. One that occurs to us would be endorsement of the proposal to establish a new and official relationship between North Atlantic Assembly (formerly NATO Parliamentarians Conference) and the NAC. Proposal has thus far evoked apathetic reaction from many Alliance members. It may stand a better chance if Harmel Study report gives it a boost and if problem is treated in context of broader efforts to strengthen the Alliance. 9. Request USNATO comments on this telegram. Would also appreciate any thoughts info addressees may have. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Bowie, Kohler, Springsteen, McAuliffe, and Thompson; and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, CINCEUR, SHAPE for POLAD, and EUCOM for POLAD. 2 Circular telegram 8514, July 18, transmitted guidance for a rapporteurs' meeting on July 21. Telegram 2756, September 2, offered an appreciation of the progress made to date in the Harmel exercise. (Both ibid.) 265. Memorandum of Conversation 265. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 18, 1967, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT Italy and the Alliance PARTICIPANTS Italy His Excellency Giuseppe Saragat, President of the Italian Republic His Excellency Amintore Fanfani, Minister for Foreign Affairs United States The President The Secretary Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter President Saragat said that the US is Italy's strongest ally and the world's greatest power. As such, US foreign policy is followed very closely in Italy. He said that he was pleased at the extent to which the President's presentation of our policy had confirmed the Italian reading. He stressed that he spoke not for Italy as a world power, but for Italy as a national power within Europe. He asked rhetorically what the European situation would be if a Communist Government took power in Italy. He said that while Italy's power might be relatively marginal, its absence from the free world could produce severe consequences just as the presence of Fascism in the peninsula had once affected the European continent and the world. The most loyal and meaningful way for Italy to serve the common cause is through an intelligent defense of democracy at home. For democracy to give way to communism in Italy would be tragic, not only for Italy, but the community of free nations as well. With regard to the domestic political situation in Italy, President Saragat was optimistic. The forces of democracy have for the moment and for the foreseeable future won the day. The mainstay of Italian foreign policy is the Atlantic Alliance. For Italy a Western orientation has historically brought progress while an Eastern orientation has brought only grief. Italy is firmly convinced of the necessity of the Alliance, and is equally convinced that without the Alliance, there would be little hope of solving Europe's problems. President Saragat enumerated what he felt to be the major problems confronting Europe. First of all was France. In France there exists a government that is both conservative and nationalistic. Even if De Gaulle were to disappear from the scene, little change could be expected in French policy. Unlike the situation which exists in Italy, De Gaulle and his policies are supported both by the forces of nationalism on the right and by communism on the left, for other, but obvious, reasons. President Saragat felt that while this is not to say that France is lost forever, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that De Gaulle's departure from the stage will cause any early reversal of policy. As for the Germans, President Saragat noted that after 23 years the German people are still divided four ways. No solution to the German problem is presently in sight. Only time will tell whether future generations of Germans will find different answers from those of Adenauer, Kiesinger, and Brandt. It seems certain, however, that Germany cannot remain divided and this poses a very serious problem which affects the life of Europe. It is this European problem that looms largest in the world and it is far more serious than even that of Viet-Nam. At present, some 20 million Germans are separated and isolated from some 60 million fellow Germans. This creates a situation that the Germans cannot continue to live with. President Saragat said that the US Civil War had been fought to bring together a divided country. He could not believe that the German people could indefinitely accept their division, although he saw no way at present to solve the problem. He was convinced that the Germans cannot long tolerate the status quo, although he added that for the moment we cannot go to war for German unification. He was convinced that a continuation of the present state of affairs could only bode ill for the long run. President Saragat saw the Atlantic Alliance as a relationship between the US and Europe which involved the US in seeking a solution to the underlying problems which beset Europe and in preventing a repetition of past tragedies. Italy feels deeply that the ties which bind the US and Europe must be preserved and strengthened. It also feels that while it is essential that the US give its attention to the problems of the world, it should give particular attention to the problems of Europe. With regard to Europe, Italy continues to press for the admission of Great Britain and the Scandinavian nations to the EEC. It is the view of the Italian Government that Great Britain must become a member of the Community because of Britain's relationship with the US. British membership would insure that the US and Europe would continue to stand together. President Saragat warned against any delusion that the USSR no longer wished to establish hegemony in Europe. Although the Russians had perhaps renounced their former means of achieving their goal, their basic aims had not changed. The size and the resilience of the Communist Parties in France and Italy, both of which receive enormous financial and moral support from the Soviet Union, attested to Russia's ultimate goal. The fact that the USSR is unwilling to take a single step toward German reunification also demonstrates that its objectives have not changed. It is thus essential for both Europe and the US that the Alliance continue, for should Western Europe come under the domination of the USSR, the US would no longer be the strongest power in the world. It is, therefore, necessary that when we talk about the relaxation of tensions, we remember that the Russians have not yet renounced their policy objectives. Some would have us believe, and we are occasionally advised in the press, that the Russia of today is different from the Russia of the past. This is not true. Their objectives remain today what they have always been: access to the Mediterranean, wider spread in the Balkans, and eventually to spill over into Western Europe. While their methods are no longer those of Stalin, we have all seen how any attempt by a nation within their orbit to break away and pursue an independent policy is immediately and brutally crushed. President Saragat said that with the approaching elections, NATO has become a major issue for Italy. The Italian Government remains firmly convinced of the necessity of NATO not only for military purposes, but also as a vital instrument to secure the existing bonds between the US and Europe. Italy firmly believes in the partnership which President Kennedy referred to in his speech at Philadelphia 2 and which President Johnson referred to in his speech of October 7, 1966. 3 A strong NATO is the only means which can prevent the loosening of the close ties uniting Western Europe and North America. President Saragat felt that De Gaulle's nationalism is more dangerous to the Alliance than are the attacks of the Communists. The Communists realize this and therefore lend their full-fledged support to Gaullist policies. There is a need today for even stronger support of the Alliance. President Saragat said that he has consistently supported the Alliance within Italy and his support has won for him the strong resentment of the Italian Communists. President Saragat said that he had found his talks with Chancellor Kiesinger on this subject to be most useful. Their talks were held prior to Kiesinger's visit to the US and they had dwelt at length on the importance of European unity and had also touched upon the problem of German reunification. The President said that the US respects the responsibilities of its allies and we draw great comfort from Italy's support. We are in complete agreement on the continued importance of Europe. The President said that he shared President Saragat's views and he expressed his gratitude for what President Saragat has done to maintain and strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. The President went on to say, however, that we also have alliances with nations in the Pacific area. We are equally committed to these alliances and it is our task to maintain the strength of both. He said that it should not be difficult to imagine with what great concern he views the present situation when we have six divisions stationed in Europe and half a million men fighting in Viet-Nam. Those individuals in the US who wanted all these men to come home increased his concern. He continued that while Italy might be concerned by the present situation, he wondered how much greater their concern would be if they had so many men committed abroad. To this must be added the continued drafting of thousands of men each month which is required by our present responsibilities. President Saragat replied that Italy's support is based not only on the friendship which has so long existed between our two nations, but equally rests on the realization that it was the US which had secured Italy's freedom. He felt that De Gaulle's France, and other European countries as well, should be grateful to the US and that their actions should reflect this gratitude. It was only as a friend of the US that he felt called upon to raise certain viewpoints that had recently come to the surface in Europe. This concern is of little importance in comparison with the friendship of all those in Europe who know and realize that they owe their freedom to the friendship and to the commitments of the US. It is because of this strong friendship which exists in Italy that his country will sign the NPT … with improvements. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on September 28 and by the White House on October 5. The conversation was held at the White House. The source text is labeled “Part V of VI.” 2 For text of President Kennedy's speech at Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962 , pp. 537–539. 3 See Document 211 . 266. Memorandum of Conversation 266. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 25, 1967, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Harmel Exercise (Part 1 of 3) PARTICIPANTS Edward Tomkins, Minister, British Embassy Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Irving Cheslaw, EUR/BMI Mr. Tomkins said the Foreign Office would like to have Mr. Kohler's latest views on the Harmel Exercise as they had been hearing some menacing noises from the French on this subject. Mr. Kohler said that he believed the French would hold their fire on the reports of the sub-groups, but that their flak would probably come at the special group meetings. Mr. Kohler said his sub-group would try to cover the French points as well as certain arrangements regarding essential cooperation with the French, and would go on to stress that NATO should play a more active role in disarmament. Mr. Kohler believed the report should stress that the present possibility of detente derived from unity in the past. This was a lesson for the future. Mr. Kohler commented that the French were angry that Spaak had written a report critical of them. Mr. Tomkins referred to an article in the Le Monde by Andre Fontaine which spoke of French withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Kohler said he did not think that the French would consider withdrawing on account of the Harmel Exercise. They might use the report as a pretext, but this decision would be made for other reasons and by De Gaulle alone. Mr. Kohler said he personally was opposed to watering down the Harmel Exercise just to allow for that factor. Mr. Tomkins said that HMG did not want to see a report that was unacceptable to the French, but the British thought the exercise must have a positive effect. Mr. Kohler said that the French had been told there was no desire to embarrass them or to argue about any of their actions. These must be accepted as given facts and even mentioned, but not provocatively. Mr. Tomkins said that HMG was concerned that U.S. thinking presumed the need for formidable nuclear strength in NATO which in turn suggested that there was no immediate prospect that the security situation might be changing. Mr. Kohler agreed that this was the U.S. view. He noted that the Soviets were making tremendous efforts in the missile field as well as in submarines, and that it would be folly not to take account of this. He said our strength was in the balance of power on the continent. Mr. Tomkins observed that the restatement of these truths would possibly not be welcome to some European ears, especially if the French thought that NATO was coming out against their policy of getting along with the Russians. Mr. Kohler said that his report would temper its language to deal with the French position, but he acknowledged that it might be hard for the French to go along. Mr. Tomkins asked if the report would consider mutual reduction of forces. Mr. Kohler said that for the present this was a non-starter as far as the Russians were concerned. It was worth considering as a subject that would be topical, especially when the Vietnam problem was over. However, prospects for practical progress were nil at this stage, because the Russians would not do anything likely to free U.S. troops for Vietnam. Mr. Kohler said that, before leaving Moscow he had asked Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov if there was any interest in reopening such old issues as military observers and security and surprise attack measures. Semenov had replied that these were subjects of potential interest but not under present political circumstances. Mr. Kohler said, however, that NATO should still set up machinery, including a strengthened international staff capability, to deal with arms control and disarmament meas-ures. Mr. Kohler observed that, as our main arms coordinating center, NATO could also be a major disarmament coordinating center. Mr. Tomkins said that HMG had the impression that the U.S. now preferred that NATO not discuss mutual force reductions outside the Harmel Exercise. Mr. Kohler said that there was no point in proceeding with this issue in specific terms, at this time. 1 Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Memcons. Confidential. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in G on September 29. The conversation was held in Kohler's office. 267. Memorandum of Conversation 267. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 27, 1967, 6:15 p.m. SecDel/MC/10 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September–October 1967 SUBJECT NATO (Part II of III Parts) PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Edward Lampson (notetaker) Edmund Glenn (interpreter) Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel Vicomte Davignon, Chef de Cabinet Baron van der Straeten-Waillet, Director General, Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Scheyven Foreign Minister Harmel told the Secretary the drafting of the Harmel study on the future tasks of the Alliance was generally going along in a positive and satisfactory way. He spoke warmly of the contributions made by Mr. Rostow and his collaborators and especially of the work of Mr. Kohler as rapporteur of the Third Sub-Group on defense policy which was doing an outstanding job. He then turned to the problem of French obstruction. Spaak had completed a draft of the report of the Second Sub-Group on Inter-Allied Relations, which the French refused to accept. They even rejected a formulation that the Alliance was an element for peace. This was a complete reversal of what Couve had said at the last ministerial meeting in Paris. Harmel said he was planning to talk to Couve in New York in the hope of persuading him to be less obstructionist. In the past it had been possible to make some headway by talking to him personally. It was much preferable to continue with French acquiescence but it might be necessary to proceed without them if they remained completely negative. With the exception of the French the work had gone well with a lot of interest and dynamism and the quality of the analysis and drafting had been high. Harmel said, however, that the drafting on Atlantic solidarity had been disappointing because a number of Europeans and the Canadians had been holding back and had shown timidity in discussing this topic. The Secretary said there was a very serious question in regard to France. There was one report that Couve might refuse to come to the December meeting in Brussels where the report will be discussed. French conduct presented us with a dilemma. If the Fourteen adjust to French sensibilities the report may have nothing in it. But if we say what we think, this may give deGaulle a pretext for withdrawal. This basic question of political strategy deserves attention at the highest level. The Secretary said that in his personal view we should not let ourselves be blackmailed but this has some danger in it. The NATO Foreign Ministers should exchange views on this vital question. But it is much better for the other Foreign Ministers to try to discuss the matter with the French. Secondly, regarding Atlantic solidarity, the Secretary said that we are willing to go as far as the Europeans wish us to go but that we cannot tell the Europeans what they should do. Harmel replied that, in his view, the concept of Atlantic solidarity was essential. The Secretary said it might conceivably be useful if the question were discussed at some time, strictly among Europeans. Harmel replied that, in his opinion, this question should never be discussed in a European caucus but in all frankness with the U.S. and Canada. The Secretary then spoke of the work of the Fourth Sub-Group dealing with NATO consultation or problems outside of the treaty area. European suspicion that the U.S. was trying to entice Europeans into Vietnam or Cuba was wrong. This was not what we had in mind at all. In our view, NATO cannot think soundly about its security if it limits itself to considering problems within the geographic framework of the NATO area. Things outside the NATO area vitally affect NATO itself. The Middle East crisis has shown that. It is impossible for NATO to ignore the vast continent of Africa which is only twenty minutes by air from Europe. It is only in the past year that Saclant has begun to think in terms of naval operations in the Atlantic south of the NATO line. But it is ridiculous to think in terms of two disconnected naval battles—one north and one south of the NATO line. Harmel agreed that NATO could not ignore such interrelationships and advocated an exchange of information and assessments regarding developments outside the NATO area. It had been a great mistake for the Europeans not to have listened more attentively to the American analysis of developments in the Middle East eight months ago. But he said that the drafting of the fourth section had been the most difficult. Vicomte Davignon, who had been working on the Report, said that the Third Group was reaching positive conclusions but the work of the Fourth Committee had been proceeding poorly. The members of the group were unwilling to engage in serious and thorough discussions and the rapporteur had to do most of the work himself. In conclusion the Secretary assured Harmel that we would do everything we could to support and assist the work of the Harmel Group and that we must keep in touch on the problem of French obstruction. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Approved in S on September 29. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. 268. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 268. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, October 4, 1967, 0307Z. 48343. NATUS. Subject: Future of the Alliance Study—US-Belgian Discussions. This message is for background and guidance of addressee posts. 1. Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel and Under Secretary Rostow on October 3 held general review of status and prospects Future of Alliance Study. Kohler, Stoessel and Department officers were present on US side. In addition to Harmel, Belgian side included Davignon (Harmel's Chef de Cabinet), Van der Straten-Waillet of Foreign Ministry and Belgian Ambassador. 2. Belgian Reaction to Work of Sub-Groups —Davignon characterized Belgian view of Sub-Group work along following lines: Report on East-West relations (Sub-Group I) has not caused major problems at sub-group level. In Belgian view, however, it is too timid, especially section on Germany which says less than public statements by German leaders. Spaak's draft on inter-Allied relations (Sub-Group II) has caused major difficulties with the French. While Spaak is unwilling to change substance of the report, he is trying to make form less objectionable. Kohler's report on defense policy (Sub-Group III) is the best report substantively. It deals with matters that primarily concern the Fourteen and thus provides less of a target for French. Patijn's report on developments outside Treaty area (Sub-Group IV) contains many good ideas but language is too far-reaching for a number of countries. 3. French Intentions —Belgian side indicated concern that, unless US and Belgium quietly spread word that they intend to see the exercise through, a number of other countries will get cold feet in face of present or anticipated French objections. Harmel expressed view that Fourteen should proceed prudently but firmly including scheduled action by Ministers in December. He said that even if De Gaulle should take France out of the Alliance completely (something he thought would not be in France's interest) the Fourteen would continue. For them to back down on Future Alliance Study would be tantamount to giving up right to carry on intensified political consultations. For the rest, Harmel thought it best not to try to speculate on French tactics or timing but deal with situations as they arise. 4. Rostow expressed general agreement with Harmel's views. He emphasized that improved political consultations are important in order to safeguard the ability of Allied nations to act internationally. This was especially important for the US given present domestic and international situation. 5. In response to Rostow's question, Harmel said he thought it would be desirable for the US or Belgium to sound out French authorities quietly. He emphasized, however, that this should not take form of a series of approaches which would dramatize the situation and engage French prestige. He also thought approach should be made only after rapporteurs' report from Ditchley Park meeting October 11–12 is in hand. It was left that US and Belgium would be in touch re this question after Ditchley meeting. 6. Form and Content of Report —Harmel thought it would not be practicable to combine the four sub-group reports into one comprehensive document. On other hand, he considered it essential that Special Group have before it a single umbrella document or covering report which would hopefully be produced by the rapporteurs. This document should be primarily a set of conclusions on which Special Group representatives could take positions. Harmel said that rapporteurs' efforts naturally reflect their individual personalities; that their work should be viewed as input to the Special Group; but that main thing would be consolidated set of conclusions. He cited Kohler summary for Sub-Group III as model. Rostow expressed general agreement with this comment. 7. Belgians noted that Brosio is prepared to take responsibility for drafting such a document after Ditchley Park if necessary. They thought it would be difficult for him to take lead at present stage lest he compromise his position with other countries, especially France. 8. Harmel expressed view that substantial agreement must be reached at Special Group level. He thought it most unlikely that Ministers in December could improve the package. As to substance, he noted that each country would have some special point of interest. Problem was for the Special Group to balance these out. Belgium, for example, would be interested in highlighting the central importance of a concerted allied program for reducing tensions with the Communist world, pointing towards an ultimate settlement. If the approach was not accepted in the first instance, that would be regrettable. But it is of great political importance that we make the effort. 9. In response to questions by Rostow, Harmel expressed opinion that Special Group could readily agree on language to identify problems and goals re Germany and European security. He recognized that there would be difficulty in defining methods for Western consultations on these issues, however. The German question affected all Alliance members. Belgium at any rate would be opposed to a restricted body in NATO to consult on this issue. Rostow and Stoessel said that after consideration of all the alternatives, they agreed. 10. Rostow noted importance we must all attach to German views in this general area. Kohler pointed out that while Germans favor Allied consultations, they have a big interest in avoiding any derogation from quadripartite responsibilities. Rostow remarked that Future of Alliance report should make clear that future NATO consultations should not imply such derogation. Stoessel noted that it might be preferable to identify problem and issues but not try to spell out plan for establishment of a group in NATO as part of Harmel exercise. 11. On issues outside NATO area, Rostow emphasized importance of NATO consultations covering, for example, the Middle East and Africa. Such consultations should be open to those NATO countries wishing to participate. Harmel agreed that it was important for the Alliance to consider developments in regions in close proximity to the Treaty area. He hoped the report would include clear language on this point. 12. Harmel raised question (which had interested Belgians early this year) of asking NATO countries “to sign on” to the Treaty for a specified number of years beyond 1969; i.e., to agree not to exercise withdrawal rights under Article 13. He had now come around to view that question was too sensitive and complex to be handled in this manner. Important thing, he thought, was for the Future of the Alliance Study to make clear by implication that Alliance is not only necessary but would continue automatically for an indefinite period in order to accomplish its objectives; e.g. bringing about a European settlement. Rostow stated US in full agreement with Belgium on this point. 13. Arrangements for Special Group Meeting —On assumption that rapporteurs will complete their work at Ditchley meeting October 11–12, both sides considered it important that Special Group meet as near November one as possible. Exact timing is to be worked out through Brosio. Both sides thought two full days would be required and that a second session might be necessary prior to December Ministerial Meeting. Rostow expressed view Special Group might meet over a weekend in case three days needed. 14. Harmel said he attached special importance to high-level, political attendance in the cases of a number of countries. Examples were: Germany, where Scheutz or his successor should be urged to come; Canada; Denmark; Italy; Netherlands; Turkey and UK. He also thought considerable diplomatic preparation might be necessary between Ditchley meeting and Special Group meeting and suggested Belgium had already been active in urging high-level participation. Harmel plans to attend himself, and has told Luns his attendance is essential. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson; cleared by Stoessel, Kohler, and EUR/FBX; and approved by Rostow. Also sent to Brussels for Bowie, EUCOM for POLAD, and SHAPE for POLAD. Repeated to CINCEUR and Belgrade for Leddy. 269. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 269. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, October 10, 1967, 1124Z. 4932. Subject: Great Britain, the Common Market, and Europe. During a conversation with Couve de Murville today I asked him if there was any proof to the various rumors around about a possible European conference next year. Couve said that everybody seemed to ask the French this question—the Russians, Poles, and others—but that they had not and would not make any suggestion for any such conference and he did not believe that the time was propitious for any such conference. In passing reference to Britain and the Common Market Couve said that Commission's report would have to be studied which he thought would be the position which he would take at the meeting of the Ministers on October 23. I told him that it looked to me as though the difference between French position and that of the Commission was quite narrow; that the Commission felt that the economic and financial situation of Britain was not such that she could join the Common Market but that the best method of examining it would be by negotiation whereas France felt that the situation of Great Britain in addition precluded negotiation. Couve admitted that as matters now stood this was approximately correct. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Brussels for USEC. 270. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk 270. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 16, 1967. SUBJECT Ditchley Park Meeting on Future of the Alliance—Information Memorandum 1. I have just returned from several weeks in Europe during which I visited Paris, London, Bonn, Copenhagen and Brussels mainly on the Harmel exercise on the Future of NATO. 2. With the informal approval of the Rapporteurs, I prepared for their meeting at Ditchley Park on October 11–12 a resume of the findings and conclusions of the four Reports which had just been completed. With a few additions and changes the Ditchley meeting decided to forward the document to the Special Group to assist it in its work. I am attaching a copy of this resume in this form (2d clip). 2 3. While the style betrays its composite origin, I think the resume states pretty well the situation the Alliance now faces and its tasks for the future. 4. From the Reports, resume and discussion, the following points seem to me worth noting: (a) The study on the whole takes a balanced view of present Soviet attitudes and military strength and reaffirms the continuing need for the Alliance. While feeling secure, Europeans are aware that the source of their security is mainly the U.S. commitment and capacity. (b) There is a general desire to use the Alliance for concerting efforts towards detente. In practice, however, ideas on the prospects and what to do vary widely; this may severely tax efforts for a common line. Two major motives of the Europeans are to keep a check on the U.S.-USSR dealings and on West German activity. (c) The Reports assert that there are real European interests in the area beyond NATO. In practice, however, the Europeans are extremely reluctant to involve themselves outside the NATO areas, partly due to the sense of impotence in influencing the U.S. in such fields. (d) The resume states much more frankly than is customary the effects of the disparity in power and influence between the U.S. and the European allies. Whether one talks to the UK, Germans, Benelux, or others, this is a central factor in defining the relations within the Alliance. (e) The Reports recognize (less clearly than one might wish) that changes in procedure will be only palliatives so long as the serious power disparity continues. Most Europeans, including the British, recognize clearly that the only effective answer would be European unity in some form, but they vary widely in assessing prospects for achieving it. If the Europeans should acquire active confidence in achieving further cohesion, this might materially improve the morale in the Alliance even though its achievement took some while. 5. The résumé probably reflects fairly well the views of almost all the Allies except the French, who seem likely to try to block a fruitful outcome of the exercise. Apparently, they intended to put pressure on the Germans, the Canadians, and perhaps others to this end. For various reasons these Allies are most reluctant to have a head-on clash with the French at this time. In this situation, careful handling will be required to assure a constructive outcome. The question may come down to whether or not to accept practical consensus of the Fourteen without a resounding declaration. In any case, the U.S. will need to consider very carefully the resulting tactical issues over the coming weeks. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Bowie and initialed by Rusk. 2 A handwritten note on the source text indicates that an EUR status report on the Harmel study was attached at the first clip and Bowie's summary at the second clip. Neither is printed. 271. Record of Discussion at the 23d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 271. Record of Discussion at the 23d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 1 Washington, October 19, 1967. PRESENT Under Secretary of State, Chairman Deputy Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence Director, United States Information Agency Administrator, Agency for International Development Under Secretary of Agriculture Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Counselor, Mr. Bowie Staff Director EUR, Mr. Leddy Amb. Cleveland ISA, Mr. Wyle JCS, General Orwat A. Discussion of the Harmel Study. Eugene Rostow introduced the subject by briefly sketching the background to the Harmel Study and the steps which led to the present critical and political phase. The Special Group, authorized by the Council to review the tasks of the Alliance, will meet on November 7 to consider the reports made to it by the four sub-groups. An excellent Summary of these reports was prepared at last week's Ditchley Park meeting. 2 Mr. Rostow explained that originally there had been some thought given to a special declaration reaffirming each nations commitment to the Alliance beyond 1969. The general view at the moment seemed to be that no specific declaration would be sought, but the continuance of the Alliance as long as danger continued would be clearly implied. For most member governments, it was important domestically that NATO play, and be seen to play, a positive political role in sponsoring policies to improve political relations with the Communist nations. Except for France, there is probably solid support for a strong result from the Harmel Exercise. All members are concerned about the possibility of hostile reactions from France, or even a withdrawal from the Alliance. It is generally thought that if France decides to withdraw it will not need the excuse of the Harmel Exercise to do so. On the other hand it would be easier to withdraw from the “feeble hulk” of NATO if it failed to revitalize its methods of political consultation. Harmel has told us that, while he wishes to avoid provoking the French, he is clear that we must not sacrifice any of the essential elements of the problem in order to propitiate France. It does not seem likely at this time that we shall have to consider going ahead with just Fourteen as we have had to do in the military field. If this kind of confrontation with the French appears unavoidable prior to the Ministerial Meeting, we would of course have to go back to the President. The ideal situation from our point of view would be to get approval of the Summary by the Special Group which would then transmit the paper to the Council as its own report. Between now and November 7 we will be exploring the reaction of governments to this Summary. We will also be trying to clarify and guide—not too oppressively—the reaction of our NATO partners, and their ideas as to procedure for the next two months. On substance, the ideas in the Summary fall mainly under the headings of European security arrangements, including the German problem; disarmament and arms control; and activities outside the strict Treaty area. The failure of Europe to speak with any authority during the Middle Eastern crisis has been felt in Europe. There was now a more forthcoming attitude toward the kind of consultation on Mediterranean and Middle Eastern problems which Ambassador Holmes was beginning. Progress in these consultations during the present period should help NATO reach a decision in the Harmel Exercise to continue them through an open-ended group at a level of political responsibility. With respect to NATO consultations on problems arising outside the Treaty area, Mr. Rostow thought the Middle East and North Africa were the obvious subjects with which to start the process of evolution within NATO. Mr. Rostow sketched the general tactical situation. He said that while there had originally been talk of a ringing Ministerial Declaration to be issued in December, we should be content to play the ministerial decisions in a low key. This could best be done by Ministerial affirmation of the Summary document or a version thereof as a kind of on-going work program. We should try to avoid the word “new”, so as not to cause problems with the French unnecessarily. All governments could make their own statements of what had been decided and play up those aspects of particular domestic importance to them. There had been talk about various alternative procedures for carrying forward the work recommended on European security arrangements, including the German problem. We had no particular preferences as to procedure. But NATO could not displace the underlying responsibilities of the United States, France, and Britain in Germany. Any consultative procedures to be developed would have to take this fact into account. There could be a continuing discussion of arms policy and force reductions and this could be done either in a new body or in one of the existing committees. On the Mediterranean Study, the creation of an open-ended committee should be considered for those who wish to participate seriously in this NATO activity. Before beginning the discussion, Mr. Katzenbach circulated the letter from Mr. Barr 3 stating Treasury views on the desirability of NATO considering cooperative methods for financing the presence of Allied troops in countries other than their own. Mr. Rostow said that he has been in contact with Mr. Fowler and Mr. Deming on the subject, which is before the new Deming Committee. They will pursue the problem in that forum. He regarded it as much too late to raise the issue in the Harmel Exercise. On the merits, he agreed with the Treasury view, and we intended to move ahead in the Deming Committee. Mr. Katzenbach agreed. He also commented with respect to the last paragraph of Mr. Barr's letter that he was not prepared to say that we were wrong in our long-standing policy on European unification. Mr. Nitze stressed the importance of progress in reviewing the strength of the Alliance. He agreed wholeheartedly with the conclusion in paragraph 27 that a lack of action in December would be a major failure. Mr. Nitze thought that most of the Alliance were together on the importance of defense arrangements, and on the importance also of better political consultation. Even with regard to France, there seemed to be some progress with respect to certain areas of the study, particularly Mediterranean problems. He thought we should put emphasis on this. On East-West policy, the Germans are the linch-pin since they were sensitive both to French concerns and generally on East-West policy since their interest was the most immediate. Therefore he recommended that we let the Germans take the lead on this. General Wheeler said that the Chiefs wish to second what Paul Nitze had said and emphasized the great importance they attached to positive movement in the Alliance. If not, it would not just be a question of “running down”, but rather of the Alliance's possible fragmentation and disappearance. While not attempting to deliberately antagonize De Gaulle, we should certainly not avoid doing what is necessary just in order to placate him. We don't need a dramatic declaration but we do need something positive even if in low key. All the Chiefs concurred in this view. He said he had no trouble with the substance of the Summary. Mr. Katzenbach said that on the tactical situation there seemed to be basic agreement among all those present on the necessity for reinvigorating the political side of NATO. We should be much worse off if no action were taken. Mr. Marks referred to his recent sampling study of public opinion showing strong support in Britain, Germany, France and Italy for a NATO role in East-West political initiatives. Ambassador Cleveland described the current political situation in NATO and how it differed from the confrontation with the French last year over defense matters. He said that the balance was now quite changed. At this point, some countries which had been unwilling to engage in a debate with the French on defense policy a year ago were now taking a strong position because the issue was or appeared to be “detente”. He said the US was now somewhere in the middle between the Danes and others who wanted a NATO political role in detente and the Germans who feared offending the French with emphasis on political tasks. He too stressed the fact that the US should not be particularly interested in a public declaration, but rather wanted clear decisions, a good statement, and a solid “working program”. Mr. Leddy made the point that the East-West relations report prepared by a German and a British official was a good, modest step-by-step program which did not aim at the fundamental security problem. It was his hope that the Germans might get the French to go along with this proposal. De Gaulle seems concerned that the Harmel proposals would seek to “control” the policies of the member countries, and not to be objecting to consultation as such. He stressed that if the French stay out of an agreement on East-West policies there is not much NATO can do because the French are essential to any such discussion. Mr. Kohler summed up the situation by saying that we needed enough in the way of positive elements for the Ministers to agree upon for a businesslike communique. Then we could let the Ministers portray the results in their own way. Mr. Bowie stressed the necessity of avoiding a German “run-out”. He supported Ambassador Cleveland's analysis that the best tactic was to aim for agreement on specific actions in order to minimize conflict with the French about formally approving reports or agreeing on major declarations. Mr. Rostow accepted the statement that the reports should not be approved as such but left to stand as the work of the Rapporteurs. But he thought something had to be approved and suggested that this could be the Summary or a document of equivalent import that would be proposed by the Special Group. Mr. Bowie said that he hesitated about this because he thought that this would lead to a renegotiation of the Summary and much of its content might be lost; it was better to retain it as a clear statement which could be used by individual members as they needed. Mr. Katzenbach summarized the situation by stating that all agreed that the Summary was a good statement of where the Alliance stands and provides good guidance for a future work program. All agreed that it was important that the exercise not be a failure however big or little a success it might be. All present also wished to get as much of the substance approved in its existing form without getting involved in a negotiation which might squeeze down the amount of substance in the report. Finally, the worst situation we could be in would be to get expectations up of a major move and then have the Germans defect and NATO perhaps lose prestige in the process. Mr. Katzenbach picked up the point about not needing a political declaration in the United States. He said this should not be overdone. We want a document which will help us convince people in the United States of the importance of NATO so that it cannot be said that we are neglecting Europe or allowing NATO to disintegrate. At most we could hope to get an approved version of the Summary and at least some agreement that the Secretary General would develop NATO actions from the Summary plus the announcement of some specific action at the time of the NAC Meeting. Ambassador Cleveland thought that Mr. Katzenbach and the Secretary might have to help out in a later stage when it would be necessary to show that the United States was prepared to get into a fight with the French, while not necessarily seeking such a confrontation. We would also have to work with the Germans and emphasize to them the importance of NATO having a political role in order for the United States to maintain public support for our troop commitment in Europe. Mr. Katzenbach agreed and said further that the question was not so much a fight with the French but more the effect on the Germans. We don't mind fighting with the French as long as we can maintain the unity of the Fourteen. [Here follows discussion of future meetings.] A.H. Hartman 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Records: Lot 74 D 164. Secret. Prepared by Arthur A. Hartman, Staff Director, on October 23. 2 See Document 270 . 3 Not found. 272. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 272. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, October 25, 1967, 1740Z. 3313. BUSEC. Subject: UK-Common Market: Where do we stand? 1. British strategy and tactics during past six months have been both intelligent and effective: A. They put in a straightforward and uncomplicated application, and have focused their efforts since on the single issue of getting a dialogue going. B. They appear to have grasped that this cannot be played as a traditional intergovernmental negotiation but requires an effort to manipulate the domestic politics of the Six. C. They have stopped talking about their own “problems” and have undermined previous French tactics by showing a willingness (once negotiations begin) to discuss all legitimate issues, including British domestic situation and sterling problem. D. They have gone a long way to solidify support of “Europeans” in Commission, in the Five and even in France by stressing need for a strong Europe able to stand up to us and play its role on world scene, and by hinting that Britain as a member would be in forefront of move towards greater economic and even political integration. 2. As a result, the British are over the first hump—the Six must now face the issue, and discuss the issues on basis of a Commission report which makes clear all problems are soluble given goodwill and determination. The problem for the British, the Commission and the Five, is how to engage a dialogue and get down to problem-solving. 3. French reaction to this evolution is clear from Couve's presentation: A. The General remains unalterably opposed to British entry, at least for foreseeable future (i.e. until Britain has been brought to her knees by unsolved economic problems). B. But he appears unwilling or unable to use flat veto because —it would create crisis in Community, and 1956–66 experience demonstrated France has greatest stake of all in Community's survival; —veto be bad French domestic politics, given public support for British entry, particularly after Giscard's public stand reported Paris 5530. 2 C. Hence French position will be —to delay and discourage, in hopes British will voluntarily withdraw or stop pushing application, at least for a while; —to keep British on the defensive by emphasizing the issue on which they are weakest—British inability to break through stop-go cycle and reconcile growth with balance of payments surplus; —to agitate “nationalization” of sterling as an issue which would necessarily take a long time to solve. 4. German position was clearly stated in off record talk by Kies-inger at House of Commons yesterday: A. Germany favors and will continue to support British application. (Kiesinger pointed out that over 60 percent of the German people support British membership even though only 38 percent think it would be to Germany's economic benefit.) B. But German Govt will not at this stage try to force any decisions (even on opening negotiations) by leading the Five in a face-down with France. Because: —German relations with France remain essential, especially to Kies-inger; —to do so might risk a crisis in Common Market, and Germany too cannot afford such a crisis; —in any case, Germans don't think the tactic would work—“if you want to bring a girl to the altar, you must first persuade her.” C. Hence Germans (who hold the key) propose to follow strategy of not forcing issue but maintaining steady pressure on French in the expectation that eventually France will yield to the pressure of “European public opinion.” (Everybody is too polite to discuss frankly whether this means before or after De Gaulle leaves the scene.) 5. From British viewpoint, German position knocks out theoretical option (probably favored by some) of trying to push the Five into face-down with France, first on starting negotiations and then on final decision. Instead, they must prepare for the long pull. Wilson's statement yesterday (London 3270) 3 that “time is on our side” confirms that this is HMG's view. While it is not yet clear what the talk of “strengthening EFTA” (reported separately) means, our initial judgment is that this is largely razzle-dazzle designed to maintain sense of forward movement until things sort themselves out more clearly in EC Council. 6. Whether time is really on Britain's side will depend largely on evolution of domestic economic and balance of payments situation in coming months. We will be in better position to assess this after October returns are in. Bruce 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Luxembourg, Brussels, Paris, Rome, and The Hague. 2 Dated October 20. (Ibid.) 3 Dated October 24. (Ibid.) 273. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 273. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, October 25, 1967. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STUDY ONMUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE Summary Conclusions : The prospects are poor at this time for reaching an accord with the Soviet Union for a mutual reduction of forces in Europe. Nevertheless, existing economic and political pressures among some NATO members to reduce defense expenditures are likely to continue and may increase. These pressures are presently manifested in budgetary defense cuts by some NATO Allies and in interest in pursuing a NATO study of mutual force reductions. At such time as the Soviets evince interest in the subject any discussions should be based on a step-by-step, “mutual example” approach. This approach could feature either a US–USSR trade-off or percentage reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. In the former case, prior agreement should be sought from our NATO Allies, who would expect to make corresponding reductions in their forces. In the latter case, our Allies would of necessity be involved in planning the approach. NATO discussion now of mutual troop reductions should be directed toward agreement upon procedures and general guidelines, rather than an early discussion of specific numbers of troops and reductions, which could precipitate a divisive debate that would prove disadvantageous to US political interests. Prospects for Mutual Reductions We and several of our NATO Allies have sought on a number of occasions to discuss the question of mutual troop reductions with the USSR. However, the Soviets show no inclination to make any cuts in their forces in Eastern Europe, either by agreement or by “mutual example”. They say that European frontiers must be settled first and that, in any case, they could not agree to any arrangement which would free US troops to fight in Viet Nam. This Soviet caution contrasts with its position in mid-1966 when the USSR showed some tentative interest in the possibility of mutual troop reductions. During the months following, however, Soviet representatives have become increasingly cool to the idea. For example, British Prime Minister Wilson raised the question of mutual troop reductions with Kosygin in London on February 10, 1967. Kosygin's only comment was that a prerequisite for any such reductions was to get European frontiers settled. An officer of the Soviet Embassy in London later confirmed to us that the British report was correct and that Kosygin had indeed set a new precondition (settlement of frontier questions) for mutual reductions of troops in Europe. The Soviet officer added that his Government was under considerable pressure internally and from the North Vietnamese not to take actions which would make it easier for the US to draw troops from Europe for use in Viet Nam. On March 17, Soviet Ambassador to the so-called German Democratic Republic Abrasimov told Ambassador McGhee that the USSR favors a continuation of the status quo. Abrasimov said that, as regards reciprocal withdrawals, the USSR would wait for deeds, not words. After the US, the UK, and France withdrew from Germany (it was not clear whether he meant all or part), then the Soviet Union would withdraw from East Germany. In July, West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt offered to discuss with the USSR reciprocal troop withdrawals from Germany; but, to date, the Soviets have given him no encouragement. As recently as August 17, a Soviet Embassy officer told a Department of State official that the USSR would not reduce its forces in Europe because it would do nothing to enable the US to send more troops to Viet Nam. At the present time, then, there appears to be no prospect that the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact will commit themselves to match any Western troop reductions with cuts of their own. [Here follow 9 pages of discussion of the details that might go into a mutual reduction of forces.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 NATO. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but is attached to a November 2 memorandum from the Department of State to Walt Rostow, which indicates that the paper was being sent to the White House in response to a “recent expression of continuing interest” and that it was developed in the course of an interdepartmental study of the topic. 274. Memorandum of Conversation 274. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Brussels, November 6, 1967. SUBJECT Special Group Meeting on Harmel Study PARTICIPANTS U.S. Under Secretary Rostow S/C—Mr. Bowie M—Mr. Enders RPM—Mr. Myerson Belgian Embassy Foreign Minister Harmel Ambassador Louis Scheyven Count Davignon Mr. Vaes Mr. Deschamps Mr. Van Bellingen USNATO Ambassador Cleveland Mr. Cargo Mr. Wilson Embassy Brussels Mr. Manfull Mr. Floyd 1. Mr. Rostow began the discussion by reporting on a talk he had just had with the German Permanent Representative, Ambassador Grewe. Following the discussion between Couve and Brandt on October 16 there had been some discussion between Beaumarchais and Sahm. There had been a Franco-German understanding as the result of these discussions. The Germans are now working on the idea of a 5–6 page declaration to be adopted by Ministers. This declaration would be complete in itself and there would be no need for a classified report to be adopted by Ministers. 2. Mr. Rostow said that, as presented by Grewe, the Germans envisaged a document that would recite the history of the exercise; explain the need for intensified political consultations including a reference to the Wise Men's Report; and identify the future political tasks. The latter would break down into four headings, namely, improving East-West relations; problems of European security including the German question; arms control; and the special problem of the Mediterranean. The German proposal would also refer to the need for open-ended bodies, with the Western Four to be the nucleus for the German and European security discussion. 3. Mr. Rostow went on to say that he had urged the Germans to speak early, perhaps immediately after Harmel. This could have a galvanizing effect on the meeting since others would assume that the Germans had been in touch with the French and were aware of what the French would accept. 4. Mr. Rostow said that Grewe did not yet have authority from Bonn to make his proposal. Grewe was in the process of clearing it. If he succeeded, and came up with a generally acceptable paper, it might be best for other delegates not to submit papers. This might only confuse the issue. 5. In response to a question by Mr. Harmel, Mr. Rostow said that Grewe had made clear that he could not guarantee French acceptance of the German ideas. 6. Mr. Rostow asked whether Harmel had heard of any sentiment in favor of postponing action on the Future of the Alliance Study beyond the December Ministerial meeting. The Italian Permanent Representative had recently raised this point with Ambassador Cleveland, although it may have been only a personal comment. Grewe had not envisaged a postponement but had envisaged continuing study of some subjects if agreement were not possible in December. 7. Mr. Harmel indicated he still thought a result was necessary in December. He was aware that some countries are hesitant. He recalled that the exercise was not designed to be a trap for France or any other country. Belgium, like the U.S., attached importance to the reported Franco-German understanding. Belgium had generally come to the same conclusions as the U.S. Harmel thought it important to find a common point of departure in last December's resolution. He also thought that substance was more important than what might turn out to be only a watered-down declaration. Thus, it would be prudent to concentrate on selecting several carefully-designed themes to steer the Alliance in new directions. 8. Mr. Harmel said he thought that Belgium would be in agreement with the German ideas as outlined by Mr. Rostow. He agreed on the order of priorities, namely, East-West relations in general, European security and Germany; arms control problems; and the Mediterranean. Open- ended groups might be established on other subjects at a later time. Mr. Harmel felt the question of a Ministerial declaration could be taken up later after substantive questions were settled. 9. There followed a discussion on procedures in which Messrs. Harmel and Rostow agreed that it would be good to press the Special Group discussions as far as possible on the following day. They recognized, however, that it might be necessary to continue on the morning of Wednesday, November 8. In any case, Mr. Rostow doubted that everything could be settled at the Special Group meeting. Any decisions taken, and especially any specific language, would have to be agreed ad referendum. 10. Reverting to the proposed work program, Harmel said that it would be important to make clear that East-West problems were larger than the problem of Germany. He thought there would always be some problem with East-West relations and, therefore, need for the Alliance. It would be a disaster if the Alliance should disappear even should the Soviet threat change. 11. There followed a discussion of the status of the Rapporteurs' reports. Both sides agreed that they might be attached to the Special Group's report as reference documents but that governments would not be asked to take any action. 12. Harmel asked about the content of Patijn's report. He thought we should not lose the ideas involved but pursue them later in a supplementary group or groups. Mr. Davignon expressed the view that much of Patijn's work, including his more positive ideas, ought to be used as input for an analytical study to be done by the International Staff. We needed more analysis of changes in the Communist world and in the Western world. It would be good for once if the NAC would forget about trying to produce an agreed document and have a paper in this general area reflecting the different national positions. In any case, the issue was too big and too difficult for the Special Group to settle on the following day. 13. The Belgian and U.S. sides then exchanged information about contacts they had had with other countries. Davignon had talked with Mr. De Ranitz of the Netherlands who was in general agreement on the work program idea. Mr. Rostow and Ambassador Cleveland mentioned the Italian sensitivities on the Middle East and explained why we were proposing to call the study a Mediterranean exercise. Mr. Vaes said he understood that the Danes and Norwegians were presently coordinating their positions. Denmark was no longer the weakest country in the Alliance on this subject. The Scandinavians disliked, however, the idea of open-ended groups. Messrs. Harmel and Rostow agreed that the Canadians might not be as weak as anticipated. Mr. Rostow said we had indications that Mr. Martin was more positive than his staff. 14. There followed a brief discussion on the importance of semantics in dealing with the French. Messrs. Davignon and Rostow mentioned the importance of avoiding any implications of common policies or integration. Mr. Bowie said we should be careful that we not go too far. He thought it would be better to formulate the proposition in terms of the freedom of interested members to consult without obliging others to participate. Davignon agreed. He and Mr. Bowie noted that the nature of consultation could range from simple exchanges of information to common action in particular cases. 15. Note : Following the meeting, discussion continued at a working dinner in the Belgian Finance Ministry. The discussion at dinner dealt with disarmament and arms control questions. Mr. Harmel asked whether we saw any possibility for regional European arms limitations actions. Messrs. Rostow, Bowie, and Cleveland pointed to the great difficulty of separating regional arms control problems from the problems of general disarmament. They also failed to see any present indication that the Soviet Union really was interested now. Nevertheless, they said we are prepared to study these matters and persevere in efforts to interest the Russians. Mr. Harmel said he was convinced that limited initiatives on regional arms control issues were desirable even if the Russians failed to respond at present. There would be certain political advantages. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and approved in M on November 16. The meeting was held at the Belgian Foreign Ministry. 275. Intelligence Note No. 904 275. Intelligence Note No. 904 1 Washington, November 9, 1967. SUBJECT First Harmel Hurdle Passed A general consensus on both substantive and procedural matters was reached among all the NATO members except France at a meeting of the Special Group which is conducting the Future Tasks of the Alliance Study (Harmel Study), held in Brussels on November 7 and 8. In the face of this consensus, the French, reluctantly and after some delay, agreed to go along with the procedural approach favored by their allies. This meeting thereby instructed NATO Secretary General Brosio to draft a report to the NATO ministers (as called for by a ministerial decision of December 1966) which would be based on the Special Group's discussion and would be submitted for consideration and approval at a second meeting, scheduled for November 22. The French made clear once again that they will continue to raise every kind of difficulty, relating to both substance and procedure, to torpedo or drastically water down the outcome of the Harmel Study. It was also clear, however, that they are inclined to desist when they think they have accomplished as much as they can at a given meeting. It is to be expected that the French will continue to pursue these tactics down to and at the December Ministerial meeting. But it is probable that, if the Fourteen can continue to maintain the unity shown at this meeting in defense of a genuine if limited consensus among themselves that is not provocative to French policy, the French will not in the end try to block adoption of a report (though they may note their dissent from some or all of it) or, a fortiori, take stronger measures of reprisal against the Alliance. French Tactics . The French agreement to stand aside to permit preparation of the draft report (termed superfluous by Roger Seydoux, the French permanent representative) was announced only on the second day of the meeting, following an overnight adjournment to permit the French to seek new instructions. But while finally agreeing to this procedural detail, the French continued to find fault with the proposed substantive conclusions of the Study. At the same time, the other NATO allies voiced general agreement that the Harmel Study should lead to positive substantive results, the theme of which would be the need for continuing the Alliance's deterrent function while at the same time pursuing political conciliation between East and West. This outcome envisions a work program for the Alliance to include intensified and systematic attention to improving East-West relations, European security and the German problem, arms control and disarmament, and the study of Mediterranean security. In the debate, the Germans, who have been particularly reluctant to risk antagonizing the French over the Harmel exercise, agreed to this general work program and firmly supported the necessity of producing a Special Group report to the ministers in response to the original resolution. The Canadians and the Danes, also sensitive to the French attitude toward the Study, likewise gave reasonably forthcoming presentations. The French representative replied to the views expressed by his colleagues by questioning the ability of NATO to act as an agent of detente. He reiterated the view that relations between East and West should not be carried on between blocs and questioned suggestions that the Alliance should try to devise a security system for Europe or arms control proposals. Seydoux also asked why specific subjects for consultation should be listed, thus limiting the field after eighteen years of successful consultation within the Alliance. In a slightly veiled reference to France's power to obstruct, he pointed to the importance of preserving a spirit of cohesion and solidarity in an Alliance which requires decisions to be taken unanimously. He also questioned whether the proposed Mediterranean study was really to be concerned with the Middle East, in which case he felt that all were agreed that this problem should be left to the United Nations. In private conversations with US officials attending the meeting, Seydoux said that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville not only did not like the idea of a report prepared by the Secretary General for the NATO ministers, but indeed hoped that there would be no report at all. It is clear that the French would still like to reduce the conclusions of the Harmel Study to a paragraph in a ministerial communique. But later, when Seydoux yielded on the procedural point and would agree to Brosio's preparing a draft statement, he switched his attack back to the substance. The French representative even asked for US help in obtaining a report to which the French could agree, stating that Couve did not want trouble over the Harmel Study at the Ministerial meeting. During this private meeting, Seydoux appeared to be considerably more forthcoming with regard to what the French would accept than in his presentation to the Special Group. He indicated that France could support the work proposals made in the Watson-Scheutz report (East-West Relations) and the Kohler report (Future Security Policy of the Alliance), and perhaps also the proposal for a Mediterranean study—in effect, the work program on which the other allies expressed general agreement, as mentioned above. The French undoubtedly felt obliged to go along with the proposed procedure for drafting a report in the face of the unexpected strength and near unanimity of the positions of their NATO allies at this meeting, including those who previously have sought to appease the French on these questions. The French desire and purpose undoubtedly is still to scuttle or severely weaken the results of the Harmel Study. However, the general agreement evidenced among the other NATO allies concerning the need for positive results from the exercise presents the French with the risk of over-playing their hand. Prospects. Notwithstanding the private declarations by Seydoux that France might be able to accept what appears to be the agreed conclusions of the rest of the Alliance members, the French can be expected to continue to test the resolve of the Fourteen, probing for weaknesses as regards support for an increased political role for the Alliance, and taking advantage of any divisions which might appear in order to press for a minimal declaration regarding the future tasks of the Alliance. The Fourteen still face the difficult task of agreeing to words which capture what seems to be an emerging consensus regarding worthwhile results for the Harmel Study and yet do not offend the many sensitivities, French and otherwise, uncovered by this year-long exercise. This game can be expected to continue up to and through the December Ministerial meeting. However, if the Fourteen are able to maintain their present solidarity on the consensus reached at the November 7 meeting, the French will find it difficult to make a convincing case, particularly in the public media, in opposition to an increased NATO role in the expansion of East-West detente and the promotion of disarmament and arms control. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and transmitted from INR Director Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary Rusk. 276. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 276. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Posts in the NATO Capitals 1 Washington, November 16, 1967, 0306Z. 71659. NATUS. Under Secretary Rostow called in French Ambassador Lucet on November 15 for an exchange of views on current status Harmel study on future tasks of Alliance. In review of exercise since its inception, Rostow made following points: 1. It was only after his talks with Couve de Murville and Alphand in fall of 1966 that United States decided to support Harmel initiative. US did this on basis these officials indicated that France was not opposed in principle to going ahead with political consultation in NATO. 2. This indication was subsequently confirmed by France's approval at last December's Ministerial session of the decision calling for the Harmel study. 3. US has consistently been careful to take into account positions of all our allies vis-á-vis Harmel study and will continue to be sensitive to these considerations. 4. November 7–8 Special Group meeting in Brussels indicated a growing consensus on objectives of Harmel study. While there was not a complete meeting of minds on all details at this session, there was general support on the desirability and necessity for Alliance consultation in three areas in particular: European security including the German question, disarmament, and the Mediterranean area. 5. On basis of talks with Seydoux in Brussels it was his understanding that the French were not opposed but favored political consultation on these three subjects, and that while there might be questions of nuance and of defining the terms of reference for such consultation, there should be no difficulty in gaining agreement on language in December Ministerial communique re general concept of political consultation. 6. In this connection, US has always stressed its desire to increase political consultation in NATO, but is seeking no new commitments by any ally and does not contemplate any “integrated political command structure” in the Alliance. 7. After seeking instructions to get over procedural impasse on report of Special Group, Seydoux had asked for his help on report to be submitted at December Ministerial as Couve hoped to avoid trouble. Specifically, Seydoux hoped US would sacrifice rhetoric for substance. Rostow agreed. 8. As we are now preparing for Special Group session on November 22 which will consider Brosio draft, he hoped to have further bilateral talks with Lucet in order to avoid difficulties later. He therefore wondered if Lucet had any comments. Lucet said that he hoped to obtain instructions before Rostow's departure on November 20. He then asked about disposition and status of four studies considered by Special Group, noting that France had already objected to Spaak and Patijn studies. Rostow replied that these papers had no governmental status, were only working papers prepared by individuals for consideration by Special Group, and would be transmitted without endorsement to the Ministers. He added that US had not taken a position on any of these studies and did not plan to do so. In an aside to Anderson, FBX, after meeting, Lucet said he hoped we “would not go too far with the Harmel exercise” as Paris would react negatively to any attempt to institutionalize consultation in areas we have in mind. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Robert Anderson (EUR/FBX), cleared by Leddy, and approved by Rostow. 277. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 277. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, November 23, 1967, 0334Z. 594. NATUS. Subject: Meeting of Special Group on Future of Alliance—Profile. 1. Strong hands were laid on from several sides during the November 22 meeting in Brussels of the Special Group on the Future of the Alliance (Harmel Exercise), with the result that (A) the broad consensus on key issues which began to take form in subgroup sessions has begun to be converted into Alliance doctrine, (B) confronted by this momentum, France appears to have made decision that it prefers the embarrassment of compromises to the risk of rejection, (C) the exercise has evidently been a soul-searching experience for at least half of the Allies, presumably accounting for their resolution and France's appreciation of it, and (D) there is emerging a rather firmly-stated report, supported moreover by the considerable body of legislative history which the Harmel Exercise has written. Hardly less important is the fact that allies are now generally viewing the emerging report as source of some form of public document. Principal segments of opinion which have emerged within this profile are discussed below. 2. An important factor in keeping the Harmel Exercise on a route headed toward a (public) report has been determination on the part of Denmark and Norway to see to it that the Alliance produces a persuasive contemporary statement of its rationale. They frankly acknowledge their concern is rooted in domestic political needs. While the two countries have been out in front in this respect, it has become clear that concern about educating member country public, particularly youth, is very widely shared among Allied governments. The public relations aim shared by these governments is to present to their publics explicit answers to the sort of politically-charged questions Alliance diplomats have been skirting for many months. Faced with this widespread interest in finding common answers to deliver publicly, French PermRep Seydoux fell back to simply quibbling about language for making such points as: the international situation has changed significantly, but not fundamentally; the Alliance must maintain and develop its military capability to assure a balance of forces and thus a climate of stability; security and detente are not contradictory, but complementary; detente cannot thrive in disorder; collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics; the Alliance and the solidarity it involves serves to promote detente in Europe. As evidence of the importance Denmark and Norway attach to this aspect of the Harmel Exercise, Foreign Ministry Under Secretaries from both countries (Paludan and Jacobsen) participated actively in the meeting. 3. UK Minister of State Mulley was a hard task master to those who wished to bypass a report or diffuse the product. In terms of confrontation of personalities, Mulley probably made it clearer than anyone else to Seydoux that French field of maneuver in trying to wear down the exercise was narrow indeed. Fog at both ends of the air lane restrained Mulley from returning to Brussels November 23. He did his share November 22, however, to convince Seydoux that the wisest course to take was to jump into the drafting himself and salvage what he could of the French viewpoint. 4. If Seydoux's behavior during the meeting is enduring, it means in effect that France looked at the alternatives in this instance, discovered that the year-long exercise had exposed and pointed up national interests to such an extent that some of the usual wells of sympathy for French obstinacy had run dry. Scandinavian preoccupation with the public dimension (discussed above), joined prominently by Canada and Belgium, and supported by the US and UK, and careful FRG concern for the essentials of European security provided little room for a totally negative French position. Seydoux was much too wise then to try to convert the Allies from any of the hard convictions formed into words during recent weeks about the need, nature and purpose of the Alliance. Instead he entered energetically into the drafting, to do all he could to erase the impression that the report was a refutation of Gaullism foreign policy. Where he insisted most vigorously, the problem usually had to do with the need to eradicate a term anathema in Gaullist doctrine. Seydoux managed a difficult task with skill and good humor. 5. Canada and FRG were prominent among those countries which apparently concluded during recent weeks that the Harmel Exercise could not just terminate in empty space and that if there was to be a report, it had better be an acceptable product in terms of their national concerns. For this, Canadian PermRep Campbell made it clear that Canada, like Denmark and Norway, needed a sound rationale of the Alliance to gain public appreciation, and the stress of FRG PermRep Grewe's interventions was to point up the need the FRG sees in keeping established Alliance doctrine from unravelling. 7. [ sic ] Reference to the flank countries in the Brosio draft provoked a demurrer from Norway (supported by Denmark) and precipitated sharp contrast between northern and southern flank sentiments. Norwegian Under Secretary Jacobsen urged the Alliance not to refer to defense problems of the flanks in a document likely to be made public. However, Turkish PermRep Birgi and Greek PermRep Cavalierato were inclined to insist on a reference to the defense problems on their flank; special reference to Mediterranean (with bow to UN jurisdiction in Mideast) has survived. 8. Meeting was enlivened considerably by Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel, who objected to the inadequate treatment rendered in the Brosio draft to inter-Allied relations. Harmel observed that peace in Western Europe owes much to the multiple means which have brought about solidarity, and it is explicit in Articles I and II of the Treaty that the Alliance is designed to play a role as a stabilizing influence drawing together Western nations. Harmel made the point eloquently that this role of preserving peace within the area needed reaffirmation. 9. Italian PermRep De Ferrariis made a strong bid for enlarging the terms of reference and expanding the time frame of the Harmel Exercise, a hardened variation of the Italian theme about postponing the reporting process. De Ferrariis cited three salient omissions from the present study (A) the “legal structure,” by which he said he meant the change from obligatory to discretionary membership after 1969, (B) NPT, on which he thought answers were needed about possible effects on the Alliance on East-West balance, on the significance of nonratification by some, and on the possibility of extending the nuclear cover of the Alliance pending implementation of NPT, and (C) ABM's and their repercussions on the Alliance. 10. As for U.S. Delegation, we have naturally taken a good deal of leadership behind the scenes and around the edges, but participation at Special Group Nov 22 and drafting committee Nov 23 has been very widely shared, and it has been comparatively easy not to overdo it. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 278. Memorandum of Conversation 278. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 6, 1967. SUBJECT Ferri's Views on British EEC Membership and Italian Domestic Matters PARTICIPANTS Italy Honorable Mauro Ferri, PSU Deputy Minister Giulio Terruzzi, Embassy of Italy Mr. Platone Romani, Ministry of Foreign Trade United States Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Wells Stabler, Country Director, EUR/AIS Rush W. Taylor, Jr., EUR/AIS Jose De Seabra, Interpreter Mr. Ferri said that he was grateful to have the opportunity to meet with a senior Department official responsible for the conduct of U.S. relations with Europe. He was interested in hearing Mr. Stoessel's views on the problem of British entry into the EEC. The French position on the British application for membership was a problem of deepest concern both to Italy and to his party. Mr. Stoessel said that we very much regret the situation which has arisen with regard to the British application. He said that we favor British entry and feel that Britain has a natural role to play in Europe. Her entry into the Common Market would strengthen the Community politically and her technology would be a considerable asset. Although we have long supported British entry, we have decided that it would not be useful to proclaim this policy from the roof tops. It is felt that such action on our part would be counterproductive as it could be used to support the Gaullist contention that British entry into the EEC would serve as the Trojan horse for the United States. It is our impression that General De Gaulle has taken an extremely harsh position. Although he has not yet used the word veto, he has as much as said that he will not permit British entry. 2 We feel that Prime Minister Wilson's attitude of waiting to hear from the Six rather than accepting De Gaulle's response is correct and sensible. Mr. Stoessel asked Mr. Ferri if he would elaborate on his views of the subject. Mr. Ferri said that the Five were presented with an impossible dilemma. No one knew just how far De Gaulle would go in blocking the British bid, but it would certainly be as far as the Five would allow him. The dilemma which the Five face is whether to push for UK entry, thus risking the destruction of the Community or to capitulate to the General. Neither alternative was palatable. Mr. Stoessel said that hopefully UK membership could be achieved after De Gaulle's departure from the scene. He would hope that Prime Minister Wilson and the UK would keep up the momentum for entry during the interim. Wilson had already demonstrated that there was no alternative to full membership and that neither NAFTA nor EFTA offered valid alternatives. Fortunately, Wilson appeared to have the support of both parties in the UK. Mr. Ferri said that the ultimate solution to the impasse was De Gaulle's “departure for another world.” Minister Terruzzi said that he was not completely convinced that the situation in France after De Gaulle would necessarily favor major changes in French policy. Mr. Ferri said it was important to note the subtle shades of opinion in France. He pointed out that Giscard d'Estaing was opposed to De Gaulle on certain issues and that De Gaulle generally received support from the Communists on foreign policy issues. Mr. Stoessel said that it is hard to foresee exactly what would happen after De Gaulle and that much depended upon how he goes. It was, of course, a mistake to assume that everything would change upon his departure. For example, French refusal to participate in the NATO unified military command structure would most probably not be altered. On the question of European integration and British entry, however, there might well be some changes. [Here follow 2 pages of discussion of Italian politics.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Taylor on December 8. 2 At his press conference on November 27, De Gaulle stated that the United Kingdom might one day be eligible for membership if it underwent “vast and very deep” changes, which might come about through some kind of associate membership. 279. Memorandum of Conversation 279. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Brussels, December 11, 1967, 10 a.m. US/MC/4 UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTIETHMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Brussels, Belgium, December 12–14, 1967 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Counselor Bowie Ambassador Knight Ambassador Cleveland E.S. Glenn Belgium Foreign Minister Harmel Chef de Cabinet Davignon SUBJECT NATO (Part I of II) After replying to the Foreign Minister's words of welcome, the Secretary said that he did not expect any special difficulties for this session. The Foreign Minister said that such difficulties as there were could probably be overcome. In as far as the preparation of the work plans for the Alliance is concerned, it seems probable that the language between brackets is negotiable. Even if the French do not accept the removal of all of the brackets, the basic positions are clearly enough expressed elsewhere so that the Fourteen can live with the report even if the bracketed portions of it are deleted. Secondly, once this question is settled, it seems that the report may be agreed by some kind of consensus such as through a statement by the Secretary General that he hears no objections. Such a procedure, however, would be acceptable to the French only if it is understood that the report itself will remain confidential. Of course, no one expects that leaks will not occur; the French understand this but will be satisfied if no formal statement of endorsement is made public. The Secretary agreed that the important point was to have a common text of the 15 nations and that this was more important than the specific language. The major difficulty is more likely to occur in connection with the annex. Counselor Bowie mentioned that it may be important to give expression to the role of the Alliance in the pursuit of a detente. If this is not done, some of the member nations—particularly the Danes—may be faced with internal difficulties with both public and parliament. This type of difficulty is precisely contrary to that experienced by the French delegation in regards to General De Gaulle. Italy also may find it difficult to come to a conclusion of the work of the Special Committee before her next elections, since such conclusions might appear to tie the hands of a future government and therefore be resented. The Italian socialists have been for 15 years the allies of the communists and had taken a stand against the Alliance. Too brusque a reversal of their policy might be difficult. The Secretary remarked that should the Italians be embarrassed by language specifying that conclusions have been reached and would prefer the concept that the work is continuing, this should be easy since the work of the governing bodies of the Alliance is never finished; it may simply continue within the Council rather than within the Special Group. In point of fact, many of the participating nations did not send special representatives to the Special Group but designated their permanent representatives. The Foreign Minister suggested that the two delegations keep in close touch in following developments. He said that he would like to make clear certain political difficulties faced by the European members of the Alliance; while applying only secondarily to Belgium, they were not without relevance here. Many, if not most, European members of the Alliance have to face parliamentary opposition which is vigorous on the part of the communists and half-hearted on the part of the socialists. This is why it is often necessary to disarm socialist opposition (and thus isolate the communists) by attributing to the Alliance a role in the pursuit of detente. This fits with President Johnson's speech of October 7. This is not an absolute necessity today for Belgium since the government coalition does not include the socialists. However, we must think of future political realignments and Belgium, as the seat of the Alliance, must remain internally stable. The manner in which the conclusions regarding the future of the Alliance are made public is not too important but the result must be achieved. The Secretary said that he wanted to make two points concerning the United States position in regard to NATO. First of all, a question of public opinion: the man-on-the-street is becoming angry at General De Gaulle; because of misinformation he may come to associate all of Europe with General De Gaulle. Until now, both President Johnson and the Secretary had followed a policy of not replying to General De Gaulle. This may be the wiser course of action but it does not help show public opinion that General De Gaulle and Europe are separate and distinct. We are now under severe pressure in Congress to bill General De Gaulle for the costs of NATO's relocation. There are even some persons who speak now about asking France to repay World War I debts. The Secretary went on to make his second point: many of the European allies of the United States do not realize that the present position of the United States amounts to a near miracle. More than a half million Americans are involved in Southeast Asia, most of them in combat. In spite of that, the United States is maintaining its forces in Europe. The willingness of the American people to bear the cost, both financial and moral, of such burdens is perhaps taken too much for granted. In this connection, any revision downward of NATO force commitments of other allies could create a chain reaction. For example, the change in the Belgian force levels is not a purely Belgian affair but may have repercussions throughout the Alliance and in particular may make it more difficult for the President and the Secretary to defend present U.S. commitments to NATO. The Foreign Minister congratulated the President and the Secretary of State for their courage in refraining from entering into polemics with General De Gaulle. As far as Belgium is concerned, contemplated restructuring of her forces amounts to an actual strengthening. In the first place, Belgium intends to maintain her defense expenditures at the present level in terms of percentage of GNP. To do this she is ready to increase the military budget by an increment up to, but not exceeding, 4% a year. Secondly, changes will be made only after consultation with her partners. Do Belgium's allies prefer more numerous Belgian forces existing largely on paper only or a smaller well-equipped and well-trained army? “It's up to the generals to decide.” He expressed the hope, however, that the Alliance will accept the GOB's proposals. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Drafted by Glenn and Knight on December 12 and approved in S on December 21. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry. 280. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 280. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, December 13, 1967, 1055Z. 1011. Secto 017. NATUS. Subject: British entry to EEC. The question of British entry to the European Communities was the principal point of discussion between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Secretary Brown at lunch December 12. Others present were Hood, O'Neill and Maitland on the UK side and Leddy, Bowie and Springsteen for US. Principal thrust of British presentation was that the British wanted the Five in the EEC to push at December 18–19 EC Council meeting for a definitive position on the question of undertaking negotiations (as contrasted with definitive decision on membership). Brown said that the UK position was eroding. Further inconclusiveness would cause only further erosion and a turning away of Britain from Europe. He stressed he was devoted to the goal of British entry into the Communities for both economic and political reasons but felt that he as a politician was “out” if he could not produce some forward momentum. Therefore, he wanted a definitive decision at the December 18–19 meeting. If it was negative, Britain would then proceed to show its continued interest in Europe by working with willing European countries in the economic, political, defense, and technological fields. He said that this could be with the Five, or three, or two or even one. (He was not specific on the details of these alternatives but at one point alluded to suggestions for strengthening EFTA and for cooperative work in field of armaments.) If the answer from the EC Council meeting was positive, they would proceed to negotiations. He also made it clear that he believed France was susceptible to pressure from the Five and felt that, if pressed, the French will agree to negotiations. He said, however, that some of his staff (O'Neill) did not share this view. He stated flatly that anything short of straight negotiations was not acceptable. Talks by the UK with the Commission looking to resolving problems prior to outright negotiations, were not an acceptable substitute because they were not with the principals in the Community and could further erode the UK negotiation position by leading to a premature sacrificing of some issues important to UK. In the course of the discussion he indicated that the need for a decision whether pro or con next week was being broached by him in his talks with the Five. Luns was particularly strong in commending Brown's tactic. Fanfani was very firm in support of negotiations but Harmel was toying with unacceptable compromise suggestions. He urged Secretary Rusk to adopt a similarly firm line in his bilateral discussions with the Five here in Brussels. The US side seriously questioned the Brown approach, noting that it was forcing the Five into a confrontation with the French with possible repercussions on the Communities, moreover, grave doubts were cast on Brown's belief that the Five could, in his words, force Couve “to turn up his card”. The US side expressed the view that time was on the UK side and it was best to let the matter proceed for the time in a manner the Five deemed best. To force a likely negative decision could not produce the same positive results as following a perhaps slow but determined route toward entry. In this context, it was mentioned that talks with the Commission could have value and maintain momentum, and should be looked at carefully. A historical note was sounded by citing past UK errors in dealing with the Common Market and the hope was expressed that such errors would not be repeated again. Brown declined to accept the vigorous US presentation, noting that the lack of a decision on negotiations would only result in further deterioration of support for entry in the UK and the UK turning its back on Europe. Whether a “yea” or “nay” answer would mean progress; the former meaning negotiation and the latter the pursuit of alternatives with interested Europeans. He urged the Secretary again to support him. The Secretary indicated doubt as to the wisdom of Brown's proposed course, saying it was doubtful the Five could be brought to such a decision. However, he said he would talk with his colleagues in the Five to see what their views were on the negotiating problem. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London. 281. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 281. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, December 14, 1967, 1749Z. 1056. Secto 044. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting: Assessment. Ref: A. Secto 26 (sent as USNATO 1022); B. Secto 31 (sent as USNATO 1127). 2 1. Although partly overshadowed by Greek crisis, NATO Ministerial results satisfactory in terms of (A) resolution of specific issues; and (B) general atmosphere. 3 Despite some tough negotiating on both the military and political issues, agreement was reached on all major subjects where Ministerial action had been indicated. Possibilities of impasse or open disagreements inherent in the situation (between the Fourteen and France on the Harmel study and between the US and FRG on strategic concepts) were avoided without any significant loss to US objectives. 2. On defense issues, results already summed up in reftel A. An important additional point to be stressed is that new force planning and nuclear consultation machinery established by NATO members last Dec has successfully completed its first full cycle. Whatever problems remain—and there are some difficult ones—the Fourteen now have in being a set of institutional arrangements enabling them realistically to tie together nuclear and conventional strategy, force planning and available resources. 3. In addition to action on firm force commitments for 1968, on five-year force plan, and on “flexible response” strategy, DPC session included several other points of interest to us. Various Ministers highlighted Mediterranean security problem in their statements, and NAC review of the international situation provided additional underpinning for future work on this subject. US is also gratified at widespread support that made possible agreement on establishment of standing naval force under SACLANT (multinational destroyer force). 4. While Secretary made his major statement in the NAC (see septel), 4 we wish to call attention to two significant US statements in DPC which merit careful reading. First is Secretary McNamara's “valedictory” presented by Deputy Secretary Nitze. Second is Secretary Rusk's brief statement on burden-sharing and NATO claims against France. (Texts of both statements transmitted to addressee posts.) 5. Main item of business for the NAC—and most highly publicized subject for Ministerial sessions as a whole—was Harmel study, outcome is reported in reftel B. The full agreement reached on text of the report, embracing both a set of agreed principles and work program for political consultations, is highly satisfactory to us. We, like number of other countries, would have preferred greater detail on a number of points in line with Rapporteurs' studies. Fact is, however, that despite hard negotiations between Fourteen and France at Special Group and in Brussels this week, our essential needs are met substantively and presentationally. France undoubtedly went along in part because of solidarity among key members of Fourteen, but existence of UK/EEC problem may also have played important role, French not wanting to add new NATO dispute to UK/Common Market dispute. 6. As the Secretary indicated in the meeting, US considers that the value of the Harmel Exercise goes beyond the report itself. We believe the analytical process carried out this year has had great utility in clarifying Alliance thinking; in bringing the members closer together on some fundamental propositions, and in laying out agreed framework for future political consultations. We also attach considerable importance to the agreement to publish the report. 7. In a sense, analogy can be made between Harmel report this December and decisions taken on defense matters last December which established tasks for future implementation. The big problem now is to begin carrying out the Alliance's political work program. 8. Methods, timing and order of priorities for followup work, as between East-West relations, arms control and disarmament, Mediterranean security, and world-wide issues all remain to be sorted out. There is also question of any additional subjects Italy may raise in the Permanent Council under compromise worked out in order to overcome Italian reservation on concluding Harmel study now. (Part of earlier Italian reserve based in part on expressed desire NATO consultation on security implications for Western Europe of such issues as NPT and ABM's.) 9. Brosio pointed out in meetings that it would be up to each member country to interpret Harmel study results for its own public opinion. We recommend addressees bear in mind hope expressed by Secretary Rusk that, in public presentation of Harmel study findings, member governments portray them as indication of future confidence in the Alliance. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Madrid. 2 Dated December 12 and 13, respectively. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453, CF 248) 3 U.S. Delegation records of the 40th North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, held at Brussels December 12–14, including telegrams to and from the delegation, memoranda of conversation, briefing papers, verbatim records of the sessions, and miscellaneous administrative records, are ibid., CF 242–251. For text of the communique issued at the end of the meeting with the Harmel Report attached, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pp. 320–323. 4 Telegram 1038, Secto 40, December 14. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR)) 5 Intelligence Note No. 1006, December 19, seconded this appreciation of the Ministerial Meeting. (Ibid.) On December 18, Secretary of State Rusk informed the British Ambassador that, in his opinion, the meeting went well with no surprises and that even the handling of the Harmel report had proven less difficult than anticipated. (Memorandum of conversation, December 18; ibid.) 282. Memorandum of Conversation 282. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 18, 1967, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Recent NATO Meeting PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin—USSR Mr. Eugene V. Rostow—M In the course of a long talk at his initiative about the Middle East and NATO at a reception last week, Ambassador Dobrynin proposed that we have lunch soon, to carry the discussion forward. The lunch took place today. Recent NATO Meeting. Dobrynin asked what I thought the NATO Ministerial meeting had accomplished. I replied that in our view it was a step towards peace—towards further efforts to improve political relations in Europe. He smiled and said, “Yes, but how?” I went on that as we saw it, the Allies wanted to take initiatives towards detente, both in the political field, and, if possible, in the field of arms control and disarmament. I recalled that the President had suggested mutual and balanced force reductions in October 1966. Dobrynin said that had been noted. Why didn't we go back to the idea of our taking a step, which they might then follow. We had had such an understanding earlier about military budgets. Then, after several reductions, we had increased our budget without telling them. This had left a bad impression. But he thought that if we reduced forces, that could lead to something. They had no objections to our forces in Europe, but they thought they were unnecessarily large. Why did we think six divisions were necessary? I replied that all sorts of things could happen, as they had in the past. We thought a strong conventional troop presence reduced the risk of nuclear confrontation. Dobrynin remarked that that was appreciated. “Was the NATO decision,” he asked, “an operational decision or a statement of intent? Are we expected to respond now?” I replied that a positive response on their part would be welcomed at any time, but on the whole we regarded the Resolution as a statement of policy, which would be followed up in due course by a number of specific proposals. Turning to the military side, Dobrynin asked why we thought a new combined naval force was necessary at this time. It had unpleasant associations with MLF in their minds, although he knew this was not now a nuclear force. I responded that we always preferred Alliance action to action alone, and that all the Allies were concerned about the possible implications of Soviet naval activities in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Rostow. The conversation was held in Rostow's office during lunch. 283. Intelligence Note No. 1020 283. Intelligence Note No. 1020 1 Washington, December 26, 1967. SUBJECT French “Pocket Veto” of UK Common Market Bid Causes Some Friction, But No Crisis The December 18–19 meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities (EC) concentrated its attention almost exclusively on the British application for entry into the Common Market. The principal result was a reconfirmation of the French “pocket veto,” although no formal vote was taken on the question. The chagrin and disappointment evidenced particularly by the Dutch and the Belgians may cause some slowdown of normal Community activities, but such a slowdown is not likely to endure long into the New Year. It is not expected that the continued French success in blocking negotiations on EC membership for the British will lead to any serious split in the Common Market. The Preliminaries . France's action at this latest meeting of the Council of Ministers is a logical culmination of the positions which that country has taken since the British renewed their bid in May. President De Gaulle, in press conferences on May 16 and November 27, made no secret of his attitude. Britain was not yet judged to be economically healthy enough for admission, the role of sterling as a reserve currency was incompatible with EC membership, and there would have to be profound changes in Britain's social and political “nature” before it would be sufficiently European, if admitted, not to endanger the viability of the Common Market. At the October 23–24 meeting of the Council of Ministers, 2 French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, noting that France had no objection in principle to British entry, nevertheless said that the question of new members had to be studied in depth. He raised the problems of the UK balance of payments deficit and the role of sterling and called for solutions to both as necessary preconditions even to negotiations. With the one exception of France, the other Common Market members were agreed that, as recommended in the EC Commission report of September 29, 1967, negotiations should be opened with the British (and the Irish, Danes, and Norwegians) to see whether solutions could be found to the problems involved in their membership applications. Given the known French position, it is doubtful whether either the UK or the “Friendly Five” seriously expected that the French could be brought to accept negotiations. But the UK Foreign Office made clear that the British expected a formal reply to their application from the Community as a whole. Further, in public statements and private conversations, British officials repeatedly emphasized that the UK application was for full membership and that any form of association—which the French hinted might be a suitable compromise—was unacceptable. The British also did all they could to encourage the five EC members favorable to their cause to stand firm. In particular, the British devoted attention to stiffening the attitude of the Germans, who were obviously in a key position to influence the French, if anyone was. As one observer noted, “the Dutch could make a row, but only the Germans could make a crisis.” It has been clear for some time, however, that the Germans were not going to make a crisis. Because of broader foreign policy considerations the Kiesinger government, in this as in other matters, wanted to avoid a head-on collision with the French. The German Foreign Office emphasized in December that Germany would not contemplate negotiations between Britain and the Five, and that Germany would not be willing to employ specific pressure to change the French position on negotiations with the British. For this reason, the major issue on December 18–19 was not whether negotiations would be authorized but what posture the Five would assume in face of, and after, the French veto. Thus, the Five agreed at a meeting on December 14 that their best tactic at the December 18–19 session would be to press for a clear discussion and a clear reply to the British, i.e., a formal French veto. The Five's tactic coincided with the British wish to force the issue on the principle of membership, perhaps with the idea that, with this in the record, it might be easier some day to reopen the issue at Brussels. The December 18–19 Meeting . The Five thus entered the Brussels meeting probably well aware of the fact that they would not obtain approval of any form of negotiations with the British. They hoped, however, to isolate the French by forcing them in a formal vote to veto negotiations on the British application. In this hope they were disappointed. A December 11–12 Council meeting had heard a report from the Commission on the UK devaluation of November 18, and its hoped-for results in improving the British balance of payments. Nevertheless, at the December 18–19 meeting, Couve de Murville insisted that the question of negotiating British entry could not even be considered until the health of the British economy had been demonstrably reestablished. In the long run the British might be able to overcome their difficulties, said Couve, but they are not now ready for membership, and to permit their entry would be dangerous for the Community. Moreover, to enter into long-drawn-out negotiations would freeze EC progress. The other five Foreign Ministers argued variously for acceptance of the Commission's recommendation and “negotiations now!” Brandt, for example, argued for a parallel progress in negotiations and British economic recovery. In the end, however, there was no vote, there was no formal veto, and the communique, subscribed to by all six, was rather bland for the occasion. The communiqué ending the meeting, in language provided by the German Chairman, Minister of Economics Schiller, provided a seven-point summary record of the session. The principal points were: that no member objected in principle to the enlargement of the Common Market, although one member believed that enlargement would modify profoundly the nature of the Community; that all member states believed that the economic recovery of the UK was an essential precondition for its membership, although several member states (probably Italy and Benelux) did not believe that recovery needed to be complete prior to entry; that five member states shared the Commission's view that negotiations with Britain should begin, although one member state believed that the UK economic recovery had to be completed in order that its application be considered; that, as a result, no agreement had been reached on opening negotiations, and the Council's Chairman had been charged with so informing the interested countries; and that the applications for membership would remain on the Council's agenda. Although no countries were identified by name in the communique, there is little question as to where each country stood. An eighth point, that the operations of the Community would proceed normally, was eliminated at the request of Italy and Benelux. It was the least they could do, but the deletion committed no one to any action. Despite the wishes of the Friendly Five, it would seem that the communique did a better job of highlighting the poor state of the British economy than of conspicuously and unequivocally drawing attention to the isolation of France. Immediate Reaction to the Pocket Veto . Resignation mingled with annoyance and, in some cases, indignation toward the French seems to be the prevailing reaction among the Friendly Five. The Dutch member walked out of a meeting of the Common Market's Agricultural Ministers, causing the German Chairman to suspend the session. A meeting of Labor Ministers was cancelled at the request of the Dutch and Belgians, and the Dutch representative did not attend a meeting of the six Social Affairs Ministers. The Belgians have decided not to take part in future debates pending a “final policy decision” next year. (The next meeting of the Permanent Representatives is scheduled for February 4–5. It is interesting to note that for the first half of 1968 the French will serve as chairmen of the different meetings.) The Dutch plan not to participate in current Ministerial meetings. Both the Dutch and the Belgians have stressed, however, that their non-participation is not a boycott of the Common Market meetings. It is not clear yet what the significance of these gestures may turn out to be. Immediately after the end of the Council meeting, the Five met in a rump session, but apparently decided on nothing except increased common action with the UK. Details are vague, and these consultations will probably turn out to be no more significant than the stratagem of semi-annual WEU meetings adopted after France's 1963 veto. If talks with the British do develop, however, they are evidently intended largely to relate to matters outside of the Common Market's jurisdictional area. The British could hardly have been surprised at the turn of events in Brussels. Following the end of the meeting, Foreign Secretary Brown announced that the British application still stood, that the British did not intend to withdraw it, and that the UK now proposed to enter into consultations with the five EC members that favored negotiations. Informal consultations between the British and the Five may indeed take place, but they will almost certainly not be institutionalized. In face of the British rejection of anything but full membership, it is difficult to know how any talk of compromise can take place, but it is likely that, as time passes, association possibilities will be at least discussed. There has been some talk of retaliation by the Five against the French which might take the form of blocking further progress in the Common Agricultural Policy (France is said to be the largest single beneficiary of the Guidance and Guarantee Fund) or preventing renewal of the Yaounde Convention which expires in mid-1969 (most of the members of the Convention and recipients of EEC aid are former French colonies). But the policies and programs of the communities are now seemingly so inextricably interrelated that it is hard to imagine that this will happen, though of course intra-community bargaining on these matters may be more fierce than ever. The Commission, although regretting the Council's failure to reach agreement and urging a resumption of the movement “temporarily abandoned” toward expansion of the Community, has appealed “to all concerned to keep the consequences of the present disagreement within the narrowest possible limits.” This seems a far cry from President Rey's pre-Council talk of crisis. Similarly, a German government spokesman said the FRG plans to work to keep the Community functioning despite the UK problem, for, according to him, the process of consolidation and development of the Community must not be made dependent on British entry. Chancellor Kiesinger told Ambassador McGhee just prior to the conclusion of the Brussels meeting that the basic German tactic will be to seek a solution in stages which will take care of political requirements and UK prestige, and that the whole matter is one for compromise. This is entirely consist-ent with previously known German attitudes. The Dutch have been considered perhaps the only ones among the Five with the courage to challenge De Gaulle frontally on this issue. But they are also realists, and our Embassy in The Hague believes that there would be considerable reluctance even in The Netherlands to generate a crisis. The Belgians have shown unusual spirit lately vis-á-vis the French, but appear to be resigned to the fact of the French veto. A high-ranking advocate of UK entry in the Belgian Foreign Ministry believes that the Five have no choice but to accept the French veto or risk breaking up the Community, and none, he thinks, will accept this risk. The Italians face an election in the spring and do not want to be faced with a European crisis at this time. Foreign Minister Fanfani, in a statement in Rome, spoke obscurely in favor of harmonizing action of the Five in favor of negotiations, and at the same time cautioned against the temptation to act before reflecting. Conclusion . The sum of these attitudes seems to be clear. The Five would like to see the UK enter the Communities, and would like to begin immediate negotiations to explore the subject. But they all appear to be aware, with varying degrees of resignation, that they have neither the juridical nor the practical means to force the French government to change what is obviously a fundamental aspect of its policy—the exclusion of the UK. It is not probable that there will be a sustained, effective attempt by them to retaliate within the Communities against France. Presumably, then, negotiations on British entry into the Communities must await the incumbency of a new French President. After the Brussels meeting of December 18–19, there will probably be less tactical skirmishing around the outskirts of this fact than there was in 1967. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Transmitted from the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, George C. Denney, Jr., to Secretary of State Rusk. 2 See Intelligence Note 854, “French Place New Road Blocks in Path of UK Bid for Common Market Membership,” October 27, 1957 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem). [Footnote in the source text. A copy of this paper is ibid.] 284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, January 16, 1968, 0108Z. 99062. BUSEC. Refs: Bonn 6824; Brussels 3892; London 5390. 2 Subj: UK–6. 1. It is not clear to us from reftels whether German Government is still in fact actively advocating association arrangement for the UK. 2. We believe it important to make clear to the Germans informally and discreetly that an arrangement for the UK which does not in fact envisage full membership by specific date in the near future would cause us serious problems. An open-ended association arrangement for the UK with no guarantee of membership would be a free trade area discriminating against American exports without the compensating benefits of furthering greater political unification in Europe which we continue favor. Such discriminatory arrangements would be especially difficult for the Administration at this time when protectionist sentiment is rampant in Congress and our balance of payments is in the limelight of public attention. 3. We leave level of this informal representation to Embassy but would hope that U.S. position would be registered with Kiesinger and Brandt. Perhaps DCM-Lahr level would be appropriate. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Katz, cleared by GER and BMI, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to brussels and London. 2 Telegram 6824 from Bonn, January 3, 1968, reported that during Under Secretary of State Katzenbach's visit to Bonn, Brandt, Duckwitz, and Rolf Lahr had all proposed partial entry for the United Kingdom at present and half entry later. Katzenbach carefully avoided any support for this idea. (Ibid.) Telegram 3892 from Brussels has not been found. Telegram 5390 from London reported on a meeting in Bonn between British and German officials on the next steps regarding British entry into the EC. (Ibid.) 3 On January 20, the Embassy reported that these views had been made known to Lahr who replied that he was aware of them, but insisted that something needed to be done to keep the British application moving. (Telegram 7473 from Bonn; ibid.) 285. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 285. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, January 17, 1968, 2029Z. 1375. NATUS. Subj: Harmel follow-up. 1. This is summary outcome of private NAC meeting January 17 on follow-up to Harmel work program: 2. Full agreement, after mild Dutch grumbling, that upgraded POLADs, under NAC as its own Steering Committee, is proper venue for European security and German question. Special responsibilities of quadripartite four explicitly recognized without disagreement. First step will be presentation of proposed topics for study to be approved by NAC. General agreement these might well begin with analysis of contemporary relevance of staff work done in 1958–60 period. 3. Similar agreement on institutional arrangements for general subject of arms control and disarmament with disarmament experts group closely geared to Harmel follow-up work, beginning with February session. Considerable sentiment for engaging experts group at this session in consultations on future POLADs work program on this subject. Broad support, in a few cases subject to approval in capitals, emerged for U.S. suggestion that one of first topics for POLADs and experts should be “after NPT, what?” How to handle mutual force reduction study put aside until French make up their minds whether and how to participate, with PermRep Seydoux indicating he would have answer by next week. 4. Discussion of Mediterranean degenerated into classical exercise in obfuscation on scope of study (Mediterranean or Middle East), content of study (military vs. political) and nature of discussion itself (procedural vs. substantive). This after Italian PermRep de Ferrariis, without instructions, rehashed trepidations about impinging on UN prerogatives vis-á-vis Middle East and Seydoux warning of “complexity” and “delicacy” of whole subject. In end, after Cleveland proposed special NAC meeting as next step follow-on to previous SHAPE briefing, group agreed to meet again in two weeks to look at written text of updated SHAPE briefing, a paper which Brosio undertook to produce, and any other papers offered by delegations. If these papers are not available one week in advance, meeting would be postponed another week. Purpose of that meeting would be to determine whether substantive papers helped clarify unresolved procedural issues. 4. In opening remarks Brosio included “other areas” as fourth item of work program. Cleveland welcomed this, though U.S. has no specific subjects to nominate at this time. Seydoux intervened to plead French understanding that work program limited to three subjects. Others pointed out members have inherent right to raise any subject under this heading at any time under normal consultative procedures. Discussion fizzled out in apparent recognition that this is non-issue in practice. 5. Septels will provide Dept with USNATO thoughts about where we go from here. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 286. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, January 18, 1968, 2238Z. 100911. NATUS. Subject: Restoration of Redeployed US Forces. Ref: State 82251. 2 1. In response to FRG request for reassurances on return to Germany of redeployed US forces (reftel), Springsteen spoke with German Embassy Counselor Von Staden on January 17. 2. Springsteen assured Von Staden US continues to adhere to letter and spirit of Trilateral Minute of April 28, 1967. 3 As specifically agreed in first sentence, para. 5 of Minute, US “will return its rotating forces to Europe whenever the situation requires.” He noted that this US pledge is unconditional. 3. Springsteen also reconfirmed second sentence, para. 5 of Minute: “in addition, the US Government is ready to negotiate a plan under which NATO countries, including Germany and others as well as the US, furnish the assurance that comparable actions will be taken, including, for the part of the US, redeployment to Europe of its rotating forces during a period of political tension and no later than at the time of the announcement of the alert phase ‘military vigilance’ for the Central Region by SACEUR.” Springsteen indicated US would be happy to receive and consider any FRG proposals for reaching such an agreement. 4. Von Staden expressed satisfaction at receiving reassurances on first sentence, which he would report to Bonn. The FRG would equally be prepared to negotiate a plan as envisaged in second sentence. 5. Von Staden suggested and Springsteen agreed that after initial consideration of proposals, negotiations looking toward an agreement would appropriately be a NATO matter. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Joseph L. Smith, cleared by McAuliffe and GER, and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to three military commands. 2 Dated December 9, 1967. (Ibid.) 3 Attachment 4 to Document 249 . 287. Memorandum of Conversation 287. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 7, 1968, 5:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS European Communities President Jean Rey Vice President Fritz Hellwig Commissioner Jean Francois Deniau Mr. Raymond Rifflet, Chief of Cabinet to President Rey United States President Johnson Mr. Walt Rostow Assistant Secretary John Leddy Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel Mr. Edward Fried SUBJECT Rey's Meeting with the President, 5:30 p.m., February 7, 1968 At Rey's request, the President met with the whole party rather than with Rey alone. Rey expressed his pleasure in making this first courtesy call on the President in his capacity as head of the Commission of the combined communities. He also expressed great satisfaction with his meetings throughout the U.S. Government, and noted the importance of such meetings in dealing with common problems. He made three points in his presentation: 1. Balance of Payments and Trade Measures —Rey congratulated the President on the courageous action he had taken to deal with the U.S. balance of payments program and on the President's strong opposition to protectionist pressures which could endanger the Kennedy Round. He said our balance of payments problem does not stem from our trade account—which is in surplus. Measures to deal with the balance of payments, therefore, should be taken in areas other than trade. He was worried that if the U.S. took protectionist action, other countries would follow and eventually the Community would have to move. 2. Crisis in the EEC —Rey said the Commission deplored existing obstacles to the admission of the United Kingdom to the Communities. He said the Commission was determined to assure that close contacts would be maintained, and that the Benelux memo was a good basis for this. What measures the Five could or should take to cooperate with the UK in outside fields is not yet decided. It was essential to find a reasonable compromise on the UK issue and Rey was optimistic one could be found within the next few months. 3. Cooperation with the U.S. —Rey pointed out that the Kennedy Round demonstrated how important it was for the U.S. and the EEC to reach agreement on specific issues and how productive such agreement could be. The bargaining was difficult but justified by the results. In the case of trade, the Community could negotiate with the U.S. as an equal. In the field of development, agreement between the U.S. and the EC in trade policy toward developing countries would provide a good basis for reaching wider agreement on the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi. Monetary matters and aid policy were also promising areas of continued cooperation. The President welcomed Rey in his capacity as Chairman of the merged Commission and thanked him for his remarks. He also welcomed these consultations between the U.S. and the Commission as a useful way of developing productive relations with the Communities. He reaffirmed U.S. support for the unity of Western Europe, and said it was important that we work closely together on the balance of payments and in other fields. Our overall problems were complex but, to a large degree, solutions depended on how we handled economic issues. Rey emphasized it was important that we believe in what we were doing. The President said we faced a difficult task ahead. We had to put our own house in order and are prepared to do so. But we also need the cooperation of our friends. When we had a surplus, we acted appropriately. We are now asking countries who are in a surplus position to act in the same way. The President agreed with Rey that the U.S. and the European Communities must continue to work together in the trade field, in monetary problems, in development policy, and in atomic energy matters. He said we should also be able to share our experiences in dealing with urban problems—which are becoming increasingly important and common to all industrial countries. Vice President Hellwig noted the possibilities for useful exchanges in technology and research. He also referred to the advances being made in European company laws and patents. The President and Rey closed their meeting by reviewing and agreeing on the proposed joint statement. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 3. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information. 2 For text of the Joint Statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1968–69, p. 199. 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium 1 Washington, February 16, 1968, 0003Z. 116198. BUSEC/CEDTO/NATUS/IAEA. Subj: Evaluation Rey Visit. 1. EC Commission President Rey's first official visit to Washington, February 7–8 concentrated on B/P issue. We achieved our primary objective of impressing on Rey and his party high priority we assign to restoring equilibrium, relation this objective to broad political and security issues and our view of responsibility of EC surplus countries. In course of meetings with Secretaries Rusk and Fowler and Under Secretary Katzenbach, these points were made forcefully with stress on unfinished task of measures necessary to improve our trade account. In meeting between Rey's party and inter-agency group at Under Secretary level, chaired by Katzenbach which lasted 2–1/2 hours in two sessions (see septel), 2 U.S. presented rounded view of B/P problem requiring EC cooperation. Rey and Deniau were obviously impressed by seriousness of the problem. We believe that as result his talks Rey appreciates political necessity for him to be cooperative on trade side and recognizes role this can play in containing protectionist pressures particularly as manifested in Congress. Since Commission's powers limited with respect to economic expansion, interest rate management and capital markets, measures in these fields were only discussed in technical presentation and not in terms of action by the Commission. Rey also indicated little likelihood EC could take trade measures benefiting U.S. trade account in short term. Rey apparently sees his responsibility to consult with the Commission and member countries on whether it will be possible for the EC to stand still should the U.S. find it necessary to take moderate action in trade field. He promised U.S. fairly precise indication of the Commission's thinking when Trezise mission arrives Brussels February 22. 2. Rey repeatedly stressed the importance of achieving U.S. program in fiscal field (income tax surcharge) in connection with obtaining European cooperation on B/P. He also stressed need to maintain KR agreements and specifically to abolish ASP. Amb. Roth made clear that it would not be possible to wait until after Congress acts on ASP before making a decision on B/P trade measures. 3. Other major U.S. substantive point concerned NPT discussed by Secretary, Chairman Seaborg, Messrs. Fisher & Leddy. Messrs. Fisher and Leddy impressed on Rey and his party need to begin informal talks with IAEA ASAP. Rey responded Commission's objective was to facilitate signature of NPT by member countries not to obstruct. He said Commission would seek negotiating mandate from Council of Ministers at end of month. It was also agreed in meetings with Seaborg and Fisher that it would be desirable have close contacts between U.S. and Commission while informal talks were going on. On staff level, Foch confirmed our earlier understanding from Spaak that Commission staff's thinking on nature of verification agreement well advanced. 4. Rey's visit was relatively uneventful with respect to UK-Six. Leddy stressed our opposition to association or free trade area solution. Rey on several occasions said such solution not in cards because unacceptable to UK. Rey's main line on UK/Six issue was that Communities have been in crisis since December 19 and he was optimistic that in few months crisis would be on way to solution by some major compromise as in 1964. Problem was to find adequate interim solution for UK and three other applicants. Benelux proposals were acceptable provided measures and activities contemplated thereunder would be within Communities framework. He repeated several times his opposition to development of technological policy outside Communities framework. 5. It is clear from what has been said above that Rey's first visit was an occasion for significant worthwhile discussions on substance. U.S. side, from President, 3 Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers to staff level, made clear to Rey and his party that U.S. looked to Commission and to European Communities for important cooperation on B/P problem as well as other economic problems, e.g., agriculture (see septel). 4 Rey heard our views expressed at all levels with a good deal of unanimity and singularity of purpose. We in turn heard Commission views on a variety of important issues. Given the collegial nature of the institution which he chairs, which in turn represents an organization of six member countries with widely differing views, Rey's response on B/P problem, while qualified and tentative, was remarkably forthcoming. The forthcoming nature of his response was influenced by the fact that he was deeply moved by the warmth of his reception. His conversation with the President and the Vice President's luncheon and toast in his honor were high points in this regard. But he was also influenced by the fact that U.S. was actually asking Communities for cooperation in a specific substantive area appealing not only to goodwill but to hard mutual self interest. 6. Finally, ground work firmly laid for future consultations on highest level as needed. The President told Rey he welcomed these consultations and said they would be useful in future development of relations between U.S. and EC. Principle to hold U.S.-EC consultations as needed in the future was incorporated in the Joint Statement 5 following Rey's call on the President. Combined meeting on B/P constituted useful precedent. During course of visit Rey and Solomon agreed that another subject for such consultation might well be entire question of association and preferences in the wake of UNCTAD and before Yaounde Convention is renegotiated. 7. In sum, Rey was clearly pleased with his visit. He clearly understands U.S. position and we believe he has undertaken a rather difficult assignment with respect to his Commission and member states. We, for our side, are pleased that his first visit as President of the Commission went beyond reiteration of long-standing U.S. positions on Atlantic partnership into specific useful discussion of what such partnership means at the present time. 8. Recipient posts may draw on above in conversations with officials of host governments. However care should be exercised to speak of Rey's response to our B/P presentation in most general terms. Line we are taking in response to inquiries is that there was thorough airing of the problem and Rey indicated he would consult with Commission and member countries and give us more precise indication of Commission's thinking when Trezise mission arrives in Brussels. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Confidential;Limdis. Drafted by Katz on February 12; cleared by U, E, EUR, STR,AEC, ACDA, the White House, and Treas-ury; and approved by Leddy. Also sent to Geneva, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, London, and Vienna. 2 Not found. 3 For a memorandum of President Johnson's conversation with Rey, see Document 287 . 4 Telegram 113390 to Bonn, February 10. (Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7) 5 See footnote 2, Document 287 . 289. Memorandum of Conversation 289. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 19, 1968. SUBJECT NATO Secretary General Brosio's Visit to the White House (Part 2 of 5)—NATO and Europe PARTICIPANTS The President Secretary General Manlio Brosio Ambassador Harlan Cleveland 2. NATO and Europe Brosio outlined work now underway in NATO on the political side—the search for a basis for European political settlement, work on arms control and study of the new situation created by Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean. Brosio stressed the need for continuing defense effort within a period when we are looking forward to the possibility of discussions with the Soviet Union about the future of Europe. The President said he was very clear on the need to maintain the level of forces required to maintain effective deterrent in Europe. He referred to the contrary views among the Senate leadership, but left no impression that these affected his own determination. I suggested that there was a close connection between the notion of seeking a balanced reduction of forces on which NATO is now beginning to work, and the need to maintain an agreed level of forces as a basis from which reductions might be calculated and negotiated; otherwise the Soviet would not need to negotiate but merely need to wait until the forces on our side melt away. The President expressed his agreement with this line of argument and with its relevance to discussions here this year on the Mansfield Resolution. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cleveland and approved by the White House on February 28. 290. Memorandum of Conversation 290. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 20, 1968. SUBJECT European Matters PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Ernst Lemberger, Ambassador of Austria Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John E. Crump, Austrian Affairs, EUR/AIS 1. NATO and European Security Mr. Stoessel replied to the Ambassador's request for a review of current European developments with a brief review of the Brosio visit and the renewed activity in NATO arising from the now-concluded Harmel study. It appears there is not much Soviet interest in mutual reduction of forces and that they are attempting in general, to solidify the status quo and to gain GDR recognition. The Soviets continue to suggest European participants only in any European security conference, but they would probably agree in the end to our participation. Ambassador Lemberger said he felt such a conference would not be useful at this time because it would only lead to a reaffirmation of the status quo. Mr. Stoessel agreed and added that it also raised the German question without prospect of settlement or progress. There are other less spectacular steps which could be taken to lead to a reduction of tension. We still see NATO as a necessary security element, but we feel it can also be used as an instrument to reduce tension. 2. Economic Developments Turning to European Community matters, Ambassador Lemberger said the results of the Kiesinger-De Gaulle meeting 2 were not clear, but he was not optimistic that progress had been made. Mr. Stoessel said it appeared that France is upset at being excluded by the Five and has decided it will participate in talks with the British, although this does not mean any improvement in the likely result of the talks—association, not membership, remains the offer to the British. Ambassador Lemberger remarked that a trade agreement is easier to achieve when the aim is merely a customs union and Mr. Stoessel reminded him we could not welcome moves which led merely to a free trade area. Returning to the possibility of lessening of tension with Eastern European countries, Ambassador Lemberger said it appeared the Administration wished to take steps in this direction, but opposition was being encountered in Congress. Mr. Stoessel agreed and added this is related to the Eastern European support for North Viet-Nam. For example, after Poland had boasted of its support there, the Congress wanted to withdraw Poland's most-favored-nation treatment. Ambassador Lemberger replied that the Romanian Ambassador had recently expressed his disappointment over his country's failure to achieve MFN treatment, although Romania is seeking to expand trade. Mr. Stoessel said our difficulty is that we sometimes cannot find much to buy from Eastern European countries. We are also hampered by our difficulty in extending credit, but our policy remains to favor trade and contacts there. 3. Sweden Ambassador Lemberger referred to a recently published study which indicated Sweden was the third most admired foreign nation in the United States and said this appeared to be changing. Is it true to speak of tension between the two countries? Mr. Stoessel replied this is too strong a statement. There has perhaps been some change in public opinion because many Americans find it difficult to understand Sweden welcoming U.S. deserters and the increase in demonstrations there recently has been noted. Now Sweden is moving to recognize Hanoi; this is not unexpected and might help in contacting Hanoi from the West. None of these will bring an official reaction from us and, in general, the Swedish image here is good. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential. Drafted by Crump on February 23. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” 2 February 15–16 at Paris. 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, February 22, 1968, 1832Z. 119536. NATUS. For Cargo from Ambassador Cleveland. Subject: Brosio Visit. You will be receiving MemCons Brosio visit discussions here Feb. 19–21. This message provides highlights which have some action implications for USNATO, based on uncleared notes,FYI, Noforn, subject to revision on review. 1. Post Harmel Follow-up Brosio took the line that we did not need to seek dramatic short-term accomplishments on Harmel follow-up studies. His concept was that the “European settlement,” “disarmament and arms control” categories were really continuing responsibilities, where concrete plans and actions by NATO members were heavily dependent on timing and nature of Soviet indications they were interested in discussing these topics. Brosio thinks it probable that Soviets will not be able to go very far in practical negotiations on any European subject while Vietnam war is on. 2. Germany Brosio put great emphasis on central importance of Germany in NATO consultations. While US participants emphasized importance of no derogation from 4-power responsibilities for Berlin and Germany, Secretary made clear that he would not feel that consultation on German problems in wider NATO circle when initiated by the Germans necessarily constituted any real threat to 4-power responsibility in themselves. Brosio is acutely aware of sensitivities involved in special responsibilities of occupying powers and will work with us closely on this. Both Brosio and US participants stressed the internal uncertainties of German politics and danger of getting either the US or NATO in the crossfire between CDU and SPD as they jockey for position before 1969 elections. 3. Mutual Force Reductions and Force Levels Main impact of President's statement following Brosio visit to White House 2 was to reiterate necessity to maintain NATO strength, and to relate this policy to need for stability and security in NATO area as “the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.” Later in meeting with Defense officials and with Secretary-Designate Clifford, Brosio picked up notion of trying to get political consensus this year on “floor” under current levels of defense effort by NATO partners, as base for discussion of balanced East-West reductions to make stalemate less expensive. Context of this idea might be a special meeting this year—possibly at June Ministerial Meeting—before which there will in any case have been discussion of Belgian and other unsatisfactory force plans at May DPC Ministerial, and hopefully Defense Ministers agreement on 1969–73 force goals which are slightly above present levels. 4. Balance of Payments Brosio reiterated his readiness to move ahead with NAC consultations on balance of payments. He was told, both in State and Treasury, that US is studying various kinds of possible payments schemes without any firm idea yet whether and when we may be able to make any concrete proposals. Meanwhile, there is no objection to concentrating consultation in the first instance on trying to get consensus on principle of equity expressed in Secretary Rusk's comments at the Ministerial Meeting. In large measure, this would be educational process of acquainting NAC with problem and means of handling it by members. Seems unlikely that USG will be a good deal clearer on what we want on NAC consultations by the time NAC meets (on present expectations) in mid-March. 5. Mediterranean On several occasions Brosio spoke in strong terms on the need for vigorous pursuit of the Mediterranean study, and mentioned as one desirable outcome the idea of a Standing NATO Naval Force in the Mediterranean, to include at least Italy, UK and US. He said he would discuss with Italians prior to first NAC meeting on this subject, try to insure that they make adequate contribution. We agreed with Brosio that first step is agreed assessment for June Ministerial Meeting. We emphasized that, apart from any NATO action recommendations that might be developed subsequently, assessment would be valuable to us and presumably others in connection with our bilateral policies and actions in the area. Brosio also pointed up his concerns about Malta's economic problems. 6. British Contribution to NATO Brosio said that he thought British would not be inclined to make further cuts in the British Army on Rhine. He mentioned possible usefulness of NATO framework in Mediterranean as basis for maintenance of British naval units there now that there is no British national role in Mediterranean. Brosio said that he would be visiting London in early March, and he would try to take advantage for NATO of statements that British leaders made in announcing their withdrawal from commitments East of Suez, by suggesting withdrawal would enable enhanced contribution by Britain to NATO. 7. Political Predictions On several occasions Brosio predicted that France would not renounce the Treaty in 1969. He also said that Scandinavia, both Norway and Denmark, were now much more solid in NATO policy than they had previously been. His chief worry about future focused on Germany and Italy where uncertainties resulting from internal political rivalries might well overflow into NATO. He also showed concern about Turkey. He was confident however that 1969 would come and go with no defections from the Treaty. 8. Briefings on Non-NATO Issues Brosio was briefed on present state of Greek-Turkish discussions and possibility of future meeting for discussion of fundamental Cyprus arrangements. He was also briefed on present state of Jarring Mission, and (by both the President and Assistant Secretary Bundy) on Vietnam. We stressed, as Brosio fully recognized, great sensitivity and need for secrecy re Cyprus. He noted that, once discussions go beyond Greek-Turkish relations, NATO role is to watch; discreetly encourage where appropriate; but keep strictly hands off. 9. Southeast Asia Secretary suggested to Brosio that we should have some discussion with Europeans on the question, “What kind of Southeast Asia do the Europeans want?” In midst of present US difficulties he felt some spontaneous response from Europe would be appropriate and welcome. Secretary asked Brosio to convey to NATO partners great danger of chain reaction toward isolationism in US resulting from isolationist actions and attitudes in Europe. 10. Nuclear Planning Group a) Defense discussions focused on nuclear planning group. Secretary McNamara emphasized importance of handling Turkish ADM planning so as to avoid any implication that Turks cooled off because of any actions on our part. Consensus was that Turkish plan should not be on NPG agenda as subject, and Turks did not need to attend Ministerial meeting. b) On ABM, previous Brosio view was watered down to recommendation that, in deciding against ABMs for Europe on basis present technological possibilities, NPG should avoid saying “never never.” We agreed that precise formulation of negative conclusion on ABMs for Europe was very important so as to avoid casting any doubts on the US decision and should be drafted and negotiated with members prior to April Ministerial NPG. In discussions with Defense staff and Secretary McNamara, Brosio agreed that it was “probably not wise” to seek European participation in US ABM research and development effort. Brosio also did not press his earlier notion of a non-nuclear anti-missile system. c) In discussion of tactical nuclear work program, we gave Brosio early warning of US intention to float a paper prior to The Hague meeting for discussion among Ministers there, laying out a somewhat more ambitious work program of tactical nuclear studies. d) Brosio repeated his earlier insistence that NPG should discuss how to consult on use of nuclear weapons in emergencies, saying that Athens Guidelines need to be “elaborated.” For the first time in my experience, Brosio described NAC's role in an emergency in a most realistic fashion, saying that we had considered NAC's role as “one alternative way” of consulting with a view to the nuclear “decision” which would have to be made by the President. Secretary McNamara emphasized suggestion that first priority should be given to tactical nuclear studies, from which some useful generalizations about crisis consultation might later be derived. e) Brosio put to Secretary-Designate Clifford the importance his personally attending meetings of NATO Defense Ministers, especially NPG. Clifford said his present calendar would make it possible to attend April NPG and May DPC meetings. He expressed special personal interest in making contribution to work of Nuclear Planning Group. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 7. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared by McAuliffe and USNATO, and approved by Springsteen. 2 For text of this statement, see Department of State Bulletin , March 11, 1968, p. 356. 292. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 292. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, February 23, 1968, 1621Z. 8667. Pass the White House for the President. Subject: Conversation with Kiesinger: No. I of V. 2 1. I met with Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday at my request. This was the first opportunity I had had to talk with him since his meeting with Gen De Gaulle in Paris on Feb 15–16. Our conversation lasted an hour and a half. The Chancellor was in a good mood, very friendly and expansive, and carried the discussion well beyond the time allotted. 2. I started by telling the Chancellor that the President and other high US officials would welcome whatever he could tell us in confidence about what transpired during his meeting with De Gaulle, and how he appraised the results. I assured him that whatever he said would be held in the strictest confidence. The Chancellor's comments on the meeting are reported in this telegram and in the three following telegrams on Eastern policy (II), the future shape of Europe (III) and financial questions (IV). The Chancellor's remarks on Vietnam are reported in telegram V of this series. 3. The Chancellor said that, as was usual in such meetings, there had been a dispute between himself and De Gaulle over their respective views toward the US. This time he believed we had “won some ground”. Whereas de Gaulle had stressed the great power of the US—which he said constituted a threat to other countries—the Chancellor had referred to the power of the Soviet Union as being a much more dangerous threat. De Gaulle had told him that he could not understand the German attitude toward NATO. However, he accepted the fact that Germany wished to “practice” NATO. De Gaulle had also said that he fully understands the German desire for the continued presence of American forces in Europe. He also appreciates the value of the Alliance. NATO can only be abandoned if the threat to Europe is removed—which he does not now consider to be the case. Unless something else “quite unforeseeable” arose, France would not leave it. The Chancellor repeated to me the words “quite unforeseeable”, which he thought was a stronger expression than De Gaulle has previously used. He considered this to be particularly significant, since De Gaulle had used this expression both in his private meeting with him and in the large plenary session. 4. The Chancellor said that he emphasized to De Gaulle, as we had always done in the past, that there cannot be full German-French cooperation as long as De Gaulle continues to make public anti-American statements. He told De Gaulle that he (De Gaulle) had lost much support in Germany as a result of these statements. The Chancellor also told De Gaulle that, as far as the facts are concerned, he did not believe that De Gaulle and the US were so far apart on their concepts of the future of Europe. Both Germany and France want a strong and united Europe, which can constitute a stabilizing factor in the world. He assured De Gaulle that this is also what the US wants. If Europe can be united in agreement with the US, Europe “can do its share” in coping with free world problems. 5. De Gaulle had, in a sense, apologized for the categorical language he customarily uses. He said that this has been necessitated by the French internal political situation. He needs the support of the Communists, and can get this if he makes statements such as his charge that the UK is “a satellite of the US”. The Chancellor believes this is an important element in De Gaulle's thinking. He had last summer given Kiesinger a similar explanation of his position. 6. With respect to UK entry into the Common Market, Kiesinger advised me that “we stick with our position”. There should be a “beginning of negotiations with the UK on entry”. Of course, De Gaulle has opposed this. However, Kiesinger pushed him in Paris to permit a start to be made. In the end De Gaulle had been willing to state, both privately to him and in the communique text, that both countries welcome in principle the entry of other countries—mentioning specifically the UK. 7. The question remained, said the Chancellor: “Can one really do something?” The idea of a “sort of free trade area” as a possible solution had, according to the Chancellor, been a common idea. When I queried him closely, he would not admit that either France or Germany had proposed the idea first. One motivation of De Gaulle in agreeing to the idea, which he expressly confirmed to the Chancellor, was to “help the UK fulfill the conditions for entry into the Common Market more quickly”. 8. Kiesinger commented that he had recently been advised by an Amb of Scandinavian country (not specified), that they would welcome the free trade area approach. The Amb had said that this was the view of his government, which also thought that the UK had not handled well its efforts to attain entry into the Common Market. 9. “The FonMins of the Six will now meet on the 29th,” the Chancellor continued, “and we will see what comes out”. Of those who will most likely oppose the French-German proposals, he mentioned Dutch FonMin Luns, who is the “most stubborn” UK advocate. In response to my query, the Chancellor said that he had not been fully advised as to the results of Luns' talk with Brandt the previous day. He himself had not been able to see Luns. 10. At this point I emphasized to the Chancellor how important it was to us that any provisional arrangements with the UK and others be clearly preparatory to their early admission as full members of the Common Market. As he knew, we and others had opposed free trade areas, in themselves, as being merely preferential trading arrangements. The Chancellor said that he fully understood this. 11. In summarizing the results of his meeting with De Gaulle insofar as it applied to UK entry, the Chancellor said that “This was the maximum we could get. If we had gotten nothing, there would have been a crisis within the Common Market, which Germany wishes to prevent. As things now stand the French have agreed to go ahead.” He believed that the UK should now be willing “to put its foot in the door.” In response to my query, he said that he did not believe that De Gaulle's agreement to proceed constituted merely a maneuver on his part. Close cooperation with Germany in Europe would not be possible if De Gaulle would now renege on the assurances he had given in this respect. The Chancellor confirmed that it was the German and French intention that both industry and agriculture be included in any arrangement with the UK. “In my view,” he said, “we must keep moving. The UK must not be isolated.” Although he agreed that the Six should continue to talk among themselves and have other contacts with the UK, it was not his impression, as it had been Brandt's as conveyed to me in my meeting with him on Feb 20 (see Embtel 8569), 3 that De Gaulle has agreed to outside consultation with the UK on exchange of technology. This De Gaulle considers to be a Community matter. 12. In response to my query, the Chancellor said that he did not think very much of the Benelux plan—somewhat contrary to what Brandt had advised me was his view (Bonn 8569). It was largely on considerations of prestige that the decision had been made to discuss this plan in Brussels on February 29. The Germans themselves opposed “any front against the French.” Such action would not be constructive. French resistance would only be accentuated, and a crisis would result in the Community. 13. The Chancellor observed that Germany has, through the stand it has taken, been put in an uncomfortable situation. Luns, as well as certain British newspapers, have said that the “Germans have bowed to France.” The Chancellor noted that he had, in his speech in Hamburg on February 21, said that it was much better “to show patience in these matters,” as the FRG had attempted to do, rather than to act “out of spite” and “as little children.” 14. In speaking of his personal relationship with De Gaulle, the Chancellor said that he believed De Gaulle had confidence in him—because the Chancellor had always been frank with De Gaulle and because De Gaulle was convinced of the Chancellor's commitment to German-French cooperation. It was quite possible, the Chancellor speculated, that France could take a contrary position, i.e., one antagonistic to Germany. The Chancellor commented that President Johnson had told him that he must be the “harmonizer.” He was ready to do this, both on behalf of French-US relations and French-European relations—even though this was not rewarding. McGhee 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to London and Paris. Rostow repeated the text of this message to the President in Texas in CAP 80525, February 23. (JOHNSON Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 64, Part 2 of 2) 2 Parts II–V are in Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US. 3 Dated February 20. (Ibid., EEC 6 UK) 293. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 293. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, March 13, 1968, 1921Z. 2131. NATUS. Subject: Item II, NAC meeting March 13, 1968: NATO and Malta. Ref: State 126086. 2 1. At NAC meeting March 13 large majority supported Brosio's procedural proposals in PO/68/102 3 for improving NATO/Malta relationship, i.e., through NATO's establishment of open-ended Malta Committee and through Malta's official and public designation of Ambassador Curmi to maintain liaison with NATO. Only France and Denmark balked at these proposals. Brosio asked PermReps of these countries to report majority consensus to their governments and expressed hope that NAC could reach positive decision at March 20 meeting. 2. Re associating GOM with strategy study on Malta, there was general consensus that Maltese views should be solicited on study after NAC has had preliminary discussion on it but before study has been formally approved by Council. Comment: Present status is that SHAPE study has, unfortunately, been revised by international military staff at British insistence to delete all economic and political comments, as well as list of possible courses of action. This revised draft is scheduled for Military Committee consideration March 14. End comment. 3. Re Brosio's suggestion that some form of collective economic aid for Malta might be considered, there was significant support in principle even though several delegates expressed anticipated doubts about NATO being appropriate forum for this subject. De Ferrariis (Italy) said that GOI is agreeable in principle to joint study of this idea. He suggested that, in view of Malta's size, a minor effort could produce excellent economic and psychological results. Grewe (Germany) recognized the danger that Malta might turn elsewhere for economic aid. He said the FRG has already shown an interest in economic projects there and would be prepared to consult on this point within NATO. 4. In explaining French opposition to Brosio's proposals, Seydoux (France) feared that, if NATO takes proposed procedural steps, it would risk giving impression that NATO is supporting the present Maltese government and that NATO plans doing more than it actually has in mind. He added that, personally, he is not convinced that Malta is an important part of the developing military situation in the Mediterranean and doubts the utility of taking steps which would give the impression that NATO considers Malta to be more important than it is in fact. 5. Hjorth-Nielsen (Denmark) said initial Danish reaction was doubt regarding the advisability of creating “new machinery” for NATO/Malta relations, but he promised to report faithfully the majority consensus in favor of these steps. 6. Groundwork for satisfactory outcome March 13 NAC meeting was laid in March 12 Malta group (US, UK, Italy) meeting convened by Brosio at which Ambassador Cleveland outlined US ideas reftel. In light of French and Danish positions, Cargo considered it was best during this NAC discussion to limit himself to statement in support of Brosio's procedural proposals. 7. Re Department's concern reftel about legal implications of designating Ambassador Curmi as “authorized link,” Brosio accepted suggestion by Boon (Netherlands) that it would be preferable to use term “liaison” rather than “link.” We agree that liaison is a better term, and see no problem if GOM chooses to name Ambassador Curmi as its “liaison” with NATO for consultation as foreseen in the 1965 NAC resolution. Cargo 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Valletta, Rome, Naples for USDOCOSouth for POLAD,SHAPE, and USCINCEUR for POLAD. 2 Telegram 126086, March 7, welcomed other NATO countries' concern about Malta, supported the idea of continued British presence on the island, and supported Brosio's plan for individual member states providing economic assistance to Malta. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 294. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 294. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in Europe 1 Washington, March 16, 1968, 0046Z. 131325. Subject: FRG March 9 Proposals re UK. Italian Ambassador March 11 asked Leddy US view of FRG proposal on commercial arrangements with applicants. Leddy replied that US following discussion with great interest but with no activity. Ortona asked whether the US would not be opposed to the free trade area concept. Leddy replied US does not favor free trade areas but it was not yet clear what might emerge from discussions in Brussels. Until Communities had made further progress in sorting out their own position, it was not appropriate for US to become involved. US noted, however, that there were no membership provisions in FRG proposals and this seemed significant flaw. We favored full UK membership and could understand transitional arrangement directed clearly to this end. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Confidential. Drafted by Fina, cleared by Katz, and approved by Leddy. Sent to 10 posts in Europe. 295. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson 295. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 16, 1968. SUBJECT Consultation with the Federal Republic of Germany on Nuclear Weapons Release Recommendation: 2 That you approve in principle nuclear consultation arrangements of the type described below subject to your final review when the details are worked out. Discussion: In November Dr. Carstens, then State Secretary for Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, handed Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze a memorandum which proposed a) increased FRG participation in the formulation and review of NATO nuclear plans, b) notice of requests submitted by General Lemnitzer to the President for selective release of nuclear weapons to be employed from or on German soil in order to give the German Government an opportunity to express its views, and c) an arrangement whereby orders for selective use of nuclear weapons by German units would be subject to confirmation by the FRG Government. [ 2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] A US–FRG staff level task force has been exploring without commitment the details and implications of the FRG request. At a meeting next week the US team expects to discuss with the Germans a draft task force report to the respective Defense Ministers which would suggest that a confidential letter between the President and the Chancellor would be an appropriate vehicle for any undertaking between the two governments 1) to consult prior to selective release by the US of nuclear weapons for use in or from any part of Germany, and 2) that the US would not selectively release nuclear weapons for use by German delivery forces over the objection of the Government of the Federal Republic. While the draft report does not actually recommend these consultation and release commitments, Secretary Clifford and I consider it desirable that you be informed of this trend of thinking before our staffs mention it to the FRG, since it may logically lead to a proposal to you for consideration of such a letter and undertaking. We would favor in principle this general approach for the following reasons: [ 1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified ] 2) As for a German desire for some measure of control over use of their delivery forces, it is difficult to deny a request for this degree of recognition of sovereignty and civilian control, or to envisage circumstances under which the President would want to release nuclear weapons for use by German units over the objection of the German Government. An arrangement recognizing this seems preferable to establishment by the FRG of de facto controls and communications by which it could assure that German units do not employ nuclear weapons without a confirmatory order from the German Government. 3) Failure to achieve satisfactory nuclear consultation arrangements could cause considerable difficulty for the Kiesinger Government. 4) A refusal to grant this relatively modest request for sovereign rights in the nuclear field could complicate other nuclear issues including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Dean Rusk Clark M. Clifford 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Baker and cleared by Farley. 2 President Johnson approved this recommendation by checking the “Approve” line. 296. Memorandum of Conversation 296. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 21, 1968, noon. SUBJECT The Climate in Europe and the U.S. PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Alfred Puhan, Director of German Affairs Harry Obst, Interpreter FRG Ex-Chancellor Ludwig Erhard FRG Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein After an exchange of amenities Professor Erhard expressed his great pleasure at being back in the U.S. and at the opportunity to renew his friendship with the President and the Secretary. He said he was profoundly aware of the problems this country faced but that they were related to European problems. In this connection he referred to the recent meeting of the presidents of Central Banks here and thought their conclusions were the right ones. The Secretary admitted to our having some serious problems, but pointed out they affect the entire free world. He said it was not a question whether Europeans supported the U.S. or the U.S. supported Europe. It was more important for Europeans to ask themselves what kind of Asia did they want to live with. What kind of Southeast Asia was desired by Europe? Did Europeans look without apprehension at a militant brand of communism in Asia which had sent 40,000 guerrillas to Laos, penetrated Thailand, entered Cambodia and sent agents to Burma? Professor Erhard said there was a malaise in Europe over the Viet-Nam question. He thought De Gaulle had played a role in infecting all of Europe. He didn't feel there was so much anti-U.S. feeling as there was a desire, particularly on the part of Germany, not to irritate De Gaulle on the one hand and not to lose the friendship of the U.S. on the other. He said there had been some recent remarks made which he regarded most unfortunate and then referred in this connection to “Atlantic imperium”, and the book by Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber “Le defi Americain”. Erhard referred to the uneasiness created by the student unrest and the development of the extreme left and right in Germany. He foresaw no great danger from these quarters in the final analysis, but their action caused much uneasiness in Germany. He said there was doubt in Europe regarding NATO. There were stupid people who shouted that the U.S. should end the war in Viet-Nam but had no alternative solution to what was being done now. He said again that the feeling wasn't anti-American but there was much anti-war feeling in Europe. Erhard said he feared a U.S. retreat into isolationism. He concluded by saying that he was happy to see the President remain unyielding and devoted to the course he had set for this country. The Secretary said there was a serious problem with growing isolationism on both sides of the Atlantic. In this country the same critics who want us to withdraw from Viet-Nam are clamoring for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Such withdrawals would surely result in isolationism in this country. The Secretary saw similar signs in Europe. Professor Erhard said he was determined to speak more often to his own people on these issues. While he did not deny the influence De Gaulle has had on European thinking, he thought too much importance was attached here to De Gaulle. He felt the other five in the Common Market and the EFTA nations as well desired continued Atlantic cooperation. De Gaulle, to be sure, desires European isolation. Erhard said that Europeans were frequently schizophrenic. They asked the U.S. to take certain actions—he was referring to the stability of the dollar—and when the U.S. does then the Europeans scream that their commerce would be destroyed. He said it was difficult for the Europeans to make up their minds one way or the other. In this connection Erhard said he had strongly supported the EEC carrying out the tariff cuts agreed upon in order to make it more difficult for protectionism to grow in this country. The Secretary asked Erhard about German political developments. He wondered if the Coalition would last. Erhard said the Secretary must be aware of his opposition to the Grand Coalition. He thought a government was credible only when there was real opposition as the experience in Anglo Saxon countries has shown. He said there was no real discussion in the German parliament today and suggested if anyone had any difficulty sleeping without sedatives he should go and sit in the German parliament. Erhard continued by saying the German people did not feel the goals had been achieved which the Grand Coalition had set for itself. He found it difficult to see what would happen in 1969 if there was no electoral reform legislation and he doubted that there would be any. He felt there was considerable opposition in the Grand Coalition in both of the great parties in Germany. As far as he was concerned he would shed no tears over the end of the Grand Coalition but assured the Secretary he had no personal ambitions. He did venture the prophecy that it was possible that disappointment with the SPD could lead to an absolute majority for the CDU in 1969. To a question by the Secretary regarding the NPD, Erhard minimized its strength. He thought it would be difficult for this right wing party to surmount the required five per cent in 1969. In adjourning for lunch at the White House the Secretary expressed his great appreciation to Erhard for his contributions to European unity. In parting, the Secretary said his greatest regret was that at a time when the communist camp found itself in its greatest disarray, we in the free world are in great disarray ourselves. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on March 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson 297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 22, 1968, 6:30 p.m. Mr. President: Attached is the summary report of consultations on the Hill which our Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, undertook at your request. He spoke to 17 Senators and 17 Representatives. (The list is at Tab A.) 2 His major conclusions are: 1. There is continued support in Congress for NATO. 2. The Mansfield Resolution is quiescent—but NATO troop levels will become a major issue if reserves are called up. 3. If reserves are called up, we should argue we must not be pulled out of Europe by events in Asia. 4. Congressional frustration over Vietnam is widespread. The fact the Europeans are not “helping us” in Vietnam is often mentioned. Opponents of our Vietnam policy are waiting to seize on some issue with Vietnam implications, filibuster it to death, and bring about a “damaging and divisive state of affairs”. 5. The Administration should emphasize that holding the line in Europe and bringing the Vietnam conflict to a successful conclusion are both necessary parts of a global strategy to keep the peace. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, Vol. VI. Secret; Exdis. 2 Neither attachment is printed. 298. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 298. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, March 28, 1968, 1451Z. 2341. NATUS. Subject: NAC consultation on bilateral East-West talks on European security. Ref: USNATO 2334. 2 1. Following are highlight impressions from lengthy March 27 NAC discussion, sparked by Brosio, of relationship between bilateral East-West contacts and NAC consultations on detente-related subject. General level of animation no doubt due to fact that Luns, in his talks with Hungarians and Yugoslavs, touched on issue of finding way for East Germans to make views known on future security arrangements in Europe. 2. Belgians and Dutch, seconded by Scandinavians, are quite defensive about role of smaller allies in taking soundings with East and are tempted to equate impasse on fundamental European issues with giganticism of major powers. Dutch PermRep, reading from instructions spoke somewhat emotionally to point there no “monopoly” on detente initiatives. 3. FRG apparently determined to prevent if possible even exploratory discussion in Group of Ten or elsewhere of East German representation. PermRep Grewe in final intervention put “precise point” that FRG was posing to allies its “desire” that GDR question “should not be touched at this time, at least, without consulting us” adding that allies traditionally respected such wishes of members if vital national interests concerned. 4. At same time, Grewe was at pains to leave door open when he stressed that position on GDR could not be fixed in advance because FRG views not necessarily same next year or two years from now as they are today. He said that “everything depends on conditions and prospects.” 5. Italians continue surprisingly strong and solid support of FRG, perhaps because their traditional allergy to being left out is reinforced in this case by fact that their opposition identifies them with larger rather than smaller allies. 6. French are participating in debate, picking up marbles in Bonn by standing firmly on special responsibility of quadripartite powers, no doubt conscious that this is their most visible political credential of major power status. This has interesting effect of winning French endorsement of relevance of multilateral as well as bilateral approaches to major East-West issues. 7. British, who announced in NAC upcoming Eastern European tour by Foreign Minister Stewart, are avoiding main issues and not asserting four power prerogatives, though UK Del tells us here they working on Dutch bilaterally re Luns initiative. 8. Debate in NAC and senior political committee is serving several purposes which in our view are healthy: A. Smoking out intentions and aspirations of allies in detente politics which clearly remains in vogue with majority of allies. B. Creating climate in which allies are unlikely to make more than tentative new probes without returning to Council for consultations. C. Revealing built-in governors which should bring about more realistic expectations on part of more optimistic allies. 9. So far as procedural status, Brosio summarized situation as follows, which seems accurate rendition to us: A. Difficult to draw line where exploratory discussions begin to shade into negotiation but only practical approach is to leave that judgment to Western principal undertaking probe. B. On subjects identified in Harmel Report as future tasks of Alliance, NAC consultations have taken “a step forward from general to specific” discussion. C. Best way to avoid possible damage from bilateral initiatives is to continue consultations already begun in NAC and senior Political Committee. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 EUR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the other NATO capitals and Warsaw. 2 Telegram 2334, March 27, transmitted a summary of the North Atlantic Council meeting of March 27, which included a preliminary discussion of bilateral East-West talks on European security. (Ibid., NATO 8–2) 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, April 10, 1968, 2152Z. 144640. NATUS. Refs: A. USNATO 2093; B. London 7068. 2 Subj: Europe's Role in NATO. 1. We do not agree with comment in reftel A regarding risk of European separatism as opposed to Atlantic cooperation. Rather, our general posture must be to examine sympathetically and on merits any European ideas or initiatives looking toward improved balance as between Europe and North America within the Alliance. This attitude is consist-ent with long-standing US views reiterated in the Secretary's December 2 remarks to United Italian-American Labor Council in New York 3 and most recently by the Under Secretary in January 1968 speech in Chicago. 4 2. We are satisfied with the current organization at SHAPE and believe alteration lessening US influence dependent on it being clearly evident that change responded to a general European desire for greater responsibility which could be expected to produce substantial benefits. 3. Re specific ideas mentioned in reftels, we have no objection in principle to examine ways and means to strengthen Deputy SACEUR's role. However, a non-American as SHAPE Chief of Staff would present various practical problems at this time, due to certain sensitive functions C/S performs for SACEUR. Therefore change in present Chief of Staff nationality would necessitate other special arrangements. 4. Before proceeding further, Brosio should be encouraged to discuss matter with SACEUR. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret. Drafted by Myerson and Captain Hanks (OSD/ISA); cleared by OSD/ISA, JCS, and McAuliffe; and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, SHAPE for POLAD, EUCOM for POLAD, and USCINCEUR. 2 Telegram 2093, March 12, briefly reviewed Brosio's views on a European military caucus within NATO and commented that they seemed headed for European separatism rather than Atlantic cooperation. (Ibid.) Telegram 7068, March 8, transmitted a lengthy summary of Brosio's March 4–5 visit to London, where he had also floated the idea. (Ibid., NATO 7) 3 For text of these remarks, see Department of State Bulletin , December 25, 1967, pp. 855–859. 4 For text of this speech, see ibid., February 5, 1968, pp. 168–172. 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, April 17, 1968, 2114Z. 148389. NATUS. Deliver Mr. Cargo by 9 AM., Thursday, April 18. Subject: Belgian Freeze Proposal. Refs: USNATO 2255; State 141484. 2 1. On basis preliminary consideration Dept has following general observations on Belgian freeze suggestion as regards relationship of freeze to Mutual Force Reductions Study, ceiling, floor, and verification aspects, and probable limits of progress that seem feasible by NATO Ministerial at Reykjavik in June. 2. Relationship Freeze Proposal to Mutual Force Reductions: We have reservations about Belgian proposal being very useful except as first step, largely conceptual, in developing models of and proposals for consideration in course of NATO MFR Study. FYI. In political climate of increasing detente when pressure in Europe is to reduce military forces, it seems unreal to focus much attention on establishing force ceilings. Fact that Belgians hope to realize domestic political objectives and have gone out on limb with Poles regarding topic does not alter this. End FYI. Prospects of converting “ceiling” to credible “floor” for NATO forces should also be related to development of models for consideration during study. Obviously, NATO can best induce reciprocity from East in direct proportion to extent it can convince East that it will not engage in unilateral reductions, and this proposition relates to consideration freeze as well as whole philosophy behind MFR. We therefore believe that Belgian proposal should not, standing alone, be considered as very promising proposal to limit forces when there is little real prospect of overall quantitative increase. Similarly, proposal should not be exploited for sole purpose of attempting establish floor for NATO forces as condition precedent to examination possibilities MFR. Main purpose of study is to evaluate political, military and economic implications of, and possibilities for, mutual reductions. Attention should not be diverted to consideration “floors” or “ceilings” to extent of preempting this main purpose. 3. Freeze as a Ceiling: We believe in any mutual force reductions proposal to East that may emerge from study, including features or concepts of Belgian proposal, ceiling on force levels should be quantitative (i.e., limited to number of men in active forces) rather than qualitative (i.e., relating to deployments, delivery vehicles, or nuclear or conventional weapons). We see no practical present possibility of qualitative stage such as Belgians appear to envisage as possible second step. Freeze ceiling should, in our view, include troops redeployed by US and UK and still committed to NATO. Any agreed ceiling should also in our view be over-all figure for NATO rather than separate national figures in order that better burden-sharing may be arranged, e.g., by increasing one country's force contribution to compensate for another's decrease. Similarly, ceiling should apply to whole NATO area and should not inhibit movements within that area, e.g., central front to flanks, as situations of tension may require. Nor should ceilings be stated in such terms as to inhibit reserve programs and mobilization capabilities either alone or in conjunction with reduction of active forces. We would wish to see any language proposed. Ceiling could at least in theory be based on any of three levels: (1) Force goal proposal level at any given time, (2) Force plan level for 1968–72 or 1969–73 or, (3) De facto level at time of offer or at time of acceptance of reciprocity by East. However attractive from force planning standpoint, do not consider offer of ceiling based on goals in excess of actual levels at time of its acceptance would be credible and provide NATO favorable image as seeking detente. Moreover, such an offer would prejudice chance of getting countries primarily interested in disarmament to accept a reasonable floor or base line from which to project possible reductions. On other hand, any freeze or reduction offer should not be so framed as to place limits on current efforts improve force posture prior to effective date of East-West agreement or mutual example arrangement. Thus priority task in NATO would continue to be to build adequate forces in being in time to be reflected in 1969–73 force plan to be acted on by Ministers in December 1969. Possibility continued NATO improvement in force level could in this way be reconciled with disarmament aspect of offer. 4. Freeze as Floor or Base Line: Unlike ceiling aspect of freeze, extent to which it would involve any agreed floor for NATO forces in event Warsaw Pact countries not responsive to MFR proposals is internal NATO matter which should not be subject negotiation or agreement by East. US attitude regarding base line should be consistent with statement by President following call by NATO Secretary General Brosio, February 19, namely “They considered the maintenance of NATO's strength, including the US commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.” While idea of clearly defined and firmly agreed NATO floor under forces would contribute substantially to strength and stability, we believe prospects for obtaining agreement this sort not better than in past in light of such factors as BALPA, competing needs for US troops in various parts of the world, Congressional and public sentiments on burden-sharing and existing US force levels in Europe, and pressures for budget cuts in several NATO governments. Although such floor may not be possible, one year commitment aspect of annual NATO force plans might, during period of any MFR offers to the other side, be reinforced at a minimum by official recognition by NATO bodies that strong and stable NATO is political imperative for successful negotiation. Corollary might be understood to be that no arbitrary or destabilizing changes in general commitments of forces would be appropriate. 5. Verification of Freeze: In view well known political difficulties of any attempt gain what Soviets call inspection without disarmament, believe one of questions which should be addressed in forthcoming MFR Study should be possibility of use unilateral means for verification for any freeze proposal as entity in itself or as first step in reduction proposal. Risks and possibilities should be objectively assessed in course study with US Del not endorsing Belgian idea verification unless conclusion of MFR Study clearly warrants. 6. Prospects: Despite apparently growing pressures for accelerated conclusions, we remain of view that Ministerial Meeting in December earliest practicable time for reaching conclusions on freeze and MFR. Even then, we cannot prejudge results of study to say whether finding would be that any specific proposal should be made at that time. It may well be possible at Reykjavik, however, to allude in some public way to Belgian proposal for freeze as one of models to be considered if this will be of assistance to Harmel. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Baker and Robert Kranich (ACDA); cleared by G/PM, OSD, and JCS; and approved by Getz. Repeated to the other NATO capitals. 2 Dated March 21 and April 4, respectively, these telegrams discussed various aspects of a Belgian proposal for an arms freeze in Europe. (Ibid. and ibid., DEF 6 NATO) 301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State 301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State 1 The Hague, April 19, 1968, 1800Z. 4939. From US Delegation to NPG. Subj: NPG highlights. 1. Meeting of NATO Nuclear Planning Group April 18 accomplished main US objectives. 2. Secretary Clifford's presence, obvious interest, active substantive participation, and bilateral conversations, all emphasized that US retains liveliest intention to share responsibility for nuclear planning with interested NATO allies. 3. Full consensus reached that “in light of current and foreseeable technological circumstances, the deployment of ABMS in NATO Europe is not at present warranted”: but question kept under review in case “underlying factors” should change. 4. Greek ADM proposals were sidetracked in favor of a study of “time factors relevant to the employment of ADMs”. This is agreed to be key area that needs to be sorted out before detailed military plans could be drafted for use of ADMs in Greece or anywhere else. Germans continue to be skeptical of ADMs for FRG. Greeks would still like ADMs but tacitly accepted stalling tactic. 5. The development of political “guidelines” for tactical use of nuclear weapons was the main focus at the one-day meeting. It is now clear all around that NPG will not try to write a one-time full-bloom “concept” for tactical nuclear weapons as a class: rather, Ministers will gradually develop what Healey called a “corpus of doctrine” by induction from the ongoing studies of specific systems and scenarios. For this purpose, NPG Ministers agreed to concentrate for the time being on the kinds of uses most likely to be considered as politically feasible by NATO governments: (A) demonstrative use, (B) clearly defensive systems (ADMs and air defense), (C) use at sea, and (D) selective use against battlefield targets in a limited conflict. These fields divided thus among the four permanent members for discussion leadership—(A) US, (B) Italy, (C) UK, (D) FRG. 6. The long-smoldering complaints about national govt participation in military nuclear planning are now effectively answered by NPG Ministerial endorsement of the Military Committee paper on the subject. 7. That other ancient issue, how host countries get enough influence on the use of nuclear weapons from or on their own territory, was nearly (but not quite) laid to rest by US endorsement of the second German paper on the subject. Ministers agreed to a general principle, sought by the Germans, that in nuclear consultation “special weight should be given to the views of the NATO countries most directly affected.” 8. SecDef used occasion to state and advertise US view that NPT would not interfere with NPG. This was well received by continental Europeans. British agreed with this sentiment, and endorsed it in confidential minute, but resisted saying so out loud. 9. Texts of communique and agreed minute in septels. Fuller report of meeting will follow. 2 Tyler 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense and to the Mission to NATO and repeated to the other NATO capitals, Geneva, and USUN. 2 The text of the agreed minute was transmitted in telegram 4923 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) The text of the final communique was transmitted in telegram 4916 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) The fuller report was transmitted in telegram 4931 from The Hague, April 19. (Ibid.) 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Switzerland 1 Washington, April 23, 1968, 1655Z. 151414. Subject: European Unification and the Neutrals. 1. Swiss Trade Negotiator Weitnauer called on Leddy, April 22, and posed series of questions centering on neutral relations with EC. Essentials of exchange follow. 2. What would be U.S. position if faced with purely commercial arrangement not clearly leading to membership between EC and UK? 3. Leddy judged this unlikely eventuality since UK probably not settle for less than full membership in view of its determination gain political role in Europe. This especially important to UK as East of Suez position being drastically reduced. US does favor full UK membership and not a preferential commercial agreement. 4. Decade ago US had two motives for favoring European unity—political and economic. Today, economic goal less important because of European economic restoration. Political goal remains and is even more important. We see no chance Europe play decisive and constructive world role unless united. And given present US balance payments situation, only major political component could counterbalance US opposition to expanded area of European commercial discrimination. 5. In this political Europe, is there a place for a truly neutral country like Switzerland or Sweden? 6. Leddy replied that he did not believe Switzerland or Sweden needed to be members or associates of the EC for economic reasons. Each could solve its problems on an MFN basis. If a neutral became a member of the Communities, progress to political unity would be halted. We cannot see how the existing European political situation could be improved by a commercial arrangement involving the UK or the neutrals. It seems to us best to wait with some patience to allow the longer term forces pushing Europe toward unity to have their effect. 7. Weitnauer, during course of his inquiries, made clear his belief that UK should accept EC commercial arrangement and strongly hinted Switzerland and perhaps other small EFTA states would urge this on UK at May 8/9 EFTA Council. He said that desired UK membership could be advanced simply by involving EC and UK in commercial negotiations. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Fina, cleared by Wells Stabler (AIS), and approved by Leddy. Repeated to 13 European posts. 303. Memorandum of Conversation 303. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 30, 1968, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Mutual Force Reduction (Part VIII of IX) PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Rufus Z. Smith, Country Director for Canada Canada Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs A.E. Ritchie, Ambassador Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary, Department of External Affairs Basil Robinson, Deputy Under-Secretary, Department of External Affairs Mr. Sharp mentioned that the June NATO Ministerial Meeting at Reykjavik will coincide with the Canadian elections, and he feared that he would be unable to attend since his absence from the country at the time would be regarded in Canada, he thought, as “supreme arrogance.” The Secretary turned the discussion to the possibilities of mutual force reductions in Europe. If both sides could come to see the desirability of reduction of military forces in Central Europe, a premise would exist for progress along these lines. If there is a chance of this kind, then it would help us in holding the line against pressures here to withdraw US forces from Europe. If there could be real signs of hope at the Reykjavik meeting, then the new President might not find himself confronted with over-whelming pressure on the issue. The Secretary went on to comment that with 650,000 men deployed in Vietnam, with the 7th Fleet, and in near-by areas, it was a near miracle that we had been able to resist pressures for substantial withdrawal from Europe. He therefore hoped that as the Canadian Government reviewed its own situation it would bear in mind that Canadian actions might well have a “multiplier effect” in the US. Even a move toward reduction by Luxembourg complicated our problem. The Secretary volunteered that he was not too hopeful that the Soviet Union could go very far toward mutual force reduction under present circumstances. He thought the Russians were very much concerned about what could happen in Eastern Europe. The Soviets also would have a political problem in taking steps which would appear to release US forces for action in Vietnam. Mr. Sharp inquired as to how deep the Russian concern is about Eastern Europe, and the Secretary responded that he thought their concern was very real, for example, with respect to Czechoslovakia. He suspected they were also under some pressure from Ulbricht. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 EUR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on May 6. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 304. Memorandum of Conversation 304. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 1, 1968. SUBJECT The United States and Europe PARTICIPANTS Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Member of German Bundestag Under Secretary Rostow Robert T. Grey, Jr., Member of German Bundestag Herbert S. Malin, German Affairs Mr. Birrenbach said that his impression on coming here this time was that the United States was beset with a major land war in Asia, an internal racial crisis of mounting proportions, and a financial crisis. All this would lead to an agonizing reappraisal of United States foreign policy, and he expected the United States to conclude that it must limit its commitments in the world. If so, he hoped that the United States would give Europe first consideration in its scale of priorities. Mr. Rostow acknowledged the essential correctness of Birrenbach's appraisal, but said he was confident of the outcome, given the texture of our society. He ascribed the current mood to a popular unwillingness to abandon 19th Century attitudes, even though these could not be reconciled with the problems of security with which the United States had been confronted after 1945. He expressed confidence that, regardless of who was elected this year, the new administration would reaffirm the world position of the United States, despite the problems it faced. He stressed, however, that other nations must join us in fulfilling this task. Birrenbach said Germans understood this, but that to join the United States means to exercise independent leadership as well, and that this latter concept was what Kiesinger had in mind in opposing “an Atlantic imperium”. Mr. Rostow also pointed out that it was of fundamental importance that there be no reduction in FRG troop levels. Birrenbach said that SPD, with detente foremost in its mind, saw this issue differently. Birrenbach said Europeans should show understanding for the enormous problems which the United States was struggling. For example, the FRG should avoid steps which clearly seemed to identify Germany with French policy. He said Kiesinger had asked him to tell the United States that there was no such identification. He mentioned the Chancellor's efforts to persuade De Gaulle to accept a preferential arrangement between the UK and EEC and the subsequent repudiation by other French officials of what Kiesinger thought had been De Gaulle's acquiescence. Mr. Rostow assured him that the FRG had no reason to be worried that the United States might misunderstand German moves. There was no anxiety here about the Franco-German relationship. In fact, we regarded this relationship as the foundation for the Europe of the future. Mr. Rostow asked why some Germans still doubted whether the United States endorsed German Eastern policy. He said the United States had no reservations over the German initiatives. Birrenbach attributed the beginning of such reports to former Chancellor Erhard. He said he personally had never heard Americans express such feelings. At the same time, the United States should be cautious on Berlin. He thought the German Government was giving too high priority to its Eastern policy. He feared it would raise unrealistic popular expectations for an early resolution of the German question. On Berlin, Mr. Rostow emphasized that the United States view on holding Bundestag Committee meetings in the city was that one should keep on holding those activities in Berlin that had been held there in the past. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR W–US. Confidential. Drafted by Malin and approved in M on May 9. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, May 9, 1968, 2018Z. 161093. NATUS. Subj: European Defense Cooperation. Ref: USNATO 2966. 2 1. Following, based on uncleared memcon, is for your information, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review: 2. In course of call on Secretary May 7, British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean referred briefly to Healey's desire discuss European defense cooperation with Clifford and also to Embassy discussions with Department officials along lines reftel. 3. Secretary indicated to Ambassador that he supported greater cooperation among Europeans in this field and emphasized that related discussions should consider across-the-board arrangements rather than only particular issues such as offset, arms sales, etc. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Irving G. Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), cleared by McAuliffe and EUR/BMI, and approved by Springsteen. Repeated to Bonn and London. 2 Telegram 2966, May 8, reported that Healey wanted to discuss some kind of European caucus within NATO on at least some defense matters. (Ibid.) 306. Memorandum of Conversation 306. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 10, 1968, noon. SUBJECT European Integration (Part IV of V) PARTICIPANTS Dr. Rolf Lahr, State Secretary, FRG Foreign Office Georg von Lilienfeld, Charge d'Affaires, FRG Embassy The Secretary Alexander C. Johnpoll, Acting Country Director, Office of German Affairs Lahr said that European cooperation and the EEC are not in good shape at the moment. The Germans had expected the British drive for immediate entry to cause serious problems, and as it has turned out, it had an even deeper and more divisive impact than had been expected. The Germans are trying hard to find expedients to bridge over the current difficult period while preparing the way for future British entry. The British themselves had caused some problems to the Germans in these efforts, especially George Brown. Stewart is more flexible, and, of course, there are great difficulties with Paris—it is becoming clear that De Gaulle dislikes anything resembling a rapprochement between the EEC and the United Kingdom. The Secretary asked Lahr what posture he thought we should adopt. We have felt that we should remain quiet and reserved, so as not to provoke De Gaulle into an even more rigid attitude. Lahr thought that the United States posture was about right. He thought we should avoid a show of activism, and that we should understand and sympathize with efforts to reach intermediate solutions. He thought we could show sympathy for the overall objective—an integrated Europe. The Secretary said that one tragedy is the fact that De Gaulle has failed to achieve his own goal, leadership of a Europe strong enough to enter into an equal trans-Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle has exercised his veto so often that no one asks any longer, “What does De Gaulle think?” Lahr said the Germans would gladly let De Gaulle step up front since the Germans have no national ambitions for European leadership. But his policies are mutually contradictory—he proclaims his desire for an independent Europe as an equal partner to the super-powers, but he has barred the development of such a Europe. De Gaulle has his own European theory—a small continental Europe led by France; but the other continental countries simply wouldn't accept it. He is isolated but doesn't realize this. The Germans don't think that De Gaulle can remain blind to the facts forever, and Chancellor Kiesinger is trying to open his eyes to the truth. The Secretary said it is tragic that France is absent from so much important international activity that is going on, and to which the French would have much to contribute: NATO, Geneva NPT talks, the United Nations where the French do not play a serious role, international monetary negotiations where they are a minority of one. We would like to see them take a useful part and see their talents utilized. Lahr wondered whether the fact that Paris had been chosen as the site for the Viet-Nam talks would have useful effects on United States-French relations. The Secretary replied that it might work the other way. We prefer Paris over Warsaw because all our allies have missions there. If De Gaulle interferes in the talks in a way detrimental to our position it would damage our bilateral relations. But that remains to be seen. Lahr thought that the French would not interfere gratuitously, but would wait to be asked. It is true, of course, that De Gaulle will be waiting eagerly to be asked. The Secretary said that De Gaulle does have a sense of propriety. Later, when we really get into the talks we'll see what the French do. The French press is hostile to us. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 3 EUR W. Confidential. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in S on May 13. The conversation was held in Rusk's office. 307. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Foreign Minister Harmel 307. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Foreign Minister Harmel 1 Washington, May 25, 1968. Dear Mr. Minister: Thank you for your thoughtful and interesting letter of May 15. 2 You are of course quite right that we are intensely interested in carrying out the mandate of the NATO Council's Resolution approving the Special Group's Report on the future tasks of the Alliance. Political developments during the last few months make progress in this direction more urgent than ever before. It is our hope that the June meeting will make constructive progress at least on arms control and disarmament proposals, and on the question of Mediterranean security. We share your deep interest in the arms control question. Your letter came just at the moment that we ourselves were submitting to Belgium and other Alliance members our thoughts on the manner of dealing with the mutual force reductions question at the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting. 3 Ambassadors Scheyven and De Staercke will probably have informed you by now of a draft resolution which we are suggesting for consideration in NATO. We believe our suggestions would go far toward meeting the purposes you have in mind, although in a different form from that proposed by your government following the discussions between Belgium and Poland. With regard to the latter, we wonder if the specific Belgian suggestions might not best be examined as part of the detailed studies on regional arms control problems now being made in NATO. I understand that though progress is being made in these studies, they will not be completed in time for the Reykjavik meeting. In part for this reason we decided to put forward our suggestions for a general resolution which ministers might adopt at Reykjavik. We fully agree with your thought that our objective at Reykjavik should be to promote a meaningful dialogue with the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe, and not to score a polemical point in the field of propaganda. Our consultations should help to clarify and orient all separate talks with colleagues from Eastern Europe. I have discussed your letter with Secretary Rusk who shares your view of the importance of frank discussions among ministers in a relatively informal setting during the meetings of the North Atlantic Council. We believe that specific arrangements to facilitate the work of the ministers at Reykjavik can best be worked out through our Permanent Representatives, and I have therefore asked Ambassador Cleveland to keep in particular close touch with Ambassador De Staercke to pursue your suggestion. It is as always a pleasure to hear from you. I'm sorry we have not had a chance to meet for several months. Sincerely yours, Eugene V. Rostow 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. No classification marking. 2 A copy of this letter is ibid., DEF 4 NATO, attached to a letter of transmittal from Ambassador Ridgway Knight to Rostow, also dated May 15. 3 The resolution was transmitted to the NATO capitals in telegram 167504, May 21. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO) The draft was subsequently discussed at a North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives luncheon on May 22 where reaction to the U.S. initiative was “unanimously” favorable, but reaction to the language of the draft was unfavorable, it being too formal and too much like a U.N. resolution. (Telegram 3173 from Brussels, May 23; ibid.) Further discussion produced a shorter resolution in line with the draft proposed by the United States, which was attached to the final communique of the June 24–25 North Atlantic Council meeting at Reykjavik, Iceland. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , July 15, 1968, p. 75. 308. Memorandum of Conversation 308. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 5, 1968, 3:50 p.m. SUBJECT Tour d'Horizon PARTICIPANTS Raymond Barre, Vice President of the Commission of the European Communities Michel Hedreul, Assistant Chef de Cabinet to Mr. Barre Pierre Montastruc, Official in Cabinet of Mr. Barre The Secretary George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Abraham Katz, Director, Office of OECD, European Communities and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs The Secretary welcomed Barre, saying we were always interested to know what was happening in the Commission and the Six. Mr. Barre replied he was happy to be here and have an opportunity to exchange views with State, Treasury and the Federal Reserve. Such a dialogue was necessary to achieve better mutual understanding. This was essential as we shared the burden of the world economy together. July 1 Tariff Cuts The Secretary, referring to press speculation, asked whether it was Mr. Barre's impression there would be no change regarding the tariff cuts scheduled for July 1. Mr. Barre replied he was certain there would be no change. Agriculture Minister p_BEJ1 Faure, at the recent EC Council of Ministers following agreement on the dairy CAP, announced there would be no objection to fulfilling the commitments including the external commitments. Despite the fact that the cost of settling the strike will be high, we have enough reserves, said Mr. Barre, to enable us not to modify our commercial and monetary policy. As a Frenchman, he said, I am hopeful this policy would be maintained. The Secretary said he had been nervous that the social costs of the events might lead to a modification of the July 1 commitments. Mr. Barre replied that in France there are protectionist forces, which as July 1 approached, began questioning the ability of France to face competition in order to change the economic structure. Perhaps if there are major political changes, the policy of liberalization may be changed. But if no such changes take place he was confident in France's adhering to its commitments. European Reaction to U.S. Tax Bill The Secretary asked if it was Mr. Barre's expectation that passage of our tax bill would be welcomed in Europe. Mr. Barre replied that he had said at the combined meeting earlier that day that, if the bill were passed, the international financial community, especially in Europe, would be confident that a crisis could be avoided. He said the impression in Europe would be that the U.S. has finally gained control of its balance of payments. This was very important for the international monetary system. UK Entry into the EC The Secretary asked whether Mr. Barre saw any possibility that the recent events, which, he emphasized, we did not enjoy, might make any change in the prospects of UK entry. Mr. Barre replied that he was not sure this was the case. In France and in other parts of Europe there was a conflict between emotions and reason when it came to UK entry. We are all confident, said Mr. Barre, that the UK will one day be admitted to the EC. But all feel, he said, that the UK cannot now assume the obligations of the Treaty. The situation is different from 1958 when the Six were entering a period of constructing the Community. Today the Common Market is built and it is difficult to conceive a situation in which one member would have a massive exceptional situation. Mr. Barre said he had agreed with the Commission on the need for consultations and negotiations with the UK. But the French government said one could not begin negotiating without knowing the end of the negotiation. Personally, he, Barre, regretted that the British were too quick to apply. If the UK had taken measures to restore equilibrium and confidence before applying, there would have been a more favorable answer. Elections in the West The Secretary pointed out that a number of NATO governments were in transition. The U.S., France, Italy, Belgium were all in the process of changing governments. He asked if Mr. Barre foresaw any difficulties for the Common Market because Italy and Belgium were without governments. Mr. Barre replied the Common Market was accustomed to having one or two countries without governments. He pointed out the recent agricultural decisions had been taken without a Belgian government. He thought it was possible to take some routine decisions this year. The big decisions pertaining to the second stage in the development of the Community—the creation of the economic union would be taken next year. But, he remarked, next year there will be German elections. The Secretary remarked that Khrushchev once said “someone in the West is always having those damned elections.” Key Political Questions Facing U.S. The Secretary, after remarking that economic and technical issues would be discussed thoroughly in Mr. Barre's other conversations, asked what key political questions Mr. Barre's colleagues would be likely to ask on his return to Europe. He offered to try to answer any such questions Mr. Barre might have. But he could not answer the question who will be the next President. Mr. Barre remarked that he would not interfere in internal political questions. He said that on the political side there were two questions or rather hopes in Europe. One hope is that it will be possible for the U.S. to arrive at a satisfactory settlement on Vietnam. The second hope was that social and racial equilibrium would be maintained in the United States in the next months. He said that the friends of the U.S. in Europe believe that international equilibrium is linked to these two matters. U.S. Social and Racial Problems The Secretary replied on the second point that no clear solution was probable in a matter of months. These were not problems of stagnation but problems of movement. Progress in this field stimulates action and sometimes violence. However, while much progress has been achieved, the most difficult parts of the problem were not resolved. Those aspects depending on attitudes and personal feelings rather than on laws and personal feelings were most difficult and will take more time. But, he emphasized, these are problems of movement and, not of stagnation. Vietnam As for the first point, the Secretary said, much will depend on how the conflict in Vietnam will be settled. Many Europeans ask the wrong question, he said. They ask whether they should support the U.S. in Vietnam. It is easy to say that the U.S. is big and stupid, but no matter what happens U.S. power will insulate Europe from South East Asia. The Europeans should be asking two other questions instead. First, what sort of Asia is in the interest of Europe, i.e., in terms of hard national self-interest? Second, what is the interest of Europe in the fidelity of the United States to its security commitments? On the latter question, the Secretary said there is no theory of the master race in this country which says NATO—yes, Asia—no. Europe has a big stake in the answer to the second question. To settle Vietnam in terms which would signify abandonment would be tragic for Europe. Europe has a big stake in not seeing America revert to isolationism. Mr. Barre replied that as a Frenchman he understood our difficult problem very well. He had experienced this sort of problem in Indochina, in Tunisia, and Algeria. He understood that the U.S. cannot accept a settlement at any price. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would reach a settlement enabling us to maintain our cooperation with the rest of the world and not revert to isolationism. As he had told Ambassador Schaetzel, it would be a great danger if the U.S. should lose interest in the rest of the world. The Secretary said we must be interested in peace both in the Atlantic and Pacific areas. During World War II we first defeated Hitler, then we defeated Japan. The second task was accomplished without much assistance from Europe or resources from the European theater, which was an indication of how high a second priority this task was given in the U.S. We have alliances with many countries. We are concerned what Peking and the government of North Korea as well as the government of North Vietnam will feel about our reaction. As for the chances of a settlement, the Secretary continued, this remains to be seen. Unhappily, in the Paris talks everything is on the public record. We have tried to engage the North Vietnamese in private conversation, but they have so far refused. Nevertheless, we hope such talks could be started soon. Mr. Barre remarked it was always a lengthy tedious process to negotiate with the Communists. The Secretary pointed out it took one and one-half years to talk the fever out of the Berlin crisis. The Cuban missile crisis was an exception because by the nature of the crisis it had to be resolved quickly. Mr. Barre remarked it was a matter of considerable importance that the conversations had begun. The Secretary said that there now appears to be a broader understanding of the situation. About 78% of the territory and 90% of the population of North Vietnam are now free from bombing. Not one kilometer in South Vietnam is free from bombing and Hanoi will not tell us what will happen if we stop the bombing completely. They must tell us this and no one else is in a position to tell us. We hope they will someday, but they have not done so yet. Mr. Barre said there was considerable hope in Europe that the U.S. could solve this problem. Europe has had the problem of decolonization. It is not the same problem, but the two problems are confused in people's minds. That is why many in France favor a quick and drastic solution to the Vietnam problem. When he was in the French government during the Algerian war, there were plenty of people willing to give advice on how to obtain peace but when one actually looks for peace it is not so easy to attain it. The Secretary said he frequently points out to his European friends that if forty Communist regiments were operating in Bavaria, Denmark, and Turkey, there would have to be some bombing. Europeans readily understand this but cannot understand bombing in Southeast Asia. For us, he said, the problem is the same. Couve's Economic Policy The Secretary asked Mr. Barre what significance the switch of Couve and Debre had for financial, economic and monetary policy. Mr. Barre replied that the change took place just prior to his departure so he had no first hand knowledge. He said he thought the change was made because Debre had not been happy with the high cost of the social settlement. Furthermore, he had not been in good health. It was necessary especially now to have a finance minister with a cool mind. Mr. Barre and the Secretary agreed that this was a quality of M. Couve de Murville. Mr. Barre thought there would be no change in economic policy nor for that matter in foreign policy. Couve had always been interested in financial and economic policies, and in the reshuffle it appeared he was the right man for solving both internal and international economic problems. He will be calm, efficient and devoted to international cooperation. Speaking for himself, Mr. Barre said it was a source of great confidence to him to see Couve in that post because of his fundamental orientation toward liberalization of trade and payments and the maintenance of competition. Contagion of French Events The Secretary asked to what extent the French events could be regarded as being provoked by a virus which was contagious in Europe. Perhaps this was true of the students elsewhere in Europe, but what about other parts of the society? Mr. Barre replied that in France it was necessary to distinguish between a small minority of anarchist students and the vast majority seeking reform within a system of order. If we consider the social situation, the unions were favorable to a cautious economic rather than political settlement, but the workers were not. Union leaders now are cautious about the instructions they give the workers as they fear they may not be followed. However, in other countries, Mr. Barre said, there is little danger of contagion. One possible exception is Italy where a balance of political forces has not been reestablished. Mr. Barre hoped that by fall the Socialist party could come back to power. In Italy, the repercussions will be social and political rather than in the area of labor relations. Mr. Barre thought it was possible, barring a major political change which he did not foresee, and assuming the economy got back to work, that in France the social and economic consequences of this extraordinary crisis of anarchy and revolutionary romanticism could be minimized. It will, however, be necessary to make some changes in the French political scene. Frenchmen are not accustomed to a lengthy stability of government. France is witnessing many important and fundamental economic changes. Young people feel divorced from the establishment. The population is irritated with the stable and self-confident government with which they have no dialogue, Mr. Barre said. The Secretary pointed out that we are in an important transitional period with respect to our population. Half of our population cannot remember World War II or the events leading up to it. When he lectures in universities, the Secretary said, he realized that one half the students were in the fifth and sixth grades when he became Secretary of State. In Eastern Europe the young people have no interest in the ideology. Thus, when there are legitimate grievances these can spread. In this country, most professors make clear they regard their students as a nuisance and would rather be at an all-faculty institution such as All-Souls. In Europe in the universities, the traditional system under which the senior professors dominate the departments leaves no place for bright young men. These real problems spread into other areas and provide the foundation for frivolity. Youth and the Common Market The Secretary felt that young people should be more involved in NATO and other major international efforts. He asked, does the Common Market succeed in engaging the interest of persons 25 and 30 years of age in the problems of European construction? Mr. Barre replied that this question had been discussed in the Commission. He had pointed out that when he discussed Common Market problems in the universities, the older men discussed them in terms of self-interest. The younger people, while not having an ideology, do have a will to build a new society. In the transitional period in which we live, Mr. Barre continued, all values are being questioned. No system of spiritual, political and social values is immune. It is, therefore, essential for younger people to find new reasons for life. It was possible that, with new themes like European construction and aid to the developing countries, which appeal to the spirit of generosity of youth, one can orient them towards new achievements. British Youth and the EC The Secretary recalled that earlier in the conversation Mr. Barre had said the UK had acted too soon on its application. Some of his British friends were concerned that the younger generation, disillusioned by Britain as a world power, by Victorian Britain, and by the Britain of Churchill, were becoming disoriented. George Brown thought that by taking Britain into Europe, the government would give British youth a renewed elan and sense of purpose. He was worried that if the British youth would become disillusioned with the prospects for Europe they would not have anything. Therefore, the application was made sooner rather than later. There was a good deal of fear that otherwise the considerable support for British membership would erode. Mr. Barre replied that he had spoken with Brown and had advised him to build up support for entry into Europe more progressively. It appeared to many Europeans despite the considerable propaganda in the UK on Common Market entry, that no true conversion had been achieved. In Europe, he said, it was asked whether the British were really ready to become part of Europe. If there could be better preparation, British chances would be better. The Secretary remarked that in British tradition, the knight always slays the dragon. And this time Sir George did not succeed. Secretary to Call on Commission in December At this point the interview ended. The Secretary assured Mr. Barre that he and his colleagues would be welcomed here and hoped he would have useful talks. He said he planned to call on the Commission in December when in Brussels for the NATO Ministerial Meeting. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 7. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Katz and approved in S on June 15. The time of the conversation is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (JOHNSON Library) 309. Memorandum of Conversation 309. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m. SUBJECT NATO and US Forces in Europe PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister of Denmark, Poul Hartling Permanent Under Secretary, Danish Foreign Office, Paul Fischer Ambassador of Denmark, Torben Ronne The Secretary Under Secretary of the Treasury Frederick Deming Export-Import Bank Vice Chairman Walter Sauer USIA Director Leonard Marks Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Affairs Carl Walske Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy Ambassador William Leonhart Country Director George Mason Ingram The Secretary pointed out that Europe is living with the “miracle” of substantial US troop deployments there at the same time that the United States is compelled to maintain large forces in Viet Nam. There is great pressure in the Senate for a reduction in the size of US forces in Europe. Many issues, such as our balance of payments and budget problems, which might to the Europeans appear unrelated, are directly linked to the question of the U.S. military presence in Europe. In this connection, the Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for the Danish decision to purchase US Treasury securities, and said this was most helpful in countering the U.S. military balance of payments deficit with Denmark. The Secretary said it would also be helpful if Denmark and Germany would join with the rest of the Fourteen to agree on the basis of NATO claims against France arising from the removal of NATO facilities and personnel from that country. The Secretary said that the exact timing of the approach to France could be decided later. The Foreign Minister said that he would look into the matter of NATO claims against France, and felt he could say that on this matter Denmark would not leave itself in an isolated position. The Secretary noted that the question of mutual force reductions would be before the NATO Ministers in Reykjavik. He doubted that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact colleagues would be particularly interested in holding discussions at this time. Events in Eastern Europe may mean that the Soviet Union will attach even greater importance to the maintenance of forces in East Germany. Also, the USSR would wish to avoid a charge, by Communist China, that it is permitting the US to release troops from Europe for service in Southeast Asia. However, NATO agreement that any troop reductions should be mutual will help the US hold the line against demands for a unilateral force reduction. The Foreign Minister responded with the observation that the US and Denmark are in agreement on the point that any force reductions should be mutual. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 6 US. Secret. Drafted by Ingram. The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the Department of State. The source text is labeled “Part II of IV.” 310. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 310. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, June 8, 1968, 1313Z. 3403. Subject: Current face of the “French problem” in NATO. 1. As NATO approaches another Ministerial Meeting, the problems posed by the basic French attitude toward NATO are again accentuated. 2. The principal elements in the “French problem” on the eve of the Reykjavik Ministerial Meeting are the following: a. The prospective inability of the French to join other NATO members in agreeing on action proposals now being shaped up in two major fields: (1) recommendations on the Mediterranean (paper being drafted by SYG for examination by NAC on June 11); and (2) the resolution on mutual force reductions (initiated by the US and under consideration in informal meetings of PermReps chaired by Brosio). b. The adverse impact of the French position on the solidarity of the Fourteen on substance of various issues, leading some of them in particular to water-down their substantive positions in the hope of finding a meeting point with the French. c. The search for formulas for moving ahead with NATO action proposals on the Mediterranean and mutual force reductions if French agreement is not forthcoming. 3. The pattern has much the same setting as the discussions of NATO action on the Harmel Report just prior to the Ministerial Meeting of December 1967. In that case, of course, the French in the end did join in the Ministerial action on the report. However, the current issues much more clearly involve action recommendations by Ministers. Seydoux is in effect underscoring this point by saying, with the advantage of hindsight and probably as an explanation to the Quai, that the French had understood that any action requirement arising from Harmel Report last December to involve only “studies”. 4. With respect to the solidarity of the Fourteen, in the last discussion (USNATO 3372) 2 on the mutual force reduction resolution, Belgian PermRep De Staercke showed a very substantial readiness to restructure the draft proposal by reducing or perhaps eliminating the “signal” contained in paragraph 5. Others of the Fourteen, including the Canadians and the British, are also looking for substantive adjustments which they hope might enable the French to go along. As for the Council recommendations to the Ministers on the Mediterranean—the paper which is to accompany the now virtually agreed assessment of the Mediterranean situation—the impact of the expected French opposition to the draft recommendations Brosio is preparing will no doubt lead some of the Fourteen to similar efforts to reduce the substantive content of the recommendations. 5. The immediate tactical problem we face is to maintain support by the Fourteen for meaningful substantive proposals in these two major areas until the French take clearer positions on the substance, either indicating, as does not appear to us very likely, a readiness to join in such substantive actions or, as is much more likely, their inability to do so. 6. As to the formulas for going ahead on these major problems without French support, the chief possibilities are: a. Further resort by the French to the “hands-off” or “constructive abstention” formula employed this week in NAC by the French in relation to the approval of the study on the security of Malta (USNATO 3366). 3 b. Remanding of issues to DPC for formal action, an approach suggested by Seydoux, but not adopted, with respect to NATO consultations with the Maltese and the ad hoc group designed to back-stop these consultations (USNATO 3190). 4 7. Seydoux has gone to Paris for weekend consultations, which will include this range of problems. Before his departure, in discussion a trois with UK PermRep Burrows and Cargo, he stressed French aversion to “action” proposals for NATO Ministerial Meeting and indicated considerable doubt that Paris would be able to agree to any kind of “signal” to Soviets and Eastern European countries on mutual force reductions, or even to studies by military authorities on action possibilities with respect to the Mediterranean looking to later recommendations to NAC or DPC. Seydoux seemed to think French might apply “hands-off” or “constructive abstention” formula to Mediterranean recommendations, noting that most of these would be in military field in any event. He did not seem to think, however, that France would be able to stand aside on the public mutual force reductions resolution. He was interested in possible DPC approach, but did not attempt forecast whether Paris would take this view. 8. Handling of these two major issues, or parts of them, by Fourteen action would pose some procedural problems. If the “hands-off” or “constructive abstention” technique were followed to and through the Reykjavik meeting, some new formula would need to be worked out for the communique. Approach involving DPC action would presumably require a session at Reykjavik of Ministers sitting as the DPC. However, a communique pattern for this has already been established. 9. Above are general outlines of “French problem” as it now appears. There is also some additional underbrush, as with French reservations on para 27 of the commentary on the E/W relations paper (USNATO 3310), 5 which may or may not be lesser example of the same basic problem. Sharper focus will inevitably be drawn on substance and procedure with respect specific issues during discussions early next week. Cargo 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense and the other NATO capitals. 2 Telegram 3372, June 6, summarized a June 6 meeting in Brosio's office devoted to the draft resolution on mutual force reductions. (Ibid., DEF 6 NATO) 3 Dated June 6. (Ibid., NATO 3–1) 4 Dated May 24. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) 5 Dated June 4. (Ibid., NATO 3) 311. Research Memorandum No. REU–35 311. Research Memorandum No. REU–35 1 Washington, June 11, 1968. SUBJECT NATO Nuclear Planning: A Progress Report The third ministerial session of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, held at The Hague on April 18–19, and the subsequent meeting of the nominal parent organization, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, on May 10, gave further evidence of the success of the Alliance framework for nuclear consultations which was formally established in December 1966 and which is now approaching the end of its first membership cycle. This report outlines the work which has been accomplished by these groups. Abstract West European uneasiness regarding the lack of opportunity for serious and continuing discussion with Americans on sensitive aspects of the nuclear resources and policies of the West became particularly apparent in the early 1960's, aggravated by talk of a “missile gap,” by extended tensions over Berlin, and by misconceptions about the US strategy of “flexible response.” The eventual recognition of this uneasiness led to the establishment in 1965 of the ad hoc Special Committee in NATO to study ways to improve and extend allied participation in planning for the use of nuclear weapons. The success of this body led in December 1966 to the organization of the present permanent framework for consideration of general policy questions on the nuclear defense of the Alliance. This framework consists of an open-ended group of defense ministers, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), and a smaller, nominally subordinate body to accomplish the detailed work, the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Membership on the NPG was limited to seven allies, which by informal agreement will always include the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. Another part of that agreement was a rotational scheme whereby other interested NATO members serve on the NPG alternately. During the past year and a half, the NPG has met three times at the level of defense ministers, and the NDAC has met twice, to endorse NPG decisions. NPG representatives have also met frequently at sub-ministerial levels to continue deliberations and carry out assigned studies. The work of the NDAC/NPG has fallen into three broad categories, dealing with strategic nuclear forces, with tactical nuclear forces, and with national participation in nuclear planning. In the first category, the NPG has concentrated on a consideration of the feasibility of an anti-ballistic missile deployment in NATO Europe. On the basis of studies which pointed up the lack of guaranteed effectiveness and the high cost of such a defensive system, NPG ministers in their most recent session agreed that a European ABM deployment was not warranted at present, but that the matter should be kept under continuing review. This decision was subsequently endorsed by the NDAC. A considerable part of the deliberations of the NPG has centered on tactical nuclear weapons. It was agreed early that the relative advantages of particular weapons systems and the circumstances in which they might be used required further detailed study in order to insure the most effective utilization of their deterrent value. Proposals for the introduction of one such weapon, atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), have received considerable attention, [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The original enthusiasm of the Turks for ADMs has disappeared, however, as they became aware of the improbability of obtaining pre-delegated authority for the release of the weapons, which they consider a domestic political necessity, and of the possibly negative effects of such plans on the limited Soviet-Turkish detente. [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ] The principal work which the NPG is now undertaking is the development of a set of tentative political “guidelines” for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, which will draw on the studies currently underway on specific weapons systems and contingency situations. European members have been particularly anxious to engage in such a project and have become increasingly impatient with the US desire to concentrate primarily on the underlying studies, from which a widely-applicable doctrine of use could later be gradually developed. NPG ministers in April agreed that work begin on the development of tentative guidelines for the possible initial use of tactical nuclear weapons under the following circumstances: 1) use for demonstrative purposes; 2) use of defensive systems; 3) use at sea; and 4) selective use against battlefield targets in a limited conflict. There remains a good deal of skepticism among some European NATO members about whether the initiation by NATO of any use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will ever be found to be feasible. The recent approval by the NPG and NDAC of recommendations by NATO's Military Committee will provide additional opportunities for participation by European allies in military nuclear planning at various NATO command levels, a process which began with the internationalization of SHAPE's nuclear planning staff in 1963. NPG ministers in April also agreed to the general principle that in nuclear consultations special weight should be given to the views of those countries “most directly affected.” This was in recognition of German concerns regarding the role of host countries in the release of nuclear weapons for use from or on their own territory. The German acceptance of the present NDAC/NPG machinery, in lieu of previous, more ambitious proposals for exercising a wider role in nuclear defense, has been an important factor in its success. The decision to undertake the development of political “guidelines” for the use of tactical nuclear weapons will now confront the NPG with some of the most difficult questions of nuclear policy, such as a definition of the “nuclear threshold.” At the same time, our European allies are still urging that the US make more specific its commitment to consult with them before an actual decision to use nuclear weapons in Western Europe is made. (A few would like to extend the consultation issue to the subject of arrangements for NATO coordination on general “crisis management”.) The United States has insisted that any refinement of the exact procedures for such consultations would be meaningless until there exists an accepted concept for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, one with clearly defined options which are understood by those with whom the US would be consulting in a crisis. This, then, is the task which the NPG has now set for itself and which will occupy its primary attention for the immediate future. But the machinery for achieving increased involvement in planning for the nuclear defense of NATO Europe has already been tested and found worthwhile by those NATO allies which have chosen to participate in it. As long as the United States continues to share some of its responsibility for nuclear planning with them, it is unlikely, especially in the present atmosphere of East-West detente in Europe, that these allies will make serious attempts to revamp drastically the Alliance's nuclear arrangements. [Here follows the body of the 8-page paper.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted from Thomas L. Hughes, Director of INR, to Secretary Rusk. 312. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 312. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. THE REYKJAVIK MINISTERIAL MEETING OF NATO A. Background The North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session of Foreign Ministers will meet in Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24–25. This will be the first time that Iceland, a small but strategically located country of 200,000 people, has been the host for a NATO meeting. This session takes place less than one year before the 20th anniversary of the creation of NATO as a defense Alliance to deter aggression against Western Europe. As the Soviet Union emerged from Stalinist influence, the nature of the threat changed. Today, the polycentric tendencies within the Communist world, the evolution of Soviet society, plus affluence in the West, obscure the fact that mounting Soviet capabilities still pose a danger to Western European security. Europe, long ago recovered from the effects of World War II, now faces problems common to affluent societies. Stable, prosperous and slightly smug, Western Europe has suddenly broken out in a rash of political and social crisis. Among NATO members, France and Canada will have elections at the time of the NATO meeting. Italy and Belgium are trying to form governments. The US is in the process of preparing for Presidential elections. Greece is confronted with a junta looking for a nationally approved constitution. The faltering British pound has created heavy pressure on the international monetary system. Despite all this, most of Europe has ample foreign exchange reserves and remains confident and firm. The economic structure is essentially sound. In this atmosphere, NATO's continued functioning on a broad front—military and political—constitutes a welcome element of stability, despite some strains within the Alliance. B. Principal Issues at Reykjavik 1. East-West Relations The Ministers will discuss the general question of East-West relations. Views will be exchanged on recent developments in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Berlin. It is expected that the German Foreign Minister will report on the Federal Republic's relations with Eastern European countries in furtherance of its Ost-Politik. The improvement of relations between East and West, and such matters as European security, will also be discussed. 2. Mediterranean Security Security developments in the Mediterranean will be an important issue in the meeting. The Ministers will address particularly the impact on NATO, and the NATO area, of increasing Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean. Ways and means of countering this growing military power in the Mediterranean will also be examined and recommendations considered on increased surveillance by NATO countries of USSR fleet movements, and the adoption of a watching brief for Brosio. 3. Mutual Force Reductions The Foreign Ministers will also take up mutual force reductions. In February President Johnson indicated to NATO Secretary Brosio that “maintenance of NATO's strength, including the US commitment, is necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.” This question is under intensive study within NATO. The US has proposed for consideration at Reykjavik a resolution (declaration) on this issue which indicates NATO is studying the problem, expresses the hope that the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe will also study it and be prepared at the proper time to explore such reductions together. The overall military capability of the Alliance should not be reduced except as a part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing. 4. NPT The negotiations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have been the subject of intensive consultations in NATO. The Germans and others wish to discuss some of the implications of this Treaty at Reykjavik. The non-nuclear NATO powers have been concerned that their signing the Treaty would impair their security, especially in the nuclear field, particularly should the NPT duration outlast NATO. We have tried to meet their legitimate concerns and persuade them to support the NPT, and are prepared to make a supporting statement at Reykjavik on our continued commitment to NATO as an instrument for peace and stability in Europe. 5. Other Matters General tour d'horizon—the meeting will permit each Foreign Minister to give his views of the overall international situation. Secretary Rusk plans to meet in restricted session to discuss Vietnam and the European views on what they would like to see develop in Southeast Asia after peace is achieved. C. Long Range Problems and Outlook for the Future Above and beyond the issues on the official agenda at Reykjavik, certain general problems confront NATO: 1. Future Viability of NATO Foremost among these is the question of the future of the Alliance. French withdrawal from the integrated military aspects of NATO in 1966 caused many skeptics to doubt at that time whether the Alliance would have continued viability. The work of the organization since then has demonstrated that it can adjust to new conditions and continue as the keystone of Western collective security even without French participation in its military aspects. We anticipate that there will be continued support for NATO by the member governments. The governments participating in its military structure continue to recognize that collective security is the most effective way to ensure national security. The French attitude notwithstanding, we do not anticipate any members will take advantage of Article XIII of the North Atlantic Treaty and give notice of withdrawal after its anniversary date (20 years) in 1969. 2. Greece Developments in Greece with the take-over of the government by a military junta have strained the bonds of the Alliance. Many NATO governments, notably in Scandinavia, and Low Countries and the UK have been sharply critical of the Greek regime. Pressures have been exerted in these countries to isolate Greece within the Alliance, if not to expel it, pending a return to constitutionality. While Greece remains a full, interested and essential participant in the Alliance, the Greek problem remains as a divisive factor. 3. Burden Sharing We keep trying to persuade the Europeans to increase their own defense efforts in various ways, but this effort has met with little positive response to date. Nevertheless, we have negotiated successfully with some of our Allies on a bilateral basis in order to neutralize the balance of payments impact of our military expenditures. Arrangements for substantial neutralization have been concluded with the Germans and the Belgians. Similar arrangements are well on the way to completion with the Danes, the Dutch and the Italians. D. Reykjavik and the Continued Importance of NATO to US NATO remains essential to US security: 1. In view of the current pattern of Soviet activity and current developments affecting Western and Eastern political stability, it is even more essential that the US maintain a consistent policy of support for a strong NATO. 2. While maintaining this support, we must also be flexible enough to ensure that the Alliance is responsive to opportunities for easing tensions in Europe. NATO can become an increasingly effective instrument of detente. 3. We shall continue to study within NATO the possibilities for exploring, with the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe, mutual force reductions. Concentration will be primarily on the Central Region of NATO in light of the heavy confrontation there of forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Meanwhile, consistent with the President's discussion with Brosio last February, we should strive to maintain overall NATO military strength. Unilateral troop reductions could undermine current efforts toward a balanced mutual reduction of forces. 4. In the Mediterranean area, we see the Soviet threat as being primarily political, and we are recommending a set of modest, non-provocative political-military responses by NATO to this threat. 5. Through the mechanism of the Nuclear Planning Group, we are studying ways for increased national participation—and thereby understanding—in military nuclear planning and for developing a sounder basis for NATO military planning with respect to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 6. We shall continue to try to work out arrangements to neutralize the effects of our military presence in Europe upon our balance of payments. 7. We are committed through CY 1968 on US force levels in NATO. These US forces in Europe contribute to both the nuclear and conventional defense of the North Atlantic area. The US forces in Europe are a part of NATO's conventional defenses as well as acting as custodians for the tactical nuclear weapons that we maintain there. They also provide an essential institutional link between NATO's conventional forces, largely supplied by the Europeans, and the strategic nuclear weapons which are almost wholly American. In addition, these units are an earnest of American leadership in the Alliance. 8. For the future we must examine means for getting greater European participation in the defense of Europe, such as a European Defense Organization, or capitalizing on the U.K. interest in the Continent as the result of its withdrawals East of Suez. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, NSC File. Secret. Attached to the source text, which bears no drafting information, are: a June 15 memorandum of transmittal from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Walt Rostow, a June 17 memorandum from NSC Secretary Bromley Smith to the Council stating that the paper would serve as the basis of discussion for the NSC meeting on June 19, and the agenda for the NSC meeting. 313. Memorandum for the Record 313. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 19, 1968. SUMMARY OF NSC MEETING ON NATO WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 1968, 12:00 NOON The President opened the meeting by noting the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting at Reykjavik. He asked Under Secretary Katzenbach to introduce the discussion. Under Secretary Katzenbach said the Ministerial Meeting was taking place against unhappy background—the difficulties in France, the lack of a government in Belgium, and the Berlin crisis. On the other hand, NATO recently had been debated in Norway and the Norwegians strongly voted for continued support of the Alliance. Assistant Secretary Leddy By way of introduction, Leddy said that NATO is in a better state of health than the pessimists predicted a few years ago. It had been effective in coordinating the discussion among the governments on the NPT and the Nuclear Planning Group was moving along well. Regarding the specific issues at Reykjavik, he said: — Berlin would be the subject of serious bilateral and quadripartite discussion among the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany. The Secretary is considering going to Bonn after the meeting. — Mutual Force Reductions —we expect to have a ministerial declaration that NATO is willing to undertake troop reductions on a reciprocal basis with the Russians. The French will not join but that will not matter. We do not expect the Russians to respond now. Vietnam is one reason; their concern over Eastern Europe is another. But the declaration may provide a platform for talks with the Russians on this issue, and progress is possible in the longer term. — Mediterranean —We anticipate some low key actions. The Soviet threat there is primarily political and secondarily military. The Ministers will authorize increased surveillance. — NPT —We hope for a NATO statement on the NPT, and we have worked out a scenario reaffirming our commitment to help others support the NPT. (The scenario was subsequently approved by the President.) — Berlin —May give the Germans some ammunition to delay signing the NPT. — Balance of Payments and Burden Sharing —Our present arrangements to offset the balance of payments costs for our troops in NATO are temporary. They buy time but they don't cure the problem. Over the longer term we look for the British to do more in Europe which could enable us to do less. We can also anticipate the UK working toward some kind of joint European military effort—including joint production of military equipment. Secretary Clifford — Berlin —Thus far the Germans have not been willing to take countermeasures. They have no reason therefore to blame us for the crisis. We must try to build up support for West Berlin. High level visits would help. — NPT —We hope the Germans could be persuaded to go along. If they don't, it will raise specters in Europe. — Mediterranean —The Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has recently been reduced but it is active and must be carefully watched. A joint NATO Naval exercise is being planned. — Mutual Force Reductions —The Germans want to have language in NATO statements ruling out any unilateral troop reductions. We can't do this, particularly in view of the rising sentiment in the Congress that we do something in this field. At the Defense Ministers meeting we had told the Europeans they should prepare for future reduction. Our language at Reykjavik on this issue should go on further than the May 10 Defense Ministers' statement. — Greece —We should resume military aid to Greece. The importance of our military position there has increased as a result of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The Greeks are cooperative and will be of more value to us if Turkey makes trouble. The President asked for comments on the issue of resuming military aid to Greece. Under Secretary Katzenbach, the Vice President, and Helms agreed with Secretary Clifford. — Burden Sharing —Our position is still not satisfactory. Bond purchases help but we must get to some better arrangement in the future. Secretary Fowler We still haven't built a financial pillar for the Alliance. Our arrangements are neither satisfactory nor enduring. The only meaningful way of dealing with this problem over the long term is through increased purchases of U.S. military equipment by the Europeans or reduced U.S. military expenditure in Europe. Secretary Clifford said that the Germans have an enormous need for new military aircraft. We should be able to work something out in the area of joint production of new planes. Under Secretary Nitze discussed the prospects for the F–5 and estimated that the total market for a new military plane in Germany might be as much as $3 billion. The President asked State and Treasury to review the status of this project with Defense. ERF 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret. Drafted by E. R. Fried. A shorter set of notes on this meeting are ibid., Meetings Notes File. 314. Memorandum of Conversation 314. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 1 p.m. US/MC/10 UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-FIRSTMINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24–25, 1968 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Assistant Secretary Leddy Deputy Assistant Secretary Springsteen Mr. Al Puhan, GER Germany Foreign Minister Willy Brandt Mr. Georg Duckwitz, State Secretary Dr. Hans H. Ruete, Assistant State Secretary Mr. Wolf Schilling, Personal Assistant to State Secretary SUBJECT Part II—Mutual Force Reductions The Secretary said we would have a very nervous time until Congress goes home for the political conventions. The troop reduction issue may come up as an amendment to the defense appropriations bill. The vote would be very close in the Senate. The Secretary noted there was a real move toward isolationism in the Senate. Some of the same Senators who wanted us to get out of Vietnam wanted us out of Europe. He thought it a miracle that we had been able to maintain our level of forces in Europe while we had hundreds of thousands of troops in Southeast Asia. The Secretary said we were trying to divert Congressional concern with MFR but we were not sanguine about the results. He regretted that there had been press speculation to the effect that it was our motive to deflect Congressional intent with MFR. He would find it very helpful if a good statement tying the removal of any forces to Soviet moves could come out of this NATO meeting. He saw one problem. We could live with the language adopted at the meeting of defense ministers on maintaining NATO military capability, but if there was a reference to unilateral reductions it would appear to be a challenge to the Congress of the United States. The Secretary said we would prefer more general language. He assured the German Foreign Minister that the President had no intention to withdraw combat forces from Europe or to dismantle NATO. Brandt said he thought the Secretary's request reasonable. The Germans were very much for mutual force reductions since any discussion of mutual force reductions would influence developments in Eastern Europe. The Secretary agreed with this observation. He said we could accept all three of the drafts that had been prepared including the German one if the last sentence in the German draft, which referred to unilateral withdrawals, were dropped. Brandt said he found the US proposed text better if the last sentence in the German draft was to be dropped. Brandt said that he wished to make an additional observation to the effect that some of our friends were not aware of developments if a regrouping of forces did take place in Europe. It would leave the German Army with a bigger role than might be desirable. He said some cynical people have said that the German Army should be able to impress the Byelo-Russians without frightening Luxembourg. The Secretary asked Brandt if he had discussed a new defense grouping within NATO with the British. Brandt said there had been no real discussion. Mr. Leddy said it seemed to us more important to have discussions in view of British moves out of the area East of Suez. Ruete did not believe the British would raise this subject tonight. The Secretary said he assumed that he would make the opening statement in the Senate, including the interpretations. This statement would represent the official position of the United States. He said we have warned the Soviets that if they contradict our interpretations, we may not have a treaty. He suggested that his opening statement in the Senate could be transmitted by him in a communication addressed to each NATO Foreign Minister and to Brosio. Brandt thought this would be very helpful. The Secretary said his opening statement would become part of the legislative history of the treaty. Ruete asked how such a statement would bind the next administration. The Secretary replied as far as the treaty was concerned, a change of administration would have no effect. He gave it as his opinion that neither Humphrey nor Nixon nor Rockefeller would take a different view from the present administration. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Approved in S on June 25. The meeting was held at the Embassy Residence. 315. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Reykjavik 315. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Reykjavik 1 Washington, June 26, 1968, 0046Z. 190741. Tosec 46. For Secretary only from Acting Secretary. At the Tuesday luncheon discussion today, 2 the President expressed himself quite strongly on the question of U.S. troop cuts in Europe, and I thought it would be helpful background information for you on the eve of your Bonn visit tomorrow. The subject arose because Clark Clifford had had a discouraging talk with Senator Russell this morning in which Russell indicated his inclination to support the Symington amendment. 3 The President said that he would have no part of dismantling voluntarily our essential troop structure in Europe before he left office next January and if he had to have a “war with Russell” to maintain options for his successor, he would be willing to do so. When Clark mentioned the possibility of non-combat troop withdrawals, I indicated that we are looking at that closely. Bus Wheeler 4 said that he had many problems with the ISA plan which you are familiar with. Plainly even such limited withdrawal plans will need much further refinement before there is a Presidential approval or action on them. [Here follow 3 paragraphs on unrelated matters.] Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 300. Secret; Priority;Nodis. 2 Notes on the President's June 25 meeting with the Tuesday Luncheon Group are in the Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 3. 3 On April 19, in the debate on the Military Procurement Bill, Senator Stuart Symington announced that he would introduce the following amendment to the Military Appropriation Bill when it came before the Senate: “After December 31, 1968, no appropriation authorized by this or any other Act may be used to support more than 50,000 members of the Armed Forces of the United States on the continent of Europe.” (Memorandum to the Secretary of State, July 9; Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 164) 4 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler. 316. Intelligence Note No. 512 316. Intelligence Note No. 512 1 Washington, June 28, 1968. SUBJECT NATO Ministers Outline New detente Goal The NATO foreign ministers, at the spring ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, 2 convened for the first time in Iceland, issued a “signal” to the USSR to encourage it to prepare for future discussions on the possibility of mutual force reductions in Europe, evidenced concern over increased Soviet activities in the Mediterranean, and declared their solidarity on the issue of access to Berlin. They thus concentrated on the twin goals of insuring collective defense and promoting detente, which were outlined in last December's Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (the Harmel Report). While the Berlin declaration was adopted unanimously, France partially disassociated itself from the actions and public statements regarding force cuts and Mediterranean security. East-West Relations . In their general review of the international situation, several ministers touched on the elusive nature of detente, referring especially to continued evidence of the rigid posture of the Soviet Union towards the West. Following consideration of a review of East-West relations since 1966, prepared by the permanent Council as part of the follow-up to the Harmel Report, there was a prolonged debate on how to achieve a proper balance in communique references to detente. It was finally agreed—as is usually the case in NATO discussions of this subject—that the ministers would publicly reaffirm their intention to continue efforts to promote detente, while warning that opportunities for rapid progress should not be overrated. The ministers also restated their intention to continue the examination and review of European security problems and to prepare for the time when “fruitful discussions” of these questions might be possible with the East, as originally called for in the Harmel Report. Several members welcomed the recent UN General Assembly endorsement of the NPT, but no attempt was made at the meeting to reach agreement on a statement regarding the treaty for inclusion in the communique. Mutual Force Reductions . In their major detente-oriented action, all ministers confirmed the decision of the permanent Council to give priority to the study, also undertaken as a Harmel Report follow-up, of the possibility of balanced and mutual force reductions by East and West. This provided the opportunity for the Fourteen to attempt to counter domestic pressures for defense cuts by reaffirming recent statements by NATO's Defense Planning Committee that the overall military capacity of the Alliance should not be reduced except as part of mutual force reductions. Belgian defense cuts announced last December and public debate about possible defense reductions in Germany had aroused concern that unilateral slashes by several NATO members might occur and that this could lead to a general downward spiral of national commitments to and hardware allocations for the common defense. Thus, the hope of heading off any unilateral cuts, by stressing the need for reciprocity, and the desire to reduce domestic budget-cutting pressures, by showing the public that NATO was as forthcoming on arms control as could prudently be afforded, were prime factors in renewing allied activity in the field of mutual East-West force reductions, even though no member government expected Moscow to be receptive to the idea at an early date. Ministers of the Fourteen adopted a declaration on this subject which was made public as an attachment to the ministerial communi-que, thus serving notice that it was up to the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries also to begin preparations for possible future discussions. While accepting the general statements in the declaration regarding hopes for progress in the field of arms control and, more specifically, the desirability of an East-West agreement on mutual force reductions, France disassociated itself from those portions which specified the principles to be followed in continuing the NATO study and which reaffirmed the need to maintain the overall military capacity of the Alliance in the meantime. The French did, however, affirm publicly their intention to continue to participate in this NATO study. Mediterranean Security . Mindful of the fact that a year has passed since a major expansion of Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean began, most members were anxious to give some evidence of the Alliance's awareness that this Soviet activity could pose an additional threat to its members' security. The most that could be agreed upon publicly by all fifteen members was their approval of a Harmel follow-up report dealing with “the situation in the Mediterranean” and their readiness to extend consultations on this subject within NATO as circumstances required. France would not concur in any reference to a Soviet threat as such and disputed the need for specific recommendations by the ministers. It thus disassociated itself from a further communique paragraph which expressed allied concern over the recent expansion of Soviet activity in the area and which noted that early consideration would be given to measures designed to safeguard the security interests of NATO members there, including increased surveillance activities. Previous discussion within the permanent Council had made apparent considerable apprehension that any specific measures undertaken might seem unduly provocative to the Soviets or to the Arab nations. Ministers of the Fourteen did agree, however, that activation of a NATO maritime air surveillance command for the Mediterranean should be expedited. They also instructed the permanent representatives to consider other possible measures, including an expansion of allied military exercises in the area and the formation of a standby multi-national naval force to be available on call. These latter actions were not made public. Previous discussions of the immediate formation of a NATO standing naval force for the Mediterranean similar to that recently established in the Atlantic had evidenced no support for this idea. Berlin . The NATO ministers also focused their attention on the recent East German attempts to encroach on the political and psychological position of West Berlin. All fifteen ministers approved and publicly associated themselves with the expressed determination of the US, the UK and France to maintain freedom of access to that city. The ministerial communique called attention to Soviet responsibility for any action which hampered or endangered free access to Berlin and urged that such actions, which it called “a deliberate attempt to jeopardize detente,” be discontinued. The statement adopted was based on a draft proposed by the West Germans; even though Foreign Minister Brandt had been prepared, in case of French opposition, to accept a Four-Power declaration on Berlin appended to the NATO communique, approval by all NATO members was achieved. Conclusions . The NATO ministerial session just concluded was relatively undramatic, as the principal items on the agenda, viz., the three follow-up reports relating to aspects of the Harmel Study, were approved and the recommendations accepted with few changes from the drafts presented by the permanent representatives, who had succeeded in making unusually thorough and effective preparations. Likewise, the French reservations on these drafts had already been spelled out in full. The position of France in NATO has thus remained consistent for over a year. It is a rather reluctant ally. It seeks continued participation in the political and many military discussions, consultations, and studies of the Alliance, and it will often join in statements of general position. However, it disassociates itself from almost all concrete actions or calls for action, and from moves that imply a coordination of future policy, lest any of this imply a subordination of French policy to the US or to others. Relatively little notice was paid at this session to the approach of 1969 and the opportunity that will legally become available to member governments to give one year's notice of withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty. By contrast, last December, with this date in mind, the ministers had given emphasis to projecting the Alliance and its work well beyond that 20th anniversary date. Secretary General Brosio did announce that he would soon seek North Atlantic Council discussion on the public affairs handling of NATO's birthday activities next year, but this was in response to several references by ministers to the need to enhance further the NATO “image” and particularly its appeal to youth, rather than in the context of withdrawal rights. Other speakers referred to continued public support for NATO membership, while only the Portuguese Foreign Minister mentioned specifically that 1969 would pre-sent the question of whether his country could remain bound to the North Atlantic Treaty, as presently written. Thus, as the Alliance focuses ever more attentively on detente, though still keeping its powder dry, its continuance into the third decade of work appears to be taken increasingly for granted by almost all, including France. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 ICE(RE). Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and sent from INR Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr., to Secretary Rusk. 2 Held June 24 and 25. The U.S. Delegation records of this meeting, including telegrams to and from the delegation, memoranda of conversation, briefing papers, schedules, and agenda, are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182. For text of the communique and attached Declaration on Balanced Force Reductions, see Department of State Bulletin , July 15, 1968, pp. 75–77. 3 In a telegram on June 25, the Mission to NATO characterized the meeting as follows: “In general, there was less disarray and more determination at this meeting than in any NATO Ministerial in recent years.” (Telegram 556 from Reykjavik, Secto 24; Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 ICE(RE)) 317. Memorandum of Conversation 317. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 10, 1968. SUBJECT US Relations with France and Europe; French Internal Problems PARTICIPANTS Pierre Malve, Leader Grantee, Deputy Chief of Cabinet to EC Commissioner Deniau Under Secretary Rostow Sam L. G. Maggio, Interpreter Stephen H. Rogers, EUR/RPE Mr. Malvé noted that he had recently accompanied Commissioner Deniau on his campaign for election as a Gaullist Deputy and is now about to tour the United States. He was hoping to be able to reach some kind of a “synthesis” from these experiences. He referred to the great value, in his view, of the partnership concept and asked Mr. Rostow to comment on relations between the United States and Europe. Beginning his response with economic problems, Mr. Rostow said that partnership is a reality. We have discovered in the Kennedy Round, the balance of payments adjustment process and other areas that problem solutions require cooperation between the United States and Europe. The discussions since January 1 on the US balance of payments situation have gone very well, with Europe's agreeing to expansion, maintenance of relatively low interest rates, and the acceleration/deceleration proposal, which Mr. Rostow called a major act of solidarity. European capital exports have been greater than anyone expected. Mr. Rostow went on to say that very important things were developing in the scientific field, where the United States is now studying means of cooperating with Europe to maintain the momentum of intergovernmental efforts. He referred to the space mission about to visit Washington, and to the United States proposals on INTELSAT. In summary, Mr. Rostow said it is basic US foreign policy to work with Europe within the concept of partnership. Mr. Malve asked for US views about France and NATO. Mr. Rostow said we were saddened by French withdrawal and missed the French contribution there, but France itself must judge whether withdrawal was an error. In response to another question, Mr. Rostow said France should not devalue. He added that the international monetary system cannot take many more shocks. He said the United States understands the French need to act because of the great impact of the July 1 tariff reductions, and we understand that what France had done were minimal steps. We want to minimize the repercussions, he added. Concerning countervailing duties, Mr. Rostow said that we have explained to France officially that the U.S. law allows no latitude. Mr. Malve said he was pleased to hear that the United States appreciates the importance of France's accepting the July 1 reductions, which was a great effort on France's part. Mr. Rostow noted that not undertaking the reductions could have been very serious. Mr. Rostow said that the US public's attitude towards France has been hurt by the French action in getting American troops out of France, by rumors about French attacks on the dollar, by the French position on the Middle East and by statements concerning Viet-Nam. deGaulle is so conspicuous, he added, that people tend to identify him with Europe. Mr. Malve said he regretted the French attitude on Viet-Nam, which he did not think was appropriate, particularly in view of France's experience there. Mr. Rostow emphasized the basic underlying friendship between the United States and France with the observation that American flags had been seen at the pro-Gaullist demonstrations on the Champs Elysee in May. Mr. Rostow asked for Mr. Malve's judgment on participation. Mr. Malve answered in terms of students, industry and agriculture. Because the number of college-level students in France has trebled in the last eight years, he said, graduates are no longer certain of having jobs. This has profoundly affected their view of society. Labor/management relations are changing, but have not yet reached a satisfactory state. Agriculture is disaffected by repeated statements that there are too many farmers, that they are inefficient, etc., and by the fact that they are subject to the decisions of “technocrats” in Brussels. There is no dialogue between professors and students in France, Mr. Malve said, and too little of the human element in French education, which is far too centralized. He referred further to the politicization of French society and the shock felt in face of the magnitude of problems of the modern world. On the other hand, the French have an obsessive fear of disorder. [Here follow 4 paragraphs on the elections in France.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL EUR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers and approved in M on July 23. 318. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense 318. Talking Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense 1 Washington, undated. On July 15, Rusk sent Clifford a brief reply thanking him for the talking paper and stating that he found it “sound, balanced, and persuasive.” 1. The Value and Function of NATO. The value of NATO to the United States rests on the basic fact that our vital security is indissolubly tied to the security of Western Europe. The resources, human and material, of Western Europe, if in hostile hands or under the domination of a hostile power, would be enough to tip the balance of world power against us. We would have to become a bristling defensive fortress, and live under drastically different conditions. Our society would have to be organized for survival against an enormous technological and manpower threat, with a manifold increase in the percentage of our resources spent for defense. The vital importance to the US of keeping Western Europe free is therefore quite clear. Almost as important to our national security is the preservation of the political stability and security of Western Europe. In view of the history of two world wars, and of today's balance of power in Europe, it is very clear that the United States is needed in Europe to preserve the political balance between East and West, and even to permit a secure and easy relationship among our friends in Western Europe. NATO has enabled us to accomplish both the purpose of preserving our vital security interest in Europe, and the purpose of letting Germany contribute to European defense without arousing fear among its neighbors. The record of US commitment to NATO—a commitment that would be brought into grave doubt by an abrupt withdrawal of 5/6 of our forces from Europe—has been repeatedly made clear by the Presidents of the US over the past two decades. Most recently, on 19 February 1968, when President Johnson met with NATO's Secretary General Brosio, they jointly announced that: “They considered the maintenance of NATO's strength, including the U.S. commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.” II. US and European Contributions to NATO. In early 1950s, the United States had to provide the muscle, the forces, the organizing talent, and the resources to get NATO started, and to create a respectable power base. But since then, our European friends have, in fact, steadily built up their forces, the equipment of these forces, and the share of the common load of defense they are carrying. United States forces now constitute only 12% of the ground manpower in NATO Europe, even if French troops are excluded, and about 1/4 of the air force. III. The Need For Strong Conventional Forces in Europe. In the most critical region, Central Europe, the Soviets and their allies facing NATO have in excess of 600,000 men. NATO forces in that area presently approximate the same total. It is here that US forces are concentrated. A drastic cut in US forces thus would upset the conventional force balance of the two alliances. For aggression to be deterred, it is essential that NATO not become inferior to the Warsaw Pact in any element of its military establishment. Nuclear weapons, for example, are no substitute for soldiers. Where one side possesses stronger conventional forces, it may be tempted to exploit that conventional strength recognizing that a nuclear response would be so imprudent as to make its threat incredible. NATO's political weakness resulting from a disparity in conventional forces would thus increase the chances of pressures by the Warsaw Pact, such as, for example, intensification of the incidents involving access to West Berlin. The multiplication of such incidents would create a grave danger that miscalculation might lead to general conflict. NATO's security, and hence our own, requires balanced forces— conventional as well as nuclear. Such balanced forces now exist. We must not abandon them. Although we should continue to seek mutual force reductions with the nations of the Warsaw Pact and should continue to encourage replacement of US forces by those of our European allies, we must follow both courses in a fashion that avoids disturbing the present balance in Europe. IV. US Withdrawals From Europe. Past and Current Withdrawals. While our military contributions are still substantial, they have steadily become a smaller share of the total European defense burden. Our troop strength in Europe has steadily diminished as our European allies have taken over more of this burden. In 1961 we had 417,000 military personnel in and afloat in the EUCOM area. In 1966 we had 366,000. In 1967, in removing our forces from France, we eliminated spaces accounting for about 18,000 military personnel and 21,000 dependents, and also eliminated 11,000 jobs held by foreign nationals, saving $110 million in BOP costs. We are now engaged in redeploying to the United States, as part of the 24th Division and four air squadron redeployment from Germany (Reforger/Crested Cap), 33,000 military personnel, about 15,000 dependents, and 96 fighter aircraft at a prospective saving of about $70 million annually in our balance of payments. Thus by September, 1968, we will have reduced our authorized strength in Europe by a total of 51,000 military personnel and 36,000 dependents. These large reductions of US forces in Europe have been kept in phase with the increasing capability of European forces, and with the capacity of the US to return our combat forces in a hurry in a real emergency. They have therefore been within the capacity of NATO Europe to absorb, both militarily and politically. Further US Withdrawals . The Department of Defense is at this moment considering, together with the Department of State, how we can make further sizeable yet orderly reductions in our European troop levels and costs over the next several years. On the 10th of May in Brussels, Secretary Clifford told the NATO Defense Ministers: “While I cannot speak for future Administrations, I do not believe that it is realistic to assume that the United States will maintain the same level of ready forces deployed in Europe indefinitely into the future. I think it is inevitable that the European members of the Alliance should plan increasingly over the coming years to assume greater responsibility for the direct and immediate defense of Europe.” We have lost no time in starting this process, but we believe it is essential to conduct the process in a way which will preserve the cohesiveness and strength of NATO and which will protect to the maximum US interests in Europe. We are considering actively a series of proposals which could result in reductions of over 40,000 additional military personnel in Europe, to start in this fiscal year and to be completed during the next, and an annual saving of over $200 million in BOP costs. Our emphasis will be on maintaining combat capability to the maximum extent, cutting drastically into expensive support activities and headquarters rather than into combat troops wherever practicable. These additional military personnel reductions, when added to our reductions since 1 January 1966, would yield almost 100,000 military personnel cuts in Europe (18,000 from relocations from France, 33,000 from Germany, and over 40,000 additional). Taking into account US and foreign employees as well as US dependents, these cumulative reductions are anticipated to yield a total cut in DOD supported population in Europe of about 215,000 and BOP savings of over $350 million a year. Our proposals regarding this further reduction should be ready in the near future, hopefully within the next month. We must then consult with our NATO allies and consider how we can fit together our planned reductions and their defense planning, making adjustments or tradeoffs to provide for an orderly transition and the maximum possible maintenance of NATO strength in Europe. What we are doing is, therefore, fully in accord with the views often expressed in Congress. We are reducing our level of forces in Europe and encouraging our European allies to provide a greater proportion of NATO forces, while at the same time adhering steadfastly to our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. Nor is the reduction now under consideration to be the final word. We will continue to diminish US force levels in Europe as rapidly as the political, military, and technological situation allows. If the Soviets respond to current NATO suggestions of mutual force reductions, such response would permit us to accelerate these reductions. But it is vital to our own security, to the political stability of Europe, and to the political and military power balance in the world that the reductions of US forces in Europe are kept in step with the political and military power realities. V. The Balance of Payments Effects of European Deployments. We are keenly aware of the importance of reducing our balance of payments deficit. But the amount of deficit that can be ascribed to our European deployments is frequently exaggerated. The fact is that of the 1.6 billion dollars in current military costs in Europe, something like 1.1 to 1.3 billion is currently offset through cash receipts from arms purchases by our allies and through financial measures, such as bond purchases, which they undertake for the purpose of relieving the US balance of payments deficit on the military account. A drastic reduction in US expenditures in Europe on military account could also result in a substantial reduction of purchases of US military equipment and US securities by our European allies. Thus the small net gap in our balance of payments on military account in Europe could well remain relatively unchanged. Our overall balance of payments deficit, in the area of $3–1/2 billion last year, is a problem of the most serious concern to all of us. But the three to five hundred million dollars current net deficit which results from our European deployments, is a small price to pay for the security it buys for us. With respect to Germany, where by far the greatest number of our forces are stationed, the “gap” is expected to average only approximately $200 million annually during FY 1968 and FY 1969. That gap cannot endanger our gold reserves, moreover, since Germany follows a policy of not converting dollars into gold. Recently we concluded an agreement with the Germans whereby in addition to payments of approximately $100 million for commercial purchases of military equipment, they agreed to purchase $625 million in bonds to reduce the military balance of payments deficit for fiscal year 1969. As to the future, we are exploring exhaustively possible means of further ameliorating the BOP situation, over and above the various force reductions currently being studied. We are examining the possibility that joint basing arrangements can be made; that certain military functions now performed by US forces can be transferred to other NATO countries; and that host countries can assume certain maintenance and operations costs now financed by the US. We have also completed a comprehensive study of US community support for our troops in Europe and have identified other measures which may enable us to realize further BOP economies. The United States and German Governments agreed on 10 June of this year to begin talks in the early fall to explore together possible long-term solutions for the particular BOP problem on military account in that country. VI. The Adverse Effects of Drastic Congressional Action. It is our strong conviction that any Congressional action at this time drastically reducing US force levels in Europe would have the gravest consequences for the security and stability of the NATO Alliance, and would wreak havoc with US policies and goals in related areas. In particular: The Europeans could not possibly make the requisite military adjustments in time to compensate for the withdrawn US forces. The remaining US forces would not be able to put up any substantial fight for Berlin, to safeguard our nuclear arsenal, or even to receive and deploy reinforcements from the US rapidly in case of trouble in Europe. A large portion of our nuclear weapons, many of which are pledged to the support of European forces which man the delivery systems, might have to be withdrawn. The psychological and political effect would be even more destructive than the military effect. Europeans would feel profoundly uneasy about the stability of any American commitment at all, and might well seek safety in neutralism and accommodation with their overwhelming neighbor on the Continent, the Soviet Union. The Germans, above all, would feel that the US had in large part decided to abandon them and that the remaining US forces were largely token. The effect on internal German political stability would be strongly adverse. Nationalist influence would grow very rapidly, and a German foreign policy seeking a relationship with the Soviets, offering heavy economic concessions and a possible neutralist stance, would gain wide acceptance. This in turn would revive a host of European antagonisms and anxieties which are now effectively held in check by the assurance of stability that the US presence provides. The other Europeans would view with great unease not only the new military balance in Europe favoring the East, but the disproportionately large German forces involved on the Western side. A massive redeployment of US troops from Europe would require very great one-time budgetary expenditures, and pose personnel, construction, procurement and training problems. Based on a preliminary analysis, withdrawal of 200,000 US military and civilian personnel and their dependents could mean one-time budget costs of over three billion dollars if equipment were procured and prepositioned overseas to permit rapid return of these forces to Europe in case of need. The cost could be about $1–1/2 billion if the redeployed units did not have prepositioned equipment in Europe. It is also very important to understand that redeployment of forces from Europe to CONUS does not save major recurring budgetary costs, since most of the costs of supporting forces—equipment, personnel, and most operating costs—are the same whether the forces are located here or in Europe. Such action would also affect the prospects for ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We would be undermining our Allies' confidence in US mutual defense assurances at the very time that many NATO countries, and especially the FRG, are seeking reaffirmation of US commitments to facilitate their undertaking a 25-year NPT obligation, in the face of the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty could be terminated at a year's notice. In Eastern Europe, the Czechs have recently made some determined steps toward greater independence from the Soviets. The USSR and other Eastern European countries are applying diplomatic and even some military pressures on the moderate Communist government in Prague. Massive withdrawal of US troops, leaving the field largely to the Soviet Union and its adherents, would discourage this and other efforts toward liberalization and would strengthen the advocates of hard-line Communist hostility and repression. It is barely a year since the US and NATO completed their relocation of troops and headquarters from France. While the Fourteen (the NATO nations other than France) have adjusted well to the new situation, and while NATO maintains peacetime cooperation with the French and would hope to have French support in wartime, the partial disengagement of France from NATO military affairs has not been without an undesirable adverse political effect. A drastic US redeployment would aggravate this effect substantially and suggest a weakening in the political cohesion of Western Europe as a whole. In the Mediterranean, Soviet fleet activities have markedly increased. Although we now consider the Soviet threat in the Med to be essentially political rather than military, the shadow of the increased Soviet presence would grow substantially longer if the US withdrew the bulk of its forces from Europe. The impact on Turkey would be immediate and damaging. NATO cannot continue as a viable organization unless we consult with our Allies well in advance about any proposed change in our force contribution to NATO which will have profound effects on their security and political posture. Drastic Congressional action to take the bulk of our forces out of Europe would confront our Allies with a fait accompli. It would make a mockery of our efforts at genuine consultation in the Alliance. A legislative directive to cut our current European forces from about 340,000 to 50,000 would be an action destructive of our own security posture, and of the military balance of Europe, and surely of the political stability of the continent. It would be regarded by friend, ally, neutral, and foe as the substantial abandonment of Europe by the US, as a loss of our interest in the continent in view of our Asian engagement, as a return to isolation, and as an act that would cast doubt on the validity of our international commitments. 1 Source: Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 164, Luncheon Meetings with the President. Secret. Attached to a July 11 memorandum from Clifford to Rusk, which stated that the Department of Defense was continuing to examine the military threat to Europe, the NATO Alliance, U.S. troop levels in Europe, and alternative ways to meet the threat with a reduced troop presence. This talking paper was intended to help in the continuing discussions of these problems. 319. Memorandum of Conversation 319. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 15, 1968. SUBJECT EC Subsidies for Exports to Third Markets PARTICIPANTS EC Commission Mr. Pierre Malve, Deputy Chief of Cabinet to EC Commissioner Deniau United States Mr. Anthony Solomon, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Mr. Stephen Rogers, Officer in Charge European Regional Affairs, Office of OECD, European Community, and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs Mr. Arthur P. Allen, Assistant Chief, General Commercial Policy Division, Office of International Trade Mr. William E. Barreda, General Commercial Policy Division, Office of International Trade Mr. Solomon began by saying the US and EC are headed for a collision on the Common Agricultural Policy. We recognize that the EC needs a CAP, but the protection level and subsidies are too high. EC subsidies for exports to third markets, such as those for lard and barley, are especially serious for us. Our farm community views them as an attack by the EC on our foreign markets. We will have to do something or our liberal trade policies now being threatened by protectionists will lose the support of agriculture—politically the most powerful group in favor of liberal trade. Mr. Solomon asked Malve if something cannot be done about the subsidy problem. Malvé said the US had missed an opportunity in not negotiating with the Community on the latter's MDS proposals in the KR since binding of the MDS would have set a limit to export subsidies and to internal EC prices. This proposal represented an enormous step for the Community. Today European farmers will not hear of any limitation on export subsidies. Mr. Solomon replied the EC had insisted on too large a differential between Community prices and world prices. Mr. Malve agreed the margin of support demanded by the EC had been too large but said it had been very difficult to make it smaller since the proportion of the Community population which gets its living from agriculture is still about 20% of the total, hence a major political force. Mr. Malve said that for the present a new round of generalized negotiations is not feasible. A long-term solution will be provided only by the Community acting unilaterally. In the meantime bilateral talks might be helpful in avoiding a US/EC conflict over subsidies. Eventually the EC would have to find the courage to overhaul the CAP which, it is already widely realized, is not the best policy. Other countries obviously cannot accept a situation in which the EC restricts access to its own markets and at the same time expands exports by means of subsidies. In the absence of an authority which could arbitrate differences, the CAP was pieced together by simply adding the extreme demands of each of the Six. Price levels were thus set for the needs of marginal producers with the result that the costs of the CAP are too high and efficient producers (e.g. of wheat) are, in Malve's view, getting rich. An overhaul of the CAP should start with a division of Community agriculture into three categories—production that is competitive, production that could be competitive if given some assistance, and production that should be abandoned (i.e., all production in a few regions, certain products in certain regions). But before such an overhaul of the CAP can be undertaken, the Community must first have a higher degree of integration—specifically, common policies are necessary in the fields of education, social welfare, industry, and regional development. Mr. Solomon noted this is a long run solution. What can be done in the short run? It is loss of our established markets in third countries that causes us the greatest political problems. Can the EC reduce subsidy payments without reducing gate prices? Mr. Malve answered that it would be very difficult for the EC to reduce subsidies. Given the strong feelings of European farmers and the political power they wield, the most the Community could do would be to make adjustments for individual products when this will not attract too much attention. Mr. Solomon said this situation left us no choice but to subsidize our own exports. We cannot allow ourselves to be deprived of established markets in third countries by subsidized Community exports. Mr. Solomon reminded Malve that the US can doubtless afford to spend more on subsidies than the Community. The Administration has been reluctant to subsidize but Congress is in favor of doing so, and perhaps US subsidies would give Communities the “courage” to improve the CAP. Malvé agreed the situation was unfortunate. Speaking personally, he wondered whether the Community should not now move toward country quotas for suppliers, something formerly thought incompatible with the CAP. Malvé said our Mission in Brussels was active, and by its constant pressure on the Commission had prevented the Community from adopting some measures we would have found even more objectionable. Mr. Solomon mentioned his visit to Brussels the following week to discuss preferences with Commission Chairman Rey, and wished Malve an interesting and profitable visit in the US. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ECIN 3 EEC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Allen and Barreda on August 2. 320. Memorandum of Conversation 320. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 25, 1968, 11:45 a.m. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN President Johnson AND FINANCE MINISTER STRAUSS OTHER PARTICIPANTS US Walt W. Rostow Mr. Edward Fried Mr. Edwin D. Crowley Mr. Harry Obst (Interpreter) FRG Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein Mr. Rieger (Assistant to the Minister) The President, after an exchange of courtesies, expressed his satisfaction at the good relations between the United States and the Federal Republic and thanked the Minister specifically for the cooperation of the German Government in international monetary matters. Minister Strauss congratulated the President on obtaining a tax increase from Congress. He said that this represented a kind of psychological turning point which had contributed greatly to get many other matters settled in the financial field. He said he knew just how hard it must have been for the President to get this bill passed as he had had to increase taxes himself when he took office eighteen months ago. Mr. Rostow interjected that Minister Strauss had remarked to him during their conversation on the occasion of the Adenauer funeral that he found himself in a very uncomfortable position. Not only did he have to increase taxes but to lower veterans' and welfare benefits at the same time. The President remarked that there may be fields in which the Americans are the equal of the Germans and there may be fields where the Americans were better than the Germans, but the fiscal was certainly not one of them. He had always believed that whenever a situation arose that tended to separate the boys from the men the Germans could be found on the proper side and this had been true of fiscal matters. Minister Strauss said West Germany had been fortunate to have enjoyed 18 years of prosperity after the currency reform. Their first serious recession had come in 1966 and it had been a good thing that the FRG was able to overcome it fairly quickly as both Britain and France had suffered economic setbacks recently which would have led to a much worse crisis if Germany had still been near the bottom of its recession. These incidents pointed out the need for greater cooperation among the European countries. Maybe in four or five years or so the British and French may have to bail out the Federal Republic. The President stated he was hoping and praying for a united Europe. Until this could become a reality, it was essential that the United States and Germany work together closely in every field, and he was sure this would be the case. Minister Strauss replied that the FRG after the war had been provided economic security through the Marshall Plan and military security through the Alliance. Nobody appreciated this more than the Germans. However, Europeans today showed a greater and greater tendency to enjoy life in the shadow of the greater world conflicts, removed from exercising responsibility on world politics. They were content to let the United States do the job. On top of that, many raised their voices in criticism of the actions of the United States. It was extremely important to bring Europe back to a greater sense of responsibility and engagement. The President nodded agreement and said, “the whole world must be brought to exercising greater responsibility.” Minister Strauss said he was often described as the “gang leader” of the Gaullists in Germany. He believed that in many ways De Gaulle was pursuing the right goals. He disagreed with De Gaulle, however, on two points: 1. He believed De Gaulle was wrong in flirting with Moscow as, for one thing, the Soviets would never regard him as their match. France was too small. 2. He also believed that De Gaulle's “constant resentful anti-American tune” was lamentable. It was not necessary to be anti-American in order to gain greater independence for Europe as the United States was not opposed to a more independent Europe. The President stated that the United States indeed favored a more independent Europe. He would not do anything that could promote such anti-American sentiments and he had always turned the other cheek when confronted with such statements. When the French found themselves in trouble, he was among the first to hold out a helping hand. Minister Strauss said he believed that this course pursued by the President was an extremely wise one. The President added that in extending a hand to France he had not only been guided by compassion and good statesmanship but that he had tried to act in the interest of the entire world and, also, because he could envision a situation in which France could be much worse off than under De Gaulle. Minister Strauss stated the present measures would not go far to cure the basic ills of France's social structure. France was lagging far behind its partners in industrial relations and the living standard accorded the working class. Minimum wages for construction workers were under $100 a month while prices were 50% higher than in the Federal Republic. With such conditions, nobody should have been surprised by the recent events in France. The President described to the Minister the plans for setting up a public affairs school in Austin, Texas, with the aim of taking outstanding students with BA's who had political interests and giving them the very best possible education in public affairs. He was trying to attract the very best of teachers and public figures to take part in this project. He, himself, having had only a limited education, was acutely aware of the benefits such an institution could render to aspiring political leaders. He would very much want to invite the Minister to come down sometime after the opening of the school next September for a few days of lectures and conversations with the students. Minister Strauss expressed his gratitude for the invitation and said he would be absolutely delighted to accept it. He said, moreover, that he found this to be a fascinating idea which the Germans should also take up as, if anything, they had an even greater need for well-trained and well-informed political talent. The President then described to the Minister the reasons that had influenced him not to run again for election, and pointed out that the major legislation he had been able to get through Congress recently would not have been possible if he had had to give undue weight to the political factors involved in running for office. He thanked Minister Strauss again for the good cooperation on fiscal matters and said he believed that this area was now in reasonably good shape. He hoped he would be able to rely on German cooperation also in the future. Minister Strauss said that he had had fruitful talks with Secretary of the Treasury Fowler and that there were no misunderstandings on financial problems separating the two. He recognized the great importance of the offset issue in keeping American troops in Europe and was ready to start negotiations on the long-term offset solution this fall. The President emphasized the great importance of such a long-term solution. He thanked the Minister for his visit and said he hoped to see him soon in Texas. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, Folder 7. Confidential. Drafted by Obst. The conversation was held at the White House. 321. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 321. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, August 26, 1968, 2146Z. 4381. Subj: Brosio views on post-Czech reassessments. 1. SYG Brosio and I had a general tour d'horizon today on the implications for NATO of developments in Eastern Europe. We agreed that while any NATO decisions would have to await outcome of current discussions in Moscow, it was probably true that the implications for NATO will be drawn primarily from events to date, i.e., the raw fact of the invasion itself. That is, the Soviets have demonstrated both a willingness to use force for political purposes and a capacity for political misjudgments and mismanagement which contrasts with the military effectiveness of their operation; this creates impression that political constraints on Soviet behavior are less than had sometimes been assumed. 2. On Kiesinger idea for a high-level meeting, we compared impressions that Germans were not taking any follow-up initiative on the subject here. I did raise on a personal basis the question of whether there might be a place in the fall scenario for a DPC meeting at MOD level, i.e., taking advantage of the fact that most key Ministers, including ours, would already be in Bonn for the NPG meeting on 10 October. Having an immediately preceding or following meeting of the DPC in Bonn might be a politically useful step if relevant decisions could be made ready by then. Brosio thought the idea interesting but wished to reflect further. 3. We also noted that the Military Committee was today discussing the notion of a collective no-reduction pledge (the text of MCM 68–68, 26 Aug 1968, is reported and discussed in septel). 2 SYG Brosio felt this notion (that there should be no weakening of NATO pending a defense review of the new situation) was a good one and especially helpful vis-a-vis the Belgians. Comment: We are not clear enough here as to the state of play of various possible U.S. adjustments in the light of the Czech situation to assess what problems, if any, this would pose for us. But on the available evidence, it appears almost certain that such a “freeze” would be strongly favored by the British— or, at least, by Healey—and by both the Germans and Italians. The Dutch, Norwegians and all others would also be favorable, so that there would be, in effect, unanimity if the Belgians and the Canadians (and, of course, the U.S.) found it palatable. See septel for our recommendation. End comment. 4. In our discussion of a “defense review”, we identified three separate elements: A. The package of problems dealing with warning, surprise, crisis management and consultation—which the Germans and Dutch will certainly want to review; B. The question of force levels and particularly qualitative factors and remediable deficiencies—which might initially be approached by way of a freeze on reductions and then improvements in the 1969–73 force plans which will be up for review in December; C. The continental mobilization—US-UK-Canadian reinforcement package, i.e., the “you mobilize—we'll reinforce” bargain suggested by Secretary Clifford's remarks at the last DPC meeting, Brosio felt that this might be the area in which the German proposal for a restatement of the NATO defense concept could find a productive application this fall. 5. Turning to the political side, our discussion also brought out the need for a parallel reappraisal (“Harmel revisited”). This, in contrast to the fourteen-nation defense review, in the DPC, would be handled in fifteen-nation NAC and POLADs. Brosio's instinctive feeling at this point is quite similar to our own, namely, that while the importance of the “defense” pillar has been heightened, the “detente” pillar remains valid, even though the process will be longer and harder than we had thought. SYG Brosio was concerned that questions might be raised about the status of ongoing work for the longer-term on East-West relations and MFR. He thought while we could anticipate increased resistance to MFR, it was still relevant to continue our homework, even if in somewhat lower key and over longer period. 6. In the next day or two, USNATO will be sending its further analysis of the substance of these defense and political reviews and how they should be related to each other, along with our ideas for a fall scenario. This package will be raw material for my consultations in Washington next week. 7. One substantive comment seems in order now: it is important to distinguish the question of posture and actions in direct response to the Czech situation on which, despite occasional sniping, there has been no responsible suggestion that NATO should have taken other than a “low profile” posture, from a kind of “malaise” which may adversely affect some elements of NATO's new strategic concept. Some Europeans are “discovering” that despite all the talk—especially from the U.S.—in recent years about crisis management, flexibility, mobility, mobilization, political waring, etc., the more likely kind of crisis is one like the present, i.e., internal to Eastern Europe, which makes it politically impossible for NATO to implement those concepts for fear of being provocative. Thus, the concepts themselves have tended to come under attack; and while we think there are some good rebuttals, e.g., on warning time (see USNATO 4364), 3 the critics may have one valid point. Perhaps the most likely contingency directly threatening NATO would be a follow-on to tension within the bloc, i.e., where the Pact subsequently decided to whip up a crisis with NATO to obscure or bridge over an internal crisis. Here NATO might not be politically in a position to take full advantage of warning time and mobility, giving the Warsaw Pact—as things stand just now—a significant head start in operational readiness. This aspect can doubtless be explored in the defense review, with a possibility that future exercise (such as one involving the U.S. redeployed forces, and some selective mobilization or reserve activation) could be arranged against a scenario of the need for “non-provocative” readiness measures in an assumed high state of tension within the Warsaw Pact. But to avoid the malaise getting too much headway, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, it would seem worthwhile to us to try to work out some such international activity, even of a limited nature, in the near term. 4 Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the other NATO capitals. 2 Not further identified. 3 Telegram 4364, August 24, summarized the discussion at a North Atlantic Council meeting on August 23 during which the question of the time for a political warning was discussed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO) 4 After summarizing the discussion at a Council meeting on August 28, Cleveland reported that the Permanent Representatives and Brosio were still in the process of disengaging themselves intellectually from the Czech crisis, and because of this the process of focusing on the nature and scope of an assessment in its wake was just beginning. (Telegram 4427, August 28; ibid.) 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, August 29, 1968, 2122Z. 229956. For Cleveland from Leddy. Subject: Strengthening NATO in Wake of Czech Crisis. In accordance with our conversation today on secure telephone, 2 following are substantive portions of EUR's recommendations to the Secretary on steps to strengthen NATO. Please consider this strictly FYI and Noforn, for your personal background only. Septel contains our ideas for scenario which are appended to basic recommendations. 3 Begin text The principal aims of the draft Presidential messages are (a) to summarize briefly the main conclusions the US has drawn from the Czech crisis for Western and NATO interests; and (b) to propose a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers for the week of September 22, 1968. As a result of the crisis a number of major issues will have to be reexamined intensively by the Allies. The Permanent Council and the NATO military authorities are already discussing some of them. Taking account of initial Allied reactions to the crisis, we believe the following matters might be indicated for Ministerial action at the September meeting: 1. We might aim at an interim freeze on NATO forces and lay the groundwork for establishing a floor under force levels for the longer term. We would, moreover, seek a demonstration of the Europeans' willingness to make increased efforts for their own defense. 2. Defense Ministers might give guidance for improving reserves, equipment and mobilization capabilities. We may wish to announce plans for exercises involving the return to Europe of our redeployed forces. 3. Ministers might give necessary directives on strategic questions. Our aim would be to seek Allied reaffirmation of the validity of the flexible response concept but with agreement to reexamine the doctrine of political warning time. 4. Closely related to the foregoing, Ministers could direct that the current study of NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities be accelerated and completed in time for Ministerial consideration in December. 5. With regard to the Mediterranean, Ministers might direct the immediate activation of COMARAIRMED, the new command which is to coordinate aerial surveillance of the Soviet fleet. 6. On the political side, we may wish to seek agreement on a special declaration in which the member governments could reemphasize their support for the Alliance and the NATO security system in the wake of the Czech crisis. Such a declaration could also deal with the continuity in longer-term objectives for improving East-West relations. 7. In the declaration, or in the regular communique, we might also wish to make clear that the mutual force reduction proposal remains on the table for the longer term. 8. The most important Alliance political issue we may need to deal with, at least in preliminary fashion, is the Italian suggestion that member governments strengthen the Treaty by formal action to make clear their intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for an additional period of years beyond 1969. While this subject may not be ready for discussion at the Ministerial session, we should give it serious internal consideration in any case. Greater assurance about the Alliance's future would have a favorable impact (a) on overall aspects of US-European relations, and (b) on various specific issues, notably the NPT. We must of course be prepared for difficulties with the French over at least some aspects of the Ministerial Meeting. It may be necessary, for example, to divide the meeting into two sessions with the Fourteen (DPC) first taking up military questions and the Fifteen (NAC) subsequently considering political questions. In our view, the advantages of an early Ministerial Meeting would clearly outweigh any difficulties. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has shocked European opinion to the point of creating a new, positive atmos-phere for NATO and for US leadership in tackling Alliance problems. We should take advantage of this atmosphere while it is so favorable. 4 End text. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Myerson, cleared by McAuliffe, and approved by Leddy. 2 No record of this conversation has been found. 3 Telegram 230009 to the Mission to NATO, August 29. (Ibid.) This scenario called for a special Presidential message to all the NATO Heads of Government and the holding of a special NATO Ministerial Meeting the week of September 22 to draft new guidance on force levels and other elements of a military/political work program. 4 On August 30, Cleveland cabled his general agreement with EUR's recommendations, but suggested the addition of a Defense Ministers' meeting in Bonn on October 9. (Telegram 4454 from Brussels; ibid.) 323. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 323. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND THECZECHOSLOVAKIA CRISIS I. Introduction The Czechoslovak crisis has raised grave issues for the United States and its Western European allies. It has cast into question such matters as the future of détente, the defensive capability of Western Europe, and the future of Communism and the independent states of Eastern Europe. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues and the current and prospective means for meeting these problems by the United States and its allies. II. detente The August 20–21 occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact provided a cold douche for the future of detente, or the progressive rapprochement of East and West. In the late Sixties, the achievement of detente had become an important objective in the policies of most Western European nations as well as the United States. It had become a key element in the work program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But its assumed basis was seriously undermined by the Czechoslovak crisis. Most Western nations have reacted with strong expressions of disgust at, and disapproval of, the Warsaw Pact occupation of independent Czechoslovakia. There was almost universal support for the United Nations consideration of this problem and approbation for the resolution supported by the majority in the Security Council. To give further meaning to their disapproval, most Western nations undertook to limit contacts with the Soviets and the occupying powers of the Warsaw Pact, and cancelled plans or proposed visits in the political and cultural fields. As the repression of Czechoslovakia continues, with the possibility of the installation of a de facto occupation regime, the deterioration of East-West contacts may well continue. These relatively limited actions do not necessarily preclude the possibility of return in due course to the pursuit of detente. The present disposition of many European nations is to avoid actions which might impair the eventual resumption of closer relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The positions of the United Kingdom and the Government of France on this score are particularly apparent. US actions have so far generally paralleled those of its Western European allies. For the time being we are seeking a balanced approach that will satisfy the immediate objective of expressing censure of Soviet action without destroying overnight our longer-range goals. [Here follow 9 paragraphs on actions to be taken in the cultural field.] III. The Defense of Western Europe The movement of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia and the continuing occupation of that country has obviously affected the military situation in Europe. The status quo has been changed. There are larger military forces present in Central Europe than at any time since the post-war period. The military occupation of Czechoslovakia puts Soviet forces in a country where they have not been since World War II. There is no assurance as yet that the Warsaw Pact forces will soon return to their deployment where they existed six weeks ago. The changed East-West military situation in Europe is of significance to the security of the United States and its allies. In the light of these developments we are reviewing with our allies what the implications may be for existing arrangements to provide for our common security. The principal forum for this review will be NATO. Since the onset of the Czech crisis, the NATO posture has combined three essential elements: (a) vigilance by the NATO political and military authorities; (b) a low public profile while the spotlight was on the United Nations; and (c) intensified consultations among the Allies regarding implications of the situation for Western security interests. As a result of NATO consultations a number of issues require consideration. These are outlined below. A. Proposals for high-level NATO meetings Following a period of speculation and trial balloons—including Kiesinger's public mention of a Heads of Government meeting—the British on August 30 took the initiative. They have sought our views on two alternative proposals. Both take account of the fact that Defense Ministers of seven NATO countries are already scheduled to meet in Bonn, October 10–11, as the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The first alternative envisages postponing the NPG until the end of October or early November, advancing the date of the usual year-end NATO meeting to the end of October or early November, and holding both sessions in Brussels. The result would be a stock-taking meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers to consider defense and political matters arising from the crisis. Like the normal December meeting, fourteen countries would meet to examine defense issues while the French would join them later to examine political problems. In the course of the three (or four) day session, the seven-nation NPG would meet for a day. The second alternative involves simply broadening the presently scheduled (October) NPG meeting to include all Defense Ministers (except presumably the French). The British favor the first alternative on political, psychological and practical grounds. It would permit a maximum amount of business to be transacted and avoid a “nuclear affairs” meeting as NATO's first major response to the Czech crisis. A key question, in either case, is whether the necessary groundwork can be laid in time to permit Ministers to take substantive decisions. A meeting without concrete results could be disappointing for NATO as an organization and for public opinion. Another possible course would be to hold a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers towards the end of September to issue a new program of work for NATO. The usual year-end meeting would be held in December. A September meeting would have the advantage of an early public response by NATO to the crisis. B. General Alliance policy on East-West Relations In connection with any special meeting, Ministers would have to decide whether the Czech crisis—and Soviet and Warsaw Pact policies demonstrated by recent events—call for any changes in Alliance policy objectives as stated in the Harmel Report (on future tasks of the Alliance), the Reykjavik declaration on mutual force reductions, or other public pronouncements (such as on strategic concept) issued by NATO over the past two years. Our aim, and presumably that of all Member Governments (with France a possible exception) would be to seek a strong public reaffirmation of the Alliance—its defense and deterrent role—while maintaining the long-range commitment to improved East-West relations. C. Strengthening NATO by extending the North Atlantic Treaty Italy has suggested—although not yet by formal proposal—that Member Governments consider strengthening the Treaty by formal action to ascertain extended life for NATO. Such action would make clear the Allies intent to refrain from exercising the right of withdrawal for an additional period of years (say, ten) beyond 1969. (Article 13 provides that, after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, a signatory state can withdraw on one year's notice.) The Allied Governments could act on this problem either by amending the Treaty or issuing individual declarations of intent to refrain from exercising the withdrawal right for, say, ten more years. Greater assurance about the Alliance's future would have favorable impact on (a) overall US-European relations and (b) specific issues, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This subject may arise in preliminary fashion, at least in the corridors, at any special NATO meeting held in the near future. Our current position is that the Alliance will continue and need not be subject to formal action. The Czechoslovak crisis raises issue of need for a more formal commitment. D. NATO force levels and planning NATO is presently considering an urgent Military Committee proposal that member governments defer any further force reductions or redeployments pending NATO review of the overall situation. This proposal gives the United States difficulty because of the current examination of further economies in our defense establishment in Europe. Beyond this immediate question, NATO must now reexamine its entire force posture and dispositions in Europe in light of such factors as what the invasion of Czechoslovakia showed about Soviet and Warsaw Pact operations and capabilities, and the fact that Soviet forces will probably be stationed on Czechoslovakia's western frontier for an indefinite period. Apart from other US objectives that may emerge as a result of study, we will want to seek increased European contributions to their own defense. This could include improvement of reserves, equipment, and mobilization capabilities as well as any changes in standing forces. E. NATO strategy, crisis and alert procedures NATO's present strategic concept based on “flexible response” and “forward defense” is unlikely to be altered fundamentally as a result of the Czech crisis. But certain aspects, notably the doctrine of political warning time , will have to be reexamined. The doctrine envisages that, prior to any overt Warsaw Pact action against NATO, there would be a period of heightened tension and warning permitting the Allies to take necessary reinforcement measures. Closely related to the foregoing, some at least of the Allies will want reexamination of the reinforcement times, strategic mobility for redeploying US forces in Europe, NATO alert and crisis procedures, and the efficiency of the early warning radar system covering the Central Front. F. The Mediterranean While the Czech crisis has focussed attention on the NATO Central Front, concern about Soviet pressures against Romania and Yugoslavia raises anew the problem of Mediterranean security. At the June meeting in Reykjavik NATO Ministers gave various directives aimed at improving command arrangements, stand-by naval force dispositions, and surveillance activities. These were directed primarily at the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. Recent events may require review and/or speeding up of NATO work on security in the Mediterranean and on NATO's southeastern flank. G. The French attitude On all of the foregoing subjects, the French are in a special position for two reasons. First, they do not participate in most aspects of the integrated military system. Second, since the invasion of Czechoslovak, De Gaulle has reaffirmed his policy of opposition to “blocs”. As a corollary, the French have been negative on the idea of special high-level western meetings—NATO, WEU, or European Community. In all probability, the French would, however, be represented at any Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council. They would expect the Fourteen to meet without them for part of the session to deal with NATO military questions. The best hope for improving French cooperation in Eastern defense would probably be through practical steps—improved liaison with the NATO military or improvement of French forces in Germany. The Germans are probably in the best position to sound out the French on these questions. H. The key role of Germany The Federal Republic of Germany—on the Central Front with the largest land army of the continental allies—has been particularly hard hit by the Czechoslovak crisis. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states have thrown into question the German policy of seeking better relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the rapidity with which the Soviet Union, with little apparent warning, undertook this action, has shaken German confidence in the warning time principle of the NATO strategic concept. The Soviet actions have also caused a reexamination of the German attitude towards signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While no public decision has been made on this subject the issue is obviously one now being subjected to re-appraisal. The Germans feel that to sign the NPT—with its duration—might well jeopardize their future security. The German press is heavy with charges of “super power complicity” in the Czechoslovak crisis and expressions of uneasy doubts of the ability of the US and other of Germany's allies to stand up to the Warsaw Pact. In addition, there is the problem of Berlin. The actions of the Warsaw Pact aggressor states, following upon the June actions of East Germany against Berlin, raise doubts in German minds about the future of that city which they regard as an important part of Free Germany. The result is a general malaise through Germany. Kiesinger reacted to this feeling in his recent interview when he urged a NATO summit meeting as a means of putting new life in NATO. Germany is key to the security of Europe and to the effective functioning of the NATO Alliance. While the current malaise may be founded on emotionalism rather than fact, it remains true that Germany is uneasy and disturbed. Such an attitude can have a multiplier effect throughout Europe unless steps are taken now to reaffirm the solidity and efficacy of Western defense within NATO. In short, high-level review and reappraisal by NATO nations could well be an important ingredient in calming the German attitude. It could also be an important factor in the continuance of constructive US/German relations. [Here follows Section IV, “Communism and the Future of Independent States of Eastern Europe.”] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meetings Notes File, Folder 7. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Attached to a September 4 memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, which transmitted the order of business for a meeting of the National Security Council on that day. 324. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council 324. Summary Notes of the 590th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, September 4, 1968, 5–7:25 p.m. U.S., Europe and the Czechoslovakian Crisis The President: The purpose of the meeting is to assess the impact of the Czechoslovakian crisis, to discuss how we can use the crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO, and to talk about our relations with the Russians and Eastern Europeans. Secretary Rusk will summarize the issues and possible ways of dealing with them. Secretary Clifford will talk about the defense of Western Europe and the new disposition of Soviet troops in Central Europe. Director Helms and Secretary Rusk will give us their views on the German reaction to the crisis. The press has already printed that the State Department was recommending additional reassurances to the Germans even before Secretary Rusk had made any recommendation to the President. Secretary Fowler will speak on the financial problems. If we speak out about a threatening situation and the situation does not develop, we are accused of over-reacting. If we don't speak out and a serious situation does develop, then we are accused of not having done what we should have done. This is what happened following an indirect mention of the Romanian situation in the speech of last Friday. 2 More meetings of the NSC should be held in the next few weeks so that all of the members may be fully informed on current foreign problems. All requests of political candidates for briefings are to be granted. Mr. Temple 3 and Mr. Rostow are to clear Administration responses to requests for positions on foreign problems coming from candidates, advisors, task forces, etc. [Here follow more than 4 pages on the Czech crisis.] Secretary Rusk: The effect of the Soviet action on the policy of detente has been serious. NATO members must consult with each other and be seen consulting. High level NATO meetings will be necessary. As to the future of NATO, it may be necessary to extend now the life of the treaty beyond 1969. The problem is what can we do to reassure NATO members that the treaty will not disappear in 1969 which does not require Senate approval and does not commit the new President. The President: We must not forget that a large number of Senators not long ago favored a substantial immediate reduction of the level of U.S. forces deployed in Europe. Some wanted to reduce this number to 50,000. Secretary Rusk: The country will now have to debate again the amount of its resources which it is willing to commit to keeping peace in the world. There is some isolationism in the United States. As NATO was warned at its last meeting held in Iceland, fears of the Soviet leaders as they face a changing world create a dangerous attitude in Moscow. [Here follow 5 paragraphs on the Czech crisis.] Ambassador Cleveland: The Czech invasion was considered in Europe as a momentous event. Soviet troop deployments raised basic questions for NATO members. Shivers went through Europe when it became clear that a successful military operation was launched with such sloppy political preparations. Some European NATO members concluded that the Soviet invasion has upset the warning theory on which they had been relying, i.e., that strategic warning would come far enough in advance to allow the NATO countries to prepare for a military response. NATO agreed to lie low during the time the Czech case was before the UN. They now have issued a statement. (Copy attached) They have agreed to assess the implications of the Czech invasion for allied defense policy, particularly force postures. (Tab C) 4 In recent years NATO had followed a two-pillar policy. One pillar was the defense of Western Europe and the other was detente, including the concept of a mutual reduction of NATO-Warsaw Pact forces. The detente pillar had made it possible for liberal political groups in Western Europe to support NATO. There is uncertainty about what NATO now does. There is already an approved policy on not getting chummy with aggressors. There are proposals to hold a high-level meeting consisting of foreign ministers plus defense ministers. Some members favor a review of NATO strategy. Another proposal is to find a way, without amending the treaty, to give members assurance that NATO's life will go beyond the treaty date of 1969. Despite the Czech crisis, Europeans still favor talks with the Soviet Union on major world problems. Some Europeans think that US–USSR relations grow out of shared “atomic complicity” and the Yalta Agreement. Secretary Clifford: There are two views as to whether the deployment of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia has increased the threat to NATO. One view holds that the actual threat against European NATO members is actually less than before the Czech crisis, in part because Soviet divisions are farther away and in part because Romanian and Czech troops are no longer available to the Warsaw Pact powers. Therefore the total number of troops available to fight NATO has decreased. The other view is that the threat has increased because Soviet and Pact forces are on a higher readiness level. This readiness level, plus the partial mobilization which was necessary prior to the Czech invasion, along with the possibility that the loyalty of Czech and Romanian troops can be regained, produces a force more powerful than before the crisis. We must use the crisis to prompt NATO states to improve the quality of their troops and to improve their mobilization potential. We should push hard on the Germans to increase their defense budget. On offsets and other balance of payment problems, we should request more from NATO members. We do not know whether there is any possibility of the French rejoining the NATO military effort. NATO members should react by promptly calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff to discuss the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe. The meeting should be held as early as September 20, even though little comes out of it, because there would be little value in a meeting later. A general communique at the end of the meeting would produce the desired result. We must use this opportunity to find out if our allies are really serious about carrying their fair share of the cost of the defense of Western Europe. Domestically, the crisis has ended the threat of passage by the Senate of the Symington Amendment. Senator Mansfield no longer is urging a major reduction in the level of U.S. forces in Europe. Secretary Rusk: Director Helms should call together an interdepartmental group to write a coordinated estimate of the change in the threat to NATO brought about by the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia. If there is a high-level NATO meeting, the first day should consist only of statements by each NATO member as to what each is doing in response to the Soviet action. Only then would members be allowed to say what others should be doing. We would need to be in a position to say that we would not withdraw additional U.S. forces without consultation and that the force rotation exercise scheduled for the end of this year would be announced now. The President: There hasn't been any shortage of NATO meetings. There should not be a hurry-up meeting. Our critics could accuse us of rushing ahead of other NATO members in the defense of Western Europe. We should be fully prepared before we go to a meeting. It should be recognized that all Presidential candidates will want to send advisers to such a meeting. First we should find out what each NATO member will do in the light of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. They should speak up and be clear about specific actions. The results of the meeting cannot be such as to encourage the aggressors to think that we are not concerned by the Soviet invasion nor such as to lead some people to think that our reaction has been too weak. We should consult, especially with the military leaders, before any decision is made. In addition, we should not have a highly publicized meeting until we know what the other members are prepared to do. We should not reassure the Germans until they take action on some of the things we want them to do. There is no need to restate our commitments. Secretary Fowler: Even before the Czech crisis, the increasing deficit in our balance of payments, projected through 1972, was higher than we can accept. (The deficit figures are in the attached paper which was cited by Secretary Fowler.) (Tab D) The procurement of U.S. military supplies by European NATO members could have greatly helped our balance of payments problem. If such procurement is made, we can avoid the choice between withdrawing troops from Europe and facing an unacceptable financial risk. Many Europeans believe we are more anxious to defend Europe than they are. Unless we make it clear to them, they are likely to let us defend Western Europe with our resources. It is well to recall that the Berlin crisis led to the first agreement by a NATO member to offset our military expenditures in Europe. Any NATO meeting held now should include the Finance Ministers so that costs can be dealt with along with military and political problems. Treasury has listed several proposals it recommends in its paper. The President: We should first get the views of what NATO members are doing and will do in response to the Czech crisis. Unless we do, we might have a big meeting of Foreign, Defense, and Finance Ministers which could blow up without agreement. We should start by asking our Ambassadors to find out from Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers what kind of money, marbles, and chalk the NATO states are prepared to put in to counter the Soviet threat. After they have this information, the Ambassadors might come here to tell us exactly what they have found out. General Wheeler: The threat to NATO is greater now than prior to the Czech crisis because: a. Warsaw Pact troops have been moved westward, b. the Warsaw Pact states have partially mobilized, and c. there are more Soviet troops deployed in the satellite states. The Soviets are on the alert and will stay on the alert. General Spivey 5 reports from Brussels that NATO military leaders are alarmed and deeply disturbed by the Czech situation. They think NATO should pull up its socks and that a NATO meeting would help. The answer to the question of which NATO members would do something specific about strengthening the Alliance is: a. The Germans, the Italians and the Dutch have the resources needed to build up their military forces. The question is whether they have the will do do so. b. Possibly the Norwegians and the Danes would do more. c. The British attitude is uncertain because their current military power is being reduced. The President: We should have our Ambassadors go to the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch to find out specifically what they are willing to do now to strengthen NATO. Ambassador Ball: [Here follow 2 paragraphs on conversations in New York.] There should be no NATO meeting without knowing in advance what is to come out of it. As to the effect of a NATO meeting, it would have no affect on the Soviet leaders but in the world it would be taken as a sign that the cold war was starting up all over again. The Soviets could use this argument to bring back into line the European communist parties which fell away following the Czech invasion. Ambassador Thompson: A NATO meeting would be used by those Soviet leaders who opposed the invasion to show their colleagues just how much the Soviet action cost. There is no solid evidence on who favored and who opposed the invasion in the Soviet leadership. [Here follow 6 paragraphs on talks with the Soviet Union and 2–1/2 pages on Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The source text bears no drafting information. 2 For text of the President's remarks in San Antonio, Texas, August 30, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1968, pp. 917–920. 3 Larry E. Temple, Special Counsel to the President. 4 None of the tabs is printed. 5 Lieutenant General Berton E. Spivey, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, September 6, 1968, 0243Z. 233633. Deliver to Cargo opening of business: Cargo is requested to convey to Brosio as soon as possible the following letter from the Secretary. Cargo should inform Brosio in strictest confidence that similar letters have been sent to the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada. Begin text. “Dear Manlio: Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, we, like you, have been thinking deeply about the best response which the NATO Alliance might make, both in real terms and in relation to public opinion in Europe, America and around the world. In the early days of the invasion we felt that the uncomfortable spotlight of the United Nations on the Soviet action should be kept bright and that for the moment activity through NATO should be kept out of public view. This posture on the part of the NATO Alliance has in no way prevented intensive consultations in NATO on the military, intelligence and political levels and has well served its purpose. But we are now thinking, as you no doubt know, of the need for a more publicly active role for NATO as the UN debate dies down and the need grows for public opinion in the Atlantic Community to be assured that the Alliance remains in place and will continue to be effective despite any changes in the military posture or deployment in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The problem as I see it is this. How can we best bring about a meas-ured reaction of the NATO Alliance so that it will be clear to its people that NATO continues with all strength to meet any challenge while avoiding a provocative NATO stance that could polarize the problem in terms of a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact rather than between the Soviets and the rest of the world—including some of the Communist world. This is a difficult prescription and may contain within it some internal contradictions. It is indeed for this reason I ask your advice as Secretary General as to what you think we all ought to do. Our own thoughts at this moment are best stated, I think, by saying, on the one hand, that a visible NATO reaction this fall is required but that, on the other hand, it would be a mistake to call an urgent high-level meeting of Foreign, Defense and Financial Ministers of NATO merely for the purpose of issuing a declaration or communique without real content. Surely we have enough words on paper. Another reaffirmation of what we have said before runs the risk that it would be regarded as an empty gesture in both the East and the West. From these considerations we have formed the tentative conclusion that it would be best to have a series of intensive consultations on what each of the NATO countries might be prepared to do in terms of a positive contribution to the strengthening of NATO before we reach the point of calling for a full-scale NATO Ministerial meeting at a date prior to the normal December exercise. A possible procedure, to which we are giving thought and on which the President and I would very much like your views would be the following: We might begin with a special NATO meeting toward the end of September to which each member would send a Deputy Foreign Minister who would begin the process of consultation on the possibilities for real action later on. This meeting might be followed up by a meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers under your chairmanship, which could be held in New York between October 1 and 10 when many Foreign Ministers would in any event be present. The advantage of this locale is that it would not tend to have the drama of a Brussels meeting but would provide the occasion for consultation. The Foreign Ministers meeting in New York could then, if there were general agreement and it appeared that a full-scale NATO Ministerial meeting would be productive of concrete results, bring about such a meeting in Brussels, possibly in late October or early November—in short speeding up the December Ministerial Meeting in the light of the new situation created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We may have before us a period when it will be politically possible for each member to take steps that would provide the desired reinforcement of our NATO institution in a way which might not have been possible a few weeks ago. The opportunity should not be lost; but neither should we proceed in a way that would lead to insignificant results or could worsen an already dangerous situation. I think this problem needs our best thought. I would appreciate knowing whatever you may have to suggest on the best way to proceed. Sincerely, Dean Rusk” 2 End text . Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Leddy and cleared by McAuliffe. A typed note on the source text indicates that the White House was informed. 2 Cargo delivered the letter to Brosio at 9:30 a.m. on September 6. (Telegram 4585 from Brussels, September 6; ibid.) On the same day, Brosio sent through the Mission to NATO an interim reply agreeing with the general procedures outlined by Rusk. (Telegram 4599 from Brussels, September 6; ibid.) In a more extensive reply on September 9, Brosio reiterated his agreement and outlined the subjects and points that should be stressed in the several meetings. (Telegram 4637 from Brussels; September 9; ibid., NATO 3) 326. Memorandum for the Record 326. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, September 13, 1968. SUBJECT The President's Meeting with Dr. Kurt Birrenbach Friday, September 13, 5:15 p.m. (The President, Dr. Birrenbach, German Charge von Stackelberg, Ed Fried) Birrenbach told the President that the Chancellor had asked him to come here to describe German concerns over the situation in Europe following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and to get an understanding of United States thinking. He stressed the following: 1. The additional Soviet divisions on the German front and the threat they posed. 2. The clear evidence of the unpredictability of Soviet policy which he attributed, in part, to collective leadership—and the dangers this carried for the West. 3. The Soviet attacks against Germany, including charges that Germany was interfering in the East and had aggressive designs. 4. The specific Soviet references to Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, implying that they had a right to interfere in Germany. He said that it was necessary to strengthen NATO and outlined his helpful discussions with Secretary Rusk on what might be done and on the various possibilities for a NATO conference. 2 The President asked Birrenbach to give the Chancellor his best wishes and to tell him that he remembered with warmth the hospitality the Chancellor had shown him in Germany. 3 He said he believed that we had had a unique relationship with the Germans in the post-war period, and that he personally had great respect for the abilities and character of the German people. The President said he believed that the future of Germany was largely in their own hands. Germany had made a phenomenal comeback since the war and was now in a position to take the lead in responding to the present crisis. The people of the United States had never been reluctant to discharge their obligations and responsibilities, but, if they were to get concerned about the present situation, they needed to be shown that the Europeans were concerned. The situation now was much more serious and dangerous than the average man believed. He had given much thought to how he could help to strengthen NATO before he went out of office. The elections in the U.S. were a complicating factor because any moves without substance could lead to accusations that he was meddling in politics. That was another reason why it was important for Europeans to take the lead. He pointed out the strength of feeling behind the Symington amendment. (Symington's views were all the more surprising since he came from a German community and had himself had experience in the Defense Department.) The Czech crisis had stopped this movement, but the proponents will be back in due time to chip away again. Nothing to damage NATO would be done in his Administration, but what would happen in the next Administration was another matter. It was essential, therefore, for Europe to take matters in its own hands. The time was ripe for a bold move to strengthen NATO and the key was what the Germans and our other NATO partners are prepared to do in terms of concrete actions. What happens here will depend on that. He said he realized there were advantages to having the top leaders get together to see what could be done, what the problems are and what solutions could be worked out. It was better for guidance to come from the top rather than for Foreign Ministers to report to their heads of government. But, if that did not prove possible, something could be done in a Foreign Ministers meeting in New York. Again the key was what the other nations are prepared to do. He said he asked that his Ambassadors in Europe discuss this specifically with European Governments and he was awaiting reports now. He would be very disappointed if the answer was only to tell us about their difficulties. We were faced with enough problems of our own: Our casualties and expenditures in Vietnam, our balance of payments problem, our deficit of $25 billion, the demands for aid. In the midst of this, he had been willing to make his statement on Rumania, showing where we stood. We will be ready to do our part. His schedule had been unusually heavy and he had cancelled appointments in order to talk to Birrenbach as Kiesinger's representative. He thought very highly of the Chancellor, of his moderation and of his ability. He wanted him to know that he believed this to be a very dangerous situation. But the first move must be by the people who are in the cone of the volcano. The American people are slow to awaken, but they cannot be expected to be concerned about people who do not show by concrete actions that they are concerned about themselves. Birrenbach said he understood the President's views and would convey them to the Chancellor. He knew very clearly that the United States understood the situation in Europe and he agreed completely that if we do not take advantage of the present situation we may not have another opportunity. He thanked the President for his statement on Berlin and he asked whether Senator Mansfield's statement on the future deployment of forces had a lot of support. The President said the situation was very acute. The leadership in the Congress had been strongly in favor of reduction of forces in Europe. He had been opposed and had fought hard to prevent reductions and he would be able to do so as long as he was in office. But before Czechoslovakia, support for troop reductions was so strong that as a compromise it might have been necessary to schedule reductions of 50,000 to 100,000 men. Birrenbach asked to what extent the offset question was in back of the drive for troop reductions. The President said it was an important factor but not the only one. It was a long time since the end of World War II and Americans felt they had a right to ask Europeans to do more themselves. The balance of payments problem on troops had to be solved but there also had to be other actions which showed that the Europeans were willing to open their pocketbooks and put their resources on the line for defense. The real question that the Europeans must face is what will happen in the next Administration. He felt that the Europeans were sleeping while Rome burns. Isolationist sentiment here was latent and becoming more serious. We have tried and will continue to work closely with Germany. He had told the Chancellor that he should try to work with deGaulle. He had also said that the flirtation probably would not work and that Germany would probably have to come back to the same old girl ultimately. He had himself avoided any confrontation with deGaulle and refused to be provoked by him. As far as the Russians are concerned, he had told them clearly that we were against aggression; that we have our obligations to the Germans and we mean to keep them. But we have problems to try to work out with the Russians from disarmament on down. And if we don't want war, we have to see whether it is possible to work out anything with them. The Russians were trying to catch us off guard before our elections. The President said he had been ready to talk to them about common problems, but Czechoslovakia had stopped that. But the problems didn't go away. The key was for the Chancellor and the other leaders of our European allies to say they believe that the Russian moves in Czechoslovakia have created a serious situation in Europe and therefore are going to do the following specific things. Armed with such a statement, the President said he could get support for actions the U.S. could take. He hoped that the Chancellor would tell Ambassador Lodge what his own ideas are and what he believed our other NATO allies in Europe could do. Birrenbach thanked the President for the opportunity to talk to him and said his visit here would help give the Chancellor a better idea of United States thinking and of the need for action that could strengthen our position in the present situation. Edward R. Fried 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Fried on September 14. 2 Memoranda of Birrenbach's conversation with Rusk on September 9 and with Katz-enbach on September 10 are ibid., DEF 4 NATO and DEF 1 EUR. 3 President Johnson had visited Bonn in April 1967 to attend the funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 327. Memorandum of Conversation 327. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 16, 1968, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Spanish Membership in NATO (Part 4 of 7) PARTICIPANTS Spain His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain The Honorable Francisco Javier Elorza, Director General of International Cooperation and Economic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry The Honorable Aurelio Valls, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Spain Mr. Marcelino Oreja, Director, Technical Cabinet, Spanish Foreign Ministry United States The Secretary The Honorable Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense The Honorable Frederick L. Deming, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs The Honorable Townsend Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force The Honorable John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Mr. George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. Ralph Earle II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain The Secretary said that no one regretted the exclusion of Spain from the European defense community more than the U.S. He said that we believe that this is due to the internal politics of three or four countries. The Secretary said he also understood the Spanish did not want to submit themselves to the scrutiny of other European countries. He said that the U.S. had made efforts on several occasions to have Spain included in NATO. The Secretary said that we had reached a point where Belgian Prime Minister Spaak had been willing to proceed, but then Spaak had left office. The Secretary said that in some cases the governments of the countries mentioned had no serious objections to Spanish participation but were afraid of domestic opposition and for this reason were unwilling to proceed. The Foreign Minister said he was grateful for the U.S. posture expressed not only by the Department of State but also by Congress. The Secretary said he would raise the question of Spanish membership in NATO with the NATO foreign ministers later this fall in New York and see what their reaction would be. The Foreign Minister interrupted and said that Spain was not asking for U.S. intervention with the NATO ministers nor for membership. The Secretary replied that he would not leave with any of the ministers the impression that Spain had raised the question, but he said he would try to discover if there had been any change in their attitude. He said that he understood fully that Spain was not applying for membership. Foreign Minister Castiella said that Spain asked only to be heard—not to be a member. He said there is a strong movement in Spain which favors a policy of neutrality. He cited the example of Morocco which, as a non-aligned nation, received aid from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Secretary remarked that the problem was not as simple as that and said that he would like to have the opportunity to discuss sometime at greater length with the Foreign Minister the question of Morocco. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 SP. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. 328. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 328. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, September 23, 1968, 1910Z. 21254. Summary . General De Gaulle carefully restricted conversation at today's 50-minute meeting to one issue, namely, Germany. Apparently De Gaulle is planning his own position for his meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger and he is reverting with singleminded concentration to his thesis that U.S. commitments to territorial integrity of Western European countries, especially Germany, are inadequate. It is this inadequacy which explains, in his mind, why the Germans are so disturbed and edgy. Despite his repeated suggestions that the U.S. was not sufficiently committed to European defense to allay West German worries, he repeatedly refused to give any indication that France would undertake any new commitments or make any new statements, public or private, bilateral or multilateral, for the security of the Western world. End of Summary. I. De Gaulle opened the conversation immediately with a question asking for our evaluation of the Czech invasion. I responded in detail utilizing the Department's 242962. 2 I emphasized that invasion had created new military situation which in turn required collective action as well as bilateral action by Western European countries to strengthen military deterrent as best antidote to possible Soviet recklessness. I referred specifically to need for larger conventional forces. De Gaulle responded by stating that in his opinion the Soviets could be expected to continue and heighten their propaganda war against West Germany, that they would maintain pressure all along the line, psychological, military, diplomatic, that it was to their advantage to keep a fear of Germany alive in Europe and to utilize revanchism as an excuse for strengthening their position throughout the satellite nations. I noted that although the Russians were using alleged activities by West Germans in Czechoslovakia as an excuse for their own invasion, there was no evidence of any Western nation threatening Czechoslovakia. De Gaulle said that in his judgment the Russians were worried by the threat of a revitalized Germany joining with Czech and perhaps even East Germany, plus the Chinese, in joint actions against Russia itself. The Russians, he said, were not worried about the current situation in which there was nothing to justify such a massive action as the Russians had undertaken against Czech. Rather it was the spectre of China and Germany working together against Russia in the next five or ten years that was the real cause of their alarm and actions. He repeated that he anticipated further diplomatic, economic, psychological warfare by the Russians against the East Germans looking toward the day when having built a sufficient foundation, the Russians would invade Hanover or Hamburg. Whereupon he asked: if the Russians did invade West Germany if they did breach the western frontiers of Germany, what would the U.S. do? II. Responding to De Gaulle's questions I drew heavily on the Department's 241284 3 affirming that the U.S. has always fulfilled its treaty responsibilities; that the President himself had reaffirmed our commitments to the Alliance in recent meetings with FRG; that we have informed the Soviets that we intend to keep our obligations to the Germans; but that our government would be greatly assisted by a show of determination and commitment from the countries of Europe. De Gaulle responded by saying that no country in Europe had sufficient power to stand up to the Russians and that, in fact, even collectively the European countries do not have sufficient power. Thus, he said, the first question remained: what would the U.S. do? I repeated that the U.S. had a record of living up to its treaty obligations and that our country would do so in this case even if it meant war. De Gaulle asked whether or not the U.S. would be prepared to respond immediately with our nuclear power if the borders of Germany were violated, to which I responded that our country would probably not respond initially with nuclear weapons to an invasion by conventional forces. Rather, we would first want to utilize our own conventional forces together with those of our European allies, that we wished to avoid a nuclear holocaust. I pointed out that these were my own opinions, that I had no instructions from my government on this issue, but that since he had raised the question I would like to know from him what France's response would be if the Soviets invaded Hanover or Hamburg as he had suggested. De Gaulle responded that it was not a question of France's response because France didn't have the power to respond adequately to such an attack that France's response would be controlled by the U.S. response; but that if the U.S. responded with all of its power, France would respond with all of its power. I asked him if he would advise me in greater detail with his own opinion of France's response to an invasion of West Germany. He responded by saying an invasion of West Germany was not an invasion of France; that France had no common border with Russia; and that France must look to its own life and death and to its own future. He said explicitly that the U.S. would do the same and he made it clear that in his judgment the U.S. would not risk nuclear war for the defense of Western Europe. Apparently he believes that since France would not respond to a military invasion of West Germany by deploying all of its resources, neither would the U.S., and because the U.S. would not really make an absolute commitment of its military power both conventional and nuclear to Germany, the Germans are worried and will continue to be worried no matter what the French, English or Italians say or do. At three different points in our conversation I specifically asked De Gaulle to suggest what the U.S. could do, above and beyond what we have already done, to allay his doubts and the doubts which he says the Germans have. What could be done, I said, to convince you that the U.S. will live up to its obligations? De Gaulle was unwilling or unable to suggest any action, public or private. Moreover when I suggested that France might well consider enlarging its own commitments, intensifying its military cooperation with Germany, and reestablishing contacts with the military forces of the Alliance, he declined to respond either negatively or positively. Our conversation concluded with his observation that the subject we were discussing was immense and that we would have many additional opportunities to talk about it, that he welcomed this exchange of views and looked forward to seeing me again. He made no allusion to Vietnam and gave me no occasion to do so before he indicated his time had run out. Conclusion . De Gaulle appeared to be in good health and in a good frame of mind. He even smiled warmly and said “thank you very much” in English when, as I was leaving, I congratulated him for his courage and vision in supporting the new educational reforms proposed by Edgar Faure in which so much emphasis is placed on decentralization and reliance on youth. Shriver 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 Telegram 242962, September 21, transmitted instructions on Vietnam and relations with the Soviet Union. (Ibid.) 3 Dated September 19. (Ibid.) 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, September 26, 1968, 0126Z. 245249. Subj: UK Accession. 1. Leddy called in Minister Tompkins of British Embassy September 25 to make following points. A. We understand German package for September 27 EC Council meeting contains very vague language on UK membership. Germans, in attempt to respond to French positions, are not dealing squarely with problem of UK accession. German proposal now seems to have Italian, Belgian and Dutch support. Arrangement such as contemplated by Germans would give us trouble as it would be nothing except discriminatory trade arrangement with no clear progress on membership. B. Although we have made our position clear to the Germans and others we have thus far not injected ourselves actively into this discussion and thought HMG would agree that this was wise. Our policy not to intervene was based on our understanding that HMG shared our views against a purely commercial arrangement. We would welcome anything Tomkins could do to reassure us that HMG would not be interested in halfway house. 2. Tompkins replied that HMG has had discussions with Belgians and Dutch who are not enthusiastic about German proposals but want some negotiations to open. 3. Leddy pointed out there seemed to be possibility of trap if the four go along with German proposal. French may conceivably accept purely commercial arrangement. Such development would face HMG with difficult problem and cause us problems as well. 4. Tompkins replied as far as he could tell from cables trade agreement by itself unacceptable to HMG. He did indicate, however, that if there were unanimous agreement by Six on offer, HMG would have to look at it. He also said that much may depend on how other two points pertaining to Marechal study on technological cooperation and study on Community enlargement emerged. He thought, however, that these two points would not be of great interest unless UK were involved in the two studies from an early date. His personal view was that trade agreement would be unacceptable unless specific reference was contained to eventual British membership. However he promised seek assurance from London as requested by Leddy that British position has in fact not changed. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK. Secret. Drafted by Katz, cleared by BMI and E, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Luxembourg, The Hague, Rome, and Brussels. 2 On September 28, the Department of State reported further that the British would accept a commercial arrangement with the EC only if the offer were made by all six Community members and if it were clearly linked to full membership. (Telegram 246776 to London; ibid.) 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, October 2, 1968, 1514Z. 248482. Subject: Special NAC Meeting October 1. 1. We have just completed quick review of reporting cables (notably USNATO 5001, USNATO 5002 and USNATO 5004) 2 describing proceedings at Special NAC October 1. Results to this point give nothing but keen disappointment and deep concern. 2. What we discern as clear and urgent need to establish a “NATO umbrella” (State 247261, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6; and State 247343, paragraph 3) 3 seems to have become lost in welter of discussion over texts and procedural processing of various assessments. Only Netherlands Representative Boon (USNATO 5004, paragraph 10) has grasped the central issue of need for decisions, i.e., an agreed NATO Minute, approved on an ad interim basis by Permanent Representatives. 3. If other Permanent Representatives continue present stalling tactics which seem certain to immure us in yet another meaningless paper exercise in order to accommodate French and/or others, you should immediately exert maximum leadership to guide proceedings along track similar to that we found ourselves forced to follow to bring Harmel exercise to a successful conclusion. Those steps are as follows: a. In NAC work out the best agreed conclusions that you can achieve. b. In NAC you may also “note” assessments as necessary and useful background but under no circumstances should you allow us to become trapped in the endless negotiation of textual changes. c. Our objective is concise, well-worded Agreed Minute which would provide needed umbrella for national contributions to NATO to improve capabilities. Our first choice is achieve this in NAC. However, if this clearly not possible, you should immediately convene DPC and get on with working out an ad referendum Agreed Minute containing constructive conclusions and recommendations which the Foreign Ministers can usefully address when they meet with the Secretary in New York on October 7. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Flash. Drafted by McAuliffe and approved by Springsteen. 2 Telegrams 5001 and 5002, October 1, and telegram 5004, October 2, reported on the special North Atlantic Council meeting held October 1. (All ibid., DEF 1 NATO) 3 Telegrams 247261 and 247343, September 30, pointed out that the special North Atlantic Council meeting was an occasion to take stock of the situation in light of NATO's activities in the 6 weeks following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and offered guidance for the meeting. (Ibid.) 331. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 331. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State 1 Brussels, October 5, 1968, 1358Z. 5096. Subject: European caucus in NATO. Ref: Bonn 17686 (Notal). 2 1. European caucus idea may now have more potential life than at any previous time; we agree with reftel that the best way to nurse it along is not to crush it in a US embrace. 2. It seems likely there will be considerable discussion around edges of NPG Bonn meeting about the defense topics that might be discussed among British and some or all of the European Five. Healey apparently intends to raise question with Schroeder, and reftels indicate Germans may for first time be receptive. Lively interest of Dutch and Belgians is predictable. And if everybody else is doing it, Italians will join in too. 3. In addition to Healey's intentions as reported by Embassy London, UK PermRep Burrows already has general instructions to confer informally here with his continental colleagues, and is talking with Belgian PermRep De Staercke about arranging informal Europe-only gathering. 4. If they stick to NATO defense topics, UK plus the Five can automatically avoid the French problem, since France has so clearly opted out of the whole process of DPC consideration of defense implications of recent Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe. This line was drawn early, clearly, and without heartburn this week in discussion that led to agreed DPC decision paper (USNATO 5085). 3 5. Burrows has sought assurance that some European caucusing among NATO colleagues would be all right with us. I have said that has been and remains our position: the more European initiative in NATO, the better. 6. But would stongly advise against any public advocacy of this trend by American spokesmen. The shoots are tender, and too much watering may drown them. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret. Repeated to London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels for the Mission to the EC and the Embassy. 2 Dated October 5. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 318) 3 Telegram 5085, October 4, transmitted the text of the DPC “Decision on the Military Implications of the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia,”DPC/D(68)30. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 1 NATO) 332. Memorandum of Conversation 332. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 7, 1968, 8:30 p.m. SUBJECT Secretary's Dinner for NATO Foreign Ministers PARTICIPANTS See attached list 2 (The following record of the discussion at the Secretary's dinner was prepared by Mr. Alec Toumayan and Mr. Peter Sebastian who served as interpreters during the dinner.) The Secretary first suggested that a date for the November Ministerial Meeting be set informally and after some discussion it was determined that the 14th, 15th and 16th of November were the most convenient dates. The meeting of the NATO Parliamentarians in Brussels that week was not considered to be an obstacle. There was a brief discussion about the nature and length of the November meeting and the Secretary said that the November meeting was a substitute for the December meeting. Mr. Brosio agreed that the November meeting was a regular meeting. He noted that Defense Ministers might have to meet again in December to approve the necessary force planning steps. The Secretary asked Mr. Brosio to explain what the Council had done with respect to Czechoslovakia. Mr. Brosio explained that he could not add much to what the Ministers already knew. He wanted to draw attention to certain aspects of the military and political reports 3 that had been prepared and of their conclusions: some practical measures had been taken in the area of crisis management. He noted that some delays had been encountered in collection and dissemination of information. A promising development was the fact that we now had a Situation Center; we did not have it in Paris and had taken advantage of our move to Brussels to establish it. It was now a new part of the organization which was working well and was useful. There were three reports—military, political and procedural. Mr. Brosio would now sum up the summary. The political report contained an evaluation, a prudent one, which was a compromise of all opinions expressed. It was not daring. Its value was that it was a unanimous report by the fifteen. It considered that the action of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia was essentially a defensive action caused by Soviet concern over the erosion of the communist empire and by their desire to maintain their control over the communist countries. The conclusion of the report agreed that there were dangerous implications in the intervention because of the high degree of uncertainty that now existed in Eastern and Western Europe. The report reflected the impact on Yugoslavia and Romania, and concern over the presence of communist troops near the German border. There was uncertainty in Europe about the further readiness of the Russians to use force. The impact of the situation went beyond central Europe and was felt in all Europe and in the Mediterranean. The policies suggested were cautious and prudent. We should affirm our intention to improve and extend East-West relations, not losing sight of a possible European Security Pact. The need for solidarity within the Alliance was stressed, as was the fact that the pursuit of a detente should not weaken or split the Alliance. The actions recommended contained no bold formulations. Some points were raised: 1) The need to make plans and to make very clear the consequences of any aggression against NATO countries. 2) It was agreed to continue to develop relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union but with discretion and moderation so as not to appear in any way to condone Soviet aggression. 3) Continued military efforts were called for to strengthen Western security, noting that this is a long-term objective. Mr. Brosio wished to make two additional points: the need to make a statement on solidarity with Germany and to study what the attitude of the Alliance would be if Romania, Yugoslavia or another country became involved in a crisis. The military report had been approved by the 14 members of the DPC. It aimed especially at remedying current shortcomings. All agreed on the need to carry on the effort to bring manning levels and training up to standards; to improve and correct force levels and the equipment of reserve units; to increase the frequency of exercises; to improve the conventional role of the air force as distinct from its nuclear role; and to make general recommendations to the countries to dedicate sufficient resources to fulfill the goals and bring up the forces to the 1969 levels. The report also recommended a series of studies. This completed the summary of the two reports which reached the conclusion that a firm response of the Alliance was needed. What was contained in the reports was in effect a minimum consensus. Two additional points deserved to be stressed: one was contained in the report and the other was implied in it. The report made a distinction between the short term and long term effect of the Czechoslovakian crisis on detente. The suppression of liberalization forces would make detente more difficult in the short term, but the long term effect might well be that these forces could not be repressed. The second point was that we must reach a determination in our mind as to whether the Soviet Union's policy was, on balance, defensive or offensive. Minister Luns stated that with the Czechoslovakian intervention the Soviets had embarked on a new policy, in which military and political considerations took precedence over ideological considerations. There should not be a complete lack of response on the part of NATO. We should not limit ourselves to expressing our disgust and our worry. Minister Luns continued that he and his government had been struck by the attacks directed against Germany. There was a clear difference between a state of peace and a state of war, but we now live in a twilight zone in which the Russians may be tempted to move further. Mr. Luns stressed that his country would do its share in increasing the defense capability of NATO. He was not in a position to make a pledge but he could state that the Netherlands would follow the recommendations of the Council. He drew attention to the fact that the Netherlands defense budget had already been substantially increased and that the figures now being made public had been set before the Czechoslovakian crisis. The sums budgeted for defense would be raised further. He hoped that all NATO countries, and in particular the most powerful member of the Alliance, would draw the necessary conclusions from the willingness of the European countries to do more. Minister Debre considered that the documents would be studied further in November. He stressed that his government viewed the reports as working documents only. Mr. Brosio drew his attention to the differences between the military and the political reports. The military report had not been approved by the French government which had not participated in its preparation. The political report had been approved, and its summary conclusions had also been approved with one exception only by the French delegation. The document therefore remains before the Council. It is not a document of the Council. Minister Brandt stated that his government welcomes the study of the political and military aspects and views these reports as a good basis for the November meetings. The German government would, he felt sure, implement its recommendations. But even before the November meeting, he would welcome a statement, a joint statement if possible, on the Alliance so that there can be no misjudgment on the part of the Russians. He would be happy if we could all agree that we intend the Alliance to continue. There are measures that need to be taken with respect to what had happened and with respect to the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia. Even before the November meeting we should stress that NATO viewed a move against Yugoslavia as a very serious development for Europe and the world. We sometimes hear the excuse that the Soviets act to maintain the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. His view was that they act to preserve their supremacy over their pact. It should be clearly underlined that solidarity is indivisible and he agreed with Mr. Luns that we cannot exclude the possibility of new dangers. The FRG was willing to participate in serious discussions on these questions. Regarding defense, Brandt pointed out that the FRG is close to the Czechoslovak border and has to be both watchful and careful; the FRG has to take into consideration not only the Soviet Union but the fact that some of its friends would not like to see a German contribution larger than what they feel they can accept. In conclusion the FRG would go along with the steps outlined and this would include budgetary meas-ures. He felt that we should begin to implement some of the DPC recommendations even before the Brussels meeting in improving quality even more than the force levels. His government would certainly try to raise the quality of the troops, their effectiveness and their capabilities to bring them up to the levels dictated by their equipment. Minister Stewart stated that what the Russians are saying in effect is “if we think it necessary in the interest of our alliance, we will invade one of our allies”. This is the situation we are faced with. It is an attitude which we of course in the NATO Alliance would never hold. It makes a clear response, both military and political, imperative on the part of NATO. Consideration must also be given to other countries which are neither in NATO or the Warsaw Pact. What would be NATO's attitude if such countries were attacked by the USSR? There was a feeling among certain Europeans that if they did more for the Alliance then the U.S. would do less. No European should even feel that this would be so. Stewart thought that NATO governments should give thought to possible statements, joint or national, that they might make on the continuation of the Alliance. Such statements might be made in November—or prior to the November meeting. They might be definite, viz., they might state that the Alliance continued for a stated number of years. Or they might simply make it clear that the Alliance would continue well beyond 1969—the year in which members are entitled to give notice of their intention to withdraw. The Secretary stated he wished to comment briefly on his conversation with Mr. Gromyko. 4 The Secretary stated he was convinced we must take the new Soviet doctrine seriously. It is a doctrine which is not limited geographically. The socialist “Commonwealth” has no geographical boundaries. It is not coterminous with the Warsaw Pact. Gromyko had refused to discuss Czechoslovakia with the Secretary indicating that he could not discuss that matter with any government. The Secretary stated that Gromyko's UNGA speech, the Pravda article to which he (Mr. Rusk) had referred in his UN remarks, 5 and his conversation with the Soviet Foreign Minister strongly suggested that we were in the presence of a new or revived doctrine, the full effect of which we have not yet determined. The Soviets have given us strong assurances regarding Romania and Berlin (on Berlin these assurances were repeated by Gromyko last night). But they are worth what they are worth. If the Soviets are contemplating further moves, these “assurances” may have been designed to mislead us. We must be watchful. The November meeting can be important if it reflects a political solution and decisions on military measures to demonstrate that NATO intends to look to its defenses. In June we had talked about the mutual reduction of forces in Europe but we were now seeing an increase in Soviet forces in central Europe with a southward thrust into Czechoslovakia. Regarding Minister Stewart's comments on the US attitude, if there was a feeling in the US that we were asked to do a great deal because others were doing less than their share, then of course this would place us in an impossible situation. However, the others would hear from the US by the November meeting, if not before, on what measures the US can take in the defense field. Regarding a statement on the duration of the Alliance, we have no problem with a statement of policy, but Ministers would understand that, any constitutional requirements levied upon the US, for example, anything requiring Senate action, would have to be left for the new administration. Minister Debre remarked that since Ministers would discuss these matters at the November meeting he would be brief today. First we must know what we want and what the situation is as we see it. One speaks of the need for a response, but what is its nature? A few battalions—a little equipment—this represents no real supplementary effort and has only drawbacks. The real question is: have we entered or are we entering into a period of preparation for conflict? If so, all we have been talking about here is insignificant. If we are entering such a period, we must have discussions with the US regarding its nuclear intentions for the defense of Europe. If, on the other hand, we think we have not entered into such a period, if we believe instead that this is the beginning of a process essentially based on a Soviet defensive reaction, the problem is not immediate, since it may be a process that will last for three, four or five years. For a number of years we have been going in a certain direction. The Soviet government has now committed an act which is morally and politically inadmissible. But should we react with token military measures thus appearing to take a position which may not be maintained, made effective, or be pertinent in the months to come? At our November meeting we must talk more and deeply about the key question of our interpretation of Soviet policies. There are two assumptions: 1) The Soviets threaten our military security: in this case, the only thing worth talking about is the nuclear support of the US. 2) The problem is essentially political. There we must study the relations between the Soviet Union and the other Eastern countries, and examine our attitude with respect to attacks on the FRG. We must take these questions up more seriously than in a short discussion. For a month and half, Mr. Debre said, he had heard statements about re-inforcing the Alliance, but all he had heard represented only drawbacks and no advantages. We all said we were shocked by the Soviet policies, but what do we do tomorrow if Yugoslavia is invaded or if there is other military action? That is a real question. The Soviet government certainly knows that European countries are prepared to defend themselves. We need more serious study of these matters. Perhaps the best service we can render the Czechoslovaks and Eastern European countries is to focus on the problems of Germany and continue to show the Soviet government that it has committed an error; that if it pulls out its troops then conversations can be resumed between the US and the Soviet Union, and other detente projects can be pursued once more. Debre felt the issues were so serious that he hesitated to speak on them now. The proposed NATO military measures he thought were self-satisfying and hence self-deluding gestures which could have no fortunate effect—only unfortunate consequences. The Secretary asked Debre if he would be prepared to have some of these questions discussed by the Permanent Representatives in the Council between now and the November meeting and Minister Debre replied “I don't see what else they can be talking about”. Minister Pipinellis stressed that we must pursue rearmament. Greece has neglected other items of its budget in order to be able to raise the level of its military forces. To deter aggression one must let the agressor know that if he tries to invade things will be difficult for him. This is what Tito is now doing. He has submitted a bill to his parliament providing for the creation of a national (guerilla) army to continue to fight after the regular military forces have been defeated. We must also raise the Alliance's standard of credibility which has sunk very low in the last few months. The Russians believe there will be no reaction if they attack a country which is not in the Warsaw Pact. If there is a doubt, they will hesitate and consider more seriously. They do not want messy conflicts. They will not want to do what Hitler had done in waging a two-front war. They have China at their backs. We must take these factors into account and use them to our advantage. He agreed with Minister Steward that we must announce that we all agree to support NATO in the coming years, and that we accept the concept that strategic implications go beyond our juridical commitments. The Alliance's legal commitments are based on the 1949 situation. The strategic situation has been transformed by the presence of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia. If Yugoslavia were occupied tomorrow, what would this do to Italy, Greece and Germany? The Secretary commented that some of the Ministers' colleagues were waiting in the other room and suggested that we should not try to summarize the conversation for them, but should join them there. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sebastian and Toumayan and approved by S/S on October 15. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. 2 Not printed. 3 The texts of the “Summary Assessment of the Implications of the Czechoslovak Crisis” was transmitted in telegram 5084 from Brussels, October 4. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO) Regarding the military report, see footnote 3, Document 331 . 4 A memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Gromyko (SecDel/MC/16) at 7:30 p.m. on October 6 is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 321. 5 For text of Rusk's address to the General Assembly on October 2, see Department of State Bulletin , October 21, 1968, pp. 405–410. The article in Pravda appeared in the September 25 edition. For text of Gromyko's address to the General Assembly on October 3, see U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1679, pp. 6–14. 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, October 16, 1968. 255959. USNATO deliver Cleveland 0900, Wed. Oct. 16. Paris also for Under Secretary. Ref: USNATO 5191 (Notal). 2 Subject: Guidance for Private NAC Session October 16 on Eastern Europe. You may draw upon following in private October 16 NAC session: 1. Assessment of situation a. Despite slowdown of rumors of imminent Soviet attack on Balkan countries, Soviets still doubtless mistrust recent Romanian, Yugoslav and Albanian moves and danger exists they may seek “regularize” situation in Balkans by military means. b. Kovalev's September 26 Pravda article presented singularly naked doctrinal pretext for Soviet intervention in socialist world (you may draw on INR Research Memorandum RSE 143 of October 8 3 —and, in your discretion, release appropriate sections to participants—for detailed analysis of major themes). While article dealt primarily with Czechoslovakia, some element of threat to other socialist countries was certainly indirectly implied. Even though signed article of this type is not most authoritative form of Soviet public discourse, it seems unlikely that Pravda editors would fail to appreciate implications of article on so sensitive a subject—and enunciation of potentially threatening doctrine was thus deliberate. Moreover, Gromyko's UNGA speech also contained gist of this doctrine. c. Whatever Moscow's intentions in August may have been, the move against Czechoslovakia produced a war scare elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe as evidenced by various degrees of military mobilizations and alerts. Romanian, Yugoslav, Albanian and even Austrian fears of the Soviet Union and in turn Moscow's own perceptions of these apprehensions themselves tend to color the future of Balkan politics. The Soviets for their part have not been averse to putting Balkan communist countries under pressure (and the Kovalev article appears to have been in part designed to keep up the pressure). Moscow doubtless resented Romania's lack of support, and was irritated with Tito's criticism of its action. Belgrade's criticism continues unabated, but Bucharest's has subsided, presumably in recognition of Soviet pressures and out of desire not further goad Soviets. d. Bucharest is thus evidently aware of Soviet sensitivities to the more fluid situation which has developed in the Balkan area, and Romania at least seems intent on avoiding actions which Moscow would find provocative. But even if Romania agrees—or has agreed during Pact Commander Marshal Yakubovsky's last visit—to take part in a Warsaw Pact exercise as a means of reasserting fealty to the Pact, it is unlikely that Soviet suspicions about the reliability of Romania as an ally can be dispelled. e. If tensions continue at their present level, there will remain for some time apprehension that Moscow may at some point in time see the situation in the Balkans as deteriorating in a way which ultimately threatens Soviet strategic interests. At such a moment, serious consideration may be given to a military solution. In any event, over long term, Soviet pressure tactics and reactions they elicit create a less stable situation in area. f. Within NATO, we shall, of course, have a continuing exchange of current military intelligence via SitCen and we trust further cooperation among attaches in checking out reports and rumors. However, the greater problem may lie in a protracted period of potential danger. And in such a period NATO governments face the problem of devising policies which will help discourage or deter Soviet adventure but which do not exacerbate tensions in the area. At this moment, we continue to believe Soviets will continue to avoid moves risking serious confrontation with West so long as NATO maintains its essential military strength and political cohesion. 2. Contingency Planning a. We believe emphasis at this time should be on non-military deterrent moves we and NATO allies can take to forestall further aggression in Central and Eastern Europe. (Strengthening of NATO in military field, a corollary move, now under way in NAC.) Planning range of specific political action possibilities presumably available to NATO might be geared to two time phases: (1) present stage of possible but unverifiable military threat, and (2) solid threat based on hard intelligence information. b. In present stage, we believe seriousness with which we view possibility of invasion can best be conveyed by such means as President's “dogs of war” speech August 30, Secretary's meetings with Dobrynin during that period, Secretary's October 2 UNGA address and subsequent meeting with Gromyko. Where opportunities available, two-way visits such as recently-completed visit of Yugoslav Deputy Premier Gligorov to Washington, visits to Bucharest by UK Foreign Secretary Stewart and Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel and forthcoming Katzenbach visit to Belgrade should be encouraged and exploited as means indicating to Soviets our serious concern over any change in existing situation. We would hope participants in October 16 NAC session would consider similar actions for both Yugoslavia and Romania, while being cautious about overloading circuit. Other useful actions during present stage would be symbolic military visits of type recently completed by destroyer USS Owens to Dubrovnik, background stories and journalistic leaks focused on gravity of NATO assessment of situation, and appropriate public reminders of previous Western assistance to Yugoslavia. Similar actions for Austria in present stage include assurances our deep concern by Ambassador MacArthur and US visit Foreign Minister Waldheim October 21–22. c. In “solid threat” phase we would differentiate fairly sharply between threat to Romania and Yugoslavia or Austria where invasion would be of totally different dimension with strong possibility of global conflict developing. Romania Following steps might be considered: (1) another urgent, top-level meeting with Soviet Ambassador for assurances no invasion planned, (2) another well-advertised Presidential statement with maximum publicity, (3) early NAC meeting to consider possible NATO response, (4) emergency Security Council session, and (5) consultation with Congressional leaders. Yugoslavia Range of possibilities would include all of above plus: (1) public announcement of readiness to consider Yugoslav requests for economic and/or military materiel assistance, (2) legal steps to facilitate assistance to Yugoslavia, (3) urgent meetings with Yugoslavs at high level, (4) cessation of two-way military dependent travel, (5) restrict all civilian travel to Eastern Europe and USSR, and (6) improve military alert status of NATO and US forces in Europe and Mediterranean. Austria While likelihood invasion or transit of Austria by Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces appears less than for Romania-Yugoslavia, we also considering possible US and NATO responses. Starting point would be assessment that military intervention in Austria would have gravest immediate consequences. For this phase we would therefore envisage all of above steps, as adapted to Austrian developments, plus shifts in deployments designed to signal Soviets that move into Austria would run serious risk of involvement with forces principal treaty signatories. Assume NATO members would display similar concern and consider related actions. d. In “solid threat” phase serious consideration should also be given to coordinated economic moves among Allies that might serve to deter or at least raise price of Soviet intervention. Economic reaction to be effective would have to involve consideration of terminating “business as usual” philosophy which appears to govern attitude most Allies toward private ventures in this area at present time. 3. You should make clear, in outlining above precis contingency planning, that while steps recommended for present phase are from standpoint US, firm and already being implemented, action/suggestions for second stage reflect only preliminary thinking. In time and as our own ideas jell, we will wish to consult actively in NAC on actual contingency plans. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–1 EUR E. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by George Kaplan (EUR) and Robert H. Baraz (INR), cleared by seven officers from EUR and INR, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, Moscow, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Vienna. The time of transmission is illegible on the source text. 2 Telegram 5191, October 9, requested instructions for a private NAC session on October 16. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., INR Files) 4 At the special session on October 16, Cleveland gave an oral presentation following in detail the outline presented here. By prior arrangement further discussion was postponed to the following week. (Telegram 5295 from Brussels, October 17; ibid., Central Files, POL 1–1 EUR E) At the meeting on October 23, the discussion, which was described as “lively and informed,” revealed widespread appreciation for the U.S. presentation and particularly the need for further consideration of the warning signal to the Soviets that might be included in the November Ministerial communique. (Telegram 5403 from Brussels, October 23; ibid.) 334. Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68 334. Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68 1 Washington, November 4, 1968. THE RESPONSE OF THE NATO COUNTRIES TO THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Summary The Czechoslovak crisis has had the effect of stalling the slow proc-ess of disintegration that has beset NATO since the late 1950s. For the first time in several years all the allies (save France) accept the necessity of preserving an effective alliance beyond its 20th anniversary next year. What this will mean in terms of increased individual country contributions to NATO is still unclear. So far the European allies have responded to the events in Czechoslovakia with far more promise than performance. Among the four or five that have pledged concrete new contributions, only Greece has offered anything approximating a clear net gain for the alliance. Belgium, for its part, has offered only to “postpone” impending troop cutbacks in West Germany; Britain has pledged further commitments which represent almost nothing new for the common defense; and West Germany, with most to fear from the Soviets, has refrained from making any substantial gesture that might reinforce charges of German revanchism. Introduction 1. Whatever the initial reaction to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia, none of the European NATO allies seems to have been sufficiently moved to put aside the frugal attitude toward defense spending or to rush to the support of the“flexible response” strategy, on which the argument for increased conventional forces has been based. This strategy, although officially adopted by NATO last year, continues to be regarded suspiciously as a prelude to US nuclear disengagement. Under current circumstances it is likely to attract even less favor among the European allies, especially since one of its basic tenets—the concept of “political warning time”—appears to have been brought into question. Judging from the rapid airlift of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia, it is no longer certain that NATO would have sufficient lead time—after the first signs of a Soviet build-up—to “rotate” back into Europe the US and British forces earmarked for allied defense. Hence there is little incentive for the Europeans to add further resources to NATO's conventional arsenal, since in the event of a Soviet attack it might have to be quickly superseded by a resort to nuclear weaponry. 2. Against these rather melancholy realities, however, a few encouraging facts may be arrayed. For one thing, the allies are once again talking seriously about strengthening the organization. On the eve of the Czechoslovak crisis, the 15-nation grouping was in a state of disarray. France had pulled its military forces out of the integrated command structure in 1966, thus severing land communications between NATO's northern and southern tiers. More recently Belgium had decided to recall two of its six brigades from West Germany. In the last five years Britain's Army of the Rhine had been reduced from 53,000 to 48,000. The US force in Europe had been cut by 25 percent over the same period. Even the West Germans had been unable to field their 12th division before 1965. Amid this growing confusion, the shock of the Czechoslovak tragedy has galvanized new interest and support for the alliance although not to the degree that some of the allies would prefer. 3. Perhaps most importantly, the crisis has led to renewed emphasis on the idea of solidarity. For the first time since the Soviet invasion of Hungary, all 15 NATO allies seem equally sensitive to the threat that has always proved the best catalyst to allied unity. Meeting in special session in early October, they were able to agree on a series of statements, together with action recommendations, underscoring the importance of a common front in the face of the new imponderables in East-West relations. Of particular value was their “political assessment” of the“post-Czechoslovak” situation, which brought into clear focus the arguments needed by some of the member governments (Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands) to justify new defense commitments to their parliaments and to public opinion. The assessment established in unequivocal language (1) that the invasion had demonstrated the unpredictability of Soviet behavior, (2) that it had importantly affected, if not radically changed, the military and security balance in Europe; and (3) that a new strategic threat had been posed by the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean. With the threat thus identified, the allies should be in a better position to cooperate in checking it. 4. As a corollary to the drafting of the NATO “assessment,” the Soviet action has stimulated the entire process of interallied consultation, which has long been a sticking point in relations between the US and the other 14 allies. Even the French were able to bring themselves to take part in the deliberations leading to the political and military papers on the situation. In the seven-nation nuclear planning group, moreover, the British and West Germans took a leading role in discussions on strategy and agreed to work together on future strategic guidelines for the alliance. This could lead to greater involvement by the Europeans in an area of allied concern traditionally monopolized by the US—a development which in turn could make them more responsive to the demands of NATO defense. 5. As still another consequence of the Czech crisis, the European allies seem to have been made more conscious of what they must do to preserve the US guarantee on their behalf. The British in particular have begun to talk of creating a European defense grouping in NATO as a means of heading off any further cutbacks in the US presence on the continent. In part this is an effort to enhance Britain's credit as a European power, but it also reflects growing awareness that the European allies must work together to relieve the US of some of its defense burdens. 6. Through the work of the Harmel committees last year, the alliance tried to identify itself with the movement toward “peaceful engagement” with the East and specifically to develop a common program on mutual troop reductions vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. Whether or not these efforts would have given new purpose to NATO is, at least for the moment, beside the point. The Soviet actions in Eastern Europe have shifted emphasis back toward the more basic problem of defense. To allies, such as Denmark and Norway, which have insisted that the search for detente be continued, the NATO “political assessment” grants only a conditional mandate detente should be pursued, it states, only so long as it does not jeopardize allied solidarity. 7. Viewed against the high ideals of Atlantic partnership, these alterations in NATO's prospects seem rather minor. They do not prefigure the quantitive improvements in the allied defense system that could steel it against an all-out Soviet assault. But in terms of what is needed to keep the alliance alive for the next few years, they do offer some grounds for optimism. At the very least the alliance is more cohesive than before and the European allies are more aware of their responsibilities under the collective defense concept. 8. In the attached annex 2 are details of the response to the events in Czechoslovakia for each of the US' 14 NATO allies. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, NATO, Messages, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the source text indicates the memorandum was prepared solely by the Central Intelligence Agency. 2 Not printed. 335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 7, 1968. SUBJECT The Forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting Secretary Fowler, Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler and I will be attending the NATO Ministerial sessions in Brussels, November 12 through 14. As you know, the main focus of the meeting will be on what our Allies and we should do to strengthen NATO in the light of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. We anticipate that the meeting will reflect the groundwork laid since our September 4 discussion in the National Security Council. 2 Our ambassadors have made vigorous demarches regarding improved allied defense contributions. Ambassador Cleveland has been involved in continuous negotiations with his colleagues in NATO and I had discussions with most NATO foreign ministers in New York. 3 I enclose a listing of the main issues that may arise at the meeting. You may wish to discuss these with us prior to our departure. I also enclose (1) a paper outlining the background and scope of the Ministerial Meeting; and (2) a paper summarizing what we are doing with each NATO country to encourage improved defense efforts. 4 Dean Rusk Enclosure 5 NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGBRUSSELS November 14–16, 1968 Position Paper SCOPE PAPER I. The Political Background Effects of the Czech Crisis This fall's Ministerial Meeting takes place against a background of continuing Allied concern stemming from the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even though the Allies do not wish to abandon their goals of reducing East-West tensions, and ultimately arriving at a peaceful settlement of the issues dividing Europe, the atmosphere has changed drastically as compared with meetings of the past few years. The fact of the invasion, and the resulting uncertainty regarding Soviet intentions toward Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and even Western Europe, have combined to produce a new situation. The highwater mark of detente was reached in December 1967 with adoption of the Harmel Report and in June 1968 with the Ministerial declaration on mutual force reductions. Today, despite differences of emphasis among individual NATO governments, the accent is on strengthening the Alliance's defenses and its deterrent posture against possible future contingencies. For some of the Alliance members—for example France, Canada and Denmark—the Soviet aggression has deflated exaggerated hopes for early change in the Soviet Union's European policy. (There is no evidence, however, that De Gaulle has changed his fundamental views on NATO, the United States or Europe. There are some signs of French probing to see whether bilateral US-French defense cooperation, particularly in the nuclear field, might be improved essentially on French terms.) For the US the present situation, which may not last, offers a major opportunity to improve the Alliance's political cohesion and its defense posture. East-West Discussions in Light of Czechoslovakia The NATO discussions since August have demonstrated that, for the longer term, none of our Allies wishes to forestall essential contacts or negotiations with the East. Most of them still favor the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would like to see a breakthrough in the arms race in which the two great powers would be committed to accept controls on their own nuclear armaments. On the other hand, however, they are seriously concerned about the psychological and political effects of any early talks in view of the post-Czech situation. Other International Issues Even though the European situation will be uppermost in the minds of the NATO delegations, other international issues will also affect the setting for this meeting. The two major questions of the Middle East and Vietnam may figure in Ministerial statements. Anticipation about policies to be followed by the new U.S. Administration will also mark the meeting's atmosphere. Western European Unification The continued lack of progress in unifying Western Europe will loom large in the corridors. It may also be reflected in statements around the table. De Gaulle's intransigence in keeping Britain out of the European Community has just manifested itself again in the failure of the recent WEU Ministerial Meeting. Tentative ideas for a European caucus in NATO have also failed to jell into anything offering promise of immediate results. The British will nevertheless continue to take soundings looking toward increased intra-European cooperation in the NATO framework. Domestic Politics and Youth The domestic political situation in some of the leading Allied countries also remains delicate and complex. This is the case for example in the UK, the FRG and Italy. For Canada, this will be the first Ministerial Meeting since the Trudeau Government's electoral victory. This year's manifestations of radicalism among the youth in various Allied countries continue to affect European attitudes across-the-board. The memory of the near chaos in France last spring is still fresh in everyone's mind. International Finance Lastly, even though the gold and monetary crisis of the past winter is well behind us, questions of domestic finance continue to loom large. Their impact on resources that can be made available for Western defense is likely to be the hardest factor conditioning Ministerial deliberations. A NATO Watershed In light of the foregoing, this last NATO Ministerial Meeting of the Johnson Administration—also the last meeting before the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty's signature—will represent a watershed in the recent history of the Alliance. The past two years have seen major improvements in NATO's defense and consultation arrangements. Now we would like to see a demonstration of renewed political will on the part of the governments, especially with regard to defense contributions. II. The Meeting: U.S. Objectives and Problems U.S. Objectives Our broad objectives for this meeting, and for followup work to be done by Permanent Representatives, flow from the political background and are largely conditioned by it. Briefly stated, these are: —To achieve formal Ministerial recognition of the changed situation resulting from the invasion of Czechoslovakia; from the permanent stationing of substantial Warsaw Pact forces in that country; from what is now known of the high state of readiness of these forces; and from the uncertainties created by Soviet actions and doctrine, including national sovereignty and the “Socialist commonwealth”. —To elicit firm commitments from the other Allies regarding qualitative and quantitative improvements in their NATO defense contributions. —To reach a common understanding on the political implications of the post-Czech situation for the future of East-West relations and contacts. —To reiterate as appropriate our support for Western European unification and, specifically, for initiatives the European members of the Alliance may take in the defense field. —To emphasize the need to continue the Alliance for the indefinite future without undertaking new legal commitments that would require action by the Senate. —To stress the continuity of US policy in supporting NATO as well as the concept of collective security inherent in the Organization. —To make clear, without being provocative, Three Power (US, UK, French) and general Allied support for established Western positions on Germany and Berlin. —To recall our continued deep interest in Mediterranean security as well as to seek, by adequate warnings, to deter possible further Soviet moves that might affect the balance in that area (e.g. Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania). —To give a clear signal to the Soviet Union of Allied determination to defend the Treaty area, and to make clear that any further Soviet aggressive moves in Eastern Europe would have grave and incalculable consequences and would cause immediate and appropriate Allied reactions in self-defense. The Meetings and the Problems The meetings will be attended by ministers of foreign affairs, defense and finance. They will embrace sessions of three different bodies: the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC); the North Atlantic Council (NAC); and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). The North Atlantic Council In the NAC, the main problem will be to get fifteen-country agreement (including France) on general statements regarding the European political situation, allied defense, Germany and Berlin, and the“signal” to the East. Much of this work will have been done in advance by the Permanent Representatives in the form of a draft communique and other documents such as the post-Czech political assessment. Discussion of these documents will afford an opportunity for ministers to have a substantive exchange of views on the overall situation. As a related but subsidiary issue, ministers may also be asked to approve a report on civil emergency planning aimed at assuring progress in this field to accompany renewed emphasis on a better NATO defense posture. The Defense Planning Committee In the DPC there will probably be some hard bargaining among the Fourteen over various decisions to be taken regarding improvement of the NATO integrated defense system, and particularly the specific increases in defense contributions to be made by individual countries. Here again, much of the groundwork has already been laid by the Permanent Representatives and by the Secretary's October 7 dinner meeting in New York. Nevertheless, the Germans, the Dutch and others have made clear repeatedly that their national decisions must follow from collective NATO decisions. Thus, the DPC decisions may have to be approved in general terms first, with individual national decisions stated in principle or on a contingent basis. The Europeans will also want to know what the United States might do; e.g. hold early deployment exercises, improve combat capability of forces in Europe, and in CONUS. On the financial side, our own concern involves balance of payments considerations as well as increased budgetary resources other governments might make available for defense. Even though our specific negotiations on balance of payments grounds are likely to remain bilateral, we are seeking to have a statement adopted recognizing the common interest in neutralizing foreign exchange losses incurred by contributions for NATO defense. The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee In addition to the NAC and DPC sessions, defense ministers of all countries except France, Iceland and Luxembourg will meet in the NDAC. The purpose will be to review the work of the NPG in light of that body's discussions in Bonn in October. One possible issue: There may be an attempt on the part of several countries to initiate discussions and studies which lead to a fixed set of consultation rules and procedures governing the use of nuclear weapons. This could result in a complete impasse or development of procedures so inflexible as to be unworkable in any of the myriad unforeseen circumstances which could arise. Either result could seriously degrade NATO's tactical nuclear deterrent. Secretary Clifford intends to discourage pressures for such development by reminding the MODs directly of the dangers involved and by expressing deep US concern about the maintenance of the deterrent. 6 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret. Drafted by Myerson on November 1 and cleared by Leddy and Springsteen. 2 See Document 324 . 3 See Document 332 . 4 Only the scope paper is printed here. 5 Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. 6 On November 8, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes transmitted Intelligence Note No. 872 to Secretary of State Rusk. This note summarized in more detail NATO's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and assessed the situation as the Alliance prepared for the November Ministerial Meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR)) 336. Memorandum of Conversation 336. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Brussels, November 14, 1968, 10:10 a.m. UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-SECOND MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL Brussels, Belgium, November 14–16, 1968 PARTICIPANTS United States Secretary Rusk Ambassador Schaetzel Richard D. Vine, USEC Commission of the European Communities Acting President, Fritz Hellwig Vice Presidents: Lionello Levi-Sandri Raymond Barre Commissioners: Hans von der Groeben Henri Rochereau Guido Colonna di Paliano Victor Bodson Wilhelm Haferkamp [Here follow the names of 14 additional participants from the EC Commission.] SUBJECT General Tour d' Horizon (1 of 2) Acting President Hellwig apologized for President Rey's absence due to long-standing official visits to the associated states. He was delighted to see this reciprocation of his, Rey's and Deniau's visit to Washington. He stressed the importance of regular consultations like this to discuss tough problems which could set the future pattern. The Secretary noted that, after eight years, he wished to share some thoughts about the problems facing the next Administration. The countries of the West had allowed secondary questions to become too important while primary questions were forgotten or had receded into the background. Both sides of the Atlantic were now debating the basic questions of peace and collective security, i.e., to prevent war and organize peace. Isolationist sentiments were increasing on both sides of the Atlantic. This was partially because the world seems in large measure safe and prosperous and many have become lazy. It is partially because of the heavy burdens borne over so long a period of time. Since 1945 the United States has suffered 350,000 casualties in collective security efforts. This is a heavy price to pay and many Americans now ask whether it should be paid. It was thus necessary to reexamine notions of collective security; perhaps it is possible to find a better solution although he had been unable to find one himself. Otherwise one would come to a worse alternative, isolationism. It was imperative to debate these issues; they had a deadly importance. It was possible for all of us to draw the lessons from World War II; we will not have the luxury after World War III. For the first time since 1945 what Europeans do will affect the way the American people react to problems. We have been paid the highest compliment by many in the world that the United States can always be relied upon. However, what others do will have a major effect on us. In NATO, one asks how NATO can be strengthened after Czechoslovakia; what the Europeans decide to do will largely dictate what the U.S. does. Europe is in the presence of a miracle that it may not understand. The U.S. has 650,000 men in Southeast Asia but continues to maintain its forces in Europe. There is already considerable pressure in Congress to eliminate these forces and any U.S. Administration must be able to say that NATO friends take the issues seriously and that we are working together in comradely common effort where each pulls his own weight. If the Mansfield resolution had been voted by the Senate in June, it would have had a majority. The Soviets saved us; this pressure has been postponed but probably not indefinitely. The Secretary's one major regret was that the disarray in the Communist world, so obvious in China, the USSR, and in the far-reaching liberalizing tendencies in Czechoslovakia, was matched by our own disarray. If the West had been moving dynamically to a position of strength in terms of European unity and North Atlantic cohesion, with unity as a common purpose, the security threat from the Communist world would have been substantially reduced. But now there was no movement toward European unity or to the expansion of membership in the Common Market. The Secretary stated he could not speak for the new Administration, but he felt that Atlantic solidarity and support for NATO were not matters for anxiety. The Republican Party is committed to cohesion in the Western world and critical of disarray. The new cabinet will probably have been designated in early December and it would be easier at that time to make judgments on specific issues. While he could not speak authoritatively on future trade policy either, it was predictable that protectionist forces would make a major effort. They have been largely fended off over the past year because of the President's firmly held views and with help from key committees in the Congress. Historically, however, there has been a tendency for protectionists to be bolder under Republican than under Democratic Administrations. There are many understanding Republicans who appreciate the importance of this and he hoped that their influence would be decisive in a new Administration. He cited the proposed “arrangement” with the U.K., however, as an example of what would strengthen protectionist sentiment in the U.S. (See separate Memcon) 2 Hellwig agreed that we concentrated too much on detail; it was critical to develop a new basic political approach to European unity. The nightmarish consequences of a failure to do so had been dramatically highlighted by Czechoslovakia. Conflicts in the past had been largely intra-European, now the possibility of conflict was largely between the US and the USSR; the Community's role, primarily on Franco-German rapprochement. NATO remained the basis for our collective security effort, but this caused a problem with the neutrals. Europeans appreciated U.S. sensitivity in accepting commercial discrimination in order to help achieve European unity. Even economically it was possible to make a contribution to world peace through increasing trade liberalization, e.g., such great moves as the Kennedy Round. Protectionism, however, was not an exclusively American phenomenon. The pressures were strong in Europe as well. The Community recognizes the effects of integration on third countries. The Community can not be protectionist and must follow an open and liberal policy wherever possible. Commissioner Colonna agreed that U.S.-European cooperation over the past decade had come to be taken for granted. We must now fight to maintain this cooperation, but it was difficult when one side was so much stronger than the other. The weakness was more political than economic. One could take pride in the achievements of the Kennedy Round. While this was not difficult for Germany and Benelux, protectionism in France and Italy was basically a manifestation of their economic weakness. They did not have the benefits of a continental market governed by a federal constitution. Thus both economic and political unity take time. While the U.S. had a right to be impatient, no responsible European could ignore the importance of these domestic problems. But it was necessary to understand each other's difficulties rather than to throw these difficulties into each other's face. Commissioner Barre noted that Europeans tend perhaps to rely too much upon U.S. for protection without clearly understanding their own responsibilities. Neither the U.S. nor Europe could confront the world of the future if they were not closely linked in friendly cooperation. The Europeans themselves must make more of an effort to strengthen links among themselves so that they could in turn strengthen trans-Atlantic links. But history and tradition weighed heavily in Europe and the problems of linking large and small countries in Western Europe could not be carried out except by recognizing complex realities. It was difficult, he confessed, to build Europe with Europeans. It was particularly difficult to do this with European diplomatic services which still relied upon 17th and 18th century techniques and conceptions. The Secretary noted that, 23 years after the war, the great creative period in the West was past. Half the population was now too young to remember the stimulus of the war and was not gripped with the problems as had been the older generation. This involved the problem of rededication; either confirming old policies or finding new ones. He could not see the shape of better policies but he feared the possibilities of more disastrous ones. Vice President Hellwig also noted the problem of the young generation. He did not think that they accepted the same premises as the older generation and it was up to Europe to work out ways and means of engaging youth in these new endeavors. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Drafted by Vine and approved in S on November 27. The meeting was held at the EEC Commission Building. 2 In this 2-page memorandum of conversation, Rusk told the Commission officials that the United States was concerned about French-German proposals to expand trade preferences by some kind of special relationship with the Common Market since they would discriminate against the United States and would not include political moves to strengthen the Community. (Ibid.) 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, November 16, 1968, 1243Z. 5845. Secto 43. Subject: Wrap-up of NATO Ministerial Meeting, November 14–16. 1. Against the background of continuing Allied concern following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the NATO partners met in Brussels a month early this year to underscore by word and deed their reaction to the Soviet aggression. Their response has been positive and constructive. The Allies have formally recognized the changed security situation in Europe and most key members of the Alliance have pledged their determination to spend more money to improve their military forces. It is politically significant that the constant trend toward reduction of military expenditures by the European allies has been certainly stemmed and hopefully reversed. The military side of the Alliance was given needed attention. 2. All Fifteen Allies—including France—showed unexpected cohesion on the key political issues. The Ministers approved a clear but non-provocative signal to the Soviets that any further adventures in intervention would “create an international crisis with grave consequences”. While agreeing that detente remains a long-term goal of NATO policy, the NAC indicated sober realization that today's accent is on military preparedness. 3. The French have been reasonably constructive throughout in contrast to the Canadians. The Berlin and Germany section of the communique 2 prepared by the Bonn group was approved swiftly at the quadripartite dinner. The major issue of stating the determination of the members to continue the Alliance was dealt with responsibly by the French who added a concurring opinion to the otherwise agreed formula. The French exhibited a clear appreciation of the significance of Soviet actions as they affect the security situation in Europe. Beyond the specific French action the manner in which Debre handled himself impressed many delegations. There was a marked change in the manner of French performance, which seemed to us more than merely a difference in personality between Debre and Couve. 4. The meeting provided opportunity for the Secretary to have bilateral meetings with such key figures as Brandt, Debre, Stewart, Caglayangil and Brosio. In addition to the specifics facing the Ministers, the Secretary was able to discuss in some depth the prospects for Europe in the post-Czechoslovakia period and how the Alliance should face the future. As usual Berlin and Germany received close and sympathetic attention, the Secretary stressing the importance of maintaining the viability of Berlin. 5. The session was opened by an NDAC meeting which went well. Secretary Clifford picked up where he left off at the Bonn NPG meeting in bringing his fellow Ministers along toward greater understanding of the nuclear problem in the defense of Europe. The serious and sober consideration of this subject revealed that Ministers have acquired a better appreciation of the terribly difficult decisions involved in this whole area, a point the Secretary of State noted in his NAC presentation. Several Ministers emphasized the value they attached to this activity. 6. The balance of payments problem received more high level attention than at other Ministerial meetings. Secretary Fowler personally intervened, an historic first for a NATO Finance Minister in the DPC discussion with a forthright explanation of the complicated and critical nature of the Alliance's financial problem: Ministers showed understanding but were reluctant to make specific commitments. The general reaction, however, was such that we now have a basis for seeking more serious consideration of this subject in capitals than has been the case previously. The communique paragraph dealing with this matter has proved to be one of the more difficult to draft in acceptable language. 7. Public reaction to the Ministerial Meeting has been, on the whole, positive. Coincidental public meeting of North Atlantic Assembly had effect of bringing prominently to attention of press much of subject matter and considerations which also before Ministerial Meeting. Allowing for fact that Parliamentarians present are generally Alliance supporters, the recommendations they generated provided helpful backdrop of Parliamentary expressions. Assembly recommendations recognizing need for overcoming military deficiencies, resolving military balance of payments and signaling NATO concern to Soviets were especially helpful in this regard. Recommendations represented undertaking by those Parliamentarians, moreover, to help translate Assembly's sentiments into national actions. 8. The specific contributions from members (reported separately) revealed growing awareness by European leaders that they must expand their contributions in sharing burden of collective defense. The unique November Ministerial Meeting has capped our efforts to carry out the scenario developed in response to the President's directive last September. 3 The spade work done by Ambassadors in the various capitals, by USNATO and the informal October 7 meeting of Foreign Ministers 4 in New York has paid off. While this Ministerial Meeting has not yet by any means solved NATO's problems, we can take encouragement from the fact that the European allies have indicated by their actions that they recognize what must be done and more importantly, they seem willing to make the sacrifices necessary to preserve the common security. As a result of this meeting we have a base from which to move forward towards greater European efforts in their own defense. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the other NATO capitals, Madrid, Moscow, and four European military commands. 2 For text of the final communique, see Department of State Bulletin , December 9, 1968, pp. 595–597. 3 See Document 324 . 4 See Document 332 . 338. Research Memorandum No. RSE–175 338. Research Memorandum No. RSE–175 1 Washington, December 13, 1968. SUBJECT Soviet Response to the Brussels Meeting of the NATO Ministers The NATO Ministerial Council agreed at Brussels in November on new defense measures and noted the creation of a NATO air surveillance command for operation in the Mediterranean. This paper recounts Moscow's reaction to these measures, and to reports from Brussels that the Council had also discussed NATO's security interest in states adjacent to the USSR. Abstract The November 15–16 meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in Brussels produced developments in three areas which could hardly have been welcome to Moscow. The participants agreed on increased national contributions to the Alliance's defense forces; they welcomed the new NATO air surveillance command organized for Mediterranean operation; and reports from the meeting indicated that NATO's security concerns might extend beyond its membership, to states on the USSR's periphery. Soviet reaction to these Brussels discussions has thus far been relatively limited at least in the propaganda realm. TASS did issue an “authorized” statement on the Brussels session on November 23 (the first such TASS statement on a Council meeting since December 1958 when NATO extended a guarantee to Berlin), and Soviet diplomats delivered a series of oral demarches about the air surveillance command in a variety of NATO capitals. On the whole, however, the Kremlin has remained generally reticent, in part perhaps to avoid giving the NATO members more cause for concern about Soviet intentions. More pertinently, however, the Soviet leaders may themselves be undecided as to the actual significance of the Brussels decisions and are still debating about suitable policy lines for the situation brought on by their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Their reactions to date suggest there is a preliminary and provisional Soviet assessment that the new attitude on defense issues in Western Europe is a manageable problem for the moment, even though it is an undesirable development. Moscow probably calculates it still has scope for maneuver here, and time for bringing its propaganda apparatus (overt and covert) to bear within the individual NATO states to limit, or dilute, the measures agreed upon at Brussels. The NATO Mediterranean air command, in contrast, poses an immediate challenge to Soviet interests and one which would have to be met immediately if the USSR is to safeguard the political principles on which it seems to be developing its Mediterranean role. The “grey area” of NATO security interest is probably evaluated in the Kremlin as an even more serious potential problem, but a less tangible one, and therefore less amenable to concrete countermeasures. Moscow has carefully given no hint as to how it expects to cope with this latter issue; it only insists that the states mentioned in connection with a “NATO umbrella” are all disassociating themselves from this “unwanted” concern with their affairs. Only in the case of the Mediterranean air surveillance unit has the USSR resorted to formal action. The Soviet ambassadors in Athens, Ankara, Rome, London and Washington delivered oral demarches (November 18–19), castigating the new unit as a “premeditated and flagrant violation of international standards governing the freedom of navigation in the open seas.” But while decrying the new NATO creation, Moscow also utilized the demarche to register in diplomatic channels for the first time its own claims to be, and to be acknowledged as, a Mediterranean power. (The thesis that as a Black Sea power the USSR is “therefore” a Mediterranean power was first enunciated by Gromyko in May 1968; Soviet media began stressing the point only in November.) Moscow's major concern at the moment seems to be to put on record—and have it accepted internationally—that the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is a vital element of the USSR's global defense posture and that Soviet ships will remain there regardless of what NATO does. But since the number of Soviet ships operating in the Mediterranean has declined somewhat in the past two months from the levels reached with the Arab-Israeli war, it also seems that the USSR intends to avoid any undue exacerbation of tension in the area while it attempts to register its point of principle. In delivering their various demarches, some of the Soviet ambassadors reportedly also raised the idea of a possible conference of Mediterranean powers to deal with the problems of that area. It still is not clear whether these hints were merely interpolations by the diplomats themselves or whether they were intended to presage a serious initiative. Moscow must be aware that the prospects for getting agreement from the interested powers for such a conference seem hardly promising, let alone realistic, at this point. The Soviets may, however, be contemplating some future initiative with their old “sea of peace” ideas and might feel mere negotiations about a conference on the topic could prove useful, even if no conference ever materializes. [Here follows the body of the memorandum.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential. Transmitted from Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary Rusk. 339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, December 20, 1968, 1817Z. 290321. Subject: Possible Spanish Relationship with NATO. 1. Since 1953 the Spanish Government has indicated to the USG varying degrees of interest in some form of association with, if not membership in, NATO. We recall the sharp Spanish reaction at the lack of consultation at the time COMIBERLANT was established. The GOS pointed out that the Spanish Atlantic Coast was included in the IBERLANT area and thus Spain had a legitimate interest in participating in the defense of the area. 2. As recently as mid-November of this year, during Secretary Rusk's visit to Madrid, the GOS reminded us of its desire to participate in the defense planning for the Spanish Atlantic area and the Mediterranean in coordination with the U.S. and other Western European countries. Spain also would wish to participate in the decision making process in defense matters pertinent to its area of concern. 3. We realize that a number of NATO members are ideologically hostile to the current Spanish regime. We also recognize that the British Government is troubled by Spanish claims to Gibraltar. Nevertheless, there are other NATO Allies who believe that Spain, by virtue of geography alone, is a valuable potential contributor to an enhanced NATO defense posture in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The mutual benefits of such a contribution are increasingly apparent in light of growing Soviet Military presence and political activities in those regions. For example, Spanish naval forces in the Mediterranean and Atlantic could cooperate with NATO forces through surveillance and intelligence exchange, coordinated planning, and combined exercises, thereby enhancing Western capabilities in the area. In the longer term, NATO could benefit from Spain's air defense capabilities in the same fashion. 4. For these reasons we are giving consideration to finding means by which a suitable Spanish relationship with NATO could be established. In light of particular British interests in this question, we wish to discuss the matter with the U.K. and seek its views and possible support before developing a final position. If the U.K. would be prepared to agree to a suitable Spanish/NATO tie, we believe that political objections on the part of other NATO Allies could be overcome. Therefore, you are requested to approach the FonOff at a suitably high level along the following lines: A. You should draw on the foregoing to explain the purpose of and the rationale behind our approach. B. You should outline the following possible means of effecting a Spanish tie with NATO. We believe that these proposals would involve neither an amendment of the treaty nor action by Parliaments. 1. Political relationships could involve establishing a liaison channel between the Secretary General and an agent of the Spanish Government (presumably the Spanish Ambassador in Brussels). Spanish concerns and interests could thus be conveyed to the Alliance and Alliance views and concerns to the Spaniards. Another means would be the establishment of a “Spanish Group” within NATO along the lines of existing open-ended Malta Group. Thus those countries with interests in the Mediterranean, for example, could meet on a regular basis or as needed with a Spanish representative. Since Spanish interest is based on defense considerations, this group might operate under the DPC. This aegis would stress the defense aspect of the relationship. Such a group could also be limited to littoral powers or those militarily active in the Mediterranean. This restricted group would have the effect of emphasizing Spanish interest in and potential contribution to the mutual defense position in the Mediterranean. 2. Either in conjunction with the political relationship outlined in B.1 above or in the absence of such a relationship, Spanish liaison with NATO military organs might be established. In this area there are a variety of possibilities that could include a liaison mission to the Military Committee in Brussels. Consideration in the MC of Mediterranean or IBERLANT issues could thus take place in the presence of a Spanish liaison officer. This arrangement would permit effective coordination of defense planning while allowing the Spanish to present views or military issues concerning their areas of interest. Similarily, Spanish liaison missions could be accredited to SHAPE, AFSOUTH and IBERLANT (and possibly SACLANT as the superior command for IBERLANT). Spanish relationship under such an arrangement would be removed from the conspicuous arena of NATO Headquarters and permit regional defense planning in a more apolitical environment. C. In your presentation you should stress the practical value of the military relationship outlined in B.2 above. You should make the point that Spain can contribute to the achievement of NATO defense objectives in the Mediterranean and IBERLANT areas and that such arrangements would not necessarily imply approval of the present Spanish regime. D. You should urge favorable consideration by the U.K. of the principle of a limited Spanish relationship with NATO. You should also state that we would welcome British support for this concept within NATO. E. If in your judgment our purposes would be served by noting relationship of this suggestion to current US-Spanish base negotiations, you may wish to say that a Spanish association with NATO could favorably affect the outcome of the base negotiations. In this connection, you should point out that US facilities in Spain serve NATO as well as US interests, e.g., Spain is home base for US Strike wing assigned to southern flank, communications links important to NATO are located in Spain, and the use of the naval base at Rota helps maintain the nuclear deterrent in the Eastern Atlantic. In addition, US bases in Spain play an important role in US ability to react swiftly to Mediterranean area contingencies. 5. U.K. reactions to the approach should be reported fully with information copies to addressees of this message. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 6 SP. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Blumberg (EUR/RPM), cleared by Leddy, and approved by Secretary Rusk. Repeated to Madrid and the Mission to NATO. Index Index Abrasimov, Petr Andreevich, 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 273 ] Acheson, Dean, 377 n [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 173 ] Multilateral Force, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 363 n [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] French withdrawal from, 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 363 n [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 378–382 [ Pgs. 378–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] Adenauer, Konrad, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 113–114 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] Aguirre de Carcer, Nuno, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Ailleret, Charles, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 106 ] Alessandrini, Adolfo, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 213 ] Allen, Arthur P., 734 n [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] Alphand, Herve, 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 211–212 [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 331–332 [ Pgs. 331–332 include portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] European Economic Community, 1–2 [ Pgs. 1–2 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] Multilateral Force, 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 107–108 [ Pgs. 107–108 include portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Anderson, Clinton P., 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] Anderson, Robert, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 276 ] Andreotti, Giulio, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] Andronikov, 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] Armstrong, F.W., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Armstrong, Sir William, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 234 ] Arnold, H., 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] Arthur, G.G., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) ( see also Multilateral Force; Nuclear sharing; Nuclear weapons): British political situation and, 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 61 ] European unification and, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 65 ] French position, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] FRG position, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 120 ] Italian position, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] U.S.-British discussions, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 193–195 [ Pgs. 193–195 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] U.S. policy, 153–156 [ Pgs. 153–156 include portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 165–167 [ Pgs. 165–167 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 173–174 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] Auchincloss, Kenneth, 57 n [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] Ausland, John C., 41 n [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Austria, 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 263–268 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 333 ] Bader, William B., 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] Bahr, Egon, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] Baker, Vincent, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 300 ] Ball, George W., 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 149–151 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 61 ] Cyprus, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 39 ] European Economic Community, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 109–112 [ Pgs. 109–112 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 188 ] crisis in (July 1965 ), 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 274–276 [ Pgs. 274–276 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Spanish relations with, 55–56 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 382–384 [ Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] European unification, 127–128 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 198–199 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] Multilateral Force, 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] British position, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 126–132 [ Pgs. 126–132 include portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 141–146 [ Pgs. 141–146 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 80–81 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 112–116 [ Pgs. 112–116 include portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 120 ] U.S. policy, 35–36 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 103 n [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] force planning, 303–306 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] French policies, 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 253–255 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 274–276 [ Pgs. 274–276 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , and Doc. 135 ] French withdrawal from, 326 n [ Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 339–342 [ Pgs. 339–342 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 420–423 [ Pgs. 420–423 include portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] Italian protest at exclusion, 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] Ministerial meetings, 168–169 [ Pgs. 168–169 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 84 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 753–754 [ Pgs. 753–754 include portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] State Department reorganization, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 63 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Baraz, Robert H., 774 n [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] Barnes, E.J.W., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Barre, Raymond, 699–705 [ Pgs. 699–705 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 789–790 [ Pgs. 789–790 include portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Barreda, William E., 734 n [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] Bator, Francis M., 192 n [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 546 n [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] British EEC membership, 529–530 [ Pgs. 529–530 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Multilateral force, 443–448 [ Pgs. 443–448 include portions of Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 178 ] French policies, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 255–256 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 106 ] French withdrawal from, 326–328 [ Pgs. 326–328 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 363 n [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 384–391 [ Pgs. 384–391 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 445–448 [ Pgs. 445–448 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 453–456 [ Pgs. 453–456 include portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 534–536 [ Pgs. 534–536 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Beigel, Edgar J., 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 479 n [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Belgium ( see also Harmel Study under North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Atlantic Nuclear Force, 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] British EEC membership, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 283 ] East-West relations, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] European unification, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Multilateral Force, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 213 ] French withdrawal from, 392–395 [ Pgs. 392–395 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Harmel Study, 617–622 [ Pgs. 617–622 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] Ministerial meeting (Dec. 1967 ), 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] NAC/SHAPE relocation, 394–395 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] Bendall, David V., 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Biller, Joel W., 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Birgi, M. Nuri, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] Birrenbach, Kurt, 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 693–695 [ Pgs. 693–695 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 756–759 [ Pgs. 756–759 include portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Blitgen, Hans, 44 n [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 46–47 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 21 ] Blomeyer (FRG), 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] Blum, Robert, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 75 ] Blumberg, Warren P., 795 n [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 339 ] Blumenthal, W. Michael, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 48 ] Bodson, Victor, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] Boehm, Richard W., 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Boemcke (FRG), 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 122–124 [ Pgs. 122–124 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] British EEC membership, 622–623 [ Pgs. 622–623 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] European unification, 123–124 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 53 ] Multilateral Force, 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 14 ] French withdrawal from, 322–324 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 331–332 [ Pgs. 331–332 include portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 351–353 [ Pgs. 351–353 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 404–405 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] French policies, 71–73 [ Pgs. 71–73 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 125–126 [ Pgs. 125–126 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Bonaccorsi (Italy), 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] Boon, Hendrik, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Borg Olivier, George, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] Bowie, Robert R., 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 595–599 [ Pgs. 595–599 include portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] European unification, 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 623–625 [ Pgs. 623–625 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 636–637 [ Pgs. 636–637 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 646–647 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 279 ] Brandt, Willy, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 770–771 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 332 ] East-West relations, 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 719–720 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] Multilateral Force, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] visit to U.S., 530–531 [ Pgs. 530–531 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Brenchley, T.T., 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Bridges, Tom, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Brosio, Manlio, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 298 ] Cyprus, 87–88 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] French withdrawal from NATO, 345–346 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 435–436 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 187 ] French policies in NATO, 71–72 [ Pgs. 71–72 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 217 ] Multilateral Force, 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] Nuclear Planning Group, 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 739–741 [ Pgs. 739–741 include portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 768–770 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 332 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] visits to U.S., 83–89 [ Pgs. 83–89 include portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 248–252 [ Pgs. 248–252 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 493–495 [ Pgs. 493–495 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 670–673 [ Pgs. 670–673 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Vietnam, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 283–284 [ Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Brown, George, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 648–650 [ Pgs. 648–650 include portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 283 ] Bruce, David K.E., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] British EEC membership, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 630–631 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 272 ] Multilateral Force, 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 105 n [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 207–208 [ Pgs. 207–208 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 253–254 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 219 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Multilateral Force, 35–36 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 95–97 [ Pgs. 95–97 include portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] abandonment proposals, 121–122 [ Pgs. 121–122 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 134–137 [ Pgs. 134–137 include portions of Doc. 56 , Doc. 57 , and Doc. 58 ] Soviet position, 271–273 [ Pgs. 271–273 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] U.S.-British discussions, 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] U.S. policy, 103–107 [ Pgs. 103–107 include portions of Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , and Doc. 47 ] , 116–119 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 187–188 [ Pgs. 187–188 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75 ] , 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 253–257 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] Wilson visit to U.S., 137–139 [ Pgs. 137–139 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 156–160 [ Pgs. 156–160 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] Burrows, Bernard, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 331 ] Butler, R.A.B., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 17–19 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Butterworth, W. Walton, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] Buwalda, Petrus, 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Caccia, Harold, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] Cadieux, Marcel, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Callaghan, James, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 219 ] Campbell (Canada), 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] Canada, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 451–453 [ Pgs. 451–453 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] Cargo, William I., 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] Carstens, Karl, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 462–463 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Castiella, Fernando, 760–761 [ Pgs. 760–761 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Cattani, Attilio, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] Cavalierato, Phedon Antonio, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 778–780 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 334 ] Cheslaw, Irving G., 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 695 n [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] China, People's Republic of, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 287–288 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 232 ] nuclear capabilities, 65–67 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] Church, Frank, 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 163 ] Cleveland, Harlan, 315 n [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] Multilateral Force, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 269–271 [ Pgs. 269–271 include portions of Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 509–511 [ Pgs. 509–511 include portions of Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , and Doc. 226 ] , 670–673 [ Pgs. 670–673 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 684–685 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 766–767 [ Pgs. 766–767 include portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] French withdrawal from, 329 n [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 344–347 [ Pgs. 344–347 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 415–416 [ Pgs. 415–416 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 425–427 [ Pgs. 425–427 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 435–436 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 440–441 [ Pgs. 440–441 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] , 481–484 [ Pgs. 481–484 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] Harmel Study, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 636–637 [ Pgs. 636–637 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 641–644 [ Pgs. 641–644 include portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , and Doc. 278 ] , 660–661 [ Pgs. 660–661 include portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Ministerial meetings, 285–288 [ Pgs. 285–288 include portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 523–527 [ Pgs. 523–527 include portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] , 585–590 [ Pgs. 585–590 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 279 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 739–741 [ Pgs. 739–741 include portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 750–751 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 777 n [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 333 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 276–281 [ Pgs. 276–281 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] nuclear sharing, 280–281 [ Pgs. 280–281 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Clifford, Clark M., 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 717–718 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 751–752 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 337 ] nuclear weapons use, prior consultation with FRG, 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] Coleridge, Richard, 277–278 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] Colonna di Paliano, Guido, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 is part of Doc. 336 ] Common Market. See European Economic Community. Congress, U.S.: Mansfield resolution, 458–460 [ Pgs. 458–460 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] Multilateral Force, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 117–118 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 103 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 561–562 [ Pgs. 561–562 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Symington amendment, 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] Trade Expansion Act ( 1962 ), 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 731–734 [ Pgs. 731–734 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] Conroy, John J., 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 46–47 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 21 ] Coppe (ECSC), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] Corrias, Angelo, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] Costopoulos, Stavros, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 622–623 [ Pgs. 622–623 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 283 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 231–233 [ Pgs. 231–233 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 638–639 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 275 ] French withdrawal from, 322–324 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 479–480 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] Crawford, R.S., 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] Crowley, Edwin D., 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] Crump, John E., 668 n [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Cuba, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 11 ] Cyprus, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 87–88 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Czechoslovakia ( see also Eastern Europe; Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia under North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Davignon, Viscount, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 279 ] Harmel Study, 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 274 ] Davis, Richard H., 211–212 n [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] De Ferrariis Salzano, Carlo, 643–644 [ Pgs. 643–644 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] De Gaulle, Charles ( see also French subheadings under other subjects ), 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 160–165 [ Pgs. 160–165 include portions of Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 673–676 [ Pgs. 673–676 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] British EEC membership, 576–577 [ Pgs. 576–577 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 675–676 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 292 ] European unification, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 123–124 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] French relationship with Europe, 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] Multilateral force, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 163–165 [ Pgs. 163–165 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 33 n [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] French withdrawal from, 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 201 ] influence on, 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] structure of, 125–126 [ Pgs. 125–126 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] U.S.-French discussions, 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 122–124 [ Pgs. 122–124 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 761–764 [ Pgs. 761–764 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] De Groote (EURATOM), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] De Jong, Petrus, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] De la Grandville, Jean de la Chevadiere, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] De Leusse, Bruno, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 426–427 [ Pgs. 426–427 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 187 ] De Staercke, Andre, 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Dean, Patrick, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 339–342 [ Pgs. 339–342 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] Debre, Michel, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 772–773 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 332 ] Defense, U.S. Department of, 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 253–257 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 727–733 [ Pgs. 727–733 include portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] Defhues (FRG), 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 48 ] Deming, Frederick L., 529–530 [ Pgs. 529–530 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Deniau, Jean Francois, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Denmark, 642–643 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Denney, George C., Jr., 722 n [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 316 ] Deschamps (Belgium), 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] DeSeabra, Jose, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Dillon, C. Douglas, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Dillon-Bidault Agreement (Apr. 1954 ), 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 181 ] Dirksen, Everett M., 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Disarmament, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 39 ] Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 43–44 [ Pgs. 43–44 include portions of Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , and Doc. 21 ] , 271–273 [ Pgs. 271–273 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 653–654 [ Pgs. 653–654 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Douguet, Adm., 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] Dozier, William B., 503 n [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] Drimer, William D., 292 n [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Duckwitz, Georg F. ( see also offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG) under North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] Dulles, John Foster, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 64 ] Earle, Ralph, II, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] East-West relations. See under North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Eastern Europe, 28–29 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] Elorza, Javier, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Enders, Thomas O., 302 n [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] Erhard, Ludwig, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 90–92 [ Pgs. 90–92 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 177–178 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 190–191 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] European unification, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] French forces in Germany, 366–370 [ Pgs. 366–370 include portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 462–464 [ Pgs. 462–464 include portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] French relationship with Europe, 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] Multilateral Force, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 193 ] Johnson, correspondence with, 78–79 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 37–39 [ Pgs. 37–39 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 100–103 [ Pgs. 100–103 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , and Doc. 46 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 69 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73–75 [ Pgs. 73–75 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 175–176 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] French withdrawal from, 412–415 [ Pgs. 412–415 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] nuclear sharing, 289–296 [ Pgs. 289–296 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 427–430 [ Pgs. 427–430 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 442–448 [ Pgs. 442–448 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 464–465 [ Pgs. 464–465 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , and Doc. 203 ] , 471–477 [ Pgs. 471–477 include portions of Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , and Doc. 208 ] visits to U.S., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 681–683 [ Pgs. 681–683 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Erler, Fritz, 113–114 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 155 ] European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] European Communities (EC) ( see also European Economic Community; European unification): British membership, 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 764–765 [ Pgs. 764–765 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] Common Agricultural Policy, 734–735 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] Commissioner visits to U.S., 662–667 [ Pgs. 662–667 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 699–705 [ Pgs. 699–705 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] export subsidies, 734–735 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] GDR participation, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] Hellwig discussions, 787–790 [ Pgs. 787–790 include portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Malve discussions, 725–727 [ Pgs. 725–727 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] neutral nations, relations with, 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] European Economic Community (EEC) ( see also European Communities; European unification): agricultural policies, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 17–18 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 51–52 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] French position, 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] FRG position, 90–92 [ Pgs. 90–92 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 109–112 [ Pgs. 109–112 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , and Doc. 56 ] Austria, relations with, 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] British membership, 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 654–658 [ Pgs. 654–658 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 287 ] French position, 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 622–623 [ Pgs. 622–623 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 630–631 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 654–655 [ Pgs. 654–655 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 654–658 [ Pgs. 654–658 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 675–676 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 292 ] FRG position, 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 658–659 [ Pgs. 658–659 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Swiss position, 599–600 [ Pgs. 599–600 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] U.S.-British discussions, 529–530 [ Pgs. 529–530 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 648–650 [ Pgs. 648–650 include portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] U.S.-French discussions, 576–577 [ Pgs. 576–577 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] U.S.-Italian discussions, 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] U.S. policy, 437–438 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 630–631 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 272 ] Brussels meeting (1963), 1–4 [ Pgs. 1–4 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Commissioner discussions, 22–25 [ Pgs. 22–25 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 51–52 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] crisis in (July 1965 ), 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 109 ] French policies in NATO and, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 269–271 [ Pgs. 269–271 include portions of Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 274–276 [ Pgs. 274–276 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] Luxembourg Compromise, 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] French position, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 48 ] French withdrawal from NATO and, 338–339 [ Pgs. 338–339 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 355–356 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 400–401 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] FRG position, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 76 ] GATT Kennedy Round and, 17–19 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 125 ] Rey discussions, 582–584 [ Pgs. 582–584 include portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Spain, relations with, 55–56 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 382–384 [ Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] U.S. commitments to Europe and, 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] U.S. policy, 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 263–268 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] European Free Trade Area (EFTA), 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 265–268 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 109 ] European unification ( see also European Communities; European Economic Community): Atlantic Nuclear Force and, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 65 ] British participation, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] EEC Commissioner discussions, 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] EEC crisis and, 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] Erhard Plan, 185–186 [ Pgs. 185–186 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Fouchet proposal, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] French position, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 123–124 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 196–197 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] Austrian position, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 109 ] Erhard-de Gaulle talks, 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Italian position, 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] FRG position, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Italian position, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 198–201 [ Pgs. 198–201 include portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] Multilateral Force and, 127–128 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] U.S. policy, 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 184–186 [ Pgs. 184–186 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] circular telegrams, 8–10 [ Pgs. 8–10 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] Rusk Cleveland speech (Apr. 27, 1965 ), 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] U.S.-Austrian discussions, 266–268 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 109 ] U.S.-Netherlands discussions, 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Fanfani, Amintore, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 468–469 [ Pgs. 468–469 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 265 ] Farley, Philip J., 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Faure, Edgar, 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Fenoaltea, Sergio, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] Ferguson, John H., 230–231 [ Pgs. 230–231 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] Ferri, Mauro, 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Fessenden, Russell H., 297–298 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 122 ] Fina, Thomas W., 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 570 n [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 691 n [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] Finletter, Thomas K., 20–21 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 35–39 [ Pgs. 35–39 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 221–224 [ Pgs. 221–224 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 231–235 [ Pgs. 231–235 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] Finn, Richard B., 80 n [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] Fischer, Paul, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Fisher, Adrian S., 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 288 ] Floyd, Arva C., Jr., 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] Floyd-Hughes, T.D., 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Foley, Arthur D., 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Ford, Emmett B., Jr., 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Fornari (Italy), 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] Foster, William C., 35–36 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Fowler, Henry H., 529–530 [ Pgs. 529–530 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 572–574 [ Pgs. 572–574 include portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 752–753 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 324 ] France ( see also European Communities; European Economic Community; European unification; France, French, and U.S.-French subheadings under other subjects ): Europe, relationship with, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 57 ] FRG military capabilities, 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] political situation, 703–704 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 308 ] Frankel, Max, 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Freato, Sereno, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] Freeman, Orville L., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Fried, Edward R., 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 716 n [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Fulbright, J. Willialm, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Furnas, Howard E., 7 n [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] Galo Plaza, Lasso, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 39 ] Gannett, Michael R., 551 n [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 243 ] Gardini, Walter, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Kennedy Round, 3–4 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] British EEC membership and, 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 188 ] European unification and, 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] French position, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 48 ] U.S.-Austrian discussions, 264–265 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 109 ] U.S.-British discussions, 17–19 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 41 ] U.S. policy, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 125 ] German Democratic Republic (GDR) ( see also GDR subheadings under other subjects ; German unification ), 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] Germany, Federal Republic of (FRG) ( see also European Economic Community; FRG subheadings under other subjects ; German unification ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization; offset negotiations offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG) under North Atlantic Treaty Organization): British forces in ( see also offset negotiations offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG) under North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 75 ] , 453–454 [ Pgs. 453–454 include portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] France, relations with ( see also European Economic Community: crisis in (July 1965 ); North Atlantic Treaty Organization: French policies), 308–312 [ Pgs. 308–312 include portions of Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , and Doc. 130 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 375–376 [ Pgs. 375–376 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 605–607 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 673–676 [ Pgs. 673–676 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] French forces in, 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 217 ] FRG position, 366–370 [ Pgs. 366–370 include portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 461–464 [ Pgs. 461–464 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] NATO discussions, 410–411 [ Pgs. 410–411 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 425–427 [ Pgs. 425–427 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 440–441 [ Pgs. 440–441 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] U.S. nuclear weapons and, 420–422 [ Pgs. 420–422 include portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] U.S. policy, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 357–360 [ Pgs. 357–360 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 380–381 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 388–389 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 410–411 [ Pgs. 410–411 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 483–484 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 212 ] GDR, relations with, 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 48 ] military capabilities, 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 596–597 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 604–605 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 263 ] political situation, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 113–114 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 461–464 [ Pgs. 461–464 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 261 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and, 748–749 [ Pgs. 748–749 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 756–759 [ Pgs. 756–759 include portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] United States, relations with ( see also U.S. forces in below ), 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 595–599 [ Pgs. 595–599 include portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 736–738 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] Erhard visits to U.S., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 681–683 [ Pgs. 681–683 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Kiesinger visit to U.S., 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 601–608 [ Pgs. 601–608 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] nuclear weapons use, prior consultation, 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] U.S. forces in ( see also Offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG)), 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 442–443 [ Pgs. 442–443 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , and Doc. 193 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] Wilson visit, 190–191 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] German unification, 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 289–290 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 119 ] French position, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 64 ] Gerstenmaier, Eugen K.A., 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] Getz, John, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 300 ] Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 278 ] Givan, Walker, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 225 n [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] Glenn, Edmund S., 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 646 n [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 279 ] Goldberg, Arthur J., 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 251 ] Gomez, Sedo, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Gordon Walker, Patrick, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 149–151 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 61 ] Multilateral Force, 93–95 [ Pgs. 93–95 include portions of Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , and Doc. 44 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 113–114 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 126–130 [ Pgs. 126–130 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 172 n [ Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Neustadt visit, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 51 ] U.S. policy, 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] visit to FRG, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 45 ] Wilson U.S. visit, 140–146 [ Pgs. 140–146 include portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] Gram, Victor B., 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] Greece, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 312 ] Greenhill, Denis, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Grewe, Wilhelm G.K., 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 80–82 [ Pgs. 80–82 include portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 485–486 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 634–635 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] Grey, Robert T., Jr., 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] Guerzoni, Corrado, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] Guttenberg, Karl Theodor zu, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] Gwynn-Jones, Alun, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] Hadow, Michael, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] Hadow, R.M., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Haferkamp, Wilhelm, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] Halls, A.N., 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Hallstein, Walter, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 109–112 [ Pgs. 109–112 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 192–193 [ Pgs. 192–193 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Hand, Lloyd N., 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 119 ] Hanks, Capt., 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] Hardman, Henry, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Harlech, Lord, 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Harmel, Pierre C. ( see also Harmel Study under North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 393–395 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 617–622 [ Pgs. 617–622 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 634–637 [ Pgs. 634–637 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] Harris, John, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] Hartling, Poul, 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Hartman, Arthur A., 625–629 [ Pgs. 625–629 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Hayes, John S., 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Healey, Denis W., 141–146 [ Pgs. 141–146 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 149–151 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 277–278 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 280–281 [ Pgs. 280–281 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 305–307 [ Pgs. 305–307 include portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 331 ] Hedreul, Michel, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Hellwig, Fritz, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 787–790 [ Pgs. 787–790 include portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Hellyer, Paul, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] Henderson, Adm. (UK), 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Henderson, J.N., 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] Henderson, Nigel, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Herter, Christian A., 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 17–19 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Hijzen, Theodorus, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Hinteregger, Gerald, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] Hinton, Dean R., 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 263–269 [ Pgs. 263–269 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 437 n [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 570 n [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Hjorth-Nielsen (Denmark), 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Holifield, Chester, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] Hood, Lord, 217–220 [ Pgs. 217–220 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] Hoopes, Townsend, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Hughes, Thomas R., 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 786 n [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 793 n [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 338 ] Hull, Richard, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 572–573 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 251 ] Ignatieff, George, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 92 ] Ingram, George Mason, 706 n [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68 , 778–780 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 334 ] Intelligence Notes: No. 512 , 722–725 [ Pgs. 722–725 include portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] No. 872 , 786 n [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 335 ] No. 904 , 637–639 [ Pgs. 637–639 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Italy ( see also Italian and U.S.-Italian subheadings under other subjects ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 2–4 [ Pgs. 2–4 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295 ] Jackson, Henry M., 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Jacobsen (Norway), 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] Jaeggi, Walter, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Javits, Jacob J., 263–264 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] Johnpoll, Alexander C., 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 306 ] Johnson, Lyndon B.: Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 165–167 [ Pgs. 165–167 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 68 ] Erhard, correspondence with, 78–79 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , and Doc. 39 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] European Communities, 662–664 [ Pgs. 662–664 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] European unification, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] French relationship with Europe, 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] FRG, U.S. relations with, 192–193 [ Pgs. 192–193 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] , 601–608 [ Pgs. 601–608 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 736–738 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] Multilateral Force ( see also nuclear sharing below ), 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Erhard, correspondence with, 78–79 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82–83 [ Pgs. 82–83 include portions of Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , and Doc. 39 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] French withdrawal from NATO and, 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] U.S.-British discussions, 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 289–292 [ Pgs. 289–292 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] U.S. policy, 35–37 [ Pgs. 35–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 117–119 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Wilson visits to U.S., 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] National Conference of Editorial Writers speech, 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( see also Multilateral force above ), 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 522–523 [ Pgs. 522–523 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 612–615 [ Pgs. 612–615 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] French withdrawal from, 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 342–344 [ Pgs. 342–344 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , and Doc. 147 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 392–398 [ Pgs. 392–398 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] emergency reentry rights, 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] U.S.-Canadian discussions, 451–453 [ Pgs. 451–453 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] U.S.-French discussions, 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] U.S. policy, 376–377 [ Pgs. 376–377 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] French policies, 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] Soviet-NATO mutual force reductions, 670–671 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] summit meeting proposal, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73–75 [ Pgs. 73–75 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] U.S. policy, 512–513 [ Pgs. 512–513 include portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 313 ] nuclear sharing, 289–292 [ Pgs. 289–292 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 460–461 [ Pgs. 460–461 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 471–478 [ Pgs. 471–478 include portions of Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , and Doc. 208 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 536–538 [ Pgs. 536–538 include portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 545–549 [ Pgs. 545–549 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 749–750 [ Pgs. 749–750 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 752–753 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 756–759 [ Pgs. 756–759 include portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] Soviet Union, 316–318 [ Pgs. 316–318 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 571–574 [ Pgs. 571–574 include portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] visit to Europe, 177–178 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] Wilson, correspondence with, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 396–398 [ Pgs. 396–398 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 460–461 [ Pgs. 460–461 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 477–478 [ Pgs. 477–478 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Wilson visit to FRG, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] Wilson visit to U.S., 137–139 [ Pgs. 137–139 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 includes portions of Doc. 61 and Doc. 62 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 28 n [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 253–257 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 300 ] Jorissen, Herman C., 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 94 ] Judd, Thomas M., 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Kaplan, George R., 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 774 n [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] Katz, Abraham, 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 664 n [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 699 n [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 764 n [ Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 508 n [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 288 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 551–553 [ Pgs. 551–553 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 670–673 [ Pgs. 670–673 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] French withdrawal from, 479–480 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 487–490 [ Pgs. 487–490 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 513–514 [ Pgs. 513–514 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] Harmel Study, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 619–622 [ Pgs. 619–622 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 627–629 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 271 ] Nuclear Planning Group, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 556–558 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 246 ] U.S. policy, 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 313 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] Kennan, George F., 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] Kennedy, John F., 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] Kent, Donald J., 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 88 ] Kiesinger, Kurt G., 518–521 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 538–546 [ Pgs. 538–546 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 673–676 [ Pgs. 673–676 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 321 ] visit to U.S., 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 601–608 [ Pgs. 601–608 include portions of Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Klein, David, 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] Klestil, Thomas, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] Knappstein, Karl H., 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 590–591 [ Pgs. 590–591 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] Knight, Ridgway B., 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 646 n [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 279 ] Knox, M. Gordon, 17 n [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Kohler, Foy D., 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 64–67 [ Pgs. 64–67 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 591–595 [ Pgs. 591–595 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 615–617 [ Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 271 ] Komer, Robert W., 335–338 [ Pgs. 335–338 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , and Doc. 144 ] Kosygin, Aleksei N., 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 273 ] Kranich, Robert, 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 300 ] Krapf, Franz, 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Kristianson (Norway), 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] Krone, Heinrich, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 49 ] Kroneck (FRG), 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] Kuchel, Thomas H., 458–460 [ Pgs. 458–460 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] Kuesterer, Hermann, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] Lahr, Rolf, 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Lambert, Francis X., 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] Lampson, Edward, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] Landau, George W., 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Leddy, John M., 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 353 n [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 465–466 n [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 513 n [ Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 546 n [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 559 n [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 664 n [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 764 n [ Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 774 n [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 795 n [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 339 ] Brandt visit to U.S., 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] British EEC membership, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 576–577 [ Pgs. 576–577 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] European Communities, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] , 764–765 [ Pgs. 764–765 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] European unification, 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] Multilateral Force, 244–247 [ Pgs. 244–247 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] force planning, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 126 ] French policies, 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 253–257 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] French withdrawal from, 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 487–490 [ Pgs. 487–490 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Harmel Study, 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 271 ] Lemberger, Ernst, 263–269 [ Pgs. 263–269 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] Leonhart, William, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Levi-Sandri, Lionello, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] Lindjord, Col., 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Lippmann, Walter S., 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 150 ] Lodge, Henry Cabot, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] Lucet, Charles, 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 576–577 [ Pgs. 576–577 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 640–641 [ Pgs. 640–641 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Lucion, Pierre, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Luns, Joseph, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 179–181 [ Pgs. 179–181 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 247–248 [ Pgs. 247–248 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 332 ] Luxembourg, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] MacArthur, Douglas, II, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 458–460 [ Pgs. 458–460 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] MacLehose, C.M., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Maggio, Sam L.G., 725 [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Maitland, Patrick, 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] Majonica, Ernst, 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Majoribanks, James A.M., 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Makarios III, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] Malfatti di Montretto, Franco, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] Malin, Herbert S., 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] Malta, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 236–237 [ Pgs. 236–237 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Malve, Pierre, 725–727 [ Pgs. 725–727 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 734–735 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] Manfull, Melvin S., 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] Mann, Thomas C., 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 77 ] Mansfield, Mike, 458–460 [ Pgs. 458–460 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 248 ] Mansholt, Sicco L., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 51–52 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Marjolin, Robert, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] Marks, Leonard, 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Martin, Paul, 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 274 ] Maynard (UK), 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] McAuliffe, Eugene V., 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 551 n [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 695 n [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 754 n [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] McCloy, John J. ( see also Offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG)), 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 366–370 [ Pgs. 366–370 include portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 495–498 [ Pgs. 495–498 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 518–521 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 538–546 [ Pgs. 538–546 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] McCone, John A., 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] McGhee, George C., 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 177–178 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 412 n [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] EEC agricultural policies, 90–92 [ Pgs. 90–92 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , and Doc. 56 ] European unification, 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] French-FRG relations, 308 n [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 310–312 [ Pgs. 310–312 include portions of Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , and Doc. 130 ] , 461–464 [ Pgs. 461–464 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 673–676 [ Pgs. 673–676 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Humphrey visit to FRG, 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] Multilateral Force, 100–103 [ Pgs. 100–103 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , and Doc. 46 ] , 169–172 [ Pgs. 169–172 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 427–430 [ Pgs. 427–430 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73–75 [ Pgs. 73–75 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 175–176 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 273 ] French withdrawal from, 375–376 [ Pgs. 375–376 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 461–464 [ Pgs. 461–464 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] McKillop, David H., 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 107 n [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 299 n [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] McNamara, Robert S., 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Multilateral Force, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 121 n [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 141–145 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] French withdrawal from NATO and, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] U.S. policy, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 118–119 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 159 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 253–257 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 522–523 [ Pgs. 522–523 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] common defense market, 229–230 [ Pgs. 229–230 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] force planning, 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 303–306 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] French withdrawal from, 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] Nuclear Planning Group, 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 227–230 [ Pgs. 227–230 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 250–251 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 280–281 [ Pgs. 280–281 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] U.S. infrastructure contribution, 44–45 [ Pgs. 44–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 21 ] Von Hassel talks, 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] nuclear sharing ( see also Nuclear Planning Group above ), 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 545–546 [ Pgs. 545–546 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] McNaughton, John, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Meeker, Leonard, 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Meloy, Francis E., Jr., 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 n [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Mende, Erich, 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 90 ] Merchant, Livingston T., 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 57 ] Merry del Val, Marquis de, 382–384 [ Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Middle East, 580–582 [ Pgs. 580–582 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 585–588 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 258 ] Milesi Ferretti, Gian Luigi, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] Millet, Pierre, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Moffat, Jay P., 260 n [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Monnet, Jean, 196–197 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 79 ] Montastruc, Pierre, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Moore, Ben, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 75 ] Moro, Aldo, 198–201 [ Pgs. 198–201 include portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Mosely, Philip, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 75 ] Moyers, Bill, 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Moyersoen, Ludovic, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] Muller, Charles, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Mulley, Frederick William, 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 277 ] Multilateral Force (MLF) ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force; Nuclear Planning Group under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear sharing; Nuclear weapons): British participation, 97–98 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 46 ] British position, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 126–132 [ Pgs. 126–132 include portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 188 n [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] British political situation and, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55 ] FRG position, 80–81 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 113–114 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Italian position, 5–6 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] Ministerial meeting proposals, 129–130 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 54 ] mixed-manning, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 93–95 [ Pgs. 93–95 include portions of Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , and Doc. 44 ] , 141–143 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers and, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 113 ] Neustadt visit, 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 51 ] U.S. position, 35–36 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 155 ] Wilson visits to U.S., 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 141–146 [ Pgs. 141–146 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] British-FRG discussions, 156–158 [ Pgs. 156–158 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] Brosio position, 86–87 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 105 ] European Economic Community and, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 48 ] European unification and, 127–128 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] French participation, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] FRG position, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 112–113 [ Pgs. 112–113 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] U.S. policy, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] French position, 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 104–105 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 107–108 [ Pgs. 107–108 include portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 112–113 [ Pgs. 112–113 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] French withdrawal from NATO and, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] FRG hardware solution, 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 289–296 [ Pgs. 289–296 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 428–430 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 183 ] FRG participation, 104–105 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] British position, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 141–142 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] French position, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 96 ] FRG position, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 143–145 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 427–430 [ Pgs. 427–430 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Italian position, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 80 ] military justifications, 15–16 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20–21 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 10 ] Ministerial meeting proposals, 129–130 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 67 ] mixed-manning, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 93–95 [ Pgs. 93–95 include portions of Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , and Doc. 44 ] , 141–143 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] FRG position, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 60 ] Soviet position, 65 n [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] NATO discussion, 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers and, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 113 ] Netherlands position, 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 179–181 [ Pgs. 179–181 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 247–248 [ Pgs. 247–248 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] nuclear non-proliferation and, 64–67 [ Pgs. 64–67 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 443–448 [ Pgs. 443–448 include portions of Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] nuclear sharing, 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Soviet position, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 43–44 [ Pgs. 43–44 include portions of Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , and Doc. 21 ] , 64–67 [ Pgs. 64–67 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 271–273 [ Pgs. 271–273 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] U.S.-British discussions, 41–43 [ Pgs. 41–43 include portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 193–195 [ Pgs. 193–195 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] U.S.-French discussions, 163–165 [ Pgs. 163–165 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 37–39 [ Pgs. 37–39 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 80–82 [ Pgs. 80–82 include portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 100–103 [ Pgs. 100–103 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , and Doc. 46 ] , 112–115 [ Pgs. 112–115 include portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 169–175 [ Pgs. 169–175 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 289–292 [ Pgs. 289–292 include portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 292–295 [ Pgs. 292–295 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] U.S.-Italian discussions, 5–7 [ Pgs. 5–7 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] U.S. policy, 35–37 [ Pgs. 35–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 40–41 [ Pgs. 40–41 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 59–60 [ Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 95–100 [ Pgs. 95–100 include portions of Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , and Doc. 45 ] , 103–107 [ Pgs. 103–107 include portions of Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , and Doc. 47 ] , 114–115 [ Pgs. 114–115 include portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 234–244 [ Pgs. 234–244 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103 ] abandonment proposals, 121–122 [ Pgs. 121–122 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 133–137 [ Pgs. 133–137 include portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , Doc. 57 , and Doc. 58 ] British position, 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Congressional attitudes, 117–119 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 135–136 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] Hillenbrand Study, 244–247 [ Pgs. 244–247 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] letter to Prime Ministers, proposed, 187–188 [ Pgs. 187–188 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75 ] McCloy mission proposals, 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] Rostow notes, 370–372 [ Pgs. 370–372 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] Muromcew, Cyril, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Murphy, Robert, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 75 ] Murray, Donald, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Myerson, Jacob M., 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 741 n [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 335 ] Nairne, P.D., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Narjes, Karl-Heinz, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 77 ] Nash, N.T., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] National Security Council (NSC), 571–574 [ Pgs. 571–574 include portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM): draft (Oct. 8, 1965 ), 253–259 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] No. 322, 165–167 [ Pgs. 165–167 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] No. 345, 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 511–513 [ Pgs. 511–513 include portions of Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , and Doc. 227 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 749–754 [ Pgs. 749–754 include portions of Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , and Doc. 325 ] Nenni, Pietro, 5–7 [ Pgs. 5–7 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Netherlands, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 283 ] European unification, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Multilateral Force, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 179–181 [ Pgs. 179–181 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 247–248 [ Pgs. 247–248 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 227–230 [ Pgs. 227–230 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] Neustadt, Richard E., 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 75 ] Newlin, Michael H., 556 n [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 246 ] Newman, George, 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Niles, Thomas, 469 n [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Nitze, Paul H., 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 627–628 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force; Multilateral Force; Nuclear sharing; Nuclear weapons; Offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG); U.S. commitments to Europe): abstention policies, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] Acheso Group, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 406–409 [ Pgs. 406–409 include portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 417–419 [ Pgs. 417–419 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Athens Guidelines, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] Belgian treaty review proposal, 31–34 [ Pgs. 31–34 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] Berlin, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 316 ] British policies, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] Brosio discussions, 514–516 [ Pgs. 514–516 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] Brosio visits to U.S., 83–89 [ Pgs. 83–89 include portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 248–252 [ Pgs. 248–252 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 493–495 [ Pgs. 493–495 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 670–673 [ Pgs. 670–673 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Central Europe and, 406–409 [ Pgs. 406–409 include portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] common defense market, 229–230 [ Pgs. 229–230 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 106 ] Congressional views on, 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Cyprus, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 87–88 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] de Gaulle influence, 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] defense cooperation proposals, 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] disarmament and, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 39 ] East-West relations ( see also Soviet-NATO mutual force reductions below ), 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 493–494 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 505–506 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 591–595 [ Pgs. 591–595 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 316 ] British position, 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 298 ] French position, 684–685 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] FRG position, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] Italian position, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] NATO discussions, 588–589 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 684–685 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 722–723 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 316 ] Eastern Europe and, 28–29 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] European caucus proposals, 766–767 [ Pgs. 766–767 include portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] European nuclear capabilities, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] European unification and, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] force planning ( see also Soviet-NATO mutual force reductions below ), 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 251–252 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 303–307 [ Pgs. 303–307 include portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 323 ] French-Italian discussions, 71–72 [ Pgs. 71–72 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] French nuclear capabilities and, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] French policies ( see also French withdrawal from below ), 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] Belgian treaty review proposal and, 32–33 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] bilateral discussions, 218–221 [ Pgs. 218–221 include portions of Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , and Doc. 92 ] , 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Brosio position, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 249–250 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 217 ] circular telegram, 48–50 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] Eastern Europe, 28–29 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] European Economic Community and, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 269–271 [ Pgs. 269–271 include portions of Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 274–276 [ Pgs. 274–276 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] European unification and, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] Italian position, 53–54 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 71–73 [ Pgs. 71–73 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] military disengagement, 48–50 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] Ministerial meetings, 286–287 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] Netherlands position, 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 323 ] Spaak position, 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Stikker position, 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 25–27 [ Pgs. 25–27 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] U.S.-British discussions, 217–220 [ Pgs. 217–220 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] U.S.-French bilateral agreement, substitute proposal, 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] U.S.-French discussions, 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 211–212 [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 231–233 [ Pgs. 231–233 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] U.S. policy, 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 253–259 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 312–314 [ Pgs. 312–314 include portions of Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , and Doc. 131 ] French withdrawal from ( see also French policies above ): Belgian position, 392–395 [ Pgs. 392–395 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] constitutional question, 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 214 ] de Gaulle letter to Johnson, 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] emergency reentry rights, 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 422–425 [ Pgs. 422–425 include portions of Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , and Doc. 182 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 479–480 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 214 ] European Economic Community and, 338–339 [ Pgs. 338–339 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 355–356 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 400–401 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] force planning and, 305–306 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 126 ] French aide-mémoire, 333–335 [ Pgs. 333–335 include portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] French forces in FRG and, 366–370 [ Pgs. 366–370 include portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 388–389 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 217 ] FRG position, 461–464 [ Pgs. 461–464 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] NATO discussions, 410–411 [ Pgs. 410–411 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 425–427 [ Pgs. 425–427 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 440–441 [ Pgs. 440–441 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] U.S. nuclear weapons and, 420–422 [ Pgs. 420–422 include portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] U.S. policy, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 357–360 [ Pgs. 357–360 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 380–381 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 410–411 [ Pgs. 410–411 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 483–484 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 212 ] French intentions, 386–387 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 404–405 [ Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] French-FRG discussions, 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 201 ] French-FRG relations and, 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 375–376 [ Pgs. 375–376 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] Johnson-de Gaulle correspondence, 342–344 [ Pgs. 342–344 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , and Doc. 147 ] Johnson-Wilson correspondence, 396–398 [ Pgs. 396–398 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Multilateral Force and, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] NAC/SHAPE relocation, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 468–469 [ Pgs. 468–469 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Belgian position, 394–395 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] NATO discussions, 345–346 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 409–411 [ Pgs. 409–411 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 481–482 [ Pgs. 481–482 include portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 232 ] NATO discussions, 344–347 [ Pgs. 344–347 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 415–416 [ Pgs. 415–416 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 435–436 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] NATO response, 339–342 [ Pgs. 339–342 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 377–382 [ Pgs. 377–382 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 384–390 [ Pgs. 384–390 include portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] U.S.-British discussions, 305–306 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 339–342 [ Pgs. 339–342 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] U.S.-Canadian discussions, 451–453 [ Pgs. 451–453 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] U.S. equipment sales, 513–514 [ Pgs. 513–514 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] U.S.-French discussions, 240–241 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 322–324 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 331–332 [ Pgs. 331–332 include portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 412–415 [ Pgs. 412–415 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] U.S. policy, 215–217 [ Pgs. 215–217 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 230–231 [ Pgs. 230–231 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 318–321 [ Pgs. 318–321 include portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , and Doc. 135 ] , 326–328 [ Pgs. 326–328 include portions of Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 335–338 [ Pgs. 335–338 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , and Doc. 144 ] , 351–354 [ Pgs. 351–354 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 376–377 [ Pgs. 376–377 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , and Doc. 162 ] , 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 487–490 [ Pgs. 487–490 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] aide-mémoire, 360–363 [ Pgs. 360–363 include portions of Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] circular telegrams, 328–330 [ Pgs. 328–330 include portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] media coverage, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] FRG force contribution, 303–305 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] FRG summit meeting proposal, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 73–75 [ Pgs. 73–75 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Harmel Study, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 623–625 [ Pgs. 623–625 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 281 ] follow-up, 660–661 [ Pgs. 660–661 include portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] French position, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 637–639 [ Pgs. 637–639 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 642–643 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 277 ] FRG position, 634–635 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] Italian position, 643–644 [ Pgs. 643–644 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Special Group meetings, 634–637 [ Pgs. 634–637 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 641–644 [ Pgs. 641–644 include portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , and Doc. 278 ] U.S.-British correspondence, 591–595 [ Pgs. 591–595 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] U.S.-British discussions, 615–617 [ Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] U.S.-Belgian discussions, 617–622 [ Pgs. 617–622 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] U.S.-French discussions, 640–641 [ Pgs. 640–641 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] U.S. policy, 500–503 [ Pgs. 500–503 include portions of Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 608–611 [ Pgs. 608–611 include portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 625–629 [ Pgs. 625–629 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 637–639 [ Pgs. 637–639 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 697–699 [ Pgs. 697–699 include portions of Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308 ] Inter-Allied Nuclear Force, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] Italy, relations with, 299–300 [ Pgs. 299–300 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 612–615 [ Pgs. 612–615 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Malta, relations with, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 236–237 [ Pgs. 236–237 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] McNamara-Von Hassel talks, 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Mediterranean security, 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 747–748 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 323 ] French position, 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] Middle East, 580–582 [ Pgs. 580–582 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 585–588 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 258 ] Ministerial meetings: Dec. 1964 , 168–169 [ Pgs. 168–169 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] May 1965 , 207–208 [ Pgs. 207–208 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Dec. 1965 , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 285–288 [ Pgs. 285–288 include portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Dec. 1966 , 504–508 [ Pgs. 504–508 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 523–527 [ Pgs. 523–527 include portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] June 1967 , 580–582 [ Pgs. 580–582 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 585–590 [ Pgs. 585–590 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Dec. 1967 , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 650–652 [ Pgs. 650–652 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] June 1968 (Reykjavik), 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 712–716 [ Pgs. 712–716 include portions of Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , and Doc. 313 ] , 722–725 [ Pgs. 722–725 include portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Nov. 1968 , 781–786 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 790–794 [ Pgs. 790–794 include portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] naval cooperation, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] nuclear defense (NSAM No. 322), 165–166 [ Pgs. 165–166 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, 523–524 [ Pgs. 523–524 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 312 ] Nuclear Planning Group ( see also Multilateral Force; Nuclear sharing), 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 523–524 [ Pgs. 523–524 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] British position, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 108 ] Brosio position, 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] French participation, 554–555 [ Pgs. 554–555 include portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Italian membership, 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] reports, 556–558 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 689–691 [ Pgs. 689–691 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 709–712 [ Pgs. 709–712 include portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312 ] U.S. policy, 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 417–418 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 509–511 [ Pgs. 509–511 include portions of Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , and Doc. 226 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] observation post issue, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] political consultation, 10–12 [ Pgs. 10–12 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia: Brosio position, 739–741 [ Pgs. 739–741 include portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] French position, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 328 ] Ministerial meeting (Nov. 1968 ), 782–783 [ Pg. 782 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 790–791 [ Pgs. 790–791 include portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 793–794 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 338 ] NATO discussions, 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 768–774 [ Pgs. 768–774 include portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 756–759 [ Pgs. 756–759 include portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] U.S. policy, 741–756 [ Pgs. 741–756 include portions of Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326 ] , 774–780 [ Pgs. 774–780 include portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] Soviet-NATO mutual force reductions: Belgian freeze proposal, 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Brosio visits to U.S., 670–671 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] French position, 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Ministerial meeting (June 1968 ) (Reykjavik), 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 316 ] U.S.-Canadian discussions, 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 719–720 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] U.S. policy, 573–576 [ Pgs. 573–576 include portions of Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , and Doc. 253 ] , 632–633 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 273 ] U.S. resolution, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 307 ] Spanish membership, 760–761 [ Pgs. 760–761 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 795–797 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 339 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 221–224 [ Pgs. 221–224 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 106 ] British position, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 296 n [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 121 ] Brosio position, 250–251 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] French position, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 118 ] FRG position, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] Italian position, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] meetings, reports on, 276–281 [ Pgs. 276–281 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] Netherlands position, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 227–230 [ Pgs. 227–230 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] Stikker Annual Political Appraisal, 25–30 [ Pgs. 25–30 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 14 ] Stikker resignation, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] strategy, 201–204 [ Pgs. 201–204 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , and Doc. 82 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 232 ] structure of ( see also French policies; French withdrawal from above ), 27–30 [ Pgs. 27–30 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Bowie report, 90–126 [ Pgs. 90–126 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] French position, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 162–163 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 206–207 [ Pgs. 206–207 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] FRG position, 175–177 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 69 ] Italian position, 28 n [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 199–200 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 80 ] U.S.-Danish discussions, 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] U.S. force contributions, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 530–531 [ Pgs. 530–531 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] U.S. infrastructure contribution, 44–47 [ Pgs. 44–47 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 88–89 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 105 ] U.S. policy, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 511–513 [ Pgs. 511–513 include portions of Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , and Doc. 227 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 727–733 [ Pgs. 727–733 include portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] McCloy report, 495–498 [ Pgs. 495–498 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Rusk Cleveland speech (Apr. 27, 1965 ), 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 204–205 [ Pgs. 204–205 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] U.S.-Soviet discussions, 653–654 [ Pgs. 653–654 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] Vietnam, 287–288 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 525–526 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 232 ] Norway, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 642–643 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 313 ] Norwood, Bernard, 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Nuclear sharing ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force; Multilateral Force; Nuclear Planning Group under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear weapons): FRG desire for, 289–296 [ Pgs. 289–296 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 427–430 [ Pgs. 427–430 include portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 442–448 [ Pgs. 442–448 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] tripartite (U.S.-British-FRG) talks, proposed, 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] U.S. position, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] Nuclear weapons ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force; Multilateral Force; Nuclear Planning Group under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear sharing): China, People's Republic, capabilities, 65–67 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] European capabilities, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] French capabilities, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 162–163 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 64 ] French position, 126 n [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 211–212 [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] FRG capabilities, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 232–233 [ Pgs. 232–233 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Inter-Allied Nuclear Force, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] NATO defense, 165–166 [ Pgs. 165–166 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] non-proliferation, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 193 ] Multilateral Force and, 64–67 [ Pgs. 64–67 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] NATO discussions, 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 312 ] Soviet position, 64–67 [ Pgs. 64–67 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 316–318 [ Pgs. 316–318 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 539–540 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 239 ] Polish position, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 206 ] U.S. control, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 65 ] U.S.-FRG agreement for prior consultation on use of, 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] U.S. withdrawal from use by French forces, 420–422 [ Pgs. 420–422 include portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] Obst, Harry, 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 289 n [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] Offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG) ( see also North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 518–521 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 546–549 [ Pgs. 546–549 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] Congressional briefings, 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 561–562 [ Pgs. 561–562 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] final report, 562–570 [ Pgs. 562–570 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , and Doc. 250 ] FRG position, 464–465 [ Pgs. 464–465 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , and Doc. 203 ] , 471–477 [ Pgs. 471–477 include portions of Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , and Doc. 208 ] Johnson-Wilson correspondence, 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 477–478 [ Pgs. 477–478 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] reports, 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 551–553 [ Pgs. 551–553 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 562–570 [ Pgs. 562–570 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , and Doc. 250 ] U.S.-British discussions, 304–305 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 219 ] U.S. policy, 444–448 [ Pgs. 444–448 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 453–456 [ Pgs. 453–456 include portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 460–461 [ Pgs. 460–461 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 534–537 [ Pgs. 534–537 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 545–546 [ Pgs. 545–546 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] O'Neill, Con, 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] Oreja, Marcelino, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Ormsby Gore, William David, 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Ortona, Egidio, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295 ] Orwat, Gen., 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Osterheld, Horst, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] Palamas, Christian X., 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] Palliser, A.M., 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Palmer, Robie M.H., 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Patijn, C.L., 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 274 ] Pearson, Lester, 451–453 [ Pgs. 451–453 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] Percival, Leroy F., 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 582 n [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Petrignani, Rinaldo, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] Philips, Richard I., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] Piccioni, Attilio, 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Pipinellis, Panayotis, 773–774 [ Pgs. 773–774 include portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] Platzer, Wilfried, 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Poland ( see also Eastern Europe), 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 469–471 [ Pgs. 469–471 include portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] Pompei, Gianfranco, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] Popper, David H., 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 225 n [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] Portugal, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] Powell, Sir Richard, 17–19 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Puhan, Alfred, 289 n [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 681 n [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] Rabot, Louis George, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Ranitz, J.A. de, 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 274 ] Rapacki, Adam, 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Read, Benjamin H., 95 n [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 712 n [ Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5–6 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] Research Memorandum REU–35, 709–712 [ Pgs. 709–712 include portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312 ] Reuss, Henry H., 263–264 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] Reuter (Luxembourg), 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 213 ] Rey, Jean, 22–24 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 51–52 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 400–401 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 582–584 [ Pgs. 582–584 include portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 662–667 [ Pgs. 662–667 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] Rickett, Denis, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 234 ] Rieger (FRG), 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] Rifflet, Raymond, 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Ritchie, A.E., 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Robinson, H. Basil, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Rochereau, Henri, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] Rogers, Stephen H., 725 n [ Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] Roll, Sir Eric, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Romani, Platone, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Romania, 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 333 ] Romine, Woodward, 574 n [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 576 n [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] Ronne, Torben, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Roosa, Robert V., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Rostow, Eugene V., 530 [ Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 653 n [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 693–695 [ Pgs. 693–695 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 725–727 [ Pgs. 725–727 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] Harmel Study, 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 619–622 [ Pgs. 619–622 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 625–626 [ Pgs. 625–626 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 634–637 [ Pgs. 634–637 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 640–641 [ Pgs. 640–641 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 697–699 [ Pgs. 697–699 include portions of Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] Rostow, Walt W., 522 n [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 744 n [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 323 ] Multilateral Force, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 370–375 [ Pgs. 370–375 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 522–523 [ Pgs. 522–523 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] French withdrawal from, 384–391 [ Pgs. 384–391 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 387–388 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 538–545 [ Pgs. 538–545 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Roth, William M., 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] Ruete, Hans H., 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] Ruhfus (FRG), 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] Rusk, Dean, 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146–148 [ Pgs. 146–148 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 150–152 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 173–174 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 68 ] Brandt visit to U.S., 530–531 [ Pgs. 530–531 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] de Gaulle discussions, 160–165 [ Pgs. 160–165 include portions of Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] disarmament, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 40–41 [ Pgs. 40–41 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] European Communities, 664–667 [ Pgs. 664–667 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] , 699–705 [ Pgs. 699–705 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 764–765 [ Pgs. 764–765 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] , 787–790 [ Pgs. 787–790 include portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] European Economic Community, 1–4 [ Pgs. 1–4 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 382–384 [ Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 400–401 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 582–584 [ Pgs. 582–584 include portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] British membership, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 648–650 [ Pgs. 648–650 include portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 306 and Doc. 307 ] Commissioner discussions, 22–25 [ Pgs. 22–25 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 51–52 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] crisis in (July 1965 ), 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] European unification, 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 186–187 [ Pgs. 186–187 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 198–201 [ Pgs. 198–201 include portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] French-FRG relations, 308–310 [ Pgs. 308–310 include portions of Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] GATT Kennedy Round, 17–19 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 125 ] German unification, 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] Multilateral Force ( see also nuclear sharing below , 5–7 [ Pgs. 5–7 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 15–16 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 163–165 [ Pgs. 163–165 include portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 179–181 [ Pgs. 179–181 include portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] abandonment proposals, 121 n [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] French withdrawal from NATO and, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] French position, 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 107–108 [ Pgs. 107–108 include portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] FRG position, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] McCloy mission, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 50 ] NATO discussion, 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] U.S.-British discussions, 41–43 [ Pgs. 41–43 include portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 93–95 [ Pgs. 93–95 include portions of Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , and Doc. 44 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 143–145 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] U.S.-FRG discussions, 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 172–174 [ Pgs. 172–174 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 261–262 [ Pgs. 261–262 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 292–295 [ Pgs. 292–295 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] U.S. policy, 40–41 [ Pgs. 40–41 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 59–60 [ Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 103 n [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 101 and Doc. 102 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 159 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 44–47 [ Pgs. 44–47 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] Acheson Group, 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] Brosio visits to U.S., 83–89 [ Pgs. 83–89 include portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 248–252 [ Pgs. 248–252 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 493–495 [ Pgs. 493–495 include portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Cleveland speech (Apr. 27, 1965 ), 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 204–205 [ Pgs. 204–205 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Eastern Europe and, 28–29 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] French policies, 48–50 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53–54 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 312–314 [ Pgs. 312–314 include portions of Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , and Doc. 131 ] European Economic Community and, 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] U.S. bilateral discussions, 210–211 [ Pgs. 210–211 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , and Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] U.S.-French bilateral agreement, substitute proposal, 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] French withdrawal from, 215–217 [ Pgs. 215–217 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 319–321 [ Pgs. 319–321 include portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 400–401 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] emergency reentry rights, 422–425 [ Pgs. 422–425 include portions of Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , and Doc. 182 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 479–480 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] Multilateral Force and, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] NATO response, 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 409–411 [ Pgs. 409–411 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] U.S. bilateral discussions, 339–342 [ Pgs. 339–342 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 412–415 [ Pgs. 412–415 include portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 441–442 [ Pgs. 441–442 include portions of Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 468–469 [ Pgs. 468–469 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] U.S. policy, 328–330 [ Pgs. 328–330 include portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , and Doc. 140 ] , 338–339 [ Pgs. 338–339 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 376–378 [ Pgs. 376–378 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Harmel Study, 500–503 [ Pgs. 500–503 include portions of Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 608–611 [ Pgs. 608–611 include portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 617–619 [ Pgs. 617–619 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 640–641 [ Pgs. 640–641 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Italy, relations with, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 265 ] Malta and, 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Middle East, 580–582 [ Pgs. 580–582 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Ministerial meetings, 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 650–652 [ Pgs. 650–652 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 790–792 [ Pgs. 790–792 include portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Nuclear Planning Group, 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 554–555 [ Pgs. 554–555 include portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] political consultation, 10–12 [ Pgs. 10–12 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 50 ] Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 741–743 [ Pgs. 741–743 include portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 754–756 [ Pgs. 754–756 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326 ] , 768–777 [ Pgs. 768–777 include portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] Soviet-NATO mutual force reductions, 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] , 719–720 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] Spanish membership, 760–761 [ Pgs. 760–761 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 795–797 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 339 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] State of Alliance, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 85 ] Stikker Annual Political Appraisal, 25–30 [ Pgs. 25–30 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] Stikker resignation, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] strategy, 201–204 [ Pgs. 201–204 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , and Doc. 82 ] structure of, 28–30 [ Pgs. 28–30 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] nuclear sharing, 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 402–403 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] nuclear weapons, 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 545–549 [ Pgs. 545–549 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] , 561–562 [ Pgs. 561–562 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Poland, 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Switzerland, 599–601 [ Pgs. 599–601 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 574–576 [ Pgs. 574–576 include portions of Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , and Doc. 253 ] U.S. forces in FRG, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 443 n [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] U.S.-FRG relations, 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] , 679–683 [ Pgs. 679–683 include portions of Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] Vietnam, 283–284 [ Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 701–703 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 308 ] Wilson visit to U.S., 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 59 ] Russell, Richard B., 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] Ryrie (UK), 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 234 ] Sandri, Levi, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] Saragat, Giuseppe, 2–7 [ Pgs. 2–7 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , and Doc. 4 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 53–54 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 612–615 [ Pgs. 612–615 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Sauer, Walter, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Schaetzel, J. Robert, 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 12 n [ Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 30 n [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] European Communities, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] European Economic Community, 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 is part of Doc. 257 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 44–45 [ Pgs. 44–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 35 ] Schaus (EEC), 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] Scheyven, Louis, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] Schiller (FRG), 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 283 ] Schilling, Wolf, 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] Schnyder, Felix, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Schricke (France), 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 92 ] Schroeder, Gerhard, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , and Doc. 56 ] , 442–443 [ Pgs. 442–443 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , and Doc. 193 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 261 ] French forces in FRG, 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 462–463 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 201 ] Multilateral Force, 169–172 [ Pgs. 169–172 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 292–295 [ Pgs. 292–295 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 428–430 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 183 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 411–412 [ Pgs. 411–412 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] Schultz-Boysen (FRG), 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] Schurmann, Carl W.A., 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 227–230 [ Pgs. 227–230 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] Seaborg, Glenn T., 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 288 ] Sebastian, Peter, 768 n [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 332 ] Segni, Antonio, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] Seidenman, Neil, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 612 n [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 265 ] Seydoux de Claussone, Francois, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Seydoux, Roger, 638–640 [ Pgs. 638–640 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 642–643 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 277 ] Sharp, Mitchell, 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] Shriver, Sargent, 761–764 [ Pgs. 761–764 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] Shuckburgh, Evelyn, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] Shullaw, J. Harold, 193 n [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Smith, Bromley, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 571 n [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Smith, Gerard C., 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 80–81 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] Smith, Joseph L., 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Smith, Rufus Z., 692 n [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] Solomon, Anthony M., 437–438 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 734–735 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 319 ] Soviet Union ( see also East-West relations; Soviet-NATO mutual force reductions under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Soviet subheadings under other subjects ), 22–23 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] Brosio position, 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 283–284 [ Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] China, People's Republic, relations with, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] Multilateral Force, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 43–44 [ Pgs. 43–44 include portions of Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , and Doc. 21 ] , 64–67 [ Pgs. 64–67 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 271–273 [ Pgs. 271–273 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 155 ] troop reductions, 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] United States, relations with, 271–273 [ Pgs. 271–273 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] Western trade with, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 is part of Doc. 11 ] Wilson visit, 316–318 [ Pgs. 316–318 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] Spaak, Paul-Henri, 31–34 [ Pgs. 31–34 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 260–261 [ Pgs. 260–261 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Spain, 55–56 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 382–384 [ Pgs. 382–384 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 760–761 [ Pgs. 760–761 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 795–797 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 339 ] Spielman, Herbert, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 109 ] Spierenburg, Dirk, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] Spiers, Ronald I., 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 53 n [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 80–81 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 179 n [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 212 n [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 227 n [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 236–237 [ Pgs. 236–237 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 315 n [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Spivy, Lt. Gen. Berton E., 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 324 ] Springsteen, George, 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 570 n [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 574 n [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 670 n [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 695 n [ Pg. 695 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 765 n [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 is part of Doc. 335 ] British EEC membership, 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] European Communities, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] Multilateral Force, 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 314 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] U.S. forces in FRG, 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] Spuehler, Willy, 599–601 [ Pgs. 599–601 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] Stabler, Wells, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 691 n [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302 ] Stewart, M.N.F., 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] Stewart, Michael, 188 n [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 303–307 [ Pgs. 303–307 include portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 332 ] Stikker, Dirk U., 10–14 [ Pgs. 10–14 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 25–30 [ Pgs. 25–30 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 44–45 [ Pgs. 44–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 392 n [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 437–438 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 479 n [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] Strauss, Franz Josef, 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 115 n [ Pg. 115 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 261 ] Strulak, Tadeusz, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Sweden, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 290 ] Switzerland, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 599–601 [ Pgs. 599–601 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] Symington, James W., 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Symington, Stuart, 721 n [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 326 ] Tartter, Jean R., 55 n [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 25 ] Taylor, Rush W., Jr., 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Terruzzi, Giulio, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 201 n [ Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 215 n [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 134 and Doc. 135 ] , 328 n [ Pg. 328 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Multilateral force, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 50 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 255–256 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Soviet troop reductions, 419–420 [ Pgs. 419–420 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] Thomson, George ( see also Offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG)), 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 551–552 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 243 ] Thorneycroft, Peter, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 54 ] Tomkins, Edward, 615–617 [ Pgs. 615–617 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 764–765 [ Pgs. 764–765 include portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] Topaloglu, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 189 ] Toscano, Mario, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] Toumayan, Alec G., 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 768 n [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 332 ] Treasury, U.S. Department of, 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 664 n [ Pg. 664 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Trend, Burke, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 255 ] Trezise, Philip H., 17 n [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Tsarapkin, Semen K., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] Turkey, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 311 ] Tuthill, John W., 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 109 n [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 110–111 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 355–356 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 152 ] Tyler, William R., 8 n [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 92 n [ Pg. 92 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 107 n [ Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 179 n [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force, 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] de Gaulle-Rusk discussions, 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] European Economic Community, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] European unification, 9 n [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 182–186 [ Pgs. 182–186 include portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 80 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 9 ] Multilateral Force, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 43–44 [ Pgs. 43–44 include portions of Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , and Doc. 21 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] U.S.-British discussions, 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 78 ] U.S. policy, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 188 n [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31–34 [ Pgs. 31–34 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 689–691 [ Pgs. 689–691 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] French policies, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 73 n [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] U.S. infrastructure contribution, 44–47 [ Pgs. 44–47 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 39 ] U.S. commitments to Europe, 76–77 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 35 ] U.S. policy, 184–186 [ Pgs. 184–186 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] United Kingdom ( see also British and U.S.-British subheadings under other subjects ; Offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG); North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Malta, 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 31 ] Wilson visit to U.S., 137–152 [ Pgs. 137–152 include portions of Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 156–160 [ Pgs. 156–160 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] Johnson-Wilson discussions, 137–139 [ Pgs. 137–139 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] preparations for, 130–131 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 54 ] United Nations (UN), 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 585–588 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 258 ] U.S. commitments to Europe ( see also North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Nuclear sharing; Nuclear weapons), 76–77 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 230–231 [ Pgs. 230–231 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] European positions, 297–298 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 122 ] French position, 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 123–124 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 53 ] FRG position, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 693–695 [ Pgs. 693–695 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] Mansfield resolution, 458–460 [ Pgs. 458–460 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] NSC discussions, 571–574 [ Pgs. 571–574 include portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Swiss position, 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Symington amendment, 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 315 ] U.S.-French discussions, 160–163 [ Pgs. 160–163 include portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 761–764 [ Pgs. 761–764 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] U.S. policy, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 729–733 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 318 ] Vaes (Belgium), 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 274 ] Valenti, Jack, 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Valls, Aurelio, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 327 ] Van Bellingen (Belgium), 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 274 ] Van der Straeten-Waillet, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 268 ] Van Hollen, Christopher, 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Van Rolleghem, Georges Jacques, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 113 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Vest, George S., 181 n [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 209 n [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 236 n [ Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] , 253 n [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 330 n [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 339 n [ Pg. 339 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 504 n [ Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] Vietnam, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 283–284 [ Pgs. 283–284 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 701–703 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 308 ] French position, 124–125 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 308 ] NATO discussions, 287–288 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 525–526 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 232 ] Vinci, Piero, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 205 ] Vine, Richard D., 787 n [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] Von Der Groeben, Hans, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 336 ] Von Hase, 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] Von Hassel, Kai Uwe, 143–145 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 279–281 [ Pgs. 279–281 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 428–430 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 183 ] Von Lilienfeld, Georg, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 306 ] Von Staden, Berndt, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] Wabeke, Bertus, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 205 ] Walker, Julius W., 248 n [ Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Walske, Carl, 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 309 ] Watson, Adam, 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Weber, Heinz, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Weiss, Seymour, 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 21 ] Weitnauer (Switzerland), 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] Welles, Ben, 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Western European Union (WEU), 569–570 [ Pgs. 569–570 include portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Westrick, Ludgar, 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 57–58 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 176 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 253–255 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 324 ] Wilson, Harold, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 190–191 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Johnson, correspondence with, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 296 n [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 396–398 [ Pgs. 396–398 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Multilateral Force, 36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 80–81 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 126–132 [ Pgs. 126–132 include portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] ., 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 296 n [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 121 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 396–398 [ Pgs. 396–398 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 273 ] offset negotiations (U.S.-British-FRG), 457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] visit to Soviet Union, 316–318 [ Pgs. 316–318 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] visit to U.S., 137–152 [ Pgs. 137–152 include portions of Doc. 57 , Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 156–160 [ Pgs. 156–160 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] meetings with Johnson, 137–139 [ Pgs. 137–139 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 146–152 [ Pgs. 146–152 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] preparations for, 130–131 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 54 ] Winiewicz, Jozef, 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Wright, Oliver, 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Wyle (DOD/ISA), 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Yugoslavia, 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 333 ] Zuckerman, Sir Solly, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ]