FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XII, WESTERN EUROPE Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XII Western Europe United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Western Europe (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Note on U.S. Covert Actions Western Europe Denmark (Documents 1-24) France (Documents 25-86) Italy (Documents 87-146) Portugal (Documents 147-176) Spain (Documents 177-224) United Kingdom (Documents 225-298) Vatican (Documents 299-313) Canada (Documents 314-349) Index Sources Sources Sources for the Foreign Relations Series The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Many of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration. The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department’s indexed central files for these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XII In preparing this volume, the editor made extensive use of Presidential papers and other White House records at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. The bulk of the foreign policy records at the Johnson Library are in the Country Files and other component parts of the National Security File, such as Head of State Correspondence. Equal in importance to the White House records at the Johnson Library were the records of the Department of State. The Department’s central files contain the cable traffic recording U.S. diplomatic relations; memoranda of diplomatic conversations; and memoranda proposing action or providing information. Some important documents are found only in the Department’s lot files. The Conference Files maintained by the Executive Secretariat contain briefing materials as well as records of conversations. Documentation on initiatives that were not approved is often found only in desk or bureau files. This volume includes a number of intelligence records. Among the intelligence records reviewed for the volume were those in country and intelligence files at the Johnson Library, the files of the Directors of Central Intelligence, especially John McCone, CIA intelligence reports and summaries, retired files of the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research containing National Intelligence Estimates, and the INR Historical Files. The Central Intelligence Agency provides the Department of State historians access to intelligence documents from records in its custody and at the Presidential libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the CIA’s History Staff, part of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and many of these records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59. See National Archives and Records Administration below for a description of those Department of State lot files that have already been transferred. Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327 Files of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, 1948-1974. EUR/CAN Files: Lot 70 D 89 Political files (Canadian Relations with the United States), 1967. EUR/SPP Files: Lot 70 D 35 Spanish political and economic files, 1967; Spanish political files, 1965, 1966. EUR/SPP Files: Lot 71 D 32 Spanish political and economic files, 1968 and 1969. EUR/WE Files: Lot 72 D 441 French Desk files, political files relating to France, 1958-1964. EUR/WE Files: Lot 72 D 509 General subject files on Italian affairs, 1950-1972. EUR/WE Files: Lot 73 D 167 Denmark subject files, internal memos, and political affairs, 1959-1972. INR Files Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for Italy, 1963-1964. INR Files Records of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 303 Committee Records. Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420 Records relating to the Palomares incident, 1966-1968. SIG Files: Lot 74 D 355 Records of the Senior Interdepartmental Group for Europe, 1967-1968. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State Central Files AID PORT: aid to Portugal, general policy, plans, coordination AID (SP): aid to Spain, general policy, plans, coordination AID (US): general U.S. aid policy, plans, coordination AV 12-2 S AFR: sale, purchase, or transfer of aircraft and aeronautical equipment to South Africa DEF (MLF): Defense affairs, multilateral force DEF 1 UK: defense policy, plans and readiness, United Kingdom DEF 4 NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, collective defense pacts and alliances DEF 4 SP-US: collective defense pacts and alliances, Spain-U.S. DEF 6 IT: armed forces, Italy DEF 6 UK: armed forces, United Kingdom DEF 6-1 UK: army, United Kingdom DEF 12-5 GER-PORT: procurement and sale of armaments, Germany-Portugal DEF 12-5 IT: procurement and sale of armaments, Italy DEF 12-5 PORT: procurement and sale of armaments, Portugal DEF 14-5 SP-US: use of armed forces for peaceful purposes, Spain-U.S. DEF 15 SP-US: bases and installations, Spain-U.S. DEF 15-4 FR-US: bases and installations, agreements and leases, France-U.S. DEF 15-4 GREENLAND: bases and installations agreements and leases, Greenland DEF 15-4 SP-US: bases and installations agreements and leases, Spain-U.S. DEF 19-3 PORT-US: military assistance, organizations and conferences, Portugal-U.S. DEF 12 UK: armaments, United Kingdom DEF 12-5 UK: procurement and sale of armaments, United Kingdom DEF 17 US: military transportation, U.S. DEF 17-1 US: flight clearances, U.S. DEF 19-3 US-PORT: organizations and conferences relating to military assistance, U.S.-Portugal ECIN 3 EEC: organizations and conferences, European Economic Community (Common Market) ECIN 6 EEC-SP: Spanish membership in the European Economic Community EEC 3: organizations and conferences, European Economic Community FN 6-1 CUBA: credits, loans to Cuba FN 12 US: balance of payments, U.S. FN 17 UK: money, currency, United Kingdom HLTH 10 SP: radiation hazards and effects, Spain NATO 3 LUX: North Atlantic Treaty Organization meetings, Luxembourg NATO 6 SP: North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments, Spain NATO 17-1: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, flight clearances ORG 7 S: visits of the Secretary of State ORG 7 TR: visits, travel requests POL 1 AFR-FR: political affairs, general policy and background, Africa-France POL 1 ALG: political affairs, general policy and background, Algeria POL 1 CAN-CHICOM: political affairs, general policy and background, Canada-Chinese Communists POL 1 FR: political affairs, general policy and background, France POL 1 FR-US: political affairs, general policy and background, France-U.S. POL 1 IT: political affairs, general policy and background, Italy POL 1 IT-US: political affairs, general policy and background, Italy-U.S. POL 1 PORT: political affairs, general policy and background, Portugal POL 1 SP: political affairs, general policy and background, Spain POL 1 UK: political affairs, general policy and background, United Kingdom POL 3-8 CAN-US: organizations and alignments, Canada-U.S. POL 4 FR-US: agreements, treaties, France-U.S. POL 5 IT: law, Italy POL 7 FR: visits, meetings, French officials POL 7 IT: visits, meetings, Italy POL 7 SP: visits, meetings, Spain POL 7 UK: visits, meetings, United Kingdom POL 7 US/HARRIMAN: visits, meetings of W. Averell Harriman POL 10 PORT: colonialism, imperialism, Portugal POL 12 IT: political parties, Italy POL 12 UK: political parties, United Kingdom POL 15 FR: central government affairs, France POL 15 IT: central government affairs, Italy POL 15 SP-US: central government affairs, Spain-U.S. POL 15 UK: central government affairs, United Kingdom POL 15-1 FR: Head of State, executive branch, France POL 15-1 IT: Head of State, executive branch, Italy POL 15-1 PORT: Head of State, executive branch, Portugal POL 15-1 UK: Head of State, executive branch, United Kingdom POL 16 CHICOM: recognition, Chinese Communists POL 17 FR-US: diplomatic and consular representation, France-U.S. POL 17 SP-US: diplomatic and consular representation, Spain-U.S. POL 17-5 US-SP: diplomatic changes in status, arrivals and departures, U.S.-Spain POL 18 GIB: provincial, municipal, and state government, Gibraltar POL 19 GIB: government of dependencies, Gibraltar POL 19 PORT: government of dependencies, Portugal POL 23-9 THE CONGO: rebellion, coups, The Congo POL 27 VIET S: military operations, South Vietnam POL 30 ANG: defectors and expellees, Angola POL 32-4 GER: unification of territories, Germany POL 33-4 CAN: territorial waters, Canada POL 33-4 CAN-US: territorial waters, Canada-U.S. POL 33-4 SP-US/SATRUSTEGUI: high seas waters, boundaries, Spain-U.S./Satrustegui POL 33-6 CUBA: high seas waters and boundaries, Cuba POL 33-8 CAN-US: Law of the Sea, Canada-U.S. POL CAN-US: general political affairs and relations, Canada-U.S. POL CHICOM-IT: general political affairs and relations, Chinese Communists-Italy POL FR-NETH: general political affairs and relations, France-Netherlands POL FR-US: general political affairs and relations, France-U.S. POL IT-US: general political affairs and relations, Italy-U.S. POL PORT-US: general political affairs and relations, Portugal-U.S. POL SP-US: general political affairs and relations, Spain-U.S. POL UK-US: general political affairs and relations, United Kingdom-U.S. POL VIET S: general political affairs and relations, South Vietnam PS 8-4 SP-US: protection of property, seizure, damage, Spain-US. SOC 12-2 PORT: missionaries, Portugal STR 10 CUBA: transportation controls, Cuba STR 12-3 CUBA-FR: shipments of non-U.S. origin goods, Cuba-France STR 13-1 USSR-MOZ: Consultative Group operations, meetings, and actions, USSR-Mozambique Lot Files Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966. Bohlen Papers: Lot 74 D 379 Files of Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen, 1942-1970. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, May 1961-December 1964. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials for 1965. Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials, January-October 1966. Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586 Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on trips taken and international conferences attended by the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials, September 1966-April 1967. Copenhagen Post Files: FRC Acc. 84-77-001 Records relating to the Thule, Greenland air crash, 1968. EUR/AIS Files: Lot 68 D 436 Selected Political, Defense, and Economic Files for Italy, 1961-1965. EUR/CAN Files: Lot 69 D 35 General political files for Canada, 1966. EUR/SPP Files: Lot 68 D 401 Portuguese Desk Files, 1958-1965. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1953-1964. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, 1966. Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of conversation of the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, 1961-1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147 Minutes of the Secretary of State’s staff meetings, 1961-1964. S/P Files: Lot 74 D 344 Senior Interdepartmental Group memos, agenda, and correspondence, January 1968-December 1969. S/S-I Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961-1968, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to the National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents, 1961-1966. S/S-S Files: Lot 70 D 263 Senior Interdepartmental Group memos, agenda, record agreements, and policy documents, March 1968-January 1969. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. Harriman Papers Special files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service Files, Special Public Service Files, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Mission Files Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of President Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Country File Head of State Correspondence File International Meetings and Travel File Memos to the President National Security Council Meetings File Special Head of State Correspondence File Special Files President’s Daily Diary White House Central Files Other Personal Papers Papers of Francis M. Bator Papers of Henry H. Fowler Published Sources U.S. Government Documentary Collections U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin , 1963-1968. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963-1968. __________. American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950. __________. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967-1969. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964. __________. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, 1965, 1967, 1968-69 . Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965-1969. Memoirs Alphand, Hervé. L’Etonnement d’étre: Journal, 1939-1973 . Paris: Fayard, 1977. Califano, Joseph A. The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson: The White House Years . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Couve de Murville, Maurice. Une politique étrangére, 1958-1969 . Paris: Plon, 1971. De Gaulle, Charles. Discours et Messages, 1940-1946 . Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1946. __________. The Complete War Memoirs . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964. Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 . New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Nenni, Pietro. La battaglia socialista per la svolta a sinistra nella terza legislatura, 1958-1963 . Milano: Edizioni Avanti, 1963. Pearson, Lester B. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson . New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972 Ritchie, Charles. Storm Signals: More undiplomatic diaries, 1962-1971 . Toronto: Macmillan, 1983. Valenti, Jack. A Very Human President. New York: W.W. Norton, 1975. Wilson, Harold. The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America, and the State of Israel. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981. __________. The Labour Government, 1964-1970: A Personal Record . London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981. Zuckerman, Sir Solly. Monkeys, Men and Missiles: An Autobiography, 1946-1988. New York: W.W. Norton, 1988. Abbreviations Abbreviations ABM, anti-ballistic missiles AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFB, Air Force Base AID, Agency for International Development ANF, Atlantic Nuclear Force ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States (security treaty) ASP, American System of Preferences ASW, anti-submarine warfare BAOR, British Army on the Rhine BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BOE, Bank of England B/P, balance of payments BUSEC, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Mission to the European Regional Organizations CA, Department of State circular airgram CAP, Common Agricultural Policy (of the European Economic Community) CAS, Controlled American Source CBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation CDT, Central Daylight Time CEA, French atomic energy agency CENTO, Central Treaty Organization ChiCom(s), Chinese Communist(s) ChiRep, Chinese representation question CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe COB, close of business COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls CONUS, Continental United States CSAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force DC, Christian Democratic Party (Italy) Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Dept, Department of State Deptel, Department of State telegram DM, Deutsche Mark DMZ, Demilitarized Zone DOD, Department of Defense EC, European Community ECBUS, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Mission to the European Regional Organizations EEC, European Economic Community (Common Market) EFTA, European Free Trade Association ELDO, European Launcher Development Organization Emb, Embassy Embtel, Embassy telegram ENI, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (Italian labor union) EST, Eastern Standard Time EUCOM, European Command (U.S. Army) EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/CAN, Office of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Committee Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution) EXIM, Export-Import Bank ExtAff, External Affairs FAA, Federal Aviation Administration; Foreign Assistance Act FCN, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (treaties) FE, Far East FO, Foreign Office FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FonSec, Foreign Secretary FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs GA, General Assembly (United Nations) GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GMT, Greenwich Meridian Time (Zebra) GNP, Gross National Product GOC, Government of Canada GOD, Government of Denmark GOF, Government of France GOI, Government of Italy GOP, Government of Portugal GOS, Government of Spain G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GVN, Government of Vietnam HMG, Her Majesty’s Government IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM, inter-continental ballistic missile ICC, International Control Commission ICJ, International Court of Justice IMF, International Monetary Fund IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (UNESCO) IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JUSMG, Joint U.S. Military Group KR, Kennedy Round (GATT) L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State LA, Latin America LBJ, initials of President Lyndon B. Johnson LDC, Less Developed Countries Limdis, Limited Distribution Loran, Long-Range Navigational Aid MAP, Military Assistance Program MinDef, Minister of Defense MLF, Multilateral Force MOD, Minister of Defense NAC, North Atlantic Council (NATO) NAFTA, North Atlantic Free Trade Area NAMSO, NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATUS, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NLF, National Liberation Front (Vietnam) Noforn, No Foreign Dissemination NORAD, North American Air Defense Command (Canada-U.S.) NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NVN, North Vietnam OAS, Organization of American States OAU, Organization of African Unity OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ORTF, Office de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française PCF, Parti Communist Français (French Communist Party) PCI, Partito Communista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) PermRep, Permanent Representative (United Nations) P.L., Public Law PLI, Liberal Party of Italy PM, Prime Minister POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants PriMin, Prime Minister PSDI, Democratic Socialist Party (Italy) PSI, Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) PSIUP, Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (Italy) R&D, research and development RDF, Radio Diffusion Francaise reftel, reference telegram RG, Record Group RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State S, Office of the Secretary of State SAC, Strategic Air Command SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO) SACLANT, Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic S/AH, Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State SAM, surface-to-air missiles SC, Security Council (United Nations) SDR, Special Drawing Rights (IMF) SEA, Southeast Asia SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SecDef, Secretary of Defense septel, separate telegram SETAF, U.S. Army South European Task Force SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe SIFAR, Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State SPD, Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands (Socialist Party of Germany) STR, Office of the Special Trade Representative SVN, South Vietnam SYG, Secretary-General (United Nations) U, Office of the Under Secretary of State UAM, African and Malagasy Union UAR, United Arab Republic UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UPI, United Press International USAFE, United States Air Force, Europe USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe USEC, United States Mission to the Economic Community USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USIS, United States Information Service USNAVEUR, United States Naval Forces, Europe USRO, United States Mission to the European Regional Organizations (in Paris) USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations VC, Viet Cong Vipto, series indicator for telegrams from the Vice President WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State WEU, Western European Union Persons Persons Ackley, H. Gardner, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, November 1964-March 1968; Ambassador to Italy from April 1968 Alphand, Hervé, French Ambassador to the United States until October 1965; thereafter Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry Anderson, George W., Jr., Ambassador to Portugal until June 1966 Anderson, Robert, Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, August 1965-July 1966; Country Director, French and Benelux Affairs, July 1966-July 1968 Armstrong, Willis C., Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until April 1964 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966; U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, June 26-September 25, 1968 Bator, Francis, senior member, National Security Council staff, April 1964-September 1967; Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, October 1965-September 1967 Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., Ambassador to Portugal from May 1966 Blair, William McCormick, Jr., Ambassador to Denmark until July 1964 Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 9, 1968; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Brown, George, British Deputy Prime Minister, October 17, 1964-August 10, 1966; also Minister for Economic Affairs, April 6-August 10, 1966; thereafter Foreign Minister until March 16, 1968 Brubeck, William H., member, National Security Council staff, until November 1964 Bruce, David K.E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom Buffum, William B., Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until August 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, September 1965-December 1966; thereafter Deputy Representative to the United Nations Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966; Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council, June-August 1967 Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until March 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (East Asian and Pacific Affairs after November 1, 1966) from March 1964 Burdett, William C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until June 1964 Butler, Richard A., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until October 16, 1964 Butterworth, W. Walton, Ambassador to Canada, October 1962-September 1968 Caccia, Sir Harold, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Cadieux, Marcel, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1964 Caetano, Marcelo, Prime Minister of Portugal from September 26, 1968 Califano, Joseph, Special Assistant to the President from January 1965 Callaghan, James, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, October 17, 1964-November 30, 1967 Castiella y Ma’z, Fernando Maria, Spanish Foreign Minister Cicognani, Cardinal Amleto Giovanni, Vatican Secretary of State Clifford, Clark, Secretary of Defense from March 1, 1968 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister until June 1, 1968; thereafter Minister of Finance and National Economy until July 10, 1968; thereafter Prime Minister Creel, Robert C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until September 1965 Davis, Nathaniel, member, National Security Council staff De Gaulle, Charles, President of France De Lorenzo, General Giovanni, Italian Army Chief of Staff until April 1967 Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States from April 1965 Debré, Michel, French Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, January 9, 1966-June 1, 1968; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs Dell’Acqua, Archbishop Angelo, Substitute for Ordinary Affairs, Vatican Secretariat of State Deming, Frederick L., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury until March 31, 1965 Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, British Prime Minister until October 16, 1964 Duke, Angier Biddle, Chief of Protocol, Department of State, to January 20, 1965; Ambassador to Denmark from September 1968 Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister, March 5, 1965-December 29, 1965; and February 23, 1966-June 5, 1968 Fenoaltea, Sergio, Italian Ambassador to the United States until May 1967 Fowler, Henry H., Secretary of the Treasury, April 1, 1965-December 23, 1968 Franco y Bahamonde, General Francisco, President and Prime Minister of Spain Fried, Edward, senior member, National Security Council staff Garin, Vasco Vieira, Portuguese Ambassador to the United States Garrigues y D’az Canabate, Antonio, Spanish Ambassador to the United States until April 1965 Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, French Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, until January 9, 1966; President of the Commission des Finances de l’Economie generale et du Plan, April 1967-May 1968 Givan, Walker, Officer in Charge of Italian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until June 1966 Goldberg, Arthur J., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, July 28, 1965-June 24, 1968 Gordon, Walter L., Canadian Minister of Finance and Receiver General until November 10, 1965; Minister Without Portfolio, January 9-April 3, 1967; thereafter President of the Privy Council until March 10, 1968 Gordon Walker, Patrick, British Foreign Secretary, October 17, 1964-January 22, 1965; Minister Without Portfolio, January 6-August 29, 1967; thereafter Minister of Education and Science until April 6, 1968 Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister Gui, Luigi, Italian Minister of Education until June 25, 1968; thereafter Minister of Defense Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 17, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Hartling, Poul, Danish Foreign Minister from February 1, 1968 Healey, Denis W., British Defense Minister from October 17, 1964 Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 28, 1965; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966; thereafter Director Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1965 Ingraham, George M., Country Director for Scandinavia, Finland-Iceland, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from November 1968 Jenkins, Roy, British Minister of Aviation, 1964-1965; Secretary of State for Home Department, December 23, 1965-November 30, 1967; thereafter Chancellor of the Exchequer Johnson, G. Griffith, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs until May 1965 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 12, 1964; Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964-September 1965; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 1, 1965-October 9, 1966 Judd, Thomas M., Officer in Charge of UK Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until June 1966; Office of UK-Ireland-Malta Affairs, June 1966-September 1967 Kaiser, Philip M., Deputy Chief of Mission in London from July 1964 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Attorney General, September 4, 1964-September 30, 1966; thereafter Under Secretary of State Kiselyak, Charles A., Officer in Charge of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, August 1965-June 1967 Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 29, 1966-December 31, 1967 Kosygin, Aleksei N., Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from October 15, 1964 Krag, Jens Otto, Prime Minister of Denmark until January 24, 1968; also Danish Foreign Minister, November 28, 1966-October 1, 1967 Landau, George, Country Director for Spain and Portugal, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1966 Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1965 Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe; also Commander, U.S. European Command Leone, Giovanni, Italian Prime Minister, June 25-November 19, 1968 Leonhart, William, Ambassador to Tanganyika until January 1966; Deputy to the Special Assistant to the President, February 1966-April 1967 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador to Vietnam until June 1964 Lucet, Charles, Director of Political Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry until December 1965; thereafter French Ambassador to the United States Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January 3, 1964-March 17, 1965; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until May 31, 1966 Marks, Leonard C., Director, United States Information Agency, September 1, 1965-December 6, 1968 Martin, Paul, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs until April 1968 Martin, William McChesney, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board McBride, Robert H., Deputy Chief of Mission in France, September 1964-May 1967 McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965 McKillop, David H., Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, May 1964-June 1966; Country Director for Scandinavia, Iceland-Finland, June 1966-November 1968 McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968 Medici, Giuseppe, Italian Foreign Minister, June 25-November 19, 1968 Meloy, Francis E., Jr., Director of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until April 1964; thereafter Counselor of Embassy and Deputy Chief of Mission in Rome Merchant, Livingston T., former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Merry del Val y Alzola, Marquis Alfonso, Spanish Ambassador to the United States from May 1964 Messmer, Pierre, French Minister of the Armed Forces Moro, Aldo, Prime Minister of Italy until June 5, 1968; concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 29, 1964-March 5, 1965, and December 29, 1965-January 21, 1966 Moyers, Bill D., Special Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, October 1964-January 1967; also White House Press Secretary, July 1965-January 1967 Nenni, Pietro, President of the Italian Socialist Party; Deputy Prime Minister of Italy until June 5, 1968; Italian Foreign Minister from December 13, 1968 Nitze, Paul H., Secretary of the Navy until June 1967; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense from July 1, 1967 Nogueira, Alberto Franco, Portuguese Foreign Minister O’Brien, Sir Leslie Kenneth, Chairman of the Bank of England from 1966 Ortiz, Frank V., Jr., Officer in Charge of Spanish Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1966 Ortona, Egidio, Italian Ambassador to the United States from June 1967 Paul VI (Giovanni Battista Montini), Pope Pearson, Lester B., Prime Minister of Canada until April 20, 1968 Pereira, Duarte Vaz Pinto de Sa, Portuguese Permanent Representative to the United Nations from June 1967 Peyrefitte, Alain, French Minister for Information until January 9, 1966; thereafter Minister Delegate for Economic Research, Atomic and Space Affairs until April 1, 1967; thereafter Minister of Education until June 1, 1968 Pompidou, Georges, Prime Minister of France until July 10, 1968 Raborn, Vice Admiral William F., Jr. (ret.), Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966 Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Ambassador to Italy until March 1968 Ritchie, Albert Edgar, Canadian Deputy Under Secretary for External Affairs from August 1964 until July 1966; thereafter Ambassador to the United States Ritchie, Charles S.A., Canadian Ambassador to the United States until July 1966; Permanent Representative to NATO, July 1966-1967 Robinson, H. Basil, Minister, Canadian Embassy, until September 1965; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Ronne, Torben, Danish Ambassador to the United States from April 1965 Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 31, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Salans, Carl F., Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, October 1964-June 1965; Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, June 1965-March 1967; thereafter Deputy Legal Adviser Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Prime Minister until September 26, 1968 Saragat, Giuseppe, Italian Foreign Minister until December 29, 1964; thereafter President of Italy Schaetzel, J. Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, until September 1966; thereafter Representative to the European Communities Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Segni, Antonio, President of Italy until December 6, 1964 Sharp, Mitchell, Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce until January 3, 1966; Minister of Finance and Receiver General, November 11, 1965-April 20, 1968; thereafter Secretary of State for External Affairs Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., Ambassador to France from April 1968 Shullaw, J. Harold, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, April 1964-December 1967; Country Director for United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta, December 1967-April 1968 Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Smith, Rufus Z., Director, Office of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, March 1966-September 1968 Solomon, Anthony M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from June 1, 1965 Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic Politico-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until October 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Stabler, Wells, Country Director for Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1966 Stevenson, Adlai E., Jr., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965 Stewart, Michael, British Minister for Education and Science, October 17, 1964-January 23, 1965; Foreign Minister, January 23, 1965-August 11, 1966; and from March 16, 1968; also Deputy Prime Minister, August 10, 1966-March 16, 1968 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, September 1965-July 1968; thereafter Ambassador to Poland Tabor, Hans, Danish Permanent Representative to the United Nations until September 1967; Foreign Minister, October 1967-January 1968 Tanguy, Charles R., Country Director for France and Benelux Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from September 1968 Taylor, General Maxwell D., Ambassador to Vietnam, July 1964-July 1965 Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations Thomaz, Rear Admiral Americo de Deus Rodrigues, President of Portugal Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 1966; also Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, July 1964-October 1965; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 1967 Trend, Sir Burke, British Secretary of the Cabinet Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, Canadian Minister of Justice and Attorney General, April 4, 1967-April 20, 1968; thereafter Prime Minister Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 18, 1965 Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to the President until May 1966 Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 1964-June 30, 1967 Vinci, Piero, Italian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Wagner, Robert E., Ambassador to Spain from June 1968 Warnke, Paul C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from August 1, 1967 Wheeler, General Earle G., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until July 3, 1964; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Wheeler, Joseph C., Principal Officer at Florence from May 1966 White, Katharine Elkus, Ambassador to Denmark, April 1964-September 1968 White, Lee C., Associate Counsel to the President until 1965; Special Counsel to the President until 1966 Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister from October 16, 1964 Woodward, Robert F., Ambassador to Spain until February 1965 Note on U.S. Covert Actions Note on U.S. Covert Actions In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute to include in the Foreign Relations series comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have sought to present essential documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of previously-declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidencies. Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington. 1 CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A. NSC 10/2 directed CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [ sic ] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.” 2 The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. 3 In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to OPC through the DCI. During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. 4 The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency. As the Truman administration ended, CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations. NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee The Eisenhower administration began narrowing CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. 5 A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA. 6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects. 7 After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June which recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group. 8 From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs. 9 President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) to assist in discharging these responsibilities. 10 NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee. 11 The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected. 12 1 NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257 . 2 NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, printed ibid., Document 292 . 3 Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, printed ibid., Document 298 . 4 NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, in Michael Warner, editor, The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 437-439. 5 William M. Leary, editor, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; the text of NSC 5412 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1950-1960, Development of the Intelligence Community. 6 Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents , pp. 63, 147-148; Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities , United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50-51. The texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1950-1960, Development of the Intelligence Community. 7 Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents , p. 63. 8 Ibid., p. 82. 9 See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. X, Documents 270 and 278 . 10 For text of NSAM No. 124, see ibid., vol. VIII, Document 68 . NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed ibid., 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 56 . 11 For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204 . 12 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence , pp. 56-57. Denmark Denmark 1. Editorial Note 2. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 23, 1968, 6:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov. The memorandum is Part III of III. According to a memorandum of conversation marked Part I of III, the group first discussed a proposed Department of Defense press release that described the findings of the ground survey team that visited the crash site. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in Leddy’s office. 3. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark Washington, January 27, 1968, 2320Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy. 4. Informal Record of Remarks Washington, January 27, 1968. Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret. No indication of the drafting officer appears on the record. Leddy gave Ronne a verbatim copy of the record during their meeting on January 27 (see Document 3) which Ronne included in his January 27 telegram to Krag reporting on the meeting. Ronne’s telegram is printed in Greenland During the Cold War, vol. 2, pp. 451-453. 5. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark Washington, January 28, 1968, 2334Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Leddy. 6. Intelligence Note Washington, January 31, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The intelligence note was forwarded to Rusk by INR Director Thomas R. Hughes. 7. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State Copenhagen, February 8, 1968, 1720Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Confidential. 8. Action Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Scandinavian Affairs (McKillop) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) Washington, February 13, 1968. Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov and cleared by Baker (EUR/RPM), Berlack (L/EUR), and Trippe (G/PM). 9. Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 23, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Confidential. Drafted by Tucker (EUR/SCAN) and cleared by Fulton (G/PM). 10. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) Washington, February 24, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 US. Secret. 11. Note from the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 26, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. No classification marking. Ronne presented the note to Rusk during a 15-minute meeting with Rusk, Leddy, and McKillop that began at 4:05 p.m. on February 26. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) A memorandum of Ronne’s conversation with Rusk was transmitted to Copenhagen in telegram 120936, February 27. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 12. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) Washington, March 11, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted on March 5 by Klebenov and cleared by McKillop, Getz (EUR/RPM), Trippe (G/PM), and Berlack (L/EUR). 13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark Washington, March 13, 1968, 2339Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Klebenov on March 12, cleared by Toon in substance, and approved by Leddy. Pouched to Moscow. 14. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, March 28, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to “The Secretary” when it was typed, but “Under” was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between “The” and “Secretary.” 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to “The Secretary” when it was typed, but “Under” was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between “The” and “Secretary.” 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark Washington, April 3, 1968, 1724Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Klebenov, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy. 16. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) Washington, April 17, 1968. Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Trippe and Klebenov and cleared in L, G, and EUR. 17. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) Washington, April 26, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17-1 US. Secret. 18. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 9, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on May 7 and cleared by Trippe (G/PM), Belman (L), and Berlack (L/EUR). 19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark Washington, May 13, 1968, 1709Z. Source: Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 11, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy. 20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark Washington, May 18, 1968, 0235Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 17, cleared by McKillop and in substance by Berlack (L/EUR), and approved by Leddy. 21. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) Washington, May 29, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov. 22. Note From the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 31, 1968. Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Leddy and Ronne exchanged notes at a meeting on May 31. Leddy reported to Copenhagen on the meeting in telegram 174887, June 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 23. Editorial Note 24. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Ingram (EUR/SCAN). The memorandum is Part III of IV. Memoranda covering the other portions of the meeting are ibid. The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the State Department. 1. Editorial Note 1. Editorial Note On January 21, 1968, a fire broke out aboard a nuclear-armed U.S. Strategic Air Command B-52 bomber, based at Plattsburgh Air Force Base in New York, while it was over Greenland on a routine mission. The pilot sought to make an emergency landing at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland but then ordered an immediate evacuation when smoke filled the cabin and electrical power went out. The pilotless aircraft crashed 7-1/2 miles from Thule Base on the ice of North Star Bay. The conventional high explosives in the B-52’s four thermonuclear bombs went off, scattering radioactive debris over the ice, but there was no nuclear detonation. Six of the seven crew members survived. For more information on the accident, see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pages 156-203. In its January 22 press release announcing the crash, the Department of Defense stated that the aircraft carried nuclear weapons but that they were unarmed and thus there was no danger of a nuclear explosion at the crash site. (Telegram 102343, January 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, DEF 17 US) On January 22 U.S. Ambassador to Denmark Katherine White warned the Department of State the “repercussions in Denmark may be severe in light of special nuclear sensitivities.” (Telegram 2814 from Copenhagen; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) Within hours Danish Foreign Minister Tabor issued a press release stating, in part: “The Danish policy regarding nuclear weapons also applies to Greenland and also the air space over Greenland. There are no nuclear weapons in Greenland. The American authorities are aware of Denmark’s nuclear policy and the Danish Govt assumes that there are no American over-flights of Greenland by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 2835 from Copenhagen, January 22; ibid.) Two hours later Danish Prime Minister Krag made a similar statement, specifying that “there can be no overflights over Greenland by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 2838 from Copenhagen, January 22; ibid.) Both statements noted, however, that in times of emergency it could become necessary for an American aircraft to land in Greenland. The statements by Tabor and Krag expressed a view of Danish nuclear policy that differed markedly from the way it was understood by U.S. officials, a difference that precipitated 4 months of negotiations resulting in a new agreement between the two countries. This critical period in relations between Denmark and the United States—and the Cold War developments that led up to it-later became the focus of a study commissioned by the Government of Denmark. In 1995 the Danish Government asked the newly established Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) to produce a historical review of U.S. overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons and the role of Thule Air Force Base in that connection for the period from 1945 to 1968. The government also asked that the report deal with the decision-making process and the general situation so far as security policy and international relations were concerned. In 1997 DUPI submitted to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs and then published a two-volume study entitled Gronland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik, 1945-68 ( Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy, 1945-68 ). DUPI indicated that its access to Danish Government archives had, in general, been satisfactory but that its extensive research in U.S. Government archives did not include privileged access. Volume 1, in Danish, contains 614 pages of analysis. Volume 2 contains facsimiles of 102 documents from Danish and U.S. archives. DUPI also published a 51-page Summary consisting of an English translation of the concluding chapter of volume 1. 2. Memorandum of Conversation 2. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 23, 1968, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT U.S. Air Force Routes PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Torben Ronne, Embassy of Denmark Mr. Per Fergo, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Denmark Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy, EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., EUR Mr. David H. McKillop, Country Director, SCAN Mr. Eugene Klebenov, Country Desk Officer, SCAN Mr. Leddy said that the statements by Danish Government leaders on nuclear storage and overflights 2 had come as a surprise to us. Ambassador Ronne said that Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Tabor had merely re-stated Danish nuclear policy. Mr. Leddy said that we did not want to go any further into this question; that we saw no utility in pursuing the matter. Ambassador Ronne said that Danish nuclear policy covers Greenland, as the Krag and Tabor statements had pointed out. Mr. Leddy replied that we had not contradicted these statements, but that we do not want to get into a public discussion on the matter of routes; that we believe it would be most unwise to open such a discussion. Therefore, we could not add to the statement (attachment B) 3 a reference to overflights. Under the circumstances, it would probably be just as well to have no statement at all. Ambassador Ronne said that Premier Krag would, the following day, be questioned on Danish nuclear policy. The Ambassador added that Mr. Leddy was familiar with Denmark’s policy in this area. Mr. Leddy said that he felt that statement could create more problems than it solved but that he would accede to its release. He added that we did not want to set off another round of routes discussion and that we could not go any further than the present statement. Ambassador Ronne said that lack of further U.S. comment could indicate that the U.S. does not accept Denmark’s foreign policy on nuclear matters. Mr. Leddy sad that it was simply that we do not comment in a way that could lead people to speculate on alert flight routes. Ambassador Ronne said that the lack of U.S. Government comment left him in a very difficult situation. Mr. Leddy pointed out that the Danish Government had made its policy statements; that we did not challenge these statements but will not comment further on this subject. Ambassador Ronne said that he was very unhappy with the situation, and that he would be informing his Government. Ambassador Ronne said that he would call later in the evening and let us know if the Danish Government concurred in the two press statements. Mr. Leddy said that, on receiving concurrence from the Danes, we would notify the Department of Defense for an 8:00 am release, January 27. [Since the Danish Government found the shorter statement (attachment B) inadequate, the USG did not release it.] 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov. The memorandum is Part III of III. According to a memorandum of conversation marked Part I of III, the group first discussed a proposed Department of Defense press release that described the findings of the ground survey team that visited the crash site. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in Leddy’s office. 2 See Document 1 . 3 Attached is the text of a proposed Department of Defense press release, which was transmitted to Copenhagen in telegram 103632, January 23. The press release stated that news stories claiming that the B-52 was scheduled to land at Thule Airfield were wrong; the B-52 was scheduled to return to Plattsburgh Air Force Base after completing its mission without any intervening landings elsewhere; furthermore, there were not “scheduled landings of B-52’s at Thule at any time.” 4 Brackets in the source text. 3. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 3. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 1 Washington, January 27, 1968, 2320Z. 106058. Personal for the Ambassador from Leddy. 1. I called in Ambassador Ronne on the afternoon of January 21 and handed him an informal record of remarks on the background of our understandings with Denmark on the questions of storage and overflights with respect to nuclear weapons. 2 The text is being sent you by separate telegram. 3 I suggested that he communicate this record personally to Prime Minister Krag only. 2. I also showed Ronne, but did not leave with him, the texts of Embtel 406 of November 18, 1967 4 and Embtel 519 of February 6, 1964. 5 3. In making this information available to him I explained that we had done so because it had appeared to us that the public statements of Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Tabor on the questions of storage and overflights seemed to us to be inconsistent with the tacit understandings between the two governments; that we had realized that these understandings had been closely held within the Danish Government; and that in view of the delicacy of the matter we had delayed reminding the Danish Government of these understandings in the hope that the Danish leaders themselves would become aware of them from their own sources within the Danish Government. 4. Ronne said that he personally had been completely familiar with Denmark’s NATO files on this subject up to 1962 (he was chief of NATO and military affairs in FonOff 1957-62) and had never heard of these understandings. However, he raised no question about them nor did he seem surprised. He concentrated instead on the inadequacy of the public statement suggested in paragraph four 6 and on the need for the US to make some statement of its own which would reassure the Danish people. We should at least say that there have been no nuclear overflights since the accident. I replied that it would be unwise to attempt to work out at this point any statement going beyond the one proposed in Deptel 103632 7 which we have not used because it did not fully meet the desires of the Danish Government. I said that it seemed to me the only sensible course was for him first to report to Prime Minister Krag the informal record of the remarks which I had made so that he could view the matter in perspective. If the Danish Government then wished to raise with us the question of an additional public statement by the U.S. we would, of course, be willing to look at their suggestions. I reminded him, however, of the language in paragraph four of my remarks that the “U.S. Government must continue to stand by its policy of not confirming or denying publicly the presence of nuclear weapons on its aircraft or bases anywhere in the world”. Ronne agreed with this course of action. 5. Ronne then said that since we have caused all the trouble we should make some public statement expressing regret and our understanding for the concern of the Danish people. I undertook to explore the possibility of releasing a statement along these lines at the earliest suitable occasion. 6. Ronne did not explicitly press for assurances for the future (carefully omitted from the record of my remarks), but indicated that the Danish Government was greatly concerned over the nuclear question in general and would no doubt wish to pursue it further. I said that we wanted to be sure that the outgoing government, which had been in power when our understandings had been reached, was fully informed and would of course always be willing to discuss these questions with the incoming government. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy. 2 Document 4 . 3 Telegram 106059 to Copenhagen, January 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 4 This reference is incorrect. Presumably Leddy is referring to telegram 419 from Copenhagen, November 18, 1957. See footnote 4, Document 4 . 5 See footnote 6, Document 4 . 6 Paragraph 4 of Document 4 . 7 See footnote 3, Document 2 . 4. Informal Record of Remarks 4. Informal Record of Remarks 1 Washington, January 27, 1968. INFORMAL RECORD OF RECORDS MADE TO AMBASSADOR RONNE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEDDY 1. Our review of the record indicates that in 1957 we determined that the effective operation of the strategic deterrent would require sometime in the future storage of nuclear weapons at Thule, Greenland. Our records indicate that while we believed that Article II(b)(3)(ii) of the 1951 Defense Agreement 2 entitled us to store these weapons at Thule, nevertheless, we considered it important to determine whether your Government wished to be informed prior to introducing nuclear weapons into Greenland. Accordingly, our Ambassador made an approach of this nature to the then Prime Minister Hansen on November 13, 1957. 3 On November 18, 1957, Prime Minister Hansen gave our Ambassador a written statement which he characterized as informal, personal, highly secret and limited to one copy each on the Danish and American side. 4 This statement noted the United States Government’s view of the Base Agreement and that we had not submitted a concrete plan for storage nor asked questions as to the attitude of the Danish Government. The Prime Minister concluded that in these circumstances no comment on his part was necessary. He was adamant, however, that there should be no publicity now or later since any kind of leak could be highly damaging to our two countries. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister did not register objection to the possibility of storage and did not request that he be informed prior to actual introduction of nuclear weapons, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] the United States Government. 5 2. Our records also indicate that the question of nuclear weapons operations from Thule was discussed early in 1964 by Under Secretary for Greenland Brun and Ambassador Blair in relation to an accident in the state of Maryland involving a U.S. bomber carrying nuclear weapons. 6 This discussion frankly addressed the possibility that a similar accident could arise as a result of operations involving nuclear weapons at or near Thule which would raise difficult questions in the Folketing. Ambassador Blair suggested that if such an unfortunate incident ever occurred, the Danish Government could state that U.S. activities in Greenland had as their sole object the defense interests of the Free World and that they had been worked out in full cooperation with Danish defense forces and the Danish Government under terms and conditions of the 1951 Defense Agreement and in accordance with over-all Danish policies. Under Secretary Brun made no objection to this proposal and pursued the matter no further. 3. In connection with overflights of Greenland, the effective operation of the strategic deterrent has also required that such flights involving nuclear weapons be carried on from time to time in accordance with Article V (3) of the 1951 Defense Agreement. 4. As for the current situation [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], nor are there now any overflights of Greenland by U.S. strategic aircraft. I wish to emphasize again that in view of the sensitivity of military operations with nuclear weapons, the United States Government must continue to stand by its policy of neither confirming nor denying publicly the presence of nuclear weapons on its aircraft or bases anywhere in the world. In addition, I urge that your Government in addressing this problem publicly in the future limit itself to a statement along the following lines: “U.S. operations in Greenland are the subject of regular consultation between the two Governments and are in accord with the 1951 Defense Agreement as well as their respective policies. The Government of Denmark is fully aware in this connection of its responsibilities to the Danish people in Greenland for their safety and defense. We are fully satisfied that the interests of the Danish people are being protected.” 5. We hope that all public statements on this matter by either Government will be subject to consultation between the two Governments. 1 Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret. No indication of the drafting officer appears on the record. Leddy gave Ronne a verbatim copy of the record during their meeting on January 27 (see Document 3 ) which Ronne included in his January 27 telegram to Krag reporting on the meeting. Ronne’s telegram is printed in Greenland During the Cold War , vol. 2, pp. 451-453. 2 For text of the 1951 Defense Agreement, which was signed at Copenhagen, April 27, 1951, and entered into force June 8, see 2 UST 1485. 3 Ambassador Peterson advised such a course of action in telegram 376, October 31, 1957, in the belief that the “general spirit of Dano-United States relations and cooperation in Greenland in defense matters puts us under moral obligation to be frank and open with Prime Minister on matter of such potential political importance for Denmark.” The Department authorized an approach to Hansen in telegram 499, November 8. In telegram 406, November 13, Peterson reported that he had met that day with Hansen, who, because of the issue’s “serious psychological and political implications,” wanted to study it and meet again in a few days. All three telegrams are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1955-59, 711.56359. The difficulties that Hansen faced in responding to the U.S. approach are discussed in Greenland During the Cold War, Summary , pp. 21-22. 4 Peterson reported on the November 18 meeting and Hansen’s statement in telegram 419 from Copenhagen, November 18, 1957. Peterson indicated that Hansen asked him to consider his copy of the statement “purely personal.” (Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos) No copy of Hansen’s statement has been found. In telegram 105056 to Copenhagen, January 26, 1968, the Department indicated that it could not locate a copy of Hansen’s statement and asked whether the document or a copy existed in Embassy files. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) The Embassy replied in the negative. (Telegram 2933, January 26; ibid) The text of Hansen’s statement, from Danish archives, is printed in Greenland During the Cold War, Summary , pp. 23-24. 5 In telegram 3436 from Copenhagen, February 23, the Embassy reported that General Ramberg, Chief of Defense, Danish Armed Forces, had explained to the Embassy Counselor the previous evening that Danish anti-nuclear weapons policy was first authoritatively enunciated on December 2, 1957, at a NATO Ministerial meeting when Hansen stated that Denmark did not want nuclear weapons on its soil. Ramberg emphasized that Danish officials had always regarded this as an expression of the belief that nuclear weapons should not be stored on the soil of European Denmark. Ramberg was sure Hansen’s remarks were uttered in a context that excluded Greenland. “At most, one might say prohibition against storage of nuclear weapons on Greenland was intended; certainly prohibition against overflights was never contemplated—particularly since overflights were guaranteed by 1951 treaty.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US) 6 A B-52 bomber carrying two nuclear weapons crashed in Maryland on January 13, 1964. Blair reported on his February 5 meeting with Brun in telegram 519 from Copenhagen, February 6. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 5. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 5. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 1 Washington, January 28, 1968, 2334Z. 106092. Personal for Ambassador and Blankinship. Following memcon is uncleared FYI and subject to revision upon review. 1. Ambassador Ronne was received by the Secretary at 2:15 p.m. Jan 28 2 and stated Krag had instructed him to seek US approval of the statement text of which already sent us by Amb White: “The Danish Govt which has had contacts with the US Govt is in a position to confirm that in conformity with Danish atomic policy there are no nuclear weapons in Greenland, and no overflights of Greenland by planes carrying such weapons are undertaken.” 2. Secretary stated he wished to make two observations: (a) Danish as well as US security depends upon US nuclear arrangements from which those countries receiving this protection cannot claim complete disassociation as if nuclear weapons did not exist, and (b) we have serious problem of how to deal with events in one country so as not to set up a chain reaction with other countries throughout world that could impair the American nuclear deterrent. To deal with this second problem we have adopted the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of our nuclear weapons and have adhered to it rigidly. There is a difference between what the United States can say and what Denmark can say. 3. The Secretary noted that the proposed Danish statement associates it with the United States thus putting the United States in the position of confirming it, a departure from our policy. He then gave the Ambassador the following shorter statement and asked if the Danish Government might wish to say something along these lines: “The Danish Government confirms that there are no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons.” The Secretary stressed that if we were queried about such a statement issued by the Danish Government, we would refuse to comment. While we deeply regretted the crash, Danish public opinion is the Danish Government’s problem, not ours, and one to be dealt with by a purely Danish statement. 4. Should any question of violation of our international obligations arise, the Secretary reminded the Ambassador of the secret understandings referred to in Assistant Secretary Leddy’s informal memorandum to the Ambassador. (Nodis Deptels 106058 and 106059.) 3 The Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to comment along the following lines on this point: “In light of the background of later developments, the Danish Govt considered that the historical observations made in the memorandum are considered to be without importance in the prevailing concrete situation.” In that connection, the Ambassador referred to the many public pronouncements on Danish nuclear policy since the signing of the Greenland Agreement in 1951, 4 including a statement in Parliament in April 1964 that Danish nuclear policy includes Greenland. 5. The Secretary replied that if the interpretation of “no importance” means that the question of the understandings is merely being put aside, that would cause no problem; but we could not accept an interpretation of it by which we could be accused of violating our understandings with Denmark. 6. Replying to the Ambassador’s inquiry about the question of future overflights, the Secretary said he thought the text given the Ambassador covered the immediate problem and the question of the future could be left to the new government. 7. The Amb mentioned the possibility of Foreign Minister Tabor coming to the United States to discuss the problem. The Secretary made remarks which made it clear to Ronne that such a visit would not be welcome. He regretted that he would be completely tied up with the Korean problem and would not be in a position to receive the Foreign Minister on Monday, after which time Tabor might not be in office. The Ambassador commented that there was probably nothing more that Tabor could accomplish in any event. He said he would promptly inform Krag of our proposal. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Leddy. 2 Just prior to meeting with Rusk, Ronne met with Leddy. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17. 3 See Document 3 and footnote 3 thereto. 4 See footnote 2, Document 4 . 5 On January 29 the Danish Government issued the following statement: “The Danish Government confirms that there are no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 106766 to all NATO capitals, January 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, DEF 17 US) 6. Intelligence Note 6. Intelligence Note 1 Washington, January 31, 1968. No. 85 SUBJECT Implications of the B-52 Crash for US-Scandinavian Military Arrangements The crash near the Thule Base of the B-52 carrying nuclear weapons has increased criticism throughout the Scandinavian countries of US military policies. Such criticism was already substantial because of their dislike of the United States’ Vietnam policy. This criticism could become strong enough to cause the governments of Denmark, Iceland, and possibly Norway to demand formal assurances from the US that no planes carrying nuclear weapons overfly their countries. Denmark Most Concerned. While the Danish Government that was in caretaker status since the parliamentary election on January 23 has accepted US assurances that the B-52 approached Greenland only because it was seeking an emergency landing site, demands are rising in all political parties for an investigation into the question of whether US planes carrying nuclear weapons have overflown Greenland in the past. Press interviews with Greenlanders and with Danes working in Greenland who have stated that such flights have occurred have aroused widespread suspicion. All parties support the government’s policy that no nuclear weapons may enter Danish territory (Greenland is considered an integral part of Denmark), and it appears likely that the new government currently being formed will feel forced to seek formal assurances from the US that such flights will not be undertaken. How far the new government will go in restricting US military actions in and over Greenland will depend to a large extent on its composition. It now seems almost certain that this government, which is expected to be announced on February 1, will be a coalition of the rightist Conservative and Moderate Liberal Parties, who are the most friendly of all Danish parties to the US and NATO, and of the centrist Radical Liberal Party, which is pacifist-inclined. The leaders of the Radical Liberals, particularly their parliamentary spokesman, Hilmer Baunsgaard, who is expected to head the new government, are not formally opposed to Denmark’s current security arrangements, including membership in NATO. However, they may attribute some of their heavy gains in the election—they doubled their parliamentary representation— to their campaign for drastic defense cuts and a referendum on Denmark’s continued membership in NATO after 1969. Some Leftists May Push for Anti-US Policies. Many of the Radical Liberals’ new supporters and some of their newly elected parliamentary deputies are anti-militarists in foreign policy who will exploit the B-52 crash, as well as the rising fear among Danes of US policies in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East, to try to reduce Denmark’s ties to the US and NATO and to put it on a more neutralist path. These Radical Liberals will be supported by the parliamentary delegations of the far left Venstresocialister Party (VS) and the Socialist People’s Party (SPP) and by some of the left-wing Social Democratic deputies. This combination of these Radical Liberals, VS, SPP, and left-wing social Democrats could not effect any basic changes in Denmark’s foreign and defense policies because the great majority of the Parliament agrees on their continuation. Yet, the key parliamentary position of the Radical Liberals makes it likely that they will feel that they can force the government to request explicit US assurances that nuclear-armed planes will not overfly Greenland, to cut defense spending, and to call a referendum on continued Danish membership in NATO after 1969. Icelanders Also Asking Questions. Icelanders, who are highly sensitive about Icelandic sovereignty over the Keflavik Base, are also concerned over the B-52 incident. Foreign Minister Jonsson has already felt obliged to state that the US is observing his country’s policy, which forbids any nuclear weapons on Icelandic territory. The erroneous impression has spread that there is a formal agreement between Iceland and the US concerning storage of nuclear weapons at the base and flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. If the Danish Government requests explicit assurances regarding the overflight of nuclear-armed planes, popular pressures in Iceland may increase to the point where the government will be forced to seek such a formal agreement with the US. However, US-Icelandic relations have improved so much and the present Independence Party-Social Democratic coalition has been so friendly toward the US and NATO that the US can expect it—and particularly Prime Minister Benediktsson—to do everything possible to contain worries concerning flights of US planes over Iceland. Norway Least Concerned. Of the three Scandinavian NATO countries, Norway is the least affected by the B-52 incident. However, memories of the 1960 U-2 affair, when suspicions arose that the US was using a Norwegian base at Bodo for activities that Norwegian officials knew nothing about, are still fresh. That episode, and the similarity between the Danish and Norwegian criticisms of US policy in Vietnam, lead us to believe that the Norwegian Government would most likely follow the lead of Denmark if the latter sought formal assurances from the US that no nuclear-arms-bearing flights will be made over its territory. However, as in the case of Iceland, the four-party coalition in Norway is basically friendly to the US and can be counted on to try to prevent any serious strain on US-Norwegian relations. Potential for Strains in Relations. How far the Scandinavian governments that are members of NATO will go in their demands for concrete assurances concerning overflights of nuclear-armed aircraft will depend to a great extent on their impression of US actions and policies concerning this issue. If the Danish Government fails to get such assurances, it and possibly also the Icelandic Government may have great difficulty in withstanding public pressure for forcing renegotiation of current base agreements to have explicit guarantees against such overflights and storage of nuclear weapons written into them. If relations reach this point, Denmark and Iceland might also seek to assume greater control over all US activities at Thule and Keflavik. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The intelligence note was forwarded to Rusk by INR Director Thomas R. Hughes. 7. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State 7. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State 1 Copenhagen, February 8, 1968, 1720Z. 3177. Subject: B-52 Crash: Conversation with Amb Ronne. 1. Amb Ronne, who came to small dinner informally at my home last evening, informed me he is working with Under Secretary Fischer preparing instructions to govern him when he returns to Washington. I gathered that the Danes are exploring possibilities and still hope to hit upon a formula for publicly prohibiting nuclear weapons in Greenland or overflights by planes carrying them that U.S. can accept. He emphasized that exchanges of notes or statement by U.S. which would satisfy Danish public opinion had somehow to be devised. 2. He said Danish Govt wanted to avoid renegotiation of Greenland defense treaty. To try to renegotiate it would open up far more serious problems than it would solve. Among other things he said sensitivity of Greenlanders must be borne in mind. Greenland had more autonomy now than when 1951 treaty was negotiated. In any renegotiation Greenlanders would interject themselves strongly and become complicating factor. Amb Ronne observed that in some ways the Greenland defense treaty smacked of Danish colonialism—a subject of great sensitivity to both Greenlanders and Danes. 3. Amb Ronne repeated what he has doubtlessly frequently said in Washington; namely, American policy of not confirming nor denying existence of nuclear weapons on Greenland or of overflights of planes carrying them is unduly rigid and the very arbitrariness of this position is a danger to existing status of American bases in Greenland. 4. Protect source. White 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Confidential. 8. Action Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Scandinavian Affairs (McKillop) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 8. Action Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Scandinavian Affairs (McKillop) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 1 Washington, February 13, 1968. SUBJECT Talking Points-Anticipated Danish Request for Assurances re Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland Discussion 1. In view of our earlier conversations with the Danes and in view of the resolution passed February 8 by the Danish Parliament (Paragraph 1, attached Talking Points), we expect Ambassador Ronne to seek an appointment in the Department of State in order to request assurances that the US is acting in accord with Danish nuclear policy in Greenland. They will probably request either a public USG statement and/or an exchange of notes between the two governments. 2. We believe that some formal USG assurance is necessary in order to maintain our present defense capability in Greenland. We wish to avoid taking a stance so rigid as to cause the Danes to question the desirability of retaining the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. The Danes have not raised this point and probably do not now intend to. However, we believe that both State and Defense should keep in mind the fact that the Danes do hold the strongest cards in any bargaining sessions. 3. Danish nuclear policy encompasses one basic ambiguity; i.e., on the one hand they wish to demonstrate that all Danish territory is free of nuclear weapons; on the other hand, they realize that Denmark’s security ultimately depends on the US nuclear deterrent. 4. We believe that the attached statement (Talking Point 5) meets this situation. It provides [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and allows the GOD to make a policy decision, in time of grave danger, to allow nuclear deployment and/or overflights. 5. Both we and the Danes realize that a situation might conceivably arise where there would be no time for consultations before initiating overflights or deployment. We believe that this contingency can best be handled by an oral statement such as the Undersecretary made to Ambassador Ronne on February 2. 2 (At that time the Undersecretary said that it was difficult to conceive circumstances where we would initiate nuclear storage or overflights in Greenland without consulting the GOD unless conditions were so extreme that reasons for such actions would be readily apparent.) 6. We hope to have an agreed State-Defense position prior to our discussions with Ronne. We would like to tell DOD that the attached talking points reflect a bureau level decision on this matter. Recommendation That you approve the attached talking points as the EUR position on the questions of nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland. 3 Attachment TALKING POINTS Danish Request for Assurances re Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland 1. The Danish Parliament on February 8 passed a nearly unanimous resolution stating that, “Inasmuch as Parliament presumes that the Government, in attempting to obtain absolute guarantees that no nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland and that Greenland air space is maintained as a zone free of atomic weapons, will make certain that Danish atomic policy will be maintained in all parts of the realm and Danish sovereignty will be respected, the house continues its debate on the proposed budget bill for the fiscal year 1968-69.” 2. The USG is prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint Danish-US decision that such storage or overflights were necessitated by a threat to Free World security. 3. As Undersecretary Katzenbach indicated it must be recognized that in circumstances of extreme emergency the situation may not permit advance consultation. 4. In our view such a statement would meet the current needs of the Danish Government and preclude a stronger stand on their part that could call into question the entire 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. 5. Under the circumstances, we would suggest that the Danish Government might wish to make a statement along the following lines: “On the basis of recent discussions with the USG, the Government is satisfied that United States activities in Greenland are and will continue to be in accord with Danish nuclear policies.” 6. As the Ambassador is aware the USG cannot publicly confirm any statement on the deployment of its nuclear weapons which may be made by the Danish Government, nor can it agree to make public any assurance it has given to the Danish Government. 1 Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov and cleared by Baker (EUR/RPM), Berlack (L/EUR), and Trippe (G/PM). 2 Ronne’s meeting with Katzenbach on February 2 was reported in telegram 109698 to Copenhagen, February 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 3 There is no indication whether Leddy approved or disapproved the recommendation. 9. Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 9. Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 23, 1968. SUBJECT Background on B-52 Crash near Thule Air Force Base, Greenland The following summary on aspects of the B-52 crash not directly related to the politico-military problem is presented for your information. Public Opinion —Public attitudes have not been a significant problem thus far. Excellent cooperation among Danish and American officials began at Thule AFB and is continuing. As a result, official statements by the Danes, and a joint statement at the end of the US/Danish scientific meetings on February 15-16 in Copenhagen 2 have been very favorable to US interests. Emphasis on US/Danish cooperation and negation of the hazards to life in Northwest Greenland seem to have helped to minimize public reaction to the crash. Contamination —The plutonium contamination in the area does not present a serious problem unless ingested or inhaled in large quantities. None of those working at the site have encountered serious contamination. The alpha particles do not penetrate through the skin, and no significant amount has been detected in the air. The contamination has been relatively fixed in the ice and snow in the immediate area of the crash. A “gentlemen’s agreement” concluded on February 16 in Copenhagen provides that we will undertake to remove about 50 percent of the contaminated ice and snow. 3 This is a massive undertaking, but we believe that General Hunziker can do the job. Impact on Local Population —We do not yet know how many of the approximately 650 people in the Thule District were affected by the crash. They hunt seal, walrus, and small whale for a livelihood. The area of the crash, one of the best hunting grounds, is now a restricted zone. We expect that compensatory claims will be made, but the Danish Government has not yet done so. Fisheries —Greenland’s economy is heavily dependent upon its fisheries (exports $9 million in 1965). The fisheries are located some 500 miles to the South of the crash area and should not be affected by contamination. Nevertheless, adverse psychological consumer reaction could become a problem. Nuclear and Ecological Studies —Joint US/Danish scientific studies are underway and will be carried out at Thule for some time. We believe that this effort will help to reassure international opinion through careful precautionary monitoring. We anticipate that the results will confirm earlier conclusions that no real hazards exist. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the very minor possibility of isolated incidents of exposure to heavy contamination. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Confidential. Drafted by Tucker (EUR/SCAN) and cleared by Fulton (G/PM). 2 The scientists from Denmark and the United States met to discuss the issue of radioactive debris in the vicinity of the crash and, in their joint statement, “agreed that under present conditions the radioactivity spread in the area is not a hazard to people or biological species, nor is any hazard foreseen for the future.” (Telegram 3332 from Copenhagen, February 16; ibid.) 3 The agreement was transmitted in telegram 3346 from Copenhagen, February 16. (Ibid.) 10. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 10. Letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 1 Washington, February 24, 1968. Dear John: Regarding the Department of State’s draft of February 16 on the question of US-Danish nuclear weapons policies, 2 I would like to propose the attached preliminary revision as a basis for a joint State-Defense position. I understand that your staff has assured mine that the final US position will not be communicated to the Danish Government until there has been full review in both our Departments of the Danish position. Sincerely, Paul C. Warnke Attachment 3 The following is a draft of an Aide-Mémoire (or Note, PM etc., depending upon the form in which the Danish Ambassador presents the Danish position to the Secretary), in response to the anticipated Danish request for an exchange of notes on nuclear weapons in and over Denmark and its territories. 1. The United States Government is prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland except with Danish approval. 2. The United States Government is also prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except in consultation with the Danish Government. It must be recognized, however, that in circumstances of extreme emergency the situation may make advance consultation difficult. 3. Fundamental security considerations prohibit the USG from publicly commenting in any way on the deployment or movement of its nuclear weapons. 4. The United States Government recognizes that the Danish Government desires that a public statement be made on the immediate question of the B-52 crash in Greenland. The USG suggests that if the Danish Government feels it must make a statement, it might be along the following lines: “The Government is satisfied that United States activities in Greenland are and will continue to be in accord with Danish nuclear policies.” The USG could, of course, in no way confirm or comment on any such statement issued by the Danish Government. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 US. Secret. 2 The February 16 draft, a copy of which is in the Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos, was based closely on the talking points forwarded to Leddy by McKillop on February 13 (attachment to Document 8 ). 3 Secret; Exdis. 11. Note from the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk 11. Note from the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 26, 1968. No. 93. USA.8 Sir: 1. With reference to our recent discussions regarding defense arrangements in Greenland, I have the honor to inform you that the Danish Government has considered the lack of consistency between the declared Danish policy on nuclear weapons on the one hand and the agreement of April 27, 1951, between our two governments concerning the defense of Greenland on the other. 2. The Danish Government appreciates the assurances recently given by the United States Government that there are no nuclear weapons in Greenland and that no overflights with such weapons are taking place. My Government has also noted with satisfaction the undertaking given by your Government that this situation will not be changed without prior consultation with the Danish Government. 3. The declaration made by the Danish Government at the opening session of the Danish Parliament on February 6, 1968, included the following section: “It is the policy of the Government that no nuclear weapons should be found within Danish territory. This policy is also valid for Greenland and for Greenland air space.” 4. On February 8 the Danish Parliament passed a resolution to the same effect and requesting the Government to get absolute guarantees that no nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland and that Greenland air space is kept free of such weapons so as to ensure that Danish nuclear policy is maintained in all parts of the realm. 5. I am instructed to ask the U.S. Government that discussions be initiated with a view to reaching agreement as soon as possible between our two governments on supplementing the agreement of April 27, 1951, concerning the defense of Greenland to the effect that no nuclear weapons may under the agreement be stored in or introduced into Greenland including Greenland air space. Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 2 Torben Ronne 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. No classification marking. Ronne presented the note to Rusk during a 15-minute meeting with Rusk, Leddy, and McKillop that began at 4:05 p.m. on February 26. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) A memorandum of Ronne’s conversation with Rusk was transmitted to Copenhagen in telegram 120936, February 27. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 2 In a March 13 note to Ronne, Rusk acknowledged receipt of the February 27 note and stated that the U.S. Government was “prepared to join in the discussions you have proposed” and would “convey its views to you as soon as possible.” (Ibid.) 12. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) 12. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) 1 Washington, March 11, 1968. Dear Paul: Your letter of February 24 and the Danish note to the Secretary 2 arrived here within a few hours of one another. We have now prepared a response that reflects the note itself as well as your suggestions of February 24. I have enclosed a copy of our proposed reply, 3 as well as of our negotiating points for the anticipated negotiations. 4 Since the Danes did not, in their note, request a USG public statement, but rather, chose to raise that matter orally, we do not plan to address this question in the note itself but as a separate but related issue. Our first paragraph calls for a joint decision of the two Governments for both storage and overflights, rather than only storage, as you had proposed. The reasons for this change are: (a) The Danes have specifically asked for equal assurance on both points, and (b) we feel that the second paragraph of our reply provides the US with the flexibility necessary in the event of future emergencies. The first paragraph of our response also takes into account Denmark’s desire to supplement the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. We see no objection to doing this in a classified note inasmuch as the practical effect of the assurances we propose will in fact be to modify rights which the Danes agree were accorded us by the 1951 Agreement. Our statement on crisis consultation in regard to overflights is designed to place on record, as you do, the idea that conditions may make such consultation difficult. I agree with your method of stating the need to avoid public comment on nuclear weapons deployment. We do, however, feel that we should, in such a statement, cite our mutual responsibilities to all of the Alliance members. In regard to the public statement to be made by the Danes, we believe that the phrase “On the basis of recent discussions with the United States Government hellip;” is necessary. Since we propose to tell the Danes that we will not publicly confirm their statement, we feel that we cannot expect them to limit a unilateral Danish Government statement in the way that you suggest. Indeed, there is little to prevent the Danes from issuing a much stronger unilateral statement than the one we propose. While it is true that the Danish Government made a statement on January 29 that did not cite discussions with the US Government, 5 they were far from satisfied with that arrangement. We believe that if we had not been dealing with a recently defeated, caretaker Government, we would have encountered strong, continuous pressure for US confirmation of the Danish announcement. We consider a statement along the lines of that given in our negotiating points to be the minimum that the new Government could accept, especially in view of its publicly stated intention of seeking US agreement on nuclear matters. In sum, we hope to work out with the Danes some sort of agreement and accompanying public statement that will remove this question from the public arena and that will insure our continued access to Greenland as a radar site and as an air route and/or deployment site in future emergencies. I believe that our proposed draft will accomplish this. I look forward to receiving your views as a matter of urgency. Sincerely yours, John M. Leddy 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted on March 5 by Klebenov and cleared by McKillop, Getz (EUR/RPM), Trippe (G/PM), and Berlack (L/EUR). 2 Documents 10 and 11 . 3 Not attached, but see the attachment to Document 10 . 4 Not attached. 5 See footnote 5, Document 5 . 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 1 Washington, March 13, 1968, 2339Z. 128993. Subj: Greenland. 1. Ambassador Ronne, at his request, called on Assistant Secretary Leddy at 5:00 pm March 8. He was accompanied by Fergo. Ambassador said he was leaving March 11 for lecture tour of 16 to 18 days duration. He asked if there had been any developments in regard to Danish note of February 26. 2 Mr. Leddy replied that we were working with DOD and hoped to have a reply soon. At Ambassador’s request, Mr. Leddy agreed to April 1 meeting with Ambassador. 2. Ambassador Ronne asked if we had any preference for manner of implementing proposed supplement to 1951 Agreement on Defense of Greenland. Mr. Leddy said that our preference would be for a confidential exchange of notes. We had not been thinking in terms of a formal agreement that would legally preclude nuclear storage and/or overflights (as distinct from undertakings providing for consultation) and we could not, of course, publish any agreement on this matter. 3. At this point the Ambassador presented the following two alternative drafts for a “Danish/American Agreement about nuclear policy in Greenland.” “Alternative 1. Activities under present agreement shall not include the storing in and introduction into Greenland territory including Greenland air space of nuclear weapons. Alternative 2. Under the present agreement no nuclear weapons may be stored in or introduced into Greenland territory including Greenland air space.” 4. Mr. Leddy again raised doubts about the wisdom of a formal amendment to the agreement that would legally and permanently preclude nuclear weapons in or overflights of Greenland. 5. Ambassador then raised question of public statement. He said public USG confirmation of absence nuclear weapons in and over Greenland necessary due to pressures in Parliament. He said that he saw USG statement as way to put an end to public and parliamentary discussion of matter. He added that such discussion could only raise new problems in regard to Greenland. He said that he understood our policy considerations but pointed out that Denmark, out of loyalty to US had gone against its own standing policy during recent Chicom representation problem in UN Security Council. 6. Mr. Leddy pointed out necessity of USG adhering to no comment practice re nuclear deployment and overflights. He said that departure from this practice would jeopardize US nuclear deterrent; that this was a security question that involves all of us. Mr. Leddy pointed out that issue was wider than Danish US question; that if we made exception for Danes we would then have this exception cited to us by every country with a current or future nuclear question. Mr. Leddy also asked why, if Danish Government said categorically that there was no nuclear storage in or overflights of Greenland, the Danish people would not believe their own Government. He also asked if Soviets were providing Denmark with assurances they were not overflying Danish territory with nuclear weapons (at this point Fergo pointed out that Danes never knew if Soviet ships transiting Danish home waters did or did not carry nukes). Ambassador said, with no great conviction, that Soviets had stated they did not operate nuclear overflights. 7. Mr. Leddy concluded Greenland discussion by stating that we were conscious of the extent of the problem and that we hoped, on the Ambassador’s return, to have something to put on table and discuss. 8. Ronne then remarked that he had recently met Dobrynin at social function and that latter had asked if Ronne had seen recent newspaper articles on US overflight suspension and asked if the Danes had seen any confirmation of this decision. Ambassador Ronne had replied that he was only concerned with overflights of Danish territory, concerning which he had no misgivings on US policy. 9. Ronne then asked if we intended to reply to Soviet Aide-Mémoire of February 10. 3 Mr. Leddy said he felt that we probably should reply, that a reply was in preparation, but that we were in no hurry. He pointed out, however, that in the context of US-Soviet relations, it was not unheard of to let such a message go unanswered. (On leaving the building, Fergo expressed to SCAN officer the hope that Danes would be consulted in advance of any reply to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire.) 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Klebenov on March 12, cleared by Toon in substance, and approved by Leddy. Pouched to Moscow. 2 Document 11 . 3 The aide-mémoire was transmitted in telegram 113631 to Moscow, February 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US) 4 In telegram 131152 to Moscow and Copenhagen, March 15, the Department transmitted the text of a proposed reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire but specified that the Danes not be consulted. The text of the Department’s March 21 reply to the Soviets was transmitted to Moscow and Copenhagen in airgram CA-6730. The text of a second Soviet aide-mémoire on the B-52 crash, dated April 9, was transmitted to Moscow and Copenhagen in airgram CA-7282, April 15, together with a covering note stating that the Department saw nothing to be gained by replying and did not plan to do so unless the Soviets publicized their aide-mémoire. Telegrams 113631 and 131152 and airgrams CA-6730 and CA-7282 are ibid. 14. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 14. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, March 28, 1968. SUBJECT Agreement with the Government of Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland Discussion: In your reply (Tab B) to the Danish note of February 26 (Tab C) 2 you stated that the United States Government was prepared to discuss with the Danes the matter of supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland. We have, subsequently, told the Danish Ambassador that our preference was for a secret exchange of notes that would make nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland subject to consultation between our two Governments. The Danes have indicated that they are willing to accept this procedure. We have drawn up a draft note (Tab A) which has been approved by the Department of Defense. I propose to present this draft to the Danish Ambassador when he calls on me on Monday April 1. Our draft is designed to: (a) assure the Danes that we are not now overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons or storing such weapons in Greenland; (b) allow for nuclear overflights or storage in the future if both Governments deem such action advisable; and (c) point out to the Danes that there may be conditions of extreme emergency under which consultations with respect to overflights would be difficult. If you concur, I plan to give a draft copy of our note to the Danish Ambassador on April 1 and tell him that we would be prepared to present that text as a secret note in reply to their note of February 26. Recommendation: That you approve the attached draft note. 3 Attachment PROPOSED RESPONSE TO CONFIDENTIAL DANISH NOTE OF FEBRUARY 26 The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint decision by our two Governments. It must be recognized however, that in circumstances of extreme emergency, the situation may make advance consultation with respect to overflights difficult. The United States Government would, nonetheless, make every effort to consult the Government of Denmark in such circumstances. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to “The Secretary” when it was typed, but “Under” was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between “The” and “Secretary.” 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to “The Secretary” when it was typed, but “Under” was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between “The” and “Secretary.” 2 See Document 11 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Katzenbach indicated his approval on March 31. 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 1 Washington, April 3, 1968, 1724Z. 140926. Subject: Greenland. 1. At April 1 meeting with Ronne and Fergo, Leddy presented draft of proposed US note 2 (text pouched March 20 under cover McKillop-Blankinship letter). Leddy stated that USG was prepared to use text as secret note in response to Danish note of February 26. 2. Ronne said first paragraph, calling for joint decision, presented no problem. He questioned both need and feasibility for including second paragraph (which states that consultation may be difficult under emergency conditions). Both Ronne and Fergo felt that the Foreign Office would object to the language of the second paragraph. They suggested omitting the second paragraph on the ground that the situation it addresses does not appear to need any spelling out in advance. 3. Mr. Leddy pointed out that, following the Thule crash, a lack of awareness of certain agreements on the part of high Danish Government officials had caused a delay of a full week in clarifying the situation between our two Governments. He proposed however, that Dept consult with Defense again on point Ronne raised and that meanwhile Ronne not transmit text to his Foreign Office. Ambassador agreed readily and pointed out present text, if sent to Foreign Office, could create negative reaction unhelpful to our discussions. 4. In regard to Ronne’s question about public statement, Leddy suggested that, for present, Government, if asked in Parliament, state that discussions with USG on matter are continuing. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Klebenov, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy. 2 Attachment to Document 14 . 16. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) 16. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) 1 Washington, April 17, 1968. Dear Paul: As you know from our reporting cable, 2 Ambassador Ronne told us on April 1 that the second paragraph, the “escape clause” of our proposed note, 3 would be unacceptable to the Danish Government. In his discussion with me, Ambassador Ronne indicated that he understood the problem that we were addressing in Paragraph 2 of our draft but stated that this situation need not be spelled out in advance. The implication of what Ronne said is that in a serious crisis it goes without saying that military requirements would be overriding. While a written escape clause might nevertheless be helpful in justifying an overflight of Greenland in an instance where time did not allow us to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government, I do not believe that the lack of such a written understanding would critically limit our freedom of action in circumstances of a grave and sudden threat. Therefore, I propose that we offer the Danes only the first paragraph in reply to their note of February 26. 4 I shall, on presenting our reply, reiterate the possible requirement for U.S. overflights under the circumstances described above: i.e., those where a grave and sudden threat does not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government. This solution of course, will not involve an outright prohibition of nuclear weapons flights over Greenland, as the Danes proposed in their February 26 note. Further, it should serve to prevent this issue from jeopardizing the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement under which we operate electronic surveillance systems in that territory and maintain the air base at Thule. I would appreciate your comments at an early date. Sincerely, John M. Leddy 5 1 Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Trippe and Klebenov and cleared in L, G, and EUR. 2 Document 15 . 3 Attachment to Document 14 . 4 Document 11 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 17. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 17. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) 1 Washington, April 26, 1968. Dear John: This is in reply to your letter of April 17, 1968, 2 in which you propose a compromise classified reply to the Danish note of February 26 on nuclear storage in and overflights of Greenland. 3 We concur in your proposed reply if, as you suggest in your letter, you reiterate to the Danish Ambassador the possible requirement for US overflights with nuclear weapons in a serious crisis without advance notification or approval, and if you furnish him a memorandum of your conversation with him to this effect, which would serve as a record that this important point had been discussed with him. We hope that, in accordance with your own expressed expectation, this compromise reply will serve to prevent this nuclear weapons issue from jeopardizing the important 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement. You make no mention in your April 17 letter of the earlier Danish request for the United States Government’s association with a public statement on the subject of nuclear overflights of or storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland. Our position continues to be that no such statement should be made, that we hope the Danes will make no such statement, and that we could not confirm any such statement if they do choose to make one. Sincerely, Paul C. Warnke 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17-1 US. Secret. 2 Document 16 . 3 Document 11 . 18. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 18. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 9, 1968. SUBJECT Agreement with the Government of Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland Discussion: In your reply (Tab C) to the Danish note of February 26 (Tab D) 2 you stated that the United States Government was prepared to discuss with the Danes the matter of supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland. The Danish Ambassador has tentatively agreed that any such supplement should take the form of a secret exchange of notes. He has also agreed that future nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland should be subject to consultation between our two Governments. The latter provision is in contrast to the Danish request, stated in their February 26 note, for an unconditional ban on nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland. On March 31 the Under Secretary authorized me to offer the Danish Ambassador a draft text (Tab B) 3 for the consideration of his Government. The Ambassador, on April 1, read our draft and indicated that the first paragraph, which makes nuclear overflights and storage subject to consultation, would be acceptable to his Government. He felt, however, that the Danish Foreign Ministry would object to the second paragraph, in which we pointed out that there may be conditions of extreme emergency under which consultation with respect to overflights would be difficult. He suggested omitting the second paragraph since the situation it addresses does not need spelling out in advance. After further consultation with the Department of Defense we are now prepared to offer the Danes, as a draft text, the first paragraph only of our April 1 text (Tab A), 4 accompanied by an oral notation on my part, pointing out that there could be a requirement for U.S. overflights under conditions of a grave and sudden threat that did not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government. If you concur, I plan to give a draft copy of our note to the Danish Ambassador this week, and tell him that we would be prepared to use that text in a secret exchange of notes supplementing the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. I would, at that time, point out again the possible need for U.S. overflights without consultation, under the conditions described above. Recommendation: That you approve the attached draft note (Tab A). 5 Attachment Draft Note to be Presented to Ambassador Ronne for Consideration by Government of Denmark The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint decision by our two Governments. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on May 7 and cleared by Trippe (G/PM), Belman (L), and Berlack (L/EUR). 2 See Document 11 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Attachment to Document 14 . 4 Printed below. 5 Rusk indicated his approval on May 10. 19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 1 Washington, May 13, 1968, 1709Z. 162867. Subject: Greenland-Nuclear Overflights and Storage. 1. Ambassador Ronne, accompanied by Counselor Per Fergo, met with Assistant Secretary Leddy on May 10 to consider US response to Danish note of February 26. 2. Leddy referred to Ronne’s April 1 comments on text proposed that date 2 (as pouched March 20 under cover McKillop/Blankinship letter); recalled that Ronne had said first paragraph presented no problems for Danes but had suggested omission of second paragraph on basis that situation it addresses did not need spelling out in advance. 3. Leddy gave Ronne draft text consisting of first paragraph only of April 1 text. He said that if Danish Fonoff approves text, USG prepared to incorporate same in formal exchange of notes in near future. 4. Leddy said that at time of exchange of notes he would reiterate possible requirement for US overflights under circumstances of a grave and sudden threat that does not allow time to obtain agreement of Danish Government. Leddy said that the USG will retain record of this statement. 5. Ronne asked if he would be obliged to report Leddy’s oral statement to his Government. Leddy replied that was Ronne’s decision. Ronne said that oral statement appeared to make the proposed agreement less than binding. Leddy pointed out that the written agreement would be governing instrument; that, as in case of any US agreement, we would abide by it to full extent of our ability to do so; but that circumstances beyond our control could make overflights without consultation necessary. He pointed out that we are not asking Danes to give written permission for such overflights, but that we must make clear the possible need for same in event of a grave and sudden threat that would not allow time for consultations. 6. Ronne asked why new draft was classified secret rather than confidential, as in the case of Danish February 26 note and US reply to that note. It was pointed out that Danish note had been request to initiate discussions on supplementing 1951 agreement in regard to nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland and that US in reply had agreed to enter into such discussions. Text under consideration was different matter since it embodied a specific limitation on deployment and movement of US nuclear weapons; hence must be secret. 7. In reply to Ambassador’s question on public statement, Leddy said that we should first give Danish Government chance to consider text. He stressed that in any case, we cannot confirm or deny any statement concerning deployment or movement of nuclear weapons. 8. Ronne said pressure from press remained heavy and that Danish Government must be able to issue statement referring to negotiations and US agreement to exclude nuclear weapons from Greenland. 9. In reply Leddy said again that we will not join Danes in such a statement; nor could we confirm any statement on the negotiations. He said that Danish Government can say that there were no nuclear weapons in or over Greenland and that there would not be any without the Danish Government’s approval. The Danish Government, he said, is free to give its people full assurances on any aspect of this question. We cannot, however, fracture our global policy on the US nuclear deterrent by publicly confirming such a statement. He added that no such USG participation should be required to validate statement by Danish Government to its own people. 10. At this point Ronne offered text, apparently for public statement, but which Leddy did not accept. Leddy noted it would amount to formal amendment to 1951 Agreement placing absolute ban on nuclear weapons in Greenland thus making it too inflexible. He pointed out that US proposal gave Danes the requested assurances on nuclear weapons but allowed both parties to act quickly if circumstances required nuclear overflights. 11. Ronne persisted in reiterating need for Danish public reference to negotiations, adding that if we cannot reach agreement here, it would be necessary to consult in Copenhagen under Article XIII (3) of the 1951 Agreement. In reply to repeated statements on need for public statement, Leddy again said that Danish Government free to say publicly that it is fully satisfied with current arrangements re Greenland nuclear matters. He pointed out that Danes do not, in practice, publish all of their international agreements and that no other nuclear power has given the sort of public assurances that Ronne was asking for. He again urged Danish Government to consider alternatives to their proposed method of assuring their public. 12. On leaving, Ronne said that US draft note appears acceptable but that need remained for public statement. Rusk 1 Source: Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 11, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy. 2 See Document 15 . 20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 20. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark 1 Washington, May 18, 1968, 0235Z. 166783. Subj: Greenland—Nuclear Overflights and Storage. Ref: State 162867. 2 1. Ambassador Ronne, accompanied by Counselor Fergo, called on Assistant Secretary Leddy May 16. Ronne said he had just received reply from Fonoff on text and discussion of May 10 meeting. 3 2. Ronne said Fonoff had noted the oral statement Leddy made May 10 re flight requirements in case of grave and sudden threat (para 4 State 162867). 3. Ronne repeated statement of May 10 that due to parliamentary and press pressures Danish Government will need to make a public statement. However, he said his Government accepts USG policy of not confirming or denying statements of this kind; that Danes would not request USG confirmation or mutual statement, but would rather issue unilateral one. 4. Ronne also confirmed Danish Government would treat exchange of notes as secret. 5. Ronne then presented following revised text prepared by Danish Fonoff: “The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. This note and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two governments and shall be considered an integral part of the defense agreement.” Ronne described Danish proposal as being minor changes in text and procedures of final exchange of notes. 6. Leddy said that Danish proposal would amount to an amendment of treaty that would prohibit absolutely nuclear overflights and storage. It made no provision, he noted, for a joint decision to institute nuclear overflights or storage. 7. Ronne said that article XIII (3) allowed for such a decision. Leddy pointed out that that article merely allows both sides to amend treaty by mutual agreement. Our aim, he said, was an agreement that provided flexibility by allowing nuclear overflights quickly, if both sides agree. Leddy pointed out that our May 10 text 4 had left full control on overflights and storage with GOD. He asked Ronne what problem was with wording that did not allow nuclear overflights or storage without consent GOD. Ronne did not defend this aspect Fonoff text, stating only Fonoff evidently did not feel reference to joint decision was needed; that article XIII (3) covered such a possibility. He added he had received text only two hours previously and so had no chance to discuss with Fonoff its rationale on this point. 8. Leddy said that he saw no problem in replacing phrase “Notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland” with wording “in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland.” 9. Leddy said that first para could be made acceptable by adding to last sentence words “without the consent of the Government of Denmark.” He did not see this as substantive change from US reference to a joint decision and would so inform DOD. 10. Re final phrase “shall be considered an integral part of the defense agreement” Leddy said there may be technical problems and he would have to consult Legal Advisor. He noted in this respect that 1951 agreement was subject to approval of Danish Parliament although as an executive agreement it was not subject to US Senate approval. 11. Ambassador Ronne said he would report quickly to his government which is under pressure to settle problem soonest. Leddy agreed to desirability of moving fast. He saw no reason for delay in exchange of notes if GOD could agree to his suggested change in para 1 and if second half of last para posed no problem to Legal Advisor. 12. Leddy said that in regard to oral statement (see para 2) we consider it as having been made. Ronne concurred. 13. At noon May 17, Ronne informed us by telephone that Danish Foreign Office had agreed to addition of phrase “without the consent of the Government of Denmark.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 17, cleared by McKillop and in substance by Berlack (L/EUR), and approved by Leddy. 2 Document 19 . 3 Summarized in telegram 162867. 4 Attachment to Document 18 . 21. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 21. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) 1 Washington, May 29, 1968. SUBJECT Negotiations with Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland Danish Request The Government of Denmark, shortly after the January 21, 1968 crash of a nuclear armed USAF B-52, requested an absolute ban on nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland. Ambassador Ronne requested such a ban in his discussions with me and in his February 26 note to the Secretary. At that same time, the Danes made repeated requests for U.S. participation in, or endorsement of, a Danish Government announcement that would indicate that Greenland was, in effect, a nuclear free zone. We could not accede to the latter request, although did in confidence give oral assurances to the Danes that we were not overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons. U.S. Objectives In our negotiations we sought: a) to retain the right to conduct such nuclear overflights of Greenland as might be required by security; b) to avoid subjecting the entire 1951 Agreement to review and possible modification under terms of Article XIII (3). (It should be noted in this context, that we sought both to retain overflight rights, as noted above, and to maintain our access to Greenland as an important base for electronic surveillance, i.e., BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning system) installations); c) to avoid as far as possible, public discussion of the deployment and movement of U.S. nuclear weapons. Effect of the Proposed Settlement We have, after lengthy negotiations with the Danes, reached agreement in principle on the issues noted above. The proposed secret exchange of notes 2 accomplishes the following: a) We retain the right to nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland, subject to the agreement of both Governments that such actions are necessary; b) The Danes are on notice that the U.S. may conduct nuclear overflights under circumstances of a grave and sudden threat that does not allow us time to consult the Danish Government. (The Danish Foreign Office has formally noted my May 10 oral statement 3 of this possible need); c) We avoid reopening the 1951 Agreement for renegotiation, thus avoiding any new provisions that might hinder our activities in Greenland including the operation of the Thule Air Base and the maintenance of an extremely important segment of the BMEWS; d) In conjunction with the proposed settlement the Danish Government agreed to drop its request for any U.S. participation in or endorsement of a public statement concerning nuclear weapons in Greenland. Timing of Agreement The Danish Government is extremely anxious to effect the proposed exchange of notes prior to the June 5 visit of Foreign Minister Hartling. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov. 2 Rusk approved of the proposed U.S. note and Danish reply (see Document 22 ) in response to a May 23 action memorandum from Leddy that reviewed the negotiations and recommended approval. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) President Johnson gave his approval of the U.S. note at a May 29 luncheon meeting with his senior foreign policy advisers. (Record of decisions, May 29; ibid., Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968) No record of the luncheon discussion has been found. On May 27 Rostow had forwarded the text of the note to the President under cover of a memorandum that highlighted the negotiations and emphasized that “we will have the right to overfly or store nuclear weapons in Greenland subject to Danish approval (unilaterally in case of emergency); and we will avoid a full scale renegotiation of the 1951 agreement.” (Ibid., Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 3 See Document 19 . 22. Note From the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk 22. Note From the Danish Ambassador (Ronne) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 31, 1968. No. 93. USA.9 Sir: I have the honor to refer to your note of this date on the subject of an agreement between Denmark and the U.S. on storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons which reads in its entirety as follows: “Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between our two Governments regarding the request of your Government, made on February 26, 1968, that the U.S. and Denmark agree to supplement the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland with respect to the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. As a result of these discussions, I have the honor to propose the following Agreement: The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951, concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons without the consent of the Government of Denmark. If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, effective on the date of your reply, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.” I have the honor to state that the proposal contained in your note is acceptable to my Government and that our two notes shall constitute an agreement, effective today, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland. Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Torben Ronne 1 Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Leddy and Ronne exchanged notes at a meeting on May 31. Leddy reported to Copenhagen on the meeting in telegram 174887, June 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) 23. Editorial Note 23. Editorial Note On May 31, 1968, the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the following statement: “As a result of the plane crash at Thule, the Government instructed its Ambassador in Washington to raise with the American Government the question of assurances that Danish atomic policy as specified in the Folketing Resolution of February 8, 1968 is upheld in Greenland. In the discussions the Ambassador has confirmed Danish atomic policy as expressed in the Folketing Resolution, in accordance with which nuclear arms may not be stocked in Greenland and the Greenland air territory may not be overflown with such weapons. As previously reported, nuclear arms are not stocked in Greenland and overflights with such weapons do not take place. The result of the discussions in Washington creates harmony between the Defense Agreement of 1951 and Danish atomic policy and therewith assurance under international law, that this policy is respected in Greenland.” (Telegram 5076 from Copenhagen, June 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US) For the text of the Folketing Resolution of February 8, see the attachment to Document 8 . Prior to release of the statement, Ambassador Ronne told an officer of the Bureau of European Affairs that he believed that the U.S. Government would find the statement acceptable and that U.S. Government interests, as expressed during the recent negotiations, had been taken into account in its preparation. (Telegram 174887 to Copenhagen, June 1; ibid.) 24. Memorandum of Conversation 24. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Nuclear Storage, Nuclear Overflights and Chemical and Biological Warfare Testing in Greenland PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister of Denmark, Poul Hartling Permanent Under Secretary, Danish Foreign Office, Paul Fischer Ambassador of Denmark, Torben Ronne The Secretary Under Secretary of the Treasury Frederick Deming Export-Import Bank Vice Chairman Walter Sauer USIA Director Leonard Marks Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Affairs, Carl Walska Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy Ambassador William Leonhart Country Director George Mason Ingram The Foreign Minister expressed his and his Government’s gratification at the exchange of notes precluding the storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by planes carrying nuclear weapons without the Danish Government’s consent. He welcomed the Secretary’s assurance that the US has not conducted chemical/biological warfare tests in Greenland, and thanked him for his assurances that it would not do so in the future as well as for his understanding that any such move would require the consent of the Government of Denmark 1 Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Ingram (EUR/SCAN). The memorandum is Part III of IV. Memoranda covering the other portions of the meeting are ibid. The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the State Department. France France 25. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, February 12, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 12-3 CUBA-FR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Brussels for the Embassy and USEC. 26. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, February 19, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. 27. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc George Bundy, Vol. 2. Confidential. In an attached March 11 memorandum to President Johnson, Rusk noted that Bohlen’s paper contained “a number of recommendations which I believe you will find of interest.” Bohlen was in Washington for consultations. 28. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 8, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 2. Secret. 29. Memorandum From Robert Manning of the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, April 10, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 FR. Secret; Personal. 30. National Security Action Memorandum No. 294 Washington, April 20, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Top Secret. 31. Informal Notes of Secretary of State Rusk’s Special Staff Meeting Washington, April 24, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147. Confidential. The notes, which bear the notation “for use of S/P,” were prepared on April 27. 32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, June 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. No classification marking. 33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 9, 1964, 6:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 3. Confidential. Drafted in AF, cleared in WE and AF, and approved by Harriman. 34. Memorandum of Conversation Paris, September 10, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel. 35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Drafted by George (G/PM) on November 25 and cleared by Tyler and in G, L, and MC. 36. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 1, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Tyler and in L and MC. 37. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 4, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State and to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. 38. Memorandum of Conversation Paris, December 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 5. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 15-17. 39. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, December 21, 1964, noon. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential. Repeated to London and Bonn. 40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson Washington, December 23, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 5. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon. A copy was sent to Bundy. 41. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 29, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Bundy. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Kitchen. 42. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, January 5, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, Luxembourg, and The Hague. 43. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 19, 1965, 11:35 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2480. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on March 5 and in U on March 9. The meeting was held in the White House. Couve visited Washington February 18-20. Memoranda of his conversation with Secretary Rusk are in Department of State, French Desk Files: Lot 72 D 441, Visits—Couve. A memorandum of his conversation with Under Secretary Ball is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. A memorandum by Rusk of a lunchtime discussion with Couve regarding Germany is ibid., POL 32-4 GER. 44. Memorandum From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) Washington, February 23, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bohlen Papers: Lot 74 D 379, M Corresp. Secret. 45. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, March 11, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg. 46. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, April 24, 1965, 1111Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, and London. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, May 4, 1965, 2020Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to London and Bonn. 48. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, May 20, 1965, 1919Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 FR. Secret. 49. Memorandum From Horace Busby of the White House Staff to President Johnson Washington, June 10, 1965, 1:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. No classification marking. A handwritten notation reads: “For Bundy for comments to me. L” No written comments have been found. 50. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 7. Confidential. Drafted by McGrew on July 12. The memorandum is an “Uncleared Draft.” 51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 336 Washington, August 6, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 336. Top Secret; Exdis. A handwritten notation reads: “Sir: this has been sent to S/S for appropriate action.” 52. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 15, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, NATO-France. Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in the Treaty Room of the White House. The French Government announced that Lucet would replace Alphand on October 8. 53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, February 21, 1966, 9:09 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Geneva, Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, Luxembourg, London, Rome, and to Paris for USRO. 54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, February 25, 1966, 1605Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 55. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All NATO Missions Washington, March 2, 1966, 8:27 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy; cleared by Ball, Llewellyn Thompson, and Bator (White House); and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Brussels for USEC. 56. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, March 3, 1966, 1655Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and The Hague. 57. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 31, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Van Dyk. 58. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, May 27, 1966, 8:41 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved by Rusk. Repeated to all other NATO capitals. 59. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Brussels and the Embassy in France Washington, June 6, 1966, 8:37 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Springsteen, and approved by Ball. Repeated to all other NATO capitals. Rusk was in Brussels for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting June 3-8. 60. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, June 11, 1966, 1337Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn and London. 8672. De Gaulle received me today and we talked for approximately one-half an hour on the following subjects: (1) Soviet Union, Europe and Germany, (2) Vietnam very briefly, and (3) French forces in Germany. 61. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, June 23, 1966, 1724Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. 62. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 28, 1966, 1507Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret; Exdis. 63. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 29, 1966, 1215Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. 64. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, August 25, 1966, 1806Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Nodis; Maria. 65. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State Addis Ababa, August 27, 1966, 1915Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 FR. Secret; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 66. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, September 1, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. No transmission time is on the telegram, which was received at 8:46 a.m. 67. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, September 7, 1966, 1201Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-4 FR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, October 26, 1966, 7:40 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Stoessel and Vest, and approved by Rostow. 69. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, November 24, 1966, 1827Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 10. Secret;Exdis. 70. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, December 14, 1966, 2139Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret; Nodis. Passed to the White House. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 15-16. 71. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 9, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson. 72. Memorandum of Conversation Bonn, April 25, 1967, 11:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which was approved in the White House on June 28. The meeting was held at the Villa Hammerschmidt. 73. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 11, 1967, 1834Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 34. Secret; Nodis. 74. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 12, 1967, 1042Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 12. Secret; Nodis. In an attached July 12 memorandum to President Johnson, Walt Rostow commented: “There is little in this you don’t know or guess; although De Gaulle’s personal anger at Israel’s failing to take his advice is an interesting but not complete explanation of French Middle East policy, you will wish to note the final paragraph.” 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 22, 1967, 10:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Rusk. 76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 27, 1967, 1552Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 FR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Ottawa. 77. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, January 23, 1968, 1739Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret. Repeated to London. 78. Summary Notes of the 586th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, May 22, 1968, 12:15-1:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. 79. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, May 28, 1968, 1545Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 FR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, London, Moscow, Rome, and USNATO. 80. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, May 31, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 13. Secret. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads: “This memorandum was prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].” 81. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State Paris, July 29, 1968, 2025Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 13. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Katzenbach visited Paris on his return from New Dehli where he led the U.S. delegation in talks with Indian leaders July 26-28. 82. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 26, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 14. Confidential. 83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, September 2, 1968, 1827Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Rome, USNATO, and USUN. 84. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, October 10, 1968, 0910Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and BUSEC, The Hague, London, Rome, USNATO, and Moscow. 85. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 11, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Tanguy and approved in the White House on October 15. 86. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 25, 1968, 3 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Drafted by Rostow. The meeting was held in Rostow’s office. 25. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 25. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, February 12, 1964, 8 p.m. 3857. We appear to be heading for a confrontation with French on Cuban trade. For Embassy to be effective in circumstances, we will need clear-cut instructions on real US objectives. Following are considerations bearing on such instructions: 1. Four Major Actual or Potential Issues Between US and French on Cuban Trade: A. French Credit Guarantees for Exports to Cuba. $10 million has already been approved for trucks and tractors (Embtel 3832) 2 and indications are there may be more. In particular we have no assurance credit guarantees would not be issued for locomotives should request again be made. B. Request for information specific firms involved in Cuban trade and their connections (based on Deptel 3780) 3 now outstanding in FonOff. We understand from Wormser (Embtel 3818) 4 we will get negative reply. C. On shipping, FonOff has forwarded forms transmitted CA-6359 5 to companies, but none have been returned, either directly or through FonOff. Basis Deptel 4004 and Depcirtel 1227, 6 we understand there is question whether French performance can be considered satisfactory under amendment to Foreign Assistance Act. Would appreciate information re application this amendment to British situation. D. If French performance on shipping or on general Cuban trade policy judged inadequate, US may have to inform French Govt of termination aid. While remaining US aid program is minimal (Embtel 3824), 7 public announcement such action inevitable and certain create political storm, especially coming on top of press attention already given to US-French differences on Cuban trade. 2. French Position on Credit Guarantees for Cuban Trade: A. Despite our best efforts here and in NATO, GOF (even officials basically sympathetic to US position) not persuaded basic validity our position. As Alphand indicated (Deptel 4008), 8 French believe effort isolate Cuba essentially governed by US domestic considerations; they tend to doubt desirability, as well as practicality, of economic warfare against Cuba. Hence their relatively cooperative attitude to date governed by desire accommodate US rather than by any conviction of their own. B. Until recently FonOff (which has on whole tried restrain French participation in Cuban trade and shipping) has had upper hand. British bus deal, however, led to intensive industrial pressures reflected through Industry and Finance Ministries. In view British Govt action, and absence political conviction based on French national interests, FonOff has been unwilling (and probably unable) in truck case to veto credit guarantees on political grounds; same may apply to locomotives and other upcoming deals. C. FonOff position until recently was strengthened by technical consideration that Finance Ministry considered Cuba bad debtor. It now appears (from Guindey, Embtel 3804 and DeLattre, Embtel 3833) 9 that Cubans have taken some action which removes this technical block. D. Result is that GOF position has been shifting towards treating Cuba on same basis as any other country for credit purposes (although strategic exports as defined COCOM list apparently still apply), unless in any particular case FonOff exercises veto on political grounds. In present atmosphere, however, FonOff will have hard time using only argument they feel they have—i.e. that such deals would displease US. 3. Sovereignty Issue. Problems described para 1B, C, and D above all raise in different ways issue of French “sovereignty” in face alleged US efforts to enforce its own will on French Govt or private citizens by use of our greater power. This is issue on which French always sensitive, but particularly so in context Gaullist foreign policy. A. French have already indicated (Embtel 3758) 10 their objection to Embassy’s dealing directly with firms under French jurisdiction on Cuban trade matters. In private conversations, several French officials have mentioned (without specifying) cases in which US officials have allegedly “threatened” French companies with retaliation if they engage in Cuban trade. B. In same line, we already know (Embtel 3818) 11 French will give us negative answer to request for information on American connections of firms engaged in Cuban trade. Assume grounds will be professional secrecy, but reason will be to protect French firms from danger of American “sanctions.” C. While French have not recently objected to US efforts to force French shippers out of Cuban trade under Executive Order of Feb. 6, 1963, 12 there is little doubt that they resent these efforts and are liable to make this point in any over-all approach they make to us. For same reason, we doubt they will go much farther than they have in cooperating with us on this subject. In particular, a written commitment such as suggested Deptel 4004 seems almost out of question. D. As already indicated, cut-off of US aid under amendment to FAA, though amounts involved are very small and effect on French policy nil, will provide easy basis for dramatization accusation US attempting to treat France as “colony;” Gaullist La Nation has already taken this line in commenting on US reaction to recent announcement credit guarantees to Cuba. Tiny nature of “stick” also likely be ridiculed by French and European press. 4. Courses of Action. In this situation, we cannot in Embassy’s view expect to hold the line on French participation in Cuban trade and shipping, as we have relative successfully so far, by informal low-key, low-level dealings with essentially sympathetic officials. We seem have choice between two possible courses of action: A. To pursue piecemeal effort to apply brakes on selective basis to French actions which might be of particular importance in terms of Cuban economy. This would require high-level approach to FonOff or FonMin, making clear we not attempting dictate policy to GOF but asking them exercise maximum restraint on Cuban matters in order avoid creating problem which could aggravate already unfortunate state Franco-American relations. To succeed in this approach, we would have to limit our objectives to questions of real importance (e.g. locomotives) and be prepared abandon any vigorous effort enforce our policy against private companies either in shipping or non-shipping business. Possibility of success would be much enhanced if we could persuade British to modify their position; another vigorous effort in NATO to obtain multilateral support for policy of restraint on Cuban trade would also contribute a great deal. B. Alternatively, we can make a more formal approach to French Govt, asking for GOF refusal to grant credit guarantees for Cuba, and full GOF cooperation in preventing French shipping and other companies from participating in Cuban trade. Such approach would be backed up by straightforward implementation of amendment to FAA. In diplomatic terms, such approach would certainly be a failure, as GOF under present circumstances would not accept what they would interpret as US “dictation.” We would, however, make a clear record that we had done our best to stop Franco-Cuban trade. The price would be a public issue on this subject between US and GOF, which will further exacerbate US-French relations with possible broader impact on relations with other EEC countries, who might well accept French lead on this particular issue. 5. Choice between these two courses of action depends essentially on whether we are more interested in making a record or in limited practical results on Cuban trade itself. In light considerations earlier part this telegram there is no guarantee at all that first course (para 4A) would succeed; we can only find out by trying. If, however, Dept judges it more essential we make record, or if mandatory legislative provisions leave us no choice, then we must choose course of action in 4B and do what we can to limit damage to Franco-American relations. 6. Would appreciate Dept’s instructions soonest, as we expect FonOff to call Embassy in at high level in next few days on this subject even if we do not take initiative. 13 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 12-3 CUBA-FR. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Brussels for the Embassy and USEC. 2 Dated February 11. (Ibid., STR 12-3 CUBA FR) 3 Telegram 3780 to Paris, January 27, requested information on French firms selling to Cuba. (Ibid.) 4 Dated February 10. (Ibid.) 5 Dated October 23, 1963. (Ibid., STR 10 CUBA) 6 Neither printed. (Both ibid., AID (US)) 7 Telegram 3824 from Paris, February 11, outlined the U.S. military assistance program in France. (Ibid., STR 10 CUBA) 8 Not printed. (Ibid., STR 12-3 CUBA-FR) 9 Telegram 3804 from Paris, February 6, reported French Foreign Ministry views on the subject of trade with Cuba. Telegram 3833 from Paris, February 11, reported that the French Government no longer considered Cuba a debt risk. (Both ibid.) 10 Telegram 3758 from Paris reported that France would oppose as a matter of policy contacts between U.S. representatives and French companies trading with Cuba. (Ibid., STR 12-3 CUBA-FR) 11 Not printed. (Ibid.) 12 Reference is to a White House announcement that action would be taken to assure U.S. Government-financed cargoes would not be shipped on foreign flag vessels trading with Cuba. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , February 25, 1963, p. 283. 13 Telegram 4096 to Paris, February 14, instructed that the handling of trade issues should follow the outline of paragraph 4B of telegram 3857 and that the Embassy should avoid public comment. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 12-3 CUBA-FR) 26. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 26. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, February 19, 1964, 8 p.m. 3968. Ref: Deptel 4097. 2 I saw Couve de Murville this afternoon at about 5:45 and raised with him the questions concerning French policy and intentions in regard to Southeast Asia with particular reference to South Vietnam. I said that since Alphand had already discussed Laos and Cambodia with Harriman 3 (Couve said he had seen the report of this) I would concentrate my remarks primarily on South Vietnam. I then made the points raised in reftel in regard to ChiCom aims and policies in Southeast Asia; their attitude towards neutralization and its relation to their policy of communization, and fact that Hanoi had rejected any neutralization for Viet Minh. I then asked Couve if he would give me frankly his own personal views on situation. Couve began by saying that he wished to assure me that there was no French plan whatsoever for Southeast Asia other than those in operation for Laos and the plans for Cambodia. He said he thought that the US was in full agreement with France in regard to the neutralization of Laos and also for that of Cambodia although he fully understood why we were not willing to join in a conference to achieve the latter. His remarks therefore would deal with Vietnam. He said he did not personally disagree with any remark that I had made in regard to Chinese attitude. He said that he thought there was perhaps a great deal of misunderstanding between what he said was De Gaulle’s vague generalized remarks in regard to neutralization which he said at best would take many years to come into being, and what could be considered current French policy. He repeated that there was no French plan to deal with the Vietnamese situation. Looking at it however personally he said that he thought the situation was very difficult insofar as the US was concerned. In his personal view the trouble was not military but political; that with the disappearance of Diem 4 who had at least set up a government which although highly unpopular had operated in a relatively effective manner for the conduct of military operations, there was no effective political force in South Vietnam and he personally did not see much prospect for setting one up. He therefore thought that the US had essentially two courses of action which it could follow: (1) To continue along the present lines it was at present, which he frankly felt would not be very successful, or (2) to increase military operations in South Vietnam appreciably, coupled possibly at a certain point in the future with a willingness to attempt some form of negotiation. In reply to my statement that intensified military operations would only make sense if it involved a willingness to carry the war if necessary to Hanoi, Couve answered that he fully understood this and had it in mind when he spoke about the increased military involvement. He repeated that these were merely personal views but he felt that in order to have any prospect of any settlement we would have to confront the Communists with a more disagreeable alternative than negotiation. He said this was what in effect had been done in Laos and why the Communists had accepted it. I told him that this very much coincided with my view and understanding of how Communists reacted but I could not of course speak for my government as to whether large military operations would be feasible or not. Couve said he was very glad to have this opportunity of discussing Vietnam with me and said he hoped it would be continued. I mentioned the discussion in NATO today to which he replied that it would have been quite impossible to have had a discussion such as ours in NAC. I inquired whether it might not be a good idea for Koren to stay over a day or so and discuss in more detail the matter at the Quai d’Orsay, to which Couve replied that he thought that was an excellent idea. Koren had planned to stay over one day in any event and I would judge after tomorrow whether or not it would be necessary for him to stay longer. Comment: This was undoubtedly one of the more frank conversations I have had with Couve, particularly on Vietnam, but it should be emphasized that as he stated it was only his “personal” view and not an official French policy. I believe therefore that this conversation should be handled with discretion as representing only his view. Department pass to other posts as desired. Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. 2 Telegram 4097 to Paris, February 14, requested Embassy officials to sound out the French Government regarding its aims in Southeast Asia. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL VIET S) 3 Reported in telegram 4139 to Paris, February 18. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Public Service Files, Memcons A) 4 Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of South Vietnam, was killed in the aftermath of the military coup of November 1-2, 1963. 27. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) 27. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) 1 Washington, undated. REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND RECOMMENDATIONS This paper does not deal with domestic problems since De Gaulle has this situation very well in hand and pending his decisions on elections, there should be no change. Fundamental and basic element in De Gaulle’s foreign policy is his strongly held and unchangeable conviction that the nation (the state and not the people) represents the permanent unit in international affairs. Its authority and sovereignty must under no conditions be watered down or weakened in any way. The conception of France as a nation is embued with almost mystical quality and De Gaulle is embodiment of this national spirit (see first page of his War Memoires ). If this concept is fully understood almost all De Gaulle’s actions in foreign affairs in last five years are logical, deductible, and quite consistent. It explains De Gaulle’s antagonism to the organization of NATO, his aversion to anything that smacks of integration. It is the reason why he has withdrawn French fleet from NATO control and Air Force and two French divisions. It is also national concept which has caused him to refuse permission for storage of American atomic weapons on French soil. De Gaulle’s conception of nation in defense matters was well expressed in 1959 talk at French Military Institute. His concept of alliance is old-fashioned 1914 type, i.e., alliance operates only in times of crisis (war danger) but not in interim periods. This explains his solidarity with United States and Alliance at time of Berlin crisis and his support of United States in Cuba. It should, however, be emphasized that support in time of crisis when issue of war is present does not (repeat not) obtain in a non-crisis period. De Gaulle has in effect withdrawn France from Alliance in political or diplomatic sense and, to a large extent, in military matters. No actions of any importance that he has taken in diplomatic field have been in consultation or even after discussion with any of his allies: Veto of Britain in Common Market, recognition of Communist China, attitude on Cyprus, actions in Africa, 2 are cases in point. De Gaulle’s conception of the nation is particularly relevant when it applies to relations of a middle-sized power (France) and a great power (United States). This conception conditions all of De Gaulle’s attitudes towards United States and forces him by its logic to take opposite position as matter of principle because of his belief that too close association would cause France automatically to become satellite. It is also explanation of force de frappe which, in turn, logically requires distortion of postwar history in order to justify current policy; for example, doubt as to United States intentions in event of war must be spread by French propaganda in order to justify heavy expenditures for force de frappe. Communist Chinese Recognition: Recognition is primarily act demonstrating French independence of American control in foreign affairs. 3 It is noteworthy that no consultation of any kind with any other country was involved. Evidence would indicate that actual discussions took place in Switzerland and that Edgar Faure’s role in this matter has been considerably exaggerated. It appears that Chinese asked two conditions: a) French support in UN, and b) breach with Formosa. France refused accept these conditions as formal conditions for recognition, but it is very probable that Chinese were told sub rosa that they would be met since French actions subsequent in both fields would appear to bear this out. In addition, France possibly foresaw crisis in Vietnam and wished France to be installed in Peking in order to take advantage of crisis when it comes. Four levels of opinion can be discerned in France: 1. De Gaulle. 2. Government, Ministers, Civil Servants, etc., of which I would say ninety percent do not agree with De Gaulle’s conduct of foreign affairs and, on the whole, are basically friendly to the United States. 3. Young Gaullists, UNR. These are irresponsible, unintelligent, authoritarian-minded, and go farther than De Gaulle in anti-American attitudes. Peyrefitte belongs to this group and his conduct of French propaganda is clearly marked by strong anti-American trend. 4. French people as a whole. Up to the present time, French people, on balance, seem to have little anti-Americanism, but this is situation that can, of course, change if current propaganda continues. There would seem to be little chance of any change occurring for the better as long as De Gaulle is in power. It is very doubtful if he wants anything from the United States and more likely that he prefers a certain amount of friction. He is, however, well aware of the fact that French survival is dependent on American military protection. At the present time, he seems to have forgotten about Europe and his major attention seems to be to so-called “third world,” particularly South America. The danger here is that he will start currents which will be stronger than he anticipates. It is not clear whether he recognized the hard core anti-American feeling in Latin America is Communist inspired, which since 1944, has treated United States as public enemy number one. RECOMMENDATIONS It is always easier to say what should not be done in regard to De Gaulle than what should be done. For the purposes of elimination, I shall start with attitudes or actions which I am convinced would be unwise to take in regard to General De Gaulle. 1. At the present moment, there seems to be no question of any meeting with De Gaulle. There would appear to be no subjects that could be profitably discussed, and since De Gaulle will not come to the United States and the President will not leave the country before the elections, there is no possibility at least until the elections. 2. No concession or bribe of any kind will affect De Gaulle’s attitude or policies. He would regard any such gesture on our part as confirmation of the correctness of his views and his just due without seeing any necessity to change his position at all. 3. The only type of action which would affect De Gaulle’s policy would be a fairly basic change in circumstances in which these policies operate. However, it appears obvious that any change in our European policy would affect other Europeans equally if not more than France. For example, a shift in our strategy which would threaten an important cutback in our troops in Europe would be quite unacceptable to the Germans and even if threatened for the sake of influencing France, would be most upsetting to the Germans and plant suspicions which would continue. The same effect would be produced on Italy and other European Allies who have, on the whole, remained faithful to the United States. We should avoid pinpricks and small actions which look as though they are based upon irritation or ill temper. These could only help De Gaulle without producing any change whatsoever in his attitude or policies. 4. In any bilateral relationship with France, whether military or scientific, we should make sure that the United States receives an adequate quid pro quo for anything that it gives. In the psychological and publicity field, we should avoid giving the appearance that all is well with our relations and that the differences are merely superficial. I would certainly not recommend we say the opposite, but I think that whenever we apply soothing words (which however occasionally may be necessary for United States public opinion) we should realize that these are seized upon by de Gaullist publicity machines to support the contention that De Gaulle is on the right track. My recommendation, wherever possible, is that there should be no statement from leading officials—i.e., the President or Secretary of State, dealing directly with our relations with France. We should avoid taking the initiative in any statements, and if reply to questions is necessary, it should, on the whole, be confined to generalities which say very little one way or another. 5. We should keep under constant review the possibility of halting the delivery of tanker aircraft in the event that French policies become more blatantly hostile to our purposes or there is some single issue which is given great publicity. 6. In regard to Europe, we should continue our advocacy, although not stated too often, of our belief in and support for European unification and for partnership with the United States. 7. In the economic field, we should continue to work for the Kennedy Round, but we must be cognizant of the fact that in direct bilateral economic relations, the United States is heavily favored. (United States exports to France were up sixteen percent for a total of over nine hundred million dollars. Imports in 1963 were down a few percentage.) Since we enjoy a very profitable trade with France, this is not the subject on which we can initiate any retaliation. The same, I would say, goes for the financial questions. 8. We should, if asked, say we welcome French interest and involvement in Latin America. At the same time, we should observe most carefully the tone and substance of General De Gaulle’s statement on his two visits insofar as they deal with the United States and adjust our attitude accordingly. In short, there would appear to be very little that we can do to make plain our displeasure with current French attitude; I think calmness and attention to detail so that we do not go too far in the direction of polite soothing remarks, avoiding the other extreme of petulant and ill-tempered criticism. It should always be borne in mind that De Gaulle cannot have very many more years of being in power, and the present indications are that a very large portion of the objectionable features of current French policy would disappear with his departure from power. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc George Bundy, Vol. 2. Confidential. In an attached March 11 memorandum to President Johnson, Rusk noted that Bohlen’s paper contained “a number of recommendations which I believe you will find of interest.” Bohlen was in Washington for consultations. 2 The phrase “and trip to South America” is crossed out. 3 France announced its recognition of the People’s Republic of China on January 27, 1964. 28. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 28. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, April 8, 1964. SUBJECT General Billotte’s Mission General Billotte was brought in to see the President on Monday afternoon by Mr. Robert Anderson. General Billotte had sought this appointment on the ground that he had a personal message from General De Gaulle, and while the French Ambassador initially tried to insert himself into the meeting, he withdrew after a conversation with General Billotte, an episode which suggests that General De Gaulle did indeed authorize this private visit to the President by Billotte. General Billotte’s assertion is that General De Gaulle believes that the U.S. and France should cooperate on smaller matters where cooperation is possible, in the hope that this may lead onward toward understanding on larger matters. General Billotte reported that he had told De Gaulle that French Defense officials had been uncooperative in responding to American proposals for cooperation in the manufacture of tanks. He said that he had General De Gaulle’s authorization to make a specific proposal and could give us assurance that if the U.S. could accept it in principle, there would be no obstacle at other levels of the French Government. General Billotte’s specific proposal is that the French AMX 13 and AMX 30 tanks should be licensed for production in the U.S. He believed that U.S. production could be cheaper by about 25%, that U.S. producers—specifically Chrysler—could shift very promptly from their present line to the French tanks, and that the French tanks are superior to our current line. General Billotte proposed that about 80% of the full run of the production of these two tanks should be American. The second element in General Billotte’s proposal is that France should join the Un. S. and Germany in the production of the battle tanks of the next generation. He recognized that France had been asked to participate in this operation before, and said that it had been a mistake for France to abandon this field to the Americans and the Germans. It was not wholly clear from this conversation whether these two proposals were linked in General Billotte’s mind or whether they are separable. We told General Billotte that we would be back in touch with France promptly, and while he himself proposed that the discussion should be pursued first with Ambassador Alphand, the President has now decided that it is better for you and the General to have a talk first. 2 McGeorge Bundy 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 2. Secret. 2 In an April 9 memorandum to Bundy, McNamara reported that he had met with Billotte the previous afternoon and listened to his proposals. “I told him we would be happy to discuss in detail how France might join with the United States and Germany in the development of the next main battle tank, and how a U.S. firm or firms might join with French firms in the production and sale to foreign governments of French armored vehicles.” Billotte responded he would favorably report this proposal to De Gaulle. (Ibid.) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 29. Memorandum From Robert Manning of the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Acting Secretary of State Ball 29. Memorandum From Robert Manning of the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, April 10, 1964. In view of the possibility that Couve de Murville will upset the apple cart at the SEATO meeting with a strong public or semi-public push for neutralization, I think it most important that we carefully coordinate any public reaction between the Department and Manila while the Secretary and the SEATO delegation are there (or between the Department and Taipei if the news breaks after we have left from Manila). 2 There is always the possibility that Couve de Murville’s actual utterances might be relatively harmless, but that background briefing by the French could produce distortions that present us with problems of U.S. governmental response. I am sure you will want to make sure that FE and the Vietnamese specialists here do not try to tackle such a problem without first allowing you to coordinate with the Secretary and Bill Bundy. Bob 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 FR. Secret; Personal. 2 The SEATO meeting was held April 13-15. For text of Rusk’s statement and the conference communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 835-839. 30. National Security Action Memorandum No. 294 30. National Security Action Memorandum No. 294 1 Washington, April 20, 1964. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Commerce The Director of Central Intelligence The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Office of Science and Technology SUBJECT U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France It is the policy of this government to oppose the development of nuclear forces by additional states, other than those whose forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force, targeted in accordance with NATO plans and, except when supreme national interests were at stake, used only for the defense purposes of the Alliance. Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government’s interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities. Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally. To this end, specific technical guidance is to be developed and issued at the earliest possible time for the use of the agencies that control the export of equipment and technology, including data exchange arrangements. Responsibility for the development of such guidance, and when necessary the revision of these guidances, will be vested in the Departments of State and Defense, in consultation as appropriate with the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Office of Science and Technology, and under the leadership of the Department of State. The approved guidance documents will be cleared at the White House and issued as technical appendices to this National Security Action Memorandum. Necessary guidance will be requested before specific commitments are made by any agency. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Top Secret. 31. Informal Notes of Secretary of State Rusk’s Special Staff Meeting 31. Informal Notes of Secretary of State Rusk’s Special Staff Meeting 1 Washington, April 24, 1964. Mr. Tyler Following the questions distributed in advance of the meeting, 2 Mr. Tyler made the following points: 1. De Gaulle is trying to increase his influence in world affairs. If one recognizes the assumptions behind this statement, he is only implicitly intent on reducing our influence. (a) De Gaulle’s view of Europe is incompatible with partnership with the U.S. as we understand it, i.e., involving European integration and European dependence on the U.S. His definition of Atlantic partnership is narrower than ours. (b) De Gaulle’s view of the world and France’s role in it is based on this estimate of a decline in the relevant power of the superpowers (U.S. and USSR). The Sino-Soviet conflict does favor his objectives, e.g., intra-European political maneuvering because it increases the options open to France in world politics. 2. These motivations are reflected as follows: —In Europe by emphasis on European interests and an independence of the U.S. —In Africa by “national” policies pursuing French advantages in cultural and economic fields. —In the Far East in obvious ways such as recognition of the Chinese Communists. —In Latin America somewhat similar to FE and by conceding that it is a natural U.S. sphere of interest while believing that France can play a larger role than at present. 3. It is difficult to distinguish between De Gaulle and France and, specifically, some of Deferre’s objectives are shared with De Gaulle. There would be no question of reversing De Gaulle’s actions if Deferre came to power. 4. It is not feasible to attempt to isolate De Gaulle and would not be in our interest except if he decided to go beyond the limits imposed by basic facts, e.g., in U.S.-European relations. The Secretary Looking at the events through which De Gaulle has lived, it is easy to understand his hopes for rebuilding France’s prestige. In the context of De Gaulle’s thinking, opportunities for France to disagree with the U.S. are “positive pluses.” We should not get excited and show too much public concern over France’s attempts at independence since this only helps achieve France’s aims. AF—Mr. Tasca France’s influence in Africa is on the whole favorable, yet the French position is constantly eroding and has significant gaps (as in Guinea). ARA—Mr. Adams If De Gaulle hopes to build up the French position in Latin America he was wrong to begin in Mexico because French influence there is greater than anywhere else in Latin America. He can only go downhill in his subsequent Latin American visits. As an example of non-alignment France could have a damaging influence on members of the OAS. Mr. Talbot The significant fact about the Middle East at present is the normalization of French-Arab relations and how this will affect the relationship that has existed between France and Israel. IO—Mr. Sisco The French have not been activists; they could be much more troublesome if they were more active. For the near future the key issues which might reveal French behavior will be Article 19 and the Chinese representation question. Grant G. Hilliker 3 Deputy Executive Secretary 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 66 D 147. Confidential. The notes, which bear the notation “for use of S/P,” were prepared on April 27. 2 Not found. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 32. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 1, 1964. SUBJECT Bob Anderson’s Call on General De Gaulle Bob Anderson telephoned this morning to say that on Friday night, just as he was ready to leave Europe, he got a sudden invitation to call on General De Gaulle on Saturday at 10 A.M. He of course postponed his return and made the visit, which lasted about 45 minutes-one hour. Anderson reports that General De Gaulle was most cordial. He said he knew there had been difficulty in communication between France and the United States, and would very much like to see this situation improved. There were only two great powers—the US and the USSR—but other countries had their own rights and interests, and he thought it important to have good communications. He said that he did not get on well with President Kennedy, who seemed to have a grand design of his own and was not in agreement with the views of General De Gaulle. On the other hand, while he had talked with you only 15 minutes in November, 2 he had found it a most valuable conversation and hoped to have a better understanding with you. The General then asked Anderson whether you would value communication by letter or by telephone, and Anderson said he particularly emphasized the telephone. Anderson said that while he could not speak for you, he could think of no reason why such communications would not be welcome. Anderson asked De Gaulle if there was any particular substantive matter which he would like to discuss, but the General replied that in frankness he was too tired and was not yet caught up with immediate issues after his illness. 3 Nevertheless he did value such connection, and while he expected to have differences with even the greatest of allies, France would always hope for good communication and understanding with her real friends like the United States. After the meeting and before he left France, Anderson received a further message from De Gaulle’s office giving him the General’s telephone number—Balzac 2000. Bob’s recommendation is that you should find a moment to make a personal phone call to the General in the next day or so. All that we need say is that we have had a report of this friendly talk, that we are grateful for the General’s kindness to Mr. Anderson, that we certainly do welcome communication with him by letter and by telephone, and that this phone call is simply for the purpose of wishing him continued recovery and expressing the hope that we can indeed have such communications. I support Bob’s recommendation with one addition. George Ball is going to Paris this week end and has already asked if he may call on General De Gaulle, as he will be calling later on Prime Minister Home. I think you might wish to mention the Ball visit to General De Gaulle, and to say that if he is feeling ready for such communication, we would be very glad if he could have a frank talk with Secretary Ball about the great problems both our countries face in Southeast Asia. 4 McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5. No classification marking. 2 A memorandum of their conversation is in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XII, Document 276 . 3 De Gaulle underwent surgery on April 17. 4 No record of a telephone conversation has been found. Johnson sent a letter to De Gaulle, dated June 4, which George Ball delivered during a June 5 meeting. Johnson’s letter and De Gaulle’s reply are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, France. Ball’s report on his meeting with De Gaulle is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 202 . 33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 33. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, July 9, 1964, 6:35 p.m. 174. Department greatly interested in recent reports from Paris and certain African posts which appear confirm French intention make significant withdrawal its military forces in Sub-Sahara Africa. Previous reporting also indicates French may be rethinking and modifying their economic aid policies in Africa and elsewhere. Conceivably actions could create dangerous vacuum that could be exploited by Bloc to grave detriment whole Western position. Modalities of troop withdrawals will have important bearing on effect they have on African countries concerned, i.e. numbers and types of units withdrawn, timing, and whether seconded officers and training units remain with local forces. Withdrawal French forces has serious political implications in terms of internal security and political stability of present regimes. It will also have a distinct economic impact quite apart from any possible changes in nature and level of economic aid. FYI. View limited US resources available for overseas aid we naturally concerned by likely increase in appeals for US assistance from Francophone states if France makes drastic cuts. We have no desire replace France or undermine French relations with its former territories. We do think however clarification of French intentions necessary to permit consideration of ways in which impact of military withdrawal could be cushioned. End FYI. Unless objection perceived you are requested discuss question proposed troop withdrawals with FonMin, eliciting clarification French plans in view of the common concern for the continued political and economic stability in important area affected. 2 Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 3. Confidential. Drafted in AF, cleared in WE and AF, and approved by Harriman. 2 Telegram 282 from Paris, July 16, reported on French plans. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 AFR-FR) 34. Memorandum of Conversation 34. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Paris, September 10, 1964. SUBJECT Franco-American Relations PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Bohlen J. Robert Schaetzel Ambassador Bohlen was convinced that De Gaulle would not take France out of NATO. De Gaulle’s objections run to the organization of the alliance while of course the Treaty itself is entirely silent on this point. In one sense De Gaulle might find attractive NATO assuming worldwide responsibilities but of course the inclusion of Germany and Italy as major elements in the alliance would conversely diminish this attraction. Bohlen doubted that De Gaulle would attempt to play the Russian card. The real problem in the area of Russian-Western relations is the apparent eagerness of the United States to reach accommodations with the USSR plus the fact that in De Gaulle’s eyes we continue to see the confrontation between the East and West in ideological terms. Bohlen stressed that the “Dumbbell” organization of the Atlantic is indispensable despite the fact that there is little prospect of early major movement forward. It was his view that both European and American public opinion should be made aware of the long term prospects implicit in the Atlantic partnership concept. He urged that we define more clearly what the United States really means by partnership. Bohlen wondered whether we had thought through the implications of such an arrangement and whether we were really ready to give up any U.S. sovereignty. In speculating about the post-U.S. election period, Bohlen noted the degree to which President Kennedy had finally come to understand De Gaulle. He was fearful that President Johnson would not have the patience to undertake this task and would probably not reach the point of appreciating the complexity of the General. Bohlen was convinced that De Gaulle’s obsession with French independence means that the General would be totally unable to compromise on any significant element of policy. On the other hand De Gaulle’s personal and public politeness might very well mislead President Johnson into mistaking manners for substantial concessions. He felt that De Gaulle might be prepared to attempt a summit meeting but certainly not a NATO summit meeting. Bohlen also felt that the place in which the meeting was held could become important. Bohlen referred to correspondence he had had from Mac Bundy 2 in which the latter had asked what could be done in the context of our political campaign to meet criticism of the deterioration of French-American relations. Bohlen’s short answer to this was “Nothing.” He referred to the letter I had written him about the Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly. He said he would be writing to us on Senator Fulbright’s proposal. His only doubt was how it would fit into the concept of Atlantic partnership. He said he was anxious to come to the United States shortly after November 3. He felt this important in view of the speculation in France about his own future. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Schaetzel. 2 Not further identified. 35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Export Control to France Under NSAM 294: Test Cases 1. The letter at Tab A 2 from AEC Chairman Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, sent you and Secretary McNamara in copy, recommends approval in two cases involving exports to France. It invites your independent comment to the White House, because the issues involved are of concern to both State and Defense. The decision on these cases will be important in terms of clarifying the intent and future implementation of NSAM 294 3 (Tab B). 2. One case involves a French request to purchase enriched U-235 in accordance with terms of our 1959 agreement, made to assist France in developing its own nuclear submarine propulsion plant, and under which we agreed to sell France up to 300 kilograms of U-235 for this purpose. We have already provided 171 kilograms, and the present request is for an additional 63. The AEC technical analysis (Tab C) leads them to the conclusion that the 63 kilograms is of no real significance to the program, and that to deny the request will cause the French no more than minor inconvenience. This conclusion seems to me unquestionably correct. 3. The other case involves a request to buy two computers, valued at about $12,000,000. One is intended for installation in a French weapons laboratory, the other in a civil establishment but with likely part-time military use. The AEC conclusion here also is that both computers will be of only marginal significance in terms of assisting the French strategic effort. This conclusion is less well supported and seems to me considerably more dubious than in the case of the U-235. 4. There has been a strong difference of view between Defense and AEC at staff level on the U-235 case, with Defense arguing against granting the French request (Tab D). There is no comparable Defense document in the computer case, but it is our understanding that the AEC itself (at Commission level) has been seriously divided over this one, with Chairman Seaborg and Commissioners Tape and Bunting favoring approval, the other two either opposed or reserved. The device of the letter to Bundy was decided on by the AEC partly as a means simply of getting a high-level decision on two cases of considerable precedent value in terms of implementing NSAM 294, partly in the hope that Secretary McNamara in commenting would in effect rule against the line of thinking of those in Defense who produced the letter at Tab D. The AEC has hoped strongly that you will favor approval of the U-235 request. There is apparently less urgency and therefore less immediate concern about our position as regards the computers. 5. I have no hesitancy whatever in recommending that we support Dr. Seaborg’s position on the U-235 request. The technical finding is well-supported, and the material would obviously be of little or no real consequence to the French program. I see no benefit and considerable potential harm in denying the request and thereby in French eyes failing to live up to a government-to-government agreement. As regards the computers, I am not convinced by the arguments in the letter, and would like to know much more before recommending anything. I therefore suggest a holding position on this. Recommendation: That you sign the letter at Tab E. 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Drafted by George (G/PM) on November 25 and cleared by Tyler and in G, L, and MC. 2 Tabs A, C, and D are not printed. 3 Document 30 . 4 Document 36 . 36. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 36. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 1, 1964. Dear Mac: I have received a copy of Glenn Seaborg’s letter to you of November 23, 1964, which invites my comment on two cases involving exports to France. 2 While the cases both require evaluation within the terms of NSAM 294, I will comment on them separately because somewhat different considerations are involved in the two. Let me first however state my understanding of the policy embodied in NSAM 294, as that policy bears on France. For the purposes before us, I can perhaps best do this by recalling that the policy has always had positive as well as negative aspects. In negative terms, it was the intent of the NSAM that we take pains to deny to France (1) whatever will significantly assist her in acquiring an independent strategic nuclear capability, whether that capability be thought of in terms of nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them or (2) whatever will identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator in the French effort. In positive terms, it was the intent of the NSAM that we take equally great pains not to deny to France things which would not so assist her, and that to the extent possible we continue to cooperate with France as with any other friend and ally. Finally, when NSAM 294 was issued last April, it was not for the purpose of setting new policy, but instead to clarify and re-affirm existent policy, with the aim of furnishing the concerned Departments and agencies with an authoritative expression of that policy to be used as a guide in their implementation of it. There have been numerous developments since last April in U.S.-French relations and the world scene generally, not all of them favorable, unfortunately. I do not however see in them anything to change the basic evaluation given above, or to cause us on our own initiative to adopt a more restrictive policy toward France in terms of implementing NSAM 294. As regards the pending French request for 63 kilograms of U-235, made under the 1959 Agreement for Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes, 3 I have carefully considered the available evidence. I accept the AEC conclusion as to the marginal importance to the French program of the requested amount, and it seems quite clear that U.S. denial of the request would cause the French only minor technical inconvenience. In political terms, on the other hand, the consequences of denial could be very serious. We do have an agreement, made in 1959 in good faith. We are already publicly associated with this particular program, by virtue of the agreement made in accordance with U.S. law and regulations, and by virtue of deliveries previously made under that agreement. To deny the pending request could and probably would be viewed by the French Government as reneging by the U.S. on a firm commitment, and in view of the determination that must necessarily be made in event of denial, as a deliberate U.S. intimation that France is no longer contributing to the common defense. As is only too obvious, we have a sufficiency of serious problems with the French Government already. I do not believe it is in our basic interest to add to the list by denying this request, or by delaying further in deciding it. It has been pending since June, and to delay much longer would be tantamount to refusal, since the French must proceed within the next few weeks to take action of one kind or another. I therefore urge a quick affirmative decision. As regards the computer cases, there is no comparable political aspect, of course, since no government-to-government agreement is involved, and the issue is largely that of deciding whether the inhibiting effect on the French program would be great enough to justify governmental intervention in U.S.-French trading relationships by blocking the two sales. This is not the sole issue, however, since an evaluation must be made also of the extent to which providing either or both these computers would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator in the French weapons program. The whole matter is a complex and difficult one, in which I would like to sort things out somewhat further before putting a recommendation of any kind to you. Sincerely, Dean Rusk 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Tyler and in L and MC. 2 See Document 35 . 3 This agreement was signed with France July 20, 1959. The text is classified. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 37. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 37. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 4, 1964. Dear Mac: Glenn Seaborg’s letter of November 23, 1964 2 raises basic issues about that aspect of U.S. policy against proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems which is represented by NSAM 294. I cannot agree with the position taken by AEC on the export of certain advanced computers and enriched U-235 to France. It suggests that NSAM 294 and over-all U.S. policy calls for the denial of assistance to France only if each denial action involves an item of equipment or technology that is in itself a controlling, critical or essential item in the French program. This position, in my judgment, is unrealistic and self-defeating if the U.S. seriously intends to follow the intent of NSAM 294 “not to contribute or assist” in the development of national nuclear capabilities. We all recognize, of course, that France or any other technologically advanced nation has the capability to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and that the impact of U.S. denial of equipment and technology may in many cases not be determinative. Nevertheless, export controls, as one of several means of carrying out the anti-proliferation policy, will—by cumulative effect—retard, increase the cost of, or discourage French and other national efforts. In my judgment, therefore, the U.S. should be firm and consistent in denying whatever would measurably assist the program of any nation that aspires to a nuclear weapons capability, unless such assistance would be clearly insignificant. The approach taken by the AEC would, I suggest, unnecessarily weaken such an export control policy and make that policy inconsistent with the over-all U.S. anti-proliferation objective. 1. The Computer Cases. I disagree with the AEC recommendation that export be permitted. These computers are designed admirably for atomic research, and provide greatly enhanced ability for development of French nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems (although they of course have other uses). One computer, the IBM 360-92, will be the largest and most advanced model ever produced. Its acquisition by France in about two years certainly would be an important, though perhaps not an immediately decisive factor in the long-range French nuclear weapons effort. The CDC 3600, the second computer, is one of the most advanced currently in use. Its proposed delivery directly to a French nuclear weapons facility convinces me that export should be denied. I recommend, therefore, that the U.S. deny the export of these computers under NSAM 294 and export of any others that would make a similar significant contribution to nuclear weapons or delivery systems development. The only condition under which I would agree to approve such items for export is a firm assurance by the French Government that they would not be so used. I have the following additional comments on the AEC memorandum attached to Glenn Seaborg’s letter: a. Paragraph C (Memo, p. 1) suggests that the advanced computers are not absolutely required by the French, pointing to the fact that a U.S. thermonuclear device was developed without such a computer capability. This is true, but our first device was very awkward and heavy, weighing 42,000 lbs. The French can develop thermonuclear explosives of this type without the very large advanced computers involved here, but they cannot design a small deliverable warhead. We do not want to provide them the ability in the next few years to reduce, say, a 10,000 lb thermonuclear device to a missile warhead of 750 lbs. This difference is vital. b. Paragraph C also highlights what most disturbs me about the AEC view of NSAM 294. The question is not whether the French are “dependent upon” the item sought to be exported (i.e., “but for” securing that item their program will founder), but rather whether the item will significantly assist their program. The AEC apparently does not dispute that the computers involved meet the latter standard. Indeed, both DOD and AEC today rely heavily upon comparable equipment in U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery system programs, the AEC military uses being interchangeable with peaceful uses. c. The acknowledgment in paragraph D that these computers would assist the French program “after 1969” should in itself be sufficient to require denial under NSAM 294. Had the U.S. been foresighted enough to act more energetically only a few years ago along the lines NSAM 294 now calls for, we might today be confronted with far fewer problems stemming from French nuclear proliferation. d. The statement is made at page 2 that the French would construe denial to mean that the U.S. is refusing “to cooperate with them in an area of fundamental and unclassified technology.” Of course, the computers are “unclassified” but they will be used for highly classified nuclear weapons research programs, and can provide a significantly improved base for strategic delivery system development as well (submarine hull design, missile performance simulation, etc.). Admittedly, the French may be unhappy, and their reaction will be understandable. This is a risk, and a predictable result of applying NSAM 294. The real issue is whether or not the U.S. seriously intends to retard the French program, knowing that they will disapprove of our actions. Moreover, I question whether the French adverse reaction is not being stressed too much. They have known of our anti-proliferation policy for some time now. e. At page 2, an inordinate stress is placed on the dollar value of the sales involved. The dollar value for export of the many, many types of computers (about 150) not falling within NSAM 294 is far greater than the value of the small number of types of advanced computers (about 12) comparable to those at issue here. Obviously I do not oppose the export of the 150 other types which have many research, industrial, and commercial applications (as well as substantial utility in nuclear weapons programs). As a rough estimate, these 150 other types comprise about 95% of the dollar value of the total market. f. The reference at page 2 to the Ferranti capability is probably incorrect in part. Information from the CIA staff indicates that neither this U.K. firm, nor the company to which it apparently recently sold its large-computer production facilities (ICT), plans to produce a computer comparable to the IBM 360-92. As a result, the largest computer developed or known to be under development outside the U.S. has been estimated to have only 5%-15% of the capability of the 360-92. Even this limited capability may be important enough to call for discussion with the source country (U.K.) to influence it to withhold any such computers under an anti-proliferation policy akin to our own. The results of such efforts should not be prejudged. g. I question the suggestion at page 2, third paragraph, that existing French computer capability devoted to non-weapons research could be harnessed to assist significantly their nuclear weapons effort, thereby obviating the need for the advanced computers at issue. Pooling a number of large computers does not provide a substitute for a single advanced machine such as the IBM 360-92. Certain sophisticated problems of extreme size and complexity do not lend themselves to piecemeal solution; in other instances the time required for solution makes pooling unrealistic. For the volume of work which could be processed, scheduling and central programming would be quite difficult; there would be inefficient fragmenting of many computing jobs; and the computer time required for much of the necessary work would be increased. Further, diverting existing French computers into the pool would starve other segments of their industry. Even with this pooling effort, the French nuclear weapons program would in all probability be held back; at least it would not be speeded up, as it would be with the advanced computers AEC would permit to be exported. 2. The Enriched U-235 Case. An initial DOD position was furnished on November 6, 1964 to AEC by Mr. W.J. Howard, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy). (A copy is attached.) 3 The position is basically that the export license should be denied because the material is expressly for the French land-based prototype submarine nuclear propulsion plant, and the French intend that submarine to be part of a missile delivery system. The 1959 Agreement under which earlier shipments were made is relevant, but not determinative. Present conditions, especially the current U.S.-French-NATO nuclear controversies, are very different from those prevailing in 1959. Subsequent to Mr. Howard’s letter, [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ] 4 For the above reasons, I reaffirm the stated DOD position in opposition to the export and would be most disinclined to certify, as the 1959 Agreement requires, that the transfer of enriched uranium to France at this time will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to U.S. defense and security. As Mr. Howard’s letter of November 6 indicates, there are adequate grounds under the 1959 Agreement to support denial. In connection with the U-235 export, I note that the AEC memorandum (page 4, paragraph D) cites as a reason for favorable action the fact that denial would have only a short-range (“limited to the next two years”) effect. In the computer cases, the AEC spoke in favor of export because denial would have only a long-range (post-1969) effect. Somewhat questionably both grounds are urged concurrently in support of permitting the exports. In conclusion, I am hopeful that the differences of interpretation which the AEC letter has usefully brought to your attention regarding the computer and U-235 transactions can be quickly resolved. This should eliminate a major obstacle to implementing the NSAM 294 policy effectively. Sincerely, Bob 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 294. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State and to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. 2 See Document 35 . 3 Not found. 4 [ Text not declassified ] 5 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature. 38. Memorandum of Conversation 38. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Paris, December 17, 1964. PARTICIPANTS M. Couve de Murville Ambassador Alphand M. Charles Lucet Secretary of State Rusk Ambassador Bohlen The Secretary began by extending his congratulations, which he said were belated, for the successful Common Market negotiations in which Couve had been involved, adding that they could now look forward to the Kennedy Round. He remarked that the U.S. had considered it would be helpful to urge the Germans on this matter and we had done so and it possibly had been helpful. Couve de Murville made a suitable response. The Secretary said that he had come to see Couve on the question of the intentions of Hanoi which had been mentioned by Couve the other day; 2 French estimates of these intentions seemed to be somewhat different from those which we attributed to Hanoi. Couve replied that, in the last conversation, the Secretary had concentrated on North Vietnam. The French, however, felt that, rather like the European satellites and the Soviet Union, it was impossible to ignore China, although they recognize that North Vietnam did not have the same interests as China since the former wished to retain its independence. It was as if South Vietnam wished to negotiate without the U.S. He said he did not know what we wished to find out. He said their information was that there were considerable economic difficulties in North Vietnam although it constituted no threat to the stability of the Ho Chi Minh regime. This had been confirmed in a conversation between the Cambodian Foreign Minister and Seydoux in New York. The Foreign Minister had said that the regime was very solid and enjoyed the support of the people, but that from an economic point of view life was very drab. He also reported that there seemed to be general expectation of a U.S. attack and that there were machine guns, etc., on the roofs of the houses. It was the French impression that the government of North Vietnam had no intention of taking over South Vietnam for at least the next ten years and that its main objective at the present time was a return to the ′54 agreements. He did not deny their belief in ultimate reunification. The Cambodian Foreign Minister had remarked about the importance of helping South Vietnam, if the fighting could be brought to an end, in order to show a better system than Communism. Couve said that he felt the North Vietnamese were between two elements, the United States in the south and the Chinese in the north, and did not wish to give in to either. The Secretary remarked that he did not believe that the North Vietnamese could think that the south wanted to take over the north and that all that was needed was for the north to stop the guerrilla action. Couve replied there was no point of arguing as to who had begun the present situation. He said the U.S. now had some 22,000 men in there and the north was sending in guerrillas. The Secretary replied that who began it and when was a point of considerable importance. Couve answered that there was a question as to whether the Viet Cong had intervened because of U.S. takeover from the French in South Vietnam or whether the U.S. had begun it following intervention by the Viet Cong. He said he would not like to enter into this discussion. There were psychological and reciprocal fears to be considered. The fact, however, was that now a situation exists which could only be solved by simultaneous disengagement, which they felt could only be brought about by negotiation. He said also the Chinese had no military combat forces in Vietnam, to which the Secretary agreed, saying they only had some training troops and forces along the border. The Secretary, turning to Laos, remarked that in yesterday’s conversation President De Gaulle had said that Souphanouvong had never questioned the status of Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister of Laos. 3 According to our information this was precisely what he had challenged for the purpose of going to a conference. Couve said that according to the French understanding Souphanouvong accepted Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister but only in the sense that he was the chairman, as it were, of the three factions in Laos. He added that if Souvanna Phouma were able to be Prime Minister on his own, and if there were no three factions in Laos there would be no Laotian problem. The Secretary remarked that it was one thing to say that the Prime Minister required the concurrence of the three factions. It was another thing when the writ of the Prime Minister does not run in Pathet Lao, as has been the case in Laos since the entry into force of the present government. Because of this there has been no possibility of controlling the 6,000 Viet Minh and the use of Laos as a corridor to Vietnam. Couve said there were difficulties on both sides of this question. The Secretary said he did not think that one could present the situation in South Vietnam as though it was an evenly balanced affair with wrong on both sides. Couve said they did not pretend it was evenly balanced, but there were difficulties on both sides. The Secretary then remarked that agreement in Laos had never been conditioned on the situation in Vietnam. Couve agreed, but said the purpose of the agreement was to keep Laos as calm as possible. In fact, however, he recognized that Vietnam did have an effect on the Laotian situation. He said in a sense the ′62 agreement had been successful, but now the war had begun again and the situation had returned to the pre-Geneva stage with Souvanna Phouma in the same situation as General Phoumi had been in 1961. The Secretary pointed out that the position of the ICC was the result of direct fraud on the part of the Russians. In Geneva it had been understood that the ICC would, by two-thirds vote, have the right to investigate developments in any region of the country. The English wording implied that such a vote would be with the consent of the Laotian Government, that is, with the consent already granted by the Geneva Agreement. The French wording was somewhat less clear. This had been pointed out by Mr. Harriman to Pushkin, but Pushkin had confirmed the meaning of the English text. However, in practice the Polish member had invoked the Pathet Lao veto as a reason for not carrying out this agreement. Couve then inquired what could be done in the circumstances. The Secretary said that Gromyko had suggested that they should see what the three Laotian factions could do together, and he understood that Souvanna Phouma had proposed a meeting in Laos but that he had not heard whether there had been an answer. Couve agreed and said he understood the meeting place suggested was Luang Prabang. Lucet, in reply to a question, said that there were still lower representatives of the Laotian factions in Paris but there were no meetings. Couve said he agreed that the best thing would be for them to meet and that he did not know about the prospects. The Secretary then inquired whether or not they had had anything from Hanoi on the subject of Laos. Couve replied they have not, but pointed out that they had no real representatives in Hanoi, and there was only a low-level trade delegation from Hanoi in Paris. The Secretary said that we had had some indirect contacts with Hanoi but there had been nothing serious. Couve remarked that the North Vietnamese would never tell us anything except to express their concern for future American intentions. They could not say anything constructive. They could only tell us to get out just the way we told them to get out. The Secretary added that we have always said if they got out we would get out. Couve said this is what they say, but suppose both sides get out—what would then happen? The Secretary remarked that with the Viet Cong out it would be much easier for the South Vietnamese, and particularly the army, to organize the country. Couve said the French did not agree and he did not think that ten or twelve generals squabbling among themselves could organize the country with the Buddhists, the sects, and the mountain people all in disagreement. The Secretary said that the absence of the Viet Cong would make it a new and easier situation. Couve said this was true but it would be impossible to foresee what would be the outcome. The present rulers were old men and they were not bad but it was obvious that they were not going to last. What was needed was time, with no fighting and no foreign intervention. A national movement was needed. He added that the French aim was to avoid a Communist regime. The Secretary remarked that he had received that impression from his talk with General De Gaulle, who had said that despite the consequences, even Communism, he preferred peace in the Far East. Couve said they should work to avoid a Communist regime. He then inquired specifically what the U.S. would like to find out from the North Vietnamese. Was it that we wished South Vietnam to be independent and to stop interference from the north? The Secretary replied there were many complications, and that perhaps an important indicator of Communist intentions would be the Laos Agreement of 1962. It might be possible, for example, to inquire of Souphanouvong exactly what his attitude was in regard to Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister at the conference, to which Couve agreed. He also wondered whether it might not be possible to inquire as to the reaction of Souphanouvong in regard to the Polish proposal for a preliminary meeting attended by the two co-chairmen, the ICC, and the Government of Laos. Couve said it was not easy now, but the Secretary said it might be possible to ascertain prospects of success before proceeding to a formal conference and it might give the Russians a chance to do something without the presence of the Chinese or the U.S. Couve then asked if it would be possible to say that the U.S. would be satisfied if Souphanouvong agreed that Souvanna Phouma would be Prime Minister but, at the same time, on the basis of an agreement of the three parties. The Secretary said this would depend on whether this meant that Souvanna Phouma could only act as the Pathet Lao wished at the conference. Couve said this would seem to him to be a matter of procedure, which the Laotians could agree among themselves. He did recall how it had worked at the Geneva Conference in 1961-62. 4 He asked what would happen if the Russians or Chinese should refer to the U.S. or Thailand military personnel in Laos at a conference. The Secretary replied that this would be quite all right with us. The ICC could look at anything provided it is not one-sided. The original agreement in ′62 had provided for elimination of all foreign troops except a certain number of French. This had been our objective, and Couve agreed that it still was. Couve then said that under the agreement the ICC had the right to inspect, which the Secretary confirmed was by a two-thirds vote. The Secretary then suggested that it might be useful for the French to make the contact with South Vietnam rather than Hanoi. In conclusion, the Secretary suggested that the French might wish to make a check on a number of North Vietnamese statements in 1959-60, which he said had gone very far in calling for the conquest of South Vietnam. Couve said he had always understood that the position of the north had been to return to ′54 but that the statements referred to seemed to go further. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 5. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 15-17. 2 Rusk reported on this discussion in telegram Secto 15 from Paris, December 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US) 3 Reported in telegram Secto 26 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2534) 4 Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Laos is in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume XXIV. 39. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 39. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 21, 1964, noon. 3642. Following Secretary’s departure and extensive Franco-American conversations this week in which he participated, following are Embassy’s preliminary comment on results this week’s activities in Paris insofar as our relations with France are concerned: 1) Secretary’s extensive program of talks with French leaders including two sessions with De Gaulle 2 has effectively undercut Gaullist press argument to effect U.S. not maintaining dialogue with French. Press and public opinion has alleged U.S. policies as well. This argument has disappeared as of now, and we are in position take line with French publicly and privately that every effort being made explain in fullest detail our positions on outstanding issues to French. Couve visit to Washington next month would further strengthen this argument. 2) Press has also stressed that Secretary took position with De Gaulle that neither ANF nor any other U.S. policy directed against France or at French encirclement. This has likewise had helpful reaction. 3) Fact all talks were held in atmosphere cordiality likewise helpful in refuting argument that U.S.-French relations acrimonious. This position already refuted directly by Secretary and we will obviously continue maintain this line here. French in their briefings on these talks also apparently taking position that everything passed most cordially. 4) Positive results McNamara-Messmer talk 3 also helpful and press has given considerable attention to conclusions that U.S. and France will coordinate their independent nuclear forces. Although there is some difference of opinion as to specifics of outcome of meeting, in general it is interpreted as promising sign U.S.-French cooperation for future even though it is realized this will not be immediate. 5) While there is general understanding that Franco-American differences over NATO and MLF/ANF not resolved and indeed no negotiations as such occurred, there is, nevertheless, opinion that heat taken out of ANF problem for moment. Embassy has previously reported French apparent plan relax anti-ANF propaganda for time being. With de Gaulle press conference scheduled for late January, Embassy believes we probably have nearly month’s respite in French attacks on this subject. Fundamental French attitudes have not changed (and some observers remain very pessimistic) but events of past week have certainly served to dampen down situation. 6) Parenthetically it should be noted that unfortunate event of week seems have been recrudescence Franco-German recriminations over four-power communiqué(on which Embassy reporting separately). Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential. Repeated to London and Bonn. 2 See footnote 3, Document 38 . A record of Rusk’s first meeting with de Gaulle, which covered European defense and Germany, is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 64 . 3 No record of this meeting has been found. 40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 40. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 23, 1964. SUBJECT Report on my trip to Paris 1. After some very plain talk in the meeting of the Finance Ministers of the Group of Ten, 2 the elements of a solution satisfactory to the United States appeared regarding the method of gold payment in connection with the forthcoming general increase of quotas in the International Monetary Fund. The next day a detailed agreement was reached by the Deputies of the Ministers which Mr. Roosa has reduced to writing and sent to his colleagues for confirmation of their agreement. The essence of the agreement is that arrangements will be made so that the United States will not suffer any gold loss as a result of the increase in quotas except for our own gold payment to the Fund. This payment is offset by equivalent automatic drawing rights in the Fund so it does not reduce our readily available reserves. If this agreement sticks, as it should, the whole matter of quota increases should be settled within a month or six weeks. 2. My bilateral talks with the French Finance Minister were not as promising. After some delay he informed me, in a private meeting at my apartment, that the French government had turned down his suggestion to make a $342 million prepayment of debt to the United States accompanied by a $150 million purchase of gold. The government had decided it would make no prepayment and no exceptional purchase of gold. However, in order to reduce their excess holding of dollars, they would approximately double their regular monthly taking of gold from the United States, increasing the figure to about $65 million. The French Minister said that this matter could be reviewed again in about six months in light of the situation at that time, and that he would continue his efforts within the French government to achieve agreement on a debt prepayment. It is most important that knowledge of this French decision be held in complete confidence in order to protect the French Finance Minister’s position. He has been, and continues to be, helpful and friendly in all his dealings with the U.S. Douglas Dillon 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 5. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon. A copy was sent to Bundy. 2 Dillon reported on this meeting in telegram 3579 from Paris, December 16. (Ibid., Vol. 4) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 41. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 41. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 29, 1964. SUBJECT Denials of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Vehicle Assistance to France This memorandum has been prepared in response to your recent request for detailed information on denials under our policy of not assisting France in her nuclear weapons effort, and on French probing of that policy. In addressing the subject of U.S.-French nuclear relationships, it is important to recall that neither General De Gaulle nor any other high-level French official has ever specifically asked for U.S. Government cooperation with France in achieving a nuclear weapons capability. This is not to say that General de Gaulle is opposed to such cooperation and would reject it if offered; it is only to say that there has been no U.S.-French dialogue at any high political level which could reasonably be termed a French request for help met with U.S. denial. Our policy vis-á-visthe French or any other independent nuclear weapons effort has been expressed principally in general statements made in the NATO context or elsewhere. The French have not overtly challenged or even discussed with us this policy as such; their probing has come principally in the form of requests to buy specific items of equipment or technology. The French approach has been a pragmatic and generally quite honest and above-board one, which could be described as follows: General de Gaulle has decided that France should press on with an independent program, getting whatever items of practical assistance may be needed and available, but persisting with the program irrespective of the availability of this assistance, and working toward self-sufficiency in all important aspects. The French officials responsible for implementing the program have of course been well aware of the general U.S. policy and have not even approached us with requests for direct weapons assistance—warheads, design data, fissionable material for weapons, etc. There have been many requests for marginal or contributory assistance of various kinds, especially on the delivery vehicle as contrasted to the warhead side of a national nuclear weapons capability. In this connection, it should be noted that during the first few years of the French program, we were comparatively more concerned with controlling warhead assistance than delivery assistance, whereas we now give close attention to both. The attached annexes compiled by State’s Office of Munitions Control, and including contributions from the Department of Defense and the three Services, furnish details on specific denials since 1958 of items coming within the purview of the policy currently expressed by NSAM 294. 2 They show that there have been denied to the French over the years in question a substantial variety of hardware, information, and technological data. The Atomic Energy Commission played an important contributory role in many of these cases, and in others mentioned below which did not involve direct denials. The AEC has also denied access to its facilities by French CEA representatives upon occasion. Records available at this time show 21 such AEC denials since 1961. Commerce has played virtually no role in this area as yet, but is expected to do so increasingly in the future because of our Test Ban Treaty obligations. 3 As of the present, six license applications for export to France have been denied by Commerce. They were for boron trifluoride, lithium, gallium, synthetic rubber products, and high-speed camera parts. Both NSAM 294 and Test Ban Treaty considerations were involved. Study of the annexes will give a good over-view of the practical results of our policy in terms of specific items the French sought and failed to obtain from the U.S. in the 1958-64 period. In addition, it is useful to summarize some key approach-response situations over the years, because they give a flavor of French “probing” and U.S. response, even though formal denials may not have been involved. It is also useful to sketch the relationship to the problem of the Test Ban Treaty, since it introduced a new factor into the situation. Submarines French interest in nuclear propulsion for submarines antedates De Gaulle’s return to power and stems in part from a U.S. offer of general assistance in this field made in the context of the 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting, and thereafter repeated specifically to France. Nothing came of this, for reasons of both a policy and security nature, and the 1959 agreement under which we undertook to furnish fuel for a land-based prototype reactor was a “consolation prize” to the French, inasmuch as no U.S. technology is involved, and the French are entirely on their own in developing the reactor. In late 1961, the French indicated to AEC Chairman Dr. Seaborg an interest in acquiring fuel for an operating submarine. Preliminary consideration was given this matter within the U.S. Government and a decision was reached in early 1962 that while it would be necessary to know more of French plans before seriously addressing the subject, it would be undesirable to engage in any detailed discussion with the French unless and until we were prepared to imply that we might be willing to supply fuel under some circumstances. This we were not willing to do, and this particular French probe was therefore turned off with a “no-response” tantamount to denial. In 1962 an Administration spokesman indicated to the French that it might be possible to sell them a nuclear submarine of the Skipjack (hunter-killer) class, indicating at the same time that it would be necessary to secure approval of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The French were definitely interested, and preliminary discussions with JCAE had been held when the De Gaulle press conference of January 14, 1963 took place, 4 slamming the door on U.K. entry into EEC. This also slammed the door on the Skipjack sale, and in answer to a French inquiry a few months later, they were told that the events of January made it impracticable to pursue the matter. Gaseous Diffusion Plant The French also expressed to Dr. Seaborg in 1961 an interest in acquiring unclassified conventional equipment for use in their gaseous diffusion plant. They were told that there would be no objection to their purchasing such equipment from commercial suppliers, provided the sale and transfer would not involve in any way the communication of Restricted Data. The actual French shopping list when received called principally for compressors and regulators, items of very considerable importance to the operation of a gaseous diffusion plant. The final outcome was that while a flat “no” was never given the French, a response in early 1962 imposed conditions and qualifications of such a nature that the French dropped the subject. Request for Information on Joint Task Force 8 In 1963, on a Navy-to-Navy basis, the French requested information on the detailed composition and methods of operation of Joint Task Force 8, which had provided the logistic and instrumentation support for our Pacific test operations in 1962. The French were candid in stating they wanted the information because it would be helpful to their Navy in participating in French nuclear tests. The U.S. decision was that while complying with the request would probably not mean giving the French any information of significance, to comply fully would only encourage further and more difficult requests. The response was, therefore, confined to referring the French Navy to published information. Observation of U.S. Underground Tests In addition to routine requests for visits to AEC facilities which the French have made from time to time, and which, as indicated above, have resulted in 21 turndowns over the past few years, they asked to send observers to the 1962 weapons test series in Nevada. Since access to the test site during operations might have compromised weapons information, this request was not granted. In response to a related inquiry, however, the French were told that we did not propose to discontinue the practice of permitting sale to France of unclassified instruments useful in weapons tests. (See below for bearing on this position of Test Ban Treaty subsequently concluded.) Lavaud Mission In early 1962 a French military mission to Washington headed by General Lavaud submitted an extensive shopping list including items of importance in guidance, propulsion, and general design aspects of missile development. It was made known to the French that these could not be considered favorably and this request was not pushed. (The compressor-regulator order described above was also connected with the Lavaud Mission.) Participation in Plutonium Effects Tests In May, 1963 the French informally requested permission to participate in plutonium effects tests at our Nevada Test Site. No response was given and after the French learned that combined US-UK tests were in progress they did not raise the matter again. Test Ban Treaty The conclusion of the Test Ban Treaty introduced a new factor into U.S.-French nuclear relationships, particularly with respect to furnishing equipment which might be used in French tests. After consideration of our obligations under the Treaty, we provided the French Government last February with the attached Aide-Mémoire, expressing a U.S. intention to deny to France any material, equipment or technology which would be used in the devising, carrying out, or evaluation of tests, as long as France contemplated conduct of tests in environments prohibited by the Treaty. In October, 1964 an important test case was decided when Secretary Rusk approved a recommendation for denial of export of unclassified equipment intended for instrumentation of French underground testing. This equipment was of a type which the French had previously purchased with U.S. Government knowledge and approval. Steps are now under way which will enable us to bring our policy and intentions on export control under the Test Ban Treaty to the attention of American manufacturers and exporters generally, since some items may be involved which have not previously been controlled by either State or Commerce. Summary Evaluation The policy currently expressed by NSAM 294 has in large part been in effect for several years. While the French have never overtly challenged it, it is clear, from the cases sketched above and from the detailed annexes, that they have extensively and systematically probed U.S. implementation of that policy by attempting to secure from U.S. sources a variety of hardware, information and technological data that they presumably considered would be of value in achieving their program goals. Our denials have undoubtedly been troublesome to those charged with carrying out the French program, and it is a reasonable assumption that the cumulative effect of our denial policy has been to delay attainment of program goals. It is also a reasonable assumption that another effect has been to force an increased degree of French self-sufficiency, given their intention, which has so far prevailed, of carrying out the program irrespective of the availability of outside assistance. These two offsetting factors require careful assessment against a background evaluation of just where the French stand in their program as of end-1964, in order to determine those areas in which a U.S. denial policy can operate effectively against French purposes in future. Llewellyn E. Thompson 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Bundy. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Kitchen. 2 The annexes are not printed. NSAM No. 294 is Document 30 . 3 For text of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed at Moscow August 5, 1963, see 14 UST 1313. 4 For extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963 , pp. 378-380. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Thompson signed the original. 42. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 42. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, January 5, 1965, 1 p.m. 3798. It occurred to me it might be useful at this time to give a summary of available information concerning France’s position on the related subjects of NATO, nuclear affairs, and the US position in Europe, which are of particular interest to the United States. Other aspects of French policy, i.e. Southeast Asia, Congo, and other questions not discussed here will be covered in a subsequent message. 2 In most cases the information and analysis have been already submitted on the separate subjects concerned, but it might help a general understanding of current French policy if they were placed together as a connected whole. During 1964 certain aspects of French policy became more definite and moved from the realm of speculation into that of quasi-certainty. In cases where feasible I have endeavored to put down probable lines of French action in relation to any given subject. 1. French Attitude Towards NATO. During 1964 it became increasingly apparent that De Gaulle’s often repeated desire to bring about structural changes in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—as distinct from the Alliance—really involved a destruction of the existing structural organization of the Treaty, including SHAPE and all its varied functions, the command structure, the assignment of forces, infrastructure, and in short any aspect of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which contained elements of integration. How and at what date this will be done remains unseen and it is always possible that the distinction will not be complete. De Gaulle wants the Alliance relationships probably in bilateral form after 1969. He apparently has the old-fashioned idea that all that is required to make an alliance effective in time of peace is occasional conversations with reciprocal exchange of war plans between general staffs to go into effect in the event of hostilities. This impression, which may seem exaggerated, is based upon a number of conversations which I have had with De Gaulle, or at which I have been present when he has talked with the Secretary. In part this view of De Gaulle is based upon his general historical analysis of the trends of events in the future. He unquestionably believes that the Soviet menace will progressively diminish, and that the sharp differences which exist in the ideological and organizational field between Communist states of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union on the one hand and the nations of Western Europe on the other, will tend to disappear. He believes the danger of general warfare, that is war between major powers, will not arise in Europe but will more likely occur in regard to Communist China in Asia, but not for at least fifty years or so, unless the US and China get out of hand in the Far East over Vietnam. De Gaulle does not plan to move in this field in regard to NATO until close to the 1969 date when it is possible for any signatory to withdraw. His apparent present intention is to hold down France’s participation in NATO to a minimum but in a formal sense to let things go on until 1969 unless, as he has stated on a number of occasions, there is a “crisis” or a “drama” which would force him to consider earlier action. In this connection, it should be noted that de Gaulle, in his talk with the Secretary this December, referred to his memorandum of September 1958 3 as an attempt on his part to bring about necessary changes in NATO, which however met with no response. It can be deduced from this that De Gaulle’s chief objection to the current structure of NATO is that it does not give ample place to France and is too dominated in his eyes by the US. Therefore, for the immediate future there is not much ground for anticipating any sudden French move in regard to NATO short of what De Gaulle would call a crisis or a drama, terms which, when he used them, he obviously meant to indicate a particular development such as the MLF or even the ANF. Short of this he will undoubtedly wait until (A) the French nuclear force is really operational and (B) until close to 1969 North Atlantic Treaty date. 2. French Attitude Toward MLF, ANF, or any Comparable Collective Nuclear Project in NATO. French attitude on the MLF when it was first broached some two years ago was very specific. The French said to us on a number of occasions, and told the same to other members of the Alliance, that France would not participate presumably because all of its resources in this regard were fully utilized by its own Force de Dissuasion, but it had no objection to the project as outlined nor any objection to any other member of the Alliance participating. In October 1964 this attitude changed radically. While the exact cause is speculation, the French themselves tell us that initially they did not believe that the idea would ever approach reality, but it is probable that Erhard’s press conference, and particularly his reference to the possibility of a German-American bilateral arrangement in this field, was what triggered off the new French opposition. The first overt manifestations of the current French position were the speech of Couve de Murville in the National Assembly and the speeches of Pompidou to the parliamentary journalists and to the Assembly. Pompidou gave considerable emphasis to the bilateral aspects of the MLF. In any event, since about the end of October, French policy has hardened into outright and open opposition to the whole concept of the participation of any European allies with the US in a mixed-manned or other joint nuclear venture in which the US would hold the crucial control. At the moment of writing the exact future of the ANF, as it is now known, is not too clear. Despite the amicable nature of the conversations the Secretary had in Paris in December on the subject with General De Gaulle and with Couve de Murville, 4 French opposition remains just as strong as it ever was and this opposition must be kept in mind in any future plans for the atomic force. It does not in any sense mean that it should be abandoned, but it merely means that French opposition cannot be dismissed or ignored or expect to change, at least as long as De Gaulle is in power. From the nature of the objections which the French have brought forward to the MLF it would appear to me that the real French objection is the recognition that any form of NATO (or outside NATO) nuclear force in which some continental Europeans would participate would inevitably do away with the French monopoly of European nuclear weapons and would, in de Gaulle ’s view, subject European defense to American veto and American control rather than French. The French undoubtedly feel that given the difficulties which the Germans would encounter (the WEU treaties, the lack of place of test, shortage of raw material), France could easily retain in the future under any circumstances the advance she has over Germany in this field. Parenthetically it is probable that De Gaulle overestimates the value in peace time of a monopoly of nuclear weapons. This central aim of French policy has rarely been enunciated and does not figure among the public chief objections to the MLF, but it is what lies behind the charge that the MLF is divisive. It is of course not in reality divisive at all, since through the European clause the MLF could become a purely European force if and when Europe ever organized itself. France will probably not take any action in this field unless the MLF once again becomes a reality. It is, however, extremely possible that the publicity attending the MLF may well force France to take further steps in the direction of European unification, or at least to make certain gestures in that direction for the sake of appearance. It is also probable that in any future discussion for the unification of Europe, France, in accordance with De Gaulle’s Strasbourg speech, will insist upon putting unification in the defense field on the agenda for immediate discussion. It is not too difficult to imagine what use France would make of any such agenda item for European discussion in the event that any one of the members attempted to go in for the MLF. 3. US Presence in Europe. Contrary to much opinion De Gaulle is not working to bring about any withdrawal of US forces from Europe in the relatively near future. He does hopefully envisage over a long period of time, according to his estimate of future international trends, the emergence of a situation in Europe when US forces will no longer be necessary for the defense of Europe. He is too realistic to wish for any withdrawal too soon or too abruptly which might imperil European security. What, however, he is trying to prevent is the political or military institutionalization of US presence in Europe after the military necessity has disappeared and consequently the forces themselves withdrawn. This is the real basis for his often asserted opposition in general to the present NATO structure and in part to his opposition to the MLF or any other integrated nuclear organization, including the US and some European countries. But I repeat that at the present time, and for at least five years, there would seem to be no possibility that De Gaulle would deliberately make any move designed to force US withdrawal from Europe. There is, particularly in the defense and NATO field, a characteristic, logical sequence in French policy quite independent of whether or not the premise is sound. For example, once the premise of the necessity of France having completely national nuclear deterrent is accepted any logical consequences become apparent. For example, it is necessary for De Gaulle periodically to voice doubts as to US intention to use nuclear weapons with the risk of its own cities in the defense of Europe. For if there were no question about American nuclear willingness to defend Europe there would be no need for the Force de Dissuasion and consequently no need for the financial burden on the French tax payers. Also, the French strategy of immediate nuclear response of the so-called trip wire theory is another logical consequence of the Force de Frappe. Since France does not have the resources to spend on nuclear armament and conventional forces, conventional forces have been and will be further starved for funds. It follows that France would not be in a position, even if it desired, to fight a conventional war on the soil of Europe. While some of the foregoing considerations are obviously speculative in character and cannot be exactly proven, I believe on the other hand they provide a reasonably accurate account of current French policy. I would like to close this message by stating that I see no possibility of any US diplomatic or political action directed specifically at France which would significantly change French attitudes or policy in any of these fields. Only external events, by changing basic circumstances, might be expected to bring about serious modification of current French attitude. While it is therefore unquestionably true that diplomacy has very little chance of success in modifying France’s intransigent position, it is nevertheless in my opinion extremely important that we should always hold out to the public the impression that we believe that there is some hope in this regard since this would permit us to maintain, as we have endeavored to do virtually ever since De Gaulle came to power, friendly relations without entertaining any naive hope of changing any French basic positions. It is also very important to this to maintain the current dialogue. An invitation to Couve to visit Washington in the latter part of this month in the event he would not be coming to the UN might be worth considering. Department to repeat as desired. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, Luxembourg, and The Hague. 2 Telegram 3858 from Paris, January 8. (Ibid.) 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1958-1960, vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 81 – 83 . 4 See Documents 38 and 39 . 43. Memorandum of Conversation 43. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 19, 1965, 11:35 a.m. PARTICIPANTS US The President Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Bohlen McGeorge Bundy William R. Tyler France Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister Ambassador Alphand Charles Lucet, Foreign Office After preliminary courtesies, during which the Foreign Minister conveyed General de Gaulle’s best wishes to the President, President Johnson referred to this morning’s events in Saigon. He had told some Senators only yesterday evening 2 that you could never tell when there might be a new government in Saigon and this morning it had happened again. 3 There had been something like ten governments in South Vietnam in the last few years. Couve said this did not surprise people any more and that it illustrated the basic problem in South Vietnam, which is a political one. The President said the Secretary of State had told him about the good talks he had had with General De Gaulle. He was glad the Foreign Minister had been able to come. He admired De Gaulle for being able to get away with few press conferences. He himself had held forty-six of them, whereas President Kennedy had held twenty-one, and yet he had been told that wasn’t enough. At Mr. Ball’s suggestion, the Foreign Minister described his talk in Paris on Saturday, February 13, with the Communist Chinese Ambassador, who had just come back from Peiping. After the usual accusations against the United States, he had said that the thing to do in Southeast Asia was to go back to the Geneva Agreement of 1954 4 as a basis for negotiations. Couve had told him this was the French position, too, but the negotiations would have to be without preconditions, because their objective was to achieve a cease fire and see what could then be developed. The Chinese Ambassador had not said exactly that he agreed, which would have been asking too much. However, as the Ambassador left, Couve had summarized their talk according to his own understanding, and had asked if the Ambassador objected to any part of it, to which the Ambassador had replied in the negative. Couve said that France had some commercial relations with North Vietnam but no political relations, since France had diplomatic relations with South Vietnam. He said the French government did not see any difference between the North Vietnamese and the Chinese, except that the former are more anxious to negotiate. The President said our information on what was happening in Southeast Asia was limited. He said we did not have the best sources available. We had always felt that in order to have useful negotiations, the other side must want to negotiate. We had not seen any sign of this, in fact our information reflected quite the contrary. (At this point the President read several passages from an intelligence report on the attitude of the North Vietnamese government which we had received through a private source.) 5 Couve said it was normal that Hanoi should speak in this vein for propaganda purposes, but he did not think that this was the real position. The President said that in the last fourteen months he had watched problems of concern to our allies very closely and very carefully, and that he had always been very cautious and had taken care not to throw our weight around. Illustrating his point with reference to an occasional bean ball thrown in a baseball game, he said that when these had come his way he had moved his head out of the line of fire and had refused to engage in quarrels with people. He had always told our own people that we didn’t want to get into fights needlessly. The President pointed out that President Eisenhower and President Kennedy had told the people of South Vietnam that we wanted to help them help themselves. This had always been our position and he wasn’t about to run out on our commitment. There were two or three thousand incidents a month in South Vietnam and he didn’t have to tell the French what this meant as they had had plenty of experience out there themselves. As the character of these incidents gets more serious we respond in kind in order to make our purpose clear, e.g.: when the North Vietnamese PT boats had been sent out against our destroyers, we had bombed their bases on the North Vietnamese coast. We had also shelled the attacking craft with our ships. Then the Viet Cong had been sent into a US compound and had killed a number of our boys. The President was not going to write them a thank-you note for this. There had been up to 78 such incidents. The President wondered what De Gaulle or Erhard or Wilson would do in similar circumstances. What we had done was to bomb certain of their staging and assembly points. Then the following night they had come and blown up a hotel and killed some more of our soldiers. So our planes went back and “sprinkled them a little.” The President said he didn’t think we had killed many of them. In fact he thought that our action had probably caused more concern in certain other parts of the world than it had in North Vietnam. The President said that whenever De Gaulle says something on the Vietnamese problem, the President asks the Secretary of State or Ambassador Bohlen to go and find out exactly what De Gaulle said. Then he is told that the suggestion is that we ought to have a political solution. The President said that he was all in favor of this but the question was how to bring it about. The President said that the press would like him to talk more than he does but he didn’t want to. He noticed that some of his colleagues talked to the press and he could tell which ones had done so from little lines here and there in the articles. The President repeated that our policy was to help the people of South Vietnam to help themselves. We would leave tomorrow if anyone would provide effective guarantees of the independence of South Vietnam. He said we would pull our men out tonight if we could achieve this. The President said that we were not going to give the other side a privileged sanctuary as in Korea, or tell them what weapons we would use or not use against them. We were going to keep them guessing and use appropriate means in response to their aggression. We don’t want to move to escalation, but if the others do it, we will do whatever is required on the basis of the wisest military judgment. We would like to have everybody else’s help in our efforts and we haven’t had much help from others. The President said that he had greatly valued President De Gaulle’s stand and help at the time of the Cuba crisis, and he had taken it into account in our relations with France. He said that until we get support we will never be able to explain our alliances satisfactorily to the American people. He said that we might have to leave South Vietnam for some reason but we hoped not. We welcomed the help and the counsel of everyone. If the North Vietnamese think that they hold all the trump cards and that they have the backing of world opinion, then they are misjudging the situation and us, just like Hitler and the Japanese misjudged us. We have no ambitions, but if we were to abandon Vietnam, we would be forced to give up Laos, Thailand, Burma, and would be back to Hawaii and San Francisco. He said that we ask for nothing for ourselves in Vietnam, we just want the Vietminh to leave South Vietnam alone. The President said we wanted a solution, and we would rather have a solution than the death of a single American or Vietnamese. The President said that when people talk about a political solution they always seem to come back to the thought that we haven’t used our strength properly. The President said that we intended to stay out there as long as necessary and we didn’t see what other courses we could follow. He said that we would continue to exercise prayer and caution, “waiting, praying and hoping that others more experienced than ourselves could come up with some good ideas.” The President said that he had not been too sensitive to demands for stronger action from people in this country. In this connection he specifically mentioned Goldwater, Nixon, Scranton, Rockefeller and Lodge, who had all asked for greater military measures. The Foreign Minister said he fully understood the feelings expressed by the President. The essential problem was: how to get out. He felt that there was a complete contradiction between our respective information on the thinking of the Chinese and North Vietnamese. The French Government’s information differed from ours. The President said he had heard that General De Gaulle says what we ought to do. He said de Gaulle is a great man, and that we are grateful that there are not as many changes of government in France as in SVN. The President said he would like to hear from him what he thinks we ought to do, with points a., b., c. (At this point there was some comment by the President on what General De Gaulle really recommended with regard to the use of strength. Ambassador Bohlen explained this point to the President.) The Foreign Minister said that the statement which the President had read was pure propaganda, and was too stupid. The Foreign Minister said the French government believed in a political solution. According to its information, the other side wants to negotiate. On the other hand, US information is that they don’t. Mr. Bundy asked whether the position of the other side was that the United States should withdraw first and then negotiate. The Foreign Minister replied in the negative. He said that US withdrawal was their ultimate objective, but they said that we should all go back to the 1954 Geneva agreements first, in order to negotiate. They did not ask for withdrawal as the first step. The Foreign Minister said that the role of the Chicoms was far more important than that of the DRV. The President asked if it was the feeling of the Foreign Minister that if we got an agreement it would be worth anything. The Foreign Minister answered that the most important factor was what kind of a government there would be in South Vietnam. He admitted that this was a risk which one would probably have to take. It was not possible to tell what the nature of a South Vietnamese government would be. Mr. Ball asked whether France felt that any government likely to emerge would be dominated by Hanoi. The Foreign Minister replied that nobody could say. Ambassador Alphand interjected that Belgrade was not Moscow. Mr. Ball referred to the problem of the other states in the general area of Southeast Asia: Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia. The President said that success by the Chinese would be likely to increase their appetite. The Foreign Minister said that the main issue was the question of relations between the United States and China. China could not fail to be impressed by the immense power of the United States. Mr. Ball referred to his talk with General De Gaulle on June 5, 1964. 6 He thought that a major difference between our two governments was in our respective assessment of the intentions of Communist China. France thought that it was preoccupied with major internal problems and thus looked inward on itself, whereas we think that the Chinese are aggressive and land hungry. Mr. Bundy said that another difference was that France seems to think that there can be no solution to the problem of stable government in South Vietnam while the United States remains there, while we think that there can be no solution if we leave. The Foreign Minister said that government stability was impossible to achieve in a period of hostilities, but that if a cease fire could be achieved, then, with the US staying in South Vietnam, internal conditions could be expected to change. Ambassador Bohlen commented that another difference was that France thinks that negotiations would last a very long time, whereas we thought that a conference would be likely to break up. The Foreign Minister said that in estimating the probable course which the Communist Chinese government would take, it was useful to look at the Soviet example. He recalled that the Soviet Union had stayed quiet until World War II and had only started its expansionist policies at that time. Mr. Ball said that Chinese expansionism had already been active in Africa. The Foreign Minister said this was different: before the war there had been activity in other countries by the Communist parties. Ambassador Bohlen said that Communist China proclaimed its belief in militant support of indigenous movements, and that this raised the question of how it could be expected to retreat. The Foreign Minister said that if the Chinese once agreed to come to the negotiating table, it would then be harder for them to resume fighting. The President asked what was the French evaluation of the Soviet thinking on these matters. The Foreign Minister answered that the Russians had the same evaluation as the French, and that they constituted a moderating element. The Russians didn’t want to see the Communist Chinese expand, and would support North Vietnam against China. Mr. Bundy said that unless the President had any special subject he wanted to raise, he thought there was nothing in particular to be discussed further except perhaps the question of gold. He said the Foreign Minister was one of the few friends gold has, to which the Foreign Minister rejoined: “Except for those who own gold.” There was some mention of the President’s session yesterday with American businessmen 7 and the question of whether moral suasion would succeed. The Foreign Minister said that if the President succeeded, this would be a great achievement. The President said that he personally had his own doubts about success. The Foreign Minister said that after all the United States was a very wealthy country. The President referred to the current dock strike which was still tying up some of our southern ports. He said that New York and Baltimore and Philadelphia were free again but that the Japanese were now buying grain from Red China while our own grain was lying on the piers in the South. The Foreign Minister mentioned some sales to Japan by Australia and New Zealand, and some by France. In conclusion, the question of press guidance was discussed, and it was agreed that the Foreign Minister would say that he had talked about various subjects with the President, including South Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said that in reply to any further questions he would refer the press to the White House. The meeting ended at 12:30 p.m. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2480. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on March 5 and in U on March 9. The meeting was held in the White House. Couve visited Washington February 18-20. Memoranda of his conversation with Secretary Rusk are in Department of State, French Desk Files: Lot 72 D 441, Visits—Couve. A memorandum of his conversation with Under Secretary Ball is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. A memorandum by Rusk of a lunchtime discussion with Couve regarding Germany is ibid., POL 32-4 GER. 2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, he met with Senators Carl Mundt, Clifford Case, and Hugh Scott at 9:10 p.m. at the White House. (Johnson Library) No record of the meeting has been found. 3 Reference is to the abortive coup of February 19 led by Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. 4 For text of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents , pp. 750-787. 5 Not found. 6 See footnote 4, Document 32 . 7 See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 206-208. See also Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Document 44 . 44. Memorandum From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) 44. Memorandum From the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) 1 Washington, February 23, 1965. SUBJECT Luncheon Conversation with Defense Secretary McNamara I thought you might like to have a record of my luncheon conversation with McNamara, although nothing very startling occurred. 1. Treatment of France. McNamara completely agreed with me that the decision in regard to the supplying of U-235 to France was not a question of the agreement per se, but was a policy decision which could interpret the agreement in the desired light. He also agreed that what we were talking about affected basic policy towards France and that there should not be a refusal of the U-235 except in connection with a basic examination of our attitude towards France. We speculated somewhat on the possibility of utilizing the U-235 question as a means for inducing France to accept some of the expeditions, particularly the Gemini recovery unit in the Pacific, which the French had turned down. I told McNamara that if this were to be done, it should be done very subtly and at a relatively low level, since De Gaulle was notoriously adverse to any attempts to use direct pressure on him. Incidentally, John McNaughton, whom I saw over there before lunch with McNamara, said that he stood one hundred percent for refusal to the French of the U-235 on the grounds that he was completely opposed to giving any material or information to any country which would help it develop nuclear strategic capability. He said his position was based on the desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He also told me, in reply to my question, that he was in favor of changing the McMahon Act 2 so as to exclude Great Britain in the future. When I asked him how he thought that would prevent the Chinese, or, conceivably the Indians, he admitted that he didn’t see how it would, but insisted on his main position. 2. Strategy . McNamara agreed with me that there was really very little substance to the difference in French and American strategy but agreed that the French would certainly try and utilize this to prevent certain NATO exercises on its soil, asserting, however, that what she was defending was previous NATO strategy from amendment or change. I told McNamara that I could only see three contingencies in Europe on which the issue of conventional forces versus nuclear were derived: a) Berlin b) A revolt in East Germany or other Communist country in Europe c) A Communist coup or revolt in a NATO country. I said that aside from these, I could not agree that the Soviets would contemplate an invasion of Western Europe without having first taken us out or attempted to in a nuclear strike. McNamara seemed to agree with me but said that he thought that the three contingencies I had mentioned were sufficient to justify the development of a strategy, as he saw it. I told him that while I had always understood that his strategy would not refuse to use nuclear weapons in the event that this became necessary to protect Europe, to which he agreed, it had nevertheless been interpreted in Europe and exploited by de Gaulle as an indication of American reluctance to risk her cities to the defense of Europe. I told him that I thought that a clarification from some authentic American voice might be worthwhile considering for the future. I merely submit this memorandum for the record in case the subject comes up in my absence. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bohlen Papers: Lot 74 D 379, M Corresp. Secret. 2 The McMahon Act, P.L. 585, formally the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, approved August 1, 1946, forbade all exchange of atomic energy information with other nations, even in areas having no perceptible military bearing. (60 Stat. 755) 45. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 45. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 11, 1965, 5 p.m. 5144. Three weeks after Foreign Minister’s return from US, it might be worthwhile take stock present status US-French relations as seen from here. Unfortunately despite all-out effort which was made in Washington to discuss matters in fullest spirit friendship with Couve, French Government has not behaved in fashion befitting an old ally in recent weeks and there are abundant signs both latent and apparent of stress in our official relations. In view its role as number one topic among our foreign problems, Vietnam has held special significance in our relations with France recently. We will not repeat here abundant evidences of Franco-American differences on Vietnam as these have been repeatedly reported by Embassy. Furthermore it is not so much fact French policy differs from ours that causes us concern but particularly exasperating way in which French keep reiterating their call for an international conference without preconditions and apparently deliberately misunderstanding our viewpoint. It will be recalled that within matter of hours following Couve’s return from US on February 24 Information Minister Peyrefitte issued call for Franco-Soviet “concert” of policy on Vietnam. On subject Franco-Soviet relations incidentally Paris is, of course, full of rumors of impending closer ties between two continental states whose interests parallel in some instances (see Embassy Airgram 2008, March 10, 1965). 2 There is little hard evidence of any sharp alteration in these relations except appointment Zorin to Paris seems indicate tendency on part Soviets get French to “put up or shut up” particularly on European and German matters and to some extent responds to French nibbles. Effect of French attitudes towards Soviets inevitably has repercussions on relation with US and impression is widespread in Paris that De Gaulle policy towards Soviets intended annoy US as much as anything. Embassy does not believe situation calls for alarm on our part or indeed any special notice of French flirtation with East at all beyond occasional reminders this is not passing unnoticed, especially since French do not seem to be getting anywhere. However, indubitably impression is left here that de Gaulle policy of increasing independence from US is furthered by recent developments in French policy towards Soviet Union. Thus net effect despite fact French have made relatively little headway is to give impression further deterioration US-French relations. While nuclear control question within Alliance is dormant for moment in French mind it could spring back into limelight if current German-British discussions lead to call for multilateral meeting on subject. French impression is that major victory over US achieved last December when MLF as then conceived not pushed further. 3 Since it remains unclear that new formula has been found, French at moment passive. However they have made clear their unswerving opposition to any form of Allied Nuclear Force and will return to charge if we seem to be getting off dead center. Furthermore French at moment consider they have upper hand over US because they do not believe other allies will ever find formula that can be successfully “sold” at least prior German elections. This issue then remains quiet but potential major explosive issue in US-French relations if situation changes. In other European fields our relations with French less tense. French have retreated from de Gaulle press conference implication that US (and UK) should not be concerned with German problem. This is probably tactical move however and appointment Zorin may presage Soviet effort deal with French on German problem without US. For moment this also quiescent though French still seek give impression that US is attempting break down smooth running Franco-German partnership and that we seeking exclusivity in our relationship with Federal Republic. In more general field European integration French, of course, less directly at odds with US because of our non-membership in “Six.” However, it is clear that despite encouraging noises made at Rambouillet by de Gaulle, French do not intend to take initiative on tentative agreements reached there towards calling series of meetings at high levels during spring and summer to attempt make progress in integration field. On contrary every indication we have here is to effect French, while ostensibly ready to listen to other five, are making no moves towards implementation Rambouillet at this time and we have been categorically told this is case by de Gaulle (Embtel 3873) 4 [and?] by pertinent Foreign Office officials. In purely bilateral questions matters have also not been going too well. Without entering into relatively minor irritants, French attitude towards US requests for assistance with important scientific projects (including Apollo-Gemini) involving Tahiti indicates unjustified suspicion US motives in area. Their failure give US clearcut approval in these cases appears to us to be clearly motivated by suspicion in connection with French nuclear tests scheduled for this area. French public attacks on present international monetary system on ground it gives special position to dollar and unjustified advantages to United States are significant irritant in our bilateral relations and cause us some difficulty in multilateral discussions. While some elements of these French views are often sincerely held by technicians and specialists, it is hard to escape conclusion that the special twist they have been given in recent months is motivated at least partly by political desire to strike new blow for “independence” from the United States. Coupled with above outline of substantive problems in our relations, official radio and TV plus UNR press continues sniping at US along lines reported. Should above summary indicate lives of American residents and Embassy personnel in Paris in any way personally difficult, it would give totally erroneous impression. Curiously enough atmosphere and attitudes French public generally appears more friendly than during difficult days of Fourth Republic through which France passed. Present French outlook seems one of self-confidence and self-reliance (partially of course caused by Fifth Republic) in which dependence on US has disappeared. As result anti-American attitudes among French public seem to have waned, perhaps partially as reaction to Gaullist policies. Difficulties reported above are almost entirely on government-to-government level and appear largely reflect personal policies of General De Gaulle which in many cases are opposed, largely ineffectively, by his own officials. Nevertheless, finally it should not be concluded that our problems with France are nearer to solution because French public remains almost entirely friendly to US. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL FR-USSR) 3 For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 63 – 65 . For text of the NATO communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 507-508. 4 Telegram 3873 from Paris, January 8, reported that during discussions with Bohlen, De Gaulle stated that he saw no important question affecting NATO arising in 1965. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 FR) 46. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 46. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, April 24, 1965, 1111Z. 6008. Ref: Embtel 5514 (not rptd info addressees). 2 Impact of Gromyko visit to Paris next week 3 on future French-Soviet relations and on European scene generally will be difficult to judge until the event has taken place. It seems especially prudent to reserve judgment before and since it appears that both Russians and De Gaulle are seeking to profit from secondary, or psychological, effects of rapprochement they are cautiously exploring. This tends to obscure realities of Franco-Soviet relations. Neither side can go very far without creating unpredictable and dangerous consequences to their rear: for the Soviets, too much truck with Gaullist ideas about “greater” Europe could have unsettling influence on Soviet position in Eastern Europe; for the French there are the obvious dangers of undermining French influence in FRG and French leading position in EEC. We therefore think that talk about reversal of alliances and a Franco-Soviet “deal,” prevalent in much opposition press speculation, seriously misses the point. As suggested in reftel, one cannot feel entirely confident that De Gaulle will give nothing of importance away to Soviets. De Gaulle’s Asian policy (Vietnam, SEATO) and failure thus far to help Erhard in latter’s efforts to make some progress in European integration before FRG elections, despite fact De Gaulle apparently allowed Erhard to leave Rambouillet 4 thinking he had such a commitment, are not encouraging signs. On other hand, Quai officers have tried to assure US, and apparently FRG Embassy as well, that we needn’t worry about Gromyko visit. Quai characterizes it as merely probing exercise, such as that periodically conducted by US and UK with Soviets, and claims De Gaulle is fully aware of its dangers and limitations. It seems to us that what Soviets obviously would like to get out of France at this stage is some form of recognition of status quo in Germany. De Gaulle’s Feb 4 press conference 5 may have encouraged them to hope they can get French to accept language more favorable to GDR than anything French have previously agreed to multilaterally or stated themselves unilaterally through De Gaulle’s speeches or press conferences. We believe, however, that French are fully aware of possible adverse consequences this might have in FRG, fresh reminder of which was German press treatment of recent exchanges of correspondence between De Gaulle and Adenauer and Erhard. There remains possibility of some kind of friendship or non-aggression pact being concluded. However, we think this prospect very remote, particularly since Gromyko visit (with return Couve visit to Moscow) is only first chapter of Franco-Soviet dialogue. More likely possibility would be for De Gaulle to move step closer toward committing himself to visit USSR, which Soviets have been pressing him to do repeatedly. Itemized below are what we consider will be main topics dominating discussion during Gromyko visit: 1) Germany. The French have made no effort to disguise that Western security and/or Germany will be main item on agenda. From De Gaulle’s standpoint, it would be risky to jettison all prospects for his continued popularity with certain sectors of German opinion by overt indications of his presumed desire to see Germany indefinitely divided. However, his Feb 4 press conference placed German reunification in realm of distant future where this could be acceptable to Germany’s eastern as well as western neighbors. Numerous statements recently made on formal occasions by Ambassadors Vinogradov and Zorin here in Paris to effect that France and USSR are primarily responsible for European security, and De Gaulle’s happy acquiescence of this echo to his own thesis, suggest this may constitute basis for expressing “common views” or “mutual interest” in joint communiquéwhich doubtlessly will be issued. Absence or tardiness of public concern in German quarters (at least as far as we can judge from here) over implications of De Gaulle’s Feb 4 press conference, would, we would imagine, encourage De Gaulle to pursue theme that German reunification is exclusively concern of European countries, rather than matter also primarily affecting US or even UK. On other hand Quai publicly denied any French intention depart from quadripartite responsibility for settling German problem after Feb 4 press conference and same assurance was given to Secretary by Couve during latter’s visit to Washington. 2) Vietnam. Here seems to be even less basis for genuine dialogue, despite previous French expressions of readiness to concert policy with USSR to end hostilities. While De Gaulle doubtless would be delighted to claim or jointly share with USSR credit for moves leading to an international settlement over Vietnam or better yet a “great power” concord on Southeast Asia, this vision of glory apparently has shrunk as events have escalated far beyond the possible diplomatic impact of communiqués issued by MinInfo Peyrefitte after Elysee Council of Ministers’ meetings. Nevertheless, it possible that Kremlin and Elysee will try to agree on some vague language expressing desire for a negotiated settlement—fuzzing over issue of what conditions, if any, should precede them. On this matter Russians also operate under obvious limits imposed by other members of socialist camp. 3) Eastern Europe. Although it safe bet that future status of Eastern Europe will be omitted from communiqué, and probably even from forthright private discussion, this problem will remain in background as reminder of wide gulf that really exists between France and Russia regarding Western security. Sore point with Communists, which we sensed from Soviet diplomats here and which has been strongly registered by French Communists, is Gaullist theme that Eastern European countries, not to mention USSR, must “evolve” out of Communism to merit inclusion in De Gaulle’s “enlarged Europe.” Such evolution is quite fundamental to De Gaulle’s concept of a Europe free from US “hegemony.” Although former Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov apparently succeeded in getting some influential French circles to believe that USSR has changed sufficiently to permit early consideration of Franco-Soviet cooperation in place of France’s present reliance on its Western allies for security, we doubt that when it comes down to discussing brass tacks with Gromyko and Zorin, De Gaulle will find there is hope for early realization Europe from Atlantic to Urals. One related but not unimportant factor which may also influence de Gaulle in his flirtation with Soviets is effect which ostensible rapprochement with Soviet Union may have on French Communist Party in connection with presidential election this December. De Gaulle undoubtedly hopes that some PCF voters will vote for him (or his heir) and partial justification for such vote could be provided through improved Franco-Soviet relations. 6 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, and London. 2 Telegram 5514 from Paris, March 31, reported on the increasing signs of dissatisfaction with De Gaulle’s foreign policy among French elites. (Ibid.) 3 Gromyko visited France April 25-30. 4 They met in Rambouillet January 19-20; for text of the press release by the German Government, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1965-66 , p. 20707. 5 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 476-478. 6 For text of the communiquéissued at the end of Gromyko’s visit, see ibid., pp. 522-523. 47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 47. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, May 4, 1965, 2020Z. 6237. Germany and Europe: I told General De Gaulle that I thought some clarification from him as to what particular differences he saw between France and the United States in regard to Europe might be useful if he would give them to me. He immediately said that he did not think that our differences were really very much a matter of principle; he thought more a matter of time and he emphasized in this connection that when he said reunification of Germany would result from the evolution of Europe he did not in any sense envisage that the U.S. would not participate in and be a party to any final arrangements for the unification of Germany. He did think however that any unification would require the consent of the neighboring states as to frontiers, which was obvious, and also, he felt, a prior agreement somewhat like the Paris Agreements in regard to the prohibition of nuclear weapons. He said in this connection Germany lost the war and should be expected to pay for it. On the subject of Europe he made the interesting comment or charge that the other members of the Six, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, were not in favor of the unification of Europe because it was very convenient for them to have America assure their security and conduct their foreign policy. I told de Gaulle that I had understood that the Germans in particular were pressing for action in regard to European unification, which he dismissed with a wave of his hand on the ground that Erhard was in an election year and would make these gestures but really didn’t mean them very much. De Gaulle however did not seem willing to pursue the subject of the attitude of the other European countries towards European unification. The conversation then led into the subject of NATO which will be covered in a separate message. 2 Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10. Secret;Limdis. Repeated to London and Bonn. 2 For Bohlen’s report on this part of his discussion, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 83 . Bohlen also reported on his discussion with De Gaulle about the Gromyko visit in telegram 6236 from Paris, May 4. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10) 48. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 48. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, May 20, 1965, 1919Z. 6614. During a call on Couve de Murville today I took occasion personally to tell him that I was concerned when General De Gaulle made a speech about Yalta and distorted the meaning and significance of this Conference. 2 I had been genuinely sorry to see the old thesis repeated by the General yesterday in his speech yesterday at La Roche-Sur-Yon to the effect that Yalta had brought about the division of the world. I told Couve that having been there I could tell him that this had no relation to reality whatsoever and that the American document on the “Declaration on Liberated Europe” 3 was on the contrary specifically designed in an endeavor to prevent the Soviets from dividing Europe. Couve said he thought he would mention this to General De Gaulle to which I replied that the General knew full well that I had been at Yalta and I felt it would do no good. Further on in the conversation I told Couve that I was really concerned that the current line of French policy would begin to have a very serious effect on American public opinion as distinct from the government. I said that when there was military action and losses began to come in the people who had lost a son, brother or other relative would not go into the nuances of political positions but would simply ask the question who was with us and who against. Couve said he realized the danger on this score and said he understood the particular role of public opinion in foreign relations and execution of American policy. He made no offer, and I did not seek any, to do anything about this but I do believe the thought was registered with him. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 FR. Secret. 2 For text, see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages , Vol. 4, pp 354-358. 3 For texts of the U.S. draft and the final version of the “Declaration on Liberated Europe,” see Foreign Relations , 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 862 - 863 and 977 - 978 . 49. Memorandum From Horace Busby of the White House Staff to President Johnson 49. Memorandum From Horace Busby of the White House Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 10, 1965, 1:45 p.m. SUBJECT Conversation, Ambassador Alphand I am sure you will be interested in various comments made to me within the past several days on his own initiative by the Ambassador of France, who has just returned from a visit to Paris. 1. Alphand says the “poor relations between France and America are a figment of the journalists in both Washington and Paris.” He says that among the people, outside Government, he finds no anti-American sentiment in France and little other than pro-France sentiment among Americans. “All of this,” he says, “is salon talk among a limited number of people in or on the fringes of our Governments.” 2. Alphand says, “Whatever is said in Paris, France will always be with you when we are needed. The average Frenchman knows this, just as the average American knows it. Your President is being misrepresented by his press, so is my President—except that my President has more trouble with cartoonists in both countries than your President has in either country. The journalists want to keep alive the fight that was started before your President became President—and President DeGaulle knows that President Johnson has discouraged the people in your Government from keeping that fight alive.” 3. Alphand says, “Mr. Martin made a speech that has been badly reported in this country. 2 If you will read it carefully, he is only saying that the Western countries should look at the international monetary situation and its problems and do some things about that which have not been done all through these post-war years. What Mr. Martin says—if you forget his remarks about 1929—is only the same thing that General De Gaulle and Mr. Rueff have been saying too. When General De Gaulle talks about gold standards, he doesn’t have a Council of Economic Advisors guiding him on what he says—he just has Mr. Rueff. The General does not know much about gold or international monetary matters. What he has asked for, I believe, is not a return to the Gold Standard as much as he has asked the allies to look for a better standard than what we have now. I think many people in your Government feel the same way, although they would not follow the same way that General De Gaulle suggests. President Johnson has a fine opportunity to take leadership in this field that has been neglected by too many people in my Capital and your Capital, too.” Comments: I am not sufficiently informed to make judgments about this, but some of the Ambassador’s observations, made on and at his own initiative, seem to be in the nature of an overture. Perhaps others could explore this more usefully and more intelligently than I. Buzz 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. No classification marking. A handwritten notation reads: “For Bundy for comments to me. L” No written comments have been found. 2 In a June 1 address William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, opposed a rise in gold prices, a return to the gold standard, or the delegation of monetary policy to an international agency. A summary of his remarks is in The New York Times , June 2, 1965. 50. Memorandum of Conversation 50. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 8, 1965. PARTICIPANTS United States Frederick L. Deming, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs D. J. McGrew, U.S. Treasury Representative, Paris France Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs Maurice Perouse, Director of the Treasury, Ministry of Finance Mr. Giscard d’Estaing opened the conversation with the remark that he had seen somewhere a report that Secretary Fowler would be coming to Europe later in the summer. He asked whether this was correct. Mr. Deming replied that while it was possible the Secretary might make such a trip before the Bank and Fund meetings, the chances were rather against it. 2 However, as it had been pointed out in the press communiquéon the Fowler-Callaghan talks, 3 the Secretary did hope to have bilateral talks during the months ahead with other Finance Ministers, including of course Mr. Giscard d’Estaing. The Bank and Fund meetings would provide one opportunity for such discussions, and we had been glad to learn from Mr. Larre that the Minister was planning to attend those meetings. On his side, the Secretary was hoping he would be able to make a trip to Europe for further discussions with some of his European colleagues sometime later in the year. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said, apropos of the Fowler-Callaghan talks, that there had seemed to the French to be some contradiction between the impression given by the communiquéand the remarks made by Chancellor Callaghan following his return to London on the question of international liquidity and the reform of the monetary system. Mr. Deming said there had been some discussion during the talks of the liquidity problem, but it had been one among several items on the agenda, and had not consumed a disproportionate amount of time. Much of the discussion had been devoted to specific problems: e.g., the action being taken by the British to liquify their official portfolio of U.S. securities and its effects on the U.S. balance of payments, and the revision that would be needed in the Anglo-American Tax Treaty as a result of the reform which the British had undertaken of their corporate tax law. The communiquéwas a fairly accurate summary of the talks, naturally not going into the details of the discussion, but reflecting quite well the amount of time devoted to the various topics discussed. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said he had two points which he wished to discuss with Mr. Deming: the current international payments situation, as reflected in the position of France herself, and the problem of international monetary reform. On the first topic, the French were continuing to experience heavy inflows of foreign exchange. In June, French reserves had, it is true, increased by only $9 million. However, after adjusting for the scheduled payments of $33 million in principal and interest on the debt to the U.S. and Canada, and for the purchase by the British of $100 million against francs received in the IMF drawing, the real inflow had been $142 million. On last Wednesday (July 7)—the day of the week on which foreign exchange receipts are concentrated—they had taken in $19 million. Thus the trend seemed to be continuing in July. The impression of the French authorities is that this continued inflow is the counterpart of the weakness of sterling. For their part, they have done what they could to discourage the movement of foreign money to Paris: They have reduced their interest rate levels, forbidden the payment of interest on foreign-owned franc balances and taken steps to curb foreign investment operations in France. They do not feel that the problem of the persistent payments imbalance is their concern. But they continue to be aware of its existence through the growth of their reserves, and the Minister wanted to flag this point for his American friends. Mr. Deming said on the subject of the growth of French reserves there was one technical point which he would like to raise. We understand the reasons behind the French policy of converting all reserve increases into gold. Thus the present question is not directed at the rationale of that policy; we would, however, appreciate knowing whether the French authorities, in deciding each month on how much to convert, make their calculations of reserve increases on a gross or a net basis. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said this was indeed an important point. In the case of the June figures, if the calculations were made on a gross basis, the conversion would be $109 million, whereas, calculating on a net basis, it would be only $33 million. On this point, the Minister continued, his staff favored using the net basis, whereas in theory he felt the gross basis was the proper one. After all, the gross figure represented the amounts of reserve currency which France had received as a result of its external economic and financial operations during any given month. It was a point to which the French authorities would have to devote a little further thought. In the case of June, however, to convert on a gross basis would mean losing the good effects of the $178 million debt prepayment. For this reason it seemed likely that the July conversion would be effected on a net basis and would thus amount to $33 million. In other words, the French authorities were leaning towards the net basis for practical rather than theoretical considerations. Mr. Deming recalled the Minister’s earlier comment that on a net basis, the growth of French reserves in June had been only about $9 million. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said that while this was true, it had been decided at the beginning of the year, as we knew, that the Bank of France would continue, as in 1964, to purchase 30 tons of gold every month and then in the following month would adjust its purchase to make up the difference between the 30-ton minimum and the actual growth of reserves during the month in question. Thus the monthly conversion figure for July would be 30 tons, or about $33 million, rather than $9 million. Moreover, it was certain that the inflow of foreign exchange during July, even if it continued to be heavy, would not exceed the $178 million outflow represented by the debt prepayment, so that in August the conversion would also be $33 million. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing then turned to the question of the international monetary system. He recalled that the French experts had put forward certain ideas concerning how this reform might be accomplished. It was not the intention of the French monetary authorities to continue pressing any specific scheme, however. What they would continue to do was to point out the need for reform, for they were convinced that the events of recent days had not made that need any less urgent—indeed, quite the contrary. They continued to be concerned regarding the weakness of the British position from both an economic and a political viewpoint. The timid deflationary measures taken by the British authorities would probably have whatever effects they would be going to on the British internal economic situation during the present third quarter of the year. Seasonally this quarter was the least favorable for the British balance of payments. Thus the prospects were for the conjunction of an unfavorable domestic economic performance and poor balance of payments results. This could very well produce a new currency crisis of a considerable magnitude before the end of the year. In the French view, such an outcome would be a real pity, for a reform of the international monetary system could not be carried out in such an atmosphere. No matter what was said, public opinion would interpret any “reform” undertaken in the wake of a currency crisis as merely a camouflage of a new set of measures taken to shore up the British position. The French authorities recognized that it was not for them to initiate the necessary action to deal with the unhealthy situation. They had done what they could to call attention to the problem. Now it was up to those upon whom fell the major responsibility for the functioning of the present system—namely, the reserve currency countries—to accept that responsibility and decide how they wanted to deal with the problem. Mr. Deming said that he was pleased to hear the Minister say that the French did not intend to press for the acceptance full-blown of their particular proposals. In the U.S. view, the fastest and best way to make progress in considering international monetary problems was for all those participating in discussion of the matter to keep an open mind. For its part, the U.S. Government had no specific “plan” for reforming the monetary system. We had been considering the problem, and we felt that by continuing the exchange of views with the other countries principally concerned, we could during the months ahead move closer to a meeting of the minds than might seem possible today. Mr. Deming said that as for the British problem, 4 he did not share the Minister’s forebodings. He expected that the measures already taken by the British authorities, together with such additional measures as they might see fit to take in the period ahead to reinforce their program, would begin to show results in the near future. If one agreed with the analysis that the problem of sterling was to a considerable extent a matter of confidence, the evidence that the British authorities were succeeding in their efforts to bring the economy under control could result in a substantial turn-around in their foreign exchange situation. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said that he nevertheless feared a new crisis of confidence in sterling and he did not know how it could be handled. The British had now exhausted their drawing rights on the IMF. Moreover, even if there were someone willing to lend them the means to weather the storm, they could not forever keep going further into debt. They had already piled up more than $4 billion in debts in the last two or three years, which it was clear they would have a most difficult time paying off. They could turn to the United States for some help, but the result would be to put additional dollars into circulation which would flow, for example, to France, where it would be necessary to convert them into gold. France did not, of course, feel particularly troubled by the prospects of a crisis insofar as she herself was concerned. She was not a disturbing element in the international payments situation. Her trade account was in balance. While her balance of payments was in surplus, this resulted not so much from the current account as from the inflow of investments—above all American capital—and there was reason to hope that that inflow had moderated since the first quarter. She had ample reserves to carry her through the storm. The French authorities knew they did not have the responsibility for the management of the system. But they could not help regretting the failure of those who did—the reserve currency countries—to grasp the opportunity now presented to them to make reforms in the system and thereby avert disaster. Mr. Deming recalled that if a new sterling crisis should arise, the British were not without the means to cope with it. In addition to the official reserves of the Bank of England in gold and foreign exchange, they had about $1.2 billion in U.S. securities, which, as the Minister knew, they had been putting into liquid form but none of which had yet been taken into their reserves. Part of these liquifying operations had already affected the U.S. balance of payments accounts, although it was true that the dollars in question were still in the hands of the British and had not yet been put into circulation. There were also the Anglo-American swap and the $250 million Export-Import Bank credit. We were of course aware that the use by the British of these facilities would mean putting new amounts of dollars into circulation, which might, as the Minister had suggested, come into the hands of France and other countries that would feel called upon to convert them into gold. At the same time, we were encouraged by the evolution of our own balance of payments. Mr. Deming said he had informed WP-3 and the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD that for the first half of the current year we estimated a deficit of $500 million on a seasonally adjusted basis, compared to about $1 billion in the first half of 1964 and $2 billion in the second half of last year. This $500 million did not of course include the French debt prepayment of $178 million, which we were glad the French had agreed should take place on July 1—that is, in the second half of the year. We had deliberately avoided making any forecasts regarding our balance of payments for the remainder of the year. In general terms, however, we expected that despite the less favorable seasonal factors in the second half, it would continue to show improvement as a result of the President’s program. Mr. Deming noted, with reference to the Minister’s comments on the French balance of payments, that in the WP-3 and EPC meetings, the OECD Secretariat had forecast a considerable increase of the surplus, compared to 1964. Mr. Perouse explained to the Minister that the forecast of the OECD Secretariat was for a surplus in 1965 of around $1 billion for the franc area as a whole. He said that the French experts thought that figure was too high. He reiterated the French analysis that the surplus arose less from the current account, which he described as showing only a modest surplus, than from capital inflows and from the overseas franc area. He emphasized the efforts of the French authorities to discourage capital inflows and labeled a part of the capital account surplus as the counterpart of the continued weakness of sterling. Mr. Deming asked the Minister what he thought would be the outcome of the sterling crisis he foresaw. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing replied that, speaking frankly, he thought devaluation of the pound would be inevitable if a crisis did in fact arise. The present Labor Government would certainly not survive any such foreign exchange crisis. Whatever the complexion of the Government that followed them, its first act would certainly be an adjustment of the exchange rate in order to get some breathing space in which to formulate its own economic program and in order to pin the responsibility for the devaluation on its predecessor. Mr. Deming asked what the Minister thought would be the reaction of the Continent to a sterling devaluation. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing replied that without question the Scandinavian countries would follow sterling to the full extent. The reaction of the Continent would depend upon the state of its own economic situation at the time the British move took place. If—as it seemed likely would be the case—economic activity on the Continent were rather slow, the tendency for most countries would be to follow the British. Mr. Deming asked if the French authorities wanted to see sterling devalued. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing replied that they emphatically did not. However, they feared that the consequences of a continued lack of confidence in the pound, both within and outside the sterling area, would leave the British monetary authorities no alternative. Mr. Deming said that this seemed to us to argue that the United States, France and other countries which played an important role in the monetary system should do their best to insure that the British were not forced into such a corner. He asked how the Minister envisaged that reform of the international monetary system could help the British out of their difficulties. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said he was convinced that the burden of the sterling balances was such that confidence in sterling could never be restored, unless and until the British external accounts were relieved of that burden. The only way he saw to accomplish this objective was to “multi-lateralize” the sterling balances by consolidating them through some international institution and allowing the British to pay them off over the long term. Such a consolidation could be included as one feature of a reform of the international monetary system. If this reform also included measures to deal with the other problems of the present monetary system and was carried out in an atmosphere of calm deliberation rather than one of crisis, the consolidation would be greeted by the public as an important strengthening of the British position and would do much to restore confidence in sterling. Mr. Deming said he had read with interest the account published in the Economist of a week or so ago on the Callaghan-Giscard talks. That article had mentioned the possible consolidation of the sterling balances. Mr. Perouse interjected to say that while this possibility had been touched upon in the Callaghan-Giscard conversations, it had not been explored in any detail. Mr. Deming expressed the view that working out an agreement on international monetary reform would require considerable time. He thought it very doubtful that anything could be concluded quickly enough to be of any assistance to the British in dealing with a new sterling crisis in the months ahead if that were indeed what was going to take place. Mr. Giscard d’Estaing said that he had two points by way of conclusion. First, he had found the present exchange of views extremely useful and he hoped they could be continued on future occasions, either with Secretary Fowler or with Mr. Deming. Second, he wanted again to make clear the position of France in these international monetary matters. While she had done what she could to focus attention on the dangers she saw in the present situation, she realized that she did not have the responsibility for initiating and putting into effect a program to ward off those dangers. That responsibility belonged to the reserve currency countries. Now, they could attempt to consolidate the present system, and that seemed to be the import of the communiquéon the Fowler-Callaghan talks, or they could undertake a reform of the system. There was nothing wrong with consolidating the present system, provided it could be accomplished successfully. For their part, the French authorities thought reform would be the more prudent course. Frederick L. Deming 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 7. Confidential. Drafted by McGrew on July 12. The memorandum is an “Uncleared Draft.” 2 Fowler attended the IMF meetings. Deming reported on his talks with Giscard in telegram 1091 from Paris, August 31. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. A memorandum of Fowler’s conversation with Callaghan, July 1, is ibid., Bator Papers, Callaghan Visit. 4 Reference is to the third emergency budget announced by the British Government on July 27. For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Documents 66 ff. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Deming signed the original. 51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 336 51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 336 1 Washington, August 6, 1965. MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence Director, U.S. Information Agency Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission SUBJECT Potentially Embarrassing Activities in France or in Areas Outside France which are Controlled by France 1. All addressee agencies should take special measures to prevent U.S. activities in France which could needlessly embarrass United States relations with France. 2. A study should be made to provide a complete catalogue of activities with respect to France being undertaken or planned to be undertaken by the United States, whether covert, clandestine, or overt, that could be regarded as illegal or that could cause embarrassment to the United States if the French decided to make an issue of them. The report should be sufficiently detailed as to the nature, frequency and scope of operations, and personnel and equipment involved, to permit judgments to be made as to the implications thereof on U.S. foreign relations. 3. An illustrative list of some of the kinds of activities that should be included in the study is attached at Annex A. 4. It is desired that this study be conducted by the addressee Departments and Agencies, with the Secretary of State exercising supervisory coordination. 5. Matters of the kind normally handled by the 303 Committee will be treated in separate annexes in 303 channels. 6. It is desired that the final report be submitted by September 1, 1965. 2 McGeorge Bundy Attachment [ 2 headings and 13 paragraphs (1 page of source text) not declassified ] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 336. Top Secret; Exdis. A handwritten notation reads: “Sir: this has been sent to S/S for appropriate action.” 2 A September 9 memorandum from Benjamin Read to Bundy forwarded the reports of the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The memorandum and attached reports are ibid. Read noted that the reports of the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense were forwarded through the 303 Committee. No copies of these reports have been found. 52. Memorandum of Conversation 52. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 15, 1965. SUBJECT President’s Comments to French Ambassador Lucet on Occasion of Latter’s Presentation of Credentials PARTICIPANTS The President His Excellency Charles Lucet, French Ambassador Also present in the Treaty Room were: His Excellency Michael Lukumbuzya, Tanzanian Ambassador Mr. Valenti and Mr. Watson of the White House Governor G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Ambassador Lloyd Nelson Hand, Chief of Protocol Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs During a brief conversation between the President and Ambassador Lucet when the latter presented his credentials on December 15 in the Yellow Oval Room, the President expressed his great pleasure at having Ambassador Lucet in Washington and said he looked forward to working with him. The President asked the Ambassador to convey his best wishes to General De Gaulle. Following the formal presentation of credentials, the President met informally with Ambassador Lucet (and with the new Tanzanian Ambassador) in the Treaty Room. In his remarks to Ambassador Lucet on this occasion, the President noted that he had just read General De Gaulle’s comments in this television interview concerning his attitude toward the United States. 2 The President observed that General De Gaulle had said that he was not anti-American in his views; the President was convinced that this was the case and that General De Gaulle’s position had been exaggerated and misrepresented by the press. He thought that, while there were obviously differences between our two countries and our approach to problems, these were caused by differing appreciations of our national interests. The President was sure that “when the chips were down” France would be with us as, indeed, had been the case in the past. He recalled that France was our oldest friend and ally, virtually from the time when the United States was conceived, and he felt sure that we could continue to count on this. Minister Lucet said that he welcomed the President’s remarks and was most appreciative of them. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, NATO-France. Confidential. Drafted by Stoessel. The meeting was held in the Treaty Room of the White House. The French Government announced that Lucet would replace Alphand on October 8. 2 Reference is to an interview with Michel Drost of RDF broadcast on December 13, 14, and 15. For text, see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages , Vol. 4, pp. 412-440. 53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, February 21, 1966, 9:09 p.m. 4058. Following is based on uncleared memcon FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision: 2 French Ambassador Lucet called February 21 at his request for tour d’horizon with Secretary in which following important subjects discussed: De Gaulle’s press conference, Viet-Nam, NATO, and Kennedy Round. 1. De Gaulle’s Press Conference: 3 Noting he had not seen full text but only preliminary ticker reports, Lucet commented three things had struck him: (a) De Gaulle restrained on Viet-Nam emphasizing hope for peace; (b) De Gaulle constructive on European problem stressing fact satisfactory Luxembourg settlement 4 should now open way for renewed EEC movement and political possibilities; and (c) De Gaulle had reiterated French position on NATO but without lending sense of urgency to issue. 2. Viet-Nam: Secretary and Lucet exchanged views on respective US and French positions but indicated no new departures. Both agreed there are no lack of contacts with Hanoi. Secretary pointed out so far Hanoi consistently “hangs up the telephone” on any proposal for negotiations regardless of interlocutor. 3. NATO: Discussing NATO question in light of De Gaulle’s press conference, Lucet stressed French intention to adhere to the Alliance even though GOF would wish to discuss changes in its implementation. He stated Paris still studying possible specific changes but so far without conclusions. Secretary replied we will not pass French, who are the demandeurs on this issue, and will wait until De Gaulle’s views are more developed. The Secretary pointed out, however, we would not be interested in replacing present NATO multilateral structure with bilateral arrangements. 4. Kennedy Round: Secretary said he wished to stress importance we attach to making progress in Kennedy Round in order take advantage of far-reaching and broad mandate in Trade Expansion Act for mutually beneficial liberalization of world trade. It would be mistake to count on Congressional extension of act on present favorable basis if success not achieved. Thus golden opportunity could be lost. Lucet stated Paris is aware of this situation. In his view GOF is quite willing to go ahead with Kennedy Round negotiations even though there may be many difficulties. Secretary replied technical difficulties, of course, must be expected but he hoped they would not be compounded by political ones on the French side. Lucet reiterated belief in French willingness to get on with Kennedy Round discussions. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Geneva, Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and USEC, Luxembourg, London, Rome, and to Paris for USRO. 2 Not found. 3 February 21. For text, see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages , Vol. 5, pp. 6-23. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 316-317 and 381-383. 4 Reference is to meetings of the European Community Council of Ministers at Luxembourg January 17-18 and 28-29, at which the Ministers accepted a compromise that achieved French demands that a rule of unanimity continue to govern Community decision-making and that limits be placed on the powers of the EEC Commission. 54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 54. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, February 25, 1966, 1605Z. 5247. For Secretary From Ambassador. High-level Foreign Office source known to you this afternoon told McGuire that subsequent to my seeing Alphand this morning (Embtel 5243) 2 De Gaulle saw Couve de Murville and issued peremptory instructions to him to prepare papers by 7 o clock tonight (1) denouncing all multilateral agreements connected with NATO except the North Atlantic Treaty itself, 3 and (2) all military bilateral agreements with U.S. Source continued that whether agreements were denunciable or not De Gaulle intended to denounce them. Later De Gaulle will be prepared to discuss with U.S. arrangements for facilities in France in the event of a war in which France would be willing to participate. Timing is not yet established but De Gaulle said possibly rather quickly, and certainly before his visit to Moscow. While we have no reason to doubt authenticity of this information, which was relayed to source by Couve immediately on arrival at Quai from Elysee, it nevertheless is extremely curious. It counter-acts specifically and definitely De Gaulle’s own statement in press conference that these changes would be accomplished progressively and that French allies would not suddenly be inconvenienced, and would seem to represent a sudden and abrupt change of his policy and tactics in this respect for as yet undisclosed reasons. In fact source said de Gaulle had changed his position in last five days, i.e., since press conference. Source added that after denunciation issued, method and timing of U.S. withdrawal was less important to De Gaulle and presumably could be carried out in manner to minimize difficulties for us. Source described these decisions as a declaration of neutralism on the part of France. Will have further comments in subsequent telegram. 4 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 Telegram 5243 from Paris, February 25, reported Alphand’s statement that a French position on U.S. facilities would be forthcoming. (Ibid., DEF 15-4 FR-US) 3 For documentation relating to the French withdrawal from NATO, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIII . 4 Telegram 5260 from Paris, February 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-4 FR-US) 55. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All NATO Missions 55. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All NATO Missions 1 Washington, March 2, 1966, 8:27 p.m. 1644. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. I transmit for your background and guidance the following commentary on US policy as it relates to France, 2 and the distinction that should be made between the foreign policy of President De Gaulle and our continuing friendship, courtesy and respect for France and French officials: The election of President De Gaulle for another seven-year term 3 is a suitable time to review US policy toward France. He is opposed to basic US objectives, such as a strong NATO, a unified Europe and US efforts to maintain freedom in South Vietnam. These strongly held, personal views of President De Gaulle are unlikely to change. They are largely based on his messianic belief in the glory and importance of France, and thus are not subject to reasoned argument. Attempts to propitiate President De Gaulle are unlikely to succeed and would probably only serve to increase the level of his demands. Policy toward President De Gaulle cannot be considered in isolation. It is and must remain an integral part of our over-all foreign policy. While it would be possible to devise a US policy which could bring about an accommodation with President De Gaulle, this would require abandonment or modification of major US objectives. Such a price is far too high to pay, particularly in view of the recent evidence that President De Gaulle does not presently have majority support in France for many of his policies. The US should make no substantial concessions to the policies of President De Gaulle, but should pursue whatever policies it finds appropriate, irrespective of his position. In arriving at decisions on overall US policy, little weight should be given to Gaullist views. We should operate on the assumption that President De Gaulle’s leadership of France is temporary, and that he will be succeeded by a government more responsive to public opinion, hence more favorable to NATO, to a United Europe and to the United States. However, in arriving at important policy decisions we should give due weight to basic French views and interests as opposed to President De Gaulle’s personal predilections. It may be difficult to sort things out in this manner, but we should make the attempt. While continuing firmly on our course in spite of President De Gaulle’s views, we should lean over backward to be polite and friendly to France, to President de Gaulle personally, and to all French government officials. Backbiting, recriminations, attempts to downgrade the importance of France as a nation, or attempts at reprisals should be avoided no matter what the temptation. They cannot be effective, will only irritate President De Gaulle and make him more difficult to deal with, and are likely to cause French public opinion to rally to his side against the US. If President De Gaulle insists on the removal of US forces from French soil, we should accede gracefully and should move promptly to consider repositioning our line of communications elsewhere. Attempts to dissuade President De Gaulle or to obtain various concessions would seem to be unwise, although it would be helpful if France would maintain the LOC in a caretaker status. If France should decide to pull out of any active role in NATO, we should not replace our NATO tie with France by any bilateral agreement. Any such agreement would make it much more difficult for France to return to the fold at a later date and might set a pattern that could undermine the whole NATO structure. In the event of a French withdrawal, we should support the continuation of the NATO organization without France. We should maintain our support for the Common Market, taking care that we do not seem to take the lead in any effort to isolate France. If France is to be isolated, it should clearly be by her own doing and not as the result of American efforts. In the event of French withdrawal from NATO, the Common Market or other international bodies, it should be made very clear to French public opinion that there is an empty chair always ready and waiting for France should she decide to return. This could be of major importance in maintaining the friendship and confidence of the French people as opposed to President De Gaulle and his personal followers. We should continually work to preserve this basic friendship despite any annoyance with President De Gaulle or his government. Finally, President De Gaulle’s growing fear of Germany, plus his desire to cast France in a leading world position, may induce him to go to unusual lengths to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union. This would be particularly likely if France should withdraw from NATO or substantially loosen her ties to the other Common Market countries. We should always bear this possibility in mind. If it comes about, we should react calmly and philosophically, based on circumstances at the time. In summary, we should continue quietly and firmly on our course, ignoring Gaullist objections but always showing respect and friendship towards him and the French people, while awaiting the day when a more friendly and cooperative government comes to power in France. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy; cleared by Ball, Llewellyn Thompson, and Bator (White House); and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Brussels for USEC. 2 The commentary was a December 24, 1965, memorandum from former Ambassador to France and Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon to Secretary Rusk. In a January 11 memorandum to Rusk, Under Secretary Ball commented: “[It]is, in my judgment, an absolutely first class job” and suggested that Dillon discuss his views with President Johnson. The Ball and Dillon memoranda together with comments by Ambassadors Bohlen and Thompson are ibid., POL FR-US. 3 De Gaulle won re-election as President of France on the second ballot, December 19. 56. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 56. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 3, 1966, 1655Z. 5434. For Secretary from Ambassador. Ref: Dept Circular 1644. 2 I have most serious reservations in regard to the wisdom of the policy outlined in ref Depcirc in the light of probable French actions against NATO and presence of American forces on French soil. The views expressed in this circular accurately define the U.S. policy towards France as it has been since I have been in Paris and which I strongly supported. It is always dangerous to transfer intact one policy into a totally different set of circumstances and I believe the French actions as reported to us in regard to NATO will radically change the situation. I shall endeavor briefly to summarize these points: 1. De Gaulle’s intentions in regard to NATO and our forces in France are so radical as to amount to a complete destruction from the French point of view of the entire NATO organization and cooperative defense efforts. De Gaulle obviously wishes to have the appearance of the Alliance preserved so that he will be able to say to the French people that he has done no damage at all to French security interests. As I have already reported I do not think we should facilitate his achievement of this purpose. 2. It would seem to me that we should judge our reaction in the light of its effect on (A) French domestic opinion and specifically on the 1967 parliamentary elections (if not earlier), and (B) on the effect on our Allies and consequently on Alliance. In regard to (A) I am convinced that if we should “accede gracefully” to De Gaulle’s actions against NATO and against our forces in France this attitude would have a very chilling effect upon the opposition in France. As indicated in the message under reference less than 50 percent of the French people support De Gaulle. If we should turn the other cheek and accept these measures I feel that French public and electoral opinion will certainly come to the belief that De Gaulle is right, that he has made some unimportant organizational changes without affecting at all France’s alliance with the U.S. and security interests. This is the opinion that we get from most of our friends in the French Government and in French political life. In fact a rather high official of De Gaulle’s government, whose name I will not give, told me recently that in his opinion if the ordinary Frenchman came to the conclusion that De Gaulle’s actions against the organization were seriously undermining the alliance with the U.S. and the consequent security for France, there would be “panic” in French public opinion. This may be an exaggeration but it is clear that De Gaulle’s game is to convince the people that there is no damage to the Alliance. On (B) I am not qualified from here to pass any judgment on the effect on our Allies (this could be done in various capitals where this message is sent), but certainly we cannot expect any of our Allies to get out ahead of the U.S. in regard to reaction to the French moves. If we should adopt as minimal a position as indicated in this message it would seem to me obvious that the Alliance would be very seriously shaken and possibly rendered ineffective—which incidentally is what De Gaulle expects. 3. I do not propose any polemics or name calling against France and I think we should avoid in any statements which we will make referring to General De Gaulle by name. We should preferably use the term “French Government.” To pretend, however, that our relations were normal, after what De Gaulle is apparently planning to do, in the hope of avoiding “irritating” De Gaulle is illusory. In the first place, what is there left to preserve after he has in effect destroyed the French participation in NATO, which I had always assumed was a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. We obviously should make no final determination of our attitude until De Gaulle’s actual moves against NATO and our presence in France have been fully conveyed to us, but I seriously fear that to follow the line of policy outlined in this message might easily lay our entire European policy in ruins. 3 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and The Hague. 2 Document 55 . 3 In telegram 6103 from Paris, March 22, Bohlen forwarded his recommendations for a program of assistance to “pro-NATO and pro-Atlantic groups in France.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO) 57. Memorandum of Conversation 57. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 31, 1966. Meeting between Vice President Humphrey and Charles Lucet, French Ambassador, March 31, 1966. Also present: Jacque LePrette, Minister Counselor, French Embassy; John Rielly, Assistant to the Vice President; Ted Van Dyk, Assistant to the Vice President. The Ambassador said that he would be going to Paris on Monday and would be seeing President DeGaulle at that time. The Vice President asked the Ambassador to convey his good wishes to President DeGaulle. The Vice President made reference to his frank and friendly discussion with the French President last June in Paris 2 and said that he had reported fully to President Johnson on that discussion. The Vice President expressed hope that Presidents Johnson and DeGaulle might at some future time be able to meet again directly. The Ambassador then, on his initiative, went directly to President deGaulle’s visit to the Soviet Union. 3 The Ambassador said that France expected no great result from President DeGaulle’s visit. He said: “We see no need for a French-Russian alliance or some kind of pact.” The Vice President said that such discussions were important. He said that the United States government, for its part, had no feeling of concern that such French-Russian contact should not be made. The Vice President then alluded to previous meetings he had held with Khrushchev and Kosygin, making the point that discussion was always useful. Ambassador Lucet said that the French impression of the present Communist Party Congress 4 was that the Soviet Union was deeply concerned with domestic matters. The French saw mildness in Brezhnev’s opening statement to the Congress. The Ambassador then said that “President DeGaulle will speak to the Soviets regarding German reunification. We believe there can be no real peace in Europe with a divided Germany.” Ambassador Lucet indicated that he felt the road to reunification was a long one, but that the subject definitely needed opening. The Vice President said that European initiatives in this regard were helpful. Certainly, he said, difficult territorial problems could not be solved easily. He agreed with the Ambassador that a divided Germany was a threat to peace. He had, he said, talked to Khrushchev regarding this during his visit to the Soviet Union, but the Chairman had refused to even discuss the subject. An “environment” must be constructed, the Vice President said, in which discussion was possible, in which positive forces could be set in motion. Ambassador Lucet said that, in France’s opinion, Poland and Czechoslovakia were highly important factors in any discussion of German reunification. He repeated this twice. The Vice President recalled that, during a visit to Germany in 1961, he had made barest mention of the Oder-Neisse question 5 and public opinion in Germany had been deeply stirred. He indicated that any American discussion of the Oder-Neisse would likely be misinterpreted in Germany, but that “Europeans can talk about borders more easily than we.” The Vice President observed, as Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, that he was greatly impressed with French efforts thus far in space. He was particularly pleased with France’s role in ESRO. The United States, he said, was particularly interested in ESRO as a multilateral organization which could bring the benefits of space exploration to all members of the European community. The Vice President emphasized that space efforts were quite costly for any one nation, and that a pooling of resources was certainly necessary. He hoped to discuss this further with French space officials. The Ambassador replied that France was highly pleased with French-NASA cooperation. In closing, the Vice President complimented Ambassador Lucet on the good impression he had created during his short time in Washington. He mentioned that a group of French parliamentarians had recently visited Washington, without visiting the Senate. He had spoken to the State Department, he said, expressing his wish that all future parliamentary delegations be brought to the Senate. tvd 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Van Dyk. 2 Humphrey and two U.S. astronauts visited Paris June 18-20, 1965, to attend the Paris Air Show. He met with De Gaulle for 80 minutes on June 20 to discuss U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic. The Embassy reported on the Humphrey-De Gaulle talks in telegram 7219 from Paris, June 21, 1965. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HUMPHREY) 3 June 20-July 1. 4 The 23d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held March 29-April 8. 5 June 1961. On June 30 Humphrey made a statement backing Mayor Willy Brandt’s comments on the terms of the German peace settlement. 6 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 58. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 58. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, May 27, 1966, 8:41 p.m. 2352. NATUS. Following is cleared MemCon 2 of Secretary’s meeting with French Ambassador Lucet May 27, 5:30 p.m. Lucet called at Secretary’s request. Secretary noted that French Aide-Mémoire of April 22 3 proposed that US and France begin to discuss “practical measures” that should be taken concerning our bilateral agreements. US is prepared to discuss any matter raised by France, subject, of course, to consultation with our Allies, and finds Paris an entirely appropriate place for discussion. Secretary said that in order to prepare for discussions, however, we must have further info on precise proposals France wishes to discuss. Secretary noted French have stated that their agreements with US are incompatible with its desire to resume full exercise of its sovereignty in French territory. He wished to make unmistakably clear that French sovereignty over French land and air has never been questioned by US. Indeed US has not failed in past and is now pledged to defend French sovereignty over French territory against armed attack. Very facilities in question, installed at express invitation and by permission of GOF, are an earnest of that pledge. Secretary said US is willing to discuss any changes in bilateral agreements which France desires and arrangements for their termination, if necessary. We have expressed our willingness to evacuate French territory, if this is France’s desire, as soon as this can be done without prejudice to Allied security. US is prepared to discuss use of facilities established in accordance with agreements in time of peace or conflict as French Aide-Mémoire of March 29 suggests. 4 Secretary said, however, a proper respect for international agreements precludes our acceptance of a unilateral denunciation of them. US has proposed a way of terminating these agreements by mutual consent, to which GOF has not yet responded. Secretary said that nevertheless certain specific questions arise under bilateral agreements, as follows: 1. US Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953, 5 authorized installation and operation of headquarters of US European Command. Inasmuch as France has denounced protocol on status of International Military Headquarters, to take effect April 1, 1967, it is intention of US to move EUCOM as soon as a suitable location can be found and arrangements made. US will, therefore, be prepared to discuss “practical measures” for this move at an appropriate time. Meanwhile, we would like to know what “practical measures” France wishes to discuss. We are prepared to discuss any French proposals re US Military Headquarters Agreement and we would like to know if it is desire of France that we agree to its termination. 2. Under Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953, 6 an oil pipeline has been laid at US expense across French territory and operated by French company for both use by France and US in peacetime and by SACEUR in wartime. We would like to know what changes in Agreement are desired by France. Does France object to flow of oil in pipeline across France for use of US forces in Germany? Does France object to present operation of pipeline? 3. Chateauroux Agreement of February 27, 1951, 7 establishes an air depot at Deols and La Martinerie for supply of US Air Forces in Europe. Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952, 8 authorizes construction and use of certain airfields in France for US Air Force missions in furtherance of common defense plans. Both these Agreements require French approval before flights may be made from these bases which are not in furtherance of NATO missions or in support of US forces in Europe. It is intention of US in view of attitude of France to remove air squadrons and supporting forces from these bases as soon as practicable after consultation with its Allies. US will also be prepared to discuss Agreements themselves. Does France request US to agree to termination of these Agreements and evacuation of bases and depots? Are these facilities among those referred to in French Aide-Mémoire of March 29 as facilities “on which the two governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance.” Does this preclude use of such facilities in event that France should not participate in a conflict arising from an armed attack against a NATO member? 4. System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958, 9 authorizes a network of depots and other facilities for supply of US Army in Europe. Under this Agreement France may propose a review or modification and, if not satisfied with response, may give notice of termination in due course. US is prepared to discuss any proposals France may have for review or modification of Agreement and would put same questions as it has put re Chateauroux and Air Bases Agreements. Finally, Secretary said that since US is entirely willing to discuss our bilateral agreements and practical measures relating thereto, we hope that France will aid in preparation for early discussions by providing clarification requested. In meantime we ask that French Govt designate someone with whom we can be in contact on a number of working level problems incident to moving of US military facilities out of France. For USRO: You may advise Fourteen of fact that we have made above points orally to the French. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and approved by Rusk. Repeated to all other NATO capitals. 2 Not found. 3 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 336. 4 For text, see ibid., pp. 324-326. 5 For text, see 17 UST 1906. 6 For text, see 18 UST 352. 7 For text, see 17 UST 1865. 8 For text, see 17 UST 1873. 9 For text, see 17 UST 1890. 59. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Brussels and the Embassy in France 59. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Brussels and the Embassy in France 1 Washington, June 6, 1966, 8:37 p.m. 2421. Tosec 100. NATUS. French Ambassador Lucet met at his request with Acting Secretary at 3:15 p.m. June 6. Minister Leprette, Springsteen and Anderson (WE) also present. Lucet called under instructions to deliver oral response to series of questions raised with him by Secretary on May 27 concerning the five US-French bilateral agreements covering US military facilities in France. 2 1. Lucet noted Secretary’s desire avoid further written memoranda during current efforts to get discussions underway, and stated that GOF was fully agreed in desirability of continuing oral exchange at this stage. 2. With regard to arrangements for the termination of the five US-GOF bilateral agreements, Lucet said that his Government did not consider that it had “denounced” these agreements, and that the best way to solve the current juridical impasse was to have concrete US-French discussions with both sides eventually agreeing that “the agreements have lost their validity by mutual consent.” The GOF, he said, could not agree to the US proposal of April 12 3 to amend the duration provision of four of the agreements to bring them into line with the duration provisions of the System of Communications Agreement. The two-year provision of the last agreement is “too long” as it is in conflict, he said, with the April 1, 1967 deadline. Acting Secretary said (1) that we cannot accept a unilateral repudiation of agreements to which we are a party, (2) that we had proposed one possible method of reaching mutual agreement on termination (two-year provision), (3) that we are not adopting a doctrinaire, dogmatic position on the conditions for terminating these agreements, and (4) that the U.S. is prepared to discuss the possibility of terminating the five agreements in question by mutual consent. However, in order to have a very clear understanding of the current French suggestion Ball, referring to the earlier GOF decision that the five agreements must terminate by April 1, 1967, asked: “May I take it then that this latest French suggestion is not a decision as it has appeared to us to be, but is now a proposal for terminating the agreements through mutual consent?” Lucet replied affirmatively. Continuing, Ball emphasized that we were prepared to try to arrive at a solution through mutual consent, but that we could not accept a solution by fiat. Lucet concurred. 3. Regarding the US Military Headquarters Agreement (1953), the Air Bases Agreement (1952), and the System of Communications Agreement (1958), Lucet stated that the GOF did not expect any particular negotiating problems with the US. Discussions on these three agreements would concern primarily the practical measures to be taken for the removal of US personnel and facilities between now and April 1, 1967. Acting Secretary said that the USG was prepared to consider this proposal for the April 1, 1967, date in order to see if we could mutually agree on it. 4. Regarding the Chateauroux Depot Agreement (1951), Lucet said the GOF recognized that the problems involved in this agreement were more complex than those related to the three just mentioned, and was therefore fully prepared to discuss any US requirements for “further delays.” Ball said it would be useful to discuss a practical termination date. 5. Concerning the Pipeline Agreement, Lucet said: “As for the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953, it is a question of defining the new conditions under which it could continue to operate, once the American personnel have been evacuated between now and April 1, 1967.” In commenting on this part of his instructions, Lucet said that there is no GOF intention to cut the pipeline now or after April 1, 1967, and that his Government welcomed discussions with the US on its future use. He mentioned continued use of it to supply US troops in Germany. Acting Secretary said that the US will be prepared to have discussions on this matter. 6. Concerning 1952 Air Bases Agreement, Lucet said that Secretary Rusk had mentioned our desire to move aircraft and material out of France and asked that GOF designate an individual with whom we could discuss this matter. He stated that if the US would name an official to carry on such discussions, the GOF would do likewise. Ball agreed to provide such a name. 7. In response to Secretary’s question concerning the facilities, mentioned in French aide-mémoire of March 29, “on which the two Governments could reach mutual agreement in the event of a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance,” Lucet said that these were logistical facilities that the USG may need in case of war, such as ports, transport facilities, stockage and air bases—i.e., “the same type that is now available to US in peacetime.” The GOF, he said, is ready to discuss and to conclude an agreement on the use of these facilities in wartime. 8. Lucet continued: “As a counterpart, we French would like to discuss the question of putting tactical nuclear weapons at the disposal of French forces in wartime under the conditions which have existed up to now.” Ball replied that the terms and conditions under which French forces would remain in Germany would first have to be determined. Depending on the achievement of a satisfactory agreement regarding those terms and conditions, the United States would then be prepared to discuss this subject with the GOF. Lucet interjected that his instructions were not limited to the provision of nuclear warheads for French forces in Germany. Ball replied that the French Government had never permitted United States nuclear warheads on French soil. Lucet seemed confused at this point and indicated that he would seek clarification of his instructions. 9. Lucet hoped that US-French discussions on the foregoing questions could be undertaken as soon as possible. 4 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Springsteen, and approved by Ball. Repeated to all other NATO capitals. Rusk was in Brussels for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting June 3-8. 2 See Document 58 . 3 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 328-330. 4 Telegram 3766, July 8, transmitted instructions for negotiations on U.S.-French bilateral agreements. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US) 60. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 60. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 11, 1966, 1337Z. De Gaulle seemed very relaxed and in excellent health and humor. 1. Soviet Union, Europe and Germany: I asked General De Gaulle if he could give me his estimate of the current Soviet problem and its future evolution, particularly in regard to Europe and to Germany. De Gaulle said it was his feeling that the Soviet Union at the present state of its development was not bellicose, certainly did not wish any armed clash, and would avoid any action which might provoke a crisis with the West. He hastened to qualify his general remarks by saying that this could change and it was for this reason that France was remaining in the Alliance while leaving the organization. He said he thought that the Soviet leaders were generally seeking a détente, obviously for their own purposes, but that he personally felt it was to the advantage of the West to support this position. He realized the Western attitude toward France was to Russia’s advantage, but he also felt that it was to a certain extent to French advantage. In regard to Europe, he thought that the Soviet Union at the present time was interested in having a general détente with the West, but in reply to my question admitted that what the Soviets were after immediately was some recognition of the two Germanies, which, he continued, was actually in effect at the present time, although he hastened to add that he would not take any official action which would appear to confirm it. He also said in regard to unification that this was a very long process and the only thing that he might conceivably obtain in Russia was some indication of reunification as a very long range aim. I replied that I thought we could all agree on the desirability of a détente with Russia but that, as he knew, this had been a constantly recurring theme in post-war relations. However, we recognized the danger of trying to create a détente when there were serious elements of instability caused by the Soviets on the European scene, namely the division of Germany and Berlin. This led to a discussion of Germany and its reunification, which I found of some interest. De Gaulle said that as matters now stood West Germany, although powerful economically, from a military and political point of view constituted no danger to anybody, that the reunification of Germany, for which the French stood in principle, if it came about suddenly would result first of all in the consolidation of Soviet hold over the countries of Eastern Europe (which he said would be a very bad thing) because those countries would seek protection from a more powerful Germany. In addition he said it would cause a considerable amount of apprehension in Western Europe. I pointed out that on the other hand a continued division of Germany would produce so strong a frustration in Germany as to raise all sorts of different dangers. De Gaulle shrugged his shoulders and said, “It is always necessary to choose between two evils in politics.” I told him that I thought his schedule was a very heavy one in Russia but that I thought he would receive a wonderful reception since the Soviet Govt was a past master in arranging such receptions. De Gaulle smiled and said the Soviet Govt could create anything that it wants among its people. 2 2. Vietnam: De Gaulle asked of any new thoughts on the subject of Vietnam and said he continued to think that only a clear indication of willingness of US forces to leave the country could conceivably bring about the possibility of a negotiation. I replied that I thought that this depended on what was meant by leaving the country. We had repeatedly said, and meant it, that we had no intention of leaving any troops in Vietnam after a settlement was made, but obviously they could not expect the US to withdraw the troops before such a settlement, and in any event we had never been able to obtain the slightest indication of any interest in negotiating from the other side. De Gaulle did not reply, and I did not pursue the subject further. 3. French Forces in Germany: I then mentioned to De Gaulle the French decision, which Couve de Murville had told the Secretary in Brussels, concerning the removal of the French air squadrons. 3 De Gaulle confirmed this and said that the reason was of course that since they were not to be integrated they could not stay on in Germany, which was not the case with the ground forces. I asked him then if he did not think that this decision radically altered the whole problem of French ground forces since whatever troops remained there, assuming they did, would require some degree of air protection, presumably from the other allies. De Gaulle denied this and said distances were so small that French air squadrons based in France could equally protect troops in Germany. He said in truth (en verité) France did not really wish to keep her forces in Germany. It was for this reason she had phrased the last communication to the Germans which said they would only remain if there were a positive German desire for political or symbolic reasons for them to remain. De Gaulle said militarily the troops would be in approximately the same position if across the border in France. In order to have complete clarity on this subject, I asked the General if he meant that France would have no desire to leave the troops in Germany but preferred to have them in France. De Gaulle said that perhaps “desire” was the wrong word, but that France would not have any interest in the sense of state interest, and that objectively it would be better if the French troops were back in France. However, he emphasized that if the Germans really wanted the troops, for whatever reason, France would be willing to see if this could be arranged. Comment: It will be noted that there was nothing essentially new in De Gaulle’s remarks to me, with the possible exception of the French attitude towards the French troops in Germany. What he said here was confirmation of what we had heard from another source, but it is perhaps the first time that he has stated it so specifically to a foreigner. General De Gaulle’s remarks on Germany indicated his fear of a reunified Germany and his description of the concentration, i.e., huddling, of Eastern European states under Moscow’s wing and apprehension in Western Europe was of interest and perhaps not too far from the truth. It is however apparent that he apparently expects, and indeed desires, Germany to stay divided for a long period of time, and that even when reunification comes about it will be more a facade than a reality since at one point in the conversation he said there never can be another Reich. I don’t know how you wish to handle the statement to me about French troops in Germany, but I would perhaps wait a little before authorizing its repetition to any foreign source. I shall not mention this point in my conversation with any of my diplomatic colleagues here. 4 Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn and London. 8672. De Gaulle received me today and we talked for approximately one-half an hour on the following subjects: (1) Soviet Union, Europe and Germany, (2) Vietnam very briefly, and (3) French forces in Germany. 2 The Embassy in the Soviet Union reported on De Gaulle’s visit in telegram 31 from Moscow, July 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 FR) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 174 and 175 . 4 In telegram 8683 from Paris, June 13, Bohlen added: “In making known so frankly his studied indifference to the retention or not of French troops in Germany De Gaulle was obviously acting with certainty that this information would be conveyed to the Germans. He probably felt that this could not hurt, and might indeed improve, his general negotiating stance.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9) 61. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 61. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, June 23, 1966, 1724Z. 9347. Ref: Embtel 8993. 2 Sensitive source known to you today gave us the following information at a luncheon with Beigel and myself. Source confirmed information reported in reftel, with the following addition. De Gaulle at this meeting, in addition to saying that France would decide after the war started what her attitude would be, expressed the hope that it would be possible for France to stay out. Secondly, in regard to the loan of U.S. tactical nuclear warheads, source said this would only be in the event and after the French decision that France would be involved in the war. (Comment: Even so, this is a reasonably fantastic proposal.) Source also said that Couve’s decision in Brussels, which was not a compromise but merely a face saving device in order to avoid at this juncture a confrontation of France and the Fourteen, was in effect dictated by De Gaulle’s views, emphasized at the June 2nd meeting, that there could be no automatic element in any French arrangements with her allies. Source reminded us that, as we had known, De Gaulle’s original impulse had been to denounce the treaty, but had been dissuaded by Pompidou and Couve from putting this into effect, in part on the grounds that it would send him to Moscow with absolutely no real backing. Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 8993 from Paris, June 22, reported De Gaulle’s remarks regarding French strategy in the event of war. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO) 62. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 62. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 28, 1966, 1507Z. 1393. 1. When I called on Lucet at his request at Foreign Office this morning, I found him tired and discouraged. (He hopes to get away on leave Tuesday morning after seeing Amb. Bohlen on Monday.) Lucet said he was forced to conclude that there existed very genuine resentment at French policies in US, and that there was a general distrust of France. He cited recent polls in this connection. He said US opinion did not seem to pinpoint its dissatisfaction with France but that there certainly was an increasingly unfortunate climate. I of course cited French policies on NATO and Vietnam as fundamental reasons for this unhappy attitude which he found in US. McBride 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret; Exdis. 63. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 63. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 29, 1966, 1215Z. 1445. For Under Secretary from Ambassador. It looks very much as though, if we want it to be that way, the August 2 meeting with Couve de Murville could well wind up the discussions in regard to the use of bases and facilities in time of war. It seems clear that the chief sticking point, as I have previously mentioned, will be the event which will commence U.S. reentry into bases or re-takeover of certain facilities. The French will in all probability think that this kick-off point will be the French declaration of war whereas naturally we must insist that it be the request by SACEUR for an alert. I am asking you to let me have your judgment as to whether Washington would prefer to break this off quickly and cleanly (with possible exception of the pipeline) or whether you would prefer to string it out and postpone it until September or even October. I could play it either way with great ease but I think some indication of the considerations which you might have in mind dictating either an early termination or playing it along would be most useful to me. I would very much appreciate if you could give me your thought before Tuesday, August 2. 2 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Confidential; Exdis. 2 In telegram 19145, August 1, the Department of State responded: “Your discussion will be ad referendum and talks should not be broken off Aug 2.” It added that the “primary objective” of the talks was “seeking ironclad agreement for US reentry.” (Ibid.) In telegram 1619 from Paris, August 2, Bohlen reported that he had presented U.S. views to Couve who had noted them but remained noncommittal. (Ibid.) 64. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 64. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, August 25, 1966, 1806Z. 2592. August 25. 1. I was informed today that following decisions had been taken August 23 at interministerial meeting presided over by Pompidou with reference to US-French bilateral military problems and more especially with regard to French relationship to NATO: 2. French Government had been genuinely shocked to learn that French had failed to take over installations which US already ready to return (Paris 2515) 2 and Prime Minister had instructed Messmer to have Army engineers instantly prepared to receive these facilities. 3. With regard to pipeline, it was decided refuse permission for 40 US technicians to assist in operation US pipeline. French position was identical for both US and NATO pipelines. US pipeline would not be closed nor would we be expelled from France but US would be given time to install pipeline elsewhere. If no US technicians were introduced and US accepted French position on re-entry, then pipeline could continue to operate for benefit US forces. However, there was no change in French position on re-entry which was that France would first have to decide Article V should be invoked. Ambassador is to be informed of this decision officially September 9. 4. With regard to NATO military budget, Deleusse would give French position to NAC September 7. France would not make any payments toward major NATO headquarters. However, France would contribute five million francs which had been earmarked for repairs on old SHAPE headquarters towards costs of transferring SHAPE and other headquarters. 5. France would not contribute towards costs of telecommunications projects. France would participate in leasing communications facilities such as PTT lines for long-range protection purposes and in connection with France’s new role towards these organizations, i.e. France is now present in only a liaison capacity. With regard to Ace High (forward scatter system) France would contribute budgetarily so long as this system remained useful. In general on these projects France would contribute in accordance with the degree of agreement which was reached between France and her allies. France would continue in The Hague and La Spezia centers but would withdraw from AGARD and London Bureau and such similar organizations. 6. With regard to infrastructure, France would not participate in Slice XVIII or any subsequent slices. Insofar as Slice XVII and earlier slices were concerned, France would continue to contribute to projects for which money had already been allocated and on which work had already started. 7. Concerning Namso and Hawk projects, France was not particularly interested in principle but these could remain for some time, until such date as perhaps 1969, if other Allies wish. France would not oppose their remaining or leaving. If they left, France would withdraw. Otherwise France’s attitude towards these agencies is similar to her view regarding NAC. 8. Comment: In general, we were told attitude underlying decisions was that France should be tough on withdrawal of all agencies which they had already asked to leave, including US installations, and deadlines were to be enforced insofar as possible. However, with regard to other agencies which had not been discussed so far, there was no particular urgency in getting them out. Attitude toward latter group was to be flexible and waiting for time to take care of them. In conclusion, I was told that Pompidou terminated meeting indicating he thought “everything” would eventually go except overflights. McBride 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 9. Secret; Nodis; Maria. 2 Telegram 2515 from Paris, August 24, reported Bohlen’s démarche to the French regarding their uncooperative stance on pipeline maintenance. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US) 65. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 65. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State 1 Addis Ababa, August 27, 1966, 1915Z. 827. De Gaulle. 1. Following conversation with President De Gaulle being reported protectively although assume contents known to Dept. 2. At reception to present Dip Corps to De Gaulle 2 this evening, General, after ascertaining I spoke French, asked to talk to me alone. I had deliberately not emulated my numerous colleagues who requested private conversations with him, but I was summoned immediately after Dean. 3. De Gaulle began by requesting I send his very warmest wishes to President Johnson. He added with a twinkle that the route to Cambodia did not go by Washington. I assured him I would transmit. 4. De Gaulle said he would talk about the Americans while in Cambodia. He added quickly that he admired and liked the Americans. There should be no question about that. But one must say what one thinks. And the Americans would thank him for it later. It was in their interest and in the interest of all that he would speak. I replied that US would thank him if his actions and words served both peace and justice. 5. De Gaulle said war must be ended. He asked me why the US did not just announce that it wanted peace, that it would stop fighting and that it would leave Vietnam. We did it, he said, why can’t you. It was not difficult to do. I asked what [he] thought would happen afterward if we followed his advice. “Afterwards,” he exclaimed throwing up his arms in well known gesture, “afterwards leave it to them.” I commented with a smile that I always found it ironic to hear a European of his generation advocate peace at any price. I had just returned from an extended period in Washington, I could assure him that President Johnson was passionately interested in ending the war and in peace. Then end the war, De Gaulle interjected. I replied that perhaps it was an American peculiarity but we could not simply walk away from commitments and responsibilities, particularly when they had implications that appeared to me to be far greater than those involved in Algeria in 1958. De Gaulle commented that he did not want the US to leave Vietnam at once but to announce its determination to do so and to halt the hostilities, then gradually phase out. Thus the way to peace would be opened. I asked why he if he were so interested in peace, he did not seek to convince the Soviets to call a peace conference instead and to end the fighting in that manner. Oh, he laughed, that route was a complex impasse. 6. Since his aides appeared nervous about extended conversation, I broke if off by suggesting others might wish to talk to him. De Gaulle said he wanted to be certain that President Johnson knew he extended his warmest wishes. 7. De Gaulle in top form and went out of his way to compliment US on what had been achieved since his last visit in 1953 to Ethiopia where he had today remarked on development for which US could take much credit. Korry 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 FR. Secret; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 De Gaulle visited French Somaliland August 25-26, Ethiopia August 27-29, Djibouti August 30, Cambodia August 30-September 2, and French Polynesia September 3-11. On this last stop, he witnessed a nuclear bomb test. 66. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 66. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, September 1, 1966. 2879. For Secretary from Ambassador. It seems to me that De Gaulle’s speech in Phnom Penh 2 is a further example of his ignoring facts in favor of his favorite position. We have already commented on historical errors contained in speech but it is extraordinary to me that an alleged ally of the U.S. would present right on the spot within a few kilometers of the battle line so erroneous a picture of cause and effect. De Gaulle appears to heap all the blame for the situation, its origin and development in Indochina, on the U.S. explicitly. I recall in this connection Paris 2075, 3 paragraph 3, in regard to De Gaulle’s ignorance of the text of the NATO agreements and it seems to me even more likely that he has not bothered or has been unwilling to really acquaint himself with the facts of the situation in Vietnam. He makes no mention of Communism as a factor and consequently his comparison with the French in Algeria is erroneous and misleading. I realize how unwise it is to answer De Gaulle publicly but I wonder in this case if some corrective measure should not be applied. Otherwise the De Gaulle version of events will have a high degree of acceptance not only here in France but in other countries of the world. I would suggest therefore that you consider very seriously the desirability of a statement by the President or you which would in no way mention De Gaulle’s Phnom Penh speech but deal with the same material that he touches on in an accurate form. I do not refer to the actual suggestion as to what the U.S. should do in the future but merely to those parts dealing with the origin and history of the Vietnam question. There may be strong reasons against any such statement but I would like to suggest it as a possibility to you. 4 Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. No transmission time is on the telegram, which was received at 8:46 a.m. 2 In his September 1 speech in Phnom Penh, De Gaulle stated, in reference to Cambodian neutrality: “That is why, while your country succeeded in safeguarding its body and its soul because it remained its own master, the political and military authority of the United States was seen installed in its turn in South Vietnam and, simultaneously, the war gained new strength there in the form of national resistance.” The full text of De Gaulle’s speech is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 646-648. In telegram 5090 from Saigon, September 2, Ambassador Lodge commented: “If these words have any meaning, this means that the United States in effect committed an aggression in South Vietnam.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) 3 Not found. 4 Circular telegram 41051 to all posts, September 2, provided instructions to avoid public comments on the De Gaulle speech, but in talks with foreign government officials to stress the impracticability of a unilateral U.S. commitment to withdraw in the face of North Vietnamese behavior. (Ibid., POL 15-1 FR) 67. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 67. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, September 7, 1966, 1201Z. 3124. Sept 7. In conducting these discussions on reentry or reutilization of facilities in France I have kept constantly in mind the phrase in my instruction which tells me that “the record should demonstrate that failure to reach agreement was not due to unreasonableness of U.S. Government.” The more however I think on this subject the clearer it is to me that there is no formula that could possibly be devised which would really solve the problem of the timing of reentry once the French had decided to liquidate the existing peacetime bases and facilities. Our present position of insisting that the time of reentry would be fixed by the declaration of an alert (of any kind) really in substance may not much differ in point of time from a declaration of war. Of all of the formulas it seems to me “following consultation and agreement between the two governments” would be the most reasonable and practicable. There is no absolute guarantee that the French would agree, even when we sought it through diplomatic channels, but at least it would leave to us the timing of the effort in the light of existing situation at the time. However, in regard to the pipeline I am concerned, as I set forth in Paris 1597, 2 that if after end of pipeline talks we move over to NATO where question of wartime use may not be specifically raised, that our position will look somewhat arbitrary and unconvincing. Incidentally, I have had no reply to this message and would like to have some word on the subject prior to my meeting at 4 p.m. on Friday, September 9. 3 I shall use every effort to try and make the French position, i.e., of no action until declaration of war, as clear as possible and will discuss with Couve the possibility of an exchange of letters which would provide us with a solid record of these talks. However, all matters will still be ad referendum to Washington which will give us some more time to consider the various factors involved. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-4 FR-US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 In telegram 1597 from Paris, August 2, Bohlen requested clarification of details for his discussion with the French. (Ibid., POL FR-US) 3 In telegram 3330 from Paris, September 9, Bohlen reported on what he described as the French “balance sheet” regarding a future reoccupation and reutilization of military facilities and inquired if he should seek a meeting with Couve on the issue. In telegram 46823, September 14, the Department of State responded that there was no need for such a meeting prior to Bohlen’s return to the United States for consultations. (Both ibid., DEF 15-4 FR-US) 68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, October 26, 1966, 7:40 p.m. 73683. 1. During courtesy call today by Ambassador Lucet on Under Secretary Rostow, latter said that he was in process of reviewing files on French-US written and oral exchanges concerning the status of the five bilateral agreements. He noted George Ball’s statement of June 6 to Lucet that USG could not accept unilateral repudiation of bilaterals but was prepared to discuss the possibility of terminating them by mutual consent. 2 In the interest of tying up loose ends, he wondered what the current French thinking was on this question. 2. Lucet said that he was unaware of any change in French position which he outlined to Ball on June 6, and that in light of Rostow’s question he would communicate with Paris to see just where the matter stands. 3. FYI. Purpose of this exercise is to give GOF opportunity to reconsider its negative, non-negotiable position on this matter which Lucet presented to Ball on June 6. This in no way precludes sound suggestion in Paris tel 6113 calling for aide-mémoire stating USG position on five bilaterals. 3 End FYI. Katzenbach 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 4 FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Stoessel and Vest, and approved by Rostow. 2 See Document 59 . 3 Telegram 6113 from Paris, October 25, also reported that at a meeting with Couve, Rusk reiterated that the United States retained “complete reservation regarding the financial aspects of the relocation of its forces.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, NATO 17-1) In telegram 6263 from Paris, October 27, Bohlen reported that the Rostow approach had been interpreted in Paris “as a possible U.S. concession which would permit the whole matter to be smoothed over without any basis for claims by the U.S.” He recommended consultations with the Embassy prior to any further approaches to the French. (Ibid., POL 4 FR-US) 69. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 69. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, November 24, 1966, 1827Z. 7884. The most interesting and I believe the most useful portion of my conversation with De Gaulle today dealt with Great Britain and the Common Market. 2 I began by saying that while the U.S. of course was not directly involved I would very much appreciate his letting me have his views on the British tentative bid for entry into the Common Market. De Gaulle said while of course he could not decide what others intended to do it was his impression that England was “not ready” to join the Common Market and would seek to obtain concessions from the other members. I told him that according to our information the British were very serious about joining the Common Market but on the supposition that Great Britain would join the Rome Treaty without concessions to her interest with merely a transitional period. What did he think then would be the possibility? I mentioned in this connection the problem of the pound sterling. De Gaulle immediately said that this would have to be settled; that it was not possible for a member of the Common Market to have the burden of sterling balances or the pound with its position as a reserve currency. I then asked him about the so-called political questions of which we occasionally heard here in France, referring to his statement in the press conference of the Nassau Agreements. De Gaulle then gave quite a long dissertation to the following effect: He said if Europe was to be formed it would have to be European in outlook and in action; that if the Economic Community of Europe was to ever develop into any political direction all its members would have to have a European point of view, and in reply to my specific question he admitted that close relations with the U.S. such as England had, and, added parenthetically, Germany sought to have were incompatible with this European outlook. He was quick however to say that he was not speaking about the policy of the U.S. but of the attitude of countries, i.e., England and Germany towards it. I said to him that since it was obvious that any question of the formation of Europe would take a long long time, to which he agreed, how did he expect the relations between an individual country and the U.S. to develop during this interim period. This question seemed to set him back a little since he said of course America could and should have excellent relations with all members of Europe, but he did not think they should be in any way privileged or special as was the case of England and as the Germans tried to achieve. Comment : De Gaulle for him was quite specific in his attitude toward Great Britain joining the Common Market. He professed disbelief in their willingness to accept the conditions of the Common Market but even if that occurred he raised objections, particularly in regard to the position of sterling and in the larger and much vaguer field of relationships with the U.S. I do not know how this should be handled with the British since we do not wish to have any responsibility for chilling the British effort. Perhaps the best thing to do would be to tell them in very general terms without being specific. I would appreciate Department’s guidance for dealing with Ambassador here. Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 10. Secret;Exdis. 2 Bohlen’s report on De Gaulle’s views regarding NATO is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 220 . His report on the portion of the discussion dealing with Vietnam, telegram 7883 from Paris, November 24, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. 70. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 70. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 14, 1966, 2139Z. 9131. Secto 66. Eyes Only for President from Secretary. Accompanied by Bohlen, I paid a call on General De Gaulle and we had approximately one hour’s conversation. The only other person present was Andronikov, the interpreter. After an exchange of amenities during which I conveyed to General De Gaulle your personal greetings and De Gaulle requested that I give to you his cordial personal wishes, De Gaulle said they had been following very closely reports of your operation 2 and had been delighted at your complete recovery. We then discussed the following subjects: Soviet/Chinese relations; Vietnam; and East/West relations in Europe. I mentioned that we thought the developments in China were of greatest importance although we did not know exactly what their meaning was. We had felt in our discussions with the Russians that China was always present in the background of their talks. De Gaulle replied that relations between the Soviet Union and China were not good and in his opinion would get worse. He said they had discussed this subject with Kosygin during his recent visit and that my observation had been quite correct, that China was always present in Soviet thoughts. China had not yet acquired the means of power but they were working hard to obtain them. He considered they were more fearful of the Soviets which surrounded China to the north than they were of the U.S. The Soviets see everything in Chinese terms, even including Vietnam. I told the General that in recent conversations with the Russians, who had never been willing to discuss China, Gromyko had nonetheless said there was an element of irrationality in Chinese developments which made it difficult to draw correct conclusions. I said that if Vietnam were only a question with the Soviets, we were convinced that they would be prepared for settlement along the lines of the Geneva accords of 1954 and the 17th Parallel but that because of Peking and the limited Soviet interests in Hanoi there was not much that could be done. De Gaulle remarked that the Russians were very much worked up against the U.S. over Vietnam and that Kosygin had said that were it not for Vietnam there could be a real détente in the world. Kosygin had stated that the Soviet Union was in fact making war against the U.S. in Vietnam, not with troops, but with material, construction, etc. I mentioned to the General (and of course our entire conversation was confidential) that we had at the end of 1965 been told by the Soviets that if there could be a bombing pause for from fifteen to twenty days this would permit governments to explore with Hanoi the possibility of a peaceful settlement. We had ceased the bombing for almost double that period but nothing had come from Hanoi except the standard four points. Hanoi would not talk, possibly for fear of Peking, and the other governments cannot speak in their own name, but with the NLF and Hanoi it is difficult indeed to determine with whom to talk in the interest of peace. In the case of Cuba it had been procedurally simple since there the conversation was direct with Moscow. I said General De Gaulle would recall Hanoi’s four points, three of which presented no problems, but point three, which insisted on the acceptance of the NLF program as a basis for future South Vietnam. Last spring, through contacts, we had attempted to propose a revision of point three, but received no reply. De Gaulle said that he was of the opinion that the North Vietnamese will not negotiate under present conditions no matter how costly the war became. He said the North Vietnamese would persist even under bombardment, and would continue to fight rather than to yield or renounce their aims, and he repeated that they would never negotiate under the condition of the U.S. being present in the country. I told him that the military problem of the twenty organized regular North Vietnamese regiments was not too difficult to deal with. The main problem was that of guerrilla infiltration and infrastructure in the villages. I mentioned that in addition to SEATO obligation the U.S. had security treaties with Japan, Formosa, Thailand, South Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia, and that obviously in any action we took in regard to Vietnam we would have to consider the effect on general security in the area. I agreed with the General that there would probably be no formal negotiations or any conference but that rather the problem might be settled de facto as had been done in Greece. We had even attempted indirectly with Hanoi to de-escalate the war to facilitate de facto settlement. I told the General that in our one hundred thirty talks with the Chinese Communists over ten years that they had always insisted that Formosa, with its thirteen or fourteen million population, must be given to China. I asked General De Gaulle whether he had any impression from his talks with Kosygin in regard to Soviet policy towards Europe, and in particular whether the Soviets would respond to any possible German initiative. De Gaulle replied that he thought the Russians were very anxious for a détente in Europe and, he said parenthetically, even with the U.S. in regard to Vietnam; that they were no longer aggressive or menacing, even in Berlin, which had receded to second place in their thoughts. They wished to develop economic and technical relations with France and not only with France. However, they continued to show themselves to be very suspicious and distrustful of Germany. Part of this may have some truth in it, but he is convinced the larger part is simply a politically motivated attitude. He said they wished to have a détente with the Federal Republic, but only on condition of the German acceptance of existing frontiers and renunciation of any pretensions to nuclear weapons, and acceptance of two Germanies. De Gaulle said he told Kosygin there might be two German states but there was only one German people and sooner or later, although it will take a long time through the process of détente, the two Germanies will come together. Kosygin said perhaps one day this could occur, but the moment had not yet come, but he did say perhaps. It is conceivable that Kosygin meant that by the increasing of contacts between the two Germanies there might some day in the future be a sort of confederation, but at present he would not say this and kept reiterating the point about two Germanies. I mentioned to De Gaulle the enormous cost the failure to solve the German problem had been to both sides. The cost to the U.S. for armaments in the post-war period had been in the neighborhood of nine hundred billion dollars and a large part of this had been due to failure to settle German problems. The Soviets had likewise incurred heavy expenses. The German question as it now stood was the only question I could conceive of which might lead to a war directly between the U.S. and USSR. If the German question could be settled and stability returned to Central Europe this would open very wide perspectives to the world in the form of trade, disarmament, and other fields. De Gaulle answered that the French had been trying for some time to persuade the Germans to make some gesture to show that they did not have any evil design on Eastern Europe. It is possible that Brandt and Kiesinger will produce something of this nature. He said that it was ridiculous for the Germans to expect that they can by abrupt action recover the lost territory of Prussia and Saxony. He went on to say that he was convinced that the Soviet Union was interested only in China and their own development and had no intention of initiating any armed attack in Europe and that the Germans really should do something and not just say “America, America” and hope that this will solve all their problems. I then mentioned to the General that time is getting short since we are on the threshold of new dimensions in defense problems, namely the ABM; the Soviets are beginning to deploy ABMs in the Moscow area and if both sides began to deploy them the cost would be phenomenal. This in turn would lead to an increase in offensive missiles to overcome the ABM and then armaments would have an indefinite expansion. He said he thought it was very important that we should find some ceiling or some method of controlling this armament race before it entered into a new phase. De Gaulle remarked that the only policy there was to make peace and he felt this was also true in Vietnam. I remarked that in Laos in 1962 we thought we had achieved a real solution but unfortunately the North Vietnamese continued the guerrilla infiltration and the area controlled by the Pathet Lao was barred to others. I said personally I thought there was a good chance that the Soviet Government had wished to support that agreement but it was just about this time, around 1962, that the Soviets had lost influence in Hanoi. I said I was convinced if it was only up to Moscow and Washington, peace would soon be made in Vietnam but Chinese influence was too strong in Hanoi. De Gaulle said the U.S. had its own policy and it was not up to him to give advice but he felt the U.S. was becoming bogged down in secondary and ridiculous considerations in Vietnam, particularly when we think of what could be done for world peace if this issue was settled. I replied we could easily stop the half of the war we were responsible for, but what about the other half. De Gaulle said if the U.S. was not in Vietnam there would be no war. De Gaulle in conclusion said that he felt that despite our differences the Franco-American friendship remains strong, to which I replied that I thought the history of the post-war period would show that American and French interests in most cases had been identical. As we left De Gaulle particularly asked that his cordial greetings be extended to you. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL FR-US. Secret; Nodis. Passed to the White House. Rusk was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting December 15-16. 2 The President had surgery November 16. 71. Memorandum of Conversation 71. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 9, 1967. SUBJECT Conversation with French Ambassador PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Charles Lucet, French Embassy Mr. Robert Anderson, Director, France-Benelux Affairs During a brief conversation at a French Embassy reception today, Ambassador Lucet said that he was very disturbed over the current state of Franco-American relations which, in his view, were at an all time low. He attributed this in large measure to General De Gaulle’s unfortunate and inexplicable remarks on December 31 and January 1 on the United States’ involvement in Viet-Nam. 2 He said that when he had read these remarks in Guadeloupe during a brief vacation, his desire for returning to Washington was, to put it mildly, less than enthusiastic. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson. 2 In a December 31 television address to the French people, De Gaulle characterized the war in Vietnam as “unjust hellip; due to the armed intervention of the United States in territory of Vietnam.” For text, see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages , Vol. 5, pp. 128-131. In a New Year’s day address to the diplomatic corps, De Gaulle again blamed the United States for the war. 72. Memorandum of Conversation 72. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Bonn, April 25, 1967, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECTS Vice President Humphrey’s Recent Visit; Meeting between the Two Chiefs of State PARTICIPANTS President De Gaulle Minister Burin des Rosiers Mr. Andronikoff President Johnson E.S. Glenn General The conversation began before lunch. After replying to the President’s greetings, President De Gaulle remarked that the late Chancellor Adenauer was a great man who had served his country faithfully and well. The President agreed and complimented President De Gaulle on the latter’s fine appearance. The conversation continued after lunch following a request from President De Gaulle carried by Minister Burin des Rosiers to the President. Vice President Humphrey The President expressed satisfaction with the reception extended for Vice President Humphrey. 2 He also said that he remembered with pleasure his own conversation with General De Gaulle at the time when he was Vice President of the United States. 3 General De Gaulle said that the French Government was very happy to welcome the Vice President in Paris. It is regrettable, said he, that the two Presidents have had so few opportunities to exchange views personally in the last few years. The President said that he shared this opinion. Exchange of Visits President De Gaulle said that there is a house near the Palace of Versailles, which was built by the kings of France and which is named the Trianon. The French Government would be delighted to place this house at President Johnson’s disposal any time the President would find it convenient to use it. The President said that this is an election year and that he does not think that he will do much travelling henceforth. However, President De Gaulle is coming to Canada and might perhaps find his presence in the Western Hemisphere a good opportunity to return the visit paid in Paris by President Kennedy. 4 President De Gaulle said that his invitation stood also for after the elections. He added that he thinks often about President Johnson not only in connection with the business two chiefs of state may have together but also as one man about another. He is fully conscious of the heavy burden constituted by responsibility and full of respect for the manner in which the President carries this burden. The President said that people in the United States are conscious of the manner in which President De Gaulle faced his own responsibilities. This has changed the face of France and greatly contributed to changing the face of the world. President De Gaulle said that the United States has done much for the world. The President said that the United States did what it could and what it considered to be its duty. It intends to continue to do its duty. Pleasantries President De Gaulle said that he was happy to have been able to exchange these few words with the President and hoped for another opportunity. The President said that he also was happy with having been able to exchange these few words and that he also would like to have further conversations with President De Gaulle. It is his understanding that President De Gaulle would be leaving Bonn almost immediately after the ceremonies. President De Gaulle affirmed that such was the case. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, which was approved in the White House on June 28. The meeting was held at the Villa Hammerschmidt. 2 Humphrey visited Paris April 7 to address the OECD meeting. 3 Johnson visited Paris twice: April 6-7, 1961, at the end of a trip to Senegal, and on September 30, 1961. No record of a meeting with De Gaulle during either trip has been found. 4 For documentation on President Kennedy’s May 31-June 2, 1961, visit to Paris, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Documents 11 , 107 , and 230 . 73. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 73. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 11, 1967, 1834Z. 506. During my conversation with General De Gaulle today 2 I asked him for his estimate of the correlation of forces in the world. He told me that he thought from the military point of view the Soviets could destroy the U.S. and the U.S. could destroy the Soviets and that therefore from a purely military standpoint we cancelled each other out. However, he said the U.S. was so much more powerful from the economic and financial point of view as well as in organization of its state that there was no comparison. I pointed out to De Gaulle that the Soviet Union, having a closed system, was in no way affected financially by the power of the U.S., to which De Gaulle replied that this may be so but that the U.S. weighed more heavily on the rest of the world. I told him that I had been associated with the conduct of American foreign policy for well over twenty years and I could really think of no case where the U.S. had sought to use its power for its own selfish ends. De Gaulle said he did not accuse the U.S. of any belligerent attitude although he thought it was “inevitable” that so much power as that possessed by the U.S. sooner or later—perhaps not now he said—would begin to influence the policy and conduct of any country. Comment : De Gaulle did not say it but implied that part of France’s current policy was a recognition of the overwhelming power of the U.S. and the necessity of helping to redress the balance. This may be supposition on my part since this view attributed to De Gaulle has already appeared in the French press. Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 34. Secret; Nodis. 2 Telegram 507 from Paris, July 11, reported on the portion of the discussion dealing with Algeria. (Ibid.) Telegram 508 from Paris, July 11, reported on the portion of the discussion dealing with the Middle East. (Ibid.) Telegram 509 dealt with De Gaulle’s views on Arab-Israeli issues. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23 ARAB-ISR) Telegram 510 dealt with De Gaulle’s visits abroad. (Ibid., POL 7 FR) 74. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 74. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 12, 1967, 1042Z. 523. Ref: Paris 508. 2 It is disconcerting to say the least to see the head of an important and traditionally friendly country conduct its foreign policy on such a series of subjective and relatively trivial prejudices as De Gaulle seems to be doing in France. It seems to me that his anger and bitterness in regard to Israel stems from two basic reasons: (1) His recognition that France did not and could not play any important role in the Middle East crisis—Russia’s blunt refusal of a Four-Power gathering, the failure of French diplomacy with its former African colonies set the background for his current mood. (2) His anger at the Israelis daring to ignore his personal advice adds a note of subjective bitterness. To his present mood (3) it should of course be added that as is customary with him he finds some reason to blame the U.S. His supposition, and it is certainly no more than that, that if the U.S. had really given a flat warning to Israel we could have prevented the war is ridiculous on the face of it. What is a matter of concern however is the degree to which under De Gaulle’s one-man rule personal and subjective prejudices have been translated into political action. As an illustration of the depth of his feeling against Israel he told me yesterday that “in this very room” five years ago Ben Gurion said that Israel had two and one-half million people, that some day it would be five million, and then asked the rhetorical question “Where will we put these people,” the implication being that Israel had solid reasons for making plans of aggression. I told him that this may have been Ben Gurion’s view five years ago, but I understood that recently the rate of immigration to Israel had gone down radically. At another point in discussing the motivations of Israeli action I said to De Gaulle, “What would you have done if you had been an Israeli” to which he replied with some frostiness, “I am not an Israeli.” (I might say that throughout De Gaulle was as usual polite and courteous.) I am inclined to believe however that De Gaulle’s statement that French abstention on Cuban and Albanian amendments was due to his feeling that the U.S. bore some share of responsibility for events in the Middle East is not completely accurate. I had learned yesterday from an officer of the Quai d’Orsay that these instructions were drafted on a general basis without any anticipation of either of these amendments, and that Seydoux had lacked the nerve to raise the question with the Quai. It was for this reason that I suggested we be particularly careful in handling what De Gaulle told me. There would seem to be absolutely nothing that we can do to bring about any change in De Gaulle’s attitude, and I believe that we can count on his continuing hostility to Israel, particularly in the field of the arms embargo, unless the Israelis should withdraw, which is in the highest degree unlikely. It is difficult to convey from here to Washington the depth of the feeling in Parisian political and non-political circles at the current line of De Gaulle’s policy. However, with the Assembly in recess until October there is no chance that any influence will be brought to bear on De Gaulle, or would have any possibility of success if it were. There seems to be no possibility of any ministerial resignation, but there is no doubt that De Gaulle’s Middle East policy, particularly the anti-Israeli aspect, has dealt Gaullism a considerable blow. Bohlen 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 12. Secret; Nodis. In an attached July 12 memorandum to President Johnson, Walt Rostow commented: “There is little in this you don’t know or guess; although De Gaulle’s personal anger at Israel’s failing to take his advice is an interesting but not complete explanation of French Middle East policy, you will wish to note the final paragraph.” 2 See footnote 2, Document 73 . 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, July 22, 1967, 10:30 a.m. 11595. For Ambassador Bohlen from Secretary. 1. Ambassador Lucet had a half-hour talk with me July 20 before his departure to France on vacation. Because you will probably be seeing him and he may mention it to you, I want you to have one particular part of our conversation that I am not reporting elsewhere. 2. Knowing that Lucet would be seeing De Gaulle at some point while back in France, I decided to speak quite frankly to him about the state of United States-French relations. I said that the United States did not seem to be popular with President De Gaulle these days. When asked by a somewhat flustered Lucet for specifics, I cited such issues as the Middle East, Viet-Nam, international monetary problems and even the “Anglo-Saxon” question of UK entry into Europe where French policy was directed against the United States. When I mentioned our sadness over the state of our relations, Lucet said that his visits to Rhode Island, Kentucky and Minnesota during the last few days had convinced him there was still some permanent friendship left. I agreed but commented that the unfortunate state of our relations gives some impetus to isolationism here in the United States. Lucet agreed with this, and concluded with the comment that “You’re fed up with all of us, but you cannot get rid of us.” I laughingly replied: “We can always try.” 3. In a subsequent discussion of this part of the conversation with Anderson (FBX) Lucet said that he understood and personally shared my views, that he welcomed having them, and that he intended to use them in Paris to try to obtain some “clarification” of French policy towards the United States. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Anderson, cleared by Stoessel, and approved by Rusk. 76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 76. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 27, 1967, 1552Z. 1288. De Gaulle has always been known as a man of strong and definite views, which he has had no inhibitions in expressing. However, along with this, De Gaulle up until recently had always had a sense of measure, of timing, of place and appropriateness. It has now become increasingly apparent that De Gaulle has lost this sense of timing and of appropriateness and his public utterances and indeed actions have more and more taken on a purely willful and personal character. According to our information, De Gaulle conducts completely single-handedly French foreign policy and is more and more neglecting other aspects of government activities. His statements on Vietnam, which have tended more and more to free himself from the normal restraints, his action on the Common Market, and finally, the recent and most incredible of all, his behavior in Canada, 2 have all reflected this tendency. It would seem that De Gaulle is suffering from two aspects of old age: (1) A progressive hardening of the prejudices—of which he had plenty, and (2) A growing indifference and even unconcern with the effect of his words on international and French public opinion. The fixation which he has always had in regard to the power and size of the United States has grown into a compulsive obsession. I have always held the view, and still do, that basically and originally De Gaulle’s antagonism to the United States was based upon his view of our size and power, coupled with the traditional friendliness of the United States towards France. These, in De Gaulle’s view, constituted the chief elements of a power which was dangerous in regard to the independence of French action. However, as I recently reported (Paris 808), 3 an attitude, whatever its original motivation, if consistently held and acted upon eventually becomes a subjective obsession. This is clear now in the case of De Gaulle’s view of the United States. We have noted that along with his powerful intrusion into Canadian domestic affairs in favor of the French Canadians, De Gaulle found two occasions to make relatively mild cracks about the United States and its size. I feel, however, that now we must definitely recognize that one of the motivating forces of De Gaulle’s conduct of foreign policy is his anti-American obsession and I believe that we can expect that almost anything he says in the future will contain some uncomplimentary references toward United States. His performance in Canada has come as a disturbing and unsettling shock to French public opinion. Virtually the entire press has been openly and severely critical of De Gaulle personally. Characteristic of this tone is an editorial in Figaro this morning which after criticizing De Gaulle very severely, ends up with “why"? The prevailing mood among such French as can be met in Paris at this season is one of incredulity and humiliation because De Gaulle has violated what the French regard as one of their chief attributes, namely that of good taste. Also, no one here can understand exactly what De Gaulle was driving at. Naturally it is the effect on the French domestic political scene which will be of chief interest. In all probability there will be more reaction than action during August when everyone, including all members of the government, will be on vacation, and it is yet too soon to state exactly what effect the Canadian fiasco will eventually have on the domestic scene. However, together with De Gaulle’s policy on the Middle East, the Canadian fiasco will be one more major error of de Gaulle in the general picture. It is to be assumed that even the most hardened Gaullists must be left with a sensation of frustration and bewilderment. It is perhaps too soon to state that De Gaulle is “becoming senile,” but certainly the restraint which used to accompany his actions and characterize his words seems to be slipping very badly. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 FR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, and Ottawa. 2 De Gaulle visited Montreal July 23-26. In the course of a speech at Montreal City Hall, July 24, De Gaulle repeated the rally cry of the Separatists, “Vive le Quebec Libre.” In a statement issued after the second speech, the Government of Canada called De Gaulle’s comments unacceptable outside interference in Canadian affairs. 3 Dated July 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US) 77. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 77. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, January 23, 1968, 1739Z. 9453. I went this afternoon to pay my farewell call on Pompidou 2 and the following points emerged from our discussion: After my telling Pompidou how much I personally regretted leaving Paris and how appreciative I was of the many acts of kindness and consideration I had received from him and from other members of the French Govt, I told him that insofar as official matters were concerned I was very sorry to see the present state of Franco-American relations and that I honestly did not feel that it was due to anything that the U.S. Govt had done or not done, leaving aside Vietnam which of course did not touch any direct French interest. Pompidou did not disagree with me but said that Vietnam, while not affecting French interests directly nevertheless was a larger question affecting almost every country in the world. I told him Vietnam was a widely complicated subject but he could be sure that no one wished to find a reasonable and decent solution more than the U.S. and I thought he would find more interest among the oriental countries in what the U.S. was trying to do there. I then went on to tell him that I couldn’t honestly foresee any great improvement, even if Vietnam was settled, in the relations between the U.S. and France, and one of the reasons was that I felt the attitude of the French Govt, including that of De Gaulle, was obsessed with the power of the U.S., particularly economically and financially; that their attitude, particularly the General’s, was that nothing could be done about it and that it was inevitable that sooner or later the U.S. would develop all the character and action of a country with too much power. In the circumstances I could not see—since obviously we could do nothing to diminish our power—how there could be any genuine improvement in our relationship. Pompidou said that no one expected the U.S. to do anything to diminish its power but the manner in which the power was used might be important. I said there were certain limits in regard to the use of power which would apply in any nation and I frankly did not see—again leaving aside Vietnam—in what manner the U.S. could have applied its powers more benignly than it had. Pompidou replied that this might be true from the point of view of the govt but that speaking from his experience in private business he felt that the action of American companies was very calculated and assertive, mentioning particularly the aviation business in which he said that every time France or England attempted sales in other countries they ran into overriding competition from American firms. I pointed out to him as a general rule the U.S. Govt practically never got into these matters involving these companies, which I did not think was always the case in France. I then told Pompidou that I had been very much disturbed at the state of public opinion in the U.S. in regard to France: that I thought this was in part due to the simple fact that the American public did not understand many of the foreign policy acts of the French Govt and I also said that the attitude of the General toward Israel and in his last press conference apparently toward the Jews in general 3 had caused a certain reaction in the U.S. I mentioned that the French position in the Middle East was by no means clear to many people and that it was matters of this kind, including of course the departure from NATO, the establishment of which I personally recalled had been very much a French desire and even insistence back in the early 50’s, was very easy to interpret as anti-American. Pompidou then asked me whether I really seriously thought that if President Johnson had wanted to use his full influence with Israel there would have been any war (in this he was parroting De Gaulle’s attitude, Paris 3931). 4 I told him from everything that I knew, both from personal conversations in Washington and from the documents in the case, it seemed entirely clear that President Johnson had gone just as far as it was conceivable to go in an attempt to dissuade the Israelis, pointing out that there was a limit beyond which you could not go in dealing with a smaller country. Pompidou made no reply. In turning to the recent American balance of payment measures Pompidou said approaching this from an economic point of view it seemed perfectly clear to him that we were taking measures which would not be unpalatable to American public opinion in an election year but were perhaps somewhat more indifferent towards the interests of others. I said that I frankly didn’t agree with this observation since many of the measures undertaken would not be a bit palatable to American business, American tourists, or other elements in American life. I pointed out to him that insofar as the interests of others was concerned there was no discrimination involving any other country despite what he, Pompidou, had said on television. Pompidou said he did not use the word discrimination and did not mean to imply it (sic), but had merely pointed out that since there was a difference of treatment towards Great Britain and the European countries it was obvious the U.S. did not consider England a European country. I told him I thought if England had been admitted to the Common Market and had really meshed its finances with other Common Market countries, the result might have been different, but in the circumstances there could hardly be any question since England was in balance of payments difficulties whereas Common Market countries were not. After some more discussion of “hegemony” as applied to the modern world the conversation ended with mutual compliment. Comment : I have always known that Pompidou was one of those who more strongly believed in the overwhelming power of the U.S. vis-á-visothers and the expressions along this line noted above were not a bit out of character, but I think are generally held by most of the French Govt. He did not disagree when I mentioned that De Gaulle’s remarks on the Jews had created a reaction, possibly for the reason that they created an equally strong reaction in France. It was interesting to note that he did not disagree with my statement that in the circumstances I foresaw very little chance of any basic change in Franco-American relations. Bohlen 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret. Repeated to London. 2 Bohlen left post on February 9. President Johnson appointed R. Sargent Shriver to succeed him on April 22. Shriver presented his credentials on May 25. 3 ”An elite people, sure of itself and dominating.” For text of his November 27, 1967, press conference, see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Vol. 5, pp. 227-247. 4 Not found. 78. Summary Notes of the 586th Meeting of the National Security Council 78. Summary Notes of the 586th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, May 22, 1968, 12:15-1:10 p.m. Vietnam-France-Germany The President: Before discussing current problems with West Germany, Under Secretary Katzenbach will comment on the current crisis in France. 2 Under Secretary Katzenbach: DeGaulle can probably defeat a vote of censure in the French Assembly. His TV speech on Friday was tough, but it did offer a compromise to his opponents. He may well emerge as the leader who overcame current disturbances. If he has to use force to end disorder, he will encounter very serious problems. It is in our interest to have the situation in France calm down. [Here follow 3 pages of discussion on the Paris peace talks, German affairs, and the situation in Vietnam.] Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. 2 On May 2 French authorities closed the University of Paris complex at Nanterres, a Paris suburb, setting off a growing wave of student demonstrations that erupted into violence on May 6. The clashes between police and students continued until May 13 when French workers staged a massive general strike in support of the students. On May 14 the students occupied the Sorbonne. Other faculty occupations followed. By May 17 workers in many parts of France were occupying factories as part of a protest against government economic policies. By May 21 when the French National Assembly began debates on the uprising, an estimated 8 million workers were striking, paralyzing industry and transportation. 79. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 79. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, May 28, 1968, 1545Z. 14914. Subject: Possible Effects of Present Crisis on French Foreign Policy. 1. Taking step back from immediate urgencies, some very preliminary observations are in order on possible effect of this crisis on Franco-American relations and on French foreign policy. 2. This Embassy has commented many times that De Gaulle’s overriding concern was reasserting his country’s independence and increasing its international standing. Many Frenchmen now recognize that his preoccupation with French prestige has been a basic cause of his neglect of domestic concerns that helped bring on present situation. We have also noted often that his aims overreached his means, and that such diplomatic successes as he enjoyed were result not of French power but of his unique personal authority and audacity, coupled with image of French prosperity and stability. 3. Whatever the outcome of present trials, it already is clear that De Gaulle’s authority in France will be significantly reduced, and that his standing and France’s leverage in the international area will be considerably diminished. Whoever governs, there will be turning inward toward domestic concerns, less temptation to attempt policies based on grandeur. Even on material level, economic implications of strikes and their settlement (see Paris 14553 for early estimation) 2 will reduce material resources available for conduct of foreign policy. 4. How all this will affect specific French policies is more difficult to say, for it depends on how firmly De Gaulle remains in saddle or, if he is unseated, who comes after. Since past French diplomatic adventures—whether shaking the Alliance, rapproching with the East, comforting our enemies in Vietnam, intervening in Canada, blocking Britain from Europe, or the rest—have issued directly from the General’s personal initiative [and] prestige, it seems certain that no French leader—even De Gaulle—will enjoy same prestige after this crisis and act the same. Using working hypothesis that Gaullists will stay in power after June 16, some possibilities might be outlined: (A) The old De Gaulle might well have taken France out of Atlantic Alliance in 1969; a post-crisis De Gaulle would not feel strong enough at home to risk such an unsettling move, at least in foreseeable future. (B) France’s political and economic relations with ITU partners in Common Market are open to question. With De Gaulle’s domestic standing reduced and adverse effect of strike-settling reforms at work, France cannot be as arbitrary and carry same weight in EEC Councils as before. (See Paris 14173.) 3 Conversely EEC partners might show more force and determination against French arbitrariness; Bonc may have less concern and respect for French leadership in the future. (C) De Gaulle’s rapprochement with Moscow has never caught imagination of most Frenchmen, and in view Communist role in present crisis, a weakened De Gaulle or successor “Gaullist” government might fear too much “opening to East” which may have brought more trouble than benefit to France. (D) France’s cherished image as hero of Third World and champion of Francophonie will suffer as base of De Gaulle’s political and economic power erodes. It is doubtful France will devote the same high percentage of GNP to foreign aid as now. Accelerating French programs in Quebec, Cuba (Embtel 14747), 4 Latin America and elsewhere are likely to be hurt; but French-speaking Africa would also suffer. (Effects may not be felt immediately, of course, since many projects already in pipeline.) (E) Even De Gaulle’s firm pro-Arab stance in Middle East could conceivably be modified should he need more powerful anti-Communist friends in the West. (F) As for Franco-American relations, it is evident that France’s internal problems should encourage any tendencies already at work for De Gaulle to ease off on his anti-American posture. He is obviously flattered by Vietnam talks going on in Paris, and in any event has less reason to criticize US about Vietnam. Domestic economic repercussions should spoil French favorite game of criticizing US payments problem; and in general De Gaulle must have need for better relations with US to bolster his reputation at home. This is particularly true since most Frenchmen seem tired of bad relations with US and many of them are increasingly worried about policy of going it alone in a world which has suddenly become more dangerous. (We cite for sheer pleasure what one Embassy officer’s concierge told him she was telling her friends: “I wish the US troops would come back; they gave us some security.”) 5. We emphasize change not discontinuity (if Gaullists stay in). We must recognize, for example, that return to the old solidarity within Atlantic Alliance is probably impossible in absence of Soviet military threats and that a certain degree of mistrust and jealousy of the US is standard part of French outlook. France, however, may be returning to reality; important, as is her due, but not the false, inflated, imperious France that De Gaulle has sought. France is returning to France—which is a great deal, and is all her friends ask. 6. We believe the USG can take pride in consistent US policy of restraint and abstinence from controversy with De Gaulle. We have not replied in kind, we have not taken steps against French interests, we have kept the hand out. We are ready to work with her again, as before. 7. Embassy assessment of effect on US interests should Gaullists lose power entirely to center and/or left (including Popular Front with Communists) will follow in subsequent telegram. This is even tougher exercise since opposition leadership is full of holes and the future full of unknowns. However, it is even more important since what was almost inconceivable a month ago, i.e. De Gaulle’s early departure, would now be an even bet if France were asked today. Shriver 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 FR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, London, Moscow, Rome, and USNATO. 2 Telegram 14553 from Paris, May 22, commented on the economic impact of the French strikes. (Ibid., E 9 FR) 3 Not found. 4 Telegram 14747 from Paris, May 27, reported on economic relations between France and Cuba. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 6-1 CUBA) 80. Intelligence Memorandum 80. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, May 31, 1968. 0591/68 THE FRENCH CRISIS De Gaulle’s Challenge 1. The events of the last 24 hours have placed France on the knife edge of disaster. By refusing to resign, De Gaulle has taken on the workers and students frontally. He has reverted to type, the powerful, challenging autocrat. He has promised elections for the Assembly, not for the presidency. He has vowed to retain his prime minister. He has threatened the use of his emergency powers. He has asked for the revival of Gaullist “civic action” committees—his private security system. He has raised the spectre of a Communist takeover. In short, he has come out of his corner swinging defiantly at opponents who thought that they had him on the ropes. 2. In his speech he made a simplistic division of France into those threatening dictatorship-his opponents, all lumped together as Communists or their dupes—and those in favor of “progress, independence, and peace"—the people. De Gaulle is attempting to achieve by words what his regime has failed to do politically, i.e., divide the country into two clear-cut camps: the Gaullists and their supporters on the one hand and the Communists and theirs on the other. This attempt poses basic problems of strategy and tactics for the leftist opposition and its electoral ally, the Communist Party. 3. The immediate reaction has been both angry, and enthusiastic. On the one hand, more workers have left their jobs, including some public service employees; on the other hand, thousands of Gaullists are jubilantly taking to the streets. When, how, and if a head-on collision between right and left will occur is not yet clear, but a spark could set it off. The Opposition’s Response 4. De Gaulle’s challenge could evoke a wide range of responses from French workers, students, and the political parties of the left. Among the workers, a small but militant and youthful minority has led both the mass of workers and the opposition political parties in fomenting strikes and forcing the French economy to a standstill. These militants are unlikely to change their tactics now. 5. In an effort to force De Gaulle’s resignation, workers could carry their activities to new levels by cutting off all electricity and gas service (they have done so for short periods already), and they could attempt large-scale industrial sabotage in installations that they now either occupy or have struck. In such circumstances De Gaulle would be obliged to restore the operation of these installations by force. 6. De Gaulle obviously hopes that the great majority of the ten million striking workers who follow but do not lead will get back on the job now that they are threatened with the full power of the government. If the labor force does begin returning to work in significant numbers, De Gaulle will have broken the back of the dissidence. If it does not, civil conflict of major proportions will almost certainly ensue. 7. If De Gaulle gets more workers back on the job and the economy moving again, he will have largely isolated the students. He can then deal with them at greater leisure and from a much stronger position. The students who instigated the early demonstrations and who are still in the revolutionary forefront must realize this, and probably see only one course open to them: to continue the resistance by all means and to persuade the workers over the heads of their own leaders that De Gaulle can be defeated. De Gaulle’s arrogant speech could lead to a hardening of the student position and to more dramatic attempts to challenge authority. 8. For the political parties of the left—the Communist and Francois Mitterrand’s Left Federation—De Gaulle’s speech poses more starkly than ever the dilemma they have faced since the crisis began. Will they gain (or lose) more by trying to assume leadership of the revolution against De Gaulle, or by strengthening their own moderate image through support of order and peaceful change? The immediate reaction of both Mitterrand and the Communist leadership to De Gaulle’s speech was to label it a call to civil war. They may have second thoughts, but apparently now believe that they would lose more by knuckling under to De Gaulle than by fully associating themselves with the dissidents. The left’s political leaders themselves are dependent on the workers. If substantial numbers of workers respond to De Gaulle and begin returning to work in the next few days, the politicians of the left will also probably pull in their horns, seek to cut their losses, and begin again to espouse order and parliamentary processes. De Gaulle’s Assets 9. At this juncture De Gaulle has one asset that he almost certainly can count on—the army; one asset that he probably can rely on—the internal security forces; and one potential asset—the nonstriking, nonstudent French public which would like to avoid bloodshed and possible civil war. The position of the army is particularly critical if De Gaulle assumes emergency powers under Article 16 of the constitution, a move that he alone—and with only a pro forma parliamentary and judicial sanction—can initiate. 10. The army probably will obey any orders it receives from the legally constituted government. If an insurrection breaks out and the army is ordered to crush it, it probably will do so. Purges that have occurred since the Algerian imbroglio and the anti-Communist sentiment among army leaders should ensure the loyalty of the officer corps. The reaction of the conscripts if massive violence breaks out is less predictable, although most officers do not seem concerned about the loyalty of the draftees. Various reports indicate that on his way back to Colombey on the 29th, De Gaulle met in eastern France with General Jacques Massu, commanding general of the French forces in West Germany, and with a number of other army leaders, presumably to inquire about the loyalty of the troops. De Gaulle’s implicit threat to use force to restore order indicates the generals probably reaffirmed their support for the regime in case of a showdown. There are numerous reports that additional troops are now moving toward the Paris area, but there has been no confirmation of this. 11. As of 29 May, two airborne regiments had been moved closer to Paris and three armored units near Paris had been placed on a six-hour alert. In addition, five gendarmerie companies from the French forces in Germany had been moved to Strasbourg and Paris and all major units of the First Military Region, which has its headquarters in Paris, were ordered to have 75 percent of their personnel present at all times. 12. The police, aided by the 60,000-man gendarmerie and the Republic Security Companies (CRS), have up to this point obeyed all orders issued by their superiors. Discontent among the Paris police has been growing, however, in part over the regime’s handling of the crisis and in part because the government has not yet responded to demands for pay raises. Police unions have publicly proclaimed their sympathy with striking workers and might balk if ordered to oust strikers from occupied factories. De Gaulle thus might be forced to rely on the CRS and the army. He has studiously avoided calling on the army up to this point, possibly in part because few units have been trained to deal with civic disorder. 13. The public thus far has been highly critical of the “establishment” and surprisingly tolerant of lawbreakers, strikes, and massive inconveniences. Now that the possibility exists of an insurrection on the part of the protesters and the wholesale use of force by the government to restore order, that sector of the public which wants to avoid a civil war might rally to the legitimate government. De Gaulle’s raising of the spectre of a Communist take-over probably was intended to arouse this up-to-now passive group. Some indications that he has considerable strength within this group in the Paris area have already been shown by the 300,000-400,000 demonstrators who gathered in Paris late today in support of De Gaulle. Outlook 14. Developments over the next few hours and days will tell whether the momentum of the dissidents is sustained—or whether De Gaulle’s opening for a return to order is seized by a tired and frightened public. Movement to chaos could be very fast indeed, particularly if some of the restraints observed so far by organized labor are abandoned. The critical areas are the public utilities, communications, and the police. 15. The leaders of the left may upon reflection recoil from attempting to come to power the same way De Gaulle did in 1958: through subversion and paralysis of the state. The events of the past three weeks, however, demonstrate that the titular leaders of both workers and students have only imperfect control over the rank and file in their organizations. It is highly questionable now whether they have the will or indeed the desire to rally their followers for a legal assault on the Gaullist regime at the ballot box. 16. Whether elections will be held, whether the results will be meaningful, and whether the losers will accept the results of the vote probably will not be apparent for a week or more. The immediate reaction of the leaders of the leftist opposition, the striking unions, and the demonstrating students indicates that they have chosen to regard De Gaulle’s speech as a “call to civil war” rather than as an opportunity to prove that a majority of the French people desires the end of the Gaullist regime. 17. The immediate outlook for a return to some measure of calm is very poor. The government already has begun organizing counterdemonstrations and mobilizing the Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) a group of World War II resistance veterans unconditionally faithful to De Gaulle. If students continue to demonstrate and workers to occupy plants, or if the Communist Party activates its own “action committees,” then bloody clashes are likely with the CDR, other Gaullist supporters, the police, and the army. Over the short run, we believe that the government probably would succeed in restoring order and essential services, but only at the cost of poisoning political life for the indefinite future. 18. The longer term political outlook is therefore ominous. The Gaullists have repeatedly violated and perverted their own constitution. They have treated even the moderate opposition with disdain and indifference. In today’s declaration, De Gaulle has reasserted his determination to maintain the dominance of the right in France. The opposition, in turn, has reacted in its political frustration with revolutionary language and calls for extraparliamentary means to redress its grievances. Long-term political stability in France probably has been undermined. Thus the stage has been set for a polarization of political forces in France, with neither extreme willing to accept the role of a “loyal” opposition. Whatever the short-term outcome, France faces a period of unrest and, eventually, even civil war. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 13. Secret. A typewritten note on the memorandum reads: “This memorandum was prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ].” 81. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State 81. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 29, 1968, 2025Z. 18701. Secun 17. For the Secretary from the Under Secretary. Amb. Shriver and I saw Foreign Minister Debre for 1/2 hour meeting this evening. Debre stated the French Economy Minister said he thought there would be serious difficulties for the remainder of this year, but that things would pick up around January and continue on an upward course. He said his technicians thought this view somewhat pessimistic and that the upturn would come sooner. In response to my question on his view as to Czech, the Minister said that it was absolutely impossible for the Soviet Union to accept the course of liberalization in Czech because if this continued it would affect all other Eastern European countries and prove to be irreversible. He did not think that it would be possible to reverse this course in Czech, other than by force. He thought the Soviets were prepared to do this. He said it was conceivable, but unlikely, that Dubcek could avert the crisis by making major concessions to the Soviets. He would have to promise to exercise strict press censorship, etc. At one point in the conversation he said that he did not think his view different from that expressed by Bohlen as reported by Lucet. I said I thought he took a more pessimistic view. Debre said that Soviet intervention would be tragic for Europe but there was nothing anybody could do about it. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 13. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Katzenbach visited Paris on his return from New Dehli where he led the U.S. delegation in talks with Indian leaders July 26-28. 82. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 82. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 26, 1968. SUBJECT U.S. Claims Against France Attached is Secretary Rusk’s memo requesting approval to initiate talks with the French on compensation for losses we incurred when we had to move our military installations out of France. 2 Secretaries Fowler and Clifford join in this recommendation. These claims cover: —the estimated value of the remaining useful life of the facilities we left in France; plus —certain moving costs involved in the relocation. State estimates the total at $230-$250 million. Our NATO allies may be willing to share certain of these relocation costs with us (up to a maximum of $96 million). They expect repayment in proportion to any compensation we might ultimately receive from France. They expect us to bring our bilateral claim to France before they begin negotiations with us to share in our costs. In addition to our bilateral claims, we share in the combined NATO financial claims against France for similar costs on NATO-financed facilities. The Fourteen invited the French to begin discussions on this issue in February but so far received only a stalling response. Asking the French to begin discussions on our bilateral claim may look like provoking a U.S.-French confrontation. The French response will probably amount to a stall or a brush-off. But we do have a legitimate claim and we will be subject to Congressional criticism if we delay presenting it. To take both factors into account, Secretary Rusk is recommending a low-key approach (along the lines of the attached draft note), with no public statement. John Leddy will seek Ambassador Shriver’s advice on a suitable time to make this approach. I concur in Secretary Rusk’s recommendation. Approve approach to the French 3 No Call me Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, France, Vol. 14. Confidential. 2 Not printed. 3 The President checked this option. 83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 83. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, September 2, 1968, 1827Z. 20272. Subject: French Policy of East-West Détente in Wake of Czech Crisis. 1. Many French officials have stated privately that this policy has received a severe setback, and that an agonizing reappraisal should be undertaken, but De Gaulle has made it clear that he will continue on same road. 2. In defending his policy, De Gaulle has fallen back on shopworn theme of attacking “both hegemonies” and has attributed events in Czechoslovakia to divisive policy of blocs. While French public opinion is far more condemnatory of Soviets than GOF statements, on issue like this De Gaulle is not susceptible to pressure from his countrymen. Similarly while there is considerable opinion within GOF favoring closer cooperation with United States, this sentiment will not any more than in past induce De Gaulle to change his position publicly or privately. Thus we should not be surprised to hear at his Sept 9 press conference further restatement of his philosophy, again balancing criticism of USSR with criticism of US. 3. What does De Gaulle now intend to do in East-West relations? He is obviously determined not to burn his bridges with Moscow and other occupying powers. We therefore do not believe GOF will sever economic, scientific and cultural relations it has built up. Rather, GOF will put brakes on more political and psychological projects with these countries—e.g., cancellation Gomulka visit. But there is no question of GOF withdrawing its support for Czech independence or its condemnation of Soviet actions. 4. Re actions in concert with US or within NATO framework, we believe De Gaulle considers NATO totally irrelevant to finding solution to situation, and doubt he would let France become enmeshed in any common action with US. In this connection, final two paragraphs of Aug 24 communiquéof Council of Ministers (COM) meeting should be read in this context. (Paris 19905) 2 5. While many Frenchmen believe swift Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia and presence of Soviet troops on Bavarian frontier reemphasizes importance of Atlantic Alliance, De Gaulle may think otherwise. One question is whether De Gaulle, during his Sept. 9th Delphic oration, might indicate France’s intention to withdraw from Alliance. Opinion thus far indicates he will not. Foccart of Elysee and Quai State Secretary de Lipkowski told us subsequent to Aug. 24 COM session that in their view there is no question of France leaving Alliance. Case could be made for De Gaulle to take this action if he determines pressures may be underway to make Alliance focal point for dealing with EE situation. He has strongly condemned what he describes as two-bloc approach to foreign affairs: he favors disappearance of both blocs. On Sept 9 he could refer to his March 7, 1966 letter to President pointing out that events have now changed fundamental elements of relations between East and West, that cold war Alliance approach has been responsible for these tragic events, and that therefore, in the interest of promoting peace in Europe, France must free itself from “the servitudes” brought about by belonging to one of blocs. 3 6. On balance, we believe it unlikely De Gaulle will make this move, when situation in Czechoslovakia is far from settled and there are apprehensions regarding further Soviet moves. We also recall that earlier he told Brosio and others that question would not arise in 1968. There is really little that France can do to deter the Soviets, and getting out of the Alliance at this time would only benefit Moscow; there is no internal threat to De Gaulle or his government’s position by stand he has already taken; membership in Alliance has not prevented France from pursuing independent policy; to turn France neutralist when faced with serious domestic problems might be another headache General would prefer not to have. These arguments are conclusive to us, but we must add caveat that de Gaulle has done the unexpected more than once in past. 7. As for impact of Czechoslovak intervention on France-US relations, we remain encouraged by increased cooperation shown at all levels below Elysee. Debre’s frank discussion with me immediately after return from Colombey on first day of crisis; statements from many French Ministers and civil servants about desire to work together; reports by both CAS and Defense Attaché that working level cooperation during Czech crisis has been remarkable—all these we take as hopeful signs. We should continue to consult with French whenever possible and cooperate more closely in those areas where Elysee is not set in concrete. 8. We believe that analysis in Paris telegrams 18471 and 18627 4 remains sound, and that Czech crisis is reinforcing pressures towards greater cooperation among Western Allies and towards building warmer Franco-US atmosphere. Fact remains that GOF’s position internally and externally was weakened by May-June French crisis. De-emphasis of rapprochement with USSR, already underway, is now likely to continue. This does not mean that De Gaulle will “re-enter NATO,” alter his position on UK entry into Common Market, NPT or disarmament efforts in Geneva, or in any way alter his attempts to promote France’s grandeur through actions which will be—as they have in past—more negative than positive because of France’s power position in the world. Shriver 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 FR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Rome, USNATO, and USUN. 2 Telegram 19905 from Paris, August 24, reported the text of a French statement regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. (Ibid., POL 27-1 COMM BLOC-CZECH) 3 For text of the letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 318. 4 Telegram 18471 from Paris, July 24, commented on the state of U.S.-French relations. (Ibid., POL FR-US) Telegram 18627 from Paris, July 26, analyzed the post-crisis outlook for French foreign policy. (Ibid., POL 1 FR) 84. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 84. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, October 10, 1968, 0910Z. 22164. Subj: Franco-American Relations on Eve of Debre Visit to Washington. 1. In mid-summer we reported several straws in the wind blowing in the direction of somewhat improved Franco-American relations. We observed (Paris 18471) 2 that although there were no basic changes in French foreign policy, one result of the May events had been improved atmosphere of our bilateral relations. Since then, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has intervened. Some thought this would lead de Gaulle to consider closer military and political cooperation for the sake of Western collective security; in contrast this demonstration of raw Soviet power apparently confirmed the General even more in his determination to work against Western political and military unity and “against blocs.” 2. What then remains of the hopes of July in this Indian summer of political uncertainty? In our view, there remains something quite important, even if intangible and perhaps fragile—namely the improved atmosphere. This has two aspects, present and future. For the present, one principal reason for this improved atmosphere is that De Gaulle does not want acutely unpleasant relations with US. This attitude is not due to any change of heart, but rather, we believe, to his recognition that with Soviets on warpath this is not time to be feuding with US. In other words, this is implicit recognition of elements of weakness in his international posture, especially now with Soviets occupying Czechoslovakia. 3. How does the improved atmosphere still show? By: (A) The continuing absence of the former snarling anti-American quality of statements by French leaders—at least in public—and despite such vitriolic statements by the rather emotional Debre, as reported by Luns (The Hague’s 7316). 3 Part of this better tone is due to France’s role as host to the Vietnam negotiations and part may be due to the evident unpopularity of “way out” anti-US rhetoric. (B) The continuing desire of French Government officials below the top for closer communication with the USG and at the top for the first time in two years the visit of a French Foreign Minister to Washington. This should not be considered as too important in our view. At the working level at the Quai, the new friendliness, greater openness and cooperation has been continued and even developed somewhat. (C) For the first time in years, the granting by ORTF of coverage in depth to the activities of our Ambassador. ORTF even ran his entire speech given at the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of St. Mihiel and today ORTFs presentation of feature of Shriver family. This is a relatively minor although much noted gesture and again, this may in part be a personal gesture to the Ambassador. (D) Closer cooperation and coordination in intelligence and security affairs has continued to develop in a satisfactory way. This is important to US and to the French. 4. The future aspect of improved atmosphere is that for some French politicians at least the “pre-post-De Gaulle” period has begun, despite the General’s absolute hold on power right now. New leaders are preparing themselves for the re-ordering of French political life after De Gaulle, and while French independence remains a cardinal article of faith, we do not believe most of them share De Gaulle’s distrust of US. What US does now will have important effect on these leaders who are waiting in wings. Improvement in atmosphere in recent months gives us elbow room to work towards a better future, and we do consider it vital to keep post-De Gaulle France in forefront of our European planning. While we probably cannot change the General’s course, we hope to do far more with France in future, and we must continue to lay the groundwork for this now. Shriver 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and BUSEC, The Hague, London, Rome, USNATO, and Moscow. 2 See footnote 4, Document 83 . 3 Telegram 7316 from The Hague, September 25, reported on anti-American remarks by Debré. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-NETH) 85. Memorandum of Conversation 85. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 11, 1968. SUBJECT US-French Relations; Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia; the Middle East; and Viet Nam PARTICIPANTS US The President Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Ernest Goldstein, Special Assistant to the President Charles R. Tanguy, Country Director for France-Benelux Affairs Alec Toumayan, Interpreter French Michel Debre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France Ambassador Charles Lucet, Ambassador of France Franco-American Relations Debre recalled with pleasure receiving the President several years ago in Paris when Debre was French Prime Minister. 2 The President replied that he would always be grateful for the opportunity that this meeting had afforded him. After saying how touched he was by the President’s receiving him today, Debre stated that no matter what the difficulties that develop from time to time in our relations, the President could be assured that his actions would leave an important mark on the history of the United States and of the whole world. Mr. Johnson had been President, Debre continued, during one of the most difficult periods since the end of the last war. Those who are attached to political equilibrium in the world know how much they owe to the President. We are gong to continue to live in a difficult world. However, the coordinated action of the West will help us to prevent the worst from happening. Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia The whole of Europe was shaken by the Soviet intervention, Debre said, and peoples’ minds are troubled by it. Debre referred to his discussion of the subject with the Secretary earlier in the week 3 and noted with satisfaction that the French Government’s analysis of the problem was similar to that of the United States. The Middle East Debre mentioned that he had also talked to the Secretary about the Middle East and expected to revert to the subject at the Secretary’s luncheon for him tomorrow. 4 In some ways, Debre said, this area of the world will be the most pre-occupying for the coming year. It would appear indispensable for the big powers to have a common policy in this area to avoid any aggravation of the situation which might create dangerous tension. These are two areas (i.e., Europe and the Middle East), Debre commented, where it is most useful for us to compare notes and coordinate our views on a regular basis. Viet-Nam Debre said that he did not really need to speak of this problem. The President’s “very fine and very great speech” of last March 31 5 had opened the way for peace talks. Since then, Debre and others in his Ministry had been in regular contact with our representatives in Paris. The French followed their patient efforts with great interest. US Domestic Policy Debre observed that the French have always followed US domestic policy with great interest. The program of social renewal which the President had inaugurated and which has been largely successful, Debre said, would mark post-war American history. The President expressed a deep appreciation for these remarks. The President’s Views on US-French Relations After recalling with pleasure and cordiality the time which Debre, as Prime Minister, had given him during his visit to Paris, the President said that he had come into office very much aware of the lack of agreement between our two governments on some of the basic questions confronting the peoples of the world. Despite this awareness, the President had proceeded in the belief that in any crisis that threatened the American people, France would always be with us. The President had tried, therefore, to minimize our differences and disagreements and to maintain the respect and affection for the French people in our country. The President could not forget the many times the United States and France had been shoulder to shoulder at the front, starting with the birth of our nation down to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. This awareness has helped him resist the temptation common to many leaders to air disagreements in public. The President hoped that his successor would find the bridge to traverse these differences so that our two great nations could come closer together. The President deeply regretted that he had not been able to do this. The President fully realized that General De Gaulle had very strong views on some of these divisive subjects. The President thought, however, it was more important to have an understanding of the situation than to get into public arguments. General De Gaulle had some problems at home just as the President did in the United States. Regardless of these various disagreements, the President said, he had always recognized what France would be without General De Gaulle. In a troubled period calling for strong leadership, the General had provided it. The President appreciated this, even though our two governments had not always gone down the same road. The President then referred to Ambassador Shriver’s reports confirming the President’s expectations that the Ambassador would have a warm reception in France. The President also noted favorably the Ambassador’s hope that we could do more to improve our relations. The President expressed appreciation for the great efforts by the French people making it possible to conduct the Peace Talks in their country. The President regretted that we do not see the Viet-Nam problem in the same light but he had thought it best not to allow this disagreement to inflame our relations. We could not go to Cambodia or Poland for the talks, the President recalled, and recent events have made even clearer why Poland was not feasible. It is a tribute to the character of the French people, the President continued, that despite their views on the Viet-Nam war, they made it possible for us to hold the talks in their country. We have trusted in the fairness of the French people, the President added, and we are still hopeful about the talks. Mr. Debre commented that there was no doubt that for the duration of the talks, the French Government would do what was necessary to assure a propitious material, political, and intellectual atmosphere for them. Launching Apollo 7 It was almost 11 o’clock and the President invited Mr. Debre to watch the launching of Apollo 7 on the television. Debre said that it was a “very great date,” and the President said that it was good to have our French friends with us on the occasion. Debre’s Concluding Remarks When the official conversation resumed, Debre emphasized that there would never be the slightest difference between France and the United States regarding fundamental matters. In the face of attempts to establish dictatorship or other actions by forces hostile to liberty, France and the United States would always stand side by side. It is natural, Debre continued, that our interests and objectives do not always coincide, but the great advantage of friendship is that we can speak freely to each other. Debre reiterated that, during this visit to the United States, he was General De Gaulle’s interpreter. He assured the President that his action had always been highly appreciated by the French Government. The latter regrets very much seeing him leave his huge responsibilities and deplores his departure. “But you leave,” Debre said, “with our total admiration.” The President’s Concluding Remarks The President said he was grateful for these statements. He asked Mr. Debre to express his gratitude for General De Gaulle’s help in connection with the Paris Peace Talks. The President hoped that the Foreign Minister would also convey to the General the gratitude of the American people for the way the General had treated the negotiations. The President also asked Mr. Debre to transmit to General De Gaulle the depth of the American people’s feeling for France. The President was sorry that he had not done as much as he wanted to bring our two countries together, but he was convinced that he had done nothing to push us farther apart. The President mentioned his keen desire to revisit France after January 20. On his previous visits, he was obliged to be in a hurry, so he was looking forward to seeing France under less pressing circumstances. After January 20 he was never going to be in a hurry again. The President noted that the problems of youth and university turbulence are prominent in many countries, including ours, and that as President, he had tried his best to cope with them. He concluded that it would take a lot more than he has seen in his lifetime to convince him that France and the United States would not always be together. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Secret. Drafted by Tanguy and approved in the White House on October 15. 2 Vice President Johnson visited Paris on April 6, 1961, to participate in ceremonies marking NATO’s 10th Anniversary. 3 October 4. Their discussions were reported in telegram 6870 from USUN, October 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US) 4 Their talks were summarized in telegram 259155 to Paris, October 21. (Ibid., POL 7 FR) 5 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, pp. 469-476. 86. Memorandum of Conversation 86. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 25, 1968, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Franco-American Relations in the Aftermath of the Monetary Crisis PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Charles Lucet, Ambassador of France Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Under Secretary Rostow called in Ambassador Lucet today to offer some personal and unofficial reflections on the trend of events in Europe, and particularly on the political meaning of the recent meetings in Bonn. Rostow said he had never been able to understand one aspect of French European policy, namely the assumption that France could indefinitely control or manage the Germans. As the Ambassador knew, we strongly favored the Franco-German rapprochement, and tried never to do or say anything to weaken it. That relationship was fundamental to any hope of a European future. But to us the natural and prudent way to organize Europe was on the foundation of the Entente Cordiale, which we could support on the basis of parity from the background, within a strong NATO and OECD context. To Rostow, speaking personally, the political implication of the crisis was clear. Germany wished to assert its economic primacy. We knew of course of French sensitivity to the thought that we treated Britain differently from France. The issue had been raised again recently in a discussion in Paris of our response to the German proposals for a commercial arrangement between the E.E.C. and the non-member countries of Europe. A French official had remarked that we hadn’t reacted that way to EFTA. Rostow thought, speaking for himself, that in the right political setting, the issue of differential treatment of Britain and France, which was largely illusory, could be overcome, even in the nuclear field, without affecting NATO arrangements. Lucet said he was returning to Paris today, and would discuss Rostow’s reflections with M. Debre. With regard to the monetary crisis, Lucet expressed great appreciation for American action and statements. 2 He said it had been a good week for Franco-American relations. Rostow said that M. Debré could know that we had suggested last summer that the Germans consider revaluation, 3 in order to safeguard the system, and head off pressure on the pound and the franc. We attached great importance to constructive action in response to paragraph 8 of the Bonn communiqué. 4 If something positive could be done along those lines—a clearing account, perhaps—we could use the opportunity of this crisis as effectively as we had that of last March, when we liberated the banking system from the gold pool. Rostow also suggested that this might be a good time for France to take a new look at the SDR proposals. Lucet said it was his impression that the French position on this question was not fixed. Rostow said that whatever happened, SDR’s would be necessary because of the shortage of gold. Lucet mentioned French interest in a new Bretton Woods monetary conference. Rostow said there was great interest in many places in such an idea. But what would such a conference accomplish? The Group of Ten could carry out the mandate of paragraph 8 of the Bonn communiquéand the IMF had already started an important study of the management of the new system, in which gold, SDR’s and foreign exchange would all be used as reserves. We attached very great importance to the potentialities of that study. We were in favor of the continued reform of the system, but saw no need at the moment for a conference. We remain opposed to any consideration of changing the dollar price of gold. Lucet said he saw no reason for such a change. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL FR-US. Drafted by Rostow. The meeting was held in Rostow’s office. 2 A mounting German trade surplus created pressure on the French currency. On November 19 France cut its budget, and on November 23 President De Gaulle announced that France would not devalue the franc. In a national address the next day, De Gaulle blamed the budgetary problems on the spring unrest and announced further budget cuts. For text, see De Gaulle, Discours et Messages , Vol. 5, pp. 354-357. A November 24 message from President Johnson expressing confidence in the French currency helped stabilize international markets. For texts of messages exchanged between Presidents Johnson and De Gaulle, November 24, see Department of State Bulletin , December 16, 1968, p. 628. 3 Germany rejected proposals for a revaluation of its currency. 4 For text of the communiqué, November 22, see Department of State Bulletin, December 16, 1968, pp. 627-628. Italy Italy 87. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 9, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. Secret. Drafted by Stout (EUR/WE) and cleared in EUR, STR, AID, RPM, S, RPE, and the Departments of Defense and Treasury. President Segni visited Washington January 13-18. 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, January 10, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IT. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to Bonn, London, and Paris. 89. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 14, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on January 19. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 90. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 14, 1964, 4:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF (MLF). Confidential. Drafted by Stout and approved in the White House on January 18 and in S on January 19. The memorandum is “Second of 5 memoranda.” All five memoranda are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. The meeting was held at the White House. 91. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m. 92. Letter From the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Meloy) to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Italy (Williamson) Washington, January 24, 1964. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Italy 1963-1964. Secret; Eyes Only. 93. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 11, 1964, 2:45 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IT-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Spielman and approved in U on March 18. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s office. 94. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson Washington, March 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Confidential. 95. Intelligence Information Cable Washington, March 13, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Sent to Army Staff Command, DIA, State Department, and NSA. 96. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, May 26, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT. Secret. Drafted by Peters and cleared by Colonel Patch and Hulse. 97. Editorial Note 98. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the Department of State Frankfurt, June 25, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn, Rome, Brussels, and Paris. 99. Intelligence Information Cable Washington, June 26, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Sent to the State Department, ACSI, Navy Department, AFCIN, DIA, and NSA. 100. Telegram From the Commanding General, U.S. Army South European Task Force to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army in Europe Verona, June 26, 1964, 1810Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe in Paris and to DIA and the Department of State. Printed from the copy sent to the Department of State. 101. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, June 30, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT. Confidential. Drafted by Barnsdale and cleared by Peters. Repeated to Moscow. 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, August 7, 1964, 11:13 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 IT. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Schaetzel; cleared in EUR, S/MF, and by Klein of the White House staff; and approved by Tyler. 103. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, August 14, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Barnsdale. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and BUSEC, London, Luxembourg, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, and The Hague. 104. Letter From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) Rome, November 12, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436, Ambassador Reinhardt. Secret; Official-Informal. 105. Letter From Livingston T. Merchant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) Washington, January 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT-US. No classification marking. Tyler wrote the following note on the letter on January 19: “I called Livie and thanked him for his thoughtful note.” 106. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 5, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IT-US. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S on April 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 107. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy in Italy (Fraleigh) to the Officer in Charge of Italian Affairs (Givan) Rome, March 10, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436, Official Informal. Confidential; Official-Informal. 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, April 9, 1965, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Confidential. 109. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson Washington, April 16, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Moro Visit. No classification marking. 110. Editorial Note 111. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 28, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 5 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Thomson on April 29. The conversation was held at the Motion Picture Association of America headquarters. 112. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 24, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on June 2. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. Copies of the other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The discussion was held during a luncheon at the Department of State. 113. Memorandum for the Record Washington, June 28, 1965. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. 114. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 22, 1965, 10:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Spielman and approved in S on July 27. 115. Letter From Prime Minister Moro to President Johnson Rome, August 2, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Italy. No classification marking. The letter is marked “Unofficial Translation.” 116. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, August 4, 1965, 5:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc-George Bundy, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive. 117. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 26, 1965, 7 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum bears no indication of the drafting officer; it was approved in S on October 15. It is Part I of IV; Parts II-IV are ibid. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. 118. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, October, 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IT. Secret; Roger Channel. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at 12:58 p.m. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, November 22, 1965, 1735Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon and Rome. 120. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 28, 1965, 8:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, United Nations. Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Recd Ranch 11-28-65, 8:15 p.” 121. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 22, 1965, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 4. The memorandum is Part IV of IV. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s private dining room. 122. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow. 123. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, June 6, 1966, 0015Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to all NATO capitals. Secretary Rusk visited Belgium June 3-8 for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting. 124. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson Washington, June 29, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. No classification marking. 125. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, September 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Reinhardt and Dozier. 126. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 13, 1966, 2 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Rusk, Leddy, and McNamara. 127. Memorandum of Conversation Rome, March 15, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-1 IT. Confidential. Drafted by Fraleigh. Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A-854, March 20. 128. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, April 1, 1967, 1300Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State Bonn, April 26, 1967, 1525Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. President Johnson and Prime Minister Moro were in Bonn to attend the funeral of Konrad Adenauer. 130. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson Washington, April 27, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Confidential. 131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 18, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Filed by LBJL. No classification marking. 132. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 24, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler on June 27. 133. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 22, 1967. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. 134. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 19, 1967, 11:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Saragat Visit. Secret. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on September 29. The memorandum is Part V of VII; memoranda of conversation of the other portions of the discussion are ibid. The meeting was held at the White House. 135. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 17, 1967, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman. The memorandum is Part II of IV. The meeting was held at the White House. 136. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 1, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Limited Official Use. 137. Record of Meeting Rome, December 23, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 55. Secret. Prepared on December 27. President Johnson was completing an around-the-world trip that included stops in Australia December 21-22; Thailand, Vietnam, and Pakistan December 22-23; and Italy December 23. He returned to Washington on the morning of December 24. 138. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 30, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 IT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 139. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, July 25, 1968, 2120Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to USCINCEUR. 140. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome,August 1, 1968, 1734Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to USCINCEUR. 141. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, September 10, 1968, 1810Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential. 142. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 11, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IT-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Fried. 143. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, October 17, 1968, 1156Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential; Limdis. 144. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, October 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The sidebars and photographs included in the report are not printed. 145. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, November 19, 1968, 1541Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 TR. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn for Fowler, to Paris, and to the EC Mission in Brussels. 146. Memorandum for the Files Washington, December 12, 1968. Source: Department of State, Italian Desk Files: Lot 72 D 509, Def 19-8. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Charles K. Johnson. 87. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 87. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 9, 1964. SIT/PM-1 (Revision 1) SUBJECT Your Meeting with President Segni Segni cannot speak for the Italian Government, but he will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Saragat, who can. As chief of state Segni has limited substantive responsibilities, but his influence on Italian policies is increased by his leadership of the largest faction of the Christian Democratic party. He obstructed the formation of Italy’s new, center-left government under Prime Minister Aldo Moro because he does not believe the Socialists can yet be trusted in domestic or foreign policy. He could try to influence you to take a very careful attitude toward the new government. He is pro-American and will use his visit to reaffirm Italy’s position in the Atlantic Alliance. We want to use Segni’s visit to reaffirm U.S.-Italian ties, which have been very close since the war, and to emphasize our identity of views on most world problems. By receiving Segni warmly, we hope to strengthen his friendship for us, since he could be a point of stability should the present government fail. At the same time, we do not want to encourage him in activity that might undermine the government or give the impression that we view current Italian politics entirely as he does. In view of his constitutional position, the ceremonial aspects of Segni’s visit should be stressed. It will not be necessary or appropriate to consider U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in depth. The major subjects to be covered are: 1. US-Italy —The high value we place on Italian friendship and our intent to maintain close cooperation . Appreciate cooperation in monetary field and arms purchases . Glad Moro succeeded in forming a government and hope for its success. Need for stable and effective Italian Government in decision-making months ahead. 2 2. General Review of World Situation —Segni wants a broad survey . Might summarize your talk with Erhard on East-West relations, 3 cover such subjects as Cuba (economic isolation—eliminate Soviets—stop hemispheric subversion—concern over Italian trade), Sino-Soviet dispute (continued deterioration—little sign of solution), Southeast Asia (win in Vietnam—support Thailand—prevent further Communist penetration), Germany (self-determination), and Berlin (access and freedom of West Berlin). 3. Prospects for Relaxation—No détente , but we shall do all possible to reduce tension and war risk. Not too sanguine on multilateral agreements with Soviets, but continue to probe. Possible progress in US-Soviet bilaterals. (Segni (a) may be concerned at Soviet exploitation peaceful coexistence to make more difficult combatting communism in Italy, and (b) may ask your commitment to help thwart a possible Communist coup attempt. In reply , (a) relaxation of tensions would make new difficulties but offer new opportunities; basic Communist strength lies in weaknesses of Italian society, which only Italians can correct; and (b) we could not accept Communist takeover in Italy but would decide our actions as we consider appropriate in circumstances.) 4. MLF —In reaffirming US support indicate appreciation of Italian cooperation and Segni’s personal support. Technical talks in Paris and Washington going well. What is Segni’s judgment on how rapidly Italy can move on project? (Italian Socialists are reluctant on MLF and if pushed too hard might bring down the government, which we would not want. Knowing Socialist reservations, Segni apparently tried to manipulate MLF issue to obstruct formation of the Moro Government.) 5. Atlantic Partnership —Reaffirm commitment to NATO and working through Alliance, and commitment to defend Europe. Grateful for Italian support for unified Europe in Atlantic partnership , as reiterated by Segni and Moro Government. Essential that EEC Commission have real mandate to negotiate. Support European political unification . Does Segni see movement? Will start Kennedy Round on time and use maximum authority we have. Encourage more aid to LDC’s on better terms. A briefing book has been prepared, which contains background material on these topics, as well as other subjects that Segni may raise, including the following: 1) disarmament, 2) Khrushchev’s latest proposals on renunciation of force, 3) Soviet relations with Eastern Europe, 4) NATO strategic planning, 5) the NATO Secretary General succession (I expect to talk to Saragat about this), 6) reduction in our forces assigned to SETAF (we see a need for a more equitable sharing of burdens within the Alliance), 7) African disputes. In his private talk with you, Segni may try to establish a channel of personal communication, possibly without the knowledge of the Italian Government. I recommend that you be noncommittal. Dean Rusk 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. Secret. Drafted by Stout (EUR/WE) and cleared in EUR, STR, AID, RPM, S, RPE, and the Departments of Defense and Treasury. President Segni visited Washington January 13-18. 2 The following parenthetical sentence was crossed out: “If you approve inviting Moro to Washington next Spring, as we are recommending separately, I suggest you let Segni know.” 3 See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XV, Document 250 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, January 10, 1964, 8 p.m. 1841. For Ambassador Reinhardt. Following are Embassy’s comments on Embtel 1814: 2 Main subjects raised with Ambassador by President Segni smack of unease with which he regards Italy’s current international posture, heightened no doubt by his distrust of center-left government. Would appear he wishes to set forth in Washington especially those worries that he may feel are not sufficiently shared by Moro and in case of Germany and Yugoslavia by US Government. Segni is basically conservative. He therefore is against and fears new center-left government headed by Moro. There is even some speculation that he would like to see it fall as soon as possible and would not be averse to helping bring this about if it were at all possible. Therefore, when Segni urges that MLF be pushed ahead despite Socialist objections, it is possible that he does so not only out of pure pro-Western conviction and ardor. We would therefore recommend repeating to him that the US is prepared to go along as fast as our allies interested in the project feel themselves able to go. We are not trying to rush things neither are we trying to postpone them. We understand what may be British internal problems as we do those of Italy. 3 On point two, concerning Yugoslavia, 4 two factors probably underlie Segni’s concern: (1) Fact Moro has accepted invitation to visit Belgrade; (2) implications Segni and some of his top advisers may feel flow from US intentions to carry out certain military reductions in Europe, particularly in Italy. It is not unlikely, though we have no direct evidence, that Andreotti has discussed with Segni US proposed reduction in US forces in SETAF through transfer to Italy of certain support functions, and may wish try to head this off, lest such withdrawals lead eventually to complete US withdrawal from SETAF and even now begin give encouragement to neutralist trends and sympathies in Italy. Certainly Segni’s concern about Yugoslavia is not consistent with views of Italian FonOff, as reflected by Director Political Office II (Terruzzi) and included in FonOff briefing of Saragat at end December (Embtel 1743). 5 It is however consistent with perennial rumors of such Yugo build-ups. They traditionally regard Yugoslavia as Italy’s natural enemy. Our Army Attaché however states that he has seen no hard evidence of Yugoslav military build-up along Italian border. In fact in last talk he had on subject with US Army Attaché Belgrade (Sept. 63) he learned that latter also had no evidence that such rumors were worthy of credence. If Segni raises Yugoslav problem while in US, we would hope US officials would air it thoroughly with him and with Saragat, particularly in making clear basic aspects of US-Yugoslav policy which Italian military and perhaps also Segni apparently do not understand and even regard with some distrust. As for Segni’s concern about nationalist tendencies in Germany, 6 Department does not need our advice on how to handle what seems to us to be an exaggerated expression of a fear which is widely held in Italy. We would only suggest, as regards aspect of particular relevance to Italy, consideration of the possibility of turning point around by hinting to Segni that Italian Government should consider jointly with FRG serious effort to improve German public image in this country through emphasis on its European-minded, democratically-oriented, non-nationalistic aspects. Curiously enough, it is usually Communists and other leftist political elements here who are prone to dwell on alleged dangers of German militarism and nationalism, rather than such right-wingish Christian Democrats as Segni. Williamson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IT. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to Bonn, London, and Paris. 2 Telegram 1814 from Rome, January 9, reported on Ambassador Reinhardt’s January 8 discussions with President Segni regarding MLF, Yugoslavia, Germany, and his visit to the United States. (Ibid.) 3 In his conversation with Reinhardt, Segni stated “he did not understand why Italian action on MLF should be linked with British elections.” (Ibid.) 4 According to telegram 1814 from Rome, Segni stated that the “military posture of Yugoslavia hellip; is now directed against Italy hellip;. He expressed fear about policies which might be followed hellip; by Tito’s successors,” and concern about border problems. 5 Telegram 1743 from Rome, December 30, 1963, reported that Moro and Saragat had accepted invitations to visit Yugoslavia. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT) 6 According to telegram 1814 from Rome, Segni told Reinhardt that “he believed that German nationalism could be contained by strengthening Germany’s position in an integrated Europe.” 89. Memorandum of Conversation 89. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 14, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT The Italian Political Situation PARTICIPANTS Italy Foreign Minister Giuseppe Saragat Ambassador Attilio Cattani, Foreign Ministry Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Minister Franco Malfatti di Montetretto, Chief of Cabinet to Minister Saragat Minister Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Italian Embassy Miss Bonaccorsi, Interpreter United States The Secretary Mr. George W. Ball Governor Herter Mr. William R. Tyler Ambassador Frederick Reinhardt Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE Mr. Walker Givan, WE Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter The Secretary told the Foreign Minister that we welcomed the opportunity to hear observations and suggested that he select his own subject to begin the discussion. The Foreign Minister preferred to comment first on the Italian political situation. He thought Italy’s greatest contribution to Atlantic solidarity could be made by strengthening democratic institutions in Italy and further isolating the Communist Party. His own political activity over the past eighteen years had been aimed at isolating the Communists, particularly at pulling the Socialists away from the Communist Party, which implied abandoning some pro-Communists to the far left. He had always received his greatest assistance from the Christian Democratic party and specifically from Prime Minister Moro, who ranks second only to De Gasperi as the most significant political personality in postwar Italy. This policy is beginning to bear fruit. The Socialists are agreeing, unenthusiastically but increasingly, to move away from the Communists, and they are in the government. In an important speech in Rome recently Nenni said that even if his party had a majority in Italy, it would nevertheless regard the Atlantic pact and Atlantic solidarity as “permanent facts.” The internal situation has improved and the shadow of a Communist-Socialist alliance has passed. The present government has better than a sixty per cent majority compared to only fifty-one per cent for its predecessors, which makes it far more stable. The Foreign Minister said that the position of the Socialists has now become irreversible and, after the administrative elections within a year or even earlier, this will in his opinion lead to a new Social Democratic party along the lines of the German party or the Labor Party in the UK, though not so strong. The Secretary asked what Minister Saragat thought would become of the new faction of the PSI: there seem to be several possibilities; one is that this faction will move toward the extreme left. How much possibility is there that it will take a large part of the Socialist following with it? 2 The Foreign Minister replied that, as shown by Nenni’s statement, the trend toward democracy is irreversible. Seven years ago the Socialist Party listened attentively to Stalin; six years ago it listened to Khrushchev. Now it listens to the British Labor Party and soon it may pay attention only to what is good for Italy. At any rate it has clearly become westernized. In this regard, contacts between the Socialists and American political parties would be extremely useful. We have reaped the fruit of years. This is not a haphazard happening; we knew what we were looking for. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister and asked when he expected the Socialists and the Social Democratic parties to unite. The Minister said that the first step after administrative elections would possibly be to organize the two parties into a federation, to be followed later by an organic merger. The new dissident Socialist party would end as Daniel Mayer’s dissident group did in France; it had dwindled to nothing two years after it left the French Socialist Party. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. Confidential. Drafted by Givan and approved in S on January 19. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 Reference to the “Carristi” faction of left-wing Socialists which broke off from the Italian Socialist Party at the time of its entry into the Moro government and formed the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). The Embassy analyzed the impact of this development in telegram 1882 from Rome, January 14. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT) 90. Memorandum of Conversation 90. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 14, 1964, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Multilateral Nuclear Force PARTICIPANTS Italy President Segni Foreign Minister Saragat Federico Sensi, Diplomatic Adviser Miss Bonaccorsi, Interpreter United States The President Secretary Rusk Neil Seidenman, Interpreter The two Presidents began their private discussion (with only Sensi and the interpreters present) on the Italian political situation, 2 and then passed on to the MLF. President Segni said that there are still problems within Socialist ranks on MLF. If the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, however, are faithful to the MLF concept, and the Socialists realize that this is a very important question for the United States; they also will agree to its creation. But it will take a little time, perhaps five or six months, particularly because much of the uncertainty on the part of the Socialists stems from the indecision of the British Labor Party. Segni said that of course Labor may say certain things now and then act differently later on, but Italy wants to form a majority on the MLF issue before the British elections, which will take place about November. Later in the conversation, the President thanked Segni for his strong support for MLF. He said he thought the Paris discussions are going well and asked how Segni views them. Segni replied that they had proceeded satisfactorily. The issue would probably turn out as desired, based on conviction on the one hand. On the other hand, when the Nenni Socialists understand how strongly the United States feels about it, their endorsement will be forthcoming. This, incidentally, would ultimately signal their complete break with the Communists. After a short discussion of the Atlantic community, the President asked Segni if he could be certain of Italy’s final position on MLF. Segni replied that at this moment he could not speak with complete certainty, but he felt reasonably sure that, with patience and fortitude, and Socialist realization of the importance of the issue for the United States, Italy would be able to support it. Secretary Rusk entered with Foreign Minister Saragat at this point. Reviewing the day’s talks with the Foreign Minister, 3 the Secretary said that there was agreement that Italy could take part in the talks going on about MLF without making any final commitments. Italy has meanwhile agreed to take part in the mixed-manned demonstration on a destroyer with the other five participants. It was agreed during the talks that it was necessary to allow time for discussions among certain elements within Italy and within the government. Hence it appeared that the time required for internal discussions in Italy and for the multilateral talks could coincide. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF (MLF). Confidential. Drafted by Stout and approved in the White House on January 18 and in S on January 19. The memorandum is “Second of 5 memoranda.” All five memoranda are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 In the course of this discussion, Segni expressed concern about “problems arising from the Nenni Socialists,” in particular their stand on MLF. In response to a query from President Johnson, he underlined the “renewed firmness” with which both the Christian Democratic Party and Catholic Church were fighting Communism. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid. 3 A memorandum of their conversation relating to MLF is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 3 . See also Document 89 . A complete set of memoranda of conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2356. 91. Memorandum of Conversation 91. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 15, 1964, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT U.S.-Italian Air Transport Problem participants United States The Secretary Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt Mr. Francis E. Meloy, Jr., WE Italy Foreign Minister Giuseppe Saragat Amb. Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Amb. Cattani, Foreign Ministry Amb. Mario Toscano, Foreign Ministry Min. Federico Sensi, Foreign Ministry Min. Franco Malfatti di Montetretto, Foreign Ministry Min. Gian Luigi Milesi Ferretti, Italian Embassy The Secretary said he hoped Foreign Minister Saragat will give his personal attention to U.S.-Italian differences over air transport. We understand there will be negotiations in March. The Secretary said he hoped the Foreign Minister could keep the situation from deteriorating between now and then. He was not asking for a decision now but wished to avoid any worsening of the problem. Foreign Minister Saragat said that he had talked with the President of Alitalia about the air transport problem and is surprised by what has happened. The President of Alitalia is pro-American but is very much exercised over the matter. He asked Ambassador Cattani to speak to this subject since he was not informed in detail. Ambassador Cattani said he was sure that between now and March the situation can be kept from deteriorating. If the Secretary were asking Italy to grant now what is being asked by the American side, the Italian position would be much more reserved. Italy wants the authorities here to realize something must be done to balance the points of difference. The Secretary said he understood there was a difference of view regarding the interpretation of the existing agreements and hoped the Foreign Minister would personally look into the problem and keep in touch. 1 Souce: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Confidential. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 27. The memorandum is Part I of III. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. 92. Letter From the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Meloy) to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Italy (Williamson) 92. Letter From the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Meloy) to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Italy (Williamson) 1 Washington, January 24, 1964. Dear Francis: The general question of our future covert support activities in Italy has come up again, this time in connection with the Civic Action project. EUR has agreed to continue support for Civic Action this fiscal year, but with the understanding that it will not be asked to approve further extension of this support before we have reviewed the entire program. As the new government takes hold I hope you can give us the benefit of your thoughts on the suitability of existing programs in the new situation and what might be changed usefully. 2 Sincerely, Frank 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Italy 1963-1964. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 According to notes of the June 4 meeting of the 303 Committee: “The Italian proposal was postponed in order to permit McCone to consider it further.” (Ibid., 303 Committee Records) 93. Memorandum of Conversation 93. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 11, 1964, 2:45 p.m. SUBJECT Governor Carli’s Discussion with Under Secretary Ball PARTICIPANTS Italy (Bank of Italy) Professor Guido Carli, Governor Dr. Emilio Ranalli, Central Director Professor Francesco Masera, Chief, Division of Economic Research and Balance of Payments Dr. Florio Gradi, Representative in New York of Italian Foreign Exchange Office Mr. Milesi Ferretti, Minister, Embassy of Italy United States Under Secretary Ball Assistant Secretary G. Griffith Johnson Deputy Assistant Secretary J. Robert Schaetzel Mr. Benjamin Caplan, OFE Mr. Herbert Spielman, WE After an exchange of pleasantries, Under Secretary Ball led off by stating that we had been watching Italy’s economic and financial problems with great interest and took it that there had been a good turn in the past few weeks. Governor Carli replied by presenting a detailed account of the Italian economic situation along the following lines: 1. Italy had reached a most difficult moment and the stabilization actions of the last month had been a turn for the good. There had been no appreciable variation in the price level last month, but the major concern now was that there be no further large increases in wage costs which would lead to increased prices. Credit restrictions had been instituted last summer leading to some violent public criticism. 2. During the second half of 1962/first half of 1963, there had been an increase in wages which far exceeded productivity increases. The effect was a profit squeeze, which necessitated intervention to increase liquidity in order to finance previously planned investments and new projects which could no longer be financed through internal funding. Increased liquidity contributed to the aggregate amount of credit and helped bring about increased prices, which resulted in a partial reconstitution of profits. The effect of wage increases over productivity increases was a redistribution of income which caused an increase in consumption, decrease in savings, and a concentration of demand for meats and fats which had to be imported. Two-thirds of the B/P deficit was accounted for by increased food imports. 3. Italy would have to solve the problems of completion of its public investment program, reducing capital investment in factories, and partial substitution of real savings with liquidity. Italy’s wage explosion had been caused by higher labor mobility in the Common Market which resulted in movement of Italian wages to the levels of other EEC countries. This occurred at a time when the rapid postwar expansion in the capital market had been checked and the market itself was not fully developed. Nationalization of electricity also had had the effect of reducing the efficiency of the market in 1963. The increase in the volume of bank credit had dropped in the past two months from the level of last July. The profit squeeze is continuing and opportunities for placement of issues on the market is being reduced. Accordingly, the public has gotten the message of serious credit restrictions. Economic planning has become necessary regardless of which political philosophy one espouses. A list of priorities in public expenditures is needed. This will also require firm action to limit expenditures by local authorities who usually run large deficits. 4. The Government has two objectives: (a) To reduce the expansion of credit. (b) To reduce the rate of growth of consumption. To achieve this, the Government initiated the stabilization measures of February 22 which have shocked the country and are the subject of lively discussion. Their purpose is to make more resources available for exports and investment, are logical steps, and are making the public more aware of the existence of the problem. The Government desires an expansion in exports of about 10% per year. Italy has an integrated economy rather than a self-contained one, and must act as an open economy integrating itself into a wider market. It must increase its productivity and devote more exports to manufactured products, thus necessitating increased efficiency in manufacturing and completion of plants now under construction. This cannot be done if the price level continues to move upward. Accordingly, the Government must make the credit squeeze felt, which will probably reduce the growth of industrial expansion, but this is a price Italy must pay. In reply to a question by the Under Secretary as to the success of the fiscal measures, Governor Carli said there had been no increase in the deficit of the federal budget, although he did not know whether there had been a marked increase in the budgets of local governments. The restrictions on credit and purchase taxes were designed to cut back consumption of consumer durables, especially automobiles. Carli noted in reply to another question by the Under Secretary that in the last two months short-term movement of capital had been a two-way traffic rather than the one-way traffic of last year. He observed that the credit squeeze had obliged some people to bring funds back to Italy. Mr. Schaetzel asked about pockets of unemployment in Italy. Governor Carli replied some of these remained. However, the migration from South to North had been slowing down. In order to further encourage this, investments in the South must be increased to promote its development. The Under Secretary asked about the shift in Italian dietary habits to greater consumption of proteins. Carli reiterated that two-thirds of the 1963 balance of payments deficit had resulted from imports of foodstuffs. Italy’s dietary habits had changed and there was now a demand for more meats and fats. The Under Secretary then asked if Italy could increase its consumer savings by a popular bond issue. Carli replied that the price level must first be stabilized. The Under Secretary referred to Carli’s discussions with Treasury officials seeking assistance in respect of Italy’s reserve holdings. Carli acknowledged he had been discussing possible financial devices to help in the months ahead, while Italy proceeded with industrialization of the South and modernization of its industry. The Under Secretary commented that we were very sympathetic to developing the kind of defense Italy will need. The lira is an important currency. We have an interest and concern in the stability of the Italian economy following its remarkable recovery in the postwar period. We assume that the political uncertainty of last year had had a substantial effect. If the new Government shows a solidity missing last year, this should be very helpful. We are impressed by what we have seen in the way the Government is moving ahead on the political side. He then asked whether the fears of the financial community concerning the “opening to the left” had abated. Governor Carli replied that he did not feel the Government had fully explained the scope of the measures it was taking, and thought a better job could be done in this regard, especially in pointing out the curtailment of public expenditures. In reply to a question by Mr. Johnson as to whether the EEC tariff reductions had affected Italy’s competitive position, Mr. Ranalli stated that the problem was not one of competition, but one in which Italian demand had been larger than supply. As for automobile imports from the EEC countries, only 1/5 of Italy’s 44% increase in automobile registrations last year had resulted from foreign car imports. The Under Secretary concluded the discussion by expressing his appreciation for Governor Carli’s lucid exposition of Italy’s problems, and stated that we wanted to be as helpful as we could in solving them. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IT-US. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Spielman and approved in U on March 18. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s office. 94. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 94. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 13, 1964. SUBJECT Financial Assistance for Italy I am attaching a copy of an Italian Government announcement 2 describing the agreements reached between Under Secretary Roosa and Governor Carli of the Bank of Italy. It will be given to the press in Rome Saturday afternoon for release Sunday morning. There will be a simultaneous release here in Washington. The agreements on the part of the United States total $733 million of assistance in one form or another. In addition, since yesterday the Germans, at our urging, have agreed to a $150 million swap with Italy and the British have agreed to a $100 million swap. The overall total has been rounded up to “approximately $1 billion” in the announcement. As I explained yesterday, 3 the United States assistance will include activation of the remaining $150 million of the $250 million standby swap arrangement between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Italy—a new $100 million swap between the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund and the Bank of Italy—a $200 million Export-Import Bank line of credit—$250 million in standard three-year CCC credits for the purchase of agricultural commodities, and the purchase by the Treasury of $33 million in lire which is the balance required to offset our outstanding medium-term borrowings from Italy. None of these transactions will have any adverse effect on our balance of payments and the CCC and ExIm credits should result in larger U.S. exports than would otherwise have been the case. As I told you yesterday, the information given us by Governor Carli of the Bank of Italy leads us to believe that the Italian program to redress their balance of payments will be effective and stands a good chance of eliminating the Italian deficit over the next 18 to 24 months. The funds available to Italy as a result of the current agreements are considerably more than adequate to care for this year’s prospective deficit. The announcement of the large total is designed to obviate any threat of speculative attack on the lira. The urgency and timeliness of this action is evidenced by the fact that rumors of a weekend devaluation of the lira swept the exchange markets today causing one large New York bank to suspend all dealings in Italian exchange. Italian foreign exchange losses today also exceeded $60 million. The CCC program has been cleared with Under Secretary Murphy at Agriculture and the entire program, including the text of the Italian statement, has been cleared by us with the Department of State. Douglas Dillon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 Not printed. 3 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Secretary Dillon met with President Johnson at 5 p.m. on March 12. (Johnson Library) No record of the meeting has been found. 95. Intelligence Information Cable 95. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, March 13, 1964. [ document number not declassified ] COUNTRY Italy DATE OF INFO 20 February-9 March 1964 SUBJECT Views and Comments of Italian Carabinieri and Intelligence Officers Concerning the Italian Political-Economic Scene PLACE & DATE ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] REF [ 2 document numbers not declassified ] SOURCE AND APPRAISAL [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] The following remarks were made to one or another of sources by the Italian officers indicated below during the course of a round of business and social calls which sources made to these officers. Although the conversation was friendly and informal, the comments were delivered with some degree of seriousness [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]. This report reflects a facet of opinion held by a segment of Italians and thus appears to complement Department of State incoming telegram no. 5541, dated 8 March 1964, 2 from the United States Embassy in Rome, Italy, which presents an excellent review of the current situation. We feel that the views expressed by the Italian officers are sincere and that they believe them to be true; nevertheless, these views are in line with their traditionally rightist and conservative views and reflect reaction that is probably more subjective than objective. 1. General Giovanni De Lorenzo, Chief of the Italian Carabinieri Corps, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], expressed to source his concern over what he regards as a progressively deteriorating political-economic situation in Italy. He stated that he had been fairly optimistic in January 1964, but that he no longer felt that way. He observed that the interplay of political and economic factors, combined with what he described as a completely supine government, was leading the government toward a condition of increasing discrimination, strikes, lockouts, and mass demonstrations. 2. Volunteering at the outset that it was not a matter of a coup d’etat, De Lorenzo hastened to add that the time had come for responsible leaders of the country to make responsible decisions. The Moro government, he said, could not go on as it had been, because, if it did, the country would go Communist by default, and he and people like him would become “the usual refugees.” Now, he said, is the time to show firmness, while the forces of public order—especially the Carabinieri—are still able to command the situation. If there were to be demonstrators in the piazza, let them come and be dealt with firmly, even if such action should produce casualties. 3. The present Moro government, according to de Lorenzo, must give way to a government headed by Giovanni Leone (former Premier) or Cesare Merzagora (President of the Senate), or Paolo Emilio Taviani (Minister of the Interior), or to a “Government of National Salvation,” or even to a revitalized Moro government with backbone and a definite line of action. But it must be made clear to Moro and other leaders that this is a time for decision. 4. To this end, De Lorenzo said, he had an appointment on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to see Antonio Segni, President of Italy, with whom he intended to talk in very similar terms. He also said that he had an appointment on [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to talk to Merzagora for the same purpose. He mentioned no one else by name. 5. When sounded out concerning the attitude of the military, de Lorenzo replied that they had always avoided involvement in such matters; he seemed to imply that, while the military might share his views, they were not involving themselves. As regards the large industrialists, he indicated their concern and frustrations, but he cited none by name or otherwise. 6. De Lorenzo went on to describe himself as normally being a patient man, but said his own patience was wearing thin. He had had numerous contacts recently in various quarters, he indicated, and had found considerable support for his point of view. 7. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] 8. As being of possible significance in relation to the above, the following remarks which reflect concern on the part of several senior members of the combined Armed Forces Intelligence Service (SIFAR) are also noted: A. On [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] said he was depressed by a discussion he had had the previous day with Umberto Ortolani, President of the Istituto Nazionale per le Case Degli Impiegati Dello Stato (INCIS; National Institute for Houses of State Employees). Ortolani painted a dark picture of the Italian economic situation, predicted that, if things continued as they were, some 25,000 construction workers would be laid off in the next couple of months and this would result in public demonstrations. Ortolani described Giovanni Pieraccini (Minister of Public Works) as an able and honest man, but said that his hands were tied by those around him; therefore Pieraccini could do little about the present economic crisis. The SIFAR officer stated that he had found confirmation of Ortolani’s views in other financial and commercial sectors. For example, the Olivetti firm was trying to get Giuseppe Pella (former Minister of the Budget) to take over as president, in an effort to inspire more confidence in investors. This SIFAR officer felt that the present government would fall before long, perhaps within the next couple of months, and that it would be just as well for it to fall now as later. B. On [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], source met briefly Colonel Renzo Rocca, Chief of SIFAR’s Economic and Industrial Intelligence Office, who had just emerged from a discussion of the current situation with General Egidio Viggiani, Chief of SIFAR. Rocca, who in the past has regularly blamed the flight of Italian capital on the lack of confidence in the center-left government, said that the situation is definitely not good, and it is not getting any better, and that certain changes (unspecified) are essential. [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] C. Viggiani expressed himself as being in general agreement with De Lorenzo, but not quite to the gloomy extent of the latter. He said that the situation is actually not bad at present, but that the potential danger is great. He felt that, in order to head off the threat of a serious deterioration, forceful economic and financial measures are called for; otherwise, the country would reach the point of collapse—which could benefit only the Communists who would be ready to exploit the resultant chaos to install a Communist system. He agreed with De Lorenzo that a new government was called for, and thought that such a government should include technicians like Donato Menichella (Administrative Councilor of the Association for the Development of Industry in the South) for finance, some important industrialist for commerce, and so on. While such a government should include political figures, they should be only those of demonstrated competence. As for an adequate chief of government, he acknowledged that this was the biggest problem of all. He found Moro timorous and vacillating and charged him with playing into Communist hands in his dealings with Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) leaders on labor matters. He observed that Moro had given recently a pitiful performance on television and considered him much too weak for the job. He said that names mentioned for leadership of the government include: Taviani, Leone, and Merzagora, but felt that none of them would be a good choice. Randolfo Pacciardi, who has recently broken away from the Italian Republican Party, had no following; Emilio Colombo (Minister of the Treasury) was too young. For him, the most capable man was Amintore Fanfani (former Premier) whom he regards as definitely and strongly anti-Communist, notwithstanding the opportunistic traits he has shown in the past. But, regardless of who might head it, a new government is needed in the near future to take vigorous steps to restore confidence in the economy, adopting austerity measures where necessary, reducing the outflow of capital, and perhaps obtaining foreign loans. There must be no further sliding by the government toward positions of increased strength for the Communists; and, if the latter attempt to force the issue through demonstrations, they should be stopped now, even at the cost of a few casualties. Viggiani felt that the temper of the people is such that, instead of creating martyrs and leading to an even more tense situation, this (i.e., stopping of demonstrations at a cost of a few casualties) would have a settling effect on the public at large. He agreed with De Lorenzo that the forces of order are now able to control the situation but that, with further slippage, they might no longer be able to do so. 9. Field dissem: none. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Sent to Army Staff Command, DIA, State Department, and NSA. 2 Reference is to telegram 2384 from Rome, March 8, which outlined the economic problems facing the Moro government. (Ibid.) 96. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 96. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, May 26, 1964. A-1641 SUBJECT Lt. Gen. De Lorenzo’s Comments on Security and Political Subjects This report contains the gist of a long after-dinner talk the reporting officer had May 19 with Lt. Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo, Commander of the Arm of the Carabinieri, at the residence of the Embassy Air Attaché. The General commented frankly but, of course, off the record, on such issues as the strength of Pacciardi’s movement for a “second” Republic, the political thinking of the top Italian security and military officers, and the Communist menace in Italy. During part of the conversation Brig. Gen. Luigi Violante, until recently Italian Air Attaché in Washington, was also present. The two men differed markedly in their ideas on the Italian political situation. While De Lorenzo was tolerant and even sympathetic towards Moro’s center-left government, Violante was violently opposed to it and predicted that the government would resign by the end of summer. The ideas expressed below are those of Gen. De Lorenzo, unless otherwise indicated. Pacciardi’s Movement Belittled Randolfo Pacciardi’s Democratic Union for the Second Republic (cf. A-1581 of May 14) 2 was not taken seriously by Italy’s security and military leaders. Pacciardi had some good ideas and was honest and in earnest, but his approach was totally wrong. His weakest point was to attempt to attract all kinds of people and to draw everybody in his movement who had a grudge against the present Italian Republic, from the extreme left to the extreme right. This motley group of people had no political or ideological cohesion; their only common denominator was dissatisfaction with the status quo. Particularly weak and uninfluential were old ex-military officers who have flocked to Pacciardi’s banner. Pacciardi’s movement will end like Giannini’s Qualunquismo of the late 1940’s. Armed Forces Could Support Well-Organized Rightist Party The top security and military officers would very much prefer to see organized a strong rightist political party which they can support and from which they can obtain political and ideological orientation. But such a party must be democratic and ready to respect the Republican Constitution. Unfortunately, however, the Italian right is in disarray and, aside from the Liberal Party (PLI), poorly led and generally discredited. The Monarchists are all but finished because they lack political vision and realism. The Neo-Fascists (MSI) leaders are hopelessly divided, squander their time in gambling houses, and still pretend to live in an age (the Fascist Era) which the great majority of the Italians abhor. There is no future for them in Italy; both should dissolve themselves as soon as possible. The Liberals are a respectable and democratic group, but they are too preoccupied with the preservation of their vested interests. They have made no serious attempt to establish contact with the military. What the country’s security and military leaders wished was the emergence of a new party, with the PLI as the nucleus, which would embrace all the right-wing forces, including moderate-elements that now belong to the MSI and the Monarchist Party, who believe in the preservation of the Italian Republic. Such a party would have the full support of the security and military establishments either indirectly in elections or directly, if need be, should the security of the state be threatened through Communist subversion. Reliability of Security Establishments Gen. De Lorenzo gave a detailed account of what he called the “order of reliability” of Italy’s security and military establishment. As expected, he placed the Carabinieri Forces at the top of the list as the mainstay of the state institutions. These forces of some 80,000 strong (the figure is the General’s) were most reliable because of their long tradition and their recruitment procedures. A thorough investigation was conducted on each member of the force, and particular care was taken in checking the records of prospective brides of all Carabinieri troops and officers. Second in reliability come the Public Security (Pubblica Sicurezza, some 75,000 strong) forces, whose ranks are also carefully checked before they are recruited. In the three armed services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the cadres (officers and professional non-commissioned officers) are reliable, but the situation among the “troops” (ranks) is not so good; too many of them seem to have voted for the PCI in the 1963 national elections. Generally reliable are the Alpine and the Bersaglieri units. The morale of the Carabinieri is very high despite constant snipings by the Communist and Socialist press. It is the policy of the Carabinieri high command to promote or otherwise confer deserved rewards on any officer or man who gets into difficulties during labor disturbances. Also, it is the policy of the high command to exaggerate the number of Carabinieri casualties as a consequence of such disturbances in order to discredit the labor unions (principally the Communist-controlled CGIL). For instance, De Lorenzo revealed, his command claimed that there were nearly 150 Carabinieri casualties during the labor riots last October at Holy Apostles’ Square in Rome, whereas actually only four or five Carabinieri were hurt (Embtel 1008 of October 10). 3 De Lorenzo personally visited the injured men in the hospital at once and either promoted them on the spot or commended them for their valor. Communist Problem There is general agreement at the top levels of the security and military establishments that the most efficient way to eliminate the internal Communist menace would be for the PCI to take the fatal step of staging an open revolt. The revolt would be so ruthlessly suppressed that the PCI would be eliminated for good. Unfortunately, however, Togliatti and his associates are fully aware of the consequences of an open rebellion, and they are accordingly banking on assuming power through parliamentary procedures. De Lorenzo did not think they had a chance to assume power this way, but General Violante violently disagreed, fearing that the PCI would continue to gain among the electorate and that following a few more national elections, the PCI and the Socialists (both Nenni’s and Vecchietti’s) might manage to obtain an absolute majority. In De Lorenzo’s view, however, the Nenni Socialists (including Riccardo Lombardi and his associates) had crossed the Rubicon and had burned all bridges behind so far as collaboration with the PCI was concerned. The PSI could therefore be counted on to stay in the democratic camp, unless it sought its self-destruction. On Moro’s Government Despite De Lorenzo’s unconcealed hope for the creation of strong rightist party which would enjoy the support of the security and armed forces, he was not critical of Moro’s center-left government, although it was obvious he did not think much of Moro as the leader of the government. De Lorenzo would have preferred Colombo or Rumor, especially the latter, whom he had learned to respect and admire when he was Minister of Interior in Leone’s government last year. (De Lorenzo had no respect at all for the present Minister of Interior Taviani; Taviani, he confided, was timid to the point of being a coward in cases involving labor disturbances.) De Lorenzo expressed high respect also for Nenni, who, he said, had demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility on problems dealing with labor strikes. Comment Although Gen. De Lorenzo gave the impression that he was expressing the general views of the security and military establishments, the reporting officer had the feeling that the General was revealing mostly his own position. It would be presumptuous to gauge the political climate of the security and armed forces leadership on the current situation in Italy by two or three samplings. The reporting officer has, however, had previous conversations with Brig. Gen. Franco Picchiotti, now De Lorenzo’s assistant, and Colonel Vito Mele, Commander of the Second Carabinieri Regiment in Rome, both of whom have expressed ideas akin to those of De Lorenzo. For the Ambassador: Julian P. Fromer First Secretary of Embassy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT. Secret. Drafted by Peters and cleared by Colonel Patch and Hulse. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 25-1 IT) 97. Editorial Note 97. Editorial Note On two occasions in June 1964, the personal views and evaluations of Italian President Antonio Segni (of the Christian Democratic Party) on the prospects of the current Italian Cabinet were made available to the U.S. Government. On at least one of these occasions, these views were conveyed to President Johnson’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy. Noted were Segni’s concerns that the recently established Italian Cabinet, consisting of an unprecedented coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists and led by Christian Democrat Aldo Moro, was unlikely to last, was drifting toward more radical political policies, and was not alleviating the economic plight of Italy. Thus, at a time when the United States was officially supportive of the new coalition government in Italy, certain U.S. Government officials were aware of the skeptical views of President Segni. 98. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the Department of State 98. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the Department of State 1 Frankfurt, June 25, 1964, 1 p.m. 1132. For Tyler from Rostow. Herewith major conclusions my two-day intense education in Rome. 2 1. Italian problem a classic dangerous example stabilization-development dilemma. Deflation has begun but foundations not yet laid for expansion needed to avoid political and social rupture. 2. Import decline has yielded favorable balance of payments position past several months. Prices steady. Good harvest in sight. Unemployment and partial unemployment rising. Import decline and other signs suggest unemployment rise to perhaps dangerous proportions by autumn. 3. Government struggling to get wage settlements in key industries at sharply reduced rates of increase, as compared to past several years. 4. Past wage increases and end of mass labor reserve in south require radical increase in industrial investment for Italian industry to remain internationally competitive. Vast flow to northern cities in past decades has created great deficit in housing, schools, hospitals. Concentration on durable consumers goods production last decade has left great deficit in docks, roads, and other infra-structure. Italy needs a big investment boom in both private and public sectors. 5. Politically, Moro’s government is a group of good men of integrity and mutual loyalty. Moro holds them together in Rome as he used to hold together the DC Party. But he and they do not project a strong image to the country in part because their problems will not yield to simple quick solutions in part because some of the solutions are extremely difficult for the left wing to take. As men, they feel themselves beleaguered in the stockade, with two groups of Indians circling about and shooting flaming arrows. They are not disheartened. They would like time to work all this out. They like and trust each other as men. They realize they represent a parliamentary majority and a popular majority if they can hold together. But they also realize the government could fall at any time. 6. Outside the government there are strong right wing elements who wish to bring the government down and business groups who are sitting on their hands hoping for devaluation of the lire. There are also the Communists who are distracted by both international schisms and some puzzlement as to how to play domestic wage policy, but basically the Communist unions are pressing for inflationary wage increases and making life difficult even though the odds are for a right wing rather than left wing succession, should Moro fail. 7. Now for the rescuing cavalry. Marjolin came to town and made a good impression with his manner and his advice. He apparently urged strong, quick deflationary medicine. As a fellow-socialist his advice had more impact than that of some other European commentators on the scene. Not knowing what he said, in fact, I can only comment on the state of Italian thought post-Marjolin. 8. There is a potentially dangerous confusion between two proportions [positions]. One, Italy needs deflation. Politically and socially Italy can stand very little deflation, and a deflationary process is already underway. Two, Italy needs the acceptance of wage guidelines which would relate future wage movements to productivity changes and guarantee that expansion in public and private investment would not lead to price increases. This is the crux of the matter. 9. Moro and Carli are apparently hoping that if they get through the current wage negotiations and the DC Congress in tolerable style they will be able to relax the restrictions on private credit. I doubt that this modest prospect, combined as it will be with new austerity taxes, will prove sufficient for Nenni to hold his cohorts in line. What Nenni needs, I am convinced after a long talk with Lombardi and others, is an add-on in the form of a public investment program. But Italy does not command the resources for this add-on unless there is an absolute wage freeze for a substantial period. And this is tough. 10. The critical economic and political question as I see it, therefore, is whether Europe via Marjolin can generate a large capital infusion into Italy, if Moro and Nenni can, in effect, get wage guidelines installed. As is typical in these stabilization-development problems, what the politicians may be able to do depends partially on their knowing what help is available from the outside if they do it. 11. If this analysis is shared in Washington, Rome, and Brussels what is required, therefore, is a continuation of the Marjolin-Rome dialogue to see if this parlay can be pulled off. 12. My conviction about all this was strengthened at lunch yesterday by somewhat higher and more knowledgeable authority. Carlo Schmidt told me that the Pope, whom he had seen, fears a dangerous right wing reaction in Italy if unemployment rises and Moro fails, urging on Germans and Europeans a program of assistance to Italy. Ford 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Bonn, Rome, Brussels, and Paris. 2 The Embassy in Rome reported on Rostow’s June 22-24 visit to Rome in telegram 3484, June 24. (Ibid.) 99. Intelligence Information Cable 99. Intelligence Information Cable 1 Washington, June 26, 1964. [ document number not declassified ] COUNTRY Italy DATE OF INFO [ date not declassified ] SUBJECT Views of Senior Italian [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] on the Present Political Situation PLACE & DATE ACQ [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] REF [ 1 document number not declassified ] and AmEmbRome airgram A-1641, 26 May 1964 2 SOURCE AND APPRAISAL [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]senior Italian [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] whose opinions, we believe, reflect fairly well the opinions generally prevailing within a wide segment of the Italian [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and whose views on occasions have been [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]given limited distribution at high levels of the Italian Government [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] Appraisal—2 , that the views of the Italian [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] are accurately reported, and that these views reflect opinions probably generally prevailing in the Italian [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] [ 1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified ] 1. The present economic and political situation is serious and whatever left-center formula is adopted, it will inevitably fail. The only solution will be an eventual overthrow of the present coalition government. There will be various attempts to form compromise governments (for example, Amintore Fanfani might be asked to form a new government), but these will be only temporizing measures and in fact will lead to further deterioration of the political situation. 2. Lamentably, the present political dilemma has been caused by the unwillingness in the past of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) to take effective action against the leftist forces and to resolve the social-economic problems which confronted Italy. An error commonly made by anti-Communist forces is to seek perfect solutions to counter the Communists in resolving political/economic problems. Greater progress will be achieved by countering or neutralizing the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on the specific issues which they project. Admittedly, however, it is now rather late in the game to adopt such measures; for this reason, the only lasting solution will come when the center forces decide to take bold action by reversing the present trend and returning to a center-liberal democratic government. Such eventuality would probably bring the battle to the piazza (into the streets) and result in some bloodshed. In the final analysis, however, such action may represent the only realistic means of extricating the Italians from the present creeping paralysis. 3. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] contended that the Italian populace is ripe for such a turn of events; the people are disenchanted and have little confidence in any of the present political leaders. What the people are looking for is the “white hope” who will lead them out of their present dilemma. In responding to a query as to who might qualify as such a leader, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] said that one would have to be created; as long as he represented a public image and was not compromised, the public would rally around him. 4. As for the role that would fall to the security forces which would have to maintain public order, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] indicated that General Giovanni De Lorenzo, Commandant of the Carabinieri Corps, represented the only force around whom the Italian security forces could rally. It was for this reason that General de Lorenzo had organized mobile task force battalions which could go into action in the event of a political emergency. The Italian officer said that General De Lorenzo did not intend to exceed his authority, but that he intended to control the military force which would neutralize any attempt at leftist pressure on the piazza, and that he would act as “king maker” in the event of a political overthrow. In this connection, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] noted that De Lorenzo has developed a direct relationship with President Antonio Segni and had won the latter’s confidence. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] also commented that President Segni represents the only viable political figure in terms of public backing and constitutional authority, and that in a political emergency the current political personalities would fade rapidly. 5. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] iterated his view that the political situation would eventually be resolved in the piazza. He described the Italian public as bewitched by the leftist influences in Italy, and particularly by the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) which he branded as worse than the PCI because it projected the party as being “social-democratic” and was in a position to mislead non-Communist elements. Recognizing that individually there are well-intentioned PSI types, he said they had no important influence on major political or party issues. He termed Riccardo Lombardi as an effective leader of PSI forces and said it was quite clear where Lombardi’s sympathies lay. The Italian officer felt it was time to break the spell on the Italian public—something which could be done only by eliminating all the forces and political personalities who have brought Italy to its present critical situation. This, he said, in turn could come about only by creating a fresh public image even at the risk of deciding the issue on the piazza—a public image which could return Italy to truly democratic ways and restore vitality and confidence in the country’s faltering, financial/commercial structure. 6. Later on the same day [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] the above views were discussed with [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]who said that he concurred in them. In this connection this senior officer referred to an article in the 28 May 1964 issue of Il Borghese (a rightist periodical) written by Giani Preda entitled, “L’Ora Del ‘Matto’ “ which promotes the idea that somewhere in Italy there is someone now unknown who will come to the fore and lead Italy out of its present dilemma. This senior officer suggested that for lack of other candidates for this part, it might still fall upon General de Lorenzo to fill this role, albeit temporarily, in a political crisis. This officer added that de Lorenzo probably did not harbor such ambitions, but was willing to play the role of “king maker”, the “king” to be selected by responsible political forces. This [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] officer also said that De Lorenzo enjoyed the confidence of President Segni and that Segni represented the only political force who could rally the Italians beyond strictly political considerations. In addition, this officer also spoke highly of Treasury Minister Emilio Colombo saying that Colombo had the courage to challenge social pressures for concessions which could lead only to a further deterioration of the economic and political situation. 7. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] concluded by expressing hope that the present political situation may be resolved without going to the piazza, but doubted that it could be resolved by reforming it along center-left lines or by calling for new elections. Eventually, he said, a center type government would have to be instituted and leftist reaction on the piazza would have to be met with a show of force—something which General De Lorenzo was ready to provide if necessary. 8. Field dissem: none. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Sent to the State Department, ACSI, Navy Department, AFCIN, DIA, and NSA. 2 Documents 95 and 96 . 100. Telegram From the Commanding General, U.S. Army South European Task Force to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army in Europe 100. Telegram From the Commanding General, U.S. Army South European Task Force to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army in Europe 1 Verona, June 26, 1964, 1810Z. P-4-480. Warning sensitive sources and methods involved. 1. (S-NoForn) Source 916 reported 430th MI DET 23 Jun 64. Information received highly reliable informant, name not given due explosive nature information, that possible coup d’etat in Italy near future. Plan being drafted for national demonstration during next few months by rightist economists and politicians, i.e., liberals, monarchists and members Italian social movements (Movimento Social Italiano) (MSI). Desired result demonstration is to bring to Rome strong groups war veterans, war wounded, ex-prisoners war, etc. under pretext reawakening patriotic feelings Italian people create favorable atmosphere for ending current political trend in Italy and installing new order founded on traditional moral and political values of nation. 2. (S-NoForn) Individual selected coordinate plans for demonstration is Senator Randolfo Pacciardi, former leader Italian Republican Party, known to oppose current economic and political trend. Funds would be supplied by industrial and agricultural confederations. Appears Pacciardi could count on moral support and collaboration highly placed political rightists, armed forces, national police (Carabinieri) and leaders veterans associations. 3. (S-NoForn) The MSI agrees with planned demonstration but not in favor Pacciardi due past tenure office Defense Minister and could count on armed forces and Carabinieri. If demonstration should be opposed by counterdemonstration of extreme leftists, Carabinieri would be immediately called to action [garble] by armed forces. Armed forces would then assume law and order maintenance Italy. Local police cannot be counted on because politically controlled. President Segni aware this plan. 4. (S-NoForn) G2 comments: A. Information pertaining to “rightist” plans for a coup d’etat in Italy was forwarded your headquarters by ltr dated 15 July 58 subject coup d’etat Italy (S) and SETAF message P0205 25 Feb 59. B. On 14 Feb 59, info was received that an anti-Communist committee had allegedly been formed to ensure that the Communists would not succeed in gaining power in Italy. The committee is reportedly composed of Italian parliamentarians, predominantly Christian Democrat rightists, monarchists and Italian Liberal Party members, as well as Italian general staff officers. Financial backing for the organization is reportedly to come from several well known Italian industrialists. C. Most recent information concerning subject is contained OARMA Rome report 2850034564 28 May 64, subject Lt Gen De Lorenzo’s comments on security and political subject, as follows: “Randolfo Pacciardi’s Democratic Union for the Second Republic was not taken seriously by Italy’s security and military leaders. Pacciardi had some good ideas and was honest and in earnest, but his [ omission in the source text ]attract all kinds of people and to draw everybody in his movement who had a grudge against the present Italian Republic, from the extreme left to the extreme right. This motley group of people had no political or ideological cohesion; their only common denominator was dissatisfaction with the status quo. Particularly weak and uninfluential were old ex-military officers who had flocked to Pacciardi’s banner. Pacciardi’s movement will end like Giannini’s Qualunquismo of the late 1940’s.” Copy of above cited report is being mailed to your office attn: PDN-CI. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 1. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe in Paris and to DIA and the Department of State. Printed from the copy sent to the Department of State. 101. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 101. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, June 30, 1964. A-1828 SUBJECT The “Democratic” Italian Communist Party—New Bait for the Old Popular Front Trap Summary The Italian Communist Party (PCI) continues to create interest and some confusion with its claims to be democratic, and to be prepared to step down, once in power, if its popular mandate were lost. Most recently, this line has been taken up in a major pronouncement by PCI leftwing Pietro Ingrao. Careful study of Ingrao’s statements, however, leads to the conclusion that there has been no meaningful change in the PCI’s revolutionary, totalitarian ideology. But Ingrao does appear to be emerging as one of the hardest running potential successors of Togliatti, with the ability to appeal not only to a very broad range of views within the PCI, but also to left-wing non-Communists who favor working class unity. The Embassy concludes that Ingrao has talent in appearing to be “all things to all people” and that as such he is a potent weapon in the PCI arsenal. While most Italians do not accept Ingrao’s or other Communist claims to be democratic and trustworthy, a few leaders of public opinion welcome the Communist line and interpret it to be significant, at least in part. To this extent the PCI line has enjoyed some success and is able to make difficult the progress of the non-Communist Italian left toward modern concepts of political democracy. I. Introduction Much interest has been shown recently in Italy, particularly by left-wing intellectuals and by the left and center-left political parties, in what is frequently taken to be a slow and laborious effort by the Italian Communist Party to seek a more democratic and “Italian” course of development for the Party. A careful reading of the many PCI statements on the subject of intra-Party and parliamentary democracy leads inevitably to the conclusion that the symptoms of change within the PCI relate to the continuing debate as to the merits of the alternative “hard” and “soft” lines of action open to the Party; the international dispute within the Communist world movement; the question of leadership and succession within the PCI; and even the question of taking different leadership views to the PCI cadres, i.e., the question of factionalism, by any other name. Unsurprisingly, Italian Communist statements do not reveal any tendency whatsoever toward democracy in any meaningful sense of the term, despite the fact that some success has been achieved by the PCI in its long term effort to present itself as a responsible, respectable and democratic party in Italy. The Embassy has carefully reviewed the major developments in the ideological debate currently in progress among the various elements of the political left in Italy, and endeavors in this dispatch to focus upon those significant documents and pronouncements necessary to assess the PCI position, and upon the general effect and importance of the PCI efforts in this field. Part II of this report examines the PCI claim to be a democratic organization. Part III offers an interpretation of the relationship between the current propaganda line and Party needs. Part IV discusses aspects of the impact of the PCI line on the Italian political scene, and the Embassy’s conclusions are included in Part V. [Here follows Section II, a 4-page discussion of PCI public statements on the issue of democracy.] III. An Interpretation of the Immediate Aim of Current PCI Efforts The Problems Within the Party As has been reported in detail elsewhere, much frustration has built up within the PCI as a result of the failure to prevent the formation of the present center-left government, the steady decline in Party membership over the last decade, and the reflected dissensions of the current dispute within the international Communist movement. (See A-1032 of February 14, and A-1385 of April 7, 1964.) 2 These frustrations, and the continued existence of the center-left threat, increase the impatience of those Communists who favor a harder, more aggressive line. These “hard-liners” believe that if the Party is held on its current line it will ultimately incur the electoral losses augured by the unmistakable signs of impotence revealed in the PCI struggle to prevent the development of PSI autonomy and the center-left. The “hard-liners” oppose any tendency toward “right-reformism,” and are generally categorized as being on the PCI left, although sympathy for left-wing (Chinese) views in the international movement is not necessarily implied by left-wing intra-Party positions. On the other hand, the PCI rightwing recognizes the danger that an overly aggressive PCI program could alarm the protest voters who have supported the PCI in increasing numbers over the years, and could push the country as well as the government to the right. The PCI rightwing points out that the fate of the Greek Communist Party was avoided by the PCI due to the wise (and very cautious) middle-of-the-road leadership of Togliatti, and is convinced that further gains can be made by the PCI on the present course. The natural result of the middle-of-the-road approach of Togliatti, however, has been the falling away of cadres on both the left and the right of the Party, and a disastrous 65% decline in the membership of the Italian Federation of Communist Youth (FGCI). It is generally accepted that the FGCI could regain some of its lost ground with a more militant, bluntly revolutionary line which would have a definite appeal among young radically militant left-wing intellectuals, or alternatively that gains could be made with an honestly democratic program which would have to be based on the junking of the authoritarian Leninist concept of democratic centralism. There is little the FGCI can do as long as it is denied either course, except to blame the Party (as Achille Occhetta did at the PCI Conference on Organization in March) and hope that the FGCI is not a bellwether for the PCI. In recent weeks there has been some evidence of a more aggressive and intransigent PCI stance, particularly in trade union activity, but as long as Togliatti remains firmly committed to what amounts to a popular front line, and at the same time to the principle of democratic-centralism, changes in PCI tactics and changes in PCI propaganda lines must be limited accordingly. In fact, on the eve of the PCI Conference on Organization in March, the Party seemed to be on dead center, in a situation which clearly called for vigorous leadership to give the Party spirit, conviction and direction. Ingrao’s Solution At the Party Conference (see A-1385 of April 7), signs of discontent and impatience were much in evidence. Several speakers vigorously criticized Party shortcomings and leadership methods, calling for more aggressive PCI opposition to the center-left government, and for more freedom of discussion within the Party. The most important of these speakers was Ingrao, the acknowledged leader of the leftwing PCI hardliners. Although Togliatti rejected the demands for change, the impatient comrades (all on the left of the PCI spectrum) established an image as innovators, struggling to modernize the standpat Togliatti line. Since the Conference, much has been heard from Ingrao, whose activities seem directed toward creating an image of a vigorous young reformer, who offers the Party more action and more internal democracy, and who sincerely assures the other Italian parties that the PCI is a democratic and reliable potential working partner. Ingrao is one of the likely successors to Togliatti, and he is a hard-running candidate. He is relatively young (49), he is a reformer, and he does offer the Party more action. Beyond this, the image he and the Party seek for him is credible only to the careless. As is set forth above, even Ingrao’s own words, if accepted without question, do not make him out to be a democrat in any meaningful sense. Sources acquainted with Ingrao have also indicated doubt to the Embassy, based on estimates of his personality, that Ingrao would espouse the concept of greater freedom of discussion within the Party once his own views and his own leadership were established. On the subject of internal Party democracy, Ingrao avoids talking about democratic centralism by name, but is bluntly opposed to intra-Party factions, thus agreeing with other Party spokesmen who maintain that “factionalism” would be the inevitable and undesirable result of abandoning democratic-centralism. Moreover, his Conference position in favor of the need for “a way in which the [Party] 3 militants can make decisions, and not just participate in a debate,” (as quoted in Il Giorno , March 14, 1964) has turned out to be as circumscribed as his support for political rights in the socialist state. In his April 25 Rinascita article he commented: “I find that often discussion is not efficacious and the political organization doesn’t really decide because [the discussion] is based on reports that present again, without change, the entire situation, the entire judgment, the entire political position of the party (underscoring by Ingrao), 4 when instead it would be more appropriate to highlight and put in discussion those developments, innovations, and corrections that really add or take away or modify some part of the analysis, line, or tactic of the party, rendering more evident and explicit the modifications and the developments and in this way asking the political organization to really decide hellip;” In other words, discussion within the Party should be ample, but it should be focused on the improvement of the Party analysis, line, or tactic, and not sufficiently wide ranging to question basic Party positions. Nonetheless, through Ingrao the Party appears to be taking a stand which is intended to be all things to all people. To the impatient left the PCI offers a young, vigorous and hard-boiled left-wing leader. To non-Communist intellectuals and left-wing political leaders, Ingrao offers a PCI position that includes “full recognition” of “the essence of democracy.” To the PCI right and Togliatti possibilismo elements, Ingrao offers capable leadership in the Party drive for a popular front which, without Ingrao, would have less and less appeal to the PCI left. There is no room for non-Communist illusions, either with regard to the things Ingrao really stands for, or with regard to the real political potential of the formula he is developing for a PCI panacea. IV. The Impact of the PCI “Democratic” Line The General View A large percentage of politically conscious Italians probably reject, unread, the long and involved PCI tracts in the Party theoretical journals, and perhaps seldom read any representative cross section of the newspaper and periodical comment on discussions as esoteric as the PCI view of the relationship between democracy and socialism. To many, the voice of the PCI is known to be unreliable anyway, and there seems little point in laboring through the dialectic to come once again to that conclusion. To others, particularly left-wing non-Communist politicians and professional political analysts, the PCI line on democracy and socialism is interesting, even encouraging and welcome as a debate with the comrades, but hardly convincing. Many of these important molders of Italian political opinion are sound and unequivocal in their assessments. On the question of political liberties, Avanti (January 16, 1964) noted that the Communists have long been prepared to grant, once in power, all the political liberties except the possibility to remove them from power. Concerning the PCI claim to believe in a multiparty system, the moderate left-wing Critica Sociale (February 5, 1964) cited Khrushchev’s recent discussions with Guy Mollet, in which Khrushchev asserted the other parties could co-exist in a socialist state where the Communists are in power. Khrushchev’s illustrations—Agrarian Istvan Kobi, Socialdemocrats Cyrankiewicz, Grotewohl, Fierlinger, Szakistas, etc.—were judged by Critica Sociale to be illustrative of Khrushchev’s well known sense of humor, and of the inanity of the PCI claim. On the subject of a minority becoming the majority, in a Communist state, Vita (February 5, 1964) also cited Khrushchev speaking to Mollet, when the question of an opposition was brushed aside by Khrushchev, saying “We will not go backwards"—language remarkably similar to that of Togliatti on the same subject. By and large, non-Communist politically conscious elements in Italy are not confused by the Communist claim to democracy, whether they reject it out of hand, as do the Italian conservatives and extreme right, or whether they welcome the debate and give the devil his due, as is the case among the non-Communist left. Wishful Thinkers, Dupes, and Politicians too Clever by Half Unfortunately, the seeds cast by the PCI do not all fall on barren ground. For various reasons, the Communist claims to democracy and their efforts toward working class unity in a popular front are appealing to some political and intellectual leaders whose opinions in Italy carry weight. These include intellectuals of the stripe of Ernesto Rossi whose experiences seem to teach them that fascism is the real and enduring threat to liberty, and who hopefully see among the Communists democratic tendencies quite unapparent to other observers (see A-1435 of April 17, 1964). 5 They include Marxists who are not alarmed by the dialectic of the PCI and the sophistry of Ingrao; who may be inclined, after all, to recognize “the profound difference in quality” between progressive and conservative forces. And they include PSI personalities who cherish the understandable conceit that the principal difference between the PSI and the PCI is that the PSI is several years ahead of the Communists in coming to terms with modern political realities, and that the PCI must follow along and therefore is following along on the path of democracy. These troublesome traces of political or ideological confusion are always at hand for the Communists to attempt to form into unwittingly helpful political opinion, and the PCI all too frequently is assisted in their effort by politicians with a particular axe to grind. The unconscious assistance from the extreme right and the assistance from dupes such as Christian Democrat Giorgio La Pira need no comment. The case of the PSI’s Riccardo Lombardi, however, is more curious and more tragic. Opinions vary, with the interests of the observer, as to whether Lombardi’s confusing use of the PSI organ Avanti represents an attempt to play a necessary role in holding on to that part of the PSI electoral base which is to the left of the present government, or whether Lombardi’s game is to hold himself apart from Nenni’s followers in case the fortunes of the center-left government fall and pull the Nenniani down also. Lombardi’s desire to control the Socialist Party, and his reluctance or inability to adjust his attitudes to the Socialist shift from opposition to governmental responsibility, are other facets of his complicated personality. vis-á-visthe Communists, Lombardi is always willing to continue the dialogue, to hold out by implication the possibility of eventual cooperation with the PCI at some further stage in the Communist evolution as he sees it, and to ignore in large part his Party’s judgement that the PCI is an undemocratic element to be isolated on the left. Rome’s A-1628 of May 22, 1964 6 sets forth the Lombardi view of the prospects for the unification of the whole working class in Italy, to be accomplished by working persistently and patiently for the type of evolution in the PCI that has already occurred in Lombardi’s own party. Lombardi sees this taking place through a series of splits in the PCI and the gradual isolation of the old guard, beginning with Togliatti. In the place of his party’s view, that the PCI should be isolated and its electorate captured by the democratic left, Lombardi apparently holds the view that PCI “dogmatists” should be isolated, but that truly “progressive” PCI elements could be absorbed by the democratic parties. Thus Lombardi envisions a Marxist party absorbing and digesting a Marxist-Leninist party; the sheep to devour the wolves. Lenin’s comment “Who-Whom"? has not helped Lombardi. On the contrary, Lombardi’s own contribution to Socialist confusion helps explain why the splits usually occur in the Socialist Party, rather than in the Marxist-Leninist PCI. Meanwhile, Lombardi and the “maximalist” group he brought with him to Avanti propagate the strange concept of the existence within the PCI of good “innovators” such as Pietro Ingrao, and bad “Stalinists” such as Togliatti—an assessment which sheds no light at all on the situation as it really exists today. Unfortunately, this kind of thinking demonstrates the state of ideological confusion that has predominated in the official Socialist organ, Avanti, since Lombardi assumed control of the paper last February. V. Conclusions The situation within the Italian Communist Party is one of stress and is indicative of change. The indications are, however, that the changes underway reflect largely the imperative need of the PCI to adapt itself to the basically perilous situation in which it finds itself in Italy today, in confrontation with the center-left government. While pressures toward democratic reform without doubt exist at the base of the Party, the Party leaders publicly claim, and there is every reason to believe, that the Party is and will remain Leninist, internally authoritarian, and orthodox in its revolutionary intentions vis-á-visthe Italian state. Left-wing non-Communists thus hope in vain that the pressures from 1.7 million Italian Communists, who do not in any case understand Marxism-Leninism, can induce basic ideological changes among a leadership which is well trained, capable, and determined in its adherence to revolutionary and totalitarian doctrine. The Embassy also regards with reserve the view that the efforts of Ingrao and the “innovators” are the beginning of the end for democratic-centralism and authoritarian control within the PCI. On the contrary, Ingrao may have given the Party the solution to the knotty problem of how Party unity can be forged, after Togliatti goes, from the disparate elements in the right and the left wings of the Party. The political blend of a left-wing reputation, a welcome call for grass roots participation in PCI decisions, and vigorous support of the PCI popular front tactic, make Ingrao a considerable threat to Italian democracy, and the threat is as yet unrecognized by some important democratic left-wing leaders. The majority of Italians, including the Italian leftwing, recognize that the Communist threat is unchanged. Nevertheless, a small but influential element on the left will continue hopefully to seek indications of PCI evolution toward democracy, and the wish will continue to be father to the thought. The new, different, democratic Italian Communism is a myth, but it will continue to impede the slow course of non-Communist left-wing Italian political thought toward democracy and away from the narrow class concepts which urge unity of the working class, i.e., unity with the Communists, and which therefore furnish grist to the Communist popular front mill. [Here follows “A Short Bibliography of Significant Articles on the PCI Attitude Toward Democracy.”] For the Ambassador: W. Fraleigh Counselor of Embassy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT. Confidential. Drafted by Barnsdale and cleared by Peters. Repeated to Moscow. 2 Neither printed. (Ibid., POL 12-3 IT) 3 All brackets are in the source text. 4 Printed here in italics. 5 Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT) 6 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 12 IT) 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy 102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy 1 Washington, August 7, 1964, 11:13 a.m. 333. Re Embtel 270. 2 In course two informal discussions Italian Ambassador somewhat confirmed information given you by Malfatti. (We agree about the delicacy this information and extreme importance that it be closely held.) Fenoaltea told Tyler Nenni has given “silent” consent. Malfatti report suggests stronger PSI position. Does Embassy have any idea as to how Italian decision will be reflected in government actions? In answer to our probes Fenoaltea seemed to say that now Moro government would not have to commit itself to the project prior to British elections. Previously Fenoaltea, as strong supporter MLF, expressed great concern that Labor victory in October would mean indefinite deferral Italian decision to participate while they awaited British action. Fenoaltea will be in Rome for week’s consultation prior holiday. He will presumably explore Italian position vis-à-vis MLF with particular reference to European clause and inner group. He raised both points with us and was given standard response. We particularly emphasized advantage not pressing these issues at this time in Paris Working Group. Quite apart from leg up given MLF by Italian government decision, PSI support of this position seems to us of great significance. In your view does this mean irrevocable commitment PSI to center left government and acceptance defection Lombardi faction? Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 IT. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Schaetzel; cleared in EUR, S/MF, and by Klein of the White House staff; and approved by Tyler. 2 Telegram 270 from Rome, July 30, reported that during negotiations for the formation of the second Moro government, the parties agreed that “Italy would subscribe and participate in MLF.” (Ibid.) 103. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 103. Airgram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, August 14, 1964. A-176 SUBJECT The July Rumors of an Italian Coup d’Etat Summary The spate of press comment following a gloom-and-doom article on the Italian political situation, published in Hamburg’s Die Welt on June 23, together with the clamorous activity of the Italian extreme right and extreme left during the recent governmental crisis, were followed by rumors in early July that a coup d’etat was imminent. The background of these rumors, and the degree to which such speculation could be realistic, is discussed in this airgram. The Die Welt article, apparently written by its resident Rome correspondent, Friedrich Meichsner, was first picked up in Italy by the Florence daily newspaper La Nazione (independent conservative) on June 24. From the La Nazione summary, it appeared that the Die Welt article foresaw the inevitable coming to power of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), if present trends in Italy continued. The German newspaper article apparently also discounted the feasibility of a sharp turn to the right, which would only result in a Communist victory in the end. The only solution, according to La Nazione’s account of the Die Welt story, was a continuation of the center-left policy of social reform, but under the guidance of other, more competent hands than those of then-incumbent center-left government, and Die Welt urged that European encouragement and economic support be given any Italian effort in such a direction. The Die Welt article saw the Italian President, conservative Christian Democrat Antonio Segni, as the only man able to step into the breach, and called for “concrete and appropriate” steps, within and outside of Italy, to save the country. This apparent call for a Gaullist solution to Italy’s current difficulties was widely and very unfavorably reported in a broad range of the Italian press from the conservative to the Communist end of the political spectrum. Thus, while objecting to the exhortatory message in the Die Welt article, the Italian press gave it heavy play. Within three days of the publication of the Die Welt piece and the Nazione playback, quite sensational reflections of the original article and of the Italian interest therein were appearing in the local press. For example, on June 26, the Christian Democrat daily of Rome Il Popolo picked up the following from the Koelner Stadt-Anzieger: “A state of alarm rule in Italy. Even in Government circles, there is a frightening pessimism with regard to domestic political developments. Inflation, corruption, and criminality in progressive increase erode the faith of Italians in their country. Extreme right-wing groups are already preparing for a coup d’etat, with the support of military officers in active service.” Similarly bleak assessments of Italy’s current course were reproduced from the French press, together with an alleged comparison of the Italian situation with conditions in the Fourth Republic in 1958 attributed to De Gaulle himself. At the same time, while the four-party negotiations for a new coalition accord seemed to hang on dead center, it was made known that President Segni had received (on July 13) the President of the Senate, Cesare Merzagora, next in succession to the President of the Republic, for the second time during the crisis, and that the President had also received General Aldo Rossi, the Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces (on July 14), and Prime Minister-designate Aldo Moro (on July 15). In the circumstances, these meetings encouraged further speculation in increasingly dramatic and even ominous overtones. Finally, more contemplative articles as well as potboilers appeared in several weekly reviews (L’Espresso, Folla, Epoca), keeping the subject alive and playing upon the earlier rumors that a coup d’etat was imminent. The Situation Behind the Rumors Behind the recent crisis and the talk of a coup d’etat lies a postwar Italian history of tremendous efforts to raise a democratic seedling in the stony ground left by the Fascist era and the disillusionment and violence of the war. This postwar struggle to create a viable democratic political and economic system has been further complicated by the persistent efforts of the parties of the extreme right and left to discredit the democratic system and the men dedicated to its service. Despite the progress of the postwar years, and the Italian “economic miracle,” the failure of the governing parties to come to grips with many remaining economic and social problems has led to a small but consistent increase in the electoral strength of the Communists, a steady attrition of Christian Democrat (DC) strength, and seemingly growing public impatience with shortcomings which have perhaps in part represented inherent national failures, but which have been understandably laid at the political door of the center parties so long in power in Italy. The impatience of the public with the present government by party bureaucracies, or “partitocrazia,” has found expression recently not only on the right and left extremes, but also by more respectable elements such as Randolfo Pacciardi (see Rome’s A-1581 of May 14, 1964), 2 erstwhile leader of the Republican Party (PRI) and well known anti-Fascist, who now rejects the present system and has called for the creation of a “Second Republic” in terms which could also describe a Gaullist solution. Additionally, both ideological and political leadership problems have beset the democratic Italian parties in recent years, particularly the DC, due to differing political interpretations of the significance of the growing left-wing vote, and consequent steps necessary to recoup at least part of it into the democratic area. A major complication was added when the Socialists (PSI) led by Pietro Nenni after long and difficult efforts, moved far enough away from the influence of the Italian Communists to be accepted, after bitter factional leadership struggles within the DC, into the controversial Italian center-left government experiment of the past few years. The immediate significance, quickly made apparent, was that instead of just one major governing political party torn by internal strife, Italy became the proud owner of two. And, despite the encouraging note struck by the reform-oriented program of the first Moro Government, internal party problems and the pressure of the serious economic situation combined to saddle a most unimpressive record on the first center-left government, which fell on June 27. Seldom was there a time like this one in postwar Italian history when so many diverse elements could agree, rightly or wrongly, that the record of democratic government in Italy had left much to be desired. Any external call for a Gaullist solution was certain to receive attention in view of the internal situation which set the stage for it. Against this kind of background, we can examine the coup rumors and try to evaluate them. Factors Militating Against a Coup The practical factors operating against a coup were more impressive, however, than the psychological factors which suggested the possibility of a coup to Die Welt. As far as concerns a coup from the right, there is a long Italian military tradition of refraining from extra-legal action to influence or control the government. Additionally, there is a deeply rooted anti-Fascist sentiment in Italy which would make popular support extremely unlikely in the absence of careful preparation of public opinion by respectable leadership elements. Such preparation would have to take place in circumstances much more discouraging to democratic opinion than the situation existing at the end of June. And any attempt by rightist elements to seize power in Italy without the overwhelming support of public opinion could not be successful under present conditions without widespread violence and possibly outright civil war. On the left, the leadership of the strong and well-organized Italian Communist Party (PCI) is well aware that a Communist coup de main would unify domestic and foreign opposition and thus probably turn the attempt into a disaster similar to the abortive Greek Communist postwar attempt under “General Markos”; which vicarious lesson Togliatti has publicly cited for the benefit of Party militants. The current status of readiness, the political reliability, and the heavier weapons made available in recent years to the Italian Carabinieri underline Togliatti’s point. PCI caution would militate against taking the initiative for a coup d’etat unless reaction from Italy’s allies were unlikely, and unless reaction at home could be quickly and quietly controlled. However, Italian reaction to a coup from the right without overwhelming popular support would hand over to the PCI a broad range of democratic anti-Fascist elements of the public. The PCI would then either have to join hands with any spontaneous reaction, to meet force with force, or abandon a popular cause in circumstances which would destroy whatever image the PCI has in Italy as a defender of freedom, an inflexibly anti-Fascist force, vanguard and protector of the working class, etc. The bold action the PCI has mounted on previous occasions, when moving with the mainstream of public opinion, leaves little doubt as to the likely PCI decision in such a situation. While unlikely to resort to a coup which the public would oppose, the PCI would almost certainly take to the barricades, with popular support and approval, in reaction to any coup from the right. In short, there is no power vacuum or dangerous imbalance of power in Italy. On the contrary, there is a relatively stable balance of forces. A coup from the left would have little chance of success, and it is all too clear that an attempted coup from the right would be likely to lead to violence or civil war which might present the unwelcome alternatives of Communism or, as a large segment of the population would see it, “Fascism”. The situation in Italy does not favor adventure. On the contrary, democratic leadership elements know from past experience that they would have to react quickly to any ill-considered move on the political right, or be prepared to witness a popular reaction ready-made for Communist exploitation. A Gaullist Formula One possible course, toward a Gaullist solution which might avoid the instability almost certain to follow any coup de main, was outlined in an article by Livio Pesce, carried in the Epoca issue of July 12, following a line of thought generally attributed to Randolfo Pacciardi. This possible course would have to be initiated by the President (as suggested in fact by Die Welt), and would carefully exploit the framework of the Italian Constitution, thus presenting the natural opposition with the alternatives of acquiescence, or acceptance of the onus and consequent political isolation which would stem from resorting first to the threat of force. At a point of “insoluble” crisis, as Epoca puts it, the President could appoint (under Article 92 of the Constitution) a Prime Minister and Cabinet without reference to the party politicians; a Government of “national unity” composed of “personalities of authority, sensible and patriotic, ready to work with the President hellip; for the good of the nation.” This of course would be entirely constitutional. But Article 94 says that “the Government must have the confidence of both Chambers [of the Parliament].” 3 As Epoca resolved the problem, the President would have to carry Parliament with him by “a solemn and dramatic appeal to the parties and to the nation; an appeal to the people for the salvation of the country.” A combination of an appeal from the President, the image projected by his Prime Minister-designate, and the lack of acceptable non-violent alternatives would then have to carry the day and also provide the political consensus for an orderly transition to whatever new forms were envisaged as the next step. All this is familiar and required little imagination in view of recent French history. However, it does not fit present circumstances in Italy. Second Thoughts After the Crisis A new look at the alarmist speculation was taken by several commentators after the crisis had passed, once the new four-party accords were achieved on July 18, on the basis of which the second Moro government was subsequently formed. Pietro Nenni, in an Avanti editorial, maintained that the alternative to the new center-left government would have been an emergency government, of “disinterested servants of the state,” which in reality would have been a government of the right, with a Fascist-agrarian-industrialist content. Ugo La Malfa in La Voce Repubblicana noted (on July 27) that after the center-left had been re-constituted, it became easy to read assessments which dismissed lightly the earlier talk of a coup. But, La Malfa observed, the maneuvers and counter-maneuvers in the dramatic atmosphere of the crisis were well designed to draw the DC to the right, toward a reactionary adventure. The extreme right-wing satirical weekly Il Borghese apparently felt that a Gaullist formula had been within reach, and the July 23 issue strongly criticized President Segni for “betraying” the country’s faith in him by re-designating Aldo Moro to form a (second) center-left government, and for failing to remove the Communist threat in Italy as De Gaulle did in France in 1958. Other heads saw the matter differently, once the crisis was resolved. Giovanni Spadolini, of Bologna’s conservative Resto del Carlino , owned by the same financial group that controls La Nazione, which started the original flurry of articles, criticized Nenni for his statement that the alternative to a new center-left government had been an authoritarian reactionary government which was ready to be launched. According to Spadolini, there had been too much talk of authoritarian solutions. Italy “is neither Bolivia nor Santo Domingo.” President Segni had no choice but to call on Moro to form a government, and in the event of failure by Moro Segni would have had to explore alternate democratic solutions before, as a last resort, calling elections. Spadolini expressed full confidence in President Segni as “the supreme guarantee of constitutional and democratic legality,” and dismissed the criticisms from the right and left as “absurd and senseless.” From the other side of the political spectrum, moderately left-wing (left-Radical) l’Espresso joined Spadolini in rejecting Nenni’s pessimistic view and the rumors of a possible coup, saying flatly (on August 2) that “the hypothesis of a coup d’etat had no possibility of realization;” that the far right continues to hopefully cultivate the idea, but that their hopes are not soundly based in the realities of Italian circumstances. Summary and Conclusions The Embassy believes that Spadolini and l’Espresso are clearly the better Monday morning quarterbacks in their assessments of the situation as it was and is, and we agree that there is little likelihood of a coup d’etat in Italy at this stage of its post-war history. This is not to deny that cries of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the system in Italy have become louder in recent years as a result of the failure of a succession of post-war governments to move quickly towards reducing inefficiency and corruption in government, to meet the pace of increasing Italian expectations, and to contain the increasing electoral voting threat on the left. Talk of a “Second Republic” has been stimulated mildly by the Pacciardi movement, but the situation is not as yet such as to create a consensus prepared to reject a system which has served many diverse elements well during the post-war years. In these circumstances, the tradition and reliability of the armed forces, the strong anti-Fascist popular sentiment, the balance of forces of political elements with the country, the caution and lack of capability of the PCI to mount a quick and clean-cut coup, and the absence of a “strong man” to attract the popular imagination constitute formidable obstacles to any illegal seizure of power. If public disillusionment continues to grow, as it will in the long run if the ability of democratic parties to govern and improve economic conditions is not firmly asserted, conditions favorable to a Gaullist solution could develop. In the absence of the necessary conditioning of broad segments of the public which would be essential not only to a Gaullist solution, but also to a coup from the left or the right, there remains only the more remote possibility of an ill-conceived attempt, without the elements of success, but which could lead to violence with political consequences. There has been no evidence of any militant dissatisfaction from any quarter both strong enough and rash enough to stake all on such a forlorn hope. For the Chargé d’Affaires Ad Interim: Alan W. Ford First Secretary 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Barnsdale. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels for the Embassy and BUSEC, London, Luxembourg, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, and The Hague. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 12 IT) 3 Brackets in the source text. 104. Letter From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) 104. Letter From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) 1 Rome, November 12, 1964. Dear Bill: I want to write a word to you regarding the way we see developments moving in Italian policy toward Communist China. As you know, and as we have reported repeatedly, Saragat has assured me that in the forthcoming UN General Assembly Italy will support the United States view that the Chinese representation issue is an “important question” and that Italy will not vote for seating Communist China at this session of the General Assembly. I have no doubt that this will remain the Italian position—for this coming session. It is important to bear in mind that these assurances have carefully been limited to the forthcoming session and it has been pointed out that they do not necessarily apply to the future beyond that time. These assurances have also been given against a background of repeated reminders that Italy is convinced the time is rapidly approaching when a new look must be taken at its policy regarding Chinese recognition. In our conversations with responsible Italian officials here there are also constant allusions to alleged rising internal economic and political pressures calling for a recognition of Communist China. Although we can and have demonstrated repeatedly by statistics that the economic advantages to Chinese Communist recognition are largely illusory, it must be admitted that there are still some pressures nonetheless from Italian business and industrial concerns favoring Chinese Communist recognition. The main issue-and here the matter is much more complex and much less susceptible to statistical refutation, is the internal political pressure from many quarters, particularly from the PSI, for recognition, as well as a general and growing feeling that Italy, by continuing to support the United States position, is on a slippery slope and is backing, without conviction, a losing proposition. We have come into possession of information in strictest confidence from a source which I consider to be completely reliable concerning Saragat’s conversation with Spaak during Spaak’s last visit here. Reportedly there were the following significant elements in the conversation: (1) Both Saragat and Spaak referred to growing strong internal pressures favoring Communist Chinese recognition. Spaak is said to have told Saragat that in Belgium only he, Spaak, is keeping Belgium on its present course. (2) Both Saragat and Spaak agreed that, although Italy and Belgium will support the United States position at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, both countries have “decided” that they will recognize Communist China in the not too distant future. It was not excluded that one or both countries might make explanatory statements to this general effect in connection with the positions they might be called upon to take in the General Assembly this year. It was noted that Canada might be in a similar position and should be consulted privately. (3) Both Saragat and Spaak agreed that the changes in Italian and Belgian policy would not be taken without full and frank prior conversations with the United States. Both agreed they wished to avoid acting in the manner in which De Gaulle had carried out his change of policy. (4) The way in which the conversation flowed from a discussion by Saragat of Italy’s intention to support and participate in the MLF to a discussion immediately thereafter of the attitude of Nenni and the Italian Socialists favoring recognition of Communist China led some among the Belgians to conclude that Saragat may have been thinking that Italian government agreement to recognize Communist China would be the price for Italian Socialist acceptance of MLF. (5) Spaak urged that the United States should be informed privately at once of the Italian and Belgian “decision” to recognize Communist China. Saragat, on the other hand, argued that, while, of course, the United States must be informed as soon as possible and full discussions should be held with the United States before any action were taken, the matter should not be broached even privately with the United States until after the United States presidential elections. I have noted from a number of reporting cables various straws in the wind which point in the direction of the information I have just set forth. Now, Malfatti has told us directly that Italy is rethinking its position as we have reported in our telegram 1291. 2 My purpose in writing to you is to bring to your attention—and through you to the attention of others whom you may consider appropriate—what I consider to be authentic information indicating the lines along which I believe Italian policy is developing. I doubt that the Italians will be responsive much longer to United States exhortations and arguments on this subject. While wishing to take their contemplated action in such a manner so as to minimize the damage to the United States and the strain on US-Italian relations, I believe that the Italians have taken a decision in principle to move on this matter. To the extent that they are able to do so in coordination with Belgium and possibly Canada, they will be strengthened in their resolve to move forward with this change in policy. 3 I believe that Saragat is sincere about this; but I know that he also expects us not to make any changes in United States policy with regard to Chinese recognition or UN admission without informing the Italian government about it at the very earliest possible time. He is particularly sensitive about this possibility, however remote, since he fears that if Italy were to be taken by surprise by any such US policy shift, the Italian government would be laid open to criticism from the Italian Left of lagging behind “even the United States” on this issue. With best wishes, Sincerely yours, Fred 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436, Ambassador Reinhardt. Secret; Official-Informal. 2 Dated November 11. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL CHICOM IT) 3 In a November 26 letter to Reinhardt, Tyler commented: “I think your analysis leaves little doubt but that in the longer run, the Italian Government intends to modify its policyhellip;. We would hope to be consulted, not merely informed, on this matter.” (Ibid.) 105. Letter From Livingston T. Merchant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) 105. Letter From Livingston T. Merchant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) 1 Washington, January 14, 1965. Dear Bill: This is a brief report of a lunch I had alone on January 12 with my old friend Sergio Fenoaltea, the Italian Ambassador, on his invitation. He wanted to talk about the MLF. I told him I had been completely out of touch with developments for over two months. Nevertheless, he pursued the topic with pertinacity and dolor. He said he was most unhappy over the shift in the US position which he had first learned of through Scotty Reston’s column some weeks ago on the President’s injunction. 2 I said I had read the article and other news stories but had not seen the memo if indeed it existed. Sergio went on to say that “The US had pulled the rug out from under the Germans (particularly Schroeder) and also members of the Italian government favoring it. The Germans were very unhappy. Even if the MLF was a poor idea (and he himself thought it a very good one) the US should have pursued it with constancy once we had committed ourselves to it. To shift gears cost us confidence in many ways. Moreover, it appeared we were appeasing deGaulle-even giving him a veto,” etc. I replied that our basic position on the problem and on the MLF—to my knowledge—had not changed. No one should doubt our constancy. The MLF had always been an attempt to meet an asserted European problem. Moreover, I said that there had been two major new elements in the situation in recent weeks. First, the new Labor Government had been elected in the UK and was striving to abandon its national nuclear deterrent. Surely it was only sensible to consider most carefully British proposals to this end which could result in UK participation in an MLF. If the Germans and Italians disliked certain of the British ideas it was far more effective for them to tell the British so directly rather than for us to object on the basis that the Germans or Italians would not like this or that. Secondly, De Gaulle’s attitude had shifted from indifference to open hostility toward the MLF with the veiled threat that he’d pull the pillars of the Temple down if it became a fact. Surely time should be allotted to ensure that he understood the basic concept and the intention to leave it open for later French adherence. I added I knew of no willingness to accord the French a veto over any or all actions in NATO. Sergio then referred to a statement in President Johnson’s speech 3 to the effect our policy was not based on an “abstract design” and asked if he should attach great significance to this as portending a basic change in US policy toward Europe. I said “certainly not—that this was language reflecting Mr. Johnson’s pragmatic approach to problems.” He agreed. Sergio then shifted to East-West relations and talked interestingly on the dangers to Italy (& France) which had large Communist parties of overemphasizing polycentrism in the European satellites and deemphasizing the inherent evils of communism as an ideology. Finally, he reverted to one of his chronic themes that the US cannot and must not leave the Europeans to make important decisions alone. US influence and leadership is needed. It was a long and interesting lunch. Despite all my efforts he was still in a melancholy mood when I left, for he has stuck his own professional neck out very far on the MLF. I leave it to you to give this note such distribution as you think it should have. All the best, Sincerely, Livie 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT-US. No classification marking. Tyler wrote the following note on the letter on January 19: “I called Livie and thanked him for his thoughtful note.” 2 Reston’s column appeared in The New York Times , December 21, 1964. For documentation on U.S. policy decisions, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 49 – 67 . 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9. 106. Memorandum of Conversation 106. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 5, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Secretary’s Discussion of the Situation in Viet-Nam with the Italian Ambassador PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy Mr. Rinaldo Petrignani, Counselor, Italian Embassy Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE Italian Request for a Review of the Situation —Calling under instructions, he said, of Prime Minister Moro, the Ambassador referred to Moro’s statements (before the publication of our White Paper) supporting the American position on Viet-Nam. 2 The Secretary expressed warm appreciation for the helpful statements that the Prime Minister had made despite his political problems. Noting this appreciation, the Ambassador stated that Moro had courageously pointed to Hanoi as the root of the trouble in Viet-Nam. By its military action against South Viet-Nam through infiltration, the U.S. had been forced to reply acting with and on behalf of Saigon. The Ambassador added that Moro is mindful of the potential danger of the situation and has welcomed U.S. assurances that we do not wish to see the conflict spread. Italy has not taken any initiative in trying to bring about a settlement of the conflict but is not indifferent to the problem and stands ready to cooperate if the occasion to be helpful should arise. In light of the foregoing, the Prime Minister had requested the Ambassador to obtain our latest views on the situation in Viet-Nam, including an evaluation of the various political initiatives that have recently been taken, notably by the British and French, whose views, however, seemed to differ somewhat. The Ambassador hoped a common approach to the problem consistent with Allied solidarity can be worked out. He thought a NATO review of the situation might be helpful, in connection with which he noted with satisfaction Ambassador Unger’s recent briefing in NATO. The Secretary then reviewed our position on Viet-Nam along the lines of his news conference of February 25. 3 He said that his opening statements in particular expressed clearly what the crux of our policy on Viet-Nam is and hoped that the Italian Government had been furnished with a text. The Ambassador replied he had sent copies of the entire text. As he had stressed at his news conference, the Secretary said that the missing piece in a solution of the Viet-Nam problem is Hanoi’s willingness to terminate its aggression in South Viet-Nam and leave its neighbor in peace. Channels to Communists Open —The Secretary also wished to stress that channels to the Communists to discuss Viet-Nam are open—the French through Hanoi, the British as Co-Chairman with Soviets on Laos, ourselves with Peiping via Warsaw, etc. Thus, there is no lack of communications, but so far none of these contacts has revealed any evidence of Hanoi’s willingness to abandon its aggression by infiltration and terrorism against South Viet-Nam. Therefore, the question of negotiations takes on a special meaning. Negotiations leading to surrender in South Viet-Nam are, of course, out of the question. If formal negotiations were started and then failed, this failure could lead to a more serious situation and wider conflict, since a way out through negotiations would have already been exhausted. In this connection, the Secretary pointed out that previous successful negotiations with the Communists (end of Berlin blockade, Laos Agreement, Test Ban Treaty, etc.) have been preceded by private talks indicating a genuine willingness to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. There has been no such indication resulting from contacts with Hanoi. The French, for instance, have asked the North Vietnamese point blank if they were willing to stop their aggression in South Viet-Nam but have received no answer. Both French and British approaches have not reflected the possibility of success in terms acceptable to the Free World. The United States has more reason than any other Western country for a successful resolution of the problem, but a peaceful solution is impossible if only one side wants it. As the President and Secretary have reiterated on innumerable occasions, we will withdraw our forces tomorrow if Hanoi will honestly guarantee to let South Viet-Nam alone. Meanwhile, as the President has affirmed, the United States is prepared to take all appropriate and adequate measures to stay on until Hanoi shows its readiness for peace. Difference Between the Situations in Laos and Viet-Nam —The Secretary said there was an important difference between the situations in Laos and Viet-Nam from a United States viewpoint. The Laos Accords of 1962 4 had been preceded by a Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement that a solution of the Laotian problem should be reached on the basis of all countries undertaking to leave Laos alone to tend to its own affairs. This bilateral agreement with the Soviets is lacking with reference to Viet-Nam. While the United States participated in the negotiations leading to the Geneva Agreement on Laos, it did not do so in the case of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 on Viet-Nam, 5 which the United States did not sign but accepted in a declaratory statement made by Ambassador Bedell Smith. Points of Emphasis for Moro —The Secretary suggested that in his discussions of the Viet-Nam problem, the Prime Minister might helpfully underline what North Viet-Nam is doing to South Viet-Nam in the way of massive infiltration and terrorism and to express confidence that the United States will withdraw just as soon as North Viet-Nam stops its aggressive interference. The Ambassador stated Moro has been doing this and that our White Paper is helpful in this regard. The Secretary commented that our French friends, for instance, express concern about our air strikes but make no mention of North Vietnamese provocation in South Viet-Nam, which makes a troublesome imbalance. Even the Buddhists in South Viet-Nam, who are keen for a peaceful settlement, base it on demands that both the North Vietnamese and Americans go home, and have told us privately that they support our air strikes even if religious considerations prevent them from saying so in public. Clarification of Point in U.S. White Paper —The Ambassador referred to a statement in our White Paper on Viet-Nam to the effect that the United States and South Viet-Nam would continue their military efforts until either North Viet-Nam ceased its aggression or other measures were taken to assure the peace and security of the area. The Ambassador wondered about the significance of the “or” clause. The Secretary explained that the “either” clause carried 99 percent of the weight of the sentence. The “or” clause had been added so as to leave a door technically open to the possibility of some sort of international action, possibly through the UN, SEATO, etc., but that possibility seemed small. Significance of the Soviet Role —The Ambassador asked if the Secretary regarded the latest reaction from Moscow to our air strikes as more violent than the others, perhaps portending stiffer Soviet action? The Secretary replied that the Soviet record in South East Asia in the past has demonstrated a Soviet desire to avoid a confrontation in the area with the United States. The Sino-Soviet conflict, however, has become a complicating factor in solving problems with the Soviets in SEA since the Soviets are under pressure to take steps strong enough to match the Chinese Communist. Therefore, the possibility of substantial Soviet military aid to Hanoi cannot be excluded. The Secretary thought, however, that the tenor of Moscow’s reaction to our air strikes has been about what could be expected under the circumstances. He added that we were sorry that the February 9 strikes occurred while Kosygin was in Hanoi, and it was not the United States which planned it that way. In short, the Secretary said we cannot say for sure what the Soviets may do. The Ambassador wondered if we were forced as a deterrent measure to strike further north in North Viet-Nam, whether that might not bring the Chinese Communists directly into the hostilities. The Secretary replied that there is no sure answer to such a question. The North Vietnamese probably fear a horde of Chinese coming into their country but, on the other hand, desire to take over South Viet-Nam. Who can tell which emotion would dominate? The Secretary did think, however, that if Hanoi fails to pull back, the situation can become more serious. Stability of Political Situation in South Viet-Nam —The Ambassador asked about the prospects for greater political stability in South Viet-Nam and mused whether the Viet-Cong might not eventually win by a political takeover rather than by military means. The Secretary regretted the effects of fourteen months of political instability in Hanoi [Saigon], which has made a bad impression abroad, including the United States, and sent the wrong kind of signal to Hanoi about the ability of South Viet-Nam to continue to resist. We hope very much that the current Saigon regime will endure, but in light of past events, cannot say for sure. In this connection, the Secretary pointed out that political commotion in Saigon affects only a comparatively few people and that traditionally the rural areas in South Viet-Nam are not too greatly affected by what happens in the capital. In areas in the countryside where the security of the population (about 75 percent) is assured, the villages and towns have cooperated satisfactorily with Saigon. In conclusion, the Secretary said that while the situation is not good, still it is not necessarily on the brink of collapse. Possibility of Italian Assistance —The Ambassador again referred to the fact that Prime Minister Moro has not proposed an Italian initiative but does not remain indifferent to the seriousness of the situation. The Ambassador wondered, therefore, if there were not something useful that the Italians might be doing now to express their willingness to cooperate. The Secretary said he appreciated this willingness, but could not think of anything they could do at this particular juncture. As he had already explained, we do have the channels for sounding out the Communists on Viet-Nam but so far none of the soundings has produced any satisfactory results. The Ambassador commented that if the French through their contacts with Peiping and Hanoi succeeded in persuading the North Vietnamese to withdraw, would that not prove the value of maintaining such contacts. The Secretary replied that if the French so succeeded that would be fine, but so far there is no evidence of such success. He thought it important that our friends, including the French, first think about the desired results in Viet-Nam and then decide on how to achieve them. If Paris, for instance, equates the neutralization of South Viet-Nam with Communist domination of South East Asia, that, of course, would not be an acceptable result for the Free World. We can accept South Vietnamese and other South East Asian peoples being non-aligned quite happily, but we cannot sanction their being taken over by the Communist camp against their will. Effect of the Viet-Nam Problem on Presidential Travel —Replying to the Ambassador’s inquiry, the Secretary stated no definite arrangements have been made for the President’s travel in Europe, which, as has been announced publicly, remains an intention in principle. How things shape up in South East Asia would, of course, be a factor affecting the timing of the President’s eventual trip to Europe. The Ambassador warmly thanked the Secretary for his kind and useful reception and took his leave. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IT-US. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S on April 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 Moro supported U.S. policies in Vietnam in February 12 and 18 statements before the Italian Senate. The white paper was “Aggression From the North,” released February 27. Its contents are summarized in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 171 . 3 For text of Rusk’s remarks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 836-838. 4 For text of the declaration and protocol on neutrality in Laos, signed in Geneva July 23, 1962, see 14 UST 1104. For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume XXIV . 5 For texts of the Indochina accords, signed in Geneva July 20, 1954, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 750-788. For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1952-1954, volume XIII . 107. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy in Italy (Fraleigh) to the Officer in Charge of Italian Affairs (Givan) 107. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy in Italy (Fraleigh) to the Officer in Charge of Italian Affairs (Givan) 1 Rome, March 10, 1965. Dear Walker: We were concerned to learn, from your letter of February 18, that you had seen an uncleared policy paper that argues that Western European Communist parties including the PCI are changing and at some point will probably be acceptable partners within the governing coalitions. 2 We presume that you will oppose clearing any such paper, and we hope that the arguments we have furnished—for example, in our A-1828 of June 30, 1964 3 —provide sufficient ammunition for you to justify formally withholding EUR clearance. Just in case it might prove useful, however, I am summarizing below the arguments against the wishful thinking which promotes the theory here that the PCI wolf is becoming a harmless and useful sheep. The rationale, here in Italy, concerning the evolution of the PCI toward respectability and acceptability, generally leans heavily on one or more of the following weak “logical” reeds: The PCI is becoming independent of Moscow, and as a fully autonomous party it will be acceptable within the democratic area. This is of course a non sequitur. The PCI link with Moscow is an excellent reason to exclude the Communists from power here. But it is not the only reason. The continued diminution eventually perhaps even to something approaching zero, of any such link with Moscow would not make the PCI acceptable or worthy of trust. They would remain a totalitarian party; as totalitarian as the Fascist MSI, and considerably more dangerous. We believe that it suffices to point out that the Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) is quite independent of Moscow and since 1948 has made tremendous strides toward reconciling itself with the Yugoslav people, but it remains Marxist-Leninist, and after almost 17 years of independence from Moscow the Yugoslav people are still offered no political alternative whatsoever to the LCY. There is no evidence to support any conclusion that a fully autonomous PCI would perform any more democratically than the LCY. The PCI is evolving toward democracy, and once fully democratic there would be no reason to exclude the Communists from the exercise of power. This fallacy is based on a false premise. The PCI is not evolving toward democracy. Steps have been taken from time to time to improve the workings of the system and (hopefully, from the PCI point of view) to give the cadres more of a feeling of participation in the Party decision-making apparatus. These are agitprop exercises, and the rest of the scanty appearances of PCI democratization are no more than a well propagandized illusion. Party leaders have said again and again that no matter how much the democratic left-wing calls for Communist abandonment of democratic centralism, the PCI will continue to consider democratic centralism the keystone of the Party principles of organization. In this sense the Leninist orthodoxy of the Party is impeccable. And it goes without saying that on this subject the views of Rosa Luxemburg stated 60 years ago (see Luxemburg’s Centralism or Democracy) still demand our careful consideration. She correctly predicted that democratic centralism and Party democracy would prove to be completely antithetical, and history has shown her to have been correct. The leaders of the democratic left-wing parties here know, and it more than ever behooves us to keep in mind, that no partial measures short of complete abandonment of Leninist organization can ever democratize the PCI. The argument can of course be made, convincing or not, that the lack of democracy within the Party need not preclude its acting in a democratic manner with respect to other parties. However, the statements of the Party (for Party consumption and therefore asserted seriously) leave no room for doubt on this score. The statements of Pietro Ingrao which were quoted in our A-1828 make it clear that the leopard has no intention of changing its spots, despite the propaganda to the contrary. Inherent PCI tendencies toward autonomy and democracy can be stimulated and brought to fruition by gradually bringing the Party into the democratic area and offering responsibility to the Communists as they prove themselves ready for it. Of course this view would not be reflected in any paper prepared in Washington, but it is properly a part of this letter because it represents a logical construction on the fundamental misconceptions listed above. And notwithstanding the political absurdity of this sort of thought, we are sometimes hit with arguments of this type which, for example, regret our “shortsightedness” for not speeding up the “PCI evolution” by recognizing the respectability of Giorgio Amendola, etc. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, let me say that we find it quite easy to bear in mind that if the PCI leaders were demonstrably autonomous and 24 karat democrats, their domestic and foreign policy programs would automatically exclude them from any sort of practical consideration as partners in an Italian coalition. The problems inherent in the present center-left coalition provide sufficient examples. It is difficult to imagine the PCI moving to the right of the PSI positions as they are today, but without such a movement by the PCI, the Communists could contribute nothing to a program which would also have to find acceptance outside the Marxist area. Putting it another way, the Catholics recognize that a “dialogue” with Leninist Communists is impossible unless the Catholics care to move toward Communist positions; see, for example, L’Impossible Dialogo tra Cattolici e Communisti, Father Giuseppe De Rosa, S.J., in Civilta Cattolica of October 17, 1964, or the recent broadside by the Vatican Osservatore Romano. As Father De Rosa said, there is no common ground—political, philosophical, religious, or social. And the PCI has repeatedly asserted it will not abandon its tenets in all these areas. It is not surprising that the Catholics, the PSDI, and all parties to the right of them have rejected cooperation with a party that remains a wolf in sheep’s clothing; a party that is not evolving toward democracy; a party that is only slightly less objectionable as a result of its growing autonomy; a party with which it would be impossible to fashion a useful democratic program, even if sincerity and trustworthiness could be assumed. We believe the democratic parties have been wise in rejecting the PCI to date. We don’t see any convincing evidence that the PCI is changing, and much convincing evidence that it is not. We don’t know, therefore, to what democratic parties the PCI might ultimately become acceptable as a coalition partner, but we are certain that in terms of US policy interests and in the interests of liberty and democracy for our allies, the Communists will remain unacceptable unless and until they become fully autonomous, scrap Lenin’s democratic centralist structure, and adopt and support programs which reflect national needs rather than narrow doctrinal or power interests. But would the PCI then be a Communist Party? The way to deal with the Communists, it seems to us, is to isolate them from the government and keep them so until the government has taken measures to improve social and economic conditions in Italy. Then it is to be hoped that their voting strength will fall off, for two reasons, as Nenni noted the other day: (1) voters will have less to protest about and (2) they will see that the Communists, absent from the “control room” can do nothing directly to influence the government’s program. To let the Communists into the government would remove this avenue of (hopefully) diminishing their voting strength. We feel strongly enough about this to wish to call the paper to which you refer to John Di Sciullo’s attention, and I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to him. We hope both of you can take a thoroughly skeptical view of any paper that claims to see any meaningful steps toward democracy by the PCI. We would be the first to be delighted by such a trend, in view of the threat the PCI constitutes in Italy, but what we have observed to date is basically not PCI evolution, but wishful thinking encouraged by the PCI. Sincerely, Bill 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436, Official Informal. Confidential; Official-Informal. 2 Neither the letter nor the paper has been found. 3 Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 IT) 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 108. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, April 9, 1965, 8 p.m. 2659. Moro Visit. Italian Communist Problem. Embtel 2551 2 advised that Moro will expect be asked for his views on problem of Italian Communist Party (PCI). Embassy believes that occasion should be used by US to strengthen Christian Democratic (DC) determination to face this problem squarely. Experience in Italy supports belief that only by standing firm can anti-Communist content of center-left program be given fair test of ability to reduce Communist threat. Majority of DC (including Moro) have no illusions concerning nature of PCI and threat it constitutes for Italian democracy. Nevertheless, important elements of DC, including factions led by Foreign Minister Fanfani, have at times shown willingness to deal with or attempt to use Communist Party to accomplish non-Communist aims. Interest by some members DC in current Communist maneuver to establish “dialogue” between Catholics and PCI, i.e. a debate which would lead to DC-PCI political understanding, is a case in point. Indications of Pope’s displeasure in March 31 audience, and subsequent strong warnings by Vatican’s Osservatore Romano and Jesuit Civilta Cattolica against DC-PCI collaboration should put to rest trend toward dangerous assumption that it possible for Church to treat profitably with Italian Communists. Strong Vatican position will have salutary effect at least for immediate future. However, US approach to Moro regarding PCI can benefit from climate of Vatican reaction and at same time contribute to broader scope and hopefully lasting nature of DC resolve to isolate Communists. Embassy therefore believes this is appropriate time for US encourage Moro to hold line against Italian Communists and press ahead with Italian effort to demonstrate that cooperation with PCI neither necessary nor compatible with good government. Although we believe Moro will need little convincing on this subject, he may point out characteristics of PCI which are different from those of other Communist parties and which are changing to adapt to contemporary world. These phenomena are major subject of debate among democratic parties in Italy, where the issues are obscured by desire of some democratic elements to reject out of hand all reports of change, autonomy, or national motivation in PCI. Facts are that PCI leaders are efficient, pragmatic, and energetic; they have given PCI character of its own, and that character is subject to certain changes to adapt to developments in Italy and within international Communist movement. Embassy believes it important that we recognize the real elements of difference and change in PCI, bearing carefully in mind that in terms of basic nature and goals, the PCI is and will remain an unacceptable totalitarian party. Moro may discuss following principal current problem areas of PCI question: Autonomy. PCI policy is linked to Moscow but substantial autonomy does exist, and trend in international movement is toward increasing degree autonomy. Pertinent question in Italy is: will PCI be acceptable for cooperation with democratic parties if and when PCI can be considered autonomous? Answer is that if PCI were autonomous, it would still have to be judged on its domestic Italian attributes. And by PCI’s own statements, these attributes are and will continue to be Marxist-Leninist in organization and philosophy. They will include materialism, economic determinism, democratic centralism, Marxist concepts of history and truth, and the range of Communist theory and practice which is irreconcilable with democratic institutions. Democracy. PCI strategy to seek power by parliamentary means has been exploited also by the Communists to project false image of respectable democratic party. Additionally, imperatives of membership appeal and popular image push PCI toward increasing semblance of democracy in internal and external practice. However, PCI Leninist control formula (democratic centralism) is authoritarian, and party consistently asserts that democratic centralism is basic to PCI procedure. As long as party holds to Leninist totalitarian concepts, PCI cannot be democratic internally or in its relations with other Italian parties. Moreover, lack of PCI democratic intent has been made abundantly clear by party leaders, despite effective propaganda to the contrary (see A-1828 June 30, 1964). 3 Reinhardt 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Confidential. 2 Telegram 2551 from Rome, March 30, provided an analysis of Moro’s character. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 3, Document 107 . 109. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 109. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 16, 1965. These are some observations that I hope that you would consider in regard to the visit of Prime Minister Moro. The Prime Minister is very anxious for this visit to be a success from both his standpoint and yours. As you know, I spoke rather sharply to the Italian Ambassador after the publication of the New York Times story about his alleged remarks on Viet Nam. 2 The Italian Ambassador was very upset about it and insisted that this was a speculative story. He later conveyed to me that he passed along to the Prime Minister my conversation with him. The Prime Minister declared the story to be entirely speculative and not at all the sort of thing he would be saying. The Prime Minister is in a difficult political situation. The Nenni Socialist Party (PSI) cannot be too accommodating or else Nenni will lose his effectiveness as well as his following. It is vital to Moro that the Nenni Socialists remain allied to him because of the substantial strength of the Communist Party. As of now the Christian Democrats have a little less than half of the majority in the Italian Parliament with the PSI about 15% and the Communists about 25%. There is a splinter group (PSIUP) a little to the left of the PSI and a little to the right of the Communists. This group broke off from Nenni’s Socialists when the Nenni Socialists endorsed NATO. Therefore, the Moro posture is on a knife-edge and the outcome of his meeting with you is very important to him. Viet Nam is the one issue that threatens the Moro-Nenni relationship. Your Baltimore speech had a tremendously favorable impact in Italy. It cut the propaganda ground out from under the Communists and strengthened Moro’s hand immeasurably. The Prime Minister wants to tell you about the Italian political situation and of the moves that Italy is making to restore its economic strength. He will be very circumspect about what is said in public about Viet Nam. I think you will find out that you will be able to call the turn on this and he would be willing to go along with your views—keeping in mind, of course, that too strong a support of the U.S.-Viet Nam policy would allow the Communists to make some hay. If it is possible for you to consider the following, it would allow Moro to go back to Italy in a stronger position than when he left: (1) The President hopefully show great warmth and affection for Moro and Italy in some visible way-perhaps a little longer than usual discussion with Moro, particularly private talks. Hopefully, I will try to come up with some ideas for pictures and other suggestions that will give evidence that the warmth of your welcome was more than merely normal and procedural. (2) Any background we can give the Press to emphasize the extreme cordiality of the meeting and the President’s genuine and intense interest in Italy’s problems and in Italy’s future. You are scheduled to actually talk with him about 45 minutes. If this could be stretched to say about an hour and a half even though Moro will be a little late to his luncheon given by Secretary Fowler on April 20 it would be taken as a gesture of warm interest on your part. (3) The Italians are quite sensitive about their position in the European power structure. It would be most helpful if your talk could underscore the fact that the U.S. considers Italy to be part of a rectangle of London, Paris, Bonn, and Rome. Like any human or nation that once tasted great glory and then settled into a decline, the Italians thirst for recognition as a nation to be reckoned with in the affairs of the world. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Moro Visit. No classification marking. 2 An apparent reference to The New York Times article by Reston of April 11. No record of Valenti’s conversation with Fenoaltea has been found. 110. Editorial Note 110. Editorial Note Prime Minister Aldo Moro visited Washington April 20-21, 1965, for meetings with U.S. officials. In a one-on-one meeting with President Johnson, Moro laid out his view of the prospects for Italy’s Center Left government. In a subsequent expanded meeting, Moro, Foreign Minister Fanfani, the President, and Secretary Rusk discussed the war in Vietnam, immigration, and European unification. Moro had a discussion with Vice President Humphrey on Latin America at an April 21 breakfast meeting. Memoranda of the Moro-Johnson talks are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 70 D 217. A memorandum of the Moro-Humphrey discussion is ibid., Italian Desk Files: Lot 68 D 436, Pol 15-2 Humphrey. A memorandum of conversation between Moro and Secretary Rusk on NATO issues is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIII, Document 80 . For texts of the welcoming statements, toasts, and communiqué, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pages 434-438 and 440-441. Telegram 2471 to Rome, April 22, summarized the talks: “Substantive discussions covering major world problems disclosed no novel GOI positions. In discussions Moro was most forthcoming in support US objectives SEA and elsewhere.” It also noted that “Visitors highly pleased with arrangements and exceptional gestures of esteem.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT) 111. Memorandum of Conversation 111. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 28, 1965. SUBJECT Italian Film Law PARTICIPANTS Mr. William H. Fineshriber, Jr., MPEAA Mr. Leo Hochstetter, MPEAA Mr. G. Griffith Johnson The Honorable G. Frederick Reinhardt, American Ambassador to Italy Mr. David R. Thomson, E/OT/GCP, Department of State Mr. Fineshriber and Mr. Hochstetter emphasized that Italy today is the most important non-English-speaking market for U.S. films. They briefly reviewed the post-World War II history of access to this market. Tight restrictions have gradually been liberalized, and the Italian market is now substantially open to U.S. competition, as shown by the fact that American films earn over 50% of total gross receipts in Italy. Liberalization has been a function of greatly increased collaboration between the United States and Italian film industries, particularly with respect to production and financing. Mr. Fineshriber and Mr. Hochstetter noted the strong political factors which had influenced the motion picture bill as recently reported out of the Parliamentary Commission. According to their information, the bill will probably come up for action in the Chamber of Deputies by late May. The MPEAA’s over-all assessment of the bill was that it provided for entirely too much government regulation, and that it contained too many elements of discrimination against foreign films. They noted, however, that some of its undesirable features would have little significance unless enforced by the Italian authorities in a restrictive way. The manner of future implementation might depend in part upon U.S. attitudes toward the new law. I.e. if the United States should make a big issue of the law, the Italian film authorities could be expected to react by enforcing it strictly, instead of by relaxing its controls where this is left open to their discretion. Specific Unfavorable Features of the Bill Rebates on admission tax for showing national films (Article 6 and other articles of bill). Ambassador Reinhardt assured the group that he was familiar with the manner in which this rebate has been in violation of Italy’s international trade commitments since 1949 (see CA-5560, 11/24/64). 2 It was noted that the new rebate formula was much more complex than the provision which had been in effect since 1949, and that one could not say offhand whether the general incidence of discrimination would be higher or lower. However, one change would clearly sharpen the extent of discrimination; namely, the fact that films from other EEC countries would henceforth be eligible for the rebates. Copies of films for National Film Library (Article 23). The MPEAA representatives expressed some concern about the new requirement to provide free of charge a copy of each new feature film for possible “educational and cultural” showings after 5 years. They recognized that the requirement apparently did not discriminate between foreign and domestic films, and that it presumably did not violate international commitments by Italy. Nevertheless, it did represent a new form of government intervention. Government intervention in terms of film rental contracts (Article 41). The law permits the Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment to fix the terms of private contracts, e.g., between distributors and exhibitors, if the interested private parties do not reach agreement. This was not a new feature of Italian legislation on films, the MPEAA representatives noted, but it left open a wide field for possible abuse by the Italian authorities. Cinema screen quota (Article 5). In the latest version of the bill, Mr. Hochstetter reported, the screen quota reserving time for films which qualify as national has been raised from the traditional 25 days per quarter (about 28%) to 30 days per quarter (about 33%). Under current market conditions, he said, the increased quota would probably not hurt American exports any more than the previous quota, since films currently qualifying as domestic were able to command about 45% of the Italian market. Mr. Hochstetter had some impression that this increase would be inconsistent with Italy’s commitments under the GATT. Mr. Thomson explained that this was not so, since this quota had never been bound in trade negotiations. Television screen quota (new Article 56). Another restrictive new feature affecting television had been added to the bill, Mr. Fineshriber reported. The bill would require that, of screen time devoted to the broadcast of feature films (and this is normally a very small fraction of total screen time), at least 50% must be reserved for national films. Mr. Thomson commented that this provision, assuming its enactment, would be a curious new departure, in that countries with state television monopolies usually preferred to conceal trade-restrictive practices in this field and to hide behind the fact of operation by the state. A brief overview ensued of the compatibility of these provisions with Italy’s international trade commitments. As the MPEAA representatives were aware, the American Embassy in Rome has already taken the position in discussions with Italian officials, by instruction (CA-5560), that any rebate of this type was incompatible with the GATT (Article III), the U.S.-Italian FCN Treaty (Article XVI), and with the OECD Code on Current Invisibles. As for the proposed increase in the cinema screen quota, it was noted that this action would be compatible with what the EEC Commission had recently prescribed in its Second Directive on films (Article 5—see Brussels ECBUS A-722, 4/15/65). 3 Assuming that the new law would go into effect at an early date, the Italians would thus be complying with this directive in advance of the required date (December 31, 1966), by providing national treatment for the films of other EEC countries under the screen quota (Article 18 of the draft Italian law) and by using their “option” to make a corresponding increase in the height of the quota. It was noted that the GATT did not provide a basis for protesting such an action, although the United States had already presented to the EEC Commission arguments against the desirability of such increases, particularly on a “proportional” basis. With regard to the reported new TV screen quota, and possibly also to the increase in the cinema screen quota, Mr. Thomson noted that Italy had undertaken a standstill commitment with respect to restrictions affecting printed films, in the OECD Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations. The United States, he noted, could argue that both measures were inconsistent with this commitment. However, Mr. Thomson added, there was still no agreement in the OECD as to whether the standstill covered screen quotas. MPEAA Position In summarizing their views about the bill, the MPEAA representatives made it clear that they were concerned about many of its features, but that they were also highly concerned about safeguarding their companies’ high volume of business in Italy and anxious to avoid aggravating the situation unnecessarily. In view of the political history of the bill, and regardless of Italy’s international commitments, the MPEAA regarded it as unrealistic to expect to achieve any change in the bill as reported out by the Parliamentary Commission which would be in a more liberal direction. They felt, nevertheless, that it would be desirable at this point for the Ambassador to make a high-level approach on the matter, preferably to Corona, the Minister of Tourism and Entertainment. The main idea they would like to see put across would be on the following lines: the Italians would be jeopardizing future cooperative relations in the film field if they should try to go any further along the path of official discrimination against foreign films. The U.S. film industry could reluctantly learn to live with the provisions of the bill as presently drafted, but the Italians could expect “real trouble” from the American side if they should allow this discrimination to go even a single step further, or if—in areas where the authorities have any discretion—they should implement the law in a restrictive manner. The MPEAA representatives also made it clear that they wanted the U.S. position on the legal issues involved to be put “on the record.” Ambassador Reinhardt said he intended to make such a démarche, and that he would consult further with Mr. Hochstetter after they had both returned to Rome. The Ambassador said he had in mind a three-stage presentation: (a) With regard to the legal issues raised by international agreements, he would make sure that the Italians understood that the U.S. Government does not condone Italy’s departures from its commitments. (b) He would ask Corona to give him a frank statement of Italian intentions with respect to U.S. film interests. E.g., under what circumstances would the Italians invoke the discretionary measures? Do they still place any value on future cooperative relationships between Italy and the United States in the field of motion pictures? Have they decided to revert to general policy of protectionism in this area? Etc. (c) He would bespeak the cooperation of high Italian officials in preventing matters from getting any worse. In connection with the last part of this proposed démarche, the Ambassador indicated that he would take into consideration the entire scope of our trade and other interests. He said that, if specific trade injury was being felt, he might make use of any figures which the MPEAA could supply him. However, he had found in dealing with certain other trade issues involving Italy that in some cases you simply could not estimate accurately the extent of such injury. Mr. Fineshriber said that the MPEAA might respond to a previous suggestion from Mr. Thomson that it make a rough estimate of the actual effect upon remittances from Italy to the U.S., attributable to (a) the previous 20% rebate, and (b) the proposed more complex rebate. However, he indicated it would not be possible to say anything definite in this regard, particularly under present favorable market conditions in Italy. Future possibilities were noted for dealing with this matter in international forums, such as the OECD, in addition to bilateral representations to the Italian authorities. Ambassador Reinhardt felt that, for the time being, it would be advisable to confine U.S. representations to the bilateral channel and to reserve any U.S. actions in international organizations until such time as circumstances appear to call for them. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 5 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Thomson on April 29. The conversation was held at the Motion Picture Association of America headquarters. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., INCO MOTION PICTURES-IT) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., ECIN 3 EEC) 112. Memorandum of Conversation 112. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 24, 1965. SUBJECT Italian-US Civil Aviation Differences PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter Italy Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani Foreign Minister Fanfani asked the Secretary if any progress had been made in the area of civil aviation. The Secretary said that we are continuing to study the subject, and, that he thought it would be best to continue to handle the matter through the normal channels on the technical level. Minister Fanfani instantaneously concluded, with the last words of the Secretary, “Yes, with the companies.” The Secretary corrected this and said he referred to government technical channels, then added that if some answer can be found to the problem of capacity there would be hope of solving some of the other aspects of the question. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on June 2. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. Copies of the other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The discussion was held during a luncheon at the Department of State. 113. Memorandum for the Record 113. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, June 28, 1965. SUBJECT Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 25 June 1965 PRESENT Mr. Bundy, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Helms, Mr. Vance Mr. Glenn Fields was present for Item 1. Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Items 3, 4, 5, 6. Mr. Frank Friberg was present for Item 7. Mr. Cord Meyer was present for Item 8. [Here follows discussion of items 1-6 covering other national programs.] 7. Italy—Covert Action Program in Italy for FY 1966 2 The Italian proposal was generally viewed as a “necessary evil” and approved with the following proviso: Mr. Bundy, deploring the chronic failure of the Italian democratic political parties to utilize their own bootstraps, used the term “annual shame” and stated that he felt obliged to advise higher authority of this continuing subsidy. Until such time as the attitude of higher authority is known, final approval remains pending. [Here follows discussion of item 8.] 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 According to the proposed agenda for the meeting “[ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] proposed spending [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for its covert action program in Italy in FY 1966. Its purpose is to strengthen the center left government. While the program has some new emphasis on ‘flanking organizations’ it is in general a continuation of policies that have been successful in Italy.” (Ibid.) According to the [ text not declassified ] proposal to the 303 Committee, June 11: “The basic political problem to which the FY 1966 program is addressed is that Italy’s four-party, center-left coalition Government, which was formed in December 1963, is faced with a profusion of problems which makes it a fragile working partnership. The Italian Communist Party has skillfully exploited the Government’s vulnerabilities and has steadily increased its electoral appeal during this period when the vote of the two major coalition partners, the Christian Democrats (CD) and the Socialists (PSI), has declined. A basic premise of the FY 1966 program is that if the strength and unity of the Government coalition can be increased, thus permitting implementation of its program of basic social, economic and administrative reforms, the democratic parties’ appeal in the next national election should increase and that of the Communist Party should decline.” (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files: Italy) 114. Memorandum of Conversation 114. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 22, 1965, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Review of Professor Valletta’s Discussions with Kosygin in Moscow PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Director, Office of Economic Opportunity Mr. Herbert Spielman, WE Mr. Jose De Seabra, Interpreter Italy Professor Vittorio Valletta, President of Fiat Mr. Carlo Cavalli, Assistant to Professor Valletta Mr. Vincent A. Garibaldi, Fiat Representative, New York Mr. Oscar Cox, American attorney for Fiat In welcoming Professor Valletta, Secretary Rusk said he understood the Professor had been traveling recently, and he would enjoy receiving his impressions. Professor Valletta noted two impressions which had emerged from his discussions with Chairman of Council of Ministers Kosygin in Moscow: First, that Kosygin desired to reduce his defense costs and, with the resulting savings, to shift from the production of armaments and nuclear weapons to more intensive development of consumer goods. Secondly, that with respect to Vietnam, Kosygin had indicated he generally desired a solution but he could not act because he was faced with “independent nations” against which it was difficult to bring pressure; Professor Valletta, who said he had initially raised the Vietnam issue with Kosygin, observed that he understood this to be a reference to Communist China. The Secretary remarked that the USSR exercises no effective control over the Hanoi regime’s actions. Hanoi, in turn, was under pressure from Peiping to achieve military results. This created difficulties for Moscow and also for us in that we had no one with whom to discuss a peaceful solution. The Secretary continued that the Vietnamese issue had become a formidable barrier in US-Soviet relations. Until that problem was solved there would continue to be considerable strain in US-Soviet relations. These remarks, he added, reflected also the recent Harriman Kosygin discussions, 2 which conveyed similar impressions on Vietnam to those expressed by Professor Valletta. Professor Valletta said that in his modest opinion if some form of US-Soviet contact could be continued as a result of the Harriman talks, this would be all to the good. He guessed that Kosygin would like to intervene usefully in the Vietnamese situation. Indeed, Kosygin had accepted the reconvening this month of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The Secretary interjected that it would be interesting to see what emerged from the current meeting of Communist party leaders in Bucharest, where the Soviet and Chinese leaders would be in contact. 3 The Professor noted that, in any event, it would be well for the United States to continue to retain a position of strength. Agreeing, the Secretary said that if Moscow and Peiping were to come together on the basis of the Soviet thesis of “co-existence” that would be all right, but if, on the other hand, they agreed on Peiping’s terms, that would involve very grave dangers not only for the United States but for Europe as well. Mr. Cox said he assumed the informal contacts between Valletta and Kosygin would continue in view of the agreement in principle for Fiat to provide technical guidance in automobile production to the Soviet Union. Professor Valletta observed that it was during the discussion of this that Kosygin had expressed the desire to better satisfy the Soviet people’s needs for a better life. The Secretary noted we always emphasized to the Russians our mutual “unfinished business” in building our own societies. For example, in the United States we required about a million new classrooms, and that we could accordingly think of better ways to spend $50 billion each year than for defense. Referring to the Soviet-Fiat agreement in principle to cooperate in automobile production, 4 Mr. Roosevelt said that Professor Valletta had discussed this with Admiral Raborn at the CIA, with Secretary Connor at Commerce, and Deputy Defense Secretary Vance. 5 The Professor had made clear to them that if Fiat’s undertaking with the Soviet Union to construct an automobile factory was not in accord with United States policy, he would disengage Fiat. Mr. Roosevelt felt that Professor Valletta would wish to make the same point to Secretary Rusk. Professor Valletta said this was correct, but he wished to point out that enhancing Soviet automobile production involved important long-range considerations. The Secretary asked Professor Valletta for his impression of the time-table for cooperation between Fiat and the Soviets. The Professor replied that the Moscow talks had only touched on general aspects of the problem, and that he anticipated the USSR would send a mission to Italy to work out more precise details. In essence, Fiat would assist in the construction of a new Soviet automobile plant which would produce from 1000 to 2000 cars per day of the American compact type. In addition, Fiat would help the USSR to modernize existing plants which now turn out about 200,000 cars per year. The Secretary asked whether Fiat would be able to carry out this program itself, or would expect some kind of American participation. Professor Valletta replied that he had told the Soviet officials that if they desired an up-to-date automobile plant, some machinery would be required from the United States. The Secretary then noted that in the broadest sense we were sympathetic toward making more consumer goods available to the Soviet people. Indeed, we were exploring legislation to permit American business to participate more actively in trade with Eastern Europe. However, he wished to add a note of caution concerning possible US participation in Fiat’s undertaking with the USSR. He would wish to convey something more precise on this particular point and would be in touch with Professor Valletta after consulting with his colleagues, especially Secretary Connor. Mr. Cox observed that Secretary Connor had made the same point. Indeed, an officer from Commerce’s office of export controls had been present and had indicated that he foresaw no problems. The Soviets would apparently require three to five-year credits, however. The Secretary asked how the Soviets would pay, by increased oil exports to Italy? Professor Valletta noted that the present balance of trade between Italy and the USSR favored the latter. If the automobile project went forward, credit terms would have to be arranged. In setting up a modern automobile industry, the Soviet Union would not only have to utilize their technical resources but would also have to import machinery, perhaps from France, Britain, and Germany, among others. In concluding the discussion, the Secretary reiterated that we would wish to give this project some thought and would convey our reaction shortly. He added jokingly that perhaps it would help if we could obtain Soviet machinery to destroy old and discarded American automobiles. Laughingly agreeing, Professor Valletta expressed appreciation for his having had the opportunity to discuss his visit to Russia with the Secretary. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Spielman and approved in S on July 27. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. III, Document 59 . 3 July 19-24. 4 On May 4 Fiat and the Soviet Government announced agreement for joint planning and construction of an automobile factory in Togliattigrad. The agreement was signed on August 15. 5 No record of these conversations has been found. 115. Letter From Prime Minister Moro to President Johnson 115. Letter From Prime Minister Moro to President Johnson 1 Rome, August 2, 1965. Dear Mr. President: Ambassador Harriman has delivered to me your message of July 26th. 2 I wish to thank you warmly for your thoughtfulness in briefing me on the South Vietnam situation through Mr. Harriman: I have much appreciated the fact that you have chosen to add your personal remarks to those of the Ambassador. The conversation I had here has been very useful to me to improve my knowledge of the issue in the light of new elements. They confirm the reasons for the understanding we have repeatedly expressed for the motivations of the United States’s action in Viet Nam. Such action is all the more valuable in as much as it is coupled with offers for a peaceful and honorable solution, constantly and even recently reiterated, and with generous plans aimed at fostering, in the framework of a re-established peace, the welfare of the peoples of South East Asia through economic and social development. I also share your viewpoint on the advisability of a solidarity, demonstrated also with facts, to an action which encourages the free world to believe in the keeping of one’s word and in the failure of violence exerted for the purpose of upsetting freely accepted juridical situations. I have therefore confirmed to Ambassador Harriman the decision to renew the medical assistance, and I wish to inform you that I have given instructions to examine the possibility of increasing our humanitarian assistance. Mr. Harriman was accompanied by Ambassador Reinhardt, whom I shall contact for any further consultation, as you kindly suggested. Please believe me cordially yours Aldo Moro 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Italy. No classification marking. The letter is marked “Unofficial Translation.” 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) Harriman visited Rome July 24-25, during a July 8-August 3 trip to Europe. The Embassy reported on his talk with Moro in telegram 229 from Rome, July 26. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Public Service Files, Kennedy-Johnson, Trip and Mission Files, Europe and Soviet Union 1965) 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Moro signed the original. 116. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 116. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 4, 1965, 5:15 p.m. SUBJECT Italian covert political assistance Some weeks ago you asked me to review this problem and bring you up to date on it more specifically. I have now done so, and the situation is as follows: Over the years the US has assisted the democratic Italian political parties and trade unions at a very high rate. Over the period 1955-1965, the total amount of assistance is just under [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. In recent years we have been cutting this assistance back, primarily because the professionals closely related to the operation have concluded that we have not been getting our full money’s worth and what the Italian political parties need is not so much U.S. money as energetic administrative leadership. President Kennedy had a personal feeling that political subsidies at this level were excessive, and they were scaled down. In the last two or three years, assistance has been running at a rate of about [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ], except in the election year of 1963. The recommendation for next year runs to a total of [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. The interdepartmental review committee for covert operations—Vance, Thompson, Raborn and myself—has approved this recommendation subject to your concurrence. Meanwhile, by separate and somewhat unusual channels, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] have let us know that they would like a lot more money. They have given no practical justification, and indeed have been at pains to suggest that our orthodox channels are stuffy and uncooperative. I have had a long interview with the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] man most familiar with this subject (he was in Rome for 8 years), and he persuades me that this end run is as unjustified in fact as it appears to be on the surface. Having begun with a sympathetic view that money might beat the Communists, I have been entirely converted by his detailed account of the efforts we have made to get the Italian parties to do better with the money we have already given them. In this situation, I believe that we should approve the recommended budget for this year and go back to [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] by appropriate quiet channels to say that we cannot do more unless and until there is evidence that additional money is what is really needed, and that such money can be used really effectively. This would put the responsibility with them, where it belongs, while leaving us free to do more if and when a really good opportunity presents itself. It remains true that the anti-Communist battle in Italy is one of politics and resources; but simple hand-outs and intelligently applied resources are two entirely different things. McG. B. Go ahead as you suggest Speak to me 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc-George Bundy, Vol. 13. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Neither option is checked. 117. Memorandum of Conversation 117. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 26, 1965, 7 p.m. SecDel/MC/24 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1965 SUBJECT Vietnam PARTICIPANTS US Secretary Rusk Mr. Emmett B. Ford, Jr. Italy Foreign Minister Fanfani Italian Ambassador to the US Fenoaltea Italian Ambassador to the United Nations Vinci The Secretary remarked that we have been in frequent contact with the other side about Vietnam but there had been no indication of interest in negotiations. We believe that, while Moscow would like to see the matter come to the conference table, Peiping is 1,000 percent opposed. Hanoi is somewhere in between, but unwilling to act independently. Fanfani advised the Secretary that the Italians had recently received reports that Hanoi was somewhat more disposed to negotiate, possibly without the expressed approval of Peiping. The Italians had gathered that Hanoi was troubled by the degree of their subordination to Peiping. As an example, a new Foreign Minister, believed to be a close friend of the Chinese Communists, has been appointed in Hanoi. Although this move might be a concession to Peiping, it might work also out the other way around. It is just possible that Ho Chi Minh might be trying to put this man in a difficult position and thereby achieve somewhat more autonomy for North Vietnam. Certainly some observers have commented that the North Vietnamese might now be much less adamant on negotiations than before. The Secretary remarked in this connection, that he would be interested to know if Gromyko would even be willing to discuss such negotiations in the UN. Gromyko would not even discuss the subject with him in Vienna. Fanfani explained that the information to which he had referred was from Hanoi rather than from Moscow. Before leaving Rome he had requested that the information and sources be checked out. He said that he mentioned it only as one slight indication of the desire of Hanoi for more autonomy. The Secretary said that the North Vietnamese should be very careful on this point. If the fighting goes on, regardless of what transpires between China and the United States, North Vietnam will be destroyed. Fanfani wondered whether the present slowing down of military operations in Vietnam might be the only way open to the North Vietnamese to indicate their desire for conciliation without the approval of Peiping. The Secretary said that this may come, but that we have not ourselves noticed any such indication. The Secretary expressed interest in any information which the Italians might develop along this line. Fanfani admitted that the Italians have no direct contact with the North Vietnamese. He said they are keeping their eyes and ears open and that they would pass along to the United States any information which they could obtain. The Secretary told Fanfani that President Johnson had recently issued two very important instructions: 1) Secretary McNamara was to take all steps necessary to insure that the other side would experience no military success in South Vietnam between now and January, 2) Secretary Rusk was to take any political steps necessary to reach a peaceful settlement between now and January. The Secretary said he interprets this to mean the following: When Congress convenes in January, we shall be at the end of a small war. Either we shall have peace or we shall have to do a great deal more than we are doing now. Fanfani remarked that the period from now until December is considered decisive even by Hanoi. This may be because of the events in Hanoi which have already been mentioned. Fanfani said that he would like to inquire, with the utmost tact and with no intention of compromising the United States, or Italy, whether he could pursue further any reports of an inclination on the part of Hanoi to negotiate. The Secretary said that he would give Fanfani the text of a recent statement which he had made on television. 2 A statement which was aimed at Hanoi. In this statement he had attempted to deal with the issues raised by Hanoi under the Four Points. 3 The Secretary pointed out that there had been numerous contacts with Hanoi but that it is impossible to know through which channel they will ultimately respond. The Secretary felt that this statement would give Fanfani a clear indication of our attitude on negotiations. Fanfani assured the Secretary that until the present the Italians have hesitated to take any step which might weaken the position of the United States. The worst mistake which could be made, in his opinion, would be to give the impression of negotiating from an appearance of weakness. He believed this was especially true during the monsoon season. The Secretary said that this was not so important now. With all our troops and firepower in the field, we are not so worried. Fanfani replied that since we could now negotiate from a position of strength it affords us a better opportunity to see what can be done through diplomacy. He wished to make clear, however, that: 1) the Italians don’t wish to compromise the United States or themselves in any way; 2) they will pursue their inquiries on a discreet basis and only in an exploratory way; and 3) they don’t wish to participate in negotiations, but only to act as a friend and an ally. 4 The Secretary said that the big question is whether Hanoi is prepared to come to the conference table without the consent of Peiping. Will Hanoi have the courage to come to the conference table with Chinese troops on the ground? If they have, the Secretary stated that he would be willing to leave for Geneva tomorrow to meet with them. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 3. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum bears no indication of the drafting officer; it was approved in S on October 15. It is Part I of IV; Parts II-IV are ibid. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. 2 For text of Rusk’s September 7 interview with Belgian television, see Department of State Bulletin , September 27, 1965, pp. 512-514. 3 Reference is to the North Vietnamese Four-Point formula presented April 8. 4 [ text not declassified ] (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 3) 118. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 118. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, October, 14, 1965. 532. Dept pass Ambassador Reinhardt. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] briefed me this morning (Oct 14) on reports of alleged US intervention in consideration of Generals Vedovato and De Lorenzo to succeed General Aloia as Chief of Staff Italian Army. These reports fitted in with recent private conversation with Malfatti who had told me it was being said US opposed De Lorenzo. Malfatti said De Lorenzo was Saragat’s candidate and anything we could do to refute reports of American opposition would be helpful. I have been to see Cottafavi in Moro’s office later this morning on other matters and have taken occasion to make clear to him for private information of PriMin that US is not intervening or taking sides in this internal Italian matter and that we have an equally high regard for all possible candidates. Cottafavi said matter would probably not be decided much before the end of the year although earlier decision had at one point appeared likely. He appreciated US position and said main obstacle to appointment de Lorenzo was fact such appointment would open question of his successor as Commander of Carabinieri which was of great importance on Italian scene. This would not be case should Vedovato be made Army Chief of Staff and De Lorenzo remain in command of Carabinieri. Meloy 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IT. Secret; Roger Channel. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at 12:58 p.m. 119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, November 22, 1965, 1735Z. 1691. 1. Highly reliable source has given me following information about recent visit paid to Hanoi by Mayor of Florence, La Pira, with request that it be treated with great discretion. La Pira had given it to source when he stopped off in Moscow last week en route home from four or five day visit in Hanoi, where he had gone to promote North Vietnamese attendance at a conference hopefully to be held in Florence to which representatives of all faiths and ideologies will be invited. 2. During his visit, La Pira saw Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong and other NVN leaders, and got impression that there had been distinct evolution in their attitudes toward the war. La Pira believes NVN leaders are now willing to stop all fighting if bombing of North Vietnam were to cease, giving rise to de facto cease-fire with all soldiers remaining in place a la Kashmir. 3. Re inter-faith conference, La Pira said North Vietnam had agreed to send representatives to conference and they would be willing to sit down with anyone there, including U.S. representatives. 4. Source described La Pira as a humanitarian and democrat. While not questioning sincerity of his belief about NVN readiness for cease-fire, he pointed out that he was not diplomat or trained reporter and consequently did not know how much weight to give his report which, I gather, will be conveyed directly to Italian FonMin by La Pira on his return. Guthrie 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IT. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Saigon and Rome. 120. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 120. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 28, 1965, 8:30 a.m. On November 20, Arthur Goldberg reported (Tab A) 2 an urgent phone call from Fanfani, and when he called on him he received a handwritten letter reporting certain conversations of Italians in Hanoi. Fanfani’s letter is at Tab B. 3 We have spent a week studying Fanfani’s letter and watching the other reports from Hanoi. It is now clear that the conversations there were held by the Mayor of Florence, La Pira, a rather fuzzy-minded non-Communist leftist who has been critical of our position in Vietnam. Moreover, it is quite clear that Ho Chi Minh managed to fold in his unacceptable conditions, while giving an appearance of interest in peaceful negotiations. This is not at all a real feeler for negotiations. At the same time, conscious of the Sevareid affair, 4 State Department is determined to make it clear that we remain ready for unconditional discussions. Dean Rusk has prepared the attached letter to Fanfani (Tab C) 5 which makes that point clear, while at the same time giving a patient but careful analysis of what La Pira heard. The letter leaves the door open for further discussions between Goldberg and Fanfani. It represents a compromise between the somewhat hard-boiled view of George Ball and my brother Bill, on the one hand, and the desire to be fully forthcoming which Arthur Goldberg and I have shared. We all support it in its present form. Goldberg would like to be able to deliver the letter to Fanfani tomorrow—Monday—so as usual we have spent the week in staff work, and now ask for a prompt approval. In this case we do have the excuse that we had to wait for Dean Rusk’s return. Moreover, the world will not come to an end if Arthur has to wait another day or two. McG. B. Letter Approved 6 Disapproved 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, United Nations. Secret. A notation on the memorandum reads: “Recd Ranch 11-28-65, 8:15 p.” 2 Not printed. 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. III, Document 205 . 4 Reference is to Sevareid’s article “The Final Troubled Hours of Adlai Stevenson,” which appeared in the November 30 issue of Look on newstands beginning on November 15. See ibid., Document 203 . 5 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 918-919. 6 This option is checked and a notation indicates that the Department of State (Sisco) and McGeorge Bundy were informed by telephone. 121. Memorandum of Conversation 121. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 22, 1965, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy, EUR Minister Francis E. Meloy, Jr., American Embassy, Rome Italy Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani Minister Vincenzo Tornetta, United Nations Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Embassy The Secretary said the United States will be faced with a major political problem in the first months of 1966. The Administration will be going to the Congress with important proposals regarding Viet-Nam which will have major significance with regard to manpower and finances. He pointed out the recent Soviet announcement of an increase of the U.S.S.R. military budget. The United States will announce an increase in its military budget. The Administration proposals will place major demands on the American people. Against the loss of lives and the expenditures to date by the United States in defense of the Free World, the American people will ask what other members of the Free World are doing. The American public will ask, for example, how many U.S. soldiers are in West Germany? The answer is 230,000. They will then ask how many West Germans are in Viet-Nam? The answer is 50. Questions will be asked about Free World shipping to Haiphong and West Germans building a steel mill in China, among others. All of these questions will be very delicate for us in the next few months. The Secretary said we do not know whether or not we will be at general war in the Pacific in the next few months. This depends on Peiping and Hanoi. We have two choices: we can quit or we can meet them. We will meet them. The Secretary continued that he had said to NATO that the United States cannot abandon its commitment in the Pacific and honor its commitment in the Atlantic. This is not possible morally, legally or psychologically. NATO, therefore, has a fundamental stake in what happens in Viet-Nam. Ambassador Fenoaltea pointed out that the internal problem in Italy is made more difficult because other Atlantic allies do not do what the United States wants. The Italian opposition says you cannot tell us what to do. Other friends of the United States won’t do what the United States wants. The Ambassador said that he was offering this not as a justification but as an explanation of Italian difficulties. The Secretary continued that it is the integrity of the United States that is a matter of national interest for each country. Fanfani said that what the Secretary had said did not surprise him at all. He had long seen that we would some day reach this point. He had a profound conviction that verbal solidarity is much more difficult to apply in days of difficulty. He had always said it was necessary to be careful lest the consensus in a crisis be less than in days of prosperity. He had always said let us be careful of France lest the example of French dissension weaken the solidarity in other countries. In Italy, there is an important segment of opinion which is not confined only to the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) but also extends to the Democratic Socialists (PSDI) which takes the position that Italy should not show more solidarity with the United States than does the United Kingdom Labor Party. Policy toward China is an example. It is not easy for the Italian Government, which must take into account the resources and reactions of other countries and not only those of the United States. Fanfani pointed out that Italian policies in Latin America had been aimed at maintaining the greatest possible support for the United States, which is Italy’s greatest ally. Italy does not seek thanks for this activity but considers it a matter of its own national interest to support the United States in this area—to fend off the mosquitoes around the legs of the United States. The Secretary said he was not being critical but some of the problems have been falsely stated. The proposition is usually put “shall we support the United States?”. In fact, the matter should be looked at in the light of the national interest of each country. The proposition should be stated “is it to Italy’s interest that Hanoi succeed in aggression?” The Secretary said he would not fear the results of a careful and dispassionate Italian examination of this proposal. He was sure our interests would come out the same. Fanfani rejoined that as he had said, Italy’s Latin American policy is not altruistic. It is in Italy’s interest to support the United States. It is a favor Italy does itself. The fact exists, however, that while being a faithful ally of the United States, Italy cherishes the liberty to disagree. The United States should not overlook a repetitive historical cycle which happens to the most powerful country. At this point in history, it is the turn of the United States. The rest of the world contains those, even your friends, who want to retain the freedom to disagree with you. Even now the Italian Government may be considered as selling itself to the United States by a large segment of its own public opinion. It can be accused of being too conservative. The trend in the world is to change, not to conserve. It is possible that in two or three months the United States may find itself in the position of bearing great burdens and of not having the full support of its friends and allies. This is a tragedy but it is also a fact. The Secretary said that to the U.S. the defense of liberty is indivisible. America has some forty allies around the world, and they should be aware of this. If you scratch an American you find an isolationist under the surface. If the American people are once disappointed in the support of their allies, you will find an isolationist United States. This is a fact. The President does not want this to happen but it will happen. Is this in the interest of Italy or that of our allies? This is as much a problem for you as it is for us. The Secretary said that he had told NATO that our friends never worry about the morale of the American people. They should be aware that anyone who relies on the United States has a political constituency in the United States that needs attention just as much as a constituency at home. Fanfani said that what the Secretary had told him confirms his own thoughts that it could be a big temptation for the United States to want to stay at home. This does not shock him. Many people, in spite of the power of the United States, wonder whether the Communist danger may not be too much even for the United States alone. The United States did not seek this responsibility. History bids the United States to carry the load in the interest of all. The problem is to come out successfully, not just to depend on your own resources and resourcefulness. Fanfani said it would give him the greatest of pleasure to join a chorus praising the United States and urging it on. There is one caveat, however. He would like to point out to the Secretary that it is very important to have not only good words but good acts from other countries. To obtain this the United States needs not only the solidarity of other Governments but also the solidarity of other peoples. Based on this solidarity of the people of other nations, the United States has twice been successful in world conflicts in this century. He would say to the Secretary, however, that before undertaking great acts, the United States should be sure that in fact it has this solidarity. Mr. Leddy asked how it would be possible to obtain the support of the people of Europe. Fanfani said he had been away from Italy for three months but he has kept in touch and has read telegrams. He felt he had made some small contribution to the United States by winning the battle of the United States bases in the Pacific in the General Assembly. Fanfani said he had been tremendously impressed by public and press attitudes in Italy regarding Viet-Nam. Nenni has abstained but how about his party? Fanfani said as the Secretary knows he has always tried to split the Socialists from the Communists but the Viet-Nam problem is working against this trend. The United States should imagine itself in a situation where it might take an extreme decision regarding Viet-Nam which might cause the Italian Government to fall and precipitate a Government crisis in Italy. The United States would be faced not only with its extreme burden in the Pacific but also with confusion in the Mediterranean area. Fanfani said he had a serious thing to say. It was his duty to say it. The Secretary spoke of the danger of isolationism in the United States. He felt it his duty to tell the Secretary that the majority of the members of the United Nations, no matter what their color, will not support the United States. This is a statement which applies in general and not only to Viet-Nam. Look at the voting record. Many of the votes are on an equivocal basis. Look at the scanty majorities. The Secretary could have no idea of the cost at which these scanty majorities had been garnered nor of the effort required on the part of the U.S. Delegation. How many times have we had to say “let’s hold off a vote for a few days.” The Secretary could have no idea how displeased Fanfani was to be obliged to tell him this. Fanfani said it should be remembered that he is of a naturally optimistic nature. The United States has need of the most sensitive thermometers to understand better the climate in which it is operating. Fanfani said that he was grateful that the Secretary told him that in the next few months the United States will have rough weather. It is true that there are forces at home which the United States must watch. There are also forces abroad which must be watched. The United States should look not only at Governments but at peoples. Otherwise, it will lose battles to the Communists. The Secretary said that for each nation it is a question of priorities. Each should begin where it is and work from there. Looking at our Western European friends it seemed to the Secretary that their first problem is the prosperity of Western Europe and he was thinking of the Common Market in this connection. The second interest of Western Europe is the soundness of NATO. Here, the Secretary said, he would like to pay tribute to Italy’s contribution to both of these interests. Another priority for Western Europe, the Secretary continued, is relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. We regard ourselves only as partners. We believe we should work as a group and, through a process of full cooperation, we should move together. The Secretary said that speaking personally, since some of his colleagues do not agree, he believes Western Europe should place a high priority on developments in Africa. This is a vast continent, ten minutes flying time from the small peninsula of land called Europe. Events in Africa should have a high priority for Europe. Beyond that, there are the problems that arise in the Pacific area and Asia. The Secretary said he could understand why Western European countries so distant from the Pacific and Asia wish that the problems there could simply go away and disappear. Fanfani interrupted to say that Europeans do not consider these problems distant, far away, or abstract. It is only Governments that do not want problems with their own public opinion that say these matters are abstract or distant. Two elements force these problems on European countries, said the Secretary. One, the Communists are active all over the world. It is a question of whether militant aggression or peaceful coexistence is to be successful. The second element he had already discussed. This was the attitude of the United States toward its commitments to other nations. The Secretary said he understood that NATO countries have problems arising out of domestic difficulties. Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway are governed by thin majorities. Denmark is facing new elections. The Netherlands has a minority Government. Belgium has a fragile political situation. France has a 75 year old leader. Italy has a not always easy coalition Government. Greece has been without a government for some time. In fact, only Luxembourg is stable. We understand these problems but they cause problems for us. The representative of a NATO Government came recently to the Secretary and said, “if the United States does not do thus and so, my Government will fall.” To whom can the United States say this sort of thing? Fanfani said he much appreciated this score card. The United States must understand the absolute necessity, however, for it to have friendly peoples as well as friendly governments in order to obtain support. Fanfani said things are not going well in the Communist world. The Secretary responded that it is a great tragedy that at this time we also present a picture of disarray in the Free World. It is the great tragedy of this period in history that while the Communist world is in disorder, we also are in disarray and unable to present a contrast of unity which would make it possible to take a great step forward. Fanfani said there are two problems: one is the lack of unity in the West. The second is that we have no Communist dictators to deal with. The Communist world is divided and redivided among themselves. We cannot go to a dictator and say: “which is it, peace or war?” It takes two to talk. Four are too many. The Secretary said there is the same problem with regard to Viet-Nam. There are differences between Hanoi and Peiping but who can we deal with? Looking at each section of the world it seemed to the Secretary that general trends are favorable if we can just solve the Viet-Nam problem. We should keep in mind that Communists are not ten feet tall. Fanfani said this was lucky in view of his own short stature. Ambassador Fenoaltea said he had seen Nenni in Rome. Nenni was impressed by the fact that any Chinese Communist triumph would have an effect on the Soviets and would bring back the hard line. The Secretary referred to a conversation he had had with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland who had said the number one problem is to turn the Chinese Communists toward peaceful coexistence. The Secretary said he agreed with the observation of the Deputy Foreign Minister, but that if he had made the statement it would be called capitalistic propaganda. If we cannot turn the Chinese Communists from the hard line and this line is successful, the hard line will triumph everywhere. Fanfani said the United States must preserve the success of the policies it has been following for the last twenty years. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Drafted by Meloy and approved in S on January 4. The memorandum is Part IV of IV. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s private dining room. 122. Memorandum for the Record 122. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 18, 1966. Ambassador Fenoaltea called on me today to ask our views on the NATO crisis before he returned to Rome. I marched him through the essential elements of the President’s Polish-American speech. 2 He then raised the following matters: 1. Speaking as a partisan of NATO and the United States and a partisan of moderate political forces in Italy, he urged very strongly that we not slide into a tripartite directorate of U.S., UK and Bonn. Leaving Italy out is dangerous to our common interests. It strengthens both the extreme right in Italy and the extreme left, undercutting the bases for moderate politics. We must never forget that Italy is there and should be treated as a senior partner along with Britain and Germany. 2. His second point was that if and when the U.S. changes course on a major issue, it is extremely important that the Italian Government be informed in advance. When a change is made (for example the MLF) the best friends of the United States are left out on a limb, having fought a tough political battle at home. He cited as another example a possible change on China policy. He then zeroed in on newspaper stories that the President was taking a different position than the State Department in dealing with DeGaulle. He wanted to know if the President was softer on DeGaulle than the State Department and possibly interested in going the route of Senator Church and Senator Fulbright. I replied that the President was deeply and personally engaged in NATO problems; we are a united Government under a strong President; and Secretary Rusk and the Department of State were the authentic voices of the President’s policies. He remarked wistfully that it is impossible in Italy to be left of The New York Times ; for example, on Viet Nam. 3. He ended by stating his appreciation for the Polish-American speech which he felt was a lucid and constructive framework for dealing with East-West relations. WR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow. 2 Reference is to Johnson’s May 3 statement commemorating Poland’s millennium of Christianity and national identity. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 475-478. 123. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 123. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, June 6, 1966, 0015Z. Secto 43. NATUS. 1. Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani called on Secretary June 5, accompanied by Foreign Office Secretary General Catalano, DirGen Political Affairs Gaja, and interpreter. Following is uncleared summary, Noforn, subject revision on review. A. France-NATO. Fanfani said Gromyko’s reaction to France-NATO situation during recent Italian visit cautious. Fanfani said he had told Khrushchev in 1961 that Soviet Union should appreciate NATO’s role vis-á-visGermany. 2 Khrushchev had disagreed, whereas Gromyko, when same point made to him, had not replied. Fanfani thought Sov initiative on European Security Conference stemmed from concern over effects of NATO crisis on Germany’s place in Europe. Secretary summarized U.S. public attitude toward NATO crisis, emphasizing that while public and Congress prepared support U.S. sharing of all burdens on Fourteen arising from position of France, major political problem would arise if Fourteen themselves fell into confusion or paralysis. This would generate disillusion with NATO and would arouse concern lest it cause miscalculation in Moscow. This unity of Fourteen at Brussels meeting highly important to future U.S. support of NATO. Fanfani said Italian contacts with others of Fourteen showed little divergencies of attitude among them. Italian public opinion not worried. In recent appearances before committees of Italian Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Fanfani had found larger majority supporting Italian sharing in material burdens arising from France-NATO crisis than usually supported government on other issues. As examples, he said no members of committees had objected when informed Italy prepared accept NATO Defense College in Rome if asked. As second example, he said that at Cabinet meeting just before his departure for Brussels, he had estimated possible cost to Italy of France-NATO problems at 60 billion lire. This had aroused no serious opposition. His statement that Vicenza depots might have to be enlarged evoked no protest. Only difficulty was minor: some had opposed choice of Rome as site when sections of NAMSA moved to Italy. As by-product of France-NATO crisis, Fanfani said Italian Socialist Party now aware of positive benefits of NATO integration. Socialists had problem of presenting their acceptance of NATO to public opinion. They would take approach of emphasizing that NATO political as well as military reform could now be studied. Fanfani thought stress on role of NATO in East-West dialogue would be helpful to Socialists. On political right, within Christian-Democratic, Social-Democratic and Liberal Parties, Fanfani said there was preoccupation with strategic isolation of Italy as result France-NATO crisis. These elements felt maximum links with France had to be maintained to facilitate France’s future reassociation. Fanfani himself thought France had substantial interests binding it to other allies, such as desire maintain troops in Germany and general question of relations with neighbors. This meant that negotiations, though difficult, might be successful. Replying, Secretary said U.S. also concerned with geographic effect of French actions on Italy. He expressed hope France-NATO agreement on use of air space could be reached and pointed out use of NATO country air space by France was vital for French atomic force. Fanfani doubted De Gaulle’s present policy was designed to produce complete break with Alliance. He saw large tactical elements in French position, as he said had been case in EEC crisis. Secretary suggested Fanfani and Schroeder might find occasion talk with Couve as neighbors, probing why France was taking actions ostensibly so damaging to neighbors’ interests. Fanfani felt De Gaulle already had in mind resumption of dialogue with EEC partners. He said De Gaulle had casually remarked to Italian diplomat on June 2 that it was time to terminate EEC and NATO affairs “on the side, then resume discussion among Six.” Fanfani said opportunity for talks of kind Secretary had in mind might arise on June 13 when EEC Council would meet to discuss whether to confirm presidency of Hallstein. French were opposed. If they yielded, this could be starting point for wider talks. If they held out, this could provide even better opportunity. B. Science and Technology. Fanfani mentioned UK decision withdraw from ELDO. He thought that while substantive reasons might be sound, UK handling and timing were poor. ELDO itself represented waste of money since members merely rediscovered what U.S. had already learned. It made no sense when ELDO was launching Europe I in Australia simultaneously with U.S. Secretary expressed concern about UK decision, which had strongly disappointed U.S. He said he intended discuss it with UK Foreign Minister Stewart, who would be calling later in evening. If UK withdrawal stood firm, Secretary would want Fanfani’s judgment as to what might be done. U.S. felt it important that Western European technology advance, and sought means make U.S. technology available. President Johnson had recently sent Mr. Frutkin to Europe in this connection. Frutkin had found much interest in Germany, almost none in UK, with Italy somewhere between. U.S. spent 30 billion dollars on research and development for all purposes, Secretary continued. Although we recognized differences in industrial capacity, and difficulties of starting “Marshall Plan for Technology”, way had to be found. Fanfani welcomed Secretary’s statement. He thought Marshall Plan for Technology would show possibilities inherent in Atlantic Community concept. Italians were impressed by almost unbridgeable gap between U.S. and European technology. They favored identifying specific areas for cooperation to integrate U.S. and European efforts. If UK indeed dropped out of ELDO, Italian Cabinet had agreed that Italy would do same, and would devote resources instead to national research. Most of shifted funds would go to send people to U.S. for study. Fanfani thought Marshall Plan for Technology would have great attraction also in France, even if not with De Gaulle. It would also find receptivity in Eastern Europe and thus promote coexistence. C. U Thant. Secretary said U Thant would decide in June whether to serve as UN SecGen beyond present term. Although President Johnson in letter had urged him stay on, appeared strong possibility he would leave. Secretary foresaw great problems in finding successor in view Soviet veto power. He requested Fanfani as General Assembly President write U Thant urging him to stay on. Fanfani said he had touched on subject with U Thant in Strasbourg but had learned little. He agreed to send letter now urging SecGen keep post. Secretary thought U Thant motivated to leave UN by pressure from Ne Win, by family problems and by behind scenes Soviet pressure to exact concessions actions as price for supporting Thant’s continuation in office. Fanfani added as motive burden of UN financing question. Fanfani thought family reasons might be overriding; suggested further exploration this motive. He thought former UN Deputy SecGen, Soviet national Milanya, who just ordained as Anglican priest, had spiritual ties with U Thant, and suggested Ralph Bunche could sound Milanya. Fanfani added rumor was circulating that U.S. was opposed to U Thant’s continuation in office while Soviets supported it. Secretary concluded by expressing hope for another talk with Fanfani before both left Brussels, to discuss Communist China and other matters. As meeting broke up, Fanfani handed over aide-mémoire on Italian approach to EximBank concerning 45 billion lire purchase of supplies in U.S. for Fiat factories. Secretary observed problem was essentially technical, with no top-level political aspects. Text of aide-mémoire will follow septel. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IT-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to all NATO capitals. Secretary Rusk visited Belgium June 3-8 for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting. 2 August 3-5, 1961; for Fanfani’s summary of these talks, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 290 . 3 Not found. 124. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 124. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 29, 1966. SUBJECT Ex-Im Financing of U.S. Equipment for an Italian Built Fiat Plant in the USSR At Tab A, 2 Secretary Rusk recommends that we grant an Italian request for a 5- year Ex-Im Bank loan of up to $50 million to finance export of U.S. equipment which would be used in a new Fiat automobile plant in the Soviet Union. This does not require formal Presidential action; the Bank has the authority and the money. The Secretary wants to (1) direct Linder to go ahead and (2) informally notify key people on the Hill. The loan makes good sense in terms of bridge-building and our interest in having the Soviets go in for “middle class” consumer goods. In terms of exports, if Ex-Im turns the Italians down we would probably lose the sale. The terms (5-years) would be standard for an export credit. Tony Solomon tells me that, despite wide publicity, there has been no noise on the Hill about the Fiat deal, and nobody in either House is a sure bet to complain. He thinks—and I agree—that prior soundings would only stir up opposition. If you approve, we would propose to notify the relevant people before Harold Linder makes any public announcement: Senators Mansfield, Long, Dirksen, Kuchel, Fulbright, Magnuson, Robertson, Hickenlooper, Cotton and Bennett; the Speaker, Messrs. Albert, Boggs, Ford, Arends, Morgan, Stagger, Patman, Adair, Frelinghuysen, Springer, Widnall, and Mrs. Bolton. All the relevant agencies are on board (DOD, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, Ex-Im Bank). I would vote yes—but you know my prejudice in favor of bridge-building (in terms of foreign policy, and in terms of a balanced Presidential posture against the background of Vietnam). FMB Approve Rusk recommendation Take soundings on Hill, then come back Disapprove Speak to me 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. 3 None of these options is checked. A notation reads: “Sec. Fowler to call LJ — Ranch. May want to talk to Clark Clifford also.” 125. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 125. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Italy (Reinhardt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, September 12, 1966. SUBJECT 303 Committee Consideration of the Italian Covert Action Program I want to elaborate further on our discussion on Tuesday about the Italian covert program. 2 The coming months may represent a critical period for political stability in Italy. Decisive steps to reunify the Socialist and Social Democratic parties are anticipated this fall. This prospect, in conjunction with the strong rivalries within the Christian Democratic party, could put new strains on Moro’s center-left coalition. An additional unsettling factor is the approaching general elections. They must take place not later than April 1968. Since my assignment to Rome I have consistently recommended the gradual reduction of covert activities in Italy. The record in fact shows sharp year-to-year cuts in expenditures. The level of funds has dropped from [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] in FY 1964 to a recommended [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] in FY 1967. The latter figure represents a cut of 35% from FY 1966. It is also significant that in recent years we have progressively discontinued direct subsidies to political parties—the last was the small program in FY 1966 for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. All other support to political parties has been contingent on approved action programs in support of U.S. policy objectives, in the absence of which no funds have been made available. The [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] is now on notice that any support for FY 1967 would be on such a basis. Accordingly the proposed program contains no unstructured contributions to any political party’s finances. In the circumstances, I recommend that the program proposed for FY 1967 be approved. An abrupt discontinuance of the program at this time would be interpreted by some of our friends, on whom we must depend for achievement of our policy objectives in Italy, as a change in our long-standing support for them and for what they are attempting to achieve. I am particularly concerned that we avoid any action which might disturb the Moro-Nenni-Saragat leadership, which is relatively strong by post-war Italian standards and which seems to offer the best chance of strengthening political stability and democracy in Italy. At the same time, I feel that we should continue the gradual reduction of the covert program in Italy with the general objective of a final phase-out in connection with the 1968 elections. 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Reinhardt and Dozier. 2 No record of this discussion has been found. 126. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 126. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 13, 1966, 2 p.m. Mr. President: You should know that Sergio Fenoaltea came in to make the strongest and most emotional representations that I have received from a diplomat in a long time. His theme was that if, in addition to the tripartite talks, we were to accept a formula for the NATO nuclear committee which did not grant Italy permanent status, the whole relation of Italy to NATO and, indeed, the stability of Italian domestic politics would be endangered. He pointed out that Italian support for NATO hinged on its being treated as an equal to the other three European countries of similar size: Britain, France, and Germany. If we built into NATO any arrangement which put the Italians alongside, say, Belgium or The Netherlands, the Italians, a proud people, would go into a violent emotional reaction—whether neutralist or Fascist, no one could say. He had heard that we had given Harlan Cleveland instructions, as a fallback position, to shift in the NATO nuclear committee from 4 permanent and 2 rotating members to a 3-3 formula. In the end, this could only mean that Italy would be odd-man-out. Basically, Fenoaltea is correct in his judgment of the danger here. We got with State and received assurances: —that they would stick with the 4-2 formula; and —that there would be no change without the issue coming to your personal attention. I wanted you to know of this because the matter could conceivably arise in your discussions tomorrow with George Brown. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 4. Secret. Copies were sent to Bator, Rusk, Leddy, and McNamara. 2 The issue was not discussed in the President’s October 14 meeting with Brown. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., United Kingdom, Vol. 9. Leddy raised the question during Brown’s subsequent meeting with Secretary Rusk. According to the October 14 memorandum of conversation: “The Foreign Secretary agreed that it would be necessary to include Italy as a permanent member.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-UK) 127. Memorandum of Conversation 127. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Rome, March 15, 1967. PARTICIPANTS Gen. Giovanni De Lorenzo, Chief of Staff, Italian Army William N. Fraleigh, Counselor of Embassy SUBJECT General’s Views on Italian internal and foreign affairs At a small dinner on March 15 I had an opportunity to talk at some length with General De Lorenzo, whom I have met a number of times before. The following were his main comments on Italian internal and foreign affairs. Internal Affairs The General was outspokenly critical of the Italian Socialist Party and of the Minister of Defense, Tremelloni. He was less directly critical of President Saragat, perhaps out of respect for the President’s high office, but it was obvious that he was also not very happy about the President’s attitude towards the Italian Army. (It should be recalled that the General, who has a strong personality and has played a leading role in organizing such key anti-subversive elements in Italy’s armed forces as the Carabinieri and the Armed Forces Intelligence Service (formerly called SIFAR, now SID) has a Monarchist background and, while not politically active in recent years, supported the Monarchy as an institution in 1945/46, and in early Fascist years. This undoubtedly profoundly affects his attitude towards Socialists, including the present Socialist President of the Republic. But the main burden of his remarks were directed at an alleged lack of understanding of the Army and its problems by Tremelloni, in particular, and the allegedly poor effects of Tremelloni’s leadership at the Ministry of Defense upon the morale of the Armed Forces. This view is apparently widely shared in the Armed Forces.) The General said that Tremelloni, having no experience in such matters, simply does not understand the job of running the Defense Ministry. Tremelloni approaches it primarily as an economist. His emphasis is constantly upon reducing expenses, without due regard for morale and quality. For example, army salaries are not high enough, and nothing is being done about raising them. As a consequence the quality of younger officers is rapidly going down. The ablest no longer desire to make the Army their permanent career. (Throughout the conversation the General referred specifically only to the Army, but by implication he was also thinking of the Air Force and Navy.) To add to the feeling of frustration in the forces, while Tremelloni turned a deaf ear to complaints about inappropriate economies in the Armed Forces, the government continued to increase the expenditures and allotments of many other Ministries. The General said that while Saragat takes some direct interest in the Armed Forces, his interest is limited to “special areas” (undefined) and not in the Armed Forces as a whole. The General did not elaborate upon this, but perhaps was referring here to the recent controversy over personal files allegedly missing from SID archives. As De Lorenzo formerly headed this organization, he has been involved in the controversy. 2 His only direct reference to this matter with me, however, was to say that this was a tempest in a teapot. In any case this led him to draw an invidious comparison between President Saragat and former President Segni. Segni, he said, took a much broader and more genuine anterest in the Armed Forces. (This led to a brief discussion of Segni’s health which the General said was still stationary. Since his stroke, which resulted in his resignation from the Presidency, Segni has been living very quietly near Rome. He is still unable to talk and moves about very little because of his partial paralysis.) My net impression of the General’s remarks was that he has reached the point of having little patience not only with Saragat and Tremelloni but with the Italian Government as a whole. I referred once to Moro’s unusually long tenure as Prime Minister, by Italian standards, and to Giulio Andreotti’s long service as Minister of Defense. But this brought forth only grunts, and no praise from the General for either of them. He did say, however, that while General De Gaulle had suffered a setback in the recent French elections, it was a noteworthy fact that despite this, Gaullism had retained an absolute majority in Parliament. This was, the General said, thanks to the fact that the French had succeeded in working out an electoral system which made such absolute majority governments possible, whereas Italy had not succeeded in doing this and therefore had to suffer constantly with unstable coalitions. The General, who is not yet 60 and still apparently in vigorous health, strongly implied that he would not be adverse after retiring to giving his support to, and perhaps even participating in, a movement in Italy for a stronger form of central government, if conditions should occur that might give such a movement reasonable chances of success. I do not think the General would himself go so far as to try to become an Italian De Gaulle. He seems too realistic about himself and Italian politics to attempt that. But he might lend his support very vigorously to someone else who had aspirations and possibilities of becoming a strong President, if he believed him to be the right man for the job. Foreign Affairs On foreign affairs the General’s main comments were on NPT and Germany. As for NPT he said there was of course great merit in the idea of trying to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the proposed treaty, he said, seemed unfair to Italy and to other nuclear have-not nations. He used many of the same arguments to support this that Italian government leaders have voiced, and I sought to answer them in the usual way. He said he had been asked recently, but did not say by whom, what younger officers in the Italian Army thought about this subject. He said he had answered that he did not think they were much interested. As for Germany he said he felt there was a very real danger of a strong revival of a Nazi-type Party. Many Germans remembered bitterly the bad treatment they received in 1945 and 1946, he said. This feeling was especially strong among the millions of German refugees from East Germany. This and the continued lack of progress towards reunification was in danger of stirring up the same stubborn and ruthless German spirit which had caused two world wars and could if we are not careful cause a third. He remarked that some Germans were involved in the constant acts of terrorism in Italy’s Alto Adige and that the Italian Government had not been able to get the German Government to crack down on these people. With particular reference to this last subject, but by inference also to other things he had been saying, General De Lorenzo remarked that the Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, General Aldo Remondino, shares his views. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-1 IT. Confidential. Drafted by Fraleigh. Transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to airgram A-854, March 20. 2 An internal probe of this issue, launched by Tremelloni, had become public, and on February 18 the Procurator General of Rome began a judicial inquiry. Subsequently, the Italian Parliament took up an investigation. In April the Moro government relieved De Lorenzo of command. 128. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 128. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, April 1, 1967, 1300Z. 5101. Vipto 039. Dept pass info London for Vice President. Subject: Vice President’s Trip in Europe: Talk With President Saragat. Ref: Rome 5095 2 on US-Italian Relations and NPT. 1. Saragat opened by welcoming Vice President as representative of Italy’s greatest ally. US-Italian relations are not only matter of treaty but of far deeper links of blood, tradition, history. Whatever happens, Saragat said, our friendship will remain firm. Italy works for European unity, but always in frame of partnership with US; President Kennedy’s partnership idea is what guides Italian policy. But US-Italian friendship is also not exclusive. It is part of effort to reduce tension throughout world. 2. Saragat then said that against this background he would like to discuss NPT. He would speak as president of parliamentary republic. As such he is not responsible for policies of govt, but is nevertheless in complete agreement with policies of Moro govt. 3. Vice President, thanking him for expressing views of US-Italian relations that are exactly like those of US Govt, said his presence in Rome showed that Atlantic partnership is continuing commitment of President Johnson. He agreed also that Atlantic Alliance is what makes approach to East possible. Finally VP emphasized that President Johnson feels strongly that US involvement in Asia in no way lessens interest in Europe, indeed it increases it. US spent 20 years building Alliance in Europe; wants no weakening of it now. US, in its position of world responsibility of chief of state. [ sic ] [4.] Saragat stated that under Article XI of Italian Constitution, Italy may accept limits on its sovereignty in the interests of peace only if it does so on an equal basis with other countries, and that any treaty which would establish such limitations without such equality would involve Saragat’s personal responsibility for carrying out of Constitution. 5. Saying he didn’t want to get into details of NPT, he said Italy has always wanted such a treaty knowing well the dangers of nuclear conflict and proliferation. 6. Italy could speak frankly because it had a clear conscience. Technically and financially, Italy could have a bomb in four years if it started to build one now or could have had one now if it had started earlier. Italy does not want to have a bomb. This was position not only of GOI but of large part of government opposition. Italy doesn’t want to involve itself in a nuclear force and doesn’t want to get into the nuclear club. Hence, Italy doesn’t need reins on it to keep it in line. 7. Given this situation, Italy wanted a treaty which would not be unfair to countries which do not want their own nuclear arms. Such a treaty should contribute to real relaxation of tension and perhaps to reduction of armaments. 8. Treaty should also be in harmony with other Italian foreign policies. It should not be an obstacle to European unity or put in danger Italian security. 9. Hence Italy must ask what other countries would sign. Italy cannot forget the area in which it lives, and doesn’t want to be put into a position of inequality. Italy is a leading industrial power in the Mediterranean basin and cannot accept a position of inferiority to Mediterranean countries of lesser industrial capacity. 10. Also Italy needs peaceful nuclear energy for its technological development. Lacking in natural resources and with a large and growing population, Italy needs the atom to help it deal with economic problems. The treaty must not block Italy’s industrial development. 11. In text of proposed treaty Saragat saw points on which Italian position was not fully taken into account. He mentioned the question of control, which also concerns the chief of state because Italy cannot accept juridical discrimination. Nuclear have-nots must have equal rights with nuclear-have countries. Any humiliation or inferiority imposed upon Italy would provoke profound political problems. There were similar problems he thought for Germany, but he would leave that to Germany to discuss. 12. Answering President Saragat, the Vice President said that in US view there were very few topics of greater importance than proposed NPT. The US considered this to be a priority matter and a definite step to arms control and disarmament. It was essential for peace of world to keep nuclear arms from proliferation. Countries could be militant whether they were large or small, and if they had nuclear arms they could be very dangerous. There were already five fingers on the nuclear trigger, some of them nervous. US wants to limit further proliferation if possible. Question is how. US certainly does not want in any way to infringe upon Italian sovereignty. 13. Vice President then explained time table US is proposing for the treaty, pointing out that our draft has been under consideration since January and that a series of steps are now proposed for further discussion which we hope may lead to the tabling of draft treaty in May. Even when draft is tabled it will be subject to review and amendments. But US considers it important not to delay longer. Before talking with Soviets again the US will do its utmost to arrive at agreement with its allies on the draft. US has the fullest consideration for rights of other nations. 14. Then dealing with specific objections that had been raised in various ways, Vice President said there was nothing in the treaty which could stand in the way of a federated Europe or a united Europe having its own nuclear arms. He pointed out the treaty only specifies what cannot be done and does not attempt to specify what can be done. 15. VP said Italians suggest treaty should be associated with disarmament. US thinks it is, but he agreed with Fanfani who had so stated earlier that this can be stated in preamble and was prepared to consider whether it would be well to place further such reference in an appropriate article. Whether this was done in draft or in Geneva after tabling was matter of tactics. There is merit to coming to table with strong treaty. 16. Nothing in treaty would impinge upon peaceful nuclear technology. US however knows Italy’s views on control and Euratom, and because of this US will offer revised Article III. This will require much discussion. GOI will soon receive details. US also knows about concern over industrial aspects, especially in Germany. US doesn’t want in any way to impair others’ civilian nuclear technology. This is part of modern industry, and Italy has right to it. US will do all it can to assure this, and will tell Soviets so. This is why such discussion is so helpful. 17. As for security, VP said of course US wanted no impairment of this. He would add, however, that it would take long time before smaller countries could make bombs. China had done so because it had tested in atmosphere. But UAR and Israel are signatories of Test Ban Treaty and cannot test in air. Also there is very little industrial spin off from military nuclear development. What there is is highly expensive. To have industrial benefits it was necessary to have civilian nuclear program, not military. Finally, VP said Italy’s security and that of US are based in NATO. If any country threatened Italy with nuclear arms, as member of NATO Italy has commitment of US to come to its help, and US has nuclear arms enough for the job. 18. Partnership is important: US needs Italy, Italy needs the US. US will keep its commitments. That is why US is involved in SEA today—to keep its commitments. 19. Discussion was interrupted here for luncheon. Saragat asked VP to convey his warmest regards to President Johnson. Reinhardt 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 Dated April 1. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US HUMPHREY) 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State 1 Bonn, April 26, 1967, 1525Z. 12810. Pass White House. 1. The following is the draft text of a memcon on the April 26 talk between the President and Prime Minister Moro. It was dictated by interpreter de Seabra immediately before his departure. He had no time to review the draft or to bring the typescript with him. Begin Text Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and Italian Prime Minister Moro. Participants: The President of the United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk Mr. A.J. de Seabra (interpreter) Italian Prime Minister Moro Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani Ambassador Lucilli (There was one more Italian Mr. de Seabra didn’t get.) Subject: Non-Proliferation Treaty. Date: April 26, 1967. Place: Presidential Residence in Bonn. After an initial exchange of pleasant amenities during which Prime Minister Moro underlined the significance of President Johnson’s presence at the Adenauer funeral, the Italian Prime Minister made a series of comments on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its importance in terms of European and Atlantic Alliance policies. Prime Minister Moro said that certain aspects of the Treaty were a source of concern to Italy and in the past the Italians had already made solid observations and presented certain amendments which were being considered by the United States. In view of the fact that the ever greater consolidation of the Atlantic solidarity was a most vital objective, the Prime Minister felt concerned about aspects of the Treaty, namely its structure as well as its contents. As far as Italy was concerned it had no nuclear ambitions. It was also expected that Germany would abide by its unilateral decision. But when it comes to shifting from unilateral decisions to a permanent arrangement regarding nuclear weapons, an arrangement which would overlap to a certain extent the guarantees required by the Atlantic Alliance, certain serious political problems might arise. Italy understood the intentions of the United States and the concern of the United States in avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and all the dangers contained in such proliferation. It is obvious that any observation made by Italy is based on the assumption that nuclear armaments should be subject to controls. But Italy has some misgivings about the permanent solution as proposed in the Treaty, particularly as regards the clause whereby in theory a country could withdraw. It is difficult for Italy to visualize how a country could renounce armaments without experiencing serious internal difficulties than we are prepared to cope with. Italy felt that the Treaty should be formulated in a provisional or temporary manner, leaving the possibility of renouncing nuclear weapons for a time in the future when there would be greater international solidarity. If this provisional or temporary connotation were to be introduced in the Treaty Italy then would not have any particularly strong objections. The Prime Minister then expressed some misgivings about the eventual position in Europe of Germany and Italy, as those countries might be squeezed between two nuclear powers such as the Soviet Union and France. If that situation were to develop, there might be an evolution in European political attitudes leading to a weakening of the ties with the United States, and strong ties with the United States was one of the underlying elements of Italian foreign policy. Italy was not at this time defending the German position as the Germans could do that very well on their own. But it was important to mention one significant aspect of the political life of Europe, namely the one of whether Germany was to be brought into the Alliance as a full and equal partner. Italy was concerned that any marked changes in the assurances given to Germany with regards to potential Soviet threats might bring about a strong public opinion reaction in Germany. That in turn could have unfavorable repercussions on public opinion within the Atlantic Alliance since the effect of German participation is of vital importance. Italy was also seriously concerned about the fact that a Non-Proliferation Treaty which had not been fully thought out might delay or even jeopardize European unity. And even though it was not anticipated that the European nations would join in a closely knit federation in the near future, it was an objective of unity that should be attained, such unity being also one of the basic elements of United States foreign policy. The Prime Minister pointed out that the Italian observations were already well known by the United States. He wanted to add that this nuclear problem was essentially a political one. He felt that the Treaty in its present form might have very serious repercussions on European politics and furthermore it could have a negative effect on the Atlantic Alliance. That was a matter of great concern for Italy since support of the Alliance was a vital element of Italian foreign policy. And it was because Italy attached such great importance to solidarity within the Alliance that he felt it his duty to call to the attention of his US friends the possible consequences of the Treaty. He then made reference to the MLF which had never come into being, saying that abandoning the idea of multilateral force based on equal participation by European countries and agreeing to an arrangement that would discriminate permanently against certain European countries could have serious consequences as far as democracy in Europe was concerned. President Johnson said that he had appreciated this opportunity for a frank and candid discussion. He was fully aware of Italy’s concerns with regard to the NPT and wanted to say at the outset that the United States was not contemplating any agreement that would be displeasing to its allies, including the Italians. The United States indeed valued very highly the friendship of Italy which it considered as a very important ally and therefore the United States did give most serious consideration to the observations presented by Italy. He assured the Prime Minister that the United States was aware of the views presented by other nations and he felt that no real progress could be made on the Treaty without the knowledge and consent of other nations, including Italy. He had already listened to the expressions of concern indicated by India, Germany, Italy and other nations and all of those views, on the part of neutrals as well as on the part of our allies would be taken into consideration in the attempt to arrive at some language that would offer the greatest measure of hope. And of the views presented none were more welcome than those of Italy. He then pointed out that of course the United States was not ready to produce a treaty in the next 24 hours and the Prime Minister could be sure that before the United States made up its mind it would explain its position fully. At the same time he thought that there might be some unnecessary concern on the part of such countries as India, Germany and Italy and he wondered whether a greater understanding could be reached by more complete exchanges of views among technicians. As a matter of fact, the United States has already made some substantial adjustments in the proposed treaty as a result of suggestions made by several countries. It was very important for the United States to have the fullest possible understanding on the part of Italy since Italian opinion and support was of the greatest significance. Secretary Rusk made two brief comments, first mentioning the many difficulties still existing with the Soviets. He pointed out that there was no treaty between Washington and Moscow as well as no treaty in Geneva. Therefore, European unity was not being affected, and European unity was a point on which the United States would not surrender. Then there was the matter of safeguards and in this connection if there was no full understanding among the Alliance there could be no treaty. He felt that all problems within the Alliance could be solved satisfactorily except one, that dealing with the reservations on the option to develop national nuclear power. If the above-mentioned problem could be set aside everything else could be easily solved. He then made a reference to the fact that if the security arrangements of NATO were to disappear, this might lead certain NATO countries to withdraw from the Treaty. He said in conclusion that the NPT might cause problems within the Alliance, however, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would destroy the Alliance. Prime Minister Moro said that he was concerned about the danger that might be caused by the Treaty in its present form and the possible proliferation. Therefore, all efforts should be made so as to avoid any such danger. President Johnson stated once more that he had been very glad to hear the views presented by the Italian Prime Minister. He wanted to say that one had not yet reached the stage where there might be cause for alarm. As a matter of fact the discussions had been on problems that may not present themselves anyway. And once more he reiterated the intention of the United States of not taking any steps that might displease our allies. End Text . McGhee 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. President Johnson and Prime Minister Moro were in Bonn to attend the funeral of Konrad Adenauer. 130. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 130. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 27, 1967. SUBJECT Civil Aviation Negotiations with Italy Recommendations: 2 1. That you approve our offering Italy a route package including, if necessary, a West Coast-Tokyo route, and our insisting on an agreement consistent with US aviation principles. 2. That you approve our informing Italy that the United States is prepared to accept cessation of direct air services between the two countries rather than accede to a disadvantageous agreement. Discussion: The Air Transport Services Agreement with Italy 3 will expire on June 1 as a result of Italian denunciation. Italy’s principal dissatisfaction with the present Agreement has been that it gave them no routes beyond the United States, whereas American carriers since World War II have operated to Italy and beyond. This led to a revenue imbalance, undoubtedly of concern to Italy ($51.9 million for the United States and $44.6 million for Italy in 1965). United States offers in 1964 and 1965 consultations to improve Italy’s routes failed because Italy wanted at the same time to introduce controls on the freedom and volume of US air services to Italy which we could not accept. Negotiations for a new agreement February 20 to March 8 made no progress. Italy is demanding a vast route package for itself—including routes both beyond New York to Mexico City and beyond Los Angeles to Tokyo—that in its entirety is just out of the question, and, at the same time, is insisting on cutting down possible routes that US carriers might serve under the present Agreement. Moreover, Italy has refused to discuss the operational principles until its route demands are satisfied. During the Vice President’s recent trip to Italy, Prime Minister Moro indicated Italy’s great concern with our air negotiations, declaring that it was time to take a “hard political look” at them. 4 Relevant political, economic and commercial factors have been taken into account in preparing the United States position. In view of the Prime Minister’s intervention, it was arranged with Italy to postpone the resumption of negotiations to May 2, so that we could ask you to review and approve this position. Essentially, we propose to offer the Italians a route package that includes the traffic rights they presently have plus a round-the-world route that they want very much. We will again offer them a round-the-world route via Miami to Mexico City and beyond, but if they reject this, we may have to give them instead a route via Los Angeles or San Francisco and across the Pacific to Tokyo. We would want, in exchange, route opportunities for our carriers similar to those we now enjoy, including affirmation of certain beyond rights that we are not now operating. We would also insist on an agreement based on established US aviation policy regarding capacity and other operational principles. Italy may continue to demand both the route beyond the West Coast and the route to Mexico. We are opposed to this because it is not justified on aviation considerations. To preclude Italian miscalculation that the United States might be pushed into concessions on routes or capacity principles greater than we have contemplated, we believe it necessary to advise Italy that we are prepared, albeit reluctantly, to accept cessation of air services between the two countries rather than get into an agreement or an ad hoc situation inconsistent with US interests. We recognize that termination of air services would represent failure to reach agreement on essentially a commercial endeavor with one of our strongest supporters in all aspects of Free World cooperation, including NATO, Atlantic Community affairs and international monetary reform. Nevertheless, we believe that this approach is realistic, sensible and fair. If we cannot achieve an acceptable agreement, you would be asked to make a final determination on the cancellation of air services and would be presented with all relevant factors for your consideration. This Department, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the new Secretary of Transportation and the US carriers all recognize that this negotiation is a particularly important one; failure to reach a new agreement would result in some possibly serious political repercussions in our relations with Italy, and could involve some transportation tie-ups. On the other hand, if the Italians—one of our strongest aviation partners—were able by denouncing the agreement to get us to make undue concessions on routes or on our fundamental capacity principles, our submission would be a signal to others to do likewise. (Spain has already told us officially that it may denounce its agreement to get what it wants, depending on what happens in the Italian negotiations.) The three American carriers operating to Italy have committed themselves in writing to support cessation of services if an acceptable agreement cannot be worked out. It is also widely accepted that Italy deserves to be given good routes. However, Pan Am, Northwest and a few other carriers that hope to get into the West Coast-Orient market in the future (but not TWA), oppose the grant of a West Coast-Tokyo route to Italy. Eastern is violently against granting New York-Mexico City to Italy, but is less opposed to a Miami-Mexico grant. We believe the grant of either the Miami-Mexico route or the transpacific route from California is justified to get a good agreement with Italy. On the other hand, to go beyond what we are proposing to grant Italy would without question generate intense dissatisfaction and opposition from virtually all US airlines. A settlement along the lines I am recommending will cause some dissatisfaction, as mentioned above, but our best judgment is that there will be grudging recognition of its unavoidability, and little or no public criticism by our airlines. 5 We have discussed this matter with Senator Monroney and the staffs of Senator Magnuson and the House Commerce Committee. They have indicated support both for a reasonably generous route grant and for any suggestion of cessation of air services that may be necessary. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Confidential. 2 There is no indication whether President Johnson approved or disapproved these recommendations. 3 For text of the agreement, signed in Rome June 9, 1947, and entered into force that day, see 61 Stat. 4074. 4 These discussions were reported in telegram 5115 from Rome, April 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142) 5 In a May 3 memorandum to the President, Francis Bator reported that at Johnson’s instructions he had checked with the major U.S. carriers on their views regarding negotiations with the Italian Government. On the basis of these talks he recommended and President Johnson approved “the State instruction, but tell them to hold off as long as possible before they suggest the Trans-Pacific route.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5) 131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 131. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 18, 1967. The State Department has been holding informal discussions with the Italians about a broad agreement for cooperation in scientific activities. The Italians started the talks because they are interested in strengthening their bilateral relationships with us on these matters and we have responded because of certain attractions we can see in having a broad “umbrella” agreement with them that would serve both scientific and foreign policy purposes. Last November Professor Vincenzo Caglioti, the President of the National Research Council of Italy, and some of his associates visited Washington and a specific draft agreement was discussed. 2 However, it was agreed that signing should be deferred until specific projects could also be announced. Several collaborative projects are now ready for initiation and final preparations are being made to conclude the agreement. Present planning is for an agreement to be signed in Washington early in June with the Under Secretary of State and Dr. Hornig signing for the U.S., and Leopoldo Rubinacci, the Italian Minister for Coordination of Science and Technology, signing for Italy. It is also contemplated that certain members of Congress will be participating in the signing ceremony. This sort of “umbrella” agreement, not restricted to specific fields of science nor to specific agencies or institutions, represents for the U.S. an innovation in the conduct of international science relations. Copies are enclosed of the draft agreement and the guidelines developed for the Executive Agency that will coordinate this program on the U.S. side (it is intended that the National Science Foundation serve as the U.S. Executive Agency). Both the draft agreement and the guidelines have been favorably reviewed by the Federal Council for Science and Technology. 3 Because of your strong interest in maximizing international cooperation in scientific matters, the State Department would like to determine the extent of your interest in associating the White House with the signature of this agreement. In view of the fact that this may be the first of a number of similar agreements to be signed with other countries, and the current demands on your time, I recommend that the ceremony not be held at the White House but that an appropriate Presidential greeting to the signers might be prepared for release at the ceremony at the State Department. Walt Approve 4 Disapprove See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Filed by LBJL. No classification marking. 2 No record of this meeting has been found. 3 For text of the agreement, signed in Washington June 19, 1967, and entered into force the same day, see 18 UST 1268. 4 This option is checked. 132. Memorandum of Conversation 132. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 24, 1967. SUBJECT Conversation with Ambassador Ortona PARTICIPANTS Egidio Ortona, Ambassador of Italy John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Wells Stabler, Country Director, Italy-Austria-Switzerland During the course of a long conversation between Ambassador Ortona and Mr. Leddy this morning, the following topics were covered. 1. Italian Foreign Policy Ambassador Ortona reviewed at considerable length the Italian political situation and described the ingredients of the Center-Left coalition. Being a coalition, it was inevitably fuzzy around the edges at times and the recent hassle within the coalition about Italian Middle East policy was attributable to the nature of the coalition. The Ambassador pointed out, however, that the formal position of the Italian Government, including all members of the coalition, was that there should be not the slightest deviation from Italy’s friendly approach to American foreign policy positions. He wished to make this clear, particularly in light of the circumstances relating to Ambassador Fenoaltea’s resignation. 2. NPT Mr. Leddy said that we had proposed to the Soviets that the NPT draft treaty should be tabled with Article 3 on safeguards left blank, and with two alternatives for the amendments Article. The Secretary had discussed the matter with Gromyko in New York. 2 Gromyko had not yet agreed to table the draft with Article III blank, but he did not exclude this as a possibility. Much may depend on the outcome of the Hollybush conversations. The Secretary had told Gromyko that some countries were concerned that there should be a limitation on the life of the treaty. Gromyko’s view was noncommittal but that if there were a limitation, it would have to be of long duration. Mr. Leddy said that if the Soviets were adamant about using IAEA safeguards only, this would cause serious difficulties for the treaty. Ambassador Ortona said that the whole question of safeguards and the Soviet attitude toward EURATOM came at a most unfortunate time when there was a “prise de conscience” within the European communities, particularly EURATOM. Ambassador Ortona said he wondered whether it would be desirable for the new fused Commission to re-examine the safeguards question. Mr. Rey would be taking over in July and it was the Ambassador’s personal thought that the new Commission might wish to re-examine the matter. 3. Soviet Pipeline The Ambassador said that he was not aware of the present status of negotiations on the natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union. He said that when he was Secretary General, the Foreign Office had instructed ENI to diversify on oil and gas and not limit its dependence on the Soviet Union. ENI had been told not to make the Soviet Union the only source of gas, and that it should go on talking with the Dutch, Libyans, and Algerians. Unfortunately, the Dutch price was very high and the cost of building the pipeline from the north would be considerable. He did not know what the Libyan situation would be now. Dealing with the Algerians was always very difficult. Ambassador Ortona recalled that while he was in the Foreign Office, he had tried to make that body the coordinator of Italian Government energy policy, but he had to confess that he had failed. 4. Situation in the UAR Ambassador Ortona handed Mr. Leddy a memorandum covering a report from Ambassador Catalano in Cairo. Ambassador Catalano had drawn attention to the dramatic situation in Egypt following its defeat and reported on the views of certain Egyptians that it would be desirable for Washington to make some gesture toward the UAR which could serve to make the UAR realize that it was not necessary to pay no matter what price to the Soviets for their support. Ambassador Catalano had indicated that certain persons in Cairo, including those close to Nasser, were preoccupied regarding the establishment of contact with the United States. De Gaulle could not be considered as a channel because of French opposition to the United States. Therefore, other channels were required and Italy had apparently been selected. Mr. Leddy said he did not see much hope for any gesture being made by Washington to the UAR under present circumstances. With regard to Soviet actions vis-á-visthe UAR, the present estimate of the British and ourselves was that the Soviets were resupplying a portion of UAR losses, but would not go so far as to attempt to rebuild the entire Egyptian force. It was the British estimate that it would take the Soviets a full year to resupply everything that had been lost. Mr. Leddy indicated that there were reports and rumors, so far unconfirmed, that the Soviets were trying to get naval bases in the UAR and/or in Syria. Ambassador Ortona then reported that he had just received another telegram from Cairo which was dated June 23. In this, Ambassador Catalano reported that he had seen the UAR Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, El Feki, shortly after his (Catalano’s) return from Rome. El Feki had drawn Catalano’s attention to the fact that the UAR would be satisfied if the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for withdrawal to positions occupied prior to June 5, but without a condemnation of Israel for aggression. El Feki had added that if such a resolution were not passed, the UAR was preparing ways to bring about withdrawal by other means. Ambassador Ortona commented that Nasser’s prestige seemed to be enhanced by the Podgorny visit and by Soviet resupply actions. 5. Civil Aviation In response to Mr. Leddy’s question, Ambassador Ortona said that the United States and Italy still seemed far apart on two or three issues. While he would make certain comments, he did not wish to negotiate, since he was not technically competent and this should be left to the negotiators. Speaking generally, he said Alitalia was psychologically motivated by two main points. The first was that the original agreement had been conceived when Italy had no civil aviation and thus Italy had been obliged to sign what may be described as an “armistice agreement.” The agreement was obsolete and it could not protect the interests of the big company which Alitalia had become. The second point was that Alitalia had an enormous fear that without the due protection which could be achieved by a new agreement, Alitalia would be submerged by the enormous capacity and strength of the U.S. companies. However, it was very difficult to translate all of this into a new agreement. Ambassador Ortona recalled that although Italy had been given Los Angeles a number of years ago, it had never been able to fly there because other questions, such as capacity and Bermuda principles, had blocked the way. The other major difficulty was to obtain a balanced route concession. Ambassador Ortona said that as Secretary General of the Foreign Office, he had seen Carandini of Alitalia, General Santini, Ambassador Capomazza, and others and pleaded with them to solve the problem before May 31. He had pointed out that failure to reach an agreement might lead to serious problems, including cessation. The Ambassador admitted that his approach had also been somewhat objective since he had desired to eliminate this problem before coming to Washington. The reply which had been given him was that Alitalia was prepared to accept anything, including cessation, rather than an agreement which was not viable. Ambassador Ortona told Mr. Leddy that against the strong opposition of Alitalia, the Italian Government was preparing to present something to us on capacity which he thought might be acceptable. There ensued a rather inconclusive exchange with respect to the routes. The Ambassador indicated that Italy believed it should serve the same places in the United States that the U.S. carriers departed from. Italy had only been offered four U.S. points. He also mentioned Italian desires for Atlanta, Dallas, and beyond to Mexico, and said that the United States thought it should keep not only what it had in the previous agreement, but also obtain Australia and Africa. He noted that we had informally said we would give up Australia and Africa, but that this had never become a formal position. Mr. Stabler said we could not formalize this position if the Italians continued to reject our offer of Los Angeles and beyond to Tokyo. We therefore continued to maintain our requests. Mr. Stabler said that we believed that any agreement to be acceptable would have to be an economically balanced one. It was out of the question for us to give to the Italians routes which provided Alitalia with a far greater revenue than that earned by the American airlines serving Italy combined. We had placed certain valuations on the routes and had explained these to the Italians. While the Italians had rejected the valuations, they had never come up with any of their own nor explained the basis or the justification for their requests. We had to view the routes as economic questions and the best hope for the achievement of an agreement between the United States and Italy would be for the Italian side to prepare a basis for evaluating the revenue earning capacity of their routes. If we could agree on a formula for evaluating routes and could accept the fact that there had to be economically balanced route concessions, then it might be possible to achieve agreement. Finally, in response to a query as to the present status of the Italian and American airlines, Mr. Stabler said that the airlines were flying normally with each side having filed applications for renewal of permits. As long as no one endeavored to restrict the other side, there should be no problem. Ambassador Ortona recognized that if the Italians tried to interfere with our services, there would be a sharp reaction on our side. He gave the impression that Italy did not intend to place any restrictions on U.S. airlines. Ambassador Ortona said he did not know when negotiations might begin again. Mr. Stabler said he understood that there had been some talk of September, but that we were waiting to hear of Italian wishes in this regard. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler on June 27. 2 Not further identified. 133. Memorandum for the Record 133. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 22, 1967. SUBJECT Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 22 August 1967 PRESENT Mr. Rostow, Ambassador Kohler, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Helms Admiral R. L. Taylor was present for all items. Mr. David Murphy was present for Item 1. Mr. Rolfe Kingsley was present for Item 2. Mr. Jacob Esterline was present for Item 3. Mr. Archibald Roosevelt was present for Item 4. Mr. Joseph Smith was present for Item 5. [Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, concerning programs for the Soviet Union.] 2. Italy—Covert Action Program for FY-1968 The wind-down of covert political support to Italian parties ahead of schedule was enthusiastically welcomed by the committee. The paper was approved as submitted. 2 [Here follows discussion of the remaining agenda items on programs for Latin America and Africa.] 1 Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, 303 Committee Files. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 The [ text not declassified ] paper for the 303 Committee, August 4, stated the following regarding the wind-down of covert political support: “The point has been approaching rapidly in recent years where the continuation of a large-scale covert action program in Italy would no longer have pertinence. Currently, socialist unification has been achieved and the Christian Democratic Party (DC), [ 1 line of source text not declassified ]despite continuing financial problems, is at least for the time being well united behind its incumbent political secretary. Domestic funds are available if [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] political groups make sufficient efforts to tap them. In addition, the amount of covert assistance the United States is prepared to offer in light of other more pressing commitments no longer equates with the amounts needed to have other than peripheral impact on the Italian political scene.” (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files: Italy) 134. Memorandum of Conversation 134. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 19, 1967, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT Fiat Deal PARTICIPANTS Italy His Excellency Giuseppe Saragat, President of Italy His Excellency Amintore Fanfani, Minister for Foreign Affairs His Excellency Egidio Ortona, Italian Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Sergio Romano, Interpreter United States The President The Secretary The Honorable G. Frederick Reinhardt, American Ambassador to Italy Mr. Neil Seidenman, Interpreter President Saragat said that another matter of concern was the Export-Import Bank loan to Fiat. 2 Although it was not of major importance, it had a definite psychological value. Fiat was a private corporation whose operations were less subject to public scrutiny than were those of Alitalia. Fiat has an annual turnover of approximately $2 billion. It employs some 12,000 workers and was obviously no small company. The transaction in question concerned a loan of $50 million. Fiat does not need the money. Its President could take this amount from his own pocket. $50 million represents only about one-fortieth of Fiat’s annual turnover. The Fiat proposal to construct an automobile industry in the Soviet Union was motivated by the desire to encourage a commercially-orientated economy in the Soviet Union. It was also motivated by the desire to promote a higher living standard and possibly a subsequent reduction of military expenditures. Fiat is not going to the USSR to produce missiles. Rather it will produce automobiles and hopefully will contribute to the improvement of the lot of Soviet workers and consumers. This would contribute to the cause of peace and by promoting a consumer-oriented economy would play a part in promoting the evolution of democracy in the Soviet Union. The $50 million loan had not been requested by Fiat from the standpoint of need. Rather the purpose was to show that the Fiat project had no anti-American overtones, and to insure that it could not be exploited for political or ideological reasons. For this reason, the problems which arise from the blocking of the loan are not financial, but are psychological. The President said that he was not altogether familiar with this aspect of the subject, but would have the matter carefully reviewed. He said that the Administration agreed that the Fiat project is a constructive and useful step and that we are in accord with the goals which it seeks to achieve. For this reason, we had asked the Ex-Im Bank to approve the loan. In our opinion, the Fiat transaction would have effects in the Soviet Union that would be in the interests of all the parties involved. Unfortunately, some members of Congress had felt that to approve the loan would be giving aid to the Communists. It sometimes takes a considerable amount of time to educate some of the members of Congress. The President said that for the last four years, the Administration had been successful with Congress both on the domestic front and in international affairs. However, we were now approaching an election year and anything that can be used to embarrass the Administration is fully exploited by the opposition and even by some members of the party in power. The latter may have presidential aspirations or other individual interests which they wish to promote. Thus, many things that the Administration feels are worthwhile run into obstacles and we then must wait until after the elections or “until the Republicans take over.” The President assured President Saragat that he would do everything possible to have the matter reconsidered. President Saragat said that in his contacts with the late Professor Valletta, former President of Fiat, he had been told that it was essential to know exactly where the US stood before entering into a contract with the USSR. President Saragat said that had the US expressed opposition, Fiat would not have signed the agreement. He said that the Italian Communists find themselves in a very uncomfortable situation each time visitors from the USSR arrive in Italy and then make a point of expressing their admiration for Fiat. President Johnson said that he himself owned a Fiat convertible about which he is very enthusiastic. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Saragat Visit. Secret. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in S on September 29. The memorandum is Part V of VII; memoranda of conversation of the other portions of the discussion are ibid. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 During an October 7, 1966, speech in New York, President Johnson announced that the Export-Import Bank was ready to guarantee Italy credit for the purchase of U.S.-made equipment for the Togliattigrad Fiat plant. For text of his statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1125-1130. In 1967 both the House and Senate adopted amendments to the Export-Import Bank authorization legislation that banned the loan guarantees. 135. Memorandum of Conversation 135. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 17, 1967, 6:30 p.m. SUBJECT Internal Italian Political Situation PARTICIPANTS Italy The Honorable Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian Christian Democratic Party His Excellency Egidio Ortona, Ambassador of Italy United States The President Mr.Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Joseph Califano, Special Assistant to the President Mr. Neil Seidenman, Department of State Interpreter Mr. Rumor said that as a responsible representative of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, he wished to convey some information which the President, who shoulders such great responsibilities throughout the world, might be pleased to hear. Mr. Rumor said that the Italian political situation today is characterized by stability. He said that the center-left coalition and the inter-party agreements are working well and will continue on a solid footing for a long while to come. Mr. Rumor said that he and his associates had from the beginning felt that the United States would stand behind them in the efforts they had been making in recent years. They were convinced that they were moving on the right path toward the stability of democratic institutions in Italy. Mr. Rumor said that this political stability had benefitted the economy as well, to the extent that Italy had recovered from the 1964 recession. Mr. Rumor said that the Italian national elections in 1968, which will take place before those to be held in the United States, promised to be of particular significance. Hopefully the elections will further consolidate the existing situation in Italy. It was because of these elections that his discussion with the President was of significant importance. Mr. Rumor said that to put the matter simply, the work being carried out in Italy is undertaken with the knowledge that America, despite its geographic distance, stands behind them. The President assured Mr. Rumor that no one takes greater interest in these matters than we in the United States. Mr. Rumor thanked the President and said that he was quite sure that this was true for, in fact, Italy represented a sort of boundary line with the Communist East. For this reason, the success of the Christian Democratic Party contributes to the strength of democracy throughout Europe. In addition, it promotes the development of unity in the European Community which the United States desires and in which the United States places its confidence. Mr. Rumor said, however, that there are some roadblocks to be overcome such as the resistance on the part of the French. With patience and perseverance, however, our efforts will succeed and we will arrive at the day when Great Britain will join Europe and when political unification will be attained. The President said that no one should have the impression that there is any less interest in the United States concerning the affairs of our friends in Italy and in Europe because of the problems which we must cope with in other parts of the world. He said that our interest in Latin America, Africa, and especially Viet-Nam caused no diminution in our interest in Europe. The President said that we will continue to do our duty in these other areas, but we will also continue consistently to give our attention and understanding to matters of concern to Europe. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman. The memorandum is Part II of IV. The meeting was held at the White House. 136. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 136. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 1, 1967. SUBJECT U.S.-Italian Civil Aviation When President Saragat visited you he raised the issue of U.S.-Italian civil aviation relations. He said that the former U.S.-Italian Civil Aviation Agreement, which Italy renounced, gave Italy less generous terms than the agreements we had with Germany, France and the UK and suggested its terms were related to the World War II armistice settlement. He said that this issue was of considerable psychological importance to Italy and you assured him that you would have the problem carefully reviewed. At Tab A is a letter from Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Fanfani 2 transmitting on your behalf our comments on President Saragat’s remarks. Secretary Rusk has approved the letter. The Rusk letter makes the following points: —the former agreement was not related to the armistice settlement; —it provided U.S. and Italian carriers approximately equal revenue opportunities. On this criterion, which is fundamental to all our aviation negotiations, it was equal to our agreements with other countries, including Germany, France and the UK; —the U.S. is prepared to grant Italy new commercial air rights as valuable as those it would obtain from Italy in exchange. We made a valuable new offer in our most recent negotiations because we very much wanted to settle this issue. We continue to be willing to consider other alternatives consistent with the principle of obtaining overall economic balance; —we want to get an exchange of views going again so that we can settle this issue. The letter closes the door on any further review by yourself. State believes, and I think it is probably right, that unless we do this we will not be able to get the Italians back to the table to negotiate a fair commercial bargain. Walt Approve State letter 3 Disapprove See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Limited Official Use. 2 Not printed. 3 This option is checked and a handwritten notation indicates that Fried’s office was notified. 137. Record of Meeting 137. Record of Meeting 1 Rome, December 23, 1967. Meeting of the President with President Saragat, Prime Minister Moro, and Foreign Minister Fanfani, Saturday evening, December 23, 1967, at President Saragat’s villa, Castel Porziano President Saragat had talked privately with President Johnson for about 20 minutes before the meeting started. The following is an account of the more general session. President Saragat opened by expressing his pleasure at the recent wedding in the Johnson family. He said he had met Captain Robb and had thought him a fine soldier. He also took the occasion to wish the President and his family a happy Christmas. President Johnson expressed his appreciation. Prime Minister Moro then said it was a time to reaffirm the feelings of friendship which were again conveyed on President Saragat’s recent trip to the United States. The President’s current visit indicates American solidarity with Italy and with Europe in general. Europe needs that sense of solidarity and support from the U.S.; and Europe in turn must reciprocate. That is the central point of Italian policy: collaboration between Europe and the U.S. There were, obviously, difficulties in Europe, which saddened and worried the Prime Minister. There were those trying to prevent European unity and trying to make U.S.-European relations more difficult. But Italy and the U.S. must remain loyal to the concept of a unified Europe which worked in intimate collaboration with the U.S. Italy was determined to see the possibility of U.K. entry into Europe not damaged. But Italy doesn’t want to break up what has already been built in Europe. Therefore, he hopes the U.K. will continue to indicate its interest in joining Europe. Italy will maintain a policy of constructive solidarity with both the U.K. and U.S. President Johnson expressed his satisfaction at the continuity of these enlightened Italian policies, as expressed by President Saragat, Prime Minister Moro, and the whole Italian government. It is a marvel of modern communications that we can exchange views frequently face to face. He almost always found his own views in harmony with those of the Italian government; for example, they were explored in detail in Washington when President Saragat was there. Moreover, the American people are the friends of the Italian people, and want the U.S. Government to work with the Government of Italy. This underlying human feeling has strengthened both governments over the past 20 years. Specifically, the President was pleased with our common support for NATO, which we had reaffirmed at Adenauer’s funeral. He was grateful for the collaboration between the U.S. and Italian monetary authorities. He appreciated Carli’s recent support in the wake of the British devaluation. He was sure that Italy would not regret having supported the U.S. position. When the U.S. was a surplus country, we undertook the responsibility of helping deficit countries. We now look to the surplus countries to help us carry our burdens until we can get into balance. We shall be taking stringent steps in the near future with respect to our balance of payments, notably with respect to investments abroad. By wisely handling our investments, we can begin to turn a deficit into a surplus, which we intend to do. But we do not want to damage the liquidity position of others. We appreciated in the past, and look in the future to continued collaboration of Italy, Netherlands, and others who have been such good partners. Finally, Vietnam. The tribute of the Asians to Prime Minister Holt was a tribute to the enlightened policy in Asia of white Australia. The growing solidarity of Free Asia was apparent to all of us in Canberra and Melbourne. It is evident that the North Vietnamese and those who support them cannot win in South Vietnam. The problem is how to apply enough pressure to bring about peace without widening the war. In no case will the U.S. withdraw. Less than one out of five in the U.S. supports our doing less than we are now doing. Two out of three want us to do more. The President’s policy is that the war shall not be widened; pressure shall be continued; and we seek negotiations at the earliest possible moment. All of the countries of the region agree with this policy: from Singapore and Malaysia, through Laos, up to Korea. We have the support of those who live there and who are in the greatest danger. As for stopping bombing, the San Antonio formula 2 is as far as we can go. We are prepared to stop bombing for prompt and productive discussions, assuming that the other side will not take advantage. For two months after August 25 we had a 300-square-mile circle around Hanoi and were in direct communication with Hanoi. On September 10, we made the formula—which Hanoi already knew—public, but the response was flatly negative. We shall stop bombing if they stop bombing with hand grenades. But we cannot stop half the war. The Italian government should know that we have intelligence that two North Vietnamese divisions are now moving towards the South. We have stopped bombing five times, and they have responded only by increasing their flow of supplies during the pause. The President does not believe that Hanoi is prepared to negotiate at this time. But he had noted Pope Paul’s response to the Cardinals, 3 and he wished to do everything possible to get discussions started. Perhaps discussions between the government in Saigon and members of the NLF on an informal basis would be the best route. He wished the Italian government to know that he would take up this matter with Pope Paul and also urge him to see what could be done on behalf of the prisoners and on both sides. 4 We are prepared to have the arrangements for prisoners fully inspected on our side. The President concluded by saying that we are prepared to leave South Vietnam when the aggression ceases and a constitutional government exists based on one man, one vote. This outcome was essential to the creation of a Free Asia, but equally to the maintenance of a Free Europe. If the U.S. were to pull out of South Vietnam, the Europeans would be the first to feel the consequences in the form of diminished security. W. W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 55. Secret. Prepared on December 27. President Johnson was completing an around-the-world trip that included stops in Australia December 21-22; Thailand, Vietnam, and Pakistan December 22-23; and Italy December 23. He returned to Washington on the morning of December 24. 2 For text of the President’s September 29 address at San Antonio, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 876-881. 3 Apparent reference to the Pope’s December 8 statement welcoming announcement of a Christmas truce in Vietnam. 4 A memorandum of their December 23 conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings File, Vatican. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 138. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 138. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 30, 1968. REU-8 SUBJECT The Imbroglio of the Italian Military Intelligence Service The world press has recently focussed its attention on the “scandals” that have surfaced in the Italian Military Intelligence Service. This paper attempts to place the imbroglio in the proper perspective. Abstract Since the spring of 1967, the Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service (SIFAR) and its former chief, General Giovanni De Lorenzo, have been publicly accused of having engaged in illegal activities ranging from the unauthorized compilation and pilfering of confidential personnel files to the plotting of a coup d’etat in mid-1964, during a government crisis. The first charge was proven correct by a government-appointed investigative committee and cost General De Lorenzo his job as Army Chief of Staff in April 1967. The authenticity of the second and much more serious charge of an attempted coup attributed to De Lorenzo by the Italian weekly magazine L’Espresso is presently being investigated by another government-appointed committee. It is also being debated in court, where De Lorenzo’s libel suit against L’Espresso is now being tried. This situation gained new attention early in 1968 when De Lorenzo, or someone in his behalf, leaked so-called “documentary evidence” to various rightwing scandal sheets purporting to show that some key Socialists in Premier Moro’s present center-left coalition took payoffs from the intelligence service in the early 1960’s. The furor over these charges and countercharges has added substantial acceleration to the normally turbulent pre-electoral atmosphere in Italy (national elections are to be held this spring). It has hardly improved harmony within Premier Moro’s coalition government and some politicians and journalists have been predicting that a government crisis would result from the imbroglio. We do not believe that the revelations that have surfaced thus far are sufficiently damaging to cause a government crisis. If De Lorenzo were to publish the mass of confidential information (real or fabricated) that he has accumulated on practically every leading Italian personality, he could certainly destroy the reputations, if not the careers, of a number of politicians. It is unlikely that the government would survive such revelations. But in so doing De Lorenzo would also be exposing himself to prosecution. He will almost certainly not take this chance. [Here follows a 4-page discussion of the issues outlined in the abstract.] 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 IT. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 139. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 139. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, July 25, 1968, 2120Z. 7330. Dept. pass Commerce and Treasury. Ref: Joint Commerce, Defense, State Message 205742. 2 Subject: Sale of P3B Aircraft to Italy. 1. Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense Henry Kuss and Lockheed officials have had series discussions with representatives Italian industry and Italian Government officials regarding proposed sale P3B “Orion” aircraft to Italy. Chief of Staff Italian Air Force Fanali and Chief of Staff Italian Navy Michelagnoli indicated to Kuss that Italian military had just about concluded that P3B clearly preferable to “Atlantique” from military point of view. They expect decision on this aspect by end of August. They also indicated to Kuss that political rather than military consideration would determine Italian decision as between P3B and “Atlantique.” 2. Mr. Kuss’ discussions with industry representatives (many of whom are also influential members of Christian Democratic Party) gave him impression that French began to mount campaign in Italy in favor of “Atlantique” immediately after Dutch decision to purchase this aircraft. However, at informal meeting between Kuss and Foreign Minister Medici latter did not indicate he yet aware of French campaign, and showed great interest in draft memorandum Kuss and Lockheed Vice President Wilder had prepared on this subject. 3 3. Embassy informed by reliable source that French Ambassador to Rome has instructions to approach GOI in effort convince GOI to join “Atlantique” consortium and to arrange for his Dutch, Belgian and German colleagues to do the same. 4. Draft memorandum prepared by Kuss and Wilder (copy left with Medici on informal basis) outlines following proposal: (A) Expresses joint US-Italian interest in common equipment planning for anti-submarine warfare role; (B) Expresses most favorable price, credit without reference to specific interest rate, training and logistics considerations for purchase of US aircraft; (C) Expresses economic political willingness to allow equal competition with US industry toward target procurement goal of 25 percent program value US aircraft purchase. (FYI. Program value estimated at $100 million. End FYI.) Also expresses willingness Lockheed Aircraft Corporation participate in transfer through licensing arrangements of technology on compound helicopter for potential civil or military use in Europe. 5. Kuss and Wilder prepared to sign this memorandum including 90-day option on basis serious consideration by Italian Government of P3B aircraft. In his informal discussion with Kuss, Medici indicated he might be prepared to accept above memorandum on formal basis. Although Medici did not so indicate, Kuss was informed by industry representatives that Medici will probably coordinate views of Ministries of Defense, Industry and Foreign Affairs on “Atlantique” consortium proposal. Medici said he would let us know by July 27 whether GOI would wish memorandum to be presented formally. Memorandum could be presented either at Ministry Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defense. 6. Regardless nature GOI decision regarding formal presentation of memorandum, we believe it most important and urgent that letter from Chief Naval Operations to Italian Chief Naval Staff and Chief of Staff Italian Air Force regarding P3B purchase (delivered morning July 25) be supplemented by letters to Italian Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers from Secretaries of State and Defense. 7. Following is suggested text: “The United States and Italian Armed Forces have been flying anti-submarine patrols over the waters surrounding Italy for many years with some of our aircraft based at the same facility in Sicily. To those of us who share the responsibility for defense of the Mediterranean waters your adoption of the P3B aircraft is of considerable importance. We would appreciate every attention you can give to this matter in the interest of our mutual security.” 8. Request urgent approval of suggested letters in order that they may be delivered early next week since we believe communications at this level are now necessary to offset expected high-level approaches from French and others in favor of “Atlantique.” 4 Ackley 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to USCINCEUR. 2 Telegram 205742 to Rome, July 19, reported on efforts to promote sales of Lockheed aircraft to Italy. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 In a July 30 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, George Springsteen, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, recommended against adopting the Embassy’s suggestion. He noted that the Department of Defense had also decided against sending a letter from Secretary Clifford. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT) 140. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 140. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome,August 1, 1968, 1734Z. 7466. Subject: Sale of P3B Aircraft to Italy. Ref: State 212833. 2 1. I discussed our P3B proposal this morning with Minister of Defense Gui and told him USG considered this matter important and hoped GOI would decide to purchase this aircraft. Gui told me P3B and “Atlantique” proposals still under study by GOI and that he had no idea when decision would be made. 2. During courtesy call on Minister of Industry and Commerce Andreotti yesterday, I also took occasion to mention our interest in this project. He seemed well aware of both our proposal and that of European consortium. He, like Gui, was noncommittal regarding GOI decision on matter. 3. We have taken steps to bring our interest informally to the attention of the Quirinale. Ackley 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to USCINCEUR. 2 Telegram 212833 from Rome, August 1, reads: “Request Ambassador convey to Formin or Defmin as appropriate proposed message para 7 reftel 7330 as general position USG rather than as specific personal message from SecState or SecDef. Dept will take similar line with Ambassador Ortona when he returns to Washington this week.” (Ibid.) 141. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 141. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, September 10, 1968, 1810Z. 8209. Ref: Rome 8173. 2 Subject: P-3B Sale to Italy. 1. I called on Minister of Defense Gui afternoon September 10 and discussed P-3B aircraft sale along same general lines my talk with Foreign Minister Medici (reftel). 2. While a bit evasive on exact status of technical recommendations by service chiefs, Gui made it clear that Italian military considered P-3B and Atlantique roughly equal insofar as operational effectiveness concerned. (Later discussion brought out fact that Italians considered P-3B operationally superior in certain respects but it had distinct disadvantage of being too heavy to operate from many Italian airfields. Thus “advantages and disadvantages of P-3B more or less cancelled each other out.”) 3. Gui said he had written letter to Prime Minister Leone requesting Leone to convene an early meeting of various Ministries concerned with this matter. In addition to Defense and Foreign Affairs, he mentioned Ministries of Industry and Commerce and State participation. He said he hoped decision would be reached soon and indicated that a principal consideration would be extent and nature of participation by Italian industry. Gui noted that there was not only the important matter of probably large participation by Italian industry in the Atlantique consortium, but of even more importance the possibility of continued participation by Italian industry in the construction of aircraft which might be developed and manufactured in the future. 4. Gui recognized the importance and relevance of the political aspects of the decision and the operational aspects involved in the use of the same equipment by Italy and U.S. He emphasized that my call had been most timely and assured me that due consideration would be given to all the arguments I put forth when interministerial meeting takes place. Ackley 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential. 2 Telegram 8173 from Rome, September 7, reported on Ambassador Ackley’s presentation on the P-3B aircraft to Foreign Minister Medici. (Ibid.) 142. Memorandum of Conversation 142. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 11, 1968. PARTICIPANTS The President, Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici, Ambassador Ortona, Walt Rostow, Ed Fried Walt Rostow told the President that, while they were waiting, he had described to the Foreign Minister the President’s statement on the NPT. Medici welcomed the statement and stressed his strong personal support of the NPT. He said the Italian Government before Czechoslovakia had authorized signature of the treaty on August 26. Czechoslovakia canceled this. The President said he was happy to see the Foreign Minister and recalled with warmth the meetings he had had with the Pope, with President Saragat, and former Prime Minister Moro. He took satisfaction in the close relations between Italy and the U.S. Medici replied in kind. The President asked whether the Italians were as concerned over Czechoslovakia as we were and what they planned to do about it. Medici said they were very much concerned and were going to do all they had been asked to do. He said he was going over the details of prospective Italian actions to strengthen NATO with Secretary Rusk on Monday. He understood that the meetings in Brussels of the Permanent Representatives had gone well and that the U.S. Representative had been satisfied with Italian actions. He added that after the explosion of Prague the Italian Government had made a strong statement of condemnation. When he met with Gromyko, he told him that the Czechoslovakian invasion contradicted the language in paragraph 12 of the preamble of the NPT. (“That states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”) He told Gromyko that the Russian action had destroyed one of the foundations on which the treaty was based and therefore had called the treaty itself into question. Continuing on the NPT, he said that the Italians were looking to see what happens in the U.S. Senate. If they see doubt arising about the treaty in the Senate, then they would have doubts about the U.S. interpretations of the treaty. These interpretations are essential to the support the Italian Parliament has given to the treaty. The Foreign Minister asked about Rumania. He said that the situation there might get out of hand. The President said he believed it was serious and that was why he had made his statement of warning. Medici said the statement had been warmly welcomed in Italy as giving further assurance to their security. Medici went on to say that the post-war situation represented an entire change in Western Europe. They were more and more becoming tied to an open system and their prosperity was dependent on trade and tourism and capital. The Italians liked peace—perhaps too much. The President said we would all have to work harder to keep the peace. He felt that it was essential for U.S. troops to remain in Europe and that they could remain in Europe indefinitely if the American people came to believe that the Europeans were doing all they could do and should do in their own defense. That was why European action was so important now. Medici said he understood this and fully agreed. The President asked how the Russians could have timed their move in Czechoslovakia as badly as they did. Medici answered that he believed the timing was very bad and that the Russians were now worried. They were pushing hard, for example, on the NPT but they had endangered German, Italian, Japanese and other participation in the treaty, and without their participation the treaty would be too weak and have too little meaning. In closing the conversation, the President expressed again his warm friendship for Italians and his hope, after he left public life, to have an unhurried visit to Italy. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IT-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Fried. 143. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 143. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, October 17, 1968, 1156Z. 8973. Subject: P3B. 1. In my conversation with Minister Medici on October 16, he raised with me the question of the P3B. I said that I assumed the matter had been taken up with him in Washington, and he told me that neither the President nor the Secretary had mentioned it, a fact which was somewhat surprising. 2 I told him I was surprised too. The Minister thought he knew the explanation. Foreign Minister Debre had told him he intended to protest vigorously to the United States Government the political pressure which had been exerted on the Italians on behalf of the “Orion”, which he thought was quite improper. Debre had seen the President prior to Medici’s call. He (Medici) assumes that the matter was not mentioned by the President or the Secretary in response to Debre’s complaint. 2. He wanted to know, however, whether the United States Government’s interest in this matter had changed in any way. I assured him that it had not. We still attached great importance to it for military, economic, and political reasons. Medici said he was very happy to have this assurance. He wanted to be able to say to the Prime Minister same afternoon that the American Ambassador had called on him and had again assured him of the American interest in this matter. Minister Medici was well aware of the second supplementary U.S. proposal, and had in his hand the English version of same. 3. As I left the office, Minister Medici expressed his hope for a favorable outcome on this matter. 3 Ackley 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 IT. Confidential; Limdis. 2 Ackley recommended in telegram 8742 from Rome, October 7, that the Secretary discuss the matter with Medici. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 258677, October 21, Secretary Rusk instructed Ackley to convey to Medici his interest in the P-3B question and to request Medici’s support. (Ibid., POL 7 IT) 144. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 144. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, October 25, 1968. ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY DRAWS FURTHER AWAY FROM MOSCOW By supporting the Prague leadership in defiance of Soviet sensibilities, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has staked out for itself a new degree of autonomy. Italian Communist theory has been developing in this direction—with some deviations—since 1956, when party leader Togliatti first publicized his belief in “many roads to socialism.” In previous crises in the international Communist movement, however—such as when the USSR invaded Hungary in 1956 and supported the Arabs in the Middle East crisis of 1967—the Italian Communists supported the Moscow line. In the present crisis, the Italian party has shown an unwonted degree of unity and has sought to develop a united front of Western European Communist support for the Prague government. Over the long term, Moscow may seek to oust unfriendly Italian Communist leaders or to split the party if it maintains its present position. In the shorter term, continuing tension between the Soviet and Italian parties seems inevitable. In domestic politics, the Italian party may seek to use evidence of Soviet disapproval to improve its image as an independent, democratic political force respectable enough to sit with the democratic parties in an Italian government. Background to Divergence The origins of the Italian-Soviet disagreement, which has now come to an open split over Czechoslovakia, go back more than a decade. The PCI, a principal heir of the resistance movement of World War II, has long been the political party in Italy with the largest number of votes after the Christian Democratic Party, the key member of every coalition government of the past 20 years. Having achieved such success and come so close to victory through the democratic political process, the PCI has been increasingly keen to win a part in national rule. Particularly in recent years, the PCI has been struggling to escape from the isolation it has experienced since its longtime ally, the Socialist Party, became instead the ally and governmental partner of the Christian Democrats. The PCI has repeatedly sought to show that Italian Communism is compatible with the democratic process either because world-wide Communism is no longer antidemocratic or, if this thesis is not tenable, because Italian Communism is following a sufficiently different path from that of a Communist dictatorship. Togliatti’s Polycentrism For over a decade, Italian Communist theory has been developing justification for a stance more independent from the Soviet Union. The Italian Communist leadership first advocated “polycentrism"—a degree of autonomy for each national party—in June 1956. In a published interview that year, Palmiro Togliatti pointed out that “there are many roads to socialism” and insisted on a system in which bilateral party relationships would replace complete dependence on the USSR. Under pressure, however, he subsequently modified these views by calling for “democratic centralism.” Togliatti redefined this term to involve close contacts with the Soviet Union, but allowed for certain variations in policy to take account of national considerations in each country. The Italian leadership in 1964 began to re-emphasize polycentrism, and on 5 September published a “memorandum” by Togliatti, who had just died. 2 In this document, Togliatti stressed full support for the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict but said that a formal split with China must be avoided. The PCI, he said, “would be against any proposal to create once again a centralized international organization”; unity must be achieved “in the diversity of our concrete political positions” in each individual country. Togliatti emphasized that the nonruling Communist parties should be more flexible and adapt to local conditions. He criticized the Soviet leaders for the reluctant pace of de-Stalinization and called for frequent contacts among Communist parties—based on equality and not on Moscow’s traditional rule of “unanimity” imposed from above. The Mediterranean Conference Movement In 1967 and early 1968, the Italian Communists attempted to develop a line separate from that of the Soviets by supporting a regional Mediterranean conference that was to include leftist as well as Communist parties. The proposal had been originated by the Yugoslav Communists and a left-wing Italian Socialist splinter group. The PCI backed the idea of cooperating with the non-Communist “progressives” in order to help the party during Italy’s elections in the spring of 1967. By establishing an identification not only with Tito but with the various leftist parties in the area, the PCI hoped to shed its old domestic image as a tool of Moscow and thereby increase its appeal to the electorate. The idea of a Mediterranean gathering gained strength after the Israeli-Arab war of June 1967. The decisive Israeli victory had stunned the Arab governments and had heightened fears among local “progressive” parties that the US would become more involved in the area. This situation, in the words of these parties, created the threat of “aggressive Atlantic-American imperialism” and threatened to transform the Mediterranean into a potentially explosive new “front” or “scene of dangerous confrontation” between the US Sixth Fleet and the newly introduced Soviet naval units. After preliminary meetings in Italy and Yugoslavia, some 17 leftist and Communist parties from 12 Mediterranean countries met in Rome from 9 to 11 April 1968, but little emerged from the secret discussions. The Mediterranean movement has had little impact, and now appears to have been dropped, at least temporarily. The Soviet Union reportedly was consulted by the Yugoslavs on the project but, as a non-Mediterranean power, probably never received an invitation nor sought to send a delegation. The Soviet reaction was cool and Moscow was probably put off by the Yugoslav proposal to discuss the presence of Soviet naval units. In addition, the Soviets undoubtedly feared the development of ideas and positions that would strengthen trends toward autonomy and jeopardize their hegemony in international Communism. The Developing Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis The Italian Communists believed that the decentralization of the international Communist movement, as exemplified in Prague’s experiment, was important to their domestic political success. The PCI, which expected to decline in the national elections in May 1968, actually went up from 25.3 to 26.9 percent of the total vote. This success may have resulted partly from the adoption by the Czechoslovak and French Communist parties of more nationalistic roles. As the Czechoslovak crisis developed, the Italian Communist leaders sought both publicly and privately to dissuade the Soviets from violent action. A reliable source reports “dramatic clashes” during the Italian-Soviet talks in Moscow from 14 to 16 July. Carlo Galluzzi, the leader of the foreign affairs section of the Italian party, told the Soviets that his party backed the new Czechoslovak leaders. He warned that, should the Soviets intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia, the Italian party would formally and publicly dissociate itself from the act. After he returned, Galluzzi told the PCI directorate that French Communist leader Waldeck Rochet, who had gone to Moscow with the Italians, had taken a similar but less explicit position against Soviet intervention. Publicly, too, the PCI sought to demonstrate its support for Dubcek. The official party organ L’Unita reported on 30 July that the PCI believed that “frank and fraternal debates and meetings” should be held in an attempt to end the divergence of views over Czechoslovakia. On 6 August, a PCI communiquéexpressed satisfaction that the Bratislava meeting had reaffirmed Communist solidarity and collaboration “on the basis of the autonomy of each party and each country in the search for ways of development of Socialist society.” On 14 August, party secretary general Luigi Longo flew to Moscow for a “brief period of repose” that presumably included talks with Soviet leaders about Czechoslovakia. Intervention The intervention shocked the PCI and came as a surprise, as far as timing was concerned, even to the leaders. They were widely scattered in Italy and abroad for the traditional Italian August holidays. Only two PCI politburo members could be found to work with lesser officials in drafting a pronouncement on party reaction. The leaders decided on immediate censure and issued a communiquéon 21 August after telephone clearance from Longo in Moscow, but without consultation with other top-ranking party members. Party leaders are reported to have commented that this situation was worse than the Hungarian intervention, that it upset everything the Italian Communists had done since 1945, that Brezhnev and Kosygin were American agents and should be shot, and that the Soviet Union was on the road to Nazism. During the week after the intervention, all Communist federations throughout Italy ratified the leadership position, according to a reliable source. Below the federation level, however, local PCI leaders expressed doubt and disagreement on both sides of the issue. Particularly among older Communists, there was some tendency to trust the Soviets. Nevertheless, the old Stalinists still prominent in the party failed to defend the USSR, and the two most prominent leaders sided unequivocally with Longo’s position. Middle-class Communists, intellectuals, and many younger members considered the PCI position too bland. Italian Support for Czechoslovakia After the intervention, the PCI made a strong effort to rally international Communist opposition to the Soviet action. The Italians wanted to protect the Dubcek government, if possible, but in any case to distinguish the Italian Communist position clearly and unmistakably from that of the Soviets. The PCI made a special point of working with its French colleagues. Longo stopped for consultation in Paris on his flight home from Moscow on 22 August, and both parties called for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. In early September, Italian Communist emissaries visited Sofia and Budapest as well as Bucharest and Belgrade. They held further consultations with the French and, according to several reports, with other West European parties, including the British, the Austrian, and the Spanish. The Italian Communists were determined to block a world-wide Communist ratification of the Soviet intervention at the international meeting long scheduled to open on 25 November in Budapest. They sought to have the meeting postponed indefinitely, and evidently found much sympathy for this point of view at the preparatory meeting in Budapest on 30 September. A new preliminary session is now scheduled for 17 November and, according to one source, the Soviets have moved their target date for a general conference to May 1969. Effect on Auxiliaries The Italian reaction to the Soviet invasion has been reflected in Communist auxiliary organizations as well as in party affairs. The Communist-dominated Italian labor confederation, CGIL, endorsed the party’s condemnation of the USSR in a commemorative issue of L’Unita one month after the intervention. CGIL leaders refused a request to go to Moscow for an immediate parley with the Soviets, and instead insisted on consulting with Yugoslav and French labor leaders—and with the Czechoslovaks—in a meeting on 30 September-1 October. In addition, the Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions—apparently at the initiative of Italian and French officials—condemned the Soviet invasion. In the World Peace Council, according to a usually reliable source, the French and Italian members requested a meeting of the leadership to discuss the situation. The two delegations succeeded in fomenting a reaction described by a Soviet official as “very confused” and “very bad.” The Italian Communist youth federation is also at odds with its Soviet control elements. The PCI and the youth federation reportedly have reached an agreement to avoid all encounters with Soviet functionaries except at the highest party levels. PCI leaders may well have feared that the Soviets would try, as they have in France, to persuade party elements to support the Soviet position. The top levels of the Italian party are also undoubtedly eager to keep lower levels of the party from making de facto policy until they themselves have set over-all direction. The secretary general of the federation evidently tried to postpone a visit in late September of a Komsomol mission that the Soviets had already scheduled and announced. A Soviet Embassy official refused to discuss the question with the Italians, however, insisting that the Komsomol group was coming anyway. Repercussions and Prospects The Italian party’s stand against Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia represents a new degree of autonomy from the Soviets. The party’s position is, in fact, an outright rejection of Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, even if the Italian comrades continue to say polite things about the importance of the USSR in that movement. The Italian party under its present leadership is unlikely to return to the relationship it had with the Soviet party before August. The PCI has been unequivocal and persistent in criticizing the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. It was in the forefront of efforts to strengthen opposition to the Soviets in Communist parties throughout the free world. Moreover, although some low-level Italian Communists still think the USSR is infallible, the Italian Communist leadership has given every sign of an unusual degree of cohesion, and Luigi Longo’s position as top leader seems enhanced. In trying to bring the Italian Communists into line, the Soviets have two principal weapons, a threat to cut off financial aid and a threat to read the Italian party out of the Communist brotherhood. Some sources have suggested that the Soviets will first choose to cut off the flow of funds. After the PCI had disapproved of the Soviet march into Czechoslovakia, Amerigo Terenzi, director of the party press and apparently the agent for Soviet press subsidies, remarked to the director of the influential Paese Sera that in two or three months the paper might have to close, according to a reliable source. Terenzi added that, as things were going, it was practically certain there would be no more money. As yet, however, there is no evidence that Moscow has cut its financing. Although the Soviets have long provided the Italian Communist Party with substantial financial support, it is not clear how essential Soviet aid is to maintaining the size and strength of the party. In 1956, the USSR contributed about $7.5 million to a party budget of just over $11 million, according to a reliable source. Since then, however, the Soviet subsidy has probably decreased markedly, but the Soviets undoubtedly continue to provide additional funds for special occasions such as election campaigns. Soviet financial pressure on the Italian Communist Party may also take the form of curtailing trade through Communist-influenced Italian commercial operations, which have customarily given a substantial cut to the party. The party could perhaps make up part of any shortfall in Soviet funding by seeking increased contributions from private Italian industry. Italian industrialists have long opposed putting all their eggs in one basket and, as a matter of policy, contribute to all political groups with major potential. Italy’s industry has thus contributed substantially to the PCI over many years to provide itself with a friend at court if the PCI achieves its ambition of entering a government coalition. The PCI’s success on a local government level and in the labor movement has also provided industry with reasons to contribute. If the split widens between the Soviet and Italian parties, the Soviets may seek to emphasize throughout the world Communist movement that the Italians have deviated from the true Marxist line. Such an indictment would be damaging to the Italian Communist sense of belonging to a world movement, a sense that has been part of their appeal. Even in this event, however, the Italian party is not likely to view itself as having taken a unique stand on Marxist doctrine. Over the long term, if there were no alternative, the Soviets could undoubtedly split the Italian Communist Party and could then provide support to a faction accepting Moscow’s dominance. Any such faction, however, probably would draw only a small percentage of present Italian Communist strength. In any case, the Soviets would probably make a strong effort first to secure more friendly Italian party leadership by bringing pressure for the ouster of some leaders and by attempting to show others—through fear or favor—the practicality of a pro-Soviet stance. The most likely immediate outlook therefore, is for continuing tension between the two parties. In domestic politics, the Italian party will seek to use its disagreement with the Soviets to further its contention that it is not a “tool of Moscow.” The party must avoid such a stigma if it is to make further progress toward its most ardently sought domestic objective—developing cooperation with left-wing Christian Democrats and Socialists to the point where the Communists will be accepted as partners in a government coalition. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The sidebars and photographs included in the report are not printed. 2 For text of Togliatti’s “Yalta” Memorandum, see William E. Griffith (ed.), Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 373-383. 145. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 145. Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, November 19, 1968, 1541Z. 9552. Subject: Rome Visit of Secretary Fowler. 1. Secretary Fowler accompanied by Under Secretary Deming, Fried, Willis, Ambassador and TreasAtt met morning November 18 with Minister Colombo flanked by State Accountant General Stammati, Treasury DirGen Nuvolini and new Treasury member WP-3 and G-10 Deputies Palumbo. 2. Secretary Fowler mentioned his hope ratification SDR amendments could be achieved by early next year. Colombo said shared this hope. Indicated that in Italy, after inevitable interruption Parliamentary consideration due forthcoming government reorganization, both Parliamentary chambers would be pressed to complete ratification quickly. 3. Secretary noted Johnson administration together with liberal minded members of Congress had been able hold back strong protectionist tendencies, but liberals becoming discouraged by developments in EC and Japan. EC Common Agricultural Policy creating ever larger surpluses which cutting into U.S. export possibilities, European border tax adjustments growing in detriment to U.S. trade and talk preferential commercial arrangements between EC, UK and other countries further aggravating situation. Trade measures should be made integral part B/P adjustment process. While said did not know what views next U.S. administration would have in trade area, Secretary stated hope EC in next months could cooperate in measures which would improve atmosphere in which new Congress would consider trade measures. Specifically suggested EC go through with acceleration KR, without insistence removal ASP, and move constructively in border tax area such as by recognizing legitimacy relief for countries whose tax system depended mainly on direct taxes. 4. In reply Colombo expressed appreciation U.S. efforts in resisting protectionism. Stated ASP was linked with acceleration KR at French insistence. Italy’s basic idea KR acceleration is good-will gesture which ought to be reciprocated by some motion on U.S. side toward ASP passage. 5. On proposed commercial arrangements with UK, Colombo stated personal opinion any arrangement for trade preferences should be tied with specific objective for achieving economic integration. Italy and Netherlands feel strongest about this. Germany not as staunch as before and Colombo hoped Secretary Fowler in visit to Bonn could help to firm up German position. Colombo said 1969 will be critical year for CAP. He personally feels CAP costs too much, creates agricultural surpluses and favors status quo rather than progress. In his opinion, export differential payments should be narrowed while expenditures for agricultural productivity improvement should be increased. Finance Minister Strauss agrees with this. But not clear that Italian or German Government as a whole does. Colombo depressed general agreement trade policy was stagnant area in which all believing in liberal trade policies should seek resume constructive forward movement. 6. Secretary mentioned positive results of NATO meeting in Brussels. 2 This connection Under Secretary Deming explained to Minister Colombo proposal which he had made separately to Carli November 16 regarding Italian purchase of special U.S. Treasury securities to help neutralize U.S. military expenditures in Italy. Colombo promised consider this in concert with Carli. 7. Meeting closed with mutual expressions appreciation past collaboration and hope close working relationship would be continued by successors. (Colombo did not say what his future would be but remarked he speaking for government which would cease exist in 24 hours.) 3 8. This message not cleared with Secretary’s party. Ackley 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 TR. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn for Fowler, to Paris, and to the EC Mission in Brussels. 2 The NAC Ministerial meeting was held November 12-16. 3 The government offered its resignation November 19, and Mariano Rumor formed a center-left government on December 12. 146. Memorandum for the Files 146. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, December 12, 1968. SUBJECT Lockheed P3B Proposal to Italy On December 12 Mr. Phil Sullivan and Mr. James Gannett of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation came in to discuss the possibility that there might still be hope that the GOI would reverse its field and buy the P3B. They had information from their representative in Rome that the GOI might not yet have formally committed itself in writing to the Breguet Atlantique; also there was a possibility that some members of the new government might be friendly to the P3B. They said they had called at the Pentagon and been informed that while DOD was not prepared to take the initiative in offering its proposal again, it would have no objection to informing the Embassy in Rome that the offer was still valid, in the event a question were asked from the Italian side. In response I told Messrs. Sullivan and Gannett that we did not know whether the GOI had signed a commitment on the Atlantique, but that it was not likely that we would be informed in any event; we would be prepared to ask the Embassy if it had any information on the general subject, but would check first with DOD. I subsequently spoke to Olney in DOD/ILN who had seen Sullivan and Gannett several days earlier. He said he felt that there was no change whatsoever of an Italian switch and that the straws held out by the Lockheed representative in Rome were very thin indeed. DOD did not want to associate itself with a further offer on the basis of such flimsy evidence, and did not even want to send a contingency “if asked” message to the Embassy. On the other hand Olney told the Lockheed officials that if the Italians were to approach them on the P3B, the Pentagon would stand behind the P3B package. During a conversation with Bob Gordon in Rome on December 13, I mentioned the Lockheed call the previous day. He said there had been a few rumors floating on the subject, but they all could be traced back to one source, the Lockheed man in Rome. If there were anything substantial, the Embassy would certainly report it, but this was definitely not the case. A month ago, MOD Gui had sent a letter of intent on the Atlantique to the NATO consortium group, but whether this constituted a binding commitment was not clear. 1 Source: Department of State, Italian Desk Files: Lot 72 D 509, Def 19-8. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Charles K. Johnson. Portugal Portugal 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, January 24, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT. Secret. 148. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson) Washington, February 6, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT. Confidential; Personal. Cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tyler. 149. Record of Actions Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Standing Group February 18, 1964. Secret. 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, April 16, 1964, 6:04 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Barbour; cleared by Williams, Sisco, and Buffum; and approved by Burdett. Pouched to Luanda, Lourenco Marques, and USUN. 151. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, April 18, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential. 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, April 22, 1964, 11:55 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Barbour and approved by Burdett. 153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, May 3, 1964, 5:33 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Barbour; cleared in DOD, G/PM, and EUR; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris. 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, May 6, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret. 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, June 26, 1964, 7:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Barbour; cleared by Buffum, AFC, and ARA; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Rio de Janiero, Leopoldville, USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques. 156. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 30, 1964, 3 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S on July 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 157. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, July 7, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. 158. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Paris, December 14, 1964, noon. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential. Also sent to Lisbon and USUN. 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, March 5, 1965, 2:50 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Creel; cleared in EUR, DOD, RPM, G, and AFC; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Lisbon, Ottawa, Paris, and USCINCEUR. 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, June 9, 1965, 5:26 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret. Drafted by Looram, High, and Beigel; cleared in EUR and AF and by Buffum and Harriman; and approved by Ball. 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, June 19, 1965, 2:40 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth and McKillop and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Paris for USRO. 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, July 2, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 3:26 p.m. 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, September 3, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Secret. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:55 p.m. 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, September 24, 1965, 7:53 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and approved by Leddy. 165. Letter from Foreign Minister Nogueira to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson) Lisbon, September 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Personal. Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 2 to airgram A-131 from Lisbon, October 6. 166. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 9, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Barry on October 11 and approved in S on October 19. The memorandum is Part I of VIII. The other memoranda of this conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at USUN. 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, October 23, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret; Limdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 10:05 a.m. 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, June 16, 1967, 6:52 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 LUX. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Funseth, cleared by EUR, and approved by Springsteen. Pouched to Paris. 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, August 18, 1967, 1135Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PORT. Secret; Limdis. 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal Washington, November 18, 1967, 0205Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PORT. Secret; Noforn; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Funseth, cleared by EUR, and approved by Stoessel. 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, July 24, 1968, 1125Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, and Rio de Janiero. 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, October 8, 1968, 1800Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US. Confidential; Limdis. 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State Lisbon, November 5, 1968, 1725Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential; Limdis. 174. Memorandum of Conversation Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 9:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part I of VIII; Part VIII is Document 175. The other memoranda of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry. 175. Memorandum of Conversation Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 9:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part VII of VIII; Part I is Document 174. The other memoranda of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry. 176. Memorandum of Conversation Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part I of III. The other memoranda of the conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Palacio Sao Bento. 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 147. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, January 24, 1964, 8 p.m. 591. I met with Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira this morning discussing with him current Portuguese-American problems exclusive of Azores and request for Consulate in Beira, both of which I felt were untimely. Foreign Minister in calm, relaxed mood listened attentively before talking. First subject was desirability of unilateral Portuguese move on self-determination in which I presented all items mentioned Department telegram 444 2 plus relation this matter to recent press statement by U Thant in which he excused himself for not visiting Portuguese Africa due to wide divergence interpretations “self-determination.” 3 Foreign Minister said he would give arguments serious consideration but reiterated his personal belief no dramatic move at this time would be helpful to Portugal. This I countered with forceful statement immediate future time for action more than any other of which I could conceive. Foreign Minister [said] SYG public announcement and reason for not accepting Portuguese invitation came as complete surprise, although they did not expect him to accept. Second subject, related to foregoing, was Portuguese image and necessity to project to world current progressive measures being taken in Portuguese Africa together with reforms which have been and are being made. This led to importance avoid antagonizing friendly elements by such actions as totally unjustified wave of critical editorials and anti-American attitude manifested in radio and TV. I mentioned harmful effect on Portuguese image by their actions re Protestant missionaries in Africa, pointing out that vast majority these people engaged in humane evangelical work and furtherance beliefs of millions Americans anxious to serve mankind. These missionaries should not be penalized nor their supporting groups alienated because of possible irritation Portuguese authorities with indiscreet actions of a few. No comment by Foreign Minister. This led to discussion recognition of Communist China; hoped he would understand US concern over French actions and emphasized points set forth Department telegram 455. 4 I said I had read reports GOP considering recognition Communist China and hoped such consideration would not lead to affirmative decision on matter, which would only expose Portugal to Communist influence and subversion and would alienate large segment American people friendly to Portugal. Foreign Minister stated he did not know exact reasons French took actions they had re recognition of Communist China nor was he in any position to judge. However, he did say he fully understood American feelings. He stated Portugal had de facto arrangement on Macau but necessarily had to consider longer range problem Macau as well as long-range commercial interests. He stated matter under consideration as had been many times before. However, was not related to French decision nor was for purpose of irritating or alienating US. He stated quite frankly any decision, if made, would not be in near future. “You do not have to worry.” Portugal greatly apprehensive effects of Chou-en-Lai visit to Africa. 5 Foreign Minister considers this master stroke of ChiCom diplomacy. Agreed with our concern Chinese ambitions. However, felt matter even more serious that we do as ChiCom approach type that appeals to Africans. In response to my question about decision on Loran-C, 6 Foreign Minister apologized delay in response but stated both Defense Minister and he had been out of country and said he would get me reply “next week.” Foreign Minister indicated information requested by Secretary Rusk on terrorist operations across frontiers in Africa was being typed by his office and would be delivered to Secretary through me within day or so. 7 I expressed appreciation for prospect forthcoming action PL-480 8 matter and indicated there was good possibility early consummation agreement on cotton textiles. Foreign Minister grateful efforts of Department but said he was not personally familiar with details. I mentioned hope that I might visit African territories sometime near future provided no Portuguese objection. Foreign Minister stated not only no objection but visit would be most welcome. In fact, he was sending circulars to all diplomatic representatives here urging them to see for themselves what is going on in Portuguese Africa. I thanked him for his views as necessary preliminary to consultation with Department on such visit. I stated I had been Portugal some months and felt it desirable to talk to Dr. Salazar. Foreign Minister indicated certain Dr. Salazar would be pleased to receive me at any time. Have initiated request for interview with him for early next week at which time will present again arguments made to Foreign Minister re statement on self-determination, improvement of Portuguese image, US views on recognition Communist China, and need for early affirmative action on Loran-C. 9 Full memos of conversation being pouched. 10 Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT. Secret. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Document 414 . 3 Pursuant to a Security Council resolution of December 11, 1963, the Secretary-General was instructed to take steps to promote “self-determination” for Portugal’s colonial territories. For text of UN document S/5481, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 161-162. The Secretary-General summarized this effort in SYG report S/5727, May 29, 1964. 4 Telegram 455, January 22, instructed the Embassy to sound out government officials on Portugal’s policy regarding China. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 CHICOM) 5 January 11-February 4, 1964. 6 The request was made December 17 during the NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Portuguese Desk Files: Lot 68 D 401, Pol Port-US. 7 Not further identified. 8 For text of P.L. 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, see 68 Stat. 454. 9 Anderson reported on his January 30 meeting with Salazar in telegram 605 from Lisbon, January 31. Anderson pressed for Portuguese cooperation with UN self-determination issues. Salazar was preoccupied with the effect of Chou’s African visit. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT) 10 The memorandum of conversation was sent to the Department in airgram A-328, January 29. (Ibid., POL 1 PORT) 148. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson) 148. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson) 1 Washington, February 6, 1964. Dear George: I greatly appreciated your letter of January 28, 1964, enclosing the report of your recent conversation with the Foreign Minister. 2 I am delighted to hear that you are contemplating a trip to the Portuguese areas of Africa. I definitely concur in such a visit and look forward to receiving from you a first-hand report of your impressions of these areas. I note that you intend to take one of your Attachés along with you on the trip. In the interest of broadening the knowledge within the Embassy of these territories, I believe it would be advantageous for you also to take along with you one of the officers from your political section. I believe that you would find such an officer of great value to you on your trip as well as after you return. It is true that the days since the trip to Lisbon last August and September 3 have been very full, but this does not mean that there is any lessening of my interest in Portugal’s problems in Africa. I’ve read your telegrams with great interest and have been pleased not only by their high quality, but also by the success you’ve had with Franco Nogueira. Now, if you’ll just get him to pull those F-86s out of Guinea, as he promised to do, we shall be impressed indeed! 4 Sincerely, George 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PORT. Confidential; Personal. Cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tyler. 2 See Document 147 . 3 For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Documents 357 , 358 , and 360 . 4 Telegram 493 from Lisbon, December 6, 1963, reported Noguiera’s promise. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 30 ANG) 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 149. Record of Actions 149. Record of Actions 1 Washington, undated. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STANDING GROUP RECORD OF ACTIONS Meeting No. 1/64, February 18, 1964—6:00 PM 1. Following discussion of a State Department paper on Portuguese African Territories, 2 Under Secretary Harriman agreed that the State Department’s short-term program for Portuguese Africa would include the following: a. Initiating a new round of U.S.-Portuguese bilateral talks at high level, to evidence U.S. efforts to influence the Portuguese. b. Expanding discussions with Portuguese officials to include conversations between U.S. and Portuguese representatives in various capitals, in international organization, etc. c. Generating bilateral talks between Portuguese and moderate African leaders and exploring the renewal of UN-sponsored talks. d. Continuing conversations with key reasonable Africans to demonstrate our own concern with the Angolan problem and to engage them in the effort to achieve peaceful evolution. 2. State, AID and CIA representatives agreed to coordinate a review of the adequacy of existing programs for Portuguese African Nationalists—particularly refugee relief, secondary education, educational programs specially tailored to potential political leaders, administrative and professional governmental cadres and other such specialized requirements; and other forms of assistance by appropriate means. 3. State and CIA representatives agreed to produce a concise information memo regarding progress, status and prospects—political and economic—of the people of the Portuguese African territories; e.g. what steps are the Portuguese taking on land reform, expanded education, broader participation in local elections and local government? 4. The Group agreed to schedule, during the next few weeks, consideration of the Congo, of Ghana and of South and Southwest Africa. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Standing Group February 18, 1964. Secret. 2 A copy of this undated report is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1. 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, April 16, 1964, 6:04 p.m. 628. Embtel 778. 2 Salazar Guidance. Department supports line of thought you conveyed to Fonmin on your return from Africa (Embtel 764) 3 and recommends similar presentation to Salazar. Believe you should also emphasize to him following two general points: 1. Basis for US policies: As shown by President’s response to Garin at April 8 presentation ceremony (texts pouched), 4 US believes change fact of life in our era. Changes in Portuguese Africa as inevitable as elsewhere in world, though Portugal still has power to decide whether they will take place with her or against her. We believe failure to respond now to self-determination aspirations of Portuguese Africans will result in changes detrimental to interests of United States and West as well as to Portugal. This is why US continually urges Portugal in its own interest become champion of political changes which will take place in her territories and, being based on pragmatic principles, it is why US policies in respect this situation have not changed and should not be expected to change. 2. Self-determination declaration: US continues believe best thing Portugal could do on own behalf would be forthright statement accepting principle self-determination as defined December 11 SC res. 5 Such statement, which would seem compatible with Portugal’s announced aims and programs in Africa, would take advantage of uniquely favorable but probably perishable opportunity offered by SC 5481. It quite possible this opportunity may no longer exist after next SC meeting, presumably in June. (Deptel 444 6 contains additional arguments for use in your discretion.) 3. You should also tell Salazar US gratified at indications certain African leaders interested in further talks with Portugal. We plan emphasize with FonMin importance these conversations and our concern that there be no prior conditions attached to them. We hope Portugal will adopt constructive attitude toward such meetings. Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Barbour; cleared by Williams, Sisco, and Buffum; and approved by Burdett. Pouched to Luanda, Lourenco Marques, and USUN. 2 Telegram 778 from Lisbon, April 10, reported that Anderson had requested a meeting with Salazar. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PORT) 3 Telegram 764 from Lisbon, April 3, reported on Anderson’s talks with Noguiera on Portuguese Africa. Anderson visited Angola February 29-March 10, and Mozambique March 10-19, 1964. 4 Not found. 5 See footnote 3, Document 147 . 6 See footnote 2, Document 147 . 151. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 151. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, April 18, 1964, 5 p.m. 813. Reference: Deptel 628. 2 I met yesterday with Salazar for one hour forty minutes. Found him mentally alert as ever but physically somewhat subdued (I had heard that he recently recovered from pneumonia). He admitted he was tired. After thanking for courtesies shown me throughout Portuguese Africa, I made 40-minute uninterrupted presentation which covered both observations on my trip and USG position with respect problem of Portuguese territories, along same lines as my talk with Franco Nogueira (Embtel 764) 3 extended as per instructions set forth Deptel 628. Salazar listened intently and then engaged me in spirited one-hour discussion, memcon of which will be pouched soon as possible. 4 I can assure Department that points contained reference telegram were covered by me both forcefully and comprehensively. In strongest terms I urged Salazar produce public statement accepting reasonable concept of self-determination on basis of which extreme African pressures could be relieved, Portuguese image could be improved, and Portugal’s friends could rally in support of orderly, phased, peaceful solution to problem of general concern to us all. Regret I must report that Salazar remained adamantly opposed any public statement on self-determination. He adduced familiar case of Belgian Congo and said with entire weight of evidence against prospects any orderly transition he could not understand why USG insisted upon trying invent yet one more formula. I told him we did so precisely to avoid repeating errors of past. Salazar said that while Nationalist pressures of today are from outside Angola and Mozambique they would promptly develop internally if GOP were to make public utterance of type we sought press upon it. To my suggestion that Angolan refugees with exception known criminals be welcomed back into that province, Salazar replied that GOP quite willing accept them and even Congo Leopoldville probably quite glad be relieved of them, but that armed forces of Holden Roberto physically prevented their return except for small groups which manage straggle across frontier and reach Portuguese reception stations. Salazar readily agreed with my assertion need for massive investment to develop material and human resources Portuguese Africa. Cited drain imposed on Portuguese development funds and capabilities by present military situation as basis for view political solution must precede economic. As regards specifically private investment, I mentioned need for political stability as one essential ingredient in favorable investment climate. He responded by comparing stability offered by Portuguese administration in Africa with that offered by newly-independent African states. Enlarging upon this, Salazar said he did not know about US but that private investors from European countries seemed willing invest in Portuguese Africa and were still doing so at present time. To him this suggested that they found business conditions more promising there than in independent Africa and that they did not attach too great importance to terrorism in Northern Angola. Only point upon which Salazar readily fell in with our thinking had to do with continued Luso-African conversations. He professed see these as unproductive due to fact participants operating on entirely different wave lengths but smilingly expressed his willingness carry them on if we felt this advisable. On balance I could perceive no real give or hint of prospective change in Salazar’s position. He made clear and explicit his belief that USG efforts are misdirected and that morally and realistically we should be pressing African states to withdraw support from terrorists who impede political, economic and social evolution of Portuguese Africa rather than pressuring Portugal to take steps which could only lead to instability and retrogression. Salazar remained personally friendly throughout entire discussion and at its conclusion thanked me for report upon my African travels. Again I was amazed at the amount of detailed knowledge he has over an area which he has never visited. Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential. 2 Document 150 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 150 . 4 Transmitted in airgram A-520, May 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT) 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, April 22, 1964, 11:55 a.m. 638. Request that in your next talk with Franco Nogueira you make clear our non-appreciation of remarks reported your A-454. 2 We find it singularly vexatious that he should engage in thinly-veiled public castigation of US and its policies before press representatives while simultaneously poring over every word or act of US officials in search of imagined grievances. Leave manner of conveying this to your discretion, but it would be adverse US-Portuguese relations if Fonmin remained under delusion that his remarks went unnoticed. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Barbour and approved by Burdett. 2 Airgram A-454 from Lisbon, April 11, reported that Nogueira delivered a “tirade” against U.S. policy toward Africa to a group of American journalists. (Ibid.) 153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, May 3, 1964, 5:33 p.m. 654. Lisbon’s A-333, A-387. 2 Subj: FY 1963 MAP. 1. Dept sympathetic problems resulting from suspension FY 1963 MAP deliveries to Portugal, particularly difficulties caused Embassy with younger military officers. We also aware disadvantages from NATO standpoint. However, we unable consider lifting suspension FY 1963 MAP equipment unless following conditions are met: (a) withdrawal remaining F-86’s from Guinea; (b) firm commitment that MAP equipment to be furnished would remain in North Atlantic Treaty area and (c) reasonably effective means of confirming compliance. (Agreement on Loran-C would also help but a-b-c required.) 2. Regardless MAP aspects, Dept considers new approach on F-86’s necessary. Ambassador therefore requested see FonMin at early date to reassert importance we attach to withdrawal. You should refer categorical undertakings given personally by FonMin Dec 6 (Embtel 493) 3 and inquire when these commitments will be fulfilled. (Would appreciate Embassy’s estimate number F-86’s still Guinea.) 4 3. Meanwhile, irrespective conditions paragraph one, and subject Embassy/MAAG views, Dept and DOD agreeable releasing some FY 63 MAP funds to offer small number Loran-C receivers to Navy (in addition those lent for civilian use mentioned Deptel 617) 5 to improve Loran-C attractiveness. Offer of course conditional on favorable response Loran-C sites. Copies pertinent memos pouched Lisbon. 6 Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Barbour; cleared in DOD, G/PM, and EUR; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris. 2 Airgram A-333, February 1, contained Embassy recommendations regarding the delivery of MAP to Portugal. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-2 US-PORT) Airgram A-387, February 29, recommended the release to Portugal of MAP arms and equipment. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-PORT) 3 See footnote 4, Document 148 . 4 Telegram 894 from Lisbon, May 19, reported Portuguese assurances that no F-86s were in Guinea. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 PORT-US) 5 Not printed. (Ibid.) 6 Not further identified. 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 154. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, May 6, 1964, 5 p.m. 865. For the Secretary. Embtel 847. 2 In anticipation of your meeting with Foreign Minister Nogueira at The Hague, and in accordance Department circular telegram 1962 3 following may be useful: Without knowing what Foreign Minister may have on his mind, I presume he will seek support Portuguese position in Africa and may advance thesis that recent provincial elections there evidence progress on part GOP along lines consistent with reasonable concept self-determination. Foreign Minister may also refer your request at last meeting with him for documented case of transborder aggression from Congo, may note that factual dossier submitted, and may inquire as to USG action contemplated on basis thereof. For our part, I would like to suggest possible desirability raising following two subjects: 1. Loran-C: Without entering into technical details with Foreign Minister, I believe it might be very helpful were you personally to impress upon him importance which we attach to Loran-C not merely for US but for all of NATO and necessity we feel for early action this matter. 2. Self-determination: My most recent talks with Salazar (Embtel 813) 4 and Foreign Minister (Embtel 848) 5 convince me that neither is at this time willing consider any public statement on self-determination of type we have been recommending. I am personally highly dubious as to merit or net advantage to USG of continuing to hammer away at theme at once unacceptable and unpalatable to GOP. Apart from being unproductive, such continuing effort progressively erodes our good will credit and our ability influence Portuguese on other matters of importance to us. We are already, I believe, undesirably far out in front of practically all other countries in this regard. While we continue press and irritate Portuguese on matter of Africa and self-determination, other nations through more passive role are picking up points and advantages in other areas. I therefore suggest as means moving this problem off dead center and for purpose introducing new element flexibility that, in your conversation with Foreign Minister at The Hague, you probe GOP position in following manner. After making reference our continuing but as yet unfruitful effort elicit GOP public statement on self-determination and reasons why US believes such statement would be helpful to GOP position, inquire of Foreign Minister as to what if any action, assurances, or guarantee of support on part of USG would persuade GOP issue such statement. You could indicate our familiarity with standard GOP arguments but also make reference again to frequently expressed belief by GOP that we are in position materially influence course of events in Africa. While reiterating view that US influence significantly overrated, you could conclude that US willingness attempt find peaceful resolution of problems besetting our allies can stand, and has stood, severe tests and we quite prepared place our prestige along side Portuguese on a specific and defensible proposal if this will move issue forward. Foreign Minister would then specifically be asked whether any action or guarantee of support on our part could induce GOP come forth with desired statement. His answer, or Salazar’s, should then either open up new and more fruitful avenue of discussion (which I doubt) or provide clear evidence no useful purpose served by continuing present tactics until circumstances have changed significantly to so warrant. 6 Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret. 2 Telegram 847 from Lisbon, May 2, reported that Anderson encouraged Noguiera to seek a luncheon meeting with Rusk. (Ibid., ORG 7 S) 3 Not found. 4 Telegram 813 from Lisbon, April 18, reported Anderson’s April 17 meeting with Salazar on colonial issues. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT) 5 In telegram 848 from Lisbon, May 2, Anderson reported he had pressed Noguiera for a declaration on “self-determination” for the African colonies. (Ibid., POL 10 PORT) 6 Telegram Secto 18, May 12, reported that on the initiative of the Secretary, he and Nogueira discussed Cuba, Brazilian developments, the Congo, and Angola, and that “neither F-86’s nor Loran-C nor question of self-determination” were raised. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1) Memoranda of the Rusk-Noguiera discussions are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2397. 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, June 26, 1964, 7:30 p.m. 773. USUN’s 4596. 2 Unless you see objection, please convey following to Franco Nogueira at next meeting. During talks in US Carlos Lacerda reported that Portuguese convinced US arms reaching Angolan rebels via Congo and that Salazar claimed have paper signed by AmEmbassy Leopoldville attaché proving US source. We cannot ignore insinuation US providing arms to Angolan rebels, and we regret that Lacerda, for whom we have great esteem, should have been made party to this renewed innuendo against US. Inform Fonmin you instructed state that allegations and insinuations such as those imparted to Lacerda in Lisbon wholly without foundation, as we have repeatedly told GOP. We very much regret GOP’s refusal accept statements made to it in best of faith. No question anyone can buy US arms on world market. These beyond our control. We satisfied no weapons delivered through official channels to African recipients have been diverted to Roberto. Commercial sales are not permitted. Would be curious see paper referred to by Salazar. Could this be document first reported your 840 of Feb 21, 1962? 3 Will be recalled Secretary personally informed Fonmin in Athens 4 and Pereira in Washington 5 that document obvious and complete forgery concocted to sow discord between us. If Portuguese have new paper, hope Fonmin will accord us courtesy of at least showing it to us, as he did on earlier occasion, or, even better, giving us copy for comment and study. 6 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Barbour; cleared by Buffum, AFC, and ARA; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Rio de Janiero, Leopoldville, USUN, Luanda, and Lourenco Marques. 2 Telegram 4596 from USUN, June 22, reported that during a conversation with Stevenson, Lacerda noted Salazar’s claim that the United States was supplying the Angolan rebel forces. (Ibid.) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 338, footnote 1 . 4 See ibid., Document 338 . 5 See ibid., Document 338, footnote 2 . 6 Apparent reference to a paper given to U.S. officials in September 1963; a copy is an enclosure to airgram A-135, September 18, 1963. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961-63, POL 19 PORT) 156. Memorandum of Conversation 156. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 30, 1964, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Portuguese Ambassador’s Call on the Secretary PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Vasco Vieira Garin, Portuguese Embassy Mr. William R. Tyler, EUR Mr. David H. McKillop, WE Calling at his request, the Ambassador first asked the Secretary whether there had been any developments stemming from the dossier that the Portuguese Foreign Minister had sent to us earlier as evidence of the dependency of the Angolan rebellion on Congolese support. 2 The Secretary replied that we have tried to get the Congolese to take a responsible and moderate approach to this problem and have cautioned against dangers inherent in lending aid and comfort to the movement. Now the Congolese political situation is in a state of flux, and it is difficult to predict what kind of government will emerge. The Secretary believed, however, that there are elements among the Congolese who wish to cooperate in finding a peaceful solution for problems involving Angola and the Congo. Until the political picture in the Congo is clarified, we can only remain on the watch to see how the situation evolves. The Secretary asked if the Ambassador had any new information. The Ambassador launched upon familiar Portuguese themes. He said that although there has been a decrease in terrorist activities in Angola, where the situation is now relatively calm and peaceful, nevertheless, the Portuguese continue to receive reports of large shipments of arms coming from a variety of Communist countries and entering the Congo for the use of Holden Roberto rather than the Congolese themselves. Thus while the Portuguese are not worried by the present situation in Angola itself, they are very concerned for the future because of the gathering military strength of the Angolan rebels and the use of Congolese territory as a safehaven in launching attacks against Angola. The Ambassador then proceeded to paint a very rosy picture of conditions in Angola, based on what he said was his firsthand observations made on his trip there in January. Describing Angola as an island of peace and contentment in a sea of African turmoil, he said that the entire population is benefitting from the many social and health benefits, that economic conditions are good, that racial integration is complete and that slow but steady progress is being made toward greater political freedom with elections now at a district level. The only threat to this favorable evolution is the non-nationalist, Communist-backed rebel movement. If the use of the Congo for this operation could be terminated, the Ambassador was convinced that all of Angola’s troubles would be quickly over. The Ambassador, therefore, urged U.S. support for obtaining this objective, including some public acknowledgment on our part of the positive developments taking place in Angola, such as the role of Angolan transportation facilities in helping bolster the Congo economy. The Secretary observed that perhaps the Ambassador was underestimating the importance of the political factor in the Angolan domestic scene. In this day and age, favorable social and economic conditions do not necessarily alone satisfy populations, which are now insisting upon the right of governing or even misgoverning themselves. The Secretary wondered, therefore, whether the Portuguese should not try to cope with the rebellion using political and negotiating methods rather than relying entirely upon force. Referring to the fact that he had told the Portuguese Foreign Minister on a previous occasion that the Spanish approach to their African problems seemed to have succeeded in muffling attacks by Afro-Asians against Spain, the Secretary thought that Portugal might profit from this example. 3 The Ambassador continued to insist that there would be no problem if the Congo ceased to be a base of operation against Angola, that the Afro-Asians refuse to accept evidence of the good conditions and contentment prevailing in Angola, as exemplified by the refusal of the UN Secretary General to visit Angola, and finally that Spaniards do not have the same large interests and investments in their African territories that the Portuguese have. The Ambassador then asked the Secretary for his appraisal of recent political developments in the Congo, including the unexpected return of Tshombe to Leopoldville. He said that these events had generated all kinds of rumors, such as one that he had heard to the effect that the United States had backed Tshombe’s return to the Congo on the condition that Tshombe would continue to support Holden Roberto. The Ambassador said that this no doubt was just a silly story, but he wished to cite it as an example of what people are talking about. The Secretary dismissed the story as obviously without foundation, pointing out that the United States is not particularly in Tshombe’s good graces because of past events and emphasizing that in any case, the United States had nothing to do with Tshombe’s return to Leopoldville, a strictly Congolese affair. As for the general political situation in the Congo, it is presently so unsettled that neither we nor anybody else is in a position to predict the outcome. Perhaps a government of national reconciliation would emerge headed up by Adoula, or even Tshombe, but at this point, we just cannot say. After expressing concern about trends in Algeria, the Ambassador said as a final point, he wished to ask how we regarded the current Zanzibar situation, which continues to worry the Portuguese because of reports that the Communist presence is still strong there. In this connection, he commented that while not a shot has been fired in Mozambique, nevertheless, the Portuguese know that so-called “freedom fighters” are being trained in Tanganyika to cause the same type of trouble and violence that has occurred in Angola as a result of Roberto’s activities. The Secretary replied that the Zanzibar situation seems now to be developing in a somewhat more favorable direction, that the former Embassies on the island, including the East German and ChiCom posts, have been reduced to Consulates, with the West Germans, however, retaining their Embassy in Tanganyika. Furthermore, the Tanganyikan police seem to have the internal security of the island well in hand. The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for his kind reception and hoped that perhaps after the situation in the Congo had clarified, he could again seek our views on problems in the area. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by McKillop and approved in S on July 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 Not further identified. 3 Not further identified. 157. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 157. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, July 7, 1964, 1 p.m. 15. Had two-hour session with FonMin July 6. First briefed him on current US views on Congo and Algeria drawing on material furnished me by Department (Deptel Topol 2002 to Paris and CA-13499, both dated June 23, 1964). 2 FonMin grateful for report. Second, commented on recent action by Committee of 24. FonMin indicated his pleasure over remarks and vote of US representative in contrast to that of Denmark. With foregoing as preamble stated substance of Department and personal indignation over allegations and insinuations by GOP officers to Carlos Lacerda following instructions Deptel 773 3 point by point. I vigorously denied assertions US supplied any arms to terrorists and that US policy in any way based on economic imperialism or efforts displace Belgian or Portuguese business interests. FonMin denied insinuations stemmed from own conversation with Lacerda and stated would check with Doctor Salazar as to whether came from him. Then confronted FonMin with article in edition number 51964 of Aussen Politik by German editor ( Handelsblatt , Dusseldorf) Hunck containing direct quotations from interview with FonMin. Statement was to effect he considered US real enemy of Portuguese in Africa. FonMin read carefully then categorically denied accuracy of either substance or tenor his attributed comment. Said he would investigate thoroughly and take appropriate action through his Ambassador in Bonn. Next raised with FonMin question of F-86’s in Portuguese Guinea, stating my concern and disillusionment GOP had not fulfilled firm commitment of past December and most recently of May 18 to withdraw aircraft. FonMin greatly embarrassed and stated all my points and arguments absolutely valid. However, he had had problems with MinDef who felt presence F-86’s in Portuguese Guinea necessary as “deterrent” but who had agreed they would not be used for operational missions. I countered with long dissertation and FonMin said he would talk again with MinDef. 4 Then raised again subject continuing restriction against any further sale of tantalite from Mozambique to Soviet Union expressing necessity for this action to avoid conflict with Battle Act. 5 FonMin said he was under heavy pressure from Mozambique to authorize shipment and went into long legalistic monologue. Although he is fully aware US position, will raise problem including Battle Act requirement on reporting on earlier shipments, at next meeting (Embtel 2 to Lourenco Marques repeated Department 14). 6 I referred to current editorial in Diario de Noticias which stated that in covering forthcoming trip of Portuguese President Thomaz hoped would not be victim of “conspiracy of silence in international press.” I cautioned FonMin not to expect significant coverage in US press since if all went well visit would simply not be major item of news value to US papers, radio and TV. There existed no “conspiracy” or even suggestion of playing down story of trip. FonMin denied any insinuation against US press and said he hoped their own house was in better order than on occasion of last year’s visit of President to Angola. On Loran-C FonMin said he was awaiting list of things wanted by MinDef and hoped to be able to provide same by end of week for US study while concurrently a site survey might be conducted. FonMin expressed gratitude for offer by US Navy of quonset huts for Azores 7 and apologized for delay in reply due to necessity for consultation other Ministries (Embtel 7). 8 Comment: In connection foregoing two items, we must recognize that in spite of all pressure things move frustratingly slowly in this “Federation of Ministries.” Meeting concluded with FonMin assessment things going very well in Angola, quiet in Mozambique and getting better in Portuguese Guinea where few months ago situation very bad due to “civil war” between Portuguese military and civil authorities. Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. 2 Telegram Topol 2002 to Paris, June 23, provided guidance regarding U.S. policy in the Congo. (Ibid., POL 23-7 THE CONGO) Circular airgram CA-13499, June 23, provided an assessment of the situation in Algeria. (Ibid., POL 1 ALG) 3 Document 155 . 4 In telegram 26 from Lisbon, July 10, Anderson reported that the Portuguese Secretary of State for Air stated that the F-86s would be removed from Guinea to the Cape Verde Islands and restricted from flying over Guinea. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Portugal, Vol. 1) 5 For text of the Battle Act, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, P.L. 218, approved October 26, 1951, see 65 Stat. 218. 6 Telegram 14 from Lisbon, July 7, reported that the Ambassador raised the tantalite issue with Noguiera and requested instructions on African policy. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, STR 13-1 USSR-MOZ) 7 An earthquake struck the islands on February 19. 8 Not printed. 158. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 158. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Paris, December 14, 1964, noon. Secto 10. Following summary of Secretary’s conversation with FonMin Nogueira is FYI, Noforn and subject to revision on review. 2 FonMin Nogueira had hour’s talk mainly on Africa with Secretary Sunday p.m. in cordial non-controversial atmosphere from which following emerged: 1. Conversation general in nature and did not touch upon specific issues such as US attitude toward Holden Roberto and other nationalists, Loran C, Azores etc. In addition to African discussion, in which FonMin showed greatest interest, Secretary gave brief rundown on inconclusive Gromyko talks, ChiCom problem, Article 19 and prospects for NATO meeting. 2. Although situation in Portuguese Africa now calm and no cause for special concern, nevertheless, FonMin said GOP much worried about deteriorating situation in Africa as whole where radical elements in Arab and Black Africa exerting increased influence and pushing continent in extreme leftist if not Communist direction. 3. African radicals wish subvert Congo as strategic heart of Africa and are now claiming right of intervention there, supported by arms shipments for rebels, on grounds legitimate GOC is unacceptable to them. Nogueira said he might talk of this danger at NATO meeting. 4. Portuguese fully approved US-Belgium para rescue in Congo 3 but would have liked see operation extended and troops kept longer. Secretary explained military limitations curtailed further use of operation. 5. Nogueira claimed recent African developments offer further evidence of correctness of Portuguese African policies and GOP cannot understand US efforts to modify them which can only lead to new Congo situations. 6. Nogueira agreed with Secretary Western European countries such as UK and France seem to be taking decreased interest in African problems and should do more to help. 7. Nogueira not expecting much from NATO meeting and disappointed by past meetings where Portuguese views largely ignored. He thought more informal and substantive exchanges of views should be encouraged but was non-committal re Secretary’s suggestion for added number of NATO sub-ministerial meetings. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential. Also sent to Lisbon and USUN. 2 Secretary Rusk was in Paris for the NATO Ministerial meeting. Memoranda of the Rusk-Nogueira conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2462-2467. 3 November 24-29. U.S. military aircraft ferried 500 Belgian paratroops to Stanleyville where they rescued and evacuated about 1,400 European refugees held hostage by Congolese guerrilla fighters. 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, March 5, 1965, 2:50 p.m. 2546. Ref: Bonn’s 3281, Deptel 2507. 2 Joint State/Defense Message. Subject: FRG Plane Sale to Portugal. Fol are our views for use in reply to MOD: (1) Since proposed transaction involves political considerations of considerable sensitivity, it would appear MOD and FonOff should consult on issue in interest arriving at coordinated FRG position. (2) It is our understanding that position of FonOff on matter is that, regardless of US position, FonOff approval of transaction would be given only if Portuguese provided assurances that use of aircraft would be restricted to NATO area as defined Article 6 NATO Treaty. MOD may wish ascertain directly from FonOff latter’s view on this point. (3) If FonOff gets meaningful assurances as described in point (2) above from Portuguese, we would have no objection to plane sale to Portugal. Under circumstances, we would give definitive opinion when satisfactory assurances are obtained. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 PORT. Confidential. Drafted by Creel; cleared in EUR, DOD, RPM, G, and AFC; and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Lisbon, Ottawa, Paris, and USCINCEUR. 2 Telegram 3281 from Bonn, March 3, reported German assurances that no sales to Portugal would take place without prior guarantee that the aircraft would not be used in the colonies. Telegram 2507 to Bonn, March 1, requested information on the prospective sale. (Both ibid., DEF 12-5 GERM-PORT) 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, June 9, 1965, 5:26 p.m. 671. Greatly appreciate your 652 2 as means break stalemate in this long-standing and grave issue. It has evoked wide interest here and in African posts whose views have been solicited and which you have seen. We are only too well aware of difficulties you would have in selling proposal to Portuguese and appreciate need for positive elements from their viewpoint if they are to give serious consideration to such proposal. At same time we are concerned about such aspects as extent of US involvement, length of transitional period, need for political activity prior to plebiscite, and role for UN and OAU. We have modified your proposal on these points and have elaborated several others and following is outline of our thinking for an approach to Portuguese. 1. We believe present juncture when Portuguese are in relatively strong position in both Angola and Mozambique presents opportunity for GOP and Africans to reach agreement for peaceful resolution their differences. Key elements of solution would have to be transition period leading to self-determination and cessation of nationalist-inspired violence and subversion, as well as inspiration and support for such actions by African governments concerned. Full range of choice would be left to people, and would include maintenance of present relationship with Portugal, autonomy within Commonwealth, or full independence. Aim of proposal would be peaceful transition and creation stable society no matter what political decisions are made by the people. 2. Specifically Portugal would propose eight-year transition period leading to free and open plebiscite observed by UN and OAU representatives. (FYI: We propose eight years, given comments from African posts that five may be realistic limit negotiable with Africans, but this of course is matter for negotiating parties to determine. End FYI.) In return neighboring African states would pledge assurances they would not allow subversive elements to organize or operate from their territories against Portuguese territories for purposes of infiltration, subversion or attack across international frontiers, and that they will not allow arms to flow across their territories to such elements. All training camps for nationalist military or para-military training would be disbanded. 3. US and other NATO allies would encourage Africans’ acceptance and urge fulfillment terms of such an agreement, would publicly come out in full support of agreement once it is adopted and would publicly condemn any violation of terms should such occur subsequently from any quarter. We would sympathetically consider Portuguese request for support for Portuguese complaint in UN if we were satisfied deliberate and organized violations had taken place, and under same circumstances would be responsive to GOP requests for arms purchases. FYI. By same token if Portugal welched on plebiscite, we would consider sympathetically African requests for support. End FYI. 4. We recognize that Guinea and Congo (Brazzaville) are not likely to accept proposal and would probably continue support of violence against Portuguese Guinea and Cabinda. If agreement were reached and in force with others, we would in this event publicly condemn such actions. We would make other African governments aware of our position on this aspect from the outset. 5. During transition period US would itself provide and would encourage other NATO allies to provide, if Portugal so requests, economic and technical support for Portuguese efforts to develop African territories. UN and its specialized agencies would be allowed to observe and report on developments and provide assistance. OAU members would also be invited to provide economic and technical assistance. 6. Increasingly free political activity would obviously have to be permitted to make for meaningful plebiscite. Full amnesty and repatriation would also be allowed for refugees and, as time for plebiscite approached, for nationalist leaders, who must be permitted to campaign openly and freely for independence if they choose to do so. 7. We would hope that GOP, if interested in such proposal, would in time present it to African leaders and thereby initiate dialogue which might result in meaningful negotiations. Should Portugal desire, we would be quite willing to assist by sounding out such leaders and U Thant on a tentative basis and in manner designed to pave way for direct Portuguese-African discussions. Would appreciate your comments on foregoing draft presentation and on timing of any approach. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret. Drafted by Looram, High, and Beigel; cleared in EUR and AF and by Buffum and Harriman; and approved by Ball. 2 Dated April 13. (Ibid., AID PORT) 3 The Embassy commented in telegram 799 from Lisbon, June 18. (Ibid.) 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, June 19, 1965, 2:40 p.m. 697. Following based on uncleared memcon, Noforn, FYI and subject to revision: 2 In three hour session June 18 with FonMin Franco Nogueira and Ambassador Garin, the Secretary, Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary Leddy patiently reviewed gamut of US-Portuguese problems. Nogueira reiterated all too familiar complaints about US policy in Africa well as NATO shortcomings in failing recognize defense problems all of Portuguese nation, i.e. Portuguese Africa. Referring to current satisfactory security conditions in Angola and Mozambique and increased willingness African moderates stand up to radicals, Nogueira said these gains offset by continuing Communist subversion and arms shipments to Africa. FonMin then embarked upon recitation of bill of tendentious particulars as evidence US is “hostilizing” Portugal in Africa while requesting Portugal to grant base and other facilities in Atlantic area. Portuguese complaints, some of which new, centered around familiar themes—alleged US aid to nationalists, especially Holden Roberto; restrictions on US arms sales and discouragement of foreign suppliers, thus hampering Portuguese struggle against Communism in Africa; and unfriendly remarks allegedly made by American officials in running down Portuguese African policy and even criticizing Africans showing some understanding for it. Under such circumstances how, FonMin asked, would aroused Portuguese public opinion agree to GOP negotiations on Cape Verde tracking station, Loran C sites and Azores base? He thought some US clarification or explanation would be useful in smoothing off present rough edges in US-Portuguese relations. Secretary said we would look into complaints but we would also like to send Nogueira list of occasions where we have stood by Portugal at UN and other international forums despite intense Afro-Asian criticism of US support of colonialism. 3 Fact US subject such accusations is evidence US not following hostile policy toward Portugal nor advocating Portuguese be forced out of Africa. Pointed out it would be unfortunate for Portugal link Loran C and Azores, which are facilities needed for defense of NATO including Portugal, with African question since this would be difficult for US public and Congress to understand. Our suggestion that Portugal, which admittedly had done much to build up African territories while rejecting racism, attempt to improve its public stance by indicating greater willingness be guided by will of the peoples of Portuguese territories, orbited Nogueira into familiar tirade on definition of self-determination and why it impossible for Portugal fix any time schedule without releasing torrent of uncontrollable events. Developments subsequent to 1961 Angolan rebellion have clearly demonstrated rightness of Portuguese policies, Nogueira insisted. End uncleared memcon. Comment: Nogueira said he would remain in Washington for several days and be available if we had anything further to discuss. We see nothing to be gained from additional talks at this time. Meanwhile we will examine long list of complaints which, in Secretary’s words, Portugal’s “over sensitive antennae,” have picked up. We will transmit results to Embassy at later date together with list of instances of US support for Portugal. Nogueira’s views discouraging in that they show no forward movement in Portuguese thinking on African problem, and if anything, some retrogression based no doubt on current success in controlling situations in their African territories. In any event, Nogueira talk here does not augur well for favorable Portuguese receptivity to Anderson or other such plans. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. Drafted by Funseth and McKillop and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Paris for USRO. 2 Memoranda of the Rusk-Nogueira conversation are ibid. 3 A July 14 memorandum from Buffum to McKillop with an attachment outlining U.S. actions in support of Portugal is in Department of State, Portuguese Desk Files: Lot 68 D 401, Visit of Foreign Minister. 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, July 2, 1965. 4. Ref: Deptel 697, June 19. 2 I met with FonMin July 1 discuss his recent trip US. He was relaxed and extremely cordial and felt he had fine visit. He recognized Secretary’s preoccupation Viet Nam and Dominican Republic and expressed regret not able see President, but said he understood. Salazar and Cabinet briefed on Brazilian portion his trip but not then on visit to US. FonMin described his three-hour conversation with Secretary as friendly and said he was obliged make complaints he did in order be sure brought to Secretary’s attention. Grateful that complaints “will be investigated.” He expressed regret he left impression Loran-C and Azores base negotiations are linked to solution Portuguese problem in Africa. He had considered asking for another brief period with Secretary to clarify this impression indicating to me that other “quid pro quo” perhaps feasible. With respect Loran-C I told FonMin I disappointed they had not come to grips this important problem during conversations. FonMin said he could not say now how we should proceed on Loran-C and would talk to me after reporting to Prime Minister. I pointed out to him that another question raised during conversation was not answered, the Secretary’s request that Portugal give its friends “a flag to rally around.” While Portuguese position in Africa relatively strong now, I suggested GOP consider best way cope with situation in terms of 15 or 20 years. If Portugal could show some flexibility we might be able help out. FonMin said he would keep these considerations in mind and talk about subject after seeing Prime Minister. He repeated old complaints about United Nations, stressing unfriendly make-up of Secretariat which is dominated by Indians and Communist Bloc nationals. After this discussion with FonMin I am somewhat less pessimistic possibilities our doing business with GOP on matters essential to US. Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Confidential. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 3:26 p.m. 2 Document 161 . 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 163. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, September 3, 1965. 93. Ref: CA-2167 August 23, 1965. 2 To best of my ability in long conversation with FonMin Franco Nogueira on Sept 2 during which I able to do most of talking, I conveyed information and proposal contained reference instruction. FonMin received in silence my oral denials of specific charges he had brought to attention Secretary and Under Secretary June 18. 3 When he subsequently explained why he found certain answers difficult to accept, I stated my understanding Dept would be discussing in perhaps greater detail with Ambassador Garin. FonMin accepted without substantive comment aide-mémoire I handed him covering recent record of US assistance and demonstrated friendship for Portugal in international forums. 4 FonMin’s reply to my restatement of USG interest in Azores base agreement and Loran-C facilities is reported separately but essentially left status these matters unchanged for the present. Finally and using approach suggested CA-2167, I broached proposal for peaceful solution Portuguese territories problem. I prefaced this by emphasizing to FonMin in highly personal manner that proposal being offered in spirit of friendship and sincerity and should not be misconstrued as attempt to “buy” Portuguese Africa or in fact to displace Portuguese interests, influence or presence there. We were in fact suggesting “flag which they themselves could raise and about which their friends and moderate Africans could rally.” FonMin listened attentively and with evident and increasing interest. He also took notes which I have never seen him do before. From his facial expression I gathered that most elements in package made considerable impression on him. Upon conclusion my presentation FonMin said that he obviously could not comment immediately and officially upon proposal of such scope. Said that it would require personal consideration by Salazar and other members of govt. FonMin did single out as elements of difficulty the role of political parties during interim period, problem of political campaigns, coverage of amnesty and repatriation arrangements, and identity and character of what I had mentioned as “international observers” at plebiscite. I was encouraged, however, by fact he did not reject my suggestion these be considered implementation details to be worked out only after decision taken as to acceptability of proposal in principle and broad outline. FonMin promised bring proposal Salazar’s attention and I indicated expectation I would subsequently request appointment discuss it further with both of them. Believe time now appropriate for Dept call in and discuss with Garin. Strongly recommend, however, effort be concentrated on emphasizing broad outline and to de-emphasize features difficult for GOP until latter has had time absorb over-all concept and gain some appreciation potential advantages vis-à-vis continuation present course of action. If proposal conceivably can get away from starting wire I am confident prospects will thereafter be better for negotiating on specific identity of “observers” and other such sticky items. FonMin did state very positive belief GOP that “time on their side” and internal situations Angola and Mozambique “solid.” I must also caution against any over-optimism that Dr. Salazar can be persuaded to alter the firm convictions which all available evidence points that he continues to hold. As final thought and one I consider essential safeguard, I strongly recommend absolutely no mention of proposal be made any other nation without our so informing GOP in advance. Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Secret. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 12:55 p.m. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Document 433 . 3 See Document 161 . 4 The text was adapted from instructions contained in circular airgram CA-2167. The Embassy reported on Nogueira’s response and summarized the aide-mémoire in telegram 97 from Lisbon, September 7. (Both in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US) 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, September 24, 1965, 7:53 p.m. 121. Ref: CA-2167 and Deptel 96. 2 Leddy summarized ref airgram to Garin, September 23, including US responses to FonMin’s complaints, reaffirmation US interest in Azores base and Loran-C negotiations and introduction new U.S. proposal for peaceful solution Portuguese African question. A. On complaint list, Garin did not recall or had difficulty recalling FonMin’s original points on tantalite, Italian mortars and armored cars. Garin only made more than cursory comments or rebuttals on questions of Roberto’s passport, U.S. aid to refugees and F-84 engines. 1. Re issuance visa to Roberto, Garin repeated continuing GOP position that it cannot understand how USG could knowingly put visa in false passport. 2. Re aid to refugees, Garin stated GOP does not deny humanitarian principles which motivate US but GOP believes USG help discourages refugees from returning to Angola. Moreover, notwithstanding US statements to contrary, GOP believes most of aid goes into “Roberto’s pockets.” Said great desire GOP is for refugees return to Angola. Said Red Cross has inspected and praised their repatriation program. Said they would welcome great mass of refugees back and only small minority of hard-core terrorists would not be acceptable and that U.S. refugee program frustrates their efforts by creating “permanent” refugee situation. Leddy pointed out refugees are fed under program for only one year then dropped from rolls—that clothing is offered once only, except in event emergency—and that no food is going to Angolan exile military forces and no clothing to members their families. He concluded, difficult see how such humanitarian program could significantly contribute any prolongation refugee situation. Garin reaffirmed GOP point-of-view. 3. F-84 engines—Garin maintained procedure was “new thing” and could not see why presence F-84 aircraft in Africa and metropole should call for more detailed verification than if all aircraft located in metropole. In general discussion US arms policy, he injected that GOP has always believed US was behind arms restrictive paragraph of original UN resolution and recalled Ambassador Stevenson asking him during debate agree to “one tiny sanction” in resolution. B. Leddy reaffirmed basic US policy objective maintaining friendly and constructive relations with Portugal, covering points Section II Paras A and B of CA-2167. He said as Ambassador Anderson had given FonMin memo of partial list of instances in which U.S. has acted to oppose or moderate action against Portugal, we would do same for Garin. Garin restated GOP analysis of origin difficulties in U.S.-Portuguese relations. Said USG and GOP, aside from ideological differences, were until 1961, “friends without difficulties, now we are friends with difficulties.” Garin recalled that in 1961 SC Angola debate, 3 USG made 180-degree turn in policy and unlike UK and France, who abstained, voted against Portugal. This act regarded as great blow in Portugal and as giving radical Africans and terrorists green light. Said Portuguese, who at great risk had given US and UK Azores facilities during war, thus exposing themselves to German retaliations (bombing of Lisbon, for example), were stunned by US suddenly turning against them. C. Leddy reaffirmed US interest in Azores and Loran-C, stating we had done our best track down and investigate all of FonMin’s complaints which FonMin said made it difficult for him reconcile with our requests. Garin replied seemed obvious that by granting these increased facilities Portugal increased its vulnerability to Soviet attack. Difficult for GOP justify to Portuguese public that it would agree greater defense facilities of its allies without improving Portuguese defense facilities and by this Garin said, must understand that defense of Portugal means all of Portugal, including Angola and Mozambique and other overseas territories. Without changing our countries’ basic policies (i.e. for U.S.—policy on arms and self-determination), Garin said, some way must be found help Portugal improve defense its territories by offering Portugal “counterparts.” Leddy observed this sounded like very difficult task and pointed out Loran-C may increase Portuguese vulnerability but at same time greatly improved defense posture of all NATO allies, including Portugal. Garin agreed but indicated GOP did not believe this was sufficient inducement for GOP agree and emphasized some ways and means must be found so that GOP can justify to Portuguese public opinion that Portuguese security would be additionally improved and this security must include territories. D. Leddy outlined proposal made by Anderson to Foreign Minister, September 2, 4 saying US advancing plan as possible constructive program in working out eventual peaceful solution Portuguese African problem. Leddy said Anderson asked FonMin consider Portugal publicly accepting principle self-determination for African territories on basis definite timetable. In exchange, Africans would agree suspension all anti-Portuguese activities. US and NATO allies would publicly support plan. US would be responsive Portuguese request for arms if we satisfied deliberate and organized violations had taken place and would be sympathetic Portuguese requests for support in UN. During transition period leading to plebiscite, US and NATO allies would be prepared, at Portuguese request, provide economic and technical assistance in support GOP efforts develop territories and prepare inhabitants exercise of self-determination. Leddy said aim US proposal is to ensure peaceful solution Portuguese African question and is based on belief that such solution can only come about through dialogue between Portuguese and Africans. Garin said his reply not represent GOP response to proposal but reflected what he thought reaction in Lisbon would be as FonMin had probably already indicated to Anderson, to wit: 1. Based on GOP experience with Africans at aborted 1963 talks at New York, 5 Africans only interested in self-determination which leads to independence. Africans rejected Portuguese offer of plebiscite—Africans would not accept plebiscite which resulted in anything but independence—difficult for Africans retreat from this position to open choice now proposed. 2. GOP concerned that once it agreed plebiscite, it would be confronted with difficult conditions under which it would be held, such as withdrawal Portuguese troops and entry all kinds of undesirables, “Ghanaians, etc.” GOP fears that with such conditions imposed, Angola would go down the drain in eight days, like Congo. 3. GOP not against self-determination and, in fact, is practicing it in territories where all inhabitants have full rights of citizens. Admitted condition of one man, one vote not yet achieved but this also true elsewhere in world. However, GOP moving in that direction. 4. On whole, Portugal believes its position in Africa steadily growing stronger, therefore, it would hesitate voluntarily weaken its position through some political action such as contained in latest USG proposal. Garin emphasized foregoing did not represent GOP reply. Comment: Garin did not appear have received very complete report Anderson-FonMin meeting, although he seemed well-informed on proposal and FonMin’s reaction. He did not take notes during conversation and was alone. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and approved by Leddy. 2 Regarding CA-2167, see footnotes 2 and 4, Document 163 . Telegram 96 to Lisbon, September 14, is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PORT-US) 3 Apparent reference to the December 19, 1961, U.S. vote on a UN Security Council resolution establishing a program for assistance to refugees from Angola. 4 See Document 163 . 5 Reference is to informal talks held during the 1963 UN General Assembly debate on Angola. 165. Letter from Foreign Minister Nogueira to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson) 165. Letter from Foreign Minister Nogueira to the Ambassador to Portugal (Anderson) 1 Lisbon, September 1965. My dear George: It will be recalled that during our conversation on September 2, 2 the Ambassador outlined to me the terms of a proposal related to the Portuguese Overseas in which, among other aspects, the possibility of a plebiscite was mentioned. It will also be remembered that for my part, when I commented then on the idea, I said that from the Afro-Asian point of view a plebiscite would only be valid and acceptable if Portugal were to satisfy the following conditions: withdrawal of all the armed and police forces whose presence in the territories would certainly be taken as an obstacle to the freedom of the voter; authorization for the entry into the territories of those whom the UN and the Africans might consider to be the “chiefs” who represent the populations, and therefore a prior amnesty would be required; and lastly, since the UN requires a “democratic process”, political debate would have to be permitted and even stimulated, and in this matter there would be imposed a complete freedom of political parties, headed by the “chiefs” referred to above, and inspired by any and all foreign governments. I recall the preceding because the Senegalese delegation at the last conference of Plenipotentiaries of the International Telecommunications Union, which took place in Montreaux, 3 presented a resolution on the 15th of this month in which it practically repeated what I had said in our conversation on the 2nd. I enclose a copy of the pertinent passages containing the “conditions” which Senegal wishes Portugal to obey. The coincidence is revealing and very significant, and full of implications. With hearty best wishes and most affectionate compliments. ( A. Franco Nogueira ) 4 Enclosure a) Immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the territories under its domination to self-determination and independence; b) Immediate cessation of all acts of repression and withdrawal of all the military and other forces at present employed for the purpose; c) Promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and establishment of conditions which will permit the free functioning of political parties; d) Negotiations on the basis of recognition of the right to self-determination through the authentic representatives of the nationalist fighting forces of the territories, in order to transfer power to freely elected political institutions representative of the people of the territories. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Confidential; Personal. Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 2 to airgram A-131 from Lisbon, October 6. 2 See Document 163 . 3 September 14-November 12, 1965. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 166. Memorandum of Conversation 166. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 9, 1965, 11 a.m. SecDel MC-30 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1965 SUBJECT Portuguese Acquisition of U.S. B-26’s PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Robert L. Barry Portugal Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira Foreign Minister Nogueira said that he wished to bring up the problem of the B-26’s which Portugal had acquired. This matter had recently been under discussion in Lisbon and Washington. 2 He asked if the Secretary knew of these discussions, and the Secretary acknowledged that he did. Nogueira remarked that it appeared that there was a violation of U.S. laws in connection with the seven B-26’s which finally landed in Portugal not long ago. The Secretary was kind enough to send a message via Ambassador Anderson on the subject. An investigation was at once carried out, Nogueira said, as the Secretary may be aware. Nogueira pointed out that he would like to repeat what he said to Ambassador Anderson in Lisbon. 3 Portugal made the agreement to purchase the B-26’s from a European firm which the GOP had every reason to believe was bona fide. The firm had headquarters in Switzerland, owned its own airport and dispatched a representative with proper credentials. The purchase contract was negotiated without any knowledge of the involvement of any other firms. Nogueira said that he himself had seen the contract and given a copy to Ambassador Anderson. As a result of the Portuguese investigation it has been discovered that the Swiss firm seems to have cooperated with a Canadian firm which in turn had dealt with an American firm (Hamilton Aircraft). Portugal has a clear conscience in this matter, Nogueira said. The contract was negotiated in the same way that such contracts are always negotiated and the GOP was unaware that any U.S. laws were being violated. Portugal paid hard cash for the aircraft and did not know the planes were supposed to fly from the U.S. The investigation has not revealed whether the planes were the property of the U.S. Government or whether they were surplus. The Secretary interjected that this made no difference, as in any event there had been a violation of the Munitions Export Control Act. The Secretary said he was no lawyer and would have to get further details on the legal questions involved. However, one of the firms involved is in serious violation of U.S. law and Portugal is in a position of a country which had received stolen property, whether or not they knew they were doing so. Nogueira said this was not quite the case, since Portugal had paid for the aircraft and paid a man who was not a thief. Hamilton Aircraft, he went on, had made it clear in a letter to the Portuguese Government that there are political reasons behind the U.S. objections. If the planes had been sold to any other country except Portugal there would have been no problem, thus a political factor has been injected. The Secretary said the problem centered on the fact that the planes had been exported without an export license. This is none of Portugal’s business, Nogueira said. The GOP is aware that the U.S. Government is not responsible for a letter which might be written by a private American firm. But Hamilton has made it clear that if the GOP will make a declaration as to where these planes are to be used, the U.S. Government will withdraw its objections to the sale. Portugal is very honest on this subject, Nogueira said, and will not make any declaration unless it can be implemented, which it cannot and will not. Portugal wishes to preserve its integrity of its position and will not mislead other governments by making meaningless declarations for the purpose of avoiding controversy. Further, he said, Portugal will not return these planes to anyone. They were paid for in cash and purchased in very good faith. The GOP does not feel guilty politically, morally or legally. The Secretary said that he would have to explore the question further upon his return to Washington. The Portuguese Embassy has been told that the matter might be brought up in a U.S. court, Nogueira said, and the U.S. Government has released information to the effect that bilateral conversations will be held with Portugal on the subject. “I must frankly state” Nogueira said, “that I have instructed Garin (the Portuguese Ambassador in Washington) to make a statement that the conversations have taken place, that the planes were bought in good faith, and that Portugal is not responsible for any violation of U.S. law which might have occurred. I wanted to let you know this,” he went on, “and I feel the Portuguese position is irreproachable.” Only the U.S. and Canadian firms can be blamed for any illegality. Nogueira said that the fact that these aircraft left the U.S. unarmed should also have a bearing on the case. The Secretary said illegal traffic in arms is a very serious matter for the U.S. Nogueira responded that this was an American law but when foreign governments are called in, the matter takes on a political coloration. Secretary Rusk said that foreign governments are normally called in on cases where mutual enforcement of laws is required. He cited the examples of Interpol, agreements to halt the white slave traffic, and others. Nogueira said that he could agree with this but that when American private organizations sent arms or war materials to groups of Angolan refugees or armed bands in Angola, the U.S. Government never made a fuss. The U.S. does all it can to enforce its laws on arms traffic, the Secretary answered. Portugal does not dispute this, said Nogueira, but these are your laws and it is your business. If the U.S. courts are to deal with the problem, it is one thing, but Portugal has been asked to do certain things at the governmental level. The GOP has a very clear conscience, he reiterated, and has violated no U.S. laws. The Secretary asked if the contract specified delivery of B-26’s and Nogueira said that it called for 20 of them. Asked whether the GOP had expected these B-26’s to come from Switzerland, Nogueira said he did not; but they might have come from Germany, France, Italy or any place in the world. Portugal has ascertained that France is now selling B-26’s and the GOP did not “have to know that these aircraft had to be U.S. property at the moment” they were sold. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2548. Secret. Drafted by Barry on October 11 and approved in S on October 19. The memorandum is Part I of VIII. The other memoranda of this conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at USUN. 2 No record of the discussion was found. 3 Not further identified. 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, October 23, 1965. 214. Ref: Deptels 169 and 171. 2 Met yesterday for nearly two hours with Prime Minister Salazar. He appeared good physical condition for man his age and mentally alert as ever. Principal topic conversation was USG proposal looking toward peaceful orderly settlement of problem Portuguese African territories. Emphasizing that much thought, serious effort and goodwill toward Portugal were embodied therein, I outlined in detail for Salazar proposal contained CA-2167. 3 I urged that if Prime Minister and his advisers saw any possibility hostilities, suffering and destruction increasing in Portuguese Africa they should give most serious consideration this proposal which did not seek elimination Portuguese presence Africa but rather a constructive approach to resolving confrontation between that presence and expanding force of African nationalism. Salazar listened attentively and evidenced awareness my previous discussion this subject with FonMin September 2 as well as Dept presentation thereof to Garin. 4 He brought up FonMin’s September 1965 letter 5 and problems cited therein, observed that USG appears accept as basic assumption invincibility of African nationalism, and said Portuguese experience indicates civilization and preparation for self government of native peoples take much longer than USG appears believe. To each of these observations I made appropriate reply and Salazar showed self ready discuss in serious friendly fashion. As conversation drew to close Salazar assured me GOP has given, is giving, and will continue give serious consideration our proposal. Urged me continue discuss with FonMin and suggested latter might treat subject during forthcoming visit United States. I in turn expressed hope GOP would as occasion permits pursue useful dialogue with appropriate African leaders. In résumé, Salazar appeared convinced as ever GOP course of action in Africa is correct. He does appear view future with some apprehension but sees this as fault of great powers for having prematurely relinquished control. Very clear to me Salazar personally calling shots GOP foreign policy but I am mildly hopeful our conversation may have stirred some new thinking. 6 Memcon follows. 7 Anderson 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT. Secret; Limdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 10:05 a.m. 2 In telegram 169 to Lisbon, October 19, the Department of State provided guidance for discussions with Salazar on African issues. (Ibid.) In telegram 171, October 19, the Department elaborated its views regarding self-determination for Portuguese Africa. (Ibid.) 3 See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 163 . 4 See Documents 163 and 164 . 5 Document 165 . 6 In airgram A-276, February 7, 1966, Anderson reported that on January 28, 1966, Nogueira responded: “Were Portugal to follow these suggestions hellip; within six months the territories would be in chaos.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 10 PORT) 7 Transmitted in airgram A-162 from Lisbon, November 3. (Ibid.) 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, June 16, 1967, 6:52 p.m. 211930. NATUS. Following is based on uncleared memcon, 2 subject to change and is FYI Noforn only. 1. Portuguese FonMin Franco Nogueira met with Secretary, June 14 in Luxembourg. He recalled pre-ministerial meeting exchanges between GOP and USG re possibility his making full presentation Portugal’s African policy. FonMin said he had finally decided not make such presentation upon learning Secretary’s response would be reiteration long-standing US views on self-determination. 2. Referring to critical comments he had just made in NATO ministerial debate on Under Secretary Katzenbach’s statement to House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 6, 3 Franco Nogueira said he strongly objected to what he took to be Under Secretary’s reference to racial problems in Angola and Mozambique. FonMin particularly regretted implication that Portuguese Africa was “infectious threat” to other African countries. He said statement also implied, incorrectly in his view, that except for southern Africa, political situation in continent was good. Portugal was seriously concerned, he said, at what it had to consider as official statement by responsible senior member State Department. 3. Secretary replied he would discuss matter with Under Secretary but wished to emphasize importance of some authentic expression of opinion by people of Angola and Mozambique on their future. He asked whether Portugal could anticipate likely results of plebiscite. 4. FonMin responded free plebiscite would undoubtedly result in large majority for status quo. Difficulty was, he said, that a vote under conditions acceptable to UN majority would seriously distort results. He said, UN would, for example, require prior withdrawal all Portuguese forces and return of exiled revolutionaries. Franco Nogueira said fact was that conditions for plebiscite could be drawn so as give any result desired. Portugal, he said, could not afford to start down such an uncertain road. 5. Secretary asked whether plebiscite would not be useful even if more extreme conditions desired by some UN members were not met. Important thing, in Secretary’s view, was that results be credible for world opinion. 6. FonMin recalled exchange between GOP and Ball in 1963 4 when GOP had asked whether US would be prepared give an advance undertaking support results of constitutional plebiscite whatever they might be. He said US response had been negative. 7. Secretary said might be useful on US side review 1963 exchange. He stated that large part of problem in southern Africa, notably in South Africa and Rhodesia, is maintenance of white rule by force. He was personally convinced this could not work in long run. 8. FonMin disagreed and expressed view most Africans in Rhodesia and South Africa support present regimes. While not questioning US right disagree with GOP’s African policy, he believed US policy based on refusal recognize reality. He said present situation in Angola and Mozambique is not only stable but has belied predictions made by US officials in early 1960’s. He said African inhabitants have full constitutional right at local and territorial levels as well as parliamentary representation in Lisbon. He said this circumstance has made no impression on those governments that long ago decided try and oust Portugal from Africa. 9. Referring to Mid-East, FonMin said GOP had refused subscribe to proposed Maritime Declaration 5 for several reasons: Israeli policy on Portuguese Africa had been unfriendly; application of principles re freedom of seas not universally applied. 10. Re Rhodesia, FonMin said 169 tankers carrying petroleum had called at Portuguese African ports in past year—58 were British-owned or registered, 27 French and balance miscellaneous. He said not one of ships in question was Portuguese but Portugal was being made scapegoat. In his view it was up to governments involved control ships owned by their nationals or registered in their countries. 11. Secretary said that, if facts were as described, he thought Portugal had a point. In any case, he said, US has not been pressing Portugal on this matter. 12. FonMin said Portugal will not alter its course in Africa. He hoped find some way convince US of this. He suggested desirability further discussion between himself and Secretary. 13. Secretary said he would be in London in July for CENTO meeting 6 and would consider whether it might perhaps be possible for him to visit Lisbon briefly at that time. In parting, Secretary said he hoped FonMin would consider whether some means could not be found for populations of Angola and Mozambique to give an authentic expression of their views on their future. He said this was very important for Portugal’s friends. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, NATO 3 LUX. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Funseth, cleared by EUR, and approved by Springsteen. Pouched to Paris. 2 Not found. 3 Apparently a reference to Katzenbach’s testimony in support of the State Department budget. While the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on June 6, Katzenbach did not testify. 4 See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 357 . 5 Apparent reference to NATO’s decision to establish a Standing Naval Force, effective January 1, 1968. 6 The meeting was cancelled. 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, August 18, 1967, 1135Z. 180. Ref: A. State 22031; B. State 13009. 2 Subj: Smuggled B-26 Aircraft in Portugal. 1. When Director General Political Affairs (Themido) called Counselor to Foreign Ministry August 17 (to deliver approved text for exchange of notes on Azores shipping problem), latter took advantage of occasion to raise subject as instructed Ref. A. USG position stated as in Ref. B and all points made that message were reaffirmed. 2. Themido said Ambassador Garin has reported July 25 conversation with Acting Asst Sec Stoessel to FonMinistry and had also mentioned it to him. Themido said he had taken note of USG views and proposals and would personally bring them to attention of FonMinister. 3. Counselor urged upon Themido that GOP remove this source of friction between two govts by providing assurances planes would not be used outside NATO defense area (which assurances would have been required before any export license could have been issued) if GOP could not bring itself to return planes to US custody as USG requested. He emphasized that use of planes in Africa outside NATO area could have adverse effects on US-Portugal relations far exceeding significance or value of planes themselves. He stated GOP position that it was bona fide purchaser for value not acceptable to US and pointed out evidence of US origin in terms of contract and in delivery arrangements. Themido especially interested in fact pilot returned to US directly from Lisbon after each plane delivery and asked this statement be repeated. 4. Counselor also referred to Buffalo trial, pointing out (A) that jury had acquitted defendants apparently because principal conspirator not apprehended and not before court, and (B) trial judge had ruled that defense allegation of complicity USG agency in conspiracy was not proved. Object was to anticipate any Portuguese contention trial outcome weakened US position. 5. Themido confirmed seven planes still in continental Portugal. He also confirmed GOP adheres to position it was bona fide purchaser for value. He implied US was exaggerating importance and significance of implications of sale and use of few military aircraft. Finally he took direct issue with US arms export policy, saying GOP did not understand why US imposed such restrictions on arms exports to an ally (in conformance with resolutions of UN which had been considered irresponsible organization at restricted meeting during recent NATO Ministerial) when it made available arms without similar restrictions to African states (he mentioned Congo), some of which eventually used against Portugal. Embassy officer denied US arms export policy for African states was unrestricted or had effects stated. He added that though Portuguese disagreed with US arms export policy, these planes were US origin and legally subject to US export control. Themido did not comment further but repeated he would convey US position to FonMinister. 3 Bennett 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 PORT. Secret; Limdis. 2 Telegram 22031, August 16, instructed the Embassy that in view of the lack of response to previous démarches it should again raise the issue of Portuguese use of “smuggled B-26 aircraft” with the Salazar government. Telegram 13009, July 25, reported that the Department of State had requested assurances from Ambassador Garin that the aircraft would not be used outside the NATO defense area. (Both ibid.) 3 In telegram 24437 to Lisbon, August 21, the Department of State reported that Portuguese Embassy officials reaffirmed their position that the transaction was legal and that they would not provide any assurances that the aircraft would be used only in the NATO defense area. (Ibid.) 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Portugal 1 Washington, November 18, 1967, 0205Z. 71457. Subject: Meeting of Secretary with Portuguese Foreign Minister, November 17. Following is based on uncleared memcon, 2 subject to revision, and sent FYI only Noforn. Principal topics discussed at two and one-half hour meeting between Secretary and Portuguese Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira, November 17, were as follows: 1. NATO and Harmel Study 3 —FonMin said GOP believes NATO should survive but does not believe it can survive unless it is reshaped, in at least two ways: first, increased political consultation in NATO of non-NATO problems such as Mid East, Cuba, South Viet Nam and Portuguese Africa; second, while NATO allies should not expect 100 percent support for respective non-NATO policies, no NATO ally should adopt position of hostility to an ally’s policy on any specific, non-NATO problem. In response Secretary’s question, he said GOP had no information on what France intended to do in NATO but shared Secretary’s impression that it was not present French intention to withdraw. 2. U.S. Vote in U.N. Fourth Committee 4 —FonMin expressed GOP’s great appreciation that U.S. voted against resolution in UNGA 4th Committee on Portuguese territories. 3. Congo —At same time, Fon Min doubted USG fully realized Portugal’s surprise and hurt over USG siding with Congo on Congolese complaint about mercenaries entering Congo from Angola. Depth of Portuguese feeling explained by fact USG had never in past seven years, believed it necessary make public announcement of disfavor against Congolese Government about incursions by armed bands from Congo into Angola who had murdered between six and eight thousand Angolans of all races, sexes and ages. In Security Council, he charged that with exception of Mali and Nigeria, all Council members, including even Nigeria, favored changing language of consensus resolution from “condemning” attitude of Portugal to “deploring” Portugal’s attitude except US delegation which wanted “condemn” left in resolution and it was. 5 FonMin said it was not important to GOP whether it was deplored or condemned by SC but US attitude was of great importance. Secretary said USG had considerable interest in helping preserve unity of Congo and preventing it from fragmenting. He said US invested about half billion dollars in this policy. Soviets interested in Congo because it is big prize but so far had not succeeded in subverting Congo. He said we have been on thin ice in Congo with Schramme mercenary action threatening to set off massacre of whites. He emphasized US attaches no particular importance to any one leader in Congo—we have successively supported Adoula, Tshombe and now Mobutu—but we have supported whichever government was in power. 4. Nigeria —FonMin said as in Congo, so also in Biafra, Portugal is being made scapegoat. He said everybody is helping Biafra—Rothschild Bank, Czechs, Spain, France, Germany, Ireland, British—but Portugal is singled out for censure because it permits foreign flag aircraft, flown by foreign crews all who possess proper documentation to transmit Lisbon airport with cargoes acquired outside Portugal. 6 5. Rhodesia —FonMin stated Rhodesia is importing everything it requires including oil and is maintaining reasonable level of exports. Portuguese trade with Rhodesia, he said, is more or less at same level with some increase attributed to economic development in both places. He said everybody is trading with Rhodesia—Germany, Japan, France, Britain and even U.S. to name but a few—and these goods are passing through Mozambique. On oil, he said, GOP has documentation on all vessels arriving at Lourenco Marques and reported that Mozambique refinery continues sell its products to traditional South African customers who, he believes, instead of selling the products in South Africa are now selling to Rhodesia. But instead of applying pressure on South Africa or criticizing or condemning parties actually trading with Rhodesia, he said, Portugal is singled out for condemnation and is once more made scapegoat. Secretary said he accepted FonMin’s point that Portugal should not be held responsible as “entrepot” for Rhodesia if others are trading with Rhodesia as FonMin said they were. FonMin said strange as it may seem to US, GOP has no information on outcome of Thomson-Smith talks and asked Secretary what he knew. Secretary said quite frankly we know relatively little about results except impression not much accomplished. In response FonMin’s further question, Secretary said US did not know what British have in mind re Rhodesia. 6. Mid East —FonMin said GOP believed new presence Soviets in Mediterranean had made bigger impact in that area than West seemed to realize. 7. China —In response Secretary’s question, FonMin said he believed internal situation in China was more stable and that internal dispute had polarized between two factions: one led by Mao and other led by President Liu Shao-ch’i. 8. Invitation to Secretary —FonMin renewed invitation Secretary visit Lisbon, recalling Secretary forced cancel projected June visit when CENTO postponed. Secretary said he still hoped visit Lisbon and would check his schedule to see when such visit might be arranged. FonMin informed Secretary that he would be departing New York for Lisbon, November 22. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 PORT. Secret; Noforn; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Funseth, cleared by EUR, and approved by Stoessel. 2 Not found. 3 For text of the Harmel Study, “Future Tasks of the Alliance,” see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 321-323. 4 Reference is to the U.S. decision not to support the report on Portuguese colonies. 5 Security Council Resolution 241 (1967), adopted November 15, 1967. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 252-253. 6 Reference is to the May 20 secession of Eastern Nigeria. Fighting between government and insurgent forces began in July. 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 171. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, July 24, 1968, 1125Z. 1716. Subj: The Twilight of the Salazar Era. 1. Prime Minister Salazar’s most recent press interview, given in late April to an obscure Argentine publication and published with maximum play in Lisbon press and in Portuguese Africa during first week of July (Embtel 1642), 2 was his most extreme to date. It has set tongues wagging here, and even Portuguese who are stout defenders of the Estado Novo and great admirers of Salazar personally have volunteered their concern over its general tone. 2. It was not so much Dr. Salazar’s references, contemptuous as they were, in referring to the United States as a country with “insoluble racial problems” which takes it on itself to preach to Portugal on Africa. Nor was it his taunting of the United States on Cuba. He has said similar things in the past. Some of the present language seems to have been lifted directly from earlier interviews such as that of March 1966 with The New York Times (Embassy’s A-371 of 11 April 1966), 3 although he has never before been quite so bluntly ill-mannered. De Gaulle has also said scathing things about the U.S., but with more style. 3. Rather more indicative of change in Salazar’s latest interview was his extreme defensiveness about his own record and about Portuguese policies and postures in general. His statements and strictures in this area were both petulant and unyielding—rigid to the point of rigor mortis. Is Salazar Senile? 4. Some of my European colleagues, astonished and appalled at the language used by the Prime Minister, have begun to whisper of senility. While Salazar has during the past year been noticeably showing the weight of his 79 years, and his eye trouble is rather well confirmed, it would still seem premature on the basis of what we know to judge him senile. As of now I would be more inclined to conclude that here is a very old man who is steeped in his self-righteousness and bulwarked in his convictions through his success in manipulating the local power levels firmly for 40 years—an ancient who is increasingly disgruntled and querulous as he sees time running out and himself unable to bring the world (or even substantial and growing numbers of Portuguese dissenters) around to his views as to how the world and Portugal should be ordered—in short, a man who has stayed on too long. 5. It was precisely this latter mood which members of the Brazilian Foreign Minister’s delegation reported after their week-long, intimate visit here early this month. During a schedule which was crowded but carried off in cozy and confiding atmosphere befitting a mother-daughter reunion, the Brazilians found Salazar active and exercising his old charm and good humor but showing definite slow-down signs as regards physical vigor. They described even official and inner establishment Portuguese as bored with their heavily encrusted government atmosphere and as actively looking forward to end of era. These Brazilian observations parallel Embassy impressions and are in line with views expressed by members of Lisbon’s foreign business community on the basis of their local contacts. Salazar Mystique Is Still There 6. This is not to say that Dr. Salazar has lost his hold on affairs or that his mystique has evaporated. In Portuguese spectrum he has been right too many times and been wiser than his critics on too many issues. Indeed his legendary acumen was at work again during recent days in handling of “folded arms” non-strike on Lisbon’s public transportation system, when service was not interfered with while conductors simply refused to accept fares. After allowing this essentially jolly situation to go on for several days, government by fiat decided it was time for company (fact that company was predominantly English-owned made action easier) to accept bulk of wage demands. After this action the workers promptly appeared wearing Salazar buttons, and there has since been a carefully staged and widely publicized rally lauding Salazar as friend of working man and dispenser of all good things. 7. For the moment, Salazar gets credit for having done workers, whom he does not allow to strike, a good turn. If, however, this precedent should come home to roost in terms of increased wage demands now being rumored with respect to locally owned industries, atmosphere could quickly turn un-jolly. Wage pressures seem sure to build up over the months ahead. A Change of Atmosphere 8. Without wishing to overstate issue or to get ahead of developments pace of which cannot now be judged, one might say that difference in atmosphere between a year or even a few months ago and now is that Portuguese are coming to admission, which for years they have suppressed, that Salazar is mortal after all. He has been around for so long and handled matters so generally well from narrow, traditional Portuguese point of view that serious people were still saying seriously a few months ago they hoped Salazar would just go on and on and continue to take care of things. One seldom hears this expression of faith nowadays. 9. The eventual removal—and it must be emphasized that precise rhythm of process cannot be predicted—of what seems to the overwhelming majority of Portuguese their rock of ages inevitably is engendering a certain air of nervousness in the local scene. 10. It is interesting that this gestating nervousness does not have as a primary ingredient concern over Portugal’s African posture and problems. Even those of the new generation who are increasingly frustrated over home policies, and who have been critical of U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam, strongly support the idea of Portugal in Africa. Although there is inevitable griping over the demands of military service, the cost of the wars in Africa (with the possible exception of Guinea) continues tolerable to the Portuguese in both human and fiscal terms. The national will seems set on staying in Africa, even though more and more people may be coming to accept the inevitability of future political adjustments there. The atmosphere of uncertainty developing locally derives primarily from worries over the future of European Portugal, and does not have at its base concern over Africa. The Influence of France 11. This country was badly shaken by the events in France in May. 4 It was suddenly and starkly clear at various levels of Portuguese society how easily a strong-man system could be brought to the brink of revolution. Portugal is of course not France. It is presumably easier to hold down the lid in a country like this one, with a largely illiterate and unorganized people under a determined regime served by a pervasive police apparatus and a strictly controlled press. 12. There have been audible sighs of relief here, both oral and written, over De Gaulle’s rebound, together with much public and private admiration over the way he brought off his recent elections. Informed quarters, however, recognize that there are accounts to pay in France. The Portuguese will be watching French labor adjustments apprehensively with an eye to their influence on the increasingly pressed local wage structure. They will have concern over the significance of educational reforms in France with respect to Portuguese students who have been up to now surprisingly quiescent but who have begun to show restiveness in recent months. There is considerable expectation here of student troubles in the autumn. Disorders in France could trigger something here. The Succession to Salazar 13. Despite the general recognition they found among their Portuguese contacts that Salazar can no longer be expected to go on forever, the Brazilians during their recent visit got no more discerning guidelines for the future than the rest of us. Their soundings received the usual stock answer which seems to satisfy Portuguese, i.e., when Salazar goes, the President will appoint another Prime Minister. It seems incredible that men of high professional stature and of important affairs, those who have more at stake than other social classes as regards the future, should not concern themselves more about the shape of things to come. Yet that is overwhelmingly the case. 14. In the muted speculation which goes on about the succession there is little change in the usual collection of names which continue to be bandied about. There is no indication that Dr. Salazar has given the nod to anyone, and his remark to the Argentine interviewer that his successor would be an “unknown” was not reprinted here. If he has imparted any views on this subject to his faithful chief of state, it is a deeply held secret. The President of the Republic 15. Meanwhile, President Thomaz, 73 years old himself, continues to go doggedly about the country doing his patriotic duty as the loyal old sailor that he is—and quite often in his sailor’s uniform. He is a man who always looks like his feet hurt him, but there is no local festival, commercial inauguration or educational happening too minor to merit his presence. At the major Evora Festival recently he drove through the streets of that medieval town, standing in an open car and waving to the crowd for all the world like a candidate for office. The President always gets respectful applause—the Portuguese are a courteous and respectful people—but there was in this basically unstaged reception at Evora some warmth which went well beyond the requirements of protocol. The President of the Republic is a taciturn man who rarely expresses any opinion publicly or in conversations with diplomats other than patriotic sentiments. Although a rather amiable father-type figure who often appears at public functions accompanied by his grandchildren, he gives every appearance on policy matters of being a hardliner. He has close military connections, and certainly his cronies belong to that group. In event of a sudden vacuum his views as to Salazar’s successor could assume key importance. The Estado Novo Tightens Up 16. The enigma of the future continues in Portugal, as inscrutable as in Spain. Here at least there is an operating framework which includes both chief of state and chief of government. Whether Salazar will go on for some years yet or whether we are on the threshold of an accelerating deterioration of age which will bring earlier changes, only time will tell. As the regime shows increasing signs of entering its final stage the inner power structure, smugly satisfied with things as they are, has begun in authoritarian style to tighten up, to turn further to the right. Recent public statements by the Saurian Minister of Interior (Embtel 1674) 5 have constituted grim warnings to all and sundry to stay in line. I am told that contingency plans of the security forces have been recently revised and toughened in anticipation of student problems in the autumn. The church has also been put on notice. 17. The initial succession to Salazar, when it comes will require the support of the armed forces and should be largely in his image. However it goes, the immediate successor will lack the immense authority which the present Prime Minister derives from his 40 year rule. The successor may also be of baser metal and lack the personal rectitude which has been one of Salazar’s principal strengths. The successor could be a real dark horse, and there might be several changes in tandem before power finally lodges. In the latter event, strains on military unity might well develop. Assuming an orderly first act after Salazar, the plot could then become more intricate and involved. Bennett 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, and Rio de Janiero. 2 Dated July 2. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid., SOC 12-2 PORT) 4 Reference is to mass demonstrations that nearly toppled President De Gaulle’s government. 5 Dated July 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT) 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, October 8, 1968, 1800Z. 2076. 1. Foreign Minister asked me to come to see him late afternoon October 7 for our first meeting since change of government and naming of Marcello Caetano as Prime Minister. 2 He wasted no time on preliminaries, emphasizing he was speaking “on direction and with authority of” new Prime Minister to present for attention of USG in formal and solemn manner a statement of GOP policy which latter considered of highest importance. Franco Nogueira said he was making same statement to Ambassadors of Brazil, Spain, France, Germany, UK and South Africa, as representatives of governments which GOP considered to have particular interest in matter. Statement concerned Portuguese policy in overseas territories. 2. Franco Nogueira began by commenting that there had been widespread view among foreign governments, press and other sectors of public opinion abroad that Portugal’s African policies had represented personal position of Dr. Salazar. Latter was regarded internationally as a strong-minded individual who had seen his country in a certain framework and had forged its policies in a manner to suit his own vision of Portugal at home and overseas. Various governments had come to conclusion that no changes were to be expected as long as Salazar remained at helm of Portuguese affairs. However, there had been considerable conjecture that, once Salazar left power, alterations would then begin to be made in GOP overseas policy. 3. Stressing again that he spoke on specific direction of new Prime Minister, Franco Nogueira said GOP considered it matter of highest importance to make its position unequivocally clear. Portuguese policy with respect overseas territories “would not be changed in the slightest degree.” Policies followed under Salazar were not personal ones but represented a considered national view of Portugal’s interests. These national interests continued to be valid and the new government was united in its determination to continue as before. There would be no changes in overseas policy, he repeated. Foreign Minister requested that I transmit this statement of GOP policy to USG. 4. I inquired whether statement, since it being made to several governments, would remain as oral one or whether we would be furnished with aide-mémoire. FonMin did not seem to have thought much about this; he replied no aide-mémoire would be furnished but then added that Garin would later follow up with presentation of GOP views in call at Department. 3 At another point in conversation Franco Nogueira said consideration had been given by new government to public announcement making clear its unswerving adherence to existing overseas policy. This idea had, however, been rejected as possibly raising rather than allaying doubts and speculation, and it had been decided instead to make direct approach to selected governments. 5. Franco Nogueira then said he would go farther and make an additional comment specifically for background information of USG. In surprisingly direct reference to political maneuvering that went on in inner government circles during week preceding Thomaz selection of Caetano as new Prime Minister, Franco Nogueira asserted he personally had tried to stay aloof from situation but that his “political friends” had been active. Discussions during that period had made it absolutely clear that no Portuguese Government could change the overseas policy and remain in power. Attachment to present policies was strongly and firmly held. This was honest Portuguese view, which had long considered its African posture a contribution to Western cause. With recent changes in Czechoslovakia, threats to Berlin and Rumania and renewed belligerent attitude on part of Soviets, FonMin considered recent Gromyko speech at UNGA as ominous, particularly with respect to its comments on Middle East and Mediterranean area—Portugal was more convinced than ever that she serving Western welfare by her posture in Southern Africa. 6. Comment: Presumably there will be opportunity in due course for a general talk with Prime Minister Caetano (we are now preparing some thoughts on this for consideration by Department). 4 Once he gets settled in, ranking member of new Cabinet, Minister of State Vaz Pinto, has invited me to accompany him to Funchal for October 12 unveiling of Columbus statue and this will provide occasion for relaxed discussion re Caetano government’s plans and intentions. Meanwhile, I have no reason believe Franco Nogueira doing other than faithfully executing government policy in transmitting statement on overseas policy. His tone in our October 7 meeting was sober and serious and belligerency which he sometimes shows when discussing overseas matters was entirely lacking. Whatever understanding may have been reached behind scenes with respect to agreement on Caetano as Prime Minister, military and other hard-line elements (including Franco Nogueira on overseas matters) would have insisted on maintenance of existing line on Africa. We start from where we are, and time will tell how much Caetano will want to change overseas policies and how he will go about his delicate operation. Bennett 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL PORT-US. Confidential; Limdis. 2 Following an accident, Salazar underwent emergency brain surgery on September 6. On September 16 he lapsed into a coma. President Thomaz announced on September 26 that Salazar’s doctors had determined the Prime Minister would not recover, and he appointed Caetano as Salazar’s successor. 3 No record of such a meeting was found. 4 Transmitted in airgram A-540, October 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT) 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Portugal to the Department of State 1 Lisbon, November 5, 1968, 1725Z. 2188. Subj: First Conversation with New Prime Minister. 1. I made my initial call on new Prime Minister late afternoon, November 4, having held off asking for appointment during his first month in office to give him time to settle in. Brazilian Ambassador also saw Prime Minister yesterday. 2. Caetano received me in his office alone, rising from meticulously clean desk as I entered and greeting me with warm courtesy. He has reputation from his days at university of enjoying conversation and exchange of ideas, and gave every impression of welcoming opportunity for exchange of views. (Interestingly enough, Franco Nogueira had sought to dissuade me from requesting appointment, asserting that new Prime Minister did not wish to receive foreign Ambassadors.) I believe we can look forward to reasonable discussion and rational argumentation with Caetano, even though we may not always find agreement. 3. Caetano emphasized he was greatly looking forward to Secretary’s visit. He spoke of his interest in a “renewal of dialogue” with USG after some years of what he described as “misunderstandings” between our two governments. He went on to suggest, in more generous approach than we are accustomed to hear from Portuguese officialdom, that both sides had suffered from misunderstandings. I assured him of USG and my personal interest in exploring differences between us and in trying to ameliorate them. 4. For my part I stressed mutual interests and common tasks which USG and Portugal share, mentioning that I had come to his office direct from ceremony of delivery to Portuguese Navy of third destroyer-escort built under shared-costs arrangement to meet NATO commitment. Prime Minister proved already well informed on that program. We reviewed recent Lisbon meeting of Atlantic Treaty Association as example of common interest. I brought up also our interest in program for exchanges of students and professors and expressed satisfaction over recent decision by GOP to make financial contribution to program. I said we thought it useful to have American students and professors coming to Portugal; before I could finish sentence Prime Minister broke in to comment that it was very valuable for Portuguese students and professors to have opportunity of spending some time in US. 5. Neither Prime Minister nor I brought Azores base or African problems into conversation. It would have been counterproductive in this initial talk, particularly in view of his lack of maneuverability at present on latter issue. 6. I took occasion to compliment Prime Minister on dignity and self-discipline shown by Portuguese during difficult period of past two months in Portuguese life. He expressed appreciation and said he took pride in the calm way in which the country had managed the change-over from Salazar regime and was now adjusting to new ways of doing things. 7. He commented with satisfaction that there was now a new spirit in the country. I agreed and remarked that one was particularly conscious of it in the daily press, going on to add that evidences of more freedom of expression had made a very favorable impression in US, with our devotion to freedom of the press. Caetano took up this theme, stating that censorship had been relaxed a great deal already. He put emphasis on fact that his is a new administration which feels itself free of the past, but balanced that by saying that this is a difficult and delicate time and that transition would have to be carried out in a “suave” manner. After all, he said, laying his palms out expressively and smiling, Portugal is changing from a regime which went on for forty years. Bennett 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 PORT. Confidential; Limdis. 174. Memorandum of Conversation 174. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 9:30 a.m. THE SECRETARY’S VISIT TO MADRID AND LISBON November 16-19, 1968 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Ambassador Bennett Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain/Portugal Diego C. Asencio, Political Officer Portugal Foreign Minister Nogueira Dr. Jose Luis Archer, Secretary General of Foreign Office Dr. Goncalo Caldeira Coelho, Director General of Political Affairs SUBJECT Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira stated that in April or May of the last year the Portuguese had received a detailed report from New York on a conversation between a prominent American friendly to Portugal and a highly placed Soviet UN delegate. The Soviet delegate had stated that while the Soviet Union was hostile to the Portuguese regime for various reasons, it would not like to see a Portuguese collapse in Angola and Mozambique in the foreseeable future because they were not yet prepared to exploit the resulting situation. Instead they were interested in Portuguese Guinea because it dominated the Cape Verde Islands where the Soviets would hope to establish a base giving them a strategic position in the south Atlantic. The Foreign Minister stated that the strength of insurgent activity in Guinea had increased considerably in recent months. The insurgents appeared to have Soviet and Czech armament in unlimited quantities. The training of guerrillas in the Republic of Guinea with Soviet supervision and support appeared to be increasing with 6,000-8,000 being the current intelligence estimate. The insurgents had introduced an entirely new type of land mine apparently of Chinese manufacture which was very difficult to detect and was causing the Portuguese great difficulties. There were reported to be large stocks of these mines in the Republic of Guinea ready to be shipped. The Portuguese forces in Portuguese Guinea amounted to 20,000 troops and to demonstrate proportions the much larger area of Angola had a Portuguese force of only 50,000. According to the Foreign Minister the Governor of Guinea, General Spinola, had made a three hour presentation to the Portuguese National Security Council (Note: on October 29, 1968) in which he requested reinforcements of troops and material and stated that unless these were forthcoming, he “would not be in a position to discharge my responsibility for the security of the territory” and an eventual collapse would occur. The Foreign Minister stated that the GOP would try to provide as much as they could and while he and the Defense Ministry felt that Spinola was painting too dark a picture, he wanted the US to know that the situation was really serious and that the Portuguese were worried. He added that he was putting this observation forward with no ulterior motives. While of course there were purely Portuguese motives for staying in Guinea, the loss of Guinea and by extension the loss of the Cape Verde Islands would also be a Western problem of very great importance. In answer to Mr. Leddy’s question, the Foreign Minister stated that the loss of Guinea would have a tremendous impact on the Cape Verde Islands because the Islands and Guinea were completely inter-related economically, socially, politically and ethnically. In answer to the Secretary’s question, Nogueira stated that he was quite certain the support for the insurgent activity emanating from the Republic of Guinea was Russian in origin rather than Chinese and he was quite prepared to allow US experts to examine captured armaments to prove the point. The Secretary replied that the US now had better leverage with the Republic of Guinea than 2-3 years ago and perhaps something could be done. In answer to the Secretary’s question as to whether Soviet ships had been spotted off the Portuguese-African territories since the closing of the Suez Canal, Foreign Minister Nogueira replied affirmatively and added that Chinese “spy ships” had also been spotted at several points. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part I of VIII; Part VIII is Document 175 . The other memoranda of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry. 175. Memorandum of Conversation 175. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 9:30 a.m. THE SECRETARY’S VISIT TO MADRID AND LISBON November 16-19, 1968 PARTICIPANTS [Here follows the same list as Document 174 .] SUBJECT Azores Base The Foreign Minister stated that at the insistence of Prime Minister Caetano the Ministry of Defense was undertaking a study of the US use of the Azores Base at Lajes. This would be followed by a Foreign Ministry study. At sometime in the future, possibly before the end of the year, the GOP would make proposals either in Washington or in Lisbon on the base. It was not the intention of the GOP to be difficult or “fussy” about the base nor to cause the US any special problems. He saw the problem in the light of world conditions and in the mutual need for cooperation. With the continuing threat of the Soviet Union and of other world problems the need for cooperation between the US and European countries was important. On the other hand Portuguese African policy which had been under attack for ten years was now being seen by other countries in a different light. The Azores was one area where US-Portuguese cooperation was possible. Such cooperation was also possible in Africa and in Europe. The Secretary pointed out that the US Government was now in the process of transition although it would be useful for him to inform his successor. The Foreign Minister immediately replied that the date of the Portuguese presentation had no significance. In reply to the Secretary’s question the Foreign Minister stated that the GOP would deal only on a bilateral basis and was not interested in Lajes as a NATO base. The same policy applied to the Beja air base where the Germans, under the terms of a bilateral agreement, had certain rights and facilities. Some countries such as the Netherlands, Turkey and Greece had indicated interest in the use of the Beja base and had been turned down. The Foreign Minister also reiterated that local relations with regard to the Azores base were excellent. There were no outstanding problems except for a small administrative one of smuggling from the PX at Lajes which would have to be faced sometime in the future. He added that the Azores shipping agreement had worked out nicely. Portugal had not been entirely satisfied with the agreement, he said with a smile; therefore, it must be a good one. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part VII of VIII; Part I is Document 174 . The other memoranda of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry. 176. Memorandum of Conversation 176. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Lisbon, November 19, 1968, 11 a.m. THE SECRETARY’S VISIT TO MADRID AND LISBON November 16-19, 1968 PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Ambassador Bennett Diego C. Asencio, Political Officer Portugal Prime Minister Caetano Dr. Goncalo Caldeira Coelho, Director General of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry SUBJECT US-Portuguese Relations and Africa The Secretary expressed greetings from President Johnson noting that both the President and Prime Minister Caetano had assumed office in a moment of sadness. The Prime Minister stated that he had been very happy to receive a message from President Johnson on his accession to office in which a reference had been made to the maintenance of cordial relations between the US and Portugal. The Prime Minister reiterated that feeling and added that “we are friends and must be friends”. According to the Prime Minister the first Portuguese concern in US-Portuguese relations is the hope for better US understanding of the Portuguese position both domestically and in Africa. On the internal situation it was his impression that US public opinion failed to understand that special circumstances operating in Portugal would not permit the type of government which would be the most acceptable to the US. However, it happened to be the government most suitable for the Portuguese. The government of Portugal was in the process of evolution. Naturally after forty years there had to be things which required moderating. This had to be done carefully and slowly in order to avoid a collapse which would be dangerous for the Atlantic Alliance. Impatience from friends or outside pressure could be fatal to Portugal and dangerous to the Atlantic Community. In response to the Prime Minister’s request for his views on Africa the Secretary stated that the US was not leading a crusade on the African question and had no interest in the disappearance of the Portuguese presence from Africa. It was not the US that raised questions in the agenda of the UN. When they came up, of course, we had to express our views, which were not always the views of our Portuguese friends. Out of our own national experience we had developed a point of view that a great deal depended on the expression of the authentic views of peoples in areas like Angola and Mozambique. The Secretary cited the case of Puerto Rico, although stating it was not analogous to the situation in the Portuguese African territories, to demonstrate how the US had met criticism in the UN on the status of the island by the simple response of “ask the Puerto Ricans.” 2 He had the impression that there was a stronger feeling among the people of Angola and Mozambique for Portugal than somehow the Portuguese had been able to make public and known. In response the Prime Minister cited the tribal state of native populations both in the Portuguese territories and in the other African lands, which he asserted made elections a farce. What was undeniable was control of a region like Mozambique with less than a division of troops, a valid demonstration that it was an integral part of the Portuguese nation. Another undeniable fact was the foreign base of the subversion being launched against the Portuguese territories. In addition in the Prime Minister’s view when public opinion manifested itself through modern processes it never expressed the deep feelings of the people but rather the thinking of certain leaders. The elite of the native populations in the Portuguese territories were sufficiently evolved to produce such an opinion but because of their European education and their very association with the Portuguese governmental structure they had become detribalized. Therefore, the Portuguese Government considered the friendliness and readiness to accept the present situation on the part of the natives of Angola and Mozambique as an expression of opinion by them. The Secretary stated that it was his impression that in the last two or three years the attitude of the African States toward the Portuguese territories had moderated to some extent partly because they had understood that the issue in the Portuguese territories was not strictly speaking a racial one. The Prime Minister replied that Portugal’s social objective in Africa was what Portugal had accomplished in making Brazil a multi-racial society and was an eminently human work which could not be precipitated. He was certain that Africa and particularly southern Africa needed the white man not only as a technician but also as a settler. Collaboration between whites and natives was essential to the progress of that region. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Secret. Drafted by Asencio and approved in S on December 3. The memorandum is Part I of III. The other memoranda of the conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Palacio Sao Bento. 2 Reference is to the 1967 plebiscite which defused Cuban efforts to have Puerto Rico considered as a separate item by the UN General Assembly. Spain Spain 177. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 11, 1964, 6:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. The meeting was held at the White House. 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, March 5, 1964, 11:59 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. 179. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 23, 1964, 12:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ECIN 6 EEC-SP. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz and approved in S on May 8. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. Memoranda of other portions of the conversation dealing with Spain’s trade with Cuba and use of the Rota naval base are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 16, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. 181. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 22, 1965, 2:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on April 2. The memorandum is marked Part 3 of 4. The meeting was held at the British Embassy. 182. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 24, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by Bundy on March 25. Castiella also met with Secretary Rusk on March 25. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SP. 183. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (McKillop) Washington, July 26, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Zimmerman. 184. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson Madrid, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Spain. Secret. The letter, which is typed on stationery of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, was delivered by Ambassador Merry Del Val to Secretary Rusk for transmission to the President on August 20. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. 185. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Spanish Ambassador (Merry del Val) Washington, September 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, NATO 6 SP. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and cleared by Acting Secretary of Defense Vance, Llewellyn Thompson, and Leddy. 186. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Embassy in Spain New York, October 6, 1965, 2302Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (SP) VIET S. Secret. Repeated to Saigon and to the Department of State as Secto 32, which is the copy printed here. 187. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 SP-US/SATRUSTEGUI. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2 Parts. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with Gibraltar is ibid., POL SP-US. 188. Editorial Note 189. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson Washington, January 18, 1966, 9:05 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, January 19, 1966, 1630Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, and POLAD CINCEUR. 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, January 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 9:26 a.m. Passed to the White House and DOD. 192. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 25, 1966, 2:15 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in U on January 28. The meeting was held in Ball’s office. 193. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 28, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 18 GIB. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz. 194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, February 17, 1966, 7:14 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ortiz; cleared in SOV, P, and G/PM and by the Department of Defense; and approved by Stoessel. Also sent to Moscow and Geneva for the delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, February 21, 1966. Source: Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Askew and cleared by JUSMG, Duke, and Walker. No time of transmission is on the telegram. Repeated to Paris for EUCOM and USAFE. 196. Telegram 1240 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, March 30, 1966, 7:34 p.m. 197. Telegram 1444 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, April 22, 1966, 1700Z. 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, May 6, 1966, 7 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-5 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz, cleared in EUR and RPM, and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to all NATO capitals. 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, June 18, 1966, 1622Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow. 200. Letter From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to Secretary of State Rusk Madrid, July 7, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Secret. 201. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 12, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz and approved in G on July 21. The memorandum is Part 2 of 2 Parts. A memorandum of conversation of the portion of the discussion dealing with Gibraltar is ibid., POL 19 GIB. 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, October 4, 1966, 5:57 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Landau, cleared by Stoessel and BMI, and approved by Landau. Repeated to London. 203. Editorial Note 204. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson Madrid, January 30, 1967. Source: Department of State, Spanish Desk Files: Lot 70 D 35, Pol 7. No classification marking. The letter, which is typed on Spanish Embassy stationery, is marked “Translation.” In a memorandum transmitting the letter to the President, Walt Rostow commented: “This letter caps a prolonged Spanish diplomatic effort to make sure the Moroccans don’t get an inside track with us on the argument with Spain over the phosphorus-rich Spanish Sahara.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. I) 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, March 1, 1967, 1830Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. 206. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 13, 1967, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Landau and Smith and approved in S on November 22. The memorandum is Part 10 of 10. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room in the Department of State. 207. Memorandum for the Files Washington, December 5, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and approved in draft by Ambassador Duke on December 8. 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, March 13, 1968, 1746Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17-5 US-SP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 209. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 19, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Noforn. 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, July 16, 1968, 1709Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Landau and approved by Springsteen. 211. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 17, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, August 22, 1968, 1645Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Landau; cleared by EUR, G/PM, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Rusk. 213. Record of the 42d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group Washington, September 5, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 344, 42nd Meeting. Secret. 214. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 12, 1968, 10:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Rec’d 11:10 a.m.” 215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 13, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 14-5 SP-US. Secret. 216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, September 16, 1968, 2358Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Landau and approved by Leddy. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 217. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 21, 1968, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on December 25. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 218. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 25, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on October 1. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. 219. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 26, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, October 17, 1968, 2301Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Drafted by Gebelt and approved by Leddy. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 221. Memorandum of Conversation Madrid, November 18, 1968, 11:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Confidential. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on November 25. The memorandum is Part I of II. Part II, which covered bilateral issues, is ibid., POL SP-US. The meeting was held in El Pardo Palace. Rusk visited Brussels November 12-16 for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, before traveling to Spain November 16-18 and Portugal November 18-19. 222. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 22, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and Landau. 223. Memorandum From Edward Fried of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 29, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Confidential. 224. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, December 5, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Landau. 177. Memorandum of Conversation 177. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 11, 1964, 6:45 p.m. SUBJECT Spanish-American Relations PARTICIPANTS The President Antonio Garrigues, Ambassador of Spain William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary President Johnson met with the Spanish Ambassador in the Treaty Room of the White House before the start of the Diplomatic Reception. The Ambassador informed the President that he had been named Ambassador to the Holy See, and would be leaving soon. He said he had conferred at length in Madrid with members of the Spanish government, and with General Franco, who had asked him to convey a personal letter to President Johnson. 2 The Ambassador thereupon gave the President the original letter and an English translation. The Ambassador said he regretted leaving Washington, and that he wished to emphasize how important to Spain were good relations with the United States. He stressed repeatedly that Spain recognized the United States as the great defender of the Free World, and as the major factor in resistance to Communism and in the search for peace. He said that whatever differences there might be between Spain and the United States, such as the question of trade with Cuba, must be seen within the broad framework of Spanish-US friendship which was a vital element in Spain’s foreign policy. The President thanked the Ambassador for his words and said he was sorry to hear the Ambassador was leaving. He knew how much Ambassador Garrigues had contributed to our good relations with Spain. The President said the United States Government was pleased that it had been possible to renew the US-Spanish Defense Agreement. 3 The President said that he was already aware of the contents of General Franco’s letter 4 and that he appreciated the sentiments which it expressed with regard to the Spanish policy of close and friendly relations with the United States. The President said he reciprocated these sentiments. The President said that the matter of trade with Cuba was an extremely serious one and that he felt that Spain must consider the effects of this issue on the course of Spanish-US relations, as well as on the fortunes of the Free World as a whole. He emphasized that Castro was an instrument for penetration and subversion of democratic governments and institutions, not only in the Western Hemisphere but, as recently shown in the case of Zanzibar, in other parts of the world. It was the purpose of the United States to bring about the end of the Castro regime so that Cuba could be ruled by a freely elected and democratic government. For these reasons the United States Government looked to its allies to cease trading with Cuba in order not to lend Castro economic support, or to make things easier for him. The President said he felt very strongly on this matter and he hoped that this fact would be taken into account by the Spanish Government. The Ambassador did not reply directly to the President, and the conversation ended on this note. Comment : Subsequently, during the reception, Ambassador Garrigues expressed to me his unhappiness and concern about the question of Spanish trade with Cuba and the emphasis which the President had placed on this matter. I told the Ambassador that he should be aware that the United States Government did indeed feel very strongly that our allies should do everything possible to reduce, or, better still, eliminate trade with Cuba in critical commodities. The Ambassador argued that Spain had needed sugar and that Cuba was the best source of supply. He also referred to the British and the French and said it was obvious that the other allies of the United States were not following our policy in this area either. I said that this was going to make difficulties all around, that there should be no misapprehension on the part of the Spanish Government as to the importance of this issue to us, and I mentioned the provision in the Foreign Assistance Act under which aid cannot be given a country which permits its ships or planes to be used for trade with Cuba. 5 I also said I understood that the five Spanish ships engaged in trade with Cuba all belonged to one individual. My remarks seemed to make the Ambassador uneasy, and he said that this matter was very complicated. The Ambassador said that the Embassy has been working on a formula which he thought might be reconciled with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, and that it had been sent to Madrid for the Spanish Government’s consideration. He said that he hoped Spain’s trade with Cuba which was so small and of so little importance would be looked at by the United States Government within the framework of Spanish-American friendship and close alliance. I said I thought that the attitude and actions of the Spanish Government on this issue would be considered by the United States Government as an indication of the value which the Spanish Government places on our relations. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 A copy of the letter, which conveyed Franco’s assurances that relations with the United States would remain close, together with President Johnson’s reply, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US. 3 For text of the joint declaration concerning the renewal of the 1953 defense agreement together with the related exchange of notes, signed at New York September 26, 1963, see 14 UST 1406. 4 In a February 6 memorandum based on his talks with Garrigues, Secretary of State Rusk informed the President of the likely contents of the Franco letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US) 5 Reference is to Section 620a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, P.L. 88-205, approved December 16, 1963. For text, see 77 Stat. 386. 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, March 5, 1964, 11:59 a.m. 2766. In farewell call by Ambassador Garrigues on Deputy Under Secretary Johnson March 4, both expressed gratification for successful outcome Section 620 FAA talks. Johnson said that, while this settled legal question of transportation by Spanish ships and aircraft, there remained policy question of trade, and referred to press despatches from Madrid in this regard. Ambassador stated that, from his talks with Franco and Foreign Minister, he absolutely certain Spain had no policy for large or long-term increases in trade with Cuba. Serious but hopefully short-term shortage obliged Spain purchase Cuban sugar, which would have to be paid for primarily in Spanish goods. Sugar shortage should be resolved within two years. Johnson urged that to maximum possible extent such payments be made in “soft goods” and pointed out that Spain could expect US to be especially sensitive to sales of machinery, transportation items, spare parts and replacements. Garrigues repeated it was absolutely out of question that Spain would greatly increase trade with Cuba. He said Spain’s relations with Cuban exiles and Latin America obliged GOS to be moderate and discreet in its relations with Cuba. Garrigues said he would report conversation to Madrid. Garrigues said that he was making trip through Latin America prior to return to Madrid and would report to Madrid sentiment in that area with respect to Cuba. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. 179. Memorandum of Conversation 179. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 23, 1964, 12:30 p.m. SUBJECT Spain’s Association with the European Economic Community PARTICIPANTS Spain Fernando Castiella, Foreign Minister of Spain Alfonso Merry del Val, Ambassador Designate of Spain Angel Sagaz, Director General for Relations with the U.S., Spanish Foreign Office Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of Spain United States The Secretary Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary Mr. Frank V. Ortiz, WE Mr. Donald Barnes, Interpreter During his call on the Secretary, Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella reviewed Spain’s position on relations with the European Economic Community (EEC). The Minister said that as the renewal of the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement provided for an exchange of views he desired the U.S. to understand fully the Spanish position on this important problem. The Minister said that although Spain’s relations with the U.S., Latin America and the Arab countries were of first importance, Spain’s policy for many years had also been designed to draw Spain closer to Europe. Thanks to Spain’s improved economic position achieved with the help of the U.S. and international organizations, Spain’s relations with Europe had improved greatly. Some two years ago Spain decided that her economic future lay in association with the EEC to which Spain’s exports were greatest. While seeking association with the EEC, Spain remains strongly committed to European unity. Two years ago Spain sent a letter to the EEC Council asking for talks leading to Spain’s association. 2 This application had a great psychological impact in Spain. Spain’s labor and business men reviewed their thinking and operations and the autarkical system in Spain was being dismantled in preparation for Spain’s entrance into the Common Market. After a careful study of the Rome Treaty no clause was found to which Spain could not subscribe. As a result of the expectation that Spain would eventually be a member of the EEC Spain had evolved considerably economically and socially, as any impartial observer could attest. Spain was requesting associate rather than full membership as it would take approximately 10-12 years for the Spanish economy to be ready for full membership. In essence Spain desired relations with the EEC similar to those of Greece and Turkey. There was no need now to decide on full membership for Spain. The Minister said the crisis over British membership in the EEC had delayed consideration of the Spanish petition. Now that such consideration was being given, maneuvers by Spanish exile groups with Socialist circles in Belgium and Italy had resulted in opposition in those countries and the Netherlands to Spain’s association. France and Germany were giving strong and active support to the Spanish application. The Spanish exile groups apparently considered that membership in the EEC was a matter of life or death for the Spanish regime. The Minister said that this was not the case. However if the door to the EEC were to remain closed, Spain of necessity would be forced to re-orient her trade and other policies. Spain, which is on the threshold of an ambitious economic development plan, is at an important cross-roads. The GOS needs to know in which direction Spain’s future lies. It is because of this that her relationship to the EEC needs to be determined. A change of Spain’s present policies would result in turning Spain on an inward course, interrupting encouraging Spanish evolution towards liberalized institutions and integration with Europe. Spanish trade would also have to be re-oriented with unforeseeable results. The Minister said that Mr. Spaak, the current head of the EEC Council, was taking the position that Spain could associate with the EEC in a commercial sense. The Minister said that commercial discussions with the EEC were not of great significance to Spain as Spain was a member of GATT, and commercial problems could be resolved there. However, a form of economic association with the EEC which would involve certain financial advantages is what Spain sought. The Minister reviewed the problems for Spanish association originating in Italy. He said the Italian Socialists were putting great pressures on Saragat and Nenni. The Minister noted that the Rome Treaty had not set up political qualifications for EEC membership. However there may be an element of agricultural competition between Italy and Spain. The Minister said that very confidentially the Spanish Government had been assured of support for its position by leading Italian political figures as well as industrial and other influential elements and that Italy’s position had already begun to soften. The Italians had very great commercial and investment interests in Spain. The Spanish market was an expanding one and Italian interest in this market would influence Italy’s position. The Minister said these factors had been brought to the attention of the Italian Government. Italy’s opposition to Spanish EEC association was harmful to the Spanish people. It did not matter much if Spain were excluded from NATO but exclusion from the EEC was a serious problem for Spain and Spain would be forced to act to protect her interests. The Italian problem seemed on the road to solution as just recently the Italian Foreign Minister had assured the Spanish Ambassador that Italy would not impose obstacles to conversations regarding Spanish association with the EEC. Belgium too was greatly interested in the Spanish market. However the Belgians had been told their opposition to Spain on the EEC question would affect Belgium’s position in the Spanish market. The Social Democratic party in Belgium was assuring Spain of its support for the Spanish position and Spain was confident that the Belgian position also would change. The Netherlands had a very favorable balance of trade and Spain had hoped the Dutch position too would undergo modification. The Minister repeated that Spain was not seeking full membership but only discussions which would lead to the most appropriate economic relationship for Spain given the present circumstances. The Minister said that while he believed the matter was developing favorably he requested that the Secretary put in a good word with the Italians and Mr. Spaak so as not to interrupt Spanish evolution along the road which is desired by all. A meaningful relationship of Spain to the EEC would be to everybody’s interest. The Secretary listened without comment to the Minister’s presentation and noted his arrival in Brussels on May 9th at the time of the EEC Council meetings 3 when the Spanish application would be considered. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ECIN 6 EEC-SP. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz and approved in S on May 8. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. Memoranda of other portions of the conversation dealing with Spain’s trade with Cuba and use of the Rota naval base are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 The February 9, 1962, letter requested the opening of negotiations for association with the European Community with the objective of eventual Spanish membership. Regarding U.S. policy toward Spanish association with the EEC, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 25 . 3 Secretary Rusk was in Brussels May 9 to address Belgian-American associations. He subsequently visited the United Kingdom before attending the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at The Hague May 12-14. 180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk 180. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 16, 1964. I called the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon and told him I was speaking to him quite personally and informally. I told him that because of your high regard for him you had not wanted to dwell too long on how upset you had been by the UPI story out of Madrid, according to which the Spanish government held the United States Government responsible for the aggression against the Spanish ship. 2 However I knew that you hoped that the strength of your feelings on this matter had not passed unnoticed by him. The Ambassador took this in very good part and assured me that he was fully aware of your position. He repeated that this news story was a distortion of the communiquéwhich had been issued by the Spanish Foreign Office, the text of which he had received and which bore out his explanation to you. He added that the Spanish press was playing up the whole incident in an unfortunately dramatic manner. 3 Bill 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. 2 The Aranzazu was attacked on September 13 by two small boats equipped with machine guns while off Cuba. Three Spanish citizens on board were killed. Rusk met with Merry Del Val on September 16 to discuss the attack. Their meeting was reported in telegram 254 to Madrid, September 16. (Ibid., POL 33-6 CUBA) 3 Telegram 378 from Madrid, September 25, reported that Ambassador Woodward met with Foreign Minister Castiella who affirmed that the Government of Spain rejected any notion of U.S. responsibility for the incident and expressed his desire to improve relations between the two governments. (Ibid.) 181. Memorandum of Conversation 181. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 22, 1965, 2:30 p.m. SUBJECT Gibraltar PARTICIPANTS UK Side Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office Michael Stewart, Chargé d’Affaires a.i., British Embassy R. S. Crawford, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office Michael Hadow, Counselor, Foreign Office J. N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary John Harris, Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary Christopher Everett, First Secretary, British Embassy US Side The Secretary Ambassador Bruce William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, NEA J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA Harrison Symmes, Deputy Director, NE The Foreign Secretary raised the subject of Gibraltar and the difficulties being experienced with Spain. 2 He said that the Spanish Government has charged that the British action in giving a measure of self government to the people of Gibraltar violates the Treaty of Utrecht. Mr. Stewart said that his government does not regard limited self government as constituting a transfer of sovereignty which is forbidden by the terms of that Treaty. The British Government is prepared to negotiate with the Spanish Government on such problems as smuggling, but it is not prepared to negotiate on the question of sovereignty. Furthermore, it is not prepared to negotiate while the Spanish continue their harassment at the border. He asked if there was any way in which the US could help. The Secretary said that in the case of Puerto Rico we have always been able to tell critics to ask the Puerto Ricans what their wishes were with respect to the relationship with the U.S. He asked the Foreign Secretary if the UK could take a similar line with respect to Gibraltar. Mr. Stewart replied that there is no doubt but that the people of the Colony would support continued British rule. They have no desire to see a change in sovereignty. The Secretary said that we would see what we can do to counsel moderation. The Spanish Foreign Minister will be in Washington this week and the Secretary said he would try to find out what he could about Spanish intentions. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in S on April 2. The memorandum is marked Part 3 of 4. The meeting was held at the British Embassy. 2 Following a UN request for further discussions between the United Kingdom and Spain regarding the future of Gibraltar, the Franco government tightened border controls, claiming that it was seeking to reduce smuggling into Spain. 3 A March 24 memorandum of the conversation between the Secretary and Castiella is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. I . Subsequently, during an April 15 discussion of Gibraltar with Prime Minister Wilson, Rusk stated: “Castiella had told him he did not think there was a really serious problem there.” A memorandum of this conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. 182. Memorandum of Conversation 182. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 24, 1965. SUBJECT Call of Spanish Foreign Minister on President PARTICIPANTS US The President McGeorge Bundy William R. Tyler Spain Foreign Minister Castiella Ambassador Merry Del Val The Foreign Minister congratulated the President on the successful Gemini flight. 2 The President thanked the Foreign Minister and said that he thought the relations between Spain and the United States were on the whole good, though he could not understand why the Spanish government was dealing with Cuba and purchasing sugar above world market prices. At the President’s request, Mr. Bundy succinctly outlined the reasons why the United States feels that it is against the interest of the free world as a whole, and in particular of the Latin American countries which are the target of Communist intervention and subversion, to have dealings with Cuba which strengthen that country’s economy. The Foreign Minister said that Spain had made the sugar agreement with Cuba last year because it was in need of substantial sugar imports. He also said that Spain had eliminated its own shipping with Cuba. However there were many Spanish nationals in Cuba, whose interests and well being the Spanish government had to bear in mind. He said that there was one flight a week between Spain and Cuba and that there were 40,000 applications for this flight from Spaniards wishing to be repatriated. The Foreign Minister also said that wheat had been sold by Western countries to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and he implied that these transactions were comparable to Spain’s contract for purchase of Cuban sugar. Mr. Bundy then pointed out the difference between the Spanish case and the grain sales. He said that the latter had no effect on the stability of the Soviet regime, whereas even a difference of 2 or 3 per cent in the Cuban economy could make things easier or harder for Castro. He repeated that if it were merely a question of dealing with Cuba by ourselves, there would be no problem, but that the issue was Castro’s policy toward other countries in this hemisphere, and of the economic resources available to him in order to continue to carry out that policy. In conclusion, the Foreign Minister thanked the President for having received him, and mutual good wishes were exchanged. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by Bundy on March 25. Castiella also met with Secretary Rusk on March 25. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SP. 2 Reference is to Gemini III, which made a 3-orbit, 4-hour flight on March 23. 183. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (McKillop) 183. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (McKillop) 1 Washington, July 26, 1965. SUBJECT Some Observations on U.S. Policy Toward Spain REF Your Memorandum to Mr. Leddy of June 25, 1965 2 With a good deal of interest and appreciation, I read your synthesis of our policies here in Spain. There was not one idea expressed which I would modify in any way. I would like to add, however, a few other thoughts that seem worth putting on paper. While the 1963 Guidelines Paper 3 perhaps is acceptable in general terms, the Embassy has always thought it left much to be desired. In fact, very shortly after it was received in Madrid, the Embassy submitted a brief commentary in the form of an Airgram (A-783, April 17, 1963). 4 During the past several months the Embassy has developed an alternate version of the 1963 Guidelines Paper which it intends to submit shortly for Department consideration. 5 Turning to specific matters, however, it may be that in the future some opportunity may present itself for collaboration with other Western European countries in projects in Spain, and I believe we should be alert to this possibility. I was reminded of this the other day when the French Ambassador suggested to me that American and French policy toward Spain was identical, even though it might be for different reasons. He alleged that France now encourages powerful neighbors in Germany, a self-reliant Spain, and a stable Italy and since he considered that the U.S. wanted an independent and sturdy nation—Spain—on Europe’s south flank, we should be able to collaborate in certain fields. My French colleague was perhaps a little ingenuous in this suggestion since we are quite clearly rivals in Spain from the point of view of investments, the development of atomic energy plants, space operations, military sales, and almost what have you. But nevertheless his comments reminded me of this general proposition of cooperation that might be possible in some cases, if not with France, with others such as Germany. Parenthetically I might note that the French Ambassador in the same conversation declared that Spaniards in many circles are reluctant to even contemplate integration into Europe because of fear of rejection on the one hand, and of inferior status on the other. He went on to say that we should do everything possible to make them conscious of their opportunities as Europeans. I have no quarrel, of course, with his later statement that we should make them conscious of their opportunities as Europeans. However, I think there is little doubt that knowledgeable Spaniards are quite conscious of the fact that Spain must become a part of an integrated Europe, and certainly most of the opposition wants such integration for political purposes. Officially, of course, Spain has made its bid to become an associate member of the Common Market and while there are many, it is true, who fear the consequences for Spain from an economic point of view if the application were to be accepted today, there is little danger of this and they are counting on perhaps two or three years of further negotiating delay at least in order to put their own economic house in order, the better to compete at some future date. After all, the Economic Development Plan 6 has this premise as one of its basic considerations. One point which we might keep in the back of our minds insofar as Spain’s integration with Europe is concerned, is the possibility of some form of collaboration with NATO on a local regional basis. The prize of Spanish membership in NATO is apparently impossible, but such limited collaboration might not appear to the GOS as simply a back-door association, and it would make sense militarily, especially as Spanish ASW capabilities increase. I am thinking of the possibility of GOS collaboration in the new NATO-Iberian Command to be established in Lisbon; 7 the discussions of Maltese association with NATO might perhaps suggest some possibilities in this direction. I believe it would be well for the U.S. to bear increasingly in mind certain dangers that may develop for Spain, and possibly for our interests here, at the time of transition. The problem as I see it is that it seems almost inevitable that at the point in time when Franco disappears from the scene, European labor organizations and some of the European socialist parties may very probably seek to intervene in some way or another in the Spanish scene. The problem is not only that of outside intervention, to which the Spanish inevitably react strongly, particularly if it is clumsily done, but also that many of those groups will be working from an emotional background of 25 years ago. I think we must give some serious thought to this problem as it could seriously exacerbate the internal problems that might develop within Spain during the sensitive transition period. Greater exchanges of visits between this Embassy and our other missions in Europe certainly will help to educate our own European embassies to the complexities of the Spanish situation, but there may be situations that will arise in which our missions can be helpful in making representations to various European socialist parties and labor groups so that such possible intervention might at least be channeled along intelligent lines. The other day we reviewed the situation in Spain with Joe Slater of the Ford Foundation and discussed various ways in which the Foundation might support our efforts here. We all agreed that it would be useful to establish here a forum for the stimulation of interest in international affairs such as a Foreign Affairs Council. Slater subsequently discussed the idea with the Conde de Motrico, former Ambassador to the United States and France, and other Spaniards and got an enthusiastic reaction. Through Slater’s initiative an organizing committee has been set up and visits to countries which have Foreign Affairs Councils will be arranged with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation. Shifting to the subject of our contacts with the Spanish opposition, I would only suggest that we should bear in mind the necessity of maintaining our flexibility. What I mean by this is that for the present we must be careful in such contacts not to become overly identified with any one group. Some of the older opposition leaders are beginning to fall by the wayside, and inevitably there will be a rise of new leaders in the indeterminate time between now and the date on which the transition or “crisis” period begins. This is particularly true in the labor field where I am convinced that the future labor leaders of Spain are probably young people whom neither we nor Spanish labor itself has as yet identified. Flexibility in most circumstances would seem to be the most desirable posture—at least initially. Turning to another area entirely, I think we should also consider the necessity of placing some of our operations in Spain on a more formal permanent footing that might provide some assurance of carrying on in the event of a radical shift of government in Spain at some point in the years to come. Actually it appears that the GOS as well would like this formalization of some of our commitments. I might cite as an example our NASA facilities in the Canaries 8 which are founded at present solely on an exchange of letters. In this particular instance you will of course be aware that the Spanish Government itself has suggested that the Canary Islands NASA facilities be formally tied in with the Robledo complex outside of Madrid in a new arrangement between our two governments that hopefully we will begin to negotiate next fall. As a final thought I should like to underline the fact that we must bear in mind that while we do have substantial influence in Spain, and while good Spanish-U.S. relations are a prime keystone of present GOS policy, our influence here is also limited (particularly in political matters) by the fact that although Spain’s world position is assisted by its relations to the U.S., we are the ones normally requesting facilities for projects of one kind or another ranging from the base complex through extensive NASA facilities to special communications stations. This does not, of course, mean that we cannot exercise our influence, even in political matters, from time to time when it seems important for us to do so, but it does mean that we must exercise considerable caution and be particularly adept in doing so. As to the succession problem, I will have more to say on this after our military establishment committee has had a chance to present some of its preliminary thoughts. It is a subject of course with which you and I will have to keep in continuous touch. 9 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Robert W. Zimmerman. 2 Not found. 3 Apparently a reference to “Report on U.S. Policy Toward Spain,” printed in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 375 . 4 Entitled “Comments on Policy and Guidelines for Spain,” not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US) 5 Not found. A note in the margin reads: “Not yet received, July 26, 1966.” 6 Reference is to Spain’s second Five-Year Economic Development Program, 1963-1967. 7 NATO’s Iberian Command, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, was transferred to Lisbon in 1967. 8 An agreement on space research projects was concluded by an exchange of notes in Washington April 14, 1966. For text, see 17 UST 493. 9 In an August 26 memorandum to Robert Anderson, Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, George Vest of the Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs, commented: “Frankly, I see no future in the [Duke] idea…. Don’t expect formal military collaboration to precede political acceptability for Spain.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 4 NATO) 184. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson 184. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson 1 Madrid, undated. My dear President Johnson: I am most grateful to you for making available to me such a sincere report on the South Vietnam situation and of the efforts, both in the political field and through diplomatic channels, which the United States is coupling with its military action in an attempt to open the way for a peaceful settlement. I am well aware of your responsibilities as the leading nation of the world at this time, and I share your interest and preoccupation, in which we Spaniards join with you at all times. I am well aware also of the fact that a military abandonment of Vietnam by the United States would affect the whole security system of the free world. Because of my military and political experience, I am in a position to appreciate the great difficulties which the task you have undertaken involves: the guerrilla warfare in the jungle is decidedly favorable to subversive native elements and allows them to contain superior forces with only a small number of troops; the most powerful weapons would lose their effectiveness against small scattered objectives; there are no vital objectives to destroy to put an end to the struggle; established communications are held on to precariously and only through the deployment of great number of troops. It would be very difficult to defeat subversion with conventional weapons. War in the jungle is an unlimited adventure. On the other hand, although acknowledging the unavoidable consideration of your country’s prestige which might be involved, it would not be possible to disregard the conflict’s possible immediate consequences. Lengthening the war, would serve to impel the Vietnamese into becoming an easy prey for Chinese imperialism, and even assuming that the strength of the Vietcong could be broken, the sporadic attack of the guerrillas would continue for a long time and would therefore demand a prolonged military occupation of a country where you would always be regarded as foreigners. The results evidently would not seem to compensate the sacrifices entailed. Although subversion in Vietnam may at first glance seem to be a military problem, it really is, in my opinion, a profound political problem; one included in the destiny of new nations. It is not very easy for the West to understand their innermost and deeply rooted problems. Their struggle for independence has stimulated nationalist sentiments; their lack of interests to protect and their state of poverty impel them toward social-communism, which offers greater possibilities and hopes than the liberal system sponsored by the West, that reminds them of the great humiliation of colonialism. Nations generally tend to favor communism because, apart from its power of seduction, it is the only effective avenue left open to them. The play of Russian and Chinese Communist aid appears to them to be a matter for opportunity and profit. We should not lose sight of these facts. Things are as they really are and not the way we would like them to be. We must work with the realities of the new world and not with chimera. Is not Russia a reality with which we have had to cope? May we not be sacrificing now the future to apparent demands of the present? In my opinion, we have to help these nations to find their political way just as we have found our own. In the face of new events, it is not possible to maintain the rigidity of old attitudes. What the big nations in Geneva agree upon 2 —and whether such decisions will please the people and secure their conformance— are two different matters. It is difficult to defend in the future and in the eyes of the world, this artificial separation of the nations, which even if it was expedient at a given moment, will always leave a longing for unity open. I realize that the problem is very complex and that it is determined by an American interest to defend the nations of Southeast Asia from the threat of Communism; but since this problem is eminently political in character, it is not solely possible to dispel this threat by the force of arms. In observing these events from the European area, as we do, we may be mistaken. Let us continue, however, to hope that everything can be solved, since fundamentally the principal parties involved hope for the same thing; the United States, that Chinese Communism will not invade the territory of Southeast Asia; the nations of Southeast Asia, to keep China as far as possible from their borders; Russia, that her future rival, China, will not expand and grow; and Ho Chi Minh himself wishes to unite Vietnam into a strong nation which China will not absorb. I do not know Ho Chi Minh, but in view of his record and his efforts to expel the Japanese, first, the Chinese next, and the French later, we must give him credit for being a patriot who cannot be indifferent to the annihilation of his country. And apart from his well-known reputation as being a tough adversary, he could, without doubt, be the man of the hour needed by Vietnam. In the higher interest of saving the people of Vietnam and of Southeast Asia, I think it is worthwhile for all concerned to make some sacrifices. I have wished, my dear President, to make known to you these confidential observations in terms of honest and sincere friendship. Although I know that many of these considerations are constantly in your mind, I have wanted to give you my loyal appraisal of the situation in the service of peace and of the future of the Asiatic countries. Sincerely, Francisco Franco 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Spain. Secret. The letter, which is typed on stationery of the Spanish Embassy in Washington, was delivered by Ambassador Merry Del Val to Secretary Rusk for transmission to the President on August 20. A memorandum of their conversation is ibid., Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. 2 Reference is to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 185. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Spanish Ambassador (Merry del Val) 185. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Spanish Ambassador (Merry del Val) 1 Washington, September 14, 1965. Dear Mr. Ambassador: You recently discussed with Ambassador Thompson the significance of a statement made by the Secretary of Defense during Congressional hearings on the Department of Defense appropriation for the coming year. 2 These hearings are held every year over a period of months and relate to all aspects of the United States military effort and requirements of the Department of Defense and the military establishment. The particular statement to which you referred consisted of extemporaneous responses by Secretary McNamara to four questions during the hearings held last February 26. I have reviewed, together with Secretary McNamara, the questions and answers to which your Government has drawn attention. I would like to emphasize that the response to which you referred concerning the relationship of Spain to NATO was descriptive of the present situation and in no way detracts from the public position of the United States Government and Congress as favoring Spanish membership in NATO. We realize that such membership may be achieved only with unanimous agreement of all the parties concerned. United States recognition of the important role of Spain in the security, well-being and development of the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas remains as stated in the Joint Declaration of September 26, 1963. 3 This question did not arise in the course of the hearing at which Secretary McNamara testified. It is unfortunate that the brief responses given to the few questions posed at that time could have given any other impression. We recognize that Spain is making a major contribution to the defense of Europe through its agreements and arrangements with several NATO countries, including the United States, through the use of Spanish military and other facilities, as well as through the extensive cooperation between the Spanish armed forces and those of several NATO countries including our own. I recall the statement of Secretary McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 13, 1963, 4 that this contribution by Spain is “important to the defense of Western Europe as well as the United States.” Secretary McNamara’s statement was related in no way to the spirit and courage of the Spanish armed forces, whose dedication and valor have been demonstrated on many occasions. The United States Government, under the Military Assistance Agreement with Spain, has been contributing to the efficiency and capability of those forces for more than ten years, and continues to do so under the current five-year program of military training and equipment grants and sales, and concomitant ship loans. I ask that you inform your Government that we consider relations between our two countries to be based on cordial and sympathetic understanding of the interests and responsibilities of both countries, that our mutual security depends upon a continuation of these close and friendly relations, and that we trust no other construction will be placed upon these basic considerations. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, NATO 6 SP. Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and cleared by Acting Secretary of Defense Vance, Llewellyn Thompson, and Leddy. 2 In telegram 192 to Madrid, August 24, the Department of State reported that Merry Del Val had presented Thompson with a memorandum dated August 24 “indicating GOS very upset and astonished over remarks by Secretary McNamara.” (Ibid.) A copy of the Spanish memorandum is an attachment to a September 3 memorandum from Leddy to Rusk. (Ibid.) For text of McNamara’s February 26 statement, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1966, Part I (Washington, 1965), pp. 343-344. 3 See footnote 3, Document 177 . 4 For text, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963: Hearings (Washington, 1963), pp. 165-179, 213-214. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 186. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Embassy in Spain 186. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Embassy in Spain 1 New York, October 6, 1965, 2302Z. 3. Following is based upon uncleared memcon Secretary and Spanish FonMin Castiella Oct. 6 in NY, FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision: 2 1. Castiella said GOS close to final action on assistance program for South Viet-Nam. Meeting of Council of Ministers scheduled in Madrid Oct. 8 (Castiella plans return to Spain to attend) to deal with this matter. Currently GOS plans provide loan of coastal vessel as well as medical assistance. 3 Secretary expressed appreciation this action as symbol international solidarity in support of South Viet-Nam. 2. Castiella announced that GOS had agreed to establishment of US space tracking station at Robledo de Chavela. 4 3. Castiella asked for US agreement to use DC-8 aircraft purchased through Guaranty Trust Co. to supplant worn-out Super Constellations on Iberia flights Madrid-Havana. According Ambassador Del Val these DC-8 purchased with “gentlemen’s understanding” that they not be used for such flights without agreement of USG. Secretary told Castiella he would look into matter. 5 Discussion also included Spanish bilateral relations, NATO, and other subjects. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (SP) VIET S. Secret. Repeated to Saigon and to the Department of State as Secto 32, which is the copy printed here. 2 Memoranda of conversation between Rusk and Castiella are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2458. 3 Telegram 358 from Madrid, October 9, reported: “With respect to Vietnam, ForMin said gift of ambulances was initial step but he did not indicate what type of further aid might be given.” (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US) 4 For text of the October 11 amendment to the 1964 agreement, see 16 UST 1710. 5 In a November 13 letter to Castiella, Rusk confirmed that the U.S. position was that “If DC-8 aircraft are used on the service to and from Havana, their flight frequencies should be reduced so as to maintain the present annual passenger capacity level.” He added: “I note that your Government is unable to agree to this.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US) 187. Memorandum of Conversation 187. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 14, 1965. SUBJECT Bombing of a Spanish ship in San Juan harbor PARTICIPANTS Spain The Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Spain U.S. Assistant Secretary Leddy Robert Anderson, Acting Director, Office of Western European Affairs Frank Ortiz, EUR:WE The Ambassador called at his request. He presented a memorandum concerning the bombing of the Spanish ship Satrustegui in the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico. 2 The Ambassador asked if the investigation by U.S. agencies had produced any indication as to the perpetrators of the act. He asked if anyone had been detained. He cited specifically the Cuban refugee leader Orlando Bosch who in statements to the press had assumed responsibility for the attack. The Ambassador said the attack on the Satrustegui was a more serious affair than the attack last year on the Aranzazu because the latest incident had taken place in U.S. territorial waters and Bosch made his statement in Miami. 3 He said it was a well-known fact that no Spanish ships called at Cuban ports and the shipping company to which the Satrustegui belongs has not permitted its ships to call at Cuban ports for over three years, at great loss to the company. The Satrustegui was now laid up for repairs and this Spanish Company (The Compania Transatlantica) would suffer further losses. The Ambassador said he regretted to state that the Spanish Consul General in San Juan reported that he was receiving no cooperation from local authorities there with regard to the incident. 4 Mr. Leddy replied that the appropriate U.S. agencies were conducting a very vigorous and active investigation of the incident. The agencies were aware of the statements made by Mr. Bosch. The Ambassador said the incident could very well have serious adverse repercussions in Spain which would redound to Castro’s benefit. Mr. Leddy repeated that the U.S. was using its investigative resources vigorously. The Ambassador said he hoped he would soon have a satisfactory explanation to forward to Madrid. 5 He pointed out that the public statements by Bosch claiming responsibility constituted a second problem to the incident itself since either Mr. Bosch was responsible for the bombing and should be prosecuted or was insane and should be put in an asylum. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 SP-US/SATRUSTEGUI. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2 Parts. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with Gibraltar is ibid., POL SP-US. 2 The memorandum was not found. An explosive charge rigged to the hull of the passenger ship detonated on October 9. Approximately 100 passengers on the ship escaped serious injury. 3 See footnote 2, Document 180 . 4 In a November 3 letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, Under Secretary Ball requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation furnish the Department of State with whatever information it believed would be of use to the Spanish Government. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 SP-US/SATRUSTEGUI) 5 In telegram 350 to Madrid, October 11, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to inform Foreign Minister Castiella that the incident would be thoroughly investigated and those found responsible brought to justice. (Ibid.) 188. Editorial Note 188. Editorial Note Secretary of State Rusk visited Madrid on December 16, 1965, for discussions with Spanish officials. Rusk met with General Franco for a discussion that centered on Vietnam. Documentation on Rusk’s visit is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2584 and 2585. 189. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson 189. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 18, 1966, 9:05 p.m. Information has been received that two of the nuclear devices which were carried on the B-52 which crashed in Southern Spain yesterday 2 experienced a low order high explosive detonation. Although no nuclear reaction would result, such a detonation could cause a radiation hazard. However, if the detonation was minimal it is possible that no radiation hazard would occur. There are sufficient qualified technical personnel now on the scene to properly take care of any situation which may exist in relation to these two weapons. Included among the personnel are Major General Wilson, Commander of the 16th Air Force (SAC) and Major General Beck for SAC headquarters. Based on minimal information received, it is not possible to accurately estimate the situation. However, it is not believed that there is any basis for undue concern over the low order detonation of the two weapons. White House Situation Room Kenneth Rosen Briefing Officer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. 2 A B-52 aircraft from the 68th Bomb Squadron, based at Seymour AFB, North Carolina, and carrying four nuclear devices, collided in mid-air with a KC-135 aircraft of the 97th Air Refueling Squadron, based at Blytheville AFB, Arkansas, over the village of Palomares shortly after 10 a.m. local time. Both aircraft crashed. Seven crew members from the two aircraft died in the accident, and four members of the B-52 crew survived. Three of the nuclear devices landed on Spanish soil and one fell into the sea. The fourth device was recovered from the sea on April 7. 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 1 Madrid, January 19, 1966, 1630Z. 855. Ref Deptel 819. 2 Dept pass DOD and HQ SAC Omaha. 1. As anticipated Deptel Spanish acutely sensitive to any further public statements on B-52/KC-135 accident. FonOff (in name Ministers Foreign Affairs, Air and Navy who happened to be in conference at FonOff when Embassy took up consultation pursuant reftel) pointed out today story dying in Spanish press and local interest subsiding. FonOff even requested that any expression of gratitude on our part for Spanish help in rescue and search operations not be made publicly. 2. However, when informed story may assume added dimensions elsewhere in international press, FonOff agreed it could conceivably later become desirable to restrain speculation with another official statement. In this spirit, FonOff gave tentative approval to draft quoted below on condition final GOS clearance be obtained if US believed changed circumstances required further statement. 3. Following is text of draft statement given tentative and conditional clearance as described above: “United States Ambassador to Spain Angier Biddle Duke today expressed deep appreciation for the wholehearted assistance provided by Spanish authorities and civilians in search and rescue operations following the mid-air collision of two American military planes on Monday. The collision involved a B-52 inter-continental bomber and a KC-135 jet tanker engaged in a routine high altitude refueling operation. Four airmen were rescued, but seven lost their lives. It has been announced by U.S. Air Force investigators that a small explosion of conventional materials had occurred on the ground as a sequel to the crash. The explosion occurred when wreckage fell near the tiny village of Palomares, near Vera, close to the spot where the damaged but virtually intact tail assembly of the B-52 bomber was found. No casualties among inhabitants of the area have been reported. Radiation monitoring teams are operating in the area and will remain to complete their survey and confirm the safety of the spot. An intensive search and recovery operation on land and off the coast in the accident area is being conducted jointly by Spanish and American forces. In order to determine the cause of the crash and to preclude a similar accident, it is desired to recover all pieces of the wreckage which will later be carefully studied by Air Force experts. Major General Stanley Donovan, Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Group (JUSMG) and Major General Delmar E. Wilson, Commander Sixteenth Air Force, joined the Ambassador in praising the cooperation and assistance rendered by Spaniards. They commended the Spanish Navy for immediately locating and directing the rescue of three airmen who parachuted into the Mediterranean. The United States officials also voiced gratification for the use of Spanish medical facilities in the accident area, the close assistance provided by the Guardia Civil, and the aid of the Spanish Air Force.” 4. Spanish objected strongly to more forthright treatment of radiation contained in original draft, and Ambassador, on advice Chief JUSMG who just returned from scene of accident, believes wording as given above adequate. U.S. officials here would decline further comment on subject if questioned by press. 5. Must emphasize GOS very anxious that no further official statement be made under existing circumstances and are likely to relent only in face clear and urgent necessity. 3 Duke 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, and POLAD CINCEUR. 2 Telegram 819 to Madrid, January 17, requested that the Embassy draft a statement on procedures being used to deal with radioactivity. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US) 3 In telegram 857 from Madrid, January 19, the Embassy reported that the United Press correspondent filed a story relating that one nuclear device was missing. It added: “Since foregoing may lead to escalation of media treatment and rapid change in present circumstances request Washington clearance soonest of draft statement.” (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17 B 52/KC 135 Collision) 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 1 Madrid, January 22, 1966. 871. Dept pass DOD. Ref Embtels 867 and 869; Deptel 834. 2 1. Following is roundup developments related B-52/KC-135 accident since last reports (Embtels 867 and 869): A. Shortly after noon January 21 FonMin telephoned Ambassador to convey “extreme concern” of Chief State upon reading UPI story cabled by Spanish Embassy Washington (text about same as that quoted Deptel 834). FonMin said he sending Sagaz to discuss question. B. Sagaz arrived displaying considerable agitation. Using such terms as “deep concern,” “emergency” and “crisis,” he complained particularly about passages in UPI story concerning alleged attitude of “US diplomats” and purporting describe complaints of Spanish inhabitants of accident area against GOS for permitting overflight nuclear-armed USAF aircraft. Sagaz did not fail ring in potential blow to tourism of radiation scare. He ended presentation saying these revelations had effect liberating GOS to take independent action on its own and mentioned possibility convening press conference for full disclosure all facts and GOS position. Ambassador refuted UPI attribution to US diplomats, mentioned imminent return Chief JUSMG from scene accident with up-to-date account of circumstances there for our information and that of GOS, and referred to desirability remaining calm and continuing mutually advantageous US-Spanish collaboration in dealing with delicate situation of equal and common concern to both govts. In this manner, Ambassador succeeded in quieting Sagaz, who at end of conversation agreed await further reports from scene. C. Upon return from Almeria, Chief JUSMG reported to Ambassador: Fourth bomb still missing and probability was it dropped into sea; USN mine sweepers about to begin sea search operations with help two local fishermen who reported having seen object with parachute drop into water; recovery of fragments wreckage on land continuing and all leads as to possible location fourth bomb being followed up; areas of radiation on land have been identified, are small and now closed off; water trucks being brought up to leach these spots; crops and livestock possibly affected being bought up; medical examinations being made of persons in area who could have been exposed; community leaders and general public being assured with effect that while there some natural fear and uncertainty among people there no evidence of mass fright or panic; Spanish in area, including civil authorities, Guardia Civil and Spanish nuclear scientific and medical teams, cooperating to full in these efforts. General Donovan also mentioned that numerous international press representatives are in area, including UPI, Paris Match, British press, CBS-TV and possibly French TV crews. D. Ambassador called in local UPI bureau chief Stathos, firmly refuted attitude “US diplomats” as attributed by UPI file and challenged him on source his information this point. Stathos appeared shaken, stated he had obtained information on this point “at third hand” and repeatedly apologized for filing story without checking with Embassy (see F below). E. Following discussions subparagraphs C and D above, Ambassador telephoned FonOff (about 1930). Gave Sagaz summary and offered send EmbOff to give full report, which Sagaz quickly accepted. Sagaz listened intently and showed keenest interest in account Stathos admission he had not received information re “US diplomats” attitude from Embassy, but from other source. We assured Sagaz we open to any Spanish suggestions on how best handle situation but reiterated belief we should continue work in close concert. Sagaz indicated concurrence, said he had no suggestions to make for time being and appeared calm, albeit obviously concerned. EmbOff had impression Sagaz wanted get Stathos incident particularly clear to report to superiors. F. Morning January 22, Stathos UPI telephoned Ambassador to reiterate apologies, offer make retribution and disclaim any attempt “make trouble.” He added that he now believed he “had been had” by his Spanish information sources (otherwise unidentified) for political reasons and expressed apprehension about his position in Spain. G. [ 9 lines of source text not declassified ] H. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] 2. Re foreign and local press coverage, Embassy hears: A. Reuters reported rumor that in village near Vera yesterday about 50 people milled about, some shouting: “Yankees go home and take your bombs.” Reuters correspondent did not witness and GOS InfoMin officially denied. AP carried denial last night. B. AP correspondent Milks has just filed interview with unnamed Spanish official saying medical specialist found small area at site of main bomber wreckage initially radioactive and “only normal that people working over that spot have been contaminated.” Official added: “But if so, this is very, very slight and offers no danger to anybody. All traces should have disappeared completely in two or three days.” C. Of three Madrid morning dailies, only Ya carried follow-up story today: brief but reassuring front page story headed: “Search and security measures proceeding in Almeria. No danger from air accident exists. Inhabitants of involved zones have not been evacuated.” Story in same tone says: “Life goes on normally in affected zone since local measures which adopted in small degree represent only excess caution. Proof of this is that inhabitants of little rural settlements in zone have not been evacuated.” 3. Understand one AEC representative from Albuquerque already in Spain and three more due arrive January 23. 4. Believe we must be prepared for continued and possibly increased media treatment of accident until fourth bomb located and removed. If much more time elapses without success in search, we may be faced with practical necessity admitting officially one bomb still missing. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] It therefore clearly of utmost urgency that no effort be spared locate fourth bomb with minimum delay. Urge all necessary US resources be provided for search. Duke 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 9:26 a.m. Passed to the White House and DOD. 2 Telegram 867 from Madrid, January 21, forwarded the text of a Spanish Air Ministry statement on the Palomares crash. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17 B52/KC 135 Collision) Telegram 869 from Madrid, January 21, reported on discussions between U.S. and Spanish officials regarding the crash. (Ibid.) In telegram 834, January 20, the Department of State reported the text of a UPI story on Spanish Government censorship of crash information. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US) 192. Memorandum of Conversation 192. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 25, 1966, 2:15 p.m. SUBJECT Spanish Government Position on Overflights of Spain by Military Aircraft of NATO Countries Bound for or Going to Gibraltar PARTICIPANTS The Under Secretary Assistant Secretary Leddy Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Kenneth B.A. Scott, First Secretary, British Embassy Ambassador Dean referred to the Spanish Government note of January 22 to all NATO governments, 2 except the UK, regarding the overflight of Spanish territory by military aircraft of NATO countries intending to land at or taking off from Gibraltar. The British representative intended to make a statement on this note at the NAC meeting on January 26. The statement would make three principal points: 1. Gibraltar was not a NATO base. 2. Gibraltar was, in fact, a British base. Use was made of it by Britain’s NATO allies at the invitation of the British Government. 3. The British Government regretted any Spanish action which might curtail the use of facilities on Gibraltar which the UK offered to its NATO allies. The effect, however slight, would be to make more difficult the defense of the West. The British Ambassador went on to say that HMG was particularly anxious to have U.S. support for this statement. HMG considered that the position taken by the U.S. would have an important effect on the attitude of other NATO members. Mr. Ball replied that this was a difficult problem for us. Our position with Spain was a special one inasmuch as we had a bilateral agreement with the Spanish Government. An additional point was that this was not purely a State Department problem; other agencies were concerned. We would need some time to work out our position. Mr. Leddy asked if there was any particular hurry. He noted that we had just received the text of the Spanish note and had not had time to study it. Also, the Spanish had included an additional point in the note they sent us. They had asked us not to have our planes operating from Spanish bases land at Gibraltar. Mr. Scott said Shuckburgh had mentioned the possibility of getting the discussions on Gibraltar postponed. Mr. Ball said this would be the best course for us. Ambassador Dean said that from the British point of view, it was more important to get the right answer than a quick answer. He said that Foreign Secretary Stewart was very interested in the Gibraltar question. He would probably want to raise it on Thursday during the discussions on the British defense review. Ambassador Dean left the attached aide-mémoire setting forth the British position. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in U on January 28. The meeting was held in Ball’s office. 2 Transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A-464 from Madrid, January 22. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. 193. Memorandum of Conversation 193. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 28, 1966. SUBJECT Gibraltar PARTICIPANTS Spain The Marques de Merry del Val, Spanish Ambassador Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Spain U.S. Assistant Secretary Leddy Frank V. Ortiz, EUR:WE The Ambassador called to inquire about the Stewart-Rusk conversations and to discuss Spain’s position on the Gibraltar dispute. 2 Mr. Leddy said the Gibraltar dispute had been mentioned briefly during Mr. Stewart’s visit. However the United States had made clear its desire not to become involved in this dispute. The Ambassador said he hoped the United States would comprehend Spain’s point of view which, he said, was not one of hostility to the defense efforts of the West since Spain’s contributions to that effort were well known. Mr. Leddy said Spain’s view of the matter was receiving very careful consideration by the Department. We would soon be in a position to reply. Mr. Leddy asked what purpose Spain had in mind in raising the Gibraltar problem in this form. The Ambassador replied that Spain’s purpose was to put the Gibraltar dispute in its proper context, namely as a bilateral dispute between Spain and the UK. Spain wished it to be clear that Gibraltar could not be considered by Spain as a NATO base. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 18 GIB. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz. 2 A copy of the memorandum of Rusk’s January 27 conversation with Stewart regarding Gibraltar is ibid. 194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, February 17, 1966, 7:14 p.m. 981. Spanish Ambassador in call on Dept (Stoessel) discussed proposed joint U.S.-Spanish press statement on aftermath air accident near Palomares, Spain. We understand Ambassador will report to GOS his concern that issuance proposed joint statement at this time could be misinterpreted as reply or comments on allegations contained Soviet Aide-Mémoire this subject. 2 Similar concern by GOS may explain reluctance GOS issue statement at this time. Unless addressees believe otherwise, Dept does not consider this possibility an overriding consideration. Although timing may be unfortunate on balance Dept continues believe proposed statement should be made but requests urgent comments. 3 Text proposed statement being sent Moscow and Geneva by septels. 4 Ball 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 17 US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ortiz; cleared in SOV, P, and G/PM and by the Department of Defense; and approved by Stoessel. Also sent to Moscow and Geneva for the delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference. 2 Dated February 16. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 911-912. 3 In telegram 991 from Madrid, February 19, the Embassy transmitted the text of a Spanish statement rejecting the Soviet note. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17) In telegram 1020 from Madrid, February 18, the Embassy repeated its endorsement of a joint statement but noted that Munoz Grandes still believed release of such a statement “unwise.” (Ibid.) 4 For text of the February 25 U.S. reply, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 916. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 195. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 1 Madrid, February 21, 1966. 1031. Dept pass DOD. Aircraft Accident . Joint Embassy-JUSMG Message. Ref Deptels 980 and 993; Embtels 1025 and 1019. 2 1. Meeting this morning at High General Staff between Chief JUSMG and Gen Prado (Sagaz, FonOff, and Gen Montel also present) resulted in following oral agreements: A. Claims . After first reiterating desirability of changing release clause of claim and receipt forms, Spanish (with Prado and Sagaz leading way) eventually agreed Feb 18 letter from Chief JUSMG (Embtel 1025) satisfied essential Spanish position. They decided prepare extract of letter and have it distributed by Spanish authorities to individual claimants to help overcome present reluctance of claimants to submit claims for processing. B. Clean-up . Following discussion claims problem, Chief JUSMG referred to message just received from Gen Wilson at Palomares (see 16 AF AVON Spain Message to CSAF C-00281, Feb 19) 3 to effect test (described Embtel 1019) had been conducted Feb 18-19 and Spanish JEN as well as USAF technicians agreed result was to bring readings down to less than “reasonable level.” Results of test accepted by Montel and others as successful and they agreed that clean-up operation proceed on basis envisaged Feb 17 agreement (subpara 3C, Embtel 1019), 4 adding merely that every effort be made ship out “contaminated” soil (i.e., that with 60,000 CPM or above already removed and in temporary storage) ASAP. 2. In any written confirmation of new clean-up arrangement cautions mentioned para 3, Deptel 993, will be observed. 3. Have just learned Munoz Grandes personally has confirmed approval of agreements described paras 1A and B above. 5 Duke 1 Source: Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Askew and cleared by JUSMG, Duke, and Walker. No time of transmission is on the telegram. Repeated to Paris for EUCOM and USAFE. 2 In telegram 980 to Madrid, February 17, the Department of State outlined requirements for claims submissions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PS-8-4 SP-US) In telegram 993, February 17, the Department outlined the U.S. position on procedures to be followed by the joint U.S.-Spanish radioactivity inspection team. (Ibid., HLTH 10 SP) Telegram 1025 from Madrid reported on the delivery of a letter incorporating U.S. assurances and explanations on claims procedures. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17) Telegram 1019, February 18, reported on discussions with Spanish officials regarding clean-up and disposal standards for the crash site. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 4 It read: “Reading would then be taken; if reading is at a ‘reasonable’ level Spanish would agree this procedure be followed for entire affected area and would no longer press for removal of soil down to 7,000 CPM level.” 5 In telegram 1054 from Madrid, February 25, the Embassy reported on a compromise agreement based on 60,000 counts as the limit for soil removal. (Department of State, Madrid Post Files: Lot 71 A 2420, Def 17) 196. Telegram 1240 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 196. Telegram 1240 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain Washington, March 30, 1966, 7:34 p.m. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 197. Telegram 1444 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 197. Telegram 1444 From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State Madrid, April 22, 1966, 1700Z. [Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6-3 US. Secret; Priority. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 198. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, May 6, 1966, 7 p.m. 1414. Ref Madrid tel 1489 repeated info addressees. 2 1. During series farewell calls Minister Counselor Spanish Embassy Aguirre de Carcer, speaking from instructions he states were drafted following April 14 visit to Washington by FonMin Castiella, 3 has made following points in somewhat emphatic manner: a. GOS attaches greatest significance to forthcoming Gibraltar negotiations with UK. Successful outcome these negotiations will have significant influence on Spanish attitudes re contribution to defense of Europe. Without satisfactory solution this problem Spain will be forced review its policy of defense cooperation with countries other than those having bilateral defense agreements with Spain (U.S., Portugal, France and Morocco). Countries not enjoying such arrangements especially UK, Benelux, Germany and Italy, will secure Spanish cooperation only through such defense arrangements as Spain freely agrees to enter. Minister said UK aware that without Spain’s acquiescence Gibraltar’s military usefulness limited. He hinted same was true of German base in Portugal now under construction. In short third parties should be interested in favorable outcome Gibraltar talks. b. Spain will press her “candidacy for Europe” with renewed vigor. Spain’s vocation and avocation is Europe as glance at map will prove. When queried re desire for NATO membership he said Spain not specifically asking for such membership since it is granted by invitation only. Nonetheless Spain expects in near future to be fully taken into account in any organization for the collective defense of Europe whatever its form. Furthermore Spain is not prepared to wait forever for relationship with Common Market. Spain will expect its friends to push for favorable action on Spanish application to EEC. He noted approvingly public statements by Schroeder in this regard. c. Above considerations will dominate Spanish negotiating posture for renewal defense agreement with US in 1968 as well as Spain’s relations with European nations. He was instructed put US on notice that extension defense agreement will have to result in expanding present bilateral agreement and would call for active role by US in integration of Spain into Europe. d. Minister said in other words Spain is no longer content to be sitting at small table for two in same dining room with US and other European countries. 2. As Aguirre de Carcer speaking under instructions and is returning to Madrid where among other duties he will serve as head US Section Ministry Foreign Affairs from which position he will undoubtedly play important role in negotiations for extension defense agreement, Department considers above authoritative statement current objectives Spanish policy. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-5 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz, cleared in EUR and RPM, and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to all NATO capitals. 2 Telegram 1489 from Madrid, April 29, reported on Spain’s position on EEC membership and on Gibraltar. (Ibid., POL 1 SP) 3 The meetings were summarized in telegram 1316 to Madrid, April 15. (Ibid., SP 15 SP-US) 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 199. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 1 Madrid, June 18, 1966, 1622Z. 1809. 1. Largely as a matter of courtesy Ambassador asked for an appointment to see FonMin Castiella June 16 following return from consultation in Washington. Castiella responded immediately with request Ambassador see him same day and took occasion launch into hard hitting bid for US support Spanish aspirations in Gibraltar dispute. 2. He began by lamenting reports to effect Ambassador “not sympathetic” to Spanish position. Asserting Gibraltar problem over-riding in Spanish relations with West, Castiella urged us recognize potentially serious repercussions on US and Western defense interests (he mentioned overflights and base agreement extension) if Spain rebuffed and forced seek other foreign policy options. He claimed Spain had already been approached to join new partnership along what he called “French and Soviet line” adding that for present Spain of course not taking such overtures seriously. FonMin then stressed great importance of military base in Western Mediterranean and traced out concept of vast military base complex involving Rota, Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla which could become available to West if Gibraltar problem settled, since Spain prepared accept same conditions from Morocco on Ceuta and Melilla as it offering UK on Gibraltar. 3. Ambassador countered by reiterating US position as clearly stated by Secretary to Castiella last year 2 and added observations on importance welfare of Gibraltar population. 4. Of interest in this connection is remark made to Ambassador earlier in day by Vice President and Chief High General Staff Munoz-Grandes to effect French had been acting in most friendly manner toward Spain. FonOff official (Aguirre de Carcer) mentioned to Ambassador just before call on FonMin that it French policy to eliminate US influence Spain. Same official later told DCM that report of Ambassadors alleged lack sympathy for Spanish position on Gibraltar had come from French sources. 5. Comment : Reports of active and increasing machinations by French are in marked contrast to assurances given Ambassador and DCM personally by French Ambassador in recent months to effect that despite divergencies on military matters France intent on retaining most friendly ties with US and anxious cooperate with US in Spain. Must also be noted that ready provision these reports by Spanish sources could reflect desire foster atmosphere US-French competition in Spain which GOS could hope exploit. Allusions to alleged invitations join France and USSR in “new partnership” as alternative to present Spanish ties with US seem represent rather forced attempt to show that Spain has “somewhere else to go” if its aspirations not satisfied in present context. 6. However, suspect Castiella’s outburst stems more from his impatience and frustration over poor outlook early solution Gibraltar problem on terms offered London last month. Castiella’s hope for smashing diplomatic victory partly to boost his prospects in transition and post-Franco stages could be waning and he seeking means retrieve situation. (Castiella of course not only high GOS official now preoccupied with personal future.) 7. Although exaggerated terms of Castiella’s performance detract from credibility, we must be prepared for further demands on Gibraltar problem and intensified Spanish attempts to apply pressure on US in any manner available to them, including overflight question. 8. We shall submit further comments next week. 3 Duke 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and Moscow. 2 See footnote 3, Document 181 . 3 In telegram 1817 from Madrid, June 21, the Embassy reported on other Spanish approaches designed to elicit U.S. involvement in the Gibraltar issue. The Embassy judged the Spanish approaches “clumsy and tactless effort at coercion,” but added that the United States had an interest in heading off a clash between Spain and the United Kingdom. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB) Telegram 1684, June 23, instructed the Embassy that U.S. policy would be one of strict neutrality in the Gibralta issue. (Ibid.) 200. Letter From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to Secretary of State Rusk 200. Letter From the Ambassador to Spain (Duke) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Madrid, July 7, 1966. Dear Mr. Secretary: On my visit to Washington last month I unfortunately missed seeing you, but had the opportunity to explain, first to George Ball and Alex Johnson, and then to the President 2 my views in some detail on the desirability of drawing Spain into the Western Alliance. The President did not express himself one way or the other, but I was very encouraged by the attention he gave to what I had to say. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Castiella has received your reply of June 23 to his earlier letter on the Gibraltar problem 3 and has gone out of his way to impress on me how grateful he was for the friendly and understanding tone of your letter. His enthusiasm reflects his intense preoccupation with Gibraltar, and, I believe, underlines the importance of some progress on that thorny problem so that it will not stand in the way of considering a place for Spain in the Alliance. In the light of my conversation with the President, I have hopes that both these matters can be reviewed with Prime Minister Wilson on his visit to Washington later this month. 4 While I fully realize the desirability—even the necessity—of non-intervention in the Gibraltar matter, it may well be that a word from the President to the Prime Minister expressing our hope for a reasonable solution might be helpful in avoiding the consequences of a bitter stalemate. As you know, the Spanish have told us that they will use all possible leverage to achieve some advance on the Gibraltar problem and toward their other pressing foreign policy objectives. We are beginning to feel the effects of their efforts, particularly in our military relations. In a broader sense, however, I believe the moment has arrived for us and our European friends to take action if we are not to forfeit the chance of helping Spain emerge from the approaching crisis of succession with a reasonably liberal government and an anchor to westward. An understanding on this subject with the British would make it possible for us to move ahead on approaches to our other friends in Europe on Spanish membership in the Alliance. 5 Internal changes in Spain as reflected in the new press law and the pending religious freedom legislation as well as other signs of progress should give us talking points in Spain’s favor when the moment is opportune. I do appreciate the complexity of the problems we have in NATO at this time, but I would hope that by the end of the year we would have begun high-level consultations on this subject. Any evidence of progress would, I believe, be of the greatest significance in keeping Spain to the course which serves our broad interests in this part of the world. With cordial regards. Sincerely, Angie Duke 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Secret. 2 No record of these meetings was found. 3 Copies of Castiella’s May 26 letter and Rusk’s June 23 reply are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. 4 See Document 266 . 5 In a July 22 reply to Duke, Rusk commented that Gibraltar would only be discussed if raised by the British and reiterated the need for Spain and the United Kingdom to work out an arrangement for the future of Gibraltar. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US) 201. Memorandum of Conversation 201. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 12, 1966. SUBJECT Spain and Europe PARTICIPANTS Spain The Marques de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain Juan Perez-Urruti, First Secretary, Embassy of Spain Jaime de Ojeda, Second Secretary, Embassy of Spain U.S. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Frank V. Ortiz, EUR/SPP During the Ambassador’s call he referred to Spain’s strong interest in some form of association with the EEC. He said by September Spain expected to know what form this association might take. He noted the French and Germans had been particularly helpful in supporting Spain’s petition. He believed the Belgian position had altered but that Italy and the Netherlands were still to some degree opposed to Spanish association. The Ambassador said Spain also desired to be integrated into whatever European defense structure emerged from the current discussions. Spain hoped the U.S. could do a little more to help speed Spain’s integration into Western defense. Mr. Johnson asked if the Gibraltar dispute would not complicate Spain’s association with NATO. The Ambassador replied that a satisfactory Gibraltar solution could well facilitate Spanish participation in Western defense. He noted that already Spain was contributing more to Western defense than the Scandinavian countries opposing Spanish NATO membership. Mr. Johnson said NATO had a “lot on its platter” at the present time, and NATO was now caught up almost exclusively with the present stage of internal readjustments. He believed an Anglo-Spanish agreement on Gibraltar would be helpful in any consideration of Spain’s role in Western defense. The Ambassador noted that aside from Gibraltar Anglo-Spanish relations had every reason to be good as British trade and tourism to Spain were assuming greater importance. There followed a brief discussion of the present economic, social, and political changes in Spain which were facilitating closer Spanish relations with Europe. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Ortiz and approved in G on July 21. The memorandum is Part 2 of 2 Parts. A memorandum of conversation of the portion of the discussion dealing with Gibraltar is ibid., POL 19 GIB. 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, October 4, 1966, 5:57 p.m. 59417. Following based on uncleared memcon is FYI, uncleared, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review: 2 1. Spanish Ambassador Merry Del Val made 15-minute call on Secretary October 3 on instructions from FonMin Castiella to present Secretary with background document covering Spanish-British negotiations on Gibraltar. 3 2. Spanish Ambassador also outlined contents of a Pro Memoria which he presented to Secretary re alleged violation of Spanish territory by British military aircraft. Ambassador stressed that British pilots apparently have instructions deliberately to violate air space over Spanish mainland and that Spain could no longer tolerate such intrusions. Secretary asked what purpose British would have in doing so. Merry Del Val lamely said he really didn’t know. 3. Secretary said that Spanish and British diplomats have been at work long before US came into existence and he was confident that the two countries would eventually find a way to settle this problem. 4. Merry Del Val also handed Secretary a second Pro Memoria to which he did not refer during conversation. 4 It attacked US “neutrality” as not consonant with US anti-colonial stand and described US attitude as “inhibition” for fear that a clearer position might annoy either side. Pro Memoria stated this attitude, however, favored status quo and was “against interests of Spanish people.” 5. Air pouching copies of Pro Memoria. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Landau, cleared by Stoessel and BMI, and approved by Landau. Repeated to London. 2 The memorandum of conversation is ibid. 3 Talks between the U.K. and Spanish Governments took place on May 18 and 20, July 12-13, September 6-7, and October 10-11, 1967. For documentation, including the text of the May 18 memorandum handed to the Government of the United Kingdom, see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Gibraltar Talks with Spain, May-October 1966, Command 3131 (London, 1966). 4 For text of the September 29 memorandum handed to the Government of the United Kingdom, see ibid., pp. 110-121. In telegram 59477, the Department of State commented that it believed this second memorandum was a “Spanish attempt to bail us into making statement on Gibraltar. We are not willing to do so.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 GIB) 203. Editorial Note 203. Editorial Note Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman met with General Franco on December 13, 1966, in Madrid. Their discussion centered on the situation in Vietnam. The two men also discussed North Africa and the Middle East. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. 204. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson 204. Letter From General Franco to President Johnson 1 Madrid, January 30, 1967. My Dear President Johnson: Please forgive me for retaining your attention for a few moments, but I trust that the importance of what I have to say will justify my writing directly—to Your Excellency. The publicity which is being given in Morocco to the announced visit of His Majesty the King to the United States 2 and the fact that among the Ministers accompanying him will be the Minister for Mauritanian and Saharan affairs, coincides with a campaign of expansionist claims on the territories of her neighbours—Algeria, Mauritania and Spain—and reveals Morocco’s intentions to exploit the King’s visit to the United States to attempt to present the United States as being implicated in her aspirations. I have therefore thought it best to forewarn you of this possibility; firstly, because none of the parties affected are ready to cede their rights, and in our case the Spanish right of sovereignty is clear as is the firm and repeatedly evidenced loyalty of the people of the Sahara—about 26.000 inhabitants; and secondly, because this sparsely populated territory has a very marked geo-strategic importance as it includes an extensive portion of the African coast immediately adjacent to the clearly Spanish Canary Islands, which are a center of world sea-routes, and which Spain has for centuries developed and defended. Among the objectives publicized in Morocco for this visit is that of asking the American Administration for a larger economic and military aid. While I find their economic interest legitimate and very convenient for the peace, development and internal stability of their country, in which we are truly interested, such is not the case with respect to military aid. The American Government is aware through our Representatives of the constant Spanish concern with respect to the increase of armaments taking place in North Africa with the general intention of threatening peace and attempting to satisfy imperialist ambitions in conflict with neighbouring countries. But no one is threatening the integrity of Morocco’s frontiers; she already has sufficient weapons for her defence and for her internal peace and security; and Spain, who only a few years ago underwent the aggression of supposedly spontaneous bands which Morocco utilized to break the peace in the territories of Ifni and Sahara, now feels alarmed by Morocco’s attempt to secure more arms at a time in which she is stirring up bellicose feelings in her inhabitants. It is really incongruous that when Morocco’s economic need is at its greatest she should wish to devote to military expenses amounts far in excess of her means in the hope that another country will finance them. I have wished Your Excellency to be acquainted with this concern, in order to avoid the possibility that, in the light of an apparent neutrality, and heeding a supposed need for self-defence which has been ably and artificially contrived, your Administration might err on the side of generosity in this military aspect. Due to my great confidence in your judgement and fairness, I feel satisfied in having made this known to you. At these moments, when the United States is going through a great sorrow at the loss of her heroic astronauts, I wish to express to you the solidarity and appreciation that this sacrifice has inspired throughout all the Spanish nation. May I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to you my highest consideration and affection. I remain, Your Excellency’s good friend. 3 1 Source: Department of State, Spanish Desk Files: Lot 70 D 35, Pol 7. No classification marking. The letter, which is typed on Spanish Embassy stationery, is marked “Translation.” In a memorandum transmitting the letter to the President, Walt Rostow commented: “This letter caps a prolonged Spanish diplomatic effort to make sure the Moroccans don’t get an inside track with us on the argument with Spain over the phosphorus-rich Spanish Sahara.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. I ) 2 Documentation on King Hassan’s February 4-12 visit is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XXIV, Documents 130 – 133 . 3 The letter is unsigned. In a February 15 letter to Franco, President Johnson thanked him for his expressions of sympathy regarding the deaths of the three U.S. astronauts and commented on U.S. policy in Morocco. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Spain) 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 205. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 1 Madrid, March 1, 1967, 1830Z. 2225. Pass White House. 1. At a meeting with General Franco this morning Jack Valenti told Franco that he had come here at what might be construed as a difficult time because of the attention the press was drawing to the CIA issue in the US. 2 Valenti explained that this matter was causing President Johnson concern and that a very high level review and investigation were underway. He emphasized however that what has been said of CIA activities should not be interpreted as a change in American policy or of the President’s attitude of friendship with Spain. Valenti said he was sure that the President was unaware of many details of the activities of CIA. 2. Franco reacted to Valenti’s comments with good humor saying the current CIA issue is illustrative of the problems of leadership at the highest level. He said he sympathized with President Johnson in this situation and understood it well. He then pointed out that in the security field agents too often act on their own initiative. Duke 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. 2 A Ramparts story revealing CIA funding of the National Student Association was released to the press on February 14. The story was subsequently picked up by the European press. In its February 21 edition, the London Times reported on assistance furnished to Spanish student groups. President Johnson directed the CIA to cease its funding activities on February 15. 206. Memorandum of Conversation 206. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 13, 1967, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Base Negotiations PARTICIPANTS Foreign His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain The Honorable Adolfo Martin-Gamero, Director General, Office of Diplomatic Information, Spanish Foreign Ministry The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of North American, Middle and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry The Honorable Aurelio Valls, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Spain Mr. Marcelino Oreja, Director, Technical Cabinet, Spanish Foreign Ministry United States The Secretary Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Mr. Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain 1. At the conclusion of the discussion on Gibraltar, 2 the Secretary inquired whether the Foreign Minister had discussed all the topics on his list which he had read to him at the beginning of the meeting. The Secretary added that the question of base negotiations had been on the Minister’s list. 2. The Minister replied in the affirmative and said that the question of renewal of the base agreements had been the reason for his visit to Washington. He said that he had come here on an official mission on behalf of his Government to request that the 1963 base agreements, due for renewal in 1968, be revised. He added that by and large Spain was satisfied with the existing relationship, but that there had been many changes in the last four years. He said it was the position of Spain that the agreements of 1963 must be revised and adapted to the current world situation. He enumerated some of the changes which had occurred since the signing of the last agreement, such as French military withdrawal from NATO, the Soviet penetration into the Mediterranean, the increased Chinese thermonuclear potential, the development of the ABM systems by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the pending NPT. He stated that serious consultations would be necessary before renewal of the bases agreements could be agreed on. 3. The Secretary asked how we should proceed on this subject, and the Foreign Minister replied that in order to avoid problems and a last minute rush similar to what had happened in 1963, talks should begin soon—as soon as possible. He expressed the opinion that diplomatic channels should be used, of course, without prejudice to advice and assistance from the military. 4. The Secretary suggested that it would be worth having such conversations through diplomatic channels, which might begin with a tour d’horizon to determine what needs to be done first. 5. Foreign Minister Castiella replied that he was in complete agreement, and added that these conversations should be on a friendly basis and should consider the question in depth and in detail. He stated that neither country should fall into the infantile pitfalls of saying such things as “the bases are no longer of any interest to the United States” or “Spain does not need the friendship of the United States”. He suggested that the bases were useful and that our friendship was based on a solid foundation, even though no relations between two countries could ever be completely perfect. 6. The Secretary replied that our friendship with Spain was important to us and that we would be willing to brief the Spanish in great detail on matters of mutual interest, as, for example, the ABM and its full significance, the question of China’s nuclear potential, and others. 7. Mr. Kohler in reply to the Secretary’s inquiry stated that we could set up briefings on various subjects mentioned by the Secretary either in Washington or Madrid and that we would be in touch with Ambassador Merry Del Val regarding the arrangements. 8. The Foreign Minister replied that it was fine to receive these briefings, but that he wanted to emphasize that we should not delay too long in getting to the negotiations. The important point at the moment was to go directly to the foundations of the agreements and begin discussions for their revision. 9. In conclusion, the Foreign Minister said that Spain considered itself a friend but not a satellite of the United States. The Secretary agreed with this statement, and the meeting ended with mutual assurances that the negotiations should be accomplished in the spirit of continued cooperation between the two countries. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Landau and Smith and approved in S on November 22. The memorandum is Part 10 of 10. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room in the Department of State. 2 The memorandum of conversation covering this part of the discussion is ibid., POL 19-GIB. 207. Memorandum for the Files 207. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, December 5, 1967. SUBJECT Spanish Base Negotiations and Palomares PARTICIPANTS The Honorable Angier Biddle Duke, U.S. Ambassador to Spain The Honorable Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mr. Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Captain William Golden, OASD/ISA Mr. Robert Funseth, EUR/SPP I. Palomares Before the arrival of Mr. Warnke, the question of the proposed U.S. gift of a desalting plant to Palomares was discussed. Ambassador Duke stated that he had just come from a meeting with Mr. Herman Pollack, Director of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, in which Mr. Pollack had reported that a telegram had been received from Madrid forwarding the results of the water sample tests made at Palomares. Mr. Pollack said that a preliminary reading of these results indicated a desalting plant was technically feasible. (At this point, Mr. Warnke joined the meeting.) The Ambassador said he hoped a public announcement of the U.S. gift could be made as soon as possible in order that the date of the announcement would be as far in advance of the January 17 anniversary of the accident. He believed it was important that our offer become part of the historical record during the current calendar year and in advance of the BBC special television program on the accident now scheduled for early 1968. Referring to the BBC program, he said it was the Embassy’s understanding that the BBC was favorably impressed on two counts: first—the work of the U.S. Claims Commission; secondly, the manner in which the nuclear contamination problem of both the residents and the area had been promptly examined and the happy results of these examinations. However, there was a third area, he said, in which the BBC apparently believed there was some legitimacy to complaints. He said this was the question of something being done about the problem of non-measurable damage—psychological as well as material. It was with this problem in mind that the Embassy had originally proposed a gift to the people of Palomares. He thought we could effectively meet this point by announcing the gift as soon as possible. The Ambassador said the prompt announcement of the U.S. offer could not help but improve the atmosphere for the base negotiations. He said we must remember that the accident brought home to the Spanish, in a most dramatic way, that the American military presence in Spain was not without serious risks to Spain. II. Spanish Base Negotiations The Ambassador said that he had seen several estimates by the U.S. military services and they appeared persuasive of the U.S. need for continued use of the Spanish bases for an additional five years. He said he had not seen a specific Department of Defense position, but he assumed that Defense would sustain the services’ estimate. Mr. Wyle stated there were several studies or reports which all supported the strategic importance or need for the Spanish bases and indicated no real disagreement with the individual estimates of the services. The Ambassador said that the problem we face as we enter into negotiations with the Spanish for a renewal of the Base Agreements hinges on the Spanish political objectives and their anticipated requests for military hardware. He said it was his view that to the extent we can meet their political requests, the military shopping list will be correspondingly reduced. However, the Ambassador said it is apparent that we cannot meet their objectives for membership in NATO and admission to the EEC, nor are we prepared to extend to Spain diplomatic support in their dispute with the British over Gibraltar. He noted that the Secretary had reaffirmed the U.S. policy of absolute neutrality on Gibraltar to the Spanish Foreign Minister on November 13, 1967. 2 He said there remains the Spanish request for an escalation of the present commitment (contained in the 1963 Joint Statement) to a U.S.-Spanish treaty. The Ambassador said the State Department’s Legal Advisor was examining the various forms of commitments which the U.S. might make, ranging from a simple executive agreement on the one hand to a legal treaty on the other. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] The Ambassador said in negotiating with Spain he hoped he would be able to demonstrate to Spain that we are prepared to offer it the same type guarantee we have extended to others [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. With regard to the Spanish request for a treaty, he mentioned that Mr. Aguirre de Carcer, Director General for North American Affairs in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, had reported that in a conversation with Senator Fulbright in Geneva, Switzerland, the Senator had told Mr. Aguirre de Carcer there would be no difficulty in getting Senate approval of a U.S.-Spanish treaty. 3 In considering the kind of commitment we are prepared to offer Spain, the Ambassador said he thought it was important to bear in mind that the Spanish were more interested in the form than the actual substance of such a commitment. For this reason, he said, their first objective is a treaty which would be public and would demonstrate that Spain had obtained something of significance from the U.S. in exchange for the bases. The Ambassador said that if we were unable to accommodate satisfactorily the Spanish on their request for an improved form of a mutual defense commitment and at the same time, because of the lack of U.S. military assistance funds, we could not satisfactorily meet their request for military equipment, then the Spanish might very well ask for our withdrawal from the bases because not even the Franco regime could justify to its citizens our continued use of the bases if there was no demonstrable benefit for Spain. Mr. Warnke said that Defense recognizes the difficulty we will have in meeting Spain’s political objectives and that we will have to consider offering them some form of military hardware. He said the problem in meeting either their political or military hardware requests originates in the same place: the Congress. He recalled that the Congress has indicated it is opposed to any new defense commitments by the U.S. and at the same time is cutting back on appropriations for U.S. military assistance. He said this latter action is, at least to some extent, inter-related to the first because the Congress believes that military assistance results in the U.S. becoming involved in increased commitments; hence by cutting back military assistance, the Congress puts a block on increased U.S. involvement. Mr. Warnke said that part of the problem in obtaining military assistance funds for Spain is that all of the various types of military assistance are lumped into one appropriation. He explained there are two types of assistance in which there is not much Congressional opposition. These consist of the assistance to countries where we are helping improve the indigenous forces in order to replace American troops, such as South Korea, and assistance to countries as “rent” for essential bases, as in the case in Spain. These types of assistance are the easiest to justify but, unfortunately, they are included with the “conventional” form of military assistance against which the Congress is directing its objection. He said Defense was trying to find some way to sort out the various types of military assistance. Specifically, he said, we might have to separate out the “rent” in order to get the necessary funds, and he wondered what the Spanish reaction would be if U.S. military assistance to Spain was publicly described as “rent”. He asked the Ambassador if he thought he could live with such a development. On balance, the Ambassador said he thought we could. He said while there might be some rumblings in Spain—such as critical editorials in certain newspapers—he thought the Spanish Government would not strongly object. He said there was a tacit realization among Spaniards that the U.S. would not be giving Spain assistance if it were not for the bases. The Ambassador said he would like to mention some positive factors as far as the base negotiations were concerned. While the difficulties that had been already discussed were valid, he said we also have certain “pluses” in our favor. He said that the Foreign Minister had told the Secretary on November 13 that Spain and the U.S. had successfully maintained a relationship for 15 years which had been of mutual interest and advantage to both countries. The Foreign Minister said Spain, for its part, was prepared to continue this relationship and it was the Foreign Minister’s estimate that this was also the wish of the U.S. The Foreign Minister said that it was on this basis that the two countries should negotiate an extension of the agreement. He had concluded that as it was in the interests of both countries to continue the relationship, he believed that both countries had the same goal of achieving a successful completion of the negotiations. The Ambassador said he thought we could expand on this point by adopting the point-of-view in the negotiations that the U.S. and Spain shared what might be described as a community of interest in the continuation of our relationship. The Ambassador said he was looking forward with keen interest to hearing the preview of the Briefing Team’s presentation at the State Department, December 8. He hoped the Team members would very much have in mind that the Spanish would be listening attentively for anything that would support their contention that the bases are more valuable to us now than they were five years ago. They attribute this increased value to the new Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The Ambassador said he recognized this was a very delicate and difficult task for the Team, but he thought they should place emphasis that the Soviet presence represented a real political threat to all the countries of the Mediterranean, including Spain. Mr. Wyle said he was in agreement not only with the objectives as described by the Ambassador but also with his assessment of the difficulties of achieving these objectives because the fact of the matter was that the U.S. Navy, for example, is making the same point as the Spanish—the Soviet presence has increased the importance of the U.S. bases in Spain. The Ambassador said we should also try to think of ways we can suggest to the Spanish that while the bases are important, their importance is lessened because of restrictions in their use. By restrictions he said he meant the suspension of nuclear overflights and that Spain’s present policy in the Middle East restricted the use of the bases by the U.S. in support of possible U.S. actions in the Middle East. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Funseth and approved in draft by Ambassador Duke on December 8. 2 See footnote 2, Document 206 . 3 Not further identified. 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Department of State 1 Madrid, March 13, 1968, 1746Z. 2951. 1. By prior appointment I today made protocol farewell call on Chief of State. He received me alone. 2 2. Main focus Franco’s remarks was wish have me convey to President Spanish understanding of difficulties, particularly in political sphere, faced in Viet Nam and hope U.S. would persevere in maintaining present military policy SEA. 3. Franco also agreed to need maintain flexibility in US-Spanish special relationship; mentioned his preoccupation over proximity Torrejon Air Base to Spanish capital; and expressed understanding of need for measures support integrity of dollar. Conversation ran over few other subjects, including developments on U.S. political scene. 4. Comment : Although Franco’s hands shook very noticeably during first part of discussion, trembling later subsided, and he looked generally fit. He sustained with interest and attention a half-hour’s exchange on matters of substance when he could very well have limited occasion to mere formalities. Duke 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17-5 US-SP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 2 Ambassador Duke left post March 30. President Johnson appointed Robert E. Wagner of New York as Ambassador to Spain on June 24. Wagner presented his credentials on July 4. 209. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 209. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 19, 1968. Dear Dean: On the subject of the extension and revision of our Defense Agreement with Spain, which the Spanish have asked be negotiated, I believe it is useful and appropriate to provide State with a Department of Defense position, supplementing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as set forth in JCSM-35-68 of January 18, 1968, and JCSM-247-68 of April 17, 1968). 2 The JCS papers have already been forwarded for your consideration. The Department of Defense considers that the availability of the Spanish base complex for the next five years will continue to be militarily of great importance to the United States. I therefore believe that we should make every effort to negotiate a full extension of all the base and operating rights which we now have in Spain, and that we should be willing to pay in return a quid pro quo approximately equal to that agreed in 1963. We should leave flexible, however, the particular level of our presence in Spain. As you know, studies are now under way in DOD aimed at improving our balance of payments vis-à-visEurope. It is possible that the results will involve changes in the nature and size of our presence. This possibility, however, should not affect our current negotiations with the Spanish. Inherent in our judgment about the Spanish base complex are such general factors as the difficulty of establishing alternative bases, our limited access to other facilities on the northern shore of the Mediterranean and in North Africa, the limitations on use of French territory and airspace, and the Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean. The specific military contributions of the Spanish bases are the following. 1. The facility at Rota provides a naval operating base for nine ballistic missile submarines operating continuously in the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. These boats form part of the alert element of our strategic retaliatory forces, and as such are essential to the nuclear deterrent. In our judgment, the only real alternative to Rota would be CONUS basing, but to provide the same number of boats on station from a CONUS base would require an additional two to four boats in the force, having a 10-year incremental cost of at least $500 million. 2. Rota also provides logistic support for surface naval elements transiting the area, including underway replenishment ships for the Sixth Fleet. Facilities at Rota have a capacity to provide 45% of the Sixth Fleet’s ammunition requirements and 17% of the POL. While these stores might be relocated elsewhere on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, such a move would have the disadvantage of increasing our political dependence on Greece, Italy, and Portugal. 3. Rota also provides a staging base for airborne [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] reconnaissance, a major communications relay, and [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. 4. The air base at Torrejon provides the permanent station for three USAF fighter squadrons committed to missions at forward bases in Italy and Turkey and partly deployed in these forward areas. The forward bases have inadequate facilities for maintaining and housing the full squadrons, especially the personnel and their families. Availability of the Spanish complex has thus provided a feasible alternative to basing these squadrons in CONUS, which requires more aircraft to meet the [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] mission in Italy and Turkey. Also, 400 MAC sorties per month are now handled at Torrejon, which represents 75% of the airlift load formerly handled at Chateauroux, France. 5. The air bases at Torrejon, Moron, and Zaragoza are required by fighter, tanker and bomber aircraft deploying from CONUS in execution of any one of several US contingency plans for the use of US forces in Europe and the Middle East. These bases are used to support tanker aircraft to refuel deploying fighters and bombers, and to receive the deploying aircraft for enroute stops including necessary refueling, maintenance, arming if required, and crew rest. The restricted availability of French airspace and the political uncertainty of US access to bases in the Azores and Greece and along the southern shore of the Mediterranean will make our access to Spanish bases of great military importance for these missions, until at least 1972; at that time, the advent of the C-5 aircraft may reduce our reliance on intermediate bases between CONUS and the ultimate point of destination in the Middle East. 6. The base at Zaragoza, now in stand-by condition, also offers an alternative to Wheelus AFB as a gunnery range and weapons training center, in the event we should leave Wheelus. All other range possibilities (in Turkey, Italy, Sicily, Portugal and Corsica) are now used by our NATO allies and are overcrowded. There is a generally acknowledged shortage of air training areas in Europe, as evidenced by the German construction program in Portugal and the extensive German training in the US. It is both cheaper and more effective to accomplish USAFE tactical air training in Europe than in CONUS, and the training is extremely important to the combat effectiveness of our European air forces. Training in CONUS would cost perhaps an added $25 million per year; moreover, the crews would be carried in transports, hence could not train in their own tactical aircraft; this factor would lower the value of the training. 7. The air bases in Spain were originally built for SAC operations, and SAC still has contingency plans for their use. These involve the prestrike forward deployment of some B-58 bombers and accompanying tankers, the post-strike recovery for a few B-52’s [ 1 line of source text not declassified ] in the Middle East. 8. Spain is now a nodal point for US military communications, carrying about 8.4% of the trans-Atlantic channels and 11.1% of the channels connecting the Mediterranean area with Germany and the UK. While communications satellites will gradually reduce our reliance on relay stations in Spain, the present facilities there will continue to constitute major components of the world-wide defense communications system until 1972. Taking into account the foregoing factors, the Defense Department considers an extension of the Spanish Base Agreements for another five years to be of great importance to the military security of the United States. In addition, it would seem highly desirable to maintain meaningful political-military ties with Spain during a transitional period which could involve significant changes in Spanish political life and in Spain’s relationships to Western Europe. A continued US presence could be a factor for moderation, and could facilitate the development of broader and more harmonious Spanish relations with Europe. 3 Sincerely, Clark M. Clifford 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Noforn. 2 Both entitled “U.S. Bases and Facilities in Spain.” They are in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Office, Joint Master Files, Case File 967/470/8 June 68. 3 In a July 9 response, Rusk noted that the defense agreement would be “one of the principal subjects” discussed with Castiella and that he would be in touch shortly after Castiella’s visit. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 4 SP-US) In an August 8 letter, Rusk stated that Paul Nitze had been instructed to brief Clifford on these talks. (Ibid., SIG Files: Lot 74 D 355) 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, July 16, 1968, 1709Z. 202916. Following based on uncleared memcon and subject to revision on review. 2 Summary: 1. During four-hour talks July 15 Secretary and Spanish FonMin Castiella discussed wide range of bilateral and international issues. Principal topics discussed were: Effects of balance of payment program on Spain; Renewal of the Bases Agreement; Spanish desire for some form of mutual security guarantees; Spain’s abstention from Non-Proliferation Treaty; Level of US military assistance as quid pro quo for base rights; Question of possible reduction of US bases in Spain; Revision of Technical Agreement; Gibraltar; Mauritanian feelers to resume relations with US; Relations with North African states; Status of Spanish Equatorial Guinea. 2. Secretary Rusk and the Foreign Minister also exchanged confidential diplomatic notes providing for the establishment of a Joint U.S.-Spanish Economic Committee to consult and examine financial and other economic matters of mutual interest. 3 End Summary . 3. Balance of Payment Program: Castiella repeated previous Spanish complaints about classification of Spain as Schedule C country referring to highly unfavorable Spanish trade balance with US and Spanish status as deficit country. He claimed that US investment in Spain had declined drastically. Castiella said that US must find ways to redress injustice committed to Spain. He said he hoped Joint Economic Committee would be helpful in finding solution. Secretary did not hold out any hope for reclassification. He explained that stability of the dollar and the US balance of payments deficit were serious matters and of concern not only to the US but to Spain and the rest of the Free World. He requested factual information on the practical effect of US measures on Spanish economy. Castiella inquired about status of his request for credit for military equipment purchases. Secretary replied that there were problems with Congress concerning military sales and the use of Ex-Im Bank credits and that no decision had been made yet on the Spanish request. He promised to let them know shortly. 4. Renewal of Bases Agreement: Castiella acknowledged that with forthcoming elections and worldwide commitment, this was not most propitious time for US to negotiate. He said that Spanish also had problems and that bases were less popular in Spain than heretofore. He indicated that Spain wished a security agreement comparable to the one contained in the treaty with Japan, and that it could not sign the NPT until it had some security guarantees. Secretary replied that the Joint Declaration of 1963 was big step forward and emphasized that circumstances were not good at the present for a more formal type of guarantee and that we would have major difficulties with Congress. He pointed out that the sacrifices presently being made by the American people in life and material constituted a demonstration of US fidelity to our commitments throughout the world. With respect to the level of mutual assistance to Spain, both Secretary and Acting Secretary of Defense Nitze explained that the Spanish list for military equipment assistance delivered recently was far beyond our capabilities and that Congressional approval was required before any assistance could be granted. Castiella said that Spanish request was reasonable and that Spain needed something tangible if US wanted to keep bases and renew agreement. Mr. Nitze said that DOD would send shortly some people to Spain for on-the-spot survey of Spanish military needs. Castiella thanked him and emphasized again need to move quickly with program of negotiation. Castiella asked whether US wanted to keep all bases or reduce some. He said that US base at Torrejon was alarming to the three million inhabitants of Madrid, and that US should give firm indication on future need for all bases quickly. Secretary replied we would inform the GOS as soon as possible when a determination had been made and that we would take GOS views on this question into consideration. He said that the administration contemplated no significant reductions in Spain. 5. Revision of Technical Agreement: Castiella stated that the GOS was not happy with the US draft. He specifically referred: 1. provisions concerning jurisdiction over military tourists; 2. providing land on cost-free basis; and 3. question of payment for residual value of permanent facilities at the bases. 6. Gibraltar: Foreign Minister repeated usual arguments for decolonization and referred to existing UN resolutions to which US should adhere. He stressed that there was great sensitivity in Spain on this subject. The Secretary indicated that we did not intend to become involved in the matter but suggested that Spain might usefully seek to woo the Gibraltarians. Castiella replied that Spain had made a very generous offer but that no progress had been made with the British towards decolonization. He said Spain would not use force but had other means of pressure at her disposal and would apply them. 7. Mauritania: Castiella gave the Secretary a message from the Mauritanian Foreign Minister. 4 Mauritania had expressed a desire to resume diplomatic relations with the US and had asked the Spanish Foreign Minister to sound out US reaction. The Secretary replied that he would check into the question immediately and give the Foreign Minister an official USG reply to transmit to the Mauritanians. 8. North Africa: The Foreign Minister said that progress was being made on the decolonization of Ifni through negotiations with Morocco and talks had started. He said GOS hoped to solve the question within the next few weeks and that he hoped Ifni could be returned to Morocco within a few months. Spain had good relations with Morocco and Algeria and had notably improved relations with Libya. Tunisia had just received a $20 million credit loan from Spain. 9. Equatorial Guinea: He referred also to progress made towards independence for Equatorial Guinea and emphasized that this was another example of Spanish good faith on decolonization question. He said independence would probably be granted by October 12. 10. At the Foreign Minister’s request the Secretary outlined briefly the present status of US-USSR relations and gave his assessment of the status of the Paris talks on Vietnam. 11. At conclusion Secretary and Castiella agreed that there was much work left to be done on base renewal and that there was need to keep in close contact. Secretary said he hoped we could aim for final negotiation in September but that we should not be idle in the meantime and keep working on the problems. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Landau and approved by Springsteen. 2 A complete set of memoranda of conversation is in Department of State, Spanish Desk Files: Lot 71 D 32, Pol 7 Visits. 3 For text, see 20 UST 843. 4 Not found. 211. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 211. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 17, 1968. Dear Dean: This is in reply to your letter of August 8 concerning our bases in Spain. 2 Your suggestion that we attempt to break out of our studies on cost reductions in Europe those portions relating to possible US force reductions in Spain is a reasonable one. It may, however, present some difficulties, since deployments in Spain are related to considerations of our overall military posture in Europe, and more particularly to the question of our tactical air capability on the southeast flank of NATO and in the western Mediterranean. Nevertheless, we will do our best to reach decisions with regard to Spain in advance of your next discussion with Foreign Minister Castiella. You requested in particular that we give consideration to closing the air base at Torrejon, in view of Castiella’s expressed concern over the proximity of that base to Madrid. While we are examining proposals for closure or reduction to standby status of Moron Air Force Base, near Seville, we have only been considering reductions in the level of our military population at Torrejon. I believe there are significant obstacles to closing Torrejon. The most important point is that it is our best base in Spain. It is far better equipped than the other bases in terms of communications equipment, administrative buildings, and a wide range of support facilities that relate directly to the staging of tactical and transport aircraft through Spain and to the headquarters requirements of the 16th Air Force. If we were to move the major elements at Torrejon to another base, it would require construction of additional communications, administrative, and support facilities, as well as considerable additional housing. The cost and time factors involved would depend upon the alternate base selected as an adequate substitute. At the present time the estimates on expense range from $10 to 20 million, exclusive of housing costs, but further study is required before any confidence can be felt in these figures. The moving costs would be substantially less if we returned the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing from Torrejon to CONUS, but, as Nick Katzenbach pointed out in his letter to Paul Nitze of July 22, 3 it could have serious political implications because of its effect on our tactical air capability on the southeast flank of NATO and in the western Mediterranean. Let me add that Castiella’s concern about our presence at Torrejon does not appear to be shared throughout the Spanish government. The Spanish military, in particular, have made no objection to our presence there. Moreover, Torrejon is a principal operating base of the Spanish Air Force, and they would probably wish to continue to use it. If we left, they would have to pay the operating costs. We are making progress in our preparations for negotiations in September. The DOD equipment package has now been developed, and the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Tim Hoopes, has discussed it with John Leddy. I understand that State has agreed that the equipment package constitutes a point of departure for our negotiations with the Spanish. While I believe it would be well for the IRG/EUR and the SIG to consider in general the possibility of military reductions in Spain, I think that any detailed discussions of this matter should be confined to State-Defense channels. As I believe you know, I have charged Tim Hoopes with principal DOD responsibility for the Spanish base negotiations. He and Ralph Earle, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, will continue to deal with your staff on the particulars of the negotiations. Sincerely, Clark 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. 2 In his letter, Rusk suggested closing Torrejon Air Force Base. (Ibid., SIG Files: Lot 74 D 355) 3 Not found. 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, August 22, 1968, 1645Z. 225515. Ref: Madrid 4813. 2 Subject: Spanish Base Negotiations. 1. Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) will discuss negotiating position Spanish bases September 5. After consideration we must seek White House concurrence on agreed inter-agency position to enable Secretary to discuss terms with Castiella. To accomplish this, earliest meeting date would be September 16. 2. We foresee no difficulties with arrival of legal mission to discuss technical agreement September 3 or 4 and believe that it would be mutually advantageous to start legal talks on basis of existing proposals and counter-proposals. We see no need at this point to send a written U.S. response to latest Spanish counter proposals. 3. We believe that no useful purpose could be achieved by further meetings with a Spanish military mission until Secretary has had chance to present to Castiella the dimensions of the hardware package which the U.S. would be prepared to agree to following SIG consideration, Congressional consultation, and approval by the President. Only after GOS agrees in principle to amount offered could there be a fruitful discussion of detailed contents of package with Spanish military group. (FYI. We are considering separate grant and credit sales package. Detailed discussions with Spanish military may take considerable time, but could be accomplished after basic exchange of letters, which would state only value of grant and credit package subject to availability of funds.) Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Landau; cleared by EUR, G/PM, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Rusk. 2 Telegram 4813 from Madrid, August 19, forwarded Castiella’s request for a September 9 meeting with Rusk. (Ibid., POL 7 SP) 213. Record of the 42d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 213. Record of the 42d Meeting of the Senior Interdepartmental Group 1 Washington, September 5, 1968. CHAIRMAN’S SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION AND DECISIONS PRESENT The Under Secretary of State, Chairman The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Poats for the Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency Mr. Fried for the Special Assistant to the President The Under Secretary of Treasury The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs SIG Staff Director DOD—Mr. Hoopes DOD—Mr. Earle JCS—General Bayne Ex-Im—Mr. Sauer Ex-Im—Mr. Balderston BOB—Mr. Clark State—Mr. Leddy State—Mr. Furnas State—Mr. Landau State—Mr. Ruser [Here follows discussion of future meetings and defense-related issues.] III. Spanish Base Rights Negotiations The Chairman congratulated Mr. Leddy on the contingency plan for Czechoslovakia. 2 The scenario and timing of the crisis had, of course, not been foreseen, and many of the contingency draft telegrams and papers had to be modified. But EUR’s preparatory work had been most helpful during the first few days of the crisis. It provided a checklist of what had to be done and first drafts for many of the messages and papers. It would have been impossible for the Department to gear up so quickly for the crisis without this earlier work. Mr. Katzenbach then invited Mr. Leddy to review the points at issue in the forthcoming base rights negotiations. Mr. Leddy said that the Spanish Foreign Minister was now definitely scheduled to meet with Secretary Rusk on September 16. It was essential that the United States Government have a clear position on the outstanding issues by that date. A. Security Guarantees Toward Spain Mr. Leddy said that the Spanish wished to strengthen the degree of assurance and commitment they felt was provided by the 1963 Joint Declaration. A subcommittee of the IRG had thoroughly reviewed all the possibilities for strengthening the language of the Declaration. The IRG had reviewed these possible changes and had concluded that none of them would satisfy the Spanish. 3 We would be better off to take the position that the wording of the 1963 Declaration was the best we could offer and try to avoid opening up this matter. The SIG agreed that the 1963 Declaration represented the maximum we could offer. Mr. Katzenbach took the view that, if for public relation reasons, the Spanish should insist on minor wording changes, we should be willing to consider them provided these changes would not substantively strengthen the language of the Declaration. As a practical matter, if Castiella should put forward alternative language, we would have no choice but to consider his proposals. B. Economic Relations Mr. Leddy said the second issue between the Spanish and ourselves was their treatment under the United States direct investment control program and, more generally, under our balance of payments program. The Spanish consider their classification in Schedule C discriminatory in view of their weak balance of payments position and relatively under-developed economy in relation to the rest of Europe. We have agreed to set up a Consultative Economic Committee but we have no intention to change Spain’s classification under the program or to provide further exemptions from the IET. We will continue to take the position that there is no evidence our balance of payments program has significantly affected the level of United States investment in Spain. The recent drop in United States investment activity would have occurred even in the absence of tighter balance of payment controls. It reflects the fact that United States companies operating in Spain have completed their expansion programs for the time being. The SIG agreed that: —We would have no proposals to make for dealing with the subject; and, —We cannot weaken the balance of payments program in order to smoothe the course of the base rights negotiations. C. SOFA Negotiations Mr. Leddy observed that a concurrent, related but separate, issue between ourselves and Spain was the renegotiation of the SOFA. A subcommittee of the IRG had prepared the United States position for these negotiations. The general conclusion was that we should go as far as we can to meet legitimate Spanish demands for better terms. The bench-mark for the United States negotiating position, generally speaking, was the SOFAs with NATO countries, including the supplemental agreement with the Federal Republic. We should not draw on the Far Eastern SOFAs as a model. The SIG took note of some of the key issues including military tourism, unusual punishment, and reciprocal rights. There was agreement that we were unable to meet Spanish requests on this latter issue in view of the delicate problems this would raise in the area of State-Federal relations. D. Military Assistance Package Mr. Leddy reviewed the history of the negotiation to date, including Spanish demands for a $1 billion assistance package. He described the United States counter offer recommended by the IRG, including the breakdown of the package between grant and credit. He emphasized that the credits would be primarily for the purchase of new equipment not available on our excess list, whereas grant assistance would be drawn from second-hand excess stocks and required new appropriations in a range of $40 to $60 million. He noted the two qualifications to the United States offer of $100 million in credits—viz: 1) That commercial bank credits for military equipment purchases, inasmuch as they were discountable by the lending bank with Ex-Im, would be counted towards the $100 million ceiling; and, 2) That, if the Spanish should take up all or part of the $55 million available from Ex-Im until September 26, these amounts would also be chargeable against the ceiling. Mr. Leddy then discussed the problem of funding. As regards FY 1969, he noted that there might be a need for up to $8 to $10 million in newly appropriated funds. There were several possibilities for dealing with this requirement: —To find money in the shrunken MAP appropriation; —To go for a supplemental after January; —To pick and choose items that require no rehabilitation or can be readily rehabilitated in Spain. On balance, the question of when we start the grant program would probably not be critical and the Spanish would appreciate our problem if we should find it necessary to defer new grant aid until FY 70. The question was raised whether we would not do well to start out with a lower figure than our maximum position. Mr. Katzenbach said that he felt this tactical question should be left to the judgment of the negotiators. The Spanish would either take our package or delay in order to negotiate with the next Administration. We should adhere to a figure of about $100 million grant even if the Spanish should refuse to accept it. This was, however, not to foreclose the possibility of a figure somewhat lower or higher if, on this basis, we should be able to conclude the negotiations. He was convinced that the United States would for some such figure be able to negotiate an extension of the agreement. He was not sure, however, that the Spanish would be willing to conclude an extension on this basis with the present Administration. A quick negotiation was in our interest-but the Spanish, for their part, could, if they wished, delay to have another try with the next Administration. The point was made that the arguments in favor of a quick negotiation should be covered in the Memorandum to the President. On Congressional consultations, it was agreed that these consultations would have to be carried out immediately and that we would not be able to wait until completion of Congressional action on the military assistance legislation because the President would not approve a United States offer without Congressional soundings. It was also agreed that these consultations should focus on the package rather than the problem of funding. Funding, if mentioned at all, should be treated lightly at the end of the consultations. E. Statement About United States Presence Mr. Katzenbach observed that it would be helpful to Secretary Rusk to be able to say something about intentions in regard to a consolidation or reduction of our military presence. Mr. Nitze said that this matter was under review. We were planning to stay at Torrejon but there was the possibility that we might wish to transfer our operations from Moron. Such a consolidation of our air force operations at Torrejon, if it should be decided on, would result in some reduction of personnel. We would do this without a reduction of our combat and combat support capabilities. Mr. Nitze indicated that the Secretary of Defense might wish to move toward a decision on this matter in the next 30 to 90 days. Mr. Rostow raised the question of timing of a public announcement in light of the events in Czechoslovakia. There was agreement that even though the planned consolidations would not reduce our capabilities, we would have this factor in mind in working out a possible announcement on this matter. Action Summary The Chairman directs: [Here follows discussion of foreign internal defense policy.] Spanish Base Rights Negotiations EUR and SIG Staff to prepare a Memorandum to the President setting forth the SIG’s conclusions and recommendations. (See SIG Memo #83, Sept. 11, 1968) 4 The IRG/EUR recommendations to serve as guidelines on renegotiation of the SOFA. A. A. Hartman Staff Director 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 344, 42nd Meeting. Secret. 2 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 23 . 3 SIG Memo No. 82, August 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG Memo No. 82) 4 SIG Memo No. 83, September 11. (Ibid., SIG Memo No. 83) 214. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 214. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 12, 1968, 10:45 a.m. SUBJECT U.S. Position on Spanish Base Negotiations At Tab A 2 is Nick Katzenbach’s memo recommending you approve a package offer we would make to the Spanish in negotiating a 5-year renewal of our base rights agreement. Secretary Rusk meets with the Spanish Foreign Minister on Monday, September 16, to discuss the renewal. Paul Nitze, Joe Barr, Charlie Zwick, and Walter Sauer, acting head of the Ex-Im Bank concur in the recommendation. Our agreement with Spain covers a naval base for Polaris-armed nuclear submarines and two air bases. Secretary Clifford believes that we will continue to need a base position in Spain over the next five years, but that we should be able to consolidate the two air bases and close down one of them. Our first base agreement with Spain was made in 1953. The present agreement was renegotiated in 1963. It expires this September 27, but provides for a 6-month consultation period beyond that date. We have nothing to gain from deferring the negotiations, however, since we need the bases. Postponement would probably put Spain in a better position to press for a higher price. The recommended package comes down to the following: — Grant aid , drawn largely from excess stocks, with a “fair value” of $100 million but requiring budget funds (for rehabilitating the equipment) of $40 to $60 million over the 5-year period. (In the last agreement we gave the Spanish $100 million in new military equipment, paid entirely from budget money.) — Ex-Im credits or guarantees , under normal terms, of $100 million for purchases of military equipment. (The Spanish bought about $180 million in military equipment from us during the past five years. They paid cash or financed commercially. Their financial position was stronger than it is now, so they did not take advantage of our offer to provide some Ex-Im credits.) This package will be far below what the Spanish request. We would tell them, however, that we also propose to close down one of our bases. This will help them domestically to accept the lower price. It helps us by cutting our goals. The Spanish also request: — A security treaty with us such as we have with Japan. We refused this in the last negotiations and will do so again. We would go no further than the existing Joint Declaration of our common interests that went with the 1963 agreement. (The Joint Declaration is shown at Annex in State’s memo.) — Exemption from the direct investment controls of our balance of payments program. We will say no. Congressional consultations do not indicate any serious difficulties on the Hill: —Secretary Clifford and Paul Nitze were in touch with Senator Russell and Congressmen Mahon and Rivers. Russell had some question about the price but was sympathetic; Mahon approved; and Rivers gave his enthusiastic and unqualified endorsement of the package and said we should get on with the agreement. —Bill Macomber and his people spoke to Senator Hickenlooper (regretted we had to pay anything but recognized the need); Senator Sparkman (bases important, price not too high); Congressman Frelinghuysen (saw need, hoped we could negotiate it at the price). They also heard from the following: Senator Mansfield—does not like a deal with Spain but goes along on security grounds and is pleased we may be able to close down one of the bases. Senator Dirksen and Congressmen Albert and Edna Kelly saw no problems. Ford was ill, but his staff did not see any trouble. I believe the package makes sense and that we should go ahead with the negotiations. Walt Required authorization for negotiating offer to Spain: 3 Grant aid : ($100 million fair value, subject to the availability of funds, requiring new appropriations of $40-$60 million over the 5-year period.) ExIm credits or guarantees of $100 million for military purchases over the 5-year period. Inform Spain we are considering closing down one of the two air bases and will consult with them before making final decision. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Rec’d 11:10 a.m.” 2 Not printed. 3 The President approved all three options. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page indicates that Fried’s office was notified. 215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of State Rusk 215. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 13, 1968. Dear Dean: I refer to your letter of August 8 concerning a possible reduction of the US military presence in Spain, and to my reply on August 17 2 that DoD would do its best to reach a decision with regard to this matter in advance of your forthcoming meeting with Foreign Minister Castiella on September 16. I am aware of the Spanish Ambassador’s recent proposal to us that, if we are unable to meet fully Spain’s requests for military equipment, we should consider a reduction in our military presence as a means of helping the Spanish government to accept an extension of the Base Agreement; and I have noted the SIG conclusion 3 that a statement concerning our intentions on future force levels is probably essential to such a Spanish acceptance. Bearing these several factors in mind, we have studied the matter intensively within DoD and have now reached certain tentative conclusions; these would permit you to advise Foreign Minister Castiella along the following lines: 1. The US is currently studying its European deployments; while no decisions have yet been made, we do anticipate some reductions and consolidations of noncombat activities. 2. Within a program of consolidations and reductions, we would anticipate placing one more of the bases in Spain in standby status, comparable to the present status of Zaragoza; this would probably be Moron. Such a move would involve personnel reductions of about 4500, approximately half of whom would be civilian employees and dependents. 3. We would anticipate the continued use of Torrejon at approximately the present level of activity. 4. We have sympathetically considered your expressed concern about Torrejon, but have concluded that there are serious obstacles to its closure. It is far better equipped than the other bases in terms of communications equipment, administrative buildings, and a wide range of support facilities. Any attempt to move present activities from Torrejon to one of the other bases would cost the United States a good deal of money and time; and in view of our present stringencies, the requirement to fund such a move might well affect adversely the grant-sales package we are proposing to strengthen the Spanish armed forces. Moreover, if the United States should leave Torrejon and the Spanish Air Force wishes to continue to use that base, the Spanish government would of course have to pick up the operating costs. 5. We will consult with you further as we approach decisions on these matters. I hope these suggestions will be helpful to you in your meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister. Sincerely, Paul 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 14-5 SP-US. Secret. 2 See Document 211 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 See Document 213 . 216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, September 16, 1968, 2358Z. 239577. Subject: Spanish Base Negotiations. Following based on uncleared memcon Secret/Noforn FYI only and subject to revision upon review: 2 1. Secretary, heading U.S. group of negotiators, met for three hours with Spanish group, led by Foreign Minister Castiella regarding renewal of Base Agreement scheduled to expire September 26. Foreign Minister termed our offer of hardware package of $100 million aid and $100 million official credits as extremely low but agreed to have the contents of the package discussed further with Pentagon officials tomorrow, September 17. 3 Castiella also said that for the reduction of U.S. presence to be meaningful Torrejon rather than Moron should be deactivated but again agreed to have this matter further discussed between the Spanish military and Pentagon officials tomorrow. 2. Foreign Minister made his usual plea for an increased security commitment and Aguirre referred to the bilateral agreement between U.S. and Iran as an example. Secretary said he would look into the matter. 3. Finally, Spanish delegation, as on previous occasions, complained about the “discriminatory” inclusion of Spain in Schedule C of the President’s balance of payments program. No concrete example of “discrimination” was offered. Under Secretary Deming agreed that Treasury would meet with the Spanish economic members of the negotiating team September 17 to discuss this matter further. 4. When we mentioned the Technical Agreement negotiations presently being held in Madrid, Castiella displayed little interest and referred to them as marginal. 5. Secretary Rusk told the Foreign Minister he would be available for further discussions at any time during the week and the Foreign Minister said he would return after the discussions with the Pentagon and Treasury had been concluded. 6. The general impression is that the Spanish, after some haggling, will be ready to extend the Agreement for another five years. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Landau and approved by Leddy. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 2 The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 7 SP. 3 The memorandum of conversation is ibid. 217. Memorandum of Conversation 217. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 21, 1968, 11 a.m. SUBJECT Renewal of Defense Agreement PARTICIPANTS Spain His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry United States The Secretary Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal The Foreign Minister said that the problem facing us was the renewal of the base agreements. We were talking about the following: 1. Torrejon—the importance of this base was so great that there was no need to further mention it; 2. Zaragoza presently in caretaker status; 3. Moron, which was important; and 4. Rota, which probably was the most important of all U.S. bases. [ 3 paragraphs (21 lines of source text) not declassified ] In addition to all this, the U.S. has the full cooperation and friendship of the Spanish people and their military. This [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Spain cooperated during the Palomares accident in keeping it as quiet as possible. The Foreign Minister said he just wanted to mention all this to let the Secretary know what Spain offers and that all this should be compared with the U.S. offer of 1968. What is Spain receiving for all these risks? The Foreign Minister said that all the U.S. offered was around $20 million per year. Perhaps by some tough negotiations this could be increased to 30 or even 40 million dollars, mainly in used equipment, some of it with very late delivery dates. On top of this the U.S. offers only a very reduced security guarantee. The Foreign Minister said he could not ask the Spanish people to accept this offer and if the Secretary were in his shoes, he would not consider signing such a deal which does not adequately reward Spain’s friendship. The Secretary replied that the U.S. valued Spanish cooperation but wanted to stress that all installations we had in Spain were mutually advantageous to both countries. Spain too was interested in U.S. troops and the presence of the Sixth Fleet. Thanks to the Foreign Minister’s skill, Spain had improved her relations with the European countries and with the Western Hemisphere but this improvement was partly based on Spain’s relationship with the U.S.. Now the situation, according to the Foreign Minister, is more dangerous in 1968 than it was before. In that case, our presence is more valuable to Spain and it is more important for Spain to have U.S. troops in Europe and to have the Sixth Fleet remain in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Minister said that he valued the U.S. contribution and that he was aware of the protection it afforded Spain but with the protection goes the increased risk for Spain. If Spain did not renew the security arrangements the Sixth Fleet would remain and 250,000 men would remain in Europe. Spain would at the same time not have to take any risks. The Secretary said that the risk came from the enemy and that if the U.S. were not present the risk would be much greater. The Secretary said that in a friendly way he wanted to make it clear that he took exception to the Foreign Minister’s remarks. He said this was not a responsible position to take. The Secretary added that the U.S. also had made enormous financial contributions to Spain by building the bases and moreover Spain derived a considerable balance of payments advantage from the presence of our troops in Spain. In other countries we have offset arrangements; we have never asked Spain for one. The Secretary said that we are working under the assumption that both sides would reach agreement to their best mutual advantage and that there should be no fundamental qualitative changes in the agreement. The Secretary said that he had seen a draft letter prepared by Treasury officials which clearly explained that our balance of payments program was not working against Spain and that the levels of U.S. investment in Spain were not expected to change. Spain would not derive any advantage from changes in reclassification to a different schedule because the Treasury had to look at all applications for Spain. The Secretary said that he was willing to sign this letter. The Foreign Minister allowed that he was grateful that progress had been made on this issue. The Secretary said that on the matter of military assistance he was reluctant to say what he was about to say because if revealed he would be in deepest trouble. We were trying our best to be as forthcoming as we could to the Spanish request. The dollar figure which we gave the Spanish is the highest considering what pressure we are under. Out of the funds of the Department of Defense and our military assistance program we must finance “a hot war” in Southeast Asia, not only in Vietnam but also in Thailand, Laos and Korea. We have tried through internal arrangements within the Executive Branch to fund the request through the Department of Defense where the budget is concealed in another budget. If Spain would buy what we offer in the United Kingdom, France or the USSR, the equipment would cost between $400 and $600 million. If Spain were to manufacture it herself, it would cost many billions. The Secretary said that he was certain that the Spanish military and the U.S. military could work out the package and that we were meeting substantially Spanish requests. The Secretary said that there would also be severe political repercussions if the U.S. and Spain were not able to reach agreement. He said a number of countries important to Spain would react in a negative way, for example, Turkey, Italy, Greece and Germany. These countries consider an agreement between the U.S. and Spain important. Only De Gaulle would be delighted. Moreover, at home we would be in deep trouble with Congress because Senators would say that if we had offered an open, cooperative and generous deal to Spain and if there were no agreement it would be tantamount to a Spanish confiscation of bases in disguise. The Foreign Minister said that he would like to remind the Secretary that Spain too had made important sacrifices in the establishment of the bases. Millions of dollars had been spent in expropriating land and the bases had not been profitable for Spain. The Foreign Minister said he appreciated the efforts made about rectifying the existing discriminatory situation on the balance of payments problem by the offer to issue a letter. Castiella then said that he agreed with the Secretary that if no agreement were reached it would cause international concern but by the same token, it would enhance Spanish prestige because it no longer could be considered as a satellite of the U.S. but as a free and independent country. Moreover, internally a part of the Spanish people would applaud the end of the agreement if the American proposals were insufficient. The Secretary replied that on the question of prestige Spain would have to choose. Of course, Nasser, Boumedienne and Tanzania would applaud non-renewal. But the prestige would go down in Western Europe, in Japan, in India and even in Yugoslavia and Spain had to choose where it wanted its prestige. The Secretary suggested that the possibility existed that both sides were the prisoners of artificial military figures and maybe in the upcoming talks we should not use figures but talk about equipment. In this way we could talk about some increases in military assistance and the Spanish military probably could report back that they were satisfied. The Foreign Minister said that it had always been the Spanish intention not to talk about figures but only about equipment because figures were misleading considering that equipment could be priced in various ways. The Foreign Minister said that the Secretary had mentioned Boumedienne but that he would like to remind us that the Algerian Air Force, thanks to Soviet generosity, was infinitely superior to the Spanish Air Force which had obsolete equipment. He said the Spanish military were ready to help the U.S. but they must be armed to do so. The Foreign Minister added that in the U.S. package we offered obsolete 102s. Mr. Landau interjected that in the discussion with Mr. Hoopes this matter had been clarified and that the U.S. Air Force was looking into the possibility of furnishing 104s as requested by the Spanish. The Secretary suggested that the military should go ahead and have another try at the package on Monday with a view of reaching an agreement on the physical contents of the package as well as on the services which could be provided by the U.S. to the Spanish Navy and to the early warning system. These services were hard to translate into dollars and cents. Castiella said that time was flying and there was need for him to meet again with the Secretary to talk about reduction of U.S. presence and security guarantees possibly on Monday. The Secretary suggested that the military group discuss the reduction of U.S. presence at the time they talked about the package. Mr. Aguirre de Carcer said firmly that the Spanish generals were not authorized to discuss this question. The Secretary then suggested that this matter be raised on the political level at DOD possibly with Mr. Nitze. The Foreign Minister said that he would be pleased to send Under Secretary Sedo on Monday to see Mr. Nitze. The Foreign Minister again stressed that we had severe time limitations and that he could not sign until he was satisfied that Spanish defense needs had been met. It was decided that the Spanish military would meet with the U.S. military group headed by Mr. Hoopes on Monday and that Mr. Nitze would see Mr. Sedo on Monday too. Following these meetings, another talk would be scheduled between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on December 25. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 218. Memorandum of Conversation 218. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 25, 1968, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Spanish Base Negotiations PARTICIPANTS Spain His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry United States The Secretary The Honorable Paul N. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal The Foreign Minister stated that normally he always looked forward to coming to the Department of State but that today he came to the Secretary’s office sadly and with a lump in his throat. For several days, while in Washington, he had come to realize that no progress was being made in the negotiations and that matters were beginning to turn in the wrong direction. This was a painful fact, sad both to the Secretary and to himself. Nevertheless, despite the difficult situation he now faced, the Foreign Minister still wished to thank the Secretary, Messrs. Nitze, Leddy, Landau, Deming, and Colman for their hard work and for having shown so much good will towards Spain. The Foreign Minister stated that he wanted to summarize the situation as he now saw it and to compare what Spain had to offer and what the U.S. was ready to come up with in return. Spain offered four important military bases, two of which were of the greatest importance for the defense of the Western world. The base at Rota was the only other base together with Holy Loch where nuclear-powered Polaris submarines could enter. Rota’s location is unique at the entrance to the Mediterranean. Also there was Torrejon, headquarters of the 16th Air Force, a powerful base with the longest airstrip in Europe. As a matter of fact, General Burchinal had told General Munoz Grandes two or three days ago that it was his hope that Torrejon might eventually become the headquarters for the whole U.S. Air Force in Europe. In addition to the four bases there were also communications facilities, assisting the U.S. and Europe. There were a number of other factors such as Colossus I and the privilege of U.S. overflight rights in Spain. If it were not possible for U.S. aircraft to fly freely over Spain and France, a problem would be caused for the U.S. Finally, pursuant to a secret agreement, Spain did not require prior consultation or notification if its bases were used in times of crisis. Spain is the only sovereign state that has gone so far in granting such valuable privileges. The Foreign Minister said that it is not the fault of Spain that they are faced with such pressure of time and that such serious matters had to be discussed during the brief period of September 16 to September 26. There still exists a very big gap between the Spanish request and the U.S. counter-offer. The U.S. has offered some $20 million of military assistance per year and a line of credit of $100 million. On the other hand, Spain had listed its needs not in terms of money but in terms of actual requirements. The Foreign Minister stated that he wanted to table the latest Spanish proposal prepared by his military team which, although not expressed in terms of dollars and cents, should amount to about $500 to $600 million. It was indeed a drama that U.S. inability to provide Spain with $100 million of equipment per year would liquidate a friendship and an alliance. Next March the U.S. might have to start dismantling its bases and what was really painful was to see how much harm could be done to a cooperation and friendship that had developed over a 15-year period. The Foreign Minister stated the news of this situation would be known around the world and that it would harm U.S. prestige in other countries. Greece, Turkey, and Italy have bases in the Mediterranean where they deny use of their facilities to Polaris nuclear submarines. These countries will be happy about the Spanish gesture because it will make their contribution more valuable in the future. There will be a quick and strong reaction on the part of the press. Regrettably, by looking at newspaper articles and editorials in the U.S. press, one could see that there was a lack of knowledge with regard to Spain’s real contribution to Western defense. The American press usually dismisses the four bases in a cursory manner and neglects to take into account the communications centers, and the overflight rights. Spain would continue to be a friend of the U.S. but it hurt the Foreign Minister deeply to see how the U.S. could be harmed by the present situation. The Foreign Minister stated that he could not understand why the U.S. could not come up with $100 million a year for these bases when the U.S. had a total defense budget of $72 billion. He said he felt that $100 million was a ridiculously low sum. He said that he did not know exactly how much could be purchased with $100 million or whether in fact the bases were worth that amount in terms of the defense of the free world. Spain had asked for this figure not because of blackmail but because it needed that level of assistance to cover its defense needs and, furthermore, Spain was willing to make its own contribution to the defense of the free world. The Czech crisis and other recent events had underlined once more the importance of conventional armies. While a country such as Denmark could contribute only several thousand troops to the common defense, Spain had 120 thousand men in uniform and in case of need could contribute half a million men to the defense of the West. But in the face of such offers there seemed to be no attempt on the part of the U.S. to attach great value to Spain’s contribution. It appeared as if the U.S. wanted to defend the entire world alone and as if only U.S. lives could be committed to the defense of a civilization, which Spain also wanted to defend. Offering lives and taking risks was something that could not be evaluated in monetary terms and, therefore, $100 million was truly a ridiculously low sum. Spain refused to trade human lives in return for an insufficient package. Spain wants to make its contribution to the defense of Europe and of the West. While it was true that the U.S. had suffered 350,000 casualties since World War II, Spain’s anti-communist stand had cost half a million lives during its bloody civil war. The Spanish military team had found the American military representatives to be very unbending during their last meeting, which was a very short one, and the U.S. counter-offer remained basically unchanged. The Foreign Minister said he had remained in Washington hoping that tension would decrease. On Sunday, the Foreign Minister had called Mr. Landau to the Spanish Embassy (and he thanked him for coming so promptly) to describe some of the difficulties that he faced in view of the rapidly approaching deadline. The Spanish Council of Ministers was to meet on September 24 and the Spanish Chief of State was to leave Madrid on September 25. The Foreign Minister had said to Mr. Landau that he and his military advisers had to report to the GOS on the course of the negotiations by Monday night. In response to his report, the Spanish Government had met and had sent him the following cable: At the Cabinet meeting on September 24 the Spanish Government has studied the position of the United States. The decisions of the Spanish Cabinet are as follows: 1. The U.S. offer of military assistance as presented on September 23 is totally unacceptable. 2. The Spanish minimum requirement cannot be reduced any further. 3. The Spanish Government cannot consider any alternate formulae through readjustment of the U.S. military presence in Spain. 4. In view of U.S. inability to meet the Spanish request, the Spanish Government wishes to apply the procedure provided by Article V of the Defense Agreement. 5. The Spanish Government authorizes the Foreign Minister to seek with the Secretary of State a jointly-agreed presentation to the press. The last point was the only concession the Foreign Minister had been able to obtain from his Government to enable him to try to present the best possible picture to the press in the midst of this catastrophe. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister on behalf of his colleagues and of himself for the Foreign Minister’s very friendly remarks about their own role. He said he esteemed the Foreign Minister’s able diplomatic expertise very highly. First of all, the Secretary expressed regret at the conclusions reached by the Spanish Council of Ministers. It was apparent that if the procedures provided for in Article V were now invoked, some serious problems would arise for both sides. From the diplomatic point of view, it was necessary to take note of the fact that the U.S. was in the midst of an election period and it was impossible to know at the present time who the next President would be and what the political composition of the next Congress might be. If Article V were to go into effect right away, the next Administration would only have two months for consultations while at the same time it would have to organize itself and look at some major problems, including the matter of negotiations with Spain. Secondly, it would be important to explain to the peoples of both countries why an agreement had not been reached. From that point on Spain and the U.S. would be following diverging paths. Regardless of what the explanations to the press might be, relations between Spain and the U.S. would begin to deteriorate. What the Spanish Government and the U.S. told their respective press and people would probably lead to a number of different interpretations and this was a problem that should not be minimized. It would probably result in a bad press for Spain in the U.S. and also for a bad press for the U.S. in Spain. While it was difficult to see the bearing of all of this on U.S. and Spanish prestige, it was clear to see that it would damage both sides. Its effect on Spain would be serious because Spain’s prestige had risen in recent years, partly due to its good relations with the U.S. The Secretary stated that the Foreign Minister had had a chance to consult with his Council of Ministers but since the Secretary did not know what Spain’s latest reaction would be, he had not consulted with his own colleagues in the Cabinet or with the President. He would like to have a chance to do so before he gave a final reply to the Foreign Minister. He added that he would like to suggest to the Foreign Minister that, to avoid the negative consequences resulting from the invocation of Article V, he ask his Government for a six-month extension of the Agreements. This would give both governments and especially the new U.S. Administration enough time to analyze the problems before Article V was invoked. He hoped that the Foreign Minister would be able to consult with Madrid about this matter and to indicate its reaction as soon as possible. At the same time, the Secretary would discuss the problem with the President and with the Secretary of Defense. Unfortunately, the Secretary had to leave for Philadelphia to make a speech and would not be back until later today, but he would be at the disposal of the Foreign Minister as of tomorrow morning. In any event, Messrs. Nitze and Leddy would represent him in the meantime. The Secretary stated that if it were difficult to get in touch with the full Council of Ministers or with the Spanish Chief of State another solution might be to waive the September 26 deadline and so to speak use the parliamentary procedure of stopping the clock. The Foreign Minister said that with reference to the difficulties caused by the present election period that Spain had not chosen the date for these negotiations and that when the Agreement was signed initially the negotiators on both sides did not realize that the Agreement would expire during the time of the election campaign. Spain had studied the problem of the renewal for quite some time and had realized what some of the difficulties might be. Nevertheless, it did not want to play up to one or the other political parties in the U.S. and had always preferred to deal with the U.S. on a Government-to-Government basis and hoped that if there were to be a change in the Government in Spain, the U.S. would also deal with Spain on the same basis. Now that Spain was required to ask for the cancellation of the Agreement, the matter of press relations became very important. The Spanish press is free and not controlled, and whoever thinks otherwise is obviously ill-informed. Be that as it may, the Spanish press had been silent during the course of the present negotiations because the Foreign Minister and his team had not sent out any information and there had been no leaks on the Spanish side. The press had reported just the fact that meetings had been held but had not divulged any of the substance. The Foreign Minister would now have to make the necessary efforts to inform the Spanish press, the world, and American public opinion of what had happened in connection with the bases and with the Agreement. This would obviously lead to a certain reaction on the part of the press, even though the Spanish Foreign Ministry would officially try to smooth things over as best it could. With regard to the subject of stopping the clock, the Government of Spain and Spanish jurists had given some thought to the matter but the fact was that the Agreement had been approved by the Spanish Cortes and that certain legal requirements had to be met so that stopping the clock was not a feasible solution. In view of this, the six-month period of consultation would start tomorrow and the only possibility would appear to be the issuance of a joint announcement saying that the present negotiations could continue. This could be done only if it were possible to see that a fruitful solution would be forthcoming. The gap between $20 million and $100 million a year appeared to be a very rigid one, since the amounts quoted by both sides seemed to be final. If the U.S. felt that it was not worthwhile to pay such a price for the bases, then there was nothing that could be done. If, on the other hand, the U.S. agreed that they were worth the price, then it might be possible to find a formula to which both sides could agree, even if negotiations then had to continue for maybe another week or possibly as much as another month. The Secretary stated that he assumed that under Article V consultations would continue for as long as six months. He stated that looking back on US/Spanish relations, the U.S. was now faced with a new situation because of the order of magnitude of Spain’s present needs which bore no relation with the order of magnitude of its needs when the original Agreement was signed. He added that there must be a misunderstanding of our Constitutional system in the attempt to compare $100 million with the total of the $72 billion defense budget. The Congress appropriates funds for certain specific purposes and the $72 billion have been assigned to specific activities. Therefore, when it comes to funds for military assistance, we are really looking at just one small and restricted item in that overall budget. A great battle was continuously being fought in Congress in order to avoid further reductions in military aid appropriations. Finally, he stated that he had made an official proposal in his capacity as Secretary of State to extend the Agreement for six months and he hoped that since this was a new question put to the Spanish Government, the Foreign Minister would go back to his Government and submit it for its consideration. It was not too late to extend the Agreement for six months or a year and, therefore, he hoped that the matter would be given serious consideration and that he would be able to obtain a prompt reply. Mr. Nitze stated that it had been his impression for many years that the Agreements had mutually benefited Spain and the U.S. and that the negotiations were not a matter of simply evaluating the direct benefits to the U.S. or to Spain but rather to recognize that both countries had worked together for their mutual interests and that the U.S. had done the best it could to strengthen the Spanish armed forces. Therefore, the matter should not be viewed by the Spanish solely as a question of payment to Spain for the use of some bases. He felt that the expression of this view would not be well received by his colleagues and by members of the U.S. Senate. The Foreign Minister said that the new order of magnitude of Spain’s needs compared to 1953 should not have come as a surprise since the cost of the most elementary consumer items had increased considerably since 1953 in every country in the world. He repeated that $100 million per year was the amount that Spain needed to cover its defense needs and that the U.S. Government should have foreseen such a request because it had been reminded several times in the past by the Foreign Minister himself that the negotiations would start soon. He added that Spain had very good friends in the Senate as proven by the fact that twice the Senate had asked for Spanish admission into NATO and as seen by attempts to fight any move to cut funds destined to Spain. With regard to the proposal to extend the Agreement by six months, he felt that the Spanish Council of Ministers could not meet because some of its members were out of town and, furthermore, that it could probably not accept the proposal. Moreover, the period from September 1968 to the spring of 1969 would be a very dramatic one. Spain could not stop the clock just as the U.S. could not get the Russians out of the Mediterranean or out of Czechoslovakia. He stated that he was not refusing to continue his present round of talks but that he felt that the Spanish Government would not accede to the Secretary’s last minute proposal. The Secretary stated that the Foreign Minister was not saying that communications between the two governments had ceased and he suggested that the American Ambassador in Madrid could see members of the Spanish Government to transmit this latest proposal. He asked the Foreign Minister whether he would transmit the proposal through his own channels to the Government of Spain and the Foreign Minister replied that he would do so but that he did not see much hope for a favorable decision. The Secretary stated that he would be at the disposal of the Foreign Minister for additional meetings on September 26. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on October 1. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office. 219. Memorandum of Conversation 219. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 26, 1968, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Spanish Base Negotiations PARTICIPANTS Spain His Excellency Fernando Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain His Excellency the Marquis de Merry del Val, Ambassador of Spain The Honorable Ramon Sedo Gomez, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Spain The Honorable Nuno Aguirre de Carcer, Director General of American and Far Eastern Affairs, Spanish Foreign Ministry United States The Secretary The Honorable Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense Mr. John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director for Spain and Portugal Mr. Joseph L. Smith, Country Officer for Spain The Secretary stated that the six-month period of consultation pursuant to Article V of the Agreement started today and that he was anxious to know exactly and accurately what the Spanish requirements were for the continuation of the Agreement, since he would have to report them to the President and also after November 5 to the President-elect. At yesterday’s meeting the Spanish Foreign Minister had indicated that Spain would invoke Article V and he had also tabled a new list of Spanish military equipment requirements. He asked whether that list was the total Spanish request or whether there were other matters. He also stated that the first question which the President and the next President-elect would ask would be whether it was the desire of Spain, as a matter of policy, to agree to a continuation of the Agreement or not. The Foreign Minister said that he could say emphatically and unmistakably that Spain wants to continue its friendship with the U.S. and that it would be delighted to renew the Agreement on the basis of equality and dignity as well as on the basis of the minimum Spanish proposal tabled on September 25. The Secretary remarked that it should be on the basis of equality and dignity not only for Spain but also for the U.S. The Foreign Minister continued saying that he was authorized to sign the renewal of the Agreement today provided that the September 25 minimum Spanish request were met in total. If this were not possible then Spain would like to know what the position of the U.S. would be since March 26, 1969, was rapidly approaching and Spain would have to start thinking about changes in its policies. In any event, Spain wanted to continue being a good friend of the U.S. He added that if Spain were to adopt a neutralist policy, Spain would not stop being a friend of the U.S. However, his purpose and the purpose of his Government was to strengthen this friendship and if the renewal was not signed today, he would continue working so that agreement could be reached as soon as possible, always on the basis of the minimum Spanish list. The Secretary replied that he did not quite understand what the contents of such a neutralist policy included. Some countries in Western Europe believed that they could adopt what they described as a third position as if they were simply innocent spectators watching the big struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Western Europe. This was not the case, because Western Europe itself was the issue. The Foreign Minister stated that such a new policy could be similar to that of Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria, i.e. a policy of neutrality and at the same time of sympathy for the U.S. Spain was not part of the Western defense system because it had been excluded due to ideological differences. Now the U.S. was unwilling to give Spain what it needed for its defense and therefore there was no other way out for Spain but to return to her traditional policy of neutrality. If the U.S. could not provide Spain with the necessary arms and a minimum level of military assistance, then Spain, although a poor country, would try to achieve its aims on its own. It should not be too difficult to do so since for example as recently as a few months ago the French Government had offered Spain 50 Mirage aircraft with very generous credit provisions which Spain had not even considered since it was counting on its friendship with the U.S. Spain could on its own acquire a smaller amount of weapons but they would be newer and they would be hers. The Secretary suggested that this might prove to be very expensive and the Foreign Minister replied that might be so but that Spain would then readjust the structure of its Army and make it smaller so that savings resulting from personnel cuts could be channeled into the purchase of better equipment. Domestic industries could be developed so that military purchases in the U.S., which last year added up to $187 million, would be made in Spain itself. The Secretary asked whether, if the U.S. were to return to isolationism, this would be in the interest of Europe and whether it would serve Spain’s security. The Foreign Minister stated that this would probably not be so but that it might prove General De Gaulle right when he said that Europe could not depend on the U.S. to defend it. The Secretary stated that it was precisely De Gaulle who had made a massive contribution to an increased isolationist feeling in this country and specifically on the part of many Senators. The Secretary inquired again whether the Spanish list of military equipment requirements was the only problem standing in the way of agreement. The Foreign Minister stated that there were certain economic aspects that would also have to be clarified but he noted with satisfaction that the letter on economic problems which had been offered to him and which would be signed by the Secretary of State was a very productive step. He also said that some minor changes were required in the language of the mutual security guarantees. Nevertheless, the key issue was that of military assistance. Yesterday, the Foreign Minister said, he had received strict and clear instructions which authorized him to sign an extension of the Agreement only if the Spanish minimum list were accepted. If this were not possible, he had been instructed to invoke the procedure established in Article V. The Secretary stated that he had had a chance to speak with the President and leaders of the Congress and that he could say that the U.S. could not accept the Spanish list. Therefore, the procedures provided for in Article V would come into play and both countries would keep in touch about future steps. He then gave a draft joint press statement to the Foreign Minister for his consideration and approval. 2 The Foreign Minister asked if the Secretary had talked to Congressional leaders about the possibility of improving the mutual security guarantees to Spain. The Secretary stated that the security problem was not something which the Congress could take up as a procedural question but rather that it was a matter of substance. The present Congress was to adjourn in about ten days and it was not possible now to foresee what the composition of the next Congress would be. Therefore, it was not practical to take up the security matter within the time limitations that were now being faced. The Foreign Minister said that many of the Senators in the present Congress would continue in office and that preparations should be made to keep them informed and that the problem should be discussed with them. He said that his only complaint was that he had warned the Secretary back in October and November of 1967 3 that all these problems would be coming up and that at the time he had urged that in 1968 there should not be a repetition of the anguished race against time that had occurred in 1963. He repeated that it was not Spain’s fault that the conversations had been delayed for so long but that he deplored it nevertheless. The Secretary replied that he was well aware that the Foreign Minister had raised these questions a long time ago and that there had been many contacts with Congressional leaders over the last months. The conclusions which he had given the Foreign Minister were the final positions arrived at after lengthy discussions with many leaders and he therefore could not accept the suggestion that the U.S. had in any way been negligent in its duties. Some Congressmen may have stated their own personal views in the course of the last months but it is really the leadership of the Congress and the corporate views of that body which should be considered. He said some foreign embassies have at times been confused by statements of individual Congressmen but it so happened that at the present time it was not possible to foresee what the corporate attitude of the next Congress or of the next President might be. All the Secretary could do was to describe the situation as he saw it today and as the present Congress also saw it today. Mr. Nitze stated that all of the Senators and Congressmen with whom the Department of Defense had dealt on these matters felt that the position of the U.S. was correct and fair and that it was consistent with what they believed were the Spanish needs at the present time. The Secretary then said that the U.S. would now proceed on the basis that it would like the Agreements extended which was also the feeling of Spain. He added that both sides should concentrate on solving their mutual problems during the next six months and that the U.S. would continue to act with good faith and with a spirit of cooperation and he expressed the hope that this would lead to satisfactory results. Mr. Nitze stated that the Senators and Congressmen concerned with Defense were fully cognizant of the contribution of Spain and that they were very appreciative of them. The Foreign Minister replied that if this were true, and he had no reason to doubt it, then the situation was very disappointing indeed and it did not offer much promise for the next six months of consultations. Mr. Nitze stated that the main point which the American legislators kept in mind was that the present Agreements were mutually beneficial. They felt that it was not right to attach a monetary value to the contributions which either the U.S. or Spain made and that they considered the American proposal as right and proper because allies should help each other and should do whatever possible to be of assistance to one another. They were sure that the American offer was commensurate with the needs of the Spanish armed forces especially in the light of demands placed on the U.S. elsewhere and of the existing limitations in funds. The Foreign Minister stated that if the U.S. was not capable of giving any more help than it now offered, it would be impossible to go any further and therefore maybe the GOS was right in denouncing the Agreement. The Secretary stated that nothing profitable could be gained by discussing further the existing gap and that it would be better to see where both countries were at the present time and to lay the foundations for further constructive action. He asked the Foreign Minister whether the draft press statement was acceptable. The Foreign Minister replied that in principle the draft was acceptable but that he would like to study it and give a firm reply by 5:00 p.m. today. Mr. Leddy suggested that if there were any contacts with the press, both sides should say that talks were continuing. The Foreign Minister indicated that he wasn’t interested in seeing the press for the time being. He also stated that he regretted that there had been no response to his latest proposal contained in the minimum list which he had tabled yesterday. The Secretary replied that he had already indicated that he was not in a position today to say that the Spanish list was acceptable. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on September 30. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 For agreed text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1968, p. 382. 3 See Document 206 . 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain 1 Washington, October 17, 1968, 2301Z. 257357. 1. The following is based on an uncleared memcon, 2 is Noforn, FYI only, and subject to revision upon review. 2. At his request, Spanish FonMin Castiella called on Secretary October 17 ostensibly for routine protocol farewell, 3 but conversation developed into substantive exchange on renewal of bases agreement. Castiella was in an extremely relaxed and cordial mood. 3. After opening cordialities, Secretary asked FonMinister how one should approach a resumption of negotiations on the base negotiations—from a political or military point of view. The FonMinister said that military aid which was basic and fundamental was first and political aspects could be handled through regular diplomatic procedures. There then ensued an exchange on some of the complications that had developed during the earlier talks. The Secretary noted that one of the problems for the US was the continuing drain caused by the war in Viet-Nam and said that if that were behind us the US would have been in a different budgetary position, but unfortunately war was not yet behind us. 4. The Secretary then suggested that there were three stages which resumed negotiations might take: a) The Secretary and the FonMinister should reach a political agreement on the fact that as a matter of general policy both Spain and US wanted the Agreement to continue in the future. b) Then the best military minds of both countries should get together quietly and discreetly to discuss military cooperation between the two countries. (During such talks both sides would try to come up with common strategic concepts which would constitute framework within which US-Spanish cooperation would continue. US would not want to question Spain’s sovereign responsibility for its own armed forces but would just discuss matter of conceivable common strategic concept and the provision of military equipment from that vantage point.) c) There could then be political conversations to clear up any remaining bilateral military or political matters. 5. Castiella enthusiastically endorsed Secretary’s outline and stated both countries should not waste any time in setting up first contacts which should be between high-level and discreet military representatives. (Castiella indicated General Diez-Alegria would be a good representative for Spain.) Castiella said that Secretary’s emphasis on concept of common strategy was of greatest importance because of sensitivity of Spanish people and desire to be a real part of Western defense effort. Secretary commented that in terms of over-all strategic concept and security of both countries it should be possible for both sides to identify their common requirements. 6. Secretary and FonMinister agreed on desirability of continuing Agreement and that they should now proceed to step two. Subject to agreement by Secretary Clifford and Spanish authorities, Secretary and Castiella expressed hope that top level military talks could start on November 15. The Secretary noted that by then US elections would have taken place and views of new Administration could be sought during course of negotiations. 7. Castiella took up the question of the Secretary’s letter on the balance of payments situation which had been drafted in September and said that it would be appreciated if the letter could be sent without being considered part of the base negotiations because it would have a very powerful psychological effect, even though it was not a commitment on the part of the US. The Secretary promised to consider the matter. 4 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SP-US. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Drafted by Gebelt and approved by Leddy. Repeated to USCINCEUR and CINCUSAFE. 2 A memorandum of conversation is ibid., DEF 15-4, SP-US. 3 Castiella was in New York attending the UN General Assembly meetings. 4 No letter has been found. 221. Memorandum of Conversation 221. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Madrid, November 18, 1968, 11:30 a.m. SUBJECT General Situation PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary Ambassador Wagner Mr. George W. Landau, Country Director, Spain-Portugal Spain General Franco Foreign Minister Castiella Spanish Ambassador to U.S. Merry Del Val Mr. Aguirre de Carcer, Director General for North American Affairs The Secretary regretted that he had been forced by illness to postpone his appointment by one day and he wished to express his gratitude to General Franco for accepting the changed schedule. He delivered greetings from President Johnson to the Spanish Chief of State and said that he did not believe the election in the United States would make any difference to U.S.-Spanish relations. The safety of Europe was basic to the security of the U.S. and as this was a bipartisan policy he felt certain that the new Administration would follow the same approach. He was equally certain that the new Administration would continue the policy of esteem and friendship towards Spain and he did not foresee any policy changes. He said that the U.S. continued to be concerned about the situation in Central Europe, the Mediterranean and Vietnam, and invited questions from General Franco. Franco said that he was greatly interested in all topics mentioned by the Secretary but that he was primarily concerned with the Mediterranean area. He said that the Mediterranean was of great importance to all of Europe and that Spain looked with justified alarm at the continued presence of the USSR in the Mediterranean. The Secretary reported that he had been encouraged by the growing interest of the NATO countries in the Mediterranean situation, a welcome change from views expressed in previous years. Not only did Turkey, Greece and France show interest, but so did some of the countries more distant from the Mediterranean like Belgium and Holland. The Mediterranean was more of a political than a military problem—and the situation of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean was similar to the position of U.S. troops in Berlin, surrounded by hostile territory and cut off from their home base. The Secretary referred to the possibility that the Soviets might acquire base facilities and other support in Algeria and said that he had mentioned this subject to the French Foreign Minister. The latter shared his concern, but did not think that the Soviets had acquired any bases in Algeria. France, according to Debre, was opposed to the Soviet presence in Algeria and would follow the matter closely. What France might do to counter a possible Soviet build-up remained a matter of speculation. General Franco said that the Mediterranean is most important to the life of Europe and that the Russian presence there was a total menace to all European countries and weakened the posture of NATO, particularly that of Greece and Turkey. He referred to the southern shore of the Mediterranean as the weak link because the countries located there received Soviet arms which mortgaged their freedom. He compared the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean to a steadily growing oil slick and said that if Soviet action in Czechoslovakia 2 constituted a menace to Central Europe and in particular Germany, the Russian presence in the Mediterranean was a menace to all of Europe. The Secretary assured General Franco that the U.S. had warned the U.S.S.R. very strongly against any move against what the U.S.S.R. called “State interests of the U.S.”, and that the U.S.S.R. had assured the U.S. at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia that there would be no infringement of those interests. He said the Soviets were under no illusion about our interest in countries where we have bases, or with which we have treaties or agreements. Although the Russians had responded seriously to our serious warning, they would have to be watched carefully because we were dealing with a communist government. As General Franco was aware the U.S. has the means of watching in some detail the movement of Soviet forces, but as of this moment there did not seem to be any indication that a use of force was contemplated or that what happened with Czechoslovakia would be repeated with Romania, Austria, Yugoslavia or Albania. The Secretary told Franco that we would advise Spain of any indications, as we understood Spain’s interest in the matter. Another matter of concern was Soviet arms build-up in Egypt and Algeria and there were a number of Soviet technicians in Egypt. He hoped that the Jarring mission would be successful and would result in a limitation of Soviet presence in Egypt. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the interest the Spanish Government took in the Mediterranean situation and referred to the exchange of information during the last two or three years on this subject which had been of mutual interest. General Franco asked whether the Czech situation was a result of spheres of interest established in Europe between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the end of World War II. The Secretary said it was just the opposite. The U.S. had agreed at Yalta to popular elections under Allied Commission supervision, but Stalin, behind the strength of the Red Army, simply snapped his fingers and invaded Eastern Europe. He added that we had never had any agreements with the U.S.S.R. about spheres of interest and that the Soviets did not consult with us prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia although we had warned them twice about this matter. The fact remained, however, that the Warsaw Pact and NATO existed and that use of force by one or the other meant war. He assured General Franco that the strong American reaction over Czechoslovakia was not based on friendship for the government of Czechoslovakia and that the Dubcek government gave us great difficulties. Soviet arms had been killing American soldiers in Vietnam. Nevertheless the U.S. wanted to make clear that even a small country was entitled to work out its own destiny. General Franco wondered whether the U.S.S.R. decision to invade Czechoslovakia and Hungary could have been decided on strategic grounds by the Soviet Armed Forces overruling the political leaders. The Secretary thought that this was possible because contrary to normal procedure the political leaders of the Soviet Union kept quiet and statements were made mainly by TASS, Pravda, Izvestia and on the radio. It was only two days ago that Brezhnev made his first statement. It was unfortunate, the Secretary said, that we had so little information and that complete secrecy was kept about what happened in discussions between the top Soviet leaders. The Secretary and General Franco agreed on the strategic impact on Europe made by the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the Secretary suggested that Soviet leaders might be frightened of peaceful coexistence which had brought about closer ties between Eastern and Western Europe. The trend towards closer ties, however, was permanent and he was sure that there would be further changes in Eastern Europe. In reply to General Franco’s question about NATO reaction to Czechoslovakia, the Secretary made these points: —Some European countries have finally abandoned their illusion about détente; —It improved French willingness to cooperate; —It made it possible for some countries to improve their defense budgets because public and parliamentary opinion had been aroused. The Secretary said that NATO was composed of national forces and any strengthening in the military forces of an individual country would result in a strengthening of NATO. He said he hoped that France would re-join NATO and added that the U.S. would hope that Spain would become a member of NATO, although there were some well-known difficulties. General Franco said that the weakest parts of Soviet power were the occupied countries and lack of Soviet domination over those countries prevented the U.S.S.R. from attacking the West. He said it would be important to encourage resistance in the occupied countries in order to make it more difficult for the Russians. The Secretary agreed and said that last June at Reykjavik he had proposed mutual withdrawal. 3 If the Soviet forces would leave Eastern Europe development in those countries would be accelerated. The U.S.S.R. unfortunately understood this, too, and had declined the suggestion. Events in Czechoslovakia had been costly to the Soviet Union and he was optimistic on a long range basis about development in Eastern Europe notwithstanding short-run difficulties. General Franco said that we should not forget that there was no liberal movement in Czechoslovakia but only a different type of national communism. The Secretary agreed but stressed that nevertheless it gave the Czechs more room to express their views. He said that even in the U.S.S.R. there are groups who are no longer under Communist Party control. Scientists in nuclear energy and space fields had become members of a world scientific community and were no longer controlled by the Party and this was a good development. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, ORG 7 S. Confidential. Drafted by Landau and approved in S on November 25. The memorandum is Part I of II. Part II, which covered bilateral issues, is ibid., POL SP-US. The meeting was held in El Pardo Palace. Rusk visited Brussels November 12-16 for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, before traveling to Spain November 16-18 and Portugal November 18-19. 2 Reference is to the August 30 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 3 Reference is to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting June 24-25. For text of NATO’s statement on mutual and balanced force reduction, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, p. 77. 222. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 222. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 22, 1968. SUBJECT General Wheeler’s Discussions in Madrid Attached is a copy of General Wheeler’s interesting memorandum 2 which you may wish to read in full reporting on his discussions with Spanish military officials in Madrid, November 18-20, 1968. General Wheeler reports that the Spanish took a hard line concerning the increased threat from Soviet forces in the Mediterranean and the inadequacy of the present defense agreements between Spain and the U.S. He estimates that in order to continue the full use of the Spanish bases, the U.S. offer will have to be approximately 100 million dollars more in grant aid than what might have been agreed earlier (i.e. $200 million instead of our offer of $100 million). In conversations with the Spanish Vice President, Admiral Carrero Blanco, and General Diez-Alegria, General Wheeler elicited the following information: 1. Spain has no intention of pursuing a neutralist course. 2. Spain must have a military force capable of unilateral defense actions, presumably in North Africa. 3. Considerable difficulty would be encountered in “stopping the clock” on the time period left for negotiations. 4. No decision has been made by the GOS, as yet, regarding the continued use of Torrejon Air Base. 5. Senior Spanish officials desire to continue a military relationship with the U.S., but consider the present arrangement an inadequate guarantee of Spanish security. 6. The Spaniards would leap at the chance to become a member of NATO, although they will not make any overt effort to do so. General Wheeler agreed with Spanish military officials to hold the next meeting in Madrid on December 4, 1968, in order to identify in greater detail those threats which could affect either country, and to jointly study ways to meet such threats by determining appropriate tasks and missions which each should undertake. General Burchinal will be General Wheeler’s representative for these discussions. The JCS will meanwhile proceed with our present reassessment of the military value to the United States of base rights in Spain, to provide a basis for United States re-examination of our current position. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and Landau. 2 Not printed. 223. Memorandum From Edward Fried of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 223. Memorandum From Edward Fried of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 29, 1968. SUBJECT U.S.-Spanish Bases Agreement At an IRG/EUR meeting held November 26 2 General Bane of the Joint Staff gave a rundown on General Wheeler’s November 18-20 talks in Madrid with General Navarro, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Air Force. A copy of the agreed minute on the talks is at Tab A. 3 General Bane stressed the following points: —The Spanish military is insisting on the creation of a joint U.S.-Spanish Military planning body which would plan joint exercises, joint utilization of the bases, and mutual defense. —The Spanish want us to give them tactical nuclear weapons training to the same extent that we provide such training for our NATO allies. —General Wheeler believes the negotiations are going to be very tough, and thinks that it is going to cost us another $100 million to get a renewal agreement. (Before the Spanish invoked Article V last September, they were asking for $690 million for the 5-year renewal; our top offer was $140 million.) General Wheeler has designated General Burchinal as his representative for the next round of military talks with the Spanish, to be held in Madrid December 4. This meeting will be limited to an examination of and preparation of a report on: —The threats which could affect either country, jointly or singly. —The appropriate tasks and missions which the U.S. and Spain should undertake, bilaterally or unilaterally, to meet these threats. DOD is now preparing guidance on these subjects for General Burchinal. Ed Fried 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Spain, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 No record of the meeting was found. 3 Not found. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 224. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 224. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, December 5, 1968. SUBJECT Spanish Base Negotiations In your October 17 meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella you agreed that as a matter of national policy the two countries desired to continue the defense relationship. The same view was expressed by General Franco in your brief conversation with him in Madrid. 2 You further agreed to a high level military meeting at the middle of November to come up with common strategic concepts which would constitute the framework for continued U.S.-Spanish cooperation; this to be followed by a related program of military assistance. As a final phase you envisaged political conversations between yourself and Castiella to clear up any remaining bilateral military and political matters. Military discussions were initiated by General Wheeler, November 18-20 and continued by General Burchinal in Madrid, December 4-6. A follow-up military meeting is scheduled to be held in Stuttgart, December 17-19, with a final round of military talks in January, possibly in Madrid, on a date to be agreed later. In light of this timetable, it does not seem likely that you will be able to conclude the base negotiations with Castiella prior to January 20. In this connection you might recall that we have firm indications of Spanish interest to carry over the base talks to the incoming administration. My inclination is not to press for rapid action but to let nature take its course. If you agree, please indicate. If you disagree, we will need to prod Defense to tighten up the schedule on military talks. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 SP-US. Confidential. Drafted by Landau. 2 According to the memorandum of conversation, Franco stated: “It had always been his wish to continue relations and that there existed a broad base of common interest for both countries. He stressed, however, that the agreements were old and had to be updated because of the change in the situation.” (Ibid., POL SP-US) 3 Rusk initialed his agreement on December 6. United Kingdom United Kingdom 225. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All European Posts Washington, February 14, 1964, 2:23 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Holloway, cleared in BNA, and approved by Tyler. Prime Minister Douglas-Home visited Washington February 12-14. Preparatory documents, briefing papers, and memoranda of conversation from this meeting are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2368-2369. 226. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Douglas-Home Washington, February 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret. 227. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 2, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on June 29. The meeting was held in the White House. 228. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 27, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on May 2. The memorandum is marked Part 3 of 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 229. Message From Prime Minister Douglas-Home to President Johnson London, June 23, 1964. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. The message was transmitted by the British Embassy on June 23. 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, October 16, 1964, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 UK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Rome, Paris for Finletter, The Hague, Bonn, Brussels, Moscow, and Luxembourg. 231. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 25, 1964, 12:15 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in U on October 27. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office. Roll was sent by Prime Minister Wilson to explain British economic policy to U.S. officials. Wilson’s correspondence with President Johnson on the subject, together with a statement of U.S. policy, are in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Documents 13, 14, and 16. 232. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 27, 1964, 12:15 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on October 29. The meeting was held in the President’s office. A record of the conversation relating to NATO and the MLF is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 93. Memoranda of other portions of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2240. 233. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, November 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret. 234. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, November 19, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret. 235. Editorial Note 236. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 7, 1964, 3:45 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, MLF No. 4. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler and approved in S on December 16. The meeting was held in the library of the British Embassy. 237. Record of Meeting Washington, December 7, 1964, 4:45-6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, CF 305, UK. Secret. A statement at the end of the memorandum reads: “These notes were prepared by Chairman Ackley, and have been checked for accuracy with Secretary Dillon and Mr. Bundy.” 238. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) Washington, February 9, 1965. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 239. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of Defense London, February 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 2. Secret; Priority; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 3:27 p.m. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the copy printed here. 240. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 23, 1965, 11:45 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2482. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Judd and approved in the White House on March 29. The meeting was held in the President’s office. Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington March 21-24. Briefing papers and memoranda of his conversations with Secretary Rusk are ibid., CF 2481-2482. 241. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, April 6, 1965, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 3. Secret; Flash; Nodis. 242. Memorandum of Conversation London, May 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Bruce and approved in S on June 25. The memorandum is Part I of III. Documentation covering other portions of the Rusk-Wilson conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2512. 243. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson Washington, June 28, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Callaghan Visit. Confidential. 244. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 30, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in U on July 14. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office. 245. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Rowen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 14, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret. Bundy transmitted copies of the memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense. In a covering memorandum, he commented: “Rowen’s memorandum shows that the Trend visit was cancelled because of Cabinet worry over consultation with Americans before Cabinet decisions are taken. This has a Skybolt flavor to me, and I have suggested to Dick Neustadt that the Prime Minister ought to bare his soul to David Bruce, if he doesn’t trust anyone else to come and talk to us.” Trend subsequently came to the United States for talks with U.S. officials. 246. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, July 29, 1965, 1:57 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 6. Top Secret. 247. Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, July 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Callaghan Visit. Secret; Sensitive. 248. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson Washington, August 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, Fowler Papers, International Classified Materials. Secret; Sensitive. 249. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Barr to President Johnson Washington, September 10, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14. No classification marking. 250. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, September 10, 1965, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, Bundy, Vol. 14. Secret. 251. Editorial Note 252. Memorandum Prepared by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret. Bruce’s record of Prime Minister Wilson’s visit is in Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Bator’s notes on part of President Johnson’s December 16 meeting with Wilson are in the Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Europe. A portion of the Johnson-Wilson private meetings dealing with nuclear sharing is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 117. 253. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, January 20, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 8. Secret; Noforn. 254. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 22, 1966, 11 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 8. Secret. Drafted by Judd and cleared by U on February 3 and by S on February 4. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 255. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 27, 1966, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 8. Secret; Noforn; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Lindjord and approved in U on March 1 and S on March 7. The memorandum is Part 1 of 5; memoranda of conversation covering other portions of this meeting are ibid. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room. The British delegation arrived in Washington on January 26 and returned to London on the morning of January 28. 256. Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:20 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 2. Secret. 257. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, February 25, 1966, 2256Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. 258. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, February 27, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 70 D 209, United Kingdom. No classification marking. A notation on the message indicates the President saw it. 259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, May 28, 1966, 1:41 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. The text was received from the White House and the telegram was approved by Read. 260. Memorandum of Conversation London, June 10, 1966, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 30. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on June 20. The memorandum is Part II of III; memoranda of the conversation dealing with NATO and Southern Rhodesia are ibid. The meeting was held at 10 Downing Street. Rusk visited London June 9-10. 261. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, July 4, 1966, 2:18 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. 262. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson Washington, July 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, UK Problem. Secret; Very Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Talked of this with Deming’s help over weekend.” 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, July 20, 1966, 1:13 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Walsh. 264. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, July 22, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Bill Moyers of the White House staff, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Secretary of State Rusk. In an attached covering memorandum to the President, Ball wrote: “The attached memorandum represents my personal view as to how we might appropriately handle the visit of Prime Minister Wilson.” 265. Memorandum of Conversation London, July 27, 1966, 10:30 p.m.-midnight. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, CO 305, UK. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street. 266. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Posts in NATO Capitals Washington, July 30, 1966, 4:12 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved by Stoessel. 267. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 17, 1966, 9:45 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Drafted by Judd and cleared in G and U on August 23. The meeting was held in Ball’s office. 268. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, April 4, 1967, 0901Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 143. Secret; Nodis. Vice President Humphrey visited Europe March 26-April 10. 269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Secretary Brown Washington, April 21, 1967. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 270. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) to Secretary of State Rusk London, May 6, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. 271. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, May 30, 1967, 1010Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 UK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 272. Editorial Note 273. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, July 13, 1967, 1600Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. An attached note from Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to Secretary Rusk reads: “The only distribution authorized of the attached message from Prime Minister Wilson by the President at this time is to yourself and Secretary McNamara.” A message from Foreign Secretary Brown to Secretary Rusk dealing with the same issues was delivered on July 13. (Ibid., DEF 6 UK) 274. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 17, 1967, 2:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in U on July 24. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. The meeting was held in Katzenbach’s office. 275. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 17, 1967, 3:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in S on August 21. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, September 14, 1967, 0144Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 UK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cheslaw; cleared in G, M, and the Department of Defense; and approved by EUR. 277. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 19, 1967, 7:05 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 46. Secret; Sensitive. 278. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 13, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 12. Secret. Drafted by Edward Fried of the NSC Staff. 279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts Washington, November 18, 1967, 2126Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted in the Treasury Department; cleared in the Departments of State and Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Reserve Board, and the White House; and approved by Anthony Solomon. 280. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of Defense London, November 18, 1967, 2315Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 12. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to the Department of State. The telegram bears the notation: “Seen by Mr. Bator.” 281. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, November 24, 1967, 1144Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 17 UK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 282. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in Australia London, December 21, 1967, 1130Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of State. The President and Prime Minister were attending funeral services for Australian Prime Minister Holt. 283. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, December 21, 1967, 1726Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to the Department of Defense. 284. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. The text of the message was transmitted in telegram 91707 to London, December 31. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom) 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 5, 1968, 2212Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 UK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Battle, BMI, and G; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, and Paris. 286. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, January 7, 1968, 0003Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 13. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 287. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State London, January 9, 1968, 1819Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 5337 from London, Ambassador Bruce told Secretary Rusk: “I think it important you read in full, before your conversation with George Brown, London’s 5336, reporting rather extraordinary conversation between Healey and Spiers. In spite of Healey’s optimism about maintaining his position in Cabinet, I think it impossible at present to predict what compromise may finally be reached.” (Ibid.) 288. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 11, 1968, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 13. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in S on January 23. The memorandum is marked Part III of V. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 289. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, January 11, 1968. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 UK. Secret. An attached January 11 note from Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff to Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, stated that the message was sent “via private wire” and authorized its relay to Bruce “eyes only.” In a January 11 memorandum to the President reporting the substance of the Rusk-Brown conversation, Under Secretary Katzenbach recommended the dispatch of this message, adding: “While I do not think it will do any good, I believe we cannot fail to express our views at the highest level and in the strongest possible terms.” (Ibid.) 290. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, January 15, 1968. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. Bruce noted in his diaries that the message was transmitted through a “special channel.” 291. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, January 15, 1968, 2300Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 292. Editorial Note 293. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) Washington, February 8, 1968. Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 63 D 327. Secret. 294. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson London, March 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK. Top Secret. 295. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UK. Secret. An attached memorandum from John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to Bromley Smith, June 1, stated that the paper was prepared for submission at the June 5 meeting of the National Security Council. On June 3 the Department forwarded to the NSC a supplementary memorandum for inclusion, entitled “UK and France.” It is printed as section H at the end of this memorandum. 296. Summary Notes of the 587th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, June 5, 1968, 12:15-12:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. 297. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 11, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 14. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Fried. 298. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, November 22, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 14. Secret. 225. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All European Posts 225. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All European Posts 1 Washington, February 14, 1964, 2:23 p.m. 1500. Talks with Douglas-Home and Butler. Missions requested draw on communiqué(sent USIS Wireless File of Feb 13) 2 and following summary in discussing this week’s talks with UK leaders in Washington: These talks can only be characterized as frank and far-ranging. We were not disappointed in our expectation that there would be agreement on most of the issues that face us. This did not inhibit either side from forcible statements of positions involving disagreements. Specifically, the US and the UK will continue to press at Geneva for meaningful yet prudent disarmament measures. The British agreed with our intention to continue to seek bilateral agreements with the USSR where these are to our interest. On Berlin and Germany, we agreed to continue to discuss proposals in the Ambassadorial Group in Washington for possible approaches to the USSR for negotiations. Both sides remain unalterably committed to join with their allies in looking for honorable settlements with the USSR. Both were emphatically agreed that they will follow up every opportunity to pursue peace. Obviously the conversations were responsive to the immediate problems the British face in Cyprus, Zanzibar and East Africa. The US gave full support to UK efforts to stabilize these areas. The British in turn expressed appreciation for this support and specifically for the US work in the Cyprus problem on which we are remaining closely and continually in touch. 3 Southeast Asia was the subject of serious discussion, particularly the heavy responsibilities each country bears in Malaysia and South Viet-Nam. We concluded that the independence and freedom of both these countries are our vital interests. The different philosophy of trade held by the two countries was clear in discussing trade with Cuba. The Prime Minister made plain UK determination neither to allow military material to be exported to Cuba nor to allow official credits to be extended to Castro for purchases of any material. But equally clear was UK determination to continue non-discriminatory treatment of all countries in trade in peaceful commodities on regular commercial terms. The PM did agree that Cuba represents a serious problem in subversion in this Hemisphere, but he could not for historical commercial policy reasons join us fully in our attempt to squeeze Cuba economically in order to isolate Castro politically. The different philosophies were reflected somewhat less starkly in the discussion of long-term credits to the Soviet Union, although the PM was again frank in his view that a “fat Communist” was a relatively safe Communist. We replied that it was not quite that simple and that controls on credit would force the Communists, if they really wanted to become “fat,” to divert resources from military expenditures, a course obviously in all our interests. We told the UK that we were not to be dissuaded from beginning the Kennedy Round talks on time, and the British agreed this was the best course. 4 On other matters, the communiquéneeds little elaboration. However, the warm atmosphere of the talks and their frankness even on Cuba trade and long-term credits cannot be overstated. The Heads of the two governments plan to meet regularly. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Holloway, cleared in BNA, and approved by Tyler. Prime Minister Douglas-Home visited Washington February 12-14. Preparatory documents, briefing papers, and memoranda of conversation from this meeting are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2368-2369. 2 Not found. For text of the communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 610-612. 3 A February 13 memorandum of conversation regarding Cyprus is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVI, Document 12 . 4 A February 12 memorandum of conversation dealing with the Kennedy Round is printed ibid., vol. XIII, Document 9 . 226. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Douglas-Home 226. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Douglas-Home 1 Washington, February 28, 1964. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In our talks in Washington we agreed that we would reaffirm together the understandings of our two Governments with regard to consultation in the use of nuclear weapons. I now confirm this agreement in the attached Memorandum of Understanding. It is very much like the one which President Kennedy sent to Prime Minister Macmillan in February 1961, 2 except for minor but necessary editorial changes and the deletion of references to the IRBM (Thor) force which is no longer operational. I note also that our two Governments have a continuing commitment to consult with the North Atlantic Council concerning the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, if time permits. 3 Let me take this occasion to say again how much Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed your visit, and how clear its value is as we continue to work together on hard problems all around the world. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson Attachment UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE BRITISH ON THE USE OF BRITISH BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1. Our understanding on the use of British bases is that the President and Prime Minister will reach a joint decision by speaking personally with each other before certain forces equipped with U.S. nuclear weapons and operating from bases in the United Kingdom will use nuclear weapons, namely SAC, British Bomber Command, 4 SACEUR-assigned forces in the UK, and U. S. Polaris submarines in British territorial waters. The basic understanding is contained in the communiquéof January 9, 1952 covering the Truman-Churchill talks: “Under arrangements made for the common defense, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.” Procedures for carrying out this basic understanding were agreed upon in the Murphy-Dean Agreement of June 7, 1958, which was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. The covering document, the Report to the President and the Prime Minister, repeats almost literally the language of the Truman-Churchill communiqué: “2. The basic understanding between the United Kingdom and United States Governments, regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces, provides that such use in an emergency shall be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of the circumstances at the time.” 2. There is a second, more general understanding with the British that we will consult with them before using nuclear weapons anywhere, if possible. The basic understanding on this point is contained in a memorandum of conversation of a meeting between the President and Eden on March 9, 1953. Eden had asked for an assurance of consultation by the President with the Prime Minister prior to U.S. use of any nuclear weapon. “He (the President) said that the United States would, of course, in the event of increased tension or the threat of war, take every possible step to consult with Britain and our other allies.” The President reaffirmed this understanding when he wrote to the Prime Minister on October 27, 1960, in connection with the Holy Loch berthing: “With reference to the launching of missiles from U.S. Polaris submarines, I give you the following assurance, which of course is not intended to be used publicly. In the event of an emergency, such as increased tension or the threat of war, the U.S. will take every possible step to consult with Britain and other Allies. This reaffirms the assurance I gave Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9, 1953.” 3. It should be noted that the agreement for joint decision by the President and the Prime Minister does not extend to all U.S. forces under SACEUR and SACLANT but only covers those SACEUR-assigned forces (strike squadrons) based in the UK. 5 The other U.S. nuclear forces under SACEUR and SACLANT would only be covered by the more general understanding to consult if time permits. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret. 2 Kennedy confirmed the understandings in a February 6, 1961, letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) 3 In a March 12 letter to President Johnson, Prime Minister Douglas-Home confirmed that the Memorandum of Understanding correctly represented the position of the U.K. Government and noted the continuing validity of the undertakings given by the two governments in 1962 to consult the North Atlantic Council, if time permitted, on the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. (Ibid.) 4 Excluding aircraft of such Command equipped with British nuclear weapons. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 This should not be taken to exclude U.S. nuclear forces based in the UK which might be assigned to a NATO commander in the future. In such event such forces would be brought under the terms of the Murphy-Dean Report by appropriate amendment of that Report. [Footnote in the source text.] 227. Memorandum of Conversation 227. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 2, 1964, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Tour d’Horizon with Harold Wilson, Leader of British Labor Party PARTICIPANTS US The President Mr. Tyler UK Mr. Harold Wilson, M.P. Mrs. Harold Wilson Mr. Giles Wilson (son) Mr. David Ennals (in charge of Research in Labor Party) The President told Mr. Wilson he was glad to see him again and Mr. Wilson recalled that he had last been in the White House in April 1963, 2 though he had come to Washington since then at the time of the funeral ceremony for President Kennedy. The President said to Mr. Wilson that things seemed to be going a little better in Cyprus, and Mr. Wilson agreed though he commented that it seemed that a vote at the UN on the resolution had been postponed until tomorrow. 3 The President said he had prepared a message to send to President Inonu of Turkey that very morning, but had held off from doing so because it seemed that the Turks were coming on board. He feared the postponement implied that there was some difficulty coming from Makarios. The President commented that he had seen Makarios last year, 4 and had formed the impression that he was a very hard man. (The President called Mr. McGeorge Bundy on the phone in order to get the latest information on Cyprus.) The President asked Mr. Wilson why the UK considered it worthwhile to continue to trade with Cuba, which represented only about $5 million, when by so doing the UK was creating so much anti-British feeling over here. The President said that after the Prime Minister’s press conference in Washington on the subject, there had been a great deal of criticism of the UK. Had the Prime Minister merely pointed out that the UK had reduced its trade with Cuba from $55 million to $5 million, the effect would have been favorable instead of unfavorable. Mr. Wilson said that the reason why the Prime Minister had spoken in the way he did was in order to get votes at home by taking the position of a staunch defender of UK policy and interests. The President set forth the reasons that lay behind US policy toward Cuba and said that Castro’s policy was a great threat not only to this hemisphere but to Western security as a whole. He said it was important that this fact should be understood. Mr. Wilson replied with classic British reasoning on not using foreign trade as an instrument of coercion except in exceptional cases. He recalled that when he was President of the Board of Trade he himself had instituted a UK embargo on shipments of arms to the Soviet Union, and that he had at one point cut off all trade with Hungary when the Hungarian government had arrested a British business man. However when it came down to non-strategic commodities, it was British policy to encourage trade across the board. He pointed out that buses could not be considered to be in this category. The President said that the situation must be looked at in terms of Cuba’s needs to keep her economy going. He said that buses represented 80 per cent of Cuban transportation. On the other hand, US wheat sales to the Soviet Union were a one-shot deal and represented less than one per cent of the Soviet Union’s need in wheat. Mr. Wilson said he realized that this was a difficult issue between the United States and the United Kingdom and that he would do everything he could to keep it from playing a major role in the campaign. He said he thought that the British elections would take place in May or June, because the Tories would not be able to hold out until the last moment. He said he thought there would be a certain amount of anti-American sentiment aroused, in the course of the campaign, by the Conservative party. There were still memories of Suez, and there were back-benchers in the Conservative party who would play up to nationalistic feeling for electoral purposes. He stressed to the President that the Labor party was a strong supporter of NATO and the Atlantic community, and had a broad international outlook which was not the case with the rank and file Conservatives. He said the Labor party wanted to play a positive role in Europe but did not want “to be corralled in a little Europe with the Six.” The Labor party was mindful of the broad interests of the Commonwealth and wanted to play a part which would be in active support of US efforts to maintain worldwide security. Turning to defense, Mr. Wilson repeated almost verbatim the arguments he had used in his talk with Secretary Rusk. 5 He said that a Labor government would want to get rid of the national deterrent which made no sense at all for England today. He said this would save 300 million pounds which could be used to put back the British fleet on the high seas, and would permit an increase in conventional forces so that the UK could play an active and useful role in putting out brush fires when necessary. The President asked Mr. Wilson for his views on the MLF. Mr. Wilson replied with the standard arguments which he had already expressed at lunch. 6 He said that the only circumstances in which the Labor government would support the MLF would be if this were the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring a national nuclear force. He said that he did not think that the German government wanted this, or that there was any support for this in German public opinion. The President asked Mr. Wilson whether he really thought that Germans had abandoned their desire to play a dominant role, and Mr. Wilson said that even if they wanted to do so, the West had the means of preventing this from happening. He felt that the MLF did have the result of putting the German finger on the nuclear trigger. He was apprehensive of a possible development whereby the United States would no longer retain the veto, and Germany might find herself in a position of casting a majority vote by “three to two.” The President said that such a situation would never be permitted to arise. Mr. Wilson said that in general the British elections would be waged and won on domestic issues, and he himself wanted to wage a campaign against poverty, as President Johnson himself was doing. The President asked Mr. Wilson how he saw the relationship between the UK Labor party and the Democratic party in the United States. Mr. Wilson said he thought that both had much in common. They were both parties of the people, with a strong social sense, and with a desire to develop and change institutions in the interest of the welfare of the majority, whereas the Conservative party was inclined to preserve the vested interests of a minority and to resist change and progress. The President mentioned the London municipal elections coming up in early April and asked Mr. Wilson how he thought they would go. Mr. Wilson said he was reasonably optimistic. The President mentioned the A-11, the new US interceptor plane. He said it had a speed of 3.2 Mach and a ceiling above 70,000 feet. He said this was a very considerable technical advance which was of great importance to the Free World. He said he had sent a message to the Prime Minister informing him about the announcement before he had made it. Mr. Wilson said that this plane was a very great development and that it pointed up the fact that it was useless for the UK to try to play a role in the same league as the United States in the defense field. He said that the UK just wasn’t “in the same line of country,” and that this was further justification of the Labor party’s policy to get rid of the national deterrent. In conclusion, Mr. Wilson thanked the President for having received him, and his family, and said he hoped very much to have the chance of seeing him and Mrs. Johnson again in London and in Washington. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on June 29. The meeting was held in the White House. 2 April 2, 1963. Documentation on the Wilson visit is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2236. 3 Reference is to Security Council Resolution 186 (1964), adopted unanimously on March 4. For text, see American Foreign Policy : Current Documents, 1964, pp. 566-567. 4 September 1962; see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XVI, Document 263 . 5 A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 UK. 6 No record of this conversation was found. 228. Memorandum of Conversation 228. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 27, 1964, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Ambassador Thompson, S/AL William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA UK Foreign Secretary Butler Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Undersecretary, Foreign Office Denis A. Greenhill, British Minister John Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary John A. Thomson, First Secretary, British Embassy Secretary Rusk said he was going to surprise Foreign Secretary Butler by discussing an aspect of the Cuban problem other than trade. He referred to over-flights of Cuba by U.S. U-2 aircraft. The Secretary said the Soviets were pulling out of Cuba and turning the surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) over to the Cubans. We had information that some Soviet passenger ships were en route to Cuba and we believed that these would be used to remove the remaining Soviet troops. We were glad to see the Soviets leaving but were not happy about the Cubans taking over the SAMs. A couple of weeks ago, we had sent the Cubans a low-key message on the subject but they had come roaring back with some Soviet support. Our flights are unobtrusive. They are seen only on radar. We feel that we must keep up some surveillance so that we know what is going on down there. If the Cubans try to prevent the over-flights we would have a nasty situation. Castro had turned down the two proposals which would have dealt with the problem, both of which had been approved by the Soviets. The first would have provided for UN surveillance and the second was for a nuclear-free zone. Mr. Butler said that what would worry the British would be retaliation. The Secretary said there would be retaliation. We would take out a SAM site if a U-2 were knocked down. Mr. Butler observed that the U.S. would be acting even more resolutely than the British had at Harib. Duncan Sandys said at the time of the Harib incident that the U.S. would have to support the UK because the U.S. would eventually want British support on Cuba. Mr. Butler added that at his press conference that morning, he had told the U.S. newsmen off the record that the UK would like to support the U.S. on Cuba. He presumed that our retaliation would lead the Cubans to take their case to the Security Council and the U.S. would have to cast its first veto. The Secretary replied that he did not know if Cuba would go to the Security Council. We might take the matter to the OAS. Mr. Butler asked what was our jurisdictional justification for over-flights. The Secretary replied that they had been approved by the hemisphere. 2 The Cubans were bound not to interfere with the over-flights. Mr. Butler asked what action might come out of the UN. The Secretary said that U Thant might be asked to send some observers to Cuba. Mr. Butler then asked if the U.S. would consult the UK before retaliating. Secretary Rusk said that we would give the UK advance notification. The Secretary said that the time would be very short. The Secretary said that we had repeatedly sent to the Cubans signals on two points which bothered us. The first was a military connection with Moscow and the second was subversion in the hemisphere. We had good evidence that they were going on with their subversive efforts. Foreign Secretary Butler recalled the Cuban crisis in 1962. When it came, Prime Minister Macmillan had called him and asked him to come to Number 10 Downing Street. Macmillan had said he couldn’t stand to be alone at such a time. Mr. Butler had gone to 10 Downing Street and had been privy to the numerous communications exchanged between Macmillan and President Kennedy. He would say for the new Prime Minister that he would like the President or Secretary Rusk to use the communications which we have in the same manner as they had been used by Macmillan and Kennedy. He said he thought this was as far as he could take it. He added that the U.S. was playing with fire. Finally, Mr. Butler said he would like to make it absolutely clear that the UK was sympathetic and understood the U.S. concern with Cuba. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Judd and approved in S on May 2. The memorandum is marked Part 3 of 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 For text of the OAS resolution on Cuba, approved October 23, 1962, see Department of State Bulletin , November 12, 1962, pp. 722-723. 229. Message From Prime Minister Douglas-Home to President Johnson 229. Message From Prime Minister Douglas-Home to President Johnson 1 London, June 23, 1964. As you know, there has been friction over the past few years between the United States and other principal maritime nations about the regulation of shipping in several of its aspects. This has now reached a point where the application of United States legislation 2 by the Federal Maritime Commission would, in our view, invade our jurisdiction and produce a situation which it would be politically impossible for any British Government to accept. Other principal maritime nations are faced with the same difficulties. I am disturbed about the possible effects of this situation on the general state of the Western Alliance. As things are, we shall be faced with recurrent crises, the first on July 3, the date now set for the conclusion of dual rate contracts. In these circumstances I would ask you to give your most serious consideration to the annexed Memorandum, 3 in which I suggest both that an international conference should be held to consider the basic question of jurisdiction in these matters, and also that you should not take action against our shipping while the question of principle is being discussed. I am sure you will agree that we must find a way out of these difficulties and my suggestions are designed to provide one. I hope you will find them helpful. 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential. The message was transmitted by the British Embassy on June 23. 2 Reference is to the Bonner Act, amending the Shipping Act of 1916. For text of P.L. 87-346, approved October 3, 1961, see 75 Stat. 762. 3 Not printed. 4 In a June 25 memorandum to the President, Francis Bator and McGeorge Bundy advised, “We think the Prime Minister’s message is largely for the record and we do not think his hints of reprisal should be taken at face value,” suggested that the United States extend the period of grace to September 1, offering a meeting on the “narrow question of jurisdiction,” and maintain its position “as we must, under the law.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 5) The President approved this position, which was transmitted to the Prime Minister in a message of June 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 230. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, October 16, 1964, 1 p.m. 1776. From Bruce. Now that Harold Wilson will shortly be Prime Minister, it might be appropriate to speculate about his possible attitude toward Anglo-American negotiations. I believe we will find him, at least for a considerable time to come, desirous of personally controlling all important aspects of British policy, foreign and domestic. The charge during the campaign that he was a “one man band” was fully justified. In fact, the contribution to victory made by other leaders of the party including those likely to be Cabinet ministers, was relatively minor, except in their own constituencies. Indeed, those who commanded a national audience were often sources of acute embarrassment, since their utterances sometimes required rectification by him. As a politician, Mr. Wilson clearly demonstrated his superiority in intellectual ability, adroitness, and persuasiveness, over his associates. The disparate elements in Labour ranks became cohesive under his leadership, united by a desire to win. It is to be expected that once the rewards are apportioned, there will be a resumption of internal feuds, exposing the doctrinal factionalism that has long plagued a party representing so many conflicting philosophies. Intrigued by the manner in which the American President is served by a personal staff, Mr. Wilson is likely to make a small scale adaptation of it for his own use, especially in the early days of office. Since Cabinet officials must sit in Parliament, the decisions usually reached with their advice and concurrence may be made more often than has been customary by the Prime Minister alone, perhaps after consultation with a sort of “kitchen Cabinet” of non-Parliamentarians. He will have in the key positions of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Minister of Defense, appointees on whose judgment in affairs vital to their own departments and to the national security, he will not completely rely. The same will apply, in lesser degree, to heads of the great domestic areas of government. Consequently, while the PM will preserve the appearance of operating under normal Cabinet conditions (it being remembered that its members have traditionally been accustomed to exercise more independent authority than do ours), he can be expected himself to outline, and support in negotiations, those essential policies requiring agreement between our two countries. We must therefore prepare ourselves for a greater degree of high level negotiation with the British than has been our previous experience. Callaghan, Healey, and whoever becomes Foreign Minister may eventually be replaced by stronger individuals, but for the present their field of maneuver will be restricted. The PM will, within a short time, wish to have a date set for conversations with President Johnson, whose re-election is taken for granted in the UK. It is tempting to try to analyze Mr. Wilson’s character, but to do so would require a magazine length report. No telegraphic summary could do justice to his complicated, often inconsistent, personality; only his future actions will disclose whether his numerous detractors or admirers have properly assessed his intentions and capacities. I would, however, recommend to those in our govt, who must shortly deal with him, an article in the Sunday Telegraph of October 11, by Peregrine Worsthorne entitled “A Man With Fire in His Belly, But.” I do not entirely subscribe to those views expressed by the author summarized in the statement: “The Labour Govt, should it be elected, will find itself opposing the United States on a major issue of policy (MLF), outraging the West Germans and delighting the Russians all in the first few weeks of office.” I consider that Mr. Wilson is too clever by half to commit such an egregious blunder. While he is unlikely to accommodate his foreign policies to those of the United States to the same extent as have a succession of Conservative governments, if our negotiations are skillfully managed from the beginning (but only so) I believe we can, with patience, enter into transactions with him to our mutual benefit. In the particular case of the MLF, though he and most of his party have no liking whatever for it, if he thinks he can gain large national advantages by participating in it, his reluctant assent to doing so will depend on a comprehensive bargain with us. There is no chance, in my opinion, of his signing the treaty until there have been discussions between him and ourselves on the whole issue of NATO defense, about which he entertains strong convictions and prejudices. Nevertheless he is keenly aware of the paramount necessity of reaching, after extensive argumentation, an accord with us on NATO defense and on the general terms of foreign policy, excepting such questions as trade with Cuba, long term credits to the Soviet Bloc, recognition of Communist China, and other matters which we have been unable to settle to our satisfaction with preceding British governments. The greatest single danger, provided he is satisfied otherwise, to an agreement with Mr. Wilson on the principle of British adhesion to the MLF (he will certainly under any conditions propose some alterations in the current plans) will, in my estimation, spring from his over sanguine views of what concessions might be obtained from the Soviet Govt in the security field. I do not think that in his frequent trips to Russia he has been hornswoggled, but he has certainly cajoled himself into believing he can negotiate more successfully with the Soviet Govt than any other allied statesman. Until he has had his beard singed, he may attempt to persuade us to use the MLF as a bargaining counter with the Soviets, and to be prepared to abandon it in return for a spectacular Soviet offer on disarmament. A lesser danger is that in proposing to renounce Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, he will cherish expectations of receiving from us a greater quid pro quo than our own interests should permit. If, by what he calls “renegotiation of the Nassau Pact,” he could arrive at an understanding with the US that he could represent to his own people as establishing a special relationship with us on the control and use of nuclear military weapons, only short of an equal right to a finger on the trigger, he might well consider MLF accession a low price to pay. I think it would be both unwise and unnecessary for us to consider such an arrangement. Regarding Britain’s entry into the Common Market, or participation in European integration in any form, Mr. Wilson and his party can be expected to be far less likely to move in that direction than have been the Conservatives. He has so forcefully and optimistically pledged himself to the development of trade with the Commonwealth, and imposed such conditions on possible membership in the Common Market, that it would seem probable he will experiment with the Commonwealth idea for at least a year before seriously considering an alternative. We will find Mr. Wilson a resourceful, tough, realistic, opinionated bargainer, but solely our own lack of equal resourcefulness and determination would enable him to profit at the expense of our more powerful position. Perhaps these observations are sufficient for the moment. What we should expect from Mr. Wilson on British Guiana, countries East of Suez, the Kennedy Round, balance of payments and other fiscal questions, 2 and additional topics of joint concern, cannot be usefully developed at this time. His domestic programs will have tangential consequences for us. It remains to be ascertained whether he is dedicated to developing class warfare. The small size of his majority may impede swift action aimed at eliminating important sectors of the free enterprise system. His anticipated proposals for taxation are awaited with fear in the City. From a national standpoint, if radical changes occur in fiscal management, as advocated by some of his advisers, there will be a further diminution of confidence, already impaired by a Labor victory, amongst Britain’s creditors. This may prove his most serious problem. The important thing is for us to be alert, when the time comes, to advocate our own policies, and to persuade him to conform his to them where we have made a reasonable case. We will not find him impervious to reason, but will discover he is sceptical of some of our cherished political, economic and military beliefs. He will be a tough nut to crack. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 UK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Rome, Paris for Finletter, The Hague, Bonn, Brussels, Moscow, and Luxembourg. 2 In telegram 1805 from London, October 16, the Embassy commented further: “Wilson will be confronted immediately with over-hanging problem of difficult British balance of payments. In Embassy opinion, problems may assume grave proportions, although much of it now seems suppressed, dealt with by short term borrowing and hidden from public eye and consciousness.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 2) 231. Memorandum of Conversation 231. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 25, 1964, 12:15 p.m. SUBJECT British Economic Measures PARTICIPANTS Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Economic Affairs The Under Secretary G. Griffith Johnson Assistant Secretary, E J. Harold Shullaw Director, BNA Sir Eric Roll gave the Under Secretary three copies of the statement being made by the British Government on October 26 concerning the urgent economic measures it is taking to deal with the balance of payments problem. 2 Sir Eric said he wished to stress the speed with which the new government has tackled the problem and the new approach which it represents. He said the contrast was not only with respect to the Conservative stop-go policies, but also with respect to Labor’s former policies. He said the leaders of the new government had rejected a return to the Sir Stafford Cripps siege economy measures of 1946-1947. Sir Eric expressed the view that this is a very significant development and, if the course is maintained, it can affect the whole range of government policy, and not alone on the economic side. In response to a question from Mr. Johnson, Sir Eric said that he did not expect that there would be a drawing from the IMF before the end of November or early December. In the discussion which followed on the statement to be made by the Department on October 27, concerning the British measures, Sir Eric offered a number of minor suggestions but expressed himself as satisfied with the positive and helpful character of the proposed statement. He undertook to endeavor to obtain a public statement by a United Kingdom minister regarding the Kennedy Round negotiations to be made shortly after the British statement on the balance of payments measures. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in U on October 27. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office. Roll was sent by Prime Minister Wilson to explain British economic policy to U.S. officials. Wilson’s correspondence with President Johnson on the subject, together with a statement of U.S. policy, are in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Documents 13 , 14 , and 16 . 2 The statement announced a plan to correct the U.K. balance-of-payments deficit. The plan’s principal measures comprised a 15 percent surcharge on all manufactured or semi-manufactured imports and a system of export rebates. Extracts of the significant portions of the Government White Paper, “The Economic Situation,” are printed in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964 , pp. 20939-20994. 3 Apparent reference to a November 3 speech by Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan. For extracts of the significant portions, see ibid., pp. 20395-20396. 232. Memorandum of Conversation 232. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 27, 1964, 12:15 p.m. PARTICIPANTS US The President The Secretary of State Mr. McGeorge Bundy Mr. William Tyler UK Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia Mr. Gordon Walker told the President that he was very glad to be in Washington and appreciated being received by the President. He said that the policies of our two countries were very close. After the President had made complimentary references to the role of Lord Harlech as Ambassador, the Secretary of State gave a general account of the current round of discussions which he said had been very satisfactory. Thirty or more subjects had been broached and we had found that our purpose was the same on nearly all points. He said there had been a wide range of agreement. He discussed the status of the MLF question and said that Mr. Gordon Walker had raised some ideas which the Secretary wanted us to think about very carefully. He said that these ideas should be subjects of discussion with other governments. The President said that he was very glad to hear this and he made complimentary remarks about the members of his Cabinet and about the role of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of State said that among the important matters which had been discussed we had found ourselves in agreement on (1) Article 19, 2 and (2) British Guiana. The President said with regard to Article 19 that we were interested in finding any face-saving device to let the Soviet government get off the hook. The Secretary then gave a run-down on the US position on Article 19. The President asked Gordon Walker for his estimate of Soviet policy in the light of the recent changes. Mr. Gordon Walker said he naturally did not know what had been going on but was inclined to think that something sudden must have happened to precipitate the sudden change in leadership. 3 He thought that perhaps Khrushchev may have had in mind an initiative on Germany which may have been unacceptable to the other Soviet leaders. He thought that there was also possibly an element of criticism of Khrushchev’s handling of the Chinese problem. He also thought that the question of the allocation of resources had played a role in Khrushchev’s political demise. The President asked whether Mr. Gordon Walker thought that Soviet policy was likely to get tougher. Mr. Gordon Walker said it was hard to know. He had found it particularly interesting that the satellites had stood up so frankly in expressing reservations about the recent change. The President asked what Mr. Gordon Walker thought about Vietnam. Mr. Gordon Walker said that the Prime Minister and he very much wanted to talk about this matter after the US elections. At all events he could assure the President that the UK Government would not say anything on the subject which might be embarrassing to the United States. The President asked whether Prime Minister Wilson wanted to come to Washington. Mr. Gordon Walker replied emphatically in the affirmative and said he thought the best time might be during the Christmas recess of the British Parliament. The President asked whether the British Government had found de Gaulle’s trip to Latin America 4 interesting and stimulating. The President said he rather felt that the trip had been a flop. Mr. Gordon Walker said that at any rate it had been a good demonstration of De Gaulle’s physical energy, but he agreed that De Gaulle hadn’t left much behind. The President asked for Mr. Gordon Walker’s views on Italy. Mr. Gordon Walker said that he thought that the present Italian government must be helped in any way we could. He said it was the only possible political formula. He spoke highly of Saragat. He added that he was sure that Nenni was now a dedicated anti-Communist but his political authority had recently been reduced and he was perhaps beginning to fail somewhat due to his age and to his bad fall a couple of years ago. The President asked about the Labor Government’s margin in Parliament. Mr. Gordon Walker was rather optimistic and said that things were not as bad as was generally thought. He said that the government could count in a certain measure on support from the Liberal Party. He said that one factor working for the government was general distaste in England for another election. The President asked what Mr. Gordon Walker thought about Chancellor Erhard. Mr. Gordon Walker said he thought that Erhard was a weak man who wanted to be loved by everybody, and that this was not a good state of mind for a politician to be in. The President said that he liked the contrast between Erhard and Adenauer. He felt that Erhard had some flexibility whereas Adenauer “thought that the Communists were going to eat him before breakfast every morning.” Mr. Gordon Walker agreed and said that Erhard’s electoral prospects were not as good as they might be since the Socialists had shown increasing strength in recent local elections. The President turned to Cuba and said he hoped the UK Government was not going to announce a new deal between now and next Tuesday. He recalled the experience he had had with Sir Alec Douglas-Home in January [February] on the same subject. 5 The Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of the UK developing its trade with other Latin American countries and thus being in a position to justify giving up trade with Cuba on purely commercial grounds rather than by announcing a change in policy. Turning to the UK domestic financial situation, the President asked whether the UK was going to cut down on its imports. Mr. Gordon Walker thanked the President for the US reaction to and support of the measures which the UK had just announced. The President commented that these measures had been understood here as being necessary and that we had been glad to support them. He said he hoped that the UK would find it possible to give a quid pro quo by helping us on Cuba. Mr. Gordon Walker said that he felt that one must take into account the fact that if the UK had not sold buses to Cuba then the French would have done so but he hoped that we would make an effort to bring the French into line on trade with Cuba too. He reiterated his thanks for the way the Administration had reacted to the current UK financial difficulties. The Secretary said that we would be glad to sell the UK more beef and the President commented that he was delighted to get this support for his difficulties from the Secretary. Returning again to the subject of a visit to Europe, the President said that he would be glad to see the Prime Minister here in early December if this was mutually convenient. He thought that he himself would be heavily involved in the first few weeks of the New Year with budget and other matters such as the economic and State-of-the-Union messages to the Congress so he would have to see later how things looked for a possible visit some time in the spring. The President said in general that the US Government wanted to be as helpful as possible to the UK. He said that there was some uncertainty in the air with new governments and changes occurring in many places. He remarked that he was counting on absentee votes from Americans in the UK to help him out in next week’s elections. He observed that there had been some pretty active and successful organization of Americans in England. The President asked Mr. Gordon Walker what he thought about the Chinese Communist explosion of a nuclear device. Mr. Gordon Walker said he was glad that it had been announced ahead of time by the US government. 6 The President commented that this was due to the wisdom of the Secretary of State, who in turn said that it had been the President’s decision. Mr. Gordon Walker said that naturally the explosion itself had come as no surprise but it was still a disturbing development. What had surprised them was the fact that the Chinese had used U-235 instead of plutonium. The President said that he thought our intelligence cooperation was excellent and that he was glad that Mr. McCone was going over to London soon to see the Prime Minister. Mr. Gordon Walker said he would be very glad to see Mr. McCone and valued our close relationship in this field. The Secretary commenced that our cooperation was so intimate that we occasionally knew everything about each other’s diplomatic activities. Mr. Gordon Walker said that he greatly valued our close relationship in this field and wanted it to continue. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler and approved in the White House on October 29. The meeting was held in the President’s office. A record of the conversation relating to NATO and the MLF is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 93 . Memoranda of other portions of the conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2240. 2 Reference is to Article 19 of the UN Charter. 3 Reference to replacement of Khrushchev as Soviet Prime Minister and Party Secretary by a collective leadership of Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin. 4 September 21-October 15. 5 See Document 225 . 6 For text of President Johnson’s statement on the Chinese nuclear explosion on October 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1357-1358. 233. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 233. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, November 19, 1964. I feel that I ought to let you know that we are facing a serious situation on sterling. 2 The pound has been under strong pressure for several days, and although the last two days were better, we cannot be sure that this improvement will continue. The pressure is coming from a number of sources, including the Continent, and probably for a variety of motives. We intend, as you know, to draw at the beginning of next month enough of our I.M.F. standby to repay the short term credit we have received from the Federal Reserve and the other central Banks. We might perhaps then expect to have a little over $300 million left in our standby. We shall also have reconstituted the swap facility with the Federal Reserve; the other central Banks also may be willing to give further short term assistance, though this cannot be certain in present circumstances. But, if the run on sterling continues at anything like Monday’s rate, we shall have exhausted the credit facilities at present available to us in a matter of weeks. We are being advised that, if we raised the Bank rate this week, we should probably halt the drain. But we are very reluctant to do this since it would run counter to the long-term policies we are developing for dealing with our basic economic problems; and I have no doubt that these are on the right lines and will be successful if only they are given time to work. Moreover, I believe that an increase in our Bank rate would be as unwelcome to you as it would be to us. Am I right in thinking this? Of course, if you are intending shortly to raise your own discount rate for your own reasons we shall reluctantly have to follow you; and I would hope that we could then make this a concerted operation. But if, as I believe, this is not in your mind, we for our part will do our best to withstand the pressure. In any event, however, recent experience has shown that, if we are to outmanoeuvre the speculators in the short term and to give our longer term policies the chance to mature, we need substantial reinforcement for sterling as rapidly as possible. We therefore have it in mind to approach the I.M.F. for a further standby of $1,000 million; and we shall greatly value your support. In order to take the necessary soundings Sir Eric Roll is returning to Washington today. He will be able to give you, if you wish, a fuller explanation of our thinking; and I shall be most grateful if you can let me have your reactions as soon as possible. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret. 2 Wilson discussed the run on the pound in The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 31-38. 234. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 234. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, November 19, 1964. Thank you for your frank exposition of the problems you are facing with sterling. You can be sure of our deep interest in your efforts to maintain its integrity. As to your Bank rate, we recognize that this is a decision you must take based on your views of what is necessary for the defense of sterling. 2 We agree with your concept that more fundamental attacks on the basic problems of your trade deficit are preferable to early and indiscriminate use of Bank rate. As for our own discount rate, this is a matter for our Federal Reserve Board which, as you know, Congress has made independent in this regard of the Executive Branch. However, I am informed that they do not feel that our domestic economy requires any increase in our discount rate. We will of course be glad to give all the help we can to Sir Eric Roll in his efforts to obtain an additional IMF standby. I think it is essential to continue the close cooperation between our people on all aspects of your current problem, and I will fully inform you in advance should there be any modification of our present situation. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 1. Top Secret. 2 The United Kingdom raised its bank rate to 7 percent effective November 23. 235. Editorial Note 235. Editorial Note Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Sir Patrick Gordon Walker, and Defense Minister Denis Healey visited Washington December 7-9, 1965, for talks with U.S. officials centering on the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). Documentation relating to these discussions together with an editorial note outlining other subjects touched upon in their meetings is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIII, Documents 59 – 62 . A briefing paper on the international economic situation, prepared in the Department of the Treasury, is ibid., volume VIII, Document 19 . A memorandum of conversation relating to British defense plans is printed as Document 236 . A record of a meeting between the President and Prime Minister dealing with the British economic situation is printed as Document 237 . For text of statements by the President and Prime Minister and the joint communiquéissued at the end of their talks, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pages 615-616 . The meetings are discussed in Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970 , pages 44-51. 236. Memorandum of Conversation 236. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 7, 1964, 3:45 p.m. SUBJECT Defense Problems PARTICIPANTS US Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Ambassador David Bruce Mr. McGeorge Bundy Mr. George Ball Mr. William R. Tyler UK Patrick Gordon Walker, Foreign Secretary Denis Healey, Secy of State for Defense Lord Harlech, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secy of State Sir Henry Hardman Sir Solly Zuckerman Sir Burke Trend Mr. J. N. Henderson Gordon Walker said the UK wanted first of all to go a little into the general defense problem and then focus on the specific problem of Atlantic nuclear defense arrangements. He asked Mr. Healey to lead off. Mr. Healey said that at the Chequers meeting on the weekend of November 21 and 22, 2 the discussion had concentrated on the future defense policy of the UK over the next ten years, under the shadow of economic pressure. It had been taken for granted that costs would continue to rise. At the same time it was very hard to keep the defense effort down. The only practical way to reduce expenditure would be to cut down the number of people. This was not easy to do nor was it really possible to achieve the necessary economies by reducing bodies. The only other way was to economize in equipment. This raised the question of what role the UK expected to fill. What was to be its mission? The UK was the only European power contributing both to European defense, and to the defense of freedom outside of Europe. A great majority of the British people was in favor of maintaining the UK’s extra-European role, which included its obligations to the Commonwealth, to SEATO, to CENTO, and to the bases in third areas. The UK was in fact almost alone from Suez to Singapore. The UK felt very strongly that the danger of a major war in Europe was now very small. On the other hand, the danger of war outside of Europe was already great and growing greater. Had it not been for the UK’s prompt action in throwing “nugatory forces” into East Africa earlier this year, the West might have had another Congo on its hands. The breakdown of UK defense expenditures in percentages of allocation was roughly as follows: 10 per cent for a strategic nuclear role, 30 per cent for the defense of Europe, 30 per cent “overseas”, 30 per cent home defense. Healey went on to say that he would like the reaction of the US Government to the priorities of the UK defense effort. The UK would like the US to consent to a nuclear role for 88 V-bombers and some Polaris submarines which would make a major contribution to a solution of the problem of nuclear defense arrangements of the Allies. The UK was prepared to put its entire strategic reserve in the Alliance. It would agree to a German veto within NATO. It could not put all its V-bombers inside Europe because it was important that some be reserved for a non-nuclear role outside of Europe. The UK was also concerned by the question of weapons: the weakness in the UK’s present defense planning was that it was not able to produce scenarios based on the needs of war outside of Europe, e.g.: such varying needs as those for police actions in East Africa, compared with a nuclear exchange with Communist China. Healey went on to say that it would be highly desirable that the US and UK (1) compare and clarify their respective roles in these areas of the world; (2) increase and extend their cooperation in logistical support in each other’s efforts; (3) cooperate in the field of nuclear weapons in relationship to responsibilities and possible contingencies. With regard to its world-wide responsibilities, excluding Europe, the UK could cover 95 per cent of contingencies likely to arise. However, in order to cover the last 5 per cent, an additional effort of something like one billion pounds sterling would be necessary. Even with regard to operational requirements the UK should have the best weapons available, and this meant the desirability of buying certain US weapons rather than some being produced at home. Quite apart from the economic benefits involved, the UK needed to maintain its R&D. This would have to be discussed with the US if the UK were to “go American” for certain weapons. There had been a “great congruence” of attitudes at the Chequers meeting. The problem was to translate attitudes into policies, and policies into hard programs. Gordon Walker said that already ten years ago there was a problem of the size and kind of bases which could be maintained. He felt that if the problem of Malaysia could be settled, 3 the UK could look forward to some solution for Aden. He said that in terms of cost effectiveness, much the best thing would be if the UK maintained Aden and Singapore. The Secretary thanked Gordon Walker and Healey for their account of the general defense problem facing the UK. He urged HMG to give full weight to the role of the UK as a world power. The UK had not reduced her world role, in spite of suggestions to this effect in the press. We were mindful that there were 26 nations in the UN which were “children” of the UK. Then there was the Commonwealth. The US wanted the UK to play as large a role as possible. It could do certain things which the US, because of certain fancies, could not itself do so well. We would look with the greatest concern at a diminution of the UK’s role, which was of very great importance to us. What the UK did had a considerable bearing on what we ourselves were able to do. The US had been carrying a very heavy budgetary burden over many years. In 1947 our defense budget was $10 billion. Since then we had spent over $600 billion in war expenditures. Since World War II the US had suffered 160,000 casualties at the hands of the Communists. (Gordon Walker repeated this figure in a tone of surprise.) We had provided over $100 billion in aid. We could not be the gendarmes of the universe. At heart, the American people are isolationists. Because of all this, what others are doing has a great effect on what we ourselves are able to do. The UK role has a multiplying effect on our own role. This emphasizes the importance to the US of what the UK itself does. The French had cut back in Southeast Asia and also in Africa. West Germany and Japan had not been able, for various reasons, to shoulder their proportionate share of the common defense burden. The interests of the free world required the UK should play a role not only in terms of its own interests but in terms of the interests of the free world as a whole. We would agree that there was no prospect of a major war on the horizon at this time. However, we should be careful about the conclusions we draw from this. If this is indeed true it is due to the fact that NATO is strong. Any change in the NATO force structure would have to be very carefully considered in terms of its implication for the defensive strength of the West and of the conclusions which the Soviets might draw from it. The Secretary said that he was not enthusiastic about trying to resolve the question on the basis of long discussions and analyses of NATO strategy. The problem was to decide what was prudently required on both sides. He had the impression that the Soviets were now interested in the possibilities of a formulation for the thinning out of troops. He wished to emphasize that this was a very ticklish matter which required frank and extensive discussion between allies. Secretary of Defense McNamara said that he understood HMG’s objectives to be: (1) to accord priority to the UK’s extra-European forces; (2) to reduce the level of UK forces over a period of ten years, and to hold the military budget at the current absolute level. Healey said that the time-frame envisaged was ten years, and that the effect would be to reduce the percentage of the military budget in relation to the GNP from 7-1/2 per cent to 5 per cent. McNamara said that these objectives were completely contradictory if the UK were to try to achieve them by reducing men. Today, the US had twice as many men in uniform per thousand of population as our Allies. The people of the US were not prepared to accept this situation in the long run. He said the UK must retain its manpower at the present level, if not increase it. A corollary of this was that the UK would not need to reduce its forces in Europe. (At this point Healey demurred and said something about the situation inevitably requiring some adjustment in Europe.) The Secretary of Defense said that except for the foreign exchange impact there was no need for the UK to reduce its forces in Europe. The only way to reconcile forces with the objectives was to make hard decisions regarding equipment. It was necessary to destroy the myth that an arms industry is necessary for economic expansion. He said that research and development in the US absorbed only about 5 per cent of the defense budget. We could help by working on working out a cooperative R&D development program with the UK. He said that, speaking frankly, the UK was financing certain projects which made no sense militarily and really represented a waste of money, in particular the TSR-2, 4 as well as certain other projects. He thought both the UK and the US could benefit through greater integration, but he realized that this was a very painful process in terms of domestic problems for the UK. Gordon Walker said that the weapons and equipment needed for a military mission in Europe were different from those required for areas outside of Europe. McNamara agreed, and said that what the US needed from the UK was a firm policy of acting as a world power. On this basis, the US could help with the problem of the 5 per cent which Healey had alluded to. The Secretary wondered whether anything could be done to increase the contribution and participation of the Commonwealth, which had great reserves of power and other assets to contribute. Healey said the trouble had been that hitherto any extra-European role had looked as though it were “the dying legacy of an imperial power.” When the UK had intervened in other parts of the world it had simply looked colonial. Also, people were inclined to ask why the UK should play a world role if the empire were no longer there to justify it. He said that if the UK once took a clear decision to play a world role, this would be not to protect British interests, but to contribute to peace and stability in the world. He said Australia had made some effort of late to help. Gordon Walker said he thought the UK could convince Australia to increase its contribution to the common effort. For example, Darwin would be useful as a triple base. India was a problem, but if we assume increasing Chinese pressure and a settlement of the Kashmir problem, he thought the UK could probably develop an Indian contribution over the next 10 to 15 years. Healey said the anti-colonial trauma was dying. He felt that a real military capacity without any colonial aims contributed to the creation of stability in the world. Gordon Walker said there was an economic problem involved, and he felt that the UK needed some thinning out of its forces. Healey commented that for all they knew, they might have to send another battalion to British Guiana in the next few days. He said a more formal agreement was needed in NATO, that the UK should be entitled to withdraw troops from Europe for special purposes at short notice. Gordon Walker said that whatever the UK did in Europe should help the strengthening of the defense of Europe and that manpower was a vital factor in this. Turning to nuclear matters, Healey said that HMG recognized the growing anxiety on the part of non-nuclear powers with regard to a guarantee by the nuclear powers. There was also evidence of a sense of a need on the part of non-nuclear powers to play a greater role, and there was growing interest in the whole nuclear problem and its organization. Theoretically, there were only two ways of meeting this: (1) to give non-nuclear powers nuclear weapons; (2) to give them more influence over, and greater participation in, the operation of nuclear weapons within NATO. The first was, of course, unacceptable, and as for the second, unless the nuclear powers retained their veto over the use of nuclear weapons this would constitute dissemination. He said that this stark truth could be fudged in negotiations but not in practice. The talk about a “European clause” had understandably given some Germans the idea that eventually the US might be prevailed upon to give up its veto. The central problem was that whatever the organization of a new nuclear force might be, either the nuclear powers must retain their veto or they would be engaged in dissemination. [Here follows discussion of British proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force.] The discussion then broke up shortly before five o’clock in order to move to the White House. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, MLF No. 4. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Tyler and approved in S on December 16. The meeting was held in the library of the British Embassy. 2 Reference is to a meeting of Ministers, advisers, and service chiefs at the Prime Minister’s weekend retreat. The meeting is discussed in Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 35-37 and Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men, and Donkeys , pp. 374-377. 3 Following the 1963 action granting independence to the Malaysia Federation, the Government of Indonesia claimed portions of the new state’s territories and launched a limited war, which it labeled a “confrontation,” to back its claims. The United Kingdom provided military aid to Malaysia. 4 A British-designed prototype fighter aircraft. 237. Record of Meeting 237. Record of Meeting 1 Washington, December 7, 1964, 4:45-6 p.m. OFF-THE-RECORD MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT WITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON Those present, in addition to the principals, were Sir Eric Roll, Sir William Armstrong, Secretary Dillon, Chairman Martin, Chairman Ackley, McGeorge Bundy (most of the meeting), Secretary McNamara (part of the meeting). It was agreed to begin with that this was a meeting which never occurred. The President opened the discussion by referring to the close economic relationships between the two countries, and the need for a full and frank exchange of views on recent financial happenings and their impacts in both countries. He referred to the effects on the U.S. economy not only of the necessary rise in the discount rate, but also in terms of public attitude toward future fiscal decisions. The Prime Minister began by summarizing recent events in the United Kingdom, and the policies that had been adopted. He referred to the critical economic situation which had been inherited from a Conservative government that both failed to take necessary actions and concealed facts about the seriousness of the situation. The Prime Minister indicated his view that tighter money is no long-term solution to British economic problems, and that the import surcharges were basically wrong, although necessary in the short run. The basic solution has to lie in improving Britain’s competitive position both with respect to exports and to manufactured imports. This will depend on many things, but principally on improving the efficiency of British industry and, in particular, on modernizing British capital equipment. He referred to the plans to cut back on prestige projects, as well as on some types of defense expenditures. He indicated his wish to discuss with U.S. officials the possibilities of greater interdependence in both research and production of weapons. The Prime Minister indicated his appreciation of the importance of a rigorous incomes policy, and reported that a “treaty” on income developments, including representatives of management, labor and government, would be signed and announced around December 16. He emphasized several times his view that deflation of the British economy will provide no real solution to Britain’s problems, pointing out that restrictive practices on the part of labor and management are encouraged and reinforced in an underemployed and slack economy. He discussed at some length the unfortunate developments which led to a loss of confidence in the new British government. He indicated particularly the unfortunate effects of having to explain and defend British policies before a whole series of international meetings, each generating leaks which agitated those in other countries who were already antagonistic toward a Labor government. The Prime Minister expressed his strong gratitude for the various public statements which have been made at critical times by Secretary Dillon and Under Secretary Roosa, and for the understanding attitude of Under Secretary Ball at the OECD meetings. He was full of praise and admiration for the American efforts to put together the $3-billion currency package which finally put an end to speculation. 2 He ended by stressing the importance of continuing consultation between the two governments at all levels, and by committing himself and his government with complete firmness against any possibility of a devaluation in the pound. The President then requested Secretary Dillon to comment on the British situation. Secretary Dillon summarized the general view of his Government that the basic programs which the UK Government had adopted were essentially sound and correct. But he indicated that the difficulties which the UK Government had encountered could be in part traced to unfortunate statements which British officials had themselves made which played down the effectiveness on the domestic economy of the measures they were taking. He reviewed several such incidents in detail, and expressed the hope that in the future, statements about the British situation and policy measures would be limited, and would be designed to inspire the confidence of foreign businessmen and governments. The Prime Minister then asked the view of the Americans about the best timing for the announcement of further details of their more basic programs to improve efficiency and competitiveness in British industry and efforts. He wondered whether the situation was so critical that the announcement should be made at the earliest possible date, or whether it could be delayed until the details of programs had been more fully developed. The President asked Chairman Martin to comment on this question. Chairman Martin indicated that in his view the situation remained highly critical, and urged the earliest possible announcement of fundamental measures which would strengthen confidence. He urged the British government to attempt to ascertain from the Group of Ten what specific measures would—in their view—be necessary in order to restore the confidence of foreign governments and foreign businesses in the integrity of the pound. Both the Prime Minister and Sir Eric Roll objected that the several governments and business communities represented in the Group of Ten had divergent views about what policies would be necessary, and that it would be impossible to please all of them, if, indeed, they could please any of them. The President encouraged Chairman Martin to indicate further his views of the British actions. Chairman Martin believed that the most serious element contributing to the British crisis had been the unfortunate statements made, or reported to have been made, by members of the British government. He discussed several of these statements in some detail. In continuing to indicate his views of the seriousness of the present situation, Chairman Martin turned to the U.S. balance of payments, indicating the importance, in his opinion, of additional U.S. measures to strengthen our balance-of-payments position. In this connection he referred to additional cutbacks of U.S. expenditures abroad which, he said, had been agreed upon in September 1963 but never carried out. The President indicated considerable interest in this subject and asked Secretary Dillon for details. The President then requested Secretary McNamara to enter the meeting and asked him about the alleged failure to carry out reductions of military spending abroad which had been agreed upon. Secretary McNamara pointed out that a proposed program of additional reductions, which had been presented to President Kennedy in the fall of 1963, had not received his approval, because the Secretary of State—rightly, in his opinion—had concluded that they would not be feasible for political reasons. The President then requested that his American advisers get together to consider whether further measures could be taken to strengthen the U.S. balance of payments, and asked that they be prepared to meet with him on Friday (December 11) for a review of these measures. When Chairman Martin indicated that he would be out of the city on Friday, the date was changed to Thursday, December 10. (A paper was prepared by Secretary Dillon for such a meeting, and was sent to the President on the night of December 8, but a meeting with the President could not be arranged.) 3 The meeting ended with an exchange between the President and the Prime Minister in which each indicated his desire to maintain the closest possible continuing consultation on economic matters, and both expressed the view that this meeting had been very useful. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central File, CF 305, UK. Secret. A statement at the end of the memorandum reads: “These notes were prepared by Chairman Ackley, and have been checked for accuracy with Secretary Dillon and Mr. Bundy.” 2 For text of the November 28 announcement regarding the package, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 614-615. 3 Not found. 238. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 238. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 1 Washington, February 9, 1965. February 9, 1965—Tuesday [Here follow 5 paragraphs on unrelated subjects.] Went to see Bill Martin at the Federal Reserve Board. I explained to him my fears about another run on the pound if the British Government perseveres in its present budgetary plans. The budget will be presented in early April, and may engender, especially on the Continent, a further lack of confidence in Labour’s fiscal policies; this would, in turn, affect the action to be taken on the British submission, in late April, of another application for withdrawals from the IMF. In spite of the current prosperity, so widely diffused in Great Britain, their foreign payments problems have never been more dangerous. Whether they are manageable, without a large cutback in prestige expenditures abroad, and a reduced standard of living at home, remains to be seen. The drastic measures probably required would, if enacted, be likely to cause the downfall of any government that courageously sponsored them. One of the important factors in the long process, commencing during the First World War, of deterioration in British revenues from abroad has been the loss of former dependencies. Many of these newly independent states are bountifully supplied with larger subsidies than they received during their former status; in addition, their contributions to UK reserves and resources have greatly diminished. The most prosperous and dependable members of the Commonwealth, Canada and Australia, are more interested in world markets, and in their own development, than in the trade and other difficulties of the Mother Country. Bill Martin told me of the rough going Cromer had last weekend at Basle in obtaining an extension of the short term credits. At least the British have another breathing spell during which they can again scrutinize their financial position. [Here follow 2 paragraphs on unrelated subjects.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 239. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of Defense 239. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of Defense 1 London, February 19, 1965. 967. Subject: UK Military Aircraft Procurement. For OSD/ISA/ILN—Kuss. Following is advanced text of letter from Healey to McNamara being signaled by MOD to UK Emb Wash for immediate delivery to Sec McNamara. Text made available by Cooper (Asst. UnderSec-MOD) and fact that advanced text made available to U.S. depts via US Emb London should be protected. Begin Text Thank you for your letter about the simple option for buying the F111 which I received on 11th February. 2 I am very grateful to you for it and for all the help you and your staff gave us in the discussions about buying the C130E and the F4. 2. I should now like to take up your offer to have further discussions about the F111 and I and my colleagues have still to decide whether to buy this aircraft or to go ahead with the TSR2. 3. You will, of course, realise that this decision is going to be one of the utmost difficulty for us and I do not need to tell you of the very strong arguments for going ahead with the TSR2 which is doing well in its development flying. 4. The really critical factor so far as the F111 is concerned is the need to have the best and fullest information about it and to know exactly how firm is this information. It would not serve collaboration well if we were to abandon the TSR2 only to find that the F111 fell short of expectations. 5. In particular we need to have:— A. The firmest possible information on all cost factors for the F111 in its presently planned configuration including, of course, the selling price to us. We should like all this information broken down to the maximum extent practicable; B. Details of the progress of the F111 development programme to date; your present technical evaluation of it against the planned programme; your present in-service dates and the risk attaching to them; C. The latest and best possible information on your plans for up-dating the F111 avionics not only as regards what the technical plans for it are and the date of introduction, but also on costs and the improvement in capability it is likely to give and at which you are aiming; D. The extent of your commitment in policy and funding to F111 MK.2 programme and at what stage you expect to decide whether to commit yourselves irrevocably to it. 7. To discuss these and other points I would like to send over to you a four man team from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Aviation, under Air Marshal Sir Christopher Hartley, which would be ready to start business in Washington on 8th March. 3 Apart from talks in Washington I very much hope they could pay a brief visit to the manufacturer and see the F111. I do not anticipate they would need to stay in the United States more than four days. Before they came it would also be very helpful if another small team could come over for a few days starting on 2nd March to have detailed technical discussions about present thinking on the avionics fit and in particular it would be very helpful if these people could talk to your officers in systems command who, I understand, are now working on it. 8. You will realize that these missions would be essentially factfinding, but it is of the greatest importance to us that we should assemble all the best facts and estimates that you can make available. 9. I hope you can agree to what I have suggested and that the dates proposed will be convenient. /S/ Denis Healey Bruce 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 2. Secret; Priority; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 3:27 p.m. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the copy printed here. 2 Not found. 3 No record of this visit was found. 240. Memorandum of Conversation 240. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 23, 1965, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECT Vietnam PARTICIPANTS US The President Ambassador David K.E. Bruce McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ambassador Lloyd Hand Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA UK Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart Michael Stewart, Chargé d’Affaires a.i., British Embassy Following a private conversation with the Foreign Secretary, the President called in the other participants. He said that the Foreign Secretary had expressed to him the views of the British Government on the situation in Vietnam which he then summarized. He went on to explain what the U.S. was doing in Vietnam. The President said we had several alternatives. We could simply stand and take it like animals do in a storm. We could leave Vietnam. He did not think that the British and our other allies wanted this. The President did not think that the British, if they were in our place, would pull out. If we did pull out, where would the retreat stop? We had learned from the dealings of Prime Minister Chamberlain with Hitler that appeasement did not pay. Another alternative which was being urged upon him, the President said, was to carry the war to Hanoi and Peking. He had resisted these pressures and had instead chosen a very carefully measured policy of striking at the enemy. This policy was perhaps better understood and supported by our soldiers in Vietnam than it was here in the U.S. He read from a letter received from a soldier in Vietnam. The Foreign Secretary asked if the U.S. realized what the consequences of these policies might be. There were no signs that our tactics would bring the communists to negotiate. Even if they did, how could we get an agreement providing any real guarantees for South Vietnam. And even if such an agreement were possible, could we be sure that the South Vietnamese Government would be able to control the situation within its own boundaries. The Foreign Secretary referred to the need for the British Government to go a bit further in suggesting negotiations than the U.S. would like. He referred to pressures from the Labor Party backbenchers and from others in the UK. The President replied that we could not be sure of course that our policy would produce the desired results. Nothing was certain. He again referred to the alternatives. The President said he would welcome any practical suggestions for other policies. He said he did not think, on the other hand, that it did any of us any good to air our differences in the press. This helped our enemies. There was a discussion on the use of tear gas in Vietnam and the strong reaction this had produced in the UK. The President pointed out that tear gas was widely used for crowd control purposes by law enforcement agencies in this country. It was considered preferable to more forceful measures. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2482. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Judd and approved in the White House on March 29. The meeting was held in the President’s office. Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington March 21-24. Briefing papers and memoranda of his conversations with Secretary Rusk are ibid., CF 2481-2482. 241. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 241. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, April 6, 1965, 3 p.m. 4857. For Secretary from Bruce. Pass to White House. I would like to emphasize how essential I think it is that the US exercise more than usual caution and restraint in whatever official statement or comment we make initially about the UK budget. I recognize that in view of the attention which this budget is attracting, and the importance it is expected to have on the future of sterling, the US will be pressed to provide its official views at the earliest possible moment. I also recognize that in view of the present uncertainties in the exchange markets, we will want to state our opinion with promptness, and in a manner that will be as helpful as is possible under the circumstances toward removing the doubts about sterling. Nonetheless, I think we should take care to avoid responding too quickly and too enthusiastically to the British proposals. Such a response might not appear genuine to the rest of the world, and we might engender suspicions that the US and Britain had jointly planned the budget and our response, which would be most unfortunate. Particularly, with the experience of last autumn surcharges, many of the Europeans and others are only too ready to suspect the Anglo-American Special Relationship in matters such as this; consequently in our endeavors to be helpful we might induce a contrary reaction. Moreover, a precipitous comment could have a harmful and unfair effect on the govt here. From what I have heard of the procedures followed in the past by Chancellors of the Exchequer in presenting a budget, the mere allegation that a Chancellor had indicated in advance to other than his Cabinet colleagues details recalls fate of Hugh Dalton, whose offhand remark to a friendly journalist on an inconsequential feature of the message he was to deliver in a few minutes, led to his subsequent resignation and political degradation. In view of the unusual circumstances, and frankness, with which Callaghan has dealt with our officials in the past few days, I urge upon you the need of not arousing speculation on linking US approval of the budget with any hint of prior knowledge of any of its provisions. 2 Bruce 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 3. Secret; Flash; Nodis. 2 No U.S. statement was issued. 242. Memorandum of Conversation 242. Memorandum of Conversation 1 London, May 14, 1965. SUBJECT British Defense Review PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Bruce UK The Prime Minister Oliver Wright, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister The Prime Minister said the best part of the summer would be consumed by a review of British defense commitments. The UK cannot count, for example, on an indefinite retention of the Aden base though it is a vital staging point for Singapore. Much consideration must also be given by the British to the purchasing of weapons abroad, including the U.S. aircraft option. The British were also concerned over the BAOR support cost; the Germans had behaved badly and there was pressure in the UK to pull out entirely. The foreign exchange problem figured importantly. The British would have meetings with the Germans again in June; they had not wanted to bring up the subject during the Queen’s visit to Germany. The Prime Minister speculated that they might have an explosion over this issue. The Prime Minister said that BAOR cost the UK about 90 million pounds per year. The Germans had offered to take a share in the UK computer business but their proposals had been rejected. The Prime Minister said that Russia seemed interested in thinning out forces on both sides in Germany. Secretary Rusk remarked that he had told Dobrynin that we might be interested in a significant reduction in combat troops. The Prime Minister said he would rather take half of the British troops out of Germany than withdraw them from the Far East; most of his colleagues support him in this course. The Prime Minister said he would like to see some four-power arrangement for East of Suez affairs outside of SEATO, etc. Such an arrangement could coordinate, for example, air striking power. The Secretary made three points: 1. The U.S. and UK should work together to encourage countries to handle their own affairs to a greater degree. In Africa, the OAU might be encouraged in this direction. The Commonwealth countries could also help in encouraging greater self-reliance. 2. The U.S. did not want to be the only country ready to intervene in any trouble spot in the world. We hoped the British would continue to uphold their world-wide responsibilities. 3. NATO countries, Australia, and Japan should have common concern over “wars of liberation.” We should develop a doctrine or strategy that “prevention is better than curing.” 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Bruce and approved in S on June 25. The memorandum is Part I of III. Documentation covering other portions of the Rusk-Wilson conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2512. 243. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 243. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 28, 1965. SUBJECT Chancellor Callaghan’s Visit The Chancellor’s schedule now contemplates meetings with Under Secretary Ball (Secretary McNamara or his representative joining for part of the discussion) and with Mr. Ackley, in addition to the Treasury. The Chancellor will also call at the International Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Federal Reserve Board. Messrs. McNamara, Ball, Bundy and Ackley and I met on Saturday in preparation for the Chancellor’s visit 2 and our discussion has provided a background for the Chancellor’s visits to the various agencies. Callaghan has cited the international liquidity question as the principal reason for his visit. This, however, appears to be largely for public consumption since it is now apparent that his attention will center on Britain’s financial needs over the next few months. As regards the liquidity question, which we certainly will touch upon and again consider at the annual meeting of the Bank and Fund in September, we will expect to learn the results of the Chancellor’s recent meeting with French Finance Minister Giscard d’Estaing. 3 We will also probably resolve to hold further bilateral discussions in quiet fashion at the staff level to coordinate our thinking—but without the danger of inciting continental European suspicions that an Anglo Saxon scheme is being contrived. As you know, Britain’s position over the past two decades or more has been so weak, its reserves so low, and its liquid debts so heavy that it has been plunging repeatedly into payments crises. So sensitive and fragile is the world’s confidence in sterling that the publication a few days ago of disappointing trade figures for one month triggered losses of nearly $200 million in three days. With a country virtually evenly divided politically, no government has been strong enough to carry out the economic policies required to eliminate this basic weakness. The British public remains, even today, apparently unconcerned at the bleak outlook. Wilson and his colleagues have taken one measure after another since coming into office in October. A listing of these actions sounds imposing, but the measures have been taken in bits and pieces as forced on them by the continuing deterioration of the payments situation, and each has been cut short of the degree of severity which the international financial community thought necessary. Wage settlements continue to provide for increases of more than six percent per year. Prices are still rising about 4-1/2 percent. There are more job vacancies than unemployed. At the end of May the Government of the United Kingdom had external debts of more than $16 billion, including more than $8 billion net in liquid sterling liabilities. Official reserves were $2,850 million and there were fairly readily realizable assets of about $2,350 million—about $5.2 million in all. These second-line assets included a U.S. dollar securities portfolio worth about $1,350 million, a short-term line of credit with the Federal Reserve System of $750 million, and a general loan commitment from the Export-Import Bank of $250 million. The British have, for all practical purposes, exhausted their recourse to the International Monetary Fund and have been told by European officials that it would be politically impossible for them to extend further credit under present circumstances. Wilson has set as his target payments equilibrium in the second half of 1966. Six weeks ago, British authorities were estimating that $800 to $900 million would be needed to meet Britain’s own basic deficit in this period and the calls upon the United Kingdom by other countries in the sterling area. A revival of confidence in sterling could bring large reflows of funds but continuing speculation could greatly enlarge the requirement. The outlook is not very promising in the absence of more decisive British measures to correct its position, measures that will prove convincing to the continent—the source to which both the British and we must look for credit to finance some substantial part of our respective deficits. I think it would be a mistake to concentrate in our discussions on the short-run problem and will therefore seek to focus discussion on the British outlook over the next two or three years. I intend to draw attention to the fact that our capacity to give financial assistance is quite limited and that the approach toward a multilateral solution which could materially ease the British position for a two or three-year period, while simultaneously handling its shorter term problem, should be undertaken. We will support British initiative to gain this end and cooperate with other countries in making financial resources available. The British will undoubtedly face continental resistance toward giving it assistance in the absence of further firm measures—but these are in all likelihood necessary in any event and an early approach by the British to the continent is most important and appropriate. A multilateral approach on a longer term program, say, three or four years financing, would buttress British reserves and thus help also to meet more immediate pressures on sterling that now seem quite likely to develop. It would also assist in removing the recurrent sterling problem as a factor restraining discussions on international liquidity needs. To ease its problem, the British officials may also seek added help in meeting its defense commitments around the world. Secretary McNamara is very firm that the United States cannot take over any part of these British commitments, although we will in close cooperative fashion seek to work out a program which will assist in financing British military costs in a way which does no substantial damage to our own balance of payments position. British determination and initiative, together with our strong support might secure on a multilateral basis the substantial amount of medium-term assistance that Britain requires. I will want to emphasize that no time should be lost in organizing this program. 4 Henry H. Fowler 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Callaghan Visit. Confidential. 2 No record of this meeting was found. 3 A memorandum of a June 30 conversation between Under Secretary Ball and Callaghan on this subject is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. 4 A memorandum of Fowler’s conversation with Callaghan, July 1, is in the Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Callaghan Visit. 244. Memorandum of Conversation 244. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 30, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT U.K. Defense Review PARTICIPANTS U.S. Side Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Bruce Assistant Secretary Leddy, EUR Assistant Secretary Solomon, E George Springsteen, U Benjamin Caplan, OFE Francis Bator, White House J. Harold Shullaw, BNA U.K. Side Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan The British Ambassador Sir William Armstrong Sir Denis Rickett R. R. Neald I.P. Bancroft The Chancellor began the discussion by a reference to the recent U.K. Cabinet decision to the effect that by 1970 the U.K. will be operating within a defense budget of two billion pounds at 1964 prices. At the present time a number of defense reviews are under way which will be completed and brought before the Cabinet in a few months time. The defense budget for this year has been brought down to 2.2 billion pounds within existing commitments by overhauling defense procurement and by deferring for five years payments for the planes being procured from the U.S. A number of options have been considered, but not yet by the Cabinet, with respect to further reducing the current 2.2 billion to 2 billion pounds. The Chancellor gave the assurance that the problem was being approached with a sense of responsibility and the U.K. Government would consult with the U.S. at regular intervals. The Chancellor was complimentary about the efforts of Henry Kuss both as a salesman and in attempting to facilitate U.S. purchases from the U.K. The Chancellor said that the Minister of Defense, Mr. Healey, was considering appointing someone on the British side with comparable responsibilities. The Chancellor referred in this connection to the possibility of the U.K. building ships for the U.S. On German offset purchases, the Chancellor said that a report just received from Mr. Diamond who has been discussing the problem in Bonn indicated some progress had been made. Sir Denis Rickett said the Germans have agreed to extend the offset agreement until April 1967 and to make an advance payment to the U.K. for offset purchases of 600 million DM. The Germans have also agreed to assist German importers with credit arrangements. Sir Denis said that he lacked information at the present time with which to assess the degree of assistance provided by these arrangements. In summarizing the foreign exchange aspects of the British defense burden the Chancellor said that it was costing 85 million pounds to maintain the BAOR. Military aid and various other stationing costs in the Middle East and Far East brought the total to 304 million pounds. In addition the U.K. is providing 195 million pounds in economic loans and grants. The total of foreign exchange cost of defense and economic aid expenditures amounts to 500 million pounds per annum. Secretary McNamara said that there are two aspects of the U.K. defense problem—one is budgetary and the other is with respect to the balance of payments. He said that we strongly urge the U.K. to achieve its reduction of the defense budget to the 2 billion pound level without altering any of its political commitments. Secretary McNamara said he was convinced this could be done, that we were prepared to be helpful in discussing ways of eliminating duplication of effort between the U.S. and the U.K. He mentioned informally in this connection the possibility of eliminating the present duplication of effort of our two navies in the Greenland North Cape area. Secretary McNamara stressed again in the strongest terms the fact that our people will not permit us to become in the future the sole policeman of the world. If the U.K. were to cut its political commitments in Germany or in the area between Aden and Hong Kong we would have to readjust our alliance obligations with deleterious effect on our own, on U.K. and on free-world interests. Secretary McNamara described the decision of Defense Minister Healey on the cancellation of the TSR-2 as courageous politically and at the same time absolutely right. He suggested that other, similarly difficult decisions would have to be taken by the U.K. For example, a decision to reduce naval costs through readjustments in deployment would undoubtedly be difficult politically. We would be prepared to inform SACLANT if the U.K. were to so decide that the U.S. would take over sole responsibility for maintaining the naval barriers in the North Atlantic. On the foreign exchange aspects of the defense problem Secretary McNamara said that the U.S. accepts the British objectives and is prepared to help by buying more from the U.K. In order to counteract domestic political pressures it will be necessary for us in explaining increased U.S. purchases from the U.K. to publicize the amount of U.K. purchases from the U.S. He said he knew this would cause problems for the U.K., but it was necessary domestically. We can buy more from the U.K., and we are prepared to re-examine existing credit arrangements with a view to improving the terms. Secretary McNamara said that everything he had said about our being helpful was conditional on there being no change in Britain’s world-wide political commitments. Under Secretary Ball said he fully agreed with what Secretary McNamara had said. While Western Europe has been growing in economic strength an attrition of these countries’ commitments around the world has created a series of power vacuums which we have had to fill. We recognize the British problem, but we cannot accept a further extension of our own commitments. The Chancellor stressed that he regards the British defense problem as primarily a foreign exchange problem at the present time. He said he was mindful that the evil day had only been put off by the arrangements for purchase of U.S. aircraft. If the foreign exchange burden cannot be borne, this will have the most serious consequences not just in the defense field but across the board. He said he would speak as frankly as Secretary McNamara had done. The U.K. cannot continue to carry the present foreign exchange burden and it must come down. It affects the entire British economy. At the same time the Chancellor emphasized that he wants the U.K. to go on playing its role—there is no other country prepared to do what the U.S. and the U.K. are doing. The Chancellor referred to the possibility of developments in Aden and Malaysia making it more difficult for the U.K. to continue to discharge its responsibilities in those areas. He mentioned that the Tunku had not always had his present attitude toward the British presence. Secretary McNamara interjected at this point the observation that absolutely and without any qualifications the U.S. could not accept any further commitment with respect to Malaysia. We are already over extended in Asia. He said that both Australia and the Philippines could do more than they have been doing. The Chancellor referred to Secretary McNamara’s remarks about the BAOR and asked what we would regard as an unacceptable reduction in its strength. Secretary McNamara replied that he saw no room for a reduction, although he could envisage the possibility of temporary withdrawals at the brigade level to deal with emergencies elsewhere. He said NATO would collapse militarily if during the next three years French pressures to change its organization coincided with British pressures to reduce the BAOR. Mr. Leddy suggested the possibility of a greater German contribution. Secretary McNamara agreed that the Germans could help more with the costs of the BAOR but not by replacing it. He also suggested that the U.K. might have been more active in pushing sales to the Germans and so resisting the recent one million DM reduction in the Federal Republic’s defense budget. He urged that after the German elections the U.S. and the U.K. should together press the Federal Republic to do more than it has been doing. In response to a question from the Chancellor, Secretary McNamara said that he was not sure about economies which might be achieved through US/UK cooperation with respect to the Army and Air Force. However, he mentioned the big increase in our air lift and air refueling capabilities and raised the possibility of the U.K. contracting with us for provision of services of this character. The Chancellor said he would faithfully report this discussion to the Defense Minister on his return to the U.K. He gave the assurance that there would be no suddenly-announced British decisions in the defense field and that there would be plenty of time afforded for Secretary McNamara to express his views. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved in U on July 14. The meeting was held in Under Secretary Ball’s office. 245. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Rowen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 245. Memorandum From the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Rowen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 14, 1965. SUBJECT UK Visit Here are my main impressions from the McNaughton, Neustadt, Rowen two-day visit. Trend and Mitchell : Trend was told that you are relaxed about a meeting. Also that we see that everything—money, foreign commitments, economic plan—is connected to everything else. He said nothing of substance . Derek Mitchell, the PM’s private secretary, made it clear that the Trend-Bundy meeting had somehow been built up inside the government to such a big event that it raised “constitutional” problems (“the Cabinet’s hand can’t be revealed before the Cabinet takes the decision”). However, Mitchell told Dick that the PM regards Trend as a good go-between—but he shouldn’t come right now. Dick conveyed appropriate points to Mitchell including David Bruce’s suitability as a trusted intermediary. Dick stressed that we didn’t expect to be told of a Cabinet “decision” before the Cabinet but that we valued outlines of the PM’s thinking. Also that the President can’t be expected to embrace the Pound until UK comes up with its overall economic and defense program. Mitchell said PM not thinking of unilateral troop reductions in FRG (cooperative reductions another matter), that PM thinks devaluation beyond bounds of possibility, and that maybe Mitchell or Oliver Wright could usefully visit Washington on occasion. Foreign Office : The Foreign Office people we saw (Gore-Booth-Caccia’s successor—Chalfont, Palliser, John Thomson, Arthur) say, with varying degrees of firmness and specificity, that foreign commitments will be cut. They don’t believe that Healey can get close to the 2000 million pounds defense ceiling through efficiency gains. The most specific and drastic view (Thomson’s—partly prescriptive, partly predictive) was that Britain should/would over the next five years: 1) get out of Malta, 2) get out of Libya, 3) get out of the base in Cyprus supporting Libya, 4) out of Aden, 5) out of Persian Gulf (or perhaps support Gulf from Indian Ocean bases), 6) expect—and welcome—being invited out of Malaysia as part of an Indonesian-Malaysian “settlement,” 7) build up base in Northern Australia, 8) build Indian Ocean bases, 9) stay in Europe. I sense agreement by the FO types that Aden is first on the list and that European commitments should be kept. It isn’t clear to what extent the Foreign Office believes these cuts inevitable because they think the Defense Review will force them, or because they think that the Cabinet will force these cuts anyway, or because they think that the Americans should be told cuts are coming for tactical reasons. In any case Healey’s line is different. Healey : He says that 50% of the needed savings have already been found (aircraft and subs), that he expects to find 25% in efficiency gains and that 25% will come out of reducing commitments. The Cabinet will get a proposal on streamlining reserve forces next week, and a big decision on land versus sea-based air by September. (This one had to wait for the Earl of Burma to go. They also want to know if US has some carriers in reserve that can handle their Phantoms.) Once these decisions are taken, further reductions will involve commitments. But not much. For example, “confrontation” with Indonesia would involve 1/2 Army, 3/4 Air Force, 90% Navy; therefore they can’t cut much unless “confrontation” can be ended. (Healey expressed unhappiness on present strategy versus Indonesia and ran through alternatives—escalate, negotiate out, turn over to Malaysia. He and a lot of his people would like out but clearly don’t see it happening in short run.) Far East and South Asia: He is trying to figure out (ex-Indonesia) what role makes sense. He is thinking mainly about little problems and focuses on Australia. They are talking with the Aussies about a base in the North, see need to do joint planning including use of Australia F-111’s and its carrier, and want to concert with US and NZ as well. Mid East : He had thought that UK would have to leave Aden by ′68 and move into Gulf. He now thinks that permanent basing in Gulf won’t work and that a post ′68 base in Aden may work. On Malta, Libya, Gibraltar, Cyprus : Nothing new. On Germany : Money offset still unsatisfactory despite new deal. Will go back after FRG election. Prefer: 1) German gold, 2) FRG pick up check for FRG people employed by UK forces, 3) buy hardware from UK. Healey did not suggest major reductions in Germany (by implication, even failing 1-3 above). On contrary, he said cheaper (in budget but not foreign exchange) to keep troops there, and they are usable strategic reserve for elsewhere. NATO : He wants McNamara to join him in attacking NATO’s naval strategy and likes the Select Nuclear Committee idea (but worries about our ability to follow-through). Consultations with US : Healey emphasized that no UK decision will be taken on commitments without prior consultation with us. He personally would like to see US-UK talks in November-December. In Sum : We don’t have all the pieces (notably the PM’s views are missing) and the ones we have don’t quite fit. Healey appears to be making useful progress (more than Bob McNamara has credited him with). Healey said he might have been holding his cards too closely—keeping them from both the FO and us. In any case, they have a clear commitment to consult and we should keep in touch with them. Dick will keep up the chase. Henry 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret. Bundy transmitted copies of the memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense. In a covering memorandum, he commented: “Rowen’s memorandum shows that the Trend visit was cancelled because of Cabinet worry over consultation with Americans before Cabinet decisions are taken. This has a Skybolt flavor to me, and I have suggested to Dick Neustadt that the Prime Minister ought to bare his soul to David Bruce, if he doesn’t trust anyone else to come and talk to us.” Trend subsequently came to the United States for talks with U.S. officials. 246. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 246. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, July 29, 1965, 1:57 p.m. Dear Mr. President: You will have heard by now of the measures which we introduced on Tuesday 2 with the object of steadying confidence. They have already had some effect and I hope that it will continue. Politically this has been a very difficult operation indeed. Deferment of important social projects, introduction of building licensing, tightening up of hire purchase terms and exchange control, and so on, make a tough package. Many of my colleagues were resistant to what I considered necessary and, since the announcement, there has been a lot of unrest among our supporters in Parliament and outspoken opposition by the Trades Union Congress. The support of the Confederation of British Industries and the recognition by our Financial Times, with its specialized leadership, that the measures showed the Government’s determination to put the strength of Sterling before politics, are things that count both ways for a Labour Government—particularly when it is far from certain that there is a case of objective economic grounds for more than a minor degree of deflation. But I am determined to face up to our overriding problem of maintaining confidence to the limit. Unfortunately there may be more breakers ahead. For example, a single month’s bad trade figures could cause a dangerous run. Beyond this I am very concerned about the wider outlook for international liquidity, and in particular by the French veto on Secretary Fowler’s call for an international monetary conference. If this is carried any further we shall have a situation in which the French will be trying to blackmail the rest of the Free World in a matter vital to economic expansion. I know how deeply pre-occupied you are with Vietnam, as I am with Aden and Malaysia, but I believe that these economic problems, and in particular the threat that hangs over us, are also of great importance for the Free World and that we must keep in close touch on them. Sir Burke Trend will be explaining our position in more detail to Mr. Bundy and we shall always be ready, at whatever level is appropriate, to get together with you. With all good wishes, Harold Wilson 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 6. Top Secret. 2 Following 2 days of heavy losses by the pound, the British Government on July 27 announced a third, emergency budget with heavy spending cuts in all areas, including defense. Prime Minister Wilson met with Ambassador Bruce that day and indicated his desire for a meeting with the President. Bruce reported: “I told him frankly that I had no idea whatever as to how such a proposal would be received, but it would seem to me it should be explored further before he took it up officially.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 247. Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 247. Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, July 29, 1965. McG. B. SUBJECT The UK Problem, and “Thinking About the Unthinkable“ 1. The Fowler-McNamara and Ball positions add up as follows: a. East of Suez and BAOR are sacrosanct (by and large); b. $2.80 is sacrosanct; c. no pre -crisis preventive package is obtainable; d. an emergency rescue package, in the face of a crisis, must be multilateral—we will not foot the bill without substantial help from others. (Substantial: Fowler—2/3; Ball—1/4?) e. no multilateral rescue package is obtainable unless the UK takes still further steps to compress internal demand, etc. f. UK troops in Vietnam, while not strictly a necessary condition for us to be forthcoming on sterling, would greatly improve the odds. On a strict construction—and even if we leave out Vietnam—the position is that they must under no circumstances devalue, or impose comprehensive trade and exchange controls, or cut back on East Suez or on the Rhine, yet we will not take part in a rescue operation unless they are prepared sharply to deflate at home. 2. As a shopping list of objectives—of what we should like from the UK—this is unexceptional if incomplete: one would want to add sensible UK handling of the Germans on nuclear arrangements, proliferation, unification, and perhaps even some things on the Kennedy Round. But as a bargaining strategy, it is badly askew. We cannot hold both to $2.80 and to no-rescue-without-painful—internal-measures as absolute objectives. In a crisis, Wilson might just decide that devaluation would be better than the alternative we might wish to impose in return for rescue-money. More likely, he will simply tell us that either we come through with a rescue package on what he would regard reasonable terms, or he would have to cut loose. 3. The point here is not one of tactics, e.g., of what we say to the British now, but one of preparing the President’s mind and getting a reading on his priorities. Assuming that they do not come through on Vietnam, but that they are prepared to promise to stay on the Rhine and East of Suez: a. Would he prefer to bail out the British with the U.S. putting in the bulk of the money even if they will not promise the internal measures that are needed to avoid another crisis a few months later? In other words, are we prepared simply to underwrite $2.80 indefinitely? b. If not, it is useless to say to ourselves that devaluation is unthinkable. It had better become thinkable, not only in the contingency group, but also in the minds of the principals and the President. 4. The interesting question, assuming that I am right that the President would opt for (b) above and not (a), is one of tactics. Does it really make sense to hold to the Fowler line of laughing off any talk of devaluation? My own recommendation would be to make very clear just how bad we think any devaluation would be, but to begin conditioning them to the need to keep any change in rate, if it does happen, small—small enough to give us a reasonable chance to hold the rest of the Group of Ten from also going down, and, also, to the need to complement devaluation with further internal measures. 5. The premise of all the above is that, for Wilson, there are some things worse than devaluation. If I’m wrong—if he makes an absolute objective of $2.80—then of course we are in the saddle and can impose whatever terms we wish when he comes for help on a Friday evening. But I am inclined to think that, even apart from extreme political demands, that the proposition that devaluation would be a total and certain disaster for Wilson is wrong. My guess would be that he might have a better chance to survive if he does a relatively small devaluation, with some complementary internal demand compression, than if he holds out at $2.80, takes Draconian measures, and gets the bankers to ante up for 90 days. Francis M. Bator 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Callaghan Visit. Secret; Sensitive. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 248. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 248. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 6, 1965. SUBJECT British Crisis ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION RELATIVE TO STERLING PROBLEM There are three main possibilities: 1. Maintenance of present rate, which probably will require some further outside assistance 2. Moderate devaluation (10-15 per cent) 3. Large devaluation (20-30 per cent) A. Maintenance of present rate In our judgment, this is the preferable course . The present British program probably would produce equilibrium if left to work without speculative raids. However, it is unlikely that raids will cease until people become convinced that the program is working. Therefore, there is likely to be need for additional finance and for additional measures on their part—partly to secure the additional finance and partly to convince people that Wilson is determined to save sterling. Our judgment is that we should insist on a wage-price-dividend freeze in order to obtain more finance—from us and the Continent—and to give confidence a boost. Our share of a proposed finance package of $2.5 billion would be $700 million. We would acquire Sterling up to this amount. It would be guaranteed as to exchange value. The cost to us would be small. B. Moderate devaluation (10-15 per cent) If devaluation could be kept to a moderate figure and if industrial Europe, Japan, and Canada did not follow, the costs of a small devaluation—while greater than the cost of saving Sterling, would not be unacceptable. It would not seriously damage our trading position. Our major concern would be with the derivative effects— the danger of depreciation by Canada, Japan, and the major Continental countries; financial speculation against the dollar and buying of gold by nervous central banks. We would take the following action: 1. Seek a formal public pronouncement, during the crisis weekend, that the Group of Ten will maintain their exchange rates. Such announcements would be concerted either by telephone or by urgent sessions. There is a good chance that the Group of Ten could be persuaded to stand firm. Canada, Japan, and Sweden would require particular attention. 2. We would maintain close contact with all major countries to assure cooperative action in reassuring markets, handling hot money, and avoiding conversions into gold—being careful to avoid any impression that gold is not available on demand. 3. Since the broad theme of this approach would be to restore as quickly as possible the atmosphere of “business as usual,” the United States would announce no change in its policy of gold conversion and be ready to meet any demands for gold from any central bank. This might result in a considerable amount of gold loss, at least temporarily, but would permit the present monetary system to operate until we are clear what improvements are desired. 4. In line with this approach, the gold pool should continue its operations in the London Market, though perhaps permitting wider fluctuations in the price of gold, under careful control. 5. The Treasury would indicate to the United Kingdom that we would expect them to take Roosa-type bonds or to hold dollars rather than buy gold with any return flow of capital. The costs of devaluation not followed by the major countries probably would be nervous foreign exchange markets and some conversion of dollars into gold—perhaps of the order of $1 to $2 billion. If other industrial nations followed the costs to us would be far greater—— both in terms of trade position and in terms of gold loss. The consequences would be essentially the same as of a large devaluation. C. Major devaluation (20–30 per cent) If the United Kingdom devalued by 20 per cent or more, most major and minor countries would follow. The costs would be unpredictable, but certainly very great. In our judgment a major devaluation of Sterling would cost far too much for us and for the world. But if it happens, the following steps would be necessary: 1. Suspension of gold sales but no change in the dollar price of gold. In essence, this would leave the dollar to float free against other currencies. 2. An attempt to negotiate new exchange rates with major countries, and reciprocal credit arrangements to protect the agreed rates. 3. Be prepared to threaten retaliation if others impose trade restrictions. A large devaluation would put in jeopardy the entire structure of trade and payments which we have worked so hard to build since World War II. It could easily have serious long—term consequences for the U.S. domestic economy as well as for our world trading position. With skill and courage, we could perhaps put the system back together. But it would not be easy. Henry H. Fowler 1 Source: Johnson Library, Fowler Papers, International Classified Materials. Secret; Sensitive. 249. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Barr to President Johnson 249. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of the Treasury Barr to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 10, 1965. Last night at about 11 p.m. London time, the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrapped up a multilateral package to support the pound sterling. The package should total between $900 million and $1 billion with the exact amounts and form of participation of some countries not yet finally settled. The countries participating are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, plus the Bank for International Settlements. The Bank of France was originally in the package but pulled out of the deal yesterday morning. United States participation in the package will total roughly $400 million in line with our agreement. This amount will be divided between the Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the Treasury. The Federal Reserve Bank in New York began operations this morning in the spot sterling market and very limited operations have brought good results thus far in terms of a higher rate for sterling. The rate has moved from 2.7918 to a recent bid of 2.7940. We are hoping that this improvement in the rate will give the speculators [no?] reason for concern and by accelerating a return of the confidence in sterling will trigger a re—flow of funds to the United Kingdom. This negotiation has been much more difficult than that of last November but we are hopeful that the package will carry the pound through the uncertainties of the next few months. While this operation has started well, the first real test may come as early as Monday or Tuesday, when the British trade figures will be announced. We have no information as yet of these figures. A release issued by the Bank of England is attached plus our own response to press inquiries. 2 We will not add any comments to these statements and feel that the details of this operation must be held very close-especially the figures. Joseph W. Barr 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14. No classification marking. 2 Not attached. 250. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 250. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 10, 1965, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Report from George Ball 1. The attached reporting cable from London shows how George Ball really put it to the British on Singapore and our support of the pound. You will not need to read the account of George’s argumentation, but you will want to look at the sidelined account of the British responses on both subjects. 2 You will notice that it took two talks for Wilson to agree to the association between our defense of the pound and their overseas commitments. The one thing which he was apparently trying to avoid was a liability in Vietnam, and you will recall that it was your own wisdom that prevented us from making any such connection earlier in the summer, although I did once informally say to one of the Prime Minister’s people that a battalion would be worth a billion-a position which I explicitly changed later. 2. The essence of the Singapore part of the conversation is being sent to Ambassador Clark for report to Menzies at the time he delivers your letter. 3 McG. B. Attachment (Copy of London Secun Five, Sept. 9, 1965) Exdis. During the last two days Under Secretary Ball and Ambassador Bruce have had extensive discussion regarding Singapore and Malaysia and the quadripartite meeting convened by Her Majesty’s Government. This telegram will report the essence of these conversations with Foreign Secretary Stewart on September 8, with the Prime Minister later in the day on September 8 and with the Prime Minister again on September 9, including the relation of this problem to UK current financial difficulties. In the course of these conversations, the Under Secretary strongly challenged the British assumption that the secession of Singapore called for urgent contingency planning regarding the maintenance of the British position and the continuance of British defense commitments in the area. He stated that the quadripartite meeting was regarded by Washington as both premature and hazardous. If it became known in any of the relevant capitals that the British were seriously considering alternatives to Singapore, the Western position would be greatly weakened. The Under Secretary made clear that the U. S. did not share the British sense that their position was in imminent danger because of recent political events. He emphasized the increasing American commitment in Southeast Asia and made clear that the American people would not understand that at the same time the British were considering a diminution of their commitment in the same area. He pointed out in detail the disastrous consequences if the word should be spread that Western power might be withdrawn or diminished. He made clear that any efforts to explore with Sukarno a possible end to the confrontation would be regarded as evidence of weakness by Indonesia and thus lead Sukarno (and the Communists) to feel that their bloody-mindedness was justified by events. He indicated strongly that the use of Japan in an intermediary role might well contribute to Japanese neutrals. The response of the British—both the Foreign Secretary and later the Prime Minister—was directed at the contingency nature of British planning. The underlying British concern was that the future behavior of Lee could not be precisely predicted. They did not know whether or not he might seek to align himself with the Afro-Asian powers. They felt therefore that some kind of contingency planning was necessary. At the same time both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister categorically rejected the idea that they were seeking an easy way out of British commitments. They therefore felt that Four-Power talks might be useful, not for the purpose of preparing a British withdrawal, but rather with the intention of developing alternative courses of action in the event that the Singapore base proved untenable. The end result of the Under Secretary’s conversations with both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister was a categorical assurance that the United Kingdom had no present intention of reducing its commitments in Southeast Asia, but that it was merely seeking to develop alternative arrangements in the event that the use of the Singapore base was progressively circumscribed. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister also indicated clearly that they had dropped the idea of any negotiations to end the confrontation. The Under Secretary felt that as a result of his conversations the British had clearly gotten the word that the quadripartite talks had been misconceived and that neither the U.S. nor Australia had any intention of letting the British off the hook in Southeast Asia. In the Under Secretary’s discussion with the Prime Minister on Wednesday, September 8, the Under Secretary vigorously pressed the argument that the U.S. regarded the maintenance of British commitments around the world as an essential element in the total Anglo-American relationship. In response, the Prime Minister insisted that no clear link could be made between the U.S. efforts to assist Sterling and a common approach to foreign policy. To clear up the American position on the point, the Under Secretary arranged for Ambassador Bruce and himself to have a private talk with the Prime Minister following the Prime Minister’s meeting with Secretary Fowler later on the evening of Thursday, September 9. During this private conversation which lasted for almost an hour, the Under Secretary and the Ambassador made emphatically clear that the U.S. Government considered that the Anglo-American relationship must be regarded as a totality, in which each element of the relationship should be given weight and each related to the other. Thus it would be a great mistake if the United Kingdom failed to understand that the American effort to relieve Sterling was inextricably related to the commitment of the United Kingdom to maintain its commitments around the world. All of the U.S. Government activities in relation to Sterling or the economic problems of the United Kingdom were necessarily related to the commitment of the two Governments to engage together in a 5-year review of the United Kingdom’s defense program. The Prime Minister agreed to all of this, noting that he had expressed his earlier qualifications merely to make the record clear that the United Kingdom would not accept an additional demand for a United Kingdom contribution to Vietnam as a quid pro quo for U.S. Government short-term assistance for Sterling. He readily admitted that all aspects of the relationship of the two Governments must be considered as a totality in any long-range review of the United Kingdom defense effort. The other subjects discussed by the Under Secretary with the Foreign Secretary were Kashmir, Vietnam, and NATO. These subjects will be reported by the Under Secretary upon his return to Washington. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, Bundy, Vol. 14. Secret. 2 The 3d through 11th paragraphs were sidelined. 3 Apparently an August 18 message from Johnson to Menzies. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Australia, Menzies) 251. Editorial Note 251. Editorial Note British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart’s visit to Washington October 9-12, 1965, included a day of talks with U.S. officials. The Foreign Secretary met with Secretary Rusk on October 11 for wide-ranging discussions. Memoranda of their conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2550. 252. Memorandum Prepared by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) 252. Memorandum Prepared by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) 1 Washington, undated. VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER WILSON December 15-19, 1965 The following is a list of the meetings in which Prime Minister Wilson participated during his visit to Washington: December 16 —5:15-7:00 p.m. President and Prime Minister alone for approximately an hour and thereafter with officials. December 17 —Under Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara and McGeorge Bundy met with the Prime Minister at the British Embassy. December 17 —1:00-3:30 p.m. Lunch at White House with conversation continuing thereafter. President and Prime Minister spoke privately before lunch. The notes are based on the comments of Ambassador Bruce and Assistant Secretary Leddy who attended some but not all of the meetings listed. Ambassador Bruce was present at the White House on December 16 and also attended the lunch on December 17. He was not present at the meeting at the British Embassy the morning of December 16 which was largely concerned with the British defense review. Assistant Secretary Leddy attended only the lunch on December 17 and the discussion which followed. Rhodesia This subject was discussed on both days with the Prime Minister expressing his appreciation for US backing, particularly on the oil sanctions and the airlift for Zambia. 2 (In his press briefing on December 17, the Prime Minister said in response to a question that United States planes would be used in the airlift.) The Prime Minister took an optimistic view of the prospects of bringing down the Smith regime in a short time through economic action. While the Prime Minister did not give a specific time estimate, Oliver Wright subsequently told Ambassador Bruce that the British Government hoped to achieve this result in a matter of weeks. British Defense Review At the White House meetings attended by officials the Prime Minister did not go into details on the defense review but said he understood the importance we attach to a continuation of British defense commitments and gave assurances that the British world-wide role would be maintained. He said that there would be readjustments in the British defense posture East of Suez but that they would maintain their presence. In the long run, Singapore might become very tricky and the UK had no real assurance that it could be used in case of need. As a consequence the British Government had been considering the possibility of an alternative base in Northern Australia. The Australians, he said, had shown interest in this possibility. He expressed interest in the possibility of defense talks with Australia and New Zealand and, by implication, with the US on the defense problems of the area. The Prime Minister indicated that he was thinking, in connection with a base in Australia, of the post 1970 period. With respect to Aden, the Prime Minister said that this could not be regarded as a long-term base. In the Persian Gulf there continues to be a need to afford some protection to Iran and Kuwait. The Prime Minister thought Bahrein would have some use in this connection but that generally it should be possible to lighten the British presence in the Gulf. Ambassador Bruce noted that the Prime Minister was careful in phrasing his remarks on the defense review to indicate a desire to have our comments while avoiding any commitment that British decisions would conform to our views. In the meeting at the British Embassy on the morning of December 17, it was agreed that Foreign Secretary Stewart and Defense Minister Healey would visit Washington in January for more detailed talks with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. Nuclear Sharing This subject was apparently discussed privately by the President and the Prime Minister. In the subsequent discussion with officials on December 16, the Prime Minister said that the UK preferred a consultative arrangement to a “hardware” solution but that if necessary it was prepared to support its 1964 proposal for an ANF. The Prime Minister indicated that he and the President would have further contact on the nuclear problem in the Alliance as the situation developed and after the President had discussed the matter with Chancellor Erhard. Vietnam In replying to press queries the Prime Minister took a strong line in support of US efforts to pursue peace in Vietnam and said that his Government was quite satisfied with the willingness repeatedly expressed by the United States to go to the conference table. He cited the efforts made by his Government to bring about negotiations and said these efforts would continue with the full support of the President. These press responses were along the lines earlier indicated by the Prime Minister in talks with the President and US officials. The discussions reflected continued understanding and support for the US position in Southeast Asia and appreciation on our part that notwithstanding domestic political pressures the Wilson Government has been constant in maintaining this attitude. The Prime Minister did, however, indicate that any bombing of Hanoi or Haiphong would create the most serious problems for him and his Government in determining what line they would be obliged to adopt. As a result of the discussions with US officials the British agreed to give further consideration to increasing their contribution to the Asian Development Bank from $10 million to $30 million. The foregoing appear to be the principal subjects covered in the discussions although other matters such as the India-Pakistan dispute were also touched on briefly. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret. Bruce’s record of Prime Minister Wilson’s visit is in Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Bator’s notes on part of President Johnson’s December 16 meeting with Wilson are in the Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Europe. A portion of the Johnson-Wilson private meetings dealing with nuclear sharing is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 117 . 2 For text of the statement issued by the Department of State on December 17, see American Foreign Policy : Current Documents, 1965, pp. 693-694. 253. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson 253. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 20, 1966. SUBJECT UK East of Suez Proposals Attached is a memorandum for the record 2 on the purported British position for the talks which will be held next week. 1. The British apparently have in mind three new elements in their relation to the Far East: (a) increased de facto interdependence East of Suez, through intensified staff talks and other consultations; (b) a formal linkage of the UK to the Far East via ANZUS; and (c) assignment to Asia of the British Polaris submarines. 2. I find no objection to their first proposal; but I feel strong reservations on the other two proposals for the reasons stated below. 3. Underlying UK Objectives . The British propose to have us pay a high price for what they intend, in any case, to do; that is, to shift from Singapore in a few years and then cut down their Far East presence to an Australian air-naval base. The price they seek from us consists in: as firm an institutionalized grip as they can manage on U.S. policy in the Far East; U.S. financial assistance; and the right to continue to maintain their national nuclear deterrent. 4. U.S. Interests . It is our interest to maintain the UK presence in the Far East during the Viet Nam war—both in Singapore and in Malaysia. Over the longer term it is our interest to work out a viable basis for containing Communist China based on the systemic mobilization of Asian and European as well as U.S. resources. Our agreement to the British second and third proposals is not required to effect our primary short-run interest; that is, to keep the UK in the Far East in the short run. They are locked into the Far East by their confrontation in Malaysia. After that confrontation ends, they will cut down their forces irrespective of what we do. There is no political basis in the UK for keeping 45,000 ground troops East of Suez except in defense of Malaysia. 5. The British proposals run counter to our long-run interests in the Far East. a. If we become too formally involved with the UK via a treaty structure or assignment to the UK Polaris submarines of important Chinese Communist targets, we will be moving towards something close to a British veto over our China policy. It is highly unlikely that domestic politics will allow any government in London to go to war against mainland China; and we could count on the UK influence consistently to make difficult any firm stand vis-é-vismainland China. b. The British joining ANZUS would create a white man’s club in Asia. It would antagonize not merely the Indonesian military but other Asians as well and make more difficult our long-run task of building an effective security grouping in Asia for the containment of China. c. Acceptance of the British proposal would turn the British away from Europe and turn the continental Europeans away from the UK. An Anglo-Saxon Asian defense club, built on what appeared to be a special London-Washington relation, would discourage rather than encourage other Europeans to move towards responsibility in Asia. It would also complicate eventual UK entry into Europe and deny the British and ourselves the correct strategy of having British entry into Europe serve as a way of leading Europe as a whole to assume increased responsibilities East of Suez and on the world scene. 6. In these three ways acceptance of the British proposals would make our tasks of containing Communist China more rather than less difficult. 7. Conclusion . I conclude, therefore, that, in dealing with the British proposals, we must distinguish sharply between the short-run and long-run problems we face in Asia. We should be forthcoming on short-term steps to help the UK stay East of Suez by financial assistance, staff talks, etc. On the other hand, we should not allow the British to exploit our short-term concerns in ways which would mortgage our long-term prospects for effective U.S., Asian, and European action East of Suez. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 8. Secret; Noforn. 2 Not found. 254. Memorandum of Conversation 254. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 22, 1966, 11 a.m. SUBJECT British Defense Review PARTICIPANTS The Secretary The Under Secretary Assistant Secretary Leddy Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Michael N. F. Stewart, British Minister The British Ambassador said he was returning to London for a brief consultation on the defense review. He hoped to give us a piece of paper setting forth the British position on January 25. The Secretary then handed him the attached paper giving U.S. reactions to what we understood to be the British position. There was some discussion of the contents of the U.S. paper, particularly our view on the four-power arrangements in the Far East being proposed by the British. The Secretary asked if the UK had in mind a formal arrangement requiring ratification or more informal arrangements. He stated that a formal alliance would cause problems for us. We would not like to get into the business of amending any of our existing treaties. Mr. Stewart said he thought the Prime Minister had in mind some kind of agreement. Whether it would need formal ratification he didn’t know. The Secretary said that we were anxious that the UK keep its commitment to Malaysia and Singapore. If the British presence in the Far East was connected only with the defense of Australia, it didn’t have much point to it. Attachment INFORMAL NOTE ON UK DEFENSE REVIEW 1. On the basis of such indications as the U.S. has received concerning the direction of British thinking, and in the absence of more specific indications of British views, U.S. reactions are likely to be along the following lines on certain important points: a. General . As a general principle, the U.S. would be unable to assume political or defense responsibilities in any area to make up for the reduction in, or withdrawal of, the UK presence. This would of course apply to Libya. b. Aden . We are likely to accept, with regret, the probable necessity for their phasing out within the next few years; we attach great importance to their maintaining an adequate military capability in the general area of the Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf. c. Singapore . This will need to be discussed at length; the British presence there is regarded as of very great importance. d. Four-Power Arrangements in the Far East . Formal alliance arrangements in this area would raise many problems; a range of other possibilities for collaboration might be explored. 2. The U.S. attaches importance to the maintenance by the UK of a balanced capability depending on a suitable mix of forces to carry out UK responsibilities in the area East of Suez. 3. The whole range of British overseas commitments and capabilities should be discussed before the UK makes a final decision. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 8. Secret. Drafted by Judd and cleared by U on February 3 and by S on February 4. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 255. Memorandum of Conversation 255. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 27, 1966, 10 a.m. SUBJECT UK Defense Review—Principal UK Presentations and U.S. Responses PARTICIPANTS U.S. State Secretary Rusk Under Secretary Ball Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Assistant Secretary Leddy Deputy Assistant Secretary Kitchen Colonel Lindjord Defense Secretary McNamara General Wheeler Assistant Secretary McNaughton White House Mr. Bator American Embassy, London Ambassador Bruce Mr. George Newman UK Foreign Secretary Stewart Defense Secretary Healey Sir Patrick Dean Field Marshall Sir Richard Hull Sir Henry Hardman Sir Bernard Burrows Sir Solly Zuckerman Admiral Henderson Mr. C. M. MacLehose, FO Mr. P. D. Nairne, MOD Mr. G. G. Arthur, FO Mr. E. J. W. Barnes, FO Mr. F. W. Armstrong, MOD A/Cdre. Maynard, MOD Mr. M. N. F. Stewart Mr. D. V. Bendall Mr. K. T. Nash Secretary Rusk expressed on behalf of the US delegation his appreciation for the opportunity to hold discussions on this series of interesting and important subjects. He expressed regret for the bad weather at the time of the arrival of the British delegation. 2 He continued that we very much appreciate the readiness of Her Majesty’s Government to discuss in depth and detail with us the problems relating to the UK Defense Review. These discussions are especially important now because it appears that today only the United States and the United Kingdom among the Free World countries are carrying the burden of world-wide security demands. Accordingly, we particularly value this chance to discuss the issues raised by the British and also to expose our thinking on our strategy, commitments, and plans. Mr. Rusk welcomed the British delegation and suggested that they lead off the substantive discussion in any way they wished. Mr. Stewart thanked Secretary Rusk and said he and his colleagues were very pleased to be in Washington. They were happy the US participants feel able to discuss in detail and in great frankness these problems of mutual concern. He suggested that before moving on to the substantive problems, they might discuss how to deal with the press. In general, the British don’t want to say much to the press at this stage; Mr. Healey is going on to Australia, and it would be unfortunate if too much is said publicly before he reaches Canberra. Mr. Stewart indicated that he and Mr. Healey would be meeting with British press representatives, on a non-attributable basis, after the talks today. They intended to confine their remarks to the press mainly to platitudes and generalities. He suggested that US and British press officers might come in for instruction later in the morning. Mr. Rusk thought these arrangements were appropriate and that we might meet with our respective press officers toward the end of the morning meeting. Mr. Stewart commented that essentially the British want to be as polite and uninformative as possible in dealing with the press. The subject matter of these discussions is extremely confidential and false inferences could readily be drawn from premature disclosures. Mr. Rusk agreed that we should say as little as possible to the press at this stage. Mr. Rusk indicated that the President had expressed the hope he could see Foreign Minister Stewart and Defense Minister Healey during the course of the day, and we would have information soon as to when this would be. 3 Mr. Stewart began the British presentation by pointing out that the Ministers closely concerned, but not the Cabinet as a whole, have now reached provisional conclusions on the British Defense Review. After talks with the UK’s allies concerned, the Cabinet will make its decisions. He proposed to set out now the foreign policy assumptions on which the British believe their Defense policy should be based. The objective of UK policy is to provide for the defense of the homeland, to contribute to the defense of neighboring nations, and to assist other nations of the world who feel threatened either by direct military aggression or by subversion. At the same time, the British do not want to be in the position of defending every existing regime in the Free World; change is simply inevitable, and the requirement is to try to promote change in an orderly fashion and to avoid getting more nations drawn into the cold war struggle. UK policy envisages not only defending its homeland and closely allied nations such as those in NATO, but also concerning itself with the defense of other allied nations such as those in CENTO and SEATO and of non-aligned countries who wish to maintain their integrity. Mr. Stewart continued that the UK has both strengths and weaknesses in playing its part. First of all, there is the economic and financial problem. The UK has been overstretched in trying to maintain a range of commitments, and has been facing a serious foreign exchange drain. The British Government is extremely anxious that the UK should not run away from its proper responsibilities. However, if British defense commitments create an unbearable strain, especially in balance of payments terms, the result will be a weakening of the UK position everywhere. Mr. Stewart said another special fact that bears on the British role is their past as an imperial power. There are both advantages and disadvantages inherent in this heritage. In some areas of the world the British are particularly vulnerable to attack because of their past associations; in other areas their past history gives them continued and substantial influence. The British have been trying now to make a series of judgments as to which bits of their former imperial holdings ought to be kept and which ought to be given up. In making these judgments, they have tried to steer clear of pre-conceived notions. There is simply no use in clinging to places where there is strong local hostility to their presence and where this would be a propaganda advantage to enemies. In other areas (the Persian Gulf is an example), the British are the only people who can provide the framework for orderly development. It is difficult to know how long the British can continue to provide such a framework. We also must keep in mind that some countries want British support but can’t say so publicly; an example is Singapore. Mr. Stewart said he would next like to reduce these general considerations to more practical terms. In Europe it is quite clear that, in view of obligations to allies and of UK policy in Europe, there should not be any reduction in British ground forces. There would be, however, some reductions in the Air Force. He noted that a special problem in Europe is the relationship between the UK and the FRG. While there is a need for a closer relationship between the two, there are problems. There is no need to elaborate the obvious personal aspects involved in this relationship; it is simply a fact that many Britons do not approach with positive enthusiasm the idea of closer ties with Germany. However, this attitude is lessening with time, and with the present government in Germany this relationship would improve. Mr. Stewart noted there is a growing feeling in the UK that the FRG is not paying its proper share of the cost of the common defense. The British accept the fact that there is not likely to be any German military contribution outside NATO at present, but there is a need for wider arrangements than offset for sharing of costs. The UK would like to discuss in detail how we can get other allies to carry a fair share of the defense and security burden. Mr. Stewart expressed the hope that diplomatically the US could help the British with the FRG on this problem. Mr. Stewart noted that most countries in the Middle East and North Africa area reject formal alliance ties with the UK. Exceptions to this rule are Libya and Iran. On Libya, the British view is that arrangements for defense of that country could be more efficient and economical if the US could undertake a bigger share of its defense. The British believe this could be done without the need for more US military resources in the area. This adjustment would permit considerable economies for the British in Cyprus, without reducing the defense capability the UK is providing in Libya. As regards the Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf area, the British believe the base at Aden is one of the areas from which they must withdraw. This would be compensated for by an increase in the forces in the Persian Gulf area. The UK plans to modify its commitment to Kuwait. With the new ruler in Kuwait, it is not certain how long UK protection will be wanted. With the changes proposed in the Persian Gulf the British feel they can reassure the Shah that they are not letting him down. It is proposed that Aden should become independent by 1968, and the UK would then withdraw from the base there. The UK very much desires that Nasser not represent this as a triumph for himself, and would hope that Nasser would withdraw from the Yemen, thus promoting peace and order in Southwest Arabia. Mr. Stewart suggested that the US use its influence with Nasser to encourage him to refrain from making difficulties for the British in connection with their withdrawal from Aden. Turning finally to the large Indian Ocean-Pacific area, Mr. Stewart referred to the British paper on this subject. The UK believes it important to continue a large and indeed expensive military program in that region. The UK recognizes that the US feels it should not have to operate alone over this area. At present, only the UK, Australia, and New Zealand are available to join the US in this task. The British wish to make very clear that they are anxious to play a full and effective part in interdependent security arrangements in this area. Much depends on what happens on confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. The British assume it will be over by 1970 or sooner and do not consider this assessment overly optimistic. Here again, US diplomatic help in easing relations between Indonesia and her neighbors would be important. Mr. Stewart said the above is essentially how the UK sees the problem. He said the Secretary of State for Defense would next discuss the proposed British force structure. Thereafter he suggested that we discuss the financial problem, the Libya and Middle East problems and the Far East-Indian Ocean area. Mr. Healey said he regretted that he had not been able to provide more details earlier on the provisional conclusions of the British Defense Review; he pointed out that the British Defense and Overseas Policy Committee had not finished their consideration of the problem until the preceding Sunday. (Mr. Rusk said we are entirely familiar with problems of this kind.) Mr. Healey said he was grateful to Mr. McNamara for all the assistance Mr. McNamara had rendered to him in doing his job as Minister of Defense. Mr. Healey pointed out that the British Government is concerned over the budget and fiscal strain created by their defense expenditures. The target given to him for the year 1969-1970 was 2 billion pounds. This meant a savings of 400 million pounds or a cut of 16% below previously projected levels. He was also given a target of 100 million pounds annual savings in foreign exchange costs or a cut of 1/3 in foreign exchange expenditures. These targets complicated the problem he already had, which was a force structure badly overstretched by covering too many commitments. He described the British forces as a “stage army” trying to cover 100 commitments with forces enough for 10, and said this stage army had become so threadbare that now there were not enough men to “walk behind the stage” fast enough to keep up the facade of strength. Mr. Healey noted that the British give the US military services their monthly deployment maps. Referring to the map, he commented that British forces were deployed in “penny packets” all over the world, doing jobs vital to peace and security. He pointed out that British action in East Africa in 1964 may have prevented another Congo type situation there; similarly, operations in Zambia now are of vital importance, and British reinforcements in Cyprus two years ago Christmas nipped serious trouble in the bud. The two British battalions in British Guiana have made a real contribution to stability in that part of the Western Hemisphere. These jobs were costly for the British but they would be much more costly for others. The problem the British face is whether they can continue to carry out all these obligations in addition to maintaining large forces in the Malaysia area. He pointed out that until quite recently the British had a relatively higher percentage of their forces deployed in the Far East than the US did. He indicated that the British see many other potential commitments-Nigeria, for example. From his viewpoint as Minister of Defense, Mr. Healey considered that this scattering of forces in penny packets all over the world (the stage army) had had two disagreeable consequences: (1) People in the military forces are badly overworked, and recruitment is becoming a problem; and (2) all British troops are continuously committed to operational tasks, limiting the UK’s military and political flexibility. Mr. Healey said by August last year the UK had identified savings of 220 million pounds out of the 400 million pound target. However, these budgetary savings, which involved getting better value for money, were made at costs in foreign exchange, specifically by buying US aircraft. Also these savings had no effect on the over-stretched condition of the British forces. Since August he has had to look at the possibility of reducing military tasks and the commitments from which these tasks flow. Mr. Healey then described the review process he had followed. The British, using the McNamara techniques, had developed functional costings of various commitments. There were many difficulties involved since the cost of commitments change and it is a problem to forecast future military tasks. The British Chiefs of Staff in 1962 making its forecasts did not foresee the requirement to send troops to Cyprus nor did the current Defense Review take into account African needs which may eventuate. He noted for example that after the illegal Smith regime has collapsed, there may be a requirement for two brigades in Rhodesia for a long period of time. Mr. Healey observed that he had had to make savings of an additional 180 million pounds to meet his target ceiling of 2000 million pounds. This could be accomplished partly by cutting out marginal military capabilities and partly by cutting out military tasks. These cuts were costed at about 130 million pounds which still leaves him 50 million pounds over his target. Mr. Healey commented he had been looking at a global force structure appropriate for tasks the British should be ready to carry out. This force structure should not be overstretched and should have some margin for unforeseen contingencies. This new proposed structure had been costed out at 2,100 million pounds. Subsequently, he had been able to narrow the gap down to 50 million pounds since it was clear the Chancellor would not accept a 2,100 million pound defense program. A range of alternatives had been identified for effecting the remaining savings, that could be offered to the Cabinet for consideration. A mix of these would close the 50 million pound gap, but he is anxious not to get tied down yet to a particular and rigid way of closing the gap. He is hopeful that the Chancellor will permit him some leeway on this remaining 50 million pounds. Mr. Healey emphasized that the Cabinet as a whole had not yet been informed about the provisional conclusions of the Defense Review. There will be a need to persuade the Cabinet on the new force structure and deployments, and particularly on the balance of payments aspects. He described the new proposed force structure as representing minor cuts in capabilities and as providing much better value for expenditures. There would be a 16% cut against the original Tory 2,400 million pounds defense program. This would consist of 12% savings due to cost effectiveness measures, with only a 4% cut reflecting actual reductions in military capabilities. Mr. Healey said the biggest single cut falls on the Royal Navy. The Navy will have a more cost effective mix of frigates and other ships, but there will be no new aircraft carriers. The Royal Navy would concentrate on East of Suez tasks, and would get some sophisticated new ships (including missile ships) plus atomic powered hunter killer submarines and more helicopters. In describing the rationale for the carrier decision, Mr. Healey reported the British conclusion that—as with ICBM’s—only big countries can afford aircraft carriers. He said the British Navy cannot man more than four carriers and the UK probably cannot afford more than 3; this means only 1 carrier actually on station. One of the carriers now in commission is the Hermes , which has a complement of only 12 strike aircraft plus 7 reconnaissance aircraft. It appeared to the British it was not worth the heavy 10-year cost of an additional carrier to maintain a force that would be represented a considerable part of the time by only this small carrier (the Hermes ). Accordingly, the proposal for a new British carrier will be cancelled. However, the British would like to keep their existing carrier fleet going as long as possible, and this means until 1975. He said there is grave doubt as to whether the Fleet Air Arm (even with Royal Air Force help) would be able to continue manning a wasting force for as long as to 1975. Mr. Healey noted that the British are thinking of buying Phantoms for two of their carriers; these aircraft could later be ground based when the carriers are phased out. He said although the strike carriers will be out by 1975 at the latest, it is planned to keep some commando carriers, plus the Hermes (for early warning.) The new force structure, according to Mr. Healey, would produce no cut in the number of aircraft or men in the Royal Air Force. He said one-third of the Air Force would be devoted to transport aircraft. He commented that there would be fewer combat aircraft in the British Air Force in the 1970’s than in the French or German Air Forces. He added that the resultant Air Force would be more effective and would cost less. The most important feature would be 50 F-111A’s, organized in four squadrons, half of which would act in the reconnaissance role. The decision to try to make do with only 50 F-111A’s was based on three considerations: first, he frankly did not think he could get approval from the Cabinet for a larger number; second, the major aircraft project for the British in the 1970’s is an Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft (he said sometimes called the poor man’s TFX), which it was planned would be the follow-on aircraft; third, the British want the F-111A’s mainly for the Indo-Pacific area, where they hope to operate in stride with the Australians, who are also buying F-111A’s. Mr. Healey reiterated that the key problem is the dollar cost of the billion dollars worth of airplanes being bought from the US. Mr. Healey then indicated that this force structure would provide an overall capability to do nearly everything the British are doing now. It would have a wide range of peacekeeping capabilities, including logistic support for UN operations; a capability for intervention against unsophisticated enemies; greatly improved airlift capability, especially by incorporating C-130’s; a strong reserve in the UK; and an amphibious capability East of Suez. It would also incorporate a powerful conventional deterrent against sophisticated nations, relying on F-111’s for reconnaissance and strike roles, plus submarines and missiles. He stressed that the F-111A’s are critical to the whole force structure. Finally the force structure would include a land and sea based nuclear capability ranging from air delivered bombs to 4 Polaris submarines. This in general terms described the overall capability of the proposed force structure. Mr. Healey then identified the limitations of this force posture. Principally, if the deterrent failed, the UK could not in the 1970’s fight a limited war against a sophisticated enemy, such as Indonesia. He expressed the hope that this would not happen, and noted that it would probably not happen if Indonesia stopped receiving Soviet equipment or underwent a more favorable development in terms of political orientation. In any event, Mr. Healey did not think it would be feasible politically for the UK in the 1970’s to fight limited wars without allies. Thus, he concluded that the British were not really giving up a relevant capability for the 1970’s. (Mr. Healey observed that in fact it is doubtful that the UK has the military capability today to deal effectively with an expanded conflict in Indonesia.) The ability to fight a limited war alone is the big option the British are renouncing, but Mr. Healey argued that the British do not really have this capability militarily now and could not use it politically in the 1970’s. Mr. Healey noted that the second significant limitation imposed by the new force structure would be the lack of the capability for large, long drawn out counter-insurgency operations. The British view is that unless the local population can carry out the basic counter-insurgency task themselves, it does not make political sense to do it for them. However, the British would have the capability to provide increments of support in the sophisticated area to poorer countries to assist them; he cited the sending of Javelins to Zambia as an example. He asserted that this ability to help poor countries in Africa or Asia by providing some sophisticated support may be very valuable. Mr. Healey said a third limitation would be the inability to land troops outside the range of land-based aircraft, or to evacuate troops in such a situation. This was a key consideration in the carrier question. He concluded that, on balance, the political requirement for this type of capability is not likely to be large. Without this capability the British would now have to rely on help from their Allies. Mr. Healey then described the deployment plans for this overall capability. Although plans have been made in great detail, it is impossible to know now what the actual deployments will be in the 1969-1970 time frame; all sorts of things may happen in the intervening years. But for planning purposes, the rough picture is as follows: (1) The only areas with almost no forces will be the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, in each of which the British will have a frigate. (2) In Western Europe, the British will keep the BAOR at its present strength provided they can get a bigger financial contribution to the cost of maintaining it. They will reduce the RAF elements in NATO committed to the nuclear role, but will increase the air units devoted to ground support. They will reduce the Royal Navy elements committed to SACEUR (from 46 to 30 escort vessels and from 26 to 13 submarines, mostly in the Mediterranean). (3) In the Middle East-North Africa area, they will retain the existing planned force in Libya, giving up re-inforcement capabilities located on Cyprus, and Malta with a small exception. They will leave Aden after 1968, but plan to start a buildup in the Persian Gulf to replace some of what is lost in the area by evacuating Aden. The buildup in the Persian Gulf will be in the Bahrain and Trucial Coast areas. They will modify their Kuwait commitment somewhat by not providing land forces hereafter except in case of a coup. (4) In the Indo-Pacific area, the attributable cost of the force structure will be 200 million pounds (which is slightly higher than the Prime Minister had envisioned). The projected cost of the Indo-Pacific deployments would be about 10% of the defense budget. They would maintain 7 major land units, partly for amphibious purposes and partly as a contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade. There would be powerful sea and air forces and a floating stockpile. The Hong Kong garrison would be retained, provided some financial support could be obtained from the Hong Kong government. There would be a much improved air movement capability in the area. In short, the British propose to retain a balanced but not wholly self-sufficient capability; this capability should be able to handle 95% of the contingencies likely to arise in the whole area East of Suez, and 99% of the contingencies likely to arise between Suez and Cocos Island. Mr. Healey continued that the British would need allied help, specifically for fighting a limited war against sophisticated enemies. When the British carriers are gone, the British will also need help in operating outside the range of British land-based aircraft. He said they would need diplomatic help, too, in dealing with Cairo, Djakarta, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Australia. Mr. Healey stressed that there were little new fixed capital expenditures provided except for 10 million pounds in the Persian Gulf over the next few years. This means, for example, that if there should be a need for an airfield on Aldabra or a base in Australia, the British would need financial help. But he said the main issue is foreign exchange costs, and it is in this area the British need help in the next two weeks in order to get their proposed new military program through the Cabinet. Mr. Healey said again that the UK has an extremely serious problem with the foreign exchange costs of their military expenditures. For the British this foreign exchange cost is about 1% of their GNP, while for the US it is about 0.4%. The UK foreign exchange deficit due to military expenditures is 14% of their budget, while for the US it is approximately 5%. Mr. Healey suggested the following areas might be explored to find ways of assisting them with their foreign exchange problem: (1) Get the FRG to contribute more to the support of British forces in Germany. (2) Possibly get some assistance for the cost of operations in Singapore. (3) Above all, work out an offset to the F-111 buy—this is critical since the F-111 is the key to the proposed overall UK defense posture. (Mr. Healey also noted that because of the carrier decision, it had not been possible to reduce the numbers of F-4s needed since the RAF will now require more aircraft.) Mr. Healey stated he must now convince the Cabinet that there is a chance to recover some of the incremental dollar costs of his proposed program. To complicate matters there are other dollar buys being considered, such as the Lance for the BAOR, and the Chinook helicopter. He commented that he had not yet told his Cabinet colleagues about these possible additional purchases from the US. In concluding his presentation, Mr. Healey said the package just described is what the Foreign Secretary and he would like. They are prepared to make adjustments to meet the views of major allies, especially the US, but also Australia. Getting this package through the Cabinet and through the Parliament will depend on being able to assure them that the program is acceptable to Britain’s allies and particularly that there will be help on the foreign exchange problem. Since the Cabinet has not yet been told any of this (only a committee of the Cabinet has been informed), Mr. Healey emphasized that it is vital to retain secrecy until publication of the White Paper. If any of this, especially anything on the weapons side and above all on the carriers, was leaked here in Washington, the whole program would be gravely prejudiced in the UK. Mr. Rusk thanked Mr. Healey for his presentation and said the US delegation fully realizes that these views have not been approved by the British Cabinet as a whole. He said he expected his colleagues to keep these matters very secret until the British make them public. He proposed that we continue to be in touch with the British as the Review progresses. Mr. Rusk commented that he found himself in general agreement with most of what Mr. Stewart and Mr. Healey had said. The US is not opposed to change as such; he pointed out that we are working very hard in this Hemisphere to introduce change at a revolutionary pace. The problem is whether the political fabric in these countries will permit change to be accomplished by peaceful and democratic means. Mr. Rusk continued that the US would be reluctant to expand its undertakings to support other nations. We have formal commitments with 42 countries, and there would be great reluctance to extend our commitments. The commitments to these 42 countries are major undertakings aimed at threats to world peace, largely the problem of Communist aggression. Mr. Rusk said the US understands the British problem of being overstretched. We have a comparable problem; our Great Society programs are being set back this year by the costs of Vietnam. Over the next 18 months, we will probably have to add $25 billion to the budget to pay for Vietnam. We also have a foreign exchange problem, which because of its cumulative nature is very serious for us. The notion of cutting the coat to fit the cloth is one we appreciate, but if everyone does this the US would have a residual responsibility involving manpower, arms and finances and we simply cannot do this on a world-wide basis. Mr. Rusk stated that the US attaches the greatest importance to Britain’s retaining a world power role. It would be disastrous if the American people were to get the impression that the US is entirely alone; they simply will not accept it. There are great strains now on this point and insistent questions are being asked by the American people as to what our allies are doing while we are in Vietnam. There will be more questions here concerning our NATO allies. The American people want to know not only what they are doing for their own defense, but what they are doing in other parts of the world. The US has met its NATO commitment but is also involved in a major conflict in the Pacific. Mr. Rusk noted that Britain as a partner is very important to the United States in sustaining the kind of role we think is essential to achieve peace and security. The British world role has, in a sense, a multiplier effect because of its influence on other nations. He commented that he had spent most of the week before Congressional committees, and there had been intensive questions on these matters. Mr. Rusk continued that in many parts of the world, the British have ties as a result of which they can act; they are acceptable, but the US would not be. This is partly because of British historical ties in these areas and partly because the US is looked on in many places as the point of the spear of the Cold War. Mr. Rusk said he had the general impression that we could narrow our differences rather quickly. In NATO, we can agree to the British treating the BAOR as a source of reinforcement for other areas, and certainly can agree with the decision to make no change now in the BAOR itself. We can see the point in making some reductions in the Royal Air Force on the Continent, but note that this will require careful handling in NATO to avoid undesirable political repercussions. Turning to the Middle East, Mr. Rusk noted we would want to talk about Libya in more detail. On Aden and the Persian Gulf, he thought we could reach a common understanding, and said we would see what we could do in influencing Nasser. He observed that Nasser had not been the chief offender recently; the Yemenis themselves had been difficult. Although Nasser has not yet been tested, we will follow this closely and be prepared to discuss it further. The thing that impressed Mr. Rusk the most was the British statement on keeping a big and expensive force in the Far East and playing a major role there. He pointed out that timing of deployments is of the utmost importance in that area. We have said ourselves that there is no requirement for US bases on mainland Southeast Asia once peace is achieved; but if either Hanoi or Peiping got the impression that the British were on the way out in the Far East, it would make the British problem and our own much more difficult. (He remarked that we have done about everything in our peace effort except to parachute the Secretary of State into Hanoi, but we have had no response.) One could understand that Hanoi might get the impression that demonstrations in the US regarding Vietnam mean that the US is becoming tired and will weary of the struggle. He concluded that acoustics are very important in regard to the Southeast Asia situation. He considered it essential to underline the fact that the American people simply will not become the gendarmes of the universe. Mr. Healey said the same was true in the UK. Mr. Rusk continued that he would not want the word to get out that the British are trying to get the US to take over some commitments the British are dropping. This is the worst possible moment in post World War II history for such a transaction. It was simply not on for us to consider seriously any additional commitments. He concluded that, in looking over the British paper, if we could reach agreement on the detailed points then we would find we are agreed in principle. Mr. McNamara said he was very sympathetic with the British need for assistance on budget and foreign exchange costs, and said the US would do everything possible to be of assistance. He was impressed with the imagination displayed in developing the extraordinarily ingenious solution to the British defense problem. He could not over-emphasize Mr. Rusk’s point concerning the political difficulties the US would have in policing the world alone. There was, in fact, a serious question in his mind as to whether the US was militarily capable of doing the world-wide job. He was certain it was politically impossible for the US to do it. It was not that it was a financial problem for the US, for even after adding $25 billion for Vietnam our defense expenditures will be a smaller percentage of our GNP than in five of the past six years. Thus, it was not a financial problem, but a political problem. Mr. McNamara observed there are twice as many Americans in uniform proportionately as in NATO countries, including the UK and FRG. He said with 270,000 men in combat, the US won’t tolerate indefinitely carrying this burden and will need the association of other nations. He doubted whether the US could carry on for very long in the Indo-Pacific area without the participation of Japan. While we must have UK participation, that will not be enough. He voiced the doubt that there would be continued public support for US participation in NATO unless other NATO nations support us elsewhere in the world, over a reasonable period of time. He suggested we should talk about this problem today. Mr. McNamara continued that the F-111 and attendant foreign exchange implications were very complex. He emphasized that the US Congress is not at all willing to extend commitments anywhere while we have 270,000 men in Vietnam. He concluded that we have problems of our own, but he again expressed admiration for the British analysis and proposed solution. 4 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 8. Secret; Noforn; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Lindjord and approved in U on March 1 and S on March 7. The memorandum is Part 1 of 5; memoranda of conversation covering other portions of this meeting are ibid. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room. The British delegation arrived in Washington on January 26 and returned to London on the morning of January 28. 2 Washington was hit by a major snow storm and subfreezing temperatures. 3 The only record of this meeting found was a January 27 entry in the Bruce Diaries: “At three o’clock Rusk, Stewart, Healey, McNamara, Dean and myself went to see the President. Most of the conversation pertained to Vietnam. It seemed evident he expected to resume bombing, but he wanted no reference made by those present to his mentioning the subject.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 4 Further discussion took place during lunch. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6 UK. 256. Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 256. Memorandum From Francis M. Bator of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:20 a.m. SUBJECT Harold Wilson’s Message of this Morning on the U.K. Defense Review The important news about the British defense decisions—which is not in Harold Wilson’s message of this morning (Tab A) 2 —is that they have decided to buy 50 of our F-111’s, for delivery during ′68-′70. The total price will be $700-750 million, with payment over a 12-year period. Bob McNamara believes that, with the F-111 order, our bilateral military balance-of-payments with the U.K. will be in the black—that our military dealings with the British will be on a better than 100% offset basis. 3 Most important, the F-111 decision provides solid evidence that they have committed themselves to a continuing and major East of Suez role. They are publishing their defense white paper on February 22. We will know more about what is in it after McNamara’s meeting with Healey tomorrow. 4 FMB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 2. Secret. 2 Not printed. In it Wilson stated that the Cabinet had adopted a Defense White Paper for presentation to Parliament on February 22 and that Defense Minister Healey would visit Washington to discuss the details of the plan with Secretary McNamara. 3 On average over the next twelve years, with a reasonable year-by-year balance. [Bator’s handwritten footnote in the source text.] 4 A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “OK. L.” 257. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 257. Telegram From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, February 25, 1966, 2256Z. CAP 66069. I am slow in sending you a line of thanks in acknowledgment for your messages of last week about aircraft sales and about your defense review decisions. 2 It has been very helpful to us to have the benefit of full and private discussion with you ahead of time, and our people will be looking to your final conclusions with the greatest interest. I have heard from Bob McNamara of the very important agreements which he and Denis Healey have worked out on some parts of this field, 3 and have asked my people to think very carefully about the subject of aircraft procurement. I can tell you, without any staff study, that we are very glad of your decision not to sell that particular airplane to China right now. While I am at it, let me thank you too for your personal account of the beginnings of your Moscow visit. Our good work together in recent months shows how helpful it is to keep in touch with each other on all these matters. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Nodis. 2 See footnote 2, Document 256 . 3 No record of their meeting was found. In a February 21 memorandum to the President following talks with Healey, Secretary McNamara commented on the U.K. decision to buy F-111 aircraft: “This decision, in my view, is a major one helping to lock the British into a meaningful role East of Suez.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 8) 258. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 258. Message From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, February 27, 1966. I think I ought to tell you that I have decided to advise the Queen to dissolve Parliament and to hold an immediate general election. This is being announced tomorrow (Monday) just after mid day your time, and the election will take place on March 31. I do not need to worry you with all the reasons why I have reached this conclusion. As a more accomplished politician you may possibly have reached the same conclusion before I did. But although we have managed to do everything that we tried to do with our majority—the smallest majority in British Parliamentary history—I think we are moving into a period where the things we are going to want to do may be more difficult. We want to toughen up and speed the measures needed to strengthen our economy and this will mean some pretty tough confrontations with various vested interests. These confrontations will be easier if we can get a more substantial mandate and if there is not expectation of an early election. I don’t know whether you are fortunate or unfortunate in having a fixed election date. In our case the so-called freedom a Prime Minister has is somewhat limited. If I do not do it now, the whole of the spring and late summer, because of holidays and other reasons, will be closed to me and I might become a prisoner of a very constricted Parliamentary situation just at the moment of time when we want to put on the legislative heat. Moreover, I am, of course, at the mercy of the Almighty in respect of the deaths of sick M.P.s. So far he has been extremely merciful but should he become more unselective in his choice of legislative advisers, I might be left with a long period with no majority at all when I want it most. I am not proposing to ask you to come and help us during the election. There are, of course, abundant precedents. Eisenhower in 1955 agreed to Eden’s request for an early Summit meeting to which in fact Eisenhower was strongly opposed. In 1959 he conferred the same electoral benefit on Macmillan and indeed allowed himself to be toted through 14 London marginal constituencies in an open car with Macmillan beside him. I have no such requests except that if you were thinking of doing anything which might be positively unhelpful, I hope that you would at any rate give me a little notice. Heath is now attacking our defence review on the grounds that it drives us too closely into relations with you. Douglas-Home in a presumably ghosted article in today’s Sunday Express listing the election issues, calls on the electors to vote Conservative so that we do not accept satellite status to the United States. I have no doubt that this will be one of their themes and that they will make an appeal to the latent anti-Americanism amongst some of our electorate which they called into being with some success at the time of Suez. If I took this particular threat seriously, I might suggest to you that we should have a row in order to help me, but quite honestly I cannot think of anything to have a row about. Should you think of a suitable subject you will no doubt let me know. It may be that during the next four weeks difficulties may arise and as I am very anxious to safeguard our future relations not only bilaterally but within the Alliance generally, you may find me getting in touch with you. If I get too hysterical you will no doubt dismiss it as the election fever. Quite honestly you may find me, if driven, taking a slightly anti-German line. If I have to employ xenophobia, which I hope will not be necessary, I would rather it be of that variety than the Tory anti-Americanism, and the Germans have been warned that this is possible since they quite unscrupulously attacked me in their last election as a means of discrediting the S.P.D. I did not react at the time because I know what politicians are like during elections, though I made it clear to them that I reserved the same right when the time came. But I would hope it would not go too far. The other big issue relates to sterling. Election speculation has led to a little weakness in the last week or two because elections mean instability and also because there has been some fear that if the Conservatives got in they would do what we did not do and devalue sterling on the day they took office blaming it on their predecessors. But now the expectation of a Conservative victory is quite small. The polls give us an all-time high in our lead and the betting odds are 6-1 on Labour, 7-2 against Tories. I am not, however, as complacent as this since an expectation of easy victory leads some times to people not bothering to vote. After all there is 1948 in your country as a warning to me. So far as sterling is concerned I am convinced an early election is essential. If we do not go now we shall have a continual period of electioneering through the spring, summer and autumn which could have a more serious effect on sterling. Moreover my colleagues and I feel that we may need tougher measures and these would be easier in a post-election rather than pre-election situation, though we do not intend during the election to disguise from the electors the seriousness of the situation and what measures we may have to take. I am sorry to trouble you with all these arguments about our internal situation and I am addressing them to you less in your capacity as head of government than in your other capacity as a full-time student of political affairs. But during the next month we may need to be in touch with you should the election situation create difficulties which may have more prolonged effects either bilaterally or in the wider field of international affairs. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 70 D 209, United Kingdom. No classification marking. A notation on the message indicates the President saw it. 259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, May 28, 1966, 1:41 p.m. 7147. Literally Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Ref: Ur 5705. 2 In response reftel following message sent from PM to President May 24: Begin text: I shall be sending you tomorrow a full account of my discussions with Erhard, 3 which went extremely well. We are in complete agreement on the whole NATO situation. With reference to your message of last Saturday, nuclear sharing was not mentioned by either of us though it was raised in the discussion between the Foreign Secretaries. My immediate purpose, however, in sending this message relates to the visit I had from David Bruce yesterday, that is to say Monday. He told me of your present intentions in connection with oil installations at Hanoi and Hi Phong, while explaining that no final decision had been taken. As I am sure you know, we have always made clear that any bombing of either of these cities would create a situation where we would have to dissociate ourselves from the action taken. This was, you will remember, fully explained at our meeting in December 4 and, as I think your Embassy has reported to you, I have said this more than once when under pressure in the House of Commons. You will therefore understand that I shall have to make a statement of this kind if this action takes place, though you will realise equally that this will not affect my general support of American policy in Vietnam, except in this particular aspect of its execution. Knowing as I well do the tremendous problems with which you are faced and recognising the tremendous pressures in which you are situated, I would nevertheless ask you to reconsider whether this action, whatever its results in terms of immediate military advantage, is worth the candle. The decision will be yours, and I know you understand our difficulties and the nature of the statement we would have to make. It will make no difference to our basic position, but I would not want there to be any possible danger that you would take this action in possible ignorance of what our reaction would have to be. End text . Following message sent from President to PM dated May 27: Begin text: It was really good and strengthening to know that your meeting with Erhard went well. I understand the political strains on your side in making this relationship solid, as well as the financial issues which you as well as we have to face with the Germans. On the other hand, as you clearly perceive and express, right now—and far into the future—the three of us must lean in and stay together. Our next test—and it is clearly critical—is Brussels. But we have every reason to go into it in reasonably good heart. On some of the longer range issues raised in your letter, I am awaiting the completion of staff work before putting to you some constructive possibilities. I am determined that, if at all possible, we shall accompany the difficult defensive moves we have to make with evidence that the Fourteen, at least, can move forward on many fronts. Let me say that I was very pleased to hear that you and Erhard had a good talk about your EEC situation. At my instruction Bob McNamara will be sending over an officer to brief you fully about the two oil targets near Hanoi and Haiphong. 5 I am coming to believe it is essential that we reduce their oil supply in the light of the radical increase in the flow of men and matériel by truck to South Vietnam. For me the calculus is, simply, whether they shall have less oil or I shall have more casualties. But I am determined that their civilian casualties be low and minimal. 6 As you may have noticed, I spoke yesterday about Africa. 7 I sense in my bones that a powerful tide of moderation is running through Africa, despite Rhodesia and all the rest. I feel we all have a responsibility to help these people prove to themselves that they can make progress, otherwise out of frustration we may face extremism down the road. I hope your experts will be collecting their best ideas about sensible next steps in African economic development and exchanging views with mine. I greatly respect Britain’s experience and good sense in that continent. End Text. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. The text was received from the White House and the telegram was approved by Read. 2 Telegram 5705 from London, May 28, reported that Wilson would see Colonel Bernard Rogers on June 1 and requested a copy of the Prime Minister’s reply to the President’s May 21 message. (Ibid.) For the May 21 message, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 168 . 3 On May 26 Wilson sent the President a 3-page summary of his talks with Erhard. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 262) 4 See Document 252 . 5 Telegram 7103 to London, May 27, commented: “From the Prime Minister’s strong reply to the President, we fear that you may not have sufficient information in presenting the question of POL installations in Hanoi and Haiphong areas to permit him fully to understand what we are considering. There is no intent to bomb either city.” It offered to send Colonel Rogers to brief the Ambassador and Prime Minister in detail. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) 6 Telegram 7266 from London, June 3, transmitted a message from the Prime Minister thanking the President for the briefing and restating his concerns regarding bombing attacks near populated areas. (Ibid.) In telegram 5767 from London, June 2, Bruce reported that Wilson was anxious for a personal meeting with Johnson but that such talks should take place considerably prior to any bombing raids. (Ibid., POL 7 UK) 7 For text of President Johnson’s statement on Africa, May 26, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 556-560. 260. Memorandum of Conversation 260. Memorandum of Conversation 1 London, June 10, 1966, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Southeast Asia PARTICIPANTS U.K. Prime Minister Wilson Foreign Secretary Stewart Defense Secretary Healey Sir Burke Trend Michael Halls Michael Paliser U.S. Secretary Rusk Ambassador Bruce Minister Kaiser Ronald I. Spiers The Secretary said President Johnson sent his warm regards and his appreciation for the way in which Wilson has kept in close touch with us on questions in Southeast Asia. There was one specific problem he wished to raise and that was the question of how Britain sees its relationship to SEATO. As Confrontation ends and the British move to bring substantial forces back from Southeast Asia, this question becomes significant. He recognized the special political problems assistance in Vietnam raised for Britain but wondered whether these were applicable in the case of Thailand. The Thais have been pressing us for U.S. manned helicopters and this is a need which the U.K. might fill, one relatively small in scale. The Prime Minister said this involved deep domestic problems. Last year, he got away pretty well with a tough line on Vietnam but the situation was now changing. The Vietnamese lobby was no longer standing alone and a big fight was brewing not only with the pacificists but with the sophisticated Europeanists. The East of Suez policy was coming under heavy attack and a much more dangerous line-up against the British policy was coming about. Both factions were afraid of Britain getting dug in in Southeast Asia in a policy of containment of China. If these suspicions were to be fed by the extension of small aid of the type the Secretary had suggested in Thailand, the result would be a strengthening of the anti-Vietnam forces in Britain which are now showing more and more overtones of anti-Americanism. Minister Healey noted that the U.K. is now giving a good deal of help, such as in training Vietnamese in Malaysia and in airfield construction in North Thailand. This could be jeopardized if the British gratuitously added to their burdens by expanding assistance in Thailand. He noted also that the British were in particularly short supply of helicopters and helicopter crews. They have had to rob their European inventory seriously and there are only 9 left in Europe. While there are many helicopters in Southeast Asia, they are still over-extended in the area. This was the last type of assistance which the British would be able to handle. The Secretary returned to the question of how to interpret our obligations under SEATO. The treaty 2 could be liquidated under conditions of peace, but these conditions did not exist. The fact is there is a treaty and the question is how does the U.K. interpret its obligations under it. Defense Minister Healey interjected that SEATO involved no commitment to help the Thais with internal security problems. The Secretary wondered whether it could be extended under SEATO contingency planning. The Prime Minister said that anything which appeared to be “reactivating” SEATO would create problems. Minister Healey observed that the very thing which the United States is trying to obtain, namely a commitment of U.K. power further north, was just the thing which would make the moves suggested most difficult to sell. New physical steps of this character would look to many like the U.K. was beginning along the same path that the U.S. took in Vietnam. The Secretary observed that there were two different views of the SEATO commitment. The French and Pakistanis have taken one view. The U.S., the Thais, the Filipinos and others have taken another. Where does the U.K. stand? The Prime Minister said that the only way the U.K. could make its commitments in Singapore credible was to terminate confrontation. Defense Minister Healey noted that the U.K. was planning now to bring home only those “Confrontation reinforcements” sent out after 1963. If everything were to go perfectly in ending Confrontation, the U.K. could start withdrawals to Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong beginning next year. Thereafter, they could start redeploying forces as, for example, returning borrowed troops to the BAOR. At most, their forces in the area would go down to 3/4 of the maximum confrontation force. It was still not clear, however, that things would go perfectly on ending Confrontation. The Prime Minister noted that it was not only the pacifists and Europeanists who opposed the East of Suez policy, but the economists, who felt that more foreign exchange was seeping away than was justified by British interest in the area. Nevertheless, the U.K. would give “prayerful consideration” to the Secretary’s words, but the problems could not be overstated. Last year, the Vietnam policy opponents were pressing for a cessation of bombing. Now they were pressing for U.S. withdrawal. He asked how the U.S. felt about the situation in Vietnam at this juncture. The Secretary said that on the military side, some of the Viet Cong battalions had come out in the open in the last few days. When they come out in the open, they cannot stand up. The U.S. now has enormous firepower on the ground. By mid-summer, there will be more than was expended in any month of World War II. The problem was, however, in fighting an enemy you could not find. On the political side, the impasse continued. As he had told the Norwegians, they could tell their critics that if they could produce Hanoi, Norway could produce the U.S. Secretary of State. It was necessary to remember, however, that Hanoi had never said that a willingness to negotiate with the Viet Cong would solve anything. There was no reason to believe that Hanoi had any change in policy since the bombing pause, which had lasted twice as long as even the Soviets had suggested without producing a single result. Nevertheless, we are interested in getting some political process underway. That is why we believe we should try to make something out of Sihanouk’s request to get the ICC going. He had urged the Russians to respond to this request. If the two co-chairmen could meet in Geneva, or the three ICC countries could get together, we would have something going for us. He had even scraped the bottom of the barrel and considered whether as many of us who would, could just go to Geneva and issue a standing invitation to do business, leaving empty chairs for the rest. However, the U.S. just cannot give up in Vietnam. What is at stake is the value of our word and this is more important than 14 million South Vietnamese or even all of Southeast Asia in the present context. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 30. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Spiers and approved in S on June 20. The memorandum is Part II of III; memoranda of the conversation dealing with NATO and Southern Rhodesia are ibid. The meeting was held at 10 Downing Street. Rusk visited London June 9-10. 2 Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, which established SEATO. (6 UST 81) 261. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 261. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, July 4, 1966, 2:18 p.m. 53. Private for Acting Secretary from Bruce. Ref: State 1116 and State 1335. 2 I discussed this afternoon with Prime Minister matters raised by reftels. He was absolutely confident he would and could avoid any embarrassment to the President during his visit Washington. He asked me to emphasize to you following points: 1. He is a politician, and, as such, highly sensitive to other statesmen’s concerns. He has never yet in his visits to the President embarrassed him, and would on no account do so. 2. If questioned by any one, publicly or privately, on his “disassociation“ 3 he would reply by saying his statements on subject are on public record, and can be read in Hansard. He sees no reason to repeat or explain them. 3. He would like President to rest assured that “he does not believe in making a mess on another fellow’s carpet.” 4. The showdown with his own party will soon be over, and though it will be a violent episode, he has no doubt of winning. 5. He would like to come to Washington on July 29. He would particularly appreciate USG consent for him to announce this on Wednesday afternoon of this week; i.e. the day after tomorrow. He has an important interparty meeting that day before the big debate Thursday. Comment : Please instruct me urgently what answer to make to above point 5. I strongly recommend approval, since I regard his assurances given me today as sincere and determined. I believe it would be helpful in forthcoming debates to have this announcement made soonest possible. 6. He has asked Soviet Ambassador here to communicate with Kosygin, who is now in Roumania, and ask whether, if Prime Minister comes to Moscow on July 16 or 17, or on July 23 or 24, he will be received by Kosygin personally. If answer is negative, Wilson will not go to Sov Union. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. 2 In telegram 1116 to London, July 2, Ball instructed Bruce that the President was willing to meet Wilson on July 29 on the basis of two conditions: careful preparation for the meeting and that the Prime Minister, “whatever his pressures at home, not come unless what he says here in public and in private reinforces the President’s position on Vietnam.” (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Telegram 1335, July 3, provided guidance for future statements Wilson might make on Vietnam. (Ibid.) 3 Following June 28-29 bombing raids, Wilson read a statement expressing regret that U.S. aircraft had attacked targets near population centers of Hanoi and Haiphong. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 822. 262. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 262. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Fowler to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 18, 1966. SUBJECT The Sterling Crisis and the U.S. Bargaining Position vis-á-vis the U.K. The Situation —Last week’s severe losses—$200 million on Friday alone—followed a month of weakness. If they do not take severe measures, they very likely will face an avalanche by the end of next week. (The U.K. reserve position is set forth at Tab A.) 2 —As you know, on the telephone on Friday, Callaghan promised a powerful package of demand-compression and wage restraint, to be announced Wednesday. 3 He was confident that Wilson would be backed by a united Cabinet. According to Callaghan, the only seriously divisive issue involved cuts in overseas spending, i.e., defense and aid. De-valuation, he said, is out. (A record of my telephone conversation with the Chancellor is at Tab B.) —Even if the Wednesday measures scare away the bears—and certainly if they do not—we will face some critical choices. This memorandum is to report the views of your advisors about these choices. It is based on extended discussion on Saturday morning between myself, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and Messrs. Ackley, Rostow, Barr, Deming, Bator, Solomon, and Okun. There are basically two possibilities: I. The U.K. actions on Wednesday are successful in keeping the bears at bay and bringing U.K. payments into balance during the next few months . (1) This outcome is quite possible. Callaghan sounded both determined and appropriately scared. The New York Fed’s foreign exchange expert, Charlie Coombs, is convinced that a strong package would lead to substantial reflow of money into London—much like last September. In any case, we will know, one way or the other, fairly quickly. (2) But no matter how successful the program is in stopping the speculators, and eliminating the deficit, it cannot be a permanent cure. It will “solve” the U.K. payments problem, but at the cost of recession now, and, over the longer pull, unacceptable unemployment and little or no growth. Wilson will still be up against the basic problem faced by every British government since the post-war recovery—how to keep his international payments in order and, at the same time, keep unemployment at a tolerable level and maintain a good rate of growth. (3) In the face of that prospect—and in the face of the mounting political pressures on him to back away from a policy of deflation (and perhaps wage freeze), Wilson may decide that, in order to resolve his long-term dilemma, he must: (i) Save several hundred million dollars of foreign exchange by cutting back on defense East of Suez and in Germany. (At Tab C is a table giving the foreign exchange costs to the U.K. of its present defense positions in Malaysia, the Persian Gulf, Germany, etc. The balance of payments cost in the Far East is about $200 million per year.) (ii) Reduce domestic spending for defense, in order to make more domestic resources available for export and investment—they will have a tough time meeting their defense commitments without running way over their 1970 target for defense spending (5-percent of GNP. The present budgetary costs of overseas defense, by area, are also set out at Tab C. The Far East costs about $750 million per year, about 13 percent of the U.K. defense budget and about 0.8 percent of GNP.). (4) Quite apart from the economics, there will be great political pressure on him to reduce defense spending—especially East of Suez. Absent such action, he will be accused of making his unemployed pay for a neo-colonial policy, under pressure from Washington. (5) This is where we come in. So far, the U.S. position has been that: —The U.K. must remain in full force in the Far East ($200 million in foreign exchange; $750 million in budget costs); —They must keep the full British Army on the Rhine ($238 million in foreign exchange, about 50 percent offset; $504 million in budget cost); —They must get their balance of payments in order without devaluation, or exchange controls, or permanent restrictions on trade; —There is no more U.S. money to bail them out in case they run into trouble. (6) It is more than likely that Wilson will say that he cannot do all that without more help from the U.S.—that it would involve his keeping his economy in a permanent state of recession. Specifically, he might face us with an implicit “more money” or “cut East of Suez” choice. His tactic would be to propose a cut-back in Malaysia during ′67-′68, on the ground that “confrontation” has ended. If so, our options will be as follows: (i) We can, after some preliminary bargaining, offer him an extra $200 million per year through arms sales and U.S. redeployment from the Continent to the U.K. This would cover his Far East foreign exchange costs. Bob McNamara believes we can do this without any significant balance of payments cost to the U.S., simply by shifting to the U.K. defense dollars now going to France and Germany (on top of what the Germans offset). All your advisors agree that this would be a worthwhile bargain. Defense and State are working on a possible package. (ii) This may not turn the trick. Wilson may feel that he has got to cut back in the Far East even if his direct foreign exchange costs are covered. He may feel that the domestic, defense-budget cost of his present Far East position ($750 million, 13 percent of defense budget, .8 percent of GNP) is unacceptable—that he needs to free up the resources involved for investment and exports. Further, he may feel that, even apart from economics, the political cost is too great. (iii) If Wilson turns down a U.S. offer which would cover his Far East foreign exchange costs, our choices will be more painful, and your advisors are of two minds: —Bob McNamara still believes that it is absolutely essential that the U.K. remain in the Far East. For the next year or two, he thinks anything which will smell of a British pull out will fatally undermine our domestic base on Viet Nam. Further, he believes that confrontation in Malaysia will, in fact, continue indefinitely and is determined that it remain a British responsibility. —I, myself, believe that, if we adopt Bob’s position—and Wilson goes along—it will either cost us a weak Britain and a great deal of balance of payments money or, even more likely, a weak Britain and an eventual devaluation of sterling. Either would have disastrous consequences for the dollar—and for our international political position. I do not believe that this, or any other U.K. government, will be willing to sacrifice its domestic goals to maintain an overseas position in which it does not believe, for the sake of a friend—unless that friend is willing to pay for the favor. And I do not think we can afford the price, either in terms of money now or in terms of an implied open-ended call on U.S. money in case of trouble later. My own position is that our first priority should be to move the United Kingdom to save its long-term economic and financial position and thereby to prevent potentially disastrous consequences for the United States, our over-all foreign policy, and the stability of the Free World financial system. A weak ally is of no use to us East of Suez, in Europe, in the international financial set-up, or anywhere else. This priority suggests that we must leave it to the U.K. government to decide what it must do, short of devaluation, to save its national position. It would be contrary to this priority for us to lean on the Prime Minister to do something he would not otherwise do. If we do, we will pay a large price many times over, and damage both the pound and the dollar. In other words, I would not go beyond the terms of the $200 million package suggested in the first paragraph, (i), above. —Secretary Rusk agrees with Bob that it is important to us that Britain hold up its end in the Far East. However, following his conversations with Michael Stewart in Canberra, he is skeptical whether we can keep the U.K. in a meaningful Far East role at any price. He doubts whether they have it in them to stick it out. You will, of course, want to hear his views—as those of Bob—in person. (7) I have assumed that the implicit choice will be: (i) pull out from East of Suez, or (ii) more money now, or (iii) a progressive deterioration of sterling during 1967-68 (with devaluation or more bail-out money at the end of the road). It is possible that, as an alternative, Wilson will say that they must cut either East of Suez or in Germany. A sharp cut in the British Army on the Rhine will appear particularly attractive to London if the Germans do not improve the U.K. offset. (They are currently bargaining, with a report due to the two governments in September.) (8) On a Far East versus Germany choice, you will wish to have a separate memorandum spelling out the arguments. Bob McNamara would clearly prefer a substantial British cut-back in Europe over any reduction in the Far East. I don’t know Secretary Rusk’s views on this. I suspect that a number of your foreign policy advisors would vote the other way. They would be worried about the strain imposed on German politics, the consequences for Britain’s prospects for going into Europe, and an unhealthy, excessive German dependence on the United States. II. The second possibility is that the Wednesday package will not do the trick . This could happen because the package is inadequate in terms of the basic deficit. I told Callaghan it would be better to be safe than sorry, but his (perfectly honest) notions of strong action may be different from mine. Or, although adequate in terms of the basic payments position, it might not convince the world, especially the speculators. In either case, sterling would remain teetering on the edge. The marginally more likely prospect would be for continued erosion over several weeks, with a series of bad Fridays culminating in a disastrous run during the late summer or autumn. The alternative would be a really massive run within the next week or two. In either case, we would face the same choices we faced last summer : (i) We could put up more bail money. I do not believe we could count on getting help from the Europeans, and I would vote, as I did last summer, against putting up a nickel on our own. (ii) A large devaluation of sterling (e.g., 25 percent), which would be followed down by everyone else. (iii) A controlled or small devaluation, followed by only a few sterling area countries and no one else. (This is the outcome we would work for, but it would not be easy to convince the U.K. A small devaluation tends to be unconvincing and may make the speculation worse.) I believe our contingency plans, worked out last summer and kept updated (under Fred Deming’s chairmanship, by Messrs. Bator, Okun, Solomon, and Dewey Daane) are in good shape. I will be prepared to discuss them with you on a separate occasion at your convenience. We will need a full-dress meeting with you and your other advisors during the early part of this week. 4 Henry H. Fowler 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, UK Problem. Secret; Very Sensitive. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Talked of this with Deming’s help over weekend.” 2 None of the tabs is printed. 3 On July 21 the Wilson government presented 500 million pounds in budgetary cuts to Parliament. 4 The meeting was held July 22. According to Bruce: “I made my spiel, suggesting we have not only a short range but a long range policy toward the British. Ball proposed, among other things, we push them into the Common Market…. Rusk supported him. Joe Fowler thinks they are over-extended in their commitments. The President listened but was cryptic in his comments.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, July 20, 1966, 1:13 p.m. 11232. For the Ambassador. President received today following message from Prime Minister. “In my message to you last night, 2 I purposely said nothing about our current economic problems because I was going straight into a full discussion with the Cabinet, on the basis of the very drastic studies made to give effect to my statement of last Thursday. My colleagues and I have now examined these in detail and I shall be making a further statement about them in the House this afternoon. So I now write to let you know how I see the basic issues and how we propose to tackle them. I need not trouble you with the details. John Stevens will go over these with Francis Bator. We all realize the basic problem that confronts us, namely that our spending and our costs must be brought under control; and that this will mean some real suffering for both the public and the private sectors. To do the trick, the package of measures which I am announcing must have—and will have—a very hard disinflationary impact. In particular, we have decided on a total standstill for the next six months on prices and incomes and on a further six months period of very severe restraint in that field. Of course, no one in Britain will like these measures, especially the wage freeze. But I am convinced that public opinion here now accepts the need for drastic sacrifice and that, in this mood, it will rise to the challenge. But if we are to ask the British public to cooperate willingly over the sacrifices essential to put our economy to rights, they must equally be satisfied that they are not being asked to carry a disproportionate share of the general cost of Western defense. We cannot, in imposing these measures at home, avoid also reducing our Government expenditure overseas, civil and military and including defense expenditures in Germany as well as elsewhere. But I am telling Parliament that any cut of this nature should not affect the basic lines of foreign policy on which the defense review was founded. This means that they must be consistent with our international commitments and with our common policy in defense of Western interests throughout the world. I hope we can discuss the problem together in this spirit when we meet next week.” Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Walsh. 2 The message reported on Wilson’s talks in Moscow with Kosygin. (Ibid.) He discussed his visit to Moscow in The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 254-255. 264. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 264. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 22, 1966. SUBJECT Harold Wilson’s Visit—The Opportunity for an Act of Statesmanship When Prime Minister Wilson comes to Washington eight days from now we can follow one of two lines of policy: We can discuss his monetary measures, review additional ways and means of bolstering the pound, press the British to put troops in Thailand and to maintain their expense expenditures, and offer to juggle our military sales arrangements to make this easier for them. This follows the general line of short-term improvisation that has marked our relations with a succession of British Governments since the end of the war. It is the course of least resistance; it is what Wilson expects and he will come prepared for it. The alternative is to look beyond the immediate present and to talk with Wilson in some depth about the longer-range relations between our two nations based on a clear understanding of the respective roles which each country should play in the development of a rational world system. This is a difficult and rigorous exercise. It requires that each of us clearly face reality. Britain must recognize that she is no longer the center of a world system but that she can nevertheless play a critical role by applying her talents and resources to the leadership of Western Europe. We, on our part, should face the fact that it is basically unhealthy to encourage the United Kingdom to continue as America’s poor relation, living beyond her means by periodic American bailouts. We must, in other words, redefine the so-called “special relationship” in terms consistent with the longer-range interests of both our nations. This is a good moment to begin. Compelling political and financial reasons combine to make it necessary and profitable for Britain to set a realistic course; at the same time they provide us the leverage to help bring this about. It is imperative that we use that leverage with a strong and clear purpose. I recommend, therefore, that we urge on Prime Minister Wilson the following propositions: Proposition One—Britain Cannot, by Herself, Continue to Play a World Role. To solve her problems Britain must adjust her national aspirations to the limitations of her resources in the perspective of the present world power structure. The United Kingdom is no longer the center of an effective world system. The Commonwealth has become little more than a figure of speech; it has meager meaning in a power sense—and not much meaning in a commercial sense. The “new” Commonwealth has no collective significance; at most it is a series of bilateral arrangements that are rapidly wasting away. The “old” Commonwealth is gradually fading out. Prime Minister Holt told me, for example, that for the first time in history the Australian papers were openly questioning the value to Australia of the “fiction” of allegiance to the Queen. The problem for Britain is primarily psychological. Unlike the continental European nations, it did not have the shock of defeat and occupation to break it out of old molds of thought. It has not found it easy to relate its own internal social revolution to the acceptance of a new national role. Here is where American influence and American policy can make the critical difference. For Britain—by itself—is unlikely to adjust to the facts of a new world environment quickly enough to check a developing imbalance in European affairs that can be dangerous for all of us. She needs the stimulus of American leadership—or, in other words, the pressure of a determined American policy. Proposition Two—Britain Can Play a Highly Constructive Role for Herself and the World by Moving Decisively Toward Europe. The need for British leadership of a uniting Western Europe is obvious. De Gaulle has rejected that leadership by pursuing an atavistic nationalism. Germany obviously cannot assume it. But Britain has the prestige and ability for the task. We should impress on Prime Minister Wilson what that role of leadership implies. The British effort should not be confined to checking the fragmentation and renewal of national rivalries toward which De Gaulle’s policies are tending. Britain should seek to turn Europe outward both in its commercial policy and its political interests—in other words, to lead the peoples of Western Europe, moving toward unity, toward a new involvement in, and responsibility for, world affairs. This is not limited to the provision of political tutelage and economic aid to a restricted group of developing nations—important as that may be. It means that a united Western Europe should play a role along with the United States in keeping the peace around the world. Britain’s other great mission in entering Europe would be to restore the balance between Germany and its neighbors that has been disturbed by French nationalism. A uniting Europe founded on Franco-German understanding has been increased by the fact of British aloofness, for a United Kingdom standing apart from Europe acts as a lodestone, drawing with unequal degrees of force on the individual parts of the European body corporate. Britain within Europe, on the contrary, would provide the balance for a strongly-based European structure. It would dilute the bilateralism of the present Franco-German relationship which, by itself, is inherently unstable. It would give Western Europe a sense of completeness that should go far to assure its durability. In this way we might tend to check the dangerous tendencies which French nationalism is already producing—tendencies which if continued could lead to the unhealthy situation of a disaffected Germany bound to the West by an increasingly irksome bilateral relationship with the United States and threatened with permanent discrimination by her neighbors on both sides. Proposition Three—Entry into the Common Market Is Essential to British Financial Rehabilitation. An equally compelling argument why Britain must join the Common Market is that otherwise she will never be able to put her economy in order. No British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, has the political strength to bring about the structural changes in the British economy and in the attitudes and habits of both labor and management that are necessary to make the economy modern and competitive. This can only be done by subjecting British industry to the pervasive impact of competition—to what Harold Macmillan described as “the cold douche of a big market.” The measures announced on Wednesday 2 do not go to the heart of the matter; they will do nothing significant to increase productivity and will in the short-run discourage necessary private sector investment. Proposition Four—Britain Should Offer to Sign the Rome Treaty as Now Written. 3 Wilson is likely to reply to these contentions that France is still threatening to interpose its veto to British accession to the Rome Treaty, and that, in any event, Britain cannot join Europe until it has negotiated adjustments in the Treaty arrangements to take care of domestic agriculture, New Zealand agriculture, etc. The answer is that Britain’s tactics are placing it at a hopeless disadvantage against French obstructionism. The French Government has said that if Britain were prepared to join the Treaty as written it could do so immediately. Britain, as an applicant, has little bargaining power; Britain, as a member, would be in strong position to work out the requisite adjustments since, on each issue, it could make common cause with one or more combinations of other Community nations. If, therefore, Britain were to make clear its willingness to sign the Treaty, France would be hard-put to find a basis for objection. Wilson’s likely rejoinder is that the British public is not ready for a decisive move toward Europe at this time. But a recent Gallup Poll has shown that 70% of the people favor entry into the Common Market if the British Government thinks it wise (as compared with 28% in 1963 at the time of the French veto). Moreover, the Labour Party would, in effect, be stealing the Tories’ clothes, since Heath has already indicated he would pursue this course if the Conservatives came to power. Proposition Five—Britain Could Contribute Both to Non-Proliferation and to European Stability by Giving Up Its Nuclear Deterrent. The final aspect of a rational United States policy toward Britain concerns nuclear weapons. The Labour Party ran for office in 1964 on the promise that it would give up its nuclear deterrent. We should urge Prime Minister Wilson to live up to that promise. Britain definitely cannot afford the resources and foreign exchange that go into the construction of the present four nuclear submarines. It gains little in world prestige by being a nuclear power but it could gain great respect from the world by taking the statesmanlike step of getting out of the business. There is reason to think that Wilson may hope some day to trade off cooperation in nuclear weapons matters with the French as the price of entry into the Common Market. This is, however, an illusion we should discourage. So long as De Gaulle rules, the French will have no interest in sharing any part of the control of the bomb with any other country, and it is certainly not in our interest to promote Anglo-French nuclear cooperation that is designed to perpetuate two national nuclear systems. Moreover, a considerable part of British nuclear technology has been provided by the United States and Britain has no right to give it away. We should make this clear to Wilson. By giving up her national nuclear deterrent Britain could strike a dramatically effective blow against the spread of nuclear weapons. The Wilson Government is pressing hard for a treaty with the Soviet Union in order to stop other nations from obtaining nuclear weapons. But British activities in this direction are likely to do more harm than good, since it is unedifying for a nation of fifty million people to insist that it must maintain a national deterrent, while contending that India with its 350,000,000 peoples and Japan with its 100,000,000 should accept self-denying ordinances. The British position is particularly galling to its former colonial dependency, India, since it gives a colonialist cast to the whole non-proliferation effort. Continuation of the United Kingdom national deterrent has a considerable effect on Indian and Japanese nuclear appetites. By contrast, an evident United Kingdom determination to abandon the national deterrent could make it easier for these countries to remain non-nuclear. Britain’s abandonment of its national nuclear deterrent would bring a second important result in greatly easing the problem of nuclear sharing, particularly for Germany. If Britain feels that she cannot give up her nuclear deterrent to any collective arrangement in which the Germans might participate then the alternative is for it to get out of the business altogether. This act in itself would make the German problem manageable. Given the status of Britain in German psychology, parity with the United Kingdom would be a full answer to the anxiety over nuclear discrimination. Proposition Six—The United Kingdom Should Be Encouraged to Move Toward a European Defense Community. Some thought is being given to such a proposal in the British Foreign Office. Whether or not the United Kingdom succeeds in joining the Common Market a British proposal for a European Defense Community—functioning within the NATO framework—would dramatize United Kingdom intentions toward Europe. Almost certainly this proposal would be turned down by France. Yet it would still have powerful appeal to the other Five and they might be prepared to move forward in this sector without France. The creation of such a Community would facilitate the solution of many issues—including the disposition of the United Kingdom nuclear deterrent, the future organization of NATO and the technological gap. THE UNITED STATES HAS THE LEVERAGE TO ACCELERATE THESE DECISIONS Up to now, we have made continuing investments in our so-called “special relationship” with Britain, but have received only limited benefits in return. The relationship does, however, provide leverage by which we can encourage the steps spelled out in this paper—provided we are willing to use it firmly. As I see it, our principal elements of leverage are the following: A. We Can Relax the Pressure for a British East of Suez Role . I would not recommend that we ask Britain to reduce her present East of Suez commitments. I do recommend, however, that we not press her hard to maintain them in anything like their present dimensions. As the Wednesday announcement made clear, Britain does not propose to maintain her overseas commitments at current levels. The basic reason for this is political. Britain cannot ask the British people to sacrifice wages and profits while still paying for a world role which, they tend to feel, is more nostalgic than real. Thus—no matter what we may say about it—Britain will inevitably cut down her overseas deployments as confrontation terminates, although in any event the United Kingdom presence East of Suez will continue for a while. To the extent that she delays the process of reducing that presence as the result of American pressure, we will have to pay an exorbitant price—both financial and political. And the probabilities are, that whatever we pay we will not materially affect Britain’s inevitable withdrawal. It is a mistake to view the problem purely in money terms. Britain’s present deployments East of Suez are costing her $263 million of foreign exchange; equally as important, they are consuming $924 million of budgetary resources which affect Britain’s ability to produce for export. In addition, there are 100,000 men East of Suez at a time when Britain is suffering an acute labor shortage at home that affects its ability to produce goods for export. Of course, we can juggle our military assistance arrangements at different points in the world so as to help meet part of these balance-of-payments costs. But this would settle nothing in the long term; for the problem is political, not financial. Whether it be logical or not, Britain will not easily adjust to a role of European leadership so long as she continues to extend herself in order to maintain a shadow of her Nineteenth Century imperial position. Certainly, that is the way it will seem to the British people as well as the Continental Europeans. In my view, we should, therefore, relax our pressure on Britain to do things that she will either refuse to do or will do only at substantial financial cost to us and at the expense of deflecting her attention from necessary and constructive decisions. We should have no illusions as to the outcome. When the chips are down, —Britain will not put troops into Thailand; —She will maintain Singapore only a few years longer; —She will fall back on Australia and bring her troops home once confrontation is ended. This should, however, not make us too unhappy. It is a mistake to regard the size of the British Far Eastern presence as significantly relevant to the American commitment in that part of the world. The American people have not conditioned their attitude toward our participation in the Vietnamese war on the continued maintenance of 55,000 British troops in Malaysia. Very few of them, in fact, know about it. If Britain were to pull her men home I think it would have a miniscule effect on the American determination to stay the course. In our current discussions the question of British overseas deployments has been posed as a matter of choice. Would we rather have Britain remove troops from Germany or diminish its East of Suez role? In terms of the propositions I have put forward in this memorandum, the answer is clear. British troops in Germany have an immediate relevance to Britain’s participation in Europe. British troops in the Far East are a distraction from the role that Britain should play over the next few years. I recommend, therefore, that we not use our muscle in an effort to keep a large British presence East of Suez, since we should not seek to perpetuate a transient advantage at the expense of a long-term policy. By permitting Britain to phase out her Asian deployments we can help her make the hard decision to give up the pretensions to a world role that are today diverting her from a more constructive purpose. B. We Should Shut the Door on Financial Support to Britain’s Chronic Financial Crisis . In spite of the words we have uttered in the past, the British Government still believes that if sterling gets into serious trouble we will rescue it. We must make it emphatically clear that this is not the case. We have failed to be persuasive in the past because we have not made the decision ourselves that we were, in fact, prepared to let sterling go down the drain. To carry conviction on this point, we must make it clear that we are prepared, if necessary, to take unorthodox financial action to protect the dollar, that we have an arsenal of measures ready, and that we have the determination to use them. C. We Should Make Clear Our Willingness to Participate in a Financial Operation that Would Lead to British Membership in Europe . But, while rejecting further futile rescue operations, we should make clear our willingness to assist developments that offer a long-term solution—particularly in relation to Britain’s entry into Europe. If Britain offered to join the Rome Treaty without prior conditions, De Gaulle’s only plausible objection would be that the United Kingdom must first put her financial house in order. The basis for such an objection is that the other Community countries should not be asked to undertake the Rome Treaty obligations to provide mutual help to a Britain running large deficits and vulnerable to the whims of the holders of its present heavy load of sterling balances. We should make clear that—if the General were to interpose such an objection—we would be prepared to discuss with the Six how Britain’s financial affairs could be put sufficiently in order to make her an acceptable member of the European Community. This might involve facing two problems: A controlled and limited devaluation of 10-12% in order to make British goods competitive within the Common Market; and the internationalization of Britain’s sterling balances. I think we should welcome the chance to participate in a concerted effort with the Continental European nations to take these constructive measures if it becomes necessary. In that way we might, once and for all, remove the disturbing element of chronic British financial crises. D. We Should Be Willing to Help the British Phase Out Their National Nuclear Deterrent . If Wilson should decide to abandon the British national nuclear deterrent he could do so in various ways. It is not essential that he decide which way now. What is essential is that he make clear publicly his intent to do so within a definite period of time. Whichever method of abandoning the deterrent the British may choose to follow we should be prepared to help: —If the British wish to phase out by way of a collective force we should be ready to help them develop such a force on acceptable terms. —If they simply want to get out of the business we should be ready to purchase the four Polaris submarines Britain is now building or assist in converting them into hunter-killers if that is feasible. Getting the British out of the national nuclear business would be worth a substantial expenditure in view of the contribution it would make to non-proliferation and the problem of nuclear sharing. We should be ready to help Wilson dramatize this contribution. One way might be by a US-British-German non-proliferation declaration, (similar to the present US draft treaty) to which other countries would be invited to adhere. Within the context of such a declaration: —The three countries could announce their support for amending the present draft non-proliferation treaty, to preclude help to existing national nuclear deterrents after some fixed date. —The United States would state its intent to seek repeal to the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act 4 which authorizes help to national nuclear programs. E. If Additional Leverage Is Necessary to Bring About an Abandonment of the British Nuclear Weapons System, We Should be Prepared to Curtail our Sharing of Nuclear Information . One aspect of the “special relationship” that has proved most galling, particularly to the French, has been our special arrangements for sharing nuclear technology with the British under the 1958 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. These amendments are, however, only permissive, and the President can, by executive decision, curtail this flow of technology. I think we should be prepared to use this power if necessary. F. Britain’s Entry Into Europe Would Not Impair But, in Fact, Improve Her “Special Relationship” with the United States . We must dispel the British tendency to feel that she must choose between entering Europe and maintaining the “special relationship” with the United States. The “special relationship” is something that springs from a common language and a common Anglo-Saxon heritage. We should make it clear to Prime Minister Wilson in unambiguous terms that we would find it easier to work with a Britain that was leading the drive toward a unified Europe than with a Britain that continues to be isolated from the Continent. CONCLUSION I have put forward the foregoing line of policy out of a deep conviction that the steps outlined are essential to a stable and healthy organization of Free World power. I have no illusions as to what can be accomplished during Wilson’s forthcoming visit. Even if we strenuously urge the arguments I have set forth, the Prime Minister would not immediately acquiesce. But we must make a start, and time is not running on our side. We should use the opportunity of the visit to begin the conditioning process. For if we continue to pursue our present pattern of conversation with the British—dealing with each problem on an ad hoc basis and without a clear sense of where we want Britain to go in the long-term— we shall do both ourselves and the British a tragic disservice. We shall retard a process that must go forward quickly if we are to have stability in the West. After all, it is the timing that matters. Sooner or later the British will be forced to abandon their pretensions to world power. Sooner or later they will enter Europe. These processes are already in train. But if we do not exercise our influence to speed them up, British actions may once more be too little and too late—as has happened so often in the past. Europe needs Britain to move toward unity. And, if Britain does not take the decisive steps to identify herself with Western European aspirations, the process of fragmentation may well outrun any British contribution to cohesion. We shall then—once again—be confronted with the conditions of a new and dangerous instability. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS When the Prime Minister raises the United Kingdom economic problem, we should make clear that we wish to widen the discussion, to deal with its causes, rather than merely with its symptoms: 1. We should press the Prime Minister to make clear to the Six unequivocally the United Kingdom’s desire to join the Common Market , i.e., to accept the Treaty of Rome in full and to negotiate desired adjustments after entry. We should indicate to the Prime Minister that, if the French response isolates sterling as the main obstacle to UK entry, we would be prepared to help in financial arrangements to overcome that obstacle. Failing this, we would not be ready to join in further “bail out” operations to help the United Kingdom. 2. We should encourage the United Kingdom to put forward the concept of a European Defense Community , whether or not De Gaulle continues to veto United Kingdom admission to the Common Market. 3. We should urge the Prime Minister to fulfill his campaign pledge to get the United Kingdom to abandon its national nuclear capability, both to advance non-proliferation and to lighten the United Kingdom’s economic load . We should urge that this be done within the context of a US-UK-FRG declaration—to which other countries could adhere—that none of these countries will help or launch national nuclear programs, pending conclusion of an East-West agreement. If necessary, we should exert leverage by suspending the flow of US nuclear information to the United Kingdom under the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act (or by seeking repeal of that amendment). 4. We should not allow the Prime Minister to use the “East of Suez” issue to bargain his way out of facing these issues . We should indicate that we realize the United Kingdom intends to stay there for a while, and then eventually to phase down, and should offer no incentive for what would almost certainly prove a vain effort to alter the inevitable. George W. Ball 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Bill Moyers of the White House staff, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Secretary of State Rusk. In an attached covering memorandum to the President, Ball wrote: “The attached memorandum represents my personal view as to how we might appropriately handle the visit of Prime Minister Wilson.” 2 Reference is to the 500 million pounds in budgetary cuts presented to Parliament on July 21. 3 Reference is to the Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, and entered into force on January 1, 1958, which established, among other things, the European Economic Community. 4 For text of the 1958 amendment, P.L. 85-479, approved on July 2, see 72 Stat. 276. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 265. Memorandum of Conversation 265. Memorandum of Conversation 1 London, July 27, 1966, 10:30 p.m.-midnight. PARTICIPANTS The Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir William Armstrong of H. M. Treasury, and the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary; Secretary Fowler, Under Secretary Ball and Mr. Deming 1. International Liquidity Secretary Fowler said he was pleased with the results of the Hague meeting. 2 What we had attained was procedural rather than substantive, but it represented a real gain. The discussions and negotiations were now in the larger group, and there was hope of more progress on substance. He hoped there would be an IMF resolution supporting the procedure at this Fall’s meeting, and his timetable for agreement in substance was the IMF meeting in September, 1967. The time for activation, of course, was open. It would depend on circumstances as they developed. The Prime Minister said he hoped the U.S. and U.K. would continue to work together, and anything the U.K. could do to help get the 1966 IMF resolution approved, they would do. 2. U.K. Program Secretary Fowler said that he thought the U.K. measures had been well taken. He referred to the comments he had made about them and the comments made at the Hague by the other finance ministers. The Prime Minister said that the measures had gone further than any others so far and that he believed the wages/prices measures would have to go further still. He doubted that they could rely solely on the voluntary program. They needed additional statutory powers and probably would seek them. Among such powers were those to literally break strikes. The problem was very tough—particularly so for a democracy. He referred to the will of the U.K. Government to stand up and take a hard line. He noted that, by so doing in the seaman’s strike, it had hurt sterling because the strike dragged on. He thought the general comment on the strike settlement had missed this point—the Government really had been tough and had insisted on less than the employers were willing to pay. Yet comment on the settlement seemed to indicate that the Government had been too easy. He referred also to the problem of sterling balances and the apparently general feeling that these were the cause of the present weakness. He noted that this simply was not so. Selling of sterling had come from the private side, including selling from the U.K. itself. He reiterated his belief that there was absolutely no point in devaluation. It would solve nothing. He wished the world—and some elements in the U.K.—would understand that. Secretary Fowler noted a point that had been made at the afternoon meeting at the Treasury—that the wage/price pause could have an important long-run effect. If the spiral of wage increases at a rate well above productivity increases could be broken (as it had been in the U.S. in the late 1950’s), it could lead to cost stability for some time. This was a very important factor. He went on to say that the U.S. now faced a problem of preventing a breakout of wage and price increases. The U.S. problem was to orbit out of a 5-1/2-6 percent real growth rate that was no longer sustainable as our slack was being used up—to a rate of 4-1/2 percent, which would be consonant with a low level of unemployment and high degree of capital utilization. It was a difficult job. The Prime Minister said he saw no real demand-pull inflation in the U.S. as yet, but undoubtedly the seeds of cost-push inflation were there. 3. Conversations in Russia The Prime Minister said that he had had 9 hours with Kosygin—5 hours alone, except for 2 interpreters. Kosygin had been very frank. The Prime Minister had asked if he wanted to be quoted to the President. Kosygin had said that he did not, but he thought it would be useful if the Prime Minister reported his own appraisal of Kosygin’s statements to the President. The Prime Minister said that he had stressed that the U.S. meant business and that Hanoi had no hope of a U.S. weariness which would produce withdrawal from Vietnam. He said he made this point a number of times. He would be reporting to the President in detail about the conversation. 4. U.K. Role in the World The Prime Minister said he also wanted to discuss broadly U.S.-U.K. relationships. In a sense, the U.K. was at a crossroads and had to come to some conclusions about her future role. George Ball said that he believed the U.K. had to define—perhaps redefine—its role in the world. For his part, he saw the U.K.’s major role as leadership in Europe. The Prime Minister said that he did not want to be corralled into an inward-looking Europe. Ball said that he visualized the U.K.’s leadership as taking Europe out of its inwardness. The Prime Minister said he had asked Pompidou directly if the French price for entry into the E.E.C. were political and if it involved the U.K. turning its back on the U.S. He got no real answer. Secretary Fowler said that he believed the U.K. should go into the E.E.C. from a position of strength rather than weakness. The Prime Minister agreed with this view. Ball said that he didn’t know the strategy or the timing but that the U.K. and U.S. should begin to work out jointly the U.K.’s role in Europe. The Prime Minister said he was skeptical. His own posture was Atlantic. He noted that the U.S. seemed to be shifting from an Atlantic to a Pacific posture. Secretary Fowler said his only advice was “don’t go in on French terms.” Ball said that everything could not be agreed in advance. Maybe it was better to get in and then negotiate. The Prime Minister appeared unimpressed. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, CO 305, UK. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street. 2 Reference is to the July 25-26 meeting of U.S. and West European Treasury Ministers. 266. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Posts in NATO Capitals 266. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Posts in NATO Capitals 1 Washington, July 30, 1966, 4:12 p.m. 18817. Following cable based on uncleared memcons of Wilson talks is FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review: 2 During one day Washington visit Prime Minister Wilson had one hour private conversation with President followed by meeting in which Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, and Fowler, and Under Secretary Ball participated. President’s toast at luncheon for Wilson emphasized in warm terms continuing close cooperation of US and UK in cause of peace. 3 President expressed confidence that UK would prevail in present difficulties which he compared with challenge of World War II. President noted Prime Minister was now asking of British people same fortitude which turned the tide in those days. Private talk between President and Prime Minister covered Wilson’s trip to Soviet Union, economic problems, Vietnam, the German situation and the British position East of Suez. 4 Prime Minister in discussing visit to Soviet Union in larger groups said Kosygin in course of nine hours of conversations had given no encouragement whatsoever concerning possibility of Geneva meeting on Vietnam. Kosygin had been strongly critical of President but at least as strong in criticizing Chinese. Wilson believes Kosygin sincerely fears escalation Chinese intervention and confrontation between US and China. Wilson said he thought we may have been too complacent in assumption Chinese would not come in. In response Secretary’s query Wilson said he thought Kosygin in refusing to go to Geneva influenced more by Chinese aspect than by Hanoi’s views. Prime Minister said he had pressed Kosygin hard on US POW’s in North Vietnam. In discussing UK balance of payments problem Prime Minister pointed to 9% increase in exports in first five months of 1966 including rise of 23% in exports to US but said economy had been “blown off course” by sharp increase in price imported materials, adverse capital account movements, and worst of all seamen’s strike. He described Draconian measures adopted by his Government and stressed his determination in dealing with situation. Wilson said devaluation of sterling would not be good thing recalling worldwide repercussions which followed devaluation of the 30’s. Prime Minister said UK financial problem had been exaggerated and some British financiers showed their political prejudices in voicing their views. Wilson and Secretary Fowler exchanged views on problems of increasing international liquidity. Secretary Fowler said there had been enough agreement at Hague meeting of Group of Ten to enable us to move into IMF. We should press hard with idea of establishing machinery for handling liquidity problem in time for September 1967 IMF meeting. Prime Minister said it was important to reach US-UK agreement before this meeting. With respect overseas military expenditures Prime Minister said there would be cuts. He would deal with confrontation situation in Malaysia when it was clear confrontation had ended not before. Troops in Germany presented difficult problem for both US and UK. President referred to prospect US ship purchases in UK to value of $23 million, $15 million from shifts of air units from France to UK and purchase of Rolls Royce engines as adding up to $100 million. Wilson expressed satisfaction with these arrangements. He suggested possibility of withdrawing presence while maintaining commitment to Libya, reduction of activities in Malta and hope US could help by increasing repair work US Sixth Fleet in Malta. In separate discussion with members of Prime Minister’s party Secretary McNamara said he did not think Germans would agree to meet full British offset request. Germans feel both US and UK forces overmanned and believe there must be cheaper way of maintaining these forces. Secretary McNamara said this could be studied. For example, UK air squadrons in Germany could just as well be maintained in UK. Also we should take greater account of air transport mobility and pay less attention to geography factor and concentrate more on “time readiness.” Sir Burke Trend said UK had attempted to do this in Defense Review and thought NATO should make systematic study of problem. Secretary McNamara agreed but said study should proceed in way which would not weaken public confidence in NATO. Secretary Rusk noted that there are two parallel trends: one a feeling in Europe that threat has lessened and on other hand danger that there will be loss of confidence in NATO if military structure weakened. Europeans feel they can relax their efforts but expect US to continue its full contribution. On question UK membership in Common Market Prime Minister said some people in his own party and most of press thought UK should cut world role and go in. He said UK anxious to join on good terms but not on French terms. French would insist UK break its ties with US or at very least abandon East of Suez position. Prime Minister thought time would come when UK could enter Common Market under satisfactory terms but that time not now. Sir Burke Trend said in separate conversation with Secretary that even if UK offered to sign on dotted line French would find some other reason to prevent UK entry. In discussion of African problems with members of Prime Minister’s party Sir Burke Trend said Soviets do not appear to place Africa at top of their priority list. Secretary noted prominent role of Cubans in Congo Brazzaville. On Rhodesia Sir Burke said sanctions biting hard but this not so apparent to man in street and thus sanctions so far have had little political effect. Under Secretary Ball said sanctions had reduced economic activity in Rhodesia but political effect at best unclear. Secretary in discussing South Africa problem said it was possible Africans would press issue hard in General Assembly in extremist form. Under Secretary Ball said it might be difficult for UK if it were faced with decision of vetoing mandatory sanctions against South Africa. When Ambassador Dean said there would first have to be finding of threat to peace Mr. Ball noted UK had already given way somewhat on this point in the resolution concerning tankers off Beira. Discussion of arms sales to South Africa covered septel. 5 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UK. Secret. Drafted by Shullaw and approved by Stoessel. 2 Copies of the memoranda of conversation are in the Johnson Library, Bator Papers, UK Problem. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation dealing with the international monetary situation is in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. VIII, Document 102 . 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 790-792. 4 For Wilson’s version of these discussions, see The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 263-264. 5 Telegram 19147, July 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 12-2 S AFR) 267. Memorandum of Conversation 267. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 17, 1966, 9:45 a.m. SUBJECT British Plans for Military Cutbacks in Europe PARTICIPANTS The Acting Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Jacob Myerson, Special Assistant, U Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BMI Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador David V. Bendall, Counselor, British Embassy Following an exchange of greetings, the Acting Secretary told the British Ambassador we were now prepared to provide our comments on the British plans for cutbacks in their military spending in Europe as requested the previous day by the Ambassador. 2 As regards the proposal to save from 5 to 8 million pounds by a reduction in troop expenditures in Germany, this was obviously something solely within the province of the British Government. We did not feel that we should comment. In regard to the proposal to save 15 million pounds in the logistics area, our main concern was with the British plan to get down to a ten-day supply situation. This would put the UK out of phase with our own arrangements. Even if HMG was thinking of resupply from the UK, in a time of emergency the system was likely to break down. Our main concern was with the British plans for saving an additional 10 million pounds. We were particularly concerned with the discussion in the British statement of the probable necessity to withdraw some combat forces and with the implication in the statement that some action might be taken by the UK in this regard before the UK/FRG mixed commission had a chance to report in the latter part of September. The injection of the possibility of a withdrawal of combat troops into the WEU and the NAC at this time would cause us great difficulties. This news was bound to leak. The resulting reaction in the U.S. would put pressure on us to unravel. We also feared, particularly in view of the problems that NATO is now having, that a whole series of adverse reactions would be triggered. The Acting Secretary and Mr. Johnson asked if the British in drawing up their plans had taken into account the additional $20 million in foreign exchange which would accrue to them as a result of our moving of three reconnaissance and two troop transport squadrons from France to the UK. They also urged the British to give us some time to see what might be done. Ambassador Dean replied that he did not know if the extra foreign exchange to be gained from the stationing of the U.S. squadrons in the UK had been taken into consideration or not. His instructions were that HMG was unable to postpone beyond Friday its statement to the NAC. The Ministers who had approved the statement had now left London on their holidays. It would be difficult to make any changes. In effect, the U.S. was asking that HMG eliminate entirely that part of its statement dealing with the 10 million pounds. Mr. Johnson replied that this was not really what we had in mind. We merely wanted the British to indicate that they would not do anything until after the mixed commission had reported. We also were urging that there be no mention of withdrawals. Ambassador Dean said he thought amendments of this nature might not be so difficult. He would report to London. He went on to say that if the U.S. wished to go over the situation with the UK, he thought it would be best to hold talks in London where the necessary facts were available. The Acting Secretary agreed with this suggestion and Mr. Johnson added that it would probably not be possible for us to have the talks until the following week. Mr. Johnson raised another matter of concern to us. He said that it was the understanding of General Wheeler, who had been briefed on British plans by Admiral Henderson, that the UK was unable to give any assurances that any troops returned from Germany would be put into the Strategic Reserve. Ambassador Dean agreed that such assurances could not be given. 3 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Drafted by Judd and cleared in G and U on August 23. The meeting was held in Ball’s office. 2 At a meeting with Ball at 11 a.m. on August 16, Dean had informed the Acting Secretary of the British decision to effect economies in BAOR and presented a copy of his talking points together with a statement the British representative would make at the August 19 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. A memorandum of their conversation with attachments is ibid., DEF 6-1 UK. 3 At a 4:15 p.m. meeting that day, Dean reported that West German response to contemplated British troop withdrawals was “surprisingly mild” and handed the Acting Secretary a redrafted version of page 4 of the British statement to the NAC. A memorandum of their conversation, together with the amended British draft, is ibid., DEF 6 UK. 268. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 268. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, April 4, 1967, 0901Z. 8004. Vipto 55. For: The President and the Secretary. From: The Vice President. Subj: Meeting with Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Chequers, Sunday, April 2, 1967. 2 On arrival in London, Sunday evening, I went directly to Chequers for dinner and overnight. After dinner, there was a lengthy conversation in the study. Present on the British side, besides Prime Minister and Mrs. Wilson, were the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner; Mr. Harold Davies, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister; and Michael Palliser, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. On the American side, besides Mrs. Humphrey and myself, were Ambassador and Mrs. Bruce, Mr. and Mrs. Dwayne Andreas, and Ted Van Dyk of my staff. Before dinner, Prime Minister asked me what reactions I had met on the continent to UK initiatives towards the Common Market. I told him that, in the Netherlands, Foreign Minister Luns favored an immediate British initiative without delay, with full acceptance of the Rome Treaty. In Germany, Willy Brandt had made clear German support for UK entry, but suggested that, after a declaration of intent now, he favored a series of bilateral contacts until sometime in the fall. In Italy, Moro, Saragat and Nenni had all indicated strong support for UK entry and for a united Europe. Wilson indicated that he was now in the process of consideration of Britain’s tactics towards EEC membership. After dinner, we gathered in the study. After brief preliminaries, Wilson brought up Vietnam and asked for our assessment of the present situation there. I reviewed for him the Guam Conference; the new American diplomatic team; the social, political and economic programs underway there, and gave him a brief review once more of our peace efforts. Wilson reviewed for me in detail his meeting with Kosygin. 3 He said Kosygin gave him an overwhelming impression of concern over Communist China. Contrary to most other reports, Kosygin believed that Red China wanted to intervene in North Vietnam—in fact he talked in terms of some three million Chinese troops. However, the leaders of North Vietnam were struggling to prevent this intervention. He said that Kosygin “spilled all the beans” concerning his fears about China, that it was an obsession. Wilson said Kosygin stated any company selling equipment to China would never get another Soviet order. He criticized UK computer and Italian scientific equipment sales to China. When Wilson said these sales were for peaceful purposes, Kosygin said they would be used for military purposes. Kosygin said U.S. did not take the Chinese threat seriously enough. Wilson feared that we had not continued the last bombing pause for a long enough period of time, that many people in UK believed the decision-making process in Hanoi could not move that quickly. Harold Davies, who knows Ho Chi Minh well and who had been to North Vietnam and met with several of the leaders there, said that North Vietnam leadership was far less monolithic than we might believe. There were a number of factions. The men in Hanoi were experienced, cultured diplomats—“real French-trained Elysée men.” They were not single minded, Neanderthal people who acted without reason. Yet, as one prominent physician had told him, they have been fighting for years and were prepared to continue to fight through their lifetimes and those of their children. The North Vietnamese were resolute. Davies felt that any attempt toward negotiation should be given ample time for development. It was necessary not only for the people in North Vietnam to discuss such a matter fully, among themselves, but it was necessary to consult NLF representatives all the way down to the lowest cadres. This could not be done overnight. Discussion then centered on how little was really known about the inside politics in Hanoi and about where and how decisions were really made in Hanoi. Wilson said Kosygin had encouraged him to do everything he could to work for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Kosygin told Wilson not to jeopardize his (Wilson’s) relationship with Washington. He had no doubt that Kosygin wanted a negotiated settlement. However, just as we did not understand decision-making processes in North Vietnam, the Soviets did not understand decision-making processes and forces at work in US. Kosygin still saw the possibility of “American workers and peasants” rising up in protest against the war. Wilson explained to Kosygin that President Johnson did have strong support for his Vietnam policies. The opposition was vocal and a minority. In closing, Wilson indicated that he thought the key to peace lay through the Soviet Union and the key to the Soviet Union lay with Britain. He felt that he had a real opportunity to act as middleman between the US and USSR to reach a negotiated settlement. In fact, he had been considering the possibility of moving more toward the middle, between the two nations, on Vietnamese policy. If he did this, he wanted us to understand that he was doing so in the interests of peace and not because of any lack of friendship or loyalty to the US. I replied that such a shift by Wilson would be misunderstood in the US and that in fact it might result in increased pressure from “hawks” for unilateral and strong US action to crush North Vietnam. It would be unfortunate if Americans believed Britain was moving away from US on this issue. The President appreciated Wilson’s support and recognized the domestic political pressures upon him. I told Wilson he should thus consider very carefully any change in the UK position. I told him he would jeopardize his relationship with the President if he followed any such course. (I repeated this again to him today, urging that he keep in close contact with the President, being mindful of the close relationship between our countries and of the friendship of the President. I believe I made my point.) There followed a long discussion about British public opinion and Vietnam. The Lord Chancellor, summing up, said that he believed most Britishers were simply appalled by the bloodshed and destruction and did not necessarily recognize the complicated issues involved. They saw the war as being dangerous to them if it expanded. Beyond that, most of the news carried by the media showed only American shooting and killing. It seemed to most people that we were a big country applying a great amount of force against a small country. Also, the Ky government was highly unpopular in Britain and that was harmful to public opinion. Our story has obviously not been effectively told in Europe. TV in particular has been damaging to our image. I reviewed in detail the progress made under the Ky government and our assessment of that government, as well as the present development toward democratic institutions there. I closed by suggesting that Wilson and others would do well to apply moral pressure on Hanoi as moral pressure was being applied against the US. He indicated that this would be useful and he would see what he could do in discussions with European leaders. I shall be meeting with him, as well as other members of the British Government during the next two days, and will send in a detailed report of my London visit late Tuesday or early Wednesday. 4 Memoranda of conversation, individual meetings, follow. 5 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 143. Secret; Nodis. Vice President Humphrey visited Europe March 26-April 10. 2 At a March 6 meeting with Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Dean had requested that the Vice President or Ambassador Goldberg visit the United Kingdom for talks as a result of “increasing difficulty over the Vietnam problem” faced by his government. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. 3 Wilson’s account of negotiations with Kosygin, February 6-13, 1967, is in The Labour Government, 1964-1970, pp. 345-365. 4 Transmitted in telegram Vipto 62 from Bonn, April 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 143) 5 Memoranda of conversation are ibid., CF 142, and Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. 269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Secretary Brown 269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to Foreign Secretary Brown 1 Washington, April 21, 1967. 1. We are well aware of the United Kingdom’s economic, budgetary and foreign exchange difficulties which lie at the heart of the decision being considered to reduce your forces in Singapore-Malaysia by about one-half over the next four years. Nonetheless, we are deeply concerned at the idea of your making significant reductions in force unless and until there is a real change in the Vietnam situation. 2. What concerns us even more gravely are the indications you gave us that a further and more far-reaching decision is in contemplation to withdraw entirely from the Singapore-Malaysia bases by the mid-1970’s, to have Minister Healey inform Singapore and Malaysia of this contemplated decision, and to announce it before Parliament rises in July in conjunction with new statement of your Defense policy. 3. As I understand it the case for taking that much more fundamental decision rests on several grounds: A. A reduction in your presence will not produce large financial savings, only a complete withdrawal will accomplish that. B. You are under great domestic pressures for this and other reasons to tell the country what your intentions are in the area. C. Your Forces must know clearly and precisely what your policy is in order to plan their programs over the next ten years. D. You believe that an indefinite continued presence in the area will prove unacceptable locally, and it will only complicate the problems of those in power. By announcing a timetable for withdrawal now, you believe the critics of your presence will be disarmed. E. It is essential that Malaysia and Singapore know what is in store so that you can together plan for an orderly withdrawal with a minimum of dislocation. 4. While I appreciate the force of some of these arguments, I would argue against major reductions in the near future, more strongly against any decision now as to what you contemplate after 1971, and even more strongly against any announcement now of any intentions to withdraw from the area. 5. My concerns arise from the consequent reactions—the chain reactions—that would be set in motion in the US and elsewhere by such an action. A. For the UK to announce that you will no longer carry this burden (even at a future date) at the very moment when we are deeply involved in Vietnam and when Thailand is under threat, would have the most serious effects here. Surely Britain shares our views that what we are doing in Vietnam is of vital strategic importance to us and to our Allies. But those articulate groups here who question our presence in Vietnam and our commitments to SEATO will argue even more forcefully that your withdrawal shows clearly that there are no vital national or international interests in this area for us to defend, that we should have never gone in, and that we too should withdraw. B. There are those here in important positions in the Senate who want us to reduce our commitment to Europe. Should you announce that you are withdrawing from Singapore and Malaysia on the grounds you cannot carry that burden, I foresee an increase in the intensity of their criticism, arguing that we too have a limit to our capacity to carry these burdens and we should cut further and heavily in Europe. C. The strength of our position in the US in assuming international commitments in these last twenty years is that we have always been able to say that we have Allies who share our views and share our burden, and not least the UK. The defection of De Gaulle has hurt us. If now there was a UK withdrawal from this area it would be regarded as a similar defection, encouraging the neoisolationists, and encouraging the critics of our policies both in Asia and in Europe. D. I am also concerned as to how your withdrawal would be viewed in Hanoi and Peking, where it would be treated as a victory for them, as a repudiation of your support of our position in the area, and as a further weakening of SEATO. E. I am particularly concerned as to the effect in the immediate area of an announcement of what you will do in the 1970’s. With the great change in Indonesia, 2 there is now the prospect that something might be built in the next decade in the way of regional associations for economic and eventually defense purposes. We do not share the view that the people in Malaysia and Singapore long to see you leave. Lee has said again and again that he values your presence, and sees no hostility in Malaysia. The free Asian countries would prefer a friendly white presence to a hostile Chinese. Your continued presence and your experienced hand could do much to keep the situation stable and to foster and encourage these promising developments, whereas the announcement of your withdrawal could set in motion strains and ambitions that could keep this area in turmoil. If there is any thought that we might be able to take on your commitments when you left, as we did in Greece, 3 I must say at once that there is no sentiment in this country to take on additional commitments in any area. 5. In short, we understand your desire to reduce your forces and base structure in Malaysia and Singapore. We hope this can be done in a gradual and reasonable way without significant withdrawals before a Vietnam settlement, for we feel that your presence continues to play a major role in the security and stability of the area. But above all we hope you can avoid taking, or in any event making public in any way, basic decisions at this point on withdrawal by the mid-1970’s. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. 2 Reference is to the abortive coup of October 1965 that resulted in the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party and effective elimination of Sukarno as national leader. 3 Reference is to 1947 events that led to the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and major U.S. involvement in Greece. 4 In a May 1 letter to Secretary Rusk, Brown responded: “I do feel that some of the reactions to the substance of our plans has been somewhat exaggerated. What we propose is based on an appreciation of what South East Asia will be like in the next decade that I believe to be realistic…. Our plans … amount to little more than a statement of what you … will in fact have done or be doing about the same period and for the same political and economic reasons.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US) 270. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) to Secretary of State Rusk 270. Letter From the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 London, May 6, 1967. Dear Dean: Last week George Brown telephoned me to say he wished urgently to talk to me privately and unofficially—I was to be alone and he would have Paul Gore-Booth with him. We met on Friday night 2 at the Embassy residence, and no notes were taken. He prefaced his conversation by saying his call was unofficial, and for the exchange of private views. Then he added that what he would discuss was British plans for reducing their military commitments East of Suez and eliminating them entirely in Singapore and Malaysia by 1975. I told him I was particularly glad he would do so, since before he had phoned me, I had already decided, even in the absence of instructions from home, to ask him to see me as a friend, and allow me to state my strong misgivings over what was proposed, the manner in which the matter was being treated by HMG, and the intention to make a public announcement about it in July, 1967. I said I had read various memcons on the subject, and wondered whether his people appreciated how dangerous and inflammatory this situation could become. He answered that he realized this, and was deeply troubled over it. His own judgment differed somewhat from that of certain of his colleagues, and also, in a few particulars, from that of the Foreign Office; Gore-Booth would tell me about the latter. George then made a lucid and comprehensive survey of the situation, stressing particularly (1) the financial considerations, and (2) the domestic political pressures for an early announcement by his Government of its intention to quit the Singapore region by 1975. Everything he adduced has already been so amply argued by him in Washington that it is needless for me to repeat it here. In fact, I am writing you solely because of his insistence that I do so, and that I ask you to communicate his reflections only to the President, and to no one on your and the White House staff! Frankly, Dean, I am at a loss to know exactly what he thinks I might convey of which you are not already apprised. I can only guess that after his return from Washington he appreciated (especially in the light of your message to him of April 21, 3 and of the adverse comments of the Australians, New Zealanders, Prime Minister Lee, etc.) 4 the inherent explosiveness of this material. The only areas in which he indicated any possible changes were: (1) Although all ground troops should be removed from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975, he might advocate in Cabinet the retention of a considerable Naval and Air Force capability in the area. (2) He thought he might advise the PM not to get frozen on a July announcement date before the Washington meeting on June 2. Paul Gore-Booth then, at George Brown’s instigation, exposed the Foreign Office case. The most important points were that the FO thought there should be further interchanges between the UK, US and other Governments most concerned before any final decision by HMG; and, secondly, that although the FO officials were without competence to assess the exigencies of British party politics, must a July announcement be made, and also could not any determination on ultimate and complete withdrawal be “fuzzed” in public statements? In my reply, I hope I did not depart far, if at all, from what you and the President would have wished, and would have authorized me to say. I was careful again to point out that my remarks were reflective of entirely private opinions. I thought: (1) The Cabinet should take no binding decision until the PM had seen the President in Washington on June 2. (2) This affair (involving the way in which HMG seemed intent on making a unilateral determination, and, announcing it in July, eight years in advance of its being carried into effect) struck me as more likely to cause bitter controversy between the US and UK Governments than any other issue between us during the last few years. (3) I was unimpressed by the alleged necessity of announcement in July, before the Parliament rose, and equally so by the supposed necessity of having this time table known before the Labour Party Conference in September. Even assuming, from the standpoint of domestic politics, such an action was deemed highly desirable, should not the vastly more important considerations of international relations have paramount place? (4) I ventured to say that if the PM were to present his decision as a fait accompli to our President on June 2, and to try to justify it, and a July announcement, on the ground of his domestic political pressures, he would be inviting, and in my opinion recklessly, a possible rebuke of really titanic proportions. We had our own domestic political difficulties in much more acute degree than those afflicting the Labour party. Moreover, the appearance of our being, by inference, deserted (for that is how the project would be analyzed) in the midst of our Vietnamese involvement, by a Government assumed to be our most reliable ally, headed by a Prime Minister who had repeatedly declared himself an “East of Suez Man”, would seem to me unwise, provocative, and absolutely unacceptable to us, to our public opinion, or to our fighting allies, to say nothing of Singapore, Malaysia, and most of the rest of Asia. I appreciated the fact we were conversing in secrecy, and on a basis of personal friendship. On that same basis, I would ask George to regard my reflex as one I felt sure would be generally shared at home. This was not merely a question of handling a British budget, or planning their future defense dispositions; it involved the whole structure of the Anglo-American relationship, and of stability in Asia. If I were he, I would advise the PM not to get into a fixed position, to keep his options open, and if he has radically altered his policy about previous East of Suez commitments, to say so when he sees the President—meanwhile to leave the matter undecided. I apologize for sending you this long and wearisome letter, but having told George I would make, at his insistence, some sort of report, here it is, though it consists so much of “I saids” and does nothing to illuminate this dark problem. I believe Brown is seriously disturbed over the prospect of trouble on this issue. Fortunately, he has acquired respect for the opinion of Gore-Booth, who shares, within the limits of bureaucratic loyalty, my convinced opposition to the way in which the matter is currently being approached. Brown stated that the affair has no connection in his mind with Britain’s attempt to get into the European complex. Also, he is, more than any other Cabinet member, except possibly the PM, anxious to preserve close comity with USG, and even more than the PM, is sensitive to the fragility of our current connexion. I would suggest if you feel so inclined, you consider sending a message to him in some such terms as these: “David Bruce has told me of his recent conversation with you, and I have spoken about it to the President. I hope you will arrive at no irretrievable decisions on this dangerous subject before it can be fully discussed when the Prime Minister comes to Washington.” 5 Sincerely yours, David 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. 2 May 5. 3 Document 269 . 4 Reference is to meetings held between Defense Minister Healey and representatives of the Malaysian, Singapore, Australian, and New Zealand Governments for the purpose of explaining the new British defense policy. 5 The Secretary included this wording in a May 12 message to Brown. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) During a May 12 meeting, Foreign Secretary Brown informed Bruce that no definitive Cabinet decision on the withdrawal plan would be taken prior to July. (Ibid.) 271. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 271. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, May 30, 1967, 1010Z. 9929. For the Secretary from Bruce. 1. The Prime Minister will come to Washington Friday expecting US interest to focus on international affairs; his own approach to these problems may be largely governed by British domestic preoccupations. Important as the Far East and Middle East are, for the British they are less compelling than domestic economics and politics and the Common Market. Since the sterling crisis of July 1966 the Prime Minister has been progressively committing himself to a bold political gamble—a set of policy commitments that are, in the short run, economically painful and politically distasteful to the British people—trusting to long-term results for his political vindication. Deflation, tight control of wages and price, rising unemployment, defense at the expense of social welfare-these are shorthand reminders of the host of domestic issues that now beset him. Things will get worse before they get better. The latest (April) indicators show unemployment still rising, production sluggish, and a further rise in imports as against exports. Even public support for the Common Market bid, in the wake of DeGaulle’s public opposition, 2 is slipping according to the polls. 2. In the face of these problems, the Prime Minister has bet nearly all his political stack of chips on his Common Market application. Now, having done so, he finds himself in trouble because of DeGaulle’s intransigence, even perhaps on the question of negotiations. 3. While Wilson has persevered in his long-range strategy through the winter and the spring, the political cost has mounted. Labor has slipped badly in Parliamentary by-elections and lost disastrously in the nationwide local elections. Labor’s public support has been steadily declining in the polls; in the past two months, for the first time in over three years, the Conservatives hold a lead in public favor. Even the Prime Minister’s personal popularity in the polls, always higher than his party’s, is down. 4. Along with widespread public disaffection, there is trouble within the Labor Party. Large scale revolts in the Parliamentary Party on the defense budget and the Common Market application have posed a serious disciplinary problem. Wilson’s tough and sensational lecture to a Parliamentary Party meeting in March had at best a temporary effect. While the trouble is mainly on the left, it spreads across the party. The defense budget, East of Suez, the Common Market, Vietnam, and domestic economic policies each have their special critics. While they may not all unite on one issue, their sum is a range of discontent that infects a large section of the party. Even the loyalists are unhappy over the Prime Minister’s failure to punish leftist rebels. 5. Wilson has shown no signs of retreat on what he regards as the basic issues—the domestic economy and the Common Market—to placate his critics. On the contrary, he continues to take a position well ahead of his party (and apparently) of the general public, counting on the fact that, between now and 1971, he can pick his own most favorable moment for a general election. 6. Nevertheless, no leader can be indifferent to the pressures Wilson is under, and he must, so far as possible, do what he can to improve his present political position. He is putting a lot of personal effort into repairing his intra-party fences and trying to damp down the harmful and publicly visible squabble within the Labor Party. Most important, he is unquestionably looking for issues on which, without sacrifice of his basic purposes, he can make some concession to public and party disaffection. 7. There may be, for example, some minor improvements in social welfare programs in July mini-budget and as wage increases are reviewed on a case-by-case basis, there may be some politically useful concessions there (the government has conceded that it expects wages to rise six percent during this calendar year and some politically important wage claims are pending). 8. In this context, the proposed East of Suez reductions are particularly significant. An announcement in July of substantial saving in that area, looking ahead to what may otherwise be a stormy Labor Party conference in September, is probably the juiciest bone he can throw his critics. It commends itself in both budgetary and foreign exchange savings (at a time when no other sources for welfare spending and investment incentives are in view) and it appeals to the growing number who, for doctrinal and emotional reasons, want to reduce Britain’s world role, furthermore, it is thought by some to strengthen the Common Market bid. 9. The Prime Minister is, thus, under heavy political fortune. There is no sign, however, that he is weakening in his long-term strategy. He is deeply committed on both domestic economic policy and the Common Market; it would probably be as costly to retreat as to see it through (though what to do if the Common Market bid fails must be now an uncomfortable question). 10. In this difficult situation, the Prime Minister shows every sign of keeping his nerve. He is visibly self confident, retains all his skill and aplomb in public performance, and apparently continues his mastery over his Cabinet and his party. He is helped, of course, by Tory weakness; the swing in public opinion seems more an expression of dissatisfaction with Labor than of support for the Tories. Heath’s personal popularity remains at a low level. 11. Wilson will probably hold to his present course and he is giving an impressive exhibition of skillful and courageous leadership, but one should not underestimate his difficulties or the stresses on him. Even within his Cabinet, he is under real pressure to retreat on issues not central to Labor’s political fortunes or to the UK economy but of great interest to the United States—issues like Vietnam, the basic East of Suez policy, and even, perhaps, the UK’s role in the present Middle East crisis. 12. When I come to the Department on Thursday morning I hope for an opportunity to discuss UKG’s attitude toward the Middle East problem. 3 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 UK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 2 The British Government announced its decision to apply for membership in the EEC on May. At a May 16 press conference, President de Gaulle ruled out British membership in the Common Market at that time citing the disruptive effects of the continuing sterling crisis on the process of economic integration. 3 According to an entry in his diary, Bruce met with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk on June 2 for discussions of “the Middle East and future British East of Suez dispositions.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 272. Editorial Note 272. Editorial Note Prime Minister Wilson visited Washington June 2-3, 1967, for talks with U.S. officials. According to a note on the preparatory briefing books for this meeting, no formal memoranda of conversation of the President’s discussions with the Prime Minister were prepared. The preparatory documents for the Wilson-Johnson discussions are in Department of State, Visits Files: Lot 68 D 475, V-33. Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, and Fowler met separately with Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet, and the other members of the British delegation while the President and Prime Minister met privately. The discussions were dominated by a rapidly escalating crisis in the Middle East, which erupted into war on June 4. Memoranda of conversation are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 11. Wilson discussed his meeting with the President in The Chariot of Israel, pages 346-347. 273. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 273. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, July 13, 1967, 1600Z. Thank you for your message of July 6. 2 As you know, the General Assembly has been having a week’s breathing space in which to see whether agreement can be reached on any form of words. 3 But all the signs so far bear out your doubts about the likelihood of any significant closing of the gap between the two positions taken in the Assembly on the main issue. I have found it reassuring that a substantial part of the membership—and notably the Latin Americans—insisted on a balanced resolution (providing for an end to the state of belligerency as well as Israel’s withdrawal), or none. The Soviet Union and the less reasonable Arabs have certainly been given good cause for reconsidering, though I also agree with you that it may be a little time before any shift becomes discernible. But at least the atmosphere is now very different from what it was when the slanging match first began. It is also a good sign that the Security Council have now agreed to permit U Thant to arrange with the Israelis and Egyptians for United Nations troops to be stationed along the sides of the canal. 4 This agreement should be used as a first step towards establishing a U.N. presence elsewhere in the area. It is a hopeful sign too that U Thant has now appointed a Swede to pursue the refugee problem. A really determined and imaginative effort by the international community is now needed to solve this problem. We ought perhaps to examine what part a comprehensive development plan might play in all this. In general I think we should go on concentrating through the Security Council, on discussion of practical matters, pressing particularly for the appointment of a representative of the Secretary General, on developing the UN presence in the area and tackling the issues affecting freedom of passage through the water-ways. As regards the Far East we have, as I am sure you know, been giving very earnest and deep consideration to this problem since I saw you last month. We have discussed it here with Harold Holt, Marshall from New Zealand, Harry Lee from Singapore and, most recently, with the Tunku. All have expressed their concern about our longer-term intentions and, while the considerations that you and they have in mind differ in many respects from country to country (as one would expect), we fully understand the fundamental concern that is shared in common by you all. And, as I explained to you we not only understand this but we sympathise with it and wish to do everything we can to mitigate it. We have planned to phase our withdrawal over a period of years so as to reduce the likelihood of any lasting setback to the economies of the countries in the area; and our mitigating aid coupled with their own determination to help themselves will contribute positively to the kind of self-reliant future at which the whole area should aim. The British Government have had to reach their decisions, after the fullest consultation with their friends and allies and taking due account of their views, on the basis of their own best judgment of what is politically and economically right for this country. The decision we have now taken has been reached in the light of the best assessment we can make of the likely development of political relationships in the area in the second half of the next decade; and of the economic requirements if Britain is to play any continuing part there at that time. We in this country will be unable to play any such part—or indeed any effective part in world affairs as a whole—unless we get our economy straight now; and to do this we have no option but to bring our defence spending into line with our resources, while making full use of these resources to achieve our political objectives. If this is to be achieved, it requires long-term decisions about the overall shape of our forces and about weapon systems which we must take now. I repeat that the views that you and the heads of the Commonwealth governments concerned have expressed to us have been taken into the fullest account and we are grateful for the frankness, and also for the spirit of friendly understanding in which they have been expressed. My colleagues and I have decided that it is politically and economically right for us to reduce our forces in Singapore and Malaysia to about half the current levels by 1970-71 and to plan on leaving the mainland of Southeast Asia entirely by the middle seventies. But because we are equally resolved that Britain shall have a continuing part to play in the area, though one that must be commensurate with our resources, we shall also plan to retain a sophisticated military capability for use if required in the Far East after that time. For it really is nonsense for us to offer to provide independently ground troops to defend Asian countries who have it in their power to train and provide their own. What we can do and intend to do is to maintain a military capability for use in the area which provides the sophisticated sea-air support which they cannot afford to provide as an assurance against external aggression. In the further round of consultations just completed, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers have, I think, been impressed by the likely scale and character of this capability. Now that we have taken this decision, the question arises—again in the light of what you and our Commonwealth colleagues have said—whether we can avoid announcing it publicly at this time. The fact is that so much has appeared publicly in various parts of the world about our long-term intentions (and this was certainly not something that we either wished or accept responsibility for) that it is simply impossible for us now to avoid giving some public indication of what they are. Otherwise there is a real risk that it may be believed that we are planning a more rapid rundown than is in fact the case. In any event, we must in all fairness give our armed forces some idea of their long term size, shape and equipment when the process is completed in the middle 1970s, particularly as the careers of many are involved. This is difficult unless we indicate the major premise on which our planning is based. In any case, as the process gets under way in the coming months our long term intentions are bound to become known. Even if we ourselves attempted to disguise them, other governments concerned might not be able to avoid some disclosures in order to kill rumours and speculation and to explain the consequential adjustments to their own policy. I believe a continuation of the present uncertainty would be damaging to us all. But we are anxious to do all we can to meet your concern by avoiding anything too specific. Accordingly, in the Defence White Paper that we shall be presenting to Parliament shortly, we propose to say that, while we plan to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the middle 1970s, the precise timing of our eventual withdrawal will depend on progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in Southeast Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East. I know that this will be unwelcome news to you. But these decisions have been taken for reasons which seem right to us, and after the most prolonged consideration and consultation. I am convinced that, if this country is in the future to be the same kind of effective partner for her friends and allies in the world as she has, I hope, been in the past, the political and economic realities must be faced and not fudged; and, in particular, that our essential objective of building an unshakeable economic base for Britain is the right one not only for this country but for all our allies as well. I believe that, in deciding and announcing now our intention to maintain a military capability for use in the Far East after the mid 1970s, we are demonstrating our continued interest in the area. The two Asian governments most directly concerned have demonstrated an impressive steadiness in this new situation, they have recognised the inevitability of change: they take the point I have made above about the need for them to make the contribution to their own defence that best accords with their own resources, while we help with a more sophisticated capability: and they have shown a readiness to co-operate with us in effecting an orderly transition to the new basis for stability in Southeast Asia which is our aim. The fact that it is very much in their interest that they should do so does not detract from the value or significance of the wise way in which they have reacted to our new policy. I am sure that we can count on the same degree of understanding and positive co-operation from our other allies. I have gone into all this at considerable length and detail because of the frankness and straightforward approach that has always characterised the exchanges between us. But you will realise how essential it is to hold this information very tight until our White Paper is published. I know I can rely on your total discretion here. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis. An attached note from Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to Secretary Rusk reads: “The only distribution authorized of the attached message from Prime Minister Wilson by the President at this time is to yourself and Secretary McNamara.” A message from Foreign Secretary Brown to Secretary Rusk dealing with the same issues was delivered on July 13. (Ibid., DEF 6 UK) 2 A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 6, P.M. Wilson. 3 Reference is to UN consideration of the Middle East in the aftermath of the Six-Day War. 4 On July 8 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had initiated talks with Israel and Egypt to place observers on their respective sides of the canal cease-fire line. On July 9 the Security Council authorized the Chief of Staff, UN Truce Supervisory Organization, to work out arrangements for placement of peacekeeping troops on both sides of the canal. 274. Memorandum of Conversation 274. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 17, 1967, 2:30 p.m. SUBJECT British Defense White Paper PARTICIPANTS Under Secretary Katzenbach T. M. Judd, UK Affairs Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Mr. Edward Tomkins, British Minister Ambassador Dean said he wished to give the Under Secretary a preview of the contents of the British Defense White Paper which was to be released on July 18, at 9:30 a.m. Washington time. He then read from the attached paper. 2 Upon conclusion of the Ambassador’s presentation, Under Secretary Katzenbach said that the British decisions were most disappointing to us. Mr. Katzenbach said that, in all candor, he could not see political wisdom in announcing now the total withdrawal which would not take place until the mid-70’s. Ambassador Dean replied that the British Government was certain that this decision would become known regardless of whether or not there was an announcement. HMG had concluded that it was better to come clean. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Confidential. Drafted by Judd and approved in U on July 24. The memorandum is Part 1 of 3. The meeting was held in Katzenbach’s office. 2 Not printed. 275. Memorandum of Conversation 275. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 17, 1967, 3:30 p.m. SUBJECT Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Mr. Irving Cheslaw, EUR/BMI Ambassador Dean said that the President yesterday had given him a full account of the bombing policy, 2 had assured him nothing was new, and had indicated that this present program would probably end by mid-September. Sir Patrick noted that the call to come to the White House had coincided with instructions from London to try to see the President on this subject. Sir Patrick asked if the Secretary saw better prospects on the diplomatic front after mid-September. The Secretary replied that hardly a week went by without an effort to test Hanoi, but the reactions continued to be negative. Sir Patrick asked if we had any reason to think that increasing the military pressure would help. The Secretary replied that there was no reason to think decreasing the pressure would make a difference. As for the previous limits on our bombing program, we imposed these limits ourselves. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese have been using the area in the far north as a safe haven for their logistical buildup. The Secretary said that the other governments with troops in South Viet-Nam attached great importance to our bombing in the North. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in S on August 21. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 No record of this meeting was found. 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, September 14, 1967, 0144Z. 37244. Pass to Under Secretary Rostow. 1. Senate today voted 49-29 to incorporate Byrnes Amendment 2 into Defense Appropriations Bill. This confirmed House action yesterday and provided that none of these appropriated funds shall be used for construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards. 2. This threatens right of HMG to bid on 16 minesweepers which Navy had previously selected as appropriate for HMG competition under offset agreement. As funds for 9 of these 16 provided under FY 66 and 67 Defense Appropriations Acts, and thereby not affected by Byrnes Amendment, HMG may have some expectation that they eligible to bid and to win orders on these 9, even if ineligible to bid on 7 being funded under FY 68 Act. DOD is currently examining these and other prospects, but not yet prepared to encourage or discourage HMG expectations. 3. If as we expect HMG raises question of 8 minesweepers, believe HMG should not be encouraged in any optimistic expectations. We can say that DOD is currently searching every means to permit British to bid on as fair and equal terms as possible for 9. Further, we can convey assurance that nothing in Byrnes Amendment will prevent USG fulfilling the $325 million and supplementary offset targets. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 UK. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cheslaw; cleared in G, M, and the Department of Defense; and approved by EUR. 2 For text of this amendment to P.L. 96-90, the Defense Appropriations Act of 1968, approved September 29, 1967, see 81 Stat. 238. 277. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 277. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 19, 1967, 7:05 p.m. SUBJECT Contingency Support For Sterling At Tab A is Joe Fowler’s memo 2 recommending an increase of $100 million in the funds he has available for market operations to support sterling. What it comes down to is this. Today’s increase in the discount rate is part of the last ditch British effort to hold the sterling rate. As you know, they moved strongly last year to support the pound: they deflated their economy, cut down foreign commitments and borrowed heavily abroad. The program worked well through the first quarter of this year. They were able to pay off more than $1 billion in debt. Then they ran into bad luck: —disappointing exports, largely because of the recession on the continent; —the Middle East crisis and the closure of the Canal; —rising interest rates elsewhere while theirs were going down. They began to lose reserves and had to draw heavily on their line of short term credits. The increase in the bank rate is designed to draw funds back to London. The market’s initial reaction was slightly disappointing because some expected a higher increase in the rate. But sterling is holding steady because of support operations. Through selective and carefully timed actions, we have operated successfully in the market in the past to keep the rate from worsening on bad news or to strengthen it on good news. We do so at our own discretion but in cooperation with the British. We now have $160 million available for this purpose. Fowler recommends that you authorize him to make $100 million more available out of the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This would give the necessary leeway to have a maximum impact on the market-either to continue defensive operations or to take advantage of favorable opportunities. These funds are guaranteed against loss from devaluation. There is no balance of payments effect. If the funds are used, it would in effect amount to an increase in our lending to the U.K. This is a contingency investment that could be used very effectively to support sterling. I believe Fowler’s proposal makes sense. Deming, Okun, Daane and Fried who have gone into it carefully concur in the recommendation. Your decision is needed as soon as possible so that our people in the exchange market will know how much ammunition they have and plan their operations accordingly from tomorrow on. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 46. Secret; Sensitive. 2 Not printed. 3 There is no indication on the memorandum of a Presidential decision. 278. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 278. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 13, 1967. SUBJECT Sterling Crisis I note you are seeing Joe Fowler at noon today. 2 He may have to give you some background on the sterling crisis on which we may need a decision from you later in the day. We do not yet have all the information to put the issues properly before you. The British came in Saturday to tell Fowler they were near the end of the line. Without assurance of long-term credit they may have to devalue—perhaps within a week. Their line of short-term credit is down to $600 to $800 million. The announcement of poor trade figures on Tuesday could keep the pound under pressure. I won’t go into the pros and cons of letting the pound go. The main point is the risks for us are just too great to be worth the gamble—if it can be avoided through a good multilateral support operation. The European Central Bankers seem to be of the same mind. It may be possible therefore to work out a support package through a large IMF stand-by credit, through a package of bilateral credits and swaps, or through a combination of both. There would be no budgetary or direct balance-of-payments costs for us in any action we might consider, and it would have to be multilateral or not at all. It is our feeling, and it seems to be that of the Europeans, that this would be the last try at supporting sterling. But it would be well worth it, if it can be pulled off. W. W. Rostow 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 12. Secret. Drafted by Edward Fried of the NSC Staff. 2 No record of the meeting was found. 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 1 Washington, November 18, 1967, 2126Z. 71785. Circular Cable for Guidance of U.S. Missions overseas. 1. British Government has notified IMF of intention to set a new par value for sterling of $2.40. This represents devaluation of 14.3 percent. The IMF approved this action this morning to be announced 2130 GMT. 2 2. U.S. view is that under existing circumstances what British have done is both necessary and desirable. We wish make sure action is effective and that similar action is limited to handful of countries with very special problems and virtual dependence on U.K. and only then through normal IMF procedures. FYI. This means Ireland almost surely and possibly although we hope not New Zealand and Denmark. FYI. 3. U.S. reaffirms commitment to buy and sell gold to foreign official holders of dollars at $35 an ounce. Similar exchange rate actions by any significant number of important trading countries would put pressure on U.S. dollar. Furthermore, until intentions of major countries are made public uncertainty may lead to speculative pressure. 4. We are hopeful governments will announce promptly intentions to maintain their present par values. To this end U.S. is initiating series moves to reduce uncertainty and calm foreign exchange markets. We are undertaking series of direct high-level telephone contacts between U.S. officials and Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of major countries, approaches by Diplomatic Missions in other areas, announcement of our own intentions. 5. U.S. will issue public statement which will be transmitted by immediate cable as soon as issued. 3 6. As soon as U.K. action becomes public knowledge Missions are urged to deliver text of U.S. statement to Finance Minister and are free to use foregoing as guidance in discussions with government officials, central bank officials and public. In meantime if Missions approached by monetary authorities who have been informed of U.K. action may feel free to use foregoing information except for FYI. 7. Supplementary cable 4 will be dispatched to advise Missions of direct telephone contacts and to provide supplementary instructions where it is desired that Missions take initiative in early approach to monetary authorities. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted in the Treasury Department; cleared in the Departments of State and Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Reserve Board, and the White House; and approved by Anthony Solomon. 2 For text of Chancellor of the Exchequer Callaghan’s statement, issued November 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 194-195. 3 The White House released a statement by President Johnson on November 18; for text, see ibid., pp. 195-196. 4 Not further identified. 280. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of Defense 280. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of Defense 1 London, November 18, 1967, 2315Z. 3989. Subj: Defense impacts of new economic measures. Following letter from MOD Healey to Sec Def McNamara given to EmbOff at 10:00 P.M. 18 Nov. for urgent transmission. “Dear Bob You will just have heard of the new economic measures announced by the Prime Minister including cuts in public expenditure for the financial year 1968/69. Inevitably these cuts include a reduction in defence expenditure. In the summer we said we expected that defence expenditure in 1968/69 would be below a target of 2000 million pounds (at 1964 prices). We now plan that it will be below 1,900 million pounds. Some of this reduction will arise not from new programme cuts, but from processes of financial refinement and rephasing of production expenditure. For presentational reasons it may be necessary for us to lay particular stress on the programme cuts. 2. In searching for economies I have been most anxious not to make changes in the pattern of defence policy as we formulated it in July, particularly as regards our political commitments, the deployment of forces and the major elements in our military capabilities. While I have not yet decided finally on the make-up of the reduction, I am now hopeful that I can maintain these conditions. 3. Though of course, my colleagues in the Cabinet will have their say before final decisions are taken, I hope to prevent the economies affecting any of our major US purchasing programmes—the F.111, Phantom or C.130—though it may be necessary for us not to proceed with the Chinook deal. As you will appreciate, such an economy would have a presentational value greater than its military or financial significance. 4. You will be particularly interested in whether there is any major consequence for the Far East and the Gulf. Again, I hope to avoid this, though inevitably there may be one or two minor adjustments in the phasing of re-equipment. But, given the broader context and our desire to preserve other parts of our programme it is clear that we shall be unable to go ahead with the Aldabra project. This was, as you and I agreed in Ankara, a marginal option. In the pressure of priorities I can no longer see a space for it, particularly as its elimination will have a bigger public impact than its military cost or value might justify. It may therefore be necessary for us to announce the decision on Aldabra very early next week. I am sorry about this especially after all the hard preparatory work put in by both our staffs. 5. I hope to be able to discuss all this in greater detail with you at Brussels, when my detailed plans will be clearer, but I wanted you to know how my mind is working as soon as possible. Denis Healey” Bruce 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 12. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to the Department of State. The telegram bears the notation: “Seen by Mr. Bator.” 281. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 281. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, November 24, 1967, 1144Z. 4172. Pass Treasury for Deming from Griffin. Following is memcon your meeting with Sir William Armstrong November 17: 1. Frederick Deming and James Griffin accompanied Sir Denis Rickett from London Airport to U.K. Treasury at 9:30 PM, Nov 17. On meeting there with Sir William Armstrong, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Deming was informed that U.K. had decided to devalue to $2.40 or 14.3 percent. Deming then listed countries which his understanding would hold their exchange rates in event of U.K. devaluation as follows: U.S., Common Market countries (although France had indicated might also move if hurt too much), Sweden, Norway, Japan, Canada, and Switzerland. Deming indicated Denmark would follow U.K. and probably Spain and Austria. He did not know about Australia but Armstrong felt they would hold, although he could not be sure. Deming said Kashiwagi had said Japan’s rate would be tied to that of the dollar. 2. Armstrong said Maude of U.K. Emb Washington had informed Secy Fowler of move Friday afternoon, London time, and Amb Deane had called on Pres Johnson to inform him. 2 Armstrong said had informed Schweitzer at IMF that U.K. would request $1.4 billion stand-by from IMF. Armstrong said Schweitzer said he would at 9 AM inform Executive Directors of special meeting and give them paper on proposed devaluation at same time and convene meeting to discuss it at 11 AM. Schweitzer estimated would take Board three hours to discuss, thus not have decision before 2 PM, Washington time, 7 PM London time. Schweitzer was sending Fund mission led by Goode. Armstrong said Callaghan had telephone conversation with Fowler at about 3:30 PM London time on Friday but was not clear whether Fowler had been informed at that time. Since telephone line not secure, discussion had been on very guarded terms and Callaghan not clear on Fowler’s understanding of some points made in the conversation. Schweitzer informed British it could be end of following week before stand-by credit could be granted, thus Armstrong said U.K. would need a large reflow of short-term funds which had gone out Thursday and Friday or short-term help from major countries. 3. Deming stated major countries had come to him in Paris on Thursday and Friday volunteering short-term credits to U.K. which along with U.S. contribution totalled some 13.75 billion dollars. Deming said these offers had been extended on assumption of no devaluation, thus he could not be sure how many would still be available, but he thought most if not all would be. 4. Armstrong said U.K. tentatively estimated devaluation would improve B/P by pounds 500 million, although this somewhat hasty estimate which would have to be refined. This improvement would not become fully effective until end 1968 or beginning 1969 since effect on exports could not be immediate. U.K. had forecast large B/P deficit for 1968 without devaluation and B/P in next few months would still be in deficit. He said for near term they now relying on large reflux of capital. 5. Armstrong gave accompanying govt program as follows: reduction in govt expenditures of pounds 400 million of which pounds 100 million defense, 100 million abolition export rebate (which Armstrong was sure would please U.S.), 100 million abolition set premium payments, 100 million reduction other govt expenditures mostly investment expenditures by nationalized industries; raise bank rate to 8 percent; credit squeeze with virtual ban on personal loans for consumption and reduction in bank lending ceiling from 105 percent to 100 percent with exemption for export credits; increase in corporate tax of 2-1/2 percent, increase in heavy fuel oil duty of one penny per gallon. Armstrong said this would take out from home resources pounds 500 million by end 1968 or beginning 1969. This would offset inflationary impact of anticipated 500 million B/P gain which was net of gross gain of 800-850 on exports partially offset by 300-350 deflationary effect from imports. 6. Governor O’Brien of BOE, 3 who had been called earlier by Armstrong, joined the meeting. Deming repeated for O’Brien his assessment of countries which would hold rate and gave O’Brien list of countries who had offered credits totalling some $1375 million. O’Brien said “we” had felt U.K.’s short-term indebtedness already quite enough and felt they should not take on any more (this was in regard to defending old parity, not in new circumstances). O’Brien computed total short-term help now available at $3275 million, including 1375 bilateral credits as reported by Mr. Deming, 1400 from IMF stand-by, and 500 from U.K. dollar portfolio. O’Brien said he felt these countries should now come to him rather than he going to them, and he hoped to be taking telephone calls from them on Sunday. He said U.K. would declare bank holiday on Monday. 7. Discussion then reverted to timing of announcements. U.K. tentatively planning to make announcement at 9:30 PM Saturday but would much prefer to make it earlier if possible. However, must wait for IMF Executive Directors’ decision which Schweitzer said could not come before 7 PM London time and possibly not before 8 PM London time. Deming questioned need for such long period deliberation in IMF and thought timing could be pushed up. Armstrong said earlier announcement would be much better for press and TV coverage in UK. It was also tentatively agreed with U.S. Treasury that Secy Fowler would make announcement at 6 PM Washington time. 4 In any event, however, U.K. would have to sustain selling pressure from Middle East markets which open on Saturday. U.K. would inform European countries of decision just before IMF meeting and Armstrong felt sure could not avoid some leak getting to Middle East countries. However, they were resigned to these losses and since Middle East banks had limitations on amount of dollar holdings, losses would be limited. 8. Armstrong and O’Brien expressed gratitude to Deming for his efforts and for what he had reported to them. They also expressed their gratitude for U.S. Govt’s cooperation through entire crisis period and Fowler’s attitude, who as reported by U.K. Embassy Washington, received news “without animosity.” Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, FN 17 UK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 No record of these conversations was found. 3 Bank of England. 4 For text, released November 19, see Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1967, p. 793. 282. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in Australia 282. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in Australia 1 London, December 21, 1967, 1130Z. 185. For the President from Bruce. Subject: President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson meeting at Melbourne. 1. In connection with Embtel 184 to Canberra 2 I should like to make following comment. 2. PriMin Wilson’s domestic political position has been so eroded that it is impossible to forecast now whether remedial financial and economic measures essential to real confidence in Britain and elsewhere in his policies will be accepted, in necessary measure. 3. Under the circumstances, I urgently suggest that the President offer him at this time nothing more than a sympathetic hearing, and say he will be glad to discuss the program when it has been definitely settled upon, and looks forward to doing so at Washington in February. 3 4. After a wild Christmas binge of buying in considerable degree increased by a desire to convert disturbed currency into goods, a winter of even heavier discontent is almost certain to distress the British. Meanwhile, I believe we should buy no pig in a poke. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the Department of State. The President and Prime Minister were attending funeral services for Australian Prime Minister Holt. 2 Dated December 20, this telegram analyzed Wilson’s political position and problems. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 3 No memoranda of conversation were found. According to Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970, p. 478, the two men discussed Vietnam. 283. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 283. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, December 21, 1967, 1726Z. 4964. Subj: New UK defense cuts. 1. Healey invited PolMil Counselor to call at his office this afternoon to discuss subject of new defense cuts, particularly in light of massive press speculation on fate of F-111 contract. When PolMil Counselor arrived Healey apologized that he had to rush off to special Cabinet session. He asked Broadbent (his office Chief of Staff) who he said was privy to his thinking to review situation on his behalf. 2. Broadbent said that Healey was fighting hard in Cabinet sessions on budget reductions, generally taking line that he had already “done his stuff” in past budget cuts, while civil depts had not. Now it was time for them to show “color of their money.” There was no reason why it was always Defense’s “sacred cows” that had to be gored. This line, on which Healey had allies, was having some effect, as was Healey’s other basic pro position, i.e. that Cabinet, and especially Political Dept, had to make decisions on what commitments UK would relinquish before MOD can get down to decisions on specific changes in structure, equipment and deployments. Broadbent said that how long Healey could sustain this line was “matter of speculation.” Timing was such in this crash exercise that decisions were perforce focussed on broad political intentions. 3. It seemed generally accepted that there was little that could be done to save money on defense budget in 1968-69. There was not much to be saved even in 1969-70. Nevertheless F-111 project is one that seems to attract attention as most beguiling area for cut, whether it makes sense in terms of UK capabilities for fulfilling its commitments or not. 4. Healey has taken same line in Cabinet as he has with press, i.e. that F-111 is a form of military capability that it is right and valid for UK to offer within framework its alliances. He has stressed its utility in Europe and its importance for rapid reinforcement capability abroad. He has also stressed value of offset and industrial advantage it brings UK. 5. Healey felt, according to Broadbent, that US could be helpful to him in this fight, if we desired, by “very discreetly” taking hard line on consequences cancellation in our discussions this subject with UK officials and reporters. We could stress the highly favorable price to UK of aircraft and concessions we have made on offset arrangement, playing up our “unfathomable generosity.” This would help undo some of the Douglas-Home line (London 4960). 2 We could also stress our conviction that F-111 represents a capability that it makes sense for UK to retain both in NATO context and worldwide. 6. PolMil Counselor pointed out that this would be fine if Healey won the day, but could make a turn around difficult if British were to come to us within a week or so and ask for soft terms on cancellation. Broadbent admitted this would be the case but stressed Healey’s determination to stand pat on entire package of 50 aircraft. He said he did not rule out, “at the breaking point,” Healey’s being willing to be forced down to 40-45 aircraft but thought it would make no sense to go below this. 7. In summary, Broadbent hoped we would be willing to stress how far we have gone to help UK in view value of F-111 to NATO and in other theatres. (Broadbent said we might make point, as Healey is doing, that if UK does not have F-111, France will be only other country on continent with long-range strike-recce capability.) To extent this could be done without cancelling out possibility reduction in size of aircraft buy so much the better. 8. Broadbent said that so far Healey had had surprisingly sympathetic response from Labor backbench. Finally Broadbent said Healey wished him to make once more the point that early response to his request to Nitze to increase offset by $150 million would materially help him in holding the line. 3 9. Comment : Embassy has had numerous inquiries from press re how US would view cancellation of F-111 and whether we would make it “easy” for HMG. So far we have refrained from comment on ground question is academic. Healey is now asking us to give him some discreet help in his internal battle. If in fact US attaches importance to preservation of F-111 program and considers retention of this capability by UK is important to us, as Embassy believes it should be, it would be fully feasible for Embassy and Washington in their press contacts to make some of these points. Request guidance on this as well as indication when we may expect response on proposal to up offset by $150 million. 4 Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to the Department of Defense. 2 Telegram 4960 from London, December 21, reported on press coverage of the F-111 cancellation. (Ibid., DEF 12 UK) 3 The response was transmitted in telegram 4860 from London, December 15. It provided a list of British weapons systems that might constitute an offset to costs of F-111 procurement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 12) 4 In telegram 89054 to London, the Department of State instructed the Embassy that in view of further British defense cuts, the United States should avoid the appearance of intervening in support of Healey. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK) 284. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 284. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, undated. Dear Harold: We are at the end of a difficult year, and both our countries have much unfinished business to carry forward. It is encouraging to recall, nonetheless, that it has been a year in which our close consultation and collaboration have helped produce a number of memorable achievements—the maintenance of security arrangements in Europe, the agreement of the new reserve unit in the IMF, the completion of the Kennedy Round, to recall a few. We are not yet out of the woods in the Middle East, but we have certainly made progress, with the passage of your Resolution in the Security Council. 2 We can take heart also from the success we have had through our joint efforts and through the cooperation of the other financial powers in meeting the critical problems of November and December and in restoring a sense of confidence and order to the world’s financial system. The speculative fever of these weeks has severely tested our methods of cooperating on economic problems; but, we have continued to work together effectively in a financial world suddenly beset by fear and disorder. We have, thus far, met and repelled a serious threat to the foundations of the international monetary system, which, in turn, could also have undone the accomplishments of the Kennedy Round and the unity of the system of international commerce. Meanwhile, the agreements at London and Rio on a plan to supplement existing reserve assets are a further reason for solid satisfaction, as we look to the longer future. In both of these achievements—the long-range improvement of our international monetary system and the recent defense of the existing system—James Callaghan at the Treasury and Leslie O’Brien at the Bank of England have played important and indeed vital roles. I know that they have contributed much to the recent efforts to preserve order in the gold and foreign exchange markets. I am reassured by our mutual determination to exert a constructive force in the world financial system. This I know reflects a clear common understanding of the importance of international monetary cooperation in creating that environment of safety and opportunity which is required for the continued growth and stability of our nation’s economies. As you know, we, as well as our trading partners, have been concerned about the balance of payments position of the United States. This concern has been increased by the events of recent weeks. As a result, I am announcing on January 1, 1968, a new and vastly strengthened program to reduce our deficit and guarantee the continued viability of the international monetary system. 3 In the program, I will press for tax increase to restrain excessive demand in the United States and to reduce our budget deficit to manageable proportions. I hope that this bill will soon become law. This, in itself, should be a helpful factor in our balance of payments and should demonstrate to the world that we will keep our own economic house in order. And the Federal Reserve has already made clear its determination to use monetary policy to this end. But much more needs to be done; and we propose to do much more. Our balance of payments actions are designed to improve both our current and our capital accounts. These actions will be painful to the United States and, to some degree, to our international partners. They are designed to avoid as far as possible adverse effects on the developing areas of the world. We hope they will result more in the reduction of surpluses than in the shift or increase of deficits. And we have kept very much in mind the views of other countries and the international economic institutions. In this effort we wish to proceed within the spirit and the letter of the recent resolution of the OECD Ministerial Council that the adjustment of the American deficit and the European surplus is a matter of common concern to be handled cooperatively. Surpluses in international payments are the mirror image of deficits. Thus, both surplus and deficit countries must strive to reach balance and act cooperatively to this end. This is no less true in the 1960’s than it was in the late 1940’s and ′50’s, when we carried the responsibilities of a surplus nation. This concept was definitively developed by our best economic and financial experts in a carefully prepared OECD report on “The Adjustment Process” in August 1966. Our deficits have been the net result of a current account surplus, including a trade surplus, inadequate to support foreign exchange costs of our external capital flows, foreign aid programs, and military expenditures for the common defense. During the period of the “Dollar Gap”, these deficits helped redistribute the world’s monetary reserves—the time has come, we all agree, to bring them to an end. As we see the problem, we need to act to improve our current account, reduce capital outflows, and neutralize more fully our net foreign exchange expenditures in the common defense. Our new program is designed to move us strongly towards equilibrium. But full success will require the understanding and cooperation of our partners. It seems axiomatic to us, and basic to our view of the OECD Resolution, that those in strong reserve positions, or in surplus, should avoid actions that increase surpluses, should not take off-setting action to preserve their surpluses—indeed, that it will be necessary for them to take positive action to move toward balance. Otherwise, the only result will be to shift the adjustment burden to those who can least bear it or to make it more difficult for us to achieve balance. In our judgment—and, I believe, in your judgment—it is important for the United States to move decisively toward balance with the last possible dislocation to the world’s system of trade and finance. Our mutual security and collective well-being, which rest upon the continuing strength and unity of the international economic system, are at stake. It is against these fundamental objectives, which I am sure are common objectives, that I hope you and your Government will judge our new and strengthened balance of payments program. I have asked Ambassador Bruce to call on you to explain our new program more fully. I have also asked Under Secretary Katzenbach to visit with you in London to review further both this program and the entire scope of our mutual cooperation. I trust you and your key ministers will support this program and, thereby, help preserve confidence in the system we have built so diligently together over the past twenty years. I am looking forward to seeing you in February. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 4 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. The text of the message was transmitted in telegram 91707 to London, December 31. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom) 2 Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), adopted November 22. 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 8-13. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, January 5, 1968, 2212Z. 94043. Subject: UK and Persian Gulf. Ref: State 93645; London 5236. 2 From Secretary for Ambassador. 1. View info reftel re imminence British decision accelerate withdrawal from Persian Gulf, request you convey following personal message from me to FonSec Brown soonest: “I am deeply disturbed by information which has just reached me to the effect that HMG may be considering accelerating its withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. As you know, we attach very high importance to the maintenance of the British position in the Persian Gulf for the indefinite future. We welcomed the repositioning of some of your forces there from Aden last year as an earnest of your determination to continue to play the essential stabilizing role in the Gulf which has been so helpful to us all for so long. While economies can no doubt be made, I would earnestly hope that when we meet next week HMG will not have taken any irrevocable decisions. In our view, fixing of specific timetable at this early stage would be likely feed instability in the region and increase your own problems in arranging eventual orderly departure.” 2. In event Brown already departed for Tokyo, I leave to your discretion how best communicate our concern to top level of HMG. Nick Katzenbach’s visit January 6 may afford additional opportunity stress our viewpoint. 3 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 UK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Battle, BMI, and G; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, and Paris. 2 In telegram 93645, January 5, the Department of State reviewed efforts to discourage the British from announcing a definite timetable for withdrawals East of Suez. (Ibid., DEF 1 UK) Telegram 5236 from London, January 5, reported that the British had not yet set a firm date for these withdrawals. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 5273 from London, January 6, Bruce reported that he delivered the message to Brown who would reply directly to the Secretary. Bruce added: “My impression is that he is sympathetic to our views, but has encountered strong opposition in the Cabinet.” (Ibid., DEF 6 UK) 286. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 286. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, January 7, 1968, 0003Z. 5279. Secun 31. For Secretary and Secretary Fowler from Katzenbach. 2 1. Tonight we met at Chequers with Prime Minister Wilson, Fred Mulley, Peter Shore, Paul Gore-Booth and William Armstrong. I first gave the Prime Minister a run-down on our visits around the continent. They were particularly interested in French reaction and whether any of the other countries had begun to make estimates of the effects of our measures. Prime Minister reiterated the position taken by Roy Jenkins at our meeting last Tuesday of complete understanding and support for the President’s program. 3 I emphasized that these measures were taken in a political context and that the President was very anxious to be able to subtract the balance of payments argument from those who would, for other reasons, wish to advocate either troop withdrawals or protectionist measures. 2. While recognizing that these political forces were at work, the Prime Minister did express concern about any measures in the trade field and commented that the introduction of the border tax by the United States could lead to consequences on world trading patterns. He said he did not wish to over-dramatize this situation but clearly implied that it would be extremely difficult for the British to go forward with their elimination of export rebates at a time when the United States was introducing such a measure. He inquired whether it might not be possible, as it was in the British system, to leave discretionary measures in the hands of the President while discussions were proceeding in the GATT about the TVA. The Prime Minister also pointed out that although we might be successful in obtaining the agreement of the major world trading powers to stand still for our border tax measures at this time, we might very well find that the next country to get into trouble would use this method and perhaps even more protectionist devices in its “package.” 3. In discussing our talks in Bonn and the reactions to our pleas for neutralization of balance of payments effects of troop stationing, Prime Minister said that it was absolutely essential for Britain to obtain one hundred million pounds offset agreement by April 1st when the current agreement runs out. He said that the Germans had not yet been able to talk to them because they had not reached agreement on their purchase plans because of internal budget difficulties. It looked now as though these talks could not begin yet for some time. The Prime Minister made the flat statement that without such an offset, given all the other drastic measures he has had to take and the situation in the Parliamentary Labor Party, he could not defend the maintenance of troops in Germany. He said that they would have to make this clear to the Germans. He recognized that any breakdown in British arrangements with the Germans necessitating such a withdrawal could very well fuel the very forces the President was opposing in the United States and therefore he would make every effort to reach an agreement with the Germans. He was not insisting that payments under an offset agreement be received immediately, but would be content with assurance that payments would in time be received sufficient to completely offset UK military expenditures after April 1. 4. In discussing this problem Prime Minister said that recent Cabinet discussions had been leading in the direction of decisions to put the greatest stress on British military presence in Europe. He knew that this gave us problems and mentioned the fact that the Secretary had sent a letter to George Brown today on the Persian Gulf. I said that this did give us concern but felt in the context of this discussion I should not go any further. (In any case George Brown will be discussing this with you next week.) 5. As we were leaving Prime Minister said he was very much looking forward to seeing the President next month in Washington and assumed he could continue this conversation there. We would then have a better idea of what we were going to do. Bruce 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 13. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 2 The Under Secretary visited the six European Community capitals and Switzerland January 2-6 to explain President Johnson’s balance-of-payments program. 3 The meeting took place on January 2. According to a January 2 entry in the Bruce Diaries: “Katzenbach, at times assisted by Deming, explained at length what we hoped to achieve by the proposed measures. Roy Jenkins replied, saying he thoroughly understood the reasons for what we were doing, and, although our actions would have a harmful effect on the British economy, he did not propose to make any complaint about them.” (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 287. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 287. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State 1 London, January 9, 1968, 1819Z. 5336. Subj: Healey views on UK defense policy. 1. Denis Healey this morning asked Embassy PolMil Counselor to come to his office for private chat on current status British defense cut decisions. Discussion, which lasted an hour, was extremely frank and far ranging. Healey’s comments made it quite clear that he was bitter about role PriMin had played but that he, Brown, Thomson—at times assisted by Callaghan—had nevertheless prevailed in assuring relatively rational approach to defense cuts. 2. Prime reason for Healey’s invitation to discussion became immediately apparent however. He said it was important for Secretary and Wash officials with whom George Brown would be talking this week to know that there was “absolutely no question of a choice between chopping the F-111 and our staying East of Suez.” It will do no good for Sec to suggest that UK pull out of F-111 deal and change decision on Singapore/Malaysia withdrawal. 3. While he did not say so explicitly, way he put matter indicated that he has some indication that this is possible proposal from Sec and that this will jeopardize his so far successful fight to save F-111, without changing East of Suez decision. EmbOff assumed from tenor Healey’s remarks also that he had discussed with Brown his making this pitch to Embassy. 4. Healey then went on to say that he felt much more encouraged about present situation than he could have thought possible a month ago. In early Dec things looked “pretty grim” and he was sure that he would have to resign before long since he would be forced to accept “lunatic” Cabinet judgments on series of irrational defense cuts which would leave Britain with no real capability even in Europe. By making common cause with Brown and Thomson and Callaghan, however, he had succeeded in getting firm Cabinet agreement that if more cuts were to be made they had to be preceded by and related to cuts in commitments, and that this was matter for decision by entire Cabinet including particularly “political departments.” At some risk he had given Sunday Times interview (A-2146) 2 which nailed down this point for record. 5. In response to EmbOff questioning Healey gave series of frank comments on status of various issues. Following are highlights: A. Defense Cut decision emerging from last Thursday’s Cabinet discussion, where “big majority” was in favor of almost immediate Singapore/Malaysia and Gulf pull-out, had been to leave Singapore/Malaysia finally on 31 March 1971 and to be out of Gulf “before” that date. (From another source, Embassy learned this could be any time during FY 70-71.) He and George Brown had argued strongly for an additional year in Singapore/Malaysia and it was agreed that “the two Georges” would have a right to raise the issue this coming Friday or Saturday in the light of their consultations in Far East and Wash. It is certain, Healey said, that they would do so. Lee Kuan Yew had performed brilliantly yesterday and had strengthened Thomson’s hand in seeking another look. He hoped Australians would do as well, but was less hopeful. He thought Lee had slightly overdone, however, in his threats about “Japanese takeover.” What Healey was indirectly urging was that Sec also concentrate on timing issue (since the only thing open was timing) in his talks with Brown. He thought that decision to extend by another year withdrawal date was still a possibility. Healey said he was somewhat surprised by Secretary’s message to Brown on Gulf since he would have assumed that as between two places US interests were much more involved in prolongation UK presence in Far East. Healey said UK would warn SEATO that its force declarations would be reduced to “derisory level” in terms of numbers and forces but that UK would not pull out of SEATO or raise membership as issue in view of SEATO’s importance to US as cover for justifying US presence in Vietnam. B. Persian Gulf. Healey said he had himself been against last year’s Brit decision to build up at Sharjah and Bahrein on grounds it made neither military nor political sense. Now all money which had been poured in would be wasted. While he continued to believe that UK forces in area were a contribution to stability (in terms of possible Iraq-Kuwait conflict or trouble between Shah and Faisal over Bahrein, or among Trucial States) he thought these conflicts could be contained diplomatically. It was clear that Britain would have had to get out of Gulf by 1975 at any rate. In light of this it was better to go sooner rather than later, by which time [garble] situations as in Aden might have been created. Brown and he both thought that situation in Gulf certain to be eroded in due course, that UK interests served by maintaining status quo as long as possible but that UK presence could be an irritant as well as inhibitor of trouble and it was a nice judgment in which direction they would operate most strongly. He thought that leaving in less than two years would be risky but his comments seemed to indicate he would prefer to use whatever influence he had in prolonging UK presence in Singapore/Malaysia rather than in Gulf and that ordinarily he would have assumed US would see it same way. If UK was going to leave, and this decision was irreversible, it was likely to be harmful rather than helpful to prolong Brit Gulf presence beyond 1970-1971. He said at least one UK rep on spot he had recently talked with seemed to feel same way he did about this. C. F-111. He said he “nearly won” this battle last week, but that PM had surprisingly “led the pack” against it; PM seemed to consider it a good sacrificial goat. Nevertheless Healey now felt relatively optimistic about his ability to keep whole order of 50 aircraft but said that he would be willing to sacrifice 10 if this was necessary to get an overall rational package of defense cuts. EmbOff raised question of UK CENTO commitment and Canberras on Cyprus. Healey said that as Canberras phase out F-111’s would be helpful in maintaining this commitment, which there was no present intention to cut. On balance he felt reduction of order to 40 (if any reduction necessary) would be “least damaging,” that he expected this matter would be resolved within another 36 hours and that he was not at all unconfident about keeping all 50, at the moment at least. He said Wash talks which indicated UK could keep Jetstream order, present offset arrangements, (including the extra $100 million if cut was no more than 15), were helpful. EmbOff noted he had understood that extra $100 million could not be kept if order were cut to this extent. Healey said he was gratified at US emphasis that offset was related to total UK aircraft buy and not just to F-111 program. D. BAOR. Healey said both he and the Foreign Office were determined to avoid any further drawdown of the BAOR either this year or next. However, the offset talks, when they came about, would have a heavy influence on whether they could prevail. He said Jenkins would be more help than Callaghan had been in this area. Also, what the US and the Germans themselves did would also bear on British ability to hold the line, and he feared that the US would be pressed to announce sometime next fall a further “redevelopment” of its own forces. (He said he felt 1970 would be too soon for another reduction.) Also the Dutch Defense Minister told him he could not hold the line on Dutch forces. Therefore this was still likely to be a troublesome area. E. Miscellaneous. Healey said that Navy Phantoms were too far along to cancel and were “so bloody expensive” that no one else would buy them. They would probably have to be repainted and turned over to the RAF. He thought there would be some reduction in total Phantom buy but evaluations had not yet been completed. He said present situation made any UK only or UK/FRG project to replace AFVG “out of the question.” Some kind of cooperative program with us, however, could not be ruled out. He would probably procrastinate by keeping present VG design team going for another year. He also said he was meeting with Messmer this afternoon and would try to have it out re French intentions on building their own VG. He did not think French would do more than build a prototype in view defense budget problems arising from de Gaulle’s trying to do a little bit of everything in the nuclear field. 6. Comment : EmbOff said he had no indications from Wash about any proposal for a tradeoff such as Healey feared between F-111 and East of Suez. EmbOff however promised to bring his comments as reported above to Wash’s immediate attention. Healey obviously has strong personal stake in continuation of F-111, feels he has matter under relatively good control and was worried that some proposal along these lines from Sec to Brown would upset the applecart. He was also clearly urging us to weigh in with Brown in favor of lengthening by one year present withdrawal deadline from Singapore/Malaysia. His judgment appears to be that with US pressure along side of that which is already coming from Singapore and Kuala Lumpur there is better than even chance of Healey, Brown and company prevailing on this in renewed Cabinet discussion Friday or Saturday. Bruce 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. In telegram 5337 from London, Ambassador Bruce told Secretary Rusk: “I think it important you read in full, before your conversation with George Brown, London’s 5336, reporting rather extraordinary conversation between Healey and Spiers. In spite of Healey’s optimism about maintaining his position in Cabinet, I think it impossible at present to predict what compromise may finally be reached.” (Ibid.) 2 Dated January 9. (Ibid.) 288. Memorandum of Conversation 288. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 11, 1968, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT British Budget and Defense Cuts PARTICIPANTS UK Foreign Secretary George Brown Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador US The Secretary John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR Irving Cheslaw, EUR/BMI Foreign Secretary Brown said that Britain had lost the battle to avoid devaluation—a matter on which USG was so understanding—because they had been trying to do too much at home and abroad with too slender resources. Since devaluation the Government had been obliged to consider what could be done to free a considerable part of its resources for greater exports as well as to consider what cuts in spending must be made to assure confidence and to avoid further devaluation. The conclusion of HMG was that this required a switch of 1 billion pounds, including substantial cuts in spending at home. This was all particularly unpalatable because it involved an attack on some cherished social programs, such as health and educational services. It would also involve a mammoth rise in taxation as well as a reduction in overseas spending. HMG did not want to attack the aid program; this would be counter productive. Therefore, Brown said, they were forced again to look at defense expenditures overseas. The Ministry of Defence had taken the view that they had made all the possible hardware and manpower cuts as long as the present commitments remained. 2 Therefore they have had to look again at the commitments implied in the July 1967 decisions. Brown said that they had come to the following conclusions: first, they must accelerate the rundown in the Far East. This meant there would be no bases on mainland Asia by March 31, 1971, instead of by the mid-1970’s. They must drop the idea of maintaining (after withdrawal) special capabilities in that area such as an amphibious force. They would however have a general capability in Europe from which troops would be available for use anywhere. Second, they must also leave the Persian Gulf by the same time. This was dictated by (a) savings, although admittedly they would not be very great, and (b) the decision about the Far East which meant there would be no carriers or bases available to support or relieve the Persian Gulf after that date. Brown went on to say that it was their intention to “renegotiate” the Anglo-Malaysian Agreement, but not to renounce it. They would remain in CENTO and SEATO, but obviously when the troops ran down the force declarations under SEATO would have no content. Hong Kong would be the only exception to this general policy: they propose to maintain and retain their position there. Mr. Brown concluded these were the firm views of his colleagues subject to the reports presented to the Cabinet this coming weekend by George Thomson, Goronwy Roberts and Brown following their visits to the Far East, Middle East and the U.S. respectively. The Secretary said he had several observations to make. At the outset he wanted to remind the Foreign Secretary that, as he had a reputation for being soft spoken, he wished Brown would add several decibels when he conveyed these views to the Cabinet. The Secretary was profoundly dismayed by the proposed withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, and he was particularly disturbed by the intention to announce these decisions. Both areas were in a high state of turmoil and free world interests were in jeopardy. The Secretary said his advice, more succinctly, was “be Britain.” This step would have profound and detrimental implications for the US and the UK. The Secretary said he would dismiss as of “no consequence” the idea that forces at home could support CENTO and SEATO. The pressures behind these moves would make it impossible for British soldiers to leave British shores. The Secretary said that if, pending its entry in Europe, the UK dropped back to a Little England he could not help but feel that this would generate a descending spiral across the board. It would have a profound effect on the economic and financial relations with these countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. By consulting their fears rather than their confidence, the British would bring about the very thing they were struggling against. This was an alarming development. The Secretary thought that HMG needed to be concerned with developments elsewhere, such as what would the Malaysians think the UK would do if their remote islands came under attack. When HMG announced last July that they would leave the Far East by the mid-1970’s, the U.S. Government had understood this would be subject to peace in the area, that the situation would be under review and that there would be no pull-out until there was stability in the area. There is no stability in the area yet although there has been some progress, for example, in HMG’s role vis-á-vis Indonesia. He said that many Americans were essentially isolationists, but since 1945 the US has had 300,000 casualties in the effort to maintain peace around the world. The British had set the example and had helped us make decisions of will in World War II and in the post-war period. The Secretary said he was disturbed when the teacher abandoned the field. Americans would ask if no one else was interested, why should they be. Authentic isolation was growing in the US because of the growing feeling that Americans were carrying the problem alone. General de Gaulle had contributed to this, but if the UK went down the trail of deliberate withdrawal the effects would be profound. The Secretary said that as he looked at the foreign exchange costs of British presence in the Persian Gulf, i.e. approximately 12 million pounds per year, he thought these costs would be multiplied if the governments there decided there was no point in staying with the UK. In the Far East, Malaysia and Singapore, Australia and New Zealand would look elsewhere, and the direct economic impact would be greater than the cuts. Foreign Secretary Brown said that he had hoped to make clear that the Persian Gulf decision was not based on the minor saving that might result, but that it was a logical outcome of the major decision to withdraw from the Far East. He said it was not true to say the Persian Gulf was in a state of unrest. At the moment, it was more stable than it had been for a long time and relations between major parties were as good as ever. The likelihood of unrest seemed minimal at this moment. As regards the Far East, Brown said that the July 1967 decision had never been intended to mean that they would review the basic decision to leave. They had always considered, even if it had remained unstated, that the reference to stability in the area was itself confined to a 1973-77 time frame. The Foreign Secretary said that he wished to note also that this did not represent a choice between defense cuts or cuts in social services, but rather that there would also be very substantial cuts in their home programs. In fact, they would derive very little short-term benefit from the cuts in their external programs. HMG could not keep forces overseas in face of a sick economy at home which was unable to sustain these forces. The inescapable facts were that their economy must be strong if they were to play any part in world affairs. This did not reflect a desire to withdraw to a Little England. The Secretary said he did not feel as comfortable about the Middle East as did Foreign Secretary Brown. Iran and Saudi Arabia were worried; and both Israel and the Arabs were concerned about Soviet penetration of the Middle East. At NATO it had been agreed that there would be further talks about Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Secretary thought that some discussion in NATO on these British intentions would have been appropriate if not obligatory. The Secretary asked if they had considered whether the prospects of improved trade figures were relevant to these decisions. Mr. Brown said the economic ministers thought the adverse consequences of devaluation would be felt first, such as in the increased cost of imports; the improvement in exports would not show until around 1969-70. This would depend on the availability of resources at home, the development of substitutes for imports, on establishing confidence in the pound and in the UK’s internal policies, as well as British determination to carry these out. Brown said it was hard to fault these assumptions and recommendations. In reply to the Secretary’s question as to whether there had been an authentic national debate on these questions, Brown said he thought the majority view was that they were trying to do too much, that they were carrying more than their share of the peacekeeping burden, and in favor of cutting their overseas commitments. There would be a debate in Parliament next week but there was no doubt that support for ending their Far East commitments ran through the left, center, and right wings of the Labor Party. He added that it was generally felt that HMG was struggling with a burden which their economic competitors did not share. The Secretary asked Mr. Brown if the pullout from the Persian Gulf was wiser than an equivalent reduction in foreign aid. Mr. Brown said he opposed a reduction in foreign aid. In fact, one of the results of these decisions was that the aid program would go up. For example, there would be the need to provide compensatory assistance to Singapore and Malaysia. As for the Persian Gulf, Brown said HMG’s continuing presence was more divisive than unitary; withdrawal was important for its own sake and this was the right moment for it. The Foreign Secretary reiterated that they could not stay in the Persian Gulf once they were rid of the Far East bases. They believed they could only get hardware savings out of such decisions as cutting the carrier force. For example, they will not refit a third carrier; this will save 30 million pounds. If there is no carrier force beyond ′72 which is capable of returning people and equipment everyone could conclude that they must come out of the area. He thought they would provide support via aircraft and, if necessary, they could make arrangements to obtain the necessary transport planes. Brown said they did not want to maintain ships against theoretical possibilities. Assistant Secretary Leddy asked if it was necessary to be so explicit about the withdrawals. Brown said that his colleagues believed that it was necessary to be clear cut as there would be leaks. Furthermore, if they followed this timetable, they must stop the buildup in Bahrain and Sharjah. The moment that buildup stopped the basic decision would become self-evident. They would also be accused of vacillation if they did not make a clear cut decision, and this reduced the risk of an Aden type situation. A reduction not accompanied by an announcement would help the extremist forces. Brown said there had been varied reactions out of the Middle East, but the most serious governments have known what was coming. They would settle down to consider other arrangements. This was also an argument for being precise. The time would come when HMG would not be the policeman; it should help these governments concentrate on what they must do for themselves in the security field. Secretary Rusk said that HMG’s departure would eliminate any contribution it could make to deterrents such as in Malaysia vis-á-vis Indonesia. The U.S. could not pick up these responsibilities; the resulting gap would be contrary to free world interests. Brown said there was no good reason why Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and even the U.S. should not get together to discuss how to fill that gap; there was no reason why it should be filled by HMG. The Secretary said USG was not in a position to advise as it could not take on any more in Southeast Asia; our current costs were too high. He asked what would be said at the CENTO meeting in April. Mr. Brown replied that HMG’s main contribution to CENTO was the equipment on Cyprus and no changes were contemplated there. As for SEATO, he reiterated that the declaration covers the forces in the area but that when there were no forces nothing could be declared. HMG would remain a member of SEATO; any forces would come out of their general capability. This obligation was not the same as that under NATO. Secretary Rusk asked if they contemplated a demobilization of forces. Brown replied affirmatively, saying they intended a rundown in their army, navy and airforce. While the troops stationed in Europe would be available to go anywhere, they would need to make a choice of flareups occurred in a number of places simultaneously. He assumed USG intended some demobilization of its own after Viet-Nam. The Secretary said the latter assumption was correct, but the U.S. would be able to move back quickly from various bases. The Secretary said that he deduced from Mr. Brown’s remarks the acrid aroma of a fait-accompli; and presumably what he said would not make much difference. He hoped that HMG would look hard at the implications of these decisions, adding also that any announcements the British make would elicit strong Congressional reaction. He hoped no action would be taken that would diminish the accomplishments for peace in the post-war period. An announcement such as the British propose would throw a long shadow far greater than the magnitude of the actions themselves. Mr. Brown reiterated that these were intentions which had been firmed up before there were meaningful consultations. He had been given the charge to explain the intentions and to report back the Secretary’s reactions. In that sense this was not a fait-accompli, but he wished not to leave the Secretary with any doubt of the intention of his colleagues to make final decisions tomorrow and announce them next Tuesday. The Secretary said that what was really important was that this represented a major withdrawal of the UK from world affairs, and it was a catastrophic loss to human society. These decisions involved the highest level of judgment and of instinct about where the human family was going. We were facing a difficult period in world affairs and Britain was saying it would not be there. The Secretary noted that, as a government, we were not making choices or indicating preferences between the Far East and the Middle East. We believed our interests were in trouble in both areas if the British took these measures. He also said he had the impression that the need for making an advance announcement was not really related to their operational requirements. Rather, he thought this was relevant to the other cuts they were making. Perhaps they were underestimating their people. Mr. Brown said all governments have this problem; each must assess its own political difficulties. However, these decisions were based on the belief that these were the right things to do, not on political reasons. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 13. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cheslaw and approved in S on January 23. The memorandum is marked Part III of V. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 During a subsequent part of the discussion, Brown, in reply to a question from Assistant Secretary Leddy, stated: “They had not decided in the same firm was as they had made other decisions what to do about the F-111’s.” A memorandum of this portion of the conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 UK. 289. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 289. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, January 11, 1968. Dear Harold: I have just learned from Dean Rusk of your plans for total British withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by 1971. I know you are close to a final decision and that there is not much time for reconsideration. I also can guess at what soul-searching you and your colleagues have been going through in trying to find the means for restoring health of the British economy and still carrying as much as possible of the financial burdens which you have so courageously borne thus far. This having been said, I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone. Although the decision must, of course, be your own, I can only wonder if you and all of your associates have taken fully into account the direct and indirect consequences. While the hour is late, I urge you and your colleagues once more to review the alternatives before you take these irrevocable steps. Even a prolongation of your presence in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put in place would be of help at this very difficult time for all of us. With warmest personal regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6 UK. Secret. An attached January 11 note from Bromley Smith of the NSC Staff to Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, stated that the message was sent “via private wire” and authorized its relay to Bruce “eyes only.” In a January 11 memorandum to the President reporting the substance of the Rusk-Brown conversation, Under Secretary Katzenbach recommended the dispatch of this message, adding: “While I do not think it will do any good, I believe we cannot fail to express our views at the highest level and in the strongest possible terms.” (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 290. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 290. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, January 15, 1968. The question of Britain’s future in the world, about which I wrote you the other day, continues to be very much on my mind. I know that you and your colleagues will be making crucial decisions on this question in the coming hours. The London press this morning carries reports that the Cabinet has in fact decided to cancel the F-111. 2 Though I know how unreliable the press can be, I have decided to communicate to you my extreme concern about this matter in particular. As Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara explained to George Brown 3 during his recent visit, and as I stated in my recent letter to you, the announcement of accelerated British withdrawal both from its Far Eastern bases and from the Persian Gulf would create most serious problems for the United States Government and for the security of the entire free world. Americans will find great difficulty in supporting the idea that we must move in to secure areas which the United Kingdom has abandoned. It has been our hope that a demonstrated ability of United Kingdom military forces speedily to deploy to these areas from its own bases might alleviate somewhat the strong reaction which will inevitably take place. The F-111, because of its range and overall capability, would demonstrate this rapid deployment ability. But if you decide to forego the acquisition of the F-111, everyone here will regard this as a total disengagement from any commitments whatsoever to the security of areas outside Europe and, indeed, to a considerable extent in Europe as well. Moreover, it will be viewed here as a strong indication of British isolation which would be fatal to the chances of cooperation between our countries in the field of defense procurement. Both Dean and Bob made it clear to George Brown that financial penalties will have to be applied if there is a decision to cancel the F-111 contract. Politically, we have no choice. Appreciable as these penalties would be in monetary terms, however, they would be far less serious than the reciprocal actions which in all likelihood would follow. Retention of the present offset arrangements would become out of the question. Pressures for domestic procurement could no longer be resisted. These would almost inescapably lead to complete cancellation of recent awards of military contracts to British firms. But even these severe economic effects would be overshadowed by the foreign policy consequences of an F-111 cancellation. Many in this country, including influential members of Congress, would bring the strongest pressures to bear on us to sacrifice international security interests to ease our present financial problems. Our ability to maintain substantial forces in Europe, while fighting a difficult and costly war in Southeast Asia, would be greatly endangered. As I indicated in my last letter to you, I recognize fully that a decision on this question is one that the British Government alone can make. I hope that it will do so with full consideration of all the factors involved. And I wanted you to know how important I consider it to be that the United Kingdom and the United States maintain their understanding on the F-111 in all essential respects and continue to at least try to defend freedom in this hectic and unsettled world in which we live. 4 Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 5 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327. Secret. Bruce noted in his diaries that the message was transmitted through a “special channel.” 2 In telegram 5479 from London, January 13, the Embassy reported that Broadbent informed Spiers of the decision to cancel the F-111 order by referring to press reports as “not far off the mark.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 UK) 3 For the Rusk-Brown conversation, see Document 288 . No record of the McNamara-Brown discussion was found. 4 On January 16 “Healey sent for Spiers. He gave Ron a letter for Bob McNamara, telling him it has been decided to cancel entirely orders for the F-111.” (Bruce Diary entry of January 16; Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) The Embassy reported on the Healey-Spiers conversation in telegram 5544 from London, January 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK) 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 291. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 291. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, January 15, 1968, 2300Z. I laid both your messages before my Cabinet colleagues today and they were carefully read before our final deliberations and decisions on the range and extent of the swingeing cuts in public expenditure, at home and overseas, that I shall be announcing to Parliament tomorrow. I should like to say at the outset how grateful I am to you for setting out with such restraint and understanding what I know to be your powerfully-held views on the measures we are having to take. I need hardly tell you how profoundly my colleagues and I regret the necessity for our decisions. As you will see when you receive a copy of my statement—and I will do my best to get this to you as early as possible—some of the decisions we have taken on the home front strike at the very root of principles to which many of us have been dedicated since we first went into politics. They are bitter decisions for us to have to make; and only our conviction that they are vital in the long-term interests of Britain, and that the British people will accept them as such, has made it possible for us to stomach them. The heavy sacrifices at home would have been pointless without drastic retrenchment abroad. I ask you to believe that this is not, as some journalists and even some Commonwealth statesmen have been saying, simply a matter of party politics—of keeping some kind of “balance” to force the unpleasant home medicine down the throats of our party supporters. Of course politics is involved here—what is politics all about anyway? But this is much wider than party politics—the politics of the nation and the sense of purpose of the British people as a whole are deeply involved. At the time of devaluation, I told you that the British people were sick and tired of being thought willing to eke out a comfortable existence on borrowed money. As your people may have told you, there has been over the past weeks an astonishing assertion of this kind of spirit throughout the nation and irrespective of party. At the root of this is a still rather confused groping for the real role that Britain ought to be playing in the world; and it has been striking to observe, in polls and other tests of public opinion, not only the extent to which people are prepared to accept drastic sacrifice at home but also their demand that we must no longer continue to overstrain our real resources and capabilities in the military field abroad. This does not mean, as you suggest, a British withdrawal from world affairs. Of course there are always, in any country, those who in moments of storm prefer to bury their heads in the sand. But the spirit that has been running through this nation in recent weeks is not that of “Little England.” I believe it to be a blend of exasperation at our inability to weather the successive economic storms of the past twenty years and determination, once and for all, to hew out a new role for Britain in the world at once commensurate with her real resources yet worthy of her past. There is at last a nation-wide realisation that this can not be done on borrowed time and borrowed money. I shall not attempt to list here all the measures which will be set out in my statement tomorrow. But just as you were able to give me brief forewarning of the dramatic steps you felt it necessary to take on New Year’s Day to protect even the vast economic strength of the United States, so I wish you to know now the two decisions that are most directly relevant to this country’s international posture and thus to our own working relationship; and those to which your two messages were addressed. First, the Far East and the Gulf. As I shall be explaining tomorrow, it is absolutely clear to us that our present political commitments are too great for the military capability of the forces that we can reasonably afford, if the economy is to be restored quickly and decisively; but without economic strength, we can have no real military credibility. If there is any lesson to be learned from the [illegible] way we have found ourselves obliged to lurch from one defence review to another in recent years, it is that we must now take certain major foreign policy decisions as the prerequisite of economies in our defence expenditure. Put simply, this only amounts to saying that we have to come to terms with our role in the world. And we are confident that if we fully assert our economic strength, we can, by realistic priorities, strengthen this country’s real influence and power for peace in the world. This was what underlay the intention, conveyed to Dean Rusk by George Brown, to withdraw our forces from the Far East and the Middle East by the end of the financial year 1970/71. But, as George explained, we fixed this deadline subject to reconsideration in the light of the account he brought back of your government’s views and what George Thomson returned to tell us of the views of the Commonwealth governments in the area. We also, as you may have seen, sent the Minister of State in the Foreign Office to discuss our intentions with the heads of government and others concerned in the Middle East. In the light of your message to me, of the reports from our other colleagues and of our deep and searching discussion with Harry Lee, who flew to London this weekend, we have decided to defer our withdrawal for a further nine months, i.e. to the end of 1971. I know that this will still seem too soon to yourself and to many others. But, in the face of the appallingly difficult decisions we are having to take over home expenditure, I believe that it is a significant contribution to the time needed to help those in the areas concerned prepare for the day when we shall no longer have a military presence there—for, believe me, it is only of our military presence that we are speaking. We know that its withdrawal involves risks. We believe that there is no option but to run them. But we intended to continue our aid programmes to the best of our ability, and of course to maintain our political, trading and economic interests there. Secondly, the F111. Again, I ask you to believe that my colleagues and I have spent many hours of discussion and heart-searching on this problem at three separate meetings and gave the fullest weight to the considerations advanced in your message. But we have come to the reluctant conclusion that the only way we can achieve the really decisive economies that are essential in the hardware budget of the Royal Air Force, while still keeping effective and sophisticated capabilities in all three services, is to cancel the order for the 50 F111 aircraft. I hope you are wrong in assessing that this decision will be interpreted abroad as a disengagement from any commitments to the security of areas outside Europe or indeed largely in Europe as well. And you are certainly wrong if you take the view you mentioned that it is “a strong indication of British isolation.” In fact, I believe both these views to be wrong. As I shall be explaining tomorrow, we intend to make to the alliances of which we are members, a contribution related to our economic capability; we shall not be withdrawing from our three major alliances; and the general capability that we shall retain in this country and on the continent can also be deployed overseas and will still thus enable us to continue to give assistance to our international partners and other allies concerned, if the circumstances so demand. Against this background and having regard to what you yourself said in the second of your two messages, I nevertheless hope that Denis Healey and Bob McNamara, for whose helpful efforts in these matters we are all most grateful, can reach an early agreement in broad terms about continued credit facilities for the unchanged Phantom and Hercules programmes and for appropriate adaptation of the offset arrangements. Believe me, Lyndon, the decisions we are having to take now have been the most difficult and the heaviest of any that I, and I think all my colleagues, can remember in our public life. We are not taking them in a narrow or partisan spirit. We are taking them because we are convinced that, in the longer term, only thus can Britain find the new place on the world stage that I firmly believe the British people ardently desire. And when I say “the world stage” I mean just that. Warm regards, Harold Wilson 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 292. Editorial Note 292. Editorial Note Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy met privately with Prime Minister Wilson in London January 20, 1968, prior to Wilson’s visit to the Soviet Union January 22-24. The purpose of Bundy’s visit was to assure coordination between the two nations over Vietnam policy. A portion of a briefing paper prepared for the President summarizing these talks reads: “Following instructions cleared by Secretary Rusk and Walt Rostow, Bundy stressed to Wilson that he must make it absolutely clear that he was not authorized by the US to do any exploring on the San Antonio formula.” (Note for President’s Evening Reading, January 22, 1968; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to President, W.W. Rostow, Vol. 57) A summary of the Bundy-Wilson meeting is in the January 20 entry of the Bruce Diaries. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) During his discussions with Kosygin, Wilson maintained a telegraphic communication with the White House. Copies of the messages exchanged by the President and Prime Minister are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom. Wilson described the negotiations in The Labour Government, 1964-1970 , pages 489-493. 293. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 293. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce) 1 Washington, February 8, 1968. The Prime Minister and his train arrived from London last night. He brought with him Mrs. Wilson, Burke Trend, Denis Greenhill, Michael Halls, Michael Palliser, Gerald Kaufman (Public Relations Adviser), T.D. Lloyd-Hughes (Press Secretary), and Donald Murray (Head of South East Asia Department, Foreign Office). John Leddy, Bob Bowie, Harry Shullaw, and I went over to meet this group, to which was attached Pat Dean and Ed Tompkins from the British Embassy, at 11:30 this morning. The road from the White House Northwest Gate to the Diplomatic entrance was lined with Army, Navy, and Air Force men, standing at attention with fixed bayonets. I trailed along behind the President as he met his guests in front of a battery of cameramen. The President and Prime Minister disappeared into the Oval Office, unattended, from which they emerged two and a half hours later (2 o’clock). The rest of us cooled our heels in the Cabinet Room, but this was pleasant enough since every one there had known the others for a long time. We were joined by Walt Rostow, who was hawkishly gratified by how things are going in Vietnam. Our unpredictable President announced we must all be hungry and should follow him upstairs in the White House to drink and eat. Poor Pat Dean was thoroughly discomfited, for he had arranged a large lunch at home for the Prime Minister. However, there was no choice; exactly the same thing happened when Harold Wilson was last here. Pat was initially angry, but yielded with good spirit. The newspapers last night made merry over the selections chosen by the orchestra for this evening’s State Dinner. Amongst the titles was On the Road to Mandalay , and one or two others that seemed especially inapposite in Mr. Wilson’s case. When, however, he heard of Protocol’s embarrassment over this, he insisted the program stand. While we were drinking before lunch, the PM remarked on how satisfactory had been his conversation with the President. To my surprise, he told us there had been a reflow of gold to London in excess of two-hundred-million dollars during the past two weeks. This does not accord at all with our Embassy figures reported by the Treasury Attache. Also, he said exports were increasing substantially, unemployment was manageable, and all in all the economy was ready to respond to the new measures. Lunch was cheerful; the President recounted some good Texas stories. Incidentally, he spoke warmly of how helpful President Eisenhower had always been to him, and of his deep affection for the General. When they left, I stayed behind for a few minutes with the President. He said his talk with Wilson had been satisfactory, and without rancor, although he had spoken sternly about British plans for withdrawal from the Far East and Middle East. Wilson gave him glowingly optimistic predictions of how Britain would pull itself up by its bootstraps. [Here follow 9 paragraphs dealing with social and personal matters.] The toasts to the Queen and the President were not out of the ordinary. Each had been carefully prepared. L.B.J. was laudatory of Britain, but did not single out Wilson for individual praise. The PM was cagey, but satisfactory on Vietnam. There were no fireworks in either production. [Here follow 3 paragraphs of unrelated personal observations.] 1 Source: Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 63 D 327. Secret. 294. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 294. Telegram From Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson 1 London, March 18, 1968. As you will guess, I have been personally following every move in the discussion in Washington this weekend and I share what I know will be your satisfaction that we have all been able to reach an agreed solution. 2 As you know, from the outset the British delegation joined with yours in rejecting any solution based on a change in the price of gold. We support you completely in this matter, and this has never been in doubt. I believe that the agreement announced tonight is the best that could be achieved in present circumstances. We must hope that it will carry sufficient conviction in the world financial arena to stop the nonsense which has been going on in these past weeks. It is impossible to be certain, because we are dealing with a degree of irrationality which I have today described as Gadarene Dementia. In addition there have been the signs of a hidden hand in operation against the dollar and the pound—and not all that hidden either. 3 In a rational world this clear evidence of determination should be decisive. But we must, even at this stage, reckon with the possibility that the irrational elements with which we have to deal may take charge. If this is so, the attack will switch more directly from the gold markets to the foreign exchange markets and will be directed against the two reserve currencies. Our continental colleagues have responded well to the dangers which we all face and I welcome the special consideration given to the position of sterling. Sterling has been, and still is, in the front line, but in a very real sense we all stand together. This stood out from the message you sent me on Thursday night. 4 That was in response to the message in which I said that, if we had to protect ourselves, we should be forced to take action which could have a grave effect on all other currencies. 5 Since I sent you my Thursday message, this has been reiterated by my colleagues and our determination is absolute. Let us hope that what is happening in Washington means that the attack will now spend itself. But if it does not, we must urgently consult together to agree what further collective action can be taken in order to avert the danger that we may be driven apart. Should we reach this point, we shall not propose a change in the gold price, but there are other policies that might have to be urgently considered between us. It is too early to canvass the various arguments, though we should prefer an arrangement providing for an embargo on the buying and selling of gold to anything which gave the enemy the prize for which they are contending, namely an increase in the gold price. We must keep in close touch if necessary on a day-to-day basis this week, though again, I hope that what has been achieved in response to your lead on Thursday night may exorcise once and for all the danger we have been facing together. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK. Top Secret. 2 Reference is to the March 16-17 meeting of governors of the central banks of the seven “gold pool” nations. For text of communiquéissued at the conclusion of their meeting, see Department of State Bulletin , April 8, 1968, p. 464. 3 Reference is to President de Gaulle. 4 A copy of Johnson’s March 15 message is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, UK, Vol. 7. 5 A copy of Wilson’s March 14 message is ibid. 295. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 295. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 Washington, undated. I. DIRECTIONS OF UK POLICY Britain’s severe economic problems have shaken the international monetary system and sealed a historic transformation of British foreign policy. The financial pressures of last November forced the UK to devalue the pound (from $2.80 to $2.40). That decision marked the failure of Labour’s previous policy of demi-austerity and necessitated severe budget cuts. Devaluation was followed by another rejection by De Gaulle of the UK’s Common Market bid. These setbacks led to a widespread public loss of confidence in Labour and in Wilson. A change in Labour leadership in the coming months, though remote, is no longer out of the question. The British Government’s vital objective is to make a success of last November’s devaluation. Britain is seeking to achieve a 1,000 million pounds ($2.4 billion) turnaround in its balance of payments, i.e. to move from a deficit of over 500 million pounds in 1967 to a sustained surplus at the rate of 500 pounds million beginning in 1969. The necessity of success has produced new policies far from Labour’s socialist ideology: curtailed public spending, even in the welfare sector; a mandatory prices and incomes policy closely correlated to productivity; and rigorous measures to reduce domestic demand in order to shift resources into exports and private investment. Cooperation from the domestic sector and the patience of the international financial community are vital to Britain’s success, but these factors are not assured and the outcome therefore is in doubt. Since November, the direction of Britain’s defense and foreign policy has become clearer and firmer. The Government has accelerated curtailment of world-wide commitments and clarification of its policy toward Europe. Still, the process is far from complete. Continued frustration of Britain’s new European vocation nourishes traditional British parochialism, resentment toward France, and suspicion of Germany. Conservative Party leaders have attacked the Government’s “retreat from East of Suez,” but before they can come to power, the cutbacks will probably have gone so far as to be irreparable. Thus, we can see the Britain of the future as, at best, a middle-sized, European power, albeit one with a nuclear capability, a residual sense of extra-European responsibility, and a continuing, if diminished, status as a favored partner of the US. II. US-UK RELATIONS AND US OBJECTIVES We can expect British governments gradually to attenuate the “special relationship” as the prospect of achieving their aims in Europe becomes more credible, but they will not repudiate it entirely as long as it has advantages for them. The UK continues to have economic and political assets which can provide valuable support for our own foreign policy objectives; for example, the British desire to play a constructive role in Western European political affairs and to provide substantial amounts of foreign aid in the less developed world. In addition they still have extensive Commonwealth contacts. These assets would probably be strengthened by a victory in the next General Election of the Conservative Party, which is currently running far ahead of Labour in by-elections, local elections, and public opinion polls. III. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS A. The Problem of Sterling No one can be certain that the post-devaluation economic program will succeed in producing the necessary, enduring balance of payments surplus. The basic positive factors are: the competitive edge provided by devaluation, the buoyancy in Britain’s main export markets, and bold fiscal and monetary restraints on the domestic economy. The negative factors are: a history of repeated crises; organized labor’s reluctance, if not unwillingness, to accept wage restraint; archaic labor and management practices; a stubbornly high level of import demand; high interest rates in the US and in Europe; Britain’s precarious liquidity position; continuing nervousness about sterling; and the generally precarious international monetary situation. The financial world so far has patiently awaited evidence that the UK is gradually moving toward surplus. Such patience is not unlimited and could be cut short by widespread strikes this summer or the collapse of the wage restraint policy. Then the financial world may well conclude that Britain’s economic program is not going to succeed. This could lead to speculative selling of sterling, including further switching out of pounds by sterling area central banks. Britain has substantial resources in standby credits and swaps to help meet such an eventuality. In a severe crisis they would need augmentation. US Position : It is important to us that the British economic program succeed. The consequences of failure were portrayed last November, when the fall of one reserve currency, sterling, led to severe pressure on the dollar, to the gold crisis, to the forced termination of the “Gold Pool” arrangements, and to a large decline in US gold reserves. If Britain fails to achieve its balance of payments objective, there could be another deep sterling crisis which would put renewed pressure of the most serious kind on the dollar. B. Britain and European Defense On February 19 HMG announced that its defense will in the future be concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic area. On May 10 Defense Minister Healey announced that withdrawals from the Far East and the Persian Gulf have enabled HMG to make an immediate contribution to strengthening NATO’s forces in Europe and the Mediterranean along the following lines: (1) a mobile task force (some 20,000 men) will be stationed in Britain but available for NATO defense; (2) an amphibious task force will be stationed in European waters; (3) two frigates will be kept in the Mediterranean; (4) a squadron of reconnaissance aircraft will remain in Malta until 1970; (5) in 1969, the UK is prepared to send a commando carrier with troops embarked to participate in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean. The UK is also exploring the possibility of some modest first steps that might evolve into a kind of European defense organization in the NATO framework. The British have in mind initially talking with the European Community members (less the French), and perhaps the Danes and Norwegians, about the possibility of cooperation in the defense production and procurement field. Subsequently, they would hope to see a kind of European caucus in NATO under which the nations concerned could concert their positions on force levels, strategy, and other questions in advance of discussions with us. Thus, by working quietly within the established NATO framework, the UK hopes to be able to avoid another head-on collision with the French which would in turn frighten off the Germans and other European Community members. This approach also assures a close institutional link between any future European defense organization and the United States, as well as with the other allies. US Position : We have been quietly encouraging the British in these efforts as they are consistent with our long-standing attitude favoring Western European cooperation and unification. If the British succeed, the result would be an improved political balance in the Alliance. It would also improve prospects that the European members together could pick up more of the burden of their own defense. Care must be exercised to avoid the appearance of an Anglo-American initiative. C. The UK and the European Communities (EC) The United Kingdom is maintaining its application for full EC membership. It has not endorsed recent proposals from among the Six for interim commercial arrangements. Foreign Secretary Stewart said recently that the UK would only be interested in “proposals coming from the Six as a whole which are clearly and unmistakably connected with our full membership in the European Economic Community.” The British see little prospect that the Six will be able to agree on acceptable interim proposals. The French veto on British membership has not diminished support within Britain for full membership. The British Government and, in general, the public seem to realize that there is no viable alternative to entry into the Communities. Proponents of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) have generated little British interest, in or outside the government. The British are expected to make some new move to maintain forward movement on membership, perhaps this summer. Britain is most likely to propose collaborations on military-political matters and technology which are outside the clear responsibility of the Rome Treaty and which it would be easier for the Five to act upon without openly provoking De Gaulle. US Position : The United States has long opposed EC preferential trading arrangements with other European states unless these lead to full membership within a reasonable period. Thus we welcome the British stand against interim arrangements with the Community. We do not believe that NAFTA is a practical or desirable alternative to British membership in EC. D. Middle East Britain no longer has the will, or can afford, to play a major security role in the Middle East. In continuing the pursuit of its economic interests, however, HMG can be expected to rely increasingly on its diplomatic resources, mutual economic interest, and placating the Arabs on the Arab-Israeli issue. US Position : We can constructively use Britain’s residual political and economic influence in the Middle East, particularly with the Arab states, as part of our common desire to seek an equitable and enduring settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to resist rising Soviet influence. In the Persian Gulf, we specifically wish to (a) encourage the British to maintain as much of their present special role as long as possible; (b) encourage the Saudis and Iranians in particular to settle outstanding differences; (c) encourage greater regional economic and political cooperation among the Gulf states; and (d) avoid an undue military buildup by littoral states while recognizing that some increase in indigenous forces is no doubt inevitable. E. UK Withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore Last January 16, Wilson announced the withdrawal of all British military forces from the Malaysia/Singapore area by the end of 1971. The British declared that they would continue to meet their SEATO obligations after 1971 within the limits of their resources and would retain a “general capability for deployment overseas” if HMG judged such deployment necessary. However, they have declined to be drawn out on the nature of this capability or how it will be brought to bear in Southeast Asia. The phase-down is calculated to minimize adverse effects on the economies of Malaysia and Singapore, and give them time to build up their own forces. A working group of the UK, Malaysia, and Singapore has begun discussing a proposed air defense system. A five-nation Defense Ministers’ conference will be held in Kuala Lumpur in early June. Australia and New Zealand are unlikely alone to fill the vacuum which will be created by the UK’s departure. They look forward to a Commonwealth effort in this area. US Position : We regret this removal of an important element of military and economic stability from Southeast Asia at a critical time. We have no intention of expanding our commitments or responsibilities as a result of the British decision, but we maintain a keen interest in the efforts of the Commonwealth partners to work out security arrangements necessary to assure continued stability in the area. F. Southern Rhodesia The UK, rejecting the use of force, has been unable to bring an end to the illegal regime of Ian Smith in spite of discussions, the UN voluntary sanctions program (November 1965), or the limited UN mandatory sanctions program (December 1966). The sanctions program suffers from the refusal of South Africa and Portugal to participate and from lax or incomplete compliance by Japan, West Germany, France, and other industrialized countries. The British insist that the best method of bringing pressure on Smith is through UN sanctions, and the Security Council is considering making selected mandatory sanctions more comprehensive. US Position : We are continuing to cooperate with the British and the UN on sanctions and will support a UN decision to make selected mandatory sanctions more comprehensive. Any lessening of US support for such a UN resolution would have serious consequences for US relations with the UK, other countries of Africa, and in the United Nations generally. G. US-UK Nuclear Cooperation Various termination provisions in the 1958 US-UK Agreement for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for defense purposes will soon come into play. The intent of either the US or the UK to terminate the exchange of information on nuclear weapons and/or military reactors must be accompanied by notice to this effect to the other party by December 31, 1968. Lacking such notice, that part of the Agreement dealing with cooperation on information will continue in force for at least five more years. Continuation of cooperation on the exchange of materiel beyond the end of 1969 will require a new agreement. In spite of their parlous financial-economic condition, the British intend for political reasons to retain membership in the nuclear club. They are currently considering alternative improvements which will enable their Polaris missile force to penetrate Soviet missile defense systems. We expect that this summer they will ask us for additional and continuing assistance in these endeavors. US Position : The question of future US policy in this field is now under review in the IRG/SIG mechanism. Some of the long-term factors which we must evaluate in reaching a decision include (1) future US-UK bilateral relations; (2) UK’s future relations with the EC; and (3) the prospects of a future European defense organization and European nuclear cooperation. H. UK and France HMG probably has a mixed reaction to the current French crisis. The British may be expected privately to consider that De Gaulle’s difficulties should serve as a salutary shock to his reputation. On the other hand, they would be apprehensive about the uncertain effects of political and economic instability in France. Current troubles in France are not likely to help the near-term British economic position since (1) any tremors in the international monetary system seem to reverberate against sterling; (2) a reduction in French economic activity will hurt British exports to France; and (3) weakness of French exports in third markets will offer Britain new opportunities only over the longer term. If, as seems likely, the French response to recent internal developments produces an expansionary, inflationary situation in the country, over the longer term the balance of payments impact would be adverse to France and presumably help to reduce the US and UK balance of payments deficits. Though we can visualize some weakening in the French balance of payments, it is too early to judge whether recent events will force the eventual devaluation of the franc. We should note that France has large reserves of gold and dollars with which the franc can be defended. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UK. Secret. An attached memorandum from John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to Bromley Smith, June 1, stated that the paper was prepared for submission at the June 5 meeting of the National Security Council. On June 3 the Department forwarded to the NSC a supplementary memorandum for inclusion, entitled “UK and France.” It is printed as section H at the end of this memorandum. 296. Summary Notes of the 587th Meeting of the National Security Council 296. Summary Notes of the 587th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, June 5, 1968, 12:15-12:45 p.m. SUBJECT Current Issues Affecting US-UK Relations Secretary Rusk summarized the current situation in Europe, making the following points: 1. We are in an interim period in our relations with NATO. A. A watchful waiting attitude is customary during our election year. B. Both Canada and France are also in an election period. C. Belgium and Italy are in the process of forming new governments. D. A difficult and uncertain situation exists in Greece. 2. At the NATO meeting scheduled later this month in Iceland, our objectives will be to prevent disarray in NATO. 3. The uncertainty in Europe has the effect of increasing the importance to Europeans of the level of U.S. forces in Europe. Secretary Rusk then turned to the current situation in the UK. He made the following points in addition to summarizing a recent cable from Ambassador Bruce (copy attached). 2 1. The Wilson Government is in difficulty with all Britishers and confronts divisions within the Labor Party. 2. Despite Wilson’s troubles, the UK is more stable than France. 3. Many Britishers have not adjusted to their new role in the world. A. The UK is steadily withdrawing from its security commitments in distant areas but at the same time is giving more support to NATO. The size of the UK contribution to NATO depends on whether the Labor government succeeds in improving the economic situation in the UK. B. The special relationship the UK has with us is less important to them now because the British have less interest in maintaining a world role. Operationally, the U.S. and UK are working on fewer real problems. The concept of Atlantic cooperation could replace the special relationship. Close bilateral relations with the British, however, will certainly continue. Secretary Fowler, describing the State paper 3 as excellent, stated that sterling is the major U.S.-UK problem. Aspects of the sterling crisis involve: 1. Short-term funding. We have assisted the British, particularly in supporting their requests for international bank withdrawals. 2. Bilateral credits. 3. The role of sterling in an international monetary system. The UK financial situation is precarious and, in Secretary Fowler’s view, British resources to apply to this problem may be less than indicated in the State Department’s paper. Essentially, he added, continental countries have confidence in London and have welcomed British actions reflected in the last UK budget. However, the London financial community has less confidence in the Wilson Government. This is because the British Government and the London business community are out of step. Secretary Fowler does not share the view of some that the return to power of the Conservative Party would be an improvement. He doubts that the Conservatives could handle the economic situation, especially a wage-price policy, as well as the Labor Party has done. With respect to the current situation in London, Secretary Fowler said the British were losing large amounts of reserves not only because of widespread lack of confidence in sterling but also because several countries are diversifying their reserves. This diversification puts pressure on the pound because those countries in the pound bloc move out of sterling into other currencies. Thus, events are forcing Britain to recognize that the pound will not much longer be used as a reserve currency. The immediate problem is how to deal with the sterling balances held in those countries which are diversifying their reserves. As to France, Secretary Fowler predicted that DeGaulle would seek to maintain the franc at its present rate. In the future, France might have to devalue—possibly as early as this fall—in order to meet wage increases which the government will be forced to grant French workmen. If the French do devalue, heavy pressure will fall on the British just at the time they may well be getting their financial situation in balance. Secretary Fowler called attention to the loss of U.S. reserves in the last six months. He said work was going forward on how to deal multilaterally with the problem of sterling balances in other countries. Contingency plans are being drawn to insure that the sterling problem does not have a major unfavorable impact on the dollar. In addition, initiatives are being worked out to deal with the impact in Europe of instability of the pound and franc which undoubtedly will affect the dollar. These initiatives can be taken only after the tax bill is passed. Secretary Clifford said that the British do not have the resources, the backup, or the hardware to deal with any big world problem. He said they are no longer a powerful ally of ours because they cannot afford the cost of an adequate defense effort. He made these points: 1. Earlier we had the closest working relations with the British. They looked after one part of the world and we looked after another part. 2. The British are continuing their contribution to NATO but are retrenching elsewhere. 3. It is not certain that the British can keep even their present level of forces in NATO. Although the UK is earmarking for NATO those troops being withdrawn from other areas, no real increase in NATO power results because the earmarked forces merely help to bring the British NATO contribution up to the level they have previously maintained. Secretary Clifford acknowledged that the British withdrawal creates real problems for us in Southeast Asia, in other parts of Asia, and particularly in the Mediterranean where the Soviets recently have become more active. In response to a request by the President, Mr. Rostow said one question he would like to have Secretary Rusk answer was whether the chance of the British getting into the Common Market was greater now that DeGaulle is in trouble. Secretary Rusk asked Assistant Secretary Leddy to reply. Mr. Leddy said DeGaulle will not change his opposition to British entry even though he is in difficulty in France. DeGaulle will, however, have greater difficulty in carrying out his effort to prevent British entry. Secretary Rusk reported that Ambassador Bohlen believes DeGaulle may win a large majority in the forthcoming French election. If this happens, DeGaulle will be able to exert considerable pressure on other Common Market members to continue to hold out against British entry. If DeGaulle loses the election, however, his power to oppose British entry may be considerably reduced. A second factor affecting British entry is that the new Italian government may not be as strong for British entry as past Italian governments have been. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the only operational matter was the suggestion that State-Treasury recommendations for actions to deal with the current monetary situation be sent to the President promptly. The President asked that such recommendations be prepared for him. 4 (Attached is the briefing memorandum for the President which he referred to at the meeting.) 5 Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. 2 Not attached; it was apparently telegram 9529 from London, June 4, which analyzed the current situation in the United Kingdom. (Department of State, Bruce Diaries: Lot 64 D 327) 3 Document 295 . 4 Not found. 5 Not attached. 297. Memorandum of Conversation 297. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 11, 1968. PARTICIPANTS The President, British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, Ambassador Dean, Walt Rostow, Ed Fried The President welcomed Stewart and expressed satisfaction with his close relations with Prime Minister Wilson. He asked Stewart whether there was any news from Gibraltar. 2 Stewart said that the Prime Minister believed that the only way to see whether there was any basis for agreement was to see Smith. He would keep us fully informed. Stewart went on to say that the debate in the UN was dominated by the Czechoslovakia and Middle East discussions. On the Middle East there had been a great deal of private talk to see what could be done to advance the Jarring Mission. 3 The President said he had tried to encourage both sides to support Jarring. He believed the Eban speech suggested some progress. Stewart said that Eban had complained to him that the rest of the world too easily accepted the proposition that there should not be direct negotiation. Stewart had tried to impress on Eban the need for the Israelis to declare themselves on the Security Council resolution. Eban said he would consider this with the objective of laying the base for talks with Jordan—first through Jarring and then directly. The President said Jarring would fail unless the two sides began to move. Jarring had been patient but he couldn’t continue indefinitely without movement. Rostow suggested that Jarring might be somewhat more optimistic than he sounds. He may be using his pessimism as a lever to push for negotiations. The President turned to Czechoslovakia and said it was essential that the world wake up to the danger before it was too late. Stewart said some talk was a necessary part of the response. That was why the British had wanted to move quickly to the Security Council— to show that not only NATO but the interests of the world were involved in the Czech invasion. The Afro-Asian countries automatically gravitated to the Soviet pole on this kind of issue: how would they act on this one? The President asked Stewart’s views on the Gromyko speech to the UN. 4 Stewart said it was cautious and made clear that the Russians faced a difficult problem. Their objective was to act as though nothing had happened, and they particularly wanted to create this impression as far as their relations with the U.S. were concerned. We, on the other hand, cannot say we will have no further dealings with them. We do have problems we must solve together, and we should get on with disarmament matters. It is a difficult line to draw but we must continually remind them and the world of what they have done. Even more serious, we must think very hard about what we would do if there are any further adventures. The President said he was very concerned about the possibility of isolationism in the U.S. and the effects on keeping our troops in Europe. He said the British withdrawals hadn’t helped. Czechoslovakia provided some time. It was necessary now to use that time well. Our people have gotten the impression that others are not pulling their share of the load. He was confident that we could stay in Europe indefinitely if others showed they were helping. Stewart said he understood this and the British were acting to strengthen NATO. He said he wanted to raise another question—the concern that smaller European countries had over U.S. negotiations with the Russians. He said some matters clearly affected primarily the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Some, on the other hand, affected NATO as a whole. There was a feeling among smaller NATO countries that these latter issues would be settled over their heads. Would it be possible to draw a dividing line between those issues we settle bilaterally and those on which we would consult fully? The President said he had tried very hard over five years to make some progress with the USSR and to see what could be done to narrow our differences in defensive arrangements, in offensive and defensive weapons, in the NPT. He said that there had been meetings at the Ambassadorial and Ministerial levels and at the Summit and there had been a lot of personal correspondence. He did not see very strong promise of our getting anywhere with this during the balance of the year. The next President would have to explore this again and make careful preparations. This would take time. On all these issues we had and would continue to get the advice of the UK and all NATO countries and to keep them informed. He went on to say that there had been progress on some issues in Glassboro and up through the day before the Czechoslovakian invasion; but he was not optimistic now. He repeated that we would not see anybody or take any action without full consultation and exchange with our Allies. Talks had been long overdue in the ABM field but this issue was now on the back burner. He had no desire to travel but he was eager to move forward on U.S. business and on the world’s business; but progress was not likely now until after the election and probably not until six months after the new President came into office. Stewart asked whether he believed there would be significant change in the defense and foreign policy positions in the U.S. after the election. The President thought there would be some rethinking. For example, a Republican President and a Democratic Senate could have awkward consequences. A Democratic President with Republican gains in the Congress could cause problems. He read Stewart a portion of the NPT statement he was about to make, which mentioned the possibility that he would call the Congress back into session. 5 Stewart asked whether the President thought that ratification of the Treaty would come eventually. The President said he could not predict but he was concerned. It was important that we move. The longer we waited the more the issue would be in doubt. Stewart asked whether the President saw any change in our Vietnam policy after a new Administration came into office. The President said that any new Administration would take a new look. As far as he was concerned he was convinced that whatever concessions we would make would never be enough unless we got some indication that they were prepared to do something. It didn’t have to be reciprocal. We would be willing to stop if they understood that if they started shelling cities or increasing activity in the DMZ we would resume bombing and if they accepted the GVN as a negotiating partner—a condition essential for serious and productive discussions of a settlement. Stewart said that the British fully supported the President’s position, but they would have difficulty if the Americans abandoned it without warning. In that context, he asked whether Vice President Humphrey’s most recent statement represented a change. 6 The President said that he believed that Humphrey tried to say that he would stop the bombing if they restored the DMZ. His emphasis created some doubt. In the end, however, he did not believe that the position was different. In any event, there would be no change until January 20. Stewart said it was their impression that the Soviet leaders visiting Cambodia intended to put some pressure on the North Vietnamese. 7 The President said that he was not much of an authority on North Vietnam. He had thought for a long time that, faced with their prospects, they would make some move. Sometimes he had thought they were moving, only to be disappointed. He believed and continued to believe that it is in their interest to make a move. They will not gain anything until January 20, and what they might gain after that will not be worth what they will be losing until then. Stewart said that when he saw Gromyko following the President’s March 31 statement 8 he had urged him to tell the North Vietnamese that they would be wrong if they thought they could alter public opinion in their favor by holding out. He told Gromyko that he thought the effects would be the other way. And he believed that this, in fact, had been the case. But he asked whether the Russians had talked to the North Vietnamese on this and how much influence they had. The President said he did not know. He had thought that Glassboro and other talks might have some results; but this did not prove to be the case. Stewart again went back to the question of contingency planning regarding further Soviet moves. He said he believed the Russians fully understood what would happen if they moved against any NATO countries. They probably also were pretty confident that if they moved against Warsaw Pact countries they probably would not get a strong NATO response. But what happened in the intermediate cases? What would we really do and what tactics should we employ to tell the Russians? The President agreed that it was important that we work hard on this kind of contingency planning and move along with it. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 14. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Fried. 2 Reference is to October 9-13 talks between Wilson and Prime Minister Ian Smith on the H.M.S. Fearless anchored at Gibraltar. 3 Between January and May 1968, Gunnar Jarring, UN Special Representative in the Middle East, met with Arab and Israeli officials in Cyprus. After his return to New York, Jarring continued secret discussions relating to a Middle East peace settlement. 4 For text of the October 3 speech, see UN doc. A/PV. 1679. 5 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book II, pp. 1029-1030. 6 Reference is to a September 30 statement by the Vice President that if elected he would stop the bombing of North Vietnam if its government gave signs it was ready to negotiate seriously for an end to the conflict. 7 Not further identified. 8 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, pp. 469-476. 298. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 298. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 22, 1968. SUBJECT Military Nuclear Cooperation with the United Kingdom Before year-end, we must decide whether we want to exercise our option to terminate certain information exchanges under our 1958 Agreement with the United Kingdom on Military Nuclear Cooperation. We will not again have this option for another five years. We have agreements for very limited cooperation in the nuclear weapons field with NATO and ten countries. The arrangement with the United Kingdom is unique, however, because it provides for exchanges of information relating to weapons design and manufacture and supply of nuclear materials for weapons. The SIG, with the participation of the AEC, has reviewed our policy in order to determine whether changes in the 1958 arrangement would be in the United States interest at this time. 2 It has concluded that: —We should maintain the existing arrangement; —We should, however, limit exchanges of weapons information and materials to what the British need to carry forward their program in nuclear weapons research and to maintain the effectiveness of their existing nuclear forces; —We should not, in the absence of advance Presidential approval, encourage, or commit ourselves to support, any significant modification to existing British programs or any major new British programs. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford and the AEC concur in the conclusions and recommendations set forth more fully below for your approval. Issues There is one issue which must be decided now, and a related question which should be considered but does not require a decision at this time. First —Under the Agreement, we have the option, until December 31, 1968, to terminate Article II, which provides for the exchange of information on nuclear weapons and military reactors—in addition to the more limited information which we also exchange with most of our other NATO allies. If we exercise the option, these exchanges will terminate at the end of 1969. If we do not, we will not again have the option to terminate Article II for another five years. There is every reason to think the British want to continue exchanges in the nuclear weapons field. Congress does not need to act. A subsidiary issue is the extent to which we would continue the flow of information to the British assuming Article II is not terminated. The Agreement leaves that to our discretion. Second —The related question is whether, if the British ask us, we should extend the 1959 Amendment on weapons materials and equipment exchanges to the 1958 Agreement. Under that Amendment, which does not expire until the end of 1969, we have been supplying the British with weapons-grade uranium, tritium, and other materials, and with non-nuclear parts of weapons. No decision is needed now. Undoubtedly, however, the British will propose a new Amendment that would keep open the option of continuing such exchanges. They will probably wait until early next year to approach us. In the unlikely event that they approach us this year, we could begin preliminary staff work but would tell them that a decision would have to be made by the next Administration. A new Amendment would have to be submitted to Congress for the statutory sixty-day waiting period before it enters into force. Discussion The United Kingdom’s nuclear forces only marginally supplement our own. But the fact of the matter is the British consider a small nuclear deterrent to be better than none. They will require some further weapons information and materials merely to maintain its effectiveness. They are unwilling to give up their nuclear deterrent except in return for an effective European nuclear arrangement which would substitute for both the British and French national nuclear programs. As of now, no such arrangement is in sight. Under these circumstances, unilateral termination by us would cause serious disaffection between our two countries, both major British parties being firmly committed to the retention of an independent British nuclear deterrent. It could also appear to be indirectly promoting France as the principal Western European country in the nuclear business. On the other hand, it is true that the nuclear weapons arrangement is a symbol of our “special relationship” and therefore a factor of major significance in French attitudes toward British membership in the EEC. However, the British, rather than we, need to judge when this aspect of our relationship should be limited or terminated to meet their political objectives in Western Europe. Continuation of some cooperation in the nuclear weapons field will also permit us to monitor closely the work being carried out by the British and will help to assure that we receive the benefits of their technical advances. We do not expect, however, that such benefits from British technical advances in the nuclear weapons field will be of more than limited value to us. For this, as well as for security reasons, we would not furnish information which reveals the vulnerability levels of United States missile systems. Continuation of our cooperation with the United Kingdom in this field would not compromise our objectives of promoting the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The various U.S./U.K. Agreements do not provide for the transfer of manufactured warheads or their nuclear cores, but are confined to assistance in the manufacture of warheads. Such assistance among nuclear weapons states is not prohibited by the NPT. The 1958 Agreement for Cooperation also provided for limited assistance to the United Kingdom in naval nuclear propulsion technology. Our obligations in this field will have been completely fulfilled by mid-1969, excepting reactor safety information, to be provided unilaterally by the United States, for the propulsion plant furnished earlier under the Agreement. We do not anticipate that the British will request additional naval nuclear propulsion information, and there are no plans to provide them with additional assistance in this field. In any event, further information would not be provided without specific approval of the President. We have, however, signed a revision to the Agreement under which the United States will supply specific quantities of enriched uranium and other specified reactor materials for the British nuclear-powered submarine program, prior to December 31, 1979. Conclusions The SIG, with participation of the AEC, has concluded: —The United States should not take steps to alter current arrangements on exchanges of weapons information . More specifically, the United States should not act to terminate Article II of the Agreement. However, it also should make no overtures concerning major new British programs or significant modification (e.g., the installation of MIRVs) to existing British programs. —Accordingly, in response to British requests, we would, selectively, release that nuclear weapons information which the British need to maintain the effectiveness of their existing nuclear forces and to evaluate fully the alternatives available to them for improvement of these forces. (This could include selective information on hardening techniques, and information related to Poseidon technology.) We would also continue to exchange information in certain areas of research on weapons technology which offer a reasonable prospect of mutual benefit. —If the British ask us, before January 20, to renew the 1959 Amendment on materials and equipment exchanges, we would tell them that a decision will have to be made by the next Administration. (Since this Amendment does not expire until the end of 1969, a decision is not needed now.) We would begin the preliminary staffing of a ten-year renewal of the Amendment—although, here too, we would limit our weapons assistance strictly to what the British need to maintain the effectiveness of their existing nuclear forces. We would also continue to exchange source, by-product, and special nuclear materials and non-nuclear parts or materials for research on atomic weapons. —We would make clear to the British that the extension of present arrangements is intended to deal only with the framework for cooperation on weapons information and materials assistance; and that we reserve the right to evaluate any specific request in this area in light of all the factors and considerations at the time. —We would be willing to limit or terminate our cooperation if the British decide their special relationship with us in the nuclear field prejudices their chances for entry into the European Economic Community. —Any requests the British might make for information or materials or equipment for major new programs or significant modification to existing programs would be submitted to the President. This would include the question of whether to assist the British in the development and deployment of MIRVs for their Polaris missiles or to provide additional naval nuclear propulsion information. Recommendations That we not exercise our option, by December 31, 1968, to terminate Article II of the 1958 Agreement for Cooperation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense and continue that cooperation in accordance with the conclusions stated above. If you approve, we will inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of your decisions set forth above. 3 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, UK, Vol. 14. Secret. 2 A copy of the SIG decision paper is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 344. 3 An undated memorandum for the files by Bromley Smith, attached to the memorandum, reads: “S/S Ben Read informed that by not acting, the President understood he was deciding not to exercise our option to terminate our exchange of information with the British. BKS“ Vatican Vatican 299. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 7, 1964. 300. Memorandum of Conversation Rome, October 30, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 2. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sherman on November 5. 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State Rome, February 10, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 302. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, October 3, 1965, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vatican, Vol. 1. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. 303. Entry From President Johnson’s Daily Diary New York, October 4, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary, October 4, 1965. No classification marking. A note on the diary entry reads: “Info fm briefing of Oct 4-#130-A.” The meeting was held in Suite 35A of the Waldorf Astoria. The discussion is also reported in Joseph Califano, The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson (New York, 1991), p. 72. 304. Text of Telegram From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) Washington, May 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret. The text of telegram 2696 from Rome was retyped in the White House for the President. 305. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI Washington, July 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret. 306. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. 307. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI Washington, November 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI. No classification marking. 308. Telegram From the Consulate General in Florence, Italy to the Department of State Florence, April 2, 1967, 0215Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 143. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 309. Aide-Mémoire From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI Vatican City, December 23, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1. No classification marking. In The Vantage Point, p. 379, Johnson stated that this aide-mémoire was sent to the Pope prior to their December 23 meeting (see Document 310) and that the Pope, who had a copy with him, “had read it before I arrived.” 310. Memorandum of Conversation Vatican City, December 23, 1967, 8:53-10:07 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Vatican, No classification marking. Drafted by Valenti. The meeting was held in the Pope’s office. Valenti described the meeting in A Very Human President, pp. 286-291. 311. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI Washington, June 15, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 2. No classification marking. 312. Letter From Pope Paul VI to President Johnson Vatican City, August 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI. No classification marking. 313. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, August 31, 1968, 1842Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only for the President. Received at the LBJ Ranch Communication Center at 2:25 p.m. CDT. 299. Memorandum for the Record 299. Memorandum for the Record Washington, October 7, 1964. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vatican, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 pages of source text not declassified.] 300. Memorandum of Conversation 300. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Rome, October 30, 1964. PARTICIPANTS Archbishop Angelo Dell’Acqua, Substitute for Ordinary Affairs, Secretariat of State, the Vatican The Ambassador William Sherman, First Secretary SUBJECT Pope’s Visit to India; Khrushchev’s Ouster; Italian Political Situation We called on Archbishop Dell’Acqua at our request. He apologized for not having been able to receive us sooner, but he had been briefly indisposed because of a cold which he had caught during the recent trip of the Pope to reconsecrate the Abbey at Monte Cassino 2 —a ceremony which had been virtually rained out by torrential downpours in the region. The Archbishop also added that to complicate matters his car had broken down en route to Monte Cassino and that he had had to “hitchhike” in order to get there in advance of the Pope, whose speech he was carrying. He had succeeded in making it only five minutes ahead of the Pope. Asked whether he would be accompanying the Pope on his coming visit to India, 3 the Archbishop said he believed so. He went on to comment that the Pope’s India visit would be relatively rapid and that the schedule would be extremely heavy. He said he did not understand the irritation of the Portuguese Government over the Pope’s India visit. He, of course, was quite aware of Portuguese sensitivity regarding Goa; however, the place and time of the Eucharistic Congress had been set four years ago, long before Goa became an international problem. The Pope’s visit was purely religious. He was going ostensibly to attend the Eucharistic Congress which is being held in Bombay. However, the Archbishop said the Pope regarded the trip much more as an “ecumenical gesture.” In the Pope’s mind and in the mind of the Church, the fact that he would be consecrating five bishops representing each of the five continents at the Congress, was much more important than the Congress itself. The Pope was also extremely interested in demonstrating that the Church is really the “Church of the poor” that it presents itself to be. To this end the Pope was taking a large amount of aid supplies (the majority of which had been collected and donated through the good offices of Cardinal Spellman) for distribution to the poor. It would be obviously impossible for the Pope to go to a country like India, where the problem of poverty is so great, without taking advantage of the great opportunity offered to demonstrate vividly that the Church is interested and anxious to make its contribution. In addition to Cardinal Spellman’s donations, the Pope had also received donations from many Italian firms and individuals the most recent being a gift of some 20,000 meters of lightweight cotton textiles. Certainly there was no political aspect to this visit, and for this reason the Pope was making it relatively brief and would be there no more than two days at the maximum. The Archbishop had already received a number of requests for the Pope to stop over either en route to the Congress or on his return flight to Rome in countries such as Pakistan and Lebanon. However, these had all been refused. The schedule and organization of the Pope’s visit had not been fully worked out. Monsignor Paul Marcinkus of the Secretariat of State and Monsignor Macchi, the Pope’s private secretary, would be returning from India October 31. They had been sent out to complete the arrangements for the visit. Asked whether there was any basis to the recent speculation about a possible papal visit to Santo Domingo early next year to attend an international congress on Mariology, the Archbishop said that he did not think there was any likelihood such a visit would take place. He stressed the fact that visits of this type invariably provoked requests to make visits to other places. A visit to Santo Domingo would immediately bring a request from the Philippines, from France and from other countries which would be difficult to refuse once a precedent had been established. Therefore, it was necessary to consider all such proposals extremely carefully with a view to their possible repercussions. The Archbishop said that it was extremely important, of course, to safeguard the health of the Pontiff and not to impose too heavy a burden on him. Traveling of this type was arduous and consumed valuable time which might better be spent otherwise. Questioned about the recent developments in connection with the ouster of Soviet Premier Khrushchev, 4 the Archbishop said that he was extremely worried and concerned. Although he did not think one could yet say that these developments signified the end of the process of gradual rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the West, certainly he believed that there was going to be a temporary halt. He went on to say that he did not believe Russia’s difficulties with Communist China were the primary cause of the Khrushchev ouster. He believed, rather, that the principal cause was a division of opinion on the German question. He had noted a tendency on the part of Khrushchev to move in the direction of accepting a partial solution to this outstanding problem—an attitude that was apparently unacceptable to the rest of the Soviet leadership. The Archbishop had heard, on what he believed to be fairly good authority, that Khrushchev’s son-in-law Alexei Adjubei had during his recent visit to Bonn promised Chancellor Erhard that Khrushchev would not interpose any objection toward West Berlin’s becoming a Land in the West German State. Whether or not this was true, such a development would undoubtedly raise fears among the more orthodox Russians who are still worried about a militarily powerful and united Germany. The Archbishop also said that the fact that Polish Prime Minister Gomulka had been the first of the satellite leaders to approve the Khrushchev ouster was indicative that certain commitments might have been made to Gomulka regarding Germany. Of course, the Archbishop continued, Russia had a considerable fear of China and this fear was justified. The mere fact that China’s huge population so outnumbered Russia’s was sufficient to justify this fear. Though, as a priest, he realized he should not even be thinking in these terms, the Archbishop said that if 200 million Chinese were to be wiped out, China as a political entity could still survive. If Russia were to lose 200 million people, it would no longer exist. The Archbishop did not believe that Khrushchev’s ouster, however, would resolve the Soviet Union’s problems with the Chinese. In fact, it might only make the Chinese more intransigent and demanding. They still certainly continued to claim a considerable part of the Soviet Union’s territory and were not yet backing down on any of their previous stands. The Archbishop felt sure that eventually the Soviet Union must realize its only hope is to get closer to the West. The Archbishop also expressed his concern over the possible increased influence of the military in the Soviet Union. He was dubious as to how much influence the military has in determining Soviet policy but was sure they played a role—particularly when it came to questions involving the defense and security of the Soviet Union. For this reason, any controversy concerning Germany might mean that the military would be more in the picture than otherwise. With regard to personalities, the Archbishop agreed with the Ambassador’s tentative estimate that the current Soviet leadership must be considered interim. He had a feeling that perhaps in the second phase of the post-Khrushchev period Podgorny might emerge as the principal leader. He believed that Mikoyan was perhaps too old and that Suslov had been on “too many sides of too many questions.” The Archbishop felt that one of the unfortunate facts concerning the Moscow events was that the Italian press had been completely remiss in not pointing out to the Italian people that it is a defect of the Communist system which has produced this crisis in Moscow and not faults of individual leadership. The system is the thing that is wrong. It does not provide for democratic transfer of power. Instead, the press, even the right-wing press, had concentrated on the events themselves and tendentious interpretations, rather than on their significance to Italians who are faced with the threat of a large internal Communist Party. Even the DC 5 newspaper Il Popolo had failed miserably to make this point which is so important particularly now during the pre-electoral period. It demonstrates a general lack of responsibility on the part of the press—and what was worse, a throwing away of a God-given opportunity. Along the same line, the Archbishop remarked that the government had shown great lack of foresight in scheduling the appearance of the Bolshoi Opera at Milan during the month of November. When the cultural exchange program was first agreed upon it was known that elections would presumably be held this month and, regardless of the artistic quality of the Bolshoi Opera, it was not in the interests of democracy in Italy to be showing Russian cultural achievements to enthusiastic audiences when Italians are voting. The Archbishop was, frankly, disgusted with the way the campaign for the administrative elections was shaping up. No work whatsoever has been done and there has been little or no definition of the issues involved. The DC party, as usual, was relying on the Church to do all its dirty work and doing little or nothing itself. (On the past four occasions when the Ambassador had seen Archbishop Dell’Acqua the latter has made the same complaint, i.e., that the Party expects the Church to do everything and is not prepared to carry its share of the load.) The Archbishop said the Church, nevertheless, would continue to do what it could. He said he would tell us in great confidence that it had already been decided to convene the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI) so that the Italian Bishops could make some statement concerning the elections prior to the vote on November 22. In addition, they would do all they could through Catholic Action and its subordinate organizations. He said, however, that the Church could not continue to do this indefinitely, that it was criticized constantly for taking too direct a role in Italian politics, and that the job was essentially one for the political parties and not for the Church. The Church was anxious to help, but not to assume the responsibility which was properly that of the politicians. The Archbishop continued saying the DC is now desperately weak. Although he has great respect for Mr. Moro’s intellectual and moral qualifications, he regrets that Moro never seems to be able to give the impression he is taking initiative of his own, or has a program to present to the Italian people which he intends to carry out. Instead, in whatever he does, he manages to give the impression that he has reluctantly been forced into it by pressure from somewhere else in the government or from the outside. This is precisely what the Italian people do not need. The Archbishop also was emphatic in his criticism of the left-wing Christian Democratic La Base faction which he called stupid and scandalous. Now, of all times, the Archbishop said, the DC needed a “unitary” (i.e., composed of all factions) Directorate, but both at the recent National Congress and subsequently at the National Council Meeting the constitution of such a directorate had been prevented by the La Base group. A unitary Directorate, the Archbishop believed, would not only give the DC greater bargaining power with its coalition partners but would also give the people greater confidence in the Party and in the Government. As it is, they have now only the impression of weakness. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Italy, Vol. 2. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sherman on November 5. 2 October 24. 3 The Pope planned to attend the International Eucharistic Congress December 2-5. 4 October 16. 5 The Italian Christian Democratic Party. 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1 Rome, February 10, 1965, 6 p.m. 2090. I have just received from Pope Paul through an authoritative Vatican representative the following message for the President: Begin Text : His Holiness is deeply worried over developments in Southeast Asia. He appreciates the gravity and delicacy of the situation and is gravely concerned lest it lead to general war. End Text . I asked the emissary to assure His Holiness that the message would be forwarded immediately and that he tell His Holiness of my personal conviction that despite the seriousness of the situation it would not lead to general war. We have been providing Vatican Secretariat of State with all appropriate information regarding developments in Vietnam on current basis. Reinhardt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 302. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 302. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 3, 1965, 11 a.m. Talking Points with the Pope I attach Dean Rusk’s memorandum of talking points, 2 and I will try to give a summary in this covering note. A. Points that can be on the record and reported later by Bill Moyers 1. The Pope is here to emphasize his interest in peace and in the United Nations as an instrument of peace. You and he can certainly agree with emphasis on this subject. As part of this common concern for peace, you may want to emphasize your concern for disarmament. In Bombay last December, the Pope appealed to all nations to divert part of their arms expenditure toward a world fund for relief and medical care. You may wish to say that nothing would give you greater satisfaction and that the whole effort of the United States is to move in this direction just as fast as the actions of others permit it. 2. You and the Pope can surely agree also on the value of informal personal contact like this meeting. 3. The Pope and you can certainly note that this conversation is a natural sequence to the talks which President Kennedy had with the Pope on July 2, 1963. 3 4. You and the Pope are not discussing diplomatic relations or population control or any of the specific issues for the Vatican Council 4 or the American Congress. (These are the sensitive subjects that reporters may press Bill on, and I think we would want to make an explicit denial on all of them. The one subject you might wish to hedge is population control, where Bill might turn the question and say that you and the Pope obviously expressed concern for improving the lot of the hungry and the poor in every nation.) B. Off-the-record Points 1. It is of great importance to impress the Pope with our passion for peace in Vietnam, and everywhere else. There have been faint indications that not all Vatican circles are persuaded on this point. 2. I think you will want to express your appreciation to the Pope for his prompt and effective help in specific situations in Santo Domingo and in Saigon. Archbishop Clarizio in Santo Domingo, and two successive Papal Nuncios in Saigon, have been very helpful to us in tight political situations, and this has been the direct result of the sympathetic interest of His Holiness. We are grateful. 3. You may wish to speak to the Pope about the Alliance for Progress and emphasize the importance which progressive Catholic efforts can have in this area. Some of our people think that the church has been a shade less progressive in Latin America under Pope Paul, and a word from you would be helpful if you think it wise. 4. Our Jewish friends would be grateful if they could be told afterwards that you have expressed appreciation to His Holiness for the efforts of the Vatican Council on the “Jewish guilt” question. 5 The present situation is that the Council will have before it both last year’s relatively progressive declaration, and an amended version which is slightly less desirable from the Jewish point of view. We will certainly not wish to choose up sides on this one, and Lee White tells me that the fundamental point is that the Council is dealing with the matter at all. (If time presses, it might be simpler to avoid this very complex subject. Many of the Pope’s people will be edgy about any comment at all from Americans.) 5. Cardinal Mindszenty. 6 Properly speaking, the Pope should raise this one, since we are doing a lot for the Cardinal. If he does, you may wish to underline urgently the fact that it really is time for the Cardinal to be removed from our Legation in Budapest. Only the Pope can do it—and even he will have trouble. Since you and Bill Moyers are much better judges than I of exactly what should be said after this meeting, I have not attempted a press briefing paper. Instead, I have given Bill and Jack Valenti copies so that they will know the diplomatic background as I understand it. McG. B. 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vatican, Vol. 1. No classification marking. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. 2 Not printed. 3 No record of this conversation was found. 4 The Second Vatican Council, dedicated to “modernization” (aggiornamento) of the doctrine and structures of the Roman Catholic Church, had been in session in Rome since 1963. 5 The Council rejected the concept of “Jewish guilt” and condemned anti-Semitism in its “Declaratio de Libertate Religiosa ‘Dignitas Humanae’,” approved December 8, 1965. 6 See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Documents 100 ff. 7 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 303. Entry From President Johnson’s Daily Diary 303. Entry From President Johnson’s Daily Diary 1 New York, October 4, 1965. The President and the Pope met for more than an hour in the President’s quarters on the 35th floor. The Pope arrived at 12:40 pm accompanied by the Papal Secy of State, Cardinal Giovanni Cicognani. They were met at the door of the suite by the President, the Vice President and the Secy of State, Dean Rusk. After an exchange of greetings, the President and the Pope walked into the sitting room for their private conversation, which lasted from 12:42 until 1:28. They were joined in the room by Monsignor Paul Marcinkus, Secy in the office of the Vatican Secretariat of State, who interpreted for the Pope and Mr. Jose DeSeabra of the US Dept of State, who interpreted for the President. The room in which they met and conversed is in English and French decor, with a deep blue rug bordered by a red design. There were arrangements of yellow and white roses and yellow and orange mums. The draperies are in gold and white satin damask. There are four paintings in the room, which remain there, and appropriately, two of them were neopolitan scenes and two were pastoral scenes, one by Francis Wheately and one by William James Muller, entitled “The View At Gillingham.” The President expressed his appreciation to the Pope for making so long and arduous a trip, at the sacrifice of his own personal convenience, to provide spiritual leadership in the quest for peace. They reviewed various trouble spots in the world, they discussed specific means of achieving peace through programs of health and education on a world-wide basis; they exchanged comments on the question of race relations. His Holiness expressed his personal appreciation and, also speaking as head of his Church, gratitude for the President’s and this nation’s progress in the field of civil rights. The President said all the strong leaders of and supporters of justice in this country were quite heartened by the recent appointment of a Negro Bishop in this country. The President discussed his visit in 1962 with Pope John XXIII. 2 He told His Holiness of the significance that visit had had for him in making him realize, in a very difficult and distressed period, that peace is possible. They discussed the UN at some length. The President said that it is his opinion that the Pope’s visit constituted a very strong expression of support for what the UN can accomplish. The President noted the recent resurgence of strength on the part of the United Nations, and said that at this particular time this unusual and unprecedented visit by the Pontiff will be a significant milestone, not only in the life of the United Nations, but in the overriding and overall quest for peace on the part of all nations. They discussed the UN as a place where men can meet to resolve their differences. They talked at some length on the programs of the US Govt and the interest of the Church in deep and continuing effort to get at the roots of poverty, illiteracy and disease. The President discussed the Alliance for Progress in that regard, and its objectives in Latin America. His Holiness pointed out that the Church, too, in Latin America was committed to the cause of justice and progress and social improvement. It was at this point that His Holiness pointed out to the President his personal and his Church’s regard for the way in which the President and this gov’t were not simply talking about ways of improving the lot of people, but were actually in a vigorous and forceful way moving ahead to achieve these objectives. The President mentioned at this point in the discussion on education that he was aware of the Church’s great interest in education, not only in a general way but in a personal way, through Luci’s studies at Georgetown in Washington. The President said “I am thoroughly familiar with her education. She keeps me informed.” The Pope spoke very eloquently on this point and said that the Church’s interest and the interest of the American people in improving the lot of people everywhere, not only spiritually but physically, was indeed a common objective. Again, they reviewed the significance of this visit, the historic nature of it. The President said that he was stimulated and inspired by the visit of the Pope. They underscored consistently throughout their conversation the larger topic of peace and what both Church and State can do to achieve this objective. The Pres. thanked His Holiness for coming. The Pope responded by saying that he was very grateful to the President for making possible this visit today in New York. The Pope said that he hoped the President would continue with all of the optimism and energy at his command to work for peace. Pope said—when men of the spirit look to men of public affairs for guidance, it is men like the President who serve the world, not only with ideas but with action. 1 Source: Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary, October 4, 1965. No classification marking. A note on the diary entry reads: “Info fm briefing of Oct 4-#130-A.” The meeting was held in Suite 35A of the Waldorf Astoria. The discussion is also reported in Joseph Califano, The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B. Johnson (New York, 1991), p. 72. 2 Vice President Johnson visited Rome September 5, 1962, at the conclusion of a Middle East trip. 304. Text of Telegram From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) 304. Text of Telegram From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) 1 Washington, May 3, 1966. TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (Rome, 2696) I was received for almost an hour this morning by Pope Paul. I found the Pope brilliant and extremely interested and concerned about Vietnam developments. He seems deeply to appreciate my calling on him. The Pope told me he had received Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on April 27 privately and informally. He had asked Gromyko about persecution of Catholics in the Soviet Union, particularly Georgia, Latvia, etc., and Gromyko had replied, predictably, that there was absolute religious freedom in the USSR. The Pope told Gromyko there had been no “Latin” priest in Moscow since 1940 and asked about the possibilities of assigning one. Gromyko could not reply. The Pope showed me a complete account in English of his conversation with Gromyko which he promised to send Ambassador Reinhardt. 2 At the Pope’s request, I gave a full situation briefing on Vietnam in the light of the President’s April 22 press conference. 3 The Pope was specially interested in the breakdown of political alignments, particularly in Buddhist support of Tri Quang. 4 I gave my views, of which the Department has already been exhaustively informed. I explained that some of the program—military and revolutionary development—had begun to go quite well. This had impelled some politically ambitious men, headed by Tri Quang, and taking advantage of the relief of General Thi, to work for a change of government. The Communists, in turn, had taken advantage of this. We faced a situation at once dangerous and evolutionary. It was still true, I believed, that if the Vietnamese were given something first rate—land reform and education, for example—that they would fight to defend it. But stability, as we know it in the West, did not seem likely. The Pope asked whether there was any possible productive demarche towards Hanoi which had not been made. I said the U.S. Government had several open channels to Hanoi, particularly through the International Control Commission, which is in Hanoi every month. To my surprise, the Pope was uninformed of the activities of the International Control Commission. I stressed the importance of the International Control Commission channel, particularly through the Canadian representative. I said that in view of Canadian ICC member Seaborn’s intelligence and immense political sensitivity, I was confident Hanoi was accurately and fully informed of U.S. Government views and positions. I said the problem is not lack of channels to Hanoi but simply Hanoi’s lack of desire for peace. The North Vietnamese believe they will win not due to American military weakness, but because Hanoi believes the U.S. Government lacks the will to win. Hanoi interprets appeals for peace as signs of weakness, largely due to the Oriental mentality with a Communist overlay. Thus, such appeals could actually lengthen the war. The Pope seemed impressed and understanding that the real problem was a lack of Hanoi’s desire for peace rather than a lack of channels of communication. The Pope was impressed by the thought that, should the U.S. withdraw, South Vietnam would fall into Communist hands, thus giving Hanoi a diplomatic and political victory which they could not have achieved by military means. I said one form of a cease fire would be to abandon the bombing in North Vietnam in return for a cessation of ground aggression in the South. No honest or complete cease fire could be achieved unless accompanied by a verified withdrawal. The Pope said he found this concept of a cease fire particularly interesting. Following the Papal audience, I paid a brief and cordial courtesy call on Secretary of State Cicognani. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret. The text of telegram 2696 from Rome was retyped in the White House for the President. 2 No record of this discussion was found. 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 441-446. 4 For documentation on the Buddhist anti-government protest in the spring of 1966 and the role of Tri Quang, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume IV . 305. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 305. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 1 Washington, July 7, 1966. Your Holiness: You have, I know, been following with prayerful concern the course of events in Vietnam and the efforts we have been making to bring to an end through peaceful means the tragic hostilities there. I want to assure you that we have explored every avenue, responded to every offer, and followed every lead that held out any hope that this tragic conflict might be settled at the conference table. Our efforts have so far been in vain. The South Vietnamese have, instead, been subjected to intensified infiltration from the North, and I have therefore had to make painful decisions to counter this by intensified air strikes. The steps we chose were carefully limited, and I have seen to it that every precaution was taken to keep to an absolute minimum the damage to civilians and to non-military property. I want personally to assure you that these steps were taken only after the most searching review and assessment of all of the factors involved and only after determining that such action was required by the circumstances. You are fully aware of my desire to end the conflict in Vietnam as quickly as possible. I can only hope that the leaders in Hanoi are beginning to realize that their aggression cannot succeed. At the same time, let me reaffirm the determination I expressed to you in my letter of December 29 2 that I will never cease my exertions until an honorable peace has been achieved in that troubled part of the world. I shall continue the search for a negotiated settlement without conditions. As Ambassador Goldberg, who will deliver this letter to you, told the members of the United Nations Security Council on June 30, 3 we will continue to press for a peaceful solution either through reconvening the Geneva Conference or in some other forum. I deeply appreciate your own efforts to bring peace to Vietnam. We share this goal, which must be the ultimate goal of all men of good will. 4 Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret. 2 The text was transmitted in telegram 1363 to Rome, December 29, 1965. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) 3 No record of the speech was found. The Security Council did not meet that day. A June 30 letter to the President of the Security Council outlining U.S. positions is in Department of State, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Subject Files, Reel 326, Frame 45. 4 In a July 9 reply, Pope Paul expressed thanks for the President’s letter and urged him to make all possible diplomatic efforts to secure an end to the conflict. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1) 306. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 306. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 13, 1966. SUBJECT Possible Diplomatic Relations with the Vatican Thomas Patrick Melady’s memoranda of October 3 and 5 are attached. 2 In these memos, Melady describes the activities of the Vatican’s permanent observer to the UN and recommends the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. You asked for a brief rundown of pros and cons on the latter point. Pros: 1. Increasingly the Vatican is an active force, pressing for peace negotiations in Vietnam. Diplomatic relations with the Vatican would better coordinate with such initiatives as the Holy See might wish to make. Ambassador Goldberg has visited the Vatican twice. 3 Each visit has been accompanied by extensive publicity. Most confidentially, a member of the Curia expressed concern after the second visit that this highly publicized consultation could create problems for the Vatican’s public stance of impartiality. A regular mission would facilitate quiet diplomacy. 2. Relations with the Vatican would strengthen America’s world-wide peace image. It would be a demonstration of America’s concern for the moral opinion of mankind. 3. Relations would remove the anomaly of the United States, along with the Soviet Union and Red China, being among the very few powers which fail to maintain relations. 4. With the increasing ecumenical spirit in American Protestantism, relations with the Vatican would have considerable support among the Protestant churches associated with the National Council (although not with the Southern Baptists and fundamentalists). 5. Recognition would be welcomed by American Catholics as an important step, taken by a Protestant President, and the removal of a long-standing and senseless indignity. 6. Relations with the Vatican would facilitate cooperation in matters like the Cardinal Mindszenty case. There is no doubt that the Vatican is involved in political situations throughout the world where the United States interests are deeply affected. 7. The Vatican would be a source of information about conditions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. We would have access to one of the important diplomatic capitals of the world. (However, the usefulness of the Vatican as a systematic source of intelligence should not be overestimated. We would not be plugging into a world-wide intelligence net.) 8. The President’s decision would be historic, a landmark among the overall accomplishments of this Administration. After November, the President may be in as good a position to take this act as any American President for a long time to come. Cons: 1. The prospect of political opposition in the South and border states remains. This opposition might be concentrated among elements where white backlash is already at work. The ratio of noise to numbers would be inordinately high. 2. We already have channels of discreet communication with the Vatican—through the apostolic delegate here and through Ambassador Reinhardt in Rome. We have made good progress normalizing these relationships and the religious issue has been quiescent. There is something to be said for not stirring it up. 3. Although the Vatican reaction to the establishment of relations would no doubt be highly favorable, such a move at this time might also reduce the Vatican’s posture of impartiality in the Cold War. 4. A Cardinal expressed the private view not long ago that US-Vatican relations might be “against the trend of history”, in the sense that—since Pope John’s accession—the Holy See has been moving away from temporal and political involvement to a more spiritual role. 5. While the American hierarchy would be publicly delighted, a few of them might be less enthusiastic in private. The apostolic delegate is presently accredited to the American hierarchy and diplomatic relations might downgrade the hierarchy’s central position in American-Vatican relationships. 6. The assumption by a U.S. mission of responsibility for arranging approximately 65,000 Papal audiences a year might be a practical—and political—inconvenience. Now the North American College takes most of the heat. It might amuse you to know that the U.S. Government never severed relations with the Papal States. Congress merely cut off the money for the mission a century ago. The U.S. is still listed in the Vatican Year Book (with a blank after it). On foreign policy grounds, I think the arguments in favor of relations are the stronger. N.D. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vatican, Vol. 1. Secret; Limdis. 2 Attached but not printed. Melady was chairman of the Department of Afro-Asian Studies at Seton Hall University. 3 December 29, 1965, and July 9, 1966. 307. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 307. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 1 Washington, November 30, 1966. Your Holiness: Upon his return from Rome, my friend, James Rowe, flew here to my ranch in Texas to report to me on his discussion with you at the Audience you so graciously consented to give him at my request despite the short notice. 2 For the sentiments you expressed to him I am most grateful and appreciative. I feel also it would have been far better for the cause of World Peace had the United States been able to announce it would accept a Christmas Truce in response to the request of Your Holiness. We would then have been responding to the moral suggestion of the Leader of World Peace. Unfortunately, as you now know, the North Vietnamese Government for its own propaganda purposes—and, I desperately hope, a little because of its war weariness—publicly offered a Christmas Truce a few days ago. Because of the propaganda implications, my Government has felt it must acknowledge and accept the Truce as soon as possible. We were thus unable to make the arrangements as to time which you had discussed with Mr. Rowe. As soon as I reached this decision that we had to respond promptly to the public offer of North Viet-Nam I directed my Government to inform the Vatican in advance. I want to assure Your Holiness once again that I bow to no one in my sincere and deep desire for peace. I will make any effort, take any step and go any place which will advance the cause of a just peace. This I think Your Holiness knows, just as you understand so well that in the struggle over Viet-Nam the United States is not the aggressor. Again let me thank you for your graciousness and kindness to me. I am particularly grateful for your prayers, and I ask that you continue to pray for me. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI. No classification marking. 2 No record of this request was found. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates that President Johnson signed the original. 308. Telegram From the Consulate General in Florence, Italy to the Department of State 308. Telegram From the Consulate General in Florence, Italy to the Department of State 1 Florence, April 2, 1967, 0215Z. 199. Vipto 50. For the President and Secretary of State. From the Vice President. I met alone with Pope Paul VI for more than one hour on April 1. I expressed the good wishes of President Johnson. The Pope responded warmly and expressed personal admiration for the President. He went on to speak of the President as a man of peace and exhibited considerable concern over the President’s heavy burdens due to the war in Vietnam. Later on in the conversation, as we were discussing the new Papal encyclical, 2 he spoke of the President’s social program. He was well aware of the domestic legislation of the Great Society. He said he wanted to be remembered to the President’s family, that he often prayed for him, and wanted to help him. Vietnam: The Pope said that in his meeting with Podgorny, 3 he had told the Soviet President that he (the Pope) knew President Johnson to be serious and sincere in his desire to obtain an honorable peace in Vietnam. The Pope went on to say that with a number of foreign visitors he had expressed his faith in President Johnson and in our efforts to bring the war in Vietnam to a peaceful solution. He indicated that Podgorny gave no negative response but seemed to accept the sincerity and integrity of the Pope’s statement. Pope Paul is still concerned over the bombing of the north. He said he fully recognized that the roadblocks to peace were Hanoi and, he thought, China. He knew that we wanted peace and never hesitates to say so. Nevertheless, he did feel that the bombing of the north was eroding America’s moral position. (At this point I asked the Pope if it was all right if I made a note because I wanted to put down in accurate substance what he had to say.) He said the United States has a great mission in the world—not merely the mission of defense of small nations or the mission of diplomacy to protect nations, but of equal importance a moral mission, a mission of demonstrating what a free society can do, a mission of showing how people of different races and creeds can live together in peace and justice. He spoke at some length about the moral position of the United States and the all importance of that moral position being maintained without blemish. And it was at this point that he returned to his concern over the bombing in North Vietnam. Public opinion, he said, was against us on the bombing, and this was particularly true in Europe. I explained to the Pope our bombing pauses. I explained to him that we were prepared to stop the bombing again if we could get any indication of a sincere desire on the part of Hanoi to negotiate. I pointed out that the bombing gave us something to bargain with in peace negotiations. I said that, when we had stopped the bombing, it had permitted North Vietnam to rearm and strengthen her forces at great loss to our men. I pointed out that even when President Johnson had said in his letter to Ho that we would stop the bombing, 4 the Communists had rejected the offer. His Holiness admitted that North Vietnam appeared unwilling to talk peace, but he still felt that the bombing cost us more in world opinion and moral leadership than it was worth militarily. He qualified his statement by saying that he was not a military man and of course was unable to properly judge military matters. Then the Pope discussed with me what other leaders have talked about: namely, the unbelievably bad press and news coverage that America receives in Europe and elsewhere. He said that it saddened him and that he had a heavy heart for America because the only news was about American killing and bombing. He went on to say he knew that Americans were doing many good things and it was at this point that I told him that I had brought along a book entitled “The Other War” and a second pamphlet, “The Search for Peace.” I presented a copy of each to the Pope. He was very grateful. He made a point that is worth special attention. He said that very few people in Europe knew anything about what Hanoi and the Viet Cong were doing, that seldom were the cruel attacks of the Viet Cong mentioned in the press or on TV except concerning U.S.-VC direct engagement. America appears to be the aggressor. He said he knew that was not true but that it appears to the person looking at television, listening to the radio and reading the newspapers that big, strong America is being brutal and cruel. He went on to point out that all the news about America in Vietnam came from American sources. He asked this question: Why doesn’t the government in Saigon be the spokesman for South Vietnam? Why does America have to be the spokesman? Why doesn’t Premier Ky speak up about wanting American help, praising American help, and telling what American help means to South Vietnam? Why don’t some of the allies speak up, such as the Philippines or the Australians? In other words, why does all the news have to be the United States doing the talking? This kind of situation leaves the big United States looking like a bully against little North Vietnam. And no one seems to know anything that the Government of South Vietnam is doing. The Pope said that the Government of South Vietnam has very poor public relations. I went on to tell him that it was inevitable that the U.S. press and news services would primarily center their attention on U.S. activities. The Pope said that it would be better for even the military announcements to be made by the South Vietnamese spokesmen, and surely all of the social improvement announcements should come from South Vietnam—at least to the European audience. He was very concerned over this matter and told me at least three times, that I recall, how important it was for us to play down our role and for South Vietnamese spokesmen to be the voice of free Vietnam. I told the Pope of President Johnson’s visit to Guam—the emphasis upon social action programs. I emphasized the importance of Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, and Bob Komer going to Vietnam. 5 I reviewed with the Pope Ambassador Bunker’s role as a diplomat. He knew Ellsworth Bunker, thought well of him but was pleased to have my assessment. Pope Paul said several times: Don’t give up. Don’t tire of your tasks. He made it clear that he was not opposed to our being in South Vietnam. He thought we were doing what was right, just as we needed to be in Europe to help with the defense of Europe. But he was afraid that we might tire in terms of our moral commitment; in other words, we might bow to the pressure of using naked strength rather than being tolerant, patient, and ever searching for peace. The Pope asked if there was anything he could do to be helpful. He repeatedly volunteered his services to us. He said that if I had any message to give to him at any time, he would be pleased to receive it as indeed he would be honored to receive any message from the President. Finally, I suggested to the Pope that since it was Hanoi who was blocking peace, it would be very helpful to us if on several appropriate occasions he could indicate in some of his messages or statements that Hanoi was causing the continuation of this painful struggle. He said he would do so, but he would have to do it in a moral and spiritual manner and not become too political, whatever this meant. Then he went on to say he thought civilian leaders in other countries ought to speak up on this issue of the reluctance of Hanoi to seek peace. I told him of my conversations with Nenni and Saragat 6 where I had asked these two left-of-center political leaders to get other Social Democrats and Socialists to demand that Hanoi come to the peace table. I reminded the Pope that the United States was always being criticized both at home and abroad, and that I sincerely felt that one of the reasons Hanoi did not come to the peace table was because no real pressure had been brought to bear on her. All the criticism was being heaped on the U.S. and, as long as this continued, Hanoi felt no moral responsibility and felt no pressure of adverse public opinion. He said he would speak to leaders who came to him about this. Papal Encyclical: His Holiness said he knew that parts of his encyclical were controversial, but that it represented the long study and commitment of the Church. He well recalled President Johnson’s statements relating to the war on hunger and foreign aid. The Pope gave me a copy of his encyclical as written in Latin and personally autographed. He went through it section by section, seeking my comment. I am sure we have a friend here but, more importantly, I am positive that he is a great man—not only brilliant but compassionate, and one who has a broad knowledge of the forces at work in the world today. I mentioned to the Pope, as I did later on to Cardinal Cicognani, of President Johnson’s commitment to Latin America, the coming trip to Punta del Este, 7 and the importance that we attach to the summit conference. I brought Latin America into the discussion during the time that we were reviewing the encyclical. The Pope was very pleased with the President’s leadership on the Latin American matter. I was greatly impressed with the sincerity of this man and his obvious friendship for Americans and the United States. He spoke well of President Johnson’s efforts to secure better relationships with Eastern Europe. He encouraged continued efforts by ourselves and the Western European countries to this end. Wheeler 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 143. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 2 Popularum Progressorum , issued March 28. 3 January 29. 4 Reference is to a letter delivered February 8 offering to end the bombing of the North and stop further increase in U.S. troop levels in South Vietnam in exchange for an end to North Vietnamese infiltration into the South. See Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. V, Document 32 . 5 Reference is to Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Deputy Ambassador Eugene Locke, and Robert Komer, Deputy to General Westmoreland with the personal rank of Ambassador. 6 See Document 128 . 7 April 12-14. 309. Aide-Mémoire From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 309. Aide-Mémoire From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 1 Vatican City, December 23, 1967. I come to you on the eve of Christmas to discuss the best route to peace in Vietnam, and to explore your thoughts on this subject. You have offered “unarmed cooperation in the reestablishment of true peace.” 2 I accept that offer with eagerness and an open heart. His Holiness has eloquently expressed the yearning felt by all humanity for peace in Vietnam. My government and people share that yearning. We know it is shared, too, by the people of South Vietnam—and indeed by all men, except a handful of fanatics in a few capitals. Let me express my views on a course of action that has been frequently suggested in recent months. It is said that the United States should once again unilaterally stop the bombing of North Vietnam, with the hope that, somehow, that act of self-denial—together with the pressure of men of good will around the world—might bring the leaders of Hanoi to enter into serious negotiations for a peaceful settlement. My country has tried this path before. I would not exclude the possibility that it may again appear wise at some point. However, I am bound to say that two factors lead me to a position of the gravest doubt and reserve at the present time. The first factor is, that such action would cost the lives of many men now fighting against aggression. In every case in the past, cessation of the bombing has been used by the other side to accelerate the movement of supplies and men to the South. For example, in the 37 day pause of 1965-66, I was told by representatives of the Soviet Union that if I could hold a pause for from 12 to 20 days, a serious move to negotiations might result. Their judgment proved wrong. Nevertheless, I extended the pause to thrice 12 days. The United States received at the end what can only be described as a brutal diplomatic rebuff. A year ago we worked for three months, through various diplomatic channels, to make the Tet season an occasion for the transition from war to peace. The result was a massive exploitation of that pause by North Vietnam. The forces just above the demilitarized zone were re-supplied. This, in turn, laid the groundwork for a strategy of exerting pressure on the South by violating the demilitarized zone. We suffered great costs from their bad faith during 1967, and we have reason to believe that bad faith will be revived when the weather in that region improves. Your Holiness, I have just today come from Vietnam. My responsible commanders in the field tell me that the North Vietnamese are at this moment taking steps to exploit even the very short pauses agreed to for Christmas, New Year’s and Tet. My first reason, then, for rejecting the road of unilateral action and hope for a measured response, is that our experience and current intelligence tell me an increased price will be paid in the blood of my men. But the second factor is even more important. It is my fear that, if Hanoi is free to—and believes it can—improve its military position through a bombing cessation, any talks that might result would be sterile and dilatory on Hanoi’s part. The result might well be a step away from peace rather than toward it. These judgments could change as a result of some new sign from Hanoi along the lines I have suggested recently in a San Antonio speech 3 and several other public addresses. His Holiness should be aware, in confidence, that the suggestions made at that time have been diligently explored through authentic contacts with Hanoi. They have been rebuffed both privately and publicly. I regret to report that Hanoi’s present position only reinforces the concerns I have stated above. I have tried repeatedly to interest Hanoi in the possibility of talks, either without conditions, or with the kind of limited unilateral reduction in bombing activity that my government attempted from late December of 1966 through early April of 1967. But there has been no useful response to these suggestions, which indeed go back over a long period. Thus, I have been inclined in the last few months to look increasingly toward what might be achieved in the search for peace within South Vietnam itself. It is this in particular that I wish to discuss with His Holiness. The question, of course, involves the so-called National Liberation Front and those individuals now associated with it. I am inclined to make a sharp distinction between these two. On the one hand, we appear to be seeing today a subtle propaganda offensive designed to depict the Front as independent of Hanoi, and as having a position that might contribute to an honorable peace. As to the Front’s independence, a great deal of evidence over many years has convinced me that, as an organization, it is, quite simply, an instrument of Hanoi. As to the Front’s program, including the new version issued in September and recently circulated at the United Nations, I find myself deeply skeptical that it offers a reasonable peace. On the contrary, the program appears to call for a coalition government in South Vietnam, in which the Front would control the levers of power—and, in short order, the whole political structure. Documents captured recently in South Vietnam, and of undoubted authenticity, contain instructions identical to those under which Communist Parties operated in certain Eastern European countries after the Second World War, with tragic results. Again in confidence, I must report that authentic contacts within the past month—with sources intimately familiar with Hanoi and the Front—have produced frank statements that support this gloomy interpretation. Yet, on the other hand, I believe a situation is evolving within South Vietnam that may, at some point, produce real possibilities of movement toward peace through political contacts—not with the Front as an organization, but with individuals now associated with the Front. I referred to this possibility in my television conversation earlier this week. For every reason, I believe such contacts must be primarily the affair of the South Vietnamese government. And, without easy optimism or hopes for immediate success, this is the path that I am inclined to pursue at the present time. I believe many thoughtful South Vietnamese, including members of the government of South Vietnam, take the same view. President Thieu and I discussed it in Canberra a few days ago. Although he is understandably cautious, I believe he desires to be constructive if real possibilities should open up. The South Vietnamese are concerned, as talk increases about a solution between Saigon and the “NLF”, that a highly organized Communist minority, operating as a popular front, might defeat the large—and presently fragmented—non-Communist majority in a political battle. In the light of these views, I believe it important that our influence on the South Vietnamese be exercised in two directions. First, we should encourage the South Vietnamese to find a solution in South Vietnam, understanding all the while the extreme delicacy of the question of “recognizing” the NLF. I believe President Thieu’s formula is useful. He has said that he will talk “informally” with “members” of the NLF. Leading anti-Communist figures in South Vietnam, including President Thieu and the newly elected president of the South Vietnamese Senate, Nguyen Van Huyen, for example, might be encouraged to look in this direction. For peace will require some form of reconciliation among those who live their lives in that country. Peace can best be achieved by South Vietnamese, for South Vietnam, in South Vietnam. Second, I believe those who have some influence in South Vietnam must encourage the South Vietnamese to organize the great anti-Communist majority into some sort of effective national political coalition. As I look ahead, it seems to me inevitable that some day the Communists, having abandoned war, will seek power in South Vietnam through political means. Those who have resisted Communism on the battlefield must be prepared to resist it at the polls. The continued fragmentation of the vast non-Communist majority could result in a tragedy which would render fruitless all the courage and suffering that have gone into the struggle so far. It would be good if Your Holiness’ influence in South Vietnam, as well as mine and all others who can help, could continue to be used to help overcome the inherited factionalism of South Vietnamese political life so that this gallant but suffering people could face their political future with confidence and with the knowledge that the Communists would not be capable of defeating them at the ballot box. If these thoughts conform to your own knowledge and insight, you could, in your New Year’s statement on the Day of Peace, speak directly to the South Vietnamese. You could urge those now working with the Viet Cong to abandon the dream of conquering their country through terror and aggression. You could urge them to turn to the path of national reconciliation; and you could call on those who now fight in this little country to turn their thoughts and energies to the needs of the people. I should also like to call Your Holiness’ attention to a matter of intense concern to the American people. I refer to the fate and welfare of American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam. We have just learned that Christmas packages sent to the men by their families in America have been rejected and returned by Hanoi. Mail to and from the prisoners has been severely limited. Requests by the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit the prisoners have been repeatedly rebuffed by North Vietnam, nor has a list of names of prisoners been provided. These are all basic rights of prisoners of war stated in the Geneva Convention, to which North Vietnam has adhered. Your Holiness might be willing to offer to send a representative to North Vietnam, and to talk with the government there about the condition of the prisoners. I feel sure the government of South Vietnam would willingly agree to a visit by your representatives to prisoners in the South. On the eve of Christmas, when Christians—and men of other faiths—are touched by a divine spirit, I have come round the world to ask your help—and to pledge that I shall not cease to struggle for a stable and honorable peace. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 1. No classification marking. In The Vantage Point, p. 379, Johnson stated that this aide-mémoire was sent to the Pope prior to their December 23 meeting (see Document 310 ) and that the Pope, who had a copy with him, “had read it before I arrived.” 2 Reference is to the Pope’s December 8 statement welcoming announcement of a bombing pause in Vietnam. 3 For text of the President’s September 10 speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 876-881. 310. Memorandum of Conversation 310. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Vatican City, December 23, 1967, 8:53-10:07 p.m. After asking about each other’s health, the following dialogue took place. President: I was impressed with the December statement of his Holiness and of his recent reply to the College of Cardinals. 2 The Holy Father and I think very much alike on many issues. I have just come from Australia where I talked with practically all the leaders of the Asian world. 3 We feel we are ready to stop the fighting immediately but we can’t stop just half a war; we must stop it all. Hanoi has great problems but they believe the U.S. will tire and fail just like France did—and then they can win by default what they lost on the battlefield. We are being extremely careful not to widen the war by bringing in China and Russia. One half of our people want to do more. Twenty percent of our people want to pull out. Thirty percent follow the moderate course of the President—thus 80 percent of the U.S. either follows the President or wants to do more. Twenty percent make all the noise and mislead Hanoi into believing we will give up. So I have this problem of keeping the pressure on without widening a war. My right hand keeps the pressure steady and with my left hand we seek negotiations. Here it seems is where the Holy Father can play a great part. Pope: I want the President to know that I have not only given counsel to South Vietnam but I have scolded the North for not making moves toward peace. President: I think your statements have been fair and just. I want to express the hope that with President Thieu and the new Senate President the Holy Father may be able to persuade them to begin informal talks with some of those associated with the NLF. Ultimately South Vietnam must settle its problems in South Vietnam—a settlement on the basis of one man—one vote constitutional government. Then the U.S. can come home just as we did in Europe and in Asia and spend the money we are expending on war on education, health, and all the other needs of our people. (At this point the President gave to the Pope and to Cardinal Cicognani copies of a proposed press release dealing with this conference. The Pope objected to a line near the end of the release which said “We will never surrender South Vietnam to aggression or attack.” The Pope said that if this line were in the release it would appear that the Pope was endorsing war. 4 The conversation resumed.) Pope: I am grateful for your visit and also your sentiments and your work in behalf of peace. I will never forget our conversation in New York. 5 The five points that you outlined before you left on your trip were very good. I understand very well the situation of the U.S. today. You went to South Vietnam to protect and defend a small country and now you are engaged in a great war. We must declare our own position to the world as friends of peace and foes of war. I must differentiate my position from yours although I very clearly understand your good intentions and your good hopes. I want to further the solidarity of my agreement with your intentions but you must understand I can never agree to war. Perhaps the methods you are now using will not arrive at your expected goal. North Vietnam will not cease its activities—especially when it has great powers supporting it. I do not believe the war will end but I do believe that its character can change, becoming a defensive rather than an offensive one. President: Does His Holiness believe that Soviet Russia wants this war to continue? Pope: It is difficult to say but when Podgorny was here he told me that Russia would never abandon the cause of North Vietnam. I tried to convince him that this was the proper time to collaborate with the U.S. in peace moves but I received negative results. Is there some way the U.S. could give an impression of a change in the character of this war to gain world favor? I am hurt and saddened that the U.S. moral position is injured by world opinion. In talking with Vice President Humphrey 6 I reminded him that the U.S. has great missions that it performs as the guardian of freedom. Your Great Society programs are applauded. But the Vietnam episode colors all this. What can I do to come to your aid? We will continue to preach peace and to be witness to your good intentions. Might it be possible for the U.S. to give new examples of its generosity? I have received messages from great personages of the world to plead with you to stop the bombing. The Church cannot give its approval to bombing as a means of defending liberty. Is there anybody that we can contact as an intermediary—the only one we know is the Commission and that is very weak. Can I be an intermediary for you—I could say that I know that what the U.S. says is true—that it truly wants peace. Can you give me your assurances of this? President: Yes, of course, and this statement that we have read says it too. Cardinal Cicognani: But Hanoi refuses to talk. How can we overcome this? President: We have stopped bombing five times but this only increases the murder. Now we are hopeful that South Vietnam and representatives of the NLF can talk and settle their differences locally. Pope: May I say this to the Russians: I have discussed all of this with President Johnson and he wants very much to stop this war. What will you do? May I say this to the Russians and use your name? President: Yes. What you would be saying is essentially what the Aide-Mémoire 7 says but of course we both agree that the Aide-Mémoire should not be made public. Kosygin told me at Glassboro 8 that he had word if the U.S. stopped the bombing, negotiations could get started. We said that we would stop the bombing if talks would get started. He said that he would talk to North Vietnam. When we received no word from him, we asked our Ambassador to press him for some kind of report. Finally Kosygin said “You are still bombing and nothing can be done.” Thus he slammed the door on us. We believe that he talked to North Vietnam and they told him no. We never publicized this. When Kosygin met earlier with Wilson, 9 he said he wanted to get talks started but North Vietnam said no then also. We know that China and Russia are supporting and will continue to support Hanoi. We think the Russians would like the hostilities to stop because they don’t want a confrontation. But I am not sure of this. Pope: Unhappily, the U.S. is more exposed to propaganda than the Russians are. Please continue these appeals. Patience is needed. Everything you do for peace I will support. President: Hanoi is simply not going to the conference table because Hanoi believes they will win this war in Washington. It will take a long time to prove but I am convinced the best avenue available to us now is in the South—talks informally between the Thieu government and representatives of the NLF. Pope: Your suggestion for South Vietnam is good. I will encourage it. President: It seems to me that if South Vietnam’s government would more or less leave us and talk informally with the NLF—and thereby the NLF leave Hanoi—this could be a way for South Vietnam to settle its own fate and have Hanoi and the U.S. pull away. Pope: This is all very good but it will take time. President: We must begin. It would be very useful if the Pope through his sources in South Vietnam could persuade Thieu and others to talk to the NLF informally. Anything the Holy Father can do to encourage this will be very beneficial. This would be one effective way of disengaging the NLF from Hanoi—and South Vietnam from us. I am also very hopeful the Pope will send a representative to see our prisoners in North Vietnam and to see the prisoners being held in South Vietnam. Hanoi is ignoring and violating the Geneva convention prisoner rules. If the Pope can call on both sides to accord just and humane treatment to prisoners and ask for permission to visit both sides, we would be willing to open our doors immediately. Pope: I urge you to have patience and perseverance in seeking peace. I believe it important for you to give new aspects to this war—to make it a more defensive war instead of an offensive war. It will strengthen your moral position in the world. You are now being accused of being unjust. You can make the same propaganda yourself by changing the war. (At this point the President went over the press release again with the Pope. The President said that he would strike the sentence that the Pope felt was a bit objectionable. The Pope and the Cardinal both agreed that this would meet their approval.) Cardinal Cicognani: With whom should Thieu and the new Senate President talk? President: Thieu is a good man—honest—and a Catholic. As you know, the Catholics are in a minority in South Vietnam. In the recent election, a new Senate was voted in and a Catholic was elected as President of the Senate. They are both men of strength and firmness. I hope the Pope will encourage them to talk (and here the President smiled and gestured to the Pope) just as the Pope encouraged me to pass my education bills. We are now spending $9 billion more on education. And the Pope can claim some responsibility for this. (The Pope smiled and offered his hands in gesture of affection for the President.) Pope: I am hopeful that you will exploit every possibility that will lead to peace. President: I want to do what I think is the best thing to do—to get the South Vietnamese to handle the problems of South Vietnam. We have a story in Texas about Ford automobiles carrying a slogan on the trunk of each car that said “Made in Texas by Texans for Texans.” My motto now is “Peace in South Vietnam for South Vietnam and by South Vietnamese.” What I would hope that the Pope would do is this: Through your Apostolic Delegate or other effective channels tell Thieu and the Senate President to talk to representatives of the NLF and to do it in their own way. If the Pope would do this, I strongly believe it would offer some chance of peace. Pope: I think I can do something. President: You can say that President Thieu is willing to have informal discussions, why not you? Pope: Is it possible that the truce of Christmas could be extended by a day or two? Could you not show the world that on the day of peace January 1 you will also make this a day of truce? President: My problem is this: My military leaders tell me that the North Vietnamese have trucks lined up bumper to bumper and as soon as the truce begins they start them moving and those supplies and those men kill our soldiers. On August 25 I told Hanoi we would draw a circle around it of three hundred miles and if we stopped bombing there could talks begin? On September 10 at San Antonio I made my speech which publicized a portion of this. I held back until October 25—and during that time they kept coming and they kept killing. Archbishop Lucey went to South Vietnam as one of my observers during the election. He told me that every time we quietened down they increase their pressure. In the 37 day bombing pause, they built up a seven months supply. Pope: Where do they get their men, their means, their materiel? President: By terror they are recruiting in the South—and they are now down to 14 year old boys. They are getting desperate and we are certain that we are hurting them very very much. They are using Kamikaze tactics for they desperately want a victory and they are unable to achieve one. Pope: We shall pray for you and we shall pray for your efforts for peace. President: Is it agreeable now for me to release this statement with the one sentence removed? (The Pope nodded his head and said “Yes, it was agreeable.”) I don’t want to press the point but I did want to know if I can assume that the Pope will try to bring the South Vietnamese to informal talks—and will immediately help out the prisoner problem. (The Pope nodded.) Pope: Would you have any objection to receiving an aide-mémoire from me which would set forth my views? I want you to know that we will follow the same theme as we have before. I assure you of my loyalty and devotion to the ideals that the U.S. stands for. President: Will the Pope be helpful in getting the South Vietnamese to talk informally with the NLF along the lines I have outlined? Pope: I will do whatever is possible. I will study the prisoner situation and see what contacts can be made. This is a cause which is close to my heart. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Vatican, No classification marking. Drafted by Valenti. The meeting was held in the Pope’s office. Valenti described the meeting in A Very Human President , pp. 286-291. 2 December 8 and 15. For texts of the Pope’s December 15 statements to the College of Cardinals, see The New York Times , December 16, 1967. 3 The President had been in Australia to attend the funeral of Prime Minister Harold Holt, December 21. 4 For text of the final press release, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, p. 1189. 5 See Document 303 . 6 See Document 308 . 7 Document 309 . 8 Reference is to the June 1967 Summit at Glassboro. For documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217 ff. 9 February 6-13. 311. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 311. Letter From President Johnson to Pope Paul VI 1 Washington, June 15, 1968. Your Holiness: I was deeply touched by your compassionate message of condolence upon the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. 2 We draw strength from your prayers for our fellow citizens and for the Nation at this sad moment. I am pleased that Archbishop Terrence Cooke has agreed to serve on the Presidential Commission appointed to seek out the causes of violence in our country. 3 Senator Kennedy believed that Americans could, if they would, end the blight of poverty and bigotry. In this he was at one with the political leadership the United States has enjoyed for the past thirty-five years. I must report that there has been no substantial progress toward a peaceful and just solution of the war in Vietnam during the Paris talks. 4 Meanwhile, the Communists have mounted a savage, indiscriminate attack on Saigon—on the government of South Vietnam and on ordinary citizens alike. There is much speculation that these rocket and mortar attacks are designed not only to shake the government, but to give the impression that the Communists hold the military initiative—and therefore to secure an advantage in Paris. It is a tragedy—one of many in this war—that the people of South Vietnam must suffer as they do because of the aggressive intentions of the Communists. I cannot predict when the North Vietnamese representatives will be more forthcoming in Paris; nor can I estimate how long the Communists’ offensive will continue in South Vietnam. I fear that neither will occur as soon as all mankind desires. Nevertheless, the United States and those with whom we are allied will continue to seek an honorable peace at the negotiating table, as we shall remain firm in resisting terror and aggression in South Vietnam. I devoutly hope that my next letter to you will bring more hopeful tidings. Unless it is myself, I know of no one on earth who so longs for news of progress toward peace in Vietnam as Your Holiness. I should tell you that I have greatly enjoyed my chats with the Apostolic Delegate in Washington. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Vatican, Vol. 2. No classification marking. 2 Senator Kennedy died June 6 from gunshot wounds. A copy of the June 6 Papal message is ibid. 3 Established June 10. For text of the President’s statement announcing the Commission’s creation, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, pp. 697-699. 4 The Paris peace talks began on May 13. 312. Letter From Pope Paul VI to President Johnson 312. Letter From Pope Paul VI to President Johnson 1 Vatican City, August 18, 1968. We are most grateful to you, Mr. President, for receiving Our messenger and explaining your thoughts concerning the visit We hoped to make to Vietnam. 2 Our efforts have, unfortunately, met with a negative response, to the effect that, “because of the war, the conditions necessary to receive Us in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are lacking.” Consequently, after studying all the factors involved, We have decided that We must cancel even Our planned visit to South Vietnam. Such a gesture might not favor the cause of peace, which We so ardently desire, and might even aggravate the situation. We also feel that it is necessary to preclude any hostile acts, which following on the negative answer of the Hanoi Government, could take place on the occasion of Our visit, causing the sacrifice of many innocent persons. We cannot permit that Our presence should be the cause of further suffering for a people already tried by many years of tragic war. You may be assured, Mr. President, that Our efforts for peace will not be lessened as a result of the reply received; they will in fact be increased, in order that the day may be hastened when peace and its resultant benefits will be the lot of men in every part of the world. We express Our sincere and heartfelt gratitude for your assistance in this matter, and We assure Our prayers for you, your family, and your noble nation, that Almighty God may pour upon all His richest blessings. Paulus P P. VI 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI. No classification marking. 2 No correspondence was found on this subject. 313. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 313. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, August 31, 1968, 1842Z. CAP 82324. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford and I discussed at length this morning the question of a prompt reply to the Pope. 2 There was no agreed conclusion, but these points emerged. 1. In general, we felt that we ought to wait a week or so before making a major substantive initiative on Vietnam to see where the attack on Saigon, etc., comes out. So far as Moscow was concerned it was also felt some time should pass before raising the Vietnam question. 2. With respect to the Pope as a channel for a serious communication, Clark Clifford had the strongest possible reservations: in part because it would undercut Paris, 3 but even more because it would undercut the possibility of using the Russians if we planned something like his (Clifford’s) proposal. He feels that if we surface our hard, minimum terms via the Pope, it would be difficult to engage the Russians. Secretary Rusk explained the underlying reasons for our desire to keep a channel open and active in Rome. Clifford recommends that we draft a friendly reply to the Pope which would not, however, use him as the channel for communicating our minimum terms for stage two. 3. Secretary Rusk, on the other hand, has grave reservations about Clifford’s proposition; that is, the President launching a public bombing cessation, on the basis of what we assume, without first exploring it via Paris. 4. We talked at length about whether we would settle for a firm DMZ proposition, with Secretary Rusk and I feeling that it would be wholly satisfactory if it were firmly nailed down. Clifford was less certain. 5. With respect to a total bombing halt on the assumption of what Hanoi might do, it was agreed that the critical question was whether the President felt he would be able politically to go back to bombing if the assumption was not fulfilled. We shall meet again for lunch on Tuesday at 12:30 P.M. and hope to have something more lucid for you to consider upon your return. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pope Paul VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only for the President. Received at the LBJ Ranch Communication Center at 2:25 p.m. CDT. 2 The Pope’s letter is Document 312 . 3 Reference is to the ongoing Paris peace talks. 4 No further documentation relating to communications through the Vatican was found. Canada Canada 314. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State Ottawa, January 9, 1964, 8 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret. 315. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 22, 1964, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 3258. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and Armstrong and approved in U. The memorandum is Part 4 of 14. Part 13 is Document 316; the other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at the White House. Prime Minister Pearson visited Washington January 21-23. Pearson’s recollections of the meeting are in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson , Vol. 3, pp. 119-123. 316. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 22, 1964, 10 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 3258. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Armstrong and approved in U. The memorandum is Part 13 of 14. Part 4 is Document 315; the other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at the White House. 317. Report Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 1. Confidential. The report was attached to a February 7 memorandum from Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to McGeorge Bundy. 318. Memorandum by President Johnson Washington, April 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2. Confidential. 319. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson Washington, May 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 1. Confidential. 320. Memorandum for the Record New York, May 28, 1964, 6:15-6:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 1. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on May 30. 321. Memorandum of Conversation Ottawa, July 6, 1964, noon-2 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. 322. Memorandum of Conversation Windsor, Canada, September 14, 1964, 9:30 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rusk. 323. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, September 18, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2. Limited Official Use. 324. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 27, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “See if McNamara agrees with this.” 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, December 9, 1964, 11:57 a.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Glazer; cleared in BNA, IO, and L; and approved by Freshman. Repeated to Ottawa. 326. Editorial Note 327. Editorial Note 328. Editorial Note 329. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State Ottawa, July 26, 1965. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. There is no transmission time on the telegram, which was received at 4:36 p.m. Passed to the White House. 330. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Confidential. Drafted by Barry and approved in S on October 12. The memorandum is Part VI of VII; other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers. 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State Ottawa, April 27, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 7:59 p.m. Passed to the White House. 332. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 1, 1966, 4 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Kiselyak and approved in G on June 8. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. 333. Editorial Note 334. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 22, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Smith and approved in S/AH on August 4 and in S and G on August 8. The memorandum is Part 2 of 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room. 335. Memorandum of Conversation Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in the White House on August 30. The memorandum is Part 9 of 9. A complete set of memoranda of conversation between Johnson and Pearson is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 70. The meeting was held in the Rossmount Inn. 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada Washington, September 14, 1966, 5:24 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kiselyak and approved by Smith. 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State New York, September 21, 1966, 4:19 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 75. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wabeke and authorized by Shaver. Repeated to Ottawa and Paris. Rusk and Martin were attending the sessions of the UN General Assembly. 338. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 25, 1966. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 69 D 35, Pol 7 Visits. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel. The memorandum is Part 10 of 10. The other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room. 339. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 16, 1966, 3:45 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Smith and approved in U on December 30. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 340. Memorandum of Conversation Harrington Lake, Quebec, May 25, 1967. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 185. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Rodger P. Davies and Rufus Z. Smith and approved by Rostow on May 29. The meeting was held at Prime Minister Pearson’s summer residence at Lake Harrington where President Johnson and the Prime Minister flew following a joint appearance at the Expo ′67 World’s Fair in Montreal. A separate memorandum of their conversation, prepared by John Vought of the staff of the Embassy in Ottawa is in Department of State, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 70 D 89, Pol 7 Visits. 341. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, May 27, 1967, 2058Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 5. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 4:50 p.m. 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State Ottawa, October 23, 1967, 2330Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CAN-US. Secret. 343. Memorandum From the President Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 26, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 5. No classification marking. A handwritten “L” and the notation “rec’d 12:46” are on the memorandum. 344. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 16, 1967, 4:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CAN-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Straus and approved in S on November 22. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 345. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Brussels, December 12, 1967, 1027Z. Source: Department of State, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 70 D 89, Vietnam 1967. Secret; Exdis. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels to attend the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting. 346. Letter From Prime Minister Pearson to President Johnson Ottawa, January 22, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59. Secret. The salutation is handwritten. 347. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, March 4, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Fried. 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State Ottawa, April 3, 1968, 0135Z. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EEC 3. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Geneva for the delegation to the GATT negotiations and to Paris for Trezise. 349. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, April 30, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 CAN-CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on May 6. The memorandum is Part IV of IX. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 314. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 314. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 1 Ottawa, January 9, 1964, 8 p.m. 861. Embassy’s 809. 2 In the course of a talk with ExtAff Minister Martin yesterday and at lunch today with the Prime Minister I was given to understand that they had not only backed away from the idea of any institutional arrangements but also were not prepared to agree upon a declaration of principles to be signed and made public in connection with the President’s meeting with the Prime Minister. Martin put forward much the same reasons as Minister Robinson had as recorded in the memorandum of conversation of January 4. 3 The Prime Minister speaking more frankly evinced no great personal enthusiasm in the institutional idea and was impressed by the difficulties of drawing up principles that would meet the test of time or as he phrased it at one point “not be able to be used by one party against the other.” Needless to say this led to a discussion of the Gordon budget measures which was disquieting in terms of possible future Canadian action. Pearson said that Gordon had returned from his December 5 meeting with the Economic Club of Chicago sure that after he had explained to the represented Chicago business community the reasoning behind his proposals they had acquiesced and Pearson implied that further measures were in preparation. Of course I expressed skepticism about the persuasive effect of eloquence on American industry whether located in the Chicago area or elsewhere to acquiesce in unprovoked, injurious and discriminatory measures against it to be reflected in balance sheets. I urged that the reconsideration that he had promised take the direction of removing injurious discrimination against existing American capital which had come into Canada under national treatment and that the change in the rules, if any, be directed towards future takeover or other forms of future foreign investment. I will report further details of this conversation when I go to Washington next week; the purpose of the second paragraph of this telegram is once again to alert Washington to the crucial importance at this time of this important problem. Butterworth 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret. 2 Telegram 809 from Ottawa, December 21, 1963, reported on discussions with Canadian officials on economic discrimination. (Ibid.) 3 Not found. 315. Memorandum of Conversation 315. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 22, 1964, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Far East and Southeast Asia PARTICIPANTS United States Side George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State W. Walton Butterworth, United States Ambassador to Canada G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary, E William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR William H. Brubeck, The White House Willis C. Armstrong, Director, BNA Canadian Side Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada (part of the time) Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs Charles S. A. Ritchie, Ambassador of Canada R. Gordon Robertson, Clerk of the Privy Council Tom Kent, Coordinator of Government Policy A. E. Ritchie, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs H. Basil Robinson, Minister, Canadian Embassy O. W. Dier, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister While President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson were talking together in President Johnson’s office, 2 the Under Secretary proposed to Mr. Martin that they discuss certain subjects of mutual interest. Mr. Ball mentioned the intention of President De Gaulle to recognize Communist China. 3 He said it looked as though this were now inevitable, and that this could “upset a few apple carts.” He said that according to our information De Gaulle probably intended to make an announcement, and then go into the matter further in his press conference. Mr. Martin said that this indeed seemed to be the case. He said he thought that, however disagreeable such a development was bound to be for the United States, he hoped that the United States Government would not unduly dramatize the occasion by reacting too violently. He asked Mr. Ball what he thought would be the effect on Southeast Asia and the Far East generally of De Gaulle’s decision. Mr. Ball said that it would be considered by Saigon as a clear indication of a trend toward some kind of neutralist solution in Southeast Asia, and that this would gravely affect the morale of the government and people of South Viet Nam and thus hamper current United States efforts to help the Vietnamese to achieve victory over Communism. He said the United States reaction would undoubtedly be very severe. It would also seriously complicate the situation in the United Nations, in the event that African and other countries followed France’s lead. He said that President Johnson was concerned by what the position of the Canadian Government would be in the United Nations on the recognition issue. Mr. Martin said that the Canadian Government felt that there was much to be said for the basic premises underlying De Gaulle’s views. He said it was not possible to isolate Communist China forever. He said that contacts had already been established between Ottawa and Peiping. As an example he cited the forthcoming exchange between the Canadian Press Agency and the New China News Agency, whereby each would have a representative in the other’s country. He said it was important to watch carefully how things would develop. The Canadian Government was fully aware of the possible implications of the French move for the United States and for the Alliance as a whole. He could not at this time say what the evolving posture and attitude of the Canadian Government would be in the future. He could not honestly say now what the Canadian Government would do eventually in the General Assembly. He hoped that such a situation would not arise until after November. He said that Canada wanted to establish increasing contacts with China because it sincerely felt that it was not a practical or farsighted policy to continue to ignore the Chinese indefinitely. Mr. Martin went on to say that when he had talked with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in Paris, 4 he had not said as much as he had just said to Mr. Ball. He did say to Couve that he hoped that the French Government would carefully weigh the effect on the Alliance and on the US attitude of its proposed action. However he had not told the French that what they intended to do was wrong. He said the Prime Minister and he had told the French that the Canadian Government at this present time had not changed its policy on the question of recognition of Communist China, or with regard to Communist Chinese admission to the UN. Mr. Ball said that it was still not clear what Taiwan planned to do if France recognized Peiping. Mr. Martin said he was pessimistic on the chances of survival of the present government in South Viet Nam. He said that it did not enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese people. Mr. Ball refuted this assertion and went on to say that an attempt to find a neutralist solution in that part of the world would be tantamount to facilitating a take-over by the Chinese Communists. He pointed out that the circumstances which had made desirable a solution of neutrality for Laos were peculiar to that country, and did not constitute a precedent for a neutrality formula for South Viet Nam. Mr. Martin asked Mr. Ball for his opinion about the Soviet proposal for a conference on Cambodia in April. 5 Mr. Ball said that we preferred not to have such a conference, but that we did not want to seem to be in direct opposition to Sihanouk’s suggestion. Mr. Ball pointed out that there were two points which could together be extremely harmful for the US attitude toward the United Nations: first, financial problems in relation to Article 19 and, second, a vote in the United Nations to admit Communist China. Mr. Martin asked whether the United States did not think that a Soviet-Chicom confrontation in the UN would be to the advantage of the Free World. Mr. Ball said he doubted this, since they would probably tend to get together on major issues. Mr. Martin asked whether the French initiative would swing the balance in the United Nations in favor of the admission of Communist China. Mr. Ball explained that this would not necessarily be the case. He said the French Government had advised its former colonies in Africa that it would be desirable they should not recognize Communist China when France does so. He said that there would be an obvious reluctance on the part of most of those governments to have a representative of Peiping in their capitals. Mr. Martin said that Canada was recognizing Outer Mongolia, and that some people in Canada would say that this was a move towards recognizing the Chinese People’s Republic. Mr. Martin referred to the action of 1955 to admit Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. He said he recalled that the United States had favored this, and Mr. Ball concurred, indicating that it was part of a package transaction. (Later, with the Prime Minister present.) Mr. Ball said that while the President and the Prime Minister had been having their private conversation the rest of the group had discussed De Gaulle and Peiping. The Prime Minister said that he had also talked about this with the President. Mr. Ball pointed out that if there should develop a trend in favor of Chinese recognition in the United Nations, at the same time as a discussion of Article 19 of the United Nations Charter, it could generate a wave of public opinion against the United Nations in the United States. The Prime Minister said that the President and he shared the view that nobody can do anything with de Gaulle once he has made up his mind, and that the best course in the situation is to minimize the importance of it, as far as public treatment is concerned. The Prime Minister went on to say that he hoped that the recognition of Communist China by France would not have a drastic effect. He said in the long run it might be helpful if the arrangement results in providing a transition toward a two-China situation. He said the President had agreed that it was not desirable to exaggerate the matter. Mr. Ball spoke of the concern over a possible trend among African states toward recognition and said that we do not want to allow this sort of thing to be built up. We understand that the French Government has suggested the UAM states not follow the French example. The Prime Minister remarked that the French must lack confidence in their own action. Mr. Ball said that some UAM states may resist the temptation to recognize Communist China. He said we certainly hope for a firm line on the Western side, and we are particularly concerned over the reaction in Viet Nam. Certainly the French action would be interpreted in Viet Nam as a further move in the wrong direction. The Prime Minister wondered whether the greatest embarrassment would be in Tokyo, and the Under Secretary said it was doubtful whether the Japanese could stand against great pressure to do the same thing. Mr. Martin referred to a speech by the Japanese Prime Minister of the preceding day, reported in January 22nd issue of the New York Times, in which the problem was reviewed. Mr. Ball said that we have advised Taiwan to sit tight. There may be no actual exchange of ambassadors between Communist China and France for about three months. The situation is hard for Chiang Kai-shek, because the French have never permitted him to have an ambassador in Paris, only a Chargé. If there is to be a Chinese ambassador, and only a Chargé for the Nationalists, this would be very awkward indeed. The Prime Minister said that it had been reported in the newspapers, particularly in Canada, that he had told the President that Canada would not recognize Red China without United States consent. This type of newspaper story is exceedingly damaging and he had had to deny it on domestic political grounds. He said he felt the world must some day get out of the difficult situation in which it has painted itself, but that he had no wish whatsoever to add to the difficulties of the United States, especially in an election year. He said that some pressure would develop in Canada but he did not want to do anything now to add to United States difficulties. Mr. Ball said it might be wise to see what happened as a result of French recognition. After all the British had not gained very much by having diplomatic representation in Peiping. Mr. Martin said that this was the sort of thing the Japanese Prime Minister had suggested—wait and see what happened. At one point during the meeting, Mr. Brubeck, who had been absent from the room briefly, returned to say that the press was inquiring whether it was true that Canada and the United States were discussing the possible recognition of Red China by Canada. The Prime Minister authorized a statement to the effect that this subject had not been considered in the discussions. 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 3258. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and Armstrong and approved in U. The memorandum is Part 4 of 14. Part 13 is Document 316 ; the other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at the White House. Prime Minister Pearson visited Washington January 21-23. Pearson’s recollections of the meeting are in Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson , Vol. 3, pp. 119-123. 2 No record of this private talk was found. 3 France extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China on January 27. 4 They apparently met during the NAC Ministerial meeting December 13-18, 1963. 5 On January 22 the Soviet Union forwarded to its Co-Chairman, the United Kingdom, a request from Cambodia for convening the ICC. 6 For text of the joint communiqué, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 432-434. 316. Memorandum of Conversation 316. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 22, 1964, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Auto Parts PARTICIPANTS [Here follows the same list as Document 315 .] Mr. Ball said there was a considerable problem over the Canadian auto parts measures. He said we might not be able to keep from levying countervailing duties. He noted that the Treasury had already obtained a number of complaints, and many companies are alleging that their businesses have been adversely affected by the Canadian policy. Concern has developed in the Congress. A company has the right to make use of its legal remedies, and the courts would have to decide whether the Canadian measure is or is not a subsidy. Our lawyers think it is. Mr. Martin said that previously the Canadian view of the problems of secondary industry was that the plan for automobiles could be followed in other industries—this however turned out not to be possible, and there was no intention of applying it. He said he thought some United States people might be exaggerating the effects of the Canadian measures. For example, Studebaker had made a decision which probably would have been made anyway, without the Canadian measures. Studebaker has a simpler and more efficient operation in Canada, and it gave them some opportunity to stay in business. 2 Mr. Martin hoped that our perspective and view of mutual interest would lead us to discourage the idea of countervailing duties. Mr. Ball said we were getting a crescendo of complaints from parts manufacturers in the United States, and there was active Congressional interest, and there would no doubt be speeches in Congress. From the point of view of the United States Government it was difficult to explain a shift of production from the United States to Canada when United States unemployment is worse than Canada’s and when our balance of payments situation is also worse than Canada’s. Mr. Martin said he thought the parts people would in due course do a lot of business, and that the total result would not be inimical to the parts industry in the United States. Canadian interests are also affected, and there are complaints from people in Canada. Mr. Martin referred to the television interview he had given in September and to the United States concern over it. He said it should be remembered that what a politician says is only good for twenty-four hours. Ambassador Butterworth noted that the Canadian measure was encouraging United States investment in Canadian production facilities, and Mr. Martin said that they did not mind further investment. The Ambassador remarked that we did not want to increase our investment in Canada necessarily; we were more interested in having existing investment treated fairly. Mr. Ball wondered if there would be Canadian interest in establishing a joint group to examine the auto industry on a continental basis, to see what might be done of a broad and general nature. Mr. Martin said he had had no opportunity to discuss this with his colleague Mr. Drury. There was no objection to consultation, but the policy had been announced and was in effect, and there could not be much thought of changing it. (Later, with Prime Minister Pearson present.) Mr. Ball suggested the question of a joint study of the auto industry to Mr. Pearson, and the response came from Mr. Martin, to the effect that Canada has given exhaustive attention to all possible alternatives. Mr. Martin said it would be regrettable if the impression got around that changes were likely, since the policy has been announced and is in effect. Mr. Ball said he felt it necessary to make two points: one, that Congress is getting disturbed and that there will be speeches and consequent excitement. The second point is that some company may apply for the application of countervailing duties, and this may release a chain of events which we cannot control. Mr. Martin said no subsidy was involved. Mr. Ball said that there is a real possibility that the courts in the United States might find that there was. Mr. Pearson said that there had been quite a talk about this between him and the President, particularly on the Studebaker case. He said he had explained to the President that the Studebaker situation would have existed just the same. He said the President seemed worried over a possible flood of cheap cars from Canada but he thought he had reassured the President on this point. He had explained the structure of Canadian car costs. Mr. Ball remarked that the Studebaker letter to its suppliers had been terrible, in that it sounded like that of a politician. He went on to say that the formulation is not applicable to other industries, and that Mr. Drury had said it could be used only in an industry that was American-controlled. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 3258. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Armstrong and approved in U. The memorandum is Part 13 of 14. Part 4 is Document 315 ; the other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held at the White House. 2 Reference is to the decision of the Studebaker Company to move some of its auto parts production to Canada. 317. Report Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 317. Report Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, undated. MEETING WITH CANADIANS ON TERRITORIAL WATERS As expected, at the meeting in Ottawa February 5 with Canadian Minister of External Affairs Paul Martin, 2 Canada dropped its claims to the waters of the Arctic archipelago but insisted on claiming all other straits and bays on both the East and West Coasts, as well as the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as internal waters. They seemed to admit that the position we have taken offering to acquiesce in a 12-mile fishing zone, measured in a valid manner from the coast and straight base lines, meets the larger part of their fishing problems, and that their claims to most of these other waters are of doubtful international legality. However, in effect the Minister took the position that, as domestic political commitments had been made by Canadian leaders on these more exaggerated claims, it would be politically impossible to give them up and hoped that the United States would bail them out of their problem by not protesting their action. Deputy Under Secretary Johnson pointed out the impossibility of our doing this because of the precedents it would set elsewhere for freedom of the seas, particularly off Soviet coasts, and made the suggestion of a non-contentious (i.e. friendly) suit in the International Court of Justice. 3 Martin was obviously very much taken aback by his failure to obtain all he was seeking from us. After a private meeting with Mr. Johnson and subsequently caucusing with his advisers, he indicated that the Cabinet would consider the matter on Tuesday, February 11, and Mr. Johnson agreed to return to Ottawa on February 12 for further discussions. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 1. Confidential. The report was attached to a February 7 memorandum from Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, to McGeorge Bundy. 2 A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. 3 Instructions to raise this possible solution were contained in a memorandum from Secretary Rusk to U. Alexis Johnson, February 4. (Ibid.) 4 Memoranda of their February 12 conversation are ibid. 318. Memorandum by President Johnson 318. Memorandum by President Johnson 1 Washington, April 28, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury Secretary of Commerce I have approved your proposed presentation to the Canadians regarding possible application of countervailing duties on auto parts and creation of a joint task force for dealing with the problem. 2 In view of the difficult economic and political issues involved, I think it essential that we do everything possible to find an agreed solution that does not require countervailing duties. Before final determination of the legal issue on duties, therefore, I would appreciate a report on the status of discussions with Canada and of prospects for a mutually satisfactory alternative solution to this problem. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2. Confidential. 2 Apparent reference to papers on U.S. tariff reclassification of auto parts and Canadian auto parts export schemes prepared for the 9th meeting of the Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, held at Ottawa April 29-30. Copies of the papers are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2390. For a report on this meeting, see Document 319 . 319. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 319. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Dillon to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 1, 1964. SUBJECT Report on meeting of Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs As acting Chairman of the U.S. Delegation at the 9th meeting of the Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Ottawa, I submit the following report. The entire meeting was attended by Secretaries Udall, Freeman, Hodges and Dillon. Chairman Heller and Under Secretary Ball attended for the first day, Secretary Rusk attended for part of the second day. The Canadian Delegation was headed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and included the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Commerce, Agriculture, and Industry, plus the Governor of the Bank of Canada and the Chief Canadian Trade Negotiator. The meeting was characterized by a far greater spirit of cooperation and understanding than had characterized our first meeting with the present Canadian Government in September. 2 The Canadians made a point both privately and publicly of improved relations with the United States. This is of course accurate, but it also reflects the interesting conclusion that, while the present government retains the traditional Canadian sensitivity on matters of national pride, they now apparently consider it good politics in Canada to play up their success in improving relations with the U.S. This is in sharp contrast to the previous Canadian Government which found it expedient to make U.S.-Canadian relations appear worse than they really were. All items except two were handled without any disagreement of importance. Full agreement was reached on parallel positions to be followed at the May 4 meeting of GATT and on the general approach to the Kennedy Round. One item that might lead to serious difficulties in the future is the regulations recently promulgated by the Department of Commerce concerning the control of the export of technical data. It was obvious that certain U.S. exporters have over-reacted to the intent of this regulation which was published on April 1. Commerce will undertake a broad campaign to eliminate this misunderstanding. Nevertheless, some serious problems may remain and this matter still has the potentiality of causing major difficulties in our overall relations with Canada. Accordingly, State will join with Commerce in a careful reevaluation of the substance of these rather extensive and hitherto unpublicized controls. The second matter on which no agreement was reached was auto parts. The Canadians were prepared for a vigorous counterattack on our views based on economic arguments and looking to the substance of the problem. However, they found no answer to the legal arguments we put forth regarding the necessity of initiating action under our countervailing duty procedures. They accepted with good grace our decision to proceed as a matter of legal necessity. They showed no give whatsoever on the substance and originally refused to even consider joint working level talks looking to a possible solution. However, when they realized that a public proceeding would soon begin in the U.S., they agreed privately that joint technical studies should be undertaken immediately by a working party. Publicly they maintained their position of no give. It is too early to predict whether they will in fact eventually agree on anything of substance. It is also clear that our decision to proceed with public hearings, under our countervailing duty law, was the only reason they agreed to substantive consideration of the matter by a working party. The Department of Commerce will head up the U.S. side in these talks. It is noteworthy that despite the disagreement on this item, which is of considerable political importance to the Canadian Government, the Canadians continued to talk about improved economic and overall relations with the U.S. and publicly labelled our meeting a great success. Douglas Dillon 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 1. Confidential. 2 Documentation on the 8th meeting of the Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, held at Washington September 21, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2311. 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Dillon signed the original. 320. Memorandum for the Record 320. Memorandum for the Record 1 New York, May 28, 1964, 6:15-6:45 p.m. SUBJECT Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Lester Pearson at the New York Hilton Hotel, May 28, 1964, 6:15-6:45 p.m. The President and the Prime Minister began by talking briefly and lightly about immediate problems of politics in their two countries. The President gave the Prime Minister greetings from Senator Magnuson, and the Prime Minister commented wryly on the problems of lumber and fish. The Prime Minister explained the great political difficulty and importance of changing the national flag of Canada, and the President remarked that he had as many troubles as he wanted, too. The conversation then turned to Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister opened by saying that in his brief conversation with McGeorge Bundy 2 he had agreed on the importance of sending Mr. Seaborn to Vietnam as soon as possible, and he made it clear that he thought this could be arranged in the coming week. He spoke warmly of Mr. Seaborn’s qualifications, and made clear his entire readiness to have a Canadian officer play this important role of reporting accurately the purposes of the United States Government and the meaning of any actions in which it might be involved. The President thanked the Prime Minister and gave a general summary of his view of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. The U.S. was not interested in starting wars, but in keeping peace. The U.S. had no desire to threaten any government in the area, and wanted nothing more than the restoration of peace in countries which were now under attack from outside. The U.S. was not going to be pushed out, but the Prime Minister could be absolutely sure that the President intended to follow a policy of peace. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction in this general exposition and said he fully understood the very difficult and important problems which the U.S. faced in Southeast Asia. He agreed that the U.S. could not simply pull out and that it must continue its support for governments which were not always very good at supporting themselves, difficult as this task might be. The Prime Minister said that, on the other hand, he did think it would be dangerous to move in directions which had recently been mentioned by Senator Goldwater, 3 and that any drastic escalation would give great problems both in Canada and internationally. The Prime Minister said that it would be a different matter if action could be carefully limited and directed in the interdiction of supply lines from North to South. The President firmly interjected that the Prime Minister could be absolutely sure that the present Administration had no interest at all in the kind of thing which Senator Goldwater had mentioned. The President himself was a man of peace, and his Administration was going to be an Administration of peace. If it did become necessary, against the President’s own hopes and desires, to act against the North, the President’s intention was that such action should be carefully limited. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction at the President’s comment and said that he thought it would be very important to have targets carefully defined and sharply delimited. It would be one thing to attack a bridge or an oil tank, but quite another to shower bombs on a village full of women and children. The President expressed his clear agreement. The President and the Prime Minister then talked briefly about more general aspects of the problem. The President indicated the next immediate courses of action were to be the subject of the Honolulu meeting, 4 and thanked the Prime Minister again for his cooperation in the matter of Mr. Seaborn’s special assignment. The conversation then became informal and social, and the President introduced the Prime Minister to members of his family and others guests in the Presidential suite. The Prime Minister later informed me that at a moment when I was out of the room, he had mentioned to the President the important meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in July, 5 and had said that he would be glad to know of any special U.S. views which it might be helpful for Canada to know about at the time of such a meeting. He told me that the President had expressed interest, and I undertook to make sure that we would be in a position to offer such close consultation before the Prime Minister’s meeting. Addendum to President’s copy In pressing upon the Prime Minister the fact that he was determined to keep the peace, the President added to the other arguments in the basic memorandum a reference to the election of 1964. He said that in this year, above all others, it was his firm intention to be a “peace man.” He had no intention of looking for military adventures. If he adopted any other policy he ought to be “bored for the simples.” McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 1. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on May 30. 2 No record of this conversation was found. 3 Reference is to a May 24 statement calling for the use of low-level nuclear devices to defoliate jungles and for the bombing of bridges, roads, and railroads in North Vietnam used to supply the insurgency in South Vietnam. 4 For documentation on the Honolulu meeting of senior U.S. officials June 1-2, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. I, Documents 187 – 189 . 5 July 8-15. 321. Memorandum of Conversation 321. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Ottawa, July 6, 1964, noon-2 p.m. SUBJECT Law of the Sea PARTICIPANTS Marcel Cadieux, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs I told Mr. Cadieux that I was glad of this opportunity to meet him and to discuss with him informally the subject of the Canadian claims and pending legislation in relation to U.S. rights and interests. I said that I had no instructions, and that the purpose of my visit was to acquaint myself at first hand with the Canadian government’s position and arguments. We agreed that nothing that would be said or omitted by either of us in the course of our conversation would be considered to constitute any change in the position of either side. Mr. Cadieux reviewed the situation at some length and in the course of our discussion, the following points emerged: (1) Gulf of St. Lawrence : I asked Mr. Cadieux what was the essential Canadian concern with regard to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. I said that if it was a matter of the restriction and control of fishing, we could consider participating in a multilateral conference with various other countries to see if agreement could be reached on fishing practices. On the other hand, if it was a question of security, we were prepared to engage in bilateral talks with the Canadian government to consider the factors involved and see what we might be able to do to be helpful. Mr. Cadieux said that closing the Gulf was essentially a domestic political necessity. While both fishing and security were an important consideration, the present situation had been inherited from the previous government, which was prepared to go to the limit on the issue, and which would have the full backing of the five maritime Provinces. The Prime Minister had no alternative to facing up to the United States if we maintained our opposition to the point of trying to take Canada before the ICJ, except to let his government fall, as it most surely would if it did not close the Gulf. (2) ”Customary” versus “historic” rights : Mr. Cadieux, while disputing this issue along the familiar Canadian lines, said he thought this would be no problem as part of an overall agreement, including the area and species aspects. (3) U.S. trawlers within 12-mile limit : I raised this in the form of a question for my own information, and was told this would present no difficulty. (4) Canadian consultation with other countries : Canada has already held, and will pursue talks with the following countries between now and the end of the year: France, U.K., Norway, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and it has told Japan what it has in mind. It does not plan to talk with any additional countries. One reason why the Canadian government is opposed to convening a multilateral conference on the question of the waters of the Gulf is that the Japanese would insist on participating for their fishing interests, while the Russians would press to come in for their own sinister purposes. Mr. Cadieux said that the French and the Norwegians had already indicated that they would have no trouble with the Canadian move. (5) Legislative timetable : The Canadian Government expects Bill S-17 to become law by July 15. It will have some flexibility with regard to applying the law, and Mr. Cadieux used such phrases as “certainly not before the end of the year, and well into the spring of 1965,” and “maybe one year if the Government can say that negotiations are still under way.” At another point, he used the words “well into next year.” (6) Canadian position : The Government position is that it has no alternative to proclaiming the extension of the fisheries zone to 12 miles, on a straight baseline basis, including closing lines for the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Without abandoning formally its claims to closing the Arctic Archipelago and Queen Charlotte Sound, the Canadian Government is prepared to postpone such action indefinitely. I asked whether Queen Charlotte Sound would encompass the adjoining waters of Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance. Mr. Cadieux said it would not, but that the Canadian Government would be prepared, if we could reach agreement, to refer the issue concerning these two bodies of water to arbitration. I asked about the Bay of Fundy. Mr. Cadieux said that it was not of comparable importance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and that he did not think “that it would be a very difficult matter for Canada and the U.S.” I inferred from the foregoing that the Canadians have in mind the following package: the U.S. (1) to confine itself to protests and to give up going to the ICJ, (2) to accept the closing of Hudson’s Bay and Hudson’s Strait, in return for which the Canadians would: (1) proclaim the extension of the fisheries zone on a straight baseline basis to 12 miles, (2) proclaim the closing of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, (3) defer action on the Arctic Archipelago, (4) defer action on Queen Charlotte Sound, (5) submit Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance to arbitration, (6) defer action on closing the Bay of Fundy in order to try to work out something mutually acceptable, (7) agree to, and be prepared to grant the most formal assurances to protect the exercise of our customary fishing rights, (8) not raise any difficulties about U.S. trawlers. 2 (7) Canadian reaction to U.S. recourse to ICJ : Canada, said Mr. Cadieux, will not appear before the Court in any circumstances. It would invoke the Connally amendment, 3 and—in order to defend itself against the charge that it was unwilling to observe the spirit of international law—would counter-attack by pointing out that the U.S. record of acceptance of the authority of the ICJ was greatly inferior to that of Canada. (8) Canadian reaction to U.S. position with regard to ICJ : At the conclusion of our talk, Mr. Cadieux advanced again the argument that we were proposing to treat Canada more harshly than we had treated other countries, e.g.: Indonesia, which had established a 12-mile limit and had enclosed certain bodies of water. I pointed out the particular circumstances of the proximity to the U.S. of the waters which Canada was proposing to enclose, and of the degree to which these waters were of importance to our security. We were not motivated by the desire to deal harshly with Canada, but we considered their proposed restrictions obnoxious, not only in themselves, but because they created a precedent for other countries to invoke. We thus could not afford to be less severe toward Canada on this issue than we would have to be toward others. Finally, I said it looked as though we were both in for a rough time, and Mr. Cadieux agreed. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler. 2 At the time it effected its 12-mile fishing ban, the Government of Canada issued an “Order in Council” that exempted the United States and certain other nations from its provisions. The text was forwarded to the Department of State in airgram A-103 from Ottawa, August 5. (Ibid., POL 33-4 CAN-US) 3 For text of Senate Resolution 196, 79th Congress, August 2, 1946, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 (rev. ed.), p. 129. 322. Memorandum of Conversation 322. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Windsor, Canada, September 14, 1964, 9:30 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada Secretary Rusk Mr. Martin was very pleased indeed that I had made an effort to visit with him at Windsor, which is his home town. We opened up with South Vietnam. I told him about the events of the last two days out there. He in turn told me that Seaborn (who did not wish to be identified to Americans as the source) felt gloomy about the prospect and in discussing details it was apparent that Seaborn was concentrating on the political disarray in Saigon itself at the top levels of government and had not really been focusing on what was happening in the provinces or the military action against the Viet Cong. We did not agree on a further date for a possible Seaborn visit to Hanoi. I told Paul Martin that I would see to it that Seaborn’s negative interpretation would not be passed to American sources in a way that would embarrass his relations with Americans in Saigon. Mr. Martin spoke especially highly of the intimate relations between Seaborn and Alexis Johnson. Mr. Martin told me that he had pressed Ikeda while on his recent trip to Japan 2 to take a more active part in Asian affairs. Specifically, Martin said that Canada would drop out of the ICC and urged Ikeda that Japan should take on that responsibility. Apparently, Ikeda did not volunteer. Martin commented that it was alleged that there were some constitutional objections to Japan’s undertaking such a role but that he, Martin, was convinced that this would not apply to such activities as the ICC or to the United Nations. On Cyprus, Martin had little new to offer except that Diefenbaker was making life very difficult for the government. Martin indicated that Canada was prepared to have its troops remain for another period of service and asked me whether I thought that the UN could raise the necessary funds to take care of the needs of the other contingents. (He stated that Canada would bear the cost of the Canadian component.) I told him that I thought that the UN would be able to raise such funds. Martin then told me about the proposed meeting in Ottawa of the countries (other than the great powers) which had contributed forces to UN peacekeeping activities. He said the Russians had strongly opposed this meeting and had been working against it in other capitals on the ground that it was a NATO imperialist plot. Martin said he had told the Russian Ambassador that this was a complete mistake and that the meeting would simply exchange views among those who had indicated their readiness to make troops available for the UN and that the representation would be across a broad political spectrum. Martin said he still agreed that the great powers ought not to be excluded in theory from contributing such forces to the UN but he and I both agreed that it was undoubtedly better for the great powers not to be included in this particular meeting. We discussed Article 19 and I emphasized the importance in not taking the United States for granted on this issue and suggested if there is to be any change in the Soviet position, it would probably require complete solidarity among the rest of the membership—as in the case of the Troika proposal. Martin seemed to have some vague notion that the Soviets might find some way to compromise but he offered no evidence of a Soviet intention to do so. We talked briefly about the automotive parts problem and I emphasized that our lawyers were almost certain to reach a decision against Canada under our legislation and that it was of the utmost importance to talk the matter over promptly at a ministerial level to see whether some answer could not be found. He did not make a flat commitment on such talks but it was clear that he was concerned about the chain reaction which might get started if we invoked our own legislative remedies. He made the point that both sides were prospering in our mutual trade and that we should not let something like this interfere with it. I told him that it was very hard to convince people, whose interests were adversely affected by practices for which we had a legal remedy, to take their comfort from the general prosperity of Canadian-American trade. ( This should be followed up to press for the ministerial talks .) The Prime Minister will mention this to President Johnson in the northwest this week. 3 I pressed Mr. Martin on trade with Cuba but he retreated behind the wheat deal with the Soviet Union and referred to certain steps of cooperation, such as reducing airplane flights, and I got no impression that he was considering additional specific steps. I told him that I thought that a recent resolution of hemisphere Foreign Ministers had the indirect effect of deferring indefinitely Canadian membership in the OAS because it would be unlikely that the OAS would admit a new member not prepared to abide by those resolutions. 4 He told me how he himself had pressed hard for Canadian interest in OAS membership and closer relations with Latin America but concluded by saying that he thought it probable that the matter was now deferred. I told him about our attitude on Malaysia and emphasized that our problem was not the policy problem as to whether at some stage the United States might not become involved but rather the practical problem that we could not become involved unless those who had direct commitments evidenced a substantial commitment of their own to provide the forces to deal with Indonesian aggression against Malaysia. I told him that the time was finished when the United States could act as the residual of responsibility in such matters if others approached it on the basis of meeting responsibility. He indicated that Canada had sent a survey team to Malaysia to inquire into what assistance Canada might give but clearly indicated that this would not take the form of military forces. They may assist Malaysia with aircraft and other equipment if the Malaysian mission now in Washington indicates an interest in such help on its projected visit to Canada. As we left the meeting, the press was waiting and I complimented Mr. Martin personally for his role in the Columbia River Treaty and expressed our appreciation for Canada’s important contribution to the Cyprus problem. 5 DR 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rusk. 2 September 4-5. 3 Johnson and Pearson were participating in ceremonies inaugurating the Columbia River Treaty, which was signed at Washington January 17, 1961, and entered into force September 16, 1964. (15 UST 1555) For texts of their remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, pp. 1071-1077. According to an undated memorandum attached to the briefing materials, no memoranda of conversation of the Johnson-Pearson meetings were prepared. Briefing papers are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2432. Pearson briefly discussed the meeting in Mike: Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson , Vol. 3, p. 125. 4 For text of the final act of the July 26 meeting of Foreign Ministers, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 328-334. 5 For Rusk’s comments on his meeting with Martin at a press conference the same day, see Department of State Bulletin , October 5, 1964, p. 472. 323. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 323. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 18, 1964. SUBJECT Canada’s Automotive Duty Remission Scheme I have read Secretary Dillon’s memorandum of September 15 2 recommending that the decision whether to impose countervailing duties on imports of automotive products from Canada be reached on legal, rather than on economic or political considerations. I agree with this conclusion. I believe, however, that we should be fully aware of the economic and political considerations and that in view of the potential effects of the decision made, the legal aspects of the matter should be as clear as possible. Canada is our largest trading partner. In 1963, our trade with Canada exceeded $8 billion, or 20% of our total foreign trade. Our exports to Canada exceeded our imports by over $400 million. In the automotive sector alone our exports during 1963 totalled $550 million whereas our imports amounted to $22 million. In 1964 the figures are expected to reach $700 million and $60 million respectively. If the decision is reached to impose countervailing duties on automotive imports from Canada, it will mean the failure of the Canadian automotive plan. The duty would be at the flat rate of 21-1/4% (in addition to the normal duty of 8-1/2%) based on Treasury’s estimate of the benefits accruing to Canadian manufacturers from the duty remission plan. Since the Pearson Government is deeply committed to the objectives of this plan, it is expected that the Canadian Government will adopt an alternative plan, probably involving an increase in “Canadian content” (the percentage of production which must be performed in Canada). The major United States automobile manufacturers have told us that such a decision by Canada would require them to make additional investments in Canada of several hundred million dollars, in order to protect the $600 million investment they already have there. For this reason, Ford, GM and Chrysler have stated that they would be placed in serious difficulty by the imposition of countervailing duties. Politically, we must expect that the imposition of countervailing duties would put a severe strain on our relations with Canada. The position of the Pearson Government will be damaged and as a matter of political preservation it would be likely to issue furious anti-American statements to protect itself against anticipated taunts from the Diefenbaker forces. I therefore do not agree with Secretary Dillon that the imposition of countervailing duties will improve our negotiating position with Canada. Moreover, the dispute could affect Canadian cooperation with us in other fields. The legal aspects of this matter are technical and properly within the responsibility of the Treasury Department. I note, however, in Secretary Dillon’s memorandum that a respectable case has been made that the Canadian plan involves no subsidy and that the issue is likely to be tested in the courts at any event. I wonder, in the circumstances, whether it would not be prudent to ask the Department of Justice to render an opinion on the question. This would, of course, involve a delay beyond the November 1 date proposed by Secretary Dillon, but it is my understanding that the significance of this date is primarily one of administrative convenience rather than of legal necessity. Subsequent to my talk with Paul Martin last Monday, 3 the Canadian Embassy has now informed us that the Canadians have developed some new proposals for an alternative to the Canadian remission plan based on a freer flow of trade. While the Embassy was not at liberty to discuss the new Canadian proposals, they indicated that they followed the lines of suggestions by United States representatives last summer. We propose to meet with the Canadians in Ottawa on September 24 and 25. These talks should indicate whether there exists a basis for an acceptable agreement with Canada which would result in termination of the remission plan and avoid the necessity to impose countervailing duties. In the circumstances I strongly recommend that the decision regarding countervailing duties be deferred until the results of the next talks are known. 4 Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2. Limited Official Use. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 See Document 322 . 4 In a September 22 memorandum to President Johnson, Secretary Dillon noted that he had the authority to issue a countervailing decision without reference to the Department of Justice and that November was the latest date such an order could be issued without impact on U.S. production. He suggested that issuance of the order be delayed to on or about November 10 to allow further time for talks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2) 324. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 324. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 27, 1964. SUBJECT Progress on Canadian Auto Parts and the Need for a Bargain with Wilbur Mills As you may remember, the Canadian auto parts row has been one of the most troublesome issues between us and Pearson’s Government for about a year. The Canadians put on a tariff scheme, designed to stimulate production in Canada, which sharply penalized independent American auto suppliers. In response to their spurs, Doug Dillon has been urging us to apply a countervailing duty against Canada; this is what the letter of the law seems to him to require, but the trouble is that it would start a major trade fracas with the Canadians and do no one any good. Common sense has now prevailed, and a possible bargain is shaping up which has the support of all departments of your Government, most of the auto industry, and—we are confident—the Canadians. It is as follows: —Both Canada and the United States would eliminate tariffs on automobiles and most automobile parts originating in the other country. —The Canadian Government would make a side deal with the major automobile producers who operate on both sides of the border; the producers would commit themselves to increase somewhat the fraction of their output originating in Canada. The shift is to take place over four years and would be made easy by the rising market for automobiles both here and there; it should cause us very little trouble. (Justice has some anti-trust worries about this, but nothing very serious.) The big companies are all in line (Ford and Chrysler with gusto). The only negative reaction has come from some independent parts producers. One company, Modine, with parts—plants employing a total of about 1,250 workers in Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky and California, is openly hostile. The bulk of the parts industry, however, is either in favor or neutral. The UAW would be prepared to support the proposal if they can be assured that there will be adequate provision for dislocated workers. Labor believes we can work this out with Reuther and his people. The immediate problem is to get Wilbur Mills to agree to push the necessary implementing legislation. You do not now have authority to reduce U.S. tariffs to zero on goods from a particular country. The plan is to tack an appropriate amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930. From a preliminary check by the Ford people, it appears that Mills would be receptive to pushing this through quickly, right after Medicare. If you instruct us to proceed, Dillon will talk with Mills and try to get a clear commitment on this point. This particular matter should take only 3-4 days of hearings. So it will delay other items very little. Henry Wilson in O’Brien’s office concurs in this tactic. The matter is fairly urgent. Doug claims that if the Canadians do not rescind their current tariff scheme he must impose countervailing tariffs by January 1 or face jail. The Canadians would be prepared to rescind in return for an agreement which would commit us to go to the Congress for the necessary legislation during the winter. If you agree, and if Mills is agreeable, we can probably close the deal with Pearson’s people well before January 1. This will be a major achievement, and one with some news value too. McG. B. Tell Dillon to work on Mills 2 Speak to me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 2. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “See if McNamara agrees with this.” 2 Neither option is checked but another handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “Mr. Bundy asked Pres. on phone 12/5 and told Bator ok to go ahead.” Representative Mills held hearings April 27-29. 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, December 9, 1964, 11:57 a.m. 1440. Law of the Sea. Department anxious Canadian Government continue be in no doubt as to serious and fundamental opposition by USG to projected plans of GOC to implement recent extension exclusive fishing limits by employment straight baseline system so as to close in as “internal waters” and thus cut off from High Seas waters of Hudson Bay and Strait, Gulf of St. Lawrence, Bay of Fundy, Dixon Entrance and Hecate Strait. It being important that our position be reiterated to Foreign Minister Paul Martin before December 13 (earliest Secretary could raise subject in Paris) 2 or his return Ottawa, you are requested see Martin soonest and make following points to him: We have consistently stressed that Canadian proposals create vital security problem for us and Free World generally; we are convinced that less friendly nations (e.g. USSR, Indonesia, etc.) could use Canadian precedent to close off vast areas contiguous waters, very seriously hampering security measures of Western allies. While we thus cannot accept Canadian proposals we have tried through many months of discussion to take forthcoming attitude, seeking arrangements that would accommodate Canadian needs without creating precedent jeopardizing vital security interests at stake. Question fisheries zone extension first raised Kennedy-Pearson meeting May 1963 3 but without reference enclosure plan. Pearson announced general intentions Parliament June and detailed plan presented in August to USG negotiators led by Alexis Johnson. During three subsequent meetings USG sought such formula through our offers for expert study fishery and security aspects of Canadian problems, acquiescence in nine mile extension fishing limits and Hudson Bay claim, removal of subject from US-Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense agenda at Martin’s request and offer non-contentious ICJ suit all rejected by GOC. Most recent informal suggestion made by Assistant Secretary Tyler October in Ottawa rejected November 30. 4 USG regrets that problem which it sees as entirely of GOC making should be cause of friction between two friendly neighbors with vast area of identity of objectives and interests. As we have repeatedly emphasized, we cannot either with due regard for our own world-wide security interests or the interests of the Western Alliance acquiesce in GOC move to cut off St. Lawrence Gulf and other bodies of water from High Seas. We will of course make known our views to other interested Governments, a step we have refrained from until now in hopes arrange some accommodation with GOC. We remain hopeful that GOC will be able to devise some solution for their problem which will be consonant with Free World interests. FYI: France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have all resisted Canadian proposals. USG does not wish to give impression of “ganging up” on GOC. However it obvious GOC has given distorted picture its negotiations with other countries—especially France. Because of this and our lack of success bilaterally with Canadians we feel time has come to consult with other interested governments. End FYI. 5 Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Glazer; cleared in BNA, IO, and L; and approved by Freshman. Repeated to Ottawa. 2 The NAC Ministerial meeting was scheduled for December 15-17. 3 See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. XIII, Document 449 . 4 See Document 321 . Canadian rejection of Tyler’s informal approach was reported in telegram 635 from Ottawa, December 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN) 5 In telegram 763 from Ottawa, December 9, Butterworth reported that the departure of the Canadian Delegation to the Paris meeting would be held up by internal political considerations and that he had sought a meeting with Martin who had requested he talk instead with Cadieux. He had carried out the démarche outlined by the Department and his presentation had been rejected. “Nevertheless, it seems to me important that Secretary should have a solemn talk with Martin.” (Ibid.) 326. Editorial Note 326. Editorial Note Prime Minister Pearson visited the LBJ Ranch in Texas January 15-16, 1965, for talks with U.S. officials. During the visit, the President and Prime Minister signed an agreement on auto parts. For text of the agreement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pages 1040-1041. No memoranda of conversation of these meetings were found. Background papers for the Pearson visit are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2478. Documentation relating to subsequent efforts to secure Congressional support for the Canadian auto agreement is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 4. Pearson discussed the meeting in Mike: Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson , Volume 3, pages 125-128. 327. Editorial Note 327. Editorial Note On April 2, 1965, Prime Minister Pearson, in an address at Temple University in Philadelphia, suggested changes in U.S. policy in the Vietnam conflict. President Johnson invited Pearson to meet with him the following day at Camp David, Maryland. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held between 12:30 and 2:45 p.m. (Johnson Library) No U.S. record of the discussions between the two men was found. At an April 22 press conference in Ottawa, Pearson confirmed reports that the meeting with the President centered on the question of Vietnam and had been acrimonious but insisted that they had parted on good terms. Pearson’s account of the meeting is in Mike: Memoirs of the Right Honorable Lester B. Pearson , Volume 3, pages 138-142. Ambassador Charles Ritchie, who was also present at Camp David, commented on the meeting in Storm Signals, pages 80-83. 328. Editorial Note 328. Editorial Note On June 28, 1965, Ambassador Livingston Merchant and Canadian Ambassador A.D.P. Heeney presented the Secretary of State with their joint report, “Canada and the United States—Principles for Partnership.” The report was the result of a January 1964 agreement by President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson to establish a working group on improving cooperation between the two nations. A copy of the report, which was subsequently released to the public on July 12, is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pages 1044-1046. 329. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 329. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 1 Ottawa, July 26, 1965. 91. Ref: Deptels 79, 127, and 128 July 25. 2 I saw the Prime Minister and delivered to him the letter contained in reftel 128 and gave him oral messages as per reftels. His immediate reaction was: “I am predisposed to be responsive to whatever the President asks. I will give ready and most sympathetic consideration to his request.” 3 He said that the members of the Cabinet are scattered now but he would discuss the problem as soon as the Cabinet could be called together. He added that this might have to be sooner than later if the postal strike did not take a turn for the better for in that case he would be left no option but to recall Parliament and legislate the postal workers back to their jobs. A move which he certainly did not wish to take. I have the feeling, based on several conversations, that Pearson has now had a change of mind and has come to the view he would prefer an election this fall for a number of reasons including the fact that he would not like to fight through Parliament his medical insurance plan without a majority behind him. But knowing him as I do, I am sure that the final decision will be made not far in advance. Be this as it may, the increase in our military commitment in Vietnam and any further notable increases in Canada’s civil benefactions will be regarded by his party as politically disadvantageous developments. Incidentally the Embassy’s information is that the additional $500,000 of aid to Vietnam which the Canadian Govt publicly announced at the time of Cabot Lodge’s visit here last September has never been disbursed. Although the Canadians have been in touch with the Vietnamese Govt and our mission there suitable projects of which we thought building materials were one have never been agreed. Butterworth 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. There is no transmission time on the telegram, which was received at 4:36 p.m. Passed to the White House. 2 Circular telegram 127, July 25, instructed Embassies to deliver the immediately following letter to their respective heads of state. Circular telegrams 128, July 25, contained the text of the President’s message, which concerned U.S. policy in Vietnam. Telegram 79 to Ottawa, July 25, contained instructions for the oral presentation of the letter. (All ibid.) 3 In an August 5 reply to President Johnson, Pearson stated his satisfaction with the continued U.S. policy of restraint and reaffirmed his statements to Parliament of July 26 of support for the “purposes and objectives” of U.S. policy in Vietnam, reaffirming Canada’s willingness to provide economic assistance to South Vietnam. He concluded by stressing the need to bring the United Nations more fully into the search for a peaceful solution to the war. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence, Canada-Pearson, Vol. 1) 330. Memorandum of Conversation 330. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 5, 1965, 6 p.m. SecDel/MC/12 SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1965 SUBJECT US-Canadian Auto Parts Agreement PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Mr. Robert L. Barry Canada Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, M. Cadieux Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, HBO Robinson Mr. Martin asked if the Secretary had been briefed on the auto parts agreement now before the Congress. He pointed out that this issue was significant in the coming Canadian elections and that his party was concerned about it. It has gone through the House without problems but in the Senate it has been amended to provide for a Congressional review in 1968. While Martin said that he has been told that this problem will be ironed out in the Senate-House Conference, it would be a great disappointment if it were not. The Canadians feel that the agreement as negotiated provides adequately for automatic review, since the President would have to report on its implementation to the Congress after 1968. In any case it would be impossible to judge how the agreement is working by the beginning of 1968 and thus Congressional review could serve no useful purpose. Martin pointed out that, if the Senate provision for review stands, there will be considerable political uproar in Canada. It would be claimed that the United States had repudiated the agreement and the Liberal Party would have to pay a price for this politically. Mr. Martin said that he hoped that Secretary Rusk and the administration would throw their weight behind the agreement as reported out by the House. He has already been maintaining in his political statements that this is an agreement which serves both American and Canadian interests, and that, had relations between Canada and the US not been very good, it could not have been negotiated. Martin said the Liberals have been trying to avoid anti-American attacks by the Conservatives in the campaign and this would be most difficult to achieve if the Senate amendment was passed. Secretary Rusk said that he would look into the matter and get a report by the following day. The Administration also hopes that the agreement will not be altered by Congress, he said. But he cautioned that under the United States constitutional system if Congress turned down an administration proposal, there is no recourse. At the close of the meeting the Secretary asked Martin what line should be taken with the Press. If Martin desired, the Secretary said, he could report that he had made the strongest representations on the auto parts agreement. 2 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Confidential. Drafted by Barry and approved in S on October 12. The memorandum is Part VI of VII; other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Waldorf Towers. 2 The Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, P.L. 89-283, offered adjustment assistance to individuals and firms affected by the abolition of tariffs on cars and car parts between Canada and the United States. For text of the law, signed by President Johnson on October 21, see 79 Stat. 1016. 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 331. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 1 Ottawa, April 27, 1966. 1455. Deptel 1136, April 25. 2 I appreciate being asked “if there is anything constructive that we can do in relation to Canada at the present time.” While there are several which I will list below, I believe there is no one thing which would be more constructive or work more good for US-Canadian understanding at this time than a visit here by the President. I will recommend certain specifics about this in Part II of this telegram. I. The political and psychological climate in Canada suggests that a visit by the President could have a tremendous impact in focussing the attention of Canadians upon enduring common interests between our countries and in redirecting their fixation away from such problem issues between us as Vietnam and China which they persistently view so astigmatically. Canadians need and would welcome new definitions and new challenges. Never in their hundred years of federation has there been less accommodation between French Canadian and English Canadian citizens or a less tenable division of power between the central government and the provinces. The political system is without reliable bearings or direction and is scarred by internal bickering and vituperation that has resulted in no major party’s meriting enough popular confidence to hold an electoral majority. In these circumstances, it is truly remarkable that as Canada’s only neighbor and potential scapegoat we are the recipients of less captious criticism or hostility than we might expect. Alongside the U.S. and its strong central guidance and purpose, Canadians feel an inferiority that is displayed in envy, resentment, and, particularly in foreign affairs, in sanctimoniousness. We have to recognize that against this backdrop of internal tensions and immaturity there are limits to what we can do. On such problem issues between us as Vietnam and China on which feeling is general and not merely regional, only peace in Vietnam or the success of a two-China policy (or its failure with Canada’s getting badly burned in the process) would exorcise these diversionary subjects. On most foreign issues, however, we are not far apart, and strictly bilateral problems usually yield to satisfactory settlement. Since the Pearson government came to power in 1963, we have accomplished a number of things as described in my 1964 and 1965 annual reviews (A-581 and A-638) 3 such as: Canada’s acceptance of nuclear weapons, the Columbia River Treaty, the auto parts agreement, the civil air accord, elimination of lead and zinc quotas, a balance of payments agreement, etc. We have staved off but not yet dissuaded Canada from pursuing its Law of the Sea statute which provides for enclosure of waters, now part of the high seas, by new baselines. Since for good reason our opposition is implacable, we should seek to avoid a future public confrontation by making our position unmistakably clear. II. Of the constructive things that we can do, I want to single out one from the following list as uniquely appropriate should the President be able to visit Ottawa. This is the St. John River project now nearing the end of negotiations. The President could expect to address a joint session of the two Houses of Parliament, and the announcement of a St. John River agreement on that occasion would accent our continental partnership and dramatize for Canadians our common interest and advantage in close cooperation. A Presidential visit customarily takes place when Parliament is in session so that he can address a joint session of both Houses. Parliament is expected to remain in session until about mid-July, and a visit in early July would be feasible. Parliament is not expected to resume its session until sometime in September, and in addition the President will no doubt wish to consider a brief trip to Montreal to visit the American Pavilion at the Exposition in the late spring or early summer of 1967. Therefore, the spacing of these visits is a consideration. Other constructive things, no one of which by itself is calculated to change very much the tenor of U.S.-Canadian relations, but together are of cumulative importance, are as follows: (1) Official designation of the NORAD regional headquarters at North Bay, Ontario, as alternate command post to CINCNORAD’s main headquarters at Colorado Springs. Canadians would regard this designation as a matter of gratifying prestige and closer military partnership. (2) Clarification by the U.S. Department of Defense of the desideratum for Canada’s future military role and contribution to NORAD and Western defense. Canada is preparing itself increasingly and all but irrevocably for a small power capability and for restrictively peacekeeping operations—without nuclear weapons (see pp. 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 10 ] et seq. of A-638). (3) Further reduction of trade barriers on both a multilateral and bilateral basis. Currently the US is rightly emphasizing negotiations in the Kennedy Round in connection with the efforts of both Canada and the US to achieve a liberalization of trade in multilateral context. Following the Kennedy Round we should examine with Canada prospects for further liberalization bilaterally such as was achieved by the US-Canadian automotive agreement. (4) An explicit decision to exempt Canada from present and future U.S. balance-of-payments corrective measures, in return for a continuing Canadian commitment to hold down and even to reduce Canadian gold and foreign exchange reserves. The existing agreement with Canada, whereby the GOC has agreed to reduce reserves in 1966 by $300 million to the advantage of the U.S., assures the U.S. that any Canadian B/P gains this year will in fact accrue to our benefit. U.S. direct investment capital outflow to Canada is nevertheless limited by the U.S. guidelines. Any restrictions applied against travel to Canada would gravely disturb our relationship particularly in view upcoming Expo 67 whereas situation in fact offers opportunity for cooperative action by US and Canada to promote tourism to North America given reserves agreement. (5) Elimination or amelioration of extra-territorial effects of U.S. legislation on U.S. subsidiaries in Canada, e.g. such as section 5 (b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act. (6) Definitive liberalization or elimination of the cheddar cheese quota, particularly on aged cheddar. (7) It would be useful now to clarify authoritatively for the Canadian Government the amendments to our 1965 Immigration Act insofar as they apply to Canada. This act [garble] long-term meaning, for example, especially in relation to the mobility of managerial, professional, and technical personnel in North America. Also, it is highly desirable that there be an authoritative clarification of our Selective Service Act in its application to legal alien residents in the US, persons with dual US-Canadian citizenship, and other persons resident in Canada who may be subject to it. Problems arising from ambiguities in this field are increasing and are getting into the political arena here. (8) Establishment of an international park on Point Roberts, a small US appendage to British Columbia accessible to Americans only via Canada. (9) Opening of a USIS office with a library in the Consulate General in Montreal manned by a young French-speaking officer for the counter—Gaullist and other reasons I have enumerated ad nauseum. I will be glad to supply further information and detail as may be desired. Butterworth 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. There is no time of transmission on the telegram, which was received at 7:59 p.m. Passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 1136 to Ottawa reads: “President has asked Dept ‘if there is anything constructive that we can do in relation to Canada at this time.’ Dept would appreciate any suggestions you may have by COB April 27.” (Ibid.) 3 Neither printed. (Both ibid.) 332. Memorandum of Conversation 332. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 1, 1966, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Law of the Sea PARTICIPANTS C.S.A. Ritchie, Ambassador of Canada G.C. Langille, Counselor, Canadian Embassy A.W. Mathewson, First Secretary, Canadian Embassy U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Charles A. Kiselyak, Office of Canadian Affairs Stanley Futterman, Special Assistant, L At Ambassador Johnson’s invitation, Ambassador Ritchie called on him the afternoon of June 1 to receive the US response to the suggestion that Foreign Minister Martin had made to Under Secretary Mann in February 2 that a way be found so that Canada could declare certain large bodies of water—e.g., the Gulf of the St. Lawrence—to be Canadian fishing seas. Ambassador Johnson gave Ambassador Ritchie an Aide-Mémoire, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum, 3 and said that while the US, after very careful consideration, could find no support in international law for the conversion of high seas into fishing seas, it was the intention of the US to be as helpful as possible in aiding Canada to achieve a solution to the problems its fishermen face or fear they will someday face. Ambassador Ritchie expressed great disappointment that Mr. Martin’s proposal had not received US assent and noted that not only did the proposal represent a retreat from the original Canadian intention of declaring the bodies of water in question to be internal Canadian waters but that, further, the proposal had been suggested by the US in the first place. Ambassador Ritchie said that Canada’s retreat from its initial position had resulted from Canada’s recognition of the security problem any diminution of the high seas would present to the US and expressed doubt that any international conservation scheme would meet Canada’s needs. Ambassador Ritchie added that it was Canada’s wish to deny the areas in question to foreign fishermen, except for those with treaty rights, and had expected from the conversation in February that the US would help them do that. Ambassador Ritchie ended his remarks by saying that the US response seemed completely to ignore Mr. Martin’s talk with Mr. Mann and that he was certain Mr. Martin would be disappointed at the US decision because he had been “counting on it”. Ambassador Johnson said that it was most regrettable if the Canadian Government had been misled and volunteered to review the record. He added, however, that his willingness to review the record ought not to be interpreted as detracting in any way from the Aide-Mémoire. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Kiselyak and approved in G on June 8. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. 2 Martin made the suggestion February 18 during his visit to Washington. No U.S. record of the conversation was found. Ritchie supplied a copy of the Canadian record of conversation to Johnson on June 3. (Ibid., POL 33-4 CAN-US) 3 Not printed. 333. Editorial Note 333. Editorial Note During March and June 1966 the Government of Canada sent Chester Ronning, a retired diplomat and Sinologist, to Hanoi to conduct soundings regarding the willingness of the Government of North Vietnam to enter into negotiations with the United States to terminate hostilities in South Vietnam. At the conclusion of his second trip June 14-17, Ronning flew to Washington accompanied by Foreign Minister Martin, for a meeting with U.S. officials at which he outlined North Vietnamese positions. A copy of the June 21 memorandum of conversation between the Canadian delegation and a group of U.S. officials, headed by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, together with a June 22 memorandum for the record by Bundy analyzing the talks, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL CAN-US. 334. Memorandum of Conversation 334. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 22, 1966, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Law of the Sea PARTICIPANTS Canadian Side Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs A. E. Ritchie, Ambassador to the US Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs George P. Kidd, Minister, Canadian Embassy, Washington Yvon Beaulne, Minister, Canadian Embassy, Washington J. G. Hadwen, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister US Side The Secretary Governor W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rufus Z. Smith, Director, Office of Canadian Affairs Mr. Martin took the initiative to raise the subject of the Law of the Sea. He recalled that he had first discussed the matter with Ambassador Johnson two and one-half years ago. 2 Since then Canada had established a 12-mile fishing zone, and the Canadian Parliament had passed legislation authorizing the drawing of baselines in a manner which would incorporate certain bodies of water as Canadian territorial waters. The matter had now reached a stage where the Canadian Government would have to move further. He recalled that then-Assistant Secretary Tyler had made a personal suggestion that the US could accept the Canadian action if it involved only fishing, but Canada had not accepted the suggestion. 3 Later, Mr. Martin had discussed the matter with then-Deputy Under Secretary Mann. 4 He had told Mr. Mann that while Canada would be unhappy that no further progress had been made, the GOC was now proposing to move only with regard to fishing and not to the extent of claiming ownership of the waters, although on this latter point Canada would explicitly reserve its position. (During this discussion Mr. Stoessel intervened to stress that the Tyler proposal had not been official, and the Secretary remarked with a smile that this had been what the lawyers call “a frolic of his own”.) Mr. Martin went on to say that he hoped the US would now reconsider the fishing proposal. If the US cannot do so, Canada will have to go back to its original position, i.e. to claim the waters as exclusively Canadian for all purposes. This, he said, is what the Canadian legislation calls for, and he just could not face Parliament when it reconvenes this fall without being able to report progress. (“We have reached dead-end. There is no other course.”) Under such circumstances his plea to the US would be that we limit our action to a protest. The Secretary responded initially by pointing out that our major concern is the question of general applicability. If Canada can do what it proposes, others can close off the Java Sea and other bodies of water, the free access to which is of vital importance to us. The Secretary also commented that to refer, as Mr. Martin had done, to bodies of water such as the Gulf of St. Lawrence as “internal waters” was begging the question. Surely this very question was what was at issue. Mr. Martin responded that in his view the Canadian action would not prejudice the US case elsewhere in the world. Surely there were unique circumstances involved in the Canadian case which any court would recognize are not paralleled elsewhere. There followed a general discussion of possible action by the International Court of Justice. Mr. Martin doubted that Canada would agree that the US could take Canada to court on the matter, although he said he recognized clearly that the US could instigate court action by another party. If Canada were faced with a suit before the Court, he would simply turn the proposal over to the Canadian Department of Justice to be dealt with by the best lawyers they could find, and he thought the US would be wrong to assume that the Canadian case could not prevail. Commenting that he saw real trouble ahead on this issue, the Secretary pressed Mr. Martin for a clear statement of what the real Canadian interest was. Was it fishing? The flag? Security? Mr. Martin responded emphatically that the interest was fishing. At another point in the conversation, Mr. Martin recalled that the matter had also been discussed between Prime Minister Pearson and President Kennedy at their Hyannis Port meeting, but Ambassador Johnson pointed out that this was the one issue discussed at Hyannis Port on which President Kennedy had made clear, as indeed was indicated in the communiqué, 5 that the US did not accept the Canadian view. Mr. Martin added that fishing is not a legal matter. Ambassador Johnson at one point recalled that the US had offered to accept one portion of the Canadian fishing proposal, that which had to do with Hudson Bay. Mr. Martin responded that, of course, this was the least important part of the proposal and therefore the offer was not acceptable to Canada. At one point in the discussion, Mr. Martin pointed out that the Canadian fishing proposal concerned only the East Coast, and he argued that in preparing its proposal Canada had taken great care not to harm US fishing interests in any way whatsoever. The Secretary reiterated his concern about the general applicability of a Canadian move to close off the waters in question. We cannot acquiesce in one area and still insist that it cannot be done elsewhere in the world. The Secretary at one point suggested that perhaps we ought to appoint people on either side to take a hard look at the matter, but nothing specific was agreed upon and this part of the conversation ended inconclusively. 6 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Smith and approved in S/AH on August 4 and in S and G on August 8. The memorandum is Part 2 of 8. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room. 2 See Document 317 . 3 Apparent reference to the June 7, 1964, meeting of Tyler and Cadieux; see Document 321 . 4 See footnote 2, Document 332 . 5 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 , pp. 371-374. 6 On August 15 Ambassador Ritchie presented Johnson with a letter from Martin to Rusk restating the decision to declare the St. Lawrence Gulf an “internal waterway” and requesting U.S. acquiescence. A memorandum of conversation with attached copy of Martin’s letter are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. 335. Memorandum of Conversation 335. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Chamcook, New Brunswick, August 21, 1966. SUBJECT Law of the Sea PARTICIPANTS United States The President Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth Rufus Z. Smith, Director for Relations with Canada Canada Prime Minister Pearson Ambassador A. E. Ritchie H. Basil Robinson, Assistant Under-Secretary for External Affairs (The President met with Prime Minister Pearson on the occasion of his participation in a cornerstone laying ceremony at the Roosevelt Campobello International Park on Campobello Island, New Brunswick. He was the luncheon guest of the Prime Minister at Rossmount Inn in the little town of Chamcook, N.B. The lunch was preceded by approximately an hour and a half of serious conversation in a parlor of the Inn set aside for the purpose.) The Prime Minister said there was one bilateral problem which he wanted to raise. He briefly reviewed the history of discussions between Canada and the US on the Law of the Sea, and he referred to the proposal recently set forth by his Foreign Minister in a letter to Secretary Rusk regarding Canada’s proposal to establish fishing rights over the Bay of Fundy, the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, and parts of the west coast. 2 He noted there had been some discussion of the legal problems involved, but he supposed these were not things that could be settled by the World Court because of the US problem with the Connally Amendment. Ambassador Butterworth interjected that in view of this aspect of the legal question, the US had a long time ago proposed that the two governments join in a friendly suit before the International Court of Justice to seek a determination prior to any action by Canada. He pointed out that Canada had turned down the proposal. The Prime Minister appeared not to have heard of this aspect of the matter and remarked, “That’s something we shall have to look into.” It was noted, in closing, that the Canadians had not yet received a reply to the Foreign Minister’s letter to the Secretary. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-8 CAN-US. Secret. Drafted by Smith and approved in the White House on August 30. The memorandum is Part 9 of 9. A complete set of memoranda of conversation between Johnson and Pearson is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 70. The meeting was held in the Rossmount Inn. 2 See footnote 6, Document 334 . 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada 336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada 1 Washington, September 14, 1966, 5:24 p.m. 46813. Subject: Law of the Sea. 1. There follows text of letter from Secretary to Martin intended to be handed Canadian Ambassador by Deputy Under Secy Johnson at 5:30 pm today: “Dear Mr. Secretary: I regret my absence from Washington delayed for a time a reply to your letter of August 10 on the Law of the Sea. 2 In the meantime, I understand, the matter was raised by Prime Minister Pearson with President Johnson during their August 21 Campobello meeting. 3 I agree completely with you that this is a matter of great importance. We have again thoroughly reviewed your proposal in the light of international law, the general interests of the Free World as we see them, and our own fishing interests. We have concluded that we cannot accept, even tacitly, the establishment of the waters in question as Canadian fishing seas. Therefore, I want to state again our willingness to give vigorous support to a Canadian effort to establish a fisheries conservation regime in the waters of concern to you. During his meeting with the President, the Prime Minister indicated he wanted to look into our suggestion of a friendly suit between the two countries, prior to any action by your Government, before the International Court of Justice. Should a less public proceeding seem desirable to Canada, we would also be willing to engage in a suitable arbitration. I would very much regret it if your Government were unable to see its way clear to pursuing any of the alternatives we have suggested and were to proceed with the action your letter contemplates. I do not know precisely how we would be obliged to respond to the assertion of your claim that certain portions of the high seas have become internal Canadian waters. It seems clear, however, that we would be forced to protest it directly and publicly, to avail ourselves of the legal remedies open to us, and to instruct our vessels and aircraft to disregard it. If such a situation were to develop, we should, of course, be faced with detailed inquiries from the Congress and from our press to which we would be obliged to respond. Among the aspects of the matter which it seems to me inevitably would thus become a matter of public record would be that we had made clear our strong opposition prior to the introduction of your legislation in Parliament and that we had suggested means by which in our judgment the problem could be resolved equitably. This subject, like others that have troubled us in the past, will eventually be, no matter what the outcome, a part of history. In the meantime, I trust that the officials of both countries will do all possible to ensure that it does not adversely affect any of the other myriad subjects that concern our two countries. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk“ 2. FYI. Letter approved by President and also by small number selected senators on confidential basis. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kiselyak and approved by Smith. 2 See footnote 6, Document 334 . 3 See Document 335 . 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 New York, September 21, 1966, 4:19 p.m. Secto 6. NATUS. Subject: Sec’s Canadian Bilateral. Following is uncleared, FYI, Noforn and subject to revision upon review: 1. In hour-long friendly but essentially unproductive conversation with Secretary, Canadian FonMin Martin made lengthy plea to let Chicoms in UN this GA, stating that “if we miss this session, we create tragic situation for world. Right course politically is to get it over with now.” Martin repeatedly indicated he seriously considering parting company with US this issue during current GA session, but he also reaffirmed that Canada would not act without prior consultation. Martin stated he would like have another chat before ChiRep issue voted in GA. 2. Secretary refuted Martin point by point, arguing that Chicoms constitute major obstacle to ending Viet-Nam war; that to reward Chicoms for misbehavior would prolong this war; that to have Chicoms in SC would destroy its effectiveness for peacekeeping. Secretary also suggested that Martin give more weight to views of Asian nations on firing line in Far East; invited him to consider question from purely Canadian national interest, and asked if Martin’s alleged problems vis-á-vishis own public could not be solved by enlightening Canadian opinion on Chicom adamancy. Secretary appeared make no dent on Martin except for grudging admission that ChiRep issue is indeed “important” (from context, however, it was not even clear if Martin views ChiRep as “important question” in technical sense in context of UNGA rules). 3. Discussion of Law of the Sea likewise tended underscore basic US-Canadian differences, though it did not completely slam door on further negotiation. Martin took line that it would be politically impossible for Canadian Govt to retreat from public position taken by Canadian parliament. Martin argued that contemplated Canadian action would not hurt US fisheries or security; would for present not be extended West Coast; would not—as Secretary suggested—set legal precedent for claims by other, notably, LA nations. 4. Martin appeared reject all suggestions made by Secretary and Legal Adviser Meeker for litigation before ICJ or arbitration and even claimed to see little practical value in further bilateral discussion. Martin did suggest the possibility of amending the law so that it would apply only to fishing, “for parliament only knows about fishing.” But when Secretary suggested he go back and amend the act in this sense, Martin indicated he would only consider doing this in return for US acceptance of Canadian position. In final aside with Meeker, Martin evinced willingness to continue bilateral discussion of the issue. 2 5. On removal of NAC from Paris, Martin seemed somewhat less intractable. When Secretary suggested that 14 PermReps be allowed take decision quietly without referral to FonMins, Martin commented: “that is way it is developing.” Martin seemed, however, want suspend judgment until he had talked with Couve Sept 26. Rusk 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 75. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Wabeke and authorized by Shaver. Repeated to Ottawa and Paris. Rusk and Martin were attending the sessions of the UN General Assembly. 2 On October 17 U.S. and Canadian officials met for further discussions of Canada’s plan to extend its exclusive fishing rights. After intensive discussions, the two sides failed to make progress on their disagreements. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. 338. Memorandum of Conversation 338. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 25, 1966. SUBJECT Secretary’s Conversation with Canadian Foreign Minister Martin: US-Canadian Relations and Over-all Policies PARTICIPANTS US Side: The Secretary Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Dep. Asst. Sec., EUR Canadian Side: Foreign Minister Martin Yvon Beaulne, Minister Martin said that the problem of Canada “and other small countries” vis-á-visthe United States is that they are forced to talk so much on the periphery of things. All of them are very concerned as to what they say to Uncle Sam and they do not speak frankly, nor do they feel that the United States is completely frank in return. The Secretary disagreed, saying that he had always felt in his talks with Martin that both were being very frank, and that the exchanges they had had were often very lively. Saying that he would take advantage of Martin’s emphasis on the desirability of frankness, the Secretary said that he had the impression that Canadian foreign policy did not evolve from a systematic calculation of the kind of world Canada would like to see in its own interest. He thought Canada reacted to situations and tried to find a middle point, but it had no over-all framework within which to make its judgments. The Secretary suggested that it might be useful if discussions could be held between the two governments at the policy planning level. For example, Canada obviously has interests in Southeast Asia and the outcome of the situation there; likewise Canada has interests in Africa and other areas of the world. A thorough discussion of such things from the standpoint of Canadian interests might lead to conclusions which would be different from what we have seen out of Ottawa so far. Martin noted that he is three-fourths French and that the French are always sensitive about the persons with whom they deal. He had profound respect for the Secretary, and the Secretary should know that the last week, in which Canada seemed to be taking a different line from that of the US, had caused him real agony. However, Martin continued, the Canadians feel that they do not really know the actual plans of the US. Canada is the neighbor of the US and Canadians have a similar origin to Americans; if this were not the case, Canada would probably take a very strong stand against the US. Martin said that the Canadian Government is always under great pressure from the public for being a satellite of the United States. This is a difficult situation. The Secretary said he appreciated this, but he asked again what Canadian policy would be if it were enunciated only in Canadian national terms. Martin said that, for one thing, Canada wanted a world where the US and the Soviet Union would be on better relations than is now the case. He felt that the UK, in the interests of such relations, should take a chance and stop the bombing in North Viet-Nam. Martin said that, in general, the Soviets are developing in the right direction in their society. He cited his talk with Kosygin as being reassuring on this score. Martin continued that the United States could not expect Canada to say “yes” to US policy in every situation. He said that Canada believes in the Commonwealth and believes very strongly in the UN. The Secretary asked if this included Article I of the UN Charter, providing for collective security. Martin responded affirmatively, although he said that the Canadian people were divided on Viet-Nam, just as the American people. So far as NATO was concerned, the French population of Canada had nothing to do with Canada’s stand on the relocation of NAC. At the same time, Canada feels close to France, and believes that no steps should be taken which could be interpreted as being against the French people. The Secretary said that it is fundamental to the kind of world we want that the US should meet its commitments. The Soviets and the Chinese must see that we mean business; otherwise we could have war. Martin said he understood our policy in Europe and in NATO and he felt this was important. The Secretary commented that what we did in Asia was equally important; we cannot be a virgin in Europe and a whore in the Pacific. The Secretary concluded by stressing again his desire for frank understanding with Canada, and he urged Martin to query us if he had any questions concerning our policies. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 69 D 35, Pol 7 Visits. Secret. Drafted by Stoessel. The memorandum is Part 10 of 10. The other memoranda of conversation are ibid. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Dining Room. 339. Memorandum of Conversation 339. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 16, 1966, 3:45 p.m. SUBJECT Law of the Sea Dispute with Canada: Possible Multilateral Solution PARTICIPANTS Canada A. E. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador US Acting Secretary Katzenbach Rufus Z. Smith, Director, EUR/CAN Donald L. McKernan, S/FW Carl F. Salans, L The Canadian Ambassador called at the Department at the invitation of the Acting Secretary, who handed him an Aide-Mémoire 2 setting forth, he pointed out, the views of the United States fisheries experts in the form of a proposal for a multilateral agreement which, from our point of view, would provide a rather happier solution to Canada’s fisheries problems than would the Canadian proposal for unilateral action. The Ambassador inquired whether the document contained the full draft of a possible agreement. The Acting Secretary responded that there were some interstices but he thought the gaps were not large ones and could be easily worked out. He stressed that he was hopeful the draft would provide a viable alternative solution to the problem. He thought the Aide-Mémoire was a self-contained paper and he only wanted to underline his great hope that it can provide a way out. Mr. Katzenbach also remarked that he understood the matter had been discussed in the last day or so with Foreign Minister Martin in Paris 3 but, of course, he did not yet have a full account of that conversation. Mr. McKernan commented that there was one other point he hoped the Ambassador would bear in mind. The fisheries experts in Canada and the United States have worked together most successfully for years and he thought he was correct in saying there is a high degree of respect on both sides. The Ambassador said he had not had a full account of the most recent technical discussions between the experts of the two countries. 4 He asked how specific they had been. Had there been a discussion of an actual draft text? Mr. McKernan responded that they had not gotten down to a draft but they had considered cases. They had talked of specific areas and had proceeded to the point where there was reason to believe that our proposal would contribute more to the interests of Canadian fishing than would the Canadian plan since it would deal with greater areas. He noted that the Canadian experts had raised questions of time and plausibility and, in this connection, he said the US experts had made a genuine effort to approach these questions realistically in drawing up the present draft. The Ambassador expressed some doubt on the question of time, noting that the draft spoke of 1968 whereas the Canadian intent had been to aim for July 1, 1967. He did not know how Canadian ministers would react to this aspect. The Acting Secretary replied to the effect that, after all, time passes very quickly when one is attempting to achieve major goals. He believed it was better to be conservative than to set an unrealistic date which could not be met. Mr. McKernan added that the US experts had tried hard to be conservative. He was aware, in any event, that the Canadian experts know as much about these problems as we do. Ambassador Ritchie concluded this part of the conversation by saying he appreciated the effort which had been made and would promptly forward the text to Ottawa where, he was sure, it would receive full consideration. (The text of the Aide-Mémoire is set forth in a cable to Ottawa, December 16, 1966.) 5 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Smith and approved in U on December 30. The memorandum is Part 1 of 2. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 Not printed. 3 Documentation on these discussions is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 108. 4 No record of the meeting, held December 5 in Ottawa, was found. 5 Telegram 103942 to Ottawa, December 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 CAN-US) 340. Memorandum of Conversation 340. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Harrington Lake, Quebec, May 25, 1967. SUBJECT President’s Conversation with Prime Minister Pearson of Canada, May 25, 1967 PARTICIPANTS The President Canadian Prime Minister Pearson (See attached list of others who were present) 2 (The President and the Prime Minister lunched together, each with only two key advisers, in the dining room of the Prime Minister’s residence. Afterwards, they talked privately together for some minutes. Subsequent to their private conversation, the talks shifted to the sitting room. The following summarizes the conversation which took place in the sitting room.) 3 Import of Canadian Oil into the U.S. After indicating, in response to a query by Secretary Martin, that he and the President had talked of Vietnam when they were alone, the Prime Minister asked the President about the prospects for shipping Canadian oil in through Chicago. He said, with a smile, that the situation in the Middle East, about which they had been talking at lunch, shows how important it is not to be dependent on Middle East sources of oil. The President responded that he had been talking along these lines only the night before with a group of Texas oilmen. 4 The Prime Minister remarked jokingly that after all, Canadian oil is all Texas-owned anyway and therefore the money all flows back into the United States in one form or another. The President commented that the Executive Branch of the Government was generally more sympathetic than the Congress on matters of this kind. For example, there is considerable pressure right now from the Congress on dairy products; next week it might be meat. In his judgment, this also raised the possibility of not being able to rely on voluntary restraints. Kennedy Round The Prime Minister asked what effect pressures of this kind would have on the prospects for implementation of the Kennedy Round. The President responded that he thought it was manageable. He recalled that President Franklin Roosevelt had once remarked to him just after his election for a third term that when you get a mandate you ought to execute it within six months. The Prime Minister then wryly asked, “Have you ever had a minority?“ The President replied by citing his own experience some years ago when he had encountered a 13-0 vote against him in a committee with a Democratic majority and reminisced about some of his legislative experiences. Vietnam The Prime Minister indicated he had been having his own Parliamentary difficulties. He referred to a major debate on Vietnam which had just taken place in the House of Commons. The situation had been difficult for him since there were many, even some in his own party, who were pressing for the Government to oppose U.S. policy. It seemed to him that the bombing of North Vietnam had somehow become a symbol in Canada and in other countries. The President agreed, saying that it had become a symbol because of very skillful propaganda. There were, in fact, very superior people in the U.S., too, who were always chanting “stop the bombing.” But one had to remember there are real problems involved. In the first place, we don’t want to tie our own hands. In the second place, we have pride too. Why should we always make the unrequited move? The President deplored the one-sided demands which are always made on the United States, particularly since we had already stopped the bombing six times. The only result every time was increased casualties for the U.S. We even tried a cessation of 37 days and nothing came of it. It is always the same. Most recently, we have said we would stop the bombing “if you, Ho Chi Minh, will stop infiltrating.” We had said we will also stop augmenting, but Ho Chi Minh rejected any such proposal. The President reiterated that every time we stop bombing we lose men’s lives, our own men’s lives, and the blood is on his hands. He said he had recently been taken to task by his daughter’s date, a young man who had suffered a severe head wound in Vietnam, for agreeing to pauses in the bombing. These men hold him responsible for the casualties accruing during such pauses. The President went on about the futility of unilateral moves. He said that every time he accedes to such a suggestion he ends up behind his own goal line. Yet, every week we say in some way to the Communist camp that we are willing to stop if we can see the slightest indication of a response from their side. The real trouble is, the President went on, that the enemy won’t stop. What they want is Thailand, Laos, and the rest of Southeast Asia. This is a fundamental fact which has to be understood. For that matter, Communist mortars kill more people than our own bombing. The Prime Minister asked about the chances of a cease-fire proposal. The President thought the proposal had about as much appeal as a proposal to become a Yankee would have had to his Confederate grandmother. The Prime Minister admitted that the President was right, but he said that was one of the disadvantages. He could talk this way to the President but he couldn’t do so to Ho Chi Minh. The President reiterated that last week we had said we were prepared to give up the bombing. But the question always is, what will the other side do? We never get an answer to this question. He thought it perhaps ought to be the price of making a suggestion that it be multilateral, or at least two-sided. The President cited recent reports to the effect that the Middle East now confronts us with a dilemma, i.e., to choose between the Middle East and Vietnam. These were dangerous in both Cairo and Moscow. We could deal with both. He thought there ought to be no misunderstanding whatsoever of our determination regarding Vietnam. We will do what we have to do and we will pay what we have to pay in terms of money, men, and forces. The President emphasized that we have fought a limited war with limited objectives. He had maintained this course against the advice of all his military advisers. Our aims are limited. All we want is self-determination. We have over 40 other countries in alliances with us and we will keep our word. We don’t want to imperialize or colonize anybody. We are willing to stop, but it has to be both sides. The Prime Minister interjected that he was not suggesting cessation for a short period. He understood that the President’s military advisers would argue as they do. That’s their job. But others, he thought, more clearly see that what the U.S. is after is a political and not a military objective. The President agreed, but stressed again that cessation can’t be unilateral. The North Vietnamese won’t even say to their best friends what they might do. He thought it ought also to be recognized that if we offered such a unilateral move and it failed, the situation might be worse. Foreign Minister Martin then asked, “But don’t you stand to lose more by perhaps inevitable escalation?” The President responded simply that unilateral appeals carry no weight with us. Mr. Martin noted that the Canadian Government’s public position was not that there should be a unilateral move on the part of the U.S., and he cited his own four-point proposal. The Prime Minister said his Government was under great pressure in Canada on Vietnam and was trying to stand up to it because they thought they were right in doing so. He asked, however, what about the public stance of the North Vietnamese that they will talk if the United States ceases bombing. The President responded that he understood the Prime Minister was under pressure and he appreciated his support. He went on to say, however, that he would trade conversation for conversation, but he would not trade bombing for conversation. The U.S. simply cannot stop unilaterally. If he tried to do so he would have a revolution on his hands. Middle East 5 With apparent reference to the earlier conversation at lunch, the Prime Minister said he thought the best course was to seek quadripartite agreement in the Security Council and that the U.S. should be most careful not to reject efforts toward this end. We must also be careful to avoid a tripartite position opposed by the Soviets and the UAR. If necessary, the U.S. and U.K. should accept quadripartite talks outside the U.N. French interests parallel those of the U.S. and the U.K. in the Near East. We must seek to strengthen French feeling on this and through them seek the quadripartite position. The President responded that he would consider quadripartite talks only in the framework of the U.N. As the session was breaking up, a message was brought in to the Prime Minister from British Prime Minister Wilson with information which Wilson asked be passed to the President immediately. 6 It contained the following points: (1) George Brown reported that the Soviet attitude on the Near East was not particularly encouraging. (2) Israeli Foreign Minister Eban told the British that any Israeli “first strike” would be withheld until he returned from his talks in Washington. If nothing had been worked out by then, Israel will have to strike first. (3) The British support De Gaulle’s proposal even if this means talks outside the U.N. The Foreign Office suggests we seek quadripartite talks at the level of our permanent delegates at the U.N. or, if the USSR prefers, at the Summit. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 185. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Rodger P. Davies and Rufus Z. Smith and approved by Rostow on May 29. The meeting was held at Prime Minister Pearson’s summer residence at Lake Harrington where President Johnson and the Prime Minister flew following a joint appearance at the Expo ′67 World’s Fair in Montreal. A separate memorandum of their conversation, prepared by John Vought of the staff of the Embassy in Ottawa is in Department of State, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 70 D 89, Pol 7 Visits. 2 Not printed. 3 According to a July 26 memorandum prepared by Ambassador Butterworth, the major item of discussion at the luncheon was the Arab-Israeli crisis: “the basic position the President took hellip; and that by the Prime Minister were repeated in the general discussion hellip; in the living room.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 185) 4 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson met with two Texas oil men for an off-the-record discussion of “industry problems” at 7:35 p.m. on May 24. (Johnson Library) 5 On May 16 the United Arab Republic declared a state of emergency. Two days later it ordered UN peacekeeping forces to leave its side of the border with Israel. On May 21 both the UAR and Israel mobilized their armed forces. On May 23 the UAR closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and on May 24 it “sealed” the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. 6 Dated May 26. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, United Kingdom, Vol. 6, Prime Minister Wilson) 341. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 341. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, May 27, 1967, 2058Z. CAP 67454. Ed Ritchie called and discussed at length the problem raised in U.S.-Canadian relations by the press leaks; Parliamentary discussion of your views; etc. He said he is deeply disturbed because literally in the next days the closest and most confident collaboration between the President and the Prime Minister might make the difference between war and peace in the Middle East. He is anxious to find a way for you to indicate that the incident is past and you are ready to do normal business with the Prime Minister. He later decided to put his side of the conversation in a personal and confidential letter to me, which follows. Personal and Confidential May 27, 1967 Walt: Here is a recap of my side of our telephone conversation this morning in case it may be of any use to you: 1. Neither of them can really afford to leave things where they now are. It would be a pity to lose any of the value of the good talk which they had at Harrington Lake. 2 It would be a tragedy if anything were to stand in the way of fully effective collaboration between them. There may not be much time to try to set things straight. —The press is beginning to detect some difference between them as evidenced by stories in the paper this morning. —The President and the Prime Minister may have to collaborate very soon, even before this weekend is out. 2. So far as the record is concerned (A) We were not the ones who made the visit so rushed that some loose ends were inevitably left which could give rise to misunderstanding. The unavoidable rushed nature of the visit also meant that press arrangements were less than ideal and in particular that there was little time to prepare any joint communiqué. 3 (B) On the night before the visit —The first leak did not come from us. (Apart from anything else we knew nothing of the helicopters mentioned in that first story.) —When a story appeared which you thought should be qualified by some indication from us that the visit was not definite —We got in touch with UPI and other bureaus. This was not without considerable embarrassment for us since the press were bound to think the next day that we had misled them when they were summoned hastily to get to the airport. —During the night we got a message back to the White House Situation Room for you and the President. (C) After the visit, when the first troublesome story came out about the President’s alleged intention to propose a Quadripartite meeting, the Prime Minister’s office issued a denial which, I understand, was checked out with the White House press office. (Even the first stories out of Ottawa emphasized that no decisions had been made.) (D) In the Prime Minister’s statement to the House 4 he answered questions and he seemed to me to confine himself pretty well to either what the President had said publicly a few days before (right of innocent passage) or what seemed most natural in the Middle East situation (U.N. aspect). (When the Prime Minister spoke about “agreement” he seems pretty clearly to have meant simply agreement of views and not of course any formal agreement.) 3. It might be hoped that in view of all that’s involved the President might find that after reading the actual text of the exchange in the House of Commons things now look rather different. Ed Ritchie Since the Canadians may be key at both the UN and in the maritime business, 5 you may wish to consider a call to him at some stage, simply asking his views on what’s going on in New York—or whatever. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 5. Confidential. Received at the LBJ Ranch at 4:50 p.m. 2 See Document 340 . 3 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pp. 576-577. 4 May 25. 5 Apparent reference to the Johnson administration’s plan to place the Maritime Administration in the newly-created Department of Transportation. The move was defeated by Congress on August 30. 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 1 Ottawa, October 23, 1967, 2330Z. 504. 1. There has been a steady accumulation of evidence in the past few months that the Pearson govt has been working out more policies, at variance with US views and harmful to US interests, which spell a general outlook which, if not anti-American in inspiration, is certainly anti-American in result. Some of these policies have some realistic relationship to Canadian interests; others reflect little more than a yen to yank Uncle Sam’s beard, to strike a theatrical and supposedly popular pose at US expense in the leadership race and to embarrass the US by highlighting embarrassing problems, partly with the view to papering over controversy with Quebec. 2 2. On the political side, there is supporting evidence in Canada’s recent actions regarding Vietnam, abandonment of private diplomacy, China, and ABM’s. The Pearson govt’s failure to make NORAD as cooperative a military arrangement as it could have been and its notification it would nationalize certain international waters even over our objections are long-time irritants and will not be further noted. A. Vietnam. For the first time, FonMin Martin called for unilateral cessation of bombing of North Vietnam by US in his speech at UNGA Sept 27. 3 He even twisted the stiletto, once inserted, by saying in Parliament in response to question that he had advised us beforehand. In fact, he had only given preview of his speech to US officials in the UN in “general terms.” To add insult to injury, he said in speech on Oct. 13 when questioned about Secretary’s remarks, expressing concern over what might happen if bombing stopped and Hanoi did nothing, that he could not discuss a hypothetical situation. Of course he had no hesitancy in calling on us to create a hypothetical situation, consequences of which would not be forecast and which Martin has already advised Secretary he would do nothing to meet. In CBC TV interview Oct. 11, he even fixed blame on US in Vietnam by saying “if the bombing stops, I think then the onus will be on the North. Now the onus is on the US to explain its position to the people of the world.” B. Public diplomacy. In the same TV interview, FonMin Martin also stated that he was, in effect, abandoning his advertised policy of private diplomacy about Vietnam vis-á-vis US. He said Canada had been mistaken in thinking it should not “speak up” to US on subject. Canada had responsibility for action in its capacity as member of ICC. C. China. In connection with abortive centennial visit to Ottawa of China’s VP Yen, FonMin Martin, even while GOC was trying to put visit by some substitute (eventually Deputy Premier Huang) back on rails, made embarrassing comments to press in Halifax Oct. 1 and 2 on Formosa’s not having been Chinese for hundred years and reiterating his one China-one Taiwan policy. This was symptomatic of his present penchant raise embarrassing subject to capitalize upon neutralist public opinion he exploits and encourages. D. ABM’s. After Secretary McNamara announced US decision to establish thin ABM defense line, 4 question was put to PriMin Pearson in Parliament whether GOC was advised in advance. Despite agreement between GOC officialdom and Emb that official line would be that US had “consulted” with GOC (as it had, indeed, throughout previous year), PriMin Pearson said only that GOC had been “notified.” This eased him out of any necessity to explain GOC rationale for participation or nonparticipation in system, but gave US cold comfort in permitting belief it had acted somewhat cavalierly in so vital a matter. 3. There are number of indications in economic area which may represent a reinforcing trend toward more divergence between US and Canadian policies. A. The insistence of GOC that it would, despite compelling nature of evidence gathered to prove that passage of Bank Act would retroactively discriminate against small American bank in Canada, proceed to limit bank’s growth notwithstanding is one example of this trend. B. Similarly, the leftist-oriented economic nationalists of Canada have also placed significant restrictions on advertising of US sources in publications circulated in Canada in effort to weaken bonds of cultural affinity. C. GOC now seems bent on introducing discriminatory postal rates against Time and Reader’s Digest to same end. D. Proposed changes in regulation of radio and television in Canada follow similar course, further strengthening Canadian content requirements and regulating cable vision facilities. E. The Carter Commission report 5 (on which GOC has yet to take a stand), which would revolutionize Canadian tax policy and practice, may also be seen as attempt to stem rising tide of integration of US-Canadian capital markets by establishing disincentives to both US capital investment in Canada and Canadian capital investment in US. Report also urges elimination special incentives to mining and petroleum industries controlled largely by US corporations and points out that this move will shift burden taxation from Canadian to foreign taxpayers. F. Canada’s foreign trade policy has for considerable period of time been at substantial variance with that of US as regards trading with Communist countries and particularly with Castro’s Cuba. G. Another evidence of thrust of Canadian economic nationalists appeared in Oct. 14 column of well-informed journalist Peter Newman under title “A Test for English Canadians Nationalist Urges.” According to Newman, the special task force under Walter Gordon’s chairmanship set up to look into the problems of foreign investment (particularly American), “may become the basis both for a tough new era in Canadian-American relations and a major plank in the Liberal govt’s next election platform.” The “senior liberal politicians” cited by Newman as his sources, “see economic nationalism as the kind of issue which might give this country a post-centennial set of objectives on which both French and English politicians could agree.” While Emb has reported that Newman article contains inaccuracies and is discounted by some officials, article is at least representative of views of economic nationalists in govt. 4. Comment : There is then this recent record of GOC’s giving US and US interests sandpaper treatment to point where it begins to hurt and be obvious to many, not to Americans only, that Pearson govt is fanning, whether purposely or not, anti-Americanism in country. Best known and most visible evidence of this development is in govt Crown Corporation CBC’s TV public affairs program Sunday night (formerly This Hour Has Seven Days, now The Way It Is ) continues to carry slanted and venomous attacks on US policy and US society. Recent shocker was half-hour US-made documentary film of race riots in US cities this past summer which has psychedelic presentation attempting show American society as welter of fear, hate, depravity, rot, and disintegration. Individual Canadians are still expressing their concern to Emb over this particular program, but CBC (and GOC) can be expected carry on mote-less. Butterworth 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CAN-US. Secret. 2 Reference is to the Quebec separatist movement. 3 For text, see UN doc. A/PV 1569. 4 For text of the September 18 speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pp. 16-25. 5 The report, presented on February 24, called for a complete overhaul of the Canadian taxation system. 343. Memorandum From the President Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 343. Memorandum From the President Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 26, 1967. Mr. President: The Canadians will announce this morning that they will henceforth consider as internal waters certain bays along the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador. We do not yet know the full details of what they plan to announce. Their action could give us additional difficulties in holding to our position on the status of international waters. It could also be troublesome to our fishing industry. The attached memorandum from State gives some background on this action and outlines what we propose to do. 2 State will issue a public statement at its afternoon briefing, 3 making clear that we are reserving our rights. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 5. No classification marking. A handwritten “L” and the notation “rec’d 12:46” are on the memorandum. 2 Not printed. It summarized the U.S. position and outlined U.S. responses to the Canadian action. 3 A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Canada, Vol. 5. 344. Memorandum of Conversation 344. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 16, 1967, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT US-Canadian Relations PARTICIPANTS His Excellency, A. E. Ritchie, Ambassador of Canada The Secretary Richard Straus, Acting Country Director for Canada (The Secretary had on November 2 at a reception mentioned to Ambassador Ritchie that he was troubled by the current state of Canadian-American relations. 2 As a result of this conversation Ambassador Ritchie had requested an appointment with the Secretary which was granted for November 16.) The Secretary commented that he had not had an opportunity to think as much about the state of Canadian relations as he had hoped to in preparation for the Ambassador’s call. Ambassador Ritchie asked whether the Secretary thought that US-Canadian relations were still troubled or headed for trouble. The Secretary, with a tone of humor, asked Ambassador Ritchie whether anti-Americanism was good politics in Canada these days. Ambassador Ritchie responded with a strong negative. He indicated that with the exception of Viet-Nam, where there appeared to be a definite difference of opinion over American bombing policy, he saw no real evidence of a deterioration of relations. Indeed he believed that following shortly after the successful conclusion of the Kennedy Round 3 and with Canadian cooperation in such fields as foreign exchange reserves, relations were indeed good. Many positive steps in this direction were being taken. Among these was the statement in favor of continued cooperation in NORAD which had just been made by Mr. Martin. 4 The Secretary said he was familiar with Canadian cooperation in the Kennedy Round, Canadian activities in the field of foreign aid, with the value of the auto agreement and with Canadian efforts in the field of foreign exchange reserves. He was also aware of Canadian activities in UN peacekeeping and of a closer relationship with the other NATO countries in arriving at a consensus of the 14. There were, however, some specific irritants. The US had thought, for instance, that Canada had been fully consulted on the ABM; yet Mr. Pearson’s indication seemed to have been that he had only been informed. Ambassador Ritchie claimed that the word “consultation” had a special meaning to Canadians, a sort of “folklore” dating to the Mackenzie King days and his relationship with Britain when “consultation” began to mean the equivalent of commitment. He thought the Liberal Government had deliberately shied away from using this expression because of this tradition. Certainly, Canada had been fully informed of US ABM plans and the discussions that had been held were much appreciated. Viet-Nam . The Secretary said he found a difference between public statements and private statements on Viet-Nam. While we had had very good relationships in private, some of the Canadian public statements seemed to him somewhat unnecessary. He particularly referred to the ICC which he said had been created as a sort of “troika” with one Communist member (Poland), one neutral member (India) and one Western member (Canada). It now seemed to him on occasion that what we had were two neutrals and Poland. Ambassador Ritchie would not be drawn into a discussion of Canadian public attitudes on this question. He forcefully stated that in the Commission proceedings themselves, Canada was far from neutral, that Canada had made great efforts at presenting a point of view different from that of the other two but had been thwarted because of Indian intransigence. The Secretary said that when sentiments opposing the American action in Viet-Nam are made in Canada he was particularly concerned because Canada was such a close neighbor. He felt that with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand openly supporting the American point of view and more sub rosa support coming from Laos, Burma and Indonesia, he would hope that this vast interest of friendly Asian countries might be reflected in the public attitudes taken by the Canadian Government. He recalled that he had been startled when Foreign Minister Martin said to him in private during his last visit that if there were a resolution in the UN calling on the US unilaterally to halt its bombing, Mr. Martin would have to vote for it. 5 Ambassador Ritchie again indicated that Mr. Martin had reflected what he believed was Canadian public opinion and what he thought might bring about genuine negotiations. The Secretary asked whether anyone in the Canadian Government had commented on the President’s San Antonio formula. 6 Ambassador Ritchie asked what might have been a useful comment on the part of the Canadian Government. The Secretary responded that a call to Hanoi to respond affirmatively to the President’s offer might have been appropriate. Ambassador Ritchie thought that this type of statement had been made on many occasions. He said Canadian opinion was very strong on this subject and that Mr. Pearson, contrary to some of the European leaders, was associated in some Canadian minds with the President as demonstrated by the fact that he had been picketed when he recently spoke at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto. Aeroflot . The Secretary then mentioned that he had not known of the outcome of the Aeroflot negotiations between Canada and the USSR when he last spoke to Ambassador Ritchie. He had been troubled by the possibility that so shortly after the OAS had passed its resolution asking the friends of Latin America to help it in containing Castro, the Canadian Government was about to give a refueling stop at Gander to the Soviet Union. He didn’t think that Cuba was that important to Canada. Ambassador Ritchie said that this had not been a matter of Cuba’s importance to Canada, rather that what had motivated Canada was the desire to obtain a substantial quid-pro-quo in hard-headed civil aviation negotiations. Canada would only have given the rights at Gander if it had obtained access to some remote airport in the USSR in return. This question was on the shelf for the time being and would not be re-raised unless some new elements were thrown into the pot. Gordon Study . 7 The Secretary asked when the Gordon study would be completed. Ambassador Ritchie thought that while the study might be completed in the next few weeks it should not be viewed as an anti-American document. While Minister Gordon might have his own attitudes there were others in the Canadian Government, notably Minister Sharp, who disagreed with him and in any case the Gordon study was not necessarily government policy. Restrictions on Turkey Imports . The Secretary then mentioned the restrictions on the imports of American turkeys. Ambassador Ritchie said that there had been consultations on the subject and that a statement was about to be issued. Mr. Straus indicated that while there had been consultations they had not led to any agreement and it was perhaps the circumstances under which the negotiations were initiated as much as anything else that had proved to be an irritant. Ambassador Ritchie readily agreed and said that he thought that there would be problems because, as the Secretary smilingly pointed out, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee as well as the Leader of the Opposition were representatives of turkey producing states. Postal Rate Discrimination . Speaking of the question of postal rate restrictions against the American magazines Time and Reader’s Digest, the Secretary asked Ambassador Ritchie whether the contemplated postal rate action was not another example of protectionism. Ambassador Ritchie indicated that postal rates for Time and Reader’s Digest would be increased and that this was being done to protect Canadian periodicals which would otherwise go down the drain. He said that the proportion of Canadian periodicals to non-Canadian periodicals circulating in Canada was already so disproportionate that there was practically no possibility for an expression of a Canadian point of view and that it was, therefore, necessary to take some action to prevent the possibility of the Canadian periodicals being driven off the market altogether. There had to be some room for the expression of Canadian views even on a subject such as Viet-Nam where some Canadian views might well differ with those expressed in US publications. In summary, however, Ambassador Ritchie felt that we were doing more together these days than we had ever done before and that Canada would not be in the business of building dams in western Canada as a cooperative venture with the US if US-Canadian relationships were really headed for trouble. ICC . Reverting to the Canadian ICC role, the Secretary wondered whether the Canadians had a man in Phnom Penh. Ambassador Ritchie replied in the affirmative but indicated that a Canadian representative had been most frustrated in seeking to inspect infiltration into Viet-Nam through Cambodia because of the Indian refusal to accept anything except a unanimous decision by the ICC. He wondered whether the Secretary’s question was based on the fact that current attacks on American troops in Viet-Nam seemed to be based in Cambodia. He also asked whether the US was thinking of following through on its theory of hot pursuit. The Secretary said that the situation was very difficult, that the troops attacking Dak To obviously came from Cambodia and would probably return there but that proof was difficult to obtain. Ambassador Ritchie offered to have the Canadian representative in Phnom Penh be of any assistance that he could possibly be and invited the Secretary to call him in this regard. NATO . Turning to NATO and the Harmel study, 8 the Secretary asked Ambassador Ritchie what he thought of its current status. Ambassador Ritchie thought that US-Canadian cooperation on this study had been quite good, that the 14 seemed to be working well together. The Secretary thought that it was important that the study itself not be watered down. While we might be flexible as to procedure and not confront the French with a vote, it seemed to him that it was important to have made the study and it was important not to dissipate the work that had been done. In this connection he asked Ambassador Ritchie whether there were continued pressures in Canada for Canada to reduce its commitment to NATO. Ambassador Ritchie indicated that while the pressures were still present, Minister Martin had in his speech in Toronto sought to restate the Canadian commitment and had done so effectively. Ambassador Ritchie added that Mr. Martin had also said in that speech that no power had the right to intervene in the affairs of another country without the authorization of the UN and had been misquoted as having directed this statement at US policy in Viet-Nam. He had officially denied this. The Secretary indicated that he had received Mr. Martin’s personal denial to our Embassy at Ottawa. The Secretary indicated that he would see Foreign Minister Martin in Brussels 9 and talk with him there and that he might follow-up with Ambassador Ritchie when he returned from the NATO meeting. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL CAN-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Straus and approved in S on November 22. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 No record of this conversation was found. 3 Reference is to the Geneva Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade signed at Geneva June 30, 1967, and entered into force January 1, 1968. For text, see 19 UST 1. 4 In a November 11 address in Toronto, Martin reaffirmed Canadian participation in NORAD. 5 Apparently a reference to Martin’s comments during his November 25, 1966, meeting with Rusk; see Document 338 . 6 For text of President Johnson’s September 29 statement before the National Legislative Conference meeting in San Antonio, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 876-881. 7 On January 23, 1967, Pearson set up a committee chaired by Gordon Walker to study the effect of foreign ownership on Canadian industry. 8 For text of the Harmel Report, “Future Tasks of the Alliance,” see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , pp. 321-323. 9 November 12-16. 345. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 345. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Brussels, December 12, 1967, 1027Z. Secto 4. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial meeting; US-Canadian Bilateral Talk: Vietnam. Subject of Vietnam occupied major part of Secretary’s talk with Martin December 11. Referring to UN possibilities, Secretary emphasized uncertainties of resort to Security Council. For example, he would prefer that Canada vote against inscription at beginning rather than find itself in position of having to vote in favor of resolution on unilateral bombing pause, but Secretary agreed that US could accept simple resolution on return to 1954 agreements. 2 Martin said Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel had suggested to him December 11, that UNSC might discuss matter and then recommend mediator or representative of UNSYG be appointed. Secretary said US would not necessarily object; there are so many people active that one more would probably not get in the way. Martin thought Communist countries would probably not accept Harmel suggestion. Martin then raised suggestion by Japanese Foreign Minister Miki. Although Canada had little confidence in Miki approach, Martin wondered if US would object to Canada raising subject with Poles. Secretary replied that US attitude is not to discourage anyone. Martin said Canada would continue to consult other countries before raising with Poles, and in any event wished to show a willingness to examine the Japanese idea. Martin then referred to letter from Bebler who wished to stimulate meeting of Co-Chairmen and three ICC countries. Canada and UK accepted, but Kosygin and Mrs. Gandhi refused on grounds that there could be no negotiations while bombing of North continues. Bebler then tried to get around this obstacle by proposing an agreement that hostilities would “begin to stop” on a given date. Martin and Pearson thought it worth asking us whether such approach had any merit, i.e. that US would agree to stop bombing on such a given date. Secretary replied that President’s San Antonio formulation gave US minimum position: Assurance of prompt and productive talks, US means something like three days and not three to six weeks. Hanoi reply was flat “no,” without even exploring meaning of US position. Secretary noted Hanoi in process of moving two new divisions south, and said Hanoi understands clearly what US means by not taking a military advantage. Communist “fight and negotiate” strategy means they seek to obtain cessation of bombing and then continue their military action. When Martin inquired about possibility of bombing pause between Christmas and Tet, Secretary doubted that even if possibility existed, South Vietnam would wish to announce in advance. This would merely give Hanoi opportunity to make [illegible] preparations for intensive reinforcement and supply of units in South. Martin then suggested that such a pause just before UNSC consideration could be meaningful; those opposing bombing would be faced with fact that bombing had stopped. This would force alteration of strategy for some countries, including Canada. Secretary replied that any pause would bring immediate question from Hanoi as to whether it has permanent and unconditional cessation. Since US would not answer this question, Hanoi would label the cessation “an ultimatum.” Martin then discussed possibility of trying to keep Sihanouk quiet. Secretary pointed out that there is over one Communist division in Cambodia, and at least one major facility in northeast corner of country. We have provided information on Communist military activities out of Cambodia to Sihanouk, and he has been more quiet since. Martin then raised question of safety of Canadian ICC personnel in Hanoi. Seaborn has become greatly concerned in recent days and also fears for Canadian courier plane. Seaborn reported that “it may be necessary to reassess our situation.” Secretary pointed out that US does not bomb Gia Lam Airport; that we use great care in bombing; and that some problems may be caused by “trigger-happy” people on the ground. Nevertheless, he asked Martin to provide detailed information as to location of ICC Canadians in Hanoi. On subject of Eastern European states’ relations with Hanoi, Secretary noted that Yugoslavia is not particularly good channel, and that Gromyko had said that none of Eastern Europeans are effective. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Canadian Desk Files: Lot 70 D 89, Vietnam 1967. Secret; Exdis. Secretary Rusk was in Brussels to attend the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting. 2 Efforts to engage the United Nations in negotiations to end the Vietnam conflict failed as a result of lack of support for discussion of the issue in the Security Council. The National Liberation Front rejected the use of the Security Council as a forum. 346. Letter From Prime Minister Pearson to President Johnson 346. Letter From Prime Minister Pearson to President Johnson 1 Ottawa, January 22, 1968. My dear President: As Mr. Sharp indicated in his letter of January 2, 2 it was very useful to have advance information on the important new programme you announced on January 1. 3 We attach importance to continuing consultation with you on the implementation and effect of the specific measures which are of direct concern to us. The strength of the United States economy and the stability of its currency are of fundamental importance to us in Canada as indeed to the whole world. We have regarded participation with you and others in international efforts to assure a healthy framework for the world economy as one of the most constructive endeavours of the past few years. As you know, our bilateral trade and payment relationship has been a net source of strength to you. We have also tried to pursue policies contributing to easing current problems, for example, by the gold sales we have made to you over the past couple of years. For our part, I would like to express my appreciation of the very evident efforts which have been made in your new programme to take account of the special position of Canada. Your programme will of course have to be carefully examined, as it evolves, before a full assessment of its implications for Canada can be made. Some direct limitation on the freedom of action of Canadian companies appears inevitable and this is bound to cause great concern. The Minister of Finance is in touch with Secretary Fowler on some of the more immediate problems. In this letter, I limit my comments to a rather different issue of great international importance, the question of border taxes. Should the United States feel it must take action to establish a system of import taxes and export rebates, or similar measures of a kind which I understand you may be considering, Canada would be obliged to take parallel measures in order to leave our competitive position in world trade unchanged. In the face of some public uneasiness here this has been publicly stated by members of the Canadian government and our position is understood by your officials; just as we understand yours. It seems to me, however, that it would be preferable to submit this general subject for international consideration and, in particular, that some re-examination of the international rules would be timely and would avoid the danger of misunderstanding leading to competitive action. I know that you now have this matter under consideration and I hope that, if you determine that some action by the United States is required, you will place proposals before the appropriate international bodies for consideration before taking such action. I believe that in this way we can avoid a cumulative process of action and counter-action whose consequences would be very damaging not only to the gains achieved through the Kennedy Round but also to the whole system of international trade and payments created under United States leadership since the war. I know that the close and continuing consultation and cooperation in respect of the matters referred to in this letter, and which has characterized in a special way the relations between our Governments, will continue. This is the kind of relationship which, I am sure, we both desire to maintain and deepen. With kindest personal regards, 4 Yours sincerely, L.B. Pearson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59. Secret. The salutation is handwritten. 2 Not found. 3 For text of President Johnson’s statement announcing the response to the balance-of-payments problem, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, pp. 8-13. 4 In his February 5 reply, President Johnson assured Pearson of continued close cooperation on trade issues and pledged to seek the cooperation of international trade bodies as appropriate. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59) 347. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 347. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 4, 1968. SUBJECT Pressure on the Canadian Dollar Canadian Finance Minister Sharp saw Secretary Fowler Friday evening to go over the problems facing the Canadian dollar. (His visit to Washington was closely guarded to keep it from the press.) Sharp said the Canadian dollar had come under pressure because of: —the UK devaluation; —the anticipated effects of the U.S. balance of payments program; —misinterpretation of the U.S. program. Pressure was heavy in January; it quieted down after issuance of the Treasury statement explaining the limited impact of the U.S. program on Canada; 2 and it flared up again during the Canadian Government crisis last week. 3 Since January 1, the Government used up $900 million, or 1/3 of its reserves, to support the Canadian dollar. U.S. consideration of balance of payments trade measures posed an additional problem: —Sharp said that if we imposed an import surcharge, the Canadians would have to devalue since they had no feasible way to offset it. —If we imposed a border tax (export subsidy and import surcharge), the effect on their exchange market would probably be manageable, since they have already announced publicly that they would match whatever we did. Nevertheless, Sharp believes that any measure in this area would not be in our interest. It could not benefit our balance of payments very much, and could set off a wave of retaliatory measures whose ultimate effect on trade and confidence no one could accurately foresee. In appraising the general situation confronting the Canadian dollar, Sharp said that Canada’s cost and price problems were manageable and the Government wanted to avoid devaluation. To maintain the rate, however, it was essential to reverse the growing belief that the Canadian dollar could not hold. He asked Fowler to consider two measures: — exemption of Canadian investment from the balance of payments program . Even though the program does not bear heavily on Canada, Sharp said that an exemption would have an important psychological effect. — an ExIm Bank line of credit of $1 billion —he said they would not intend to use it but its existence would be strong evidence of Canadian determination to hold the rate. Sharp said that whatever we could do to help would not be a balance of payments drain for us because of our bilateral reserve arrangement. He argued that the U.S. can neither gain nor lose reserves in dealing with Canada. Secretary Fowler explained our problems with an outright exemption of Canada from the investment program, asked Sharp to consider what we could do together in the border tax area, and said we would go over their requests and give them an early answer. We have begun to explore the possibilities of: —an ExIm standby credit as part of a multilateral support operation with the Europeans; —a statement of intent that we would re-examine our investment guidelines for Canada if they were proving to be a serious problem for Canada. We will have firm recommendations for you after looking into these possibilities. W. W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Fried. 2 Not found. 3 On December 14, 1967, Pearson announced that he would retire as soon as the Liberal Party chose a successor. The party called a meeting for April 4-6 to elect a new leader. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Canada to the Department of State 1 Ottawa, April 3, 1968, 0135Z. 1440. Ref: State 138435; State 119551. 2 Subject: Balance of payments trade measures. 1. In considering possible US import surcharge Embassy suggests following factors relating US-Canadian trade might usefully be taken into account: A. While exclusion of duty-free trade very helpful in limiting impact any US measure on Canadian exports, flat rate surcharge applying only dutiable items would still strike heavily and unfairly at Canada. Based on limited statistics available Embassy, US average rate on dutiable imports from Canada 6 percent (1964) compared to 13 percent for EC, 15 percent for EFTA and higher for Japan. Flat surcharge of, say, 6 percent would double tariff for Canada but be only two-fifths increase for EFTA. Result could well lead to charges of inequitable burden sharing. B. Surcharge related to underlying tariff rate would obviate this difficulty to some extent. To have equivalent import dampening effect, a surcharge would have to be steep, perhaps 50 percent increase in basic rate. Result would average 9 percent on Canada and 22-1/2 percent on EFTA. Case can be made that trade disruption might nevertheless be more serious for Canada than for Europe; dutiable imports from Canada contain relatively larger share semi-manufactures and raw materials as result North American economic integration. This trade generally operates on low margins through established trade channel and competes with US production. Thus any trade diversion could produce lasting injury. Moreover, in calculating protective effect of surcharge on value added in manufacturing, protection derived from rate relationships remains unchanged and excessive protection on semi-manufactures avoided under this formula. Such “tariff rate surcharge” would also have economic advantage for us in limiting inflationary impact on US manufacturing costs. 2. Embassy suggests: as equitable burden for Canada in possible surcharge situation, rate related to underlying tariff on dutiable imports but with exemption for rates scheduled for duty elimination under Kennedy Round. Consequently surcharge coverage for Canada would be reduced by $480 million (1964) to $1.2 billion out of total $4 billion of US imports from Canada. Of this, the substantial petroleum imports from Canada (just under $400 million in 1967) would not be significantly affected since trade not regulated by tariffs. Thus we could reasonably claim that although nearly 70 percent of Canada’s exports go to US, the burden of the US tariff increase would not be greater on its economy than for other countries. For example, Japan would face this surcharge on approximately 25 percent of its total exports while for Canada it would be less than 20 percent, taking petroleum into account. While Embassy would not predict that this approach would persuade GOC not to take reciprocal offsetting measures against US, it might be helpful to this end. Additionally, such a formula would provide “non-discriminatory” means of reducing scope of action for LDC’s in light our significant use TEA 3 Sections 213 and 202 authority in KR, as well as meeting economic problems cited 1 (B) above. 3. Still another alternative would be to invoke principle of TEA Section 202 to exempt from surcharge all rates below 5 percent. This might prove more difficult presentationally with third countries however. 4. If tariff rate surcharge along lines (2) above likely provoke protests as increasing tariff disparities, combination could be considered. This might be in form of flat rate surcharge of, say 8 percent, but only up to maximum of 50 percent of underlying tariff rate. Effect is to ease burden on both very high and low rates. 5. Embassy would appreciate Department’s comments and requests more comprehensive analysis our suggestions based on up-to-date figures, including comparisons with other countries. Scott 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, EEC 3. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Geneva for the delegation to the GATT negotiations and to Paris for Trezise. 2 Telegram 138435, March 25, is ibid. Telegram 119551, February 22, is ibid., FN 12 US. 3 For text of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, P.L. 87-794, approved October 11, 1962, see 76 Stat. 872. 349. Memorandum of Conversation 349. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, April 30, 1968, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Review of Canadian Foreign Policy: China PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Rufus Z. Smith, Country Director for Canada Canada Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs A. E. Ritchie, Ambassador Marcel Cadieux, Under-Secretary, Department of External Affairs Basil Robinson, Deputy Under-Secretary, Department of External Affairs Mr. Sharp noted that in the course of the foreign policy review which his government is undertaking, 2 the China question would be re-examined. The Canadian public, he observed, thinks its government should look very hard at the question of whether there is a way of getting China into the UN without forcing Taiwan out. The question of Canadian recognition would also arise. He inquired whether the Secretary saw any change in the US position. Secretary Rusk replied that we had made a number of efforts to increase contacts with the Chinese Communists in a variety of fields. Peking, however, always takes the position that before any progress can be made we must abandon Formosa. He wondered, therefore, if this did not provide the answer to Mr. Sharp’s problem. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 CAN-CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Smith and approved in S on May 6. The memorandum is Part IV of IX. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. 2 On April 6 the Liberal Party elected Pierre Elliott Trudeau as party leader. He succeeded Pearson as Prime Minister on April 20. Mitchell Sharp replaced Paul Martin as Minister of External Affairs the same day. On April 23 Trudeau called for new elections on June 25. Index Index Note: The numbers in this index refer to document numbers. Ace High, 64 Ackley, H. Gardner, 141 , 143 , 237 , 243 , 262 Adair, E. Ross, 124 Aden, 236 , 242 , 245 , 254 , 255 Adenauer, Konrad, 46 , 129 , 137 , 232 Adjubei, Alexei, 300 Adoula, Cyrille, 156 , 170 Aeroflot, 344 Africa ( see also Portuguese Africa), 133 Canadian interests, 337 China, People’s Republic of, role, 43 , 156 , 315 Communist subversion, 160 European policy toward, 121 French economic aid, 33 , 79 French military withdrawals, 33 , 236 French policy toward, 27 , 31 Italian flights, 132 Terrorism, 147 , 151 U.S. policy toward, 135 , 259 White role, 176 African and Malagasy Union (UAM), 315 AGARD, 64 Agency for International Development (AID), 149 Aguirre de Carcer, Nuno, 179 , 181 , 187 , 193 , 198 , 206 , 207 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 221 Albania, 74 Albert, Carl, 124 , 214 Aldabra, 255 , 280 Algeria, 65 , 66 , 73 , 80 , 132 , 202 , 210 , 217 , 221 Alitalia, 91 , 132 Alliance for Progress, 302 , 303 Aloia, Gen., 118 Alphand, Hervé, 25 , 28 , 38 , 43 , 49 , 52 , 54 Amendola, Giorgio, 107 American System of Preferences, 145 Anderson, George W., Jr., 147 , 148 , 156 , 157 , 161 , 162 , 164 , 165 , 166 , 167 Anderson, Robert, 28 , 32 , 59 , 68 , 71 , 75 , 183 , 187 Andreas, Dwayne, 268 Andreotti, Giulio, 88 , 127 , 140 Angola, 151 , 154 , 156 , 157 , 161 , 163 , 164 , 168 , 170 , 174 Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), 70 , 206 , 297 , 342 , 344 ANZUS, 253 Arab-Israeli conflict, 273 British position, 271 , 272 , 340 Canadian-U.S. talks, 340 , 341 French position, 74 , 340 Jarring Mission, 221 , 297 UN consideration, 74 , 132 , 273 , 279 , 284 , 341 Soviet position, 74 , 144 , 340 Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict; Middle East; North Africa ; individual countries . Aranzazu, 180 , 187 Archer, Jose Luis, 174 , 175 Arends, Leslie C., 124 Arms control. See Disarmament. Armstrong, F. W., 255 Armstrong, William, 237 , 244 , 265 , 281 , 286 Armstrong, Willis C., 315 , 316 Arthur, G. G., 245 , 255 Asencio, Diego C., 174 , 175 , 176 Asian Development Bank, 252 Atlantic Nuclear Force ( see also Multilateral Force; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; Nuclear sharing), 39 , 42 Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly, 34 Atlantique consortium proposal, 139 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 , 191 , 298 Australia ( see also Australian subheadings under other subjects ), 132 , 242 British defense, 254 British military forces, 245 , 252 , 264 Defense role, 236 , 244 , 255 Grain sales to Japan, 43 Sterling crisis, 281 United Kingdom, relations with, 238 , 288 United States, relations with, 70 Austria, 144 , 219 , 221 , 249 , 281 Azores, 157 , 158 , 161 , 163 , 164 , 175 , 209 Bahrein, 252 , 255 , 287 , 288 Baker, Vincent, 8 Balance of payments: British, 230 , 231 , 233 , 234 , 238 , 243 , 266 , 295 Canadian, 331 Italian, 93 Trade policy and, 145 U.S.: British aircraft purchases and, 255 British securities sales, effect on, 50 Cutbacks in overseas expenditures, 237 As issue in Spanish base negotiations, 209 , 210 , 213 , 217 , 220 Program of 1968 , 284 , 286 , 346 , 347 , 348 Balderstein, C. Canby, 213 Ball, George W., 33 , 55 , 160 Canada, 315 , 316 , 319 France, 32 , 59 , 63 , 68 , 315 Italy, 89 , 93 Nuclear proliferation, 264 Portugal, 148 , 161 , 163 , 168 Rhodesia, 266 Singapore, 250 Spain, 187 , 192 , 213 , 300 United Kingdom: Defense policy, 236 , 267 Defense review, 244 , 254 , 255 Economic situation, 237 , 243 , 264 , 265 EEC membership, 262 , 264 United States, relations with, 32 Vietnam war, 29 , 43 , 120 Visit to Lisbon, Aug.-Sept. 1963 , 148 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), 21 Bancroft, I. P., 244 Bank of England, 50 Bank of France, 249 Bank for International Settlements, 249 Bank of Italy, 94 Barbour, Walworth, 150 , 152 , 153 , 155 Barnes, Donald, 179 Barnes, E. J. W., 255 Barnsdale, William J., 101 , 103 Barr, Joseph W., 214 , 249 , 262 Barry, Robert L., 166 , 330 Bator, Francis M., 55 , 124 , 130 , 244 , 247 , 252 , 255 , 256 , 262 , 263 , 280 , 324 Battle, Lucius D., 285 Baunsgaard, Hilmer, 6 Bayne, Gen. Harry C., 213 , 223 Beaulne, Yvon, 334 , 338 Bebler, Ales, 345 Beck, Maj. Gen. Stanley C., 189 Beigel, Edgar J., 61 , 160 , 185 Belgian Congo. See Congo (Leopoldville). Belgium, 47 , 104 , 121 , 139 , 158 , 179 , 221 , 249 Belman, Murray, 18 Ben Gurion, David, 74 Bendall, David V., 255 , 267 Benediktsson, Bjarni, 6 Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 169 , 173 , 174 , 175 , 176 Bennett, Wallace F., 124 Berlack, Evan R., 8 , 14 , 18 , 20 Berlin, 27 , 44 , 60 , 70 , 87 , 106 , 172 , 225 , 300 Biafra, 170 Billotte Mission, 28 Biological warfare, 24 Blair, William M., Jr., 4 Blankinship, Byron E., 5 , 19 Boggs, Hale, 124 Bohlen, Charles E., 25 , 77 British EEC membership, 69 East-West conflict, 73 European unification, 47 France: Middle East, policy toward, 74 NATO role, 34 , 42 , 56 Nuclear export controls, 44 Soviet Union, relations with, 46 United States, relations with, 27 , 45 , 62 , 68 U.S. troop withdrawal, 67 German reunification, 60 NATO, 54 Sino-Soviet relations, 70 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 81 Vietnam war, 26 , 38 , 43 , 66 Yalta Conference, 48 Bolshoi Opera, 300 Bolton, Frances P., 124 Bonaccorsi, Miss, 89 , 90 Boron trifluoride, 41 Bosch, Orlando, 187 Boumedienne, Houari, 217 Bowie, Robert, 293 Boyd, Alan S., 130 Brandt, Willy, 57 , 70 , 268 Brazil, 154 , 162 Brewer, William D., 285 Brezhnev, Leonid, 57 , 144 , 221 , 232 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 207 British Guiana, 230 , 232 , 236 , 255 Broadbent (UK), 283 , 290 Brosio, Manlio, 83 Brown, George, 126 , 269 , 270 , 273 , 285 , 286 , 287 , 288 , 290 , 291 , 340 Brubeck, William H., 315 , 316 Bruce, David K.E., 239 , 260 British defense review, 242 , 244 , 245 , 255 British military withdrawal from Asia, 250 , 270 , 285 British 1965 budget, 241 Gibraltar, 181 Sterling crisis, 238 , 262 U.S. balance-of-payments program, 1968 , 284 U.S.-British relations, 230 , 252 , 268 , 271 , 293 Vietnam war, 240 , 255 , 259 , 268 Brun, Alice A., 4 Buddhism, 304 Buffum, William B., 150 , 155 , 160 , 161 Bunche, Ralph, 123 Bundy, McGeorge, 40 , 49 Canada, 317 , 324 Cyprus, 227 France: Billotte Mission, 28 Nuclear export controls, 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 United States, relations with, 32 , 34 , 51 Italy, 97 , 113 , 116 Papal visit to New York, 302 Singapore, 250 Spanish-Cuban trade, 182 United Kingdom: Defense policy, 236 , 245 Economic situation, 237 , 243 , 246 , 247 United States, relations with, 232 Vietnam war, 29 , 120 , 240 , 320 Bundy, William P., 120 , 292 , 333 , 334 Bunker, Ellsworth, 308 Bunting, Mary, 35 Burchinal, Gen. David A., 218 , 223 , 224 Burdett, William C., 150 , 152 , 228 Burin des Rosiers, Etienne, 72 Burma, 43 , 344 Burrows, Bernard, 255 Busby, Horace, 49 Butler, Richard A., 225 , 228 Butterworth, W. Walton, 315 , 316 , 325 , 329 , 331 , 335 , 340 , 342 Cabinda, 160 Caccia, Harold, 181 , 228 , 232 , 236 Cadieux, Marcel, 321 , 325 , 330 , 334 , 349 Caetano, Marcello, 172 , 173 , 175 , 176 Caglioti, Vincenzo, 131 Caldeira Coelho, Goncalo, 174 , 175 , 176 Califano, Joseph, 135 , 303 Callaghan, James, 50 , 230 , 231 , 241 , 243 , 244 , 262 , 268 , 279 , 281 , 284 , 287 Cambodia, 26 , 65 , 66 , 85 , 260 , 297 , 315 , 344 , 345 Camera parts, 41 Canada ( see also Canada and Canadian subheadings under other subjects ): Arab-Israeli conflict, 341 Capital controls, 314 China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 331 China, Republic of, relations with, 342 , 349 Chinese representation in the UN, 104 , 315 , 337 , 349 Conservative Party, 330 Cuba, trade with, 321 , 342 Cyprus, forces in, 322 Denmark, relations with, 321 Elections, 296 , 329 , 330 Expo 67 (Montreal World’s Fair), 331 , 340 Federal-provincial disputes, 331 Foreign ownership of industry, 344 France, relations with, 321 , 325 French-English disputes, 331 , 342 ICC role, 320 , 322 , 344 Italy, relations with, 321 , 325 Japan, relations with, 321 Law of the Sea, 317 , 321 , 325 , 331 , 332 , 334 , 335 , 336 , 339 , 342 , 343 Liberal Party, 329 , 330 , 349 Malaysia, military aid to, 322 Monetary situation, 347 Mongolia, relations with, 315 NORAD, participation in, 331 Norway, relations with, 321 Oil exports, 340 , 348 Political situation, 121 Portugal, relations with, 321 , 325 Postal strike, 1965 , 329 Soviet Union, relations with, 321 , 344 Spain, relations with, 321 , 325 Sterling crisis, 248 , 249 , 281 Tax law, 342 UN peacekeeping, 322 , 344 United Kingdom, relations with, 238 , 321 United States, agreements with: Auto parts tariffs, 326 , 330 Balance of payments, 331 Civil air accord, 331 Columbia River Treaty, 322 , 331 United States, relations with, 328 , 331 , 341 Auto parts tariffs, 316 , 318 , 319 , 322 , 323 , 324 , 326 , 330 Canadian oil exports, 340 , 348 Postal rate discrimination, 342 , 344 U.S. investment guidelines, 347 U.S. turkey exports, 344 U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 325 Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC), 342 Canadian Press Agency, 315 Canary Islands, 183 , 202 Cape Verde Islands, 157 , 161 , 174 Caplan, Benjamin, 93 , 244 Capomazza (Italy), 132 Carandini, Niccolo, 132 Carli, Guido, 93 , 94 , 98 , 137 , 145 Carrero Blanco, Adm. Luis, 222 Carter Commission, 342 Case, Clifford, 43 Castiella y Maiz, Fernando, 178 , 179 , 180 , 181 , 182 , 186 , 187 , 191 , 198 , 202 , 221 U.S.-Spanish base negotiations, 206 , 209 , 210 , 212 , 213 , 214 , 215 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 220 , 224 Castro, Fidel, 177 , 187 , 225 , 227 , 228 , 344 Catholic Action, 300 Catholic Church ( see also Vatican), 90 , 108 , 302 , 303 , 304 Cattani, Attilio, 89 , 91 Cavalli, Carlo, 114 CBS-TV, 191 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 30 , 37 , 124 , 144 , 149 , 205 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 168 , 170 , 236 , 287 , 288 Chalfont, Baron, 245 Chamberlain, Neville, 240 Cheddar cheese, 331 Chemical warfare, 24 Cheslaw, Irving, 275 , 288 Chiang Kai-shek, 315 China, People’s Republic of ( see also China, People’s Republic of subheadings under other subjects ; Chinese representation under United Nations; Sino-Soviet conflict): Belgian recognition, 104 British aircraft sales, 257 Canada, relations with, 331 Containment, 253 , 260 Formosa question, 70 French recognition, 27 , 31 , 147 , 315 Italian policy toward, 104 , 121 Japan, relations with, 43 , 315 Nuclear weapons development, 44 , 128 , 206 , 232 Portuguese policy toward, 147 , 170 Soviet Union, relations with, 70 United Kingdom, relations with, 315 United States, relations with, 43 U.S. policy toward, 122 Vatican, relations with, 306 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, relations with, 117 , 121 , 310 Wheat purchases by, 182 China, Republic of ( see also Chinese representation under United Nations), 27 , 70 , 315 , 342 , 349 Chou En-lai, 147 Chrysler, 25 , 323 , 324 Church, Frank F., 122 Churchill, Winston L. S., 226 Cicognani, Amleto Giovanni Cardinal, 303 , 304 , 308 , 310 Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 130 Civil rights, 303 Claims Commission, U.S., 207 Clarizio, Archbishop, 302 Clark, Edward, 250 Cleveland, Harlan, 126 Clifford, Clark, 82 , 124 , 139 , 209 , 211 , 220 , 296 , 298 , 313 Colombo, Emilio, 95 , 99 , 145 COCOM, 25 Commerce, U.S. Department of, 30 , 37 , 124 , 319 Committee of 24, 157 Commodity Credit Corporation, 94 Common Market. See European Economic Community (EEC ). Commonwealth of Nations, 227 , 230 , 236 , 242 , 264 , 295 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, London, July 1964 , 320 Communications satellites ( see also Outer space), 209 Communism ( see also Communist Party under individual countries ): Catholic opposition, 90 , 108 In the Far East, 38 French position, 38 , 46 , 66 Italian position, 90 , 144 Mediterranean Communist meeting, Rome, 1968 , 144 Pluralism under, 101 , 144 Vatican position, 300 Compania Transatlantica, 187 Computers, 35 , 36 , 37 Conde de Motrico (Italy), 183 Confederation of British Industries, 246 Congo (Brazzaville), 160 , 266 Congo (Leopoldville), 149 , 150 , 154 , 156 , 158 , 169 , 170 Congress, U.S.: Acts of: Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480 ), 147 Atomic Energy Act, 1946 (McMahon Act), 44 Atomic Energy Act, 1958 , 264 Automotive Products Trade Act, 1965 , 330 Battle Act, 1951 , 157 Bonner Act, 1961 , 229 Byrnes Amendment, 1967 , 276 Connally Amendment, 1946 , 321 , 335 Defense Appropriations Act of 1968 , 276 Foreign Assistance Act, 1964 , 177 Immigration Act, 1965 , 331 Munitions Export Control Act, 166 Selective Service Act, 331 Tariff Act, 1930 , 324 Trade Expansion Act, 1962 , 53 , 348 Trading with the Enemy Act, 331 Auto parts tariffs, 316 , 326 , 330 British aircraft purchases, 290 Claims against France, 82 Eximbank loans for Soviet auto production, 124 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 168 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 41 Law of the Sea, 336 Spanish base negotiations, 217 , 219 Trade issues, 145 U.S. military aid programs, 207 , 210 , 213 Vatican-U.S. relations, 302 , 306 Vietnam war, 121 Connor, John T., 114 Cooke, Archbishop Terence, 311 Coombs, Charles, 262 Coordinating Committee (COCOM), 25 Corsica, 209 Cotton, 147 Cotton, Norris, 124 Council of Economic Advisers, 279 Counter-insurgency operations, 255 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 26 , 33 , 38 , 42 , 43 , 45 , 46 , 48 , 54 , 60 , 61 , 63 , 67 , 68 , 123 , 315 , 337 Covert actions, U.S., 51 , 92 , 113 , 116 , 125 , 133 , 205 Cox, Oscar, 114 Crawford, R. S., 181 Creel, Robert C., 159 Cripps, Stafford, 231 Cromer, Earl, 238 Cuba ( see also under individual countries ), 70 , 79 , 344 African role for, 266 Arab-Israeli conflict, 74 Attack on Spanish ship, 180 Missile crisis, 1962 , 27 , 43 , 85 , 228 NATO political consultation re, 170 Spain, relations with, 177 , 178 , 182 , 186 Trade with, 25 , 26 , 177 , 225 , 227 , 232 , 321 , 342 U.S. policy toward, 87 , 154 , 171 U-2 overflights, 228 Cyprus, 27 , 225 , 227 , 245 , 255 , 287 , 288 , 322 Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, 101 Czechoslovakia, 57 , 170 Soviet invasion: British position, 297 Communist split over, 144 French position, 81 , 83 , 85 Italian position, 142 , 144 Portuguese position, 172 Spanish position, 221 U.S. contingency plan for, 213 U.S. position, 297 Daane, Dewey, 262 , 277 Dalton, Hugh, 241 Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI), 1 Davies, Harold, 268 Davies, Rodger P., 340 Davis, Nathaniel, 306 De Gasperi, Alcide, 89 De Gaulle, Charles, 69 , 103 Africa, 31 Arab-Israeli conflict, 74 , 75 , 340 Cambodia, 66 China, People’s Republic of, 104 , 315 Communism, 38 , 46 Cuban missile crisis, 43 East-West conflict, 73 Europe, 42 , 47 , 219 , 264 European Economic Community, 53 , 69 , 271 , 295 German reunification, 47 , 57 , 60 Jews, 77 Johnson, meeting with, 72 Laos, 70 Latin America, 27 Multilateral Force, 105 NATO, 27 , 123 French military withdrawal from, 42 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 61 Nuclear weapons, 41 , 44 Political situation in France, 55 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 127 Sino-Soviet relations, 70 Soviet Union, relations with, 45 , 46 , 60 , 83 Tank production, 28 UAR-U.S. relations, 132 United States, policy toward, 27 , 288 U.S.-French relations, 32 , 34 , 44 , 49 , 52 , 55 , 57 , 75 , 76 , 269 U.S.-Spanish relations, 217 U.S. view of, 30 , 122 , 171 Vietnam war: French-U.S. talks, 39 , 43 , 60 , 65 , 70 Neutralization of Vietnam, 26 North Vietnamese diplomatic actions, 53 Paris peace talks, 85 U.S. responsibility for, 66 , 70 , 71 Visits: Africa-Asia-Polynesia, Aug.-Sept. 1966 , 65 , 66 Bonn, Apr. 1967 , 72 Canada, July 1967 , 72 , 76 Latin America, Sept.-Oct. 1964 , 232 Yalta Conference, 48 De Leusse, Bruno, 64 De Lipkowski, Jean, 83 De Lorenzo, Giovanni, 95 , 96 , 99 , 100 , 118 , 127 , 138 De Ojeda, Jaime, 201 De Rosa, Fr. Giuseppe, 107 De Sciullo, John, 107 De Seabra, Jose, 114 , 129 , 303 Dean, Patrick, 192 , 226 , 254 , 255 , 266 , 267 , 274 , 275 , 281 , 288 , 293 Debre, Michel, 81 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 143 Declaratio de Libertate Religiosa “Dignitas Humanae,” 1965 , 302 Declaration on Liberated Europe, 48 Decolonization, 210 , 238 Defense, U.S. Department of, 1 , 2 , 30 , 35 , 124 , 146 , 153 , 207 , 209 , 210 , 215 , 219 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 100 Deferre, Gaston, 31 Dell’Acqua, Angelo, 300 Deming, Frederick L., 24 , 50 , 145 , 216 , 218 , 262 , 265 , 277 , 281 , 286 Denmark ( see also Denmark and Danish subheadings under other subjects ): Canada, relations with, 321 Chinese representation in the UN, 13 Conservative Party, 6 Currency devaluation, 279 , 281 Elections, 6 European defense, 295 Military force levels, 218 Moderate Liberal Party, 6 Nuclear weapons policy, 1 , 2 , 5 , 8 , 23 Political situation, 6 Portuguese policy toward, 157 Radical Liberal Party, 6 Social Democrat Party, 6 Socialist People’s Party, 6 U.S. nuclear storage and overflights: Danish position, 7 , 8 , 11 , 13 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 19 , 20 Danish public statements, 5 , 8 , 10 , 11 Greenland Agreement, 1951 , and Supplement, 4 , 5 , 8 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 Settlement, 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 Tacit understanding, 3 , 4 U.S. position, 8 , 10 , 14 , 15 , 17 , 18 U.S. silence, 2 , 7 , 17 U.S. B-52 crash in Greenland ( see also U.S. nuclear storage and overflights above ), 1 , 2 , 9 , 21 , 23 Venstresocialister (VS), 6 Vietnam war, 6 Diaz-Alegria, Gen. Manuel, 220 , 222 Diefenbaker, John, 322 , 323 Diem (Ngo Dinh Diem), 26 Dier, O. W., 315 , 316 Dillon, C. Douglas, 30 , 55 , 94 , 237 , 318 , 319 , 322 , 323 , 324 Dirksen, Everett M., 124 , 214 Disarmament ( see also Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference), 128 , 225 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 22 , 242 Dominican Republic, 57 , 162 Donovan, Maj. Gen. Stanley, 190 , 191 , 195 Douglas-Home, Alec, 32 , 225 , 226 , 227 , 229 , 232 , 283 Drost, Michel, 52 Dubcek, Alexander, 81 , 144 , 221 Duke, Angier Biddle, 183 , 190 , 191 , 199 , 200 , 205 , 207 , 208 Earle, Ralph, 211 , 213 East Africa, 225 , 236 , 255 Eastern Airlines, 130 Eastern Europe, 44 , 46 , 87 , 123 , 308 , 345 East-West relations, 87 , 300 Eban, Abba, 297 , 340 Eden, Anthony, 226 , 258 Egypt. See United Arab Republic (UAR) . Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, Geneva, 83 , 114 , 184 , 194 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 43 , 226 , 258 , 293 Elizabeth II, Queen, 242 , 258 Ennals, David, 227 Entente Cordiale, 86 Equatorial Guinea, 210 Erhard, Ludwig, 42 , 43 , 46 , 47 , 87 , 232 , 252 , 259 , 300 Esterline, Jacob, 133 Ethiopia, 65 Euratom, 128 , 132 European Defense Community, 264 , 295 European Economic Community (EEC): British leadership role, 264 British membership: Application, 271 , 295 British position, 227 , 265 , 266 French position, 266 , 296 French veto, 27 , 41 , 69 , 75 , 77 , 83 , 295 German position, 268 Italian position, 135 , 137 , 268 , 296 Netherlands position, 268 U.S. position, 230 , 264 Common Agricultural Policy, 145 French influence, 46 French policy toward, 76 , 79 French withdrawal, 55 German leadership role, 264 Greek membership, 179 Labor mobility, 93 Ministerial meeting, Luxembourg, Jan. 1966 , 53 Spanish membership, 179 , 183 , 198 , 207 Tariffs, 93 , 348 Turkish membership, 179 U.S. position, 121 , 145 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 86 , 348 European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), 123 European Security Conference, 123 European unification, 47 , 110 , 129 , 135 , 145 Everett, Christopher, 181 Exchange Stabilization Fund, 94 , 249 , 277 Expo 67 (Montreal World’s Fair), 331 , 340 Export-Import Bank: British use of, 50 Canadian line of credit, 347 Italian lines of credit, 94 , 123 , 124 Loans for Soviet auto production, 123 , 124 , 134 Spanish military purchases, 210 , 213 , 214 Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia, 287 Fanali, Gen. D. S., 139 Fanfani, Amintore, 95 , 99 , 10 , 109 , 112 , 117 , 120 , 121 , 123 , 128 , 129 , 134 , 136 , 137 , 139 , 140 Farley, Philip J., 14 Faure, Edgar, 27 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 187 Federal Council for Science and Technology, 121 Federal Maritime Commission, 229 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 249 Federal Reserve Board, 234 , 279 , 284 Feki, Ahman Hassan al-, 132 Fenoaltea, Sergio, 89 , 91 , 102 , 105 , 106 , 109 , 117 , 121 , 122 , 126 , 132 Fergo, Per, 2 , 13 , 19 , 20 Ferranti (British company), 37 Fiat, 114 , 124 , 134 Fields, Glenn, 113 Fierlinger, Zdenek, 101 Fineshriber, William H., Jr., 111 Finletter, Thomas K., 230 Fischer, Paul, 24 Fisheries ( see also Law of the Sea under Canada), 9 FitzGerald, Desmond, 113 Foccart, Jacques, 83 Force de dissuasion, 42 Force de frappe, 27 , 42 Ford, Alan W., 103 Ford, Emmett B., Jr., 117 Ford, Gerald, 124 , 214 Ford Foundation, 183 Ford Motor Company, 323 , 324 Formosa. See China, Republic of. Fowler, Henry H., 50 , 82 , 109 , 124 , 145 , 243 , 248 , 261 , 262 , 265 , 266 , 272 , 277 , 278 , 281 , 286 , 296 , 346 , 347 Fraleigh, William N., 101 , 107 , 127 France ( see also France and French subheadings under other subjects ): Africa, policy toward, 27 , 31 Arab states, relations with, 31 Biafra, aid to, 170 Bomber sales, 166 Canada, relations with, 321 , 325 China, People’s Republic of, recognition, 27 , 31 , 104 , 147 , 315 China, Republic of, withdrawal of recognition, 27 , 315 Chinese representation in the UN, 31 Committee for the Defense of the Republic (CDR), 80 Cuba, trade with and economic aid to, 25 , 79 , 177 , 232 Cyprus, 27 Debt repayment, 40 Economic situation, 50 , 86 , 295 , 296 Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, 83 Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 39 , 45 , 46 , 55 , 86 International liquidity, 246 Israel, relations with, 31 , 74 , 77 Italian policy toward, 121 Latin America, policy toward, 27 , 31 , 79 Marshall Plan for Technology, 123 Mexico, relations with, 31 Middle East, policy toward, 31 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 79 , 85 Military capabilities of, 80 , 283 Nationalism in, 264 NATO, withdrawal from, see French military withdrawal under North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear program, 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 Office de la Radiodiffusion-Television Francaise, 84 Outer space flight, 57 Political situation: Communist Party, 46 , 80 , 144 Elections, 46 , 55 , 56 , 127 , 171 , 296 Foreign policy, effect on, 79 General strike, 1968 , 80 Left Federation, 80 Socialist Party, 89 Student/worker uprising, 78 , 80 U.S. view of, 80 , 121 Rhodesia, trade with, 295 Sino-Soviet conflict, 31 Soviet Union, relations with, 45 , 46 , 57 , 79 , 83 Spain, relations with, 198 Sterling crisis, 281 Tank production, 28 United States, agreements with: Air Bases Agreement, Oct. 1952 , 58 , 59 Chateauroux Depot Agreement, Feb. 1951 , 58 , 59 Civil Aviation Agreement, 136 Cooperation for Mutual Defense Purposes, 1959 , 35 , 36 , 37 Pipeline Agreement of June 1953 , 58 , 59 System of Communication Agreement, Dec. 1958 , 58 , 59 Termination, 58 , 59 , 68 U.S. Military Headquarters Agreement, 1956 , 58 , 59 United States, relations with, 27 , 31 , 32 , 49 , 51 , 52 , 55 , 84 , 85 Compensation claims, 82 Czech invasion, effect on, 83 Lavaud mission, 41 Nuclear cooperation, 39 Nuclear export controls, 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 Oil pipelines, 58 , 63 , 64 , 67 Strains in, 45 , 71 , 75 , 76 , 269 Trade, 27 U.S. public opinion, 48 , 62 U.S. military aid, 25 , 27 U.S. troop withdrawal, 55 , 56 , 57 , 59 , 67 , 79 , 82 Franco y Bahamonde, Gen. Francisco, 177 , 178 , 184 , 188 , 203 , 204 , 205 , 208 , 221 , 224 Freeman, Orville H., 319 Frelinghuysen, Peter H. B., Jr., 124 , 214 French Polynesia, 65 French Somaliland, 65 Freshman, C. Arnold, 325 Friberg, Frank, 113 Fried, Edward, 136 , 142 , 145 , 213 , 214 , 223 , 277 , 278 Fromer, Julian P., 96 Frutkin, Arnold, 123 Fulbright, J. William, 34 , 122 , 124 , 207 Fulton, Robert M., 9 Funseth, Robert, 161 , 170 , 207 Furnas, Howard, 213 Futterman, Stanley, 332 Gaja (Italy), 123 Gallium, 41 Galluzzi, Carlo, 144 Gandhi, Indira, 345 Gannett, James, 146 Gardiner, Lord, 268 Garibaldi, Vincent A., 114 Garin, Vasco Vieira, 150 , 156 , 161 , 164 , 166 , 167 , 169 , 172 Garrigues y Diaz Canabate, Antonio, 177 , 178 Gaseous diffusion plants, 41 Gebelt, Stephen G., 220 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ( see also Kennedy Round), 111 , 179 , 286 , 319 , 344 General Motors, 323 Geneva Agreement on Laos, 1962 , 38 , 106 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, 1954 , 38 , 43 , 345 Geneva Conference on Vietnam, 305 Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war, 309 , 310 George, Scott, 41 German reunification, 46 , 47 , 57 , 60 , 70 , 87 , 247 Germany, Democratic Republic of, 44 , 46 , 127 Germany, Federal Republic of ( see also Berlin ; German and Germany, Federal Republic of subheadings under other subjects ): Air base rights in Portugal, 175 Atlantique consortium proposal, 139 Biafra, aid to, 170 British military forces: British-German talks, 245 Costs, 242 , 262 Cutbacks, 267 , 287 Offset purchases, 244 , 255 , 262 , 266 , 286 U.S. position, 247 China, People’s Republic of, trade with, 121 Defense role, 236 Elections, 45 , 47 , 244 , 245 France, relations with, 39 , 45 , 46 , 55 , 86 , 183 French troops in, 59 , 60 Nationalism in, 88 , 127 NATO role, 123 Nuclear proliferation, 128 , 264 Oder-Neisse line, 57 Rhodesia, trade with, 295 Social Democratic Party (SPD), 89 , 232 , 258 Soviet policy toward, 70 Spain, relations with, 198 Sterling crisis, 249 Tank production, 28 United Kingdom, relations with, 249 , 255 , 258 United States, relations with, 69 , 136 , 213 U.S. military use of oil, 58 U.S. troops, 27 , 121 Ghana, 149 Giannini, Guglielmo, 96 , 100 Gibraltar: British military forces, 245 British-Spanish talks, 198 , 202 British-U.S. talks, 181 , 200 Overflights of Spain en route to, 192 Rhodesian-British talks, 297 Spanish-U.S. talks, 193 , 199 , 201 , 206 , 210 UN consideration, 181 U.S. policy toward, 207 Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, 50 , 243 Givan, Walker, 89 , 107 Glassboro Summit, 297 , 310 Glazer, Harry B., 325 Glenn, E. S., 72 Goa, 300 Gold, 40 , 43 , 49 , 50 , 86 , 248 , 294 , 295 , 331 Goldberg, Arthur, 120 , 305 , 306 Golden, Capt. William, 207 Goldstein, Ernest, 85 Goldwater, Barry M., 43 , 320 Gomulka, Wladislaw, 300 Goode (IMF), 281 Gordon, Bob, 146 Gordon, Walter L., 314 , 319 , 342 Gordon Walker, Patrick, 232 , 235 , 344 Gore-Booth, Paul, 245 , 270 , 286 , 288 Gradi, Florio, 93 Grain, 43 Great Society, 85 , 255 , 308 Greece, 70 , 101 , 121 , 175 , 209 , 217 , 218 , 269 Greenhill, Denis, 293 Greenland ( see also Denmark), 1 , 2 , 9 , 21 , 23 , 244 Griffin, James, 281 Gromyko, Andrei A., 46 , 47 , 70 , 117 , 123 , 132 , 142 , 172 , 297 , 304 , 345 Grotewohl, Otto, 101 Group of Ten, 86 , 237 , 248 , 266 Guam Conference, 268 Guaranty Trust Co., 186 Gui, Luigi, 139 , 140 , 141 , 146 Guinea, 31 , 160 , 174 Hadow, Michael, 181 Hadwen, J. G., 334 Halls, Michael, 260 , 293 Hallstein, Walter, 123 Hamilton Aircraft, 166 Hand, Lloyd, 240 Hansen, Hans Christian, 4 Hardman, Henry, 236 , 255 Harlech, Lord, 228 , 232 Harmel, Pierre C., 345 Harmel Report, 170 , 344 Harriman, W. Averell, 26 , 33 , 38 , 114 , 115 , 149 , 160 , 203 , 334 Harris, John, 181 Hartley, Air Marshal Christopher, 239 Hartling, Poul, 24 Hartman, A. A., 213 Hassan, King of Morocco, 204 Hawk project, 64 Healey, Denis, 230 , 235 , 239 , 244 , 245 , 252 , 255 , 256 , 257 , 260 , 269 , 270 , 280 , 287 , 290 , 291 , 295 Heath, Edward, 258 , 264 , 271 Heeney, A. D. P., 328 Heller, Walter E., 319 Helms, Richard M., 113 , 133 Henderson, John N., 181 , 228 , 236 Henderson, Adm. Nigel, 255 , 267 Herter, Christian, 89 Hickenlooper, Bourke, 124 , 214 High, George, 160 Hilliker, Grant G., 31 Hitler, Adolf, 240 Ho Chi Minh, 38 , 117 , 119 , 120 , 184 , 268 , 308 , 340 Hochstetter, Leo, 111 Hodges, Luther H., 30 , 318 , 319 Holloway, Jerome K., 225 Holt, Harold, 137 , 264 , 273 , 282 , 310 Holy See. See Vatican. Home, Lord. See Douglas-Home, Alec . Hong Kong, 255 , 260 , 288 Hoopes, Townsend, 211 , 213 , 217 Hoover, J. Edgar, 187 Hornig, Donald C., 131 House Foreign Affairs Committee, 168 Howard, W. J., 37 Howe, Douglas, 258 Huang (ROC), 342 Hughes, Thomas L., 6 , 138 Hull, Richard, 255 Hulse, Stacy B., Jr., 96 Humphrey, Hubert H., 57 , 72 , 110 , 128 , 268 , 297 , 303 , 308 , 310 Hungary, 144 , 221 , 227 Hunziker, Gen., 9 Iceland, 6 Ikeda, Hayato, 322 Immigration, 110 India ( see also Indian subheadings under other subjects ), 162 , 217 , 236 , 262 , 264 , 300 , 302 , 344 Indian Ocean, 245 Indonesia, 253 , 344 Communist Party, 269 Confrontation with Malaysia, 236 , 245 , 250 , 255 , 260 , 266 Coup of 1965 , 269 Law of the Sea, 321 , 325 , 334 United Kingdom, relations with, 255 , 288 Ingram, George Mason, 24 Ingrao, Pietro, 101 , 107 Inonu, Ismet, 227 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 50 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 309 International Control Commission (ICC), 260 , 304 , 38 , 320 , 322 , 344 , 345 International Court of Justice (World Court), 317 , 321 , 334 , 335 , 336 , 337 International Eucharistic Congress, Dec. 1964 , 300 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 40 , 50 , 86 , 145 , 230 , 233 , 234 , 238 , 265 , 266 , 278 , 279 , 284 International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 165 Iran, 216 , 252 , 255 , 288 , 295 Iraq, 287 Ireland, 170 , 279 Israel ( see also Arab-Israeli conflict), 31 , 74 , 77 , 128 , 168 , 288 , 297 Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), 300 Italy ( see also Italy and Italian subheadings under other subjects ): Aldo Adige, terrorism in, 127 Anti-submarine warfare, 139 Armed Forces Intelligence Service (SIFAR/SID), 95 , 127 , 138 Armistice Agreements, Sept. 1943 , 132 , 136 Atlantique consortium proposal, 139 Canada, relations with, 321 , 325 China, People’s Republic, 104 , 121 , 144 Communist Party (PCI): Conservative opposition to, 88 , 89 , 96 , 99 Democratization, 101 , 107 Fiat automobiles, 134 Government takeover, 103 Italian Federation of Communist Youth (FGCI), 101 Split with Soviets, 144 U.S. covert action, 113 U.S. position, 101 , 107 , 108 Disinformation from the Carabinieri, 96 Economic situation, 93 , 98 Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), 132 European economic aid, 98 French policy toward, 183 German economic aid, 98 Italian army leadership, 118 Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL), 95 , 96 , 144 Latin America, policy toward, 121 Middle East, policy toward, 132 Military situation, 127 Nationalization of electricity, 93 NATO nuclear committee representation, 126 Natural gas, 132 Peace Agreement, Feb. 1947 , 132 Political situation ( see also Communist Party (PCI) above ; Socialist Party below ): Christian Democratic Party, 87 , 88 , 90 , 98 , 9 , 103 , 108 , 109 , 113 , 123 , 133 , 135 , 300 Coalition government, 109 Coup threat, 100 , 103 , 138 Democratic Union for the Second Republic, 96 Elections, 125 , 135 , 138 , 144 Italian military and law enforcement view, 95 , 96 Liberal Party (PLI), 96 , 100 , 123 Monarchist Party, 96 Moro government, conservative reaction to, 87 , 88 , 97 Movimento Social I Italiano (MSI), 96 , 100 , 107 Qualunquismo, 96 , 100 Republican Party, 95 Social Democratic Party (PSDI), 89 , 121 , 123 Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP), 89 , 109 Socialist-Communist split, 89 , 96 , 103 , 121 Stability, 135 Vatican position, 300 Socialist Party (PSI), 102 , 104 , 121 Coalition role, 109 , 113 Conservative view, 87 , 99 Factionalism, 89 NATO endorsement, 109 , 123 Soviet auto production agreement, 114 , 123 , 124 , 134 Spain, relations with, 198 Sterling crisis, 249 United States, agreements with: Air Transport Services Agreement, 1947 , 130 Civil Aviation Agreement, 136 United States, relations with: Aircraft sales, 139 , 140 , 141 , 143 , 146 Aviation issues, 91 , 112 , 132 , 136 Civic Action Project, 92 Military offset purchases, 145 Moro visit, 108 , 109 , 110 Scientific cooperation, 131 Segni visit, 87 U.S. air bases, 209 U.S. covert action programs, 92 , 113 , 116 , 125 , 133 U.S. military force reductions, 88 Vietnam war, 106 , 110 , 115 , 117 , 121 , 135 , 137 Japan ( see also Japan and Japanese subheadings under other subjects ): Australian grain sales, 43 Canada, relations with, 321 China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 43 , 315 Defense role, 236 , 255 French grain sales, 43 ICC role, 322 Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, 250 Italian flights, 132 New Zealand grain sales, 43 Nuclear proliferation, 142 , 264 Rhodesia, trade with, 295 Spanish-U.S. relations, 217 Sterling crisis, 248 , 249 , 281 United States, relations with, 70 U.S.-Japanese security treaty, 214 U.S. tariff rates, 348 Vietnam war, 344 Wars of liberation, 242 Jarring Mission, 221 , 297 Jenkins, Roy, 286 , 287 John XXIII (Angelo Roncalli), Pope, 306 Johnson, Charles K., 146 , 153 Johnson, G. Griffith, 93 , 111 , 231 , 315 , 316 Johnson, Lady Bird, 226 Johnson, Luci Baines, 303 Johnson, Lyndon B.: Arab-Israeli conflict, 77 , 341 Atlantic partnership, 127 , 128 Balance of payments, 237 , 284 , 346 , 347 British sterling crisis ( see also United Kingdom below ), 137 , 247 , 248 , 249 , 262 , 277 , 278 , 279 , 281 Canada: Auto parts tariffs, 316 , 318 , 319 , 322 , 323 , 324 , 326 , 330 Economic aid to Vietnam, 329 Law of the Sea, 335 , 336 , 343 Pearson, correspondence with, 346 United States, relations with, 328 , 341 , 346 , 347 U.S. oil imports from, 340 Cuban missile crisis, 43 Czechoslovakia, 142 Denmark, 21 Eastern Europe, 308 France: Billotte Mission, 28 De Gaulle, meeting with, 72 Debt repayment, 40 Monetary crisis, 86 Nuclear export controls on, 30 United States, relations with, 27 , 32 , 34 , 49 , 52 , 57 , 85 U.S. claims against, 82 Gold prices, 294 Great Society programs, 85 , 308 Ho Chi Minh, correspondence with, 308 Italy: Aviation issues, 130 , 136 NATO nuclear committee representation, 126 Political situation, 135 Scientific cooperation with the United States, 131 Soviet auto production, financing for, 124 , 134 United States, relations with, 109 , 110 , 128 , 142 U.S. aircraft sales, 143 U.S. covert action programs, 116 U.S. economic aid to, 94 Kennedy Round, 340 Middle East, 271 Multilateral Force, 90 , 105 , 106 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 129 , 142 Nuclear sharing, 252 Poland millennium speech, May 1966 , 122 Pope Paul VI, meeting and correspondence with, 302 , 303 , 305 , 307 , 309 , 311 , 312 Portugal, 176 Portuguese African colonies, 150 Rhodesia, 297 Singapore, 250 Southeast Asia, 260 , 320 Soviet-U.S. relations, 297 Spain: Base negotiations, 212 , 218 , 219 Cuba, trade with, 177 , 182 Franco, correspondence with, 184 , 204 Morocco, relations with, 204 NATO membership, 200 Palomares bomber crash, 189 United States, relations with, 221 U.S. covert actions, 205 United Kingdom ( see also British sterling crisis above ): Aircraft purchases, 290 Asia, military withdrawal from, 270 , 289 Cuba, trade with, 227 , 232 Defense review, 253 , 257 Douglas-Home, correspondence with, 226 , 229 EEC membership for, 268 Incomes policy, 237 Multilateral Force, 227 Nuclear information exchanges with the United States, 298 Nuclear weapons consultation, 226 United States, relations with, 232 , 252 , 266 Wilson, correspondence with, 233 , 234 , 245 , 257 , 258 , 259 , 263 , 273 , 284 , 289 , 290 , 291 , 294 Vietnam war: British-U.S. talks, 240 , 255 Canadian-U.S. talks, 327 , 340 Christmas truce, 1966 , 307 French-U.S. talks, 43 , 65 Italian role, 115 Negotiations, 120 Spanish position, 184 , 208 Vatican position, 308 , 313 Visits: Bonn, Apr. 1967 , 72 , 129 Canada (New Brunswick), Aug. 1966 , 335 Canada (proposed), 331 Canada (Quebec), May 1967 , 340 Canada (Vancouver), Sept. 1964 , 322 Europe, 1965 , 106 Melbourne, Dec. 1967 , 282 , 310 Middle East, Sept. 1962 , 303 Paris, Apr. 1961 , 72 , 85 Paris, Sept. 1961 , 72 Paris, Apr. 1967 , 72 Punta del Este, Apr. 1967 , 308 Rome, Sept. 1962 , 303 Rome, Dec. 1967 , 137 , 310 Johnson, U. Alexis, 125 , 178 , 200 , 201 , 213 , 255 , 267 , 317 , 322 , 325 , 332 , 334 , 335 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 209 , 222 Joint Task Force 8, 41 Joint U.S.-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, 318 , 319 Jonsson, Emil, 6 Jordan, 297 Judd, Thomas M., 192 , 227 , 240 , 254 , 267 , 274 Justice, U.S. Department of, 323 Kaiser, Philip M., 260 Kashiwagi, 281 Kashmir, 119 , 236 , 250 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 81 , 286 , 131 Canada, 339 Denmark, 8 , 14 , 18 , 21 France, 78 Italy, 130 Portuguese African colonies, 168 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 81 Spanish base negotiations, 211 , 214 United Kingdom, 274 , 285 , 289 , 298 U.S. balance-of-payments program, 1968 , 284 , 286 Kaufman, Gerald, 293 Keflavik Air Force Base, 6 Kelly, Edna, 214 Kennedy, John F., 32 , 34 , 43 , 72 , 106 , 116 , 128 , 226 , 227 , 237 , 325 , 334 Kennedy, Robert F., 311 Kennedy Round ( see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ): British position, 225 , 231 Canadian-U.S. talks, 319 , 331 , 340 Completion, 284 , 344 French position, 145 French-U.S. relations and, 27 , 53 Italian position, 145 Tariff rates, elimination of, 348 U.S. position, 87 , 145 , 225 , 247 Kent, Tom, 315 , 316 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 57 , 87 , 89 , 101 , 106 , 123 , 232 , 300 Kidd, George P., 334 Kiesinger, Kurt, 70 Kingsley, Rolf, 133 Kiselyak, Charles A., 332 , 336 Kitchen, Jeffrey, 41 , 255 Klebenov, Eugene, 2 , 8 , 13 , 14 , 16 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 Klein, David S., 102 Kobi, Istvan, 101 Kohler, Foy D., 133 , 206 Komer, Robert W., 308 Korea, Republic of, 70 , 137 , 207 , 344 Koren, Henry L. T., 26 Korry, Edward M., 65 Kosygin, Aleksei N., 57 , 70 , 106 , 114 , 144 , 232 , 261 , 263 , 265 , 266 , 268 , 292 , 310 , 337 , 345 Krag, Jens Otto, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 Kuchel, Thomas, 124 Kuss, Henry, 139 , 239 , 244 Kuwait, 252 , 255 , 287 Ky (Nguyen Cao Ky), 268 , 308 La Malfa, Ugo, 103 La Pira, Giorgio, 101 , 119 , 120 Labor issues, 43 , 80 , 171 , 183 , 246 , 329 Lacerda, Carlos, 155 , 157 Land mines, 174 Landau, George W., 174 , 175 , 202 , 206 , 210 , 212 , 213 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 221 , 224 Langille, G. C., 332 Laos, 26 , 38 , 43 , 70 , 106 , 315 , 340 , 344 Latin America, 27 , 31 , 79 , 121 , 133 , 135 , 178 , 302 , 303 , 308 , 337 , 344 Latvia, 304 Lavaud, Gen., 41 Law of the Sea, 317 , 321 , 325 , 331 , 332 , 334 , 335 , 336 , 337 , 339 , 342 , 343 Lead, 331 Lebanon, 300 Leddy, John M., 55 , 185 , 216 , 220 B-52 crash in Greenland, 9 France, 82 Gibraltar, 192 , 193 Italy, 121 , 126 , 132 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 132 Portuguese-U.S. relations, 161 , 164 , 174 , 175 Spain: Base negotiations, 213 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 224 Ship bombing, 187 U.S. military aid, 211 , 213 United Kingdom, 244 , 252 , 254 , 255 , 288 , 293 U.S. nuclear storage and overflights of Danish territory, 2 , 3 , 5 , 8 , 10 , 12 , 17 , 18 Danish position, 11 , 13 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 19 , 20 Settlement, 21 , 22 , 24 Lee Kwan Yew, 250 , 269 , 270 , 273 , 287 , 291 Lenin, Vladimir I., 107 Leone, Giovanni, 95 , 141 , 143 Leonhart, William, 24 LePrette, Jacque, 57 , 59 Less-developed countries (LDCs), 87 Libya, 132 , 209 , 210 , 245 , 254 , 266 , 255 Linder, Harold, 124 Lindjord, Col., 255 Liquidity, international, 243 , 246 , 265 , 266 , 284 Lithium, 41 Liu Shao-ch’i, 170 Lloyd-Hughes, T. D., 293 Locke, Eugene, 308 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 139 , 146 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 43 , 66 , 304 , 329 Lombardi, Riccardo, 96 , 98 , 99 , 101 , 102 Long, Russell, 124 Longo, Luigi, 144 Looram, Matthew J., 160 Loran-C, 147 , 153 , 154 , 157 , 158 , 161 , 163 , 164 Lucet, Charles, 38 , 43 , 52 , 53 , 57 , 58 , 62 , 68 , 71 , 81 , 85 , 86 Lucey, Archbishop Robert E., 310 Lukumbuzya, Micael, 52 Luns, Joseph, 84 , 268 Luxembourg, 121 Luxemburg, Rosa, 107 Macau, 147 Macchi, Alessandro, 300 Mackenzie King, 344 Maclehose, C. M., 255 Macmillan, Harold, 226 , 258 , 264 Macomber, William, 214 Magnuson, Warren, 124 , 130 , 320 Mahon, George H., 214 Makarios, Archbishop, 227 Malaysia: British military forces in: British position, 273 , 287 British-U.S. talks, 270 China, People’s Republic of, position, 269 Costs, 262 Departure, 245 , 260 , 264 Malaysian position, 244 U.S. position, 253 , 254 , 269 British-U.S. talks, 225 Canadian military aid, 322 Confrontation with Indonesia, 236 , 245 , 250 , 255 , 260 , 266 French-U.S. talks, 43 Training of Vietnamese, 260 Vietnam war, 137 Malfatti di Montetretto, Franco, 89 , 91 , 102 , 104 , 118 Mali, 170 Malta, 183 , 245 , 255 , 266 , 295 Mann, Thomas C., 332 , 334 Manning, Robert, 29 Mansfield, Mike, 124 , 214 Mao Tse-tung, 170 Marcinkus, Paul, 300 , 303 Maritime Administration, 341 Marjolin, Robert, 98 Markos, Gen., 103 Marks, Leonard C., 24 Marshall, John R., 273 Marshall Plan for Technology, 123 Martin, Paul, 314 , 315 , 316 , 317 , 322 , 323 , 325 , 330 , 332 , 333 , 334 , 335 , 336 , 337 , 338 , 339 , 340 , 342 , 344 , 345 , 349 Martin, William McChesney, 49 , 237 , 238 Martin-Gamero, Adolfo, 206 Masera, Francesco, 93 Massu, Gen. Jacques, 80 Mathewson, A. W., 332 Maude, E. W., 281 Mauritania, 202 , 210 Mayer, Daniel, 89 Maynard, A/Cdre., 255 McBride, Robert H., 62 , 64 McCone, John A., 30 , 92 , 213 , 232 McCormack, John W., 124 McGrew, D. J., 50 McGuire, Ralph J., 54 McKernan, Donald L., 339 McKillop, David H., 2 , 3 , 5 , 7 , 8 , 10 , 11 , 15 , 19 , 20 , 53 , 105 , 156 , 161 , 181 , 183 McNamara, Robert S.: Anti-ballistic missiles, 342 Arab-Israeli crisis and Six-Day War, 273 Canada, 324 France, 28 , 39 , 51 Nuclear export controls on, 30 , 35 , 37 , 44 Military spending cuts, 237 NATO, 44 , 245 Spain, 185 , 218 United Kingdom: Aircraft purchases, 239 , 255 , 257 , 290 , 291 Asia, military withdrawal from, 290 Defense policy, 236 , 243 Defense review, 244 , 255 German military offset payments, 266 Sterling crisis, 262 , 280 United States, relations with, 264 , 272 Vietnam war, 117 , 255 , 259 McNaughton, John, 44 , 245 , 255 Medici, Giuseppe, 139 , 141 , 142 , 143 Meeker, Leonard C., 337 Meichsner, Friedrich, 103 Melady, Thomas Patrick, 306 Mele, Col. Vito, 96 Meloy, Francis E., Jr., 89 , 91 , 92 , 118 , 121 Menichella, Donato, 95 Menzies, Robert, 250 Merchant, Livingston T., 105 , 328 Merry del Val y Alzola, Alfonso, 179 , 180 , 182 , 184 , 185 , 186 , 187 , 193 , 194 , 201 , 206 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 221 Merzagora, Cesare, 95 , 103 Messmer, Pierre, 39 , 64 , 287 Mexico, 31 , 132 Meyer, Cord, 113 Michelangnoli (Italy), 139 Middle East ( see also Arab-Israeli conflict; individual countries ): French policy toward, 31 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 79 , 85 French relations with Arab states, 31 Italian policy toward, 132 NATO political consultation on, 170 Oil exports, 340 Soviet position, 172 Soviet presence, 170 , 288 Spanish bases and restrictions on U.S. actions, 207 Spanish-U.S. talks, 203 United Kingdom, relations with, 255 , 295 Miki, Tadeo, 345 Mikoyan, Anastas, 300 Milanya (UN), 123 Milesi Ferretti, Gian Luigi, 89 , 91 , 93 Military Assistance Program (MAP), 153 Mills, Wilbur, 324 Mindszenty, Josef Cardinal, 302 , 306 Missionaries, 147 Mitchell, Derek, 245 Mitterrand, Francois, 80 Mobutu Sese Seko, 170 Modine Manufacturing Company, 324 Mollet, Guy, 101 Monetary system, international, 49 , 50 Mongolia, 315 Monroney, Mike, 130 Montel, Gen., 195 Morgan, Thomas E., 124 Moro, Aldo, 87 , 88 , 95 , 97 , 103 , 106 , 108 , 109 , 110 , 115 , 137 , 125 , 129 , 130 , 142 , 268 , 300 Morocco, 198 , 199 , 202 , 204 , 210 Motion picture import regulation, 111 Moyers, Bill D., 264 , 302 Mozambique: Security situation, 151 , 156 , 161 , 163 , 168 Soviet policy toward, 174 Soviet purchases of tantalite, 157 Mulley, Peter, 286 Multilateral Force (MLF) ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ; Nuclear sharing ): British position, 45 , 227 , 230 , 236 French position, 42 , 45 French-U.S. differences, 39 Multilateral Force-Continued German position, 42 , 45 Italian role, 87 , 90 , 102 , 104 U.S. policy toward, 122 , 129 Mundt, Carl, 43 Munoz Grandes, Gen. Augustin, 194 , 195 , 218 Murphy, David, 133 Murray, Donald, 293 Myerson, Jacob, 267 Nairne, P. D., 255 Namso project, 64 Nash, K. T., 255 Nassau Agreements, 69 Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 132 , 217 , 255 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 30 , 57 , 183 National Council of Churches, 306 National Liberation Front (NLF). See Viet Cong . National Science Foundation, 131 National Security Action Memoranda: No. 294, 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 No. 336, 51 National Security Council: Meetings: 568th , 78 587th , 295 , 296 Standing Group, 149 National Student Association, 205 Nationalism, 88 , 127 , 184 , 227 , 264 , 342 Natural gas pipelines, 132 Navarro, Gen., 223 Navy, U.S., 207 Ne Win, 123 Neald, R. R., 243 Nenni, Pietro, 89 , 96 , 98 , 102 , 103 , 104 , 107 , 109 , 121 , 179 , 232 , 268 , 308 Netherlands: Air base rights in Portugal, 175 Atlantique consortium proposal, 139 EEC, 179 , 268 European unification, 47 , 145 French aircraft sales, 139 Natural gas, 132 Political situation, 121 Soviet Mediterranean role, 221 Sterling crisis, 249 United States, relations with, 137 Neustadt, Richard, 245 Neutralism, 219 , 222 New China News Agency, 315 New Zealand ( see also New Zealand subheadings under other subjects ): British defense talks, 252 British forces in Malaysia, 270 Currency devaluation, 279 Defense role, 255 Grain sales to Japan, 43 United Kingdom, relations with, 264 , 288 United States, relations with, 70 Vietnam war, 344 Newman, George, 255 Newman, Peter, 342 Ngo Dinh Diem, 26 Nguyen Cao Ky, 268 , 308 Nguyen Chanh Thi, Gen., 304 Nguyen Van Huyen, 309 Nguyen Van Thieu, 309 , 310 Nigeria, 170 , 255 Nitze, Paul H., 133 , 209 , 210 , 211 , 214 , 215 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 283 Nixon, Richard M., 43 Nogueira, Alberto Franco, 147 , 148 , 150 , 152 , 153 , 154 , 157 , 158 , 161 , 162 , 163 , 164 , 165 , 166 , 167 , 168 , 170 , 172 , 174 , 175 North Africa, 203 , 210 , 255 North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 331 , 342 , 344 North Atlantic Council (NAC), 267 , 337 North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 295 North Atlantic Treaty, 54 , 158 , 159 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ( see also Multilateral Force): British-German talks, 259 British participation, 295 , 296 British-U.S. talks, 250 Canadian role, 344 Cuban trade, 25 Danish role, 6 Defense College, 123 French-German relations and, 86 French military withdrawal: Costs, 82 , 123 French position, 42 , 53 , 54 , 64 , 83 French public opinion, 56 Spanish position, 206 U.S. position, 34 , 55 , 56 , 77 , 221 French position, 5 , 27 , 44 Harmel Report, 170 , 344 Italian position, 87 , 137 Italian-U.S. talks, 110 , 122 Maltese role, 183 Middle East, political consultation on, 170 Military budgets, 64 Ministerial meetings, 4 , 147 , 315 May 1964 , 179 Dec. 1964 , 38 , 158 , 325 Jan. 1966 , 192 June 1966 , 59 , 123 Dec. 1966 , 70 Dec. 1967 , 345 June 1968 , 221 , 296 Nov. 1968 , 145 , 221 Naval strategy, 245 Nuclear weapons, 129 , 226 Portuguese position, 170 Soviet-U.S. relations and, 297 Spanish membership, 183 , 185 , 198 , 201 , 207 , 221 , 222 Standing Naval Force, 168 Tenth anniversary, 1961 , 85 U.S. position, 121 , 255 Vietnam war, review of, 106 Warsaw Pact, relations with, 121 Northwest Airlines, 130 Norway, 6 , 121 , 260 , 281 , 295 , 321 Nuclear energy, 128 Nuclear free zones, 21 , 228 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): French position, 83 German position, 129 , 142 Indian position, 129 , 132 , 264 Italian position, 127 , 128 , 129 , 132 , 142 Japanese position, 142 , 264 Soviet position, 132 Soviet-U.S. talks, 297 Spanish position, 206 , 210 U.S.-British-German declaration, 264 U.S. position, 298 Nuclear sharing ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force ; Multilateral Force), 252 , 259 Nuclear submarines, 41 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Moscow, 1963 , 41 , 106 Nuclear weapons ( see also U.S. nuclear storage and overflights under Denmark): British elimination of, 227 , 230 , 264 Canadian acceptance, 331 French development, 30 , 35 , 41 German development, 42 , 227 Indian development, 44 Israeli development, 128 NATO policy toward, 129 , 226 Palomares crash incident, 189 , 190 , 191 , 194 , 207 PRC development, 44 , 128 , 206 , 232 Testing, 41 , 45 UAR development, 128 U.S. loan to France, 61 U.S. storage in France, 27 , 59 Use of, 226 , 320 Nuvolini (Italy), 145 O’Brien, Lawrence, 324 O’Brien, Leslie K., 281 , 284 Occhetta, Achille, 101 Oder-Neisse line, 57 Oil, 340 , 348 Okun, Milt, 262 , 277 Olivetti, 95 Oreja, Marcelino, 206 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 50 , 72 , 86 , 111 , 284 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 160 , 242 Organization of American States (OAS), 31 , 228 , 322 , 344 Ortiz, Frank V., Jr., 179 , 187 , 193 , 194 , 198 , 201 Ortolani, Umberto, 95 Ortona, Egidio, 132 , 134 , 135 , 142 Outer space and space flights, 44 , 45 , 57 , 85 , 123 , 183 , 186 , 202 , 209 Pacciardi, Randolfo, 95 , 96 , 100 , 103 Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran, 255 , 287 Pakistan, 252 , 260 , 300 Palliser, Michael, 245 , 268 , 293 Palomares incident. See under Spain. Palumbo, 145 Pan Am, 130 Papal States, 306 Patch, Col., 96 Pathet Lao, 38 , 70 Patman, Wright, 124 Paul VI (Giovanni Battista Montini), Pope, 98 , 108 , 137 , 142 , 300 , 301 , 302 , 305 , 307 , 308 , 309 , 310 , 311 , 312 , 313 Pearson, Lester B., 315 , 316 , 320 , 322 , 325 , 326 , 327 , 328 , 334 , 335 , 336 , 340 , 341 , 342 , 344 , 345 , 346 Pella, Giuseppe, 95 Per, Fergo, 2 Peraccini, Giovanni, 95 Pereira, Duarte Vaz Pinto de Sa, 155 Perez-Urruti, Juan, 201 Perouse, Maurice, 50 Persian Gulf: British military withdrawal, 245 , 255 , 262 , 285 , 286 , 287 , 288 , 289 , 291 Regional cooperation, 295 Pesce, Livio, 103 Peters, S., 96 , 101 Peterson, Frederick V., 4 Petrignani, Rinaldo, 106 Peyrefitte, Alain, 27 , 45 , 46 Pham Ngoc Thao, Col., 43 Pham Van Dong, 119 Philippines, 70 , 244 , 344 Picchiotti, Brig. Gen. Franco, 96 Pieraccini, Giovanni, 95 P.L. 480 , 147 Plutonium, 9 , 41 , 232 Poats, Rutherford, 213 Podgorny, Nikolai V., 132 , 232 , 300 , 308 , 310 Poland, 37 , 38 , 85 , 122 , 344 Pollack, Herman, 207 Pompidou, Georges, 42 , 61 , 64 , 77 , 265 Pope Paul VI. See Paul VI (Giovanni Battista Montini), Pope . Popolarum Progressorum, 308 Population control, 302 Portugal ( see also Portuguese Africa; Portugal and Portuguese subheadings under other subjects ): Bomber purchases, 166 , 169 Canada, relations with, 321 , 325 Cuba, 154 , 171 German plane sales, 159 German air base rights, 175 Israel, relations with, 168 Labor issues, 171 Rhodesia, 168 , 170 Spain, relations with, 198 United States, relations with, 147 , 152 , 154 , 161 , 173 , 175 U.S. air bases, 209 U.S. military aid, 153 Vietnam war, 171 Portuguese Africa ( see also Angola; Mozambique ; Portugal; Portuguese Guinea ): China, People’s Republic of, involvement, 174 Elections, 154 NATO political consultation, 170 Portuguese attitude toward, 171 , 172 Protestant missionaries, 147 Self-determination, 147 , 150 , 154 , 160 Soviet involvement, 174 UN consideration, 160 , 164 , 168 , 170 U.S. military aid to rebels, 155 , 157 U.S. peace proposals, 163 , 164 , 165 , 167 U.S. policy toward, 149 , 150 U.S.-Portuguese talks, 156 , 176 Portuguese Guinea, 148 , 153 , 157 , 171 , 174 Prado, Gen., 195 Preda, Giani, 99 Puerto Rico, 176 , 181 , 187 Pushkin, Georgi M., 38 Quebec, 76 , 79 Raborn, Vice Adm. William F., Jr., 51 , 114 , 116 Ramberg, Gen., 4 Ramparts, 205 Ranalli, Emilio, 93 Read, Benjamin H., 51 , 227 , 252 , 273 , 289 , 298 , 317 Refugees, 127 , 151 , 164 , 273 Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 88 , 89 , 91 , 104 , 108 , 111 , 115 , 125 , 134 , 300 , 301 , 304 , 306 Remondino, Gen. Aldo, 127 Republic Security Companies (CRS), 80 Reston, James, 105 , 109 Reuther, Walter, 324 Rey, Jean, 132 Rhodesia, 168 , 170 , 252 , 255 , 266 , 295 , 297 Rickett, Denis, 244 , 281 Rielly, John, 57 Ritchie, Albert E., 315 , 316 , 334 , 335 , 339 , 341 , 344 , 349 Ritchie, Charles S. A., 315 , 316 , 327 , 332 Rivers, Mendel, 214 Robb, Charles, 137 Roberto, Holden, 151 , 155 , 156 , 158 , 161 , 164 Roberts, Goronwy, 288 Robertson, R. Gordon, 315 , 316 Robertson, Willis, 124 Robinson, H. Basil, 314 , 315 , 316 , 330 , 335 , 349 Rocca, Col. Renzo, 95 Rochet, Waldeck, 144 Rockefeller, Nelson, 43 Rogers, Col. Bernard, 259 Roll, Eric, 231 , 233 , 234 , 237 Romania, 142 , 172 , 221 Romano, Sergio, 134 Ronne, Torben, 2 , 3 , 5 , 7 , 8 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 Ronning, Chester, 333 Roosa, Robert V., 40 , 237 Roosevelt, Archibald, 133 Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 114 , 340 Rosen, Kenneth, 189 Rossi, Gen. Aldo, 103 Rostow, Eugene V., 68 Rostow, Walt W., 21 , 73 , 340 Arab-Israeli conflict, 297 British sterling crisis, 262 , 277 , 278 Canadian-U.S. relations, 341 , 343 , 347 France, 74 , 82 , 85 , 86 Italy: Aviation issues, 136 Economic situation, 98 NATO nuclear committee representation, 126 Political situation, 135 Scientific cooperation with the United States, 131 U.S-British relations and, 86 U.S. covert activity, 133 NATO, 122 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 142 Spanish base negotiations, 223 Spanish-Moroccan relations, 204 United Kingdom, 253 , 296 Vatican-U.S. relations, 306 Vietnam war, 292 , 293 , 313 Rothschild Bank, 170 Rowe, James, 307 Rowen, Henry, 245 Rubber, synthetic, 41 Rubinacci, Leopoldo, 131 Rueff, Jacques, 49 Rumor, Mariano, 96 , 135 , 145 Ruser, Claus R., 213 Rusk, Dean, 184 Africa, 147 Arab-Israeli conflict, 273 Balance of payments, U.S., 217 , 286 Biafra, 170 Canada: Auto parts tariffs, 318 , 322 , 323 , 330 Law of the Sea, 317 , 325 , 335 , 336 , 337 United States, relations with, 338 , 344 China, People’s Republic of, 232 , 337 , 349 Congo (Leopoldville), 170 Cuba, 321 Cyprus, 322 Denmark, 5 , 9 , 11 , 18 , 21 , 22 , 24 European troop reductions, 242 France: Nuclear export controls, 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 United States, relations with, 27 , 31 , 51 , 55 , 68 , 75 , 82 U.S. troop withdrawal, 58 , 59 German reunification, 46 Gibraltar, 181 , 202 , 207 Italy: Aviation issues, 91 , 111 , 136 Moro visit, 110 Political situation, 89 Representation on NATO nuclear committee, 126 Soviet auto production, financing for, 124 , 134 Soviet Union, relations with, 114 , 124 U.S. aircraft sales, 139 , 143 Malaysia, 322 Middle East, 85 , 271 Multilateral Force, 42 , 90 NATO, 42 , 122 , 337 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 129 , 132 Papal visit, New York, Oct. 1965 , 302 , 303 Portugal, 152 , 154 , 161 , 166 Portuguese African colonies, 156 , 158 , 163 , 168 Rhodesia, 170 Sino-Soviet relations, 70 South Africa, 266 Southeast Asia, 260 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 81 Spain: Attack on ship off Cuba, 180 Base negotiations, 206 , 209 , 210 , 211 , 212 , 213 , 214 , 21 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 220 , 224 EEC role, 179 NATO membership, 185 , 200 United States, relations with, 186 United Kingdom: Budget, 1965 , 241 Defense policy, 236 Defense review, 242 , 254 , 255 EEC membership for, 262 , 268 Nuclear information exchanges, 298 Nuclear weapons, 227 Persian Gulf military withdrawal, 285 , 286 , 287 , 288 , 289 , 290 , 291 Singapore-Malaysia military withdrawal, 269 , 270 , 288 , 289 , 290 , 291 Sterling crisis, 262 United States, relations with, 251 , 264 , 272 , 296 Vietnam war: British negotiating role, 292 British-U.S. talks, 255 , 275 Canadian-U.S. talks, 321 , 344 , 345 DRV diplomatic actions, 53 French position, 66 French-U.S. talks, 38 , 39 Italian position, 106 Italian-U.S. talks, 117 , 121 Negotiations, 120 Neutralization, 29 Spanish-U.S. talks, 186 , 188 U.S. expenditures, 220 U.S. position, 162 Vatican role, 313 Visits: Brussels, May 1964 , 179 Europe, 1965 , 50 Madrid, Dec. 1965 , 188 Madrid, Nov. 1968 , 221 Portugal, Nov. 1968 , 173 , 174 , 175 , 176 United Kingdom, May 1964 , 169 United Kingdom, June 1966 , 260 Russell, Richard, 214 Sagaz, Angel, 179 , 191 , 195 Salans, Carl F., 339 Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, 147 , 150 , 154 , 155 , 157 , 167 , 171 , 172 Sandys, Duncan, 228 Santini, Gen., 132 Saragat, Giuseppe, 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 104 , 118 , 127 , 128 , 134 , 136 , 137 , 142 , 179 , 232 , 268 , 308 Satrustegui , 187 Saudi Arabia, 255 , 288 , 295 Sauer, Walter, 24 , 213 , 214 Scandinavia, 6 , 50 Schaetzel, J. Robert, 34 , 93 , 102 Schmidt, Carlo, 98 Schramme, Jacques, 170 Schroeder, Gerhard, 105 , 123 , 198 Schweitzer, Pierre-Paul, 281 Scott, Hugh, 43 Scott, Kenneth B. A., 192 Scranton, William, 43 Seaborg, Glenn T., 30 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 41 , 51 Seaborn, J. Blair, 304 , 320 , 322 , 345 Second Vatican Council, 302 Sedo Gomez, Ramon, 217 , 218 , 219 Segni, Antonio, 87 , 90 , 95 , 97 , 99 , 103 , 127 Seidenman, Neil, 89 , 90 , 112 , 134 , 135 Senate, U.S. ( see also Congress, U.S. ), 142 , 185 , 207 , 218 Senegal, 72 , 165 Sensi, Federico, 90 , 91 Sevareid, Eric, 120 Seydoux, Roger, 38 , 74 Sharjah, 287 , 288 Sharp, Mitchell, 319 , 344 , 345 , 346 , 347 , 349 Shaver, Thomas R., 336 Sherman, William, 300 Shore, Peter, 286 Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr., 79 , 81 , 82 , 84 , 85 Shuckburgh, Evelyn, 192 Shullaw, J. Harold, 181 , 231 , 244 , 293 Sicily, 209 Sihanouk, Primce Norodom, 260 , 315 , 345 Singapore: Aden as staging point, 242 British military role: Australian position, 270 British position, 236 , 260 , 273 , 287 New Zealand position, 270 U.S.-British talks, 250 , 270 U.S. position, 253 , 254 , 269 Japanese threat, 287 Vietnam war, 137 Sino-Soviet conflict, 31 , 87 , 106 , 144 , 184 , 266 , 268 , 300 Sisco, Joseph, 31 , 120 , 150 Six-Day War, 1967 . See Arab-Israeli conflict. Slater, Joe, 183 Smith, Bromley K., 78 , 289 , 295 , 298 Smith, Ian, 170 , 255 , 295 Smith, Joseph, 133 Smith, Joseph L., 206 , 219 , 222 Smith, Rufus Z., 334 , 335 , 339 , 340 , 349 Smith, Walter Bedell, 106 Solomon, Anthony M., 124 , 244 , 262 , 279 Souphanouvong, Prince, 38 South Africa, Republic of, 149 , 168 , 266 Southeast Asia ( see also Vietnam war; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ; individual countries ): Australian role, 295 British military withdrawal, 270 , 287 , 288 , 289 , 290 , 291 , 295 British role, 250 Canadian interests, 337 China, People’s Republic of, policy toward, 26 , 184 Economic and social development, 115 French policy toward, 26 , 32 , 236 New Zealand role, 295 U.S. policy toward, 87 , 250 Vatican concern, 300 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO): British position, 236 , 242 , 260 , 287 , 288 , 295 French position, 46 , 260 Meeting, Apr. 1964 , 29 Pakistani position, 260 Philippines position, 260 Thai position, 260 U.S. commitments, 269 Vietnam war and, 29 , 106 Southwest Africa, 149 Souvanna Phouma, 38 Soviet Union ( see also Sino-Soviet conflict; Soviet subheadings under other subjects ), 133 Auto production agreement with Italy, 114 , 123 , 124 , 134 British arms embargo, 227 Canada, relations with, 321 China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 70 , 266 , 268 Cuba, troop withdrawal from, 228 Disarmament, 114 , 225 Eastern Europe, relations with, 87 Foreign policy, 232 France, relations with, 31 , 73 , 45 , 46 , 57 , 61 Glassboro Summit, 297 , 310 Law of the Sea, 325 Mediterranean role, 206 , 207 , 209 , 221 , 222 Middle East, 170 , 172 , 288 Military influence, 300 Natural gas pipelines, 132 Portuguese trade, 157 Religious persecution, 304 Twenty-third Party Congress, 1966 , 57 United Kingdom, relations with, 230 , 261 , 263 United States, relations with, 13 , 210 , 297 , 337 Vatican, relations with, 306 Vietnam war, 70 , 106 , 117 , 265 Wheat purchases, 182 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 104 , 179 Space. See Outer space. Spadolini, Giovanni, 103 Spain ( see also Gibraltar): African colonies, 156 , 202 , 210 Air links to Cuba, 186 Attacks on Spanish ships, 180 , 187 Biafra, aid to, 170 Canada, relations with, 321 , 325 Communist Party, 144 Cuba, relations with, 177 , 178 , 182 , 186 Currency devaluation, 281 Economic Development Plan, 1963-1967 , 183 EEC role for, 179 Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference, 184 , 194 Foreign relations, 217 France, relations with, 183 , 198 , 199 Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 198 Italy, relations with, 198 Japanese policy toward, 217 Labor issues, 183 Latin America, relations with, 178 Libya, relations with, 210 Middle East, 203 , 207 Morocco, defense treaty with, 198 Palomares bomber crash, 189 , 190 , 191 , 194 , 207 Portugal, relations with, 198 Sino-Soviet conflict, 184 United Kingdom, relations with, 181 , 192 , 198 , 202 United States, agreements with: Defense Agreement, 1953 , 214 Defense Agreement renewal, 1963 , 177 , 179 , 185 , 206 , 210 Defense Agreement renewal, 1968 , 198 , 206 , 207 , 209 Military Assistance Agreement, 185 Space research projects, Apr. 1966 , 183 Space tracking station agreement, Oct. 1965 , 186 Status of Forces Agreement, 213 United States, relations with, 208 , 217 , 218 Aviation issues, 130 Economic issues, 210 , 213 Outer space research projects, 183 , 186 U.S. bases, 209 Closing of, possible, 211 , 213 , 215 Negotiations, 206 , 207 , 210 , 212 , 224 Rusk-Castiella talks, 213 , 214 , 215 , 216 , 217 , 218 , 219 , 220 Wheeler visit, 222 , 223 U.S. covert action programs, 205 U.S. military aid, 185 , 207 , 210 , 211 , 213 , 217 U.S. policy toward, 183 U.S. security guarantees, 213 , 214 Vietnam war, 184 , 203 , 208 Spanish Guinea, 210 Spanish Western Sahara, 202 Sparkman, John, 214 Spellman, Francis Cardinal, 300 Spielman, Herbert, 93 , 114 Spiers, Ronald I., 58 , 260 , 283 , 287 , 290 Spinola, Gen. Antonio de, 174 Springer, William Lee, 124 Springsteen, George S., Jr., 59 , 139 , 210 , 244 Stabler, Wells, 132 Stagger, Harley, 124 Stalin, Yosef, 89 , 221 Stammati (Italy), 145 Sterling crisis. See under United Kingdom (UK) . Stevens, John, 263 Stevenson, Adlai E., Jr., 155 , 164 Stewart, Michael, 181 , 240 , 254 , 255 Stewart, Michael N. F., 123 , 181 , 192 , 193 , 240 , 250 , 251 , 252 , 255 , 260 , 262 , 297 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 2 , 52 , 68 , 169 , 170 , 194 , 198 , 202 , 206 , 334 , 338 Stout, Charles R., 87 , 90 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 209 , 226 Straus, Richard, 344 Strauss, Franz Josef, 145 Studebaker Corporation, 316 Suez Canal closure, 277 Sugar, 177 , 182 Sukarno, 250 Sullivan, Phil, 146 Suslov, Mikhail A., 300 Sweden, 219 , 248 , 249 , 281 Switzerland, 27 , 166 , 219 , 249 , 281 , 286 Symmes, Harrison, 181 Syria, 132 Tabor, Hans, 1 , 2 , 5 Tahiti, 45 Taiwan. See China, Republic of. Talbot, Phillips, 31 , 181 Tanganyika, 156 Tanguy, Charles R., 85 Tanks, 28 Tantalite, 157 , 164 Tanzania, 217 Tape, Gerald, 35 Tariffs ( see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ), 93 , 316 , 318 , 319 , 322 , 323 , 324 , 348 Tasca, Henry, 31 TASS, 221 Taviani, Paolo, 95 , 96 Taxation, 50 , 230 , 342 , 346 , 347 , 348 Taylor, Adm. R. L., 133 Television, 111 Terenzi, Amerigo, 144 Terrorism, 127 , 147 , 151 Terruzzi, Giulio, 88 Textiles, 147 Thailand, 43 , 70 , 87 , 260 , 264 , 269 , 340 , 344 Thant, U, 123 , 147 , 156 , 160 , 273 Themido (Portugal), 169 Thi, Gen. (Nguyen Chanh Thi), 304 Thomaz, Rear Adm. Americo de Deus Rodrigues, 157 , 171 , 172 Thompson, Llewellyn E., 35 , 41 , 55 , 113 , 116 , 185 , 228 Thomson, David R., 111 Thomson, George, 170 , 287 , 291 Thomson, John A., 228 , 245 303 Committee, 51 , 92 , 113 , 133 Thule Air Force Base ( see also Denmark), 1 , 2 , 6 , 9 , 21 Tito, Josip Broz, 88 Togliatti, Palmiro, 96 , 101 , 103 , 144 Tomkins, Edward, 274 Toon, Malcolm, 13 Tornetta, Vincenzo, 121 Toscano, Mario, 91 Toumayan, Alec, 85 Trades Union Congress (TUC) (UK), 246 Transportation, U.S. Department of, 341 Treasury, U.S. Department of, 124 , 217 , 279 , 323 Treaty of Rome, 69 , 179 , 264 , 295 Treaty of Utrecht, 181 Tremelloni, Roberto, 127 Trend, Burke, 236 , 245 , 246 , 260 , 266 , 272 , 293 Trezise, Philip H., 348 Tri Quang, 304 Trip wire theory, 42 Trippe, Jerry C., 8 , 16 , 18 Tritium, 298 Troop levels, U.S., 27 Trucial States, 255 , 287 Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, 314 , 349 Truman, Harry S, 226 Truman Doctrine, 269 Tshombe, Moise, 156 , 170 Tucker, Frank M., Jr., 9 Tunisia, 210 Tunku Abdul Rahman, 244 , 273 Turkey, 175 , 209 , 217 , 218 Turkeys, 344 TWA, 130 Tyler, William R., 148 , 155 , 159 , 226 Canada, 315 , 316 French-U.S. relations, 31 Gibraltar, 181 Italy, 89 , 91 , 98 , 104 Law of the Sea, 321 , 325 , 334 Multilateral Force, 102 , 105 Portugal, 156 Spain, 177 , 179 , 180 , 182 United Kingdom, 227 , 232 , 236 Vietnam war, 43 , 240 Udall, Stewart, 319 Unger, Leonard S., 106 United Arab Republic (UAR), 128 , 132 , 221 , 255 , 340 United Kingdom (UK) ( see also British and United Kingdom subheadings under other subjects ; Gibraltar; Multilateral Force; North Atlantic Treaty Organization ): Aircraft purchases, 239 , 256 , 257 , 283 , 290 , 291 Biafra, aid to, 170 Canada, relations with, 321 China, People’s Republic, relations with, 315 Communist Party, 144 Conservative Party, 227 , 258 , 264 , 271 , 295 , 296 Cuba, trade with, 26 , 177 , 225 , 227 , 232 Cyprus: Military forces in, 245 , 255 , 287 , 288 British-U.S. talks, 225 , 227 Debts and assets, 1965 , 243 Defense policy, 236 , 243 Defense review: British position, 245 U.S.-British talks, 242 , 244 , 252 , 254 , 255 U.S. position, 253 , 257 White paper, 256 , 273 , 274 Economic situation ( see also Sterling crisis below ): Balance of payments, 230 , 231 , 233 , 234 , 238 , 243 , 266 , 295 Budget, 1965 , 241 , 246 Incomes policy, 237 Military budget, 255 , 283 Sterling as reserve currency, 296 Tax law changes, 50 , 230 ELDO, withdrawal from, 123 Elections, 88 , 90 , 102 , 105 , 227 , 258 Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 255 , 258 Indonesia, relations with, 255 , 288 Labor issues, 246 Labour Party, 89 , 90 , 102 , 105 , 121 , 227 , 230 , 240 , 258 , 261 , 264 , 270 , 271 , 283 , 288 , 295 Liberal Party, 232 Libya, withdrawal from, 245 , 254 , 266 McMahon Act, exclusion from, 44 Middle East, 255 , 295 New Zealand, relations with, 264 , 288 Nuclear export controls on France, 37 Nuclear weapons: Consultation on use of, 226 Elimination, 227 , 230 , 264 U.S. sharing of information, 264 , 295 , 298 Political situation, 121 , 282 Rhodesia, 252 , 255 , 266 , 295 Soviet Union, relations with, 230 , 261 , 263 Spain, relations with, 181 , 192 , 198 , 202 Sterling crisis: Alternate courses of action in, 248 British position, 233 British role in Southeast Asia and, 250 Decolonialization and, 238 Devaluation, 137 , 247 , 262 , 279 , 281 , 295 , 347 Easing, 284 Economic package in response, 262 , 263 , 265 , 271 French position, 50 Italian position, 137 Multilateral support package, 249 1966 elections and, 258 U.S. contingency support, 277 U.S. position, 247 , 264 , 278 Trade embargo on Hungary, 227 United States, agreements with: Agreement on Military Nuclear Cooperation, 1958 , 298 Civil Aviation Agreement, 136 Murphy-Dean Agreement, 1958 , 226 Nassau Pact, 230 Tax Treaty, 50 United States, relations with, 32 , 251 British bids on U.S. minesweeper contracts, 276 French position, 86 Intelligence cooperation, 232 Planning for Wilson visits, 264 Shipping regulations, 229 Trade increases, 244 U.S. objectives, 295 U.S. troops in, 267 United Nations (UN): General Assembly, 121 , 164 , 166 Arab-Israeli conflict, 74 , 132 , 341 Chinese membership issue, 13 , 31 , 104 , 315 , 337 , 349 Fourth Committee, 170 South Africa, 266 Gibraltar, 181 Indian role, 162 Jarring Mission, 221 , 297 Papal visit, Oct. 1965 , 303 Peacekeeping, 322 , 344 Portuguese African colonies, 160 , 164 , 168 , 170 Security Council: Chinese representation issue, 13 Cuba, U.S. overflights, 228 Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion, 297 Rhodesia, 295 Six-Day War, 1967 , 273 , 284 , 297 Resolutions: 242 ( 1967 ), 284 Angolan refugees, 1961 , 164 S/5481 , 147 , 150 Vietnam war role, 106 , 305 , 345 United Nations Charter, 31 , 232 , 315 , 322 , 338 United Press International (UPI), 191 Uranium-235, 35 , 36 , 37 , 44 , 232 , 298 U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense, 325 Val y Alzolaletta, Vittorio, 134 Valenti, Jack, 52 , 109 , 205 , 302 , 310 Valletta, Vittorio, 114 Vallis, Aurelio, 206 Van Dyk, Ted, 57 , 268 Vance, Cyrus R., 113 , 114 , 116 , 185 Vatican: China, People’s Republic of, relations with, 306 Civil rights, 303 East-West relations, 300 Education, 303 Population control, 302 Sino-Soviet conflict, 300 Soviet Union, relations with, 306 U.S. diplomatic relations with, 302 Vietnam war, 301 , 304 , 305 , 307 , 308 , 309 , 310 , 311 , 312 , 313 Vaz Pinto, Alfredo de Queiroz Ribeiro, 172 Vecchietti, Tullio, 96 Vedovato, Gen., 118 Vest, George, 68 , 183 Viet Cong, 38 , 43 , 70 , 106 , 137 , 184 , 260 , 268 , 308 , 309 , 322 Viet Minh, 38 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV) ( see also Viet Cong ; Vietnam war), 43 , 117 , 121 , 297 , 310 , 345 Vietnam, Republic of ( see also Vietnam war): Buddhist protests, 1966 , 304 Canadian economic aid, 329 French policy toward, 26 , 66 , 106 Informal talks with NLF members, 309 , 310 Military situation, 38 , 322 NATO political consultation regarding, 170 Neutralization, 26 , 29 , 106 , 315 Spanish military aid, 186 Stability, 106 , 240 Surrender issue, 106 , 304 U.S. commitment to, 43 Vietnam war: Australian position, 344 Bombing of the North: Canadian position, 342 Christmas truce, 1966 , 307 ICC meetings, 345 Rejection of pause, 261 , 309 Soviet position, 309 U.S. position, 259 , 275 , 313 Vatican position, 308 British policy toward, 106 , 232 , 252 , 261 , 293 British role, 247 , 250 , 292 British-U.S. talks, 240 , 250 , 255 , 268 Burmese position, 344 Canadian intermediary role, 333 Canadian-U.S. talks, 321 , 331 , 340 , 344 China, People’s Republic of, role, 38 , 43 , 106 , 117 , 268 , 337 China, Republic of, position, 344 Communist attack on Saigon, 311 , 313 DRV position, 117 , 119 , 310 French policy toward, 43 , 46 , 62 , 66 , 70 , 71 , 75 , 76 , 85 , 106 French-U.S. talks, 38 , 39 , 42 , 60 , 65 , 77 German role, 121 Great Society programs, effect on, 255 Indonesian position, 344 Italian position, 106 , 110 , 115 , 117 Italian-U.S. talks on, 117 , 121 , 135 , 137 Japanese position, 344 Korea, Republic of, position, 137 , 344 Laotian position, 43 , 344 Malaysian position, 137 NATO review, 106 Negotiations, 117 , 119 New Zealand position, 344 Nuclear weapons use, 320 Paris peace talks, 70 , 79 , 85 , 210 , 311 Philippines position, 344 Political solution, 43 Portuguese position, 171 In the post-Johnson era, 297 San Antonio formula, 137 , 310 , 344 , 345 Scandinavian position, 6 Singapore position, 137 Sino-Soviet conflict and, 106 , 114 Soviet-British talks, 265 Soviet-French cooperation, 45 , 46 Soviet position, 70 , 117 Soviet role, 106 Spanish position, 184 , 208 Spanish-U.S. talks on, 203 Tet offensive, 309 Thai position, 344 U.S. expenditures, 220 U.S. position, 106 , 117 , 137 , 162 , 302 , 305 , 311 Vatican position, 301 , 304 , 305 , 307 , 308 , 309 , 310 , 311 , 312 , 313 Viggiani, Gen. Egidio, 95 Vinci, Piero, 117 Vinogradov, Sergei A., 46 Violante, Brig. Gen. Luigi, 96 Wabeke, Bertus, 337 Wagner, Robert E., 221 Walsh, John P., 263 , 295 Walska, Carl, 24 Warnke, Paul C., 10 , 12 , 16 , 17 , 206 , 207 Warsaw Pact, 121 , 297 Watson, Marvin, 52 Western European Union (WEU), 42 , 267 Wheat, 182 , 227 Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 222 , 223 , 224 , 255 , 267 Wheeler, Joseph C., 308 Wheelus Air Force Base, 209 White, Katherine Elkus, 1 , 3 , 5 , 7 White, Lee, 302 Widnall, William B., 124 Williams, G. Mennen, 52 , 150 , 252 Williamson, Larry, 92 Willis, George H., 145 Wilson, Maj. Gen. Delmar E., 189 , 190 , 195 Wilson, Giles, 227 Wilson, Harold: Aircraft purchases, 287 Arab-Israeli crisis and Six-Day War, 273 , 340 British economic policy, 231 British EEC membership, 266 Budgets, 1965 , 246 Cuban-British trade, 227 Defense review, 242 , 252 , 256 , 257 Gibraltar, 181 , 200 Gold prices, 294 International liquidity, 265 , 266 Johnson, correspondence with, 233 , 234 , 246 , 258 , 257 , 259 , 262 , 273 , 284 , 289 , 290 , 291 Multilateral Force, 227 Nuclear weapons, 227 , 252 Persian Gulf, military withdrawal from, 286 , 289 , 295 Political situation, 282 Rhodesia, 297 Singapore-Malaysia, military withdrawal from, 287 , 289 , 295 Southeast Asia, 260 Soviet-British relations, 261 , 263 Sterling crisis, 247 , 262 , 265 , 271 U.S. balance-of-payments program, 1968 , 286 U.S. view of, 230 Vietnam war, 43 , 250 , 252 , 259 , 265 , 292 , 310 Visits: Melbourne, Dec. 1967 , 282 Moscow, July 1966 , 261 , 265 , 266 , 268 Soviet Union, Jan. 1968 , 292 Washington, Mar. 1964 , 227 Washington, Dec. 1964 , 232 , 235 , 237 Washington, Dec. 1965 , 252 Washington, July 1966 , 261 , 266 Washington, June 1967 , 270 , 271 , 272 , 293 Washington, Feb. 1968 , 293 Wilson, Henry, 324 Woodward, Robert F., 180 World Federation of Trade Unions, 144 World Peace Council, 144 World War II, 43 World War III, 61 , 63 , 67 Wormser, Felix, 25 Wosthorne, Peregrine, 230 Wright, Oliver, 242 , 245 , 252 Wyle, Frederick S., 207 Yalta Conference, 48 , 221 Yemen, 255 Yen Chia-kan, 342 Yugoslavia, 88 , 107 , 144 , 221 , 345 Zambia, 252 , 255 Zanzibar, 156 , 177 , 225 Zimmerman, Robert W., 183 Zinc, 331 Zorin, Valerin, 45 , 46 Zuckerman, Solly, 236 , 255 Zwick, Charles, 214