FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XI, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume XI Arms Control and Disarmament United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Arms Control and Disarmament (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XI) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations Persons Arms Control and Disarmament (Documents 1-302) Index Sources Sources Sources for the Foreign Relations Series The Foreign Relations statute of October 1991 requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute. The editors had complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. When this volume was compiled, all Department of State records consulted were still in the custody of the Department, and the footnotes citing Department of State files suggest that the Department is the repository. By the time of publication, however, all the Department's indexed central (or decimal) files for these years were permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, will also be transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II over the next several years. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnson's telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. The first audiotapes became available to the editors in late 1994, with most audiotapes following during 1995 and 1996. The editors added selected transcripts of the President's relevant telephone conversations to this volume when the audiotapes became available. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. Since 1992, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanding access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. This access arrangement was concluded in order to enlarge the scope of coverage as required by the 1991 law. As Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of identifying the key portions of the intelligence record, the variety of documentation made available to Department of State historians and ultimately selected for publication in the volumes has expanded. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of these agencies, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XI In the planning of this volume documenting U.S. foreign policy on arms control and disarmament issues during the Johnson administration, the editors focused their research in the extensive records of the Department of State. The Department of State and Presidential files were supplemented by documents in the records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) at the Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. Among the ACDA records, the editors looked at the office files of the Director, Deputy Director, and Executive Secretariat. They also perused office files of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and the Assistant for Atomic Energy in the Department of Defense records, and they located in the DOD records several relevant policy papers on arms control subjects prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. An invaluable source of documentation was the multi-volume Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, who served as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 to 1971. Interspersed among his detailed daily journal entries are reproductions of declassified memoranda, minutes of meetings, letters, and other government documents. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. Unpublished Sources Department of State Indexed Central Files . See under National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files . A list of the lot files of the Department of State used in or consulted for this volume follows. Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110 Collection of documentation on international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials for the years 1961-1964. Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586 Chronology of international conferences abroad attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials for the years 1966-1967. Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163 Correspondence between the President and the Chairman of the Soviet Union and other top officials of the two countries for the years 1961-1969, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Presidential exchanges of correspondence with heads of government for the years 1953-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294 Presidential exchanges of correspondence with heads of government for the years 1953-1965, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149 Complete chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for the years 1956-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2 Records of the Ambassador at Large, 1963-1966. S/S Files: Lot 66 D 294 Presidential and Secretary of State's official exchanges of correspondence with various foreign officials for the years 1961-1965. S/S Files: Lot 67 D 262 Presidential and Secretary of State's official exchanges of correspondence with various foreign statesmen for the year 1966. S/S Files: Lot 70 D 21 White House and executive departments' memoranda and letters to the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1963-1966. S/S-I File Microfilmed files of Nodis, Exdis, and Limdis telegrams, airgrams, and despatches for the years 1952-1969. S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246 Microfilmed master files of international conferences attended by the President, the Secretary of State, and other U.S. officials for the years 1956-1966. S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 247 Microfilmed master files of Top Secret, Nodis, and Exdis memoranda and historical projects for the years 1963-1969. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961-1966. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Master file of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) for the years 1961-1968. S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452 Restricted data files maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1963-1966. S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171 Restricted data files maintained by the Executive Secretariat for the years 1957-1967. Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of the Secretary of State's and Under Secretary of State's conversations for the years 1961-1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. Record Group 59, Department of State Records Indexed Central File AE 3-IAEA: Atomic energy, organizations and conferences relating to the IAEA. AE 4 UK-US: Atomic energy agreements involving the United States and the United Kingdo. AE 6: Peaceful uses of atomic energ. AE 6 US: U.S. peaceful uses of atomic energ. DEF (MLF) 3: Defense affairs, multilateral forc. DEF 1 US: Defense affairs, U.S. policy, plans, readines. DEF 1-1 NATO: Defense affairs, contingency planning relating to NATO. DEF 6 MLF: Defense affairs, multilateral armed forc. DEF 6 US: Defense affairs, U.S. armed force. DEF 12: Defense affairs, armament. DEF 12 FR: Defense affairs, French armament. DEF 12 NATO: Defense affairs, NATO armament. DEF 15-4 UK-US: Defense affairs, bases, installations, agreements and leases relating to the U.S. and the U.K. DEF 15-4 UK-USSR: Defense affairs, bases, installations, agreements and leases relating to the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. DEF 18: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmamen. DEF 18 AE: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, atomic energ. DEF 18 UN: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, United Nation. DEF 18 US: U.S. defense affairs, arms control and disarmamen. DEF 18-1: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, general policy and plan. DEF 18-2: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, general reports and dat. DEF 18-3: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conference. DEF 18-3 SWITZ (GE): Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences relating to Geneva, Switzerlan. DEF 18-3 USSR (MO): Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, organizations and conferences relating to Mosco. DEF 18-4: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, agreements and treatie. DEF 18-6: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, control measure. DEF 18-8: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, testing and detectio. DEF 18-9: Defense affairs, arms control and disarmament, demilitarized and nuclear free zone. ORG 7: Organization and administration, visit. ORG 7 ACDA: Organization and administration, visits by and to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official. ORG 7 AEC: Organization and administration, visits by and to Atomic Energy Commission official. POL FR-US: Political affairs and relations between France and the U.S. POL UK-US: Political affairs and relations between the U.K. and the U.S. POL UK-USSR: Political affairs and relations between the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. POL US-UK: Political affairs and relations between the U.S. and the U.K. POL US-USSR: Political affairs and relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. POL 1 US: General U.S. political affairs and relation. POL 1 US-USSR: General U.S.-U.S.S.R. political affairs and relation. POL 3 UN: Political affairs and relations, United Nation. POL 7 UK: Political affairs and relations, visits and meetings with U.K. official. POL 15-1 USSR: Political affairs and relations between the heads of state of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. POL 17-1 UK-USSR: Political affairs and relations, acceptability and accreditation between the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. POL 21 E EUR-W EUR: Political affairs and relations, peace and non-aggression issues between Eastern and Western Europ. SP 1 US: General U.S. policy, plans, and coordination on space and astronautic. SP 4: Space and astronautics, agreement. SP 6 UN: Peaceful uses of space relating to the United Nation. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Department of Defense OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306 Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1964. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1964. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1965. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1966. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 I 6648 Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1966. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 J 6648 Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1966. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546 Files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1967. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4919 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1967. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498 Disarmament files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the year 1968. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499 Top Secret files of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for the years 1967-1968. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265 Top Secret records of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for the year 1965. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266 Records of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for the year 1965. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443 Records of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for the year 1966. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662 Top Secret records of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and their Special Assistants for the year 1966. OSD/AE Files: FRC 72 A 4120 Subject files of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for the years 1958-1968. OSD/AE Files: FRC 73 A 1400 Top Secret subject files of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for the years 1961-1969. OSD/AE Files: FRC 73 A 2413 Top Secret subject files of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for the years 1961-1969. Record Group 383, Records of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/CRSC Files: FRC 77 A 59 Miscellaneous policy and position papers for the years 1953-1968. ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23 Files of Director William C. Foster for the years 1959-1966. ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52 Memoranda to the White House, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense for the years 1961-1968. ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80 Files of Director William C. Foster for the years 1958-1969. ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17 Files of Deputy Director Adrian S. Fisher for the years 1961-1969. ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 32 Files of Deputy Director Adrian S. Fisher for the years 1961-1967. Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83 Records of the Committee of Principals for the years 1965-1968. Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5 Top Secret numbered documents for the years 1961-1983. Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas National Security File Agency File Committee File-Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Country File Head of State Correspondence File Intelligence File Memos to the President Name File National Intelligence Estimates National Security Action Memorandums National Security Council Histories NSC File NSC Meetings File Rostow File Subject File Ball Papers Bator Papers Clifford Papers Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings Records and Transcripts Transcripts and Tapes of Cabinet Room Meetings White House Central Files Confidential Files Unpublished Studies . Additional background information was derived from the following classified and unclassified historical studies prepared in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Cornelius, Wayne, Jr. (ed.). Documents on Non-Proliferation: A Compilation of Documents Relevant to the U.S. Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation Tabled in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, August 17, 1965, at Geneva. (1965) Lambert, Robert W. (ed.). American and Soviet Substantive Statements on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, December 1966-July 1969. (1969) Lambert, Robert W. Arms Control Developments Concerning Outer Space, 1957-1967. (1971) ———. Background Information on the Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Freeze, 1964-1967. (1968) ———. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban, 1963-1971. (1971) Nary, R. William. Negotiations of Article V (Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (1977) The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Administration During the Johnson Administration: Part I. Summary and Analysis of Principal Developments; Part II. Policy and Negotiations. (1969) Published Sources Government Publications and Documentary Collections United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 (New York: Columbia University Press) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990 edition) ———. Documents on Disarmament, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) ———. International Negotiations on the Seabed Arms Control Treaty. Publication 68 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973) ———. International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons . Publication 48 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) ———. Review of International Negotiations on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests, September 1962-September 1965 . Publication 32 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966) U.S. Congress, Senate. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII [1966] (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) ———. Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) ———. Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968) ———. Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session , Part 2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969) ———. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency. Operations Crosstie and Bowline: Events—Door Mist, Dorsal Fin, Milk Shake, Diana Moon, Hudson Seal, and Ming Vase, 31 August 1967-20 November 1968 (DNA 6322F, 1985) ———. Operations Flintlock and Latchkey: Events—Red Hot, Pin Stripe, Discus Thrower, Pile Driver, Double Play, New Point, Midi Mist, 5 March 1966-26 June 1967 (DNA 6321F, 1984) ———. Operations Nougat and Whetstone: Events—Hard Hat, Danny Boy, Marshmallow, Mudpack, Wishbone, Gumdrop, Diluted Water, and Tiny Tot, 15 February 1962-17 June 1965 (DNA 6320F, 1984) U.S. Department of Energy. Announced United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 Through December 1992 (DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 13), May 1993) U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968-69 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) ———. Department of State Bulletin , 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) ———. Documents on Germany , 1944-1985 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985) Memoirs, Autobiographies, Diaries, and Histories by Participants Garthoff, Raymond L. “Banning the Bomb in Outer Space,” International Security, V (Winter 1980/81), pages 25-40. Johnson, Lyndon. Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971) Nitze, Paul H. (with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden). From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989) Rostow, W. W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Macmillan, 1972) Seaborg, Glenn T. Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg . Pub-625, Volumes 7-17, 26, Appendix, and Press Clippings (Berkeley: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 1989-1992) ——— (with Benjamin S. Loeb). Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1987) Abbreviations Abbreviations A, airgram ABM, anti-ballistic missile ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/D, Office of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/DD, Office of the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/IR, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDA/ST, Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACEP, Advisory Committee on Export Policy AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AEDS, atomic energy detection system AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFI, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State AFTAC, Air Force Technical Applications Center AICBM, air-launched intercontinental ballistic missile AID, Agency for International Development AL, Ambassador at Large ANF, Atlantic Nuclear Force ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARPA, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense ASAP, as soon as possible ASW, anti-submarine warfare B, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation BDSA, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce BIP, Bureau of International Programs, Department of Commerce BMD, ballistic missile defense BMI, Office of United Kingdom, Ireland, Malta Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State BOB, Bureau of the Budget BR, Belgian reactor BUSEC, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the U.S. Mission to the European Communities C, Confidential CA, circular airgram CANDU, Canadian Deutrium Uranium (nuclear reactor) CAP, Common Agricultural Policy, refers to agricultural policies of the Common Market CAP, series indicator for communications from the White House to the Johnson Ranch in Texas CBW, chemical and biological (bacteriological) weapons CEA, Council of Economic Advisers CEDTO, series indicator for communications from Paris relating to OECD matters CFR, Code of Federal Regulations CG, circular airgram; Consultative Group, based in Paris, consisting of nations working to control the export of strategic goods to Communist countries ChiCom, Chinese Communist CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIR, Canada-India reactor CM, Chairman's Memorandum, Joint Chiefs of Staff CMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps CNO, Chief of Naval Operations COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group COMIBOL (CMB), Corporacion Minera de Bolivia (Mining Corporation of Bolivia) COP, Committee of Principals CP, Contracting Party (Parties); Cabinet Paper CPR, Chinese People's Republic CSD, Commodities Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State CTB, comprehensive test ban CTBT, comprehensive test ban treaty CU, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs CY, calendar year D, Democrat; Office of the Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development DAC, Development Assistance Committee DAG, Development Assistance Group DC, Disarmament Commission (United Nations) DC/T, Telegraphic Branch, Division of Communications Services, Department of State DD, Deputy Director Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency Disdel, Disarmament delegation (to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee) dissem, dissemination Disto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva to the Department of State DLF, Development Loan Fund DM, Deutschemark DOD, Department of Defense E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State E.O., Executive Order EA, Office of East Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State ECBUS, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Mission to the European Communities to the Department of State ECD, Economic Defense Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State ECONAD, Committee of Economic Advisers (NATO) ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council ECRB, Export Control Review Board ED, Economic Development Division, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs EE, East European; Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EEC, European Economic Community EFTA, European Free Trade Association EMA, European Monetary Agreement Embtel, Embassy telegram ENDC, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee EPC, European Political Community ESSOR, Essai Orgel (Orgel test reactor) (Italy) EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Community Exdis, exclusive distribution EXIM, Exim Bank, Eximbank, Export-Import Bank EXSEC, Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development FAC, Office of the Deputy Coordinator for Foreign Assistance, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations FAZ, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FN, International Finance Division, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State FOB, forward operating bases FODAG, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FRB, Federal Reserve Board FRC, Federal Records Center (Washington National Records Center) FRG, Federal Republic of Germany FSD, Fuels Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State FSE, Fuels and Energy Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs GA, General Assembly (United Nations) G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GC, Office of the General Counsel GCD, general and comprehensive disarmament GDR, German Democratic Republic GER, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State GNP, gross national product GOI, Government of Iran GOJ, Government of Japan G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs GRC, Government of the Republic of China GSA, General Services Administration H. Rept., House of Representatives Report H. Res., House of Representatives Resolution H.R., House of Representatives HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare HMG, Her (His) Majesty's Government IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency IAIAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (Costa Rica) IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICA, International Cooperation Administration ICAC, International Cotton Advisory Committee ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile ICFEP, Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy IDA, Institute for Defense Analyses IDA, International Development Association IDB, Inter-American Development Bank IDD, International Development Decade IDY, International Development Year IL, International List (of embargoed goods) ILO, International Labor Organization, United Nations IMF, International Monetary Fund INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IOC, initial operational capability IR, intermediate-range ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense JAG, Judge Adjutant General, Department of Defense JAPCO, Japan Atomic Power Company JCAE, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum JPDR, Japan power demonstration reactor JRR, Japanese research reactor KG, kilogram KT, kiloton L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State LA, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development LA-NFZ, Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty LAS, long-range assistance strategy LASA, large aperture seismic array LASL, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory LDC, less developed country Limdis, limited distribution LRL, Livermore Radiation Laboratory LS, Language Services Division, Office of Operations, Department of State LTBT, Limited Test Ban Treaty M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group MAP, Military Assistance Program MC, memorandum of conversation MD, missile driver MDC, Mutual Defense Control Staff, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State MFN, Most Favored Nation MIRV, multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehicle MITI, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan MLF, multilateral force MOD, Ministry of Defense MRBM, medium-range ballistic missile MSA, Mutual Security Assistance MSP, Mutual Security Program MT, megaton MWE, megawatt-electric MWT, megawatt-thermal MZFR, Mehrzweck Forschungs Reactor (multi-purpose research reactor in West Germany) NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems; North Atlantic Council (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATUS, series indicator for communications from the Department of State to the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDAC, Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State NESA, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development NFZ, nuclear free zone NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NM, nautical mile NNC, Non-nuclear Conference Nodis, no distribution NP, non-proliferation NPD, nuclear power demonstration NPG, Nuclear Planning Group (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NPR, nuclear power reactor NPT, non-proliferation treaty NRU, National Research Universal (nuclear reactor) (Canada) NRX, National Research Experiment (Canadian reactor) NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council O, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration OAS, Organization of American States OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense OAU, Organization of African Unity OC, Office of Communications, Department of State; Operating Committee of the Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP) OCB, Operations Coordinating Board OCDM, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation OEP, Office of Emergency Planning OES, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State OFD, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OFE, Office of International Finance and Economic Analysis, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OIA, Office of International Affairs, Department of the Treasury OIF, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury OIN, Office of Industrial Nations, Department of the Treasury OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPR, Office of Operations, Department of State OPR/LS, Language Services Division, Office of Operations, Department of State OR, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD/AE, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy OT, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State OTC, Organization for Trade Cooperation P.L., Public Law PNE, peaceful nuclear explosion PNED, peaceful nuclear explosive device POLAD, Political Adviser (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State R&;D, research and development R, Republican RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State RAF, Royal Air Force RD, Restricted Data REA, Office of Inter-American Regional Economic Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State reftel, reference telegram ResDel, resident delegation RG, Record Group RO, Regional Office(r) RPE, Office of Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State RSB, Office of Research and Analysis for Soviet Bloc, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State S, Office of the Secretary of State; Senate S. Res., Senate Resolution S/C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State S/S-I, Information Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State S/S-S, Executive Secretariat Staff, Department of State SALT, strategic arms limitation talks SAM, surface-to-air missile SCI, Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SecDef, Secretary of Defense Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences to the Department of State septel, separate telegram SNDV, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate SNV, strategic nuclear vehicle SONJ, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey SOSUS, Sound Surveillance Undersea System SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Stat., Statutes at Large SYG, Secretary-General (United Nations) TN, thermonuclear Todis, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the U.S. Delegation at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva Topol, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences TR, terms of reference TS, Top Secret TTB, threshold test ban TTBT, threshold test ban treaty U, Unclassified; Under Secretary of State; uranium UAR, United Arab Republic UEM, Union Electrica Madrilena (Madrilenian Electrical Union) (Spain) UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDC, United Nations Disarmament Commission UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State USA, United States Army USAF, United States Air Force USC, United States Code USG, United States Government USIB, United States Intelligence Board USN, United States Navy USRO, Office of the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations VERAC, Verification Advisory Committee WEU, Western European Union WH, White House Z, Zulu time (Greenwich mean time) Persons Persons Alessandrini, Adolfo, Italian Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Anderson, Clinton P., Democratic Senator from New Mexico Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, June 26-September 25, 1968 Barber, Arthur W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Arms and Trade Control) Bator, Francis M., Senior Economic Adviser, Agency for International Development, until April 1964; Member, National Security Council Staff, April 1964-1965; Deputy Special Assistant to the President, 1965-September 1967 Beam, Jacob D., Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, until 1966; Ambassador to Czechoslovakia after August 31, 1966 Berard, Armand, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations after 1967 Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France until February 9, 1968; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs after February 11, 1968 Bowie, Robert J., Counselor, Department of State, September 21, 1966-April 1, 1968 Bowman, Colonel Richard C., Member, National Security Council Staff, 1964-1966 Brandt, Willy, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister after December 1, 1966 Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; also President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet until July 1, 1964 Brosio, Manlio, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after 1964 Brown, George, British Foreign Secretary, August 10, 1966-March 15, 1968 Brown, Harold, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, until September 30, 1965; thereafter Secretary of the Air Force Bundy, McGeorge, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966 Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until March 14, 1964; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bunn, George, General Counsel, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, until 1968 Butler, Richard A., British Foreign Minister until October 16, 1964 Carlson, Frank, Republican Senator from Kansas Carstens, Karl, Deputy West German Foreign Minister Casteneda, Jorge, Chief Director, Mexican Foreign Ministry; Mexican Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee after 1967 Cavalletti di Oliveto Savino, Marquis Francesco, Head of the Italian Delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Chalfont, Lord, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs after 1964, and British Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 1965-1967 Cleveland, Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until September 8, 1965; thereafter Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Clifford, Clark M., Secretary of Defense after March 1, 1968 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States after April 13, 1965 De Palma, Samuel, Deputy Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, November 1965-November 1966; thereafter Assist-ant Director Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, President of Mexico after December 1, 1964 Dirksen, Everett M., Republican Senator from Illinois Dobrynin, Anatoly Fedorovich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Douglas-Home, Sir Alex, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until October 16, 1964 Ecobesco, Nicolae, Head of the Romanian Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 1967 Eklund, Dr. Sigvard, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Erhard, Dr. Ludwig, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until December 1, 1966 Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister, March 5, 1965-June 24, 1968 Fedorenko, Nikolai Trofimovisch, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations until May 1966 Finletter, Thomas K., Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until September 2, 1965 Fisher, Adrian S., Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Foster, William C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Frosch, Robert A., Director, Nuclear Test Detection, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, until 1965; Deputy Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1965-1966; Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, 1966-1967; Chairman, Interagency Committee on Marine Research, Education and Facilities, after 1967 Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Garcia Robles, Alfonso, Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America; Mexican Subsecretary of Foreign Relations in charge of Multilateral and Cultural Affairs; Mexican Permanent Representative to the United Nations after 1965 Gardner, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until 1965 Garthoff, Raymond L., Special Assistant for Soviet Bloc Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 1964; Chairman, Presidential Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, November 1964-January 1965 Gleysteen, Culver, Deputy Assistant Director, International Affairs Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, after September 1966 Goldberg, Arthur J., Permanent Representative to the United Nations, July 28, 1965-June 24, 1968 Gordon, Kermit, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, until 1965 Gordon Walker, Patrick C., British Foreign Secretary, October 16, 1964-January 22, 1965 Gore, Albert, Democratic Senator from Tennessee; Chairman, Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Graybeal, Sidney N., Member, Strategic Weapons Panel, Department of Defense, until June 1964; thereafter Assistant Director, Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, Soviet Foreign Minister Halperin, Morton H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Policy Planning and Arms Control) after 1967 Harriman, W. Averell, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until March 17, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at Large Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Republican Senator from Iowa Holifield, Chet, Democratic Representative from California; Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, until 1966; thereafter Vice Chairman Hornig, Donald F., Director, Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, after January 1964 Hosmer, Craig, Republican Representative from California Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., Democratic Senator from Minnesota until December 29, 1964; Vice President of the United States after January 20, 1965 Jackson, Henry M., Democratic Senator from Washington Johnson, Charles E., Member, National Security Council Staff, 1962-1969 Johnson, General Harold K., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, July 3, 1964-July 2, 1968 Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 12, 1964, and November 1, 1965-October 9, 1966; Deputy Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-1965; Ambassador to Japan after November 8, 1966 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General until February 13, 1965; Attorney General, until October 3, 1966; thereafter Under Secretary of State Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., Member, National Security Council Staff, 1963-1969 Kent, Sherman, Assistant Director and Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, Chairman of the U.S.S.R Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until October 15, 1964 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany after December 1, 1966 Knappstein, Heinrich, German Ambassador to the United States Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 14, 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, November 29, 1966-December 31, 1967 Kosygin, Alexei Nikolaevich, Vice-Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers until October 15, 1964; thereafter Chairman Kratzer, Myron B., Director, International Affairs Division, Atomic Energy Commission, 1964-1967; Assistant General Manager for International Activities, Atomic Energy Commission after 1967 Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilievich, First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Labowitz, Allan, Assistant for Disarmament to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission Leddy, John M., Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development until June 15, 1965; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Lilenfield, Georg von, German Minister to the United States until 1967 Mansfield, Michael J., Democratic Senator from Montana; Senate Majority Leader Marks, Leonard H., Director of the U.S. Information Agency, September 1, 1965-December 6, 1968 McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965 McGhee, George C., Ambassador to Germany until May 21, 1968 McMillan, William G., Jr., Chairman, Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968 McNaughton, John T., General Counsel, Department of Defense, until June 25, 1964; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1, 1964-July 19, 1967 Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser, Department of State, after May 18, 1965 Mendelevich, Lev I., Head of Latin American Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry Miki, Takeo, Japanese Foreign Minister after December 3, 1966 Moro, Aldo, Italian Foreign Minister, December 29, 1964-March 5, 1965 Moyers, Bill D., President's Special Assistant, 1963-1967; also Press Secretary to the President, 1965-1967 Mulley, Fredrick W., British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Head of the British Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee after 1967 Myrdal, Alva, Head of the Swedish Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Nitze, Paul H., Secretary of the Navy until June 30, 1967; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense Oliver, Covey T., Ambassador to Colombia, August 13, 1964-August 26, 1966; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, July 1, 1967-December 31, 1968 Ormsby Gore, David (Lord Harlech), British Ambassador to the United States until April 1965 Paine, Thomas O., Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, after 1967 Palfrey, John G., Member, Atomic Energy Commission, until June 30, 1966 Pastore, John O., Democratic Senator from Rhode Island; Vice Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1965-1966; Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, after 1967 Penney, Sir William, Chairman, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Pollack, Herman, Deputy Director, Office of International Science Affairs, Department of State, 1964-1967; Director, Office of International Science and Technology Affairs, Department of State, after 1967 Popper, David H., Director, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Department of State, until September 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Puhan, Alfred, Director, Office of German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, August 1964-June 1968; thereafter Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Raborn, William F., Jr., Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965-June 30, 1966 Ramey, James T., Member, Atomic Energy Commission Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State Rey, Jean, Member, Commission of the European Economic Community in charge of External Relations until July 1, 1967; thereafter President of the Commission of the European Communities Roshchin, Alexei Alexeevich, Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee after 1966 Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs after October 14, 1966 Rostow, Walt Whitman, Counselor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until March 31, 1966; President's Special Assistant after April 1, 1966 Rowan, Carl, Ambassador to Finland until February 8, 1964; Director of the U.S. Information Agency, February 28, 1964-July 10, 1965 Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Sarabhai, Vikram A., Chairman, Indian Atomic Energy Commission, after 1966 Saragat, Giuseppe, President of Italy after December 28, 1964 Schaetzel, J. Robert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until September 16, 1966; thereafter Representative to the European Communities Schroeder, Gerhard, German Foreign Minister until December 1, 1966; thereafter Defense Minister Schultze, Charles L., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, until June 1, 1965; thereafter Director until January 29, 1968 Scoville, Herbert, Jr., Assistant Director, Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Shaw, John P., Counselor, Embassy in Bucharest, until 1965; Political Officer, Embassy in Bonn, after June 1966; Special Assistant for Communist Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, after January 1968 Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs after September 10, 1965 Smyth, Henry D., Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency Solbert, Peter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1965 Spaak, Paul-Henri, Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister until March 20, 1966 Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until October 1966; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Staden, Berndt von, Counselor of the German Embassy in the United States, 1964-1967 Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965 Stewart, Michael, British Foreign Secretary, January 22, 1965-August 10, 1966 and after March 15, 1968 Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Minister-Counselor, Embassy in Moscow, until 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Strauss, Franz Josef, German Finance Minister after December 1, 1966 Tape, Gerald F., Member, Atomic Energy Commission Taylor, General Maxwell D., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 1, 1964; Ambassador to Vietnam, July 14, 1964-July 30, 1965 Taylor, Rufus L., Director, Naval Intelligence, 1963-1966; Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1966-1967; thereafter Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations Thomas, Peter, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Head of the British Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee until 1964 Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large until December 26, 1966, also Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Ambassador to the Soviet Union after January 23, 1967 Timberlake, Clare H., Chairman, Disarmament Advisory Staff, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, until 1964; thereafter Deputy Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Trivedi, Vishnu C., Indian Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee until 1967 Tsarapkin, Semen Konstantinovich, Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee until 1966 Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 18, 1965; Ambassador to the Netherlands after June 23, 1965 Valenti, Jack J., President's Special Assistant until May 1966 Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of the Army until January 27, 1964; then Deputy Secretary of Defense until June 30, 1967 Walsh, John P., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, after May 1965 Warnke, Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs after August 1, 1967 Webb, James E., Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration until 1968 Weiler, Lawrence D., Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, after April 1964 Wheeler, General Earle G., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, until July 2, 1964; thereafter Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Wiggins, James Russell, Permanent Representative to the United Nations after October 7, 1968 Wilson, James Harold, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom after October 16, 1964 Zorin, Valerian Alexandrovich, Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, 1964; Soviet Ambassador to France after 1965 Arms Control and Disarmament Arms Control and Disarmament 1. Notes of Conversations Washington, January 7, 1964. Source: Glenn T. Seaborg, Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971, Vol. 7, pp. 187-188. No classification marking. Seaborg kept a handwritten journal that he edited into a typescript in 1985. It is the edited, typed version that appears in the published Journal. Of the 25 volumes, plus 3 volumes of appendices, Volumes 7-17 cover the Johnson presidency. Copies of the Journal are available through research libraries and institutions, including the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Presidential Libraries of Kennedy and Johnson, and the libraries of the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles. 2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 14, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 388.3, January 11-16, 1964. Secret. Attached to another copy of Bundy's memorandum is a January 15 memorandum from ACDA Director William C. Foster to the Committee of Principals, recommending that Bundy's memorandum serve as the agenda for their meeting on January 16 and transmitting a list of working papers for use as reference material. The list covers three areas: nuclear containment, immediate reductions or limitations of arms, and observation posts. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament—ACDA Publications, Vol. I, Box 11) 3. Editorial Note 4. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 18, 1964. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 251-252. No classification marking. 5. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 3, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. 6. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, February 7, 1964, 11 a.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Thomas Ehrlich (L). The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For another account of this meeting, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, p. 348. Seaborg's version gives the time and place of the meeting. 7. National Security Action Memorandum No. 282 Washington, February 11, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, General, Vol. I, Box 27. Secret. 8. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 13, 1964, 9:30 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by M. Gordon Knox (EUR/BNA) and approved in S on February 26. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” The meeting was held at the White House. 9. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 13, 1964, 10:55 a.m. Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Knox and approved in S on February 20 and by the White House on February 24. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” On February 12-13 in Washington, Prime Minister Douglas-Home and President Johnson had their first working meetings since assuming the leadership of their respective governments. 10. Editorial Note 11. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev Washington, February 22, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Regarding the decision to send this message, see Document 10. In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, February 18, Fisher attached an undated draft of the proposed message to Khrushchev. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8) Fisher's draft is similar to the source text but more directly proposed “appropriate inspection of some of the closed facilities,” such as President Johnson had already offered for one of the U.S. reactors that was being shut down. A similar draft to Fisher's, dated February 18, is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, p. 23. 12. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 22, 1964. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 (January-February 1964). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached is a February 24 covering memorandum from Barber to Fisher enclosing copies of this memorandum and JCSM-147-64, entitled “Basic Elements of a Freeze.” JCSM-147-64 has not been found. 13. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 27, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Henry (EUR/SOV) on February 28 and approved in S on March 9. The source text is labeled “Part I of VII.” The conversation was held in the Secretary's office. In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, February 26, Fisher provided talking points for this meeting. (Washington National Records Center,RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary, 1964) 14. Notes of Meeting Washington, February 28, 1964. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 424, 429-430. No classification marking. Here and elsewhere, Seaborg has inserted reproduced documents in the Journal, which account for the interrupted pagination. 15. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson Moscow, February 28, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Attached is a March 2 memorandum from Thompson to Secretary Rusk, indicating that Dobrynin gave Thompson the oral message at 10 a.m. that morning. After reading the message, Thompson remarked that “the reply did not refer to the President's suggestion that we might accept inspection of closed plants. The Ambassador said he had no further instructions, but remarked that traditional Soviet policy was 'no inspection without actual disarmament.'” 16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, February 28, 1964, midnight. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Paris, USUN, and Geneva. 17. Notes of Meeting Washington, March 3, 1964. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 8 and 30. No classification marking. 18. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev Washington, March 9, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. 19. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. II, Box 12. Secret. 20. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 171-173. The source text, originally classified, has been sanitized. All deletions are in the source text. Though the source text is undated, Seaborg's Journal confirms that Seaborg wrote the letter on March 25. (Ibid., p. 169) The source text was sent under cover of a March 25 memorandum from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., p. 170) It is an account of his meeting with Penny on March 24, which Bundy asked Seaborg to write after hearing Seaborg's oral report about it. (Ibid., pp. 162-163, 169) 21. Editorial Note 22. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev Washington, April 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. 23. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson Moscow, April 17, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the date refers to the day the message was received. 24. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson Moscow, April 20, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. No classification marking. 25. Editorial Note 26. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev Washington, May 1, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. 27. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, May 7, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—General, Vol. 1, Box 27. Secret. 28. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Washington, May 21, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament,ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 18 memorandum from Fisher to members of the Committee of Principals. 29. Editorial Note 30. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff and Steven R. Rivkin of the President's Office of Science and Technology to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the President's Science Adviser (Hornig) Washington, June 2, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the source text reads, “McGB: For your mtg with Butch Fisher this afternoon. DK” The source text is signed only by Rivkin. 31. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson Moscow, June 5, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the date refers to the day the message was received. 32. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) Washington, June 9, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. 33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Scoville) to President Johnson Washington, June 12, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. 34. Notes of Meeting Washington, June 16, 1964. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 565-566. No classification marking. 35. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, June 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 13 memorandum from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy. Keeny expressed reservations about the failure of the agencies to resolve the issue of aerial reconnaissance and the exclusion of certain types of nuclear reactors from inspection but nonetheless concluded, “I am impressed that all the agencies have agreed to the paper and believe that you should recommend that the President approve the paper as it stands.” 36. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. The source text is attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 37, which notes the time of the meeting and that it took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Also attached is a June 30 note from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy (who missed the meeting) that asked him to note the summary of actions and Secretary Rusk's comments “on the problem of nuclear weapons for India when China obtains nuclear weapons.” Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 8, pp. 566-567. 37. Summary of Actions Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament,ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. 38. Editorial Note 39. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-64, USSR, Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data. According to a note on the cover sheet: “This estimate consists of an updating of those subjects in NIE 11-2-63 about which significant new information has become available, and which merit a restatement. It includes topics under the following main headings from NIE 11-2-63, 'The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,' dated 2 July 1963: Nuclear Reactor Program—Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems; Fissionable Materials Production; Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program. The reader should refer to NIE 11-2-63 for information on other details of the Soviet atomic energy program.” NIE 11-2-63 is ibid., National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63,USSR, Box 1) 40. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals Washington, July 23, 1964, 8 a.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964. Secret. Probably drafted by Scoville, who is listed as reporting officer on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room, Department of State. The source text is also attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 41, which provides the time and place of the meeting. 41. Summary of Actions Washington, July 23, 1964, 8 a.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room, Department of State. 42. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 12, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. Probably drafted by Jacob D. Beam, who is listed as reporting officer on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. The source text is also attached to the summary of action taken at the meeting, Document 43, which provides the time and place of the meeting. 43. Summary of Actions Washington, August 12, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. 44. Draft Position Paper Washington, August 14, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Noforn. The source text was forwarded to Secretary Rusk under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Foster. Foster's memorandum indicated that the paper “is based in part on discussion at the June 16 and July 23 meetings of the Committee of Principals and also sets forth a U.S. response to the recent resolution of the Organization of African Unity on this subject.” Regarding these two meetings of the Committee of Principals, see Documents 36, 37, 40, and 41. The OAU resolution refers to the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity at Cairo, July 21. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 294-295. 45. Editorial Note 46. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 25, 1964. Source: Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on August 24. The source text forms Tab C-1 of a briefing book prepared for Secretary Rusk for the meeting of the Committee of Principals on August 27. 47. Editorial Note 48. Informal Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities Washington, September 25, 1964, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Committee on Nuclear Weapons. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on September 30. The source text was transmitted under cover of a September 30 memorandum from Thompson to the members of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities. 49. Editorial Note 50. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 23, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 399, 404, and 409. 51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 320 Washington, November 25, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 320-Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 6. Confidential. 52. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) Washington, November 28, 1964. Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limit Distribution. 53. Memorandum of Conversation New York, December 5, 1964, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Gromyko/Secretary Conversations, December 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 9. The source text is labeled “Part III of III.” The meeting, which took place at the U.N. Mission, was one of several between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko in late November and December in New York and Washington. Memoranda of their conversations on disarmament on November 30 and December 2, 9, and 19 are ibid., and also in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. 54. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 9, 1964, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 11 and approved in S on December 15 and by the White House on December 16. The meeting was held in the White House. 55. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Washington, December 10, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff. At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard H. Davis (EUR), Henry D. Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Thomas L. Hughes (INR), and Richard N. Gardner (IO). 56. Draft Minutes of Discussion of the Second Meeting of Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Washington, December 13-14, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on December 19. The second meeting of the Gilpatric Committee was held in the Old Executive Office Building from December 13 at 10 a.m. to December 14 at 1 p.m. No approved version of the minutes has been found. 57. Memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 16, 1964. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret. 58. Editorial Note 59. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 7, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Garthoff. The attached list of participants is not printed. 60. Minutes of Discussion Washington, January 7-8, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on January 19. The minutes cover the third meeting of the Gilpatric Committee, which met in the Old Executive Office Building from January 7 at 10 a.m. to January 8 at 5:45 p.m. 61. Message From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, January 14, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text bears no salutation. Attached is a January 14 memorandum from Thompson to McGeorge Bundy in which Thompson indicated, inter alia, that he would give the message to Dobrynin during the latter's call the same day. 62. Notes of Meetings Washington, January 19, 1965. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 73 and 75. No classification marking. 63. Editorial Note 64. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation Washington, January 21, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Report (Final, 12/21/65), Box 8. Secret. The report and a 13-page “draft of an NSAM which would in the opinion of the Gilpatric Committee give execution to its recommendations,” was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Foster, Seaborg, General Wheeler, McCone, and Hornig, January 23, 1964 [1965], with the President's admonition that “these papers not be shown to anyone outside the Committee of Principals without his direct approval in each case … . I cannot overstate the strength of the President's conviction and concern for the security of these documents.” A copy of the draft NSAM, not printed, is ibid. The NSAM was never formally issued. 65. Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Washington, January 22, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. No classification marking. In a January 22 telephone call to Seaborg, Foster said that Dobrynin made this oral reply to Thompson at 3:15 p.m. the same day. (Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 87) Dobrynin handed the aide-mémoire to Thompson, saying it was not related to the inquiry Secretary Rusk had made of him concerning the Soviet test on January 15. When Thompson responded that he hoped there was no relationship between the two inquiries, Dobrynin “said he thought that in fact there may have been some similarity between the two events in that both may have been accidents.” (Memorandum of conversation, January 22; ibid., p. 89) 66. Oral Reply From the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Confidential; Limdis. A copy is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 101. 67. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Confidential; Limit Distribution. A copy of the aide-mémoire is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 98-100. The source text is undated, but is attached to a January 26 memorandum from G. William Moser to the Committee of Principals indicating that a copy of the aide-mémoire was given to Ambassador Dobrynin on the same day. Llewellyn Thompson, who handed it to Dobrynin, wrote of their meeting: “I handed the Ambassador our reply to their aide-mémoire on the Kiwi reactor. After reading it, the Ambassador quoted from the language of the Treaty, stating that in addition to weapons tests, 'any other nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described' was prohibited. He stated that this experiment had been described by the American press as a nuclear explosion. I said that although the matter was a technical one, my understanding was that the operation of any nuclear reactor could, in one sense of the word, be described as a nuclear explosion. My understanding was that in this case in order to develop reactor safety, a reactor was speeded up to the point where it burned itself up, but that this was not comparable to what we would consider a nuclear explosion by a very wide margin. “Dobrynin said he would of course transmit our aide-mémoire and that it would be studied in Moscow, but he clearly indicated that he did not consider we had made a convincing case.” (Memorandum of conversation, January 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31) 68. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson Moscow, February 1, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR—Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. The source text contains no salutation. The February 1 date is the day Dobrynin delivered it to Thompson. (Memorandum from Thompson to Bundy, February 1; ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8) 69. Editorial Note 70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, February 11, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. 71. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, March 6, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. 72. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and approved in S on March 31. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 5.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington, March 21-24. 73. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy Washington, March 30, 1965. Source: Department of State,S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, Miscellaneous Microfilm Files, U.S./U.S.S.R. Conversations. Confidential. A cover memorandum of conversation by Thompson (S/AL), March 30, states that he asked Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to come to the Department of State to give him the aide-mémoire. Dobrynin said he would transmit it to his government, but he made no comment on it. 74. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 30, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential;Exdis. Drafted by Foster. 75. Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State Washington, April 29, 1965. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 437-438. No classification marking. A cover memorandum of conversation by Thompson (S/AL), April 29, reads as follows: “Dobrynin handed me the attached aide-mémoire concerning the recent Plowshare experiment. I made no comment.” (Ibid.) This aide-mémoire seemed to Seaborg “to be a political move, possibly in anticipation of discussion of mutual problems in conducting Plowshare programs.” (Ibid., p. 435) 76. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy Washington, May 18, 1965. Source: Department of State,S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. No classification marking. Drafted by Thompson. The draft memorandum was considered at the meeting of the Committee of Principals on May 13; for a brief summary of the meeting, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, p. 478. A May 14 memorandum from Foster to the members of the committee transmitting the final version stated that it would be delivered to Ambassador Dobrynin at an early date. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65) May-June 1965) 77. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 18, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 1965), May-June 1965. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Thompson, May 18. 78. Memorandum of Conversation New York, May 19, 1965, 1:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Foster, who was in New York to attend meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission which met from April 21 to June 16. 79. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 19, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-65, U.S.S.R., Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board. 80. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, May 29, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, National Program, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. 81. Editorial Note 82. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, June 15, 1965, 2345Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential. Reported to Geneva. Beginning in May 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 83. Report by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Washington, June 18, 1965. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA/Foster. Confidential. The source text was sent under cover of a June 21 memorandum from Foster to President Johnson, stating that the report was his evaluation of the results of the session. “I hope you will agree,” he concluded, “that on balance, it went well for the United States.” 84. National Security Action Memorandum No. 335 Washington, June 28, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13. Confidential. 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations Washington, July 11, 1965, 10:26 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers (EUR/RPM) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA), cleared by Thompson (G), Leddy (EUR), Jeanne W. Davis (S/S-S), Ball (U), Klein (White House), and initialed by C. Arthur Borg (S) for Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Rome. A July 12 memorandum from Fisher to Rusk states that Weiler's name was added to the source text as a co-drafter without his knowledge. Weiler had worked with Spiers on an earlier draft which ACDA concurred in except for paragraph 6. It included an FYI section, supported by ACDA, which reads as follows: “US non-proliferation policy is currently under review, and it is possible that new approaches and changes in past position will result. Accordingly, we do not want to give impression that 1963 draft treaty or above points are immutable.” Fisher's memorandum maintains that this section was excised from the draft telegram transmitted to Rusk without ACDA's being informed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6) 86. Memorandum of Conversation Moscow, July 21, 1965, 3–4:40 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text is enclosure 1 to Airgram A-151 from Moscow, July 26. Drafted by Marshall Brement on July 26. Ambassador at Large Harriman visited the Soviet Union July 12-21, during his July 10-August 3 trip to Europe to seek European support for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war. 87. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals Washington, undated. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 299-303. No classification marking. The source text is undated, but Seaborg indicates elsewhere in his Journal that the meeting occurred on July 22; ibid, Vol. 11, p. 77. The source text notes the meeting took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room from 5 to 6:30 p.m. For additional background on the issues discussed at this meeting, see Document 90. 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, July 22, 1965, 9:43 p.m. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, Sec. Rusk/UK Officials 11/64-12/65. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk on July 22 and cleared by Alexander L. Rattray (S/S). The source text is stamped “Sec Def has seen. 26 Jul.” 89. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk London, July 23, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13. Secret. The source text is attached to a covering note of transmittal from British Ambassador Dean to Secretary of State Rusk, July 23. The source text contains no salutation or signature. 90. Editorial Note 91. Memorandum of Conversation Geneva, August 1, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster. This conversation took place in the Hotel des Bergues. 92. Editorial Note 93. Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of Principals Washington, August 25, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by George W. Rathjens (ACDA/D) on August 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 304-307. 94. Summary of Actions Washington, August 25, 1965, 4 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by George W. Rathjens (ACDA/D), August 28, 1965. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. 95. Editorial Note 96. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 29, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Peter S. Bridges (ACDA/IR) on September 28. The source text was transmitted through Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thompson. 97. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 1, 1965, 8:30–11:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (LS) and Alfred Puhan (EUR/GER) and approved by S on October 2. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their countries' delegations to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly's twentieth session in New York, September-October 1965. Rusk was in New York, September 26-October 5, 1965. 98. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, October 4, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, Box 27. Confidential. 99. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 6.” This meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. Stewart visited the United States October 11-14. 100. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 29, 1965, noon. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL), October 29. Thompson informed British Ambassador Dean of the Soviet oral message, allowing him to take full notes, November 6. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid.) 101. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Beam) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 4, 1965. Source: Washington National Records, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos of the Secretary of State, 1965. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by James S. Bodnar (ACDA/IR) and Beam and cleared by Helmut Sonnenfeldt (INR/RSB), Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM), Thompson (S/AL), and Vladimir Toumanoff (EUR/SOV). 102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, November 25, 1965. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, U.S.S.R., Vol. XI, 11/25-2/66, Box 221. Top Secret. 103. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Washington, December 2, 1965. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1965. The source text is Tab B to a December 3 memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which asks Rusk to get McNamara's concurrence on a draft letter from Foster to the Latin Americans on a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (Tab A). Fisher's memorandum states that the attached draft letter “maintains the pressure for the inclusion of Cuba but, in accordance with the position paper you approved, leaves the way open for subsequent U.S. agreement even if Cuba is not included.” For text of the revised letter of December 10, see Document 105. 104. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 8, 1965, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US Officials Memoranda of Conversation with Leading USSR Officials, 1965. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) December 9, and in S/S-S by John P. Walsh. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 105. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (Garcia Robles) Washington, December 10, 1965. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 626-627. The source text is an attachment to a memorandum of conversation between Gerard Gaussen, Counselor of the French Embassy in Washington, and Samuel De Palma, Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA/IR, December 15. 106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, December 23, 1965, 1345Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. 107. Draft Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 11, 1966, 6 p.m. Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR). The conversation was held in Ball's office. 108. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson Moscow, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. A January 12 memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that this message seemed to renew the “pen-pal” correspondence. 109. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject Files, Disarmament, 18-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), Vol. II, Box 13. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A January 14 cover memorandum by R.C. Bowman, transmitting a copy of the source text to McGeorge Bundy, states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “strongly oppose any new test ban proposal at this time,” because the likely Soviet development of an area anti-ballistic missile system could reduce the U.S. strategic deterrent capability to a dangerous level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted continued testing for several years and at the same time improvement in detection capabilities to an adequate level for monitoring a test ban. 110. Abstract of the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals Washington, January 14, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, JCS 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2557. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The report contains a transmittal letter from Panel Chairman W.G. McMillan to General J.P. McConnell, Chief of Staff,USAF, January 14. Also attached is a cover memorandum from General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to members of the Committee of Principals (JCSM-78-66), February 3, stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the U.S. Air Force as the executive agent to establish a panel for an independent analysis of technical problems relating to test ban proposals to evaluate the security implications of further nuclear test restraints. 111. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27. Top Secret, Restricted Data. 112. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 19, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by William F. Miller (ACDA/IR) on January 27 and approved in ACDA/D. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this conversation was held at the British Embassy. Memoranda of two other conversations, January 19, are ibid. No memoranda of the January 20 conversations were found. 113. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, January 20, 1966. 114. Summary of Action Washington, January 21, 1966, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 3, Box 14. Secret; Restricted Data. An attached list of participants is not printed. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's conference room. 115. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 21, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, JCS 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1966. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Chairman Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy. 116. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13. No classification marking. A January 24 cover memorandum to another copy from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that “this is the message to Mr. Kosygin as delivered by Ambassador Thompson at 3:00 p.m. today.” (Ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 13) A January 23 memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, transmitting the draft of this letter, reads in part as follows: “This letter now has the agreement of Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Foster and myself. We have managed to find language which gives a little more reassurance to the Soviet Government on nonproliferation than we have managed before now, while at the same time it fully protects our interest in nuclear arrangements that will keep the Germans with us. The major contribution is George Ball's definition of proliferation in the fifth paragraph. That definition is a shade more binding than the language we have used before now, but it is entirely consistent with everything we have said to the Germans.” (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13) 117. Editorial Note 118. Telegram From the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) Geneva, February 16, 1966, 1323Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6. Secret; No Distribution; Eyes Only. A February 16 cover memorandum from Fisher to McGeorge Bundy states that the telegram arrived by special channel because of the reference to the President's January 24 letter to Kosygin. Fisher added that he was sending a copy to the Secretary of State. 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 20, 1966, 12:38 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Text received from the White House on February 20. This text is apparently a White House revision of the draft text transmitted by memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Johnson, February 19. (Ibid.) 120. Letter From the German Chargé d'Affaires (Lilienfeld) to President Johnson Washington, February 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret. A cover memorandum by Francis M. Bator, which transmitted this letter to President Johnson on February 25, states that Chancellor Erhard was concerned that the recent changes in the U.S. draft nonproliferation treaty “will narrow the possibilities for NATO nuclear arrangements involving hardware.” Bator stated that “we will be able to reassure the Germans on this score.” 121. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, March 2, 1966, 2116Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva, London, and Warsaw and pouched to all other NATO capitals. 122. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State Paris, March 3, 1966, 1950Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, Geneva, London, Moscow, and Warsaw. Pouched to all other NATO capitals. 123. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, March 18, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) on March 19. 124. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, April 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Typed notes on the source text read as follows: “Signed original hand carried to President 4/2/66.” “Approved by President 4/2/66. Announcement made by President 4/3/66 [sic].” This memorandum apparently was generated by a memorandum from Leonard C. Meeker (L) and Joseph J. Sisco (IO) to Secretary Rusk, April 1. (Ibid.) 125. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Test Ban Treaty, Box 11. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 126. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson Washington, May 2, 1966. Source: Department of State,S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA A-Z 1966. Top Secret. A May 2 cover memorandum from Adrian S. Fisher to Secretary of State Rusk states that he is sending the memorandum to the President, as well as to Secretary of Defense McNamara, and he asks for Rusk's comments on the draft letter to Chairman Kosygin. No record of Rusk's comments or of the dispatch of the letter to Kosygin has been found. In a memorandum to Rusk of May 2, Ambassador at Large Thompson opposed this initiative, partly because it was unlikely to draw a constructive response from the Soviets. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Rostow, May 2, Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., suggested that they not send the proposal to the President until they got McNamara's and Rusk's reactions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10) 127. Editorial Note 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations Washington, May 10, 1966, 7:03 p.m. 129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson Washington, May 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Nonproliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret; Limited Distribution. 130. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, May 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-66, U.S.S.R., Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Atomic Energy Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The estimate was submitted by W.F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board; the representative of the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. 131. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 25, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Memoranda Files, FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. An unsigned handwritten note on the source text reads as follows: “Sir: We are informed by Ben Read that Mr. Foster mentioned this memo to you last evening. Copies have been sent by S/S to Messrs. Ball, U.A. Johnson, and Thompson.” 132. Aide-Mémoire From the British Embassy to the Department of State Washington, June 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean transmitted this aide-mémoire to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, June 1. A cover memorandum of the conversation, June 1, indicates that Ambassador Johnson noted that “the Russians already seem to have heavily discounted the European clause option, and have been leveling their main attacks in the ENDC against any form of multilateral association. Consequently, it would appear doubtful whether a change in our position on the European option would substantially improve our tactical position in Geneva.” A cover memorandum transmitting the British aide-mémoire from Spurgeon Keeny to Walt Rostow, June 8, supported the British proposal for the nonproliferation treaty to exclude the possibility of nuclear dissemination to associations of states, the European option. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft on Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) 133. Editorial Note 134. Editorial Note 135. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret. A June 10 cover memorandum from Spurgeon Keeny to Rostow states that Keeny thought Rostow should be aware of McNamara's letter “suggesting that we reconsider our position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” 136. Memorandum for the Files Washington, June 9, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files:FRC 77 A 32, National Security Council. Secret; Exdis. 137. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 9, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft on Non-Proliferation Treaty, Box 27. Secret. 138. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals Washington, June 17, 1966, noon. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 3, Box 14. Secret; Restricted Data. The meeting took place in the Secretary of State's office. No drafting information appears on the source text, though Lawrence D. Weiler is listed as Reporting Officer on the attached list of 23 participants. Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 614 and 628. 139. Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 17, 1966. Source: Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 140. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, July 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—National Nuclear Test Program, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. 141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, July 26, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 388.3, January 1966. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A cover memorandum from Foster to members of the Committee of Principals, August 3, states that all the members of the Committee of Principals concurred in the memorandum with the exception of the Atomic Energy Commission, which suggested a number of minor changes that were incorporated in the memorandum sent to the President. 142. Editorial Note 143. Memorandum for President Johnson Geneva, August 5, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty, Box 72. Confidential. 144. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, August 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6 US. Secret; Exdis. An August 9 cover memorandum from Ball to the President states that this proposal had been “informally discussed with experts in ACDA and the AEC. If you think well of the idea we can go forward with full staffing and clearance with the interested departments.” In a telephone conversation, August 10, Walt Rostow told Ball that “he had sent up Ball's Plowshare memo and it came down with note 'approve staffing and Departmental clearance.'” (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Disarmament, Box 3) 145. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 4. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald B. Helman (IO/UNP) and cleared by Joseph J. Sisco (IO), Leonard C. Meeker (L), and Elizabeth A. Brown (IO/UNP). An attached August 8 memorandum from Robert L. Bruce, S/S Duty Officer, to Thomas R. Shaver (S/S-S) states that Mr. Read would like him to discuss with the Legal Adviser the preparation of a Read to Rostow memorandum on the Celestial Bodies Treaty, setting forth the points agreed on and those not agreed on. A handwritten note on this memorandum states that Helman was doing this. 146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 2, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:52 p.m. the same day. The source text bears the following choices for approval: “Set up a special meeting, Put on Tuesday lunch agenda, Leave it to Secretary Rusk, and See me.” The choice “Put on Tuesday lunch agenda” is checked. No record of the Tuesday lunch discussion has been found. 147. Report Prepared by a Panel Appointed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Washington, September 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text has two cover memoranda: the first from Larry Williamson (S/S-S) to Llewellyn Thompson (S/AL), et al., September 6, transmitting the report. The second from William C. Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals, September 2, transmits the Ad Hoc Panel's Report and explains the origins of the Panel as follows: “at the meeting of the Deputies to the Committee of Principals held on June 3, 1966, serious questions were raised about the possibilities of evasion of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty through provisions for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As a result ACDA organized a panel of experts consisting of Dr. Richard Blankenbecler, Dr. Warren Heckrotte, Mr. William J. Howard, Dr. William G. McMillan, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, and Dr. M. Carl Walske under the chairmanship of Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky to study the security implications of modifying various agreements to ban nuclear weapons tests while permitting explosions for peaceful purposes.” 148. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson Washington, September 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Secret; Exdis. 149. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, September 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6 US. Secret. A September 16 cover memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to Rusk reads as follows: “Pursuant to your commitment to the President at lunch last Tuesday, I have had the attached memorandum prepared setting forth the pros (from the AEC papers) and the cons (from Bill Foster's memoranda) and your recommendation that the President authorize the experiment to proceed. ACDA has approved the con portion of the memo and Alex Johnson has approved the whole memo. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum.” A typed note on the source text states that the memorandum was “approved by the President. W. Rostow's office notifying AEC of approval.” 150. Editorial Note 151. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15–11:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly, September-October 1966. 152. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15–11:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly. 153. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30–11 p.m. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (OPR/LS (Interpreter)) and approved by Thompson (S/AL) and by S on September 26. This conversation was held during Foreign Minister Gromyko's dinner for Secretary Rusk at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Rusk visited New York September 19-25 and October 4-8 during the general debate at the U.N. General Assembly. (Johnson Library, Rusk's Appointment Book) 154. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 3, 1966. Source: Department of State,S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, 1966. Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. 155. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach Washington, October 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 4. Confidential. Drafted by Datus C. Proper (IO/UNP). A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the “Acting Secretary saw.” 156. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials Memoranda of Conversation 1966. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson(S/AL), October 10. 157. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson (S/AL) and approved by the White House, October 13. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) 158. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966, 7:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) on October 11 and approved by S on October 13. This conversation took place in the Department of State, probably at an informal dinner that the Secretary hosted in the Madison Room. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 159. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, Nuclear Free Zone, 1966. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV), October 18, and cleared in S/S and S, October 19. Although the source text provides no time, this conversation apparently took place at the same informal dinner referenced in footnote 1, Document 158. 160. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) on October 18 and cleared in S/S and S on October 19. Regarding the location and time of this conversation, see footnote 1, Document 158. 161. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 14, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mortimer D. Goldstein (EUR/BMI) and approved in S, October 28. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 7.” The conversation was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. Foreign Secretary Brown was in New York in early October to attend meetings of the U.N. General Assembly and visited Washington to confer with U.S. officials. 162. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 15, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, Non-Proliferation, September, 1966. Secret. The source text bears the stamped indicator, “15 Oct 1966, Sec Def has seen.” 163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea Washington, October 31, 1966, 7:52 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA/DD); cleared by Fisher (ACDA), McNamara (DOD) (in substance), McNaughton (DOD/ISA), and Sherrod McCall (S/S); and approved by Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach. The President and Secretary Rusk were in Seoul October 31-November 2 to meet with Korean President Park Chung Hee. 164. Editorial Note 165. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 22, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: “Secretary Saw.” 166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Confidential. Drafted by Scott George (G/PM) on November 22. A typed notation on the source text reads: “ORIG hand carried to President by Secretary per S/S—JPWalsh.” 167. Editorial Note 168. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson. The source text is labeled “Part V of V.” 169. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 10, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the source text reads “Mr. Vance has seen.” 170. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 10, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Vance has seen.” For context of this memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 169. 171. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, December 10, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Vance has seen.” 172. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 11, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret;Limdis. 173. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2752. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A typewritten note on the source text reads “Draft 1/4/67 (Revised 1/17/67).” 174. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 18, 1967, 7 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3541. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. 175. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, January 18, 1967. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential;Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. This conversation is presumably part of the 7 p.m. meeting between Dobrynin and Rusk. See Document 174. 176. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 19, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, Vol. IV, June 1966. Secret. 177. Editorial Note 178. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, January 21, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. Secret. The source text, which the President had cleared on January 14, was submitted for the President's signature under cover of a January 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President. 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, January 22, 1967, 1:27 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3543. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher (ACDA) and Garthoff (G/PM); cleared by Rostow, McNamara, Kohler, Foster, and Walsh; and approved by Secretary Rusk on January 21. 180. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, February 8, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–1 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Alfred Puhan (EUR/GER) and approved by S, M, and G on February 17. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 2.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, February 15, 1967, 9:15 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3539. Top Secret; Nodis; Priority. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on February 15; cleared by Walsh, Kohler, Fisher, and Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV); and approved by Katzenbach. 182. Message From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, February 18, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. Secret; Nodis. The source text is a typewritten copy of telegram 3560 from Moscow. 183. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 25, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Secretary Saw.” 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, February 26, 1967, 7:48 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Nodis; Priority. Drafted and approved by Secretary Rusk on February 26. 185. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson Moscow, February 27, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Box 11, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. 186. Oral Statement Delivered to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) Moscow, February 28, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 187. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, February 28, 1967, 1345Z. Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. Top Secret; Nodis. 188. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 4, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State 1967. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of a March 4 memorandum from Mildred J. Asbjornson (S) to the Secretary informing him that “Mr. Gene Rostow has asked if you would meet with him and Messrs. Leddy, Kohler, possibly this afternoon on the trilateral talks.” The handwritten initials “DR” next to an approving line indicate that Rusk agreed to meet at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Sir: A dissenting memorandum from EUR is at Tab C.” This attachment, not printed, consists of two parts. The first, undated telegram drafted by George S. Springsteen (EUR), cleared by Leddy (EUR), Hinton (EUR/RPE), Baker (EUR/RPM), Fisher, and Rostow, and approved by Rusk, expresses EUR's principal view that alternative suggestions should be considered to gain our Allies agreement on Article III which could then be broached to the Soviets. Specifically, Springsteen wrote, “We are prepared to take account of two suggestions they [the Europeans] have advanced. One would concern compatible treatment of transition period throughout draft and other would deal with definitional problem of special materials and equipment.” Part two is a March 4 covering memorandum from Leddy to Rusk. 189. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 5, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. 190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, March 8, 1967, 6:05 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis; Immediate; Priority. Repeated to Bonn. Drafted by Fisher (ACDA/DD); cleared by Leddy (EUR), Rostow (M), and Walsh (S/S); and approved by Rusk. 191. Notes of Meeting Washington, March 14, 1967. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 304-306. No classification marking. 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, March 18, 1967, 4:55 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3546. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on March 16; cleared by Kohler, McNaughton, Fisher, Stoessel, Walsh, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. 193. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson Washington, April 6, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 388.3, March-May, 1967. Confidential. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Barber has seen.” 194. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 8, 1967, 1:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “rec'd 1:45 P.” Another reads, “4/9/67—Mr. Rostow telephoned Mr. Katzenbach.” 195. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, April 15, 1967, 11:09 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations (I) 1/67-9/68, Box 231. Top Secret. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 2:20 p.m. on April 15. 196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Secret; Nodis. The source text is undated; however, it was submitted to the President under cover of two May 16 memoranda both from Walt Rostow. The first memorandum, 11:05 a.m., informed the President that “Secretary Rusk will probably wish to raise this at lunch today.” The second, 4 p.m., requested that the President make a decision urgently in time for Secretary Rusk to send a letter to Foreign Minister Brandt explaining the U.S. position before the North Atlantic Council meeting scheduled for the following day, May 17. The approval block of this memorandum is checked. 197. Editorial Note 198. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, June 23, 1967. Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walt Rostow and approved in S on July 5. 199. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, June 24, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. 200. Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 4, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Committee of Principals Record Book, January-December, 1967. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text was sent to Rusk under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Kohler requesting Rusk's approval to circulate the source text to the members of the Committee of Principals. Rusk indicated his approval with a checkmark on the covering memorandum with the date “8/15/67” next to it. 201. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 10, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “rec'd 1:46 p.m.” 202. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 28, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret; Noforn. 203. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 29, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR,ABM Negotiations (II), Box 231. Secret. 204. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) Washington, September 1, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Miscellaneous Papers. Secret; Exdis. 205. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1909Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 206. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1910Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, September 2, 1967, 1000Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret; Nodis. 208. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 5, 1967. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. 209. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, September 6, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR,ABM Negotiations, 1/67-9/68, Box 231. Secret; Nodis. 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, September 14, 1967, 0019Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM) on September 13; cleared by Philip J. Farley (G/PM), Wyle (DOD/OSD/ISA), Leddy (EUR), Fisher (ACDA), and Robert G. Houdek (S/S-S); and approved by Rusk. Beginning in mid-1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 211. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson Washington, October 2, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. III, Box 6. Secret. 212. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 4, 1967, 1:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Volume I, 11/63-4/68, Box 229. Secret. Exdis. Drafted by Foster on October 5 and approved in S/S on October 6. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. 213. Editorial Note 214. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 2, 1967, 1:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster on November 2 and approved in S/S by Walsh on November 10. The meeting took place in Foster's office. 215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 7, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret. 216. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, November 11, 1967, 2257Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by George Bunn (ACDA/GC); cleared by Culver Gleysteen (ACDA/IR), Fisher (ACDA/D), George S. Springsteen (EUR), Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM), Abraham Katz (EUR/RPE), Walsh (S/S), Allan Labowitz (AEC) (informed), and Morton Halperin (DOD) (informed); and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. The telegram was sent to all NATO capitals, Tokyo, Moscow, and to the Mission in Geneva. 217. Notes of Meeting Washington, November 28, 1967, 12:10–1:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1. No classification marking. An attached December 4 cover memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President notes the time of the meeting and lists the participants as McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Schultze, Hornig, Seaborg, Spurgeon Keeny, Robert Anderson, Tape, Fisher, and Foster. 218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Washington, December 5, 1967, 1602Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Also sent to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, the Mission in Geneva, and USUN. 220. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson Washington, December 5, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Secret.1 221. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 5, 1967. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret. The typewritten date of December 4 has been corrected by hand to read December 5. 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany Washington, December 11, 1967, 0353Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva and to USNATO for Secretary Rusk. The text of the telegram was received from Walt Rostow at the White House and cleared for transmission by Under Secretary Katzenbach and Samuel G. Wise (S/S-O). The telegram text was submitted under cover of a December 9 memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson. Rusk recommended that it be sent in response to Chancellor Kiesinger's December 8 letter to President Johnson which “discussed unresolved German concerns over the Non-Proliferation Treaty … other bilateral issues and his recent trips to London and Asia.” Rusk also suggested that “Since I shall be seeing German Foreign Minister Brandt in Brussels on December 12 and shall raise the Non-Proliferation Treaty with him there, I think it would be helpful for you to send the enclosed letter [the text printed here] in time to reach Chancellor Kiesinger before that meeting.” 223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, December 15, 1967, 1523Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Moscow, Rome, New York, Tokyo, and to the Mission at NATO. 224. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 26, 1967, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Volume I, 11/63-4/68, Box 229. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Foster on December 26. The conversation was held in Foster's office. 225. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 28, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Secretary saw.” 226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, February 12, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of an undated memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which enclosed for Rusk's approval “a self-explanatory Memorandum to the President recommending that the United States sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement.” 227. Editorial Note 228. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 15, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Confidential. The source text bears the concurrences of Leddy, Pollack, and Tape. 229. Memorandum for the Record of the 584th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, March 27, 1968, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 66, 3/27/68, Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Secret. 230. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, March 29, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. 231. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 5, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2915. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM) on April 2. There is a typed notation on the source text for Ambassador Thompson's concurrence, but it is not initialed. 232. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, April 10, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and Leon Sloss (G/PM). The source text was sent under cover of an April 15 memorandum from Foster to Katzenbach, in which Foster recommended that Katzenbach send the letter to Clifford “informing him of the background of the U.S. interpretations of Article I and III before he (Clifford) goes to the NPG meeting at The Hague, April 18-19.” Foster also proposed to Katzenbach that he suggest that Clifford make a statement “setting forth our opinion that the NPT will not affect the activities of the NPG. The FRG has requested that such a statement be made. Messrs. Bohlen and Leddy concur.” 233. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals Washington, April 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (1), Box 20. Top Secret; Noforn. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Sec Def has seen Brief.” 234. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, April 15, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy Files: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3566. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text was sent under cover of a April 18 memorandum from Clifford to President Johnson forwarding the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on possible proposals on arms control on the seabed. Clifford further related he had just received from ACDA a proposal on arms control on the seabed which was under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by his staff. Clifford proposed that a Committee of Principals meeting be held to discuss the ACDA proposal, after which their views on the proposal would be forwarded to President Johnson. 235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret. 236. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, April 27, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, January 1968. Top Secret. 237. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, May 2, 1968. Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special U.S.-U.S.S.R. File, Pen-Pal Series, 1968. Top Secret. On May 3, at the request of Secretary Rusk, Dobrynin met with him confidentially to receive a copy of this letter, and was asked to deliver it to Kosygin. Bohlen also attended this meeting. (Ibid.) The text of the letter was also telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow on May 7. 238. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals Washington, May 14, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File:FRC 85 A 83, Principals Meeting, May 14, 1968. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal and George Bunn of ACDA are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. 239. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 17, 1968, 1–3:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy (EUR) and approved for distribution by J.P. Walsh (S/S) on May 20. The source text is labeled “Part I of V.” The conversation took place in the Secretary's dining room. 240. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 24, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Glassboro State College, 6/4/68 Commencement Speech, Box 11. Confidential. 241. Report of Meeting Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (1), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “latest draft.” There are many brief handwritten inserts throughout the text in addition to those cited below. 242. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals Washington, June 3, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal (ACDA) and C. Normand Poirier (ACDA) are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. 243. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Deputies—6/4/68, “Arms Control on the Seabed.” Secret; Noforn. The source text was submitted under cover of a June 4 memorandum from Foster to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals informing them that, in accordance with the decision reached at the June 3 Committee of Principals meeting that he was forwarding for their concurrence a memorandum in draft form that recommended a U.S. position on arms control on the seabed. 244. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Washington, June 7, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Secret; Noforn. 245. Editorial Note 246. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, June 18, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. 247. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson Moscow, June 21, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. The date is the day the letter was received. 248. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, June 22, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. 249. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson Moscow, June 27, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. 250. Editorial Note 251. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Members of the Committee of Principals Washington, July 2, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Committee of Principals Memo dated July 2, 1968 re “Cutoff.” Secret; Limited Distribution. 252. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals Washington, July 8, 1968, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17-18. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Another record of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 18, and 24-25. 253. Summary of Meeting Washington, July 10, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Working Group-Strategic Arms Talk-Meeting, July 10, 1968. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. A July 9 date on the source text has been corrected by hand to read July 10. 254. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk Brussels, July 12, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab B to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk. 255. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson Washington, July 13, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ENDC, vol. III, Box 13. Confidential. 256. Editorial Note 257. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 18, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; [code word]; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. 258. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) Washington, July 22, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab A to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk. 259. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 23, 1968, 4 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Edwin D. Crowley (EUR/GER) and approved in S/S on August 5. The source text is labeled “Part IV of V.” The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. 260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 24, 1968, 12:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 12:32 p.m. 261. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson Moscow, July 25, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text identifies it as an unofficial translation. 262. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, July 26, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. At the bottom of the first page is the following typewritten note: “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence, Economic Research, and National Estimates.” 263. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, July 30, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a July 30 note from Bromley Smith to the President which reads: “This is the retyped letter containing the revisions you suggested in paragraph 2.” Other drafts of this letter have not been found. 264. Paper Prepared by the Interagency Working Group Washington, July 31, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Top Secret; Nodis. According to a memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, July 31 (reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 341-342), this paper is a revision of an earlier draft sent to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals on July 26. A copy of the July 26 draft is in Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. A revision of the July 26 paper, marked “ACDA-2956/Rev.2,” dated July 30, and containing proposed last-minute changes by DOD, is attached to a memorandum from Shaw (G/PM) to Bohlen, July 31, with recommendations on the positions Bohlen should take on these proposed changes at the interagency working group meeting that afternoon. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12) 265. Memorandum for the Record Washington, August 5, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by General Wheeler on August 6. 266. Notes of Meetings Washington, August 7, 1968. Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 128, and 132-133. No classification marking. 267. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, August 12, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret. 268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson Washington, August 13, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive. 269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, August 15, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. 270. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 15, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Confidential. 271. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 15, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 272. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 15, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Secretary Rusk on August 16. 273. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 16, 1968, 3:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive. 274. Editorial Note 275. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals Washington, August 22, 1968, 4:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Typewritten notations on pages 3 and 7 indicate that they were revised on September 11. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room. 276. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford Washington, August 24, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Secret. The source text was sent under cover of a September 6 memorandum from Halperin to Fisher, which reads as follows: “The current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a possible cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes are forwarded for your information. You will note that the JCS oppose a cutoff of production at this time. I believe that it would be useful if ACDA would circulate substantially in advance of the reconvening of the ENDC (or the GA if the issue will come up there) a proposed U.S. position on the range of issues related to the cutoff question.” 277. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 29, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. II, Box 26. Top Secret; Nodis. Handwritten notations in the margin read: “Jane told Rostow” and “Mr. Rostow notified; also Mr. Keeny.” 278. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 30, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Top Secret. Sent through Ambassador Bohlen. 279. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 4, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Popper (IO) on September 4. 280. Editorial Note 281. Note From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States Moscow, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. An attached memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, September 13, 1:45 p.m., indicates that Dobrynin orally delivered the contents of the note to Rostow just before 1 p.m. on September 13, and also left with him Dobrynin's “handwritten translation from which we typed up his communication, literally.” The handwritten text is ibid. Rostow also summarized the points he raised with Dobrynin following the latter's presentation, as they might pertain to a prospective summit meeting. None of Rostow's points involved the strategic missile talks or arms control. Rostow offered his “very tentative first thoughts” on the Soviet message in a memorandum to President Johnson, September 13, 3 p.m. Concerning strategic missiles, Rostow wrote: “The formula on missile talks is probably as far as one could go unless one were immediately to exchange position papers and try to get a bit more substance into the communique.” Later in the same memorandum, he called this formula “promising.” (Ibid.) In another memorandum to the President, September 13, 6:40 p.m., Rostow related his just completed conversation with Secretary Rusk about the Soviet note. As summarized by Rostow, their discussion did not touch on the missile talks or arms control. (Ibid.) 282. Memorandum From the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union Washington, September 16, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. Originally drafted by Secretary Rusk following Rostow's September 13 meeting with Dobrynin (undated memorandum from Rusk to Rostow; ibid.), with the understanding that Rostow would hand the text of the message to Ambassador Dobrynin, and revised by Rostow (memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, September 15; ibid.). Rostow forwarded the revised message to President Johnson under cover of a memorandum, September 16. Also attached were “rough guidelines for my 'personal' remarks [to Dobrynin] which would be done as reflecting the President's attitude as I've perceived it, with no trace of ultimatum,” and a “paper of issues and actions that lie down the line if you decide to proceed.” (Ibid.) The message forwarded to President Johnson is identical to the text printed here. In a September 16 memorandum for President Johnson, Rostow reported that he handed this memorandum to Ambassador Dobrynin, with whom he met from 6-7:30 p.m. that evening, noting that it had the same status as Dobrynin's September 13 “oral communication.” After reading the memorandum carefully, Dobrynin “said in general that the communication was 'positive and clear.'” Concerning the missile talks, Dobrynin made the following observations: “He understood our objective in proposing an amplification of the principles. He wanted to know, simply, whether the response of the Soviet government should come back through his channel to me or through normal diplomatic exchanges. I said that until we were clearer as to whether the conditions for a Summit were mutually understood and agreed, he might let their response come back to me. I then went through the points that it was agreed that I should make on a 'personal basis' as reflecting the attitude of the President, as he had indicated it to Sec. Rusk and myself.” (Ibid.) 283. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 17, 1968, 1:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential;Exdis. Drafted by Foster on September 17 and approved in S on September 18. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. 284. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts Washington, September 20, 1968, 0026Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by D.L. Aaron and A.F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) on September 19; cleared by officers in ACDA/IR, IO, EA/AA,EUR, NEA, AFI, ARA, and G/PM; and approved by Adrian Fisher. The telegram requested action from all posts except Algiers, Dar es Salaam, Cairo, Kabul, Khartoum, Lusaka, Saigon, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, and Bucharest. 285. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, September 20, 1968, 12:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Drafted by Leddy and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S) on September 24. 286. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Shaw) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) Washington, October 2, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Limited Official Use. 287. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States Moscow, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking; Unofficial Translation. A handwritten note on the source text reads, “handed to Sec. Rusk by Gromyko on Oct. 2.” Gromyko apparently gave it to Secretary Rusk along with the Russian text. (Ibid.) 288. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, undated. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3548. Top Secret. 289. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 6, 1968, 7:30–10:45 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Krimer and approved in S on October 17. The source text is labeled “Part V of VIII.” The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers. 290. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) Washington, October 9, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. The letter is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 332-333. 291. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, November 7, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin—Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence departments of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency; concurred in by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor (Deputy Director, Central Intelligence), Thomas L. Hughes (Director,INR), Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA), Marshall S. Carter (Director, NSA), and Dr. Charles H. Reichardt (AEC). William O. Cregar (FBI) abstained; the subject being outside his jurisdiction. 292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 14, 1968, 5:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 105, Box 42R. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. 293. Summary Notes of the 594th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, November 25, 1968, noon–1:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 76, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. 294. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) and Secretary of State Rusk November 29, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin. No classification marking. Ambassador Thompson was in Moscow; Secretary Rusk was in Washington. The time is apparently Washington time. 295. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson Washington, December 2, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Sensitive. The date has been inserted by hand. Attached is a memorandum from Clifford to Walt Rostow, December 2, asking Rostow to forward his memorandum to the President. Rostow forwarded Clifford's memorandum to the President under cover of a December 2 note, which noted Clifford's “strong case for beginning strategic talks with the Soviets at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks,” and continued: “If I may say so, the problem with working level talks (as opposed to simply exchanging positions and asking some initial clarifying questions) is: “—We will have to take some time to study throughout the government the Soviet paper; “—We are pretty well committed not to negotiate off our initial position during the life of this Administration. “Perhaps Clark's point could be met if: “—On the first day of the talks the chiefs of government presented their respective positions; “—On the second day working sessions were held to clarify the respective positions while the chiefs of government met separately on Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.” (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R) 296. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, December 5, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Secret. At the bottom of the first page of the source text is the following typewritten note: “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence and Economic Research.” Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from John P. Shaw to Bohlen, December 12, which reads: “I thoroughly commend for your reading the attached CIA analysis of Soviet motives in seeking the opening of strategic missile talks at an early date. In particular, I endorse the argument—which I have advanced on a number of previous occasions—that the consensus within the Soviet Government in favor of holding talks could well fall apart if the talks are not held soon, and that this possibility partly explains the eagerness of apparently committed Soviet leaders such as Kosygin. The recent evidence compiled by CIA reinforces my earlier conviction on this point. The CIA memorandum also contains a cogent analysis of the economic pressures which increase Soviet interest in the negotiations.” Bohlen's handwritten note on this memorandum reads: “very interesting. CEB” 297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 6, 1968, 8:40 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R. Top Secret; Cherokee; Eyes Only. 298. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) Washington, December 7, 1968. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. 299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, December 11, 1968, 1:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was received at 1:40 p.m. 300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, December 24, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Soviet Union, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17. Top Secret. An attached December 24 memorandum from Adrian Fisher to Clifford notes that Secretary Rusk still believed “that the phrase ‘equally’ should be inserted in the second principle and will doubtless so indicate to the President when the matter is discussed today.” 301. Draft Paper Washington, undated. Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Soviet Union, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17-18. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “SecDef has seen 13 Jan 1969.” 302. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, December 24, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle, David L. Aaron, and Richard L. McCormack on December 21, and cleared by Peter S. Thacher, Committee I Executive Officer. 1. Notes of Conversations 1. Notes of Conversations 1 Washington, January 7, 1964. [Here follow notes of several conversations and meetings, including an NSC meeting on Indonesia.] At 5 p.m. Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, Kermit Gordon and I met with the President in his office to clarify the President's intentions with respect to the fissionable materials production cut; that is, would it apply only to FY 1965, or whether the longer-range aspects of cutting to 2000 megawatts and eliminating six reactors were intended. 2 I pointed out that I thought if the longer-range aspects were intended, that it would be difficult to negotiate power cuts without an overall longer-range plan. In this connection, I recalled that this longer-range plan of cutting to 2000 megawatts was geared to the 1968 and 1972 peg points of long-range weapons requirements suggested by McNamara. McNamara and Gordon did not support this point of view and felt that the meeting of December 21st was consistent with the view that the decisions had been made only for FY 1965, with the longer-range plan yet to be finalized. 3 McNamara mentioned his earlier suggestion that the adoption of the AEC figure of a cut to 3700 megawatts might be reasonable in order that there would be less of a minimum before it would be necessary to increase power to meet the requirements for civilian purposes. The President decided that, so far as the budget message was concerned, he would refer only to the FY 1965 cuts, and he asked us not to reveal any longer-range plan at this time. 4 He agreed that McNamara, Rusk, and I should hold a “backgrounder” following his budget message tomorrow. 5 Rusk had some doubts that he should properly participate, but the President felt that it would be very worthwhile to have him there to bring out the possible connection to arms limitation. (My own impression is that there is some confusion over the details of the decision taken by the President on December 21, 1963, to cut production, that this decision was clearly to cut electric power for U-235 production to 2000 megawatts over a three- to four-year period, and to shut down six reactors.) The memorandum prepared for the President (copy of my letter to President of December 19, 1963, attached) 6 as the basis for the December 21, 1963, meeting supports this view. Perhaps there has been some change in this December 21st position in the meantime of which I had not explicitly been told. Beginning at 5:50 p.m. I called Senators John Pastore, Clinton Anderson, Henry Jackson, Albert Gore and Congressman Chet Holifield and advised them (with the exception of Jackson—reached on January 8th) that the President has decided to mention in one sentence, in his State of the Union message tomorrow, that he is taking steps to cut back production of fissionable material by 25% (U-235) and closing down four production reactors. I said I had just gotten this word and wanted them to know beforehand. (Note: I mentioned to both Pastore and Holifield that we would like to meet with the JCAE to go over a few things just prior to the budget submission to Congress, and suggested January 17th. I asked them to hold that evening free for dinner, and we would be in touch with them.) At 6:05 p.m. I called Elmer Staats (BOB) and told him that we are going to revise our draft statement on the cutback and that we are now working on the version which I left with him. I said it wasn't clear whether we would issue a statement, but Rusk, McNamara, and I would hold a background press briefing at 3 p.m., tomorrow, at the State Department. Before that time it can be decided whether or not it will be necessary to issue a statement also. Staats said he would appreciate seeing the statement in the morning. 7 1 Source: Glenn T. Seaborg, Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971 , Vol. 7, pp. 187-188. No classification marking. Seaborg kept a handwritten journal that he edited into a typescript in 1985. It is the edited, typed version that appears in the published Journal. Of the 25 volumes, plus 3 volumes of appendices, Volumes 7-17 cover the Johnson presidency. Copies of the Journal are available through research libraries and institutions, including the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Presidential Libraries of Kennedy and Johnson, and the libraries of the University of California at Berkeley and Los Angeles. 2 Reference is to a proposal that President Johnson intended to make in his State of the Union address. At a meeting earlier that afternoon, Seaborg, McGeorge Bundy, Harold Brown, Elmer Staats (Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget), and others discussed the following proposed sentence for this address: “It is in this spirit that we are cutting back our production of enriched uranium by 25%, shutting down four plutonium piles and closing many non-essential military installations.” Because the participants disagreed about whether the President's message should mention longer-range cutbacks or only those for FY 1965, they decided to confer with the President and “if the President wanted to refer only to the FY 1965 cutback in production, the sentence should be modified in order to make this clear.” (Ibid., pp. 182 and 186) 3 For Seaborg's notes of the December 21 meeting, see ibid., p. 123. 4 The sentence in President Johnson's State of the Union message, given at noon on January 8, reads: “It is in this spirit [of not seeking an excess of military power that could be provocative and wasteful] that in this fiscal year we are cutting back our production of enriched uranium by 25 percent.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , Book I, p. 117) 5 In an entry for January 8, Seaborg noted: “I participated with Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Rusk in a background briefing of several hundred reporters in the State Department Auditorium on the State of the Union Message; we gave out a press release (copy attached) and explained the details of the production cutback.” (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 192) For text of the referenced AEC press release, January 8, see ibid., pp. 193-195. For the Department of State transcript of the background briefing, see ibid., Appendix: Press Conferences, pp. 117-140. 6 Ibid., Vol. 7, pp. 103-105. 7 This statement was presumably the AEC press release; see footnote 5 above. 2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 14, 1964. The January 16 meeting of the Committee of Principals was cancelled, and Foster and others instead worked on a paper that attempted to incorporate the President's general thoughts. (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 228) Regarding this paper, see footnote 3, Document 4 . Butch Fisher, Spurgeon Keeny and I have been working on the possible set of “new proposals” for the United States in Geneva, and from our point of view the following are desirable and practicable, subject to your advice. We have broken them down into two major fields—A. Nuclear Containment, and B. Immediate Reductions or Limitations of Arms (formerly called separable first stage). The organizing principle of these proposals is that each separate numbered item should be something which we are prepared to negotiate on its own terms. The posture we seek to present is that of a nation which believes that the way to begin is to begin. We are offering a dozen or more ways to begin and are ready to start whenever others will meet us half way. While many of these proposals are not altogether new, the approach has some novelty and appears to us to match the President's temper and his general purpose. A. Nuclear Containment 1. Non-dissemination. This is a familiar field and we would follow the general guidelines in the ACDA paper. 2 2. Non-reception of nuclear weapons. This is a partial element of non-dissemination and one which is worth encouragement, although probably not front-page leadership by the United States. 3. Non-dissemination to individual nations of strategic nuclear delivery systems. This is a separable element which might be accomplished by unilateral or bilateral agreement. This could be accomplished by the reciprocal destruction of B-47/Badger bombers so that they would not be available for possible dissemination to other countries. We also believe the United States could easily make a self-denying statement that its obsolete bombers, for example, will not be sold to those who might seek a nuclear capability of their own. 4. Reciprocal inspection of large peaceful nuclear reactors both here and abroad. 5. An agreed nuclear production cut-off with minimum inspection. 6. An offer to allow inspection to confirm our own projected close down of plutonium production reactors. 7. Improved proposals for the transfer of nuclear materials to peaceful purposes. These transfers need not be in the same amounts and will be under improved IAEA supervision. 8. Basic principles for nuclear-free zones. 9. Assertion of the possibility of nuclear-limited zones (such as a possible nuclear freeze in Europe). 10. Reassertion of the comprehensive test ban (in a low key with emphasis on seismic study if the subject is posed). 3 B. Immediate Reductions or Limitations of Arms 11. An agreed reduction across the board. 12. An agreed reduction in strategic forces. 13. An agreed reduction in tactical forces. 14. A separate agreement on nondeployment of AICBMs (comparable to the nuclear weapons in space agreement). 15. An agreed freeze on the production of strategic delivery systems. 4 16. An agreed across-the-board stoppage of arms production. 5 All of these separable measures are designed to be consistent with existing approaches to inspection with the possible exceptions of the reduction in strategic weapons and AICBM non-deployment, where our own means of surveillance may be satisfactory. The President's set of proposals should also include: —A general reaffirmation of our basic position. —An assertion of our great interest in a plan for control posts, coupled with a statement that this is a matter which so closely engages the interest of some of our major allies that we will not make specific proposals until we have consulted further with them. —A reaffirmation and resume of the proposed agreements on preventing the use of force set forth in the President's letter to Khrushchev, of which I attach the latest draft. 6 Butch Fisher still wants to say something about budgets and will reluctantly settle for whatever small bone you wish to throw in his direction. He points out that this is a field of real promise and that in the fitness of things it should not be wholly neglected in a Presidential declaration at Geneva. We recognize that not all of this may be negotiable in your terms in the few days that remain, but my own belief is that we ought to be able to get enough agreement on most of them to have them put forward as examples of the sort of things for which the Johnson Administration is ready, while detailed work proceeds, on specific ways and means. McG. B. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 388.3, January 11-16, 1964. Secret. Attached to another copy of Bundy's memorandum is a January 15 memorandum from ACDA Director William C. Foster to the Committee of Principals, recommending that Bundy's memorandum serve as the agenda for their meeting on January 16 and transmitting a list of working papers for use as reference material. The list covers three areas: nuclear containment, immediate reductions or limitations of arms, and observation posts. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament—ACDA Publications, Vol. I, Box 11) 2 Reference presumably is to the January 14 ACDA paper, “Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” which is cited in the list above under Nuclear containment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament—ACDA Publications, Vol., I, Box 11) 3 A handwritten question mark appears in the right margin next to this sentence. 4 The word “emphasis” has been inserted by hand in the left margin next to this sentence. 5 The word “No” is handwritten in the margin next to this sentence. 6 Not printed. Text is identical to a letter President Johnson sent to Chairman Khrushchev on January 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , pp. 153-155. 3. Editorial Note 3. Editorial Note On January 16, 1964, President Johnson sent a letter to AEC Chairman Seaborg approving Niblick III, an AEC proposal for a total of 13 underground nuclear tests to be conducted in the third quarter of FY 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—U.S. Testing Program, Volume II, Niblick Series—FY 1964, Box 27) Seaborg proposed this series in a December 21, 1963, letter to President Johnson. (Ibid.) In a January 16 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Charles E. Johnson noted that the proposed test program had been circulated to all members of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests on January 6 for comments and no negative comments or objections had been made. Thus, he and Spurgeon Keeny recommended that the President's previously signed letter of approval be dated and sent to Seaborg under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Bundy. (Ibid.) The Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests was established by President Kennedy in NSAM No. 269, October 31, 1963. For text, see Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, volume VII, Document 372 . Bundy's January 16 memorandum to Seaborg reads in part: “In making his approval, the President noted that your submittal was based on the understanding that there must be no untoward risk of violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty limitations concerning delivery of radioactive debris beyond national boundaries, and your assurance to him that the test program proposed is consistent with such understanding.” (Ibid.) The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 10, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, 1963. (14 UST 1313) In a March 26 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg said that 10 shots were carried out under Niblick III, which had been completed, and he requested 14 weapons development tests and 2 Plowshare events for the Niblick IV series in the fourth quarter of FY 1964. “The Plowshare events,” Seaborg wrote, “are directed toward the development of clean explosives and techniques for their employment in the excavation program.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—U.S. Testing Program, Volume II, Niblick Series—FY 1964, Box 27) In a memorandum to President Johnson, April 9, McGeorge Bundy wrote that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and his office had reviewed the AEC request for the President's approval. The President initialed his approval of the Niblick IV program on this memorandum. (Ibid.) Bundy conveyed the President's approval in an April 10 memorandum to Seaborg. (Ibid.) Ultimately, the U.S. Government conducted 10 tests, including 1 Plowshare event, during the third quarter of FY 1964 and 13 shots, including 2 Plowshare events, in the fourth quarter. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , pages 20-22) 4. Notes of Meeting 4. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 18, 1964. [Here follow notes of a meeting on the impact of the impending reactor shutdowns.] At 3:30 p.m. until about 4:30 p.m. I met with the President in the Oval Room of the White House, along with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, William Bundy, General Marshall Carter, 2 Fisher, Moyers, and Valenti. The President called on Rusk, who said that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain clearance on the statement to be made, in President Johnson's name, to the Geneva Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. A draft statement was given out. 3 It was decided to add the word “now” at the end of the first sentence of paragraph (2) on page 2. The President asked about the sentence concerning appropriate international verification of the reactor shutdowns already scheduled in our country, and I explained the situation with respect to the three reactors at Hanford and the one reactor at Savannah River, namely, that two of the reactors at Hanford were old and there is no problem of international inspection, but the reactor at Savannah River is essentially the same as the four reactors that would continue to operate, and therefore, there would be problems in revealing the internal construction of this reactor. Rusk and McNamara asked whether there would be problems concerning the inspection of the shutdown reactor at Savannah River if the inspection entailed no more than standing in the door to watch whether operating personnel were working at the reactor, or monitoring the electrical power that was going into the reactor. I said that, with that interpretation, there would be no problem with the language of the last sentence of paragraph (3) on page 3, namely, “… we are prepared to accept international verification of some or all of the reactor shutdowns already scheduled in our country.” I also pointed out that we might want to start the reactors up again either for the production of electrical power or for production purposes, and it was agreed that this was consistent with the President's statement. The other issue in the statement was whether the paragraph (5) (c), on page 3, should be deleted as the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested, and the President decided that it should be deleted. 4 The President asked Fisher to give him a 1,000-word statement that he could make to the American people Tuesday morning concerning this matter (attached on January 16). 5 The President said that he would take care of the consultations with the congressional leadership at the breakfast on Tuesday morning (January 21) 6 and asked McNamara to take care of consultations with the foreign relations people in Congress. It was also agreed that Fisher would take care of informing Senators Pastore and Anderson of the JCAE. Carter said that the Director of the CIA (McCone) is opposed to several points in the memorandum; but, upon further discussion, it appeared that the memorandum, as changed, is now satisfactory from his point of view. It was also agreed that the President's letter to Khrushchev would be released on Monday morning (January 20). 7 [Here follows discussion of a possible appointment of an AEC Commissioner, the President's concerns about leaks at the Department of State, and other meetings and conversations.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 251-252. No classification marking. 2 Deputy Director, CIA. 3 A January 17 draft is reproduced in the Seaborg Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 229-231. For the text of the final version of President Johnson's message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 21, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , pp. 171-172. 4 Paragraph (5) (c) in the January 17 draft cited above states: “on the principles which could lead to the establishment of nuclear-free zones.” 5 Reference should be to the President's statement on Tuesday, January 21, not January 16. Fisher's statement has not been found, but the White House press release derived from it is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 261-262, and printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , pp. 174-175. 6 No record of this meeting has been found. 7 See footnote 6, Document 2 . 5. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 5. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 3, 1964. SUBJECT Summary of Arms Control Activities for Period 17 January-3 February, 1964 I have prepared for your information the following summary of the principal activities of White House interest in the arms control field during your absence from 17 January-3 February. 2 On Friday, 17 January, shortly after your departure, Fisher and I agreed on an amended version of Sorensen's draft of the Presidential statement for Geneva. Fisher then circulated the draft, which to the best of my knowledge reflected the agreements reached by Rusk, McNamara, Fisher and yourself the previous day, to all interested agencies for clearance by close of business on the 17th. 3 There were immediate objections from all sides and it looked for awhile as though it would be impossible to clear a paper with anything new in it at all. The JCS objected to the production freeze and the nuclear free zones. 4 There was also strong opposition within the State Department to the nuclear free zones. Finally, the AEC managed to find some alleged security reasons to object to our offer to permit inspection of all four reactors involved in the present U.S. cut-back of plutonium production (i.e., one reactor scheduled for shut down at Hanford is immediately adjacent to a reactor that will continue operations and consideration is now being given to operating the closed down Savannah River pile as a commercial power reactor). On Saturday, 18 January, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and Fisher held a private meeting in which it was concluded that the JCS and State Department would only go along with the statement if the reference to nuclear free zones was eliminated and production freeze was presented in terms of “agree to explore” rather than as an actual proposal. 5 Separately, AEC support was obtained by fuzzing the language a bit so that it did not necessarily offer to permit international inspection of all closed down U.S. reactors. Later Saturday afternoon, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and Fisher were joined by Seaborg and Carter and they met with the President who approved the attached statement for Geneva (see attachment 1). 6 Actually, in the eyes of the world, I doubt that the final statement was very much weakened over the original draft since the full significance of the semantics was not apparent to anyone who was not acquainted with the internal debate. On Sunday, 19 January, Rusk, McNamara and members of their staffs held a series of meetings to develop a program to reassure NATO that the Presidential proposal would not affect any U.S. NATO commitments. The attached cable of instructions (see attachment 2) forwarded copies of the Presidential statement for Geneva to all NATO capitals. 7 This cable, which makes quite a few policy decisions that to my knowledge had not previously been agreed to, was not cleared by anyone in the White House. I complained about neither having been included in the preparation of these instructions nor informed of the results and to my knowledge all subsequent substantive cables have been cleared with either Bromley or myself. Fisher has actually been very good about keeping me informed on day to day developments. On Tuesday, 21 January, the President delivered the attached television statement to coincide with Foster's delivery of the Presidential message at Geneva 8 (see attachment 3). The draft was prepared by Sorensen and cleared with interested agencies just prior to delivery. At the last moment (30 minutes before the President went on the air), the AEC formally took the position that the statement in the speech that, “This country and the Soviet Union already have produced enough explosive force to equal 10 tons of T.N.T. for every man, woman and child on the face of the earth.” was Restricted Data and wanted it removed from the speech. They persisted in this ridiculous position up until the moment before the President went on the air. 9 It is also interesting to note that the President himself, at the last moment, added the “excellent” next to last paragraph referring to the importance of individuals interesting themselves in the problems of arms control. In the week following the Presidential statement, there were a series of meetings and cables aimed at further reassuring our allies. 10 There appears to be a major effort in some quarters to use this opportunity to establish as large a “safeguards” program with NATO as possible and tie up possible negotiations with commitments to make future proposals only on a joint NATO basis. I objected to a number of cables on the grounds that they implied positions and commitments that had not been agreed to and managed to tone things down a little. At the same time, the control post proposal ran into anticipated troubles in NAC. Finletter and the Germans and French objected to both the schedule and the proposed method of procedure. The Timberlake mission appears to have accomplished little and he has returned to Washington. Finletter asked that the control post proposals be advanced as formal NAC proposals and that all deadlines be removed. I objected to an EUR cable which would have authorized Finletter to agree to handle the control post proposal only as joint NAC proposal since it should be much easier to get the key members of NATO to go along with a U.S. initiative in this field than to create a formal joint NATO control post proposal. The final instructions, which although weak are acceptable, are attached (see attachment 4). As I understand it, formal discussion of the control post proposal will begin in Paris today but there is no longer any official date by which a decision will be reached. At the end of last week, ACDA circulated for staff consideration the attached paper setting forth in more detail the basic elements of a production freeze proposal (see attachment 5). This will be considered at a Principals meeting next Monday, 10 February. 11 ACDA also circulated the attached position paper on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons to formalize the changes involved in clearing the Geneva statement (see attachment 6). 12 This has now been agreed upon. Meanwhile in Geneva, the Presidential statement appears to have been well received although Foster has not been able to elaborate on it in much detail. Most of the initial concern has been with what the proposal would not do rather than with what it would do and this does not make very good text for Geneva. The most interesting development in Geneva was probably the discussion of the much anticipated Polish proposal. The Poles are clearly going out of their way to indicate that they are very flexible and I believe that it may eventually be possible to build something on it. The U.S. response has been non-committal and a series of questions are being posed to clarify the proposal (see attachment 7). 13 The Soviet Union has also tabled a proposal which appears to have been rather hastily put together in response to the U.S. initiative (see attachment 8). 14 When the U.S. jet was shot down over Germany last week, 15 Foster, lacking instructions, did not make his planned presentation to the ENDC. He has now been instructed to continue his participation as previously planned without further comment on the incident. On Friday, 31 January, at the request of the President, Fisher prepared the attached useful summary of actions in the field of disarmament (see attachment 9). Looking into the immediate future, a Deputy Principals meeting is scheduled for 6 February and a Principals meeting for 10 February to consider the ACDA paper on the basic elements of the freeze on nuclear vehicles. A second item for consideration is the ACDA proposal to set up a Verification Advisory Committee (VERAC), which you will recall we have discussed with Foster and Fisher in the past. As I anticipated, this has run into some AEC-CIA opposition. With all of the unfinished business before us, I do not really believe the Principals should occupy themselves with this VERAC question at this time if there is strong opposition. Looking back over the past two weeks, I conclude that although our present Geneva position is much less impressive than we had hoped, it is a substantial improvement over the one we would have had if you had not given things a strong push the week before you left. I think that the initiatives that have been started, if not allowed to die on the vine, could evolve into some rather interesting and conceivably negotiable proposals. The action or lack of action of the past two weeks present the following immediate problems: (1) Need for agreement within U.S. Government on the basic elements of our proposal for a production freeze so that the Geneva delegation can expound on these ideas at an early date. (2) Prevention of proliferation of “safeguards” for NATO prior to any indication of Soviet interest in our present proposals. (3) Prevention of any commitments to NATO limiting our arms control initiatives to formal joint NATO proposals. (4) Need for continued consideration within Government of both strategic and conventional reductions that might be coupled with the production freeze. (5) Need for follow-up action to assure that the control post proposal does not bog down indefinitely in NAC debate. (6) Need for careful consideration of the Polish proposals to see if new counter-proposals can be built upon them. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. 2 Bundy was on vacation during this period. 3 Sorensen's draft has not been found; but regarding the draft submitted to the interested agencies, January 17, and the President's message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, January 21, see footnote 3, Document 4 . 4 See footnote 4, Document 4 . 5 No record of this private meeting has been found. 6 No attachments are filed with the source text and have not been further identified except as indicated in footnotes below. Regarding the Saturday afternoon meeting, see Document 4 . 7 The President's statement was sent to all NATO capitals and USRO in circular telegram 1300, January 19 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) and the instructions in circular telegram 1301, January 19. (Ibid.) 8 Regarding the President's televised statement at 11:30 a.m., January 21, see footnote 5, Document 4 . 9 Item 4 in the minutes of the AEC's Information Meeting 243, which began on January 21 at 10:50 a.m., notes approval of the declassification of the President's statement, with Howard Brown,AEC Assistant General Manager for Administration, informing Bromley Smith “telephonically of the Commission's decision regarding language.” The meeting was held in the absence of Seaborg who was giving a speech in Denver, but the minutes are in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 258. 10 Examples of this exchange of cables are Disto 1496 from Geneva, January 24 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) and Todis 1208 to Geneva, January 25. (Ibid.) 11 No record of a February 10 meeting of the Committee of Principals has been found. 12 The ACDA position paper has not been found. The “Geneva statement” apparently refers to Foster's remarks on dissemination, which he made to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on February 6; for text, see Documents on Disarmament , 1964, pp. 32-36. 13 On December 28, 1963, Polish First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka proposed a nuclear freeze in Central Europe. For extracts from his statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963 , pp. 651-652. 14 Reference is presumably to the Soviet memorandum submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 28. For text, see Documents on Disarmament , 1964, pp. 12-17. 15 Reference is to a USAF jet trainer that was shot down by Soviet aircraft on January 28 after it strayed across the East German border near Erfurt. 6. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 6. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, February 7, 1964, 11 a.m. SUBJECT White House Meeting Today Concerning Project Sulky 2 As you know, a meeting was held today at the White House to discuss Project Sulky. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Hornig, in Mr. Bundy's absence, and representatives from the Defense Department, the Army, AEC, and ACDA were present. 3 The AEC, represented by Commissioners Seaborg and Palfrey, first presented its basic justification for the project: It will provide necessary information concerning cratering and dispersion of radioactive debris. In the view of the AEC the project is not objectionable under the Treaty on the ground that the risk of detection outside the territorial limits of the United States is minimum. Mr. McCone questioned the compatibility of the project with the Treaty and indicated that in his view only an event which was intended to be fully contained was permitted under the Treaty. The Defense Department was represented by Dr. Harold Brown who supported the AEC position. I pointed out that there were two aspects involved in the question whether the project violated the Treaty. First, the actual amount of radioactive debris that would travel beyond our borders and, second, the probability that such amount could be detected. There may be a Treaty violation even though no radioactive debris is detected beyond our borders, just as there can be a violation of a speeding limit even though no policeman sees it. On the other hand, we recognize that every underground nuclear explosion, no matter how fully contained, will produce some radioactive debris and that some of that debris will inevitably travel beyond our borders. The Treaty was obviously not intended to preclude all underground explosions. The question of detection is, therefore, a relevant, though not the only, consideration. Dr. Scoville, the ACDA representative, questioned the project both on the ground of the Treaty and also because of the lack of a detailed analysis of future projects. In response to Dr. Hornig's question, Dr. Seaborg stated that the project could be delayed until the fall without impairing the Plowshare program if the AEC received some indication that the project would probably be actually carried out in the fall. I was asked what the reaction abroad would be if the test turned out to be detectable. In essence I responded that there might well be adverse propaganda but that I doubted whether any nation, including the USSR, would denounce the Treaty as a result. I also commented upon the domestic-political factors involved in rejecting the project. Dr. Hornig concluded the meeting by stating that he would discuss the matter with Mr. Bundy. There may be a further meeting on the subject. I will be in Europe for the next two weeks but have asked Leonard Meeker to keep in touch with the White House concerning this matter. He will inform you of any further developments. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Thomas Ehrlich (L). The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For another account of this meeting, see Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 348. Seaborg's version gives the time and place of the meeting. 2 Seaborg earlier explained the rationale for Project Sulky, which was a proposed Plowshare excavation nuclear test the AEC wanted to conduct at the Nevada Test Site in late February 1964, in a letter to McGeorge Bundy, January 15. Seaborg requested that the proposed test be considered by the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and submitted to the President for his decision. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) 3 The following attended the meeting: Donald Hornig (Chairman), Seaborg, Chayes, Pete Scoville, McCone (for first 15 minutes), Charles Johnson, Howard, Harold Brown, Keeny, Jackson, Fred Schuldt, AEC Commissioners Palfrey and Tape, Thomas, John Kelly, and other military representatives. (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 348) 7. National Security Action Memorandum No. 282 7. National Security Action Memorandum No. 282 1 Washington, February 11, 1964. In a telephone call to President Johnson on February 11 at 12:20 p.m., McGeorge Bundy reported on “three small matters,” the first of which had to do with “a project Plowshare peaceful uses experiment which will vent and may be detected in Canada.” Bundy continued, “The recommendation of State and of myself and I'm pretty sure of Bob McNamara is that we ought to put this off til after the election. You don't want the Russians accusing you of breaking a treaty. There'll be some fuss in the Commission, but they themselves are not prepared to do it in the grazing season because of the fear of American farmers complaining, which seems to make it clear that we're not quite ready to run these risks. I would prefer to sign the instruction myself and to sign you on it directly, unless you are deeply interested.” President Johnson: “No, it's all right, if all of you follow the agreement.” Bundy: “Well, as I say, Seaborg would love to do it, but he's a special interested party, and I think I can cool him off. If I get a tough reaction, I'll come back.” (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, February 11, 1964, 12:20 p.m., Tape F64.13, Side A) Bundy then called Seaborg at 3:45 p.m. and said that unless Seaborg objected, he was planning to issue the NSAM that day. Seaborg replied that he had no objection “so long as this is only a postponement and that this does not actually preclude the shot. (In my opinion this decision may be a mistake in view of the very small risk and the history of the Senate Test Ban hearings, need for Plowshare, etc.).” (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 366) MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission SUBJECT Project Sulky In view of the delicacy of the balance of US-USSR relationship in other major areas plus the tight schedule for conducting Sulky at this time, the President has decided to defer further consideration of Sulky without prejudice until next winter in the expectation that the intervening time could be profitably used for a review of possibilities for improving nondetection and to give a longer period in which to select the most favorable wind and weather conditions. In addition, the President requests the Secretary of State, in consultation with other responsible officers of the Government as appropriate, to give immediate consideration to the probabilities and problems involved in obtaining from the nations signatory to the Test Ban Treaty approval for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful explosions under adequate international controls. The President requests that a first report on this matter be available to him by the end of March. McGeorge Bundy 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, General, Vol. I, Box 27. Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 8. Memorandum of Conversation 8. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 13, 1964, 9:30 a.m. SUBJECT US Thinking on Disarmament PARTICIPANTS British R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador N. Henderson, Private Secretary to Mr. Butler Tom Bridges, Second Private Secretary to Mr. Butler Denis Greenhill, Minister, UK Embassy M. Hadow, Press Secretary, Foreign Office US Secretary of State Rusk Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain Secretary of Defense McNamara Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director,ACDA McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Richard I. Phillips, Director, P/ON M. Gordon Knox, Deputy Director, BNA Secretary Rusk introduced Secretary McNamara, who made the following remarks: the US current efforts in the field of disarmament are to find some next steps toward disarmament which do not require rigorous inspection. The West now has a balanced force of nuclear missiles, land and sea, which is considerably larger than the Soviets. However, the West cannot completely destroy the Soviet missiles in a first strike, so the Soviets have the power to inflict unacceptable damage on the West. Hence, they have the essence of a deterrent. It appears the Soviets believe they have this power. Therefore, a freeze would be to their advantage even as it would be to ours. The verification procedures would be less complicated than with more extensive disarmament measures. They would be applied only at declared testing sites and at production facilities; verification would also involve some checking for clandestine facilities. The categories of delivery systems affected by the freeze would be: a) Intercontinental missiles b) Medium-range missiles c) Heavy bombers (above 40,000 kilograms) d) Medium bombers (25,000-40,000 kilograms) e) Anti-ballistic missile missiles. It would be possible to maintain and replace missiles on a one-for-one basis and keep confidence in the missiles by some number of firings. There would be no testing of new models. The tactical weapons systems, for instance the Pershing, would not be affected because they lacked the range to reach to the heart of Russia and they were needed in West Germany. The inspection would be simple and agreed. In addition the West would have unilateral monitoring of launch facilities by its own facilities. There would be a withdrawal clause. Other states would join the agreement as their development of nuclear weapons caused them to affect the balance of power. Initially France and Communist China would not need to be included. The Multilateral Force concept would be protected because the MLF does not contemplate the national dissemination of control of nuclear weapons. The anti-missile missile would have to be controlled; otherwise there might be a big shift in the balance of power. Mr. Rusk added that the US felt quite sure the USSR would not agree soon to such a program if it were proposed. It would be a miracle if agreement were reached in 1964. This meant that the nuclear production of 1964 would be maintained. Our first step, of course, was to consult our allies regarding this general idea. Mr. Butler asked whether Polaris were covered. Mr. McNamara said yes, that one could not build one after the agreement. Ambassador Ormsby Gore said that Britain, for example, could declare 5 Polaris submarines with 16 nuclear missiles apiece and replacements, and this would be the British limit under such an agreement. Mr. Butler thought the idea might be an infringement of Nassau. 2 Mr. McNamara said no because the British program would be provided for under the agreement. Mr. Butler asked what was the Soviet reaction. Mr. Fisher said it was too early to say. He thought such a program was too big a bite for the Soviets to take now; they probably want to make haste slowly. Mr. McNamara pointed out that the British did not have production in several of the five categories that would be frozen. The program was devised to exclude from control the British TSR-2 and the US TFX. Mr. Butler, turning to a new subject, said he was thinking of advocating publicly asymmetrical reductions in armaments, including a balancing in some way conventional and nuclear forces. He also wondered about the details of the proposed destruction of out-moded nuclear delivery systems. Mr. McNamara thought that the effort to work out a reasonable relationship between conventional and nuclear forces was too complicated to be realistic or helpful. Mr. Rusk said, for example, what is one million civilians; are they potential soldiers? Mr. Butler surmised that the US would prefer that he not raise the idea of asymmetry in disarmament. Mr. Rusk said he would prefer to have Mr. Butler emphasize the prime importance of making sure that arms production curve does not soar upwards. Mr. Butler asked whether it was still fashionable to have a Badger-B-47 bonfire. Mr. McNamara said, yes, if they do not have much value and Mr. Rusk pointed out the value of keeping such obsolescent weapons from falling into the hands of, for example, the Egyptians or the Indians. He agreed with Ambassador Ormsby Gore that other kinds of weapons might be proposed for the bonfire. He said that Gromyko had asked him whether other weapons than the B-47-Badger could be destroyed and that the reply had been that the US would be glad to consider further suggestions. In point of fact, the first important step was the freeze on manufacture of new weapons, but, Mr. Rusk concluded, it might prove possible later on to throw into the bonfire more than merely out-moded weapons. Mr. Rusk asked whether Mr. Butler at Geneva might not also consider saying something publicly about arms races other than that of the US and UK versus the USSR. For instance, the Arab-Israeli arms race, the Indian-Pakistan, the arms acquisition of African states all served to jeopardize the peace and to impoverish nations already very poor. Mr. Butler thought that the expose of this subject had been most helpful and thanked Mr. McNamara. He said that the British had been making the right noises in their public statements in Geneva and that they would continue doing so. He recognized that the major responsibility was that of the US since the US had so much larger and more varied an arms production. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by M. Gordon Knox (EUR/BNA) and approved in S on February 26. The source text is labeled “Part II of V.” The meeting was held at the White House. 2 Reference is to the U.S.-U.K. agreement, concluded at Nassau on December 21, 1962, on nuclear defense systems. For a joint U.S.-U.K. statement issued on that occasion, see Department of State Bulletin , January 14, 1963, pp. 43-45. 9. Memorandum of Conversation 9. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 13, 1964, 10:55 a.m. SUBJECT US Thinking on Disarmament PARTICIPANTS British Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister of Great Britain R.A. Butler, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office N. Henderson, Private Secretary to Mr. Butler Tom Bridges, Second Private Secretary to Mr. Butler Denis Greenhill, Minister, UK Embassy M. Hadow, Press Secretary, Foreign Office US The President The Secretary of State Governor Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to Great Britain McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Richard I. Phillips, Director, P/ON M. Gordon Knox, Deputy Director, BNA Secretary Rusk reviewed current US thinking on disarmament for the Prime Minister. He referred to the categories of missiles and delivery systems which the US thought could be banned from further production under a carefully devised formula with a minimum of inspection. These included intercontinental missiles, heaviest bombers, medium bombers of 25,000 kilograms, anti-missile missiles. In the meantime, the Secretary thought that it might be helpful if the British wished to contribute something to the “bonfire” of Badgers and B-47's. He suggested that the British could discuss aspects of disarmament privately with the French. The French government was interested in non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, he said, though it was not interested in a Multilateral Force. It might be possible for the French to tell the Russians that in the French opinion MLF does not constitute dissemination of nuclear weapons. Sir Alex asked whether the categories of weapons and delivery systems where production might be halted excluded all tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. Rusk said they would not be included; that the US was now in the process of re-equipping its allies with smaller but more effective weapons of this sort. Mr. Bundy pointed out that thousands of them are in existence and are hard to inspect. Sir Alec wanted to know why the Russians would want to agree on a strategical hold-down. Mr. Rusk referred to these advantages: a) the expense, which the Russians could spare themselves (developing an anti-missile missile might cost $14 billion); b) the Russians have a deterrent now. The British Ambassador remarked that in fact the Russians to date have not shown much interest in the idea of limiting production of various categories. Sir Alec inquired whether if the bomber production were stopped, it would be stated that the Polaris production continues as a replacement of the bomber. Mr. Bundy thought that the rationale would be different. The US would agree to a freeze on terms which would allow it to honor its agreement at Nassau and with regard to MLF. Furthermore, the freeze would permit confidence firings and this would mean a one-for-one replacement of such missiles. Secretary Rusk indicated that some specifications might be made which would allow, for example, Polaris submarines on the way but not built to be completed. He felt sure that such a plan, in any case, would not become a reality for a considerable period of time, almost certainly not in 1964. Sir Alec asked whether the Soviets were interested in comprehensive and general disarmament. Secretary Rusk thought they had no interest at the present time. Mr. Bundy said that the immediate problem is to make use of and yet control underground testing in the light of the partial test ban. There is also the problem of the peace time use of nuclear power. These issues would not be acute, he thought, this year, but they would be in 1965 and the years to come. 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Knox and approved in S on February 20 and by the White House on February 24. The source text is labeled “Part II of II.” On February 12-13 in Washington, Prime Minister Douglas-Home and President Johnson had their first working meetings since assuming the leadership of their respective governments. 10. Editorial Note 10. Editorial Note Because of budgetary constraints, the AEC developed possible schedules for power reductions at its gaseous diffusion plants, which in turn would result in further reductions in the production of U-235 beyond the 25 percent cut President Johnson announced on January 8, 1964. Seaborg outlined the alternatives in a February 11 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, which is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Volume 7, pages 363-365. At a meeting among Bundy, Charles Johnson, Keeny, Ambassador Thompson, Seaborg, and AEC Commissioners Gerald F. Tape and John G. Palfrey on February 12, the conferees agreed to a schedule for reducing power and U-235 production. They further agreed to announce these reductions by February 15 because “a long delay on this matter would cost on the order of $16 million in penalty payments” to the utilities, which required long advance notice of power cutbacks. When Bundy asked Thompson whether there would be any value in delaying this decision in order to use this possibility of a cutback in the current disarmament negotiations with the Russians, Thompson said that “it wouldn't be worth the cost of delay on the basis of the slight hopes that the Russians would go along with mutual reductions in production.” It was further decided that Seaborg would write a letter to the President recommending these actions. (Ibid., pages 373 and 382) Seaborg's February 13 letter, which did not mention the possible disarmament implications, is reproduced ibid., page 383. McNamara cleared this letter on the telephone subject to Secretary Rusk's concurrence, but the disarmament people at State and ACDA apparently demurred. (Ibid., pages 386 and 392) In his memorandum to Bundy, February 14, ACDA Acting Director Fisher argued that a premature announcement of the pending additional reduction in U.S. production of U-235 would undercut the President's earlier call for the Soviets to respond to the earlier U.S. cutback and to accept some inspection, and he proposed first “that an effort be made to elicit a favorable Soviet response.” Fisher's memorandum is reproduced ibid., pages 393-394. Bundy agreed to go ahead with a message to the Soviet leadership and to defer the announcement of the cutback until April 20. (Ibid., page 400) 11. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 11. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 1 Washington, February 22, 1964. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Handed to Dobrynin, Sat. 2/22/64. WR Tyler.” In a memorandum to Llewellyn Thompson, February 22, Tyler recounted that he handed the oral message to Dobrynin at 11:30 a.m. He noted that Dobrynin read it carefully but made no substantive comment. Tyler stressed to the Soviet Ambassador that this was one in a series of private messages between the two leaders and that the U.S. approach was to be helpful and had “no propaganda objective.” In reply to Dobrynin's question, Tyler said he was not aware of any specific date for the announcement of the U.S. reduction, “but I thought we would not wish to delay it too long.” (Ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (1), Box 8) Dear Mr. Chairman: With further reference to my announcement of January eighth of the reduction by twenty-five percent in the United States output of enriched uranium (U-235) and the closing of some plutonium-producing reactors, 2 I have again reviewed our requirements and have concluded that it will soon be possible to reduce United States production of U-235 by an additional substantial amount. I am furnishing you this advance notice in the renewed hope that the Soviet Government would find it in its interest to take a parallel step. It seems to me that this is an area in which our two Governments could put into practice the concept of “mutual example” which you have suggested. 3 The reductions need not be by an equal amount. I am sure that another substantial reduction in United States output will naturally lead the world to hope that the Soviet Union will follow suit. I would hope that your Government would also be prepared to join the United States in taking such action as would confirm to the world that we were in fact taking these steps; I have already offered to take action of this type with respect to one of the reactors we are shutting down. Should my suggestion meet your approval, I am prepared to delay my announcement of a further United States reduction for the time it would require to concert our views on the matter. We could then consider how best to make this public, whether by a joint announcement or other appropriate means. You will have noticed that the UK has announced the cessation of production of U-235 for military purposes, 4 and I would hope that the UK would want to join in any discussions we have. I sincerely believe that both our Governments would stand to gain by such joint action. It would hearten world public opinion and give new impetus to the disarmament talks. Sincerely, 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Regarding the decision to send this message, see Document 10 . In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, February 18, Fisher attached an undated draft of the proposed message to Khrushchev. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8) Fisher's draft is similar to the source text but more directly proposed “appropriate inspection of some of the closed facilities,” such as President Johnson had already offered for one of the U.S. reactors that was being shut down. A similar draft to Fisher's, dated February 18, is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 8, p. 23. 2 See Document 1 . 3 The quoted phrase has not been further identified. 4 Included in the British Defense White Paper, issued February 13, was a statement that sufficient supplies of fissile material were already available and that therefore production of U-235 for military purposes had ceased at Capenhurst in 1963 and military plutonium production was gradually being terminated. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives , 1963-1964, p. 19978) 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 12. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 12. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 22, 1964. JCSM-148-64 SUBJECT Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles (U) 1. Reference is made to the memorandum from the Acting Assist-ant Secretary of Defense (ISA) I-21210/64, dated 11 February 1964, 2 which requested comments on an Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) paper, subject as above. 2. By JCSM-128-64, dated 15 February 1964, 3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a preliminary analysis of the national security implications inherent in a “verified freeze” of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. That study served to focus attention on the many complex problems involved in defining and subsequently negotiating the basic elements of an acceptable freeze agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded from the preliminary analysis that there was real doubt whether practical solutions could be found to some of the problems. One of the principal areas of doubt was the negotiability of the type of verification system that would be adequate to provide necessary assurance of compliance with the provisions of an agreement. Certainly such a system would be intrusive to a greater extent than the USSR has been willing to consider in the past. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that many benefits would accrue if a breakthrough could be made in opening up the Soviet Union to the level of inspection deemed necessary. On the other hand, they also note that if, through the negotiation process, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on adequate verification were substantially eroded, national security could be adversely affected. 3. The ACDA paper would apparently place major reliance on US intelligence to verify a freeze agreement. In particular, no provisions are made for aerial surveillance and unscheduled on-site inspections, other than of production facilities, at the option of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the verification system negotiated should be completely sufficient within itself to assure compliance with an agreement. US intelligence, on the other hand, should only be relied upon to validate any list of installations, to cross check information and data obtained from the inspection system, and to establish priority for the type and area of inspection. Any other role could result in either a compromise of US intelligence sources with degradation of US intelligence capability or in an inability positively to confirm suspected violations. The latter case would tend to negate the tension-reducing objectives of the agreement by creating situations whereby legitimate suspicions could not be definitely allayed. Thus, before a US position paper on verification can be formulated, the foregoing role of US intelligence in the verification process must be accepted. 4. In addition to the freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, the preliminary analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that consideration should also be given to including other items under the freeze, such as launchers and fissionable material production. Accordingly, the attached Appendix 4 has been prepared consistent with the inclusion of these items and compatible with the view expressed above on the role of US intelligence. 5. In view of the fundamental nature of the comments provided in the Appendix, a detailed review of the verification portion of the ACDA paper is not appropriate until basic differences are resolved and the paper has been redrafted. It is recommended that the views expressed in the Appendix be incorporated in the redraft and that such redraft be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. Taylor 5 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 (January-February 1964). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached is a February 24 covering memorandum from Barber to Fisher enclosing copies of this memorandum and JCSM-147-64, entitled “Basic Elements of a Freeze.” JCSM-147-64 has not been found. 2 Not found. 3 Entitled “President's Proposal To Explore a 'Freeze' on Strategic Nuclear Offensive and Defensive Vehicles.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 388.3 (March-August 1964)) 4 Not printed. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original. 13. Memorandum of Conversation 13. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 27, 1964, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Disarmament: (1) MLF and Non-dissemination (2) Military Budgets PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador, Soviet Embassy David Henry, Deputy Director, SOV At the Secretary's request, Ambassador Dobrynin came in this afternoon to discuss disarmament matters. The Secretary opened the conversation by explaining that he had mentioned Dobrynin's visit at his just-concluded press conference 2 because not to have done so would have created an undesirable air of mystery. The Secretary mentioned that Mr. Foster's return from Geneva did not indicate any lessened American interest in disarmament and stressed that we must keep trying to reach agreement. The Secretary also mentioned seeing today for the first time an indication that the Soviet Government is supporting the Polish proposal for a nuclear freeze in Central Europe. 3 Dobrynin indicated that his Government would support the Polish plan but, in response to the Secretary's question, said he did not know when full details of the plan would be available. The Secretary said that we will take a good look at the plan when the details are available. MLF AND NON-DISSEMINATION The Secretary then turned to the subject of the Multilateral Force (MLF) and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, saying that this was an informal conversation and not a government-to-government representation. The Secretary stated that he wished clarification of one aspect of this subject. He desired to know whether the Soviet objection to MLF is that the Soviet Government believes MLF would mean dissemination of nuclear weapons or whether the Soviet Government has additional or different objections. He said that if the Soviet objection is merely the former, we believe that we can eventually reassure the Soviet Government on this point. After Dobrynin had said that the U.S.S.R. is opposed primarily to dissemination, the Secretary asked further whether the Soviet Government was concerned primarily about the possible dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany or whether it was more generally concerned about dissemination to any country. Without answering the question in specific terms, Dobrynin indicated that the U.S.S.R. is concerned about the dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany but was also concerned about dissemination of these weapons to any country. At this point the Secretary mentioned that the primary U.S. concern in this field is Communist China and asked whether the Soviet Government had any indication whatsoever whether Peiping would be interested in a non-dissemination treaty. Dobrynin said he had no information and would not guess but stressed that we (the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) should not lose interest in non-dissemination in any case. The Secretary agreed and stated that he hopes we can keep the issue of non-dissemination open, adding that we know the MLF will not give nuclear weapons to Germany; that the safeguards are not merely legal but also apply to the physical arrangements; that the MLF safeguards will be even stronger than those currently in force among NATO partners. He asked Dobrynin whether, if the U.S. can satisfy the U.S.S.R. on this point, the Soviet Government had other objections to MLF. He mentioned as an example that the U.S.S.R. might be concerned that MLF would add the financial and economic resources of other countries to the production and deployment of nuclear weapons capability. Dobrynin responded that the Soviet side believes that MLF means dissemination, that the Soviet Government understands the U.S. position but does not agree with it, that the Soviet Government is concerned that Germany, and also other countries, will get nuclear weapons through MLF. The Secretary said that if this is the specific point of Soviet objection, it is important to keep the discussion of non-dissemination open because the Soviet Government will discover that the Germans will not get nuclear weapons through MLF. Dobrynin asked if he could summarize the Secretary's position as follows: The U.S. believes in the desirability of non-dissemination but is going ahead on the MLF and will later try to convince the Soviet Government by the actual MLF arrangements that the MLF will not mean dissemination. The Secretary said there was one more point—that he had asked whether the Soviet objections to MLF were concentrated on dissemination or on other questions. Dobrynin replied that the question of other objections had not arisen because the Soviet Government was concerned about dissemination. The Secretary repeated that in this event it is important to keep the discussion of non-dissemination open because the U.S. will eventually be able to show the U.S.S.R. that the MLF will not mean the dissemination of nuclear weapons to Germany and others. MILITARY BUDGETS The Secretary said that the Soviet Government had made proposals for a mutual reduction of defense budgets and that the U.S. had responded by suggesting technical talks on this subject. He indicated that the U.S. is concerned that the Soviet and American military budgets are so different that it would be impossible to make percentage reductions which would be meaningful. He pointed out that the U.S. defense budget contains more items than the Soviet defense budget and suggested that the U.S. defense budget expert, Mr. Charles Hitch, 4 talk to his Soviet counterpart to obtain a proper comparison in military budgets. He added that when he had discussed this subject with Gromyko the latter had neither agreed nor disagreed and the Secretary asked Dobrynin to sound out his Government as to whether we could have such a discussion of experts. Dobrynin said the Soviet side and he personally felt that such a discussion would do no good, that if the U.S. doesn't trust the U.S.S.R. now, no details would ever satisfy the U.S. The discussion passed back and forth on this question, the Secretary reiterating the need for further information and Dobrynin arguing in favor of an immediate percentage cut in budgets. When Dobrynin asked why, since the U.S. favored cuts by mutual example, it could not accept cuts by agreement, the Secretary replied that by an agreement the U.S. would be giving up its freedom of movement. He also said that, since the Soviet defense budget is more narrow than ours, a percentage reduction would mean less of a reduction for the U.S.S.R. than for the U.S. Dobrynin said that when the U.S. announced a reduction in its defense budget, it did not say exactly what it was reducing. He added that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to do this same sort of thing. He continued that another committee to study defense budgets would get nowhere. It would take years of discussion and the U.S. would want to look at the defense budgets of all the Soviet ministries. The Secretary replied that he thought a policy of mutual example was best, but the U.S.S.R. was pressing for a percentage reduction at Geneva. Dobrynin claimed the U.S.S.R. had set a good example but said he felt an agreement was better than mutual example. He added that the U.S. had intelligence means to discover whether the U.S.S.R. carried out its agreement. He concluded by saying that without some such technical discussion of military budgets he did not see how the U.S. could agree to a percentage reduction of military budgets, since it would be giving up its freedom of action for something unknown. The Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin agreed that Dobrynin would tell the press that they had discussed a number of disarmament matters. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Henry (EUR/SOV) on February 28 and approved in S on March 9. The source text is labeled “Part I of VII.” The conversation was held in the Secretary's office. In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, February 26, Fisher provided talking points for this meeting. (Washington National Records Center,RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary, 1964) 2 Text in Department of State Bulletin , March 16, 1964, pp. 403-409. 3 Reference presumably is to a February 24 memorandum from the Government of Poland on freezing nuclear weapons in Central Europe, which was transmitted to interested governments through diplomatic channels. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 53-55. The first indication of Soviet support for the Polish proposal has not been further identified. 4 Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 14. Notes of Meeting 14. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, February 28, 1964. [Here follow notes of a telephone conversation on the Argonne Laboratory and a Regulatory Information Meeting.] At 11 a.m. I attended a meeting of the Principals in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Present were Rusk, Foster, Fisher, Palfrey, Taylor, McCone, Webb, Bundy, Barber, McNamara, Hornig, Keeny, Alexis Johnson, plus Tyler, Labowitz, et al. Rusk opened the meeting by asking Foster to give a summary of the negotiations at Geneva. Foster said that these had been conducted in the best atmosphere yet. There had been no agreement, not even on the agenda. The Soviets are insisting on reductions in the military budgets, but we are resisting this since there is no way of verifying such reductions. The Soviets emphasize the election year aspects of the U.S. reductions. The Soviets are proposing a 20% reduction in military budgets, with the savings to be contributed to the welfare of developing countries. The Soviets have given no answer to our proposal for the destruction of bombers. 2 Tsarapkin often refers to the strategic superiority of the U.S. in missiles and bombers. With respect to the cutoff of the production of fissionable materials, he says privately that the U.S. already has too much and has a five-year lead on the USSR. Rusk said he talked to Dobrynin yesterday, not about observation posts, as the newspapers reported, but about the possibility of the Soviets letting Charlie Hitch talk to their “Hitch,” but they refused. 3 They say that the policy of mutual example is best, but Rusk said that the U.S. couldn't agree to this without a lot of verification. It was suggested that Fisher go into this further. Rusk said that Dobrynin hinted at some Soviet withdrawals from Germany. Rusk continued that today's issue is the freeze on delivery vehicles and that we should get our position in line. We needn't disclose any details in the early negotiations. The Soviets haven't disclosed any position on this as yet. He said he appreciated the fine work done by the JCS on this question. Issue I . (Degree of linkage of a fissionable material cutoff to the freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.) Rusk said he tended to agree with the Chiefs on this linkage, 4 and that we could discuss the separability later. Foster, however, demurred and said that President Johnson's message indicated that they are separable. 5 McNamara felt that the language in this message was sufficiently finessed to make either point of view possible. Rusk said he thought we should proceed with what he called Option (5) [added to the four options listed in the agenda document (not attached) 6 for this meeting] which would be to proceed with both missile freeze and production cutoff in parallel. McNamara said he would like to see them definitely linked, but Bundy said that linking them would weaken the proposal. Rusk spoke again for Option (5), whereas Bundy said he would prefer Option (4). Rusk suggested that a try be made to draft something to clarify this, which might be used to talk to our allies concerning our position. Issue II . (Basis for production replacement.) Rusk then suggested that we go on to Issue II, for which Fisher suggested Option (2) modified toward Option (1). There seemed to be general agreement on this. Issue III . (The extent of limitations to be applied concerning the dispersal and hardening of launchers, in view of the interaction with the MLF and the Nassau Agreement.) Rusk then suggested we go on to Issue III. McNamara suggested that Option (3) be agreed to, with specific provision for the MLF. Rusk, McNamara and Bundy spoke to the necessity of protecting the MLF and the Nassau Agreement. Rusk pointed out that the exact method of this could be left flexible and would depend on the effective date of the treaty in any case. Issue IV . (Limitations to be applied on construction and testing of prototypes.) Rusk then went on to Issue IV. Fisher said that the missile and firing systems apparently can be improved, and thus a freeze on testing is important; Hornig confirmed this. Rusk reiterated that we can't depend on limitations that depend on good faith; we must have verification. The consensus seemed to be that this arrangement needs much more exploration, and it was decided that a task force would be set up by Foster to explore this. McNamara said that we will need a specific statement on research and development limitations for use before the North Atlantic Council. [Here follow notes of a meeting on AEC research support and a long meeting of the AEC Commissioners.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, pp. 424, 429-430. No classification marking. Here and elsewhere, Seaborg has inserted reproduced documents in the Journal , which account for the interrupted pagination. 2 The U.S. and Soviet Governments had earlier discussed the destruction of bombers informally, but the U.S. position was not formally presented until Fisher introduced it in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 19. Text of Fisher's statement is in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 101-105. 3 Regarding this conversation, see Document 13 . 4 For a statement of the JCS position, see Document 12 . 5 Reference is to the President's statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 21. See footnote 3, Document 4 . 6 Brackets in the source text. The paper has not been found, but is identified elsewhere as a paper forwarded under cover of a memorandum from ACDA to the Committee of Principals, February 25. (Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary McNamara (JCSM-223-64), March 18; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10) 15. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 15. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 1 Moscow, February 28, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I have studied your oral message delivered on February twenty-second through our Ambassador Dobrynin. 2 In that message you raise the question that our two countries should agree on and put forward a joint declaration of, or make public in some other appropriate way, their intention to cut production of fissionable materials for military purposes. You express the view that this would have an encouraging effect on world public opinion and that it would give new impetus to the talks on disarmament. I want to tell you at once in this connection that we, naturally, are ready to explore jointly all ways, to use all opportunities that might lead to an improvement of the international situation and to the strengthening of trust among states and that might facilitate progress in the disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Government firmly holds the view that to this end now certain preconditions have developed in the world. The conclusion of the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater and after it the understanding that has been reached on not putting into orbit objects with nuclear weapons aboard, 3 as is now being widely recognized, have helped clear somewhat the international horizon. We were also able to reach mutual understanding on the question of some reduction of military budgets. 4 Now it is necessary to proceed further and to try to reach an understanding on further steps directed at reducing the arms race and at creating increasingly favorable conditions for solving the cardinal problem—that of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government has expressed in the Eighteen Nation Committee among other places, its considerations with regard to those measures which we believe desirable to undertake in this direction. You know, of course, our position—we propose to agree on the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of others or, by way of beginning, on the reduction of the numerical strength of such forces, on the further reduction of military budgets, on the signing of a nonaggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty states, on preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and so on. We are convinced that these are both the most effective, from the standpoint of reducing international tension, and the most realistic measures in present conditions. However, we gave our full attention to the suggestion set forth in your message, that an understanding be reached on a certain reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. After thinking it over and consulting our specialists I come to the conclusion that it may be worthwhile to try to seek a mutual understanding in this area also. Of course, as I understand it, you yourself proceed from the assumption that a reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes does not represent any step forward in terms of actual disarmament. Indeed, in this case neither nuclear weapons stockpiled by the states are to be destroyed nor is even further stockpiling to be stopped. I shall confide that our specialists have also drawn my attention to the numerous remarks in the American press as well as to the statements of some of your officials to the effect that for two decades the United States has accumulated a quantity of fissionable materials, which in general exceeds all thinkable and even unthinkable requirements for the production of nuclear weapons. If this is really true, it means that a kind of a crisis of overproduction is about to happen in the field of fissionable materials in the United States. But no matter what the situation is, I admit that the very fact of agreement between our countries about the reduction of production of fissionable materials for military purposes can have positive significance as evidence of our intention to take the way not of further increasing the nuclear weapons race but to go along the way of its gradual slowdown. It is precisely on this basis that we are saying that we are ready to search for such agreement. You express the opinion that in this field we could take practical steps in accordance with the concept of “mutual example.” I agree with you in this respect. Reducing production of fissionable materials for military purposes is the very field where apparently it is easier to act on the basis of “mutual example.” But then it is necessary of course to seek sincerely an actual reduction of production of fissionable materials since this involves national security and each side takes a certain risk. What good could come out, for example, if one of the sides took the path of closing some enterprises producing fissionable materials while at the same time put into operation others and more powerful at that? If we have mutual understanding concerning the necessity of a wholly sincere approach by both sides to the question of reducing production of fissionable materials for military purposes and taking into consideration all actually existing circumstances, then I think we could come to agreement. I, for example, even now could inform you that the Soviet Government would be prepared to announce the ending of the construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. However, our specialists have informed me that the United States, having adopted a decision to stop four old plutonium reactors of low power, at the same time is starting a new reactor NPR in Hanford, which has more than twice as much power as all four reactors to be stopped taken together. Now as for a reduction of the production of uranium-235. Here, too, certain circumstances should be taken into account. For instance, you refer to the announcement of the British Government concerning the ending of the production of uranium-235 for military purposes. It is no secret however that at the same time new large plutonium plants are being put into operation in England. And in France after the forthcoming starting of a large gas-diffusion plant in Pierrelatte, the production of uranium-235 as reported will reach one-fourth of the American level. All this will more than compensate for the stopping of the production of uranium-235 for military purposes at a small plant in England. I consider it necessary to draw your attention to all this because it is already important to avoid now any reservations which in the future could lead to misunderstandings and to complications that would damage mutual confidence. Your words that the reductions of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes need not be by an equal amount I interpret as an indication that you too take this into account. So, let us try. If it turns out that a possibility really exists to take agreed steps in the field of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes then there might also become more practicable such prospects as the extension of the transfer for peaceful use of such materials out of current production or of accumulated stockpiles. And this would give a considerable impetus to the development of international cooperation in the field of peaceful application of the energy of the atomic nucleus including the implementation of large projects for instance in the field of desalinization of sea water which a number of states need so badly. But let us not forestall events. You suggest that the British Government should also be drawn in our discussions. We have no objection to this. Here, Mr. President, are considerations which came to my mind with regard to your oral message of February twenty-second. In transmitting this message to our Ambassador a wish was expressed that the exchange of views on this question as before be of a confidential nature. I agree with this. Sincerely, 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. Attached is a March 2 memorandum from Thompson to Secretary Rusk, indicating that Dobrynin gave Thompson the oral message at 10 a.m. that morning. After reading the message, Thompson remarked that “the reply did not refer to the President's suggestion that we might accept inspection of closed plants. The Ambassador said he had no further instructions, but remarked that traditional Soviet policy was 'no inspection without actual disarmament.'” 2 Document 11 . 3 Reference apparently is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), adopted by acclamation on October 18, 1963, in which all nations were called upon to refrain from stationing in outer space or placing in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1963 , p. 538. 4 An apparent reference to parallel reductions of military budgets in the Soviet Union and the United States. 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 16. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, February 28, 1964, midnight. 2691. Gromyko on Disarmament and NAP. After discussion on bilateral issues (reported separately), 2 Gromyko commented that he had impression from recent speech in New York 3 that Secretary was now considerably less sanguine as to prospects of reducing world tensions than he had been last summer in Moscow after signature Test Ban Treaty and even last fall in talks with Gromyko during the General Assembly. I pointed out that obviously Secretary in major speech on foreign policy must inevitably react to world developments and Soviets own behavior in giving his assessment of detente prospects. Thus the Secretary was obliged to take into account recent TASS statement with regard to Vietnam, 4 certain unfounded Soviet press allegations with regard to use of chemical warfare by US forces, and failure of Sovs play more vigorous co-chairman role on Laos problem. Nonetheless, it was clear from Secretary's speech that he intended to continue search for avenues to agreement in order reduce world tensions. The Secretary obviously had not forsaken his belief that the Test Ban Treaty was a good start on which to build, but he felt the world should not be deluded into thinking that this was any more than an initial step. There was still a long way to go before we could be sure the world had ceased to be a dangerous place in which to live. I knew from personal knowledge that the Secretary hopes that among the many items now on ENDC agenda, we would find it possible to agree on further partial measures which would constitute useful sequel to Test Ban Treaty in our mutual efforts to reduce tensions. I understood Secretary had discussed problem with Dobrynin yesterday, although I was not yet informed of details. 5 Despite my remarks Gromyko said he could not avoid feeling the Secretary was less positive now in his approach than last year. He agreed, of course, that proper approach was to single out partial measures on which we could agree and in this connection he felt the Soviet proposal for destruction of all bombers was ideally suited. Proposal, in Gromyko's view, sufficiently limited to avoid impairing present balance of forces and at same time radical enough to impress world. I said that we had hoped to find common interest in measure of this type, but we feared that radical extension of proposal by Sovs to cover all bombers might in fact result in killing off chances for agreement. Best approach, in our view, was to agree now on limited step of B-47-Badger destruction in order not to upset balance of forces—UK for example relies exclusively on bomber force—and perhaps ultimately reach understanding on destruction of all bombers. Gromyko said that perhaps compromise could be reached under which we might agree on general policy of destroying all bombers and in implementing this policy decide on one or two particular types for initial destruction. In his view, it would be difficult to convince world that this genuine disarmament measure if agreement confined only to destruction obsolete weapons. Important thing was to agree in principle; question of timing, he was sure, could be worked out to satisfaction both sides. [Here follows discussion of a non-aggression pact.] Kohler 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Paris, USUN, and Geneva. 2 Reported in telegram 2690, February 28 (ibid., POL 27 LAOS), telegram 2692, February 28 (ibid., POL 7 US-USSR), telegram 2693, February 28 (ibid., POL 28-8 CYP), and telegram 2694, February 28 (ibid., POL 3 UN). 3 Reference apparently is to Secretary Rusk's address at Barnard College in New York on January 22; for text, see Department of State Bulletin , February 10, 1964, pp. 190-195. 4 Not further identified. 5 See Document 13 . 17. Notes of Meeting 17. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, March 3, 1964. At 11 a.m. I met in the Situation Room of the White House with Bundy, Foster, Thompson, Scoville, McNaughton, Keeny, McCone and Chamberlain. Bundy opened the meeting, which was called to discuss Chairman Khrushchev's oral answer (copy attached) of February 28, 1964, 2 to President Johnson's message (copy attached) of February 18, 1964, 3 by asking Ambassador Thompson for his reaction to this response. Thompson said he felt that it might have some significance in regard to Khrushchev's desire for an agreement in this area. Bundy asked me whether a further delay in announcing the further cutback in power for U-235 production was possible, and I indicated that another month or two could certainly be arranged. Thompson suggested that a copy of the Khrushchev message be given to the U.K. Bundy and Foster thought we should decide our own course of action before we do this. 4 Bundy raised the question of whether the NPR produces weapons grade plutonium, or whether it could be said that this production was all for peaceful uses. I said that it is contemplated that a substantial fraction of its output would be used for weapons grade plutonium. Bundy mentioned that the President had some doubts as to the future value of the NPR. There was further discussion as to the possibility of the NPR's being devoted exclusively to the production of plutonium for use as fuel for civilian power, with the implication that this might be explored further. McCone pointed out that, with respect to possible cuts by the Soviets on the production of enriched U-235, this could be monitored by the power input in the gaseous diffusion plants. Bundy said he thought that we should think about the possibility of coupling the announcement of the cutback in Soviet plutonium production, mentioned by Khrushchev, with the announcement of a further cutback of U.S. production of enriched U-235. There ensued discussion of the type of reply that should be prepared for the Khrushchev message, and it was agreed that Scoville, Chamberlain and Keeny should draft such a message. This message would include an explanation that the cut in plutonium production through the shutdown of four reactors would much more than counter-balance the increase in production due to the start up of the NPR; in fact, it was felt that it might be best to say that the NPR production is only about one-half that corresponding to the shutdown of the four reactors. McCone felt that this might be included in the letter to Khrushchev because they already very likely know our production rates. It was agreed that the letter should reiterate the value of inspection in connection with cutbacks. It was agreed that when a draft of the letter was available, it would be checked with me. I identified the dilemma of whether any joint announcement with the USSR would be based, from the standpoint of the U.S., on the rationale that the U.S. was cutting back production because it had more fissionable material than it needed, or on the rationale that we were cutting back production in concert with the Soviets (which presents the difficulty of appearing that we are entering into an arrangement without provisions for inspection). (Attached is a copy of the draft reply to Khrushchev.) 5 [Here follow notes of a meeting with private industry executives, a meeting on congressional legislation, and a telephone conversation relating to the University of Chicago.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 8, pp. 8 and 30. No classification marking. 2 See Document 15 . In a March 3 memorandum to the President, Foster offered his optimistic assessment of Khrushchev's “encouraging response” and proposed an approach “to obtain the maximum benefits from the initiative of your original letter.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (1), Box 8) 3 Reference is to the President's draft message of February 18 (see footnote 1, Document 11 ), not the final version of February 22, Document 11 . 4 In a March 4 meeting with British Ambassador Ormsby Gore, Foster and Scoville shared the exchange of letters and the March 3 draft response and asked for more details on the British cutback for possible inclusion in President Johnson's reply to Khrushchev. The Ambassador, taking the three documents with him, agreed to get his government's answers to them as quickly as possible. (Memorandum for the Record by Scoville, March 4; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Current Johnson-Khrushchev Papers) No early British response has been found, but President Johnson's oral message of March 9 ( Document 18 ) eliminates the following sentence from the March 3 draft: “I have been assured by Her Majesty's Government that no expansion of plutonium production capacity for weapons is in fact being undertaken.” For further U.S.-U.K. discussions of this question, see Document 20 . 5 Dated March 3. (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 8, pp. 25-29) At a White House meeting on March 7, Foster, Scoville, Keeny, Thompson, and Seaborg further discussed the wording of President Johnson's proposed message to Khrushchev. The participants “focused especially on the question of the comparison between the production rate of the oncoming NPR reactor and the four old reactors that are being shut down.” (Ibid., p. 50) 18. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 18. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 1 Washington, March 9, 1964. When Thompson gave the message to Dobrynin on March 9, the Soviet Ambassador read it carefully and inquired on what basis the 25 percent reduction was made, and Thompson replied that he “understood this was on the remainder after the earlier cut had been made.” Dobrynin also asked whether the suggestion of verification was an absolute condition. Thompson said he “did not think it was an absolute condition, but that we felt strongly that this would be advisable and would greatly add to the significance of the announcement of cutbacks.” (Memorandum of Conversation, March 9; ibid.) Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received your oral message of February 28 2 in answer to a similar message of mine of February 22 3 and I am pleased that you agree with me on the desirability of concurrent action in the area of the reduction of production of fissionable materials. I am particularly gratified to learn of your decision that the Soviet Government is prepared to announce the ending of the construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. In your letter you raise some question on the announced U.S. reduction in plutonium production since your specialists have informed you that the new NPR reactor at Hanford would have twice as much power as all four of the reactors which are being shut down. On the contrary, our cutback in plutonium production is actually very much greater than your specialists have stated. The new NPR will have very much less power than the total power of the four reactors in question. Perhaps this misunderstanding on the part of your specialists arose from the fact that the power levels of the four reactors being shut down have been increased several-fold over their original design levels. Moreover, it is our plan to operate the NPR reactor, which will be used to produce civilian electric power, in such a manner that a substantial portion of the plutonium produced will not be used for weapons but for the development of breeder piles for the peaceful civilian power program. Nevertheless, as I previously stated, I do not believe that the reductions in production of fissionable materials by our two countries need be by an equal amount. Therefore, I believe that your proposed halting the construction of two new reactors would serve as an appropriate step on your part to parallel the closing down of the four U.S. reactors. As I informed you in my oral message of February 22, the U.S. also proposes to undertake additional substantial reductions in the production of Uranium 235. Specifically, we plan to cut back the production of Uranium 235 by another twenty-five percent in addition to the reduction of twenty-five percent that I announced in January of this year. This additional cutback will be implemented in an orderly fashion over the next few years. In your reply no specific reference is made to parallel Soviet reductions in the production of Uranium 235, but your message implies that you have such actions under consideration. I think that this would be particularly appropriate since it is our understanding that you are continuing to expand your already substantial Uranium 235 production capacity. I am therefore looking forward to learning of any reductions or curtailment that you might have planned in this area which might be considered as a counterpart of the U.S. reductions. You have called attention to the starting up of the French gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte and indicate that it has been reported to have a capacity of one-fourth the American level. We are convinced that this report is incorrect and that the proposed production of the French Uranium 235 plant is a much smaller fraction of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. capacity. Therefore, I do not believe that this activity on the part of the French should preclude a decision on your part to reduce Uranium 235 production or plant expansion. The United Kingdom has also announced that it has stopped the output of Uranium 235 for weapons purposes and is gradually bringing to an end the production of plutonium for weapons use. This is in contrast with your concern that new plutonium plants were being put into operation in England. I am taking this up with the British Prime Minister and I feel sure that he would be prepared at the right time to amplify the recent announcement about United Kingdom reductions as a part of a concurrent action by our three countries. In your message you raise serious questions about the accuracy and nature of the proposed reductions in fissionable materials production programs. I can appreciate these misunderstandings since all of these programs have been conducted in a highly secure manner. Precisely for this reason, I should like to reaffirm my previous suggestion on the desirability of some type of verification to confirm the nature of the cutbacks being carried out by our countries. I am sure that mutually satisfactory arrangements could be devised so as not to involve unreasonable intrusion. For example, simple observation of some facilities could confirm they were shut down. If such verification could be arranged, I feel that it would add measurable to the confidence of all peoples in the reality of our reductions. Moreover, this verification would provide invaluable experience for the development of verification procedures that must accompany any agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material production for use in weapons. In any case, I believe that we should try to make our announcements on plutonium and Uranium 235 reductions as soon as possible. I also note with pleasure your suggestion that we move on from these initial steps to other measures which would involve actual transfers to peaceful uses of substantial quantities of fissionable materials out of current production or accumulated stockpiles. The U.S. has made numerous offers to transfer large quantities of fissionable material to peaceful uses, and I look forward to further exchanges of view on this subject in the near future. I also share your interest in the possibilities of increased applications of nuclear energy to the welfare of the peoples of the world and would welcome further discussions on possible cooperative projects such as the desalinization of sea water. I shall look forward to hearing from you in the near future on your overall program of reductions or curtailments which would parallel the planned U.S.-U.K. reductions. I propose that we prepare and exchange independent announcements of our intended actions for concurrent release. I believe that the proposed parallel actions will provide a good illustration of what you have called a policy of mutual example. Sincerely, 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. 2 Document 15 . 3 Document 11 . 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. 19. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 19. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 12, 1964. Dear Bob, I have received comments from members of the Committee of Principals on the 29 February draft policy paper pertinent to the “Basic Elements of a Verified Freeze of Strategic Delivery Vehicles.” 2 I have attempted to incorporate these comments into another draft 3 to the extent they conform to my understanding of the agreements reached by the Committee of Principals last February 28. 4 This latest draft has been circulated to each of the members. From the comments made by you and the JCS on the earlier draft, there are three areas where negotiating tactics seem to be unnecessarily entwined with basic policy. 1. With regard to the question of linking a possible “freeze” proposal with a possible “cut-off” proposal , I have studied the extensive treatment of this subject by the JCS (JCSMs 128-64 5 and 187-64). 6 I have noted your views and theirs as to the essentiality of linking any such proposals which might be made to the USSR. Leaving the need for this link to future government decision, as decided at the Principals' meeting, I feel that I must have leeway as to the tactics in exploring possible proposals in these two fields, as well as the remainder of the items in the President's five-point message. As Secretary Rusk observed at the Principals' meeting, if we were to state initially that the U.S. insists on linking the two measures, we would pay a political price during the initial exploration that we may never need to pay. However, we do not want to state at this time that they are not linked. I believe that the wording suggested by the Chiefs and agreed to by you would, in effect, require us to insist on clear linkage from the start and would thus not be fully responsive to the intent of the Principals' meeting. In view of what appeared to be your judgment as to the essentiality of linkage, however, my own explorations for the present should not preclude our insisting upon such linkage if and when the Soviets indicate a real interest in the freeze—presuming, of course, that the need for the linkage is ultimately determined to be the U.S. Governmental position. 2. With regard to the limitations to be placed on construction and improvement of launchers , we agreed at the last Principals' meeting that the preparation of a detailed position was not desirable at this time. We also agreed on the need for indicating that we would protect the MLF even though we could not state at this time just how this would be done. The proposed wording of the JCS comments on this matter appears to make it virtually impossible to explain, even to our Allies, that there do exist ways and means to protect the MLF. 3. With regard to prototype testing , we agreed at the last meeting of the Committee of Principals not to restrict R&D efforts in any way which could not be adequately verified, and would therefore place the U.S. at a disadvantage because of its more open society. We also agreed to establish a task force (which is now at work) to study the technical questions involved in controlling various forms of prototype testing, and to await their report before determining the specifics of our position on prototype testing. In the interim, it appears to me that we would fare far better in exploratory discussions if we at least imply a willingness to impose suitable limitations on prototype testing, within the limitations imposed by verification considerations. This appears to be in consonance with the spirit of the basic measure. If the USSR does not show any detailed interest we would thus avoid giving the USSR an important new propaganda angle from which to attack our proposal. If they do show some active interest, we can use the results of the technical study as a basis for insisting on the continuation of whatever prototype construction and testing activities we ultimately decide are necessary. In setting forth the above, I have attempted to leave open Governmental decisions on the items referred to above—decisions which the Committee of Principals agreed do not have to be made at this time. However, by means of this policy paper, I am trying to arrive at a basis on which we can prepare a presentation to NAC to elaborate on one item of the President's brief message to the ENDC last January 21. 7 I hope, therefore, that you can concur in my latest draft of the subject policy paper which differs from your wording on the three items cited above. Sincerely, William C. Foster 8 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. II, Box 12. Secret. 2 The draft policy paper was transmitted under cover of a February 29 memorandum from Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals. (Ibid., Vol. 1, Box 10) Comments on this draft have not been found. 3 A copy of this undated draft, with JCS proposed amendments, is attached as Appendix A to a March 18 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara (JCSM-223-64). (Ibid.) 4 For notes of the February 28 meeting, see Document 14 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 12 . 6 Dated March 5; not found. 7 See footnote 3, Document 4 . 8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 20. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson 20. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. Dear Mr. President: I met yesterday with Sir William Penney, Chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, as a result of your exchange of correspondence with Prime Minister Home last week in which you agreed, in response to the request of the Prime Minister, to such a meeting of “experts.” 2 Sir William had seen this correspondence exploring the possibility of concurrent announcements between the US, the UK and the Soviet Union concerning planned cutbacks in the rate of production of fissionable material. He wanted, in particular, to discuss for further clarification your response to the Prime Minister's request that the US might immediately deliver all of the U-235, due normally for delivery to the UK between now and 1969, in return for the delivery to the US of plutonium from the UK according to the original schedule contemplated in the barter agreement entered into between the US and the UK in 1959. 3 I explained to Sir William that your position is that such a speedup of delivery is not necessary at this time because what is contemplated is only a concurrent announcement on cutbacks of fissionable materials which had already largely been planned in the three countries. I said that it was the feeling of the US that the Prime Minister's proposal, if appropriate at all, would presumably be better related at some future time to an agreement for the complete cutoff of the production of fissionable material. Sir William seemed to understand this and suggested that if such an event should come to pass, which seemed unlikely for a few years, the UK could again raise the question of immediate delivery of the remaining U-235 at that time; I said that the US would then have to decide at that time as to their response to any such request. Sir William said that, as he saw it, if such a cutoff agreement should be up for consideration at some future time, and if the US didn't feel that they could, at that time, immediately deliver all of the U-235, the UK would have the option of either, (1) not signing the cutoff agreement and restarting their Capenhurst plant for the production of U-235 in order to meet their planned national goals in thermonuclear weapons, or, (2) signing the agreement and meeting their national requirements for thermonuclear weapons by producing some of them, less desirably, entirely from plutonium without the inclusion of any U-235. Sir William went on to explain to me that they have set national goals for the production and acquisition of the fissionable materials, plutonium and U-235, through 1969, at which time their goals will be met. This requires the production of an additional [ text deleted ] weapons grade plutonium and the acquisition of all of the U-235 to be obtained from the US through the barter agreement by 1969. He said that with respect to the plutonium, he is recommending that their 8 production reactors, 4 at Chapel Cross and 4 at Windscale, now devoted in large part to the production of civilian power grade plutonium, be converted entirely to the production of weapons grade plutonium. Under this program the required additional [ text deleted ] weapons grade plutonium could be produced by 1966 since their reactors can each produce at the rate of about [ text deleted ] of weapons grade plutonium per year. Thus, if an agreement to cut off the production of fissionable material was signed by 1966, they would have all of their required plutonium but would still be short that portion of the U-235 to be delivered from the US from 1966 to 1969. Sir William indicated that the maximum UK production rate of U-235 was about [ text deleted ] per year and that the total cost of their Capenhurst plant was less than some $80 million. This plant, of course, is now no longer producing weapons grade U-235 and is producing only a small amount of civilian power grade U-235. He expressed surprise that the French Pierrelatte plant would only produce, as he understood it, about [ text deleted ] of U-235 per year despite the billion dollar cost. He also mentioned, interestingly, that he understood the French are having trouble in their plutonium production reactors with the leakage of plutonium through the cladding material which surrounds the uranium fuel elements. An ironic consequence of this is that they cannot run to the desired high exposure levels for the plutonium and, hence, are forced to make more low exposure level, weapons grade plutonium, than they might otherwise do. Sir William also mentioned that it was his opinion that the French would conduct a test of a thermonuclear weapon in the Pacific by the end of next year, which, of course, would imply that it would have to be an all plutonium weapon. I regard this as an exceedingly interesting observation in view of my conversation with you on November 29, 1963, regarding this possibility. 4 Respectfully, Glenn T. Seaborg 5 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 8, pp. 171-173. The source text, originally classified, has been sanitized. All deletions are in the source text. Though the source text is undated, Seaborg's Journal confirms that Seaborg wrote the letter on March 25. (Ibid., p. 169) The source text was sent under cover of a March 25 memorandum from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., p. 170) It is an account of his meeting with Penny on March 24, which Bundy asked Seaborg to write after hearing Seaborg's oral report about it. (Ibid., pp. 162-163, 169) 2 Home's letter to President Johnson, March 17, is reproduced ibid., pp. 126-131. President Johnson's letter to Home has not been further identified. 3 Terms of this agreement are summarized in Senate Report No. 513, July 14, 1959, p. 6. 4 An account of this conversation is in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 7, p. 18. 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Seaborg signed the original. 21. Editorial Note 21. Editorial Note During the early months of 1964, U.S. Government agencies concerned with arms control policy continued to develop a proposal for a strategic nuclear delivery vehicles freeze. Regarding some of these discussions, see Documents 2 , 14 , and 19 . Additional documentation on formal papers and comments on them can be found in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. I, Boxes 10-11. Finally, in an April 14 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Spurgeon Keeny reported that the principals had cleared instructions for presentation of the U.S. initiative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. A typed copy of the instructions is attached to Keeny's memorandum. (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. I, Cables, Box 11) These instructions were transmitted in Todis 1399, April 14. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3) On April 16, Acting Representative Adrian Fisher introduced this initiative in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. For text of his statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pages 157-162. 22. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 22. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 1 Washington, April 17, 1964. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have decided to announce our plan for an additional cutback in the production of Uranium 235 in an address on foreign policy on April 20. I had hoped to make this announcement in conjunction with parallel announcements by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. I still hope that this will be possible. We are under considerable pressure, however, to proceed promptly with this announcement since major long-term electric power contracts must be renegotiated immediately if the action is to be accomplished in an orderly and expeditious fashion. I have not heard from you on this matter since my oral message of March 9, 2 and I do not think I should delay further the public actions necessary to initiate this cutback in the production of Uranium 235. In my speech, I will announce that I have ordered a further reduction of our production of Uranium 235 by an additional 25 percent—which will result in a total reduction of some 45 percent below present levels. This reduction will take place in an orderly fashion over the next four years. I was very gratified to learn in your message of March 2 3 that the Soviet Government was prepared to announce the ending of construction of two new large reactors for the production of plutonium. At the same time, I urged you in my message of March 9 to consider seriously the possibility of some action on your Uranium 235 program since it is our understanding that this program is continuing to expand. I hope that you have decided that such reductions will be possible and that your announcement can more closely parallel those of the United Kingdom and ourselves. Unless I hear from you before April 20, I do not plan to refer in my speech to the possibility of parallel actions by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom since I am not certain how you will wish to proceed in this matter. Sincerely, 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Khrushchev (2), Box 8. No classification marking. 2 Document 18 . 3 Document 15 . The March 2 date is the day Dobrynin delivered the message to Llewellyn Thompson. 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. 23. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 23. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 1 Moscow, April 17, 1964. Dear Mr. President: Your reply to my verbal message of February 28, 1964, 2 which expressed our point of view on the question of reducing the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, was transmitted to me. You express satisfaction at our consent to try to search for agreement on this question. I can confirm that we are actually ready for this. At the same time, it appears to me to be necessary, at this stage of our exchange of opinions, to say once more quite definitely that we consider some reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes to be a measure which is most limited in its significance. The reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials will not only fail to signify liquidation of nuclear weapons, but will not even arrest the process of their further accumulation in the arsenals of states. Accordingly, reaching agreement on this question, if one regards matters in their true perspective, will simply bear witness to the fact that neither side has any intention to compete with the other, without restraint, in an effort to determine who will have the large reserves of raw material for nuclear weapons. However, for the present situation of international affairs this, too, may turn out to be useful, in as much as any step which in some degree contributes to the strengthening of mutual trust between our two countries, which reflects mutual understanding with respect to the necessity of avoiding nuclear war, may contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for the solution of those questions upon which in the final analysis the preservation of peace depends. It is for this very reason that we are, in addition to that which has already been accomplished—the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the agreement on not launching into orbit objects with nuclear weapons, some measure of reduction of military expenditures of the USSR and the USA—in favor of now also adding agreement on reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. I consider it necessary to tell you about all this because it is useful for both of us to have a clear understanding of each other's views with respect to the realistic significance of this measure; otherwise a situation may arise when that limited success which has already been achieved will overshadow those important and urgent tasks which are still far from being solved—the tasks of reaching agreement on measures toward reducing the arms race, on measures of actual disarmament. If I have correctly understood the meaning of your message of March 9, 1964 3 there are a number of points of contact as regards a practical solution of the problem of reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. This pertains, first of all, to the recognition by both sides of the possibility of proceeding to some measure of reducing production of plutonium, as well as uranium-235, for military purposes. As concerns plutonium, here, apparently, there is agreement between us to the effect that we are to discontinue the construction of two new large reactors, while you will shut down four old reactors which have a considerable smaller capacity than the ones we are now building. But with respect to reducing the production of uranium-235, we shall be able to determine our decision after it has become definitely known what steps for reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials will be undertaken by your NATO partners—England and France. For now, I will only say that we have planned to reduce the manufacture of uranium-235 for military purposes and to increase its consumption for peaceful needs. In this connection I would like to remark that we have noted your expressed consideration as to the fact that the reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials by our two countries need not necessarily be carried out in equal dimensions. I think that this is a realistic approach to the problem if only because in NATO fissionable materials are being produced by three powers—not only by the United States of America but also by your allies—England and France, while among the Socialist countries they are being produced solely by the Soviet Union, which fact, of course, one cannot fail to take into account. Therefore, we shall determine the extent of the reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials by taking into account their total production by NATO countries. You have informed me of the fact that you are discussing the question of reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials in England with the English Prime Minister and that you are sure that the English Government would be ready at the proper time to undertake appropriate steps in this direction as its contribution to the simultaneous action of our three countries. It would be desirable, however, to have a specific understanding as to the steps which England would be ready to undertake. And France? You do not say anything about whether there is any prospect that on her part, too, measures will be undertaken towards reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. I hope that you will agree that it is important for us to know how matters will stand in this respect with France. In speaking of this I cannot refrain from remarking in passing that our specialists continue to insist on the evaluation of the capacity of the French Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant which I cited in my preceding message. In doing so, by the way, they cite American publications as well. Also, they confirm their appraisal of the capacity of the new American reactor in Hanford and the four reactors to be shut down, to which capacities I have also referred. It is necessary to clarify one more question as well. As I understand it, we agree with respect to having the actions for reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials carried out by our two countries in a parallel manner—by way of mutual example, i.e., on the basis of faith in each other's intentions. Otherwise in this case it is simply impossible to approach a solution of this problem, since it is a question of such steps as do not provide for actual disarmament and, consequently, their implementation cannot be subjected to control without being detrimental to the legitimate interests of the security of states. At the same time, in your message you speak of the desirability of working out some kind of provisions providing for the verification of the reduction by our two countries in the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. I will tell you frankly: we will not agree to the establishment of control over the enterprises of our atomic industry if at the same time no agreement is reached on disarmament, on the liquidation of nuclear weapons. As to the factor of mutual trust in the implementation by both sides of reduction in the manufacture of fissionable materials, it seems to me that due significance should be given to this factor. We already have certain experience in this regard: it was on this very mutual trust that we based our agreement not to launch into orbit objects with nuclear weapons. And it seems that this does not disturb either side, because each side relies on the word given by the other side. The same may also be said concerning the steps which we took toward mutual understanding with regard to a certain reduction in military budgets. These are the thoughts, Mr. President, which occur to me in connection with our exchange of opinions on the question of reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes. The impression is created that on this problem, apparently, agreement may be reached, it being important merely to know what steps will be taken in this direction also by other powers producing fissionable materials for military purposes. As to the form of such an understanding, your proposal to prepare and exchange separate statements concerning our proposed action toward reducing the manufacture of fissionable materials and to publish these statements simultaneously is acceptable to us. It seems advisable to us that the statements should likewise reflect the intention of our governments to expand in the future the delivery for peaceful uses fissionable materials from current production or from accumulated reserves. In this connection I should like to note with satisfaction your positive attitude toward our idea of cooperation in the implementation of such big projects as the desalting of sea water, which, as I have already pointed out in a preceding message, 4 is so badly needed by a large number of states. If Soviet and American scientists and engineers would combine their efforts in the interests of a more effective solution of the problem of desalting sea water and utilize atomic energy for such purposes, this would be a great and very useful operation. It would also be possible to consider other potential fields of cooperation between our two countries in the utilization of nuclear energy for the good of mankind. With respect. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the date refers to the day the message was received. 2 Document 15 . 3 Document 18 . 4 Khrushchev mentioned desalinization of sea water in his February 28 message to President Johnson. 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 24. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 24. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 1 Moscow, April 20, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I have received your oral message of April 17 2 on the question of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes which you sent through our Ambassador in Washington A. Dobrynin and which as it turned out you prepared before you could familiarize yourself with the answering message which I sent you earlier on this question. 3 You state that you intend to make a statement April 20 concerning the plans of the Government of the U.S.A. in connection with a fixed reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and would like to know whether you could refer in some form or other to the possibility of parallel actions on the part of the Soviet Union in this area. I think the answer, although possibly not complete, to this question of yours is already contained in my last message to you of April 17: we regard the achievement of agreement between our countries on the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes useful, although naturally we for our part will determine the amount of the reduction of such production of active materials proceeding from a calculation of the total production of them by the NATO countries. As for England, in addition to your communications, I have only just received a message from Prime Minister Douglas-Home 4 in which he informs me of his intention to associate himself with your forthcoming statement of April 20 although he is doing this in general form not giving concrete expression to his intention. Concerning the plans of France, nothing as formerly is known to us in this connection, although as I have already noted it is important for us to know this. Nevertheless, since as a result of the exchange of opinions, agreement in principle between us concerning the desirability of parallel actions in this question has been achieved and, as you point out, it is important for you to make a statement on this question April 20, we also on that day will make a declaration concerning the intentions of the Soviet Union in the matter of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Our declaration naturally will take into account the above mentioned circumstances complicating for us a determination at the present moment of the specific amount of reduction of the production of uranium-235. As for plutonium, as I have already informed you we shall make a declaration concerning the discontinuance of the construction of two new big atomic reactors for the production of plutonium. And so, we have nothing against your referring in your statement to the receipt from me of a communication concerning the intention of the Soviet Government to carry out some reduction of fissionable materials for military purposes. For my part, I have in mind to refer in my statement to the receipt of analogous communications from you and from Prime Minister Douglas-Home. I am sure that our parallel statements on the question of the reduction of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes will be interpreted positively by international public opinion as a step in the development of that course which our governments have taken through the conclusion of the treaty on the banning of the testing of atomic weapons in three spheres. Of course, as I have already said, this new measure which it is now possible to consider agreed, is although useful limited in its significance. This is not a disarmament measure. However the very fact that we have succeeded in undertaking certain practical steps as a matter of mutual example—I have in mind both the present agreement and mutual reduction of military budgets—shows that this approach can also be applied beneficially in a number of other instances. Why, for example, do we not attempt to agree in the same manner on the reduction of foreign troops on others' territories? I am familiar with the declarations to the effect that the U.S.A. intends to withdraw from Western Germany 7,500 soldiers and officers transferred there additionally in 1961. 5 We welcome this step of yours. If you would be prepared to go farther and proceed to the reduction of those American troops which are permanently stationed on the territory of the FRG, then I can say right now: we in that case will also be prepared to reduce our troops stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic with the provision, naturally, that the reduction of your troops would not be compensated by the further increase in the number of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany itself. It is no secret that recently the West German Bundeswehr is swelling quickly. Your Minister of Defense declared recently that the number of NATO troops in Europe already exceeds the number of troops of the countries of the Warsaw Pact 6 and we understand that this on the whole is directly connected with the rapid growth of the West German Army. All this we must naturally take into consideration. I would be happy to know your views on this score. In conclusion, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the warm congratulations in connection with my 70th birthday sent me through Ambassador A. Dobrynin. I am grateful for the token of remembrance which you sent through our Ambassador for me on my birthday. 7 I have also received your official congratulations for which I thank you and to which I shall reply. Respectfully, 8 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. No classification marking. 2 Document 22 . 3 Document 23 . 4 This message has not been further identified. 5 No announcement of these specific numbers of troop withdrawals has been found. 6 In a speech to the New York Economic Club on November 18, 1963, McNamara stated that “the Warsaw Pact total [of armed troops] including the Soviets is only about 4,500,000. Against that, it is today the members of NATO whose active armed forces number over 5,000,000.” (Keesing's Contemporary Archives , 1963-1964, p. 19920) 7 Neither the President's message nor his “token of remembrance” has been further identified. 8 Printed from an unsigned copy. 25. Editorial Note 25. Editorial Note In luncheon remarks to the Associated Press in New York on April 20, 1964, President Johnson declared: “I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our production of enriched uranium to be carried out over a 4-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an overall decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 percent, and of enriched uranium by 40 percent.” He also mentioned that in reaching this decision, he had been in close consultation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home and Chairman Khrushchev, and the latter was releasing a simultaneous announcement in Moscow of Soviet reductions in U-235 production. Text of the President's speech is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64 , pages 493-500. For text of Khrushchev's statement, see Documents on Disarmament , 1964, pages 166-168. Regarding concerns by Seaborg, Foster, and McGeorge Bundy on the failure of Khrushchev to respond in a timely manner to the President's March 9 message, which proposed a joint announcement of cutbacks ( Document 18 ), and discussions about the timing and content of the President's April 20 announcement, see Seaborg, Journal , Volume 8, pages 247-248, and 307. On April 20, the Atomic Energy Commission issued a press release providing further details on the cutback. On the same day the White House issued Seaborg's February 13 letter to the President, initially recommending the cutback, and a letter from Seaborg and McNamara to the President, April 16, reviewing the status of their joint progress on the implementation of the limited test ban treaty safeguards earlier recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Kennedy. The AEC press release, Seaborg's February 13 letter, and the Seaborg-McNamara April 16 letter are reproduced ibid., pages 291-293, and 308-310. The text of the Seaborg-McNamara letter, with an additional White House explanatory statement, is also printed in Documents on Disarmament , 1964, pages 162-164. At the 528th meeting of the National Security Council on April 22, President Johnson asked about congressional and foreign reactions to his announcement of the cutback, and Seaborg and McNamara reported that it had been generally well received in Congress, and Carl Rowan reported that the world reaction “had been generally good, and that the overall tendency was to reflect credit on President Johnson. He said that the Indians liked the action; the Chinese stated that the Soviet Union had been taken in by the United States and that the action indicated that the United States was siding with Khrushchev in the Sino-Soviet dispute; the French indicated that the action was rather unsatisfactory.” (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 8, pages 329-330) Another account of the NSC meeting is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 9, Box 1. NSC Action No. 2484, April 22, noted this NSC discussion. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting—April 22, 1964) 26. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 26. Oral Message From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev 1 Washington, May 1, 1964. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have read with great interest your two recent letters 2 and I think we can agree that the separate decisions which we announced on April 20 3 have already had a useful effect. Such responsible actions on each side are helpful in moving us forward on the hard road to peace. It was particularly good to have our announcements come out at the same time, and I send my thanks for your understanding of the need which I faced to make a statement, and for your willingness to make your own statement at the same moment. Throughout the world these actions have been warmly approved, and I have already told your Ambassador how strongly I believe that we should continue the search for further steps along this road. In this spirit I am happy to express my agreement to your suggestion that our scientific and technical experts should cooperate on the problem of desalting sea water, including the possibility that nuclear energy may be an effective force for this purpose. This is a problem which is of great interest not only to our two countries but to many others throughout the world, and we believe that there is every reason for hearty cooperation among the interested nations. I have designated my own Scientific Adviser, Dr. Donald F. Hornig, to prepare concrete proposals for cooperative efforts, working with Chairman Seaborg of the Atomic Energy Commission. They or their chosen representatives will be ready shortly to begin discussions with those whom you designate. As I understand this problem, it appears to be one which requires a great deal of careful scientific and technical study before we will be ready to undertake large-scale projects, but that is all the more reason for moving ahead urgently, and we on our side are ready. As soon as your representatives are designated, I suggest that we should make a simultaneous announcement of our interest in this problem. I also continue to believe that our representatives in the field of arms control and disarmament should continue to press forward to seek agreement in their great field of work. I will not take your time in this message to repeat the arguments which we have put forward both in my public statements and at Geneva on this subject, but I mention the matter so that you may know that the positions taken by the American Government on this subject have my strong personal support and have been designed, at my direction, to provide real hope for additional useful agreements. We continue to hope that as these proposals are further studied by the Soviet Government the prospects for agreement may improve. In two of your messages, and especially in the most recent one, you refer to the problem of the reduction of troop levels, especially in Germany. I am sorry to have to tell you that I do not think this subject is one on which we can expect to make progress by private discussion between us at this time. The American forces in Germany are there for entirely defensive purposes, and their presence is a matter of great importance for the people and government of West Germany. For there to be any substantial additional reduction in the level of the U.S. forces in Germany there would have to be changes in the situation which would make it possible for the Germans and others in Western Europe to feel secure in other ways. In the meanwhile, I hope we can continue to cooperate in reducing the level of tension in Central Europe. The problem of the future of Germany is a most important one, and nothing could be better for the peace of the world than a real settlement. We on our side remain ready for such a settlement, which could serve the legitimate interest of the German people as well as the other peoples involved, including your own. I think we should go forward with projects like the desalting of sea water, in which no one can misunderstand the purpose of our cooperation. Meanwhile, of course, we should also work hard to find ways which will reconcile our differences in all fields, with due regard to the interests of others. This is the central purpose of my policy in international affairs. There are differences between us, Mr. Chairman, in important areas, but it should be our purpose to reduce them and to find sensible agreements wherever we can. Let me state again, in closing, my great satisfaction with our success in reaching parallel positions on the cutback of production for nuclear weapons, and my hope that we shall continue to make more progress of this kind. Sincerely, 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. 2 Documents 23 and 24 . 3 Document 25 . 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. 27. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 27. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, May 7, 1964. SUBJECT International Approval of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Applications National Security Action memorandum No. 282 2 requested a first report by the end of March on “the probabilities and problems involved in obtaining from the nations signatory to the Test Ban Treaty approval for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful explosions under adequate international controls.” This is a response to that request. The problem posed is one which necessarily must be reviewed periodically in the light both of the international situation and the state of our technical development. There are two ways that international agreement to the conduct of Plowshare excavation projects might be obtained. One would be the amendment of the Test Ban Treaty to exclude peaceful uses applications of nuclear explosives from the restraints of the Treaty. The other method would be the approval of specific described projects through the voting procedures prescribed for amendment of the Treaty. Our view, at the present time, is that the second method would be the more likely of success. There appears to be little likelihood, however, that the Soviets would be receptive at this time to any proposal to exempt Plowshare excavation experiments or applications from the Treaty restraints. We have very little evidence of active Soviet interest in the application of nuclear excavation techniques (See Tabs A and B), 3 although the USSR leads the world in large-scale excavation with conventional explosives. Clearly, at the time of the Test Ban Treaty negotiations, Khrushchev did not envisage early amendment of the Treaty, and his statements about the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes were set in a vague and indefinite future. Perhaps encouraging is Khrushchev's April 20 statement about allocating “… more fissionable materials for peaceful uses—in atomic power stations, in industry, agriculture, in medicine, in the implementation of major scientific, technical projects, including the distillation of sea water.” 4 We note, however, that nuclear excavation was not included specifically in the enumerated activities. We understand that four or five years will be required to develop the devices and cratering technology which would be required in large-scale excavation projects, such as a new trans-Isthmian canal. During this period it would seem important to stimulate international interest and cooperation in the nuclear excavation program to the maximum extent possible. By international participation in Plowshare symposia, observation of cratering shots or experiments and perhaps exchange of test data, it should be possible to demonstrate the economic development potential of nuclear excavation, the absence of hazard to human life and the safeguards that could be provided to prevent evasion of the Treaty for weapons development purposes. Development of international acceptance or even of cooperative effort by Treaty signatories would obviously provide the most favorable atmosphere in which to seek and gain support for international agreement, under the voting procedures of the Treaty, for approval of specific excavation projects. ACDA has suggested that the most likely opportunity for raising the question of a treaty amendment for the conduct of nuclear excavation projects probably will be in the context of future international discussion of a comprehensive test ban. In the context of such discussions it might be possible to obtain some easing of the restraints on the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is difficult to predict, however, when such discussions might be reopened and it is possible that discussions in this context might lead to more rather than less restrictive conditions on Plowshare. (See Tab C) While development of the nuclear devices can proceed within the Treaty limits, there are some uncertainties as to the limitations placed on the development of the necessary cratering technology by the Treaty language. The committee established by NSAM 269 5 is charged with reviewing the facts relating to any prospective nuclear test “which might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” The discussions to date by that committee seem to indicate that the Treaty restraints may well inhibit the development of cratering technology and become a limiting factor earlier than the estimated first large-scale excavation project some four or five years hence. (In presenting the Treaty to the Senate, Administration witnesses, while acknowledging that large-scale applications such as a trans-Isthmian canal could not be carried out under the Treaty, clearly expressed the view that properly devised experiments for developing the excavation technology could be conducted, see Tab D. Similar testimony was given as recently as 4 March 1964 before the Senate Committee on Commerce.) 6 Certain of the tests designed to develop the necessary cratering technology raise concerns of Treaty violations with some of the committee members. The concern is with the definition of “radioactive debris … present outside the territorial limits” of the United States. While it seems useful to identify the conflicting views on this problem (as is done below), it is not our purpose here to address ourselves to its solution, which is the proper concern of the NSAM 269 committee. The concerns expressed in that forum, however, underline the urgency of establishing an atmosphere of international acceptance of and cooperation on peaceful excavation activities. The AEC believes that the review committee established by NSAM 269 can adopt policies of appraisal which would allow many of the cratering experiments to be carried out. If so, the need for a Treaty amendment would be obviated for some years. Furthermore, if cratering experiments are carried out with international observation, an atmosphere can be created in which an amendment could be obtained more easily. In AEC's opinion a particularly appropriate consideration in appraising cratering experiments, in view of the Treaty limitation on causing debris “to be present” beyond territorial boundaries, is the internationally accepted technical definition of when radionuclides are considered “not present.” Such a definition is found in the health protection guides of both USSR and the US (10 CFR 20) as well as in the guides of the International Commission on Radiation Protection and the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition a precedent for the use of this definition in interpreting an international treaty is found in the operation of the McMurdo nuclear reactor and the very slight attendant release of radioactivity within the limits of 10 CFR 20. This procedure is considered by the US to be consistent with the prohibition in the Antarctica Treaty of 1961, to which the USSR is a party, against “disposal there of radioactive waste material.” 7 Soviet representatives have visited this facility. AEC points out that the legal basis for such policies of appraisal is the principle of “de minimis” or the application of a “rule of reason” to interpret otherwise imprecise provisions of law. Since the Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria, it becomes necessary for the NSAM 269 committee to decide when debris might be considered “present.” Among other relevant material to be considered in deciding this question is the understanding of the Senate in advising and consenting to the Treaty. In this connection, the Foreign Relations Committee reported, after hearing all the testimony on this and other questions, its understanding that “the Plowshare program will not be seriously inhibited by the Treaty.” 8 It should also be noted that, since the technical definition of when radionuclides are “not present” is when their concentration is small compared to maximum permissible concentrations under health protection guides, the levels of radiation involved in this definition are internationally accepted as being far below the point where there might begin to be a health hazard. Thus, this definition would be consistent with a stated objective of the Treaty “to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances.” ACDA is concerned about the international repercussions if debris attributable to U.S. underground nuclear explosions should be picked up outside our territorial limits (Tab E). The Tass press release and related cable from Moscow commenting on the accidental venting of one of our recent Nevada tests 9 (Tab F) show that the Soviets are fully alert to this possibility. In these circumstances, ACDA is concerned that the good faith of the United States in seeking arms control agreements could be thrown into doubt by possible charges of violation, and that our reputation as a country which takes its treaty obligations seriously could be prejudiced. As to the consideration suggested by the AEC for appraising what is acceptable under the Test Ban Treaty, ACDA believes that its application would result in a substantial risk of incurring the international consequences described above. The Treaty speaks simply of causing “radioactive debris” to be “present” outside territorial limits and there is nothing in the text itself to indicate that the presence of small amounts of debris should be accepted. Finally ACDA calls attention to arguments that could be made against the suggested policy of appraisal on the basis of official U.S. records published in connection with the Treaty. (Tab E) Whether or not the AEC interpretation is accepted by the review committee as a standard of appraisal, it can be borne in mind as possible rebuttal should any nuclear test accident, either weapons or Plowshare, bring forth Soviet charges of Treaty violations. In summary , we urge a) the question of amending the Treaty be kept under continuing surveillance, b) a program of Soviet and international participation and cooperation in the U.S. nuclear excavation development program be devised and carried out, and c) the acquisition of intelligence on Soviet interest and planning in this area be intensified. U. Alexis Johnson 10 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—General, Vol. 1, Box 27. Secret. 2 Document 7 . 3 None of the tabs has been found. 4 Reference is to Khrushchev's April 20 statement. See Document 25 . 5 Regarding NSAM 269, see Document 3 . 6 The testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee has not been further identified. 7 Signed on December 1, 1959, and entered into force on June 23, 1961. (12 UST 794) 8 For text of the entire report, September 3, 1963, see Documents on Disarmament, 1963 , pp. 450-483. 9 Though the Tass press release and related cable from Moscow have not been further identified, the reference presumably is to an AEC test of a small nuclear device (called Pike) in Nevada on March 13. In a March 25 information memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy noted in part that the device “partially vented” and produced “measurable quantities of radioactive debris at considerable distances from the test site. Although there is no evidence that the debris was detected outside the United States or that the Mexican authorities were in a position to measure it, the possibility cannot be excluded that measurable quantities of debris did, in fact, cross into Mexico. There remains, therefore, a remote possibility that charges may be made subsequently that this event constituted a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—U.S. Testing Program, Vol. II, Niblick Series—FY 1964, Box 27) 10 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 28. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 28. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 1 Washington, May 21, 1964. Dear Bill: This is in reply to your memorandum of 8 May to the Committee of Principals, requesting comments on the paper “Verification of Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles.” 2 I am glad to note certain changes in the present paper which I believe are steps in the right direction. Specifically, paragraph 8 on page 14 no longer says that only a “small” number of undeclared facilities would be eligible for inspection and it makes explicit that no disclosures of unilateral information would be necessary to justify on-site inspection. These changes bear on problems of the perishability and possible compromise of unilateral intelligence which have concerned me for some time. Nonetheless, I remain concerned about the reliance placed on unilateral means to verify declarations and to help police controls over production and launcher construction. As the paper itself notes, our present means are inadequate in some areas. Moreover, if we go ahead with this proposal, there can be no assurance that we will not in the future be deprived of some of the intelligence we now possess. I hope that further thought can be given to ways in which the negotiated inspection arrangements can be expanded. In particular, I continue to think it important that the number of on-site inspections to check undeclared facilities be large enough to protect against the perishability of intelligence and the danger of its compromise. Sincerely, John 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament,ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 18 memorandum from Fisher to members of the Committee of Principals. 2 The memorandum and the draft paper have not been further identified. Regarding other drafts of this paper, see Document 21 and footnotes 3 and 4, Document 36 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original. 29. Editorial Note 29. Editorial Note In a May 30, 1964, letter to President Johnson, Seaborg formally requested approval in principle of the Whetstone series for FY 1965, which included 50 tests for weapons development, about 8 for the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes (Plowshare Program), another 12 tests for the Department of Defense, and 1 or 2 tests by the United Kingdom. He also requested specific approval for 17 AEC tests, including 1 Plowshare event, 1 Department of Defense test, and 1 possible U.K. test for the first quarter of FY 1965 (Whetstone I). (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Volume 2, Tab 7, June 16, 1964, FY 1965, Underground Nuclear Test Program, Box 1) Copies of this letter, along with its four enclosures and a paper entitled “Briefing for the President: Underground Test Program, FY 1965, Parts I and II, June 1964,”were transmitted to NSC members under cover of a June 15 memorandum from Bromley Smith. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting—June 16, 1964) In a June 13 memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy summarized these papers and gave his own recommendations on possible decisions the President might make. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Volume 2, Tab 7, June 16, 1964, FY 1965, Underground Nuclear Test Program, Box 1) For an account of the June 16 NSC meeting, at which the Whetstone series was discussed, see Document 34 . In a memorandum to Seaborg, June 22, Bundy reported that the President had approved in principle the FY 1965 testing program with a few exceptions, including one Plowshare event, tests above or near one megaton yield, and the Long Shot event at Amchitka Island, Alaska, for all of which specific Presidential approval was required. Bundy added that the President also approved all the tests proposed for the first quarter of FY 1965. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In an August 27 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg requested approval of 18 tests, 16 by the Atomic Energy Commission and 2 by the Department of Defense, and also of Sulky, a Plowshare cratering experiment, for the second quarter (Whetstone II) of FY 1965. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—U.S. Testing Program, Volume III, Whetstone Series—FY 1965, Box 28) Bundy informed Seaborg in a memorandum, September 25, that except for Sulky the President had approved his request. (Ibid.) Adjustments to the schedule for Whetstone II are contained in a letter from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, October 20. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) Regarding Sulky, see Document 58 . In a letter to President Johnson, December 14, 1964, Seaborg requested approval of Whetstone III for the third quarter of FY 1965, which was to consist of 12 tests by the Atomic Energy Commission and one or two by the Department of Defense. One of the AEC events was to be a Plowshare experiment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—U.S. Testing Program, Volume III, Whetstone Series—FY 1965, Box 28) Bundy informed Seaborg in a memorandum, January 8, 1965, that the President had approved his request. (Ibid.) In a letter to President Johnson, March 17, 1965, Seaborg requested authority to conduct Whetstone IV for the fourth quarter of FY 1965. The request consisted of 13 new and 3 deferred third quarter AEC weapons development tests, 1 AEC Plowshare test (Palanquin), and 3 Department of Defense tests. The test program was described in some detail in an undated enclosure to Seaborg's letter. (Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In a memorandum to Seaborg, April 2, McGeorge Bundy stated that the President had approved all these tests. (Ibid.) The United States conducted 48 tests in the Whetstone series for FY 1965. Breakdown by quarters was 11 (July-September 1964); 13 (October-December 1964); 10 (January-March 1965); and 14 (April-June 1965). ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 , pages 22-25) A history of the Whetstone series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Nougat and Whetstone: Events—Hard Hat, Danny Boy, Marshmallow, Mudpack, Wishbone, Gumdrop, Diluted Water, and Tiny Tot, 15 February 1962-17 June 1965 (DNA 6320F, 1984). 30. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff and Steven R. Rivkin of the President's Office of Science and Technology to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the President's Science Adviser (Hornig) 30. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff and Steven R. Rivkin of the President's Office of Science and Technology to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the President's Science Adviser (Hornig) 1 Washington, June 2, 1964. Mr. Fisher wants to review items for consideration at a possible Principals meeting Friday. 2 He will raise two issues—non-proliferation and inspection for the freeze—in preparation for resumption of the ENDC June 8 at Geneva. 1. Non-Proliferation . An ACDA paper (not yet circulated) proposes modifications in our non-proliferation position to circumvent continuing Soviet attacks at Geneva on the MLF. 3 It suggests that we a) settle for a less comprehensive agreement (dropping prohibitions on transfer and concentrating on an agreement not to assist manufacture by potential nuclear powers) and b) undertake publicized preparations “to assure that the MLF charter will contain nuclear weapon non-manufacture and non-transfer provisions.” Fisher believes the Soviets have a forceful argument in charging that we are “keeping two sets of books” on proliferation and consequently would like the Principals' agreement on a formula that characterizes the MLF as a definitive step toward non-proliferation. The Secretary opposes circulating the current non-dissemination paper (Tab A) 4 because of its MLF references, and Fisher therefore is thinking about softer language for Geneva to indicate that the U.S. will seek “assurances” from its MLF partners against proliferation. He feels we should emphasize what is now only “implicit” in our existing characterizations of the MLF, i.e., that the weapons involved will not—or even never—be transferred to national control. At the same time, he is clearly aware of possible British and Italian domestic embarrassment (forecast by the disarmament negotiators of both countries at four-power discussions here last week), 5 should non-dissemination be pushed hard this summer. 2. Verification of Production Freeze of Strategic Delivery Systems. ACDA negotiations with DOD (Barber) for authority to elaborate on our proposal have stalled on the unresolved aerial overflight issue. Mr. McNamara has indicated he is prepared to overrule the JCS if and when the Soviets express interest in the proposal and, preferably, not before. ACDA, on the other hand, believes the Russians may be frightened off and will continue to distort our proposal, unless we give clear assurances that we do not seek to inspect their operational launch forces. To do this, ACDA suggests we now spell out general procedures for a quota of on-site inspections of suspected new construction without mentioning aerial overflights (Tab B). 6 DOD and the Chiefs, however, believe that this approach would leave the implication that we do not seek comprehensive inspection rights. Fisher acknowledges that semantic foot-work could help somewhat—e.g., if we change our language from “control over the number of launchers” to “verification of limitations on launchers”—but he continues to desire early agreement along the lines of ACDA's proposed quota presentation. 3. Other issues. Of the other issues considered for inclusion on the agenda, only the cut-off of fissionable material production is likely to be ready; except for second thoughts by AEC on minor details, no particular troublesome problems should arise at this late date. The ACDA paper on prototype testing is not likely to be discussed, 7 because of DOD and JCS reservations. Barber does not now accept the conclusion of the interagency task force that significant major changes in re-entry bodies—other than the development of multiple warheads—can be monitored with confidence. At the same time, the JCS continues to react strongly in principle against restraints on prototype testing. Also, the Chiefs have yet to review the prototype testing problem from the point of feasibility—as opposed to desirability—and the results of their review are not expected until two weeks hence. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the source text reads, “McGB: For your mtg with Butch Fisher this afternoon. DK” The source text is signed only by Rivkin. 2 The Committee of Deputies to the Principals met on Friday, June 5, but not the Committee of Principals. 3 Reference presumably is to May 19 ACDA draft position paper, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement.” (Ibid.) 4 Not attached, but presumably either the same paper referenced in footnote 3 above, or an unidentified memorandum by Secretary Rusk. 5 A summary of these discussions between U.S., British, Canadian, and Italian officials (with a French observer present) on May 27-28 is in CA-12610, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-2) 6 Not found. 7 Reference is to the report of the Interagency Task Force on Strategic Vehicle Prototype Testing, May 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament,ACDA Publications, Vol. II, Box 12) This task force was convened in response to action taken by the Committee of Principals at its meeting on February 28. See Document 14 . 31. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 31. Oral Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson 1 Moscow, June 5, 1964. Dear Mr. President: I received your verbal message of May 1 2 even before my trip to the United Arab Republic. 3 I have thought it over and I wish, in turn, to express a few thoughts. First of all, I should like to assure you that I also am pleased with the measures taken simultaneously by us concerning the cut-back in the production of plutonium and uranium-235 for military purposes. They have met with widespread approval throughout the world. After concluding the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water and reaching the understanding not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons, this new step agreed upon between us constitutes, in effect, a third milestone on the way to ending the nuclear weapons race. It is good that such a course is gradually becoming established in the relations between our countries, and in international relations in general, although, of course, we both know that the progress achieved along this line is still limited, on the whole, especially if it is compared with the vastness of the problem that confronts our countries and all mankind, that is, the elimination of the threat and the very possibility of a nuclear war. As I learned from your message, you agree with our proposal that we now take a step forward in the field of cooperation between our countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, that is, in solving the problem of the desalinization of sea water. That is also a useful undertaking and, after receiving your reply, I immediately gave instructions to our appropriate organizations to start preparing for the forthcoming meeting with the American representatives. You suggested that both sides issue a statement simultaneously concerning our mutual interest in solving the problem of the desalinization of sea water. That is acceptable to us. For our part, we are prepared to publish a statement by the USSR State Committee on the use of atomic energy concerning the understanding reached on the meeting of Soviet and American specialists for the joint study of scientific and technical questions relating to the desalinization of sea water by means of nuclear energy. If you have no objection, such a statement by us and a similar one from the American side could be published about a week after the transmittal of this communication by Ambassador Dobrynin. As for the practical details of the preparations for the forthcoming meeting, including the time and place of the meeting, it will not be difficult to coordinate them through diplomatic channels. We are, of course, pleased with whatever contributions have been made to the improvement of the international situation; this provides further assurance that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in this matter is not an impossibility but quite within the realm of reality. In this connection, I liked your recent statement that you will henceforth try every path to peace, that you intend to keep moving forward and that, after all, the United States is not standing still. I can definitely assure you that we, for our part, will be equally dynamic and equally flexible in searching out ways to promote peace. [Here follows discussion of possible reductions in foreign troops in Germany.] In your message you mention the US proposal submitted at the Geneva conference on disarmament. I am acquainted with these proposals, just as you yourself are of course acquainted with ours. I do not think there is any need at present to enter into details, but if it is a question of the whole gamut of disarmament proposals, then we surely have before us an unlimited field for serious work on the finding of ways to achieve agreements. The Soviet Government has made, and is making, considerable efforts to plow this field and to grow a good crop on it. However, to be perfectly frank, we do not have the feeling that the other party is acting along the same lines. The fact is that there has not yet been any progress in the Geneva negotiations, and the state of the disarmament problem naturally leaves us with a strong feeling of disappointment. Now you are in favor of our representatives, who are dealing with disarmament problems, being instructed to make a really persistent effort to reach agreement in this important area. Why not? Let them work a little longer, and a little harder; we have to explore every possibility to the end, that is my feeling. We shall give our representative in the Committee of 18 the necessary instructions. And to increase the chances of success, to ensure that the disarmament negotiations do not again sink into routine, let us both follow the work of our representatives more closely; let us prod them a little if that is needed. As you will obviously remember, as early as 1962, before the beginning of the work of the Committee of 18, the heads of states and the member governments of the Committee agreed to take a personal interest in the course of the negotiations. 4 That was a sensible decision. I am thinking that sometime soon it might be useful to instruct our ministers of foreign affairs to examine the course of the negotiations. They could do this, for example, during the XIX Session of the General Assembly of the UN. They will of course have other matters to discuss. Let us see what concrete results can be achieved by our ministers. And then, perhaps, the need will arise for us to meet. We understand that similar views are current in Washington also. But this is, of course, a matter for the future. We should not run too far ahead. [Here follows extensive discussion of Cuba, Southeast Asia, and especially the “German question.”] 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the date refers to the day the message was received. 2 Document 26 . 3 Khrushchev visited the United Arab Republic May 9-25. 4 Reference is to the exchange of correspondence between Khrushchev and Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy on this question in February and early March 1962. For texts of their messages, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962 , Vol. I, pp. 25-26, 32-38, 49-57, 61-63, and 75-81. 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 32. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) 32. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) 1 Washington, June 9, 1964. I-25047/64 Dear Butch: I have reviewed the rewritten paper on the cutoff of fissionable material and find that the changes which you and the AEC made are a distinct improvement to the paper. 2 As you know, the Chiefs have not commented on the verification annex in its present form 3 but I feel they are now in general agreement with the paper with the following exceptions: a. They desire overflights and some monitoring of atomic explosions for peaceful purposes. As the Secretary said last week, we believe that the question of overflights need not be decided at this time, and therefore a policy of conscious ambiguity is appropriate on this matter. 4 As for the matter of monitoring atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, the Secretary made it clear that we believe this is a subject more appropriately discussed in the context of the test ban. b. The JCS have also stated that: “Until the IAEA safeguards organization and procedures are strengthened and the concept of IAEA inspection of a US/USSR cutoff agreement can be evaluated, adversary resident inspection of declared facilities is required as one of the safeguards against Soviet cheating.” 5 It is our understanding, based primarily on Section I of the verification annex, that this requirement is adequately recognized in the cutoff paper, and that we are not at this time firmly committed to an IAEA role. c. As neither the Chiefs nor the Government as a whole have studied the problem of cutoff and transfer together, I would appreciate it if you would not authorize discussions now of transfer of over 60,000 kilograms for the United States and of a US/USSR ratio greater than 2. The Chiefs' study on this subject should be available some time next month. At that time the Secretary will forward his views on any possible increase in our transfer proposal. If these suggestions are acceptable to you, we have no objection to the use of the revised paper in the Geneva negotiations, or elsewhere, as appropriate. Sincerely, Peter Solbert 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. 2 Entitled “Cutoff of Fissionable Material Production and Transfer to Peaceful Uses as Separable Measures,” June 4. (Ibid.) 3 Entitled “Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff,” June 4, and attached as Annex A to the above referenced paper. 4 McNamara expressed these views in his letter to Foster, June 3. (Ibid.) 5 The quotation is from the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, May 28, JCSM-449-64. (Ibid.) 33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Scoville) to President Johnson 33. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Scoville) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 12, 1964. SUBJECT U.S. Position on a cutoff of fissionable materials production and transfer to peaceful uses Enclosed (at Tab A) is the position paper, “Cutoff of Fissionable Material Production and Transfer to Peaceful Uses as Separable Measures,” dated June 4, 1964, together with an annex “Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff” of the same date. 2 The purpose of this memorandum is to request your approval for use of this position paper as guidance for the United States Disarmament Delegation in Geneva, and for use of the Annex as a working paper. In accordance with the position approved by President Kennedy in November 1962, 3 the United States has discussed these proposals in Geneva; you will also recall that the cutoff proposal was included in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. Thus, the enclosed position paper does not involve new proposals, rather the paper contains elaboration of our existing proposals, particularly with regard to verification. The working paper which the position paper authorizes the Delegation to table at the Conference would constitute the first detailed United States public statement to be made on inspection of the cutoff since the measure was initially suggested by the United States in 1955. The position paper has been developed through extensive interagency consultation and has been approved by the Department of State. In addition, the position paper and annex now presented for approval were redrafted in light of Secretary of Defense McNamara's letter of June 3, 1964, expressing his own views and transmitting those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enclosed at Tab B. I am enclosing as Tab C a letter of June 9, 1964 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Solbert which states that the drafts are now acceptable to the Department of Defense on certain conditions which are acceptable to ACDA. 4 Mr. Solbert's letter indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the inspection provisions, with the exception of two matters: they desire overflights and some monitoring of atomic explosions for peaceful purposes. Secretary McNamara has indicated that the question of overflights need not be decided at this time, and therefore a policy of conscious ambiguity as incorporated in the paper is appropriate on this matter. As for the matter of monitoring atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, Secretary McNamara made it clear that he believes this is a subject more appropriately discussed in the context of the test ban. The JCS have also stated that: “Until the IAEA safeguards organization and procedures are strengthened and the concept of IAEA inspection of a US/USSR cutoff agreement can be evaluated, adversary resident inspection of declared facilities is required as one of the safeguards against Soviet cheating.” As indicated by Section I of the verification annex, this requirement is recognized in the cutoff paper, and we are not, at this time, firmly committed to an IAEA role. The Joint Chiefs also believe that the relative advantages and disadvantages of a combination cutoff and transfer proposal have not been thoroughly analyzed. Secretary McNamara has asked the Joint Chiefs to conduct such an analysis, but has noted that the paper is consistent with the position approved by President Kennedy in November 1962. The Department of Defense, through Mr. Solbert, has asked that we not authorize discussions now of transfer of over 60,000 kilograms for the United States and of a US/USSR ratio greater than 2. The Chiefs' study on this subject should be available some time next month. At that time the Secretary will forward his views on any possible increase in our transfer proposal. This is acceptable to ACDA. The AEC has also concurred in this position paper with a few clarifying comments. On the basis of discussions of these comments with the AEC staff we are in agreement with them. (Tab D) 5 Mr. McCone has concurred in this position with the exception of a point relative to declarations. (Tab E) 6 All agencies concur with this point and it will be taken care of by subsequent instructions to the delegation. Recommendation That you approve the use of the enclosed position paper as guidance for the United States Delegation in Geneva. Herbert Scoville, Jr. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. 2 Not printed, but see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 32 . 3 In a memorandum to President Kennedy, November 20, 1962, Foster made recommendations regarding U.S. positions at the resumption of the Geneva disarmament talks, and President Kennedy approved them on November 21, 1962. See Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. VII, Document 246 . 4 Neither Tab B nor C is printed; see footnote 4, Document 32 . 5 Letter from Seaborg to Fisher, June 12; not printed. 6 Reference is to McCone's letter to Foster, June 10, in which he wrote in part that “there should be another declaration in Annex A (Section IVA, page 2) on the intended uses of allowed production. Without this, it is doubtful that unilateral intelligence could provide the necessary assurances that declared production requirements were reasonable.” 34. Notes of Meeting 34. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, June 16, 1964. At 12:10 p.m. Commissioners Gerald Tape, John Palfrey, and I attended the meeting of the National Security Council held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Those present included President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, Vance, Taylor, Harold Brown, Charles Johnson, Wilson, Gordon, Carter, McDermott, Hornig, McCormack, Crowson, Kelly, Howard, General Donnelly, Keeny, Clifton, Reedy, and Valenti. This meeting was to be devoted to consideration of the FY 1965 underground test series—the Whetstone series. President Johnson called upon me to make the introductory remarks. I gave a description of our FY 1965 underground test program (Whetstone). In particular, I noted that the Commission was caught in the position that it must not violate either the safeguards or the test ban treaty and, thus, it has to walk a rather tenuous middle course. I said that there could be no guarantee against venting, although we think the probability of venting is very small. I described the number of tests planned, in the development category to be carried on by the AEC; in the Plowshare category to be carried on by the AEC; and in the weapons effects and detection category to be carried on by the Department of Defense in collaboration with the AEC. I then called upon General Crowson, who made a presentation of the AEC development tests, with charts. There being no questions on this, I then called upon General Donnelly, who made a presentation covering the weapons effects and weapons detection tests, using charts. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Long Shot device (to be detonated at Amchitka Island in the Aleutians) to give data on the detection of underground nuclear explosions would be an old reliable device or an advanced type. I said that it would be an old reliable device because we needed to be sure of its operation and of its yield. Secretary Rusk asked if we could invite the Russians to be involved in some way in this test, and I said I thought that we could. Bundy mentioned the problem of the effect of this test in Alaska; a problem which is probably psychological but nevertheless very real. I then called upon John Kelly, who described the Plowshare tests, with the help of charts. At the end of this presentation, President Johnson asked me how many tests there had been this last year; and, when I told him, he asked why there are so many planned for this year. I explained that the AEC had refrained from testing during the summer months last year during the sensitive period of test ban negotiations and, thus, due to the fact that the testing last year was for a shorter period, the rate of testing this year will not be much greater. I also indicated that it might not be possible to make as many tests as are being requested, but that it is important to have the flexibility in preparing for the entire number. Then, if some of the tests turn out to be unexpectedly difficult or to yield unexpected results, it might be that it will not be possible or desirable to carry out every test in the series; on the other hand, it might be desirable to add some as yet not foreseen tests to the series. Secretary McNamara added that the DOD program included more tests this year, which adds considerably to the increase; the reason for this is that it took some time to get ready for the complex tests in their series. McNamara went on to say that he thinks it is a good series and that the entire number should be approved. He also mentioned a couple of tests in 1962 in the low kiloton range. He said he feels that we can detect tests down to the low kiloton level. President Johnson commented on the comparison in the numbers between the U.S. and Soviet underground tests and asked why the Soviets had such a small number. Bundy replied that the Soviets used to say that they couldn't afford an underground testing program. He also said that he feels that their program is consistent with the rather restrained rocket program that they apparently are engaged in. Bundy went on to say that he is not persuaded that we should develop high yield weapons just in order to test the effects of such weapons, and he asked Harold Brown to comment on this. Brown said that there is no approved program for high yield tests, but he said that tests in the Whetstone program will help us be ready to test weapons in the 100-megaton range should that become desirable. Secretary McNamara said that this aspect of the program is not very expensive, and he thinks that work along this line should continue. President Johnson then asked me whether this program can be carried out within our budget without asking for an increase. I replied that I think it can. We had approximately $117 million in our budget for this purpose and we will need to augment it by about $13 million, which can be done by transferring funds from production. Bundy suggested that the matter of approval be handled as in the past; thus, it might be proper to authorize only the first quarter of the series, i.e., Whetstone I, at this time. I pointed out that we had been working under rather flexible authorization in the past. Secretary Rusk said that he wouldn't recommend any reduction. He pointed out that we don't know what Soviet plans are, and they might resume testing. Another possibility might be that we would move toward a comprehensive test ban. Thus, he said that all in all, from a foreign policy point of view, he feels we should carry on a vigorous underground program at about the level for which approval is being sought. The implication is that we will hear from the White House soon regarding the approval for Whetstone I. [Here follow notes of an AEC-NASA luncheon, a telephone call about Congressman Holifield, meetings with Potomac Electric Power Company officials and the Committee of Principals.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 8, pp. 565-566. No classification marking. 35. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 35. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 16, 1964. The attached position paper on the cutoff of fissionable material production and the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses 2 has been submitted by ACDA for your approval as guidance for the U.S. Delegation in Geneva. 3 The paper has been agreed to by all interested agencies: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Their comments are attached. 4 The basic proposals in this paper have already been approved and were included in summary form in your January 21 message to the Geneva Conference. This paper is essentially an elaboration of our present position particularly with regard to the requirements for verification. In order to achieve agreement, the paper intentionally avoids facing the issue of whether or not aerial reconnaissance should be involved in the verification procedure. Although there is agreement among all other agencies that aerial reconnaissance is not necessary in connection with this agreement, the JCS recommends that a provision for aerial overflight be included. Secretary McNamara has informally advised Mr. Foster that he is prepared to overrule the JCS on this issue but would prefer not to do so unless the Soviets show some interest in the proposal. Mr. Foster agreed to fuzz the language on inspection so that it would not necessarily preclude subsequent consideration of aerial inspection. Although this is a touchy point since even the hint that we are considering aerial inspection as a condition for this proposal would completely discredit it abroad, ACDA believes they can live with this instruction for the time being by avoiding the issue in Geneva. Subject to your approval, the paper will be submitted for information to NAC next Tuesday 5 and will be presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva next Thursday. 6 I recommend that you approve the paper. If you approve, I will inform the interested agencies of your action. 7 McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Vol. 1, Box 10. Secret. The source text is attached to a June 13 memorandum from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy. Keeny expressed reservations about the failure of the agencies to resolve the issue of aerial reconnaissance and the exclusion of certain types of nuclear reactors from inspection but nonetheless concluded, “I am impressed that all the agencies have agreed to the paper and believe that you should recommend that the President approve the paper as it stands.” 2 See footnote 2, Document 32 . 3 Document 33 . 4 Reference presumably is to Document 32 and the documents referenced in footnotes 4 and 5 thereto, and Document 33 , and the documents referenced in footnotes 5 and 6 thereto. 5 June 23. 6 On June 25, the U.S. Delegation submitted the U.S. working paper, “Inspection of a Fissionable Material Cutoff,” to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 235-238. This paper was virtually identical to the draft paper, June 4, cited in footnote 3, Document 32 . 7 The approval line of the recommendation is checked. In a memorandum to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Seaborg, McCone, and Hornig, June 16, Bundy indicated that the President had approved the position paper for guidance for the U.S. Delegation in Geneva. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the White House, 1964) 36. Memorandum of Conversation 36. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m. SUBJECT (1) Verification of Freeze (2) Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Discussed by the Committee of Principals PARTICIPANTS See attached list 2 1. Verification of Freeze Mr. Fisher briefly outlined the scope of the proposed position and mentioned two areas which warranted further discussion because of differences of opinion or because decisions have been postponed. 3 A major substantive disagreement in the existing paper arose from the Joint Chiefs' views that production of additional subassemblies, such as guidance packages and re-entry vehicles, should be monitored, while DOD and other agencies had not concurred in this proposal. In addition, the present paper postponed resolution on some of the key issues which were still under discussion in the basic position paper agreed upon in March. 4 These included: (a) What type of control should be applied to launchers; (b) What limitations should be placed on research and development and prototype testing; (c) The definition of ABM systems to be included in the freeze; and (d) The need for aerial surveillance in connection with spot inspections. With relation to ABMs, Mr. Keeny suggested that there should be a specific reference to them in the paper to avoid giving rise to the misconception that ABMs had been dropped from the freeze or that no inspection was required. Secretary Vance and General Taylor requested information on exactly what was our position on the inclusion of ABMs since they were unclear on agreed linkage of ABMs to the remainder of the freeze proposal. Mr. Fisher quoted from the President's 21 January message to the ENDC which included strategic defensive missiles and from a speech by the U.S. representative referring to ABMs in later presentations at Geneva. 5 He pointed out that ABMs were just as much an agreed matter for exploration as were the offensive missiles, although we had consistently indicated that precise definition of such systems had not been arrived at. Secretary Rusk said that he understood ABMs had been included at the request of DOD to provide against a possible loss of deterrence if only offensive vehicles were frozen. Secretary Rusk asked for information on Soviet interest in the freeze proposal. Mr. Fisher indicated that the Soviets had shown no enthusiasm but nevertheless had given evidence of careful study since their statements had emphasized many of the unanswered questions and twisted them to Soviet advantage. In particular, the question of inspection and verification had been misconstrued in order to make it appear very unacceptable. Mr. Fisher felt that the present paper was needed in order to make the record straight on our ideas on inspection which had been designed to minimize intrusion consistent with maintaining U.S. security. Secretary Rusk indicated he felt the present subject needed NATO discussion and questioned how we could avoid the four subjects upon which no decisions had yet been reached. Upon request for a schedule as to when these matters might be completed, Dr. Scoville indicated that the launcher question was basic to the entire MLF problem and it had been agreed that no attempt would be made to reach a decision until after the Soviets had evidenced constructive interest in the freeze proposal. With respect to prototype testing, a paper had been prepared and distributed to the Principals 6 whose reply was presently being awaited. The problem of ABM systems definition had proven technically very difficult and a task group had just been formed to try and clarify this problem along with our ideas on how such controls on these systems could be verified. However, results could not be expected until August. The question of aerial surveillance would be resolved at any time that the principals chose to make a decision in this area. Mr. Fisher indicated that our proposed schedule for processing the verification paper involved transmittal to NAC at the earliest possible time for discussion which might be somewhat more limited than the NAC discussion on the basic freeze paper. Following this, it would be discussed in a co-chairmen's meeting at Geneva prior to public presentation at the ENDC, probably within three-four weeks (now scheduled for 9 July 1964). This presentation was needed in order to answer the most critical public questions on the nature of the freeze. Mr. Fisher indicated that the other major problem with the position revolved around Mr. McCone's worries on the use of intelligence to support the verification. He believed that the paper had been modified so that intelligence was primarily in a supporting role but that he believed Mr. McCone had wished to discuss this matter. 7 In Mr. McCone's absence, Mr. Marengo indicated that the particular worry concerned the launcher problem which had not yet been defined. The paper proposed no inspection of existing launchers. While intelligence might be adequate for evaluating present declarations on launchers, there would always be a question on adequacy if the deployment made were changed or if mobile launchers were involved. He also worried about the perishability of intelligence and particularly how we could convince Congress and the public that our verification was satisfactory without disclosing intelligence sources. Mr. Fisher agreed that convincing the public and Congress was a problem but one which had been handled satisfactorily in the past. Mr. McCone himself had been very effective in the test ban hearings and with proper briefings and other measures available to the Executive Branch, it is felt that proper support could be obtained for the measure without compromising our intelligence capabilities. Dr. Scoville mentioned that the proposed verification procedures used intelligence only to supply the U.S. the necessary information to make decisions. The basis for these decisions need not be disclosed and, therefore, the intelligence source not compromised. This appeared an appropriate use of intelligence in support of U.S. disarmament policy and Mr. Marengo agreed. General Taylor indicated he would like to receive a copy of Mr. McCone's letter on the proposal and Mr. Fisher read the letter to the group. Secretary Rusk pointed out the significance of CIA's views on the reliance which we could place on intelligence. Mr. Fisher next raised the matter of which subassemblies should be monitored. Gen. Taylor believed that the more subassemblies that could be monitored the better, and he indicated that from his studies both guidance system and re-entry vehicle production should be included. Dr. Scoville indicated that guidance systems had been omitted because of the difficulties in verification. Such systems could be produced in very small facilities, and it would be virtually impossible to detect clandestine production. Including guidance systems would put the U.S. in the position of abiding by a restriction over which they would have no reasonable possibility of confirming Soviet compliance. Dr. Hornig and Mr. Seamans 8 concurred in this evaluation. With respect to re-entry vehicles, Dr. Scoville indicated that while these might be verifiable, they presented certain security problems to the U.S. Monitoring the production of re-entry vehicles might disclose sensitive U.S. information on warhead or penetration aid characteristics. Therefore it had been decided that it would not be in the U.S. interest to risk disclosure in these areas by allowing foreign inspection of such production. General Taylor indicated that he did not feel strongly on this subject and that if the others concurred, he would not press this point further. Deputy Secretary Vance stated that the DOD was prepared to go ahead with the subject paper as presented. Secretary Rusk indicated that he would like to have the paper revised to define explicitly the status of our existing positions on the unresolved issues: prototype testing; launch site construction; and ABM. He also believed there should be a classified intelligence annex to the paper for discussion with the President which would point out the interaction of intelligence with the proposed verification procedures and the risk to intelligence of disclosure in justifying a measure before Congress and the public. He believed that there should also be a paper which outlined the parliamentary situation, i.e., our schedule and procedures for discussion with NAC, the co-chairman, and the ENDC. Dr. Seaborg, Dr. Hornig and Mr. Seamans indicated they had no problems with the paper as written. 2. Non-Proliferation Secretary Rusk opened the discussion on non-proliferation by asking for views on whether we would be prepared to have a non-proliferation agreement along the lines of previously proposed non-dissemination, non-acquisition measures without the participation of Communist China. How critical could the absence of China be to the usefulness of such agreements? The West Germans had indicated that they would go along if the Chinese would. Would the Senate concur in such measures without Chinese participation? Much of the previous thinking, and particularly the Soviet interest, had probably been directed at providing pressure on the Chinese. The possibilities of other countries obtaining an independent nuclear capability were more remote, although India, Israel, and Sweden were potential candidates. He did not wish for any formal Department positions but rather informal views. Mr. Fisher indicated that he felt that Chinese participation was not essential in order to have a very useful measure. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by China at some time in the not too distant future had already been written off by most of the world since no one at the present time saw any particularly promising way of preventing this. If we continue to insist on the participation of China as a precondition to non-proliferation agreements, this would indicate that the U.S. had written off non-proliferation as a viable measure. Other nations would question our sincerity in this area and this, in turn, might influence their decisions on developing nuclear capabilities. General Taylor asked whether we would propose to treat China as a nuclear power once she detonated her first nuclear weapon. Mr. Fisher indicated that we should continue to use pressure, even after the detonation, to get China to adopt a sane nuclear policy. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Government has seriously looked at the problem of giving India nuclear weapons in the event that China had such a weapon. Mr. Fisher indicated that he knew of no detailed look, but that he felt rather strongly that it would be more desirable to have U.S. controlled weapons providing defense or a deterrence against nuclear attack on India rather than India's having its own nuclear capability. Secretary Rusk indicated that he did not wish to prejudge this question but that he felt such a look would be useful. He pointed out that no Government position exists as to whether we would oppose other nations having nuclear weapons once China obtains them. Secretary Rusk then stated that he had considered a new U.S. approach to the problem of non-dissemination. This approach might take the form of a draft treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In addition, we would circulate a letter with those statements of our policy relative to MLF which state that this force should not lead to additional new national nuclear capabilities. This approach might replace the agreed minute under which we operate at the present time. Mr. Meeker indicated that he thought this would be a good approach since silence can be considered as meaning consent. The treaty would not be signed initially, but a “letter of intent” would be circulated first to the nuclear powers and then to the non-nuclear powers. This would provide the opportunity for each to indicate his “intent” but not to the point of commitment until it could be ascertained which other countries were going to be included. Secretary Rusk indicated that although the Soviets have always stated that the MLF is their only objection to a non-dissemination agreement, they may indeed have others. However, we had reason to believe that the Soviets had a real interest in non-dissemination and that, therefore, this might be in an area in which we had sufficient community of interest to obtain an agreement. He felt that we should work out a draft agreement and “letter of intent” and then send it around to see how many nations would join us, and then see who was missing. Secretary Vance indicated and others generally concurred that this was a matter worth exploring. Secretary Rusk said he had some questions about Recommendation #1 in Mr. Fisher's letter of 15 June on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the MLF. 9 He felt that it singled out the MLF members to make non-acquisition declarations which would not be required of other nations. Secretary Vance indicated that he had the same worry about this recommendation. It was agreed that Mr. Fisher would redraft the U.S. Governmental position on this subject of non-proliferation in accord with the discussion at this meeting. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. The source text is attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 37 , which notes the time of the meeting and that it took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Also attached is a June 30 note from Keeny to McGeorge Bundy (who missed the meeting) that asked him to note the summary of actions and Secretary Rusk's comments “on the problem of nuclear weapons for India when China obtains nuclear weapons.” Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 8, pp. 566-567. 2 The list of 22 participants is not printed. 3 Reference is to the position paper, “Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles,” June 6, which was transmitted under cover of a June 6 memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) 4 Reference presumably is to the undated draft paper prepared in early March; see footnote 3, Document 19 . See also Document 21 . 5 For example, Fisher mentioned anti-missile systems in his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 16. (Ibid.) 6 See footnote 7, Document 30 . 7 See Document 28 . 8 Dr. Robert S. Seamans, Associate Administrator, NASA. 9 This recommendation stated: “That a policy decision be made now that the United States will assure that at the time the MLF Charter comes into being there will be some public commitment by the non-nuclear participants not to acquire a national nuclear capability.” (Memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Multilateral Force-General, Box 22) 37. Summary of Actions 37. Summary of Actions 1 Washington, June 16, 1964, 4 p.m. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS ACTION TAKEN ON VERIFICATION OF FREEZE PAPER The 6 June 1964 paper outlining procedures for verification of freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles was discussed with particular attention being given to the following points: a. The four unresolved issues; i.e.: (1) Types of controls to be applied to launchers; (2) Limitations to be placed on research and development and prototype testing: (3) The definition of ABM systems to be included in the freeze; and (4) The need for aerial surveillance in connection with spot inspections. It was agreed that the status of these unresolved issues should be made clear in the position paper or, in the case of aerial surveillance, in the forwarding letter to the White House. b. The relationship of intelligence to the verification of the freeze and the risks of compromise to intelligence sources. It was agreed that a classified annex discussing this relationship should be prepared for presentation to the White House prior to the use of the verification paper at the ENDC. c. The vehicle sub-assemblies which should be controlled under the freeze. After General Taylor presented the JCS views and general discussion thereon, it was agreed that guidance systems and re-entry vehicles should not be added to the sub-assemblies listed in the subject paper. The proposed paper on the verification of the freeze was then approved subject to the changes and additions discussed above. ACTION TAKEN ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION PAPER Secretary Rusk requested informal views on the importance of the participation of Communist China in any non-dissemination, non-acquisition measure. Mr. Fisher expressed the views that such measures would still have great usefulness without Chinese participation since he felt it still important to prevent additional countries from becoming nuclear powers. Secretary Rusk pointed out that at the moment no Governmental position existed as to whether we would oppose other nations, and particularly India, having nuclear weapons once China obtains them. Secretary Rusk suggested consideration be given to approaching the non-proliferation matter by means of a “letter of intent” in the form of a draft treaty along with a letter restating U.S. policy that the MLF should not lead to additional national nuclear capabilities. Others concurred in this suggestion as a useful approach. Secretary Rusk and Secretary Vance expressed concern about Recommendation No. 1 in Mr. Fisher's letter to Secretary of State Rusk dated June 15, 1964, on non-proliferation which singled out MLF members to make non-acquisition declarations not required of other nations. It was agreed that Mr. Fisher would redraft the U.S. Governmental position on the subject of non-proliferation in accord with the discussion at this meeting. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament,ACDA Publications, Vol. III, Box 12. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. 38. Editorial Note 38. Editorial Note In late June and early July 1964, during meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, Foster and the Soviet Representative Valerian Zorin met privately several times to discuss U.S. and Soviet approaches to arms reductions. At these discussions Foster particularly sought clarification of the Soviet proposal for reduction of military budgets, which Zorin apparently advanced to Foster privately on or before June 24 and formally introduced into the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on June 25. Text is in Documents on Disarmament , 1964, pages 228-235. Memoranda of Foster's conversations with Zorin on June 26, June 30, and July 3, and a memorandum of conversation between Alexander Akalovsky, a member of the U.S. Delegation, and Soviet counterpart L. I. Mendelevich on July 4 are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Current Johnson-Khrushchev Papers. A more detailed memorandum of the last conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ACDA Publications, Volume III, Box 12. 39. National Intelligence Estimate 39. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, July 16, 1964. NIE 11-2-64 THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM The Problem To evaluate significant recent information and developments in the Soviet Atomic Energy Program and to estimate the probable future course of that program to mid-1974. Summary and Conclusions General 1. Since publication of NIE 11-2-63, final evaluations of Soviet nuclear devices tested in 1961 and 1962 and re-evaluations of several earlier devices have led to some changes in the estimate of Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities. While new evidence has led to no changes in the previous estimate of U-235 production, a small upward revision of current and future plutonium-equivalent production has been necessary. The estimate has been extended to cover a ten-year period to mid-1974. Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program 2 2. Three basic classes of nuclear-powered submarines are known to have been constructed in the USSR and identified in an operational status. (See Table IV). 3 A number of these submarines are probably undergoing modifications. The performance of the Lenin and several of the nuclear submarines during 1963 indicates that the Soviets have probably improved the reliability of their naval nuclear propulsion system. We believe, however, that there is a need for further improvement in their nuclear propulsion technology and operational reliability. (Paras. 17-18) Fissionable Materials Production Plutonium-Equivalent 3. There are three plutonium production sites in the USSR; these are located at Kyshtym in the Urals, and near Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk in Central Siberia. [ 4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] (Para. 21) 4. [ 7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ](Paras. 25-26) 5. Future production estimates have taken into consideration Khrushchev's statement in April 1964 that the Soviet Government had decided “to discontinue now the construction of two new, big, atomic reactors for the production of plutonium.” 4 We have no basis, at present, for ascertaining whether or not such construction has been discontinued. The spread shown in Table VI for the years 1967-74 represents estimates with and without continuing construction of new reactor facilities. It is estimated that even if reactor construction is discontinued, improvements in reactor operation will lead to increases in future annual plutonium-equivalent production rates. (Paras. 27-28) U-235 Production 6. There are four gaseous diffusion isotope separation complexes in the USSR: one at Verkh-Neyvinsk in the Urals, one north of Tomsk in Central Siberia, a third at Angarsk in the Lake Baykal region, and a fourth which started operation recently, north of Zaozerniy near Krasnoyarsk. Consideration of all available information leads to a U-235 production estimate (see Table VI) which is essentially the same as that shown in NIE 11-2-63. (Paras. 29-32) 7. We estimate that the probable Soviet cumulative U-235 production for mid-1964 is 170,000 kilograms and that it is unlikely that actual cumulative U-235 production is less than 100,000 or more than 220,000 kilograms. 5 There is no valid means, short of on-site inspection of determining whether or not or by how much the USSR will carry out the announcement by Khrushchev that the USSR has decided “ … in the next several years to reduce substantially the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons …,” therefore, a cut-back has not been assumed in the projected estimate. We estimate that by 1967 the [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] will increase the Soviet U-235 production capacity 60 percent over their mid-1964 production rate. (Paras. 30-32) Nuclear Weapons Weapon Improvements from 1961-1962 Tests 8. The Soviets significantly improved their fission and thermonuclear weapon capabilities as a result of the 1961-62 test series. However, the status of Soviet nuclear weapon technology, while highly sophisticated and apparently adequate for their present needs, is such that substantial advances can still be made through further development and testing. We believe that the Soviets are continuing an active weapon development program. They will certainly have a continuing requirement to test at a greater rate 6 than has been evident since the Test Ban Treaty was initialed in July 1963. (Paras. 42-48, 50-57 and 64) 9. Fission Weapons . By 1958, the Soviets had developed implosion devices encompassing a variety of yields and physical dimensions and employing boosting techniques in some cases. The 1961-62 test series provided the Soviets with improved fission weapon capabilities. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] However, a large number of new devices were tested without employment of boosting. This perhaps indicates that the Soviets will limit their employment of boosting, thus, in their unboosted weapons gaining simplicity and a reduced requirement for tritium at the cost of some increases in vulnerability, fissionable materials, and size, and perhaps decreased yield. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] However, possible undetected tests and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]might have provided the Soviets with still smaller low-yield weapons. (Paras. 41-45) 10. Thermonuclear Developments . By 1958 the Soviets had tested a variety of thermonuclear devices [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ]. In 1961 and 1962, the Soviets greatly improved the performance of their thermonuclear weapons and extended their yield experience. [ 10 lines of source text not declassified ] 11. [ 10-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] Future Weapon Development and Testing 12. We have detected only three Soviet tests in the twelve months since the initialing of the Test Ban Treaty in July 1963. There are undoubtedly a variety of useful tests the Soviets could now conduct underground both for research and development and for military purposes. We have no evidence that they have conducted tests banned by the Treaty and do not believe they will resort to such tests so long as the options of underground testing and formal treaty withdrawal are open to them. (Para. 65) 13. It is certain that the Soviet weapons laboratories have remained active and are creating new test requirements. The potential improvements obtainable through underground testing together with the high rate of US underground testing [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] between 1 August 1963 and 1 July 1964—must be generating considerable pressure on the Soviet leadership for a more vigorous test program than has been conducted to date. We do not believe, however, that research, development and military requirements alone are now so pressing as to necessitate withdrawal from the Treaty or are likely to become so in the near term. Hence, we believe that political factors will be the major consideration in reaching a decision whether or not to withdraw. If such a decision is made by the Soviets, atmospheric testing by the French or Chinese Communists might provide the pretext. (Para. 66) 14. If the Soviets embark on a reasonably extensive underground testing program involving yields up to about 200 KT, they could achieve, during the period of this estimate, [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ]. Improvements in Soviet low-yield devices which could occur during the period of this estimate are more likely to emphasize the development of small-diameter [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]warheads rather than [ 6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. 15. Underground testing and simulation techniques would permit the acquisition of a limited amount of weapon effects data, including the effect of ground shock upon hardened underground structure, the effects of nuclear radiation upon materials or systems components, and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. Other effects data related to high-altitude effects and the full effects of electromagnetic pulse could not be obtained through underground testing. (Paras. 72-74) [Here follow Part I. Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program; Part II. Fissionable Materials Production; Part III. Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program; and Annex A. Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests (29 August 1949-6 June 1964.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-64, USSR, Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data. According to a note on the cover sheet: “This estimate consists of an updating of those subjects in NIE 11-2-63 about which significant new information has become available, and which merit a restatement. It includes topics under the following main headings from NIE 11-2-63, 'The Soviet Atomic Energy Program,' dated 2 July 1963: Nuclear Reactor Program—Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems; Fissionable Materials Production; Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program. The reader should refer to NIE 11-2-63 for information on other details of the Soviet atomic energy program.” NIE 11-2-63 is ibid., National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-63,USSR, Box 1) 2 For the estimated number of Soviet submarines, see National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-63, dated 8 January 1964. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-14-63 is ibid.] 3 None of the six tables is printed. 4 Quoted from Khrushchev's statement, April 20, 1964. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , p. 168) 5 See page 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] for the view of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 As of 1 July 1964 three tests had been detected. [Footnote in the source text.] 40. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 40. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, July 23, 1964, 8 a.m. SUBJECT Verification of Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles—Discussed by the Committee of Principals PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by commenting that he thought the subject paper 3 was quite complicated and questioned whether this would be understandable to the political representatives at the ENDC. Mr. Foster pointed out that most of the representatives at the ENDC had been intimately involved in the disarmament problem for two or more years and were therefore quite used to handling papers of this sort. He added that many of the items here had been previously handled in briefer form in the ENDC and the objective was to present this more detailed material on verification in order to answer and clarify certain Soviet objections. Certain areas of the freeze were not covered, such as ABMs, prototype testing and elaboration on the launcher problem. He felt that it was very desirable, however, to present this material on either the 6th or the 20th of August since these were the two dates during the present session at which the U.S. would be in a position to select the topics. Secretary Rusk believed the paper was suitable for presentation but suggested two additional paragraphs; one at the beginning and one at the end. The initial introduction would point out that the freeze was a serious U.S. proposal but that the present paper was illustrative in nature and not a complete or definitive U.S. position. These and other subjects would have to be negotiated out in detail. A final paragraph would be added which would point out that this paper did not cover all subjects and would list the various items which would have to be considered at a future time. Mr. Foster concurred in the concept of an introductory paragraph which would put the present statement in an illustrative context. He doubted, however, the desirability of mentioning the specific items in a final paragraph since this might open these for detailed discussion at a time when the U.S. had not yet achieved agreed upon positions. In this connection he indicated that the insertion (Page 11) on launch site inspection proposed by Mr. McCone would raise some problems since we did not have a position on the desired type of controls on launch sites. 4 Secretary McNamara indicated that he, too, felt some kind of an introduction was needed to point out that this was only a partial discussion of the problem but agreed that specific issues need not be detailed. Mr. Bundy suggested that in view of the importance of ABMs this could be used as an example in order to avoid possible implications that ABMs were no longer a part of the freeze. Secretary Rusk asked whether the inspections were not so arduous that the Soviets would never accept them. Mr. Foster explained that while inspection was quite detailed, it was very much less than that which existed for GCD. Mr. McCone explained his reasons for recommending the inclusion of the sentence on launcher inspection (Page 11). He felt that without it the right to inspect existing launchers for unauthorized improvements would be foreclosed. He also suggested the deletion of the clause, “yet at the same time unnecessarily intrusive,” at the end of the last paragraph on Page 14. 5 He felt it would be difficult to justify or misleading to indicate that the type of inspection required would not be intrusive to the Soviets. He further observed that there had been in the past considerable criticism of inspection systems which observed the removal of things, but did not inspect the remainders. He further agreed with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara on the need for an introductory paragraph. Mr. Foster observed that the purpose of the “intrusive” phrase was to try to bring the Soviets along on this inspection and that indeed the inspection was very much less intrusive than that required for GCD. Secretary Rusk suggested that perhaps the language might be changed to draw the comparison with GCD, and this was agreed upon. Secretary Rusk also wondered whether the language was adequate to provide protection against inspection of sensitive installations. Mr. Foster read the sections on Pages 13 and 14, and indicated that he believed this adequately covered the problem which would be admittedly difficult. He felt that the situation would be adequate to guard against significant violations. Some discussion ensued on what violations would be significant, but it was agreed that this was a very complicated problem and could not be resolved at this time. Secretary McNamara expressed a desire not to foreclose at this time on this subject or on the numbers and types of inspections required. Mr. Bundy agreed that the paper should remain loose and said he felt that it was just about right at the present time. He felt that it was important to present it at this time at Geneva since this had been one of the key points in the President's position. General Wheeler requested clarification on why it was proposed to change the phrasing on additional procedures in Paragraph 1, Page 14. 6 He preferred the original wording. Although State had proposed this change, Secretary Rusk said he had no objection to going back to the old wording and all concurred. With these changes it was agreed that the paper would be suitable for presentation at Geneva at an early date. Other Business Secretary Rusk observed that he was worried about the procedures involved in handling the collateral or partial measures. The negotiation of large numbers of treaties with all the complications of developing precise and agreed language and the clearing of these treaties through the Government and the Senate were very cumbersome and time-consuming. He thought we should look at other alternatives such as a possible Arms Commission under the Security Council which would keep a roster of information on the armed forces of all countries. This Commission could keep everyone informed and might make it easier to achieve arms reductions by unilateral decisions. Such decisions would be less binding and, therefore, perhaps not require elaborate control mechanisms. Mr. Foster observed that this was the general direction in which we were presently going and quoted the examples of the bombs in orbit resolution, budget reduction, and the fissionable material cutback. He felt that the ENDC still served a very useful purpose even in these types of arrangements and he would not like to see this abandoned. Secretary Rusk felt that it was desirable to develop some machinery which would get the smaller nations involved in arms control since almost all the arms control activity involved only the U.S. and the USSR. Mr. Foster indicated that this had resulted from the criticality of the nuclear forces in the present age, but agreed that other areas were important. He agreed that we should explore this other approach. Mr. McCone agreed that the small nation problem was extremely worrisome and could precipitate all of us into war. Mr. Foster informed the group that he had prepared a paper on non-dissemination 7 as a follow-up to the discussion at the 16 June 1964 Principals' meeting. 8 He stated that this paper should have a limited distribution to the Principals in view of its sensitivity and would go out shortly for comment. Secretary Rusk informed the group that Mr. Butler had requested permission to tell Khrushchev on his forthcoming visit that we would never give up the veto on the MLF. 9 Secretary Rusk had told Mr. Butler that this would not be appropriate since it would have to be considered by all eight countries. 10 Secretary McNamara agreed, but he felt very strongly that we should avoid giving the reverse impression. He felt that a number of Government people were encouraging the idea of giving up the veto either by leaks or in private conversations. He thought this was very bad and would be a great disservice to the success of many of our programs and our policies, and even to the MLF itself. Secretary Rusk agreed and said he would pass these instructions on to his staff. Mr. Foster indicated that in the ACDA paper it was attempted to develop a language which would “waffle” the situation, by referring to no increase in the number of independent entities having control over nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara had some doubts on the desirability of any language at this time. He stated that he had made it clear to various European leaders, and believed Secretary Rusk had done likewise, that when the day came that European nations could have an independent nuclear force it would be the day that the U.S. would remove its five divisions from Europe. He had discussed this with Von Hassel and he did not feel there was any great pressure from the German side for this control. 11 Secretary Rusk agreed and stated that a Europe with an independent nuclear force also meant an independent U.S. Upon a request from Mr. Bundy for the Geneva schedule, Mr. Foster pointed out that we had two days, 6 and 20 August, on which the U.S. could select topics for discussion. One of these would be covered by the freeze paper which had been agreed upon today. 12 The other subjects which had been agreed for discussion as a part of the collateral measures were non-dissemination, fissionable materials cutoff, budget and bomber destruction. He had suggested termination for the present session early in September to permit smaller countries to prepare for the UN meeting in the fall and to avoid unprofitable discussions during the pre-election period. Secretary Rusk wondered whether we could not raise the topic of arms control in other countries than the U.S. and the USSR, perhaps initially in private discussions with the Soviets. Mr. Bundy indicated that this should be handled with great care since it was potentially explosive. It was agreed that the matter would be studied. The meeting was adjourned at 9 a.m. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964. Secret. Probably drafted by Scoville, who is listed as reporting officer on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room, Department of State. The source text is also attached to the summary of actions taken at the meeting, Document 41 , which provides the time and place of the meeting. 2 Not printed. 3 Reference is to the position papers, “Draft U.S. Statement to the ENDC on Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles,” July 9, which was sent to the Committee of Principals under cover of a memorandum from Foster, July 9. A prefatory note to this paper states that it was based “on the U.S. statement in NAC together with the substance of the amendments transmitted in Todis 1508 of July 7.” (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) Todis 1508 is ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-3. 4 Reference presumably is to a later paper, “Proposed Modifications in Draft U.S. Statement to the ENDC on Verfication of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles.” July 17, which has not been found. 5 The full text of this paragraph is as follows: “The U.S. believes that an inspection arrangement of the type I have just described, together with such additional procedures as might be required, would afford adequate assurance of compliance with the proposed freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and yet at the same time not be unnecessarily intrusive.” 6 This paragraph related to procedures for withdrawal from a treaty covering a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles. 7 Entitled, “Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” this draft position paper was sent under cover of a memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, July 23. (Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) 8 See Documents 36 and 37 . 9 British Foreign Minister Butler had several talks with Khrushchev and Gromyko during his visit to Moscow July 27-August 1. Using reports not yet approved by Butler, Richard Faber, British First Secretary, summarized these talks in a conversation with Richard Freund, Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA/IR. In his talk with Gromyko on July 29, Butler said that his government would not take part in the MLF without a veto on the use of weapons nor if it thought the MLF would be provocative to the Soviets. After Gromyko replied with a tirade against Germany, Butler “reiterated that Britain would retain a veto on the use of nuclear weapons and that the control arrangements could not be changed without British consent.” (Memorandum of conversation, August 7; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) 10 This conversation or communication has not been further identified. 11 Reference is apparently to McNamara's trip to Bonn from May 9-11, during which he held several conversations with German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel. Documentation on this visit is scheduled for publication in volume XV. 12 The draft paper was revised to incorporate the decisions of the meeting, and the approved paper was forwarded under cover of a memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, July 24. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964) Acting Representative Timberlake read the approved paper at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting on August 27. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 367-373. Timberlake's statement was identical to the text of the July 9 paper cited in footnote 3 above except for a few sentences and an added opening and final paragraph. 41. Summary of Actions 41. Summary of Actions 1 Washington, July 23, 1964, 8 a.m. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS 1. Verification of the Freeze References: (a) July 9, 1964, Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, Subject: Draft US Statement to the ENDC on Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles 2 (b) July 17, 1964, Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, Subject: Proposed Modifications in Draft US Statement to the ENDC on Verification of a Freeze on Strategic Nuclear Vehicles 3 Reference (a) with amendments included in Reference (b) was approved for presentation at Geneva with the following modifications: 4 a. An introductory paragraph would be added which placed the speech in an illustrative context rather than as fixed complete U.S. position. The incompleteness of the subjects covered should be described using the ABM problem as an example. b. Paragraph 1, Page 14, was approved without the amendment in Reference (b), and with the final clause to be modified to describe the intrusiveness in comparison to GCD inspection. 2. Other Business a. It was agreed, on Secretary Rusk's suggestion, that studies be made of other modes of handling arms control negotiations which might facilitate unilateral measures not requiring treaties and which might increase attention toward arms control by nations other than the U.S. and the USSR. Any international discussions of this should be handled with great care. b. Announcement was made by Mr. Foster that a new non-dissemination paper, based on the discussions at the 16 June meeting, would be shortly distributed on a limited basis to the Principals. It was also agreed that it would have been inappropriate for Mr. Butler to have given Khrushchev assurances that the veto would never be removed from the MLF. However, statements should not be made on any basis which would imply that the veto would be given up. A radical change in U.S.-European relationships would occur if the Europeans had an independent nuclear force. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-July 1964. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the James Madison Room, Department of State. 2 See footnote 3, Document 40 . 3 See footnote 4, Document 40 . 4 Regarding presentation of the approved paper at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee conference, see footnote 12, Document 40 . 42. Memorandum of Conversation 42. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 12, 1964, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Recommended Content of a Joint Statement Relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures—Discussed by the Committee of Principals 2 PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 3 Secretary Rusk asked two preliminary questions: first, whether, barring unforeseen developments such as possibly might occur in the Far East could one foresee the shape of next year's military budget? (Secretary McNamara replied the DOD budget would be about the same as this year's and Mr. Palfrey said the same applied with respect to AEC); secondly, what are the Soviets doing about expenditures, are they reducing? (Mr. McCone replied they were not.) Mr. McCone continued that he had a summary to read from which shows that Soviet public statements and actions in this field are contradictory. It appears that the Soviets are engaging in a dynamic expansion of their weapons program by steps such as the following: testing of the new ICBM types and launch systems; continued expansion of fissionable materials capacity, including new reactors; construction of fourteen large reactors; increase up to thirty, of the number of nuclear submarines, and conversion of old submarines; expansion of aircraft plants. In summary, this was not a crash program but a consistently expanding one, despite public statements designed to mislead world opinion. In reply to a question, Mr. McCone said his statement was based on a study which had just been prepared by a special group and general distribution had not been made. 4 Secretary McNamara generally agreed with the substance of Mr. McCone's report but said its significance depended to some extent on interpretation. The facts are not new; the Soviets are building new missiles, including Polaris types, are engaged in hardening of sites, etc. It was obvious that the Soviets are trying to strengthen their position, faced as they are with U.S. overall superiority. On the other hand, economic pressures may be working on them to reduce expenditures. We should try to lead them toward this objective but Secretary McNamara doubted whether this could be done by a public statement of the kind envisaged which he felt might have unfavorable effects on Vietnam, our European allies, etc. In reply to Mr. Foster's question regarding the two plutonium reactors which the Soviets said they would not complete, 5 [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. It was possible, of course, that they may have decreased by that number the new reactors they plan to build. If two were actually shut down, they would probably be earlier types. Mr. Foster thought it would be valuable to obtain more knowledge about Soviet military expenditures and an attempt to secure records would be useful. The question is, and the answer would seem to be affirmative, whether it would be advantageous to the U.S. to have a commitment from the Soviets, proceeding from the Geneva discussions, to reduce their military expenditures. A statement along the lines proposed might have a good effect on the smaller nations, might furnish the Soviets an opportunity to make reductions, strengthening their hand in their dispute with the Chinese communists. Some kind of understanding on how to deal with budgets was probably the only hopeful area for progress at this session of the ENDC. Essentially the decision before the Committee of Principals was a political one and it should be examined in the light of a balance between potential advantage and disadvantage to the U.S. Mr. Foster informed the Committee that he intended to return to Geneva during the first week of September for the remainder of the session which is due to end September 17. Secretary Rusk thought that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft statement offered the best possibilities and were the only things really requiring agreement. 6 We favor these ideas, the Soviets do not. As regards paragraph 6, we make this information public anyway and perhaps we should try to get the principle accepted as a minimum; later we might examine other avenues. We should not “express satisfaction” with Soviet budgetary announcements, since we don't know their meaning. 7 Secretary Rusk suggested the Committee approve paragraphs 5 and 6 which could be set forth in a speech and might lead to the setting up of a useful technical mechanism for the examination of budgets. Mr. Bundy was reluctant to encourage disclosure beyond existing budgets since we would not wish to give supplementary information in some fields. Secretary Rusk pointed out our foreign military aid programs were mostly public knowledge; we should try to engage the smaller countries in doing something about disarmament. Among the non-aligned Eight at Geneva, Mexico was probably the most sincere since many of the others were expanding their military establishments. Secretary McNamara approved paragraphs 5 and 6 but opposed any suggestion there should be a mandatory reduction. In reply to Mr. Foster's question whether a revision of the paragraphs preceding 5 and 6 in the draft statement might be acceptable, Mr. Bundy expressed doubt about the usefulness of a statement. Reductions were important but the suggested timing and place for a statement of this kind seemed inappropriate. As regards the reported feeling of malaise among the non-aligned at Geneva, this might possibly be confined to the delegates only and might not apply to their Governments as such. Since it might merely be a question of personal feelings, the matter did not seem to be of major substantive importance. Mr. Foster said a statement might benefit the work of the Geneva conference. At any rate, the Soviets had shown some interest, even though we had been unsuccessful in obtaining their agreement to a technical working group on budgetary matters. An understanding at Geneva might be helpful in easing tensions which could arise in the General Assembly and among the Africans with respect to difficult questions such as non-dissemination, MLF, etc. It might be possible to avoid the bad effects which a statement on budgets might produce on NATO. In any event, we should not let the decision as to whether a statement was useful or not go by default. Secretary Rusk indicated the Committee could agree on something along the lines of paragraphs 5 and 6 as the basis for a statement at Geneva which could be helpful in mitigating crisis tensions. The statement should not exaggerate the limited progress achieved but could expand on the objectives we are seeking through our disarmament discussions. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. Probably drafted by Jacob D. Beam, who is listed as reporting officer on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. The source text is also attached to the summary of action taken at the meeting, Document 43 , which provides the time and place of the meeting. 2 A draft position paper, transmitted under cover of an August 11 memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals; not printed. In his memorandum Foster explained that a statement of this kind, if approved, might be issued at the time of the recess by Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee or in the Committee's report to the United Nations. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) 3 Not printed. 4 This study has not been further identified. 5 Reference is to Khrushchev's statement in his April 17 message to President Johnson and repeated publicly in his April 20 statement that the Soviet Union was stopping construction of two large plutonium reactors. See Documents 23 and 24 , respectively. 6 Paragraph 5 called for a joint statement on the technical questions involved in establishing commonly understood budgetary procedures. Paragraph 6 was a recommendation to the U.N. Assembly that all nations submit to the U.N. Secretary-General annual reports on their actual military expenditures for the preceding year, planned military expenditures for the following year, and supplementary data to permit evaluations of the scope of and changes in expenditures devoted to the military effort. 7 An apparent reference to paragraph 2 of the draft joint statement: “An expression of satisfaction at the announcement by the Soviet Union and the United States of reductions in their current military budgets.” 43. Summary of Actions 43. Summary of Actions 1 Washington, August 12, 1964, 5 p.m. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS 1. Statement Relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures Reference: August 11 ACDA Memorandum for Members of the Committee of Principals, Subject: Recommended Content of a Joint Statement relating to a Reduction of Military Expenditures. 2 At an appropriate occasion a statement may be made in the ENDC utilizing the substance of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft attached to reference paper; statement would also relate question of military expenditures to broad U.S. disarmament objectives. 3 2. Other Business A new ACDA non-dissemination paper, responsive to the discussions at the 16 June meeting, will be distributed this week to the Principals. 4 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. 2 See footnote 2, Document 42 . 3 See footnote 6, Document 42 . 4 See Document 37 . For the draft U.S. position paper, see Document 44 . 44. Draft Position Paper 44. Draft Position Paper 1 Washington, August 14, 1964. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS I. The Problem Our current estimate is that there could be a test of a Chinese Communist nuclear device at any time, but that it may not occur until late 1964 or early 1965. This estimate is being reviewed now but is still considered valid. There are today at least three or four states in addition to the nuclear powers which could make a national decision to produce nuclear weapons with assurance that they have the national capability to support this decision. This number will increase as nuclear technology continues to develop throughout the world, as it becomes increasingly feasible to use manufacturing techniques amenable to clandestine operations, and as large nuclear power reactors are placed throughout the world producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium annually. The detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists will place great pressure on these countries to make a national decision to develop nuclear weapons in some cases for reasons of security, and in other cases for reasons of prestige. Because of regional rivalries a national decision by any of these countries may force other countries perhaps technically less qualified to make a similar national decision to engage in an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons either by development or by other means. Once this process starts it may be impossible to halt. The problem which faces the United States is how to prevent it from starting—how to develop political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear capabilities which are sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation. The problem which faces the United States is how to develop these political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear capabilities within the limited period of time available to us. If we do not solve this problem—either because of mistake or because of delay—we will soon be faced with a world in which there are ten and then possibly twenty states having national nuclear capabilities. This would be a world of the greatest danger and insecurity. II. The United States Position 1. The United States should intensify its program to prevent the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities which should include the following lines of action, which are mutually reinforcing and should be pursued in parallel. They should include: (a) efforts to discourage individual states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs; (b) efforts to impede the spread of the technical capabilities required for the development and production of nuclear weapons; (c) efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union a nuclear non-proliferation agreement open to accession of all states; and (d) efforts to develop the widest possible political consensus favorable to such a non-proliferation agreement which will make a national decision to acquire a nuclear capability more difficult even before such an agreement comes into effect. 2. With respect to our efforts to discourage individual states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs we should examine on a case-by-case basis the feasibility and desirability of bringing appropriate arguments, pressures and inducements to bear on countries which are estimated to have both the technical capability and a strong incentive to manufacture, or otherwise acquire control of, nuclear weapons. Where legitimate security concerns may represent a principal source of the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, the usefulness of security arrangements or guarantees, in which the United States might participate or assist, should be given special consideration. Consistent with the foregoing we should: (a) accord high priority to the development of an approach to the problem of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by India; and (b) develop approaches in the case of additional countries determined to warrant such consideration. 3. With respect to efforts to impede the spread of technical capabilities required for development and production of nuclear weapons, we should undertake the following courses of action. (a) We should consider arrangements among major suppliers of nuclear materials and equipment to permit exports to only those nations prepared to accept adequate safeguards. We should not limit our consideration of this problem to formal agreements offered in arms control and disarmament negotiations. (b) We should seek to strengthen arrangements to prevent or delay the dissemination of relevant technology, including such developments as the gas-centrifuge process. (c) We should continue our efforts to strengthen the capabilities of the IAEA to assure the use of fissionable material for peaceful purposes only and continue our efforts to win acceptance of IAEA safeguards. 4. The U.S. should continue its efforts to negotiate, initially with the Soviet Union, a nuclear non-proliferation agreement. A revised text to be used for this purpose is attached as Annex A. (a) As a government, we recognize that no agreement with the Soviet Union on non-proliferation would be possible in the foreseeable future were we to make inclusion of the Chinese Communists a precondition. The U.S. should refrain from raising the question of whether Communist China must be a party to a non-proliferation agreement. If the USSR asks for our views on this matter, we should state that Communist China in our view should be a participant in any such agreement both because of the problem of India and because of the desirability of having the agreement world-wide in scope. We should not indicate that we consider Soviet acceptance of this view a precondition to further discussions of the subject. We should indicate that we are prepared to defer consideration of this problem until we have completed the discussion of other aspects of the agreement. (b) In order to increase the negotiability of the non-proliferation agreement by lessening the implication that Soviet acceptance of the U.S. text would constitute Soviet endorsement of the MLF, a letter to the Soviet Government (attached as Annex B) 2 should be used in place of the earlier U.S. draft minute for the purpose of giving reassurance with respect to the MLF at the time of the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement. The U.S. should give in the draft letter (final paragraph of Annex B) an assurance that the “European clause” of the MLF Charter would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. should support and encourage appropriate efforts which may develop among participants in the MLF to register a commitment on non-acquisition in connection with adherence to the MLF. (c) In discussing a non-proliferation agreement with the USSR, the U.S. should suggest that a willingness to accept International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities of states not presently possessing nuclear weapons should preferably be made a part of the agreement. However, the U.S. should be prepared to adhere to the position already made known to the Soviets and accept an agreement without such international safeguard provisions if the USSR rejects such provisions. 5. The U.S. should continue its efforts to develop the widest possible political consensus favorable to a non-proliferation agreement, and thus make more difficult prior to such an agreement any national decision to acquire a nuclear capability. The Cairo OAU resolution of July, 1964, in which the OAU member states declared their willingness to undertake in an international treaty “not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons,” and called upon “all peace-loving nations to adhere to the same undertaking” should be used as a vehicle to obtain such a consensus by the following line of action: (a) By means of private consultation with selected OAU member states at appropriate times, the U.S. should urge preparation of language for a draft U.N. resolution and a draft treaty which does not conflict with the MLF, U.S. transit rights, or other U.S. objectives, so as to assure that the proposed resolution and treaty could be supported by the U.S. and its allies when the disarmament discussions resume in the U.N.G.A. (b) The United States should review the question of the desirability of the international conference called for in the OAU resolution and should also consider other means of developing the treaty called for if a conference is determined not to be in the best interests of the United States. (c) We should continue to state publicly, at appropriate times, that we welcome the basic objectives of the OAU resolution as a valuable step toward such a consensus, and we should quietly encourage other states to associate themselves with the OAU resolution. III. Discussion A. Efforts to Discourage Individual States from Embarking on a Nuclear Weapons Program. At the present time Israel, India, Sweden, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany have the technical capability to support a national decision to produce nuclear weapons. The development of a national nuclear weapons capability by any one of these countries would exacerbate international tensions and tend to induce additional states to follow suit. At the present time the United States has an on-going program to deal with the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and with the broader aspects of the Middle East arms race. The U.S. should, of course, continue this program. It also should expand it, on a case-by-case basis, to discourage other states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs. It should do so at a level of urgency commensurate with the need to develop political inhibitions against the development of further national nuclear capabilities sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation. It should consider, where feasible, the desirability of security arrangements, in which the U.S. participates or assists, where legitimate security concerns may represent a principal source of the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. In considering tactics and timing—in gauging the sense of urgency required—it must also be recognized that the estimates as to when these various countries could detonate a nuclear device is not a true measure of the time available to us. The critical time is the time of national decision to develop nuclear weapons. This could be made very soon by any of three or four governments, with confidence that they have the technical capabilities to back it up. Once made, such a decision may be hard to change, even though the actual nuclear detonation may not occur for some period of time afterwards. In considering such an expanded program, high priority should be given to the problem of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by India. The detonation of a Chinese Communist nuclear device will put great pressure on India to make a national decision to develop nuclear weapons of its own. The development of nuclear weapons by India would be a serious—perhaps irreparable—break in the political and psychological barrier which now restrains proliferation. The U.S. should make every effort to prevent such a development, including the consideration of the possibility of appropriate security arrangements. The U.S. should also consider developing approaches with respect to the other countries which have been mentioned. In considering such an expanded program there must be recognition of the fact that, in several key states, the success of such bilateral efforts may depend upon parallel progress toward a non-proliferation agreement open to accession by all states, and the attitude of the United States concerning the creation of additional centers of decision over nuclear weapons in the context of the MLF. Looking at the other side of the coin, the success or failure of our efforts to prevent other countries from developing national nuclear capabilities will also have a direct bearing on the success or failure of MLF. If the political and psychological barrier which now restrains proliferation is broken down, the objectives of our MLF policy will be seriously threatened. For example, should India, Israel, Japan, or Sweden acquire an independent nuclear capability, the Federal Republic would probably come to feel that it had accepted second-class status in limiting its nuclear power to that provided by the MLF. B. Efforts to Impede the Technical Capabilities Required for Development and Production of Nuclear Weapons. Efforts to impede the spread of the technical capabilities required for the development of production of nuclear weapons systems cannot be a substitute for the political approaches to prevent national decision to develop nuclear weapons outlined in the other portions of this paper. As indicated earlier in this discussion there are already at least five countries (apart from China) which now have the technical capabilities to support a decision to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, the problem of developing a modern delivery capability daily appears less of an inhibition on any decision of an industrialized nation to seek a nuclear capability. Effort to impede these technical capabilities is necessary to keep the political problem one of manageable proportions. A political program of the type outlined in the preceding and succeeding portions of this paper may be manageable if it has to cope primarily with the five countries mentioned. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, if the number is increased to fifteen. For example, there will soon be many countries with nuclear power reactors producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium per year. If some form of action is not taken to prevent the diversion of this plutonium to weapons, it will be almost impossible to bring this problem under control. It is for this reason that the political program outlined in the other portions of this paper must be accompanied by continuing efforts to impede the spread of the technical capabilities required for the development and production of nuclear weapons systems. These measures should include continued efforts to strengthen the IAEA, the consideration of an arrangement among major suppliers of nuclear materials to limit export to those nations prepared to accept adequate safeguards and a consideration of ways to impede dissemination of relevant technology. C. Negotiation of a Non-Proliferation Agreement. (1) Participation by Communist China The reopening of discussions with the Soviet Union on the question of a non-proliferation agreement emphasizes the question of the participation of Communist China in any such agreement. Communist China will almost certainly refuse to adhere to any nuclear non-acquisition agreement. At the present time, therefore, the United States cannot continue to insist on Chinese adherence without foreclosing all opportunities for achieving such an agreement. The Soviets are also aware of this, and it would not be in the interests of the United States to indicate to them that we are not really interested in such an agreement at the present time. Moreover, we should not delay our efforts to work out a multilateral agreement as part of our overall efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, such as Israel, Sweden, India, and Germany, until the Chinese problem is settled. The further proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world would not alleviate the problems raised by a Communist Chinese nuclear detonation. Even if the Chinese were to develop a nuclear capability, a world of five nuclear powers would be far preferable to a world of ten or twenty. One useful contribution of an agreement, even if it did not include Communist China, would be to isolate China still further in world opinion, and to undercut Chinese efforts to develop friendly relations among the less-developed countries of the world. Moreover, the agreement would strengthen the Soviets' hand in maintaining their non-assistance policy with respect to Communist China, regardless of any changes which might occur in their relations with the Chinese Communist leadership. As a matter of negotiating tactics, it would be unwise for the United States to take an initiative in indicating it is dropping its prior requirement of Chinese Communist participation. It would be preferable for the United States merely not to raise this subject when the problem of non-proliferation is next raised with the Soviets. If the Soviets raise the issue of Chinese participation, we could restate our position that Chinese Communists should participate, indicate that we do not consider this a precondition for continuation of discussions of a non-proliferation agreement and state that the question should be deferred until we have reached an understanding on other provisions of such an agreement. If we should be able to come to a satisfactory understanding on all other provisions of a non-proliferation agreement, we would then consult with our allies on the issue of Chinese Communist participation. (2) Relationship to MLF For more than a year, the United States has been trying to persuade the USSR to accept a non-proliferation agreement. The MLF has been cited by the Soviets as the only obstacle to reaching such an agreement. In attempting to persuade the Soviets to accept our language regarding non-proliferation to the national control of other states, the U.S. has stressed the argument that such an agreement will give further assurance that the MLF will not in fact become a device through which Germany could acquire such control. We have thus confronted the Soviets with the dilemma of either accepting such language or seeing the MLF come into being with no commitment of this kind to limit its evolution. The procedure which we have followed so far of using a minute to set forth our views on the MLF has one element of difficulty. The non-proliferation agreement and minute which we have proposed to the Soviet Union could be interpreted by them as implicitly sanctioning the MLF. It is unlikely that they will enter into any agreement which can be interpreted as having such effect, at least as long as they have any hope that the MLF will not come into existence. The present procedure, therefore, may have inhibited any progress on a non-proliferation agreement until there has been a final resolution of the MLF, if not for some time thereafter. This would not be a serious disadvantage were it not for the possibility that nuclear developments by other states might meanwhile progress to a point which would not only cause a further break in the non-proliferation dike, but, for the reasons indicated above, would probably make the Germans unwilling to remain satisfied with the MLF. The relevance of such developments to the urgency of a non-proliferation agreement should be pointed out to the USSR. The proposed procedure of using a letter rather than a minute is designed to make somewhat more likely Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement, since the USSR would not have to agree expressly to our letter. In addition, the U.S. letter (Annex B) contains an undertaking that if a nuclear non-proliferation agreement is concluded the U.S. will not agree to future arrangements that would increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. should point out to the USSR that this portion of the letter is intended to deal with the concern which the USSR has expressed regarding possible future evolution of the MLF. This portion of the letter is along the lines of the assurances which Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns, at our private suggestion, gave to Khrushchev last June. 3 The immediate question, then, relates not to what the U.S. position on the evolution of the MLF should be, but to when and how we should reveal our position. It has been argued that a clear U.S. acceptance of restraints now on the evolution of MLF, as desired by the British, would permit the British to gain their objectives without having to join, and hence reduce the pressure on them to join. It is more likely that the British decision will be governed at the proper time by considerations broader than those of mere tactics and will depend upon the UK's judgment of its basic interest in either joining or staying out. Since Britain's ultimate participation in the MLF is valuable to us, it seems worth facilitating by agreeing, at this stage, to the position which is recommended in this paper. This is particularly so since the basic US position, whose final form has been set even now by the almost certain insistence of Congress on restraints, is essentially the same as that of the UK. Any delusion or vagueness contrived for tactical purposes is not likely in the long run to enhance the effectiveness of German or Italian participation in the MLF. Vagueness about our position on the evolution of the MLF will also handicap our efforts to dissuade India, Israel, and other countries from embarking on nuclear weapons programs. As indicated earlier, failure in these efforts may undercut the MLF as an alternative to German national nuclear capability. An important consideration, moreover, is the possible effect of the proposed undertaking on negotiations with the USSR. While the Soviets will continue to oppose the MLF for a number of reasons, a large part of their stated concern is the prospect that the MLF is a step toward acquisition of a nuclear capability by the FRG. If the Soviets, by adhering to our proposed non-proliferation agreement, could obtain from the U.S. a clear undertaking against such evolution, the Soviets might reconsider their present negative position. Given increasing Soviet concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to a number of countries, as well as their incentive to find a new vehicle for isolating China in world opinion, it is possible that the proposed undertaking would tip the balance, at least to the extent of permitting resumption of serious negotiations on a non-proliferation agreement. It might also make prompt agreement possible once the MLF issue had been resolved. It is recommended that the U.S. support and encourage appropriate efforts which may develop among participants in the MLF to register a commitment on non-acquisition in connection with adherence to the MLF. It must be recognized it may be difficult to ask, much less insist, that a non-nuclear participant assume a formal non-acquisition obligation. The Italian Government recently expressed reluctance to take such a step and the FRG has indicated it will not expand its non-manufacture commitment beyond the WEU countries and especially not to the Soviets, unless it receives some return benefit. Something might nevertheless be accomplished by an approach such as the following to non-nuclear prospective participants: they doubtless can be persuaded to say they agree with us (and the FRG could hardly deny it) that non-dissemination is necessary; they must be convinced, as the U.S. is convinced, that MLF does not involve, but indeed obviates, the risk of dissemination; while they may feel unable at this time to volunteer a formal undertaking, public statements by authoritative officials acknowledging the foregoing points would support the credibility of MLF objectives. Furthermore, since it has been shown the Soviets value associations with some NATO countries such as the Netherlands and the UK, which have not yet decided to join the MLF, were those countries to make a decision not to join MLF for reasons of their own, they should be encouraged to state that they are of the firm belief that MLF as such does not involve dissemination of nuclear weapons. (3) Verification The nuclear weapons non-manufacturing obligation should preferably include verification provisions to provide assurance that non-nuclear powers are not attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons. Such provisions should provide for the acceptance of IAEA or similar international safeguards against the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful to military purposes. If the IAEA provisions prove acceptable to the members of NATO and to the USSR, the United States, in private discussions with such ENDC members as India, Sweden, and the UAR, should attempt to persuade them to accept these provisions before the text of the draft agreement becomes public knowledge. In trying to persuade the non-nuclear states to accept such provisions, the U.S. could point out that, since violations of the agreement would threaten their own security more than the security of the nuclear powers, international inspection would appear to be in their own self interest. The U.S. could point out that IAEA safeguards are important for the following reasons among others: (a) From the point of view of proliferation, the construction of facilities for the production of fissionable material constitutes the most critical stage of the process of developing a nuclear weapons production capability. It is relatively easy to detect construction of these facilities by unilateral intelligence, considerably more so than the facilities used in other portions of the weapons manufacturing process. Once the existence of these production facilities is known, IAEA safeguards are well suited to see that the products of these facilities are used only for peaceful purposes. (b) In the absence of safeguards, it would be difficult to distinguish this critical stage from the construction of large-scale nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes which many countries are now planning to build. Several non-nuclear states would probably prefer to sign an agreement without such verification. The U.S. should try to link verification with non-proliferation in a single agreement, in order to obtain acceptance of desirable verification provisions by the largest possible number of states. If it should prove impossible, however, to persuade these states to accept the IAEA provisions, we should stand on the position already made known to the Soviets. A non-proliferation agreement without such provisions would serve U.S. interests better than no agreement at all. The U.S. might also at that time consider the possibility of presenting a separate IAEA safeguards agreement for adherence by those states willing to accept it. D. Efforts to Develop Wide Political Consensus Favorable to Non-Proliferation: Response to OAU Resolution. An essential element in a non-proliferation program is an attempt on a broad multilateral basis to develop political inhibitions against the creation of further national nuclear capabilities. This element is not present in either our efforts to discourage individual states from embarking on nuclear weapons programs or our efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union concerning a non-proliferation agreement. As already indicated the attempts to persuade individual nations are valuable. They should be continued and expanded. They cannot, however, take advantage of the fact that, as shown by the limited test ban, regional rivals may find it possible to agree to something in the context of an agreement open to all states that they could not agree to just with each other. The negotiation with the Soviets is valuable and should continue. It is being conducted primarily on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. basis with the thought that other countries will be approached when agreement is reached. It is not certain, however, that there will be agreement on the basis for such an approach to other countries sufficiently soon to meet the urgency of the situation. What must be guarded against is that while we (a) engage in private talks with individual states on a state-by-state basis and (b) engage in private discussions with the Soviets, we do not (c) fail to take the multilateral steps which may be an essential part in our actions to develop a broad political consensus favorable to non-proliferation which is sufficiently strong to stand the shock of a Communist Chinese nuclear test. The Irish Resolution was a step in developing such a consensus, but it was adopted almost three years ago. 4 The limited test ban had a similar effect. By banning tests in the medium which might be the simplest for a country developing nuclear weapons it represented a political decision pointing away from such a development. But it does permit tests which could be used by a country developing such a weapon. Further steps to develop such a consensus therefore seem advisable. One device which has been considered to develop such a consensus was an attempt to seek broad international support for “declarations of intent” indicating willingness to adhere to a non-proliferation agreement of the kind we have discussed with the Soviet Union. Perhaps an even better method would be in the nature of a response to the Resolution on non-proliferation adopted in July by the Organization of African Unity (informal draft in Annex C). 5 This Resolution contained a statement in the preamble confirming UN Resolution 1652, XVI, which, among other things, proposed the banning of transit. 6 It also reaffirmed the quite unrealistic resolution on general disarmament adopted by the Summit Conference of Independent African States of May 1963. 7 Nevertheless, it is based principally upon the UNGA Irish Resolution of December 4, 1961. It declares the readiness of OAU member states to undertake in an international treaty “not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons;” calls upon all nations to adhere to the same undertaking; and calls upon all nuclear powers to respect and abide by this declaration. It also invites the U.N. General Assembly to convene a conference with a view to concluding a non-proliferation treaty. Notwithstanding the problems implicit in the call for a conference and the undesirable references in the preamble, the body of this resolution states its objective in terms which may make it possible for this resolution to be used in developing a consensus in favor of a non-proliferation agreement open to accession by all states and which would make it more difficult, while such an agreement is being worked out, for other countries to make a national decision to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Private consultation with selected OAU member states, the preparation of a draft U.N. resolution and a draft treaty which does not conflict with the MLF or U.S. transit rights, and a statement that we welcome the objectives of the OAU resolution (together with quiet encouragement to other states to make similar statements) could all be steps toward developing such a consensus. Consideration should also be given to having the draft resolution more than merely a call for an agreement but drafted in terms of a “statement of intent”—a statement of present intent not to proliferate or acquire—so long as there was no basic change in the situation. Annex A 8 NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT ( Note : The following language is based upon the “Draft Non-Transfer Declaration” which has been discussed with the USSR, 9 with the following changes: (a) Insertion of IAEA provisions in paragraphs 2 and 3. (b) Revised withdrawal clause in paragraph 4.) “Desiring to promote international peace and security, Desiring, in particular, to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race, Believing that the creation of additional national nuclear weapons forces will jeopardize these ends, Recalling that General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI) urges all states to cooperate for these purposes, Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, 1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly declare that they will not transfer any nuclear weapons directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, into the national control of individual states not now possessing such weapons, and that they will not assist such other states in the manufacture of such weapons. 2. The other signatory Governments solemnly declare that they will not manufacture nuclear weapons; that they will refrain from acquiring directly, or indirectly through military alliances, national control of any nuclear weapons; that they will not seek or receive assistance from other states in the manufacture of any such weapons; and that they will accept, as rapidly as practicable, International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards on all their nuclear activities in order to assure that such activities are not conducted in such a way as to further any military purpose. 3. All the signatory Governments solemnly declare that they will notify the International Atomic Energy Agency promptly of all shipments to any other states of source or fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, and will supply source or fissionable materials to states not now possessing nuclear weapons only if such materials will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards. 4. This declaration, which shall be deposited with the Government of ———, shall be open to signature by all Governments. It shall remain in effect indefinitely, subject to the right of any signatory Government to be relieved of its terms if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this declaration, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. 10 In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this declaration.” ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH 4 11 4. This declaration, which shall be deposited with the Governments of ——— and ———, shall be open to signature by all Governments. It shall remain in effect indefinitely, subject to the right of any signatory Government to be relieved of its terms if it decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized because any Government takes action which the signatories have declared they will not take. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Noforn. The source text was forwarded to Secretary Rusk under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Foster. Foster's memorandum indicated that the paper “is based in part on discussion at the June 16 and July 23 meetings of the Committee of Principals and also sets forth a U.S. response to the recent resolution of the Organization of African Unity on this subject.” Regarding these two meetings of the Committee of Principals, see Documents 36, 37, 40 , and 41 . The OAU resolution refers to the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity at Cairo, July 21. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 294-295. 2 Not printed. 3 Luns met with Khrushchev on July 8, 1964, and on the following day summarized their conversation in a meeting with Ambassador Foy D. Kohler. Kohler then reported: “Luns said conversation with Khrushchev had focused primarily on Germany and MLF. Discussion of MLF took nearly half of ninety-minute meeting and was based on Secretary's letter to Luns, content of which was incorporated in memo left with Khrushchev. Luns said Khrushchev listened carefully, asked pertinent questions and seemed impressed. Luns tried to establish the basis by demonstrating that Dutch losses in World War II were comparable to Soviet losses and that Dutch feeling with respect to proliferation of nuclear weapons to Germany no less strong than those of Soviets. While Khrushchev's own remarks were consistent with established and often-repeated Soviet opposition to MLF, Luns feels there may be some chance for a shift.” (Telegram 73 from Moscow, July 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Europe and U.S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Cables, Vol. IV, Box 218) The Secretary's letter to Luns has not been found. 4 Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XVI) on the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, approved unanimously on December 4, 1961. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1961 , p. 694. 5 Not printed. 6 This resolution, approved on November 24, 1961, by a 55-0-44 vote, called upon member states to consider Africa as a denuclearized zone. The United States was one of the 44 abstaining nations. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1961 , pp. 647-648. 7 Dated May 25, 1963; text ibid., 1963, p. 195. 8 Secret; Limited Distribution. 9 Secretary Rusk handed a “Draft Non-Transfer Declaration” to Ambassador Dobrynin at their meeting on December 10, 1962. (Memorandum of conversation; Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. VII, Document 248 . 10 The draft declaration presented to the Soviet Union in early 1963 was “subject to the right of any signatory to be relieved of its terms if another signatory fails to observe them or if any other Government takes action which signatories have declared they will not take;”. [Footnote in the source text. As noted in footnote 9 above, the draft declaration was given to the Soviet Ambassador on December 10, 1962, rather than in early 1963.] 11 This alternate paragraph is stapled onto the bottom of the last page of the source text. 45. Editorial Note 45. Editorial Note In late August 1964 Secretary Rusk directed the establishment of a new committee, within the framework of the Committee of Principals, to consider further steps that might be taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He specified that Llewellyn Thompson would chair the new committee, which would be composed of the Deputies of the Committee of Principals, plus the Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs and Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. In a memorandum to the Committee of Principals, August 24, Foster explained the terms of reference of this committee: “The task of the Committee is to develop, on a priority basis, specific recommendations for further action that should be taken by the U.S. to prevent the further proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities. These recommendations should be developed in the light of the possible early detonation of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. Thus, particular attention should be given to the course of action the U.S. should take with respect to India. At the same time, however, consideration should be given to further actions which might be taken, either bilaterally or on a multilateral basis, with respect to the dangers posed by other potential capabilities of Israel, Sweden, Japan, and possibly the Union of South Africa. In developing recommendations consideration should include the way in which the U.S. could meet, either bilaterally or multilaterally, legitimate security concerns which may be a principal incentive to acquisition of nuclear capability.” (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) This Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, as it was soon called, held its first meeting on August 28. Twenty-three officials, representing the Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, White House, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Information Agency, attended this meeting. (Ibid.) Altogether, this interagency group held nine meetings from August 28, 1964-February 4, 1965. Discussions focused on general approaches to the problem of inhibiting prohibition, the spread of nuclear and related technology and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency, possible substantive initiatives on nonproliferation at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and the U.N. General Assembly, the problem of India, and draft treaty and declaration language. For the minutes of the fourth meeting on safeguards, September 25, see Document 48 . Following the creation of the Gilpatric committee on Nuclear Proliferation in November (see Document 51 ), the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities met less frequently but prepared papers for the Gilpatric Committee. Memoranda, minutes of the nine meetings, and other working papers of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities are in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964, and ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Committee on Nuclear Weapons. 46. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 46. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 25, 1964. SUBJECT The ACDA Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons I have reviewed the ACDA paper on non-proliferation 2 to be discussed at the Principals' meeting scheduled for August 27, 3 and consulted with the interested bureaus in the Department. With the exception of a divergent view held by Len Meeker, which I understand he will submit to you separately, 4 the views in this memorandum have the concurrence of the other bureaus. 5 The ACDA draft position paper marks a substantial step forward, in my view, in placing greater emphasis than heretofore on recommending a case-by-case consideration of the key situations which could provide an undesirable trigger to proliferation. Communist China represents a special problem and is being dealt with separately. With respect to Germany, we have the MLF. Current efforts to deal with the Israel-UAR situation offer our best hope for that area. This paper notes, I believe correctly, the need to give high priority to the Indian case. Our concrete programs for the MLF and to deal with the Israel-UAR arms race were developed by careful consideration of local pressures and problems, and we believe additional case-by-case studies as now recommended by ACDA should be undertaken. Bill Foster has been in touch with me with the suggestion that I chair a group to consider these various regional case problems, and arrangements for this are going forward. In several other respects, the ACDA paper also contributes to advancing our tactical handling of the problem of preventing proliferation, in particular by suggesting a letter (though not the one ACDA has drafted) instead of a minute to express to the Soviets our interpretation of the relation of the MLF to non-proliferation, and to suggest (but not insist upon) specifying IAEA safeguards in a non-proliferation agreement with the USSR. In view of Soviet opposition to reliance on IAEA safeguards, it would not be desirable to make this a required element of our position. At the same time, I believe that the ACDA paper raises three major problems: (1) decision not to insist on Chinese Communist participation as a precondition to a non-proliferation agreement, (2) decision now to place sharp constraints and conditions on the MLF, and so to inform the Soviet leaders, and (3) advocacy of an attempt to use the recent OAU resolution on non-proliferation as a vehicle to open a new campaign for a world-wide agreement. I, and the other interested officers in the Department, have grave reservations on the conclusions of the ACDA discussion, and oppose several recommendations made in the paper. 1. Should we decide now to accept an agreement without Communist China? I believe that if we are able to agree upon a satisfactory non-proliferation agreement, we should probably accept it even without adherence of Communist China. I see no way to induce or compel Chinese commitment to forego acquisition of what they regard as an essential symbol, as well as instrument, of great power status. However, I strongly question the advisability of making that decision at this time. Even if, as ACDA proposes, we would not at once disclose such a position to the Soviets, I am much inclined to believe it would become known to our Allies, some of whom would be greatly alarmed at our giving up this card while pressing them to accept such an agreement. Similarly, India at least would probably be disinclined to adhere to such an agreement without Chinese commitment, and premature Indian realization of our position accepting an agreement without China could adversely affect our efforts to restrain India from initiating its own nuclear weapons program. Accordingly, as a clarification and alternative to the ACDA draft, we would propose adopting at this time the following US position: (a) If the Soviet Union should prove willing to accept a non-proliferation agreement on terms acceptable to ourselves and our Allies, we should, at that time and in the light of the circumstances then prevailing, consider the question of whether we should enter into such an agreement without the participation of Communist China. (b) If, at the time the US and the Soviet Union reach agreement, other countries should hesitate to adhere to the agreement without the participation of Communist China or other particular countries, we should consider the usefulness of their issuing declarations of intent to adhere at such time as the adherence of other necessary parties may take place. 2. Should we offer the Soviet Union, in connection with a non-proliferation agreement, a commitment that we will not allow the MLF control formula to evolve in a way that would increase the number of nuclear decision-making centers? It is highly unlikely that the US would or should give up a decisive voice in the control of the MLF unless this step involved abandonment of at least one of the existing European national deterrent forces and thereby had the effect of not increasing (or possibly of reducing) the number of “powers” controlling the use of nuclear weapons. But freezing our position now and offering a formal commitment to the Soviet Union on this score would damage important US interests without increasing the likelihood of early Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement. The question of the “review clause” of the MLF Charter is one of the most sensitive issues confronting participants in the MLF, including the US. To make this issue the subject of negotiations with the Soviet Union, as ACDA suggests, would present severe substantive difficulties reaching beyond the MLF and affecting our basic position in Europe, and the timing of ACDA's proposal could not be worse. Taking both substance and timing into account, adoption of the ACDA proposal would have the following adverse effects: (a) It would lead to a deepening crisis of confidence in our relations with West Germany (the more so in view of the aide mémoire left by Ambassador Knappstein with me on August 5, which expressed concern about the handling of the non-proliferation question at the Geneva Conference and which forecast difficulties in the forthcoming General Assembly). 6 (b) It would create a first-rate opportunity (which would not be lost) for the Gaullists in Germany as well as France to step up criticism of US policy in general. They would argue that the US was selling out European interests in dealing with the Soviet Union over the heads of the Europeans; that the US had, in effect, disowned assurances which had been given by both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson about possible evolution in MLF control as Europe moves toward unity; and that Germany should turn away from the MLF and cooperate with a force “that is really at Europe's disposition”—the force de frappe. All of this would weaken Erhard in his effort to fight off external and domestic pressures to abandon an “Atlanticist” outlook, in favor of narrow Franco-German collaboration. (c) While disturbing our relations with West Germany, the ACDA proposal would, evidently, not satisfy the British. As you know, the ACDA proposal is patterned after a suggestion initially put forward by the UK Delegation to the Geneva Conference and subsequently, in effect, disowned by the Foreign Office after implications for continuation of the British national deterrent were realized. To advance the language now suggested by ACDA would catapult the question of MLF control and its relation to the British national deterrent into the British electoral campaign, by making it appear that the US contemplated that the MLF would eventually absorb the British force. (This may be a desirable objective from our standpoint, but the way to achieve it is not by making it a partisan issue in the British election.) (d) From the standpoint of the MLF control issue itself, the ACDA proposal would be counterproductive. It would be strongly resented by such “Europeanists” as Jean Monnet and his Action Committee who, while not pressing for abandonment of the US veto, set great store on not precluding this possibility—if only to make it clear that their acceptance of joint US-European control is not the result of US pressures. The net result would be a revival of European pressures for abandonment of the US veto since the recent decline in these pressures (manifest in statements by Von Hassel, Monnet, and others) was partly due to a belief by the Europeans that they would be able to consider the issue on its merits, instead of having the answer dictated to them by the US. (e) Adoption of the ACDA proposal might divert and disrupt the MLF drafting exercise in Paris at a time when we are trying to bring this exercise—one of the few constructive ventures we now have going in Europe—to a successful conclusion by the end of the year so that the governments concerned can then reach the necessary decisions in a final negotiation. (f) Finally, while we can probably agree to a withdrawal clause in a non-proliferation agreement along the lines suggested, it would be undesirable to give the Soviets now a club to wield over the MLF prior to its ratification. While incurring the liabilities noted above, the ACDA proposal would not be likely to achieve its objective of hastening Soviet acceptance of a non-proliferation agreement. Ambassador Kohler's assessment (which I share, and which INR also shares) is that, as long as the MLF is in the formative stage, the Soviet Union will reject any non-proliferation agreement that does not bar the MLF. Past experience with the Soviet Union supports this conclusion, and the price of again confirming this experience by putting forward the ACDA proposal is prohibitively high for the reasons that have been presented. As an alternative to the ACDA proposal, we recommend the following: (a) As specific MLF arrangements emerge from the Paris discussions, we recommend further talks between you and Ambassador Dobrynin to clear up any Soviet misunderstandings of these arrangements. This would be in line with your previous assurance to Dobrynin that many Soviet concerns would be met when details respecting the MLF became available. (b) Continuing assurances should be given the Soviet Union that we will not permit the MLF to fall into the hands of any single country or of any grouping in which a single European country was predominant. (c) Later in the year, when the time comes for European governments to adhere to MLF, we can consider how this adherence should be related to non-proliferation. Tentatively, we are inclined to believe the best approach would be the issuance of appropriate non-acquisition/non-dissemination statements by MLF participants at that time, but this is a matter that we can consider and discuss with other MLF participants between now and then, and not unilaterally decide nor at this time. 3. Should we take the initiative in promoting support of the OAU (Cairo) resolution on non-proliferation? 7 ACDA proposes that we should endeavor to develop “the widest possible political consensus favorable to a non-proliferation agreement” by mounting an initiative on the basis offered by relevant sections of the OAU (Cairo) resolution on non-proliferation. In our view, there is today already substantial support for a non-proliferation agreement among those countries which have no possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons, and to the extent that world opinion can pose a barrier to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries that can obtain them, that obstacle already exists. Accordingly, we doubt that there is much to be gained by a further major initiative, particularly one which would be resented by our Allies (as ACDA's earlier proposal concerning unilateral non-proliferation declarations was found to be unacceptable both to the Germans and Italians). Moreover, we have some difficulty in believing that the OAU resolution would prove to be a very sturdy vehicle for this purpose. Notwithstanding the fact that the OAU resolution is based in part on the Irish Resolution (which we supported), 8 the UAR representative at the Geneva Conference has already sought to precipitate debate concerning the relationship of the MLF to non-proliferation and advocated holding-up the MLF pending agreement. Moreover, as ACDA recognizes, the OAU resolution, taken as a whole, includes some provisions that are either not acceptable to us (an implied ban on transit of nuclear weapons) or at least undesirable (an international conference on non-proliferation). It would, therefore, be undesirable for the US to “encourage other states to associate themselves with the OAU resolution.” Finally, we recognize that the OAU resolution was a “holding action” by the African states instead of agreeing on a nuclear-free zone, and any efforts to influence them (such as ACDA suggests) would not only probably be ineffective but very likely also counterproductive. While we do not, therefore, support the present ACDA proposal, we recognize that other countries may well take the initiative. OAU members may well press their proposal in the General Assembly; the Soviet Union will almost certainly inject attacks on the MLF into that forum; and, all in all, non-proliferation is likely to be a hot topic. Therefore, we believe that we should proceed now with an assessment of those tactics which would best protect our interests. In this context, further consideration could be given to the handling of the OAU resolution and to preparatory steps, in this or other connections, which it might be desirable for us to undertake in advance of the opening of the GA. Accordingly, we recommend that IO, together with EUR, S/MF, AF, and ACDA, be requested to prepare recommendations concerning our tactical approach. 4. Accession to a non-proliferation agreement. Finally, I am disturbed about the suggested arrangements for adherence to the new draft non-proliferation agreement which envisage a single depository government and state that it would be open for accession to “all governments.” I believe some way must be found to deal with the problem of East German adherence, particularly if we are to have the support of the Federal Republic. 1 Source: Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on August 24. The source text forms Tab C-1 of a briefing book prepared for Secretary Rusk for the meeting of the Committee of Principals on August 27. 2 Document 44 . 3 The August 27 meeting was postponed without scheduling a new date. (Memorandum for the Files by John J. de Martino (S/S-S), undated; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) 4 Meeker explained his views in a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, August 25, which is attached as Tab C-2 to the briefing book cited in footnote 1 above. 5 At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard Davis (EUR), Henry Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Howard Furnas (S/MF), David Popper (RPM), and Joseph Sisco (IO). 6 The German aide-mémoire, August 5, expressed “great concern” about the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee discussions, which “are increasingly used by the Soviets to attack the policies followed by the Federal Republic and the creation of the MLF.” The Germans felt the discussions were being “exploited by the Soviets as a welcome means to discredit us in the eyes of the world and especially in those of the uncommitted countries represented at Geneva.” It further asked the U.S. Delegate in Geneva to avoid the subject of nonproliferation if possible and to consult with the Federal Republic of Germany in anticipation of future attacks that the Soviets would launch against the MLF in the United Nations. In a memorandum of conversation between Llewellyn Thompson and Ambassador Knappstein, August 5, attached to the aide-mémoire, Thompson said that he did not expect further discussion of nonproliferation at the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and gave assurances that the United States would continue to respond to Soviet attacks on the Federal Republic and the MLF and would consult with his government on the nonproliferation issue in the U.N. General Assembly. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) 7 See footnote 1, Document 44 . 8 See footnote 4, Document 44 . 47. Editorial Note 47. Editorial Note President Johnson sent a message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee when it recessed on September 17, 1964. The President's message expounded on the importance of international cooperation in controlling the spread and use of nuclear weapons, indicated U.S. previous arms control initiatives and past achievements in arms control, and urged the participating nations to resolve upon reconvening “to take additional steps toward peace.” Text is in Documents on Disarmament , 1964, pages 433-435. A draft of this message, September 8, was sent under cover of a memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals, September 8. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) A later draft incorporating changes suggested by the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Atomic Energy Commission, September 15, was sent under cover of a September 15 memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.) The September 15 draft is identical to the September 17 message. 48. Informal Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities 48. Informal Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities 1 Washington, September 25, 1964, 10 a.m. The fourth meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities met, under Ambassador Thompson's chairmanship, at 10:00 a.m., on September 25, 1964. A list of those attending is appended. 2 Chairman Seaborg expatiated on existing bilateral and multilateral safeguards, and the possibilities and problems in extending them more widely. 3 In answer to a question, he noted that US policy is consistent in not permitting reactor sales without safeguards. Attention was given to the problem of discrimination by the application of safeguards over transfers to non-nuclear powers, while nuclear powers are not obliged to apply such safeguards to their own operations. Insofar as the objective is to curb further proliferation, such a distinction is wholly justifiable; on the other hand, the sensibilities of non-nuclear countries are adversely affected by this distinction. The question was raised whether the Soviets would acquiesce in safeguards on Soviet transfers to other countries, particularly to other “socialist” countries. It was agreed that the Soviets might agree to such safeguards over transfers to non-Bloc countries, but would probably not agree to safeguards on transfers to Bloc countries. They have shown themselves averse to any application within the USSR itself. In response to a question, Chairman Seaborg stated that he did not believe the Soviets would be concerned over technological intelligence with respect to any reactors they have been willing to supply to other countries. The Soviets have acquiesced to the IAEA safeguards program, but have objected to having the cost of inspections be borne by the IAEA. The question was raised whether safeguards on transfers of reactors and fissionable materials is adequate to prevent proliferation. Ambassador Thompson noted the recent remark by Dr. Kistiakowsky to the effect that a total test ban is necessary for this purpose. Chairman Seaborg agreed, but noted the value of also extending safeguards on transfers. It was observed that the US has been able to persuade countries such as Israel and India, particularly in the latter case only with considerable pressure, to accept IAEA safeguards on our transferred materials and reactors. India will not, however, accept safeguards on its own planned reactor. Our Ambassador in Tel Aviv has reported that Israel is ready to accept any controls acceptable to the UAR, so long as there is adequate inspection. It was remarked that the Swedes appear to have a misconception on the intrusiveness of safeguards inspection. Ambassador Thompson noted that the IAEA did not appear to be the appropriate body for inspection of nuclear free zones. Chairman Seaborg agreed that at least for the present the IAEA was not suitable. Dr. Scoville noted that the IAEA could inspect reactors in such zones, and this was generally agreed. The discussion drew attention to the problems posed for the US in seeking effective inspection for such zones, assuming there were no restrictions on transit, while opposing any inspection involving transit. The ACDA proposal for including provisions for IAEA safeguards in the draft non-proliferation agreement was discussed. 4 The ACDA proposal would include provisions both for applying safeguards on transfers, and on the indigenous programs on non-nuclear states. While the discussion was not conclusive, Ambassador Thompson noted that this question might be an appropriate one for determination by the Principals. In discussion of the problems posed by the separate Euratom safeguard arrangements, it was noted that many consider such arrangements as at best Western self inspection. Moreover, its safeguards apply only to transactions of the member governments conducted under the specific auspices of Euratom. The Soviets have denounced Euratom and prevented its recognition by the IAEA. The discussion concluded with two recommendations on which there appeared to be a tentative consensus, apart from the divided judgment on the advisability of including provisions for IAEA or similar safeguards in a non-proliferation agreement. The first recommendation was to consult with and urge the Western Suppliers Group to adopt a policy requiring IAEA safeguards on equipment transfers. The desirability of admitting Germany to the Group was also generally agreed upon. It was noted that the French have been offering reactor sales without safeguards, and do not consider themselves bound by decisions of the Suppliers Group. The second recommendation was to encourage Japan to submit its entire nuclear program to IAEA safeguards. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Committee on Nuclear Weapons. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff on September 30. The source text was transmitted under cover of a September 30 memorandum from Thompson to the members of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities. 2 Not printed. 3 Seaborg's brief account of this meeting was as follows: “We discussed the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of safeguards and inspection in connection with the peaceful nuclear activities of new nuclear countries. I spoke strongly for a significant role for the IAEA and described the problems of getting the USSR to go along. I said that much progress in this line has been made in the last year or so.” (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 9, p. 190) 4 See Annex A, Document 44 . 49. Editorial Note 49. Editorial Note On October 16, 1964, the People's Republic of China exploded an atomic bomb in the atmosphere. Documentation on this development, which brought the number of nations having atomic weapons to five, is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII . One effect of the successful Chinese test was to heighten concerns throughout the Johnson administration about nuclear proliferation. President Johnson's own concern was expressed in a telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State George Ball, October 29, 9:10 a.m.: “Bundy said there was lots of feeling by the President that we should get a higher-level, harder look at the problem of nuclear spread—a better policy than we would be able to get by using our interhouse machinery. The thought has been expressed [that] a nuclear spread task force be established. He mentioned Ros Gilpatric in this regard, whom Ball thought would be excellent. It was decided that Bundy would tentatively mention this to the President, subject to what Secretary Rusk would have to say on it.” (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Disarmament, Box 3) On November 1, the White House announced the appointment of a special panel of citizens to advise the President on the proliferation problem. In this announcement the panel was asked “to explore the widest range of measures that the United States might undertake in conjunction with other governments or by itself.” (Quoted in Glenn T. Seaborg, with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years , (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), pages 136-137) Formally entitled the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, the group was often referred to more simply as the Gilpatric Committee after its chairman, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. The names of the members of the task force and the instructions to it were contained in NSAM No. 320, Document 51 . The Gilpatric Committee received briefings and administrative support from the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, which had been created only a few months earlier. Regarding the establishment and work of this Committee, see Documents 45 and 48 . The Gilpatric Committee held three plenary meetings on December 1, December 13-14, and January 7-8, 1965. For the minutes of the second and third of these meetings, see Documents 56 and 60 . For Secretary Rusk's meeting with the Committee at this third plenary meeting, January 7, see Document 59 . Regarding the Gilpatric Committee's presentation of its Report to the President, January 21, see Document 63 . For text of the Report, January 21, 1965, see Document 64 . Additional documentation on the workings of the Gilpatric Committee is in Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Gilpatric Committee, and Committee on Nuclear Weapons; ibid, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals; Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation File, Boxes 1-10; and ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Presidential Task Force-Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 35. 50. Memorandum of Conversation 50. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 23, 1964. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—Course of Action for UNGA—Discussed by the Committee of Principals PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 Secretary Rusk opened the meeting pointing out that in view of the difficulties over Article 19, 3 it might be a long time before non-proliferation would come up at the General Assembly. Mr. Foster stated that the paper on “tactics” on non-proliferation for the General Assembly had been prepared by the Thompson Committee at this time 4 since a US position was necessary long in advance of the formal discussion at the General Assembly. Three questions which involve important policy matters were highlighted in the covering memorandum. 5 He also stressed the need for secrecy on the proposal for the Irish to present the resolution at the General Assembly 6 since any leaks might prejudice the US position. Furthermore, he emphasized that the resolution was illustrative since changes might of necessity occur during the process of presentation. Secretary Rusk asked the basic question of whether the US should oppose other countries' obtaining nuclear weapons over the next ten years. Should it always be the US which would have to use nuclear weapons against Red China? He could conceive of situations where the Japanese or Indians might desirably have their own nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara stated that this question had not been staffed thoroughly in the Department of Defense, but he thought it unlikely that the Indians or Japanese would ever have a suitable nuclear deterrent. He thought a group should be established to study this basic policy. Secretary Rusk stated he had asked a committee to investigate inter-Asian security problems, giving consideration to a US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile. Mr. Foster agreed that these alternatives should be looked at but that in the meantime it was necessary to maintain a strong non-proliferation policy. Once a nation had taken the nuclear road, it would be impossible to turn back. Secretary McNamara concurred that the resolution should be available, if needed, but that the Gilpatric Committee and a US Government group should study the desirability of non-proliferation. He raised the question of whether a non-proliferation policy automatically meant providing a nuclear guarantee to all countries for, if so, this would be a major policy change. Mr. Foster pointed out that when the General Assembly convenes we will be under major pressure in this area since a number of other countries would be pushing actions which would be less acceptable to the US. He did not believe that the proposed course of action would preclude a different non-proliferation policy which might develop from the studies proposed. Secretary Rusk emphasized that the present discussions should continue with a clear understanding that US policy favored non-proliferation. Chairman Seaborg stated that he saw no other pattern than non-proliferation since anything else would involve a loss of US control. Mr. Foster discussed the bracketed points in the draft resolution. 7 Ambassador Thompson believed that the Germans should be consulted since Par. 3 puts them under considerable pressure. Secretary Rusk said that the British Prime Minister had today made a strong statement against the MLF. He raised the problem of concealing a treaty obligation (bracketed Section in Par. 2) in a UN resolution since a resolution had no mandatory authority. Perhaps Par. 2.c. might ask States to inform the Secretary General of their intention not to acquire nuclear weapons. He also questioned the desirability of inserting “national” before “control” in this paragraph. Without this the Canadians might claim they were forced to give up their participation with NATO nuclear forces. He felt it most unlikely that the Germans would be willing to undertake the obligations in bracketed Par. 3. Mr. Foster emphasized that the bracketed Par. 2 was the most constructive action in the resolution and would have major value during the interim required for negotiating the treaty. Mr. Fisher pointed out that this was the only major addition to the Irish resolution and also stressed that we had always construed the use of control as in the Irish resolution to refer to “national.” The insertion of “national” at this point would weaken this interpretation for other documents in which it was not present. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that the most critical problem in the General Assembly would be the introduction of an anti-MLF clause into any non-proliferation actions. The Canadians felt that some such self-denying ordinance as a proposed resolution was necessary on the part of those states having nuclear capability who had not chosen to develop weapons. Mr. Thompson indicated that the Swedes were reluctant to have to vote again at this time on the proliferation issue. In view of this discussion, Secretary Rusk questioned whether the procedural resolution would not be better than the proposed non-proliferation one. 8 Mr. Foster believed that pushing the procedural resolution first would look like a stalling action. Mr. Thompson said the matter was one of tactics of deciding to push for a resolution with which we could live with or getting a lot of resolutions which were unacceptable and then might be handled by the procedural resolution. Mr. Cleveland indicated that the UN Staff felt we needed something more than the Irish resolution; perhaps some intermediate resolution would be satisfactory. Certainly, we would have to do something more than to agree to go to a meeting. Mr. Foster pointed out that there have been several international meetings on the subject, such as the OAU and non-alignment conferences. The other nations wish to get on with the problem of non-proliferation and also to limit the MLF. The US resolution tends to get the MLF out of the picture and satisfy their desires to get on with non-proliferation. The US would have a difficult time, at best, and therefore we needed a positive policy. Secretary Rusk stated that it was disconcerting to see gaps in the concern about disarmament in many countries. There was no evidence that many countries were worried about non-proliferation. Most countries ignore disarmament for themselves and support sweeping resolutions on disarmament for the world. He felt there should be limitations on conventional weapons transfer as well as nuclear. Mr. Cleveland pointed out that the purpose of this exercise was to go beyond idle statements and reach some kind of semi-binding international agreement similar to the “ban the bombs in orbit” resolution. 9 Mr. Foster felt that the non-proliferation proposal had broader support than other possible items, the inclusion of which might only serve to muddy the waters and preclude achieving a meaningful resolution on non-proliferation. Chairman Seaborg stressed the importance of the enforcement side and discussed the progress being made in instituting IAEA safeguards. This program was moving in parallel to the one under discussion and he saw no inconsistency with the resolution except for the possibility that the resolution might justify some nations in rejecting the need for safeguards. He urged that we continue to press other countries to place reactors under safeguards and for suppliers, such as the UK and Canada, to demand safeguards in connection with their international programs. Mr. Foster pointed out that ACDA had circulated another paper relative to programs in this area which had been generally approved by the Thompson Committee. 10 Secretary Rusk questioned whether the proposed resolution could be strengthened by inclusion of a requirement for safeguards in the international agreement. Following this discussion, the following actions were decided upon: a. Par. 2 of the draft resolution should be amended for further consideration to include a reference to a requirement for safeguards in any international agreements to be concluded. b. Par. 3 should be changed to substitute “governments and authorities” for “states.” In concluding the meeting, Secretary McNamara again urged that the question of alternatives to our non-proliferation policy should be kept highly classified. Secretary Rusk and others agreed that there should be no question that the established Government policy is against proliferation of nuclear weapons. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret. Drafted by Scoville. Another account of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 9, pp. 399, 404, and 409. 2 Not printed. 3 Reference is to discussions in the U.N. General Assembly on the question of the applicability of Article 19 of the U.N. Charter to the costs of peacekeeping operations. Article 19 specified procedures for U.N. member states that were in arrears in the payment of their financial obligations. 4 Reference is to the November 9 paper, “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” which was sent under cover of a memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, November 12. Foster explained in his memorandum that the paper set forth a general course of action on the proliferation problem for the United States at the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly: “While, as the paper notes, it will be necessary to retain tactical flexibility in order to take account of the results of consultations and the developing situation with respect to the General Assembly, it seems appropriate for the Principals to consider and approve the general tactical line.” (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) Foster's memorandum is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 9, pp. 405-407. 5 The three points were: 1) Should the United States try to include a non-acquisition pledge into the resolution; 2) Should such a resolution include a provision calling upon non-member states of the United Nations to declare their readiness to undertake the same obligations; and 3) The danger of an amendment to the resolution seeking to prohibit a MLF. 6 At the prompting of the United States, the Republic of Ireland during the summer of 1964 quietly began to circulate a draft resolution on non-proliferation to a number of delegations in the U.N. General Assembly. (Memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, July 11; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) No record of Ireland's introduction of this resolution in the General Assembly has been found. 7 The bracketed parts are contained in three paragraphs of illustrative UNGA Non-Proliferation Resolution, October 30, attached as Tab 1 to the November 9 paper, as follows: “2. Welcomes the fact that the Member States voting for this resolution which do not possess nuclear weapons hereby declare [that they do not intend to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons, and] that they are ready to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under UN auspices, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of nuclear weapons; “[3. Calls upon all states not possessing nuclear weapons to declare their readiness to undertake the same obligations;] “6. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to undertake on an urgent basis the preparation of a draft international agreement as called for in resolution 1665 (XVI), which would be open to all states [and to report to the UN Disarmament Commission as soon as possible and in any event not later than 30 July 1965].” 8 Reference is to Draft Procedural Resolution, October 30, attached as Tab 2 to the November 9 paper. 9 See footnote 3, Document 15 . 10 Reference may be to the ACDA paper on safeguards discussed at the September 25 meeting of the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities. See Document 48 . 51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 320 51. National Security Action Memorandum No. 320 1 Washington, November 25, 1964. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Director of Central Intelligence The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation The President has appointed a special Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, to study means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Task Force has been asked to examine the problem in its broadest ramifications. It is expected that the Task Force report will be available for the President by the end of January 1965. In addition to Mr. Gilpatric, the members of the Task Force are: Mr. Arthur H. Dean Mr. Allen W. Dulles General Alfred M. Gruenther Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky Mr. John J. McCloy Dr. James A. Perkins Mr. Arthur K. Watson Mr. William S. Webster Dr. Herbert F. York Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., National Security Council staff, will serve as Staff Director for the Task Force. The President assigns great importance to the work of the Task Force and has asked that all agencies assist the Task Force in the execution of its assignment. In view of the urgency of the nuclear proliferation problem, the responsible government agencies should continue their work in this field on a high priority basis in parallel with the work of the Task Force. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 320-Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 6. Confidential. 52. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) 52. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) 1 Washington, November 28, 1964. SUBJECT ACDA's Six-Point Suggested Program to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation 2 In reply to your memorandum of November twenty-fifth, I have the following comments on Mr. Foster's memorandum for the Committee of Principals, dated November twenty-third: 3 As a generalization, while I think we are all agreed that it would be useful if we could find some significant step to take with the Soviets in the field of disarmament, I suggest we should be on our guard not to fall into becoming victims of a standard Soviet tactic; that is, that we put forward sound proposals which they reject and, after a time, we abandon them and scratch around to find something else upon which we can agree. This often results in a serious weakening of our position. My point is that we should continue to plug sound proposals even though they are categorically rejected by the Soviets. On the question of non-proliferation, I do not think we should put forward, at this time, an assurance that the MLF would not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities controlling the use of nuclear weapons. I do not think that such an assurance would change the attitude of the Soviets at this time and it would block any possibility of an Asiatic MLF before such an institution has been seriously examined. Even if it were decided to give such an assurance, I should think this would be one of the last concessions we would make in a negotiation. A comprehensive test ban treaty would probably eliminate any possibility of developing Plowshare. I wonder whether we should reopen the question of a comprehensive ban just at this time when the Soviets have shown some interest in Plowshare programs. I would agree, however, that a priority review of the present US position would be useful. Of all the proposals in the memorandum, the suggestion for a tacit agreement to halt new construction of ICBM sites without on-the-ground inspection seems to me the most likely to have some chance of Soviet acceptance. There would appear to be three troublesome problems with it however. One would be that it would probably have the result of pushing the Soviets to put their resources into sea-borne launchers which are more difficult for us to deal with. A second problem is that if MRBMs and IRBMs are excluded, the proposal may look to our European allies as an attempt to deal with our problem without worrying about theirs. A third problem is, as you point out, the question as to whether ABMs should be included or not. The Soviets may look at this proposal simply as a means of our attempting to freeze a US advantage, but it might appeal to them on the basis that it could reduce their costs at a critical time. In any event, before putting forward such a proposal, I should think there would have to be careful examination of the effectiveness of our national capability of detecting secret deployments by the Soviet Union. With respect to the cutback and eventual cut-off in fissionable material production, it is my understanding that if we should go in for multiple warheads in a big way, this would materially increase the need for plutonium. I should think that this question should at least be looked at before any decision is made. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964. Secret; Limit Distribution. 2 In a memorandum to the Committee of Principals, November 23, Foster outlined “a renewed and broadly based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation,” as follows: “ First , an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which includes a U.S. position on the MLF designed to facilitate agreement. “ Second , the working out of an understanding to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. “ Third , the reopening of technical discussions in order to achieve a comprehensive nuclear test ban. “ Fourth , an understanding to halt new construction of land-based ICBM launch sites (and possibly ABM launch sites) verified by our respective national capabilities, while we negotiate a wider and more formal strategic nuclear delivery freeze. “ Fifth , requested assurance that the announced Soviet cutback in planned production of fissionable material has in fact been made; with an indication that if this question is resolved we can move forward to a verified total production cutoff and a transfer of materials to peaceful uses, under IAEA safeguards, together with destruction of some nuclear weapons. “Sixth, if assurance on the fissionable material cut-back is forthcoming, a simultaneous announcement of planned reductions in military budgets.” (Ibid.) 3 Foster's November 23 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above is attached to a November 24 covering memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, McCone, and Seaborg. (Ibid.) No covering memorandum from Fisher to the Committee of Principals, November 25, however, has been found. 53. Memorandum of Conversation 53. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, December 5, 1964, 4 p.m. SecDe1/MC/8 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, December 1964 SUBJECT Non-Dissemination; MLF PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Ambassador Stevenson Ambassador Kohler Mr. Tyler Mr. Taylor-BTF Mr. McIntyre-BTF Mr. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Dobrynin Ambassador Fedorenko Mr. Smirnovskiy Mr. Falin Mr. Sukhodrev Mr. Gromyko raised the subject of non-dissemination, noting the Secretary knew well the Soviet position on that subject. That position had been stated on a number of occasions, but, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to state again that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the non-dissemination question. The U.S., too, had on a number of occasions stressed the significance of that question. In the past, the Soviet Union had the impression of the U.S. sincerely wanting a non-dissemination agreement. However, as time went on, it had become clear that this was not so because, in parallel with U.S. statements stressing the importance of non-dissemination and indicating the desire for negotiations and agreement on that subject, plans were being hatched for the creation of the MLF—in other words, plans for associating the FRG with nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko said that on behalf of the Soviet Government, he wished to state once again that the MLF plans were an obstacle to agreement on non-dissemination. The Soviet Union was of the opinion that the MLF would be of no significance from the military standpoint, given the existing correlation of forces. But the situation in Europe and the world at large would become much more dangerous and alarming if the MLF were created. The Soviet Union could not ignore the fact that Germany had unleashed two world wars within the span of one generation. He said he wanted to repeat with all forcefulness that a non-dissemination agreement was obstructed by the MLF plans. If that obstacle were removed, a broad non-dissemination agreement could be concluded which would be in the interests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and of the world at large. As to the content of such an agreement, the Soviet Union had given the U.S. a proposed text. 2 The Soviet Union regarded that text as not being out of date, but was prepared to discuss language at any time. He hoped that the U.S. Government would be prepared again to discuss the non-dissemination problem with the Soviet Government and any other party concerned. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Union was not impressed by tranquillizing statements regarding some separate arrangements between the U.S. and the FRG which allegedly removed the threat to the Soviet Union. Such statements were not tranquillizing at all and could not be accepted. The Secretary said we regarded non-dissemination as a very serious problem to all of us at this time. We believed that today at least half a dozen countries had the technical capability of detonating a nuclear device within two or three years, with the expenditure of about $150 million above what was being spent today on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Another half a dozen countries could do the same, but somewhat later. We regarded the spread of nuclear weapons as a very negative and dangerous development. It was in the very nature of nuclear weapons that those who had them and knew about them viewed their spread with dismay. Therefore, the U.S. had been consistently against dissemination. The Secretary then said he wished to ask Mr. Gromyko a couple of questions. He noted that most of what we were doing was known to the U.S.S.R. from our public statements or announcements, whereas the reverse was not true. We had certain information indicating that the Soviet Union had made arrangements with some countries on its side regarding nuclear delivery vehicles, and we were wondering about any arrangements the U.S.S.R. might have with those countries regarding actual nuclear weapons, their control, etc. The Secretary pointed out that while we were virgins with respect to dissemination, we were not certain about the U.S.S.R. The only cooperation in the nuclear weapons field we had was with the U.K., and such cooperation stemmed from our partnership in the nuclear weapons program during World War II. On the other hand, some of our visitors to Moscow, in talking with Soviet personalities, had received the impression that the Soviet Union had provided fuel for the Chinese detonation. He therefore thought it useful to ask Mr. Gromyko about Soviet arrangements with other parties regarding delivery vehicles and also about any Soviet contribution to the Chinese capability of detonating a nuclear device. Mr. Gromyko responded that as far as China was concerned, he had already given the Secretary certain clarifications, and there was nothing he could add. In any event, the U.S. should base its conclusions regarding Soviet actions on Soviet statements rather than on rumors stemming from dubious sources. Regarding allegations about delivery vehicle arrangements, which were also based on rumors, he could only say that in considering the non-dissemination problem, the U.S. should not look for any difference between Soviet words and deed. There were perhaps other governments whose words and deeds differed and whose policies of yesterday were not those of today, or whose policies of today might change tomorrow. He wished to stress that it was in the interest of peace to have a broad non-dissemination agreement concluded. Otherwise, if nuclear weapons were to spread all over the world, everybody would lose. Perhaps the U.S. Government would find it possible to consider this problem with a view to finding agreement between the two sides. He wished to note that discussions on non-dissemination, just as talks on any important subject, were no hide-and-seek game. The great powers particularly should keep this in mind, since no responsible government was free to say one thing and do another. Therefore, he wanted to appeal to the U.S. Government to approach non-dissemination in a serious manner; perhaps not everything was lost yet and perhaps there was still possibility of agreement. If no agreement should be reached, many non-nuclear powers would acquire nuclear weapons, the situation would be much more complicated and much more difficult to control, and all parties would stand to lose. The Secretary said he didn't wish to press the questions he had asked of Mr. Gromyko. However, he wished to point out some facts as we saw them. For instance, some Warsaw Pact countries had publicly displayed armaments highly inefficient for use as conventional weapons but highly suitable for use as nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko interjected that this might be a subjective appraisal. The Secretary responded that he couldn't help being who he was or being on his side. The Secretary continued that whenever NATO countries were in a similar position there were public statements giving the necessary information, but there was no such information in the case of the Warsaw Pact countries. The Secretary stressed that we were deeply concerned about proliferation. The danger of proliferation came from different sources. For example, Sweden and Switzerland, two countries with a long and profound tradition of neutrality, in signing the Limited Test Ban had stated that they were not giving up their right to any future decision regarding acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The French Prime Minister recently had made a speech in which he said that if a nation had the capability of producing nuclear weapons it was almost obligated to do so. 3 As Mr. Gromyko knew, we were in disagreement with France on this point. The Chinese detonation had raised questions in India and Japan. While we hoped that those countries would not embark upon a nuclear weapons program, this situation still presented a grave problem. Moreover, unfortunately, the question of acquiring nuclear weapons also arose among those countries who were the targets of nuclear weapons. It was one thing to have nuclear weapons and another to be in the bull's-eye of those weapons. He did not wish to recriminate, but the fact was that some NATO countries were in the target area of nuclear weapons. For this reason, those countries wanted a voice in nuclear defense matters, matters which were vital to their security. Turning to the MLF, the Secretary noted that he had discussed this subject with Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin on earlier occasions. What he wished to know was whether the Soviet Union objected to the MLF really on strictly non-dissemination grounds or whether its objections were due to some broader considerations. If the latter was the case, e.g., if the Soviet Union was objecting to the existence of NATO as such, there was nothing that could be done about it, although of course we hoped that gradually the situation would improve and tensions would lessen. On the other hand, if the Soviet objections to the MLF were based on non-dissemination, he wished to repeat that under the MLF arrangements, we would not permit transfer of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons technology to any non-nuclear member of the force. Of course, a great deal of information about nuclear technology was now available in popular publications which even high school students could read, but he wished to stress that under the MLF arrangements, no non-nuclear member would be involved in the overhaul or repair of nuclear weapons or would obtain custody of such weapons. In sum, no non-nuclear member of the force would be able to acquire national nuclear weapons capability through the force, no such member could employ the weapons on its own, and no such member could take apart or repair nuclear weapons. Consequently, we saw no arrangement envisaged for the MLF that would be inconsistent with the principle of non-dissemination. Our conscience was clear as regards non-dissemination in the MLF. If the Soviet Union was concerned that the MLF might be only the first step towards acquisition of national nuclear weapons capability, such concern could be removed, and we could state that the first step would be the last step. Indeed, this point was reflected in the non-proliferation language we had given the Soviet Union two years ago. While he didn't know about the situation among the socialist states, the Secretary said that the problem of dissemination did exist in non-socialist states, whether they were allied with us or not. The Chinese detonation was a great disappointment to us and we did not believe it was a good thing for us or the Soviet Union or anyone else. But those were the factors urging others to build their own nuclear weapons unless, of course, we succeeded in stopping the process. In the MLF, we gave participation to those who were the target of nuclear weapons so that they could know they would be taken into account in decisions regarding nuclear defense, but without transfer of nuclear weapons capability. However, with respect to such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, India, and possibly others, we needed Soviet cooperation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Secretary observed that he had discussed all this on a number of occasions and there was nothing he could add at this point. The MLF was still under discussion, and as Mr. Gromyko knew, the British Prime Minister was coming to Washington next week. 4 Mr. Gromyko would surely learn a great deal about those discussions from newspapers. But, in any event, if the Soviet concern about the MLF was with respect to non-dissemination, we could meet it because we ourselves are against proliferation. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union was against NATO, we were afraid we could not do much about it. Mr. Gromyko said Soviet objections to the MLF were based on both broad and narrow considerations. The broad consideration was that German imperialists had unleashed two world wars in thirty years. The Soviet Union had suffered tremendous losses in those wars, and particularly in World War II. It was good that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been on the same side in World War II, but still it was the Soviet Union which had had to bear the main burden in fighting the Germans. The Soviet Union could not ignore this fact in appraising the situation in Europe and in looking into the future. This is how he wanted to answer the Secretary's first question. In reply to the Secretary's second question, Mr. Gromyko said, he wished to state that the Soviet Union could not rely on U.S. assurances regarding the various technical safeguards such as keys, etc., because all such technical devices were subordinate to policy. The policy of German military quarters was well known to the Soviet Union; the ashes of World War II had been still warm when the German militarists advanced the slogan calling for a revision of the German borders established as a result of World War II. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. could not rely on those technical devices the U.S. maintained would prevent proliferation. In asking his second question, the Secretary had mentioned NATO. The Secretary knew the Soviet appraisal of NATO, which was that NATO did not serve peace. However, if we started discussing this question, that would lead us far away and there was really no point in doing so. Mr. Gromyko then stated that if the U.S. had definitely decided to create the MLF, it was assuming a great and heavy responsibility. The Soviet Government would regard the creation of an MLF, in whatever form, and the provision of access to nuclear weapons to the FRG as a hostile act towards the Soviet Union. If the MLF plans were implemented, the Soviet Government and its allies obviously would have to draw appropriate conclusions for their own policy. However, he still hoped that not everything was lost and that a broad and conclusive agreement on non-dissemination could be reached. The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on a few of Mr. Gromyko's points. He said he disagreed with Mr. Gromyko's remarks about German militarists. We knew the background of the two World Wars, in both of which our two countries had been on the same side. It was for this reason that we wanted a definitive settlement of the German problem in a period when we knew that the Germans wanted peace, when the Germans were deeply involved with the rest of Europe, and when it was possible to prevent a development echoing the past. As to the MLF, it was not up to Washington alone to make a decision. This question would be decided by a number of governments as a group and not unilaterally by the U.S. However, in any event, we were not talking about access to nuclear weapons and this was a fundamental point. No one—Germany, Italy, or anyone else—in the MLF would have access to nuclear weapons in the sense anybody could object to. No national nuclear weapons capability and no technical nuclear capability would arise from the MLF. There would be further discussions on the MLF among the allies, and the Soviet Union would surely be au courant as they proceeded. We hoped the Soviet Union would cooperate so that we could have general agreement on non-dissemination. However, the Secretary said, he wished to emphasize that he was talking about actual nuclear weapons and not about considerations having nothing to do with actual weapons. Mr. Gromyko noted the advanced hour and said that at the next meeting with the Secretary, he would wish to discuss the question of the reduction of troops in Europe. He would wish to ascertain the U.S. views on whether anything could be agreed upon in that area. In addition, he would wish to discuss the question of a German peace settlement and to see whether there was any possibility of agreement on certain aspects of the German problem. The Secretary said he had no objection to discussing these points. For his part, he would also want to get Mr. Gromyko's views about the prospects for agreement on the so-called bonfire. He wondered whether we could add certain armaments to those included in our original bonfire proposal. In addition, perhaps certain points from Mr. Gromyko's speech at the General Assembly could be discussed at the next meeting, since we assumed that Mr. Gromyko would speak before he met again with us. It was agreed that the next meeting would take place on December 9, prior to Mr. Gromyko's meeting with the President. 1 Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Gromyko/Secretary Conversations, December 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 9. The source text is labeled “Part III of III.” The meeting, which took place at the U.N. Mission, was one of several between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko in late November and December in New York and Washington. Memoranda of their conversations on disarmament on November 30 and December 2, 9, and 19 are ibid., and also in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. 2 Not further identified. 3 Presumably a reference to French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou's speech in the French National Assembly on December 2. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 492-497. 4 Prime Minister Harold Wilson had discussions with U.S. leaders in Washington, December 6-9. For selected documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Documents 58 - 63 . 54. Memorandum of Conversation 54. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 9, 1964, 5 p.m. SUBJECT U.S.-Soviet Relations PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Secretary Ambassador Kohler Ambassador Thompson Mr. Akalovsky U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Smirnovskiy, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry Mr. Sukhodrev [Here follow exchanges of pleasantries, Gromyko's general survey of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the President's optimistic assessment of the relationship over the past year.] The President continued that in the period of the Democratic administrations, we had been encouraged by the progress made in some fields. Agreement had been reached on the hot line, on the Limited Test Ban, and the Consular Convention now pending before the Senate. Also, there had been reciprocal actions by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in cutting back the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and substantial reductions had been made in our preparedness effort. We had observed with pleasure the desire of the Soviet Government to reduce its military budget. As far as we were concerned, in the brief period between 1964 and 1966, there would be a reduction in our military spending by some $2-3 billion; this was a substantial reduction, particularly if one took into account the military pay-raise, which obviously would not add to our military effort but would only make it easier for military personnel to acquire goods for their own use, such as housing, etc. Mr. McNamara's plan provided for the closing of 566 military installations; just recently, he had announced the closing of 95 such installations. This trend towards economy caused hardships in certain areas, but generally speaking the American people were pleased with it. The President then noted that he had tried, notwithstanding occasional failure, to understand some things he saw in the papers. He had tried to refrain from criticizing Soviet leaders personally, even though sometimes he read in the papers about their views on what he did in certain parts of the world. He simply took the papers home, showed them to his wife, and tried to forget, without replying. He did so because he sincerely believed that both of our countries wanted peace if they could only find it. They were like children hunting for Easter eggs, and it was important that both of them searched until they were found. Things would be all right if both of our countries showed patience and understanding and if they adhered to the principle of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” Summarizing, the President said we wanted to do everything in order to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. He reiterated his pleasure at the hot line agreement, and said he was also pleased with the Exchange Program and the understandings reached in the field of outer space. He noted that he had received an excellent report from his Science Advisor, Dr. Hornig, who had been very well received in the Soviet Union and who had greatly enjoyed his discussions there. 2 He had also received a good report from the U.S. businessmen who recently had visited the Soviet Union. 3 Reiterating that the Consular Convention was pending in the Senate, the President also noted that the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement was ready for signature; however, we didn't want to kill the former by signing the latter prematurely. The President reiterated that the November elections clearly showed that the American people rejected the course advocated by Goldwater, a course which was opposed to the one the present Administration was following. Some people had said rather ugly things about Mr. McNamara in connection with his economy drive. But we believed that the American people at large supported the policies of the present Administration. Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said he would convey them to the Soviet Government. He thought there were two main questions relating to U.S.-Soviet relations. The first one was that of the arms race. Arms were constantly piling up; indeed, stockpiles were as high as the Mont Blanc. However, what was important was not only their quantity but also their destructive capability. The Soviet Government believed it would be important if both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as well as other countries, were to find a radical solution to the armaments problem. In such a case, all would gain—both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and also the U.K., France, and others. Of course, this was a very complex problem and even if there was a will to resolve it, its solution would require time. Therefore, partial steps were needed. He did not wish to enumerate the individual steps which the Soviet Union believed would lessen tensions and facilitate disarmament, inasmuch as he had discussed them with the Secretary. However, he did want to draw the President's attention to one area where the Soviet Union believed there was possibility of agreement. The Soviet Union believed that it should be possible to reduce U.S. and Soviet troops, as well as foreign troops generally, in Europe. Such a step would not be important from the standpoint of the existing correlation of forces since such correlation would remain unchanged; however, such a step would reduce tensions in Europe and in the world at large. Referring to the President's remark about the closing of 95 bases, Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that one could close 95 obsolete bases and build two new ones which would be more powerful than all the 95 taken together. He thought this point only emphasized the importance of disarmament. As to the President's remark about some statements aimed at him personally, Mr. Gromyko said they were probably an incorrect interpretation by the American press. There had been no statements by Soviet leaders aimed at personalities; they spoke only in terms of the principles of policy. Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to turn to the European problem, and particularly the German question. However, perhaps the President might first wish to comment on the arms race problem. The President noted that both sides had had a great number of discussions about disarmament and had submitted their respective proposals at various times. He said only today he had suggested to the Secretary that the Soviet December 7 statement on disarmament 4 be fully explored in order to see whether it contained any hope of agreement. Earlier this year, the President continued, he had made a statement expounding the views of our Government on the subject of disarmament. He hoped progress could be made in this area. We were particularly concerned about the problem of non-proliferation. He had spent the past two or three days discussing this very problem; namely, how to keep nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of others. 5 As to the bases we were closing, they were not essential to the state of preparedness we believed was required, and we would save the salaries of 50,000-60,000 men who would be released as a result of that action. The President reiterated his pleasure at our intended reduction in military spending by $2-3 billion between 1964 and 1966, and at the Soviet-announced cut of 500 million rubles in their upcoming military budget. He said the U.S. would be willing to consider any suggestions regarding disarmament and repeated that we would evaluate the Soviet December 7 disarmament statement with a view to fully exploring the possibilities for agreement, if there were any. Regarding the remarks made about him personally, he did not mean that there had been comments about his height or looks, but he did wish to stress the desirability of not questioning the motives of other governments and of knowing what one was talking about. We had always refrained from questioning the motives of the other side and we believed this was better for our relations. The President then stressed the concern we had about the nuclear explosion conducted by the Chinese Communists. He said we were anxious to avoid a situation where others might follow in the footsteps of the Chinese. We were doing all we could to discourage others from embarking upon a nuclear weapons program. Mr. Gromyko said that since the President had stated the U.S. Government's support for disarmament and non-proliferation, he wished to state that it was the Soviet Government's firm position to do everything to facilitate disarmament and to prevent proliferation. Turning to Europe, Mr. Gromyko said World War II had left behind it a very complex situation. The Soviet Union did not regret the results of the War. Both of our countries had been on the same side of the barricades in World War II, and it was as a result of their joint struggle that Nazi Germany had been forced to its knees. However, now the situation was different. In the light of past experience, the Soviet Union wanted to create a situation in Europe where no seeds of a new world war could be sown. Thus, the Soviet Union believed it to be most important for the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the other states concerned to draw a line under World War II and to have a German peace settlement on the basis of the situation which exists as a result of that war. That would be in the interest of both of our countries. Mr. Gromyko said that the second point he wished to make was related to non-dissemination and to the general situation in Europe as well. The Soviet Union saw a great danger in the plans for providing the FRG with access to nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was not concerned over this because the existing correlation of forces would change. The FRG would not become stronger as a result of the implementation of those plans, but the possibilities for provocation by the Germans would greatly increase and the situation in Europe would become much more acute. He continued that the Soviet Union would welcome it if common language could be found on a German peace settlement and on the question of non-proliferation. He wondered whether the President could state his views on these points, noting that he had another brief point to raise later. The President reiterated that we were greatly concerned about the fact that the Chinese had developed and exploded their nuclear device, and that we wanted to do everything possible to prevent any other power from following the Chinese example. We realized that the more nations possessed nuclear weapons, the greater the danger, and we would not do anything which would increase that capacity. The U.K. now wished to minimize its effort in the nuclear weapons field, and we did not want to stimulate the Germans to exercise the capacity we knew they could possess. The President said he had tried to be very patient during his service as President, and we now had the U.K. discussing the problem with the Germans rather than Uncle Sam having to indicate any particular conduct. Of course, there were some who wanted to encourage the Germans to build up their own capacity. We were trying to counter this because we saw what happened in China. Thus, Mr. Gromyko could be sure that we were genuine and sincere in our attempts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. We recognized the tremendous power the Soviet Union had, and we also recognized our own tremendous power. We were not anxious at all to see the number of nuclear powers increase. He assured Mr. Gromyko that we did not want to encourage the proliferation process. The President said he was happy that both sides now seemed to be in agreement as to the importance of non-proliferation, and his people would be encouraged by what Mr. Gromyko had said on this point. As to Germany, we would be glad to receive any new ideas the Soviet Union might have on the German problem. Of course, we were familiar with the standing Soviet position that both German states should be recognized. The President said he did not believe much progress could be made on that basis. If the Soviet Union had any new ideas, he would ask the Secretary to stop traveling all over the world and get busy studying them. Reverting to non-proliferation, the President said we did not have in mind to give the Germans nuclear technology or to encourage nuclear aspirations in any other way. What we were trying to do was to deter them from seeking an independent capability and to forestall any pressures that might develop in that direction. The U.K. was now prepared to give up its independent capability and to get out of the picture; what we wanted to do was to prevent the Germans from getting into the picture. In this effort, we needed Soviet encouragement and maybe even their prayers. For, as frequently is the case in negotiations, we were not in complete agreement with our partners in the course of the past two days' discussions. The pressure for an independent nuclear capability in Germany was not strong today, but it could become so quickly in the absence of our leadership. Mr. Gromyko commented that while it was true that both sides said they were in favor of non-proliferation, they were in agreement only in theory and their actions were in different directions. The President has said the Germans might follow the Chinese example; however, the Soviet Union was providing an alternative, namely, a broad non-proliferation agreement. As to new ideas on the German problem, Mr. Gromyko said that if the exchange of views on the German problem continued, he did not exclude the possibility of the Soviet Union's put-ting forward new considerations on some points, particularly on the question of the Western forces in West Berlin. The Secretary remarked that he would have discussions with his colleagues shortly and that he would be in touch with the Soviet side. [Here follows discussion of Cuba and the Caribbean.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky on December 11 and approved in S on December 15 and by the White House on December 16. The meeting was held in the White House. 2 Hornig headed a delegation of U.S. industrial research leaders that visited factories, laboratories, and engineering design institutes from Moscow to Novosibirsk in Siberia during a 2-week study tour in mid-November. No written report of Hornig's trip has been found. 3 Reference may be to the business leaders who accompanied Hornig. No written report of their visit has been found. 4 Reference is to a Soviet memorandum on measures for the further reduction of international tension and limitation of armaments, submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on December 7. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 509-517. Extracts from Gromyko's speech to the U.N. General Assembly the same day, in which he expounded on the memorandum, are ibid,. pp. 500-509. 5 An apparent reference to President Johnson's talks with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson December 6-9; see footnote 4, Document 53 . 55. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 55. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 1 Washington, December 10, 1964. SUBJECT Memorandum for the Principals on Subjects for Possible Discussion with the USSR Your memorandum of December 3 2 raises a number of important and difficult issues which require further study. I believe that the subjects raised deserve careful attention and staffing before being considered by a meeting of the Principals. I am not at all sure that the present time is the most appropriate one to take up the dialogue on disarmament with the Soviet leaders. We are not certain as to what direction the policy of the new Soviet Government will take. 3 If the disarmament debate in the United Nations is delayed, as now seems possible, I should think there would be a delay in the resumption of the work of the ENDC. If this should be the case, I would suggest we might do well to wait to see how the Sino-Soviet quarrel develops. In any event, I doubt if the new Soviet leadership is yet ready to take any important steps in this field. Comments on Point 1—A Non-Proliferation Agreement (a) We are presently embarked on the course of seeking an acceptable Resolution in the UNGA which would hopefully reduce opportunities for Soviet obstructionism. This continues to seem to be the most promising course for progress on non-proliferation during the period of decision on Allied nuclear arrangements. (b) I do not believe that it would be appropriate or feasible for the US to approach the Soviets at this time with respect to assurances on such matters as the European clause of an MLF. We can, of course, restate our general assurances that MLF forces could not be used by national decision of any non-nuclear power. However, we should not go beyond this until the issues involved are decided in negotiations with our Allies. (c) I am still very skeptical of the wisdom of giving assurance that the MLF will not be used to increase the number of independent decision-making entities. It would appear to me that this will be worked out in connection with the MLF itself and, since I do not believe it would in fact change the Soviet attitude toward MLF, I do not think we should give such an assurance at this time, particularly in the absence of any quid pro quo. (d) In addition, I do not believe that any assurance, even one jettisoning the European clause, would buy acceptance by the Soviets pending final resolution of the MLF question. As you know, Ambassador Kohler shares this judgment. Comments on Point 2—Preventing the Spread of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (a) In the memorandum of December 3 much of the discussion is written in terms of “nuclear delivery vehicles”; it should specify strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in all cases. 4 Any question with respect to tactical nuclear delivery vehicles would pose a host of additional problems with respect to ongoing programs especially, but not exclusively, with respect to our European Allies. Although we would wish to define “strategic” vehicles as we have done in our production freeze proposal, we must recognize that the Soviets will almost certainly continue to challenge that definition. (b) In consideration of any measure of this kind, it would be necessary to assure continuing freedom to transfer strategic delivery vehicles to an MLF. (c) At a time when we are still considering the implications of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons, we should preserve options for possible transfer of strategic delivery vehicles. (d) In addition to further study taking account of points raised above, we would need to consider whether we wished to make any informal agreement subject only to similar Soviet restraint. Comments on Point 3—A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (a) I think it is not quite accurate to state that the Soviets “have given no indication as yet that they would be prepared to permit any on-site inspection.” It would be more accurate to note that the Soviets have withdrawn their earlier offer of three on-site inspections and persistently state that no on-site inspections will be allowed. (b) I agree heartily that we should initiate a priority review of the US position, but until this is done I believe we should not press the Soviets. Given their firmly stated position, I think it would be misleading to tell them that in our view “a treaty at an early date is feasible.” I am pleased to see that you suggest that such a review should include a reappraisal of the impact on the military balance of possible undetected violations; I think it should also include reappraisal of the expectations for military gains from future underground testing both by the USSR and the US. In addition, the political effects of a comprehensive test ban should, of course, be included. (c) With respect to the provision for assurance that weapons development shots are not disguised as peaceful detonations, my understanding is that only sophisticated devices could be successfully used and I therefore do not see how the assurance suggested could be obtained without revealing US technology on any shots we undertake. 5 Comments on Point 4—Extending the Freeze to Include Reductions (a) In the discussion, the Soviet proposal for a nuclear umbrella is described as an alternative to our freeze proposal. It is, however, not offered as a corollary measure but as part of the GCD plan. In addition, while the Soviets have not been precise, I think it is more accurate to say that the Soviets have indicated the number of strategic delivery vehicles which they envisage for the umbrella is very small, rather than “relatively small”; that they have in mind parity of numbers, rather than application of any percentage reduction; and that they have specified informally that only land-based ICBMs could be allowed. (b) At the time of earlier consideration of this question, the Principals rejected a freeze coupled with reductions and especially the possibility of variable reductions under which the US might cut a large number of ICBMs than would the Soviets. I would not object to reconsideration of this question, but I believe it clearly deserves further study before any discussion with the Soviets. Comments on Point 5—Halting Construction of New ICBM and ABM Sites (a) I think the proposal to halt construction of new ICBM and ABM sites is the most promising of the ACDA proposals from the point of view of Soviet acceptance, even though its implementation now would freeze a US advantage. We should, however, decide on a clearly defined proposal before initiating exploratory discussions with the Soviets. (b) Military consequences of the SNDV freeze have already been assessed and found satisfactory, as the paper notes. I am not, however, certain that an assessment of the consequences of implementation of a freeze only on certain land-based launch sites can be based on an assessment of a much broader proposed measure. Incidentally, I think there might well be a problem with respect to sites partly constructed at the time of any agreement. (c) ABMs are included on page 2, but their inclusion is left in the air on page 12. We continue to be concerned about the possible destabilizing effect of any freeze on strategic offensive delivery systems which would not also include strategic defensive systems. At the same time, I question whether we should tie our hand on this matter at a time when we are still considering the advantages of damage-limiting capability, and such questions as the value of an ABM for dealing with potential small Chinese Communist intercontinental capabilities in the 1970's. (d) I very much doubt if the Soviets would cooperate in excluding seaborne strategic delivery launchers, particularly since this would facilitate agreement on an MLF. However, if they were to agree to such a provision we would probably have pushed them toward a buildup in a submarine launch system. (e) A proposal limited to ICBMs, while it has certain advantages from our point of view, would also provoke Allied concern as to whether the US was reaching agreement advantageous to North America without equal regard for the Soviet missile threat to Western Europe. Assuming, however, that we could deal with these concerns, we might find new pressures rising for a NATO land-based MRBM system. (f) The proposed 18-24 month moratorium “pending negotiation of a freeze (on site construction? on vehicles?) with provision for verification” would probably vitiate considerably our bargaining power for agreement on verification. The onus for withdrawal and resumption of deployment, if agreement were not reached on verification, would rest on the US. (g) I believe the problem of the sufficiency and perishability of US unilateral intelligence collection capability requires careful consideration. Moreover, the question would doubtless be posed as to why, if the US is confident that it could detect ICBM deployments, it needs to overfly Cuba. I don't say that this question cannot be answered, but we would be faced with the need to give a rather precise reply. Finally, our general position on inspection for disarmament might be undercut. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Garthoff. At the end of the source text are concurrences initialed by Richard H. Davis (EUR), Henry D. Owen (S/P), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Thomas L. Hughes (INR), and Richard N. Gardner (IO). 2 Following receipt of comments from Thompson and other principals on his November 23 memorandum to the Committee of Principals (see Document 52 ), Foster sent a revised memorandum to the Committee of Principals on December 3. This memorandum recommended “a renewed and broadly based effort to prevent nuclear proliferation,” as follows: “ First , an intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which clearly commits all parties to halt proliferation in any form. “ Second , informal discussions to prevent the spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. “ Third , the reinstitution of negotiations looking toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. “ Fourth , a proposal to extend our freeze proposal to include reduction of an agreed number of nuclear delivery vehicles and launch sites. “ Fifth , an understanding to halt the construction of any new land-based ICBM launch sites and ABM launch sites after July 1, 1965, while we negotiate limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles.” (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, August-December 1964) A sanitized copy of Foster's memorandum is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 9, pp. 529B-529N. 3 On October 15, it was announced in Moscow that Khrushchev had been removed from power and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, and Alexei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, would succeed him. 4 In the margin next to this sentence is the handwritten notation, presumably by Keeny: “correct!” 5 In the margin next to this sentence is the handwritten notation, presumably by Keeny: “Correct—We may have to drop Plowshare.” 56. Draft Minutes of Discussion of the Second Meeting of Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 56. Draft Minutes of Discussion of the Second Meeting of Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 1 Washington, December 13-14, 1964. 1. Opening Remarks Mr. Gilpatric outlined the intended program of the 1-1/2 day meeting, emphasizing the timeliness of the Committee's review in view of the need for imminent White House decisions on three export issues (transfers of U-235 to France for use in a stationary submarine reactor, and of plutonium to Euratom for its fast reactor program, and the sale of two computers to the French Atomic Energy Authority) and on the MLF. He reviewed progress in sub-group activities, which he hoped would continue in the weeks ahead. Prior to the next meeting, the staff would work to elicit views and reactions of individual Committee members, and thereafter seek to put together the basis for a report that could be circulated to members before the January 19 meeting. To achieve maximum usefulness, Committee views could be presented to the Government either piecemeal or on any other basis that might prove appropriate. 2. Export Control Policies and Problems Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, with assistance from colleagues, discussed the problems posed by U.S. efforts to control trade in technological elements useful for nuclear weapons programs, especially to France, while maintaining the fabric of normal commercial and political relationships. The U.S. has long, and to the extent possible, satisfactory experience with regard to export controls to the Bloc, where no countervailing commercial considerations exist. In regard to France, policy is now articulated in National Security Action Memorandum 294, of April 20, 1964 (attached), 2 which bars “exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate (the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity) by significantly affecting timing quality or costs or would identify the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator.” Mr. Kitchen emphasized the difficulty in discriminating within the “gray areas” of exchanges, i.e. transfers that would neither “significantly affect …” the French as in the case of major military systems or sub-systems nor make no significant contribution. Efforts within the past six months, centered in the Department of State with technical assistance from other agencies, have not been successful in identifying broadly applicable categories beyond specific end items, which even then, because of conflicting policy considerations can only be regulated on a “case-by-case” basis. He emphasized that ample legal authority for controls exist, but that we remain deficient in the ability to discriminate clearly and efficiently. Mentioning computers as a case in point, he cited pending transfers of a Control Data Corporation machine to the French weapons laboratory and an advanced IBM machine to the French Atomic Energy Authority for general research. Despite obvious French intentions with regard to these machines, Mr. Kitchen pointed to the hardships and likely retaliation to U.S. corporations and their European affiliates and the availability to the French of alternate facilities in Europe, should the sales be denied. Dr. York on the other hand, emphasized the material handicaps to weapons scientists of not having ready physical access to an appropriate computer, and suggested the significance of sales to the French be judged on the basis of their relation to overall laboratory expenditures. Mr. Kitchen pointed to the special and unsolved problems of regulating transfers where a domestic French company is controlled or partly owned by a U.S. supplier itself subject to effective control. Dr. Perkins emphasized the potential wide sweep of NSAM 294, overriding any narrow interpretation of its scope, through its provision barring the appearance of assistance to the French weapons program. He, Mr. Gilpatric, and Dr. York joined in identifying four dimensions of the export problem to France: —normal commercial relations, the direct current effort to hamper French weapons production, fulfillment of previous commitments to the French (e.g. submarine reactor U-235), and the indirect provision of assistance through Euratom. Mr. Kitchen emphasized the lack of intelligence and experience with the impact of exchanges of French weapons production sufficient to serve as a base for firm discrimination (although he said NSAM 294 merely confirms long-standing policy), and said that the French are now subtly trying to probe the inadequately coordinated U.S. control mechanism to achieve maximum advantage. Consideration, meanwhile, is now being given to the problems of broadening the NSAM's application to other countries. Discussion resumed with Mr. Kratzer of the AEC 3 about the Euratom plutonium sale, in which he made the assertion, which was challenged, that the British are ready, willing and able to supply Euratom should we cancel our proposed sale. 3. U.S. Response to Pressures for Proliferation Mr. Walt W. Rostow, Counselor of the Department of State, presented a broad review of the factors making for proliferation and of U.S. policy alternatives, based on his paper “A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation,” 4 supplemented by comments about individual countries. He traced our current policies back to the Post-War Baruch plan, and forward to the prospect of eventual arms control, emphasizing that meanwhile it is insufficient to try to stop proliferation to the exclusion of considering other U.S. objectives. He contrasted Soviet policy since 1956 (overhanging threat of nuclear war, pressure on Berlin as a divisive issue in the West, and maneuvers to get U.S. to start conflict) against successful U.S. policies of shoring up world security while working to lessen tension. Proliferation now holds the dangers of increasing the risk of war and posing a “dilemma of commitment” through U.S. efforts to maintain a more dangerous balance or withdrawal from exposed position. Alternatively, U.S. should seek to strengthen factors working against proliferation by (1) “giving our allies knowledge and maturity about the inherently collective nature of the deterrent,” (2) emphasizing other routes to prestige than national weapons production, and (3) enhancing the “credibility and relevance to security of U.S. military power.” With respect to Europe, Mr. Rostow referred to a “package” of measures under consideration in the Policy Planning Council, including consultation, commitments to collective negotiation, and the MLF/ANF. He saw evolution in Britain since her first achievement of an independent deterrent, and in Germany “an overwhelming vote against an independent nuclear force.” If the MLF fails to come to pass, he saw the need in Germany for either an extension of current bilateral relations with the U.S. or a link-up with the French, with whom the Germans are now “utterly at cross-purposes.” The MLF, however, offers the Germans “prestige along with participation, and increasing credibility to the deterrent.” If the U.S. maintained its veto, the MLF would be a logical extension of our two-key arrangements to meet the need for substitutions for the MMRBM and obsolescent QRA aircraft. He indicated four steps that would give substance to our evolving European posture: (1) Repeal the 1958 Atomic Energy Act amendment allowing transfers of military nuclear information when a country has made “substantial progress” in its own weapons capability, an implicit reward for undertaking weapons development. (2) Secure a non-acquisition pledge from the Germans as an element of the MLF. (3) Encourage the British to publish a white paper on the fruitlessness of their independent deterrent. (4) Dramatize our readiness for serious arms control negotiations. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed to technical anachronisms in the mixed-manning approach of the MLF, stating that such procedures are more suitable to systems more dependent upon cooperative human performance. Outside of Europe, Mr. Rostow pointed to the need to avoid premature U.S. reinsurance or “loss of options” in the wake of the Chicom explosion. Japan needed an outlet for its technology in support of its security, perhaps through an Asian MLF or weapons pool. In India, there will be difficulty in getting compatible U.S. and Russian commitments; Mr. Rostow notes deep nationalism in Indian youth, awareness of the costs of a nuclear deterrent, and a need for demonstration of technological success. A pool of weapons available to both India and Pakistan for defense against external attack might be suitable to deal with their mutual suspicion. Mr. Henry Rowen (DOD/ISA) predicted a difficult defense problem for the Indians, should they elect to achieve their own deterrent in the face of what will probably be a sophisticated Chinese program. He posed the need for serious and urgent U.S. study of steps necessary if we sought to discourage Indian efforts, specifically including the content and form of a treaty, the commitments necessary to make U.S. guarantees credible, the secrecy of our commitments, and the partners we would seek to involve (i.e. Russia?). 5. Status of the MLF Ambassador Gerard Smith (Special Assistant to the Secretary/MLF, Department of State) outlined the history and objectives of the Multilateral Force proposal, beginning with the post-Sputnik decision of the North Atlantic Council to provide an intermediate range force for SACEUR and European access to tactical nuclear weapons. The MLF is not proliferation, he said, because it represents an affirmative step to stop the loss of control over nuclear weapons and the loss of design data to other countries, while the U.S. exercises its necessary affirmative vote. In response to a question, Ambassador Smith acknowledged that MLF ships could be overpowered and seized, but not without risk of war. Any exposure of design data would be comparable to what our allies have already. Soviet surveillance and control would not be possible short of installation of extensive satellite systems, due to Western Europe's extensive coastal waters making evasion simple. Capital cost of the MLF was put at $2.3 billion for a 25-ship force, with $160 million annual operating expenses. 6. Underground Nuclear Testing Dr. Harold Brown (Director, Defense Research and Engineering) discussed military aspects of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which he said would probably slightly favor the U.S. Detection capabilities available in 3-5 years will enable the U.S. to detect down to 0.0 kiloton in granite, 0.2 kt in tuff and 1/2-1 kt in alluvium. This would result in some 20+10 unidentified events above the present detection threshold of 1 kt in granite. He suggested that 2 or 3 inspections with these capabilities would provide the same level of protection as 7-8 under the previously assumed capabilities. The utility of continued testing relates to (a) effects tests bearing on ABM technology, (b) yield-to-weight improvements, and (c) tactical weapons developments. He emphasized that improved accuracy was more important than increased yield-to-weight ratios. The need for inspection remains, however, to identify suspicious events, to underpin political sanctions, and to serve as a precedent for other disarmament agreements. Dr. Brown believes our own underground testing to date has been more fruitful than that of the Soviets. He discounted the practicability and significance of deep-hole testing, simultaneous shots, or timing to accompany an earthquake. In regard to proliferation, however, Dr. Brown downgraded the significance of an all-environments test ban treaty, to stop proliferation because others need not adhere, weapons can be stockpiled without testing (although political prestige of an explosion would not be achievable), and because a “substantial measure of disarmament and action against the self-nuclearizers” would be more effective. Mr. Keeny asked whether this conclusion was not based on the questionable assumption that countries such as India and Japan would not sign such a treaty and that if they did sign, there would be much less incentive for them to test since they would lose the political prestige and military deterrent value of testing. Dr. Brown concluded that: “It is hard to conclude that a comprehensive test ban would be a serious mistake, since there are no substantial military disadvantages; it would probably be a net plus.” Dr. Brown saw a need for continued R&D on land-mobile air-transportable MRBMs that could be moved every few hours. Though not as good as the original MMRBM concept (inertial guidance, trucks, 5-minute firing), they would be usable under appropriate control in Europe, the Far East and Southeast Asia. An ABM system sufficient to protect the U.S. from disparate threats could be effective to shore up U.S. damage-limiting strategy, based on modifications of an enhanced Nike-X system. Where a $25 billion system is estimated against a Soviet attack to reduce casualties from 100 million to 40 million people, a $5 billion system (plus fall-out shelter) against a less sophisticated threat could bring casualties down from 30 million to about 10 million or fewer. Other threats change the equation (suit-case bombs, ship-launched missiles, aircraft). He posed the alternative to expensive guarantees to discourage Nth country development of a U.S. defensive capability against modest strategic threats. “There is a discount rate to trouble, just as there is to money.” However, he anticipated no major foreseeable break throughs in military technology, although the Chinese could mount an earlier threat to the U.S. through 400-mile missiles launched from ships than from ICBMs. He saw “no overwhelming losses” if Plowshare is delayed for 10 years. 7. Concluding Remarks Mr. Garthoff presented cautionary views under consideration in the Department of State reviews of problems of proliferation—that appropriate attention be given to the real effectiveness of particular measures, that problems be considered in all their significant dimensions, and that solutions applicable to a country-by-country basis be devised. Mr. Gilpatric outlined for the Committee four alternative courses of action: Alternative “Zero”—selective relaxation of efforts to retard proliferation; Alternative One—the current “prudent course”; Alternative Two—“positive efforts to hold the line where it is”; and Alternative Three—an all-out effort to stop and roll back nuclear proliferation. 5 He called for a staff paper laying out the pros and cons of the four courses, in the nature of proposed findings, which would enable the Committee to focus on the objectives and alternatives which various measures would serve. 6 Mr. McCloy emphasized the urgent need for increasing communications with the Germans and implicating them in a collective approach to planning for the future of the Alliance, especially in the event of a failure of the MLF to come into existence. That proposed device was conceived to deal with a set of real problems, that still remain to be confronted effectively. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on December 19. The second meeting of the Gilpatric Committee was held in the Old Executive Office Building from December 13 at 10 a.m. to December 14 at 1 p.m. No approved version of the minutes has been found. 2 Not attached. A copy is ibid., National Security File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Dr. York Nuclear Proliferation Committee, Box 9. 3 Myron B. Kratzer, Director, Division of International Affairs, AEC. 4 Not found. 5 A paper drafted by Rivkin, “Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation,” bearing the handwritten date December 15, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5. 6 An undated and unsigned paper, “Problems Concerning Alternative Courses of Action,” is ibid. 57. Memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 57. Memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 16, 1964. SUBJECT Arms Control Subjects to be Explored with USSR I believe that we have reached a crisis point in our efforts to develop concrete proposals to carry out the President's stated objective in the arms control field. In the attached memorandum to Bill Foster (Tab A), 2 Ambassador Thompson essentially comes out against all of the arms control initiatives that ACDA has recommended for discussion with the Soviets in their memorandum to the Committee of Principals (Tab B) 3 that we discussed last week. As I pointed out previously, I understand that Secretary McNamara is prepared to support all of the ACDA proposals and that General Wheeler has indicated his willingness to go along with all of the proposals except the item on the moratorium on construction of ICBM and ABM sites which he wishes to consider further. It is my own judgment that the proposals are clearly in conformity with the President's stated arms control objectives; and that, if properly handled, all of the proposals are to our net security advantage. The attached memorandum from Ambassador Thompson is really a remarkable document that essentially calls into question our entire arms control and non-proliferation policy. I call your attention in particular to the second paragraph that characterizes in classic fashion a foreign policy based on a desire to react to external events rather than to influence them. Although I agree with several of the detailed points made in the Thompson memorandum, I am afraid it is basically a collection of arguments designed to assure that no action will be taken in this field in the foreseeable future. I am particularly concerned about their comments on the comprehensive test ban. While at first glance these comments appear to be only a delaying action, I am afraid they are in fact an effort to reopen the whole issue despite rather clear U.S. policy in this area. Among other things, the memo implies that there is no possibility that the Soviets will consider inspection with a comprehensive test ban. I do not think that we should take this for granted. (For your information, Mr. Faber, First Secretary of the British Embassy, reported to me today that a member of the Soviet Embassy in London had told a senior British official informally that he thought his government would be prepared to return to its original position of 2 or 3 on-site inspections.) 4 There are a number of useful points in the Thompson memorandum, however, I believe that most of these could easily be taken care of on an informal staff basis and are not critical to the proposals. In general, I share the basic concern that ACDA has not done its homework better in spelling out the details of their proposals. On the other hand, these are not new ideas; we have studied the problems (e.g., comprehensive test ban) in great depth and are now presumably interested in indicating to the Soviets our desire to move forward and in determining what general proposals the Soviets might be prepared to pursue. More specifically, I share State's concern that the 18-24 month moratorium on construction of sites might be difficult to get out of and would complicate our subsequent bargaining position on verification rights. To minimize these effects, the time period, if any, should be short, the arrangement informal, and our future actions closely coupled with Soviet activities in this area. I agree also that Plowshare presents a serious problem under the comprehensive test ban. In order to avoid unacceptable risks or a meaningless treaty, we may have to exclude Plowshare initially with a provision that this subject be re-examined after a few years. However, this problem is one that we can resolve internally and is not immediately involved in reopening the dialogue on this question with the Soviet Union. I think it is most important that the Thompson memorandum does not become the State Department's formal position. If it does, the President will be faced with a serious problem that the State Department is effectively preventing the pursuit of his stated policy on arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bill Foster is going to recommend that you call a special meeting of the Committee of Principals next Monday in the Situation Room to discuss this problem. 5 He is asking you to do it this way to keep the number of participants down. However, I recommend that, if the opportunity presents itself, you discuss the problems privately with the President, Rusk and McNamara later this week to establish the President's desires in this area. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Spurgeon Keeny Memos, Box 5. Secret. 2 Document 55 . 3 Regarding these ACDA recommendations, see footnote 2, Document 55 . 4 No record of this conversation has been found. 5 Seaborg's sanitized record of the discussion at the December 21 meeting of the Committee of Principals in Secretary Rusk's Office on Monday, is in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 26, pp. 274-280. 58. Editorial Note 58. Editorial Note Throughout 1964 officials in the Johnson administration discussed the wisdom and timing of Project Sulky, a proposed Plowshare test in nuclear excavation. President Johnson called for a Department of State report on the proposed event in NSAM 282, February 11 ( Document 7 ). Upon completion of the Department of State report, May 7 ( Document 27 ), the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests discussed the recommendations in the report. In a June 26 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Brigadier General Harry L. Evans, Alternate Representative of the JCS Chairman to the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests, reported that the conclusions in the report were “sound” but recommended that the timing of the recommended actions be considered by the Review Committee. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, in a June 26 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, concluded that the recommendations were “generally sound” but opposed the suggestion that foreign observers be invited to witness the initial Plowshare type of test, and he recommended that the proposed Sulky test “be carried out before there is any public announcement of the event, either in this country or abroad.” He also urged that the results of this shot and possibly other cratering events should be evaluated before any action is taken to negotiated changes in, or exceptions to, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The AEC advanced justifications for shot Sulky in two reports, “AEC Comments on Suggestions for Implementation of the Department of State Report on Nuclear Excavation,” June 26, and “Analysis of Project Sulky,” undated. Seaborg sent the two reports under cover of memoranda to Bundy, June 26 and July 15. All of this correspondence and the two reports are in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. At a meeting of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests at the White House on July 16, the Department of State report was discussed further, and an “implicit approval to the Sulky shot in December was given.” (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 9, page 33) On July 20, Bundy sent a memorandum to holders of NSAM 282 indicating that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests had endorsed the three general courses of action proposed in the State Department's May 7 report, including “the desirability of conducting Project Sulky sometime in December.” The AEC would include this shot in its regular authorization request for Whetstone II, and “final approval would be given at that time after the Review Committee had an opportunity to consider the final analysis of the predicted fallout associated with the test.” (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In a letter to President Johnson, October 13, Seaborg requested approval of Sulky as planned, and in a memorandum to Seaborg the same day McGeorge Bundy wrote that the President had approved his request. This exchange of correspondence is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Volume 8, pages 235-236. Shot Sulky took place at the Nevada Test Site on December 18. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 , page 23) 59. Memorandum of Conversation 59. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 7, 1965. SUBJECT Secretary's Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-Proliferation The Secretary opened by expressing appreciation that this Committee is working on the proliferation problem, and said that he was awaiting its recommendations with interest. The US opposes nuclear proliferation. Each nuclear power does not wish to see further proliferation. Thus it is easy for the US to speak out against proliferation, but the Prime Minister of India or Japan must look on the question quite differently. The problem of alternatives to national nuclear proliferation arises. It is easier to see solutions in cases where firm defense alliances with the US exist, e.g., Japan and the Philippines. The solution is not so clear or easy in a case such as India. De Gaulle doubts the US commitment even in Europe—it is much easier to have such doubt in distant areas not traditionally bound to us. Moreover, do we want to give guarantees which would guarantee that we will be involved at the risk of 100 to 150 million lives ten years from now in the face of possible Sino-Soviet alliances? An Asian nuclear defense community, perhaps with a US nuclear stockpile available for it to draw upon, may be one solution. A commonwealth nuclear committee for South Asia may be an answer; the UK is ready to commit its nuclear force in NATO, if we can find an answer to support for her commitment East of Suez. In general, a different organization of nuclear arrangements will probably be necessary. The Secretary remarked that General De Gaulle had said to him that unless the nuclear powers physically suppress proliferation, it is inevitable. De Gaulle opposes, and does not expect, such suppression. On the other hand, De Gaulle has indicated that France would not disseminate nuclear weapons to anyone, including Germany. The UK is more optimistic on agreements to curb proliferation. We have long sought a non-proliferation agreement; the Soviets have opposed it ostensibly because of the MLF, but really because of their more basic opposition to NATO. The Secretary noted that he had inquired of Gromyko with respect to Warsaw Pact arrangements, and had mentioned reports of Soviet nuclear aid to China in the 1950's. Gromyko made no comment on the Warsaw Pact, but said only that we should not listen to rumors with respect to Soviet aid to China. 2 In fact, the Secretary added, we did not know if they did anything more than assist the Chinese peaceful nuclear program. Soviet interest in non-proliferation is 95 percent centered on the FRG, just as we have been on China. The Secretary suggested that Soviet interest in the partial test ban in 1963 seemed to be based in part on a hope to restrain Communist China. This, however, is inference, since the Soviets steadfastly refuse to discuss China with us. For a long time the Soviets played down Chinese nuclear development, until shortly before the Chinese test. Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary whether he had reassured the Soviets on the US veto and European clause in the MLF. The Secretary replied that he had. He had pointed out that the MLF was a move against proliferation and it was the Soviets who had put the FRG in the nuclear picture by targetting them.MLF arrangements would not give the Germans control of nuclear weapons nor would the Germans acquire nuclear weapons technology through it. In fact, he had pointed out that the MLF would be more secure than existing NATO arrangements. Gromyko kept objecting that the MLF was only the “first step” to a German capability. The Secretary noted that he had replied that the Soviets should then sign up on a non-proliferation agreement which would commit us all to the proposition that this “first step” was also the “last step.” Mr. Ball commented that if the Soviets can use an issue to divide the West, they do so. Also, to the extent that the MLF would strengthen the Alliance, they also oppose it. Ambassador Thompson added that the Soviets also oppose an MLF because it would establish a longer term and closer knitting together of the US with Europe in defense. The Secretary then raised the question of nuclear free zones, stating that we were favorably inclined toward such zones in Latin America and Africa, assuming the problem of transit rights were worked out, because there would be no need for the nuclear powers to target these areas. Other areas are too closely involved both with the presence of nuclear weapons, and as potential nuclear targets. In the Far East there is a special problem of requiring an alternative to conventional forces for meeting the enormous Chinese masses. We therefore oppose the Chinese Communist proposal for no first use of nuclear weapons. General Gruenther asked the Secretary if he would comment further on France. The Secretary drew attention to the extreme sensitivity of the information he was about to give. For De Gaulle, the French nuclear program is strictly political, not military. There is a touch of Poincare in De Gaulle's view that France must have a special place, and is only safe when Germany is in a secondary position. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] De Gaulle objects that an MLF would give Germany a preferred position, though France has always been invited to have that same opportunity. De Gaulle is not yet prepared to say that Europe should organize its defenses entirely separately from the US. He would preserve the Alliance, while giving Europe an independent ability to bring the US in. Messmer did say that France would talk about coordinating nuclear targetting with us when the Force de Frappe was ready. The Secretary noted that strategy is discussed in NATO on three levels: (1) Deterrence—with a premium on telling the opponent that all hell would break loose right away; (2) the question of how to wage combat—for example, there has been full agreement on the measured use of force in our Berlin contingency planning; and (3) talk about strategy, by those (such as De Gaulle) who assume there will be no war, and therefore manipulate strategic questions for present political purposes. Our forces are under the NATO Guidelines; the French are not. Mr. Ball noted the French justification for the Force de Frappe. Pompidou has said that [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ]. Recently Raymond Aron has also written an article contending that proliferation is not a very serious danger. 3 The Secretary raised the problem of US actions with respect to the French nuclear program. To begin with, we are clearly obligated not to transgress the provisions of the partial test ban. But there is a difficult question of where, beyond that, we should draw the line. The US has never openly opposed or adopted sanctions against the French program. Nor for that matter, the Secretary said, will US sanctions stop the French. We do not want out of vexation to open a spiral of economic reprisal and retaliation. Should we not sell to France that which we would sell to other Allies? Finally, there would be particularly serious consequences of attempting to stir up resistance to the French program. Mr. Gilpatric noted that Mr. Ball had earlier stated that the French expect such a policy of us. Mr. Ball replied that there were problems on the border line, but that we have not tried to use our power in the way the French might have if they were in our place. General Gruenther asked how the French react to our decisions on the sale of computers. Mr. Ball noted particularly the problem of a nuclear weapons laboratory as a designated recipient. Mr. Watson, remarking that he was not speaking from the standpoint of a selfish interest, raised the question of possible repressive retaliation by the French against a company with large assets in France. Mr. Ball agreed that we must look hard at this problem and that the French might use such instances as an excuse for action against American subsidiaries. The current instance of artificial limitations on the dollar element in the French treasury reserve is an example of political interjection. Mr. Gilpatric asked the Secretary's view on what the FRG would do if the MLF/ANF does not come into being. The Secretary replied that the German elections this year might make a difference. But more generally, in the long run the Germans would face a choice between two solutions: (1) joint development with France in a European force, or (2) a national nuclear weapons program. Mr. Ball remarked that Germany would probably first of all turn to us for bilateral arrangements with MRBMs in Germany under the two-key system. The Secretary remarked that the Germans seem to have drawn away from the idea of placing MRBMs on their own territory, where they would attract additional fire. He believed the FRG would probably reject De Gaulle's terms for collaboration in a basically French controlled force, so that in the long run the pressure would be for a German nuclear capability. Ambassador Thompson suggested the Germans might also increase pressure for more tactical nuclear weapons. The Secretary stated his agreement with Mr. Ball and Ambassador Thompson that in the first instance the Germans would seek bigger and better bilateral arrangements with the US, but that later they would seek their own. Mr. Ball remarked that many German ministers and others have been saying that without an alliance nuclear arrangement there will inevitably be pressures for a German nuclear force. The Secretary said that when Secretary McNamara had asked von Hassel why the latter wanted an MLF, he replied that he wanted it first to tie the US to Germany [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Mr. McCloy noted that Erler of the SPD is also concerned over eventual pressures for a German force. Mr. Ball noted that after World War I four restrictions had been placed on German rearmament, but three went by the board very quickly, and the last by 1936. We can not make the Germans into second-class citizens. We can not subject them to a discriminatory state of original sin. In the first place, the Germans themselves would not put up with it, and in the second place, over time the West itself would refuse to press such discrimination. The Germans had already spent $850 million in atomic energy research. The Secretary said that in Adenauer's last year as Chancellor he had privately declared that the WEU restrictions were no longer binding by virtue of rebus sic stantibus. Mr. Dean inquired whether, if we have to give the Germans an MLF, does it not mean the Soviets would not agree to non-proliferation. Mr. Ball noted that the Germans will not sign a non-proliferation agreement except in a situation in which they participate in nuclear defense arrangements. Mr. Gilpatric asked whether it would be possible to put more pressure for German reunification. The Secretary replied that very morning the German Ambassador had told him, not officially under instructions, that there was German thinking along lines of holding back from any further commitments on nuclear non-proliferation as a bargaining counter for reunification. 4 The Secretary further commented in reply to Mr. Dean's question that the MLF does not involve proliferation. It would, on the contrary, deal with the German appetite for a nuclear role on a basis of equal participation. Mr. Dean noted that the Soviet delegates still oppose an agreement providing for an MLF. He asked whether this means abandoning a non-proliferation agreement. Mr. Dulles noted that we all agree that non-proliferation is desirable; the problem is in costs. We apparently need a big effort, with many kinds of measures, to have much chance of success. He then asked the Secretary if he would sacrifice a great deal in terms of other policies in order to get non-proliferation. The Secretary replied that when faced with this question we had not decided in 1956-57 to launch an all-out effort against France, with threats and the like. We probably could not have succeeded even if we had tried. And we have not struck China to deal with its nuclear program. Non-proliferation is not the overriding element in US relations with the rest of the world. In individual cases—e.g., the UAR/Israel—it could become dominant. Mr. Gilpatric asked how we can approach the problem on a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on others. The Secretary replied that each case is different. India may face a nuclear attack; the UAR does not. They must be dealt with differently. In general, the Secretary added, there is probably more time to deal with this problem in the Alliance than with respect to India, Israel, etc. Mr. Gilpatric asked what the terms might be if we decided that it was definitely in our interest that India remain non-nuclear. The Secretary replied that the Indians want guarantees from the Soviets and from us. We do not think that a joint guarantee with the Soviets would be feasible or desirable, and we do not believe the Soviets would grant a meaningful effective guarantee. Perhaps some Commonwealth arrangement can be reached providing nuclear weapons to support India in time of crisis. In further reply to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Ball noted that it was necessary to give these potential nuclear powers something concrete in order to get them to give up the nuclear option. A mere general undertaking would otherwise probably be no more effective than the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Mr. Dean questioned whether we would be giving a blank check to India to do whatever it wanted. The Secretary agreed that the question of guarantees opened a difficult chain of problems. He stated that he did not favor one-way US guarantees; an alliance with reciprocal obligations, or to meet certain specified conditions, might be another matter. But a conditional guarantee satisfactory to us might not be sufficiently satisfying to India. Mr. Dean asked what would happen if Japan and India sign a non-proliferation agreement, then later when under threat asked for our assistance and we did not give it—would not the credibility of our commitments in general go down the drain. The Secretary replied that he considered the situation covered in cases where we have an alliance like Japan but not in other cases. Mr. McCloy asked the Secretary if he regarded Indian policy as a complete change from the time of Nehru. The Secretary replied that present Indian policy was not basically different. After all, Nehru had moved into Kashmir, Hyderabad, Ladakh, and Goa. The Indians are probably already working on the first stages of preparation for nuclear weapons if they later decide to proceed. Changes in Indian policy are due more to circumstances than to changes in the leadership. (Mr. Ball left the meeting at approximately this stage in the conversation.) Mr. McCloy remarked that while we were talking about the price of proliferation, he was concerned about the price of dissolving the Alliance. He expressed the view that NSAM 322 5 placed the ball in the court of the Europeans, who can't handle it. He had received ominous views from Germany and Brussels of our stepping back from leadership. Is the MLF out? Mr. McCloy noted that Secretary McNamara had said he would give the MLF at most a 50 percent chance. Without arm twisting, we must nonetheless lead. The Secretary replied that he considered the idea of the Europeans looking to us for a lead as phony. They all want us to “lead” in different directions. The Europeans now feel secure, not under threat from the East. This gives them the luxury of playing around in pursuit of other objectives. With respect to the MLF we had attempted to respond to the European view that something was needed. After waiting a year or two after Nassau we said that we would then show them a way. There was at that time no serious objection in the Alliance and eight countries showed serious positive interest. Lord Home said privately that they would go along with the MLF after the election. We went further along the MLF path before meeting real objection in the Alliance. Then, in October 1964, France suddenly got worried about its success and the Scandinavians hardened their position from non-participation to opposition. The Secretary remarked that when he was in Paris the Quai had remarked to the press the incorrect notion that he would ask De Gaulle to coordinate the Force de Frappe with SAC and the ANF. Gordon Walker 6 quickly objected, of course, to that idea. Meanwhile, Italy wants a special role with Germany in a Directoire of five. Mr. McCloy remarked that if not the MLF, we need something to keep the Western community together. He did not like the idea of dropping the MLF just to suit the Soviets and De Gaulle. The Secretary said that was not the point. Italy and Germany will next take the lead, then with the UK, and then with us. Erhard and Wilson will meet this month. Moreover, there is more maneuver in the UK position than has been disclosed so far. There is a strong impetus to do something with the UK nuclear deterrent. The problem of control in the ANF is open—the UK wants the veto for all principal members; Germany does not want the UK to have a veto. But the UK will eventually come through, even on participation in an MLF surface fleet component. In Germany the situation is complicated by the fact the present government does not want to give the SPD any chance for credit. Mr. McCloy reiterated his concern over talks among the Germans, Italians, and British without us. The Secretary replied that we will continue to be deeply involved, but that we must stand back from the position of appearing to be out in front of the rest, where we had been with the MLF. It is, he noted, essential to present the ANF to Congress as a unifying measure in the Alliance. Mr. Perkins inquired whether the Secretary wished to comment on the relation of this subject to German reunification. The Secretary replied that the MLF-ANF, as we had indicated to others, would not be permitted to stand in the way of German reunification, the unity of Europe, or major disarmament. Mr. Gilpatric requested the Secretary's view on the appropriate time to broach any non-proliferation approaches to the Soviets. Should such approaches precede or follow the Communist Party talks scheduled for March? The Secretary noted that we have been talking with the Soviets, that there is an on-going dialogue, and that we can approach them at any time that seems appropriate. He added that he was concerned at present about possible erosion of the atmospheric test ban. Mr. McCloy commented that General Wheeler had indicated that the JCS may oppose a comprehensive test ban. The Secretary remarked that he did not see urgency in seeking a comprehensive test ban at a time when France and China are testing. The Soviets, he noted, will not yield on inspection. He had discussed the question with Mr. Gromyko, and Gromyko had made quite clear that inspection is for the Soviets strictly a political question, and that they did not care about the technical side of the question. Moreover, the Secretary continued, it was not inconceivable that under some circumstances the Soviets might test clandestinely in China. In response to a doubting interjection, the Secretary recalled that the Stalin-Hitler Pact showed how two hostile totalitarian states could sometimes get together very quickly when it suited them. In conclusion, the Secretary stated that he was not convinced that a comprehensive test ban would yield a major gain for non-proliferation. (At this point, the Secretary was obliged to excuse himself to meet another commitment, and suggested that Ambassador Thompson take the chair.) Ambassador Thompson opened by suggesting that the March meeting of the Communist Parties, as it occurs, may tell us more about the Soviet position. Mr. Gilpatric asked for the Ambassador's view on the signs of displeasure in Moscow at the President's State of the Union address. Ambassador Thompson emphasized that Moscow's behavior at the moment is largely conditioned on their expectation with respect to the March meeting. He stated that for the Soviet leaders five other things take priority over general relations with the West: (1) consolidation of their power; (2) dealing with crucial internal problems left by Khrushchev; (3) dealing with the East Europeans; (4) dealing with Communist China; and (5) relations with other Communist Parties around the world. Under these conditions, the Soviet leaders seek to remain loose and flexible. Ambassador Thompson added that he believes the Chinese Communists will force a split in the movement, despite the fact that the Soviets have shrunk back from forcing a split. Dr. York inquired why this should be so. Ambassador Thompson responded by noting that the Chinese were doing well in splitting the Communist movement, especially in Asia. The Chinese leaders also feel that it benefits them, especially with respect to Taiwan, whenever they can raise hell anywhere for the US. The Soviets, by contrast, are playing a longer-range game of establishing their presence and influence in various areas without wildly provoking outbreaks. The Chinese have very real tactical and strategic differences with the Soviets. Mr. Dulles asked whether the Soviets are really very interested in non-proliferation. Ambassador Thompson stated that he did not believe so, except for their concern over West Germany. The Soviets did make threats when, several years ago, the Swiss considered developing a nuclear weapons capability, and have pressed the Swedes. But in some other areas they may be inclined to see problems caused for us. Mr. McCloy asked Ambassador Thompson for his views of the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Ambassador Thompson said that he thought such a development was very remote, that all evidence points to the depth of the split. Of course, as the Secretary has noted, for the very long run we must consider all possibilities. Mr. Gilpatric raised a question relating to putting pressure on Euratom. He indicated that Dr. Seaborg had said that we should not pressure Euratom because of the value of that institution to European unity, even if Euratom was delinquent in permitting us to verify its safeguards. 7 Ambassador Thompson replied that he believed we should proceed with the scheduled plutonium transaction, not only for reasons of supporting European unity but because failure to carry out a commitment could have serious disadvantages. We have faced a similar problem with South Africa. Many considerations enter such decisions, including the availability of other suppliers. Mr. McCloy asked whether we wanted the French to dominate Euratom. Ambassador Thompson replied that this was not the case. Mr. Perkins remarked that he had learned that the French serving in the Euratom staff were by no means partisans of General De Gaulle. Mr. Gilpatric expressed his thanks to Ambassador Thompson for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. He wanted to express his great appreciation to the Secretary for having made Mr. Garthoff available to assist the Committee. Ambassador Thompson thanked Mr. Gilpatric and reiterated the Department's readiness to assist in every way that it could. He noted that if Mr. Gilpatric found it useful to submit a draft of the Committee's conclusions, when such a draft is available, we would be happy to look at it. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret;Exdis. Drafted by Garthoff. The attached list of participants is not printed. 2 See Document 53 . 3 Reference is to Raymond Aron's article, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” The Atlantic Monthly , Vol. 215 (January 1965), pp. 44-50, which is an excerpt from the concluding chapter of his book, The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy , published the same month by Doubleday. 4 A memorandum of Ambassador Knappstein's January 7 conversation with Secretary Rusk on this matter is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF (MLF). 5 “Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic Alliance,” December 1, 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM 322, Box 5) 6 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 7 Reference may be to Seaborg's briefing of the Gilpatric Committee the same morning. Seaborg briefly summarized the briefing, as follows: “I spoke for keeping our commitment to deliver 425 kilograms of plutonium to Euratom (I believe I convinced them) for means of strengthening IAEA safeguards. I expressed my feeling that Plowshare is worth striving for in a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, p. 21) 60. Minutes of Discussion 60. Minutes of Discussion 1 Washington, January 7-8, 1965. COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 1. Briefings by the Principals (January 7, 10 a.m.-5:45 p.m.) Presentations and responses to questions on the part of Chairman Seaborg, General Wheeler, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster took place in Executive Session on January 7. Minutes of their remarks are set forth as attachments to this memorandum. 2 2. General Review (January 8, 9 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.) Mr. Gilpatric stated his preference for a world with a limited number of nuclear powers, finding it implausible that additional proliferation could be compartmentalized, quarantined, or regionalized and comparing the consequences for the world of the Sarajevo incident. He found it all the more unlikely that a nuclear conflict involving 1.5 billion Chinese, Indians and Japanese could not affect our own security. Furthermore, the United States is already committed to Asian defense, both through treaty and through the President's October 18 message. 3 We cannot avoid fulfilling these commitments and we have the power—more usable today than ever before—to do so. The additional price, for example, $5 billion for an ABM, is not beyond our means, and Mr. Gilpatric would wish to recommend to the President that he make good on the course he's set for himself. Mr. Webster said that he felt a rearguard action to keep proliferation to the minimum is to some extent inevitable although the characterization is perhaps oversimplified. He questioned whether we should be prepared to pay the ultimate price to stop proliferation—for example, a nuclear umbrella to India which might be too much temptation for Indian adventures; he would not give the Indians the ultimate military guarantees. On the other hand, he favored the taking of all steps reasonably necessary to slow proliferation, to approach the problem on a case-by-case basis. He felt he was nearer to Secretary McNamara's “Model A” world than to “Model B,” 4 but not so close as Mr. McNamara. Mr. McCloy focused on the form of the guarantees that might be necessary, feeling that thorough analysis is needed. He said that it is not the answer alone to say that we have tremendous military power, but that we must instead acknowledge the political limitations on the use of that power. We have been convincing on our guarantees of Berlin, but the character of our determination will be diluted if we have 20 such commitments and our fundamental image of capability to defend the free world might be impaired. He is not convinced that a guarantee is the price we should pay; as to India, for example, we should try first to get an agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons without offering an umbrella. Mr. Dulles concurred. Mr. McCloy went on to emphasize that it is “fantastic” to assume that the problem of European security is solvable by the “other side” alone, as suggested in NSAM 322. He feared that our position in the Alliance is rapidly deteriorating and that we risk both losing the Alliance and non-proliferation as well. We are going to have to confront De Gaulle's belief that a return to nationalism in the Twentieth Century is appropriate; nationalism isn't adequate for conventional weapons and is not adequate for nuclear weapons. Mr. McCloy thinks that the United States is drifting in a situation where proliferation in Europe is more serious than in Asia or the Middle East. He questioned the view that we owe the Germans nothing, emphasizing that such an approach opened the door to German insecurity in the 1920s. Mr. Watson said that the ideal is the “Model A” world although he was puzzled by how we were to get it going without participation by the French. Soviet cooperation, he felt, would be desirable, at the price of overcoming their historical fears of Germany. Mr. Gilpatric suggested that perhaps at some time we may have to give up the “Holy Grail” and move to a “Model B” world. Mr. Watson emphasized that he was concerned with the need for a long-range plan for the future of the Germans. At the same time he said that it is a terribly dangerous course to repudiate France. He felt that some horse-trading would be necessary to soften the blow to the French of making Germany the dominant power in Europe. He said it was hard for him to see the practicality of alienating both the French and the Russians in order to achieve an Allied Nuclear Force. Mr. McCloy added that we did the same before on both the Common Market and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and he felt that the Russians will adjust once again, even though they hate Western unity. France's equivocal position, Mr. McCloy said, was readily stiffened by De Gaulle because our approach to the MLF has been so maladroit. Mr. McCloy emphasized that a solid Western Community was far more important than De Gaulle and is the essential basis for both the long-range prospects of disarmament and a modus vivendi, even affecting China. General Gruenther indicated that his views had changed in the course of the study and that a “Model A” world is not impossible, stating that he feels we have to go forward to achieve it whatever the cost. He felt that a principal problem would be the selling of increased American commitments on India to the American public. Mr. Dulles believed that we should begin with Course II as outlined in the Committee's planning and move to Course III as we find targets of opportunity. 5 We have to be sure that when we move to more adventurous positions we will be successful. Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that for our own lifetime we might prefer to live in a “Model B” world, but his thoughts about his grandchildren have changed his mind and commit him strongly to seek the “Model A.” To term such action rearguard, he believes, is a concession of defeat. We must wage a campaign to keep proliferation at a minimum and be prepared to lose individual battles, but not the overall war. First, we should be prepared to impose pressures and present inducements to others. He felt the non-European world is at least as important as Europe in the light of growth in population and technological innovations. He is convinced that guarantees are essential to security in this area but that they should not be given promiscuously. He also thought that our own example will be essential and that we should press measures of arms limitation and increasing understanding with the Soviet Union. Mr. Dean indicated that he, like General Gruenther, had changed his views somewhat to support “Model A” if the United States will pay the necessary costs. To succeed, he said, we must involve the Soviet Union. In this context, he thought it wise that we weigh reunification as an alternative to the MLF. Dr. York came out squarely for “Model A.” Guarantees, he believes, are possible, and in the short run at least, United States lives need not be at stake in India to support a guarantee, although we must also be able to withdraw from guarantees, if necessary. “With nervousness about the long run, I am for 'Model A' as a goal for the short run.” Dr. Perkins emphasized that proliferation is not the totality of United States policy and that the subject should not be expanded until it covers all of our interests and those of our allies. He also emphasized the need to relate our short-run actions to long-range objectives. First, he felt we should emphasize our conventional military option and seek to make it convincing. In regard to peaceful uses of atomic energy, he felt our restraints should be relatively mild because such restraints are not likely to prove especially significant in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, he had some distress about NSAM 322 and its exclusively regional basis. He is concerned that we are seeking to get out of a difficult situation rather than to work out an appropriate alternative. In the Far East, he felt that a strict treaty with India is not necessary but that we should consider a regional alternative, such as NATO in Europe, and to this end, start conversations with the Indians, the Japanese and the Filipinos to work out regional arrangements on a series of national agreements. Internationally, he felt we should strive for the non-proliferation and comprehensive test ban treaty, whether we are likely to get them or not. We should beef up the IAEA to make it the inspectorial system around the world. In terms of long-range objectives, he urged: a. A beginning of considerations about United States-USSR “sharing of nuclear power progressively,” which he defined as two sharings between allies of the respective super-powers. (Dr. York interjected that perhaps we should seek a United Nations Security Council “that really runs the world.”) b. With regard to the French, Dr. Perkins feels we are too optimistic to think that our policies will change after De Gaulle and that we should consider now what kind of a French role we expect, what kind of relationship with the French we should desire, and what kind of Atlantic Community we can have after De Gaulle's passing. c. The Chinese are the biggest problem of all because of their size, intransigence and isolation which, together, make the rest of our problems seem academic. He emphasized that it should be the highest order of business to achieve a study of our future policies on China as a follow-on to the activities of this Committee. d. In regard to Africa and Latin America, he felt we should quickly push for denuclearization in order to achieve a 5-25 year breathing space. Mr. Gilpatric, in summation, pointed to the problems of defining appropriate guarantees on a selective basis. Dr. York stressed that such guarantees should be extremely limited, and Mr. Gilpatric emphasized that we could give them only so long as the protected country remains non-nuclear. There followed a review by members of the staff of problems of special significance to them. Mr. Keeny stressed that he believed the net security advantage for the United States fell in “Model A,” which course we could change to “Model B” if “Model A” fails. Dr. Rathjens and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union in future efforts to stop proliferation. Mr. Rivkin pointed to the overall security position of the Soviets in the face of possible Chinese and German nuclear weapons capability, urging that the United States be prepared to negotiate directly with the Soviets on their long-range security situation, and suggesting that we consider denuclearized, guaranteed German re-unification as an early alternative to the ANF. Mr. Garthoff expressed reservations about the consequences of Course III, some of which he felt could be either bad or disastrous. He indicated that if we give up the ANF to achieve non-proliferation, we avoid getting the British out of deterrence. He warned, with regard to dealing with the Soviets, that we might be exchanging good relations with our allies for an uncertain detente. He believed that Soviet participation is not essential to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Any proposal to the Soviets for halting strategic delivery vehicle deployment should not be allowed to affect Polaris. In summary, he preferred Course II, “with liberal borrowing from Course III and perhaps with Course I and Course IV.” Professor Fisher emphasized the need for continuing studies. Existing policy, he said, is based on getting along with our allies, regardless of the consequences. The problem of guarantees, he thinks, has been over-emphasized, and little more is required than has been given already. He desires a policy to make nuclear weapons appear bad and the undertaking of progressive policies to eliminate United States reliance on nuclear weapons. Reunification of Germany, he said, should be clearly considered as an alternative to the MLF since it is the only policy which appears to resolve all our needs. He felt that the Committee should recommend the study of orderly controls on uranium exports and that it also consider the organization of the vigorous mechanism within the government necessary to stop proliferation. Dr. Kistiakowsky noted that arguments in favor of Plowshare are based on an unsymmetrical assumption about technology in which Plowshare improves and conventional excavating technology stays the same. There was general agreement, in conclusion, that our hopes to stop proliferation are based on two basic “ifs”: Soviet cooperation and future Chinese behavior. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Minutes of Meetings, Box 9. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rivkin on January 19. The minutes cover the third meeting of the Gilpatric Committee, which met in the Old Executive Office Building from January 7 at 10 a.m. to January 8 at 5:45 p.m. 2 Minutes of each of these briefings are ibid. For a memorandum of Secretary Rusk's briefing, see Document 59 . For Seaborg's account of his briefing, see footnote 7 thereto. 3 For the text of President Johnson's October 18, 1964, message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964 , Book II, pp. 1377-1380. 4 In his briefing of the Gilpatric Committee on January 7 (see footnote 2 above), McNamara developed two models. In “Model A” the United States would push for a world in which there were no additional nuclear weapons nations; in “Model B” the United States would acquiesce in a world in which there would be a limited amount of further nuclear proliferation. 5 Reference is to the undated and unsigned planning paper for the Gilpatric Committee, “Problems Concerning Alternative Course of Action” (see footnote 6, Document 56 ), which developed four possible courses, as follows: “i. Course I. Avoid costs and risks of trying to stop proliferation; attempt to establish regional stability based upon new balances of power, in the hope that the U.S. can avoid dangerous external involvements; assist proliferation where useful in creating such stability (e.g., India and Japan as counter-balances to China). “ii. Course II. Attempt to slow proliferation everywhere while at the same time preserving other goals and avoiding major risks. Use the extra time to learn to live with the problem. “iii. Course III. Accept substantial costs and risks in exchange for a materially increased probability of halting or greatly retarding proliferation. “iv. Course IV. All-out efforts to stop proliferation; most or all other policies subordinated; acceptance of large costs now to avoid greater costs in the future.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Chron File, Box 5) 61. Message From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 61. Message From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, January 14, 1965. Now that Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk have had a series of discussions of our mutual problems, 2 I wish to reply to the message from your Government of November 3 , 1964, which was transmitted through Ambassador Dobrynin.3 I was particularly pleased to have the expression of the interest of your Government in first restraining and limiting the arms race, and then decisively reversing it. I think that we can take some satisfaction in the fact that both our Governments have been able, without formal agreement, to reduce our military budgets by amounts which may be small in relation to our total arms expenditure but are nevertheless of some significance in that we have both succeeded in putting an end to the annual increases in this heavy burden. I am able to tell you now that our budget for the fiscal year 1965 will call for expenditures in our Department of Defense of $47.9 billion, which is more than $2 billion less than was requested in my budget submitted to the Congress in January 1964. As I have already touched upon disarmament questions in my New Year's message to you, 4 I will not discuss them further at this time, other than to say that I continue to believe deeply that there would be advantage to us all in progress toward the specific arrangements I have proposed. In particular, we are convinced that the interest of our two peoples, and indeed of all mankind, would be advanced by steps beyond the limited test ban treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. I am able to confirm to you once again that it is this fundamental policy that underlies all our actions in this field, including those about which your Government has expressed concern, in the area of the nuclear defense of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. I remain convinced that if we work together with the common purpose of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should be able to eliminate misunderstandings between us and serve our common interests. I fully share your view that agreements reached between our Governments should be honestly observed by both sides, and I can assure you of our good faith on this score. Many of the problems which today plague the world, and which in one way or another involve the Soviet Union and the United States, are highly complex, both in their origins and in their ramifications. I am hopeful, however, that with good will on both sides, a steady and consistent effort to resolve them can succeed. We shall, of course, have to proceed step by step, but every success will, in my opinion, make the remaining problems easier to resolve. You may be sure that I am determined to persevere on this path. [Here follows discussion of Article 19 of the U.N. Charter, various bilateral matters, and the President's “hope for a visit from your side to the United States.”] 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text bears no salutation. Attached is a January 14 memorandum from Thompson to McGeorge Bundy in which Thompson indicated, inter alia, that he would give the message to Dobrynin during the latter's call the same day. 2 See footnote 1, Document 53 . 3 In his November 3, 1964, message to President Johnson, Kosygin discussed defense budget reductions, mutual cutback of troops in Europe, U.N. financing, and various bilateral matters. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR—Vol. 1) 4 Dated December 30; text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964 , Book II, pp. 1673-1674. 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 62. Notes of Meetings 62. Notes of Meetings 1 Washington, January 19, 1965. [Here follows discussion of a swearing-in ceremony and telephone conversations about irradiated food and personal matters.] At 2 p.m. I attended the Meeting of Principals in Secretary Rusk's Office in the Department of State. Others present at the meeting included Rusk (Chairman), Ball, McNamara, Bundy, Llewellyn Thompson, McCone, Foster, and Fisher. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the venting of the January 15th Soviet underground test. McCone described the evidence upon which the conclusion was based that venting had occurred. The acoustic signals were somewhat anomalous, which is consistent with the venting nature of the event, but makes the determination of the energy vented into the atmosphere a little indeterminate. Substantial debris was picked up over Japan, which together with the other evidence makes it clear that it was a Soviet test that had vented. It was decided that there should be a press release, accompanied by a background briefing for key press people. McNamara, Foster, and I had draft press releases available, and these were used as the basis for drafting the press release (attached), 2 which was agreed to by the group. I argued for the inclusion of the statement that this was not a violation of the limited test ban treaty, but the others disagreed with this point of view. McCone was particularly strong in his feeling that this was, in fact, a test ban violation, while the others felt that it should not be so regarded, but they didn't feel it would be wise to so state in the press release. There seemed to be general agreement that the venting was accidental. There was some discussion of the U.S. Kiwi-TNT test, in which McCone and I explained that this was definitely not a weapons test but a planned excursion of a nuclear reactor. 3 At 3:15 p.m. I attended the Meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Others present at the meeting included President Johnson, McNamara, Ball, Foster, McCone and Bundy. Ball began the meeting by saying that its purpose was to discuss the venting of the Soviet nuclear underground test that took place on January 15th. He and McCone described the evidence for this. The detection of radioactive debris over Japan, at about the predicted time, made it quite clear that it was a Soviet nuclear test that had vented. Ball suggested that, in view of the fact that the Japanese would probably detect the radioactive debris soon and would announce this fact, it seemed highly desirable for the U.S. to make an announcement immediately. The proposed press release that had been composed by the Principals in their meeting during the previous hour was placed before the President. He read it and said he thought it was generally all right, but perhaps a little obscure with its somewhat technical language. Bundy explained the need for the particular phraseology used and that much of it constituted words of art understood by the interested press people. The President then agreed to the wording of the release and authorized its issuance without change. It was agreed that it would be issued for 6 p.m. release, and that there would be a background briefing of the press at the State Department at which Ball, Fisher and a representative of the AEC (to be designated by me) would participate. (Kavanagh was chosen to play this role.) 4 It was also requested that Rusk inform Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate [Foreign] Relations Committee; I would inform key members of the Armed Services Committee of the Soviet venting and the impending press release. The President then went on to complain about the leaks to the newspapers that had occurred within the last few days. He was particularly direct and vociferous in his complaints to Ball, McNamara and McCone, as the leaks had involved their departments. He reiterated that the leaks to newspapers must be stopped. At 4 p.m. I talked with Holifield, Pastore, Hickenlooper (at Secretary Rusk's request) and Mrs. Eileen Case in Hosmer's office, and advised that we have detected debris from the Russian test which, to us, means that it vented. I said that the U.S. is going to announce this in a rather low key. We are reasonably sure the Japanese have detected this, and we wish to announce first. [Here follows discussion of personal matters and inaugural events.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, pp. 73 and 75. No classification marking. 2 Not printed. AEC press release, January 19; ibid., p. 74. It was also read to news correspondents by a Department of State spokesman on January 25. (Department of State Bulletin , February 8, 1965, p. 187) 3 Anticipating the Soviets' complaint about this U.S. test held on January 12, Seaborg noted on January 15: “It appears that they may try to cover a venting by accusing the U.S. of violating the Test Ban Treaty in the Kiwi-TNT (reactor excursion test) held at the Nevada Test Site a few days ago.” (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, p. 56) Concerning this Soviet complaint and the U.S. response, see Documents 65 and 67 . 4 Dr. George M. Kavanagh, Assistant General Manager for Reactors, AEC. 63. Editorial Note 63. Editorial Note On January 21, 1965, at 1 p.m., the Gilpatric Committee met with President Johnson to present its report on nuclear proliferation. In addition to the members of the Gilpatric Committee, Vice President Humphrey, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler, Seaborg, McCone, Foster, Hornig, and George Ball attended the meeting. In preparation for this meeting, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to President Johnson, January 21, in which he reviewed the work of the Committee and the conclusions of the report. He also noted: “The committee comes down hard on one side of this tough question [of proliferation], and at least one of your advisers—Dean Rusk—has real doubts about its recommendations. For that reason there will be no public discussion of the report at present, and you yourself will probably wish to reserve your position until the matter has been studied by your own people.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Presidential Task Force—Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Box 35) For Seaborg's account of the meeting, together with his later editorial comments, see Stemming the Tide , pages 144-145. Following the meeting, the White House issued two press releases, which noted the meeting, listed the names of the Committee members, and provided the text of the President's formal statement to the Committee on that occasion. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Gilpatric Committee) The President's statement is also printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , page 74. For text of the Gilpatric Committee's report, see Document 64 . 64. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 64. Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation 1 Washington, January 21, 1965. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION At your request, we have studied the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In our examination, we consulted widely with your principal officers from relevant agencies of the Government. In the process, we considered a range of possible policies for the future and their consequences for the Nation. We have noted a significant diversity of views within the Government about the feasibility and the costs of preventing nuclear proliferation, and consequently about appropriate policies for the United States. Among ourselves there was also a diversity of opinions at the outset of our study. As a result of our study, however, the Committee is now unanimous in its view that preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons is clearly in the national interest despite the difficult decisions that will be required. We have concluded, therefore, that the United States must, as a matter of great urgency, substantially increase the scope and intensity of our efforts if we are to have any hope of success. Necessarily, these efforts must be of three kinds: (a) negotiation of formal multilateral agreements; (b) the application of influence on individual nations considering nuclear weapons acquisition, by ourselves and in conjunction with others; and (c) example by our own policies and actions. Specifically, we have concluded that: 1. The spread of nuclear weapons poses an increasingly grave threat to the security of the United States . New nuclear capabilities, however primitive and regardless of whether they are held by nations currently friendly to the United States, will add complexity and instability to the deterrent balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, aggravate suspicions and hostility among states neighboring new nuclear powers, place a wasteful economic burden on the aspirations of developing nations, impede the vital task of controlling and reducing weapons around the world, and eventually constitute direct military threats to the United States. As additional nations obtained nuclear weapons, our diplomatic and military influence would wane, and strong pressures would arise to retreat to isolation to avoid the risk of involvement in nuclear war. Nevertheless, even then, we could not escape the problem. There would be additional nuclear powers—perhaps some in this hemisphere—individually possessing the capability of destroying millions of American lives. Major defensive efforts might help substantially to diminish such limited threats, but millions of American lives would always be at risk. 2. The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons . Nuclear power programs are placing within the hands of many nations much of the knowledge, equipment and materials for making nuclear weapons. The recent Chinese Communist nuclear explosion has reinforced the belief, increasingly prevalent throughout the world, that nuclear weapons are a distinguishing mark of a world leader, are essential to national security, and are feasible even with modest industrial resources. The Chinese Communist nuclear weapons program has brought particular pressure on India and Japan, which may both be approaching decisions to undertake nuclear weapons programs. Although one might be tempted to accept Indian or Japanese nuclear weapons to counterbalance those of China, we do not believe the spread of nuclear weapons would or could be stopped there. An Indian or Japanese decision to build nuclear weapons would probably produce a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries, such as Pakistan, Israel and the UAR. In these circumstances, it is unrealistic to hope that Germany and other European countries would not decide to develop their own nuclear weapons. We are convinced, therefore, that energetic and comprehensive steps must be taken in the near future to discourage further acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities or an accelerating increase in the number of nations engaged in nuclear weapons programs will occur—possibly beginning within a matter of months. 3. Success in preventing the future spread of nuclear weapons requires a concerted and intensified effort . Although non-proliferation has been a declared part of United States foreign policy since 1945, we must now greatly intensify our efforts—both to obtain appropriate multilateral agreements and to affect directly the motivations of individual nations—if we are to have any hope of success in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. We have been impressed in the course of our study by the fact that actions affecting the spread of nuclear weapons also relate to a very broad range of United States interests: relations with our allies and with other nations, weapons deployments at home and abroad, programs in peaceful atomic energy, and commerce with foreign nations. In order that our efforts to stop nuclear proliferation may succeed, each of these areas of interest, as well as the agencies of Government which deal with them, must be truly responsive to our non-proliferation policies, and must give such non-proliferation policies far greater weight and support than they have received in the past. We must acknowledge the importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation. 4. A major effort on our part has promise of success in halting or retarding the spread of nuclear weapons . The dangers of proliferation affect all countries, creating a widespread common interest in early and effective steps to halt the nuclear spread. To date, initiatives within the United Nations and in disarmament negotiations have been only partially successful, but the Irish Resolution of 1961 and the limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 continue to offer a basis on which to take more comprehensive and effective steps. There remains broad support for multilateral measures to control nuclear proliferation. We believe that the Soviet Union, because of its growing vulnerability to proliferation among its neighbors, probably shares with us a strong interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Further, we believe that the change of leadership in the Soviet Union and the possible resulting review of Soviet nuclear policies may now provide an immediate opportunity for joint or parallel action in the near future to stop the nuclear spread. Of course, even major efforts on our part may not be successful in halting or greatly retarding the spread of nuclear weapons. But we are unanimous in our agreement that such efforts should be made. The rewards of long-term success would be enormous; and even partial success would be worth the costs we can expect to incur. RECOMMENDATIONS We therefore recommend that the United States undertake the following measures to implement its policy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: 1. Multilateral agreements. Measures to prevent particular countries from acquiring nuclear weapons are unlikely to succeed unless they are taken in support of a broad international prohibition applicable to many countries. We should seek to obtain on a multilateral basis formal treaty commitments of three kinds: a. Non-proliferation agreement . We should intensify our efforts for a non-proliferation agreement and seek the early conclusion of the widest and most effective possible international treaty on non-dissemination and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to bring strong pressure on significant countries (including Germany, France, India, Japan, Israel, the UAR and Sweden) to achieve their participation in such an agreement. Our initiatives in this area should not wait, or be dependent upon, the resolution of any issues relating to an Atlantic nuclear force, however helpful such resolution might be. As recommended in paragraph 3 below, we should intensify our efforts to persuade the Soviets of our strong non-dissemination objectives in connection with any Atlantic Nuclear Force in order to make it possible for the Soviets to take the lead with us in seeking worldwide support for a non-proliferation treaty. In any event, any conflict between our non-proliferation and ANF objectives may not become critical until the future of the MLF/ANF is known; but if it arises strongly before then, the priorities of the two proposals with respect to our overall national security should be carefully reviewed. b. Comprehensive test ban . We should renew our efforts to negotiate a verified comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union. Assuming there will be an adequate withdrawal provision in the treaty, we should be prepared to go ahead without the participation of either France or China. We should be prepared to accept the minimum number of on-site inspections in the Soviet Union that would be consistent with a viable treaty. In this connection, we should consider our anticipated improved capabilities for seismic detection and identification, and our other relevant unilateral intelligence capabilities. Inspection procedures and quotas covering other countries should also be reviewed to facilitate the widest and most effective application of the treaty. We should be prepared to propose an exception to such a treaty for peaceful nuclear explosions if a satisfactory procedure can be promptly devised that would preclude the development of nuclear weapons under the guise of a peaceful explosives program and if such an exception would be acceptable to other nations. An early approach should be made to the Soviet Union, and we should seek the widest adherence to the agreement and be prepared to bring strong influence to bear on significant countries to participate in it. c. Nuclear free zones . We should actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, Israel-UAR) nuclear free zones. To facilitate such agreements, we should be prepared to modify our requirements for verification and our position on transit rights and declarations with respect to United States nuclear weapons to the maximum extent consistent with demonstrable United States security needs. 2. Policies toward non-nuclear powers. In conjunction with the multilateral measures described above, we should intensify our efforts on a country-by-country basis to influence the decisions of individual non-nuclear powers not to undertake the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and to secure workable commitments to this effect. We should ourselves refrain from actions that would contribute to or suggest a future contribution to the development of nuclear weapons by these countries. The State, Treasury and Commerce Departments should develop programs of economic restrictions and other measures which could be quickly imposed by Executive action and which would be strong enough to produce a reversal of any decision to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. a . India—to deter India from building nuclear weapons : (1) While attempting, if possible, to avoid formal guarantees, we should be prepared, to the extent necessary and if requested by the Indians, to offer credible assurance of United States action in the event of a nuclear attack on India in exchange for an Indian commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. We should be prepared to undertake, if requested by the Indians, parallel action with the Soviets and/or the United Kingdom. Appropriate agencies of the Government should give early consideration to the form such United States assurances might take. (2) We should assist India in reasonable and economically justifiable scientific programs designed to build the prestige she might otherwise attempt to obtain from the development of a nuclear device. Such programs should be of a character that will not contribute significantly to future nuclear weapons capabilities. Particular attention should be given to those areas (such as natural resources, health and birth control) most relevant to India's economic and social problems. We might also initiate a major coordinated United States-Indian program of scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. In consultation with appropriate agencies, your Science Advisory Committee should be called upon to submit recommendations regarding United States assistance to Indian scientific activities and United States-Indian exchanges. (3) We should back India for a larger role in the United Nations. Such support, and, to the extent feasible, any new role, should be conditional on India's remaining a non-nuclear power. (4) We should reconsider the level of our economic and military assistance to India in the event she decides to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that advance knowledge of this intention by Indian officials would be likely to have a constructive influence, it should be disclosed to them. b . Japan—to deter Japan from building nuclear weapons : (1) We should reaffirm, and if necessary, reinforce our present defense commitment. As in the case of India, early consideration should be given to the form these commitments might take. (2) We should, as in the case of India, attempt to help the Japanese with appropriate prestige alternatives. (3) We should support Japan's desire for a more important role as a world leader. c . Israel-UAR . (1) Israel. As long as Israel remains a non-nuclear power, we should continue to give Israel assurances against being overrun by the UAR. We should make clear to Israel that these assurances would be withdrawn if she develops a nuclear weapon capability and that we would be prepared to consider other measures as well. (2) UAR. We should make it clear to UAR that our policy restraining an independent Israeli nuclear force is unlikely to be effective if the UAR acquires nuclear weapons. If the UAR should make a decision to do so, we should be prepared to take measures designed to reverse that decision. (3) We should make major efforts to persuade France, Germany or others against providing missile or nuclear assistance to Israel or the UAR, and should work for Soviet cooperation in keeping the Israeli-UAR confrontation non-nuclear. d . Spread of weapons technology . We should revise and broaden NSAM 294 so that it will restrict United States contributions to the development of nuclear warheads or strategic nuclear delivery capabilities of any country (including the United Kingdom if she can be induced to fold her strategic nuclear force into the ANF). Moreover, we should seek to enlist the cooperation of other advanced nations in parallel actions designed to complement the actions of the United States. 3 . Policies toward Europe and the Atlantic Nuclear Force. Our present policies in this area are defined in NSAM 322. In dealing with the Soviet Union, it should be made clear that any Atlantic Nuclear Force must reinforce and contribute to our basic policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To this end, it should be emphasized that any treaty establishing such a Force would include undertakings whereby the nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons to the independent control of non-nuclear members and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to develop or acquire or obtain control over nuclear weapons; that in all cases the agreement of the United States would be required in order to have the Force fire nuclear weapons; and that the voting procedures could be revised only with the unanimous agreement of all participating nations. Moreover, it should be emphasized that any ANF agreement would prevent the proliferation of individual nuclear capabilities among the participants and may reduce the number of nations having independent strategic nuclear capabilities by at least one (the United Kingdom). Several of the members of the Committee believe that an MLF/ANF or something like it may be essential if the Germans are to be inhibited from eventually acquiring an independent nuclear capability. Others feel that more modest measures such as increased sharing in nuclear consultation and planning and further exploitation of bilateral arrangements for nuclear weapons systems would suffice to deter the Germans from an independent nuclear course, particularly since the Germans are aware that such a course would be strongly opposed by France and the Soviet Union. In addition, it could be made clear to the Germans that the maintenance of United States forces in Germany would be inconsistent with the independent possession of nuclear weapons by Germany. Others of the Committee, seeing a basic incompatibility between the goal of German reunification and German acquisition of nuclear weapons, feel that greater emphasis should be placed on reunification as a means of shifting German interests away from nuclear weapons toward an objective more consistent with long-term European stability. In any case, all members agree that the appropriate agencies of the Government should continue urgent exploration of possible alternatives to an MLF/ANF which would permanently inhibit Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons, but would nevertheless assure that, in the absence of German reunification, West Germany would remain as a real ally on the Western side. 4 . Policies toward existing nuclear powers. a . France . While maintaining a place for France in the structure of any ANF, as provided in NSAM 322, we should make it clear to France that her insistence upon the development of an independent nuclear-strategic capability and upon atmospheric testing are unacceptable. Accordingly: (1) We should in no way assist the French atmospheric or underground nuclear test program and should be prepared to support international measures initiated by others having the effect of impeding or penalizing French nuclear tests. (2) Insofar as France is concerned, we should interpret NSAM 294 strictly. b . United Kingdom. (1) We should continue to favor the incorporation of the United Kingdom independent strategic nuclear deterrent in an ANF-type arrangement. (2) In consultation with the United Kingdom, we should undertake an appropriate revision of the 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act authorizing nuclear assistance to nations with advanced weapons capabilities that would be consistent with the future course of a special relationship with the United Kingdom while removing the implicit encouragement of existing law to other countries to achieve advanced nuclear capabilities. c . Soviet Union . In view of the great importance of Soviet support and cooperation in connection with efforts to stop nuclear proliferation, we should undertake new initiatives to obtain such support. We should make early approaches to the Soviets, seeking cooperation on as broad a basis as possible in achieving the objectives described in this report, and to the extent possible, the relevant specific actions set forth in paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of these recommendations. In addition to the direct non-proliferation measures described in paragraph 1 above, we should undertake early initiatives toward the following United States-Soviet arms control agreements as a means both of reducing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and creating an atmosphere conducive to wide acceptance of restraints on nuclear proliferation: (1) A verified fissile materials production cutoff for weapons purposes, to be established by treaty (with appropriate provision permitting the production of tritium). (2) A verified strategic delivery vehicle freeze coupled with significant agreed reductions (e.g. 30%) in strategic force levels, to be established by treaty. (3) An 18- to 24-month halt in the construction of new ABM or ICBM launchers, to be accomplished by reciprocal Executive action based on unilateral verification capabilities. d . China . We believe that it will prove difficult over the long term either to halt nuclear proliferation or to obtain worldwide peace and stability until China has joined the society of nations and is willing to participate responsibly in arms control measures. In view of the complexity and difficulty of the problem, we recommend that the Government undertake a major high-level reexamination of our policies toward China, taking into account the effect of those policies upon all aspects of our national security and our alliances in the Far East. 5. Peaceful uses of atomic energy. While we recognize that in the long run fissionable materials will probably be available in all industrial countries as a result of nuclear power programs, we believe that every effort should be made at this time to ensure that peaceful atomic energy programs do not unreasonably contribute to potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. We should in all cases insist on adequate safeguards for all peaceful programs. Moreover, our support should be limited to those programs which will advance the economic development of friendly countries; and we should not press such programs with special subsidies. Careful consideration should be given to the political stability and reliability of countries where such programs are undertaken. We should make an effort to get all potential suppliers to agree to offer materials and facilities only under adequate safeguards. We should take the following actions with regard to IAEA and Euratom: a . IAEA. (1) We should increase our efforts to build up the IAEA, including broader responsibilities, increased operational activities, larger budgets and improved technical capabilities. (2) We should exert stronger influence on all nations including supplying nations and the Soviet Bloc to accept IAEA safeguards on reactors and separation plants and should offer, in return, to extend safeguards to additional United States facilities. (3) We should explore additional means of establishing control practices with respect to uranium and fuel elements which would reduce the risk of nuclear power facilities being used for military purposes. b . Euratom. (1) We should press Euratom in order to obtain satisfactory United States verification of Euratom safeguards. (2) We should work toward Euratom acceptance of IAEA safeguards and IAEA acceptance of Euratom. While we recognize that the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives (Project Plowshare) may have long-term economic importance, we do not believe that the program should be allowed to jeopardize a comprehensive test ban treaty or to encourage interest in nuclear weapons. Undue emphasis on such programs tends to make nuclear explosives appear desirable, necessary and acceptable for countries presently considering undertaking nuclear weapons programs. In addition, attempts to incorporate provisions permitting such programs under a comprehensive test ban treaty may be difficult, if not impossible, without providing a loophole under which nuclear weapons could be developed. We should not, therefore, actively seek to interest other countries in such programs until we better understand their relationship to the comprehensive test ban and the general nuclear proliferation problem. 6. United States weapons policies. If we are to minimize the incentives for others to acquire nuclear weapons, it is important that we avoid giving an exaggerated impression of their importance and utility and that we stress the current and future important role of conventional armaments. It is also important that our physical arrangements minimize the possibility of unauthorized seizure or compromise of design information regarding United States nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Accordingly, we should take the following actions: a . NATO strategy . We believe that the prospects for success of our effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be enhanced by adoption of a revised NATO strategy, along the lines now being proposed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, placing greater stress on a non-nuclear option and relying less upon tactical nuclear weapons. (Such a policy would of course maintain a tactical nuclear capability for deterrence, credibility and flexibility.) b . Physical security . The program for the installation of Permissive Action Links (PALs) in weapons deployed in Europe should be continued and expanded to apply to all weapons deployed overseas. Intensified research to develop improved safeguards against seizure or unauthorized use should be continued. We should consider appropriate assistance to the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union in connection with the development of PALs and safety devices for their respective weapons. c . Research and development . The Department of Defense should reexamine future requirements in the light of the policies recommended in this memorandum. Consideration should be given, among other matters, to damage limitation systems effective against lesser nuclear threats; to detection and identification systems related to such threats; and to the development of any weapons systems necessary to back our commitments to nations electing not to develop their own nuclear weapons. The program outlined above should not preclude other measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and the appropriate agencies of the Government should be called upon to undertake to develop additional proposals to that end. All agencies should carefully consider the implications for nuclear proliferation of all their actions and information policies, and their progress on non-proliferation matters should, we think, be followed closely by you and your senior advisers. Arthur H. Dean Allen W. Dulles Alfred M. Gruenther George B. Kistiakowsky John J. McCloy James A. Perkins Arthur K. Watson William Webster Herbert F. York Roswell L. Gilpatric Chairman 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, Report (Final, 12/21/65), Box 8. Secret. The report and a 13-page “draft of an NSAM which would in the opinion of the Gilpatric Committee give execution to its recommendations,” was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Foster, Seaborg, General Wheeler, McCone, and Hornig, January 23, 1964 [1965], with the President's admonition that “these papers not be shown to anyone outside the Committee of Principals without his direct approval in each case … . I cannot overstate the strength of the President's conviction and concern for the security of these documents.” A copy of the draft NSAM, not printed, is ibid. The NSAM was never formally issued. 65. Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 65. Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 1 Washington, January 22, 1965. No. 3 According to Associated Press Agency reports, a nuclear rocket engine of the “Kiwi” type, which is a prototype of engines for space ships, was exploded for experimental purposes on January 12 of this year in the U.S.A. The purpose of this experiment, as the Agency points out, was to establish what might occur in case of an accident during the launching of a rocket with nuclear fuel. As an Associated Press correspondent reports, there occurred as a result of the explosion “a tremendous cloud of dust and a flash of light which blocked the sun” for some time. Judging by the report of this Agency, published prior to the experiment, the self-generating explosion of the nuclear rocket engine must have been accompanied by the dissemination of radioactive particles from the explosion over a large distance. In connection with this the Soviet Government cannot but come to the conclusion that if these reports of the Associated Press Agency about the nuclear explosion which has been conducted conform to reality, then there has taken place a violation by the United States of the “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater,” signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and which entered into force October 10 of that year. As is known, in point 1, Article I, of the cited treaty it is stated that each of its participants “undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control,” in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. Considering the full seriousness of the situation which can arise in the case that there really took place a nuclear explosion falling under the prohibition stipulated by the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the U.S.A. will give the necessary clarifications regarding the character of the experiment carried out in the U.S.A. on January 12 of this year. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. No classification marking. In a January 22 telephone call to Seaborg, Foster said that Dobrynin made this oral reply to Thompson at 3:15 p.m. the same day. (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, p. 87) Dobrynin handed the aide-mémoire to Thompson, saying it was not related to the inquiry Secretary Rusk had made of him concerning the Soviet test on January 15. When Thompson responded that he hoped there was no relationship between the two inquiries, Dobrynin “said he thought that in fact there may have been some similarity between the two events in that both may have been accidents.” (Memorandum of conversation, January 22; ibid., p. 89) 66. Oral Reply From the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) to Secretary of State Rusk 66. Oral Reply From the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 25, 1965. An underground nuclear explosion was indeed carried out in the Soviet Union. 2 This explosion was carried out deep down underground. The quantity of radioactive debris that leaked into the atmosphere was, however, so insignificant that a possibility of its fallout outside the territorial limits of the Soviet Union should be excluded. Thus, the underground explosion that was carried out does not affect the provisions of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Confidential; Limdis. A copy is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, p. 101. 2 Regarding this Soviet test, see Document 62 . 67. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 67. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 1 Washington, undated. The aide-mémoire from the Soviet Government, dated January 22, 2 requests that the Government of the United States provide clarification regarding the Kiwi reactor safety experiment as to whether it constituted a nuclear explosion falling under the prohibition stipulated by the “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.” Reactors are designed as stable power sources and are intrinsically unsuitable for use as weapons. Neither reactor safety experiments nor reactor accidents which they are designed to stimulate or reproduce constitute nuclear explosions. Therefore, they do not fall under the prohibition stipulated in the Treaty. Nevertheless, in view of the interest of the Soviet Government, the Government of the United States provides the following information concerning this experiment. The Kiwi experiment of January 12, 1965, at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station in Nevada, was the latest of the series of reactor safety experiments to obtain information to ensure the safe operation of nuclear reactors and to assess the potential consequences in the unlikely event that a reactor accident occurred. Reactor safety experiments have been freely discussed at the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 3 and elsewhere. All of the previous U.S. reactor safety experiments including those involving reactor destruction, such as the Spert test conducted during November 1963, and the Snaptran test in April 1964, have been reported in the open literature. The same procedure is being followed for this experiment. The experiment was announced publicly in advance and the press was present. The Kiwi reactor safety experiment involved a deliberate burn-up of a nuclear rocket reactor designed for space exploration. This experiment was necessary to obtain data on the behavior of reactors of this type under rapid changes in power levels. Extensive safety studies have been performed to determine the effects of various postulated accident conditions which might theoretically cause such rapid changes in power levels. This experiment was conducted to confirm or correct the predictions of those safety studies. The Kiwi reactor is a uranium carbide fueled, graphite moderated reactor of approximately 1,000 megawatts thermal power. The experiment was conducted as planned and produced a relatively small amount of energy over a time period thousands of times longer than the period involved in nuclear explosions. Specifically, according to preliminary data, a total energy of about 15,000 megawatt-seconds was produced over several milliseconds. This release of energy caused portions of the reactor to vaporize and the reactor to destroy itself. Results were in good agreement with pre-test predictions. The experiment therefore lends confidence to the reactor safety studies which are so important in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Confidential; Limit Distribution. A copy of the aide-mémoire is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, pp. 98-100. The source text is undated, but is attached to a January 26 memorandum from G. William Moser to the Committee of Principals indicating that a copy of the aide-mémoire was given to Ambassador Dobrynin on the same day. Llewellyn Thompson, who handed it to Dobrynin, wrote of their meeting: “I handed the Ambassador our reply to their aide-mémoire on the Kiwi reactor. After reading it, the Ambassador quoted from the language of the Treaty, stating that in addition to weapons tests, 'any other nuclear explosion anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described' was prohibited. He stated that this experiment had been described by the American press as a nuclear explosion. I said that although the matter was a technical one, my understanding was that the operation of any nuclear reactor could, in one sense of the word, be described as a nuclear explosion. My understanding was that in this case in order to develop reactor safety, a reactor was speeded up to the point where it burned itself up, but that this was not comparable to what we would consider a nuclear explosion by a very wide margin. “Dobrynin said he would of course transmit our aide-mémoire and that it would be studied in Moscow, but he clearly indicated that he did not consider we had made a convincing case.” (Memorandum of conversation, January 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31) 2 Document 65 . 3 Regarding this conference, held in Geneva, August 31-September 9, 1964, see Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 9, pp. 145-156 and 178-180. 68. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 68. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 1 Moscow, February 1, 1965. Your personal message of January 14 of this year 2 has been attentively studied by us. On that same confidential basis we should like to inform you of the point of view of the Soviet Government both regarding the questions raised by you and also regarding several other international questions. We received with satisfaction the response, which we found in your message, to the ideas of the Soviet Government, which were transmitted to you on November 3, 1964 3 , regarding the necessity to resolve ripened problems by means of discussions and regarding the importance of honorable observance by both sides of agreements already reached between our governments. We agree with the statement contained in your message that measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons would answer the interests of our two peoples and all of humanity. In this connection, it goes without saying that there should not be left a single chink (for access) to them by states not now possessing such weapons—direct or indirect. However, what is now happening in the West is, unfortunately, going in the opposite direction. You know what a negative attitude is called forth in the Soviet Union and in countries who are our friends and allies by plans to establish NATO nuclear forces in any of their variations—“multilateral” or “ Atlantic.” These plans likewise are plans to disseminate nuclear weapons, and in the most dangerous region of the world. Giving Western Germany access to nuclear weapons, in whatever form it might be planned, we cannot regard as other than a step directed against the interests of the security of the Soviet Union and of the countries united in the Warsaw Pact organization, as a step strengthening the threat of war. We know that you have a different point of view. You say that between the Governments of the USSR and the USA there exists a “misunderstanding” in this regard. In our view the case is much more complicated. The Soviet people has its own experience—an experience costing millions of lives—with the treachery and aggression of the German militarists, whose well-known pretensions, as is widely recognized even in the West, mainly stimulate the development of plans for the dissemination of nuclear weapons, for example under the flag of NATO nuclear forces. We should like with all frankness to tell you of our serious concern that in several regions of the world and first of all in Southeast Asia there continue to take place cases of breaking international agreements and even military actions against the democratic republic of Vietnam. Such actions cannot fail to call forth a corresponding answering reaction among us and among our friends and allies. We are convinced that realism in policy demands elimination of the dangerous tension which has arisen in Southeast Asia especially in Vietnam and Laos, and that the way out lies in unbending observance of the principle of respect for the sovereign rights of peoples and for valid international agreements. The Soviet Government considers that at the present moment it would be appropriate to separate out from the group of problems which were the subject of an exchange of opinions between the Governments of the USSR and the USA those problems with regard to which it would be possible to reach an understanding. We have been successful in reaching an understanding without formal agreement, for example, on the question of reducing military budgets. In your message you state that the Government of the USA intends to reduce somewhat military expenditures for the 1965 fiscal year, as we have also done with regard to the Soviet budget. Our views both with regard to the usefulness of this measure as well as with regard to its limited significance, obviously coincide. The Soviet Government takes as a point of departure the fact that it is now important to develop such concrete and realistic measures as would narrow the scope of the arms race and would lay a path toward the resolution of the basic questions of disarmament, toward general and complete disarmament. Soviet proposals, which in our opinion serve this goal, were presented for the consideration of the XIX Session of the UN General Assembly. 4 The Government of the USA promised to study them. We await the results of this study. Some questions concerning the problem of disarmament are touched upon in your New Year's message. 5 You mentioned, in particular, an inspected world-wide all-inclusive prohibition on nuclear weapon testing, a combination of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes with measures assuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and an inspected freeze on strategic delivery systems. The American proposals on these questions have already been discussed in detail, as is known, at the disarmament negotiations in Geneva, and the positions of the parties on these questions have been fully determined. If it is a question of concepts which have been in the field of view earlier, then we are prepared to consider them with full attention. [Here follows discussion of European security and a German peace settlement, the U.N. financial situation, bilateral matters, and the possibility of a personal meeting between the two leaders.] 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR—Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. The source text contains no salutation. The February 1 date is the day Dobrynin delivered it to Thompson. (Memorandum from Thompson to Bundy, February 1; ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8) 2 Document 61 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 61 . 4 Presumably a reference to the Soviet Union's memorandum of December 7, 1964. See footnote 4, Document 54 . 5 See footnote 4, Document 61 . 6 Printed from an unsigned copy. 69. Editorial Note 69. Editorial Note Following the U.S. announcement of the venting of radioactive debris into the atmosphere from the Soviet test of January 15, 1965 ( Document 62 ), and the Soviet Government's oral reply, January 25, denying any violation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty ( Document 66 ), the Committee of Principals grappled with this issue at its meetings on January 25 and February 3. At the former meeting the Principals decided to issue a Department of State press release that summarized the Soviet's oral reply and stated, “The United States is continuing its own evaluation of the facts involved.” (Department of State Bulletin , February 8, 1965, page 187) McGeorge Bundy's handwritten edited version of the draft press announcement, January 25, which had been prepared by Seaborg, is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Volume I, Box 31. Notes of the January 25 meeting are in Seaborg, Journal , Volume 10, page 103. A summary of actions of this meeting is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Volume 2, Box 14. Foster also prepared a draft oral statement from Rusk to Dobrynin, January 25, for the January 25 meeting and he circulated a revised version of it under cover of a memorandum from him to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Wheeler, Seaborg, Hornig, McGeorge Bundy, and McCone, January 26. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217) At its February 3 meeting, the Principals further considered the matter in light of intelligence data gathered about the Soviet test and wrote a draft aide-mémoire, February 3. (Ibid., S/S-RD Files: Lot 68 D 452, Committee of Principals, January-May 1965) Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal , Volume 10, page 133. A later revised version of the aide-mémoire, February 8, is in Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Regarding the decision to present the aide-mémoire to the Soviet Union and the final draft text, which contained a few revisions of the February 8 draft, see Document 70 . 70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 70. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 11, 1965. SUBJECT A further message to the Soviets on their nuclear test that vented 2 1. As you know, we picked up radioactive debris from a Soviet test that vented on January 15, 1965. We reported this fact to the Soviet Union and asked for an explanation. 2. Ambassador Dobrynin came back with an oral statement in which the Soviet Government agreed that there had been venting, but denied the possibility of fallout outside the limits of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we got pictures of the crater, and we have been refining our analysis of the Soviet test. It is now reasonably certain that the test was intended as a Plowshare excavation experiment. The explosion was very clean, with a yield of 300 to 400 kilotons. We believe that the venting was not accidental but was inherent in the cratering design of the experiment. On the other hand, the weather conditions at the time may well have led the Soviets to believe that there would be no fallout beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. 3. The test clearly raises a question of its legitimacy under the test ban treaty, and we face something of a dilemma. On the one hand, if we do not keep pressing the Soviets for a fuller explanation, we may seem to be giving our tacit approval to a violation. On the other hand, if we take a prosecutor's attitude we may only succeed in pinning ourselves to a position of rigidity, on very small amounts of venting, that will work against our own interest at some later stage when we may wish to make similar tests of very clean devices of our own. 4. The conclusion that we have reached is that we should register our dissatisfaction with the existing Soviet position and ask for more information. This will protect us from seeming to accept an explanation that is simply not in accordance with the facts, while at the same time we avoid the position of a prosecutor under the treaty. Moreover, if by any chance the Soviets do provide additional information, it will help to strengthen the precedents for full disclosure of the facts surrounding any cases of venting in the future. 5. The Committee of Principals (State, Defense, AEC, JCS, CIA, Hornig, and Bundy) agree upon the Aide-Mémoire attached at Tab A, for presentation by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin. 3 McG. B. Tab A 4 February 9, 1965. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF AIDE-MEMOIRE CONCERNING THE SOVIET UNDERGROUND TEST OF JANUARY 15, 1965 5 The United States Government has studied Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement of January 25 together with all other presently available data on the Soviet Union underground explosion of January 15, 1965 in the light of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The United States has noted the observation contained in Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement that the quantity of radioactive debris that was placed in the atmosphere was “so insignificant that a possibility of its fall out outside the territorial limits of the Soviet Union is excluded.” However, we are unable to reconcile the scientific findings with respect to the radioactive debris resulting from the Soviet Union's test with the observations in Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement. On January 19, 20, 21 and 22 radioactive debris, which can be associated directly with the Soviet nuclear explosion on January 15, was collected outside the USSR. U.S. aircraft operating in the Sea of Japan acquired fresh fission fragments traceable to the Soviet test. In addition, the Radioactivity Countermeasures Headquarters of the Government of Japan has published data collected from many ground stations on January 20, 21 and 22 indicating concentrations of radioactive debris which were as much as 10 to 100 times the levels on previous days. Article I (b) of the Treaty imposes an obligation on parties to prohibit, prevent and not to carry out any nuclear explosion in any environment including underground, “if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits” of the party conducting the test. In view of the foregoing, the Government of the United States requests further information concerning this event. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—USSR, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. 2 Regarding discussions leading to the preparation of this message (aide-mémoire), see Document 69 . 3 The approved option at the end of the memorandum is checked. 4 Confidential; Limdis. 5 This aide-mémoire has not been found, but was later referred to as dated February 15. See footnote 7, Document 76 . U.S.-Soviet discussions on this Soviet test apparently continued, for Seaborg later recounted: “On November 19, 1965, the State Department announced, 'on the basis of discussions with the Soviet Government,' that the venting from the Soviet test had been a result of 'miscalculation' and that the United States had asked the USSR 'to take precautions to assure observance of the limited test ban treaty.'” (Stemming the Tide, p. 225) 71. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 71. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, March 6, 1965. SUBJECT ACDA Draft Message on Disarmament The attached draft message on disarmament has been circulated by Bill Foster to the Committee of Principals with the suggestion that it be discussed in the near future at a meeting of the Committee of Principals. 2 While I believe the attached draft is, in general, pretty good, I think that it is clear that the next pen-pal message should cover a number of current issues in addition to arms control. I hope that Ambassador Thompson will draw on this ACDA draft in the message he is preparing. 3 I am afraid he may not, however, since the word I get from both ACDA and Dave Klein is that Thompson does not consider this entire subject as a “starter.” For my own part, I am not prepared to rule out entirely the possibility that we might in the relatively near term reach some sort of an agreement with the Soviets on some modest arms control proposal such as a non-proliferation treaty. Even if one discounts this possibility entirely, I believe that it is still important to restate and develop our ideas on arms control as part of the background mood music for a continuing dialogue with the Soviets. The ACDA draft calls for exploration of essentially all of the proposals currently being considered within government that appear to have any chance of being cleared by the Principals and negotiable with the Soviets. While I believe we should refer to specific arms control areas in the next pen-pal message, I don't think we need throw in everything we have at this time. Actually, I believe that ACDA made their package this comprehensive to increase the probability that something would survive. The ACDA draft also names Foster as our negotiator to explore the problems with the Soviets. While I have no objection to Foster doing the job, I wonder if naming him specifically is a wise tactic at this time since it invites a Soviet reply that he should deal with his opposite number, Tsarapkin, (an old-line bureaucrat who, I doubt, is very close to the top of the Soviet Government) rather than opening up the relatively high-level discussion which I believe it called for. In considering the priority of the items in the ACDA package, I agree with ACDA that the most important is an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. With regard to the ANF, ACDA has suggested some very cautious language that is calculated not to upset the State Department; however, I am afraid that it will not prove sufficiently reassuring to the Soviets to be of much value. I have, therefore, suggested an alternate, more controversial, text that I believe expresses our actual intentions in this matter. 4 In this connection,ACDA suggests that we explore the possibility of joint reassurances to nations that forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons. I like the idea, but I do not think we should open this up until we have further clarified our own thinking and have explored the question further with the Indians who are, of course, the principal nation concerned at the moment. I believe that the next priority should be to reaffirm our interest in a safeguarded comprehensive test ban. The Soviets seem to be putting out the word that we are no longer interested in such an agreement and we must not let them convince themselves that this is the case. I believe we should also reassert our desire to discontinue the production of fissionable material for weapons, and I agree with ACDA that we should use this opportunity to press the Soviets for a clarification of the steps the Soviets have actually taken to carry out Khrushchev's announcement of cutbacks last spring. 5 I think it is also important that we set forth at least one or two new ideas. I believe the best candidates are the proposal to couple reductions of agreed numbers of strategic missiles and launching sites to our strategic freeze proposal and the proposal for a two-year moratorium on the construction of new land-based facilities for strategic missiles and for anti-ballistic missiles. These are substantive matters that would, of course, require clearance with the Pentagon. They have, however, been previously staffed and I understand that McNamara will support a proposal to explore them. I place a lower priority on, but do not object to, the proposal to explore arrangements to include the destruction of the non-nuclear components of agreed numbers of nuclear weapons in conjunction with the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes. This idea, which has been worked out in some detail by ACDA, is an interesting response to Soviet charges that our transfer proposals don't really affect nuclear weapons; however, I don't really believe the Soviets will be very attracted by the proposal at this time. Similarly, while I strongly support the concept of nuclear free zones and do not object to discussing it with the Soviets, this is not the critical forum since we have correctly taken the position that the initiative for nuclear free zones must come from the areas involved. I have placed the lowest priority on proposals to explore informal restraints on the proliferation of strategic nuclear vehicles and the proposal to consider reductions in launch facilities and associated strategic vehicles prior to working out a strategic production freeze. I have not thought these proposals through very carefully yet and have some questions about them. Moreover, I think there would be considerable difficulty clearing these two concepts quickly. Finally, I do not believe that we should include ground observation posts in Europe and the associated question of possible reductions in force levels. While it is true that we have previously proposed observation posts to guard against surprise attack, I am afraid that this creates more political problems in NATO than it is worth. In any event, the suggestion that we explore reductions in force levels seems unwise at this time. I have indicated a number of detailed editorial changes on the ACDA draft, but have not attempted to rewrite the draft in accordance with the above comments. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. 2 Not found. 3 No record has been found that a message was sent at this time. 4 Not further identified. 5 See Document 24 . 72. Memorandum of Conversation 72. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 22, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Disarmament PARTICIPANTS UK Side Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office Michael Stewart, Chargé d'Affaires a.i., British Embassy R.S. Crawford, Assistant Under Secretary, Foreign Office Michael Hadow, Counselor, Foreign Office J.N. Henderson, Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary John Harris, Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary US Side The Secretary Ambassador Bruce William C. Foster, Director,ACDA William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary, IO Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary, P J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA Foreign Secretary Stewart said that Gromyko in his talks in London last week had refused to include in the communique any mention of resumed disarmament discussions at Geneva. 2 Nevertheless, he had indicated that the Soviet reply to the US proposal regarding resumption of the talks would be forthcoming shortly. Mr. Stewart listed three subjects which he had discussed with Gromyko: (1) a non-dissemination agreement; (2) extension of the test ban to cover underground tests; and (3) a combination of a freeze on delivery systems with the destruction of some means of delivery. Gromyko had been emphatic that so long as there is a prospect of MLF or an ANF there can be no agreement on non-dissemination. With respect to an extension of the test ban to include underground tests, Gromyko maintained that there is no need for on-site inspections. He did not respond to Mr. Stewart's suggestion that scientists on each site should examine the scientific basis for the Soviet contention that on-site inspections are unnecessary. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Stewart said that Gromyko had not made any suggestions regarding a reconstitution of the membership of the Geneva Conference, for example, to include Communist China. In discussing other forums for disarmament negotiations, however, Gromyko had referred to the possibility of a five-power meeting, including Communist China, to discuss nuclear weapons. Mr. Stewart believes that the Soviet Union will probably agree to resume discussions at Geneva but in doing so is likely to attach various restrictive conditions. The Secretary said that the U.S. does not exclude the possibility of Chinese Communist participation in disarmament negotiations. We have always recognized that at a certain stage their participation will be necessary. The Foreign Secretary reported that Gromyko in discussing a possible budgetary approach to disarmament had been unresponsive when the problem of differences in budgetary accounting between different countries was raised with him. The Secretary said that we would be interested in a budgetary approach to the problem of disarmament but a necessary preliminary would be a discussion of the comparability of budgets. We have informed the Soviet Union of reductions in our defense budgets pursuant to the idea of encouraging reductions by mutual example. Mr. Foster said that some parts of the U.K. draft agreement on nonproliferation caused us concern. He mentioned in this connection implications with respect to MLF and ANF with which we did not agree. Mr. Foster also expressed doubts about the desirability of early tabling of such a proposal in disarmament discussions. He emphasized that we are in accord with the importance of a non-dissemination agreement and the urgency of the matter. With respect to an extension of the test ban treaty to cover underground tests, Mr. Foster said that for scientific and political reasons there is still a need for on-site inspections. He recalled that our last offer had been for a minimum of seven on-site inspections while the Russians had proposed three and then later had withdrawn their offer. Mr. Foster expressed doubt about the desirability of our proposing a new number of on-site inspections until the Soviet Union has accepted the principle of such inspections. Mr. Stewart agreed with Mr. Foster on this point. The Foreign Secretary, reverting to the recent UK/German talks, 3 said that the Federal Republic is not prepared to consider any form of discrimination going beyond its present undertaking not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The Germans are unwillling to enter into new contractual obligations with the Soviet Union without concurrent progress on reunification. The Secretary said we do not agree that this is a card the Germans are entitled to play. If we reach agreement on an MLF/ANF we can, however, say the German reunification would necessitate review of the situation. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and approved in S on March 31. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 5.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. Foreign Secretary Stewart visited Washington, March 21-24. 2 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, who visited London March 16-20, 1965, for talks with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, did not mention resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which had adjourned in Geneva on September 17, 1964. 3 Probably a reference to West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder's talks with British Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker in London on December 11, 1964, largely on the NATO nuclear issue. 73. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 73. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 1 Washington, March 30, 1965. In its note of March sixth, requesting further clarification of the Kiwi reactor safety experiment, the Soviet Government apparently misinterprets the position taken by the United States Government in its Aide-Mémoire of January 26, 1965. 2 The position of the United States Government is that the Kiwi experiment did not constitute a “nuclear explosion” within the meaning of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The experiment was a reactor safety test and its technical characteristics are readily distinguishable from a nuclear explosion. Reactors are legitimately present in all parts of the world; accidents in which they burn up or experiments designed to simulate such accidents have never been considered to be nuclear explosions, and consequently are not within the scope of the Treaty. As a continuation of the discussions in these scientific areas held at the Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy last September in Geneva, detailed descriptions and analyses of the Kiwi experiment will be made available to the world scientific community at the International Symposium on Fission Product Release and Transport Under Accident Conditions, at the Oak Ridge Laboratory during the first week of April. The Soviet Union has been invited to send representatives to attend and participate in that meeting and thus will soon have an opportunity to obtain further information concerning that experiment. 1 Source: Department of State,S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, Miscellaneous Microfilm Files, U.S./U.S.S.R. Conversations. Confidential. A cover memorandum of conversation by Thompson (S/AL), March 30, states that he asked Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to come to the Department of State to give him the aide-mémoire. Dobrynin said he would transmit it to his government, but he made no comment on it. 2 Document 67 . 74. Memorandum of Conversation 74. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 30, 1965. SUBJECT Disarmament PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin, U.S.S.R. William C. Foster, Director,ACDA At Ambassador Dobrynin's invitation, I joined him at luncheon at the Soviet Embassy about 12:30 p.m. Before sitting down to luncheon, he first asked about the intent of Long Shot. 2 He outlined his own interpretation which was that from this experiment we would prove out our theories that we would be able to detect and identify all underground events. With that information added to our present information, he stated his own belief that from a scientific viewpoint there would be no questionable events and, therefore, there would be no need for on-site inspection. He stated his further conclusion that the only reason for on-site inspections was political and in view of the fact that there was no risk to the security of the U.S. because of the possibility of a few unidentified events, it would be well to proceed to a comprehensive test ban, if, indeed, the U.S. still wanted it. I explained that from our viewpoint, while our ability to detect and identify had improved, there was little likelihood that all events could be identified. In view of this, both from a scientific viewpoint and a political viewpoint, there continued to be a requirement for some on-site inspections, even though, as we had stated on a number of occasions, our approach to this requirement is flexible. At luncheon two basic points were discussed. The first had to do with the Ambassador's puzzlement as to why we had not responded to the confidential note on the matter of arms control and disarmament which had now been in our hands almost three months. 3 I stated this, in my opinion, was a reasonable question, but that the conditions in the world had been such in the interval, that so far it had not seemed appropriate to respond. The other basic point, and the primary reason that he had asked me to luncheon, concerned a formal Soviet Government proposal which will be made to the U.N. Secretary General, I presume almost immediately, and which calls on their part for a convening of the U.N. Disarmament Commission in order to discuss disarmament proposals, as they say, consistent with the statement issued in Geneva by the ENDC at the time of their adjourning last September. 4 He read to me an English version of what presumably will be the content of their note 5 in which the Soviet Government called attention to the wording of the recess statement and said that, due to “the futility of the discussions at the last session,” it was necessary to discuss the disarmament situation at the U.N.G.A. and, following that discussion, the question of a further return to the ENDC might be decided. The note will apparently call for a convening of the Commission at the earliest possible moment in order to move ahead with the important work of disarmament. I said that, of course, we would give attention to this immediately when it was officially set forth. I said also that in a preliminary way I had some question regarding the utility of such a discussion, since without instruction from the G.A. on an established procedure or definite time limitations such a Commission with 100 or 115 participants could degenerate into a futile exercise. However, the U.S. Government obviously would give appropriate consideration to the proposal and we would be in touch with him further when the official version had been presented. I suggested that it might be useful to consider on a concurrent time basis some bilateral discussion of what might be the most fruitful specific areas for discussion when, as, and if we returned to Geneva. I also said that I would make inquiry as to the status of a response to their earlier official government note on disarmament. Our discussion ended at 2:15. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential;Exdis. Drafted by Foster. 2 Long Shot, a Department of Defense nuclear test detection experiment of about 80 kilotons, took place at Amchitka Island, Alaska, October 29, 1965. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 , p. 21) 3 Reference presumably is to February 1 message from Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson, Document 68 . 4 Reference is to the Fifth Interim Progress Report by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the U.N. Disarmament Commission and the U.N. General Assembly, September 17, 1964. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 435-440) 5 A letter from Soviet U.N. Representative Fedorenko to U.N. Secretary-General Thant, March 31, 1965, proposed convening the U.N. Disarmament Commission, on which all members of the United Nations were represented, as soon as possible in the first half of April 1965. (Ibid., pp. 30-31) 75. Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 75. Aide-Mémoire From the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State 1 Washington, April 29, 1965. No. 12 According to a report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission an underground nuclear explosion was conducted, on April 14 of this year in the state of Nevada, 2 as a result of which there took place the ejection of earth to the surface and the penetration into the atmosphere of released radioactive materials. Inasmuch as this explosion was conducted under the “Plowshare” program and, as is indicated in this same report of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, a crater of large dimension formed at the site of the explosion—350 feet in diameter, 100 feet in depth, and forming a 60 foot lip—it is evident that with this underground nuclear explosion there took place not an accidental but a pre-planned ejection of a significant amount of earth and, consequently, a pre-planned ejection of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. At the same time it is known that Article I (b) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water contains the obligation of the parties of this Treaty to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear explosions in any environment, including underground “if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits” of the State which conducts the explosion. In this connection the Soviet Government requests that it be given more detailed information about the nuclear explosion conducted in the U.S.A. on April 14 this year since the assertion of the Atomic Energy Commission that the fallout of radioactive debris is within the boundaries of the U.S.A. is unconvincing because the Commission does not control the air streams carrying radioactivity, and there is reason to believe that with the conduct of this explosion there took place a violation of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments. 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, pp. 437-438. No classification marking. A cover memorandum of conversation by Thompson (S/AL), April 29, reads as follows: “Dobrynin handed me the attached aide-mémoire concerning the recent Plowshare experiment. I made no comment.” (Ibid.) This aide-mémoire seemed to Seaborg “to be a political move, possibly in anticipation of discussion of mutual problems in conducting Plowshare programs.” (Ibid., p. 435) 2 Reference is to Palanquin, a Plowshare cratering test, with a yield of 4.3 kt, which released radioactivity detected off site. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , p. 25) 76. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 76. Aide-Mémoire From the Department of State to the Soviet Embassy 1 Washington, May 18, 1965. The United States Government has carefully considered the Soviet Government's Aide-Mémoire of April 29, 1965, 2 concerning the April 14, 1965, experiment conducted by the United States Atomic Energy Commission as part of a program for developing peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. 3 In planning the experiment of April 14, the United States took numerous precautions to avoid violation of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater. In fact, the purpose of the experiment was to obtain data on a method to enhance the containment of radioactive debris from underground nuclear excavation explosions. The explosion had a yield of about four kilotons and was buried at a depth of 280 feet in hard rock. The depth was specifically chosen to be the same, scaled for the size of the explosion, as a previous test which did not produce a crater. As in the case of the previous test, the experiment was permitted to take place only under meteorological conditions carefully chosen to avoid the escape of radioactive debris from the territory of the United States. As has been announced, the experiment did produce a crater and small amounts of radioactive debris were projected into the atmosphere. Most of this debris was deposited in the vicinity of the site of the experiment. In accordance with meteorological predictions, the small quantity of radioactive debris which went further was blown northward within the United States for several hundred miles from the Nevada test site and then southeastward over the central United States. During this time, the airborne concentrations of radioactive debris were determined by measurement to have been diluted by fallout, radioactive decay, and dispersion to extremely low levels. The United States Government will continue to take the greatest care in the conduct of nuclear detonations including its program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. The United States Government affirms its commitment to the preservation of the Treaty with unimpaired authority. In this connection the Government of the United States believes it necessary to revert to consideration of a very much larger nuclear explosion conducted in the Soviet Union on January 15, 1965, 4 seemingly directed at a similar application as that of the United States on April 14, 1965, but which resulted in many times as much radioactive debris being released to the atmosphere. The United States Government has studied Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statements of January 25 5 and March 9, 1965, 6 and has examined all other available data on the Soviet underground nuclear explosion. As was pointed out in the United States Government's Aide-Mémoire of February 15, 1965, 7 radioactive debris from that Soviet explosion was detected on the ground by the Radioactivity Countermeasures Headquarters of the Government of Japan in concentration from as much as 10 to 100 times the levels on previous days. If the Soviet Government were more forthcoming in response to the request of the United States Government for further information concerning the January 15 Soviet test, the United States Government might be better able to conclude that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Government to violate the terms of the Treaty. A nuclear explosion such as that of January 15, which causes such large amounts of radioactive debris to be present outside the borders of the USSR, causes grave concern. Repetition of such a release of debris outside the borders of the USSR as occurred after January 15 could jeopardize the very existence of the Treaty, a consequence which the United States would view as extremely serious. The United States Government considers the maintenance of the obligations of this Treaty to be of utmost importance and trusts that the Soviet Government will take every precaution to ensure that the Treaty will be observed. 1 Source: Department of State,S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. No classification marking. Drafted by Thompson. The draft memorandum was considered at the meeting of the Committee of Principals on May 13; for a brief summary of the meeting, see Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 10, p. 478. A May 14 memorandum from Foster to the members of the committee transmitting the final version stated that it would be delivered to Ambassador Dobrynin at an early date. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65) May-June 1965) 2 Document 75 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 75 . 4 Regarding this Soviet test, see Document 62 . 5 Document 66 . 6 Ambassador Dobrynin's oral statement of March 9, 1965, has not been found. 7 Not found, but see the draft aide-mémoire of February 9, attached to Document 70 . 77. Memorandum of Conversation 77. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 18, 1965. SUBJECT Palanquin Aide-Mémoire PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State I handed Dobrynin our Aide-Mémoire of today's date 2 in reply to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire on the Palanquin experiment. 3 He queried the meaning of the sentence to the effect that we would be in a better position to believe that they had not intended a violation of the Test Ban if they had been more forthcoming with information on their experiment. I reminded him that we had asked for further information and that this had been refused. He asked if we really believed they intended to violate the Treaty. I said I did not think so, but that it would have been much easier to say so directly if we had been given more information. He shrugged and said that this was a matter for their atomic people to deal with. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 1965), May-June 1965. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Thompson, May 18. 2 Document 76 . 3 Document 75 . 78. Memorandum of Conversation 78. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, May 19, 1965, 1:45 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador S.K. Tsarapkin, U.S.S.R. William C. Foster, Deputy U.S. Representative, UNDC At my request Ambassador Tsarapkin lunched with me in my suite at the Waldorf Towers. I wanted to continue the discussion with Tsarapkin which we had at the luncheon Ambassador El-Kony gave for us on May 17 (reported in separate memcon). 2 It became perfectly clear from Tsarapkin's first remarks that the position of the Soviet Union has decidedly hardened with reference to a return to Geneva unless and until the U.S. states that it is willing to agree to a number of things, which largely we cannot accept. We had an extensive discussion as to no first use of nuclear weapons. Tsarapkin contended that as long as the U.S. continued to engage in aggression, such as in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic, it was impossible to achieve any real agreements. I stated that what we were undertaking in South Viet Nam was not aggression. We had a long argument about the historical background of the 1954 Agreements, 3 the election which had been called for in 1955, the line between two parts of the same state, and the introduction of U.S. troops which, he said, was designed through pressure to subjugate South Viet Nam to U.S. desires. Tsarapkin expounded on what he said were U.S. attempts to subjugate many countries around the world where the U.S. had bases, troops under the guise of advisers, etc., etc. I brought up the subject of non-proliferation, but this was discussed only briefly since he said that this was directly linked to our desire to give nuclear capabilities to the FRG. As long as the U.S. had that approach there was no way possible to achieve a non-proliferation agreement. I then asked: “What exactly does the U.S.S.R. want as an outcome of the meeting of the UNDC?” He said he felt that the UNDC must agree on specific arrangements by which we could achieve several things: A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; a non-proliferation agreement without ANF/MLF; a reduction of bases and troops on foreign territory; a no first use agreement; and a decision to call a world conference on disarmament in which the Chinese would participate. Obviously, several of these are non-starters. As to the world conference, I said that while the U.S. recognized that at some point in disarmament discussions it would be essential for the Chinese to be included, we saw no evidence that their inclusion at the moment would further arrangements on arms reduction and disarmament. I reminded him that we had active and current discussions with the Chinese in Warsaw during which proposals for arms control and disarmament had been suggested by the U.S. but that no affirmative response had ever been received. In view of that it was difficult for us to comprehend how progress could be made by present inclusion of the Chinese at the ENDC, or at a world conference, or at the U.N. itself. It was interesting that when I asked him how he would suggest the Chinese could be included in a way to have constructive results, he shrugged his shoulders and said it was up to the U.S. I told Tsarapkin that we had delivered an aide-mémoire to Ambassador Dobrynin yesterday in response to their questions about the Palanquin shot. 4 I said that we were quite clear that the Palanquin shot was not a threat to the continuance of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, but we were not so clear that their shot of January 15 was in the same category. We had previously asked the Soviet Union for further information about that shot and about its possible impact on the treaty, 5 and we had reiterated that question because we were concerned about the magnitude of the shot and the extent of radioactivity outside the borders of the Soviet Union. I expressed the personal hope that they continue to believe, as we do, that the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was of great importance and should be supported by both of us. We moved from that to a discussion of the Comprehensive Test Ban, and Tsarapkin said that this was one of the things where there is no necessity of returning to Geneva, since they were aware of our point of view concerning the requirements for on-site inspections. If we were unable to accept the realities of the situation—no on-site inspection requirements—no progress could be made at Geneva and therefore there was no reason for returning there. I made no impression on him by reiterating the advances which we had made as a result of the extensive research which we had undertaken. Tsarapkin said both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. knew that it was possible with national capabilities to detect and identify any violations of a treaty and all that was needed was the utilization of national resources. During the course of the discussion about the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Tsarapkin attacked us on the maintenance of the Guantanamo base in Cuba. He said that the U.S. contends that it has troops and bases only in those countries where the people wanted U.S. assistance for purposes of mutual security. He said obviously that the people of Cuba did not want us and therefore we should withdraw. I said that Guantanamo was there because of a long established treaty, 6 promulgated by a desire of the Cuban people, and that a treaty of this nature continued to be binding. We then had a lengthy discourse on the sanctities of treaties. The point Tsarapkin was making was that any time the mood of a people changes, treaties should be abrogated. I said that this was a reason for real concern about their willingness to adhere to treaties and whether we could depend on such arrangements. My conclusion after this extended luncheon (he departed at 4:30) was that Tsarapkin is operating under harder instructions both as to the return to Geneva and as to the flexibility which he might be able to exhibit on proposals where in the past there has appeared to be some possibility of mutual acceptance. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Foster, who was in New York to attend meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission which met from April 21 to June 16. 2 Not found. 3 Reference is to the Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, done at Geneva, July 20, 1954; texts in American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents: 1950-1955 , vol. I, pp. 750-767. 4 Documents 75 and 76 , respectively. 5 See Document 66 . 6 Reference is to the Agreement for the lease to the United States of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations, signed at Havana February 16, 1903, and at Washington February 23, 1903; entered into force February 23, 1903; 6 Bevans 1113; continued in effect by the Treaty signed at Washington May 29, 1934; entered into force June 9, 1934; 6 Bevans 1161. 79. National Intelligence Estimate 79. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 19, 1965. NIE 11-2-65 THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM The Problem To estimate the current status and probable future course of the Soviet atomic energy program over the next five to ten years. Conclusions A. In a nuclear test program of more than 15 years duration, the USSR has developed nuclear weapons in a variety of designs and sizes which we believe have yields ranging from fractions of a kiloton up to 100 megatons. Soviet weapons technology has differed from that of the US in certain respects. In thermonuclear weapons, the Soviets have emphasized the development of multimegaton devices rather than relatively small, light weight lower yield weapons, [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. (Paras. 10-14, 16-17, Table III) B. In fission weapons the Soviet program has been directed toward development of reliable, efficient, and economical devices. They have emphasized development of unboosted devices but they have also developed some high-performance boosted devices, probably in order to achieve reductions in size and weight. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] Our evidence is insufficient to determine whether the Soviets decided not to pursue development of lightweight fission weapons or whether the apparent lack of development in this area is because of our failure to detect the evidence of such a program. However, there have been a number of Soviet tests on which we have little or no data and the Soviets have probably developed and stockpiled a number of fission weapons which we have not identified. (Paras. 18-20, 22-23, Table IV) C. We have detected 11 Soviet underground tests since the test ban treaty took effect in 1963. We believe that most of these were related to thermonuclear rather than fission weapons, possibly directed toward development of [ 5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. The rate of underground testing detected to date does not indicate that the Soviets have made an extensive effort to improve their fission weapon technology. (Paras. 15, 21) D. The Soviets are continuing an active weapon development program which is almost certainly creating new test requirements. This, together with the active US program of underground testing is probably generating considerable pressures for a vigorous test program. The pace of Soviet underground testing will probably increase. However, we do not believe that research, development, and military requirements will become so pressing as to cause the Soviets to withdraw from the treaty in the near term. (Para. 31) E. In thermonuclear weapon technology, an area in which the Soviets could make significant advances—the submegaton and low megaton yield range—is susceptible to improvement by underground testing. Future improvement in fission devices could be in the direction of further development of small diameter [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] warheads. The Soviets could also obtain a limited amount of data on weapons effects by underground testing, but one of their strong-est requirements in this area—effects data on high-altitude nuclear explosions—could be met only by atmospheric testing. (Paras. 32-36) F. The Soviets are continuing to expand their facilities for the production of fissionable materials. Our estimates indicate that by 1975 Soviet [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] U-235 production will increase by more than one-third, resulting in nearly a four-fold increase in cumulative production by that date. These estimates are subject to wide margins of error. Nevertheless, a significant expansion of these facilities has continued despite Khrushchev's statement to the contrary in April 1964. 2 (Paras. 1-9, Tables I and II) G. In industrial and military applications of power and propulsion reactors, the Soviet program has been characterized by certain technological weaknesses. Inadequate developmental testing has tended to degrade operational reliability, chemical engineering has lagged, and capabilities in stainless steel technology has been notably weak. As a result, the Soviets encountered major problems with their first marine propulsion system. This system has been considerably modified and improved and probably will give satisfactory performance in the newer ships and submarines. But the Soviets are still several years behind the US in marine propulsion technology. Technological difficulties, together with economic constraints, have also slowed the Soviet nuclear electric power program. The Soviets are now embarked upon a program of expansion which incorporates many of the power reactor concepts under development in the West, but we doubt that they will achieve their planned expansion to a 2,000 megawatt generating capacity by 1970. (Paras. 39-45) H. Soviet research reactors appear to be adequate in quality and quantity to meet the needs of the atomic energy program, although nuclear research has probably been hampered somewhat by deficiencies in instrumentation and by the limited availability of large fast computers. Reactor research seems directed toward power and propulsion application with emphasis on containment materials, coolants, moderators, and fuels capable of withstanding high irradiation levels and temperatures. (Paras. 37-38) I. More advanced research in thermoelectricity and thermionics will probably find application in space power supplies, which will eventually permit the use of electric propulsion systems in space. The Soviet program of research on controlled thermonuclear reactions is the world's largest, and Soviet scientists have made major advances in plasma physics. We do not believe, however, that the USSR will achieve a controlled fusion reactor in the next ten years. (Paras. 45-51) [Here follow a four-part “Discussion,” entitled “Soviet Production of Nuclear Materials,” “The Nuclear Weapons Program,” “The Nuclear Reactor Program,” and “International Activities,” and a three-part Annex.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-65, U.S.S.R., Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board. 2 For the views of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy, see the footnote to paragraph 4, page 5. [Footnote in the source text. The cited text and footnote are not printed.] 80. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 80. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, May 29, 1965. Your letter to the President of February 18, 1965, transmitting a document, “The National Nuclear Test Program,” has been noted. 2 It was also noted that the plan contained in the document is sufficiently broad in scope as to provide maximum flexibility of response in the event we should have need to resume testing in any of the environments now prohibited by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. This approach is sound; flexibility should continue to characterize our planning. In addition, we should continue to keep in mind the thought expressed in your letter that any test series which might eventually be conducted in any of the prohibited environments would be developed in response to the particular objectives considered most important at the time. Such tests might be somewhat different and fewer in number from those contemplated in “The National Nuclear Test Program” as presently drafted. At several points in the document, there is expressed an expectation that underground testing would continue essentially unchanged and at approximately the same rate even after we resume testing in the atmosphere. This assumption seems open to question. The need for and feasibility of continuing a full-blown underground testing program simultaneously with atmospheric testing would be a matter on which the President would have to decide. I suggest that those portions of the document that appear to establish such assumptions with respect to underground testing be revised to leave the question open. I also request one other revision in the document, a change in the section on ultra-high yield weapons to make it explicit that the President has not yet made a decision as to how far the development of such weapons will be carried. Except as indicated above, it appears that “The National Nuclear Test Program” document is an excellent statement of the current plan for continuing to maintain the state of readiness which has already been achieved by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. It is requested that the plan contained in the document be periodically reviewed to ensure that it takes into account the advances made in our underground test program and by the other research and development work at the laboratories. In addition, the plan should be reviewed in collaboration with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to ensure that the planning takes place with appropriate political guidance and in light of our best estimate of significant developing conditions. Any significant changes that occur in the program and the reasons for them should be brought to the attention of the President either on a periodic basis or whenever the program is formally revised. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, National Program, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. 2 A sanitized version of Seaborg's February 18 letter is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 10, pp. 184-186. 81. Editorial Note 81. Editorial Note In a June 10, 1965, letter to President Johnson, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, submitted for approval the basic plan for the underground nuclear test program of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1966 (Flintlock), and the detailed plan for the first quarter (July-September 1965), Flintlock I. The fiscal year 1966 budget allowed for a program of 42-46 weapons development tests, 5-7 Plowshare tests, 10 effects tests, and 3-5 detection tests, but Seaborg described some 45-57 Atomic Energy Commission events and 13-15 Department of Defense events to allow sufficient latitude in the final underground test program. In addition, one British event (Charcoal), Seaborg stated, had been approved for the Nevada Test Site. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, FY 1966, Flintlock Series, Volume IV, Box 28) At its meeting on June 28, the Review Committee on Underground Tests, to which Seaborg's letter was referred, recommended among other things approval in principle of the AEC proposal for fiscal year 1966 underground testing and specific approval of the first quarter (Flintlock I) test program, except that the three line-of-sight tests proposed in Flintlock I would be given further technical review. The Committee would later advise the President if the review would result in further deferral of the tests. It withheld approval of the Plowshare catering experiments and the Vela Uniform detection tests, except for Long Shot, pending receipt of more detailed information. (Memorandum for the Record from Charles E. Johnson to the members of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests, July 1; ibid.) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Seaborg, July 1, approved the fiscal year 1966 program in principle, but deferred approval of Plowshare cratering experiments, tests above 300 kilotons yield, and Vela Uniform detection series, excepting the Long Shot event at Amchitka Island, Alaska, which had been approved in principle, but was still subject to detailed Review Committee consideration. Specific approval was given to the tests proposed in Seaborg's letter for the first quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock I, consisting of 13 Atomic Energy Commission tests, 1 Department of Defense test, and 1 British test (Charcoal). [ text not declassified ] The three tests involving use of line-of-sight pipes would be given further review. If the review raised questions of safety or possible venting, the President would be informed. (Ibid.) In a September 10 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg requested approval of the underground nuclear test program in the second quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock II, consisting of 15 tests, including 5 previously approved for the first quarter of fiscal year 1966, but postponed primarily because of labor unrest at the Nevada Test Site. Included in Flintlock II was the Department of Defense Long Shot event, which the Department of Defense recommended for execution after reevaluating it. (Copy of Seaborg's letter to President Johnson, September 10, attached to memorandum from Brigadier General Delmar L. Crowson, USAF, Director of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, to the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests, September 13; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Seaborg, September 30, approved Seaborg's request for underground tests for the second quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock II, consisting of 12 Atomic Energy Commission and 2 (sic) Department of Defense underground tests. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, FY 1966, Flintlock Series, Volume IV, Box 28) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Seaborg, September 29, authorized conduct of the Sepia event and reauthorized the Kermet test, if deferred, for the second quarter of fiscal year 1966. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In a letter of December 15 to President Johnson, Seaborg requested approval of the test program for the third quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock III, consisting of 16 tests, including 8 previously approved for Flintlock II but postponed because of labor troubles at the Nevada Test Site. Project Cabriolet, a Plowshare cratering experiment scheduled in March 1966 would be the subject of a complete analysis in January 1966 for review by Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Affairs. (Copy of Seaborg's December 15 letter to President Johnson enclosed with the memorandum from Crowson to the Review Committee on Underground Tests, December 16; ibid.) A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, January 3, 1966, stated that the President approved all the tests proposed by Seaborg for the third quarter of fiscal year 1966 except for Cabriolet, which was subject to submission of details to Hornig and the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests for further reconsideration and recommendation. (Ibid.) Analysis of Project Cabriolet was enclosed with a letter from Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy, February 15, 1966. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, Vol. 2, Plowshare Events (Cabriolet), Box 29) A March 25 letter from Seaborg to President Johnson requested approval of the underground nuclear test program for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1966, Flintlock IV, consisting of 16 Atomic Energy Commission and 4 Department of Defense tests, including 5 events postponed from the third quarter due to the unstable labor situation at the Nevada Test Site. Three of the tests would employ vertical lines of sight to the surface, permitting weapons effects measurements. It was expected that each test would be conducted within the constraints of the limited test ban treaty. (Ibid., FY 1966, Flintlock Series, Vol. IV, Box 28) In a memorandum of March 31 to Seaborg, President Johnson approved the testing program proposed for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1966. (Ibid.) In a letter of May 26 to W.W. Rostow, Seaborg advised modification of Flintlock IV, deferring one test (Ajax) for technical reasons and adding two less complex tests (Puce and the Plowshare test Vulcan). The modification lay within the scope of the underground test program for the fiscal year and resulted in an increase of one test over the program approved by the President for the fourth quarter. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) In all, of some 49 authorized tests in Operation Flintlock, 48 underground nuclear tests were conducted. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , pages 25-28) A summary history of the tests series is in U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Flintlock and Latchkey: Events—Red Hot, Pin Stripe, Discus Thrower, Pile Driver, Double Play, New Point, Midi Mist, 5 March 1966-26 June 1967 (DNA 6321F, 1984). 82. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 82. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, June 15, 1965, 2345Z. 5028. Subject: Disarmament. After DC meeting this p.m., 2 Foster and Tsarapkin discussed resumption ENDC. Foster recalled ENDC decision that co-chairmen should consult on resumption date conclusion disarmament discussion at UN and then consult with other ENDC members. Tsarapkin said Sovs do not object to ENDC resumption in principle. Noted, however, he had mixed feelings about resumption when no agreement and only fruitless discussion in prospect. Inquired whether today's NYT story about new US proposals was a leak and asked Foster to give at least some indication of what US planned to do if ENDC reconvened. Foster referred to his reply to Syrian Rep today (see septel), 3 noting US had attempted produce new ideas and proposals at every past ENDC session and would make every effort to do so in future as well. Pointed out even if next ENDC session produced no specific agreement, discussions would be useful and certainly more constructive than those at current DC session. In course brief discussion of US proposed freeze on SNV, 4 Tsarapkin reiterated freeze out of question since it would involve control. Said Gomulka Plan, 5 while also providing for freeze, quite different inasmuch it would not involve control on either US or Soviet territory. In response Tsarapkin query, Foster suggested July 6 or 13 as suitable date for ENDC resumption. Tsarapkin said would report to his govt and in view his departure for Moscow June 17 respond through Dobrynin in Washington. When we asked what other ENDC members should be told at this time, Tsarapkin suggested we say co-chairmen have agreed to ENDC resumption in principle but resumption date subject further consultations. Suggested that once US-Sov agreement on resumption date reached, it would be easier for US to get in touch with other ENDC members via NY and obtain their reactions. Throughout conversation, Tsarapkin carefully avoided committing himself to early ENDC resumption. When we pointed out non-aligned Res, which adopted today, envisaged an ENDC session before 20th GA, he said Sovs had abstained on that Res and therefore were not bound by it. 6 Stevenson 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential. Reported to Geneva. Beginning in May 1965, the dates and transmission times of all incoming Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 2 The U.N. Disarmament Commission, consisting of all U.N. members met in New York, April 21-June 16, 1965. 3 Not found. 4 In his message of January 21, 1964, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, President Johnson proposed that “the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964 , Book I, pp. 171-172) 5 The Gomulka Plan to freeze nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe was proposed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Central Committee, United Worker's Party of Poland, in a speech in Plock, Poland, December 28, 1963. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1963 , pp. 651-652) A memorandum by the Polish Government transmitted through diplomatic channels, February 24, 1964, outlined the proposal. (Ibid., 1964, pp. 53-54) 6 In pursuance of Resolution DC/225, adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission on June 15, 1965 (ibid., 1965, pp. 260-262), the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened in Geneva on July 27, 1965. 83. Report by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 83. Report by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 1 Washington, June 18, 1965. Summary of Session of United Nations Disarmament Commission After almost two months of discussion, the United Nations Disarmament Commission adjourned on June 16, having adopted two resolutions: (1) a Yugoslav-sponsored resolution recommending that the General Assembly urgently consider the convening of a world disarmament conference “to which all countries would be invited” 2 and (2) a “non-aligned”-sponsored resolution recommending the early resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva to consider various measures, with particular emphasis on a comprehensive test ban and non-proliferation. The resolution on the world conference was adopted by a vote of 89-0, with 16 abstentions. However, vigorous lobbying by the United States delegation had succeeded in obtaining some revisions in the resolution, including deletion of one of its more objectionable features. The United States abstained, but most NATO countries, led by the United Kingdom supported the revised proposal. The predominant issue was the strongly expressed desire of most members to associate the Chinese Communists with disarmament negotiations and the desire on the part of many to bring them, via such negotiations, into the United Nations, although some said they expected only to create a situation where the Chinese Communists negative attitude toward disarmament could be fully exposed. Despite opposition by the Soviet Union, the “non-aligned” resolution carried 83-1-18, with the United States supporting despite some reservations, Albania opposing, and the Soviet bloc abstaining. Until the very last moment the Soviets made strenuous—but unsuccessful—efforts to have that resolution revised so as to omit language implying a condemnation of Chinese nuclear explosions and to include a formulation on non-proliferation aimed at possible NATO multilateral arrangements. The Soviet Union apparently grossly misjudged the support it could develop for its two draft resolutions, one calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases, 3 and the other for outlawing nuclear weapons and as a first step for a non-first-use pledge by the nuclear powers. 4 Rather than risk defeat on the bases and troops resolution and a poor showing on the ban-the-bomb resolution, the USSR declared at the last moment that it would not press its resolutions to a vote. The United States then agreed to refrain from pressing to a vote its own draft resolution which had been introduced to counter the Soviet proposals. The United States resolution urged ENDC consideration of the United States proposals for a cut-off and transfer agreement and a freeze on strategic nuclear vehicles and paralleled the non-aligned text in calling for priority negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and a non-proliferation agreement. 5 The most salient features of the Disarmament Commission's session were: (a) the coming to the surface of a growing resistance on the part of non-nuclear states, particularly those which are potential nuclear states, to a non-proliferation arrangement prohibiting acquisition of nuclear weapons without imposing any obligations on nuclear states in terms of limitations on, or reduction in, their own nuclear capabilities; (b) the relative sophistication and realism displayed by many delegations in the course of the debate, in large part due to the leadership displayed by the Eight who had participated in the ENDC at Geneva and who were well informed as to the substantive issues involved; (c) the obvious misjudgment by the Soviets of their ability to use its attacks on United States action in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic as a means of ramming through two politically motivated resolutions; and (d) growing sentiment that the deadlock between the great powers should be broken by mobilizing the voices of the world at large, coupled with the desire on the part of some of the non-aligned—particularly Yugoslavia, the UAR, and India—to play a prominent role in that effort and thus strengthen their general position of leadership among non-aligned nations. On the basis of our contacts with the Soviets in New York, it appears questionable that they will agree to a resumption of ENDC negotiations this summer. They have expressed skepticism about the usefulness of reconvening the ENDC in the absence of prospects for agreement. However, their position seems to be determined by broader political considerations relating in particular to their dispute with the Chinese Communists. For our part, we have suggested July 6 or July 13 as a suitable ENDC resumption. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA/Foster. Confidential. The source text was sent under cover of a June 21 memorandum from Foster to President Johnson, stating that the report was his evaluation of the results of the session. “I hope you will agree,” he concluded, “that on balance, it went well for the United States.” 2 Resolution DC/224, adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission, June 11, 1965. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 47) 3 DC/218, May 27, 1965; text in Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 206-207. 4 DC/219, May 27, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 207-208) 5 DC/220/Rev. 1, June 10, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 244-245) 84. National Security Action Memorandum No. 335 84. National Security Action Memorandum No. 335 1 Washington, June 28, 1965. TO Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Director of Central Intelligence Director, United States Information Agency Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology SUBJECT Preparation of Arms Control Program In his speech at the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations, President Johnson stated: “We of the United States would hope that others will join with us in coming to our next negotiations with proposals for effective attack upon these deadly dangers to mankind.” 2 The President has directed the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to prepare for submission to him a proposed new program of arms control and disarmament, including a proposed program for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. The initiative in preparing this program should be with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Its proposals should be presented to the President together with preliminary comments from other interested agencies of government. The purpose of this procedure is to assure that the issues and the points of view of the interested agencies of the Government are brought to the attention of the President in a timely and orderly manner in order to permit a decision by him at the appropriate time. The timing of this procedure will be determined by this office, in consultation with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in the light of the prospects for international negotiations. McGeorge Bundy 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13. Confidential. 2 The text of the address by President Johnson at the 20th Anniversary Commemorative Session of the United Nations in San Francisco, June 25, 1965, is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 703-706. 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 85. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations 1 Washington, July 11, 1965, 10:26 a.m. 53. Following are points US intends to make to UK with respect to general question of non-proliferation treaty and specifically re their new draft (CA-13995). 2 We hope that British, in light these comments, will not pursue subject at this time, but if they do continue to desire discussions in NAC, US should be guided by these points. 1. US believes draft non-proliferation agreement which Secretary gave Dobrynin April 13, 1963, 3 after document had been circulated in NAC in February 1963, represents best position for West to adhere to, certainly for the present. We are prepared to drop Minute attached to that draft (CA-6451 of December 13, 1962) 4 and to substitute a withdrawal clause based on limited test ban treaty for last sentence of present paragraph 3. 5 US does not see any particular tactical advantage to tabling revision of this draft at this time. 2. We do not see that UK draft has any advantages over US 1963 proposal, although we are prepared, of course, to listen to British arguments in this connection. 3. UK draft has number of substantial drawbacks in our view. We consider particularly that it would be tactically dangerous to negotiate on basis UK formulation whereby exclusion of MLF/ANF from ban on transfer of control of nuclear weapons to “any association of states” (Article I (1)) hangs tenuously on definition of “control” in separate and subsequent article (Article III (c)). Exposed definition of “control” might be so tempting a target for Soviet negotiators that it could be self-defeating in terms of Western effort to bring Soviets to face-saving agreement. 4. Language of UK draft would also limit evolution of MLF/ANF under “European clause” by requiring maintenance of veto by one of existing nuclear powers. The “European clause” was introduced into MLF discussions in response to apparent desire of Europeans and in reflection their aspirations towards eventual political unity. As far as US is concerned, we are not ourselves insisting that any MLF/ANF charter must include a “European clause,” but we do wish to respond effectively to largest possible consensus among interested European allies, and their collective view of this matter is not yet clear. 5. As indicated above, we are ready to introduce in non-proliferation agreement withdrawal clause similar to that in test ban. 6. We continue to attach importance to having agreement cast in terms of prohibiting transferring weapons into national control of individual states so as not to leave any ambiguity re effect of agreement on new NATO nuclear arrangements such as ANF/MLF which in our view are consistent with our non-proliferation objectives and should not be precluded by non-proliferation agreement. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by Ronald I. Spiers (EUR/RPM) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA), cleared by Thompson (G), Leddy (EUR), Jeanne W. Davis (S/S-S), Ball (U), Klein (White House), and initialed by C. Arthur Borg (S) for Rusk. Repeated to Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Rome. A July 12 memorandum from Fisher to Rusk states that Weiler's name was added to the source text as a co-drafter without his knowledge. Weiler had worked with Spiers on an earlier draft which ACDA concurred in except for paragraph 6. It included an FYI section, supported by ACDA, which reads as follows: “US non-proliferation policy is currently under review, and it is possible that new approaches and changes in past position will result. Accordingly, we do not want to give impression that 1963 draft treaty or above points are immutable.” Fisher's memorandum maintains that this section was excised from the draft telegram transmitted to Rusk without ACDA's being informed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6) 2 CA-13995 to NATO capitals, Moscow, New Delhi, Tokyo, Wellington, Dublin, and Geneva, June 25, transmitted a copy of the U.K. draft Non-Dissemination Treaty, May 1965, as Attachment A, and a copy of the Canadian draft treaty, “Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” April 8, as Attachment B; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. 3 Secretary of State Rusk handed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin a draft Non-Transfer Declaration with an appended clarifying Minute on April 12, 1963. ( Foreign Relations, 1961-1963 , vol. VII , Supplement) 4 CA-6451, December 13, 1962, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-1362. The draft Minute of interpretation is quoted in Foreign Relations , 1961-1963, vol. VII, Document 249 . 5 A cover memorandum from Fisher to Bundy, July 12, transmitting a copy of the Draft Non-Transfer Declaration together with the Minute which Secretary of State Rusk discussed with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12, 1963, reads in part as follows: “If amended pursuant to Topol 53, the Minute would be dropped and the attached clause would be substituted in lieu of paragraph 3 of the Declaration.” The attached clause reads as follows: “Test Ban Type Withdrawal Clause for 1963 U.S. Non-Proliferation Declaration. This declaration shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any signatory to withdraw from the declaration if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the declaration have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatories three months in advance.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6) 86. Memorandum of Conversation 86. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Moscow, July 21, 1965, 3–4:40 p.m. PARTICIPANTS USSR Premier Kosygin M.N. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry O.A. Troyanovsky, Foreign Ministry V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter US Governor Averell Harriman Ambassador Foy D. Kohler Marshall Brement, Second Secretary [Here follows a discussion on agricultural matters.] The Governor stated that he was glad to inform Chairman Kosygin that President Johnson had read with great care his report of their previous conversation. 2 The President, he said, shares Chairman Kosygin's view that the U.S. and USSR have heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. “You may be assured,” the Governor continued, “that U.S. action in Vietnam will be what is necessary—but only what is necessary—to stop the armed attacks which have been mounted, under the direction of Hanoi, against the people and government of South Vietnam. The President agrees with your emphasis on (1) the tasks of disarmament; (2) the importance of bilateral relations between our two countries and (3) the advantage of personal contact in appropriate circumstances. The President is now making a final review of our disarmament position for the meeting in Geneva. He hopes very much that the Soviet Union will join in a constructive approach to these problems and he agrees with the Chairman as to the special importance of non-proliferation.” In this connection, Governor Harriman told Kosygin that Mr. Foster would head the U.S. Delegation at Geneva and asked him who would head the Soviet Delegation. Kosygin replied that a final decision on this had not yet been reached. However, he assured Governor Harriman that the head of the Soviet Delegation will be a responsible official fully empowered to act, report, make decisions and not just “sit on the fence.” When asked by Governor Harriman as to whether he had any comments on the Governor's previous statement, Kosygin replied that he was pleased to learn that the President is concerned about the same problems which bothered him. He was personally convinced that progress could be made on the questions which had been discussed and to which the President had reacted, if it were not for Vietnam. The Vietnamese problem is an impediment to the solution of many important problems such as disarmament, nuclear weapons and the like. The reasons why progress cannot be made in these fields, he said, now boils down to a lack of confidence between us. “I would like to venture my personal opinion that if it were not for the Vietnam issue we could find a new approach to the disarmament problem, a different angle to view it from than that which we have used in the past. One possibility would be for a meeting to be held—not necessarily in the USSR or U.S., it doesn't matter where—prior to a disarmament conference where a fundamental understanding could be reached on these important issues. A meeting of two or more heads of state or government might reach a prior understanding in principle and make a disarmament conference more productive. Such a meeting could in a matter of hours make important decisions in principle, which might require years of discussion at a formal conference. On questions relating to nuclear arms and disarmament no side can be dishonest since, sooner or later, lies must come to the surface and destroy mutual confidence. Naturally, progress could be made by conventional methods as well, but faster progress might be made by adopting unconventional ones. However, nothing can be done today because of the Vietnamese problem. Thus, the Vietnamese problem—which is a small problem—becomes large and influences all other important issues.” Governor Harriman asked whether this meant that Chairman Kosygin would be willing to meet President Johnson to discuss these issues. He also inquired as to whether Chairman Kosygin was thinking in terms of a bilateral meeting, or one which would include other heads of state. Kosygin replied that his ideas on this subject had not yet been worked out, but that he did not exclude either bilateral or multilateral high-level meetings. For example, in connection with such an important problem as non-proliferation both forums could be useful. Kosygin emphasized the real relief throughout the world if agreement in these fields could be reached. Governor Harriman said that he knows the wisdom of Chairman Kosygin's words from personal experience. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which he had signed in 1963 was only a small step, but it had been greeted with great relief all over the world. Wherever he went, the Governor said, people still talk about it. If we could move further toward disarmament, any such steps would, of course, be greeted with even greater relief by the people of the world. The Governor referred to the fact that the UK, France and unfortunately Peiping are now involved in nuclear issues and asked Kosygin whether the problem of dealing with the Chinese might be discussed bilaterally between the U.S. and USSR. Kosygin replied that the Chinese were not a major issue. The U.S. and USSR are the only real owners of nuclear weapons. Others have some capability, he said, but are not now of any importance. However, science is making great strides and is the property of all states. Cheaper bombs, which do not require the present tremendous amount of electric power for their manufacture, will be developed, Kosygin said. Many states will thus be able to possess nuclear weapons and when this happens, there will be no guarantees as to who might take these weapons into their hands. Hitler existed in the past. What guarantees are there that another Hitler will not arise tomorrow? he asked. “These weapons are terrible. We must do all in our power to prevent proliferation of these weapons. This is why the American proposal to pool nuclear weapons—which amounts to giving weapons to the Germans—arouses such emotional opposition in the USSR.” The Soviet Union, he said, would be forced to respond by sharing nuclear weapons with its own allies. Governor Harriman said that President Johnson fully shares the first part of Chairman Kosygin's statement. Regarding MLF, Secretary Rusk had previously pointed out to Gromyko that the USSR should sign the non-proliferation treaty and thus prevent forever the possibility of independent possession of nuclear weapons in Germany. Governor Harriman told Kosygin that the U.S., like the Soviets, had suffered twice from aggressive German leadership and was mindful of the possibility that such leadership could arise in the future. Mr. Kosygin must believe that the U.S. does not want the Germans to possess nuclear weapons independently. The Governor stressed that he was speaking very frankly and that it would be most unfortunate if what he had just said were discussed with others. He stated that he was encouraged to speak in an open manner because of the frankness which Kosygin had displayed in their last conversation in speaking of Soviet problems with the Chinese. [Here follows a discussion on Germany.] Governor Harriman offered to bring back any message on Germany which Premier Kosygin would like to send to the President. He then inquired as to when Chairman Kosygin thought a high level meeting could be held on nuclear questions. Kosygin replied that such a meeting was both possible and necessary but that it could only take place when the Vietnam issue leaves the scene. Such a meeting would not be possible earlier since, if it took place, everybody would think that the meeting was only to discuss Vietnam. What is immediately necessary, he said, is to end the war in Vietnam as soon as possible. [Here follows a discussion on Vietnam.] Governor Harriman stressed the hope that everything will be done to minimize the influence of the Vietnam issue on bilateral relations. He referred to Kosygin's observations in his previous talk that the U.S. had violated a commitment to reduce its military budget by making a supplementary allocation of $700 million to deal with the Vietnam situation, and presented Kosygin with the following memorandum (based on Deptel 190). 3 Governor Harriman said that this memorandum demonstrates that the statement made by Secretary Rusk to Gromyko on this subject was still valid. U.S. Military Expenditures and Budget (Billions of Dollars) Comparative totals for United States Department of Defense military functions plus military assistance are as follows for fiscal year 1964 (July 1, 1963 through June 30, 1964) and 1965 (July 1, 1964 through June 30, 1965): Expenditures New Obligational Authority FY 1964 51.2 (Actual) 50.9 FY 1965 47.4 (Tentative Final Estimate) 50.4 Fiscal year 1965 expenditures were $3.8 billion less than in 1964. New obligational authority, including the supplemental of $700 million for Southeast Asia for fiscal year 1965 was $500 million below fiscal year 1964. For fiscal year 1966 (July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1966) new obligational authority requested by the President in January 1965 for the Department of Defense was $48.6 billion and expenditures were then estimated to be $49. billion. 4 It is thus presently estimated that United States military expenditures for fiscal year 1966 will be considerably lower than estimated in a statement given to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko by Secretary of State Rusk on December 5, 1964, which indicated that “military expenditures in fiscal year 1966 will be at least $1.25 billion below the level of fiscal year 1964.” 5 Whether and when supplemental appropriations will be requested for fiscal year 1966 depends upon developments in Southeast Asia. Kosygin, after glancing at the memorandum (which was in English), repeated that according to U.S. statements, it is planning to increase its budgetary appropriation by $700 million. He hit on the figure of $50.4 billion (for FY 1965) in the memo, stating that this was a figure which had been published previously and that the $700 million must, therefore, increase that figure. “My memory is very good. I remember figures,” he said. Governor Harriman noted that we may have to increase our military expenditures if the situation in Southeast Asia worsens. Kosygin said that if faced with a similar situation, the Soviet Union would have given very serious thought as to whether it would increase its own military expenditures; and that if it found it necessary to do so, would only take such action after informing the other side. Ambassador Kohler explained that the figures given in the memo clearly show that the savings, even including the $700 million appropriation for Southeast Asia, were much greater than previously anticipated and considerably below the figure which Secretary Rusk had quoted to Gromyko. Governor Harriman added that 1965 expenditures, including those for Vietnam, are $3.8 billion less than those for 1964. Savings in other directions have more than offset additional expenditures for Vietnam. Kosygin stated that another point which bothers the Soviets is that in the USSR funds not expended by the end of the fiscal year are terminated, whereas in the U.S. such funds continue to be available to the Defense Department. Governor Harriman quickly responded that Secretary McNamara was ready to appoint an expert to meet either in Moscow or Washington to consult with a Soviet expert on mutual budgetary structure and practices in order that there could be understanding of each other's methods. Kosygin responded that if this issue were connected with disarmament measures, then a need might indeed arise to examine each other's procedures. [Here follows discussion of commercial and other bilateral relations, Vietnam, and China.] 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text is enclosure 1 to Airgram A-151 from Moscow, July 26. Drafted by Marshall Brement on July 26. Ambassador at Large Harriman visited the Soviet Union July 12-21, during his July 10-August 3 trip to Europe to seek European support for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war. 2 The substance of Harriman's July 15 conversation with Kosygin was transmitted in enclosure 1 to A-120 from Moscow, July 22. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 190 to Moscow, July 17, is ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman. 4 For the Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1966, January 25, 1965, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 82-99. 5 The quotation is an excerpt from Secretary of Defense McNamara's press conference in Texas on November 10, 1964, which Secretary Rusk gave to Gromyko at the outset of their December 5, 1964, meeting. (Secto 28 from USUN, December 5, 1964; Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US-USSR) 87. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 87. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, undated. PRESENT Secretary Rusk, Chairman; Vice President Humphrey, Foster, Fisher, Rowan, Seaborg, Thompson, Raborn, McCloy, Bundy, Keeny, and Admiral McCormick of Joint Chiefs of Staff Rusk opened the meeting by saying to Bill (Foster) that he has quite a party coming up to discuss disarmament, although we may be rearming the very day that he gets to Geneva. He asked him to comment on the strategy of starting the meeting when he gets there. He asked whether Foster might open by making a statement updating what we have already proposed, or whether he should make a general policy statement possibly preceded by private talks with the Russians. Foster said he thought he would start with a statement as to why we are in Viet Nam and he would go back to the Khrushchev letter of January 8, 1964, 2 and the answer from President Johnson of January 21, 1964; 3 he would describe the nuclear threat that faces the world, especially the proliferation problem. He thought that this might all be in his own statement, not a Presidential statement. Then he would go to Tsarapkin to talk privately, emphasizing that in spite of Viet Nam the nuclear race needs to be controlled. He would point out that there have been many meetings last year and this year, and that 114 Nations are vitally interested in the outcome. Rusk said to Foster that he would have to deal with Viet Nam rather directly, pointing out that we are willing to cooperate, but that our efforts have not borne any fruit, and that he might recapitulate those efforts. Fisher protested that too much detail on Viet Nam might lead to the wrong impression as to our objectives, and he said that the Soviets will certainly bring up this question in any case. Foster pointed out that the Soviets will be the first to speak. Rusk again made the observation that Tuesday of next week, the opening day of the ENDC Conference, will be a hell of a day to make a speech on disarmament. 4 He asked Foster when he planned to leave. Foster said he would leave on Saturday morning, seeing the British on the way, at their request. Rusk then read from a message that he is sending to the British 5 in which he is sharply critical of the British response to our counter proposals to their draft treaty on nonproliferation. This message would state that a reply is hoped for before July 26. The problem is that Germany insists on retaining the concept of MLF, while the UK resists putting in any nonproliferation agreement statements which provide for a MLF. The British feel that this weakens the nonproliferation treaty in a serious manner. Bundy suggested that we might try to persuade the British to add a clause which would be helpful with the Germans, and less objectionable to the British. This language was handed out at the meeting by Fisher, and is attached to this memorandum. 6 Rusk asked if this language would permit the MLF, and Bundy responded that it would. Bundy was concerned that we should not table something in the NAC that would lead to a civil war of words among the Western Alliance. Foster pointed out that the UK had already tabled their resolution in the NAC. 7 Rusk said that in his opinion the UK wouldn't do much before their election. He also said he thought Germany would not give up the MLF. Perhaps it would be best to find out what the Russians have in mind by talking to them before we start; their aim may be primarily to break up the MLF, McNamara's Select Committee, 8 NATO, etc. Bundy again stated that the UK objects to the US version of the nonproliferation treaty 9 because it clearly was written by someone who was defending the MLF. Foster pointed out that Prime Minister Wilson made a speech on December 16, 1964, in which he, in fact, said that he couldn't do what the US would now have him do. 10 Bundy suggested that the Rusk message should be sent to the UK so that we could see what their response would be. He read a copy of Wilson's speech of December 16, 1964, and said that he thought our language is consistent with this and that we should say this in the Rusk memorandum to the UK. Rusk agreed to this. Bundy and others suggested that maybe the Soviets would agree to going back to the earlier '63 language 11 saying they would withdraw from any nonproliferation agreement if there should turn out to be a MLF. Rusk made the observation that it is entirely possible that by the time a MLF came into being that the Soviets would say that it isn't a proliferation step. In any case, we shouldn't conclude this nonproliferation agreement before the German elections. Bundy summarized by saying that we would send the Rusk memorandum to the UK in order to have one more try. Rusk then suggested to Foster that we go back to a discussion of his opening statement. Foster said that he would probably open by defending our valid position in Viet Nam, probably as a response to an earlier Soviet statement on this. He would re-emphasize the continued US resolve to respond to subversion; he would then say something on the nonproliferation question and something on the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty and something on the destruction of nuclear warheads. Rusk said he doubted that Foster should say anything on the destruction of nuclear warheads on Tuesday, in view of the other statement that would be issued about then concerning our future plans in Viet Nam. Foster said that he had in mind saying that such destruction would be on the basis of the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses. Bundy agreed that this might not be the right thing to say early next week. We couldn't be in the position of going in to get new Congressional authority and then mention at the same time that we were going to destroy nuclear warheads, creating the impression that we did not need them. Rusk was of the opinion that perhaps the best strategy would be to go into a general negotiating situation, discussing these matters for about a week or so before revealing our detailed position. Humphrey expressed the opinion that Foster should limit his statement to the nonproliferation treaty and the comprehensive test ban, or at least give these the emphasis. He said he thought that Foster should proceed like a boxer, and feel them out for a while before committing himself. He should let someone else carry the ball. It might be all right to also propose a cutoff of fissionable material with emphasis on peaceful uses. He said that if we do all the rest that we plan for next Tuesday, and tell the Nation that we have a hell of a job in Viet Nam and that we are in a hell of a mess in Viet Nam, we shouldn't at the same time say we're cutting back on warheads. Humphrey said he thinks we can sell the nonproliferation concept and that we can sell the comprehensive test ban. Foster remonstrated that we have an approved position in the US on the destruction of warheads. He then went on to ask if there was general agreement on what he might say about the comprehensive test ban treaty, reading from a memorandum that had been prepared as a possible guide for a Presidential message on this. (Attached.) 12 Seaborg objected to the phrase which said that significant advances had been made in the detection of underground nuclear explosions. Foster said that this was nothing more than the language that Stevenson had used in April. 13 Seaborg then read the entire Stevenson April statement, which included reference to the need for inspections. Bundy and Rusk both agreed with Seaborg that Foster shouldn't make a statement that would make it impossible to maintain the position that we would need inspections, or that would decrease the flexibility of our ultimate position because we have not yet decided on the various alternatives for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Bundy emphasized that we shouldn't tie our hands. Foster countered with the statement that the Ruina report, 14 with which the AEC people were involved, declared that significant progress has been made in the detection of underground [sic]. Seaborg disputed this, saying that he had seen a resume of the Ruina report and it did not say that. Seaborg said that the improvements to which Mr. Foster referred had to do with Large Aperture Seismic Arrays, which were yet to be built and demonstrated, and to underwater Arrays yet to be built and demonstrated. Rusk summarized by saying that perhaps we should recommend to the President that he give a brief message of greeting and that Foster would make the main speech. Bundy suggested that with respect to the comprehensive test ban treaty, Foster use both parts of the Stevenson statement, that is, that significant success had been achieved with underground detection, but that verification is still needed in a treaty. Rusk asked Foster whether he now had what he needed, and Foster said that he thought he did, that he basically needed instructions on the content of his message to the ENDC, and instructions to be tough with the British on Sunday. Humphrey said he thought that the thing to worry about most in Geneva would be the Russians on Viet Nam, and on the attitude of some of the nonaligned countries. Foster said he didn't think we needed to worry about the nonaligned countries, and Humphrey answered that he hoped Foster was right. Foster pointed out that this will be a closed session, although it was also noted that there would be the usual corridor briefings of the newspaper people. Bundy, in a recapitulation, said that we would be counter-attacking on Viet Nam following a Russian opening statement, and Humphrey agreed that this was the best approach. Foster said he would have a contingency statement ready for this purpose. Rusk said that NATO had never before been confronted with a disagreement between the US and the UK such as this, and he said that, therefore, a longer meeting than planned would be necessary with NATO. The meeting broke up with the understanding that the President would give a general message of greeting, and that Foster would make an opening statement that included a rebuttal on Viet Nam, and statements on the US desire for a nonproliferation treaty and for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, with the description of the comprehensive test ban to be general enough so as not to tie our hands in the future. Possibly Foster's message should include some other aspects of arms limitations as well, such as cutoff of fissionable material. G.T.S. 15 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 299-303. No classification marking. The source text is undated, but Seaborg indicates elsewhere in his Journal that the meeting occurred on July 22; ibid, Vol. 11, p. 77. The source text notes the meeting took place in the Secretary of State's Conference Room from 5 to 6:30 p.m. For additional background on the issues discussed at this meeting, see Document 90 . 2 Not found; reference presumably is to Chairman Khrushchev's December 31, 1963, message to world leaders. (Seaborg, Journal, Appendix, Vol. 26, pp. 654-665) 3 Not found; reference presumably is to President Johnson's January 18, 1964, letter to Khrushchev. (See footnote 6, Document 2 ) 4 Secretary of State Rusk possibly had in mind the decision to increase U.S. fighting strength in Vietnam announced by President Johnson at a news conference on July 28, the day after the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened in Geneva. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 794-803) 5 Document 88 . 6 Not found. 7 Not further identified. 8 Reference is to the NATO Select Committee proposed by McNamara at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Paris on May 31, 1965, to study ways of extending nuclear weapons planning and consultation. 9 The U.S. draft “Treaty on the Prevention of the Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons,” which the Committee of Principals considered, forms Annex A to the memorandum from Foster to the Committee of Principals, July 16, 1965, “Position Paper on a Non-Proliferation Agreement.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: Lot 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), 7 July 65-31 July 65) 10 Reference is to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's statement in the House of Commons on December 16, 1964, in which he reported on his visit to Washington, December 7-8, 1964, for talks with President Johnson and administration officials, and outlined the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-1966, Vol. XV, p. 20525A) 11 See footnote 3, Document 85 . 12 Reference presumably is to the “Outline of Points for Presidential Message to the ENDC” in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 11, pp. 81-82. It suggested, inter alia, that the President refer to progress in detecting clandestine underground tests opening up “a wider range of possibilities for extending the scope of prohibitions on nuclear testing.” (Ibid., p. 82) 13 Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, spoke to the U.N. Disarmament Commission on April 26; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 59-77. 14 The report, presumably by Dr. Jack P. Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, is not further identified. 15 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, July 22, 1965, 9:43 p.m. 395. Please deliver ASAP the following message to the Foreign Secretary: “Dear Michael: I am deeply concerned about the failure of our respective colleagues to reach a meeting of the minds on a draft proposal regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. “First of all, I am sure you and I could agree that both our governments are deeply preoccupied with and committed to the attainment at the earliest possible date of a satisfactory treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Our problems arise over questions of how best to reach that objective. “After the most careful consideration of the draft treaty your government presented for our consideration, 2 your government was informed in London and in Washington on July 19th, 3 of suggestions for amending the draft treaty to a modest extent that would permit the US to support a United Kingdom initiative at the ENDC, 4 after adequate consideration by the North Atlantic Council and, hopefully, with a united allied front. “My colleagues attempted to make clear the United States understanding of your government's domestic situation and its commitment to some form of early action with regard to a non-proliferation treaty. At the same time, they emphasized our equal desire to avoid any schism in NATO. In the latter regard, our suggestions took into account what we judged to be certain long-range but serious preoccupations of the Federal Republic of Germany. “I have just been informed today of the rejection by your government of all of our suggested changes in the draft treaty and of your government's intention promptly to table the draft at the ENDC, after NAC consultation apparently of only one day's duration. 5 In the circumstances I foresee, as virtually certain, results clearly contrary to your interests and ours. Following the sharpest of disagreements within the North Atlantic Alliance, in which the UK draft treaty could not receive support from at least the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, other even more unfortunate developments would be bound to occur. There could be no successful negotiation of the treaty at the ENDC without the support of the United States or the willingness of the Federal Republic of Germany to sign it. This would present a heaven-sent opportunity to the Soviets both to exploit allied differences and to rebuff United Kingdom efforts as unacceptable in view of the provision that would still permit some form of nuclear sharing within NATO. Only you could judge the political gains or losses for your government. But such developments could clearly not be regarded as advantageous to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of its elections only two months from now. In my own country there would inevitably arise further doubts about the effectiveness of the NATO alliance. “I am aware of your Prime Minister's statements in the House of Commons on this subject, particularly those on December 16, 1964, that we should not have any new fingers on the nuclear trigger. 6 I believe that the language that we have proposed—that there should be no increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons—takes this consideration into account. “Further, it seems to me that we should not anticipate too much the attitude of the Soviet Union in the forthcoming Geneva talks. They have indicated non-proliferation as a matter of high priority to them. We do not know whether they will amend their previous objections arising from possible NATO nuclear arrangements. We should face candidly, I think, the fact that Soviet objections are spurious and have nothing to do with the central problem of non-proliferation. They have strongly condemned the MLF, the ANF and now even the special committee suggested by Secretary McNamara. Gromyko finally confessed to me that their objections to MLF were not based solely upon non-proliferation. They clearly would like to block any increased cohesiveness in NATO and to create as much dissension as possible in NATO ranks. “I felt that our counter proposals with respect to a draft which your government could table at NATO and in the ENDC were constructive and went a very long way toward meeting your needs. Some margins of dissatisfaction on the part of some of your colleagues seem to me to be offset by the disadvantage of tabling proposals which the United States could not accept. Our intimate cooperation in the nuclear field over the years would make such a divergence of view inexplicable. “Given all that is at stake with regard to our mutual basic interests, I would be deeply grateful for a reply, hopefully before July 26, indicating that your government is prepared to adopt a position that we here could support. “With personal regards, “Sincerely, Dean Rusk” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, Sec. Rusk/UK Officials 11/64-12/65. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk on July 22 and cleared by Alexander L. Rattray (S/S). The source text is stamped “Sec Def has seen. 26 Jul.” 2 See footnote 2, Document 85 . 3 The conversation in Washington between British Ambassador Dean and ACDA Director Foster on the U.K. draft Non-proliferation Treaty is reported in telegram 302 to London, July 19, and in the memorandum of that conversation, including an attached British aide-mémoire of July 19. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) 4 Telegram 299 to London, July 17, transmitted the text of the British draft Non-Dissemination Treaty as amended by the United States. (Ibid.) 5 Telegram 313 from London, July 21, reported that Chalfont had just informed the Embassy of British Ministers' rejection of U.S. amendments to the U.K. draft non-proliferation treaty. He said that in view of the U.K. position on an Atlantic Nuclear Force, it was not possible for political reasons to leave any options unsettled in any U.K. initiative. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) A memorandum from Foster to Bundy, July 21, stated that the British draft “excessively restricted the possible development of an MLF/ANF with a European clause.” Foster's memorandum attached a draft message from Rusk to Stewart or from the President to the Prime Minister, much of which was included in the present message. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda and Letters to the President, 1965) 6 See footnote 10, Document 87 . 89. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk 89. Message From Foreign Secretary Stewart to Secretary of State Rusk 1 London, July 23, 1965. Thank you for your message about our draft treaty on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. 2 I am as anxious as you are not to cause strains in the Alliance or to allow the Russians to exploit Western disagreements, although we must recognise that a real difference of view exists between our two Governments on the question of the so-called “European option.” I should make it clear that our draft treaty has been in the hands of NATO Governments for several weeks, which should have given ample time for them to form views on it. But we shall certainly want to review our position, rather than proceed at once to tabling the draft treaty at Geneva, if unfortunately we cannot get a NATO consensus of view. I am naturally very glad to hear that Mr. Foster will be able to come to London to discuss the whole problem with Lord Chalfont before the NATO meeting on Monday, 3 and I very much hope that a satisfactory way of handling our differences can be found. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13. Secret. The source text is attached to a covering note of transmittal from British Ambassador Dean to Secretary of State Rusk, July 23. The source text contains no salutation or signature. 2 Document 88 . 3 Telegram 354 from London, July 25, reported that in his meeting with ACDA Director Foster in London on that day (Sunday), Lord Chalfont agreed to inform other NATO members at the NATO meeting on July 26, that he did not intend immediately to table a draft treaty at Geneva and that “there would be opportunity work out agreed language.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) 4 Printed from an unsigned copy. 90. Editorial Note 90. Editorial Note On July 27, 1965, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed meetings in Geneva after a recess that began September 17, 1964. In a brief message of greetings to the conference, July 27, President Johnson set forth three objectives of the American delegation: nuclear non-proliferation, limitation of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems, and a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, page 790) This message was read by William C. Foster, head of the U.S. Delegation, in his opening statement. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pages 281-286) The decision to limit President Johnson's message to general welcoming remarks was made at a meeting of the Committee of Principals, July 22. For Seaborg's minutes of the meeting, see Document 87 . Recommendations for a comprehensive message are contained in a July 14 memorandum from Foster to McGeorge Bundy (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13), and Ambassador Thompson's memorandum to Rusk, July 21 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6). 91. Memorandum of Conversation 91. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Geneva, August 1, 1965. SUBJECT U.K. Draft Treaty PARTICIPANTS Lord Chalfont, U.K. William C. Foster, USDel/ENDC At Lord Chalfont's request, I received him in my apartment at the des Bergues at 4:30 today. He said that the purpose of his visit was to make it clear that his government felt that it must table its present draft treaty with respect to the major articles on nuclear arrangements. Although appreciative of U.S. attempts to find compromise language which would reduce German and Italian opposition to their present language, his government felt that the statements of Prime Minister Wilson in December were so explicit on this subject that any backing away from that would be political suicide. They also believed that their formulation was the best possible in order truly to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. He said he recognized that our position is difficult in attempting to develop a European consensus and that as we had said in the Western Four meeting, our suggestions were probably as far as we could go in attempting to help achieve this consensus. He again stated that they had no objection to our proposed safeguards clause, nor to our concern about early tabling of any assurance clause. He said his government would be willing to make some concessions toward the Canadian draft in order to attract Canadian support. 2 While he recognized our difficulties with the proposed Canadian withdrawal clause including the possible submission of problems and decisions to the Security Council, he felt that they could accept the Canadian formulation to obtain Canadian support. I expressed our disappointment that our suggestions could not be accepted, particularly since he had heard the strong objections to the U.K. formulation of the Germans and the Italians, at Paris and here. I inquired whether some general language which avoided the specific problem of ANF/MLF and the majority vote would allow them to change their current position. He said that they had considered this but believed that so much legal ingenuity had been expended in getting where we are that there is little hope for this as a promising course. He said that he and his government had perhaps misread what they thought were signals as to U.S. position as set forth in my Foreign Affairs article, 3 the Kennedy speech 4 and what he characterized as a leak of the Gilpatric report. 5 From those alleged signals they had concluded that the U.S. Government was assigning top priority to non-proliferation, even as against the necessity for achievement of an MLF/ANF. In view of that, he believed they may recently have promised too much too soon in the House of Commons and with the press, all of which may have caused much of the present embarrassing differences between the allies. I conceded that he might be right as to the embarrassment. I also said that non-proliferation continued to have top priority with us but that we also continued to support our basic commitments on MLF/ANF. Until after the German election, at least, any discussion in this field is very difficult for the present German government. This political problem for the FRG was much like his own estimate of his proposal as being essential for the political health of his own government. In an attempt to find a possible way out of this dilemma, I inquired whether the speculation which I had heard from some source, which source I did not recall, as to their possible willingness, although admittedly reluctant, to accept as amendments our Articles I, II, and IV, after a U.K. treaty had been tabled. He said that this offered possibilities, and if they could table their present draft with some possible Canadian amendments and possibly the safeguard clause added, then we or one of our allies, or even one of the non-aligned, might offer U.S. amendments and they could (in what could be made to appear reluctantly) accept the amendments. They then would have carried out their political commitment. I said that this appeared to have possibilities and it might be that we could advise our allies that we still did not like Articles I, II and III, of the U.K. draft, as we have already informed the British. However, by agreement, we could perhaps publicly commend the British for their initiative but stating in low key that we would have to give more thought to their formulation since it had features which we felt were not the wisest. We would need to discuss such a statement with our allies before presenting it, so that each could weigh the political consequences, and, indeed, we would need to develop a scenario that could help answer many of our problems. I said that I hoped the British had also considered the political cost of appearing to diverge from a unified position with the U.S., both in terms of cohesion of the alliance and in terms of possible attacks from their conservative opponents at home. Lord Chalfont said he recognized this problem and hoped that any public evidence of the differences could be minimal. In concluding, he asked that our discussion and his personal tentative favorable reaction to this sort of plan be kept in the closest confidence while he discussed it back home as he presumed I would do also. I told him that I would only discuss it with Washington and with Mr. Bunn here in view of Mr. Bunn's participation in treaty activities. He said that he would discuss it only with his associate, Sir Harold Beeley, and that we could consult again later in the week when we had word back from home. He raised the question of the Italian position. I said we had not heard, but we both agreed that if we and the U.K. and probably the Canadians, agreed with the plan, and also the Germans came along, that the Italians could undoubtedly be persuaded also to accept. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster. This conversation took place in the Hotel des Bergues. 2 See Document 85, footnote 2 . 3 Foreign Affairs, July 1965, pp. 587-601; annotated in Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 265-280. 4 Reference presumably is to a speech by Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY); not further identified. 5 Document 64 . 92. Editorial Note 92. Editorial Note Telegram Disto 2243 from Geneva, August 11, 1965, transmitted the text of a draft non-proliferation treaty negotiated by the American, British, Canadian, and Italian representatives of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) By agreement among the four Western delegations, the United States would sponsor this text and table it at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting on August 17. (Telegram Disto 2251 from Geneva, August 12; ibid.) The Western Four fully agreed to a revised text (circular telegram 233 to 20 posts, August 13), except that the British intended to make an interpretive comment on Article I, indicating their intention not to relinquish their veto on any eventual NATO Multilateral or Atlantic Nuclear Force (circular telegram 232 to 20 posts, August 13; ibid.). Article III of the draft treaty committed parties to the treaty to cooperate to facilitating application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguards to peaceful atomic energy activities. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who supported mandatory safeguards in the original American draft, expressed dismay with this provision in a letter to William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, August 13, 1965. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. I, Box 13) At 1:40 p.m. on August 13, Seaborg called Foster in Geneva to tell him that he was sending him this letter expressing concern about dropping mandatory IAEA safeguards from the draft treaty. According to Seaborg's record of this call, “Foster said it was this or nothing as far as our Allies are concerned. He said it has been made clear that the U.S. was accepting this deletion under protest. He said that it is the very definite intention of our delegation to push aggressively, in speeches, discussion, etc., in support of the basic idea of IAEA safeguards.” (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 11, page 189) In an August 16 memorandum from Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., to McGeorge Bundy, transmitting a copy of Seaborg's letter, Keeny stated that in deference to the Atomic Energy Commission, “Foster will say something about the importance of the strongest possible provisions for the IAEA safeguards in his speech presenting the draft Treaty.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Volume 1, Box 13) On August 17, 1967, the U.S. Delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted the U.S. proposal for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pages 347-349) In his statement presenting the draft treaty to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 17, Foster said that the draft treaty was the product of consultation among NATO countries represented at the conference and that it embodied “important contributions from Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom.” (Ibid., page 351) Foster explained the provisions of the treaty to the conference. Regarding Article III dealing with the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities, he said “this article does not set forth a precise or completely formulated obligation; but it does clearly indicate a line of policy which all parties undertake to implement; namely that they will help to bring about the application of such safeguards to their own peaceful nuclear activities and to those of other countries.” (Ibid.) He added that “we have drafted this provision to take account of the views of all countries; including those which are not prepared at this time to commit themselves to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable circumstances.” (Ibid., page 352) A memorandum from Keeny to Bundy, August 14, attached several copies of the draft treaty, a memorandum for the President which Bundy might use to send him a copy of the treaty (not in the file), and an ACDA draft of the Presidential statement releasing the draft treaty (not in the file). Keeny stated that the draft statement needed “to be improved a bit.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, NPT, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) A statement by President Johnson on the United States draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was released in Washington on August 17, 1965. Among other things, it stated that Foster had presented the draft treaty to the Geneva disarmament conference on the President's instructions. The President said: “This draft treaty would bind its signers in a pledge to refrain from actions which would lead to any further increase in the number of nations having the power to unleash nuclear devastation on the world … . It plainly demonstrates that a treaty can be drawn which meets the legitimate interests of nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, page 890) 93. Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 93. Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, August 25, 1965, 4 p.m. 2 Minutes of the Meeting: Secretary Rusk indicated that the meeting would begin with a presentation of background material relevant to consideration of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Mr. Fisher began by pointing out the importance that an extension of the test ban treaty to cover underground testing would have as a means of dealing with the question of proliferation of nuclear capabilities. With respect to the objectives of the meeting, he indicated that he believed that as a minimum the U.S. should probably be prepared to make available to the ENDC information on improved present and projected technical capabilities for detecting and identifying seismic events. Dr. Frosch of ARPA began the technical presentation by giving estimates of natural seismic events in the Soviet Union as a function of seismic magnitude, and with a discussion of the relationship between the yield of nuclear explosions and the earthquake magnitude scale. In so doing, he treated as extreme examples the possibility of explosions being conducted on the one hand in hard rock and on the other in dry alluvium, pointing out the range of uncertainty in our understanding with respect to both cases. He indicated that there appear to be limits to testing large yields in alluvium in the Soviet Union because, so far as we know, it is not available in sufficient depth. Dr. Frosch then summarized the results of a recent analysis of present and projected capabilities for detecting and identifying seismic events. [ 11-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] With respect to each of these systems he gave estimates as a function of magnitude of the number of natural seismic events that could not be distinguished from possible explosions (indicating for example, that with the system of LASA's and ocean bottom seismometers there would be on an average approximately 30 such events per year in the Soviet Union of magnitude greater than 4.0). [ 1 paragraph (31 lines of source text) not declassified ] In response to a query about the State Department paper which examined the effect of a comprehensive treaty on the proliferation question, 3 Ambassador Thompson indicated his personal reservation that the Germans might not go along with the treaty. Dr. Seaborg asked about the possibility of Soviet evasion, to which Dr. Frosch replied that he felt that it would be possible for them to evade successfully at very low yields provided they were willing to make a considerable effort, but he considered it doubtful that very large tests, and in particular more than one or two large tests, could be done clandestinely. Thus, he felt that evasion around 2 kt would be feasible provided there were sufficient effort made, but that at yield levels significantly above that it would be difficult. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] In response to a question from Dr. Seaborg, he indicated that clandestine testing at significant yields above ground would be very difficult. Dr. Howard then presented the results of some analyses of the implications of continuation of the present treaty, a threshold treaty, and a comprehensive treaty. 4 In so doing, he indicated those areas where there was a consensus within the Government and where there were differences in view, particularly involving the AEC, JCS, and OSD. He first discussed the implication for the US-USSR balance in offensive strategic systems, then in defensive systems, and then very briefly implications with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, and to the US-Chinese Communist balance. With respect to the last point, he observed that the Chinese position relative to that of the US and the Soviet Union will improve whether or not we and the Soviet Union test or not. Finally, he discussed the effect of the various treaties on the degree to which we would be able to meet requirements of the “Jackson” safeguards, 5 including a discussion of the viability of the weapons laboratories and of our confidence in the status of weapons in stockpile. Secretary Rusk then asked Mr. Fisher to comment on the parliamentary situation in Geneva. Mr. Fisher indicated that we probably should make a presentation of revised estimates on detection and identification capabilities, but that for this session perhaps no more would be needed; it would, of course, be desirable in connection with the presentation of technical capabilities if there were some feeling about the direction in which we might be moving with respect to a comprehensive treaty. He indicated that difficulties in reaching agreement on a non-proliferation agreement and in particular because of difficulties on the MLF, suggested that an extension of the test ban looked increasingly like the most realistic way of actually making progress in preventing nuclear proliferation. He then stated as an issue whether or not the difficulties in a treaty along the lines favored by ACDA 6 would be balanced by the gains that might be realized on the non-proliferation front. Secretary Rusk asked whether we could not achieve the same objectives with respect to non-proliferation through the Fanfani proposal. 7 Mr. Fisher replied that that remained to be seen, depending on the response of various non-nuclear powers, but that he was not confident that the Fanfani proposal would be acceptable to the nations about whom we were most concerned. He then discussed briefly the three alternatives that had been presented in ACDA background papers. 8 With respect to continuing to insist on a treaty involving an explicit number of on-site inspections he felt this was certainly a viable US position—but one that could prove to have been unduly conservative if, by having stuck with it, we would have been confronted a few years hence with a number of new nuclear powers, a possibility which he felt a comprehensive treaty might do much to head off. He conceded that the first ACDA alternative, and for that matter the second as well (a threshold treaty), would require such extensive discussion within the Government that it would be totally unrealistic to expect any decision in the context of the presently projected time scale for this session of the ENDC. In response to a query from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara observed that he felt that it was presently not the time for a new proposal on the part of the US and that we would pay a heavy price for what would ultimately not succeed. Secretary Rusk indicated agreement with the qualification that this would be true, unless of course, the Soviet Union should indicate—as they have not so far—some willingness to move in our direction on the verification issue. Mr. Fisher indicated that six of the non-aligned nations in Geneva have suggested going ahead with the threshold treaty. He realized that such a treaty might in fact not prevent a determined non-nuclear power from developing nuclear weapons while still complying with the treaty but that the negotiation of such a treaty might nevertheless have some useful political effect. The Vice President said he felt such a treaty would be a mistake—that it would be an invitation to acrimony and distrust. Ambassador Thompson suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union did not want an agreement of any kind at this time in view of the Vietnam confrontation. Secretary McNamara concurred. Secretary Rusk asked whether there would be difficulties on security grounds in making information available on detection and identification. Dr. Scoville indicated there would be some difficulty because of the sensitivity of the AEDS system, but felt that such problems could be dealt with. General Wheeler observed that he felt that the estimates given by Dr. Frosch with respect to a system of LASA's were overly optimistic. For example, he said he was informed that 16 and not 10 LASA's would be needed. Dr. Seaborg doubted that a system of LASA's could be installed as quickly as had been estimated (in from two or three years). Secretary Rusk inquired as to the cost of the system. Dr. Frosch replied that it would be about $250,000,000. General Wheeler observed that this price would not be excessive if the projected capabilities would be realized, but again expressed his doubts with regard to the estimates of projected capabilities considering the data so far available from the system. Dr. Frosch said the prototype in Montana was not operational yet, but that preliminary indications suggested that it would be as good or better than had been estimated. General Wheeler, with Dr. Seaborg concurring, advised conservatism in the use of estimates on projected capabilities. Secretary Rusk indicated that he concluded: (1) that the atmosphere was presently not encouraging for agreement; (2) that there was no interest on the part of the USSR in grappling with the problem of verification; (3) that the briefing that he had just heard indicated that we still had a verification problem to deal with; and (4) that he did not see that it would be profitable to go through the major effort required in modifying the US position, considering the benefits that could be obtained. He suggested that for the present ENDC our position should remain basically as it is, pending some indication of willingness from the Soviets to deal with the verification problem, but that we should go ahead with technical briefings at the ENDC. He suggested that our problem in connection with a comprehensive treaty was not with such countries as Egypt, but was with the Soviet Union. Mr. Fisher observed that he felt our most immediate problem was with India. Secretary Rusk replied that he felt that the preferred solution there would be along the lines suggested by Fanfani. Mr. Bundy supported Mr. Fisher in his contention that the major immediate problem was India, but suggested that we really do not understand what the Indian position is. He observed that we probably could modify our position on the number of on-site inspections but thought that is a US-Soviet problem that might be best dealt with other than in Geneva. Secretary Rusk raised the question as to why, if it is desirable to stop nuclear proliferation, the non-nuclear powers should not simply go ahead and get together to stop it. Mr. Fisher observed that we cannot take the position that nuclear proliferation is a matter of concern to the non-nuclear powers alone. Secretary Rusk suggested that perhaps a more effective way to prevent India from going ahead with a nuclear weapons program would be to threaten denial of US foreign aid. Mr. Fisher remarked that we had been considering the advisability of a “Sense of the Congress” resolution which would to some degree have had implicit in it such a threat, but that there had been opposition from the State Department to the use of such threats to discourage the Indians. Mr. Fisher argued for the necessity of our taking leadership in attempting to prevent nuclear proliferation and indicated the improbability of our being able to achieve the desired objectives through a non-proliferation agreement, in the light of the difficulties with the Germans regarding the MLF/ANF. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the difficulty was not Germany, but unwillingness on the part of the Soviet Union to accept an agreement. In reply Mr. Fisher cited the recent outburst by former Chancellor Adenauer with reference to the Geneva negotiations. Mr. Bundy replied that if the Soviets would accept reasonable language we could certainly sign such a treaty despite Adenauer's opposition. Mr. Fisher continued, observing that the point he was trying to make was that it seemed unlikely that we were going to get a joint US-Soviet non-proliferation agreement very soon (though we could be surprised by Tsarapkin's response next Tuesday) and that, therefore, perhaps we should emphasize other approaches to non-proliferation. Secretary Rusk then asked Mr. Fisher to draft some instructions along the lines of the attached summary of conclusions and desired actions. 9 With respect to the question of making available at the ENDC information on detection and identification capabilities, Commissioner Tape noted that we would be giving information on projected, rather than presently reliable, capabilities. His view was supported by Dr. Seaborg. [ 1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified ] Secretary Rusk then suggested that he and Mr. Fisher should talk further about whether and how there should be a review of our position on a comprehensive treaty. We could not do this for the present ENDC, but the problem would not die with that session. The Vice President observed that we ought not always to assume that we need come up with a new position and that he did not necessarily agree that because the Soviets have been recalcitrant with respect to verification we should necessarily look for something new. He suggested their attitude could change as it did abruptly in the case of the partial test ban treaty. He indicated his support of the Fanfani idea, and he agreed that it would not be realistic to expect a new Government position between now and September 9 (estimated date of adjournment of the present ENDC). He said we ought not to include in any treaty those things that build distrust, and suggested that a treaty that had no on-site inspections would suffer from that defect. He also strongly opposed a threshold treaty for that reason, and also because it did not do much toward preventing proliferation. Secretary Rusk observed that he felt that not many countries were really very much interested in disarmament. Ambassador Thompson suggested the possibility, assuming neither China nor France would be a party to a treaty, that some day political relations might even change so greatly that China might conduct tests for the Soviets and the French might test US devices. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by George W. Rathjens (ACDA/D) on August 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 304-307. 2 According to Secretary of State Rusk's Appointment Book, he attended this meeting beginning at 4:38 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book, 1965) 3 Keeny's August 24 memorandum to Bundy and Hornig states that this paper by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) “concludes that all significant powers except China, France, and Indonesia will probably sign a comprehensive test ban agreed to by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.” (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14) The paper by Garthoff was possibly transmitted by the memorandum from Fisher to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals, August 19. (Meeting of the Committee of Principals, August 25, Agenda; Washington National Records Center,RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb 65), Aug. 1965) 4 According to the agenda of the meeting this item was entitled “'The Military Consequences of Alternative Test Ban Proposals,' dated August 11, 1965 (being reviewed in light of JCS and AEC comments) by Jack Howard, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14) 5 The “Jackson” safeguards, presumably by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), are not further identified. 6 That is, one in which there would be an understanding that failure to provide adequate assurances of compliance through on-site inspection would be grounds for withdrawal. [Footnote in the source text.] 7 In a statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva on July 29, Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani said: “It is quite conceivable that the non-nuclear countries might agree to renounce unilaterally equipping themselves with nuclear weapons for a specific length of time, it being understood of course that if their aforementioned demands were not complied with during that time limit, they would resume their freedom of action.” The demands consisted of “having certain safeguards against nuclear attack” and “some progress in the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear countries.” ( Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 288-289) 8 According to Keeny's August 24 memorandum to Bundy and Hornig, at the August 25 meeting of the Committee of Principals, ACDA would present “the following four separate proposals for consideration by the Principals: #1—The comprehensive ban with no inspections except in connection with the withdrawal process. #2—An uninspected partial ban with a threshold at Mag. 4.5. #3—a comprehensive test ban with a reduced number of inspections. #4—An uninspected threshold treaty that would become comprehensive without inspections provided a sufficient number of states adhere to it.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14) The background papers are memoranda from Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals, dated July 16 on Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (not found), and July 19, on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban With Small Quota of On-Site Inspections. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), 1 July 65-31 July) 9 Document 94 . 94. Summary of Actions 94. Summary of Actions 1 Washington, August 25, 1965, 4 p.m. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 Subject Matter: Presentation of background material relevant to detection and identification of underground nuclear tests and consideration of possible modifications in the U.S. position on a treaty prohibiting or limiting such tests. Summary of Conclusions and Desired Actions (As stated by Secretary Rusk) : (1) For the time being our basic position on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should not be changed. (In the context of the meeting it was clear that it was not the Secretary's intention to preclude the possibility of the number of inspections being reduced or the modalities of inspection changes in the light of technical progress, but rather to indicate that we should continue to hold that any new treaty or modification of the present treaty would have to include provision in it for adequate verification.) (2) We should welcome any indication from the Soviet Union of its willingness to consider seriously a treaty in which there was adequate provision for verification. (3) We should indicate willingness to engage in technical discussion with the Soviet Union on the question of detection and identification capabilities. (4) We should be willing, to the extent that security considerations permit, to make available to interested countries (presumably particularly at the ENDC) information on recent and prospective progress in detecting and identifying seismic events. In conclusion, Secretary Rusk suggested that he and Mr. Fisher get together to explore what further steps should be taken over a longer (than ENDC) time scale in reviewing the U.S. position on a comprehensive test ban treaty. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 2, Box 14. Secret. Drafted by George W. Rathjens (ACDA/D), August 28, 1965. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. 2 Not printed. 95. Editorial Note 95. Editorial Note The ninth regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency met in Tokyo September 21-28, 1965. In his message of September 21 to the conference, President Johnson pledged U.S. support of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, page 1010) This message was read to the conference by the U.S. Representative, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, in his statement of September 22. (Department of State Bulletin , October 25, 1965, pp. 677-682) The conference, among other things, unanimously adopted a revised safeguards system, September 28. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pages 446-460) Seaborg surveys his activities and discussions in Tokyo, September 18-24 in Seaborg, Journal, Volume 11, pages 347-365. Additional documentation on the meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled for publication in volume XXXIV . 96. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 96. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 29, 1965. SUBJECT Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone In the light of my recent conversation with you I am attaching herewith for your approval a position paper on the Latin American nuclear-free zone which discusses at some length the relation of Cuba to the proposed zone. 2 The paper calls for me to urge the inclusion of Cuba, which is a sine qua non for some other states in the area and which would involve Cuba's consent to a multilateral verification system in place of our unilateral surveillance to which it now objects; but the paper calls for us to support creation of the zone even if Cuba ultimately refuses to join, since establishment of a zone by other states would exert pressure on Cuba to join it and since the zone would generally be valuable in halting nuclear proliferation. We will shortly be approached in New York by representatives of the Latin American working groups on a nuclear-free zone, who are not perfectly satisfied with the limited statements of our views that we have so far made to them. Your approval of this paper will enable us to expand on those statements. Recommendation: That you approve the attached position paper. 3 Adrian S. Fisher 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Peter S. Bridges (ACDA/IR) on September 28. The source text was transmitted through Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thompson. 2 Not printed. 3 The source text bears the typewritten approval of Secretary Rusk on November 10, 1965. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Fisher signed the original. 97. Memorandum of Conversation 97. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 1, 1965, 8:30–11:30 p.m. SecDel/MC/3 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1965 SUBJECT USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko's Dinner for Secretary Rusk PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Amb. Goldberg Amb. Thompson Amb. Kohler Wm. D. Krimer (Interpreter) U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Gromyko Amb. Fedorenko Amb. Dobrynin Amb. Novikoff Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter) [Here follows discussion of issues other than arms control.] Referring to their previous discussion of disarmament and a World Disarmament Conference 2 Mr. Gromyko then asked the Secretary if there were any real possibilities of resolving some other matters during the present UNGA Session. The Secretary said that while he did not now want to make an official statement, he did want to express a few thoughts. One of the things that particularly disturbed him in the Disarmament question was the fact that countries other than the US and USSR appeared to have very little interest in resolving Disarmament problems among themselves. He recalled that at the very same moment, a few years ago, when the General Assembly unanimously adopted a Resolution for General and Complete Disarmament, some 70 countries were asking us for military assistance and some 20 countries were asking the USSR for such aid. He noted an almost complete lack of effort on the part of other countries in putting an end to the arms race in the Near East, in Latin America and in other areas of the world. He was hopeful that a limitation of armaments in other parts of the world would eventually be achieved, but was struck by the others' great indifference towards this problem. He had pointed this fact out to some other world leaders in private discussions; it was clear to him that Disarmament was of primary interest to the two great powers only. Did the Foreign Minister, for example, see any possibility of discussing the level of armaments as between Israel and Egypt; would he care to carry on a very private conversation concerning the possibility of limiting the quantities of arms being supplied to other nations by the US and by the USSR? Mr. Gromyko stated his views as to the reason for other nations' lack of interest in Disarmament. He ascribed this to the fact that while many good resolutions had been adopted in the past and many fine speeches delivered, nothing much had been practically accomplished. He was therefore not surprised at the fact that others had little faith in the effectiveness of the various resolutions. The Secretary said that we had, for example, tried to get Egypt and Israel to accept the Vienna safeguards on atomic energy. We had spoken to representatives of each country privately, but it was hard to get one to act before the other, or even together. He thought that if the US and the Soviet Union were to undertake joint efforts in this direction, it might prove to be more encouraging to the countries involved. Mr. Gromyko replied that even if this were so, it would still be difficult for the countries involved to reach the proper decisions since they could see that at the same time everyone else was continuing arms accumulation. He made a distinction between the regional and the partial approach to Disarmament. He did see merits in a partial approach provided it applied to all the countries which were relevant to the problem. As to a regional approach, what possibilities did the Secretary see in that? Secretary Rusk replied that the regional approach might be effective for entire continents, such as Africa and Latin America for example. He informed Mr. Gromyko that since their last conversation the Foreign Minister of Mexico had informed him that he intended to discuss the question of a nuclear-free Latin America with Cuba. He thought a similar approach could be taken with reference to a nuclear-free Africa, provided Israel were included in this region for this purpose, inasmuch as it would involve Egypt. He also thought that the US and the USSR could be of considerable assistance in pressing these countries to agree to a renunciation of nuclear arms acquisition. Mr. Gromyko informed the Secretary that since their last conversation he had tried to ascertain if there were any change in Cuba's attitude toward a nuclear-free Latin America, but that he had not been able to detect any new elements in this attitude. Mr. Gromyko recalled that the General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for nuclear-free Africa a few years ago, with support of all the great powers. 3 Why should we not now take some steps in the direction of giving judicial force to this resolution; he thought it would have a good effect in improving the international atmosphere. Secretary Rusk agreed that we would be interested in this undertaking. He wanted to talk to Mr. Gromyko privately concerning a strong effort to keep Cairo and Israel from going too far in the arms race, not only in the nuclear field, but also in the matter of other sophisticated weapons. He thought it might be possible to reach an informal understanding to bring pressure to bear upon Israel and Egypt in this respect to limit their arms buildup to certain levels; for the more sophisticated the weapons at their disposal, the more trouble could be anticipated. The Secretary cited the fact that just one squadron of supersonic planes involved costs equal to those of building and maintaining an entire university. Ambassador Dobrynin inquired as to the possible reaction of the two countries. The Secretary cited the suspicion and distrust between the two countries involved; they were unwilling to reach any agreement with each other. He could imagine that some day it might be possible for both the US and the USSR to jointly lay down the status quo in the Near East— to say to the countries involved “here are the borders, here is the settlement, and we will not tolerate the use of force to resolve disputes in the Near East.” If the Soviet Union and the United States both made it clear to these countries that we would not accept force, we could establish a real peace in the Near East, so that these countries would no longer be burdened by the arms race. He realized that because of broader questions, there were some difficulties now involved in joint action. Mr. Gromyko inquired as to when this could be brought about. He thought the great powers themselves should first find a way to lessen their arms burdens. The Secretary replied that once we agreed upon what the status quo in the Near East should be, we could make such a policy effective. Ambassador Goldberg referred to the proposal of diverting a quantity of fissionable material to peaceful uses, which he had made in his UN speech at the suggestion of Mr. Foster. 4 Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that the procedure had not been made clear. Ambassador Goldberg said that while he had made the proposal officially, it would be up to the experts to work out the details. He pointed out that the diversion of necessity implied halting the further production of nuclear materials, the transfer of some of the existing stocks to peaceful uses and also the destruction of an appropriate amount of nuclear weapon carriers, although this latter aspect would also of necessity be limited. He assumed that both sides had more than enough weapons at present. Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that before his country could agree to the transfer of 40 tons of U-235, the major question of control, including control over industrial installations would have to be resolved. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not consider this proposal to be practical under present circumstances, in fact he considered it to be impossible of implementation. Unavoidably this proposal raised a number of other difficult questions of control; what was to be the scope of control, its depth and techniques? In fact many of the already familiar post World War II questions were being raised by this proposal. The Secretary said he wanted to ask a naive question. Was it possible that the word “control” had somewhat different meanings in the two languages? To us the word did not imply management, direction and the making of decisions. The Secretary mentioned that there was a subtle difference between the meanings of the word “control” as between the English and the French languages; could it be possible that misunderstandings arose because of a difference in meaning between English and Russian? The Foreign Minister did not attach any significance to the linguistic problem. There was practically no difference in meaning. The very earliest discussions on control had made it clear that the problem was not linguistic, but rather fundamental. For this reason he again pointed out that Ambassador Goldberg's proposal touched upon a great many difficult problems. Under present circumstances he could see no possibilities of getting it adopted. Still he thought it would be good if understanding on other practical matters could be reached. Ambassador Thompson remarked that the amount of control required could be relatively small. Mr. Gromyko continued his argument by pointing out that in the event the proposed quantities of fissionable material were diverted and such diversion verified, but due to the impossibility of reaching an understanding on control production of new nuclear weapons were to be continued, nothing would have been accomplished. This proposal was similar to the proposal made by the US several years ago regarding demolition of certain types of military planes. He did not think that the security of his country and indeed that of the rest of the world would have been enhanced by such demolition. Secretary Rusk thought that, on the contrary, in his opinion both countries would have gained something by carrying out the proposed plane demolitions. He reminded Mr. Gromyko of the fact that many weapons, which were obsolete for the US and the USSR were not by any means obsolete for other countries. It would be better to destroy them than to spread them throughout the rest of the world. Both the US and the USSR were often under great pressure to supply other countries with supersonic aircraft which had become obsolete for them, but were quite sophisticated for other countries. He therefore could see an advantage in their destruction. Mr. Gromyko thought it would be simpler not to furnish such aircraft to other countries, if we did not want them to be spread throughout the world. The Secretary pointed out that this question had not been thoroughly discussed and that there were some other considerations. For example, if Egypt were furnished supersonic aircraft, the Israelis would feel they too must have such planes, even though their country was almost too small for a supersonic plane to turn around without violating someone else's border; Israel would then proceed to acquire such planes from France, for example. In other words, there was a certain snowball effect in operation. Perhaps here was a subject—ceilings on sophistication—on which the US and the USSR could reach an understanding. Did Mr. Gromyko think this might be possible, in view of the beneficial effect this would have upon the budgets of other countries. Mr. Gromyko pointed out that the other countries involved would inevitably point to the military budgets of the great powers. He asked the Secretary if the United States estimated that there is any real danger of other countries producing nuclear weapons, that is countries which did not possess such weapons today. He meant not only capabilities, but also intentions and practical steps. The Secretary said it might be useful to exchange impressions on this subject with each other. He was prepared to do so in some detail. As to Egypt, at present that country did not have the scientific, technical and industrial capability of producing nuclear weapons. He thought that Israel did have such capability in view of the advanced state of science and technology in that country. For this reason we had insisted on inspecting their installations periodically. While they were not at present engaged in the production of nuclear weapons, they could do so in the future. As the Secretary had mentioned in his last conversation with the Foreign Minister, he thought Israel was “three months pregnant.” The Israelis had assured us that they would not be the first country in the Near East to produce such weapons. It was conceivable, however, that Israel would some day announce that it had developed nuclear weapons, even without having first tested them. We do observe their activities closely. Sweden has the capability of producing nuclear weapons. At the time of signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Sweden had reserved its right to withdraw from the Treaty in the future if it thought its interests demanded such action. We do not believe, however, that they are producing today. They could move rather quickly, however. India probably had the necessary scientific and industrial base for nuclear capability. The Chinese detonations provided a stimulus for India's interest in the subject. Without pointing a finger at anyone, the Secretary wanted to mention that we had been informed that some Indians felt that they had been encouraged by some Soviets to develop nuclear weapons. Our policy has consistently been to discourage this and the Secretary hoped that this was the Soviet policy, as well. He did not believe Indonesia had any nuclear capability; if an explosion did occur in that area, we must conclude that it was of Chinese origin. The Secretary was not fully informed on what had happened in Djakarta today, but he did think it possible that the Chinese would detonate a nuclear bomb in Indonesia. As to Germany, it did possess the necessary industrial and scientific base. Mr. Gromyko interjected that the Secretary must have meant the FRG. He pointed out that there were two Germanys today. The Secretary went on to say that he thought this was true of both Germanys. But he could very frankly assure the Foreign Minister that this would not be permitted to happen, as far as Western Germany was concerned, for if it did, it would break up NATO. We did not see any political possibilities in this direction. These then were the key countries. For reasons of prestige a few other countries had stated their reservations at the time of signing the Test Ban Treaty, Brazil and Switzerland, for example. As to Czechoslovakia, perhaps the Minister knew the situation there. This, then, was the Secretary's assessment of the situation. Mr. Gromyko thanked the Secretary for the information. He said that he completely excluded the possibility that anyone from the Soviet Union had advised India to develop nuclear weapons. If such rumors were indeed current, he would think that they originated from countries which had had relations with India, and perhaps also with the Soviet Union. He did not think that the Secretary really believed such rumors. Such action on the part of the Soviet Union would have been completely contrary to its position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He thought that if the position of the US on proliferation was identical with that of the USSR, it would be best to close all channels and all possible ways for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. He emphasized this point again with reference to an international treaty on non-proliferation. The Secretary said in his opinion it was in the nature of nuclear weapons themselves that the country, which possesses them is opposed to other countries acquiring such weapons. As for the United States, we had thought that even one nuclear power was one too many as evidenced by our position in the Baruch Plan in the forties. 5 Certainly, two, three, four or five were also too many. This is a Pandora's Box—we had tried to close the lid. We therefore concluded that in this matter our positions were identical. The Secretary appreciated the Minister's remarks about India and accepted his statement. Recently we had heard the doctrine of proliferation proclaimed from Peiping and Djakarta—statements to the effect that other developing nations in Asia and Africa should be encouraged to acquire nuclear weapons. The Secretary thought it would be useful to clear the decks of lesser problems by putting together a draft of a non-proliferation treaty containing provisions even now acceptable to both sides, and then to see if the Minister's doubts of possible nuclear arrangements in NATO could be cleared away in private discussions, before presenting a proposed treaty to the UN, a draft, in other words, agreed on all points except Articles 1 and 2 of the Soviet draft. We could in this manner get rid of the underbrush before proceeding to the trees. Mr. Gromyko pointed out that in his view these two articles contained the crucial provisions of an effective treaty, but that he would leave this matter up to the Secretary. The Secretary continued by saying that he had in mind an effort to reduce and clarify the issues. For example, how many nuclear powers at a minimum would have to be a party to such a treaty; we had already informed the Minister that we thought three powers to be essential. Mr. Gromyko appreciated the Secretary's explanation, but he did see a real difference in the respective positions on the crucial issue. [Here follows discussion of European security.] The Secretary was particularly interested in general disarmament. Ambassador Dobrynin would notice this clearly next January and February when the Budget is discussed in Congress. We have embarked on a broad program of many social reforms; this means that disarmament has become even more important to us than it was earlier, since we want to be able to push more of our resources into taking better care of our own people. The Secretary therefore could assure Mr. Gromyko of the seriousness of his interest. While he could not speak for France, Great Britain or the FRG, he thought that perhaps there was some advantage in private, quite informal and relaxed conversations without any specific agenda. We would like to see some movement on these problems so as to lighten the tremendous burdens borne by the two countries at present. We would like to see a permanent settlement in Central Europe, which was fully guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States, so as to preclude the possibility of war. Mr. Gromyko noted that the Secretary had several times referred to military budgets; he concluded that this was of major importance to the US; why not then consider once again the possibilities of reducing military budgets? The Secretary pointed out that our two countries were not the only ones involved. We had recently heard some references to the advantages of a foreign policy conducted by the end of a rifle barrel—they come from another part of the world. There was no point in discussing budget reductions with the Soviet Union, to include reductions in the military budget of the country from where these statements came, since the Soviet Union could not deliver. We were of course referring to Peiping. Mr. Gromyko inquired if we would not agree that the US was far more powerful than China. The Secretary replied that in general this was of course true. However, we did have a specific problem on the ground, which had cost us a lot of money—Southeast Asia. We would have much preferred to use this money for peaceful development of many areas of the world, including North Vietnam, as the President had stated in his Baltimore speech. 6 Mr. Gromyko remarked that the sooner the Southeast Asia situation was normalized, the better. In a sense he could see that the US Government was rather pessimistic regarding disarmament, reduction of military budgets and a secure European settlement. He recalled that President Roosevelt had once said we had nothing to fear but fear itself. He wondered whether our pessimism in itself did not now constitute a serious obstacle. The Secretary had two comments to make, one of which did not involve the Soviet Union and another, which did. In the largest historical and geographical sense the US had a compelling interest in peace in the Atlantic and Pacific. During World War II we had agreed with the Soviet Union that our first priority was the defeat of Hitler, but he wanted to remind the Minister that the second priority had involved a very large military effort. Therefore the portion of our present defense budget which pertains to the Pacific does not involve the Soviet Union. If Peiping pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, this would be a different matter, but we are now unable to agree with the Soviet Union on reducing our defense budget without regard to events in the Pacific and without regard to the policies of Peiping. The other problem is one in which the Minister could make a contribution. We realize that when we ask the Soviet Union for verification and control, we are asking the USSR to make a unilateral concession; this is due to the nature of our open society. Verification, control and information needs of the Soviet Union are answered by the very fact that our society is open to the extent of 97 percent of these needs. An additional 2 percent are contributed by the fact that people in our government cannot keep their mouths shut. The final 1 percent is accounted for by Soviet espionage, so that there is nothing unknown about us to the USSR. It is quite a different matter in the opposite direction. The General Staff of the USSR considers secrecy to be a strategic weapon, and people in the Soviet government do know how to keep their mouths shut. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to gather intelligence about the USSR. The Secretary suggested that the Foreign Minister appoint someone in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study ways of how the USSR could provide us with the necessary assurances on verification, etc. The Minister should not ask us to accept this on good faith. It was too soon to expect us to rely on good faith alone—we did need verification, inspection and other assurance. The Secretary wanted to leave this problem with the Minister. We are not trying to pry or control; all we needed was to find some basis of confidence that when we sign an agreement, the result will be what we anticipated when we signed it. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Secretary's references to the policies of China. Did he not think that to a great extent these policies were merely a reaction to the policies of the United States in the Pacific? He, the Minister, was sure this was the case. Another thing was the Secretary's reference to confidence and mutual trust. A minimum of these between the US and the USSR were essential—i.e. a minimum of trust which was not the result of physical checkups, control and verification. For example, in the handling of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty confidence and trust were most important. The Minister thought the Secretary had confidence in the Soviet Union's observance of its provisions and he, for his part, did not believe we were violating the Treaty. He wanted to take up the possibility of extending the Treaty to underground tests as well. A like attitude of trust and confidence would be needed, for example, to implement nuclear-free zones in Africa, Europe and other parts of the world. He did not think that control in itself was an absolute. It related to the specifics of each situation and he did not think this question had been sufficiently explored in relation to specific measures. Secretary Rusk replied that Mr. Gromyko's comment about Chinese policy being a reaction to US policy might be a possible explanation if only Washington had trouble with Peiping. But, there was also trouble between Peiping and Moscow. Ten days ago we had held our 127th meeting with Peiping in Warsaw. For the 127th time Peiping had rejected any kind of discussions with us unless we first were prepared to surrender Formosa. We replied we could not surrender 11 million people. If we were to offer recognition to Peiping tomorrow morning, without Formosa, they would say no. As concerns verification—our need for this is easily explained by the differences in our political system: we must be able to assure our own people that we are confident that certain things are or are not happening. In the case of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty extending to underground tests, we are certain that someone will say “those damned Russians are cheating.” We have to be able to say to them: “No, we are sure of our own knowledge that they are not.” From our point of view this question of verification is solely a matter of technology. Our policy will follow scientific and technical capabilities in this field. They have been and will be increasing, but they are not as yet adequate to place us in a position to extend the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to underground testing without verification. For this reason we would be very glad to have American and Soviet scientists cooperate on improving the applicable technology. Ambassador Goldberg added that with reference to underground testing he had stated that our position was flexible and that we had therefore invited Soviet representatives to come and see our latest scientific advances in detection, which made it possible to distinguish earthquakes from other explosions within a certain range. The Secretary inquired of the Minister whether he had understood the Soviet position with reference to underground testing correctly, that is that test of a level of 4.75 and above to be added to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and that a moratorium without time limitation be placed upon tests below the threshold. Mr. Gromyko replied that the proposal mentioned in his UNGA speech 7 was that originally made by the UAR representative in the ENDC. 8 To a further question he replied that the two were of necessity connected. The Secretary stated that we could not agree to a moratorium below the threshold. Mr. Gromyko thought that if anyone would benefit by such a moratorium, it would be the United States, because it had a number of bases on the territory of countries surrounding the Soviet Union, from which any violation of the moratorium could be detected—for example Japan and other countries. The Soviet Union had no such possibilities, hence the moratorium could still be verified by the US. The Secretary pointed out that when we spoke of national capabilities, we were in fact talking of “international capabilities.” These facilities were provided by other countries and if we were to lose some of them our capabilities would be accordingly reduced. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the proposed treaty could include a provision like that in the present Test Ban Treaty, which would make it possible for any signatory state to withdraw if it considered that its highest interests required it to do so. He did not want the Secretary to think that the Soviet Union's interest in this proposed treaty was any greater than that of the US. If we could not reach an understanding, we could go on as before. The reason that he could not separate the moratorium provision from the threshold band was that other nations would minimize the importance of the treaty if below threshold tests were to be continued. The nature of observance of the moratorium would be similar to that of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A certain amount of trust and confidence was needed and unavoidable. The Secretary stated that we were not concerned over the existing Nuclear Test Ban, since we could assure our people that it was being observed. But, if all testing were to be banned, the element of assurance would become extremely important. Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that a separation of the two provisions could lead to arguments, such as 4.6 versus 4.75. The Secretary repeated that assurance for our people was indispensable and that we had no reason or intention to be picayune about the magnitude of an explosion. Mr. Gromyko suggested his comment about FDR's statement on fear be reexamined. Ambassador Fedorenko remarked that they were ready to trust us, but that we evidently were not ready to trust them. The Secretary ended the discussion by saying that we needed something to eliminate some of the fear, so that we could tell our people to relax. It was agreed between the Secretary and the Minister to tell the press that they had discussed problems of European security and United Nations problems, including disarmament. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (LS) and Alfred Puhan (EUR/GER) and approved by S on October 2. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their countries' delegations to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly's twentieth session in New York, September-October 1965. Rusk was in New York, September 26-October 5, 1965. 2 A memorandum of their conversation at Secretary Rusk's dinner for Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, September 29, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. 3 Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI), adopted November 24, 1961; text in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, pp. 29-30. 4 Reference is to the statement by U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Arthur J. Goldberg, to the U.N. General Assembly, September 23; text in Department of State Bulletin , October 11, 1965, pp. 578-587. 5 Reference is to U.S. proposals for the international control of atomic energy made by Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946. For text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 865-871. 6 Reference is to President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, April 7. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 394-399. 7 Reference is to Gromyko's address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 24. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 436-441) 8 Reference is to the statement by Abdel F. Hassan, United Arab Republic Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, August 17, 1965. (Ibid., pp. 340-347) 98. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 98. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, October 4, 1965. SUBJECT Soviet Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Attached for your information is a copy of the Soviet draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that was submitted to the UNGA with a request that an item on the “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” be included on the agenda of the 20th Session of the UNGA. 2 Also attached are a talking paper for Rusk on the Soviet Treaty and a preliminary analysis of the Treaty by ACDA. 3 The Treaty, the substance of which is contained in Articles I and II, clearly rules out the MLF and would also appear to rule out existing bilateral NATO arrangements. Note particularly the use of the extremely restrictive phrase, “participate in … use of nuclear weapons,” in Articles I and II. Unless there were a clear understanding to the contrary, I would interpret this language to prohibit our existing NATO arrangements. This has always been the point that has worried me as lying behind our debate with the Soviets on the MLF and a non-proliferation Treaty. The question now is whether the Soviets have tabled this draft to answer criticism that they have not been forthcoming with specific proposals and will insist on the details of their draft, or whether the Soviets are simply trying to get a good bargaining position for future negotiations on a Treaty. For example, they might eventually propose to give up the language outlawing our NATO arrangements if we were prepared to give up the MLF. Only time will tell. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, Box 27. Confidential. 2 For text of the Soviet Draft Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, transmitted by letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the President of the U.N. General Assembly, September 24, 1965, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 443-446. 3 Not printed. 99. Memorandum of Conversation 99. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 11, 1965, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Disarmament PARTICIPANTS U.S. Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Thompson Assistant Secretary Leddy Ambassador Bruce Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director,ACDA J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA U. K. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under-Secretary of State The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Michael N. F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy Lord Chalfont, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs The Secretary suggested that Lord Chalfont and Mr. Fisher exchange views in advance of the meeting on October 14. Lord Chalfont asked whether there was any possibility of going further in linking a reduction of war heads with a freeze. The Secretary replied that there would be if we were engaged in serious discussions with the Russians. The trouble is that we have continued to make concession after concession with no response from the Soviet Union. Ambassador Thompson said that Gromyko had not been encouraging on the subject of the arms race in the Near East but appeared to want to keep the matter open. The Foreign Secretary said Gromyko had not discussed the Near East arms problem with him but had raised the question of denuclearizing Africa. On the matter of extending the test ban treaty the Secretary said the Russians insisted on linking the threshold concept with a moratorium on all other tests. He said that this amounted to an unverified test ban and was unacceptable. The U.S. had proposed technical talks on detection systems. But Gromyko took the position that there could be no inspection for political reasons, and therefore it was unnecessary to hold technical talks on the effectiveness of detecting systems. The Soviets had also been unwilling to talk about the comparability of defense budgets. The Secretary said that progress by mutual example in budget reductions had been interrupted because Peiping had entered the picture in South East Asia. Nevertheless we are seriously interested in disarmament and a mutual understanding of defense budgets in the USSR and the U.S. would be helpful. Secretary McNamara agreed with this. He pointed out that the U.S. had made some defense budget cuts which the USSR didn't understand because they weren't familiar with our complex defense budget system. A full understanding by both governments of the other's defense budget could well lead to practical results in mutual reductions in defense expenditures. Mr. Fisher raised the question of our attitude toward a World Disarmament Conference. We see no merit in the idea but the problem is how to deal with it in the General Assembly. Lord Chalfont agreed that a World Conference could not be an effective forum for negotiations. In view of broad world support for it, however, it would be best to avoid appearing to oppose it while allowing the obvious difficulties in sponsorship etc. to arise without helping to solve them. Lord Chalfont said that Gromyko had made it clear the conference should be outside the UN and should take place by the middle of next year. The Secretary agreed that no good could come from such a conference. He added that it would cause great difficulties with Germany and could endanger the work of the Committee of 18. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Drafted by J. Harold Shullaw (EUR/BNA) and approved in S, U, and G on October 19. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 6.” This meeting was held in the Secretary of State's office. Stewart visited the United States October 11-14. 100. Memorandum of Conversation 100. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 29, 1965, noon. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large The Ambassador said he had been instructed to make the following statement: “The contents of talks which recently took place between you, Mr. Secretary, and the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko, 2 were carefully examined in Moscow. During these talks positions of both sides were stated and explained with regard to major international problems and questions of bilateral relations between the USSR and the US. “Now we would like to dwell on the question which, in our view, is not only one of the most urgent but appears to be more than other questions ripe for constructive discussion. “Proper attention was given in Moscow to your words that the U.S. Government and personally President Johnson most seriously view the question of nondissemination of nuclear weapons and that the US is anxious to see to it that nuclear weapons would not come into possession of countries which do not have such weapons now. “However, we cannot but feel concerned that while the consideration of the question of preventing dissemination of nuclear weapons has reached the stage of discussion of concrete drafts of an appropriate international agreement, there have been reactivated efforts leading in the opposite direction, towards drafting plans for the creation of a NATO nuclear force. “Our position on this question is absolutely clear: we are against any forms and means of dissemination of nuclear weapons, we stand for true and immediate efforts to solve the problem of nondissemination. In no way can we be blamed for taking any steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to conclude a treaty on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. We strive for an agreement on an equal basis and seek no special purposes except a firm international understanding to the effect that nuclear weapons should really be not disseminated. If one evaluates the state of affairs objectively, the United States should be no less interested in such an understanding than the Soviet Union. “In this connection we have to emphasize once again that the plans for creating a NATO nuclear force are the main obstacle in the way of concluding an agreement on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. While explaining the position for the U.S. Government with regard to the plans for creating a NATO nuclear force you have repeatedly stated—and you did so, too, in recent talks with A.A. Gromyko—that the United States considers these plans as a means of preventing the emergence of a national nuclear force in West Germany. Yet, the fact remains: the realization of these plans would not keep West Germany further away from but bring it closer to nuclear weapons. This would mean dissemination of nuclear weapons by bringing them within the reach of precisely those forces which have twice in our time plunged Europe and the whole world into bloody wars. “No one should ignore the experience of history and forget what attempts to satisfy revanchist claims of German militarism through one concession after another led to in the past. We would like to stress once again that plans to create a multilateral nuclear force or other similar plans to bring nuclear weapons within the reach of West Germany constitute a problem which directly concerns the interests of security of the USSR and states friendly to us. It goes without saying that in that case the Soviet Union and its Allies would take measures to safeguard their security. But implementation of such plans would exclude the possibility of concluding a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. Such an action would considerably aggravate the situation in Europe and throughout the world, it would greatly damage Soviet-American relations, the state of which, even without this leaves much to be desired. “Now the moment has come when it is necessary to make up one's mind, to make a choice. If the United States intends, one way or another, to put into effect the plan to create a NATO nuclear force, any negotiations on the problem of preventing spread of nuclear weapons become devoid of sense and are doomed to failure in advance. But if the U.S. is really willing to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons, it would be possible to start without delay business-like negotiations aimed at working out a mutually acceptable text of a treaty on nondissemination of nuclear weapons. For our part, we are ready for such talks. “A hope is expressed in Moscow that these considerations of ours will be carefully examined by the U.S. Government and personally by President Johnson.” 3 The Secretary stated he would wish to study the statement in detail, but it did not appear to him that the statement represented any movement in the substance of the question. He said it appeared to him that the Soviet Government was raising obstacles without knowing what the problem really was as they could not know the details of any nuclear arrangements since these had not been worked out. He also observed that it was not clear whether the Soviet draft of a non-proliferation treaty excluded existing NATO arrangements. Dobrynin said that if existing arrangements provided for nuclear proliferation, that the Soviet Union was against them. He said, however, that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss their draft treaty article-by-article. The Secretary said that in conversation with Mr. Foster, Mr. Tsarapkin appeared to make a distinction between delivery vehicles and weapons. Ambassador Dobrynin said that this matter could be looked at and the text of an agreement could be discussed. The Secretary said that one thing that struck him was that the Soviets seemed to be nervous about their security with regard to NATO nuclear arrangements that were more secure and more safe than existing arrangements. Dobrynin observed that this was a matter of judgment. The Secretary said he was being driven to the conclusion that there was something in the Soviet minds other than proliferation. Dobrynin repeated that the Soviets were prepared to discuss both the American and the Soviet drafts. The Secretary concluded by stating that he would wish to study the Soviet message but, at first glance, his impression was that it had not changed the situation. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL), October 29. Thompson informed British Ambassador Dean of the Soviet oral message, allowing him to take full notes, November 6. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid.) 2 Document 97 . 3 A November 3 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy transmitting a copy of the memorandum of conversation suggests that Bundy send a copy to President Johnson “with a covering memorandum relating it to the current debate within the Government on MLF problems.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, NPT, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) A November 23 memorandum from Thompson to Bundy transmitted an ACDA draft of a reply. (Ibid.) A December 3 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy states that “attached statement [in reply to Dobrynin], which is consistent with the full range of solutions to the NATO nuclear sharing problem, is acceptable.” It bears a check mark and a handwritten note “Hold for trip to ranch Dec. 7.” (Ibid.) 101. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Beam) to Secretary of State Rusk 101. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Beam) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 4, 1965. SUBJECT Soviet Position on Nuclear Sharing The following is in reply to your inquiry at the Nov. 4 Staff Meeting: 2 To date the Soviet position on what forms of nuclear sharing might be permitted under a non-proliferation treaty remains unclear. Indeed, in the course of US-Soviet bilateral talks on their respective draft treaties, the Soviets have introduced new uncertainties rather than clarified specific issues. It thus appears that by deferring any final definition of an acceptable formula for nuclear sharing and still allowing for the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviet Union hopes to retain a focus on its objections to nuclear sharing in the broadest sense. Moscow apparently hopes to exert pressure on the U.S. and possibly other Western governments on the eve of FRG Chancellor Erhard's visit to the United States and the forth-coming NATO Defense Ministers' meeting. This suggests that while wishing to keep the focus on MLF the Soviets may desire to leave open the option either of retaining some element of potential flexibility on nuclear sharing, or conversely, of challenging present NATO nuclear arrangements should they consider this expedient. The Soviets may have had the latter alternative in mind when on September 24 they proffered their draft treaty at the UN. The language of the draft not only ruled out MLF, but could have been read as prohibiting a Special Committee, existing nuclear arrangements in NATO and perhaps even some in the Warsaw Pact itself. (The Soviets could, however, interpret this language in such a way as to use it against the NATO Stockpile without incurring similar penalties.) Subsequent conversations with Soviet officials conveyed an impression of a degree of possible flexibility on the subject of existing arrangements in NATO. That the Soviets might not be unalterably opposed to such arrangements was implicit in Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin's remark to ACDA Director Foster October 20 to the effect that the Soviet objections were not directed at the deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States in Europe. Pressing him further, Mr. Foster said that Tsarapkin's statement seemed to clarify matters on this point, but Tsarapkin remained silent. The issue of nuclear sharing also arose in the course of your talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on October 29. 3 In emphasizing the futility of negotiations in the face of efforts to create an MLF, Dobrynin did not raise the idea of a Special Committee but merely referred to Soviet opposition to “any forms and means of dissemination” and to the plans for a NATO nuclear force “or other similar plans” to bring nuclear weapons “within reach of West Germany.” Though reluctant to talk about existing arrangements, he did state that if such arrangements provided for proliferation then the Soviet Union was against them. Thus, he again left open Moscow's appraisal of whether a Special Committee or existing arrangements fit the Soviet structures or as something to be decided later. The sum and substance of official talks with the Soviets, leaving aside the more casual encounters with officers of the Soviet Embassy, is that on the one hand the Soviets first stated that they oppose “new proliferation” only, and that if future plans do not contemplate such new proliferation or new access to nuclear weapons, the Soviets would not object; on the other hand most recently they have taken a harder line across the board, indicating that they would find unacceptable any arrangement providing for, or even implying, a form of sharing or participation by non-nuclear parties in policy determination regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster has told me he will wish to report to you in detail on his latest talks with Tsarapkin. 4 J.D. Beam 1 Source: Washington National Records, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memos of the Secretary of State, 1965. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by James S. Bodnar (ACDA/IR) and Beam and cleared by Helmut Sonnenfeldt (INR/RSB), Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM), Thompson (S/AL), and Vladimir Toumanoff (EUR/SOV). 2 Not found. 3 See Document 100 . 4 Foster met with Tsarapkin in New York October 26 and November 2 for discussion of their respective draft treaties on non-proliferation. Foster reported these discussions in telegram 1577 from USUN, October 26 (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4), and in letters to Secretary Rusk, October 26 and November 2 (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Miscellaneous Papers). 102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 102. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 25, 1965. I attach a memorandum of conversation which I had yesterday with Ambassador Dobrynin because it seems to me to lend clear force to your Armistice Day request that while we work on the Atlantic nuclear problem, we keep Soviet interests in mind. 2 We will have more on this next week when Ball and McNamara have completed their exploration in London and Paris, 3 but I begin to think more and more that it is an opportunity for a real Johnson break-through here. It is clear that the Germans no longer really expect that we will support an MLF, and I believe that if you and Erhard could reach a firm agreement in early December, that no new weapons systems is necessary, the way might be open toward a non-proliferation treaty and toward a new collective arrangement for command control and consultation in NATO. 4 Dobrynin also raised the question of the pause, and I am doing a separate memorandum on that which will come to you in a day or two. 5 I continue to think that the considerations are very evenly balanced, but I now think there is just a little more to be said in favor of the pause than has yet been fully presented to you. McG. B. 6 Attachment 7 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION With Ambassador Dobrynin Wednesday, November 24 1-3 p.m. Ambassador Dobrynin and I had the most candid and cordial conversation of our three-year acquaintance today. In approximate order of importance, the topics we discussed are as follows: 1. European nuclear arrangements. The Ambassador raised this subject toward the end of the lunch—which is where he has usually raised the thing most on his mind in our past talks. The moment he raised the question, I told him that I was troubled by the lack of clarity in the Soviet position on ANF and MLF and other arrangements. Sometimes the Soviet Union seemed to be saying to us that it was only the MLF that was objectionable. At other times Soviet representatives seemed to be hostile to all possible arrangements, even those for simple consultation. The Ambassador parried by saying that the Soviet Union had a hard time telling just what we had in mind. He said that he had been unable to satisfy repeated requests from his government for an accurate account of purposes and meaning of the McNamara special committee (even his NATO colleagues in Washington had told him that they honestly did not know what it was all about). The Ambassador said that it would be easier for the Soviet Union to comment on our policy if it knew exactly what that policy was. He said that he knew there was a difference of opinion within the USG as between believers in collective weapons systems and believers in consultation. He said that he had the impression that there was not a firm decision in the USG and he implied that the Soviet Union could not express a fully defined position until it knew what it had to deal with on our side. I pointed out to the Ambassador that this position in turn created difficulties in Washington. We were determined to move ahead with necessary defensive arrangements, while at the same time we worked for the cause of non-proliferation. The Ambassador was certainly correct in believing that different kinds of arrangements were preferred by different groups here, but I pointed out that as long as it appeared that the Soviet Union was equally opposed to all arrangements, it would be hard for anyone in this government to believe the choice we made would have any effect on relations with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador said very earnestly that he understood this point and that for this reason it would be of the greatest value to the Soviet Government if he could have a wholly private and informal indication of the real plans and preferences of the USG as soon as they might be decided. He was sure that such a private indication of our position would be helpful, almost no matter what it was. The Ambassador cited as an example the announcement today of a 700-man reduction in our forces in Berlin. He thought that 24 hours private notice of this decision would have been most helpful in Moscow. I told the Ambassador that I understood the value of private communication. The Ambassador, on his part, assured me that the Soviet Union would have no interest whatever in using any such private communication to undermine our relations with the Germans—he said that he thought we worry too much about that, and that this simply was not the framework within which these matters were reviewed within the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government's concern about the Germans was real and deep, as he had told me often before. The Ambassador remarked that he had often been told by his friends in the State Department that Soviet protests in the nuclear field were merely another example of the Soviet hostility toward NATO, and that he wanted me to understand that this was not the case. Of course, NATO was not a Soviet favorite, but the problem of nuclear proliferation and Germany was far different and much more serious. On non-proliferation, he added, the Soviet Government had exposed itself to severe criticism from quarters he need not name (I inferred China); that should prove its sincerity. I told the Ambassador that we understood the Soviet concern with Germany and that indeed we shared it. I told him that I could give him categorical assurance that there was no one in the USG who had the smallest intention of allowing the Germans to have national control of nuclear weapons, and no one who would support the Germans in any effort to use any German nuclear role as an instrument of pressure against the Soviet Union. The Ambassador indicated that he believed me, but he made it equally plain that his confidence was not shared in Moscow. My own private and personal conclusion from this extended exchange, the flavor of which I have not fully recaptured, is that we may well be able to win Soviet acceptance of any nuclear arrangement in the West which does not involve an immediate decision to build a new weapons system like the MLF, and which clearly avoids any increase in direct German access to the nuclear trigger. I believe that both the McNamara committee and the revised ANF now under discussion could meet this condition. I believe that Dobrynin is right and serious in his emphasis upon the value of early private communication with the Soviet Government when we know our mind in this matter. Since in fact no one now wants the MLF, I think we may well be able to make some money with Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly. In sum, I believe that what Dobrynin said on this subject may open the way for us to meet our NATO responsibilities and move at the same time toward an agreement on non-proliferation. At the very least, the Ambassador's position seems to me to reinforce the importance of the President's stated view that we should approach the problem of Atlantic nuclear defense with a full awareness of the concerns of the Soviet Government. (I should add that I told Ambassador Dobrynin that this was the President's position.) [Here follows discussion of Vietnam, private communication, the Ford Foundation, and habits of the Soviet bureaucracy.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, U.S.S.R., Vol. XI, 11/25-2/66, Box 221. Top Secret. 2 Not found. 3 The NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers met in Paris, November 27, 1965, to review “existing nuclear capabilities and arrangements within the alliance, means to improve Allied consultation concerning the use of nuclear forces, including strategic forces, and ways of improving and extending Allied participation in nuclear policy and planning.” (Final Communique, November 27, printed in Department of State Bulletin , December 13, 1965, p. 939) 4 The phrase “—both at once” is handwritten on the source text. 5 Not further identified. 6 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 7 Top Secret. 103. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 103. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 1 Washington, December 2, 1965. Dear Bill: The Chiefs have reported to me their objection to a statement you made a few weeks ago that the Canal Zone will be included in any nuclear free zone. I understand that this statement, reported in USUN cable 1926 to State, 2 was based on an ACDA policy paper which was approved by State but which was not reviewed by the DoD. 3 While I realize that current negotiations with the Panamanians may result in significant changes in the status of the Canal Zone, such policy has yet to be approved and in any case such negotiations have not been completed. Therefore, I would urge you not to make any further statements that the Canal Zone will be included. It seems to me that if we are asked our position on this matter, it would be appropriate to reply that pending the outcome of the current negotiations between the Panamian Government and the United States, it does not appear appropriate for the U.S. to take a position on this matter. The Chiefs also object to your statements concerning the inclusion of Guantanamo in a nuclear free zone if Cuba were also included. As long as the Latin Americans continue to assure our air and sea transit rights, I do not believe such a commitment, however unlikely, would affect our security. Furthermore, I understand it is very unlikely that Cuba will join a nuclear free zone. Therefore, our position appears to be based primarily on political considerations. In order not to give Castro an excuse for failing to participate, I would be willing to support the inclusion of Guantanamo in a Latin American nuclear free zone if and only if Cuba is also a member of the zone. Finally, the Chiefs have informed me that they consider it essential that they be consulted in the formulation of any inspection plan since such a plan might affect the current surveillance of the Cuban area. I agree with the Chiefs on this issue and trust that you will provide us an opportunity to review such a plan. Sincerely, Bob 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1965. The source text is Tab B to a December 3 memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which asks Rusk to get McNamara's concurrence on a draft letter from Foster to the Latin Americans on a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone (Tab A). Fisher's memorandum states that the attached draft letter “maintains the pressure for the inclusion of Cuba but, in accordance with the position paper you approved, leaves the way open for subsequent U.S. agreement even if Cuba is not included.” For text of the revised letter of December 10, see Document 105 . 2 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-9 LA) 3 ACDA paper is not further identified. 104. Memorandum of Conversation 104. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 8, 1965, 6 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State The Secretary said he wished to make the following oral communication in reply to the oral remarks which the Ambassador had made to him on the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: “The United States Government has carefully examined the oral statement made by Ambassador Dobrynin on October 29, 1965. 2 “The United States Government agrees with the Soviet Government's view that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a mutual interest in reaching an agreement to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We also agree that this is one of the most urgent problems and that it is ripe for constructive discussion. Finally, we agree that the objective should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated. As a recently-adopted General Assembly resolution which we both supported declares: 'The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.' 3 “We must point out, however, that as long as the Soviet Union had hundreds of intermediate and medium range nuclear missiles aimed at the territories of our allies in Europe, our allies are naturally going to desire participation in their defense against possible nuclear attack, but without the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For this reason, no non-proliferation treaty which, in addition to barring proliferation, also bars such participation will be acceptable to the United States. We have no intention of signing any agreement which would preclude our allies from participating in their own defense, so long as such participation does not involve proliferation. “We have assured your Government in the past that no proposals for the defense of NATO nations which we have supported would produce proliferation. Our proposals are, on the contrary, designed to prevent it. If, as your statement indicates, you do not accept this conclusion and believe such arrangements could in the future lead to proliferation, then you should join us in negotiating a treaty to prevent proliferation from taking place in any manner. “The United States is prepared to negotiate a treaty, such as the United States draft, which bars dissemination in any form, directly or indirectly. 4 We are prepared to agree that no non-nuclear country acquires nuclear weapons, rational control over nuclear weapons, the power itself to fire nuclear weapons, or information on how to manufacture nuclear weapons. We are prepared to agree that these things should not be done directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of States, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. Finally, to close any conceivable loophole that might otherwise remain, we are prepared to ban any action which would cause an increase in the total number of entities having independent power to use nuclear weapons. “We believe this to be a reasonable basis upon which a treaty could be negotiated, assuming the Soviet Government is interested in such a treaty. We believe it possible to proceed with negotiations promptly, in New York, in Geneva or elsewhere. To expedite those negotiations, Secretary Rusk suggested, and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed, that a beginning be made with the articles of the two draft treaties upon which agreement appears to be close, and such talks have begun. “The United States Government continues to attach the greatest importance to achieving progress on the problem of proliferation, and is ready for constructive discussions to this end.” The Secretary added that if the concern of the Soviet side was proliferation, we should be able to reach agreement. We are not, and never have been, thinking about proliferation. We were as opposed to this as the Soviets for many of the same reasons. On the other hand, if the Soviet objection was based on the fact that they did not like NATO, we could not help them. The Secretary said he had not seen the British Foreign Minister yet to see if he has had any further reflections on his discussions in Moscow. 5 He was not certain whether Mr. Stewart would be coming with Prime Minister Wilson or not. 6 The Secretary said that this matter had had the personal attention of the President who was familiar with these discussions. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that he had spent yesterday at the President's ranch. 7 Dobrynin asked about the meaning of the word “entities,” which was explained to him. After a long conversation on other subjects, Dobrynin returned to the subject of non-proliferation and said that our reply introduced nothing new. The Soviet impression was that we were yielding to pressure from the West Germans. The Secretary said if the Soviets were prepared to concentrate sincerely on proliferation, we should be able to reach agreement. Dobrynin pointed out that we wished to have an agreement but also an arrangement in NATO. He said it would have been easier for the Soviets to have confined themselves to criticizing our draft but they had put in one of their own, to which there was some opposition in Moscow, in an effort to get a solution. They would be prepared to sign tomorrow if the NATO issue could be cleared up. He pointed out that even the NATO representatives in Washington were not clear about the United States position. He said that representatives did not question United States sincerity but did not know what we were really planning. The Secretary said he had told Gromyko that neither he nor we knew what an eventual arrangement might be. Dobrynin said the Germans were now thinking of medium-range missiles. He had discussed this with members of the German Embassy here, who were quite frank about it and they were equally frank in Bonn. He said the Soviets believe that the future of Europe lay in reconciliation. Many Germans, and this had been particularly the case during the time of Adenauer and Dulles, believed that by creating military power of their own, they could get East Germany back. Some of them seemed to think they could exploit Soviet difficulties with China. We were making one concession after another to the West Germans. The Secretary said these questions did not arise in NATO until the Soviets created this enormous nuclear force, targeted on Germany. Dobrynin said that we had moved first in this matter and had put our missiles in Germany and then the Soviets had reacted. The Secretary said we took seriously the matter that the Soviet Union and we had heavy responsibility for peace. We were not trying to mislead the Soviets on non-proliferation, and could not do so in any event. The Soviets, in fact, sat at the NATO table on these discussions but when we ask about the Warsaw Pact we get no answer. Dobrynin rejoined that the Poles had given the Secretary a clear answer by saying they had not asked for nuclear weapons. At this point the conversation turned to other subjects. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US Officials Memoranda of Conversation with Leading USSR Officials, 1965. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) December 9, and in S/S-S by John P. Walsh. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. 2 Document 100 . 3 For text of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted November 19, 1965, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965 , pp. 72-73. 4 For text of the U.S. Draft Treaty to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on August 17, 1965, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 347-349. 5 British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart visited the Soviet Union November 29-December 3 for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. 6 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson visited the United States December 16-18 for talks with President Johnson and other administration officials to address the U.N. General Assembly on December 16. 7 Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy visited the LBJ Ranch in Texas on December 7. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book, 1965) No record of their discussions with President Johnson has been found. 105. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (Garcia Robles) 105. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America (Garcia Robles) 1 Washington, December 10, 1965. Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to the Negotiating Committee's request to me on October 26, the following points reflect the attitude of the United States towards the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. The United States supports the creation of nuclear free zones such as a Latin American nuclear free zone, where the initiative for such zones originates within the area concerned; where the zone includes all states in the area whose participation is deemed important; where the creation of a zone would not disturb necessary security arrangements; and where provisions are included for following up on alleged violations in order to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the zone. An effective agreement based on these principals, which were presented by US representatives at the Eighteenth Session of the General Assembly and reaffirmed by the United States at the United Nations Disarmament Commission earlier this year, would complement efforts to achieve the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As recently as November 22, 1965, Secretary of State Rusk stated before the Second Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro the following: “The United States has followed with keen and sympathetic interest the efforts of Latin American countries to work out agreed arrangements for excluding the proliferation, the stationing, or storage of nuclear weapons within the territory of Latin American States. We have noted the encouraging progress toward this end which was made during the current year at discussions in Mexico City. The United States believes the project of a nuclear free zone in Latin America is constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the Hemisphere. We welcome the effort and would be glad to see it reach a successful conclusion.” 2 We are aware that the governments of Latin America are now considering certain aspects of the proposed zone in preparation for additional meetings of the Preparatory Commission and its committees. Our final position, of course, will have to await decisions on the nature and scope of the zone. We do not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States. In the case of both these areas, the United States must deal with disarmament policies affecting other nuclear powers. From the US point of view, we would be agreeable to inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone, although of course the well-established transit rights would not be affected by the establishment of the proposed nuclear free zone. We could also agree to include Guantanamo if Cuba participates. 3 The United States believes it important that all states in the area should participate. The refusal of certain states to participate would lead us to consider whether their exclusion might render the agreement ineffective or meaningless, or whether the agreement would still be worthwhile. The United States heartily approves the proposal of the Preparatory Commission to apply IAEA safeguards to all Latin American nuclear activities, which would permit verification against the diversion of peaceful activities to weapons development. For verification against the introduction of nuclear weapons, we believe that other procedures would have to be considered. The United States understands that such other procedures are under consideration by Governments participating in the Preparatory Commission. In the hope that the governments of Latin America can successfully achieve a viable and workable nuclear free zone, the United States welcomes opportunities to exchange views with the representatives of the Preparatory Commission and the governments of Latin America. Sincerely, William C. Foster 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 626-627. The source text is an attachment to a memorandum of conversation between Gerard Gaussen, Counselor of the French Embassy in Washington, and Samuel De Palma, Deputy Assistant Director, ACDA/IR, December 15. 2 For complete text, see Department of State Bulletin , December 20, 1965, pp. 985-994. 3 See footnote 1, Document 103 . 106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, December 23, 1965, 1345Z. 2008. 1. Following is distillation of remarks on nuclear-sharing problem which were interspersed in my conversation last night with Gromyko (Embtel 2000) 2 on general state of our relations. 2. Leaving question of Vietnam which we had been discussing, Gromyko said he wished to address question of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Soviet Government believed, he said, that it was not too late to remedy this situation. In common with UK, USSR and other countries, we should not allow nuclear weapons to spread. Time would come when we too might regret our current policy. USSR was resolutely opposed to FRG's access to nuclear weapons in any form, but believed this to be not just in Soviet interest but in interest of all major powers. Referring to his statement to recent meeting of Supreme Soviet, 3 Gromyko said Soviets believed that door to solution of this problem was not yet closed and they would not like to see it closed. It seemed to him that President Johnson should now address himself with greater sympathy to their position on non-dissemination. 3. I said that I had always felt our interests were basically the same on non-proliferation, and I referred him to communique issued at end of Erhard visit which I thought served interest of non-proliferation. 4 I made point again that Soviets should understand interest of peoples, who had missiles targeted against them, in sharing in their own defense. I was glad to hear him say that door was still open, and I hoped we could make progress when the meetings in Geneva resumed. Our view was the same, I repeated, on point of not allowing additional political entities to gain control over nuclear weapons. Our differences related to means of accomplishing this purpose. 4. Gromyko responded by warning that if by any chance we reached agreement with FRG on access, including access on “political plane,” to questions relating to use of nuclear weapons, that would close door to agreement on non-proliferation and Soviets would have to take necessary steps looking to their own security and that of their allies. In meantime, reports had appeared, Gromyko said, that de facto decisions had been taken to give access to Germans “on political plane.” If this were so, truth would [come]out sooner or later and this would eliminate possibility of non-proliferation agreement. 5. I pointed out that this got down to question of definition, and asked Gromyko to clarify whether in his remarks on this subject to Supreme Soviet he had been referring to present arrangements. Gromyko replied that what he was talking about was the nuclear committee idea, which they considered unacceptable. For the Germans to take part in preparation of nuclear strategy would, he said, be considered access. When I remonstrated that this had nothing to do with access, he insisted that “if a country has a means of taking part in decisions on use of nuclear weapons, this is access.” 6. I said I believed we were following more realistic policy on this matter than they were. If a country, whether it was a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, had hundreds of missiles trained upon it as Soviet leaders had publicly said was case with respect to FRG, wasn't effect of this to exert pressure on them to secure their own in absence other defense arrangements? If Soviet Government was going so far as to consider that political consultation constituted “access,” they were putting tremendous pressure on a country to get its own weapons. While Soviets focused on Germany, it seemed to me that Soviet position barring political consultation had still broader implications for countries like India which had nuclear capability plus a hostile neighbor on its border. Gromyko protested that this was introducing unrelated question. 7. I told Gromyko that I appreciated his willingness to discuss these issues frankly with me, and that I would carefully report his remarks. Kohler 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL US-USSR) 3 Reference presumably is to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's address of December 9 before the Supreme Soviet. Extracts are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965 , pp. 454-456 and 494-497. 4 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of the Federal Republic of Germany visited the United States December 19-21 for talks with President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and other government officials on December 20-21. The joint statement issued following discussions with Chancellor Erhard is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 1165-1167. 107. Draft Memorandum of Conversation 107. Draft Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 11, 1966, 6 p.m. SUBJECT Message from Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to President Johnson on Non-proliferation PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador Acting Secretary George W. Ball Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Ambassador Dobrynin called, at his request, on the Acting Secretary. He said he wished to present a personal message from his Prime Minister to President Johnson on the subject of non-proliferation. 2 The Ambassador noted that the message was confidential and that it was being handled in the same way as previous confidential communications between Soviet leaders and the President. Although the original text in Russian was not signed, the Ambassador reiterated that the message was from the Soviet Prime Minister. He handed to Mr. Ball an unofficial translation in English of the Prime Minister's message. After reading the message, the Acting Secretary said that it would be transmitted to the President at once and that a reply would be prepared. The Acting Secretary commented that we have a difference of view with the Soviet Government with regard to what we consider as the same purpose, namely, that the FRG should play a constructive role in Europe and not a destructive one. In this connection, our stand is conditioned by the effects of efforts in the past to stabilize the situation in Europe. If we are to prevent developments which could lead in the direction of destroying Europe, we must make it possible for non-nuclear powers to exercise some influence in the control of nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the energies of these powers might be channeled in harmful directions. The Acting Secretary said that he was sure this line of argumentation was familiar to Ambassador Dobrynin and he regretted that we have not been able to persuade the Soviet Government of the correctness of our views. The Acting Secretary emphasized that we do not envisage a situation where a German Government would have the possibility of making an independent decision to detonate nuclear weapons. We see three alternatives in regard to the control of nuclear weapons: 1. Attempt to maintain a situation where the powerful nations already possessing nuclear weapons do not share their nuclear power with others and keep non-nuclear countries in a state of permanent inferiority. 2. Allow countries not having nuclear weapons to develop nuclear capability on an independent, national basis. We consider this a disastrous course. 3. Establish a collective arrangement where control over nuclear weapons would be shared and no new independent capabilities would be created. We feel that this offers the best prospects. The Acting Secretary said that we are very sincere in desiring non-proliferation and that we have given great thought to our policy in this regard. He did not know if it would be possible to reconcile the United States and Soviet views but he assured the Ambassador that the Soviet message would be studied carefully. 1 Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. (EUR). The conversation was held in Ball's office. 2 Document 108 . 108. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 108. Message From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 1 Moscow, undated. TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE HANDED ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN January 11, 1966, 6 p.m. Dear Mr. President. We have decided to address this communication to you in order to set forth our views on a question, the urgency of which is recognized by everybody. This question is the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which has been discussed for a long time on a bilateral basis and at international conferences, but the solution of which has not progressed so far. The Soviet Government, as you undoubtedly know, attaches great significance to the program of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons. We believe that if the dissemination of these terrible weapons of mass destruction is not blocked and these weapons continue to spread more and more throughout the world, that would inevitably lead to the growth of the threat of war and would immeasurably increase the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Having in mind the importance of this problem the Soviet Government submitted it for consideration by the twentieth session of the UN General Assembly, by introducing a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are aware of the official position of your Government on this question. We have taken note of the statement of the U.S. Government, transmitted on December 8, 1965, through Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, that it is interested in reaching an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and that “the objective (of such an agreement) should be that nuclear weapons really not be disseminated.” 2 We also note that the U.S. Government agreed that such a treaty, as set forth in the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1965, adopted at its twentieth session, “should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.” 3 If one proceeds from these statements it would not seem to be very difficult to work out a mutually acceptable text of a non-proliferation treaty. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The American draft treaty and even more steps actually taken by the U.S.A. indicate that the Governments of our countries by no means give the same content to the very notion of “non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” The Soviet Government has in mind such a treaty which would really exclude the possibility of any dissemination of nuclear weapons whatever which would make it impossible for non-nuclear powers to acquire access to these weapons in any form, directly or indirectly. As for the Government of the U.S.A., our understanding is that while declaring its readiness to reach an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has in mind an agreement which would provide a significant exception to the principle of non-proliferation by permitting the implementation of plans, now under discussion within the framework of NATO, for providing access to nuclear weapons to the non-nuclear member states of this military alliance, including West Germany. It is precisely this that is the main difference between the positions of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government has frequently drawn the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that statements on striving to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons are in no way compatible with actions actually leading to the spread of such weapons. We have invariably emphasized, since we have most weighty reasons for doing so, that what is especially dangerous is a policy of satisfying step by step the nuclear claims of the Bonn Government, creating thereby conditions which make it easier for the West German revanchists to get access to nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is a fact that the U.S.A. on an evergrowing scale provides the FRG and the other NATO allies with atomic information. It is a fact that the U.S.A. trains military personnel of those countries in the methods of using nuclear weapons. It is a fact that the U.S.A. provides some of its allies, including the FRG with the very weapons which are capable of carrying nuclear shells, although it declares at the same time that the nuclear warheads for such weapons remain under the control of the U.S. Moreover, as it was recently reported in the Western press, American nuclear warheads are now not only assigned to the armed forces of several non-nuclear member-states of NATO and deployed on their territories but in some cases West German planes and missiles manned by West German military personnel are even equipped with these nuclear warheads. There are going on in NATO and at bilateral meetings of representatives of Western powers active discussions of various plans, the essence of which, no matter what might be said, is only one thing: how and to what extent to satisfy the growing nuclear demands of West Germany. A new concession to West Germany which creates obstacles on the road to the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was the proposal providing for the FRG's participation in decisions on the question of nuclear strategy in NATO within the framework of the so-called “McNamara committee.” 4 And today the Bonn Government is now putting forward new claims and is getting ready to demand even more tomorrow. The final goal pursued by the West German Government is obvious, although it tries meanwhile to camouflage it, is the possession of nuclear weapons. Frequent attempts have been made to convince us that West Germany allegedly has no such goals and its access to nuclear weapons is not involved. But what is left of these assurances if the Defense Minister of the FRG von Hassel openly states that West Germany will not be satisfied until it possesses atomic weapons, and other Bonn leaders now publicly say that the FRG will not sign a non-proliferation agreement if it blocks the creation of a NATO nuclear force. Thus, the FRG Government in effect challenges the whole world, the United Nations, which called for earliest conclusion of a treaty to prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons. And how can one evaluate statements by the head of the West German Government that during his recent visit to the U.S.A. he received not only a promise to provide West Germany with “appropriate participation in nuclear defense” 5 of NATO, but also agreement that the settlement of NATO nuclear problems would be given priority over the question of the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty? These statements by leaders of the FRG Government were not refuted by the American side although their meaning is at variance with the position of the U.S. Government as it was stated to us in the communication of December 8 and earlier statements made to us by official representatives of the U.S.A. Moreover, the Western press has carried a report that the United States indeed gives priority to NATO nuclear plans in the belief that the non-proliferation agreement can wait, since even if these plans should be resolved, the Soviet Union allegedly would not abandon its position on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In connection with such baseless speculations we deem it necessary to emphasize once again that no matter what intentions the United States and other Western powers may have in connection with those plans now under discussion in NATO, the Soviet Union will never agree that West Germany should acquire access to nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever. No matter how one evaluates the FRG's policy,—we know that your assessment of this policy differs from ours,—one thing is clear: the access of West Germany to nuclear weapons would create a direct threat to European states and would cause a new, sharp aggravation of the whole international situation. The Soviet Government has already unequivocally stated that if the FRG got access to nuclear weapons either through a multilateral or an Atlantic nuclear force, on the basis of creating some “atomic committee” or in any other form, the Soviet Union would be forced to take all measures which it, along with its allies and friends, would consider necessary for securing peace in Europe. This is a question of the vital interests of the Soviet Union, and we not only have the right but believe it to be our duty—this stems from the Potsdam agreements as well—to prevent West Germany from becoming the source of a new war. Now, Mr. President, the moment has come, when it is necessary to make a definite choice: either we shall firmly adhere to the position of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without any deviations from this position or the situation will inevitably lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is said that this whole question is still under consideration by your Government and that final decision has not yet been made. We would like to believe that this is so. Knowing that the decisive word on this rests with you, we hope that you will personally devote the most searching attention to this question. The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is so important that it is necessary once again to weigh with utmost responsibility all possible consequences of the decision to be made. It would be a mistake in this matter to try to derive some unilateral advantages. A non-proliferation agreement must meet in equal measure the interests of all countries and all peoples. For its part, the Soviet Government, consistently standing for the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons, is ready to begin businesslike negotiations to prepare such a non-proliferation treaty. Taking into account the considerations put forward by the American side in the statement of December 8, we propose that during the forthcoming session of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, along with the discussions of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Committee itself, representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. carry on a bilateral exchange of views in order to expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 8. Secret. A January 12 memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that this message seemed to renew the “pen-pal” correspondence. 2 Document 104 . 3 Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted November 19, 1965. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 73) 4 Secretary of Defense McNamara suggested the establishment of a select committee of four or five members reportedly including France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany to study ways of extending nuclear weapons planning and consultation at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in Paris May 31-June 1, 1965. A Special Committee of the Defense Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany met at Paris, November 27, 1965, for this purpose. It set up three working groups concerned with communications, data exchange, and nuclear planning under the guidance of a steering committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the participating countries. See Department of State Bulletin , June 21, 1965, p. 993, and December 13, 1965, p. 939. 5 The phrase “appropriate participation in nuclear defense” is in the Joint Statement issued December 21, 1965, following discussions between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 1165-1167) 109. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 109. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 13, 1966. JCSM-28-66 SUBJECT Test Ban Proposals (U) 1. (S) In response to the request by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-28246/65, dated 23 December 1965, 2 subject as above, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are provided on a memorandum by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to Members of the Committee of Principals, dated 17 December 1965, proposing a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 3 as amended by a second memorandum, dated 29 December 1965, subject: “Addendum to December 17, 1965, Memorandum on 'Test Ban Proposals'(U).” 4 2. (S) A study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Military Implications of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was forwarded by JCSM-348-65, dated 11 May 1965, subject: “Draft Message to Soviet Leaders on Disarmament (S).”4 Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ACDA proposals for a comprehensive test ban and a threshold ban were forwarded by JCSM-601-65, dated 5 August 1965, subject: “Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (U).” 5 Many of the previous views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have relevancy to the current ACDA memorandum. The Appendix to this memorandum restates and amplifies previous positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which are germane to this issue. 6 3. (S) The ACDA memorandum proposes that, at the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) on 27 January 1966, the United States attempt to negotiate a CTBT. In the event that the USSR is unwilling to permit the on-site verification necessary for a CTBT, the United States should then propose an extension of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) to underground tests with a seismic threshold of 4.75 without inspections. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the foregoing references concerning a CTBT remain valid and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a CTBT would prejudice the national security interests of the United States at this time. The views concerning a 4.75 TTBT follow. 4. (S) The ACDA memorandum assumes that the United States could verify a threshold test ban using its existing national system and would rely heavily on unilateral US intelligence to identify suspicious events. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), 7 have consistently stated that US intelligence capabilities should not be used as a primary means of verification of any arms control measure. Seismology, at best, can identify some seismic events as earthquakes; it cannot now identify seismic events as nuclear detonations. For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their position that a separate means of verification, including on-site inspections, should be established and in operation on the effective date of implementation of any such proposal. 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that there will be inadvertent violations of such a treaty and many suspected violations because of the uncertainties and possible ambiguities associated with monitoring. For this reason, they believe that such a treaty may well create more suspicion than it dispels and may increase international distrust. 6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the effects of a TTBT upon the strategic nuclear balance may be sufficient to justify rejection of the ACDA proposal. The United States must approach any nuclear test ban from a position of strength. Although it may be accepted that the United States enjoys a favorable strategic position, this advantage is threatened by the deployment of a Soviet ABM system. To counter this threat, the United States must develop its own ABM system, must remove known vulnerabilities in US strategic missile systems, and must develop an advanced re-entry system, such as Multiple Individually-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). To realize these goals, tests beyond those permitted by the proposed test ban are required. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 7. (S) While ACDA acknowledges the importance of a hot X-ray ABM system, the argument set forth by ACDA appears to be that the USSR does not possess the needed know-how to exploit this potential capability and that further restriction, at this time, could freeze the USSR and US ABM race. The NIE statement, “there is no evidence that [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] is not sufficient assurance in this case. The USSR has had the opportunity to discover this and other effects under the present treaty as well as in their 1961/1962 high-altitude, high-yield tests. These latter tests might also have uncovered effects we know nothing about. We cannot assume that the USSR knows less than the United States about these effects. 8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there may be political advantages to the United States signing a TTBT, such as a limited impact on proliferation. However, there are important political disadvantages which, with the military disadvantages, are overriding in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They concur with the consensus of the Committee of Principals in the 25 August 1965 meeting in which it was noted that the imprecision inherent in monitoring such a treaty may lead to disputes, suspicion, acrimony, and distrust. 9. (S) On balance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the ACDA proposal would prejudice the security interest of the United States. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to a threshold treaty as proposed because: a. There are no provisions for policing a TTBT effectively. b. Primary responsibility for verifying compliance with a TTBT would have to rest with Atomic Energy Detection System and US intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as USIB, believe that these sources should not be relied upon for verification nor should they be so employed. c. The inexactitudes of the science of seismology, as it applies to nuclear detonations, preclude a definite and unarguable policing of a TTBT. Such a treaty may lead to disputes, suspicion, acrimony, and distrust. d. The TTBT would prevent the development of high-yield area defense ABM systems, as well as advanced re-entry warheads. e. A TTBT would prevent rectification of serious vulnerabilities in existing US ballistic missile forces. f. A TTBT would have a debilitating impact on the ability of the United States to maintain a competence in nuclear weapons technology. 10. (U) The ACDA memorandum states that a modalities paper for on-site inspection will be circulated for comment at staff level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their desire to make recommendations on any on-site inspection procedures prior to their being discussed, in public or in private, with foreign governments. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 8 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject Files, Disarmament, 18-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), Vol. II, Box 13. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A January 14 cover memorandum by R.C. Bowman, transmitting a copy of the source text to McGeorge Bundy, states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff “strongly oppose any new test ban proposal at this time,” because the likely Soviet development of an area anti-ballistic missile system could reduce the U.S. strategic deterrent capability to a dangerous level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted continued testing for several years and at the same time improvement in detection capabilities to an adequate level for monitoring a test ban. 2 Reference is to a cover memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Adam Yarmolinsky to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle G. Wheeler requesting his views on the ACDA memorandum of December 17, 1965, to Members of the Committee of Principals, which proposed a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), Nov.-Dec. 1965) 3 Not printed. (Ibid.) 4 Not found. 5 Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, 388.3 (2 Feb. 65), Aug. 1965) 6 Not printed. 7 TCS 3236/65/USIB-D-32/12/3; available in SAO channels. [Footnote in the source text.] 8 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 110. Abstract of the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals 110. Abstract of the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals 1 Washington, January 14, 1966. In responding to the JCS request for an analysis of the technical aspects of nuclear test ban proposals, the Panel has focused upon the effects which either a Comprehensive Test Ban or a 4.75 Threshold Ban would have upon the keystone of US National defense: the strategic deterrent. Three areas of critical vulnerabilities, which if exploited by the Soviet Union would seriously compromise our deterrent, have been discussed in the context of the underground nuclear tests required for their correction. Upon examining the capability of the Soviets to exploit these vulnerabilities the Panel concluded that We have no evidence whether or not the Soviets have already achieved the necessary nuclear developments, but if not, even a comprehensive ban could not prevent their acquisition. To maintain our deterrent, our best course is to pursue with all vigor the programs now in progress for eradicating these vulnerabilities. Many of these programs involve underground nuclear experiments. The Panel therefore further concluded that From the standpoint of our current and planned military-technical programs the present is a particularly disadvantageous time for the US to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement. Looking forward to the future and the obvious continued need for a high level of competence in nuclear technology to maintain our deterrent, we see as one of our greatest potential losses that Under a comprehensive test ban our scientific and technical competence in nuclear weapons design and in weapons effects would deteriorate substantially in about three years and be seriously degraded in ten. [ 2 paragraphs (10 lines of source text) not declassified ] Turning to proliferation, which has been advanced as one of the principal motivations for extending the Limited Treaty, we find that On a purely technical basis, for a country bent on becoming a nuclear power, the lack of testing would inhibit the development of thermonuclear weapons and light-weight fission weapons, but could not prevent the development of primitive but effective fission weapons. After a section dealing in some detail with what might be done if a Treaty extension appears inevitable, the report attempts to answer the four specific JCS questions (Section X). Finally, a summary and list of major conclusions is presented. [Here follow a Table of Contents, the text of the report, and three appendices.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, JCS 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2557. Top Secret; Restricted Data. The report contains a transmittal letter from Panel Chairman W.G. McMillan to General J.P. McConnell, Chief of Staff,USAF, January 14. Also attached is a cover memorandum from General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to members of the Committee of Principals (JCSM-78-66), February 3, stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the U.S. Air Force as the executive agent to establish a panel for an independent analysis of technical problems relating to test ban proposals to evaluate the security implications of further nuclear test restraints. 111. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 111. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 15, 1966. JCSM-37-66 SUBJECT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (U) 1. (S) In response to an oral request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) on 6 January 1966, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are provided on the position paper in the Appendix hereto, prepared by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 2 This paper recommends that the United States press for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) when it reconvenes on 27 January 1966. 2. (S) A study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Military Implications of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was forwarded by JCSM-348-65, dated 11 May 1965, subject: “Analysis of Comprehensive Test Ban (U).” 3 Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ACDA proposals for a comprehensive test ban and threshold ban were forwarded by JCSM-601-65, dated 5 August 1965, subject: “Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (U).” 4 These views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain valid and are relevant to the current ACDA position paper. 3. (S) The ACDA paper proposes that at the resumption of the ENDC on 27 January 1966, the United States attempt to negotiate a CTBT, providing for an unspecified number of on-site inspections. The number of inspections would be subject to negotiation but would have to be sufficient to give confidence that the treaty was being observed. On-site inspections would be conducted in accordance with a modalities paper prepared by ACDA. In the event that the USSR were unwilling to permit the on-site verification necessary for a CTBT, the United States would then propose an extension of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) to underground tests with a seismic signal of 4.75 or higher without inspections. 4. (U) The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Threshold Test Ban (TTB) have been provided by JCSM-28-66, dated 13 January 1966, subject: “Test Ban Proposals (U).” 5 The ACDA memorandum states that a modalities paper for on-site inspection will be circulated for comment at staff level. This paper has not been referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it is emphasized that the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to make recommendations on any on-site inspection procedure prior to it being discussed, in public or in private, with foreign governments. 5. (TS) There are serious gaps in hard US intelligence about the state of Soviet research in the newest weapon effects areas known to US scientists. However, there are indications that the USSR already may have made important gains in nuclear weapons technology beyond US capabilities, which could alter the military balance. Such gains may have occurred in their knowledge of weapon effects causing communications and radar blackout; they also may include advances in the area of enhanced gamma, cold, and hot X-rays for antiballistic missile (ABM) and offensive applications. This technology may introduce important vulnerabilities in the US strategic missile systems. 6. (TS) It is believed that the Soviets have begun to deploy an ABM defense; however, it has not yet been determined whether the defense will be an area or terminal system, or a combination of both. USSR deployment of an ABM system capitalizing on advanced nuclear technology (which the Soviets may possess), combined with improvements in strategic weapon design and potential counterforce actions which exploit US vulnerabilities, could upset the nuclear balance in favor of the USSR. To counter this threat, the United States must develop its own ABM system, must remove known vulnerabilities in US strategic missile systems, and must develop an advanced reentry system. These developments require vigorous nuclear testing which can be accomplished within LTBT restrictions. 7. (TS) It is important, from the standpoint of ability to monitor a CTBT, to assess whether there is a minimum yield below which crucial military gains could not occur through clandestine testing. [ 3-1/2 lines of source text are not declassified ] Vigorous exploitation of low yield (less than 1 KT) techniques as a sole means of weapons development, if successful, could lead to important technical gains conceivably capable of changing the nuclear balance. As a practical matter, the yield below which crucial military gains could not occur through nuclear testing is unknown. 8. (S) The current US Atomic Energy Detection System can, with acceptable confidence, detect nuclear explosions in most environments at thresholds of approximately 10 KT in the Northern Hemisphere and as high as 100 KT in the Southern Hemisphere. If current improvement plans prove out, a reasonable capability can be expected in 2 to 3 years to detect signals from a 5 KT nuclear test in almost all environments in the Northern Hemisphere and 60 KT in the Southern Hemisphere. Testing below these levels may go undetected, and, with decoupling and evasion techniques, tests well above these yields may also go undetected. 9. (TS) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose a CTBT as not in the security interest of the United States. The United States must approach any nuclear test ban from a position of strength. Although it may be accepted that the United States enjoys a favorable strategic position, this advantage is threatened by the probable deployment of a Soviet ABM system and the important advances that the Soviets have probably made in weapons effects technology. To counter this threat, the United States must develop its own ABM system and must remove vulnerabilities in US strategic missile systems. To realize these goals, substantial underground testing is required. Additionally, verification procedures in being and projected are insufficient to insure that under a CTBT the USSR could not conduct sufficient tests to achieve important advances in nuclear technology. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to make recommendations on proposed on-site inspection procedures prior to their being discussed, in public or in private, with foreign governments. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 6 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27. Top Secret, Restricted Data. 2 Not printed. 3 Not found. 4 See footnote 5, Document 109 . 5 Document 109 . 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 112. Memorandum of Conversation 112. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 19, 1966. SUBJECT US-UK Disarmament Discussion: Test Ban (U) (January 19-20, 1966) PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 Lord Chalfont considered that inability to make headway on a non-proliferation treaty at Geneva would make some movement toward a test ban desirable. The Canadians shared this view. A comprehensive test ban would also contribute to non-proliferation objectives. The U.K. considered that as a result of progress in seismic detection the risks involved in a comprehensive test ban without on-sites were so small as to be politically acceptable. The U.K. would, however, continue publicly to support the U.S. position, despite growing pressures at home. Lord Chalfont asked whether the U.S. saw any possibility of a comprehensive test ban without on-sites. If not, perhaps further thought might be given to suggestions for an international “detection club” or to the concept of “challenge inspections” suggested in the ICY report. Mr. Foster said that at this time there was no possibility of the U.S. abandoning its insistence on on-sites. “Challenge inspections” would introduce elements of such great instability as to make any test ban concluded on these bases less than useful. Mr. Foster said that consideration was still continuing within the USG of a half-a-loaf approach, including a threshold test ban. He did not feel that there was much basis for optimism as to the results of our consideration, however. In any event, the U.S. remained firmly opposed to any linking of a threshold ban and a moratorium. The U.S. had devoted considerable research to ways of simplifying on-site modalities and making them less intrusive, and it was not impossible that at some stage the Soviets might return to accepting some form of on-sites. Mr. Fisher elaborated further on the subject of “challenge inspections.” He doubted whether they would have a strong deterrent effect against violation. If, as the ICY report admits, it was unlikely that the Soviets would admit inspectors into their territory anyway in response to a “challenge,” it hardly seemed just that the onus for initiating withdrawal from the test ban would have to fall on the innocent party. A test ban based on “challenge inspections” would also have considerable de-stablizing effect in US-USSR bilateral relationship. Referring to studies on a threshold test ban, Mr. Fisher said on a personal basis that three main problems seemed to be involved: a) whether a threshold ban would have practical value if the USSR and countries such as India could still test under the threshold; b) whether it might seriously inhibit countries from going nuclear; and c) to what extent it would prevent us from doing what we want to do. Mr. Fisher asked for U.K. views on the possible inhibiting effect on non-nuclear states of a threshold test ban or even of the offer of such a test ban. In short, would it be worthwhile even to propose one? Lord Chalfont replied that in his opinion a threshold test ban would not have much concrete effect; its real value would be mainly tactical. However, the whole question of acceptability of a test ban seemed to be viewed on the U.S. side in absolute terms. The U.K. considered that the danger of breach of agreement on extension of the limited test ban to all tests was very small, since seismic capabilities were now so highly developed that a country would have to go to great lengths to conceal even very small underground tests. He realized that there were political factors that the USG had to take into account. A more important question, however, was whether the U.S. was able to give up underground testing. Mr. Fisher replied that he did not believe the U.S. could agree to cease underground testing unless the broader implications for other areas of some Soviet acceptance of the principle of verification made it worthwhile. However, for us to accept a cessation of underground testing without obtaining any change in the Soviet position on inspection would simply generate mistrust and suspicion of possible violation. Mr. Fisher recalled the atmosphere that had prevailed during the moratorium. Mr. Barber, describing DOD's interim conclusions on the effects in the bilateral US-USSR context, of cessation of underground testing, said that the U.S. would not be able positively to identify some 4-6 Soviet underground tests if they were to be conducted elsewhere than at presently known Soviet test sites. While the number of tests would be small, what was significant was that the few tests of these yields conducted in the U.S. test program had been very important for ABM warhead development. The question, therefore, was whether the U.S. could risk an agreement under which the Soviets might carry out such tests to their military advantage. Lord Chalfont said the basic question was whether it was likely the Soviets would sign a test ban if they intended to violate it. Mr. Fisher noted that our open society was incapable of the kind of secrecy that the Soviets could maintain, so that we could safely proceed only on the basis of what we could find out through verification. Lord Chalfont said that he was quite content to wait and see whether some movement might be possible on the U.S. side. A threshold test ban at magnitude 4.75 would be valuable for tactical and presentational reasons and could have some significance for non-proliferation. Sir Harold Beeley 3 commented that the U.K. saw some advantage in “challenge inspections.” Acceptance of this concept by the Soviets would involve admission by them that the only way of proving innocence is by on-site inspection. He thought that this would be a valuable gain for the West. Furthermore, he thought that if a challenge inspection were refused, it would be relatively easy to fix odium for the withdrawal on the adversary. Sir Harold further suggested that it might be possible to combine a threshold test ban with challenge inspections. Mr. Foster said that we would want to give study to Sir Harold's suggestion. Sir Harold also thought that a threshold test ban might be strengthened if it were indicated that in time the seismic threshold could perhaps be lowered. Mr. Barber asked whether this would really be negotiable or was simply a suggestion as to possible tactics. Sir Harold replied that otherwise it might be difficult to defend a threshold ban offer against the argument that if it was possible to lower the threshold this far then why not all the way, that is, to zero. Mr. Foster said that we would give careful consideration to the British views. The test ban question could be discussed further by the Western Four in Paris, and it was also certain to come up at the NAC meeting. Lord Chalfont concluded that it would be very helpful to the U.K. if the U.S. could come forward at Geneva with a proposal of this sort (i.e., threshold test ban), since the British government was under some pressure at home to give up demands for on-site inspection. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret. Drafted by William F. Miller (ACDA/IR) on January 27 and approved in ACDA/D. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that this conversation was held at the British Embassy. Memoranda of two other conversations, January 19, are ibid. No memoranda of the January 20 conversations were found. 2 Not printed. 3 Deputy Head of the British Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. 113. National Intelligence Estimate 113. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, January 20, 1966. NIE 4-66 [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament, Box 1. Secret; Controlled Dissem. 22 pages of source text not declassified.] 114. Summary of Action 114. Summary of Action 1 Washington, January 21, 1966, noon. MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS Draft of Proposed Presidential Message to the ENDC 2 REFERENCE Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals, dated January 19, 1966, from William C. Foster, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 3 1. The paper used as a point of discussion for the meeting was the draft of the proposed Presidential Message to the ENDC, attached to the Memorandum referred to above. 2. Mr. Bundy suggested that the reference to “sophisticated” weapons be deleted from the Seventh item of the message because of our use of such weapons in Vietnam. It was agreed that the third sentence of the message should refer to an exploration of ways to limit arms competition among the countries concerned. In later discussion, General Goodpaster 4 stated that, while the JCS supported the measure described in paragraph Seventh , they questioned whether it should be described in a Presidential Message. Mr. Barber said the DOD view was that this was a matter of tactics, not of basic position. Secretary Rusk thought it useful to have a Presidential endorsement of the idea (1) to put pressure on the many countries which have urged disarmament by the great powers, and (2) to show that the United States does not intend to stimulate arms competition between smaller countries. He added that he thought Congress was likely soon to take the U.S. out of much of the arms sales business anyway. Secretary Rusk indicated his belief that while the Soviet Union and the United States sincerely desired some form of arms limitations upon themselves, there was a great deal of hypocrisy about disarmament by many others. General Goodpaster suggested that the measure not refer solely to developing countries, which was agreed. Secretary Rusk suggested that an understanding among supplying countries be sought. Mr. Foster indicated that part of the plan was to seek some such understanding about not supplying costly prestige weapons to certain areas of the world. 3. Secretary Rusk suggested that the message, or Mr. Foster's first speech to the ENDC, should refer to the fighting in Vietnam. Mr. Foster read from testimony on that point he had given that morning to the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 5 This testimony was to the effect that the great differences with the Communists over Vietnam made our common interests in preventing nuclear spread and curbing the nuclear arms race all the more important to pursue at the ENDC. Secretary Rusk agreed with this but suggested that the draft message also indicate that Vietnam was an obstacle to disarmament, or that the burden of armaments had increased because of the war there. He asked that the message include a statement that the United States Representative would be prepared to discuss, outside official channels and with other representatives to the ENDC, any avenues toward peaceful settlement of Vietnam. Such a settlement would permit a reduction of the burden of arms. The Vice President said we would be ignoring facts of life if we did not recognize the impact of Vietnam on the disarmament discussions. 4. General Goodpaster urged the elimination of paragraph Fourth of the draft message. This paragraph repeats prior proposals for a comprehensive test ban. The JCS objection was twofold: (1) no adequate system of verification had yet been devised; (2) even if verification were possible, recent scientific analyses show that information on hot x-rays which might help solve ABM and related problems may be available to the Soviets (although not to the U.S.) and could be exploited to the disadvantage of the United States. Chairman Seaborg explained that if this were so, and if we tested up to several hundreds of kts underground, the United States could also make progress in this area. Mr. Barber pointed out that there was no agreement within the government or within the intelligence community as to the recent analyses referred to by General Goodpaster. He reported Secretary McNamara's view that further analysis of the data should be made before any drastic change was made in the United States position. Secretary Rusk concluded that deletion of paragraph Fourth would reverse a Presidential decision made long ago. In his view our position should remain the same while making the further analysis desired by Secretary McNamara. Chairman Seaborg and others agreed. 5. General Goodpaster urged revision of the last sentence of paragraph Fifth (cutoff and transfer) so that it would refer to verification by “on-site inspection.” It was agreed that the message should be revised to refer to “effective inspection.” 6. General Goodpaster suggested that the last sentence in paragraph Sixth (freeze and reductions) should be revised to delete the reference to “issues involved in both a freeze and the reductions which could accompany a freeze.” It was agreed that this be revised to “issues involved in both these proposals.” 7. Chairman Seaborg suggested that paragraph Second relating to IAEA safeguards be amended to add a phrase to the effect that the non-proliferation treaty should itself provide a specific undertaking that such safeguards be applied to peaceful nuclear activities. Commissioner Tape said this would mean dropping out all of paragraph Second after the first sentence. Mr. Foster objected to a Presidential message urging that language be included in the treaty which we knew the Italians and the UK would object to before we had an opportunity to consult with them. Mr. Fisher was also concerned about deleting the remainder of the paragraph because of the importance of this language to the Government's effort to secure adoption of IAEA safeguards in other ways than through a non-proliferation treaty. After an exchange about the Senate debate on the Pastore non-proliferation resolution, 6 Secretary Rusk suggested that the draft Presidential message endorse the Senate's discussion. The Vice President reported a discussion with Pastore before the resolution was introduced. Although he had agreed with Pastore that the resolution was a good idea, the Senate's position was now being interpreted as contrary to that of the Administration. He felt it useful therefore that the Presidential message refer with approval to the resolution. 8. Chairman Seaborg objected to some of the language in paragraph Fifth and several other drafting changes were suggested by others present. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that there should definitely be a Presidential message to the ENDC. He asked that the draft be amended to reflect the comments made at the meeting and submitted to the White House for final drafting changes. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 3, Box 14. Secret; Restricted Data. An attached list of participants is not printed. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's conference room. 2 A copy of the proposed Presidential message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is attached to the January 20 memorandum from Keeny to Bundy on the upcoming meeting of the Committee of Principals, January 21. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Nonproliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966) 3 Not found. 4 Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 5 Foster's testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 21, 1966, is printed in Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series): Volume XVIII, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, 1966 (Washington, February 1993), pp. 105-131. 6 Reference is to S. Res. 179, 89th Cong., introduced January 18, by Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) and adopted May 17, 1966, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution supporting the President's efforts to negotiate a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 306-307) 115. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk 115. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 21, 1966. Dear Dean: It has just come to my attention that proposals for transferring enriched uranium to West Germany and Italy for military rather than civil purposes are under study in the United States Government. Since such transfers would seriously affect both our efforts to broaden the coverage of international safeguards in non-nuclear countries and our efforts to negotiate a non-proliferation treaty, I feel I should give you my preliminary views on these proposals. I suggest that before any decision is taken to negotiate such an agreement with West Germany or Italy, there should be full discussion of these ramifications at the staff level among the Department of State, ACDA, AEC, DOD, and any other interested agencies. As you know, it is the current policy of the United States, as a key part of our efforts to curb nuclear proliferation, to endeavor to broaden the coverage of international safeguards on nuclear facilities in non-nuclear countries. As part of this policy, we are transferring U.S. bilateral safeguards to international safeguards and urging other countries to do the same. In my view, the United States should not enter into agreements with any non-nuclear country to supply nuclear material for military purposes until: (a) We have considered thoroughly the serious problems which would arise directly and indirectly from establishing such a precedent, including the effects on our efforts to persuade other supplier countries not to make analogous transfers, and the effects on our non-proliferation treaty negotiations. (b) We have thoroughly explored alternative ways of meeting the desires of the requesting countries. With respect to the specific requests now under consideration, there would appear to be possibilities for working out such alternative arrangements. If, after consultation with all interested agencies of the government, it were to be determined that it is in the net interests of the United States to enter into any such military agreement with a Euratom country, I believe that we should carefully consider at least imposing a requirement that the transferred material be subject to the application of Euratom safeguards in addition to U.S. bilateral safeguards. While this would not eliminate all of the problems that such a military transfer would pose for the United States, it would somewhat reduce the extent to which the transfer would undermine our policy of promoting international safeguards on transferred nuclear material. While I recognize that Euratom safeguards now cover only non-military activities, I think we could probably persuade the country concerned to request and receive Euratom inspections designed to assure that the nuclear materials in question are not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. If this were not done, a precedent would be established for a troublesome “loophole” in the application of the Euratom safeguards system to non-nuclear countries. I believe that both Euratom safeguards and other alternatives should receive our full study before a final decision is reached. Sincerely, Bill 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, JCS 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1966. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary McNamara, Chairman Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy. 116. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 116. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, undated. My dear Mr. Chairman: I should like, first of all, to congratulate you upon your role in bringing together the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan at Tashkent and upon the agreement achieved there. 2 As you know, we encouraged both India and Pakistan to adopt a constructive attitude at these discussions. I am sure you share my view that the agreement leaves many difficult problems between these two countries unresolved, but progress toward peace anywhere is to be welcomed. I regret that I am unable to report even a modest step toward peace in Vietnam as we have had no significant response from the other side. I am, of course, aware of the position of your Government in this matter and I refer to it only to express my disappointment that the efforts of the United States to stimulate the first moves toward peace in that unhappy area have been met merely by a public repetition of rigid positions which are known to be impossible for us to consider. I have read with care your letter on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on January 11, 1966. 3 I appreciate the forthright statement of your views and welcome this opportunity to respond frankly to some of the points on which our views differ. You have emphasized the great significance which your Government attaches to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The long-standing concern of the United States with this problem has been amply shown by the major initiatives we have taken, beginning with the U.S. draft non-proliferation declaration which was given to Ambassador Dobrynin by Secretary Rusk in April 1963. 4 The latest U.S. proposal was the draft non-proliferation treaty presented at the disarmament talks in Geneva on August 17 last year. 5 We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has also presented a draft treaty at this last session of the General Assembly. 6 In order for us to approach a meeting of the minds on this question, I think we must first agree on the meaning of the concept of “proliferation.” We believe that “proliferation” results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national capability or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the explicit concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. This is the reasonable meaning of the term. It seems to us that we are much more likely to reach an understanding by agreeing to a precise definition of “proliferation” such as this than by attempting to discuss the question in terms of such a loose concept as “access.” If you agree to the above definition, you will, I believe, recognize that the United States has shown its willingness to enter into an agreement that would effectively forbid proliferation. Our willingness is based on the strong conviction that it would be contrary to the interests of the United States if any presently non-nuclear nation were to acquire such a right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. In this respect, I believe that your interests and ours coincide. Since you have concentrated your comment on the Federal Republic of Germany, let me make it clear that this position applies to the Federal Republic of Germany as to all non-nuclear powers, and is so understood by the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time, I must also make clear that we are not prepared to enter into any agreement that would deny our allies the possibility of participating in their own defense through arrangements that would not constitute proliferation. The situation would be different if the European member states of NATO were not presently threatened by nuclear weapons. But the unhappy fact is that the Soviet Union has many hundreds of missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the territories of these nations. Under those circumstances our allies have a vital and just interest in participating with us in their defense. That is the purpose of NATO and that purpose is steadfast. None of the defense arrangements under discussion between the United States and its NATO allies would involve relinquishment of nuclear weapons to the national control of a non-nuclear country, now or at any time in the future. They are entirely consistent with, and indeed reinforce, the principle of non-proliferation. To deny the possibility of such arrangements might only promote proliferation by encouraging states to develop national nuclear forces for their own protection. Moreover, if because of unwarranted Soviet concern over possible NATO defense arrangements our two governments failed to act together to meet the real threat of proliferation which looms in other regions, that threat might spread even to Europe. Our two governments would bear a heavy responsibility. Some of the comments in your letter show a misunderstanding about the effectiveness of the control that the United States maintains over its nuclear weapons. Our physical and legal arrangements are and will remain such as to insure beyond doubt that these weapons will not be used without the consent of the United States Government. I can assure you that the concerns you express on this point are groundless. It would be helpful to me to have a similar assurance with respect to the arrangements you may have with any of your allies as to which you have not provided us with any information. I have noted your comments with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany. I must take strong exception to your unwarranted use of the epithet “West German revanchists” in relation to the Bonn Government. The Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken a treaty commitment never to use force to achieve reunification or modification of its present boundaries, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes in which it may become involved. 7 The Federal Republic of Germany is the only nation in the world that has renounced the production of atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons on its territory. 8 Chancellor Erhard has stated as recently as last month that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intends nor desires to acquire national control over nuclear weapons. As stated in the communique following his visit here in December, Chancellor Erhard and I firmly believe in the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 9 There is no conflict between this principle and the understanding that we reached during his recent visit that there should be continued discussion between our countries and with other interested allies to work out arrangements to assure NATO members an appropriate share in nuclear defense. There can be no question of priority between arrangements for such defense and a non-proliferation agreement since they are not in conflict with one another. I can assure you that any arrangements we may conclude within NATO will not result in proliferation. You can satisfy any concerns you may have on this score by joining with us in a treaty that would prohibit all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States stands ready to sign such a treaty now. To expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty, I accept your proposal that representatives of our two governments exchange views during the forthcoming session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The U.S. Representative will be authorized, in his capacity as Co-Chairman, to conduct such an exchange of views with the Soviet Co-Chairman. It is my hope that the opportunity thus afforded will be fully utilized to remove any further misunderstandings that may hinder the achievement of a mutually acceptable draft non-proliferation treaty. My Government will make every effort toward that end. I would also hope that, while giving urgent consideration to working out a non-proliferation treaty, the Co-Chairmen will also renew their consideration of other measures that could contribute to halting or limiting the nuclear arms race. For if the treaty we seek is to receive the widest adherence, we must take account of the view expressed by a number of non-nuclear countries. They have made clear that their renunciation of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by evidence that the nuclear powers are themselves prepared to halt the nuclear arms race. Our Governments have a strong mutual interest in acting together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in achieving a closer understanding on other means to curb the nuclear arms race. I want to assure you of my earnest intention to make the exchange of views that is about to take place in Geneva a fruitful one and to contribute to the successful outcome I am certain both of us deeply desire. 10 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13. No classification marking. A January 24 cover memorandum to another copy from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that “this is the message to Mr. Kosygin as delivered by Ambassador Thompson at 3:00 p.m. today.” (Ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 13) A January 23 memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, transmitting the draft of this letter, reads in part as follows: “This letter now has the agreement of Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Foster and myself. We have managed to find language which gives a little more reassurance to the Soviet Government on nonproliferation than we have managed before now, while at the same time it fully protects our interest in nuclear arrangements that will keep the Germans with us. The major contribution is George Ball's definition of proliferation in the fifth paragraph. That definition is a shade more binding than the language we have used before now, but it is entirely consistent with everything we have said to the Germans.” (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13) 2 Reference is to the Agreement between India and Pakistan for a Withdrawal of Troops in Kashmir and Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, signed at Tashkent, U.S.S.R., on January 10. Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 681-682. 3 Document 108 . 4 See footnote 3, Document 85 . 5 See Document 92 . 6 See footnote 2, Document 98 . 7 Reference is to the Declaration by Chancellor Adenauer, recorded in the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, London, October 3, 1954; text in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 , p. 422. 8 Reference is to Protocol III on the Control of Armaments, signed at Paris by the Foreign Ministers of the Western European Union (including the Federal Republic of Germany), October 23, 1954, to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948; entered into force May 6, 1955. Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents , vol. I, pp. 979-984. 9 See the joint statement issued on December 21, following discussions between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson; text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, pp. 1165-1167. 10 Printed from an unsigned copy. 117. Editorial Note 117. Editorial Note The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held two sessions at Geneva in 1966—January 27-May 10 and June 14-August 25. President Johnson's message, which was read to the conference by U.S. Representative William C. Foster on January 27, proposed a seven-point program: (1) a nuclear nonproliferation treaty; (2) application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes to nonnuclear states; (3) strengthening international security arrangements for nonnuclear states; (4) a verified halt in fissionable materials production for weapons along with demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons and transfer of their nuclear materials to peaceful purposes; (6) a freeze on numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; and (7) halts in regional conventional arms races. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 92-94. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reach agreement on these matters during the period under review. Its report covering the period January 27-August 25, 1966, was issued as U.N. document A/6390. 118. Telegram From the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) 118. Telegram From the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) to the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) 1 Geneva, February 16, 1966, 1323Z. Gen 064. Re Foster/Tsarapkin meeting, 10:30 am today. In response to Tsarapkin's question on amended language for Article I, described more fully in regular reporting cable this date, 2 Foster said that President's letter went further than before in clarifying our purposes 3 and amendments were designed to assure that the Treaty itself was consonant therewith. 4 Foster said that as the President's message to Kosygin made plain we envisaged no plan which would involve relinquishing control over U.S. weapons. Foster read following from President's message: “Our physical and legal arrangements are and will remain such as to insure beyond doubt that these weapons cannot and will not be used without the consent of the United States Government. I can assure you that the concerns you express on this point are groundless.” Tsarapkin then took text and read back to Foster following: “Chancellor Erhard and I firmly believe in the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is no conflict between this principle and the understanding that we reached during the recent visit that there should be continued discussion … to work out arrangements to assure NATO members an appropriate share in nuclear defense.” Tsarapkin then said that obviously the U.S. continued to want to establish a new category of nuclear weapons state as evidence by continued emphasis on nuclear sharing with FJCS. Tsarapkin then further said that as long as this was the U.S. position it would be impossible to make progress; on contrary, if U.S. would but sign and accept the Soviet Articles I and II Soviets considered that no access could take place and we could thus achieve non-proliferation together. Please inform Secretary. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6. Secret; No Distribution; Eyes Only. A February 16 cover memorandum from Fisher to McGeorge Bundy states that the telegram arrived by special channel because of the reference to the President's January 24 letter to Kosygin. Fisher added that he was sending a copy to the Secretary of State. 2 Telegram 1464 from Geneva, February 16, 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) 3 Document 116 . 4 Reference presumably is to U.S. amendments to the U.S. Draft Treaty To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, subsequently presented to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 21. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 159-160) 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, February 20, 1966, 12:38 p.m. 4853. For Amb. Bruce From McGeorge Bundy. The following message transmitted directly to Prime Minister Wilson from the President is for your information and requires no action. Begin Text: As you leave for Moscow, I want to share my thoughts with you on one further problem that you may have occasion to discuss with the Russians. 2 This is the problem of relations between the negotiations on non-proliferation and our efforts to get an agreed Atlantic nuclear policy. I think we have to walk a careful line between contending groups which would give one or the other of these related problems an overriding priority. The Soviet Government continues to assert that any form of cooperation with Bonn in the nuclear field is dangerous. While this position may in part reflect a genuine concern about the Germans getting control over nuclear weapons, it is also plain that the Soviets are seeking to use the issue as a means of causing trouble in the NATO Alliance. The main point of Soviet tactical pressure in the coming weeks is likely to be the language of the non-proliferation treaty. They will be pressing for language which would bar what they call “access” to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. Their evident purpose is to foreclose the possibility of nuclear arrangements in NATO which would involve the Germans more intimately in the business of nuclear defense. We are inclined to think that the best way to counter the Soviets on this—and to get on with a constructive treaty—is to focus discussion on the true meaning of proliferation, and, at the same time, to convince Moscow that we will not sign a treaty which would rule out NATO nuclear arrangements which would not, in fact, involve proliferation. In our new draft treaty, 3 we have suggested that proliferation results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national control, or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. In addition, there should be no increase in the number of states and organizations which have control of nuclear weapons. In general, the draft represents an attempt to come to grips with the real problem of proliferation without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear members of the Alliance. In any case, I think it most important that we not let the Soviets maneuver us into a position which would arouse strong and honest resentment in Germany. To let them do this would be no service to the cause of non-proliferation, since it would increase the very dangers the Soviets constantly stress. The Soviet Government is surely not blind to one further aspect of this matter—namely, that there is, on this issue, a pronounced difference of emphasis between your public opinion and ours. They are bound to see advantage in trying to exploit that difference to set us against one another. We must be careful not to fall into that trap. My own view is that we should keep an absolutely evenhanded view of these twin problems. A sound non-proliferation agreement and a sound Atlantic nuclear policy are in truth mutually consistent and reinforcing. I do not accept the argument that we must finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty. But I think we should equally reject the notion that we can push aside the Alliance problem now, and go along with a treaty which would rule out, or drastically narrow, possibilities for a NATO nuclear arrangement which would not result in proliferation. On non-proliferation, we can meet the legitimate interests of the Soviet Government because they are the same as our own. But we must not let the Soviets use this most important issue to undermine German confidence in our willingness to treat their nuclear problem seriously and constructively. This course naturally tempts some in Moscow, but it is no more in the Soviet interest than in ours. I thought it would be useful for me to give you this indication of my own thinking, because of the great advantage which comes to us both when we stand together. I hope you will have a good trip and I send you once again my best wishes for success in your effort to get Soviet help in reconvening a Geneva Conference. I am doing what I can to keep the public discussion here from complicating your task, but it is an understatement to say that I do not control it completely. End Text. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-US. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Text received from the White House on February 20. This text is apparently a White House revision of the draft text transmitted by memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Johnson, February 19. (Ibid.) 2 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Minister of State Lord Chalfont visited Moscow February 22-24 for talks with Chairman Alexei N. Kosygin and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev. See Documents 121 and 122 . 3 See footnote 4, Document 118 . 120. Letter From the German Chargé d'Affaires (Lilienfeld) to President Johnson 120. Letter From the German Chargé d'Affaires (Lilienfeld) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 25, 1966. My dear Mr. President: Chancellor Erhard has asked me to transmit you the following telegram: [Here follows the German text of the letter.] “Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of 12 February in which you informed me about the result of your Honolulu talks with the leaders of the South Vietnamese Government and about American intentions regarding future economic support for South Vietnam. 2 I have read your message with close attention, and I may assure you that the German Government, too, in conformity with our talks in Washington, is looking for ways and means to afford South Vietnam effective assistance in the non-military field. I have followed with great interest the reports on the presentation before Congress of the United States Government's position. I would congratulate you on the obviously deep and convincing impression which your Government's explanation of its policy has made. The purpose of my present letter is above all to expound to you my views on the Geneva negotiations concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As I was able to explain to you during our meeting in Washington, 3 the German Government shares your wish that it may be possible to halt the peace-threatening spread of weapons of mass destruction. Naturally, we must in this connexion give thought to problems affecting our own security. The basis of our security is the confidence in the Atlantic alliance and in particular in the declarations made by the U.S. Government within the alliance. I have particularly appreciated that you received my ideas about the development of a joint nuclear force within NATO which I put before you during my visit to Washington, with positive understanding. Provided that this plan will be realized, we are prepared, as repeatedly stated, to envisage further international commitments in the nuclear field. In view of the security requirements of the alliance we have welcomed the draft treaty submitted by your Government on 18 (sic) August 1965 4 as an important contribution towards solving the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. We have now noted that your Government intends to make some changes in the wording of the draft treaty which, in the American view, are not supposed to affect the substance of the treaty. 5 On examination of the changes proposed by your Government doubts have, however, arisen whether the amendments envisaged would not in fact narrow down the present possibilities of the alliance to settle the nuclear question. Thus, the new wording in particular raises the question whether it is still beyond any doubt that the establishment of a European nuclear force, in which majority decisions on the use of the weapons could be taken, remains possible. Furthermore the new wording of Article II of the draft seems to exclude the cooperation of non-nuclear countries in the atomic armaments production of nuclear states and thus to block certain perspectives which the German Government would not like to see given up in view of future possibilities of European-Atlantic cooperation, however remote they may be at present. Generally speaking, we feel that the new draft because of its complicated wording may give room for misinterpretation, a possibility of which the Soviet Union may avail itself to the detriment of the Atlantic alliance. Thus the Soviet Government might argue that the use from German soil of tactical nuclear weapons under the command of SACEUR was not admissible, even after a general release by the U.S. President. This would make an element highly significant for NATO defense a subject of discussion with the Soviet Union. I would be very grateful to you, Mr. President, if another exchange of views could take place between your Government and the German Government on the extremely important question of how the objective of nuclear non-proliferation could best and most effectively be attained. Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my highest consideration. m.p. May I in this connection once again express the hope that political developments in 1966 will allow you to visit Europe including Germany. You may be sure of the enthusiastic concurrence of my countrymen. Mrs. Erhard and I would be extremely glad to welcome on that occasion Mrs. Johnson as well. Very sincerely, Yours (sgd) Ludwig Erhard.” Respectfully Yours, Georg von Lilienfeld 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret. A cover memorandum by Francis M. Bator, which transmitted this letter to President Johnson on February 25, states that Chancellor Erhard was concerned that the recent changes in the U.S. draft nonproliferation treaty “will narrow the possibilities for NATO nuclear arrangements involving hardware.” Bator stated that “we will be able to reassure the Germans on this score.” 2 President Johnson's February 12 letter to Chancellor Erhard is in circular telegram 1531 to 15 Embassies, including Bonn, February 11. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Special Correspondence File, Germany, 6/25/65-2/25/66, Box 17) 3 See footnote 4, Document 106 . 4 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 347-349. 5 See footnote 4, Document 118 . 121. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 121. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 2, 1966, 2116Z. 5414. Subject: NAC, March 2: Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Sharing. 1. This message reports Chalfont's briefing of NAC on his and Wilson's discussions in Moscow last week. 2 (Other aspects Moscow talks and NAC disarmament consultation covered septels.) 3 2. Most important aspect to come out of Chalfont briefing and subsequent discussion in NAC was that “moving target” is being presented by Soviets and their allies so far as defining what proliferation really means in NATO context. As brought out by Chalfont and Cleveland, Soviets seem to have moved from defining proliferation as FRG sharing in ownership, to FRG access, and now to FRG “association” with nuclear arrangements. Chalfont pointed out that Polish rep at ENDC on Mar 1 went one step further by objecting “to any increased influence in the Western alliance by the FRG.” 3. Following are highlights Chalfont presentation on Moscow talks: He said Kosygin spoke of the one “insuperable” obstacle to non-proliferation treaty as the whole complex of nuclear sharing problems. Kosygin was harder and more vigorous than other Soviet spokesmen, and made clear, with no ambiguity, that so long as NATO contemplates any arrangement bringing the FRG into closer association with nuclear weapons, there will be no chance of a treaty. Soviets totally rejected UK views that nothing contemplated in NATO involves proliferation. Soviets said we are trying to bring the FRG into closer association and this constitutes a “political proliferation.” (In reply to question from Alessandrini (Italy) as to origin of phrase “political forms of proliferation,” Chalfont said this term originated with Gromyko.) Soviets specifically said it would do no good to suggest that consultative arrangements are acceptable, since this too is proliferation. 4. Chalfont, expressing his distress over Soviet attitude, said it is up to US to assess whether this is negotiating or final position. When pressed for his personal assessment, Chalfont said he thought Soviets are serious in wanting non-proliferation agreement, and that they will finally, after long process, accept NATO nuclear arrangements which we can make clear do not constitute proliferation. However, Soviets are aware of differences within NATO, see an opportunity to make trouble within Alliance, and will play this as hard as possible. 5. At this point Cleveland commented that Soviets have presented moving target on what they might accept in sharing arrangements (para 2 above). He was not, however, clear as to whether Moscow talks threw any further light on Soviet attitudes toward existing NATO arrangements in Europe, which their treaty draft seems to exclude. Chalfont replied that he could make only general comment that Soviets seemed not to wish to attack existing arrangements, although he pointed out that UK was careful not to raise this specific point in Moscow. 6. Concluding, Chalfont agreed with moving target description, saying that Soviets are broadening objections from technical to political forms of proliferation. He described this new Soviet position as totally untenable and unnegotiable. We must therefore see whether it is only a negotiating position. In these circumstances the prior and urgent need is for East-West agreement as to what a non-proliferation treaty would bar as proliferation. It appears, said Chalfont, that while we can proceed with discussions at Geneva, this is a matter for specific, high-level political decision. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva, London, and Warsaw and pouched to all other NATO capitals. 2 See footnote 2, Document 119 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 122 . 122. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 122. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State 1 Paris, March 3, 1966, 1950Z. 5463. NATUS. Subject: NAC March Two: Other Disarmament Matters. In addition discussions reported Embtels 5414 2 and 5416, 3 following additional disarmament subjects raised on occasion Lord Chalfont briefing of NAC. 1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Chalfont reported meeting a blank wall in Moscow so far as any Soviet flexibility on CTB is concerned. 4 UK told Soviets they are eager to extend TBT to underground testing, but state of detection and identification art is such that a small number of on-site inspections would still be necessary; however UK indicated number of inspections open to discussion. Soviet reply was that they too were anxious for extension of TBT, but that any monitoring would have to be external. If West insisted on on-site international inspections, discussion was completely blocked. When Chalfont tried to probe regarding acceptability of suggestions such as those from Egypt and Sweden (challenge inspections), Soviets show no spark of interest. Chalfont said they would not discuss any variations. Chalfont said this Soviet attitude was reflected at Geneva. 2. Freeze and Reduction of SNDV's. Chalfont reported Soviets extremely hard on this point. They describe freeze as involving inspection without disarmament and said that only safe way to approach this problem is to abolish SNDV's entirely. 3. Nuclear Free Zones. In response Norwegian question, Chalfont said this was discussed only briefly in Moscow. While both sides agreed NFZ's in Latin America and Africa would be useful step, they disagreed completely so far as Central Europe concerned.UK made clear any progress in Central Europe would have to be made in context of general political settlement, including reunification of Germany. Cleveland 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense, Geneva, London, Moscow, and Warsaw. Pouched to all other NATO capitals. 2 Document 121 . 3 Telegram 5416 from Paris, March 2, deals with North Atlantic Council consideration of Chairman Kosygin's proposal in his February 1 message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to include, among other provisions in a non-proliferation treaty, “a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory.” ( Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 9-13) At the NAC meeting on March 2, Ambassador Cleveland, the U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council, said it was important to point out at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee that the Kosygin proposal was “unsatisfactory in order to avoid leaving the field open for the Soviets to exploit their proposal.” He stated that the United States “thought it best to shoot for a UNGA Resolution” and he “suggested best venue for any further discussions would be Geneva, leaving to NATO its continuing work on improving Western security arrangements, including the nuclear variety.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) 4 See footnote 2, Document 119 . 123. Memorandum of Conversation 123. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, March 18, 1966. SUBJECT Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR At a luncheon which the Secretary gave for Ambassador Dobrynin today, the Secretary raised the question of peaceful uses of atomic energy which had been previously discussed at the luncheon which the Ambassador had given for the Soviet delegation on Cultural Exchanges on Wednesday, March sixteenth. 2 The Secretary gave the Ambassador a pamphlet on possible uses of atomic energy for the construction of a sea-level canal to replace the present canal in Panama. 3 He said, of course, that our interest extended beyond this and there was a possibility of building ports in countries which needed them and other uses of this sort. He pointed out that one of the issues which arose was that of radioactive debris getting into the atmosphere as a result of operations for such purposes. The Secretary said we would be prepared to have technical talks with a view to exchange of information in this field, as well as discussions concerning the relationship of peaceful uses to the limited Test Ban Treaty. The Secretary said he was not making any proposal but simply thinking out loud and said he could imagine the possibility of some sort of machinery by which the Soviet Union and the United States could assist countries interested in using nuclear energy in peaceful projects. He said it seemed clear that neither side would wish to let others have access to its nuclear devices, but he understood that there could be the possibility of observation to make clear that the operation was the peaceful one it purported to be and not a test of an atomic weapon. The Ambassador asked if Panama had given its consent to the use of nuclear energy for the construction of a new canal. The Secretary did not answer this question directly but mentioned that several possible sites were under consideration, both in Panama and in other countries. The Ambassador said that he would discuss this matter with his Government when he returned to Moscow. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Thompson (S/AL) on March 19. 2 The March 16 memorandum of the conversation between Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy on peaceful use of nuclear explosions states that Thompson proposed U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union in this field in accordance with the memorandum on cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy which Chairman Seaborg and Chairman Petrosyants concluded in Moscow in 1963 (15 UST 631). Thompson told Dobrynin, “I assumed that we would proceed by each appointing a group of scientists to get together to discuss the problem and to exchange information.” (Department of State, Central Files, AE 6) 3 Not further identified. 124. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 124. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 2, 1966. SUBJECT An approach to the Soviet Union on a Celestial Bodies Treaty Recommendations 2 1. That you announce, as a U.S. initiative, proposals for a treaty to govern activities on the moon and other celestial bodies. A suggested statement is contained in Enclosure 1. 3 2. That Ambassador Goldberg (a) circulate the announcement to U.N. Members in New York, and (b) propose a meeting of the appropriate United Nations committee to take up our proposals. 3. That Ambassador Thompson inform Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin a day or so in advance of the U.S. announcement and urge an affirmative Soviet response. He will give Dobrynin a brief paper outlining the basic elements for a treaty to be covered in the U.S. announcement. Discussion Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. General Assembly on December 18 that the U.S. would make a definite proposal for a treaty governing activities on celestial bodies. 4 We are not ready to put forward such a proposal. I believe doing so would constitute a constructive U.S. initiative. It would emphasize once again our interest in international cooperation in outer space, and it would signal the progress of this country in moving toward a manned lunar landing. We have cleared with other Executive Branch agencies the text of a draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Enclosure 2). 5 This treaty would bar claims of sovereig nty to the moon and other celestial bodies, guarantee freedom of scientific investigation and free access, and call for international cooperation in studies relating to celestial bodies. The treaty would prohibit military fortifications, military maneuvers, weapons tests, and stationing nuclear weapons on a celestial body. I think the best way to move ahead is to make an announcement publicizing the principal elements of the proposed treaty. Later, when negotiations are begun, we will be ready to discuss with other governments the text of treaty provisions. Dean Rusk 6 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Typed notes on the source text read as follows: “Signed original hand carried to President 4/2/66.” “Approved by President 4/2/66. Announcement made by President 4/3/66 [sic].” This memorandum apparently was generated by a memorandum from Leonard C. Meeker (L) and Joseph J. Sisco (IO) to Secretary Rusk, April 1. (Ibid.) 2 All three recommendations have been checked as approved. 3 Not printed. The draft statement is identical to the statement issued May 7 except for a change of the preposition “on” to “of” in the last sentence. See Document 127 . 4 Reference is to the statement by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1965. (Department of State Bulletin , January 31, 1966, pp. 163-167) 5 Not printed. This draft treaty is virtually identical to the one Ambassador Goldberg transmitted to Kurt Waldheim, Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on May 9, cited in Document 127 except for one substantive difference. Article 3 of this draft contains the following sentence that is not in the later draft: “A State conducting or planning to conduct activities on a celestial body shall provide reasonably in advance of each mission, notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 125. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 125. Memorandum From R.C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 13, 1966. SUBJECT The McMillan Report Attached are what appear to be some afterthoughts by two members of the nine-man scientific committee which turned out the McMillan Report. 2 These comments will be distributed to the Committee of Principles in the near future. Last fall General Wheeler persuaded the JCS to make a more thorough evaluation of test ban questions. Among other actions, we established a scientific panel under Dr. McMillan which rendered a report that was distributed to the Committee of Principles with the understanding that it would be very closely held. The McMillan Report noted very serious weaknesses in the present US nuclear deterrent forces stemming from the following critical vulnerabilities: (a) in-silo vulnerability to blast, shock and possibly EMP (b) launch phase vulnerability to gamma and X-rays (c) vulnerability of re-entry vehicles The panel concluded that this was a particularly bad time for the US to consider entering into a comprehensive test ban. The Soviets were seen to have a considerable advantage in any test ban situation: greater internal security, greater manpower control, larger payload capacity of ICBMs, and ability to advance through clandestine testing. In my judgment, the attached comments further underline the seriousness of the situation, since these two men who were disposed against testing from the beginning indicate agreement with the technical vulnerabilities highlighted by the basic panel report. Further, the basic report had already been softened considerably in the process of obtaining the original approval of these two gentlemen. On 17 March the JCS forwarded a study to SecDef 3 recommending increases in manpower and funding for research and weapons effects testing in our effort to eliminate the vulnerabilities cited by the McMillan report. RCB 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Test Ban Treaty, Box 11. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 2 A March 9 letter from Marvin L. Goldberger and Franklin A. Long, members of the McMillan Panel, to General J.P. McConnell, USAF Chief of Staff, enclosed their comments on the McMillan Panel report ( Document 110 ), concluding that the report correctly identified vulnerabilities of the U.S. strategic deterrent, but that it did not properly relate these weaknesses to the problem of the credibility of U.S. deterrence. They added that the possibilities of a crash program in advance of a new treaty, or failing this, “experimental simulations” had not been adequately considered by the McMillan Panel as means of coping with U.S. deterrence problems. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) 3 Not further identified. 126. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 126. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 2, 1966. SUBJECT Suggested Letter to Mr. Kosygin on a Truce in the Deployment of Offensive Strategic Missiles and Antiballistic Missile Launchers (S) Enclosed for your consideration is a draft letter to Mr. Kosygin setting forth a proposal for an eighteen-month halt in the construction of fixed land-based strategic offensive missile launchers and antiballistic missile launchers. 2 The proposal could be adequately verified by our respective national capabilities to satisfy both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that the national security of our countries was not being adversely affected by action taken contrary to its terms. It, therefore, would not require negotiation of the complex arrangements for formal international verification. You will recall that last January 4 Mr. Foster suggested for your consideration the possibility of including a similar proposal either in your State of the Union Message or in a private letter to Soviet leaders. It was decided at that time that the matter was more appropriate for a private letter than a public speech but no private communication was dispatched because of a feeling that it might confuse the discussion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which had become the subject of private correspondence between you and the Soviet leadership on January 11. 3 I believe the present time is appropriate for resuming the consideration of a letter from you to the Soviet leadership making such a proposal. Such a letter would be a logical follow-up of the discussions on the problem of strategic nuclear vehicles which Secretary Rusk and Mr. Foster had with Ambassador Dobrynin prior to his departure for Moscow. A letter from you would assure such a proposal the appropriate careful consideration by the Soviet leadership. We would of course wish to review the letter should Ambassador Dobrynin , upon his return from Moscow, raise any matters relating to this subject. But with this caveat in mind, I believe it would be worthwhile to proceed now with the appropriate consideration of this subject within the government. I believe that such a proposal would clearly be to the net advantage of the U.S. in terms of relative ratios of forces. Nevertheless, there may well be serious interest in such a proposal on the part of the Soviet leaders. It might well afford a rationale for Soviet leaders to forego an extensive Soviet ABM program, which would result in an economic payoff for the Soviet Union in terms of decreased expenditures. Such an undertaking would also involve the promise of possible future reductions in defense spending. In addition, the political consequences of such an arrangement may be sufficiently attractive to induce serious consideration of the proposal by Soviet leaders. And finally, at a minimum, it would open up a dialogue at the highest level, something that seems particularly needed at this time if we are to move towards a greater meeting of minds upon practical methods of curbing the arms race. This proposal has not been coordinated within the Government although it takes into account some of the views expressed within the Government when the earlier suggestion was made by Mr. Foster in January. It will, of course, be advisable to have the discussions of the problem presented by this memorandum, including the problem of what allied consultation should be held, before sending a letter of this kind. A back-up study which supports the proposal in the draft letter is attached. 4 Against the possibility that you might wish to consider this matter further, I have taken the liberty of sending copies of this memorandum and its enclosures to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara with a request for their comments on the draft letter. If you think the suggestion has merit, it might be appropriate to hold a meeting at which the appropriate advisers would discuss the draft letter with you. Adrian S. Fisher 1 Source: Department of State,S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, ACDA A-Z 1966. Top Secret. A May 2 cover memorandum from Adrian S. Fisher to Secretary of State Rusk states that he is sending the memorandum to the President, as well as to Secretary of Defense McNamara, and he asks for Rusk's comments on the draft letter to Chairman Kosygin. No record of Rusk's comments or of the dispatch of the letter to Kosygin has been found. In a memorandum to Rusk of May 2, Ambassador at Large Thompson opposed this initiative, partly because it was unlikely to draw a constructive response from the Soviets. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Rostow, May 2, Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., suggested that they not send the proposal to the President until they got McNamara's and Rusk's reactions. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10) 2 Not printed. 3 Document 108 . 4 Not found. 127. Editorial Note 127. Editorial Note In a statement of May 7, 1966, President Johnson expressed the need for a treaty governing the exploration of celestial bodies. He outlined the essential elements of such an outer space treaty, including a provision that “no country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers should be forbidden.” (Statement read by Robert Fleming, the President's Deputy Press Secretary, at a news conference in San Antonio at 11 a.m. on May 7; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pages 487-488) This statement was quoted in a May 9 letter from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Kurt Waldheim, Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, requesting an early convening of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Outer Space to consider the U.S. proposal. ( Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pages 276-277) On May 11, Ambassador Goldberg gave a U.S. outline of points for inclusion in a celestial bodies treaty to Nikolai T. Fedorenko, the Soviet Representative to the United Nations. (Ibid., page 304) On June 16, Soviet Deputy Representative to the United Nations, Platon D. Morozov, transmitted to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant the “Soviet Draft Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies” for consideration by the U.N. General Assembly. (Ibid., pages 347-350) A June 16 letter from Arthur Goldberg to Kurt Waldheim (ibid., pages 350-351) quoted the U.S. outline, transmitted the text of the “U.S. Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (ibid., pages 352-355), and suggested that the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space convene on July 12 to consider this subject, a suggestion to which the other members subsequently agreed. 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1 Washington, May 10, 1966, 7:03 p.m. 2639. Subject: Celestial Bodies Treaty. A. We hope it will be possible for Amb. Goldberg at meeting with Fedorenko May 11 to move ahead on celestial bodies treaty. We think it desirable that you give Fedorenko paper containing “Outline of Points for Inclusion in Treaty on Celestial Bodies” (text follows). 2 This outline is an elaboration of the treaty items mentioned by the President in his May 7 announcement 3 and is designed to give picture of treaty we have in mind without getting at this early stage into problems detail and drafting. B. Meeker can come to New York May 16 if desired to assist in consultations with other members of Legal Subcommittee and Waldheim. Possible pattern for such consultations might be (1) Old Commonwealth, (2) Waldheim, (3) friendly fifteen and (4) non-aligned. C. “Outline of Points for Inclusion in Celestial Bodies Treaty 1. The moon and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration by all in accordance with international law. 2. Celestial bodies should not be subject to any claim of sovereignty. 3. There should be freedom of scientific investigation, and all countries should cooperate in scientific activities relating to celestial bodies. 4. A State conducting explorations on a celestial body should report on the results of a mission. 5. Open access to all areas of celestial bodies should be assured. 6. Celestial bodies should be used for peaceful purposes only. No country should be permitted to station weapons of mass destruction on a celestial body. Military fortifications, weapons tests, and military maneuvers should be forbidden. 7. A launching State should be entitled to exercise authority over its facilities on a celestial body and persons participating in its activities there. 8. Ownership of objects landed, constructed or used on a celestial body should be retained by the launching State. 9. Astronauts of one country should render assistance to other astronauts as may be required by circumstances. 10. States should pursue studies and take appropriate steps to avoid harmful contamination. 11. Consideration should be given to a provision for the settlement of any disputes that might arise. 12. Final clauses—there should be appropriate provisions on signature, ratification, depositary, entry into force, amendment, duration, and registration with the United Nations.” D. Department will inform Soviet Embassy here. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald B. Helman (UNP) and Herbert K. Reis (L/EUR); cleared by Meeker (L), Stoessel (EUR), and Jonathan Dean (IO/UNP); and approved by David H. Popper (IO). Repeated to Moscow and Paris. Shortly before leaving for Geneva to negotiate an outer space treaty with the Soviet Union, Ambassador Goldberg telephoned President Johnson on June 28 to brief him on the latest developments. Goldberg said that the U.S. draft of the treaty was very similar to the Soviets' draft. “We should be able to make an agreement because they took the points from your letter and incorporated [them] in their treaty, a very interesting development,” he remarked. In briefing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the previous day, he had said that the treaty contained no military or security considerations and both Senators Symington, who attended as a representative of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Anderson said they supported the U.S. draft. Throughout Goldberg's presentation, President Johnson interjected “good” or “sure” after nearly every sentence. (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Arthur Goldberg, June 28, 1966, 5:21 p.m., Tape F66.17, Side B) Reference to the President's “letter” above presumably is to his May 7 statement, which Goldberg quoted in a May 9 letter to Kurt Waldheim, Chairman of the U.N. General Assembly Outer Space Committee. See Document 127 . 2 Regarding this outline, see Document 127 . Telegram 4852 from USUN, May 11, reported that Soviet Ambassadors Fedorenko and Morozov gave Ambassador Goldberg a “sympathetic but noncommittal reception in course of presentation per reftel” on May 11. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN) 3 See Document 127 . 4 Telegram 2651 to USUN, repeated to Moscow as telegram 2638, May 12, reported that Stoessel and Meeker called in Soviet Charge Alexander I. Zinchuk to give him the outline. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 6 UN) 129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 129. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 12, 1966. SUBJECT Constructive Initiatives Addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union In NSAM 345 you requested proposals for U.S. initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 2 To this end, Mr. Foster and I would like to submit for your consideration the following suggestions in the field of arms control and disarmament. Non-Proliferation Agreement The subject that has received the greatest attention during recent negotiations is, of course, a non-proliferation agreement. Such an agreement is looked upon by many as the most logical and urgent next step forward in arms control and disarmament. An initiative on our part to break the present deadlock on this subject is dependent upon the decisions that are to be made on NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. If these decisions do not involve a “hardware solution,” it may well prove possible to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union without sacrifice to any legitimate interest of any member of the NATO alliance. The United States should, we believe, avoid dismissing a non-proliferation agreement with the oversimplified arguments that since the Soviets do not intend to proliferate anyway, there is little value in an agreement with them; and that if other countries wish to go nuclear, this would be a matter of such supreme national interest that a treaty would not stand in their way. Without a non-proliferation agreement it is fair to say that we have no hope of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons on the basis of unilateral appeals. On the other hand, if we and the USSR were to agree to a non-proliferation treaty, probably all of the non-nuclear powers that are in danger of going nuclear would find it difficult not to adhere to such a treaty. Thus the issue would not be whether a treaty would stand in the way of the supreme national interest of such countries. The issue would rather be whether a US-Soviet sponsored international consensus, finalized in a treaty, would be a factor to be taken into account in determining what the supreme national interest of these countries was. Clearly it would be. ABM and Missile Launcher Freeze A second possible initiative would be the suggested letter from you to Chairman Kosygin proposing an eighteen-month “truce” in deployment of anti-ballistic missile launchers and strategic fixed land-based missile launchers. This proposal was outlined in the memorandum I submitted to you on May 2, 1966. 3 Threshold Test Ban Recent significant improvements in seismic identification capabilities now make it possible for the US to verify through national means an extension of the Limited Test Ban agreement to cover all underground tests having a seismic magnitude of 4.75 or higher. Thus we are, with respect to underground tests of a magnitude of approximately 30 KT or higher, in a situation very similar to that of 1963 with regard to tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space. An agreement of this type would not be a complicated one since no international inspection machinery would have to be created. Moreover, the mere making of such a proposal would itself be highly regarded throughout the world as a constructive step forward. Attached is a paper which deals with the threshold test ban proposal in greater detail. 4 We plan to submit the proposal in the near future to the Committee of Principals but thought it advisable for you to be aware of this possible initiative in the context of NSAM 345. I am sending copies of this memorandum and its attachment to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara in the event that you may wish to discuss these suggestions with them. Adrian S. Fisher 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Nonproliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 NSAM No. 345, dated April 22, on Nuclear Planning is printed in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 159 . 3 Document 126 . 4 Not printed. 130. National Intelligence Estimate 130. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, May 25, 1966. NIE 11-11-66 THE IMPACT OF A THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY ON SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS The Problem To estimate the impact of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty on Soviet military programs, with particular emphasis on its impact on Soviet ABM activities; to discuss the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor such a test ban; and to evaluate Soviet capabilities for covertly violating it. Foreword The Threshold Test Ban Treaty considered in this estimate is generally in line with proposals under discussion in the US and abroad, but it does not reflect a specific proposed treaty. We assume continuation of the terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty now in effect, which prohibits testing of nuclear devices in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; underwater (including both territorial waters and the high seas); or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. The Threshold Treaty considered in this estimate would add to the restrictions of the current treaty a prohibition of any underground nuclear test producing a seismic disturbance above 4.75 on the Gutenberg-Richter scale. It is assumed that treaty language will specify a method by which a mean magnitude for any particular event will be established, thus avoiding international disputes about the magnitude of reported events. It imposes no limitations on the underground medium in which the tests take place, or on the degree of decoupling employed. It provides no on-site inspection and no sanctions. Each participating national will have to decide for itself whether any given seismic event of magnitude greater than 4.75 was caused by a nuclear detonation and constituted a treaty violation. Conclusions A. We believe that for most of the Soviet military development programs which we can foresee over the next few years a Threshold Test Ban Treaty would impose no greater restrictions than those already imposed by the Partial Test Ban. However, the relationship between the yield of underground explosions and the resulting seismic readings is uncertain at best, and can be greatly altered by decoupling. The Soviets might therefore still test over a wide range of yields, depending on how far they were willing to risk violating the treaty and to support the cost and effort of decoupling. Practically speaking, we believe that they could develop weapons yielding [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] by scaling up from lower yield tests which would have a fair chance of not producing seismic readings above 4.75. They might conceivably develop TN weapons with yields [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] by expensive decoupling methods. (Paras. 13-19) B. With respect to ABM weapons, we think there is about an even chance that the Soviets have already [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]exoatmosphere ABM warhead yielding [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. If they have not already done so, a Threshold Treaty would not, in our view, make such a development impossible, as we believe existing Soviet weapon technology would support it either without further testing, or with tests that would have a reasonable chance of not exceeding the threshold. (Paras. 10-12, 20, 21) C. We believe that a Threshold Treaty would impose prohibitive restrictions, beyond those of the Partial Test Ban, only for developing weapons which might need new warheads yielding [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. If the development of such weapons had a sufficiently high priority the Soviets might conduct tests virtually certain to violate the treaty, in the belief that the violation could not be proved against them. As few as one or two such tests a year could be of significant aid to their military programs. (Paras. 18, 19, 30-33) D. The US Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) would almost certainly detect all seismic events in the USSR with a magnitude of 4.75 or greater. Perhaps with help from [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] sources, it could probably discriminate between explosions and earthquakes occurring in most parts of the USSR, but there would still be a few events a year over 4.75, especially in the Kamchatka-Kuriles area, which could not be so identified. Such events would represent possible treaty violations, but it would be extremely unlikely that intelligence could with certainty either confirm or deny that a nuclear event had in fact occurred. (Paras. 23-28) E. If a seismic event over 4.75 was identified as an explosion, it would almost certainly be nuclear in origin. Thus this evidence, combined with what might be available from intelligence sources, would probably be sufficient, except in a few cases, to determine to the satisfaction of the US government whether or not the explosion was nuclear in origin. Evidence sufficient to convince a world forum that an explosion was nuclear could almost certainly be derived only from on-site inspection, which is not permitted by the Threshold Treaty under consideration. (Paras. 25, 29) [Here follows the “Discussion” section, consisting of four parts entitled “Current Soviet Nuclear Weapons Technology,” “Impact of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty on Soviet Military Programs,” “US Detection Capabilities,” and “The Possibility of Soviet Covert Violation.”] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11-66, U.S.S.R., Box 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Atomic Energy Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The estimate was submitted by W.F. Raborn, Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board; the representative of the Assistant Director of the FBI abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. 131. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk 131. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 25, 1966. SUBJECT Key ENDC Developments and Recommendations 1. Non-Proliferation . My final report to you from Geneva (Disto 2210) 2 describes a possible shift in the Soviet position. As you know, both in public and private, the Soviets have previously taken a tough and extreme line against any FRG “access” to nuclear weapons, including “political access,” such as the Special Committee. Their public attacks on our non-proliferation treaty have continued to be extreme. However, in private conversations at Geneva, both Soviet and Bloc representatives have now shown awareness of the need to accommodate any non-proliferation treaty to the reality of continued nuclear consultations and, by implication at least, to the reality of present nuclear arrangements in NATO. From comments by Soviet and Czech staffs and Polish representatives, it appears they do not really expect any formal burial of NATO hardware proposals, which they say they consider “dead” anyway. They seem to want some assurance, presumably in the treaty, that continuing NATO arrangements, including improved consultative machinery, will not serve as a front for future hardware arrangements and that participants in any consultative group will not acquire power of decision regarding actual employment of nuclear weapons (as distinct from participation in questions of strategy, deployment, etc.). We have no way of knowing whether the Soviets and Bloc representatives are genuinely, though cautiously, seeking serious negotiations. As a result of increased tensions over Viet Nam, this may not be the case. Nevertheless, I believe we should consider whether there are ways we can test Soviet willingness to move to more reasonable positions. With this in mind, I recommended in cable 2210 from Geneva that we give serious thought to the possibility of a general non-proliferation formula which neither expressly permits nor prohibits a NATO “hardware” option. We do not believe the Soviets could utilize a withdrawal clause in such a treaty to interfere seriously in the affairs of NATO because withdrawal as such would not give them any practical basis for taking action against our interests, i.e., they will presumably not wish to disseminate in any event. Our allies would, of course, have to be consulted. In practical effect, this amounts to a recommendation that we take a serious look at the current price of getting a non-proliferation treaty. I shall want to discuss this further with you. I cannot help but believe that a non-proliferation treaty would have fundamental value beyond the field of non-proliferation. On the one hand, there would be unquestioned political value to us in achieving a major arms control agreement with the Soviets in view of the state of Sino-Soviet relations. On the other hand, it would be particularly unfortunate if the U.S. becomes isolated on arms control issues at a time when, because of the repercussions of the Viet Nam situation, the U.S. badly needs to demonstrate its desire to seriously negotiate measures contributing to international stability and curbing the nuclear arms race. 2. Soviet Willingness to Cooperate in Test Ban Verification . In Geneva, the Soviets requested a Co-Chairman's meeting in order to inform us of their willingness to participate in the exchange of national seismic data. Exchanges would be on a “voluntary” basis and analysis of data would be done by national institutions rather than by an international center. The Soviets professed an interest in bringing U.S. and Soviet viewpoints closer together to enhance long-range prospects for agreement. I replied that we welcomed their interest in data exchanges but this could not be a substitute for necessary on-site inspections. The Soviets did make clear that their interest in exchanging seismic data was not contingent on the U.S. dropping its demand for on-sites. Although the Soviets may be attempting to undercut our position on on-sites, it is also a possible indication that, in the arms control field, they are willing to work towards agreement, despite Viet Nam. We should not under-estimate the significance of the Soviet move. The Soviets know that international exchange of data is basically directed at improving the capability of other countries to determine what is happening inside the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union is, in fact, willing to exchange data toward this end, it will be a most important step. 3. SNDV Freeze and Reductions . On instructions,3 I formally asked the Soviet Co-Chairman whether his government would be interested in the possibility of a freeze on the manufacture of SNDVs if this could be accompanied by reductions. I read to him a list of issues which we proposed for discussion in the event they were interested. A week later, the Soviets indicated their recognition that we had made a serious proposal and requested a paper setting forth the issues to be discussed. We provided the paper, 3 but have not yet received their response. William C. Foster 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA Memoranda Files, FRC 77 A 52, Memos to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. An unsigned handwritten note on the source text reads as follows: “Sir: We are informed by Ben Read that Mr. Foster mentioned this memo to you last evening. Copies have been sent by S/S to Messrs. Ball, U.A. Johnson, and Thompson.” 2 At this point the source text bears the following handwritten note: “(below at clip; Sec saw),” referring to telegram Disto 2210 from Geneva; not found. 3 Not further identified. 132. Aide-Mémoire From the British Embassy to the Department of State 132. Aide-Mémoire From the British Embassy to the Department of State 1 Washington, June 1, 1966. The latest version of the U.S. draft non-proliferation treaty (incorporating the amendments tabled at Geneva on the 21st of March, 1966) 2 still permits the transfer of nuclear weapons into the control of an association of States, provided that (a) this association includes at least one nuclear-weapon State; (b) there is no increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. As the United States Government are aware, Her Majesty's Government have always considered that a non-proliferation treaty should exclude the possibility of nuclear dissemination to associations of States, whatever their membership and whether or not an existing nuclear power should cease to have control of nuclear weapons. Her Majesty's Government understand the considerations which have caused the United States Government to leave open a “European option” in their draft treaty. But it seems to them that the only such option strictly compatible with non-proliferation would be a fully federated European State, which would acquire by succession the nuclear status of either France or the United Kingdom or both. In such a case no transfer of control would be involved and there would be no need for a non-proliferation treaty to be so worded as to provide for it. On the other hand, the idea of transferring control of nuclear weapons to a European association of States, where decisions could be taken by majority vote, is not easy to reconcile with a straightforward statement of non-proliferation requirements. Her Majesty's Government believe that their concern on this point is shared by an increasing number of governments and that the need to preserve a “majority vote European option” constitutes an unnecessary weakness in the presentation of the Western case at Geneva. During the last session of the E.N.D.C. Soviet attacks have increasingly concentrated on the possibility of creating mixed associations with numerous non-nuclear members—and these attacks seem to have some success in enlisting the sympathies of the non-aligned countries. If the U.S. draft treaty could be amended so as to close this option, the West would be in a better position to rebut Soviet criticism and to persuade the non-aligned countries, at Geneva and elsewhere, of the sincerity of its support for non-proliferation. Her Majesty's Government hope that, if the United States Government agree with the above, they may be ready to support them in raising the matter once again, first with the Canadian and Italian Governments, and afterwards with the Federal German Government. They suggest that, in order to close the “majority vote option” in the U.S. draft treaty, it would be sufficient to omit Clause 3 in Articles I and II as well as the words “non-nuclear-weapon” and “such” where they qualify the words “association of States” in these two Articles. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential. British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean transmitted this aide-mémoire to U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, June 1. A cover memorandum of the conversation, June 1, indicates that Ambassador Johnson noted that “the Russians already seem to have heavily discounted the European clause option, and have been leveling their main attacks in the ENDC against any form of multilateral association. Consequently, it would appear doubtful whether a change in our position on the European option would substantially improve our tactical position in Geneva.” A cover memorandum transmitting the British aide-mémoire from Spurgeon Keeny to Walt Rostow, June 8, supported the British proposal for the nonproliferation treaty to exclude the possibility of nuclear dissemination to associations of states, the European option. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft on Nonproliferation Treaty, Box 27) 2 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 159-160. 133. Editorial Note 133. Editorial Note On June 29, 1964 (15 UST 2128), July 15, 1965 (16 UST 888), and June 2, 1966 (17 UST 1966), the United States and the United Kingdom renewed their Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy of June 15, 1955 (6 UST 2709). In June 1965 the United States suggested that the renewed agreement should contain provision for safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on any material transferred. The British agreed to application of IAEA safeguards to enriched uranium purchased under a new agreement for use in the British civil power program. They also reserved their position in the event the United Kingdom joined Euratom for the application of Euratom safeguards on materials transferred under a new U.S.-U.K. Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy, signed June 2, entered into force July 15, 1966 (17 UST 862). Because of the intermixture of British civil and military atomic energy programs, they could not agree on the application of international safeguards to highly enriched uranium purchased from the United States for use in their civil research and development program. Documentation on cooperation with the United Kingdom in the civil uses of atomic energy is in Department of State, Central Files, AE 4 UK-US. 134. Editorial Note 134. Editorial Note A June 6, 1966, letter from Glenn T. Seaborg to President Johnson submitted for approval the underground nuclear test program for fiscal year 1967, designated Latchkey, and a detailed plan for the first quarter (July-September), Latchkey I. The proposed program consisted of approximately 56 tests, including 38-42 weapons development and 7-9 Plowshare tests (including the deferred Cabriolet), sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission, and 1 test detection and 7 weapons effects tests, sponsored by the Department of Defense. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, Latchkey Series, Vol. V, FY 1967, Box 28) A memorandum from Rostow to the President, June 25, stated that the Review Committee on Underground Tests recommended approval of the program for fiscal year 1967, subject to the following reservations (with DOD and AEC concurrence): cratering experiments and tests executed off the Nevada Test Site required specific Presidential approval; and the large-yield (600 kt) [Greeley] test for the first quarter was subject to Dr. Hornig's review of test procedures and safety precautions. The President's approval line on this memorandum was checked. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, Latchkey Series, Vol. V, FY 1967, Box 28) Rostow informed Seaborg of this decision by memorandum of June 27. (Ibid.) Rostow's November 3 memorandum to the President stated that the Review Committee on Underground Tests recommended approval of the AEC tests program for November-December, the remaining months of Latchkey II, including the large-yield Greeley test, but it withheld authorization of Cabriolet pending the President's decision on that event. The President's approval line on this memorandum was checked. (Ibid.) A January 9, 1967, memorandum from Rostow to the President stating that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests had no objection to the AEC test program for the third quarter (January-March), recommended approval of Latchkey III, consisting of 14 tests including Cabriolet. That test, however, required issuance of a prior public explanatory statement, coordinated by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Under Secretary of State, with Department of State, ACDA, DOD, and White House clearances before release. The President's approval line on the memorandum was checked. (Ibid.) Rostow informed Seaborg of this approval by memorandum, January 11, 1967. (Ibid.) Ultimately the United States Government conducted 38 tests, including Greeley (870 kt), but not Cabriolet in the Latchkey series. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 , pages 28-30) Further documentation on the Latchkey series is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing, U.S. Testing Program, Latchkey Series, Vol. V, FY 1967, Box 28 and in Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. A summary history of the test series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Flintlock and Latchkey: Events—Red Hot, Pin Stripe, Discus Thrower, Pile Driver, Double Play, New Point, Midi Mist, 5 March 1966-26 June 1967 (DNA 6321F, 1984). 135. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 135. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 7, 1966. Dear Dean: I think the growing pressures for proliferation in India indicates that we should reconsider our position on the nonproliferation treaty. I suggest that we consider language in our draft treaty which would make clear that the United States and other nuclear powers would each maintain a veto over its weapons. I have enclosed proposed language to this effect. May we discuss these proposals at your convenience. Sincerely, Bob 2 Enclosure 3 NONPROLIFERATION TREATY Present US Version—Article I Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes: 1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon States. 2. Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State or association of such States— (a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in preparation for such manufacture, or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or (b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons. 3. Not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. 4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited in the preceding paragraphs of this Article directly, or indirectly through third States or associations of States, or through units of the armed forces or military personnel of any State, even if such units or personnel are under the command of a military alliance. Proposed US Version—Article I Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of another nuclear-weapon State, any non-nuclear-weapon State, or any association of States. Additionally, nuclear-weapon States will take no action, direct or indirect, which would increase the total number of States or associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. Assistance or encouragement to the research, production, or test programs of non-nuclear-weapon States, which could result in the development of a nuclear weapons capability, is prohibited. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 3, 1965-July 29, 1966, Box 30. Secret. A June 10 cover memorandum from Spurgeon Keeny to Rostow states that Keeny thought Rostow should be aware of McNamara's letter “suggesting that we reconsider our position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” 2 Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original. 3 Confidential. 136. Memorandum for the Files 136. Memorandum for the Files 1 Washington, June 9, 1966. SUBJECT NSC Meeting, June 9, 1966 The President made an introductory statement apparently written for him by Rostow recognizing the urgency of some action in connection with the possibility of India making a decision to go nuclear. In those remarks he stated that this had great significance for the United States and the world and might, if India made such a decision, promote great instability in view of the fact that others would undoubtedly follow. He then called upon George Ball. Mr. Ball made an excellent statement based largely on the paper, 2 but going beyond that in setting a framework of actions which needed to be taken, both in the way of creating obstacles against India taking the step, and in addition creating conditions which would encourage her to believe her security would be all right without taking the step. He listed alternatives which would act as obstacles such as the non-proliferation treaty, comprehensive test ban treaty and the threshold treaty, stating that the comprehensive test ban would be ideal in that it was nondiscriminatory but that in the circumstance of the difficulties concerning verification he felt that the threshold test ban treaty was a good step even though it did not assuredly prevent their going nuclear. It would, however, impose considerable restraint. He called attention to the rising price which India was implying it would need in order to accept a non-proliferation treaty. He pointed out the discussions we had had with the Soviet Union on assurances by both the Soviet Union and ourselves, and indicated his feeling that under present circumstances at least it would be impossible to get the Soviets to take a position so clearly in opposition to the Chinese. He gave support to the possibility of a General Assembly resolution which was later supported vigorously as apparently the answer to all problems by Ambassador Goldberg. The President, following George Ball's presentation, called on Ambassador Goldberg and then on Bob McNamara. McNamara said that he would differ with Ball's conclusions on the ideal solution, but his differences were matters of degree and generally he supported the principles set forth by Under Secretary Ball. Ambassador Goldberg referred to the General Assembly resolution as having been premature last fall, 3 but he believed that it was much more possible now in view of the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to use the General Assembly for the new space proposals. The President, following comments by those three asked what Mr. Ball's recommendations were. Mr. Ball recommended that there be a study which would be concluded within a month to make more precise the exact lines of action to be taken. Mr. McNamara supported that. The President said he thought this was all right. I asked to be heard at this point and said that I had no objection to this, certainly, except as a matter of timing since there was already a good deal of data on this and that in fact there would be a meeting of the Committee of Principals next week to consider one or more of the suggestions which had been made. My feeling of urgency was occasioned by the fact that the ENDC was opening next Tuesday. 4 It would last, presumably from 8 to 12 weeks, and I felt that it was essential that some proposals be put forward by the United States early in that period, otherwise no action could occur and the value of the ENDC might vanish. I felt that in the circumstances it should be possible to come up with conclusions within two weeks for decision by the President. Unfortunately, the President is apparently planning on a long weekend over the Fourth, so this probably puts it over until the Fourth. In any event, the conclusion of the meeting was that there would be a NSAM referring to State, DOD and ACDA the job of coming up with recommendations following this discussion. The Vice President indicated quite surprisingly that he thought India could have credible nuclear explosions and some capability for the expenditure of perhaps $50 million in addition to past expenditures. He appeared to be somewhat less than enthusiastic about a threshold test ban treaty and felt that the comprehensive treaty was the best solution. I did not disagree with him on this, but told him that we were concerned with the art of the possible and the only thing that appeared possible is the threshold test ban treaty. Incidentally, Hornig should be talked to by Pete Scoville because Hornig believes that many of the non-nuclear nations would be able to have an initial test up to 50 kilotons under the threshold test ban treaty by proper utilization of the many sources of alluvium throughout the world. I disagreed with this after the meeting and told him that I would have Pete talk to him. Under the circumstances, I think we got as much out of the meeting as it was possible to get. Leonard Marks brought up the question of next Tuesday being the 20th Anniversary of the Baruch presentation 5 and thought that the United States should use the occasion to call for a major restudy of the problems of proliferation. The study should take place under the auspices of scholars from the academic as well as the government field. There was no response to this suggestion. I do feel we must make some note of the Baruch anniversary in our opening statement at Geneva even though we are unable to accompany it with any dramatic proposals. William C. Foster 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files:FRC 77 A 32, National Security Council. Secret; Exdis. 2 The paper has not been further identified. 3 The U.N. resolution has not been further identified. 4 The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva June 14-August 25. 5 See footnote 5, Document 97 . 137. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 137. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 9, 1966. SUBJECT Dobrynin-Foster Meeting Following up your request this morning for further information on the Dobrynin-Foster meeting reported in the President's Evening Reading for June 8, 2 I met with Bill Foster and obtained the following additional information. The discussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty came in the middle of an extended discussion of the status of a broad range of Arms Control measures. Foster reports that, while Dobrynin did not state flatly that the Soviets would sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if we rejected the hardware solution to nuclear sharing, he did indicate quite clearly that this was the area of their concern and that they were not concerned with present US weapons in Germany or with the possibility of more substantive consultation between us and our allies on the use of nuclear weapons. Dobrynin said that he understood the UK was going to table revised Non-Proliferation Treaty language that would differ from ours. Dobrynin did not respond to Foster's comments on the importance of some sort of multilateral nuclear assurances for non-nuclear countries such as India in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the basis of my brief discussion with Foster, I don't believe there were any other particularly significant points to report. With regard to the freeze on strategic offensive-defensive delivery systems, Dobrynin commented that it was so complicated that he did not think there was much point in discussing it at Geneva now. Dobrynin appeared to agree with Foster's standard argument as to why we should have a freeze on ABMs but did not offer any suggestion as to what should be done about it. In response to Dobrynin's question as to whether we had actually made a no-first-use proposal to the Communist Chinese, Foster explained that we were simply trying to clarify what Chou En-lai had proposed in his earlier statement. 3 Bill Foster is preparing a detailed memcon which we should get later today. 4 Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, U.S. Draft on Non-Proliferation Treaty, Box 27. Secret. 2 Reference is to a June 8 memorandum from Ball to President Johnson, “Items for Evening Reading,” item 4 of which reads as follows: “Dobrynin-Foster Meeting—In the course of their meeting today, Ambassador Dobrynin and Bill Foster discussed non-proliferation, improved detection measures, and the freeze and reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Foster reports receiving a clear implication that, if the Soviets could be sure that Germany would not use or would not be able to use nuclear weapons on their own decision, a non-proliferation treaty would be possible. Dobrynin stated that Soviet Embassies in NATO capitals had reported that no one except the Germans had any interest in a change in present nuclear arrangements. He said they were prepared to make arrangements with us at Geneva for the exchange of seismic data. In an aside he said they were shuffling their diplomatic corps to replace about thirty of their older Ambassadors.” (Ibid.) 3 In an address at a Sino-Albanian Banquet on May 10, Premier Chou said that “China has proposed to the United States that the two countries undertake the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. But U.S. imperialism has rejected China's proposal.” ( Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , p. 280) 4 Foster's memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin, June 8, is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. II, Box 6. 138. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 138. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, June 17, 1966, noon. PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 REFERENCES (1) Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals dated June 14, 1966, from Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director, ACDA, subject: Proposed U.S. Arms Control Initiatives (U). 3 (2) Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals dated June 9, 1966, from William C. Foster, Director, ACDA, subject: Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Proposal (U). 4 SUMMARY OF ACTION I. Threshold Test Ban Proposal There was agreement with the Secretary of State's suggestion that he prepare a memorandum for the President summarizing the argumentation and issues on the threshold test ban proposal. The Secretary said he would attach to the memorandum the more detailed comments that have been submitted from the various agencies. II. Non-Proliferation Treaty The Secretary of State said he would circulate as soon as possible for consideration by the Principals a revised non-proliferation treaty draft. The Secretary said the revised draft would be a more simplified version of Article I than the present U.S. draft and would focus on “physical access.” Discussion Mr. Fisher outlined the principal reasons why the threshold proposal had been brought to the Principals once again, referring to the AFTAC report showing that seismic identification was excellent for events above 4.75, thus indicating a threshold could be verified without on-site inspection; 5 Mr. Fisher said it was, moreover, important to keep the dialogue with the Soviets on non-proliferation open and it appeared that the threshold proposal was at this time the only way we could take some initiative in this area. It was, he said, ACDA's belief that the question should be raised with the President and he hoped the Committee of Principals would agree to submit the issues to the President. Mr. Fisher noted the AEC and JCS objections to the threshold proposal. He said it was, nevertheless, ACDA's view that the proposal was in the U.S. interest, recognizing that it would however require considerable political effort to obtain its acceptance in Congress. The inhibitions placed on non-nuclear powers would inhibit them, both technically and in a political sense, from achieving their nuclear ambitions. He said he recognized, however, that technically the threshold ban would not prevent a test by presently non-nuclear powers if sufficient effort were made to conduct one but nevertheless the inhibition would be there. Mr. Fisher commented that within the government the discussion had tended to go back and forth between moving in the non-proliferation field by enlarging the present limited test ban treaty or by making a new effort for a non-proliferation treaty. The Secretary of State said the first question was whether the proposal was in the U.S. interest and if the answer was affirmative the second was should we attempt to achieve it by formal agreements or by unilateral undertakings. Chairman Seaborg referred to the concerns regarding the proposal that had been expressed in his letter of June 16 to Mr. Fisher. 6 He said the Commission's view was that the IDA Study was overly optimistic with regard to possible modifications under a threshold test ban [ less than 1/2 line of source text not declassified ]for ABM warheads. 7 Chairman Seaborg made particular reference to the last two paragraphs of Enclosure II of his letter, the weapons laboratories comments. 8 [ 13 lines of source text not declassified ] The Secretary of State commented that the problems described by Chairman Seaborg would apply doubly to a comprehensive test ban. He asked what our assessment was as to where the Soviets are with their ABM development. Admiral Raborn said there was some evidence that they are up to where the U.S. is at the present time. Mr. Fisher pointed out that Mr. Foster of the Department of Defense took a different view than the weapons laboratories with respect to ABM warhead developments that would be possible under the threshold test ban. The Secretary of Defense said Mr. Fisher's comment on Mr. Foster's views dealt with the first point he had wished to make, and the second was to inquire about the observations made by Chairman Seaborg in his letter to Mr. Fisher regarding the difficulties of differentiation and identification of events under a threshold test ban. Chairman Seaborg said there was no real assurance that we could test at 30 KT and not violate a threshold ban, [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Mr. Fisher commented that the 30 KT figure was based on the AFTAC studies. He also noted the hidden asymmetries between nuclear and non-nuclear powers that would make it more difficult for non-nuclear powers to initiate a test program under the threshold limitation. When Mr. Marks noted the differences between the ACDA and AEC judgments on the inhibitions a threshold ban would place on non-nuclear powers, Mr. Fisher reviewed the political as well as the technical inhibitions that ACDA believed would apply to non-nuclear powers under a threshold ban. The Secretary of State said that a non-nuclear state might well merely declare that it had a nuclear weapon but say it was not going to test it; he said if the Israelis made such a statement he would probably be inclined to believe them. Dr. Scoville commented on the ABM warhead need, saying he did not understand why we could not make better use of existing weapons technology [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. We already have this capability, he said, in the lower and higher yield ranges. The Vice President said this was a point that needed to be examined carefully. Chairman Seaborg said the IDA Study had examined the question raised by Dr. Scoville. Mr. Keeny commented that the IDA Study had merely looked at the existing devices. Chairman Seaborg said it might be possible to modify [ less than 1/2 line of source text not declassified ] and have some type of defense against ICBM's. The Secretary of Defense then summarized the objections and questions he believed had been raised by the AEC to the threshold proposal. They were, he said, that the threshold ban would not get us very much in the way of inhibiting proliferation; the price would be some reduction in our ABM capability, if it were decided to go this route; there was some question as to our ability to distinguish events above 4.75; and finally the problems raised by the peaceful uses question. In response to the Secretary of State's question about the possibility for cheating above 4.75, Admiral Raborn said the margin for cheating was very good. He said the Soviets could conduct two or so clandestine tests a year unless we had on-site inspection. General Johnson noted that the studies that have been made are for a period when the Soviets have been testing in their normal test areas and not attempting clandestine tests. Mr. Fisher stated that the AFTAC study indicated there would be an average of one event a year that would be unidentified by seismic means and that these events were almost all in the Kamchatka area. Moreover, for this area no low coupling material was available—therefore it would not make sense for the Soviets to go to an area where the coupling was not advantageous in an attempt to test illegally what they could test legally in other areas where coupling was more satisfactory for their purposes. Admiral Raborn restated his view that the Soviets could test clandestinely two tests a year. Dr. Scoville pointed out that the U.S. would be able to spot all suspicious events whether identified or not and to focus on these events with intelligence resources. Admiral Raborn said we could not, however, prove to the world any of our conclusions. After further discussion of the coupling question, Mr. Fisher pointed out that decoupling would be perfectly legal under the threshold test ban. Chairman Seaborg said there was no question but that the ABM problem was the most bothersome of the difficulties AEC had with the threshold proposal. He suggested that the U.S. go on as fast as possible to meet our testing requirements for ABM warheads and in a year or two we would have most of our needed testing for this purpose completed. The Secretary of State asked about the effects of a threshold at 5.0. Chairman Seaborg said this would help with the ABM problem but of course it would not be much of an inhibition on non-nuclear countries. Admiral Raborn said the intelligence community was agreed that a threshold test ban would have little effect in halting proliferation. Mr. Fisher questioned this assessment, pointing to the technical and political inhibitions he believed would apply. He said, moreover, that Soviet-U.S. agreement on a threshold ban would itself have a very real effect on potential nuclear countries. The Secretary of State said a threshold ban might, during the process of ratification that would take place in potential nuclear countries, precipitate a debate over the question of going or not going nuclear. Mr. Marks wondered if our posture would not suffer more by making the threshold test ban proposal and having the Soviets respond with a call for a moratorium than in not making the proposal. Mr. Fisher pointed out that new verification data will not remain unknown for very long and said that when it becomes known the U.S. will either have to be in favor of a threshold proposal or change its present position of being prepared to ban all tests that can be adequately verified. The Vice President wondered if a threshold test ban would really inhibit proliferation. Mr. Fisher said there was no certainty it would prevent proliferation but it would make it more costly and more difficult and therefore decrease the likelihood of proliferation. He said it was ACDA's conclusion that this was the only way we could move at the present time to inhibit proliferation in view of our policy on options we were keeping open on NATO nuclear questions. He said it was either moving on the threshold proposal or doing nothing. He added that the question for the meeting really was whether the issue should not be put to the President. The Secretary of State said he believed the President should be informed of the discussion. He thought it would be advisable for him to prepare a two or three page memorandum for the President, digesting the issues and arguments involved, with the detailed comments from various departments attached. The Vice President questioned the value of a country going nuclear if a potential adversary was likely to develop an ABM system, and he wondered if the cost factors would not be too high for various potential nuclear countries. The Secretary of State said he believed India, Israel, Sweden and others could afford to go nuclear, though they might underestimate the ultimate cost to them of doing so. Chairman Seaborg noted that with respect to the 4.75 limitation, the AEC would have to instruct the laboratories not to go above 10 to 20 Kt in their testing in order to avoid a risk of treaty violation. [ 2 lines of source text not declassified ] In response to the Vice President's question as to the real objectives of a threshold ban, Mr. Fisher said it was both turning down the nuclear arms race and inhibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Secretary of State commented that in terms of creating an atmosphere of peace the threshold test ban would certainly not be comparable to Soviet action for peace in South East Asia. The Vice President said that if the threshold proposal did not curb nuclear technology it was not clear how it would really inhibit the proliferation. Chairman Seaborg said that it was necessary to settle the Plowshare question before any decision was made on the threshold proposal. The Secretary said that if it were agreeable with the Vice President, he would put together for the President a digest of the issues on the threshold proposal. He said he would like to review the issues himself before making final judgment on the proposal. He commented that he was concerned about the problem of ultimate cheating and the problem of defending this possibility in any U.S. debate on a threshold proposal. The Secretary of State said he would like to turn for a moment to the question of a non-proliferation treaty. He said the Soviet representative in Geneva had seemed to put an emphasis on “physical access.” He thought we might consider the possibility of a simplification of Article I of the U.S. draft treaty. The Secretary of Defense said he completely agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary of State said we should consider a simplified Article I that would prohibit the transfer of physical access to nuclear weapons. He said he would be sending to other members of the Committee of Principals as soon as possible a simplified text for their consideration. He added that it may be that the Soviets are beginning to move and would be prepared to gamble on their estimate that the MLF is dead. Mr. Rostow asked if a prohibition on physical access would be compatible with joint ownership. The Secretary said he did not believe ownership was relevant to the problem of proliferation, although he did not believe that we should be opposed to other countries paying some of our costs if they wished to. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, Vol. 3, Box 14. Secret; Restricted Data. The meeting took place in the Secretary of State's office. No drafting information appears on the source text, though Lawrence D. Weiler is listed as Reporting Officer on the attached list of 23 participants. Seaborg's notes of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 614 and 628. 2 Not printed. 3 The memorandum attached a draft memorandum from Fisher to the President recommending that he propose a new test ban agreement extending the present Limited Test Ban Treaty to cover verifiable underground tests—a threshold test ban treaty. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, June 1966) 4 The memorandum transmitted a revised draft position paper on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the May 26, 1966 ACDA draft position paper as amended June 9. (Ibid., OSD/AE Files:FRC 72 A 4120, #3 Plowshare (Panofsky Panel)—1966) 5 The report by Dr. Evernden of the Air Force Technical Applications Center, “Critique of U.S. Capability of Discriminating between Earthquakes and Explosions,” was distributed in February 1966, but has not been found. 6 A sanitized version of the letter is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 620-622. The original has not been found. 7 IDA Study S-235, “Special Nike-X Warhead Study,” has not been found. 8 A sanitized version of Enclosure II, AEC Weapons Laboratories Comments on the IDA Study, is in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 12, pp. 626-627. 139. Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to Secretary of State Rusk 139. Letter from Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 17, 1966. OD-ACDA-2623 Dear Secretary Rusk: In accordance with your suggestion at today's meeting of the Principals, 2 I am forwarding herewith a few comments, from the intelligence point of view, on the proposed Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] On the Soviet side, we believe that ABM deployment has begun at Moscow. In our judgment, the chances are about even that the Soviets have developed an exoatmospheric ABM system [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Our evidence, however, is skimpy, and the Soviets may well be further along. If not, there will be great pressure on them to develop a highly sophisticated system, since they are certainly aware in general terms of U.S. plans for improving warheads and penetration aids, e.g., multiple re-entry vehicles. The Soviets have shown considerable willingness to risk violation of the present test ban treaty, and even one or two tests a year above magnitude 4.75 would give them significant advantages. Thus, the Soviets could forge ahead of the U.S., unless the U.S. were itself willing to violate the TTBT, or at least risk doing so. I do not believe that the TTBT will have much effect in slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was agreed at the Principals' meeting that the technical restraints imposed by the treaty would create additional difficulties for non-nuclear states in carrying out nuclear programs meaningful to them, but would not prevent it. On the political side, we are all agreed that China will not sign. Hence, the pressures on the countries being threatened by China will continue to grow as China conducts further tests. I do not believe that the TTBT or even a non-proliferation treaty would deter a country from going nuclear if it felt that its vital interests were threatened. Regarding verification of a TTBT, there is an important distinction between convincing ourselves that a violation has occurred and proving it to others. There could be endless controversy about the magnitude and especially the nature of events which we believed were over magnitude 4.75. In general, convincing proof of a violation could come only from on-site inspection. [ 1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified ] Sincerely, W.F. Raborn 1 Source: Department of State,S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171. Top Secret; Restricted Data. 2 See Document 138 . 140. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 140. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, July 12, 1966. The National Nuclear Test Program transmitted by your joint letter of February 25, 1966, 2 has been reviewed by the Executive Office staff. I wish to confirm that it is most important that we retain a test readiness posture and maintain an active plan to resume testing should it be necessary. I note that the Program is sufficiently broad in scope as to provide maximum flexibility of response in the event we should have need to resume testing in any of the environments now prohibited by the limited test ban treaty. This approach is sound, and its flexibility should continue to characterize our planning. The Program should be periodically reviewed to insure that it takes into account the advances made in our underground test program and the other research and development work at the laboratories and within the Department of the Defense. Periodically this Program needs updating and any significant changes that occur in the Program should be brought to my attention. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—National Nuclear Test Program, Vol. I, Box 31. Secret. 2 The letter under reference transmitted “The National Nuclear Test Program, First Revision—January 1, 1966.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/AE Files: FRC 72 A 4120, 93. National Nuclear Test Readiness Program (1964-66) The revision was requested by a memorandum from Bundy to McNamara and Seaborg, May 25, 1965. (Ibid.) 141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 26, 1966. SUBJECT Proposed U.S. Initiative on Threshold Test Ban (U) A new arms control initiative aimed at inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons has been given serious consideration by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and discussed with the Committee of Principals at its meeting on June 17. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggestion is for a Presidential proposal for a new test ban agreement, expanding the present Limited Test Ban Treaty to cover verifiable underground tests. No consensus was reached at the Principals' meeting on the desirability of making a proposal for a threshold test ban at this time. It is suggested that you may wish to discuss this personally with the Principals. The following is a summary of the major issues which must be considered in reaching a decision on the U.S. proposal in this area. A more detailed draft position paper prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is forwarded as an annex to this memorandum 2 along with comments thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency. 3 A. Technical and Political Effects of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty While all agree that as a technical matter a non-nuclear country could test its first weapon under a threshold test ban which could be reasonably verified at the present time, it would nevertheless increase the technical difficulties and cost and, at the same time, reduce the political and military gains from such a development. Key potential additional nuclear countries, i.e., India, Israel, Japan, Sweden and Germany, would doubtless sign a threshold test ban and as a result probably would be constrained to test at about the 5 KT level, since they seemingly have neither the soil conditions nor the experience to conduct tests at much higher yields without serious risk of violating the threshold. The threshold would prevent the development of an advanced military nuclear capability. There are differences of opinion as to the importance of these constraints and on the willingness of such countries to risk a violation if they had signed such a treaty. The Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, however, believe that these constraints might be a significant factor in preventing a decision by these countries to go nuclear. We cannot be sure at this time what the Soviet reaction to such a U.S. offer would be, since previously the Soviets have always linked the threshold test ban to a moratorium on all underground tests. A moratorium is completely unacceptable to the United States. A Soviet response of this type would limit the political gains obtained by offering a threshold ban but on balance the U.S. position of being willing to ban all tests it can verify would be better than it would be otherwise, particularly when knowledge of the improved detection capability became public. B. Verification of Compliance with a Threshold Test Ban Treaty Recent developments in the field of seismic detection and identification of underground events indicate that all contained underground explosions with seismic magnitudes above 4.75 generate seismic signals with characteristics common to all such explosions and that only a very small number of earthquakes above magnitude 4.75 (on the average of one per year in the USSR) have signals which cannot be distinguished from explosions and which therefore might provide false alarms. The suspiciousness of even these few false alarms would be further reduced by investigation of their location and by the use of other intelligence sources. Furthermore, the number of these natural events which cannot be identified by seismic means decreases rapidly with increase in magnitude and is essentially zero at magnitude 5. There are differences of opinion among the Principals on the adequacy of this degree of verification at the magnitude 4.75 level. Some feel that even a single Soviet nuclear test above the threshold could have a significant effect on U.S. security and that either the low natural false alarm rate could be used as a cover for such a test or that the United States would not choose to denounce a violation and abrogate the treaty based only on seismic evidence supported by unilateral intelligence. They believe that some type of on-site inspections would be required as well in order to provide demonstrable proof to the world. Others believe that this verification capability would provide the United States the ability to satisfy itself that a violation had occurred and that the United States could take the necessary international actions if it felt its security were affected. [ 1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified ] C. The Military Implications of a Threshold Test Ban Although a 4.75 threshold test ban could preclude the proof-testing of certain advanced warhead designs the major effect in terms of existing requirements would be on the development of warheads for ABM systems. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] The Department of Defense has had conducted a study which indicates that the presently planned effectiveness of the Nike-Zeus system designed against a Chinese Communist threat could be regained under the constraints of a threshold test ban by system changes at some additional cost. 4 Maintaining the effectiveness of a system designed against a sophisticated Soviet threat would be more difficult and would require considerably greater costs and could not as certainly be obtained. The Atomic Energy Commission does not believe that the warheads postulated in the Department of Defense study for the revised systems could be developed under a threshold test ban but notes that certain nuclear tests could probably be carried out within the next year or two in order to achieve such developments. There are also a number of differences of opinion as to the validity of the detailed systems aspects of the DOD-sponsored study on this ABM problem. The USSR is believed to lag somewhat behind the United States in terms of nuclear warhead development in the yield ranges which would be forbidden under the threshold test ban. In a recent NIE the belief is stated that for most of the Soviet military development programs which can be foreseen over the next few years a threshold test ban treaty would impose no greater restrictions than those already imposed by the partial test ban. 5 [ 9-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] D. Threshold Magnitude The magnitude of an event is proposed to be defined as the mean of the measurements obtained by at least nine standard stations located between 1,500 and 6,000 miles from an event. The United States now operates more than twelve stations, some of which are classified, which could be used to make a determination of magnitude by the United States with respect to events taking place in the USSR. Few stations now exist outside the United States jurisdiction which meet the qualifications for a standard station. Twenty-five to thirty properly distributed standard stations would be required in order to assure that at least nine stations at the desired distances will be able to measure the magnitude of events of m4.75 and above in the USSR, United States, India and Israel. Such stations could be constructed with equipment readily procurable in 1-5 years depending upon the intensity of effort and cooperation of host countries. In the absence of such a network of stations and the public availability of data therefrom, there would be no internationally accepted data base for a magnitude determination for a given event, leaving the way open to possible international controversy concerning the magnitude of a given event. The threshold magnitude proposed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and used as a basis for most of the studies was 4.75 which might permit tests up to 30 KT on the part of the United States and the USSR without significant risk of violations, and about 5 KT on the part of the key non-nuclear nations. The Atomic Energy Commission feels that the United States might be constrained to tests at lower yields to avoid risking inadvertent violation. Consideration has been also given to establishing the threshold at 5.0 which would allow U.S.-USSR tests at about 80 KT and non-nuclear country tests at about 12 KT. Such a threshold would reduce the number of false alarms from natural earthquakes in the USSR to essentially zero. It would also permit the development of some of the more conventional type Nike-Zeus warheads by the United States and presumably the USSR. On the other hand, raising the threshold would reduce the effect of the treaty in discouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be difficult for the United States to justify raising the threshold to 5.0 in light of current detection and identification capabilities at 4.75, and there would be strong sentiment on the part of other countries to retain the familiar 4.75 threshold. E. Explosions for Peaceful Uses The present Limited Test Ban Treaty provides severe limitations on explosions for peaceful excavations purposes and a threshold treaty would add some additional limitations. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has proposed provisions in these treaties which might permit peaceful uses explosions but many believe that such provisions would provide legal or illegal opportunities for weapons development intended to be forbidden by the treaty. Studies are now underway in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to elaborate on the significance of such loopholes and to develop additional procedures to close them. The Atomic Energy Commission believes that the United States should not make any proposals on a threshold test ban until an agreed position is reached within the Government concerning the extent to which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be permitted under such a treaty, and the specific treaty provisions relevant to such purposes which would be acceptable to the United States. Dean Rusk 6 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 388.3, January 1966. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A cover memorandum from Foster to members of the Committee of Principals, August 3, states that all the members of the Committee of Principals concurred in the memorandum with the exception of the Atomic Energy Commission, which suggested a number of minor changes that were incorporated in the memorandum sent to the President. 2 Not found with source text. A copy is attached to June 9 memorandum from Foster to members of the Committee of Principals; ibid., OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, June 1966. 3 The cover memorandum states that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated June 29 (not found), the comments of the Atomic Energy Commission dated June 16 (copy ibid.), and the comments of the Central Intelligence Agency, June 17 ( Document 139 ) were not circulated with this paper because they were previously made available to the Committee of Principals by the originating agencies. 4 The Department of Defense study has not been found. 5 Document 130 . 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 142. Editorial Note 142. Editorial Note A July 29, 1966, letter from Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to President Johnson requested concurrence in plans for conducting underground tests of yields up to 6-7 megatons at temporary supplemental sites, involving explorations of the following possible sites: (1) the Nellis Gunnery Range in Nevada adjacent to the Nevada Test Site for yields near 2 megatons; (2) in Alaska, north of the Brooks Range, or on the Island of Amchitka (6-7 megatons); (3) and other higher yield sites outside the United States, possibly central Australia, or on Christmas Island. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—General, Vol. I, Box 27) An August 4 memorandum from Keeny to Rostow transmitted for Rostow's signature a memorandum for the President concerning a Bureau of the Budget recommendation that $25 million in fiscal year 1967 funds be reprogrammed in connection with the Atomic Energy Commission's proposal to develop alternate underground nuclear weapons test sites. Keeny endorsed the Bureau of the Budget proposal to reprogram funds “to initiate the new Nevada site and to permit an initial unpublicized survey of Alaska for potential additional sites” as “a very reasonable interim solution to this problem.” (Ibid.) An August 8 memorandum from Rostow to Seaborg stated the President's approval of reprogramming of $25 million of available funds for AEC use in fiscal year 1967 “for initial development of the proposed Nevada site and for an initial survey of possible sites in Alaska.” It required prior clearance by the Alaskan Governor and Congressional delegation for the Alaskan survey. The President did not approve the proposal to approach the United Kingdom or Australia for the possible use of Christmas Island or Australia as alternate test sites. No action was to be taken in this regard without specific clearance by the Department of State and the White House. (Ibid.) 143. Memorandum for President Johnson 143. Memorandum for President Johnson 1 Geneva, August 5, 1966. For President Johnson and Secretary Rusk from Goldberg (Geneva, 676) 2 As you know, the Outer Space Committee has recessed Space Treaty negotiations which will be reconvened in New York before or early during the forthcoming General Assembly. 3 In addition to detailed reports which the delegation has made concerning the negotiations, I wish to make the following comments: On the whole, we can regard the negotiations to date as reflecting great credit upon the United States, for the following reasons: 1. Negotiations came about as a result of initiative taken by the President on May 7, in calling for negotiations looking to a treaty. 4 This was initially resisted by Soviets who finally had to go along under the pressure of world opinion. This fact recognized and emphasized during the course of negotiations here in Geneva. 2. The attitude of the U.S. delegation in accordance with Department instructions has been forthcoming and this too has resulted in very favorable claim on world opinion both diplomatically and in the world press. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] confirmed that it is the shared opinion among the delegations irrespective of ideology that Soviets have been placed at a disadvantage by reason of forthcoming and conciliatory attitude of the U.S. delegation. 3. In final statements by delegates winding up this phase of deliberations, only Hungary and Bulgaria fully supported Soviet reservations which for time being blocked a treaty. It is interesting that statements by Poland and Romania did not expressly support key Soviet reservation on equal access and reporting. Unless the Soviets remain unwilling because of Vietnam to conclude an agreement in General Assembly, I see no reason why a final treaty text cannot be speedily concluded once the Committee reconvenes in New York. My own analysis of Soviet actions here is that Morozov, the Soviet representative, was acting under instructions not to make a final agreement in Geneva but to reserve a few points as a delaying maneuver. It is my impression that Soviets were unwilling because of concern about Chinese criticism to make it appear that they were agreeing with us too readily on an international treaty of this importance. An alternative explanation is that Soviet delegation at Geneva was concerned about the possibility of a government shake-up and desired to confirm their instructions in Moscow personally before making final agreement. Although present government was confirmed by Supreme Soviet during last stages of our negotiations in Geneva, Morozov in private conversation with me several times referred to the necessity of consulting with “new” government. Whatever the cause, it will be very difficult for the Soviets in the light of the great support the U.S. received in the Committee among other delegations including all non-aligned countries to block an acceptable treaty draft at General Assembly. Finally, I want to convey to the Department the excellent cooperation I received from all members of the U.S. delegation, particularly Meeker, Reis, Helman (State Department); Thacher (USUN); Sohier (NASA); Graybeal (ACDA); Moroncew (ACDA); and Captain Cole (DOD). They were a superb and hardworking team and contributed greatly to the progress we made in Geneva. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, Celestial Bodies Treaty, Box 72. Confidential. 2 The source text apparently is a typed version of telegram 676 from Geneva. 3 The Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in Geneva, July 12-August 4, and resumed negotiations in New York, September 12-16. 4 See Document 127 . 5 Printed from an unsigned copy. 144. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 144. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 8, 1966. SUBJECT Creating an International Entity to Make Plowshare Explosions Available to the World 1. This memorandum outlines a possible new peaceful initiative in the nuclear field. Ambassador Thompson believes there is a fair chance that the Soviet Union might be prepared to join with us in this proposal. If so, it could pave the way for further nuclear cooperation at a time when we are at an impasse over a nonproliferation treaty. Need for a New Plowshare Arrangement 2. As now worded, the language of the Test Ban Treaty severely restricts us in using peaceful nuclear (Plowshare) explosions to dig tunnels, harbors, etc. This is a point of concern, for example, in connection with the proposed Panama sea-level canal. 3. The Treaty does, however, permit underground explosions, whether for peaceful or military purposes, so long as they do not cause fall-out beyond national limits. Recently there have been some indications that India might set off underground explosions on the excuse that it was developing a Plowshare capability. In this way it could acquire most of the technology needed for military weapons. The proposed scheme would—among its other benefits—remove this excuse. It would thus discourage India and other countries from becoming military nuclear powers through the back door—on the pretext of acquiring Plowshare capability. Nature of Initiative 4. Under the initiative I propose we would invite the Soviet Union to join with us in a common undertaking to make available to all the nations of the world—nuclear and non-nuclear alike—the benefits of Plowshare explosions for public works projects in their countries. This would involve the creation of an international corporation or other entity that would arrange for, approve, and authorize the US or USSR to conduct such Plowshare explosions. Together we would seek an amendment to the Test Ban Treaty that would permit such explosions when approved and authorized by the international corporation. 2 5. By providing for membership on the entity's Board of Governors for representatives selected by the 93 non-nuclear signatories of the Test Ban Treaty, we would assure a strong voice for non-nuclear states in the control and utilization of this new technology. At the same time the arrangements could be so set up as not to compromise the security of our own Plowshare devices or to create an intolerable risk of military advantages for the power conducting the explosion. 6. As you know, a proposal to permit Plowshare explosions was discussed during the Test Ban negotiations, and elicited some Soviet interest. A draft Plowshare section of the Treaty was largely agreed with some major open points but, by mutual consent, it was then dropped as too complicated in the rush to sign the ultimate Treaty. 7. However, the Treaty was made relatively easy to amend. With the approval of only one-third of the 96 signatories, the Original Parties (US, UK, USSR) can call a conference to consider a proposed amendment. The amendment itself can be adopted by a simple majority of the signatories including all three Original Powers. Dissenting signatories are legally free to withdraw, but are unlikely to risk the world-wide opprobrium that would result. Benefits of Proposal 8. The proposal promises a number of cumulative benefits that increase in importance depending on how far we can get with it. For example: a. By presenting the plan to the Soviets, we could begin a useful dialogue with them, based on our mutual interest in deterring proliferation and in sponsoring peaceful nuclear applications. The discussion themselves would be valuable, regardless of their outcome. (The UK would, of course, have to be brought in at the outset.) b. If the discussions are fruitful, joint US-Soviet sponsorship of a Test Ban Amendment would be a major diplomatic breakthrough, regardless of whether the Amendment is ultimately adopted by the other signatories. Apart from the impact of a joint US-Soviet initiative, key features of the plan would have world wide appeal. The major nuclear powers would be offering the other signatories the economic benefits of peaceful explosions on attractive terms when and if Plowshare proves economically feasible, as well as a strong voice in the international agency that decides when and how such explosions would be conducted in the light of the military and fall-out risks and the economic and political criteria involved. c. If we get this far, it should be easy to get the support of one-third of the Treaty signatories to convene a Conference. The Conference itself would have major political value whatever its outcome, and could help to delay proliferation efforts by the nuclear-capable signatories (e.g., India and Japan). d. With the US, UK and USSR agreed, it should not be too hard to get the simple majority vote needed to adopt an amendment. If adopted, the amendment might help to deter the nuclear-capable signatories from proceeding with their own programs by lawful underground tests. The amendment would deprive them of both political and economic arguments sometimes used to justify going it alone. It is an open question whether the remaining military arguments for going ahead with national programs would be persuasive to most countries. e. If economically viable Plowshare projects are developed and if the international agency works out the many problems involved in approving them, the world can begin to realize another constructive potential from having unlocked the atom. But should the economics and hazards of Plowshare projects prove so intractable that few if any operations are approved and conducted for many years to come, we will still have achieved all of the other benefits described above. f. If the Soviets agree to the international entity plan, we could then discuss with them whether to offer the plan as an independent proposal apart from the current Anti-Proliferation, Threshhold Test Ban and Total Test Ban proposals now being discussed at Geneva, or whether to go the further step of agreeing with the USSR on some compromise version of one of those other proposals, and then offering the two as a single package. A joint package proposal would clearly be better if it proves feasible, but if we are able to agree with the USSR only on the international entity plan for Plowshare, I would favor proceeding with this alone. 9. I attach a memorandum spelling out some aspects of the proposal in more detail. 3 George W. Ball 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6 US. Secret; Exdis. An August 9 cover memorandum from Ball to the President states that this proposal had been “informally discussed with experts in ACDA and the AEC. If you think well of the idea we can go forward with full staffing and clearance with the interested departments.” In a telephone conversation, August 10, Walt Rostow told Ball that “he had sent up Ball's Plowshare memo and it came down with note 'approve staffing and Departmental clearance.'” (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Disarmament, Box 3) 2 As more fully discussed in the attachment, the international entity could be given authority either over all Plowshare explosions (including presently lawful underground shots) or over only those explosions of the crater-making type that may violate the present Test Ban Treaty. The first alternative would have the advantages mentioned in the attachment. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Ball signed the original. 145. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 145. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 10, 1966. SUBJECT Negotiation of an Outer Space Treaty Background —On May 7, President Johnson asked Ambassador Goldberg to undertake the negotiation of a treaty governing the uses of celestial bodies. 2 After some initial private conversations, and a letter from Gromyko to U Thant which indicated that the USSR was interested in such a treaty, 3 both the U.S. and the USSR tabled drafts. 4 Ambassador Goldberg proposed a meeting on July 12 of the Legal Subcommittee of the UN's Outer Space Committee, and the USSR agreed. The meeting took place in Geneva between July 12 and August 4. Negotiations —We agreed at an early stage to expand the scope of a treaty from celestial bodies to outer space generally. The Soviet draft Treaty had proposed this broader scope with which we were prepared to go along, as the Soviet text was drawn in large part from UN resolutions which we had taken the leadership in obtaining. We held a number of private bilateral discussions with the USSR in which points of agreement and disagreement were defined. The proceedings of the Legal Subcommittee reflected the results of these discussions. Results —Agreement was reached on thirteen substantive points (Tab A). The most significant of these are (a) the translation into a treaty obligation of the UN resolution banning the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, outer space or on celestial bodies; (b) an unconditional commitment to assist and return astronauts who land in another state and to publish discoveries relating to astronaut safety; and (c) the proscription of claims of sovereignty over and national appropriation of celestial bodies. There are two principal issues which divide us at the moment: a. Access —We insist that the principle of free access to all installations and vehicles on celestial bodies be reflected in a treaty, subject only to reasonable safety precautions. The USSR has sought to qualify the right of access with such concepts as “reciprocity” and agreement as to the timing of visits. b. Reporting—Our treaty article as tabled provides for compulsory reporting to the Secretary-General on the nature and location of activities on celestial bodies and publication of information on the results of these activities for the benefit of the public and the international scientific community. The USSR insists that the reporting obligation should be voluntary. There are two other differences which should not prove as difficult. One relates to the types of military structures to be prohibited on celestial bodies and the nature of the equipment to be permitted. We are substantially in agreement with the USSR on permitted and prohibited structures and equipment, but have not been able to reflect this in treaty language. The other difference involves a USSR proposal which would require a state hosting a tracking installation to grant similar facilities to other space powers. We suspect that the USSR tabled such a provocative proposal to serve as a barrier to the conclusion of a treaty until they are ready for one. We received generally strong support from members of the subcommittee for our position on the disagreed provisions. Tab B contains a chart of agreed and disagreed principles. 5 Next Step —The results of the Subcommittee's work will be reported to the Outer Space Committee. 6 The Subcommittee also decided to hold further negotiations before or during the 21st General Assembly. We will be pressing for early talks but recognize that the USSR has the capacity to delay negotiations and agreement. BHR Tab A 7 POINTS AGREED IN OUTER SPACE TREATY 1. The exploration and use of outer space shall be for the benefit of all mankind. 2. There shall be freedom of exploration and use of outer space for all states on a basis of equality. 3. There shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 4. Freedom of scientific research in outer space and international cooperation to that end should be assured. 5. Claims of sovereignty and national appropriation are barred. 6. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 7. The role of international law and the U.N. charter in man's future activities in outer space should be established. 8. There shall be an unconditional obligation to help and to return astronauts in distress and to exchange information relating to astronaut safety. 9. Launching states are liable for any damages. 10. There shall be no contamination or harmful interference in space activities. 11. Launching nations shall retain ownership over the objects sent into outer space and other states should return these objects. 12. Parties to the treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space. 13. No weapons of mass destruction shall be placed in outer space or on celestial bodies. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 4. Confidential. Drafted by Gerald B. Helman (IO/UNP) and cleared by Joseph J. Sisco (IO), Leonard C. Meeker (L), and Elizabeth A. Brown (IO/UNP). An attached August 8 memorandum from Robert L. Bruce, S/S Duty Officer, to Thomas R. Shaver (S/S-S) states that Mr. Read would like him to discuss with the Legal Adviser the preparation of a Read to Rostow memorandum on the Celestial Bodies Treaty, setting forth the points agreed on and those not agreed on. A handwritten note on this memorandum states that Helman was doing this. 2 See Document 127 . 3 Reference is to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's letter of May 30, 1966, to U.N. Secretary-General Thant, requesting inclusion in the agenda of the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly of an item entitled “Conclusion of an international agreement on legal principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and conquest of the moon and other celestial bodies,” and explaining the Soviet Government's interest in it. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 326-329. 4 The Soviet Draft Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon, and Other Celestial Bodies, June 16, 1966, is ibid., pp. 347-350; the U.S. Draft Treaty Governing the Exploration of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, June 16, 1966, is ibid., pp. 352-355. 5 Not printed. 6 Reference is to U.N. Document A/6431, Report of Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; Annex III: Report of Legal Subcommittee on work of its 5th session, 12 July-4 August and 12-16 September 1966. 7 No classification marking. 146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 146. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 2, 1966, 1 p.m. Mr. President: In the light of my memorandum to you of August 12, 1966, 2 I have talked with Bob McNamara at length about the non-proliferation treaty. He agrees that the heart of the matter is this: so long as we are committed to NATO we cannot, should not, will not give up our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons in that theater. The issue arises in connection with the “European clause”: it never arose with the MLF, where the retention of our veto was universally accepted. There have been several U.S. statements in the past which implied that if the Europeans fully united we would not rule out the possibility of their having an independent right to fire nuclear weapons from a presumably integrated European nuclear force. Behind these statements were three judgments: —It was wise to encourage the movement towards European unity, and unity would be encouraged by “not ruling out” the possibility of a European force with a right to fire as independent as that now enjoyed by U.K. and France; —If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration and seriously contemplated the problem, they would, in fact, not ask for the surrender of the U.S. veto, because they would lose more in the dilution of the U.S. commitment this would bring about than they would gain by this act of “independence;” —If and when the Europeans ever got to a position of true integration, and there was a European executive equivalent to the President of the United States, a rational arrangement could be worked out with that executive consistent with the requirements of the alliance. The non-proliferation treaty forces us to face this issue sooner than we might otherwise have to face it; because the European clause in the treaty makes a reality out of a quite distant but important contingency. If we are now to probe Gromyko and the Russians deeply as to the possibility of a non-proliferation treaty, Bob McNamara's and my judgment is that the probe should take place on this question: Would the Russians sign a treaty if we were to guarantee that we would not surrender under any future circumstances, and whatever the form of nuclear organization in the West, our veto over the firing of nuclear weapons? As I said in my memo, this is the one issue on which the Russians might have a legitimate interest in the nuclear organization of the West, and it is an issue where Russian and U.S. interests converge with those of Europe, if the Europeans think the matter through. If Secretary Rusk should find that Gromyko was willing to accept a non-proliferation treaty based on this principle, we would, however, then face an interesting problem of persuading the Europeans to accept this proposition. I believe the job could be done because, at bottom, what the Europeans are really groping for—although they are not very clear about it—is not an independent right to fire, but an insurance policy against the possibility that at some future time some American administration might pick up its nuclear weapons and its troops and go home. The British and French national nuclear capabilities and a future possible European nuclear force is a kind of insurance that, if we should ever move in this way, Western Europe would not be left naked of nuclear capacity. But so long as we remain a fully committed ally of Europe, Europeans can, I believe, be made to see: —that it is ridiculous for them to think of firing their nuclear weapons without ours; and —that the threat to use a small nuclear force in Europe to engage us in a nuclear war to which we were not committed could only lead to the U.S. pulling back and dissociating itself from European defense. No American President is going to place in the hands of the Europeans—or anyone else—the right to determine when we are engaged in a nuclear war. The outcome of such sober and careful discussion with the Europeans would, I believe, be an understanding that so long as they wanted our total commitment, including a nuclear commitment, to the defense of Europe, a European nuclear force could relate to ours only on the same basis as the two-key system now works: namely, that affirmative action both by Europe and the U.S. would be necessary for the firing of nuclear weapons in defense of Europe. Therefore, we suggest that: 1. Secretary Rusk focus on this question of the continued U.S. veto in his talks with Gromyko; 2. If it emerges that this is the critical issue with Moscow, we then tell Gromyko that we must talk with our allies and then come back to him. I am raising this with you at Bob McNamara's request. He feels that you, Secretary Rusk, and he ought to talk about this before the conversation with Gromyko is undertaken in New York. For some reason he did not feel free to raise it directly with Secretary Rusk, as I suggested he might. It is possible that Secretary Rusk would have views which differed from Bob's and mine in this matter; and he may have alternative formulae to suggest to try out on Gromyko. This matter is so fundamental that you may wish to budget for a small and quite leisurely meeting with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara in which we could hear Secretary Rusk's views about how to probe Gromyko; Bob McNamara would have a chance to express his; and you would have a chance to give Secretary Rusk guidance for his talks on this subject with Gromyko. To recall my own approach to this question of the U.S. veto, I am attaching my memorandum of August 12. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 1:52 p.m. the same day. The source text bears the following choices for approval: “Set up a special meeting, Put on Tuesday lunch agenda, Leave it to Secretary Rusk, and See me.” The choice “Put on Tuesday lunch agenda” is checked. No record of the Tuesday lunch discussion has been found. 2 The memorandum under reference sets forth Rostow's conclusions from his thoughts on nonproliferation and arms control which he elaborated in an attached memorandum of the same date to the President. (Ibid., Bator Papers, Non-Proliferation, August 1, 1966-September 27, 1966, Box 30) 147. Report Prepared by a Panel Appointed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 147. Report Prepared by a Panel Appointed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1 Washington, September 2, 1966. REPORT OF THE ACDA PANEL ON SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF MODIFYING VARIOUS AGREEMENTS TO BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS WHILE PERMITTING EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES [Here follows a table of contents.] I. Introduction The Panel to examine the security implications of modifying various agreements to ban nuclear weapons tests while permitting explosions for peaceful uses 2 was convened at the request of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Panel was requested to address itself to the following questions. a. What types of weapons development or effects tests could be carried out as part of legitimate or defendable peaceful uses explosions programs within the terms of a limited, a threshold and a comprehensive test ban treaty? b. What would be the probability of verifying that no illegal weapons development or effects tests were carried out as a part of a peaceful uses explosions program? c. What is the military significance of developments which might be carried out under “a.” above and by illegal means? d. What types of verification arrangements could be incorporated in such treaties in order to reduce to acceptable levels the risk that U.S. security might be compromised by development under “a.” and “b.” above? The Panel met in Washington on June 28, 1966; in Livermore, California, on July 14, 1966; in Los Angeles on July 30, 1966; and in Washington on August 21, 1966 to examine these questions and to receive information on the status of U.S. and USSR Plowshare and weapons test programs. Particular attention was paid to techniques for carrying out actual nuclear weapons tests. Sub-groups of the panel also met to examine various more specialized problems associated with the topic. It was not a function of the Panel to evaluate the usefulness of specific projects for peaceful uses of nuclear explosions or the value of such programs as a whole; likewise it was not a function of the Panel to evaluate the merits or demerits of specific test ban proposals per se, except insofar as additive provisions to such test ban proposals relating to peaceful uses explosions might provide opportunities for obtaining weapons development or weapons effects information, or contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Consequently it should be made clear that, although our report contains numerous definite conclusions, it does not contain recommendations for or endorsements of either specific test ban proposals or specific projects relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. The Panel would like to express its appreciation for the cooperation received from ACDA and from the AEC staff and its laboratories, particularly from the Livermore Laboratory. 3 II. Conclusions This Panel was charged with analyzing the implication of a Plowshare annex to various forms of nuclear test ban treaties. In the conclusions to follow we interpret the term “annex” to mean an addition to the treaty that would provide for a declaration of purpose of a peaceful uses explosion combined with some kind of approval mechanism and that would permit observers with specified duties and powers to attend the operation. In addition to these general provisions, possible annexes might, for example, restrict the yields available to a Plowshare detonation or require that explosive devices be placed at an early specified time in a warehouse. We have assumed that disclosure of the device would not be permitted to other nuclear-weapons-powers or non-nuclear-weapon-powers. Disclosure to the latter would reveal weapon technology, and disclosure to the former raises serious and difficult problems of national security. The US has agreed to the present limited test ban in the hope of retarding the development and diffusion of military nuclear explosive technology. In the absence of a Soviet “open society,” a basic policy of the US Government toward any arms control agreement is that it be adequately verified so as to give reasonable assurance that U.S. security interests are protected. While we see little incompatibility between a Plowshare annex and the limited restrictions on weapons development imposed by the present Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the basic question faced by this Panel centered around whether this policy of verification on the one hand and full development and exploitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on the other are compatible with further tightening of the test ban limitations. Our conclusion is that the answer to this general question is “no,” primarily since even with an extensive observer program it is not possible to assure that the basic data needed for military device development are not being obtained in a given Plowshare operation. However, a more limited Plowshare program excluding excavation may be compatible with a further extension of the LTBT. In further detail we submit the following conclusions: 1. To the extent that Plowshare annexes of the types considered by the Panel extend the yields and types of tests permissible under the test ban treaty, they correspondingly open the possibility of some important weapons device development being carried out as part of Plowshare operations, and to an even greater extent in connection with tests for the development of Plowshare explosives. 2. It is possible through observers of a Plowshare operation to restrict severely the acquisition of diagnostic data on specialized device outputs or on weapons effects tests, depending upon the number of observers, their tools and their degree and duration of access. Achievement of an adequate observer program may be a serious negotiation problem. 3. Plowshare activities under any treaty annex would not make a technical contribution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations unless (a) the annex provided for disclosure of the design of the devices used or for their inspection, (b) the declaration of purpose or the permitted activities of the observers would reveal nuclear device design information, or (c) the annex allowed the development or detonation of nuclear explosives by non-nuclear nations. 4. If a Plowshare annex were to be added to the present LTBT the military potential of the nations now subscribing to the treaty would not be substantially affected in view of the large flexibility in terms of nuclear tests allowed under the present treaty. Although an excavation program permitted by a Plowshare annex is compatible with the restrictions on weapons development imposed by the LTBT, such an annex would set a serious precedent which could be incompatible with future more restrictive test bans. 4 5. A Plowshare annex to a seismic threshold test ban treaty (TTBT) that permitted an extensive Plowshare program would have the effect of circumventing the yield threshold for weapons development. A Plowshare annex based on a yield limit for explosions in hard rock corresponding to the yield legal in “soft” media under a TTBT could permit some underground engineering activity. If the annex permitted in effect a substantial increase in the nuclear test yield, then, for example, the impediment that a threshold test ban provided toward further development of area defense anti-missile warheads could be circumvented. In addition, the annex would leave the option open for Soviet Union developments in lighter-weight strategic warheads of high yield-to-weight ratio that would contribute to a MIRV development. Particularly serious is the loophole made possible by a Plowshare annex that would permit a few high-yield weapons development tests that could culminate illegally a series of lower-yield tests carried out legally under a threshold test ban treaty. These “loopholes” provided by the annex could have exceedingly serious consequences for the U.S. deterrent if the Soviet Union chose this means of evasion. 6. Under a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), a Plowshare annex would in effect decrease the “comprehensiveness” of the treaty by permitting, even in the absence of explicit evasion, continued nuclear device development over a wide range of yields and proof testing of the stockpile, and by maintaining the vitality of nuclear weapons establishments. The ability to maintain the vitality of the weapons establishments of both the U.S. and the USSR would make the asymmetry through possible Soviet cheating under a CTBT less significant than if no Plowshare program were permitted. However, an annex permitting an extensive Plowshare program, 5 including excavation, would make possible weapon developments as discussed in Para. 5 above and also would add weapon development possibilities below the threshold. These loopholes, if used by the Soviet Union and not by the U.S. could have highly damaging military consequences. Such an annex adds extensive evasion possibilities to the limited evasion possibilities available without an annex. [Here follow Sections III-V of the report entitled “Nuclear Test Requirements for Plowshare Modifications of Various Test Ban Treaties,” “The Evasion Possibilities and the Possible Plowshare Modifications of Various Test Ban Treaties,” and “Military Significance of the Nuclear Test Program Possible Under Plowshare Modifications of Various Test Ban Treaties,” respectively, and Appendix A, “Examples of Peaceful Uses and Nuclear Explosive Requirements.”] 1 Source: Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text has two cover memoranda: the first from Larry Williamson (S/S-S) to Llewellyn Thompson (S/AL), et al., September 6, transmitting the report. The second from William C. Foster to the members of the Committee of Principals, September 2, transmits the Ad Hoc Panel's Report and explains the origins of the Panel as follows: “at the meeting of the Deputies to the Committee of Principals held on June 3, 1966, serious questions were raised about the possibilities of evasion of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty through provisions for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As a result ACDA organized a panel of experts consisting of Dr. Richard Blankenbecler, Dr. Warren Heckrotte, Mr. William J. Howard, Dr. William G. McMillan, Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, and Dr. M. Carl Walske under the chairmanship of Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky to study the security implications of modifying various agreements to ban nuclear weapons tests while permitting explosions for peaceful purposes.” 2 Throughout the report the terms “Plowshare” and “peaceful uses” are used synonymously; and therefore the first term should not be interpreted as limited to the present U.S. program. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 The LRL report “Technical Relation Between Plowshare and Weapons Programs Under Various Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Proposals” by G. Werth and W. Heckrotte, dated August 1, 1966, was made available to the Panel. [Footnote in the source text; a copy of this Livermore Radiation Laboratory report is attached to a September 6 cover memorandum from T.R. Shaver (S/S-S) to Johnson (G), et al. in Department of State, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2.] 4 Dr. Heckrotte believes that an evaluation of a Plowshare annex to the LTBT as a “serious precedent” involves value judgments of Plowshare and test ban treaties dependent on technical, economic, and political factors, most of which were not within the purview of this Panel. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 Dr. Heckrotte believes that some attention should be given to the possibilities of accommodating a limited Plowshare program to more restrictive test bans. This could avoid risks which would be introduced at this time by an annex to more restrictive test bans which permitted an extensive Plowshare program; for example, see pages 14 and 16 and also the LRL report mentioned on page 4. [Footnote in the source text.] 148. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson 148. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 15, 1966. SUBJECT Steps to Achieve a Non-Proliferation Agreement As a result of the recent private discussions with the Soviets at Geneva, I believe it should be possible to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement which would not interfere with the “McNamara Committee” 2 type of nuclear consultative arrangements and which would not require changes in our existing bilateral NATO nuclear arrangements. I am transmitting the text of such an agreement. 3 Although this draft treaty does not expressly so state, I believe we can only negotiate it if we make clear to the Soviets that we are no longer holding open the option of transferring ownership of nuclear warheads to the Federal Republic of Germany or to an association of states through which the FRG obtains joint ownership of nuclear warheads. U.S. law presently prohibits the exercise of this option and both the Administration and Congress have made it clear that they do not favor a change in this legislation. It is, of course, necessary to advise Chancellor Erhard of our thoughts on this matter and it might be advisable to do so prior to his visit at the end of this month. A draft of a possible letter from you to Chancellor Erhard is attached. 3 I recognize that there are other aspects of our relations with the Federal Republic which make this an unfavorable time to seek German recognition of the realities of the current situation but the passage of time will continue to make it increasingly difficult to clarify this matter. The Germans are undoubtedly aware that it is extremely unlikely that we will ever exercise this option and if we do not clear the matter up and are forced to reiterate at the time of the Erhard visit 4 that we are keeping the option open, it may well cause increased doubts among Germans about U.S. frankness in dealing with them. Once we have come to an understanding with the Federal Republic, the United States would be in the position to undertake serious negotiations with the Soviet Union in the conversations between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko. I recommend that those conversations be preceded by a letter from you to Chairman Kosygin. I have attached a draft of such letter. 5 William C. Foster 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Secret; Exdis. 2 See footnote 4, Document 108 . 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard visited the United States September 24-27 meeting with President Johnson and other high officials, September 26-27. See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968 , vol. XIII, Documents 207 and 208 . 5 Not printed. 149. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 149. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 16, 1966. SUBJECT Cabriolet Nuclear Cratering Experiment Recommendation: I recommend that you authorize the AEC to conduct the Cabriolet test, without prejudice to the decision on any subsequent cratering experiment in the Plowshare series which should be evaluated and decided on the merits at the time and in light of experience with Cabriolet. Problem: The AEC is requesting approval to conduct Cabriolet, a 2.7 kiloton nuclear cratering Plowshare experiment, about December 1, 1966, in Nevada. Some radioactive debris will be released into the atmosphere, since the object of the experiment is to produce a crater. There is no health hazard involved, but a detectable amount of radioactive debris can be expected to drift from Nevada and cross the Canadian border. The consensus among proponents and opponents is that there is a 50-50 chance that a certain amount of debris would be picked up and identified by the Canadians as coming from Cabriolet; a much slighter chance that detection would occur when the debris had proceeded beyond Canada. Pros The main arguments AEC and others have cited for conducting Cabriolet are: It would permit continued U.S. technical progress in nuclear excavation, which we have indications the USSR is also pursuing. It would help maintain the credibility of the nuclear excavation option for a sea level Panama Isthmus Canal. It would furnish data necessary to support the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission program, and permit tentative planning of follow-on experiments needed if the Commission's reporting schedule to you is to be kept. It would allay Joint Atomic Energy Committee concern that we seem to have stopped conducting a nuclear excavation program, whereas testimony to the Congress in connection with the Test Ban Treaty, as well as subsequently, indicated that cratering experiments could and would continue to be conducted without violating the Treaty or future amendments thereto. Cons The main arguments which ACDA and others have made against conducting Cabriolet are: There is an even chance that it would expose the U.S. to a charge of violating the Test Ban Treaty by depositing across our border detectable, identifiable radioactive debris from a U.S. test. Consideration of Cabriolet should not be separated from the decision to be made on the overall Plowshare program. To be meaningful, Cabriolet would have to be followed by other and larger shots, thus increasing still further the probability of charges of Treaty violation. If we are charged publicly with a violation of the Treaty as a result of Cabriolet, it could hamper consideration of other Plowshare peaceful explosion proposals, such as that suggesting the creation of an international entity to offer Plowshare services to the world. The ACDA General Advisory Committee on Disarmament, headed by John McCloy, expressed a formal consensus without dissent on September 13, that it opposed the conduct of Cabriolet, because of “prejudice to non-proliferation” and concern about a conscious violation of the Test Ban Treaty. The Committee includes men such as I.I. Rabi, Herbert York, John Cowles, George Kistiakowsky, Roger Blough and Tray Post. Discussion: This problem has been considered fully and carefully over a considerable period of time at the highest levels of government. It is my view that the advantages of proceeding with Cabriolet outweigh the risks. Dean Rusk 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6 US. Secret. A September 16 cover memorandum from Benjamin H. Read to Rusk reads as follows: “Pursuant to your commitment to the President at lunch last Tuesday, I have had the attached memorandum prepared setting forth the pros (from the AEC papers) and the cons (from Bill Foster's memoranda) and your recommendation that the President authorize the experiment to proceed. ACDA has approved the con portion of the memo and Alex Johnson has approved the whole memo. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum.” A typed note on the source text states that the memorandum was “approved by the President. W. Rostow's office notifying AEC of approval.” 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 150. Editorial Note 150. Editorial Note The International Atomic Energy Agency held the 10th regular session of its general conference in Vienna September 21-28, 1966. In his remarks to the conference on September 22, Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, delivered a message from President Johnson, emphasizing the U.S. commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards over peaceful uses of atomic energy as a principal instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. ( U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966 (Washington, November 1967), page 182) Seaborg's biweekly letter to President Johnson on October 11 highlights the proceedings of the conference as follows: “(a) The Polish and Czech delegates announced the willingness of their governments to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards provided West Germany would do the same. The USSR delegate endorsed the Polish-Czech offer, which is now under consideration. The West German reply stressed the fact that all of their nuclear facilities are already under effective Euratom safeguards. “(b) The Conference approved the 1967 regular (assessed) budget of $9.5 million and the 1967 operational (voluntary) budget of $2.4 million. For the first time pledges to the operational program were made by Soviet Bloc countries (USSR—about $111,000; Poland—$25,000, and Czechoslovakia—$14,000). “(c) The Conference approved the membership applications of Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Uganda, which will raise the number of IAEA countries to 99. “(d) The IAEA Board of Governors approved the application of IAEA safeguards to the U.S. bilateral agreements with Spain and Australia.” (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 13, pages 372-373) 151. Memorandum of Conversation 151. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15–11:30 p.m. US/MC/11 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1966 SUBJECT Outer Space Agreement (Part III of IV) 2 PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson,S/AL Ambassador Foy Kohler, Amb. to Moscow Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, USRep to UN Ambassador William Foster,ACDA Mr. William D. Krimer, OPR/LS, Interpreter USSR Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko, Ambassador to UN Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to US Ambassador Alexey Roschin, Ambassador to Disarmament Committee Mr. Lev Mendelevitch, Deputy Delegate to UN Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter The Secretary expressed the hope that the negotiations concerning an agreement for peaceful exploration of outer space could soon be brought to a successful conclusion. We felt that the discussions in the UN Committee had resulted in considerable progress and that the remaining issues had really narrowed down to one or two specific points. 3 He hoped that our colleagues could resume their discussions here in New York and reach agreement on these remaining points during the present UN General Assembly meeting. For our part we were prepared to undertake necessary measures for mutual use of tracking stations as far as US territory was concerned; we could not, however, force third countries to do the same, although we would be willing to do all we could to encourage all countries to take a cooperative position. The Secretary repeated his hope that our negotiators could bring the work they started in Geneva to a successful conclusion. Mr. Gromyko agreed that the outer space negotiations had achieved positive results and that there remained only the one point the Secretary had mentioned. He expressed the view that all countries signing the proposed agreement must assume the same obligations and enjoy the same rights so that the principle of equality be preserved. If however some countries took the position that their “relatives” would be extended privileges while other countries would be denied these same privileges, the principle of equality was violated; what kind of cooperation would that represent? He was surprised that the Soviet proposal of equal rights and obligations had met such a negative response. He was sure that acceptance of the Soviet proposal would not affect the interests of the United States. He would, therefore, like to see a more positive attitude on the part of the US toward this principle of equality of rights and obligations. Did the Secretary see any possibility of overcoming this difficulty? If so, he thought a treaty could be signed soon. He asked the Secretary to think about this problem; the Soviet Union was not, after all, asking the impossible. The Secretary replied that given this Soviet position we would have to face the very real possibility that the US and the USSR would be the only two countries signing the outer space agreement; other countries might not be willing to sign. Such a Soviet and American signature in itself might represent a positive step; but, as is the case in negotiating “most favored nation” treatment in trade agreements, this was really a matter for bilateral negotiations between the countries involved. The Secretary did not believe that this single issue should stand in the way of signing an outer space treaty. Mr. Gromyko repeated that this difficulty would have to be overcome. He agreed that the representatives of the two countries should continue to exchange opinions on this matter, but would hope to see greater objectivity on the part of the United States. If all parties agreed to cooperate on an equal basis there was no problem, otherwise this represented an instance of discrimination against the Soviet Union. He realized that the United States had worked out use of tracking stations with other countries on a bilateral basis, and he did not blame the US for doing so, but this had taken place when an outer space treaty was not even being discussed. Now that such a treaty was under consideration, being a multilateral treaty, new arrangements on a multilateral basis, providing for the principle of equality, were in order. Ambassador Goldberg commented that we ought to be able to reach agreement; in fact, we had leaned over so far backwards for the purpose of reaching agreement that certain American newspapers had referred to the outer space negotiations as a succession of American retreats. On the UN General Assembly floor we had said today that we accept the principle on a bilateral basis. 4 We are willing to work out a bilateral tracking station agreement with the USSR; we are further willing to include in the preamble of the agreement a statement emphasizing the desirability of signatory countries working out practical arrangements with each other. As a practical matter this was not really a problem which easily lent itself to multilateral solution. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Lebanon and Australia wanted to have their own say in this matter. We did not encourage any opposition on the part of any country to working out suitable technical arrangements with the Soviet Union and with each other; this was not only a matter of equality of rights, but also a matter of very special technical arrangements. Thus, for example, tracking facilities set up for our purposes would not be of help to the Soviet Union, since different equipment would be required. The Ambassador emphasized that this was not a matter of opposition on the part of the US, but rather a matter of other sovereign states wanting to have their own say in the matter. As a matter of fact, some of our friends had told us that the offer we made today had put them in an awkward position. We should have a treaty before either of us achieved a landing on the moon. Later such a treaty would present many more difficulties. It is for this reason that we are willing to include a statement as to the desirability of bilateral arrangements being worked out in the preamble or text of the proposed treaty. Mr. Gromyko agreed that representatives of the two countries meet and discuss possible solutions; the points of view of both countries had been expressed clearly. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly, September-October 1966. 2 Part I dealt with a Civil Air Agreement; Part II with an Indonesian Creditors' Moratorium. (Ibid.) Part IV is Document 152 . 3 The Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space met in Geneva, July 12-August 4, and reached agreement on most points of the draft outer space treaty including one arms control measure, namely that “No party will orbit any nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or station such a weapon on a celestial body.” ( U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966 (Washington, November 1967), p. 14) The Legal Subcommittee resumed negotiations in New York, September 12, but reached no further agreement before it adjourned September 16. 4 See Goldberg's statement before the U.N. General Assembly in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 962. 152. Memorandum of Conversation 152. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 22, 1966, 8:15–11:30 p.m. US/MC/11 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1966 SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Agreement (Part IV of IV) 2 PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, US Rep to UN Ambassador William Foster,ACDA Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson,S/AL Ambassador Foy Kohler, Amb. to Moscow Mr. William D. Krimer, OPR/LS, Interpreter USSR Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko, Ambassador to UN Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to US Ambassador Alexey Roschin, Ambassador Disarmament Committee Mr. Lev Mendelevitch, Deputy Delegate to UN Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter The Secretary raised the question of reaching an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said that we believed very strongly that this problem was most urgent and important. The United States was opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not presently in possession of such weapons. We also believed that the Soviet Union was opposed to such proliferation. We had never discussed any arrangements providing for the delivery of nuclear weapons into the hands of any other state, neither in NATO nor anywhere else. This position of the US was really very old. Because of the very nature of these weapons we were determined to prevent their proliferation. We were somewhat puzzled over the difficulty of reaching agreement on this subject; we regarded the problem as being urgent and as one in which the passage of time was making it more and more difficult to come to an effective agreement. This was not really a problem between the United States and the Soviet Union. The true importance of the problem dealt with those states which did not now possess nuclear weapons, but were desirous of moving in the direction of acquiring nuclear capability. As time elapsed more and more obstacles were being raised by such non-nuclear countries. Some such states now say that they would not join in a non-proliferation agreement unless it also provided for agreement between nuclear countries for steps toward nuclear disarmament. While this in itself is desirable it should not be a condition of reaching agreement on non-proliferation. Some countries, such as India, for example, state that they must reserve the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; well, if you have that capability you also have the capability of using a nuclear bomb. As Mr. Gromyko knew, some non-nuclear countries have said that they could not participate in a non-proliferation agreement unless they had nuclear guarantees from nuclear countries in the event of an attack. The Secretary thought that difficulties of this type will keep on growing with time. In the meanwhile, we know that some countries are, as it were, “seven months pregnant.” We thought that toward the end of the Geneva negotiations we had moved toward the prospect of an agreement between our two countries. 3 At one of the last meetings Ambassador Roschin had said that the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries was the real heart of the matter. We agree that this is so. In the past a variety of issues had been injected into the negotiations which had nothing whatever to do with non-proliferation. But in the recent discussion between Mr. Fisher and Amb. Roschin, the Secretary felt that there was a possibility of moving toward an agreement. 4 He wanted to emphasize the urgency and the danger involved in the time factor. A non-proliferation agreement was clearly in the interest of both countries; in this respect they had common interests. Perhaps a part of the difficulty consisted in both countries having become “frozen” to the texts of the proposed agreement; perhaps we could find new language to close the gap, which would offer the possibility of reaching agreement. We have not discussed this matter with our allies and any contacts between the two countries would have to be carried on on the basis of complete discretion; otherwise nothing could be accomplished. The Secretary would be glad to hear from Mr. Gromyko whether he thought Ambassadors Roschin and Foster could find some new language which might open the door to agreement. He was greatly concerned over the increasing difficulties presented by long delay in reaching agreement. Mr. Gromyko said that non-proliferation was an old question, which had been discussed at great length, and yet, if the Secretary had not raised it at this meeting, he would have done so himself because of its importance and because it concerned all countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. We had already lost a great deal of time with detrimental consequences. Thus, for example, just one year ago the foreign minister of India had discussed non-proliferation matters in a very timid manner, whereas today India was taking a stronger position; 5 the Secretary said he had noted the same thing. Later this point of view would become even more widespread and this could also be seen in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. Not only India, but other states also are beginning to tie non-proliferation to other questions such as halting the production of fissionable material, etc. The Secretary knew that if non-proliferation was tied to such matters there might not be any treaty at all. Mr. Gromyko wondered whether India and others proposing such tie-ins were serious or not, and whether a treaty with broad participation would be possible in view of such attitudes. He, too, therefore believed that there was no time to be lost in reaching agreement. As concerns the Soviet Government, it was ready to sign a treaty banning direct and indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons. He wanted to ask the question very clearly, whether the US was ready to say so in the treaty. He defined what he meant by saying that the treaty must contain a prohibition against non-nuclear countries producing or receiving nuclear weapons directly or indirectly. Nuclear countries must be forbidden to transfer nuclear weapons into the national hands of any non-nuclear country, directly or indirectly. He added that the Secretary knew what he meant by the word “indirectly.” He meant by that transfer of nuclear weapons through an alliance. If the treaty could contain such a prohibition, he would think that the major part of the difficulties was already behind us. It was true that there were some other points to be discussed also, but he did not now want to do so, they could be discussed later. He asked the Secretary to clarify the US position on these points and added that these questions should not be regarded as a matter in which one country would lose something while another gained, since both countries were equally interested in closing the door to nuclear proliferation. The problem was far too serious for considerations of tactics or prestige to be given any importance at all. This crucial problem affected the interests of nuclear and non-nuclear states alike. In reply the Secretary stated categorically that as far as the United States was concerned, we shall not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries; we shall not assist any non-nuclear country to develop or fire nuclear weapons; American nuclear weapons would be fired at the command of the President of the United States exclusively. If the United States joined in an alliance arrangement, nuclear weapons would still be fired only at the command of the President of the United States. If the Secretary understood Mr. Gromyko's question concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons correctly, his answer was an unqualified yes, and Ambassadors Roschin and Foster could discuss the language with a view to eliminating any possible hidden misunderstanding. He again emphasized the point that if this was merely a question between our two countries, we would not need a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The very essence of the situation made it clear that both countries must be opposed to the appearance of nuclear powers; even the present five were too many. Mr. Gromyko interrupted to say that even one was one too many. The Secretary agreed and blessed Bernard Baruch for having seen this fact in his time. 6 He said that if the US and the USSR could reach agreement on a treaty, while they would still be unable to force other countries to sign it, they would be in a much better position to influence them to do so. He pointed out that many of the arguments used by non-nuclear countries against non-proliferation were merely contrived pretexts, designed to hold their positions open for future negotiating purposes. He did not accept such arguments as genuine. The Secretary went on to say that he could not see why our two countries could not agree about the heart of the matter and then put their heads together to see what could be done to make other countries, which were presently merely “flirting,” sign the treaty. Foreign Minister Gromyko asked for clarification. The Secretary had said that without the US Government, indeed, without orders from the President of the United States personally, American nuclear weapons could not be fired. Mr. Gromyko said that this was not the question here, although this, too, raised some other questions he would prefer to leave for another occasion. The main problem was to find out where we now stood. The Soviet Union proposed that the treaty prohibit non-nuclear countries from manufacturing and receiving into their national hands nuclear weapons from nuclear countries and further that they not be given access to nuclear weapons through blocs, alliances or military organizations. Conversely nuclear countries were to be forbidden to transfer nuclear weapons into the national hands of non-nuclear countries or to grant non-nuclear countries access to nuclear weapons through blocs, alliances or military organizations. Did the Secretary agree that these two conditions must be reflected in a non-proliferation treaty, or not? It seemed to Mr. Gromyko that these two conditions, concerning direct and indirect transfer must be included in such a treaty. He wanted to ascertain that position of the United States in this respect at the present time. He knew that the US was interested in a non-proliferation treaty and he was sure the Secretary also knew that the Soviet Union was interested in it. He was only trying to tie what the Secretary had said to the language of the proposed treaty. In reply the Secretary asked Mr. Gromyko to go directly to the heart of the matter and to deal with it clearly. Unfortunately during the past two or three years a great deal of theology had accumulated around the use of certain terms, such as “give, dispose of, turn over to, contribute to the ability of non-nuclear powers to obtain the technology required” etc. The situation, on the other hand, was very clear. We should try to return to language which would cut through words and misunderstandings. We ought to see if such language could be found. Mr. Gromyko said that he did not believe the difficulty to be a matter of theology or semantics only. He would ask the question in a different way. There had been plans in existence for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force or an Atlantic nuclear force, mixed manning of ships bearing nuclear weapons, etc. The Soviet Union regarded all such forces as being a form of access to nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers. The Secretary was surely better informed than he as to the plans and status of such forces, but all of them, in the Soviet view, represented access of non-nuclear countries to nuclear weapons. The United States maintained that this was not the case, that you did not grant the Federal Republic of Germany or any other country access to nuclear weapons. Therefore he now asked whether these plans are still in existence or not, whether any plans the USSR considered to represent access are under consideration. Since the Secretary did not keep the Soviet Union informed of such plans and since the press also was not informed, he did not know. If there were no such plans in existence and if the United States was willing to accept a ban on direct and indirect proliferation, the Soviet Union would be fully satisfied and by these provisions in the treaty all loopholes would have been closed. It was this question that needed to be clarified. It was on this question that we stumbled two or three years ago and we have not been able to move ahead since. The Soviet Union was convinced that the United States would not lose by a non-proliferation agreement and Mr. Gromyko was willing to believe that the US was not interested in proliferation and that it did not dispute the Soviet Union's interest in reaching a non-proliferation agreement. Why, then, could not a way be found to do so? The Secretary replied that the US could not make the USSR the 16th member of NATO with veto power at the NATO table any more than the USSR could admit the US with veto power to the Warsaw Pact. What the two countries could agree to was a clear and precise ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States was willing to sign an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons into the control of non-nuclear countries, not to put any non-nuclear country in a position to fire nuclear weapons, to give assurances that such American weapons would be fired only at the order of the President of the United States, and not to help any other country acquire the technology required to produce nuclear weapons or to assist any other country in firing them; we had demonstrated our good faith in this respect by our attitude to France's nuclear tests in the Pacific. The Secretary suggested that between now and the meeting scheduled for Saturday evening (September 24, 1966) 7 Ambassadors Roschin and Foster and any advisers they wanted to assist them attempt to work out a text acceptable to both sides. The Secretary added that he had not mentioned further talks with the USSR to our allies at Geneva simply because we did not then think that we had come close enough to resolving the difficulties. If anything needed to be said now it would only be that the US and the USSR were discussing the very heart of the problem. Ambassador Foster added that the Soviet Union had apparently been haunted by the specter of the FRG; yet, we had no intention of giving the Germans access to nuclear weapons for this would be contrary to the philosophy the US had been guided by for the past twenty years, namely that only we had the right to fire American nuclear weapons. We have no intention to give up this national control and we would not help any non-nuclear country obtain nuclear weapons, for we believe it to be contrary to our interest to increase the number of nuclear powers. The matter of reaching agreement on non-proliferation is most urgent, for the price of obtaining other countries' consent keeps on going up day to day. Now may very well be our last chance to work out an agreement. Mr. Gromyko restated his position to the effect that a general statement of intentions, without more precise definition, concrete obligations, would lead to a variety of interpretations of a specific act on the part of a signatory country. The US would tend to interpret its own acts one way and the Soviet Union another, and vice versa. We would then find ourselves in a trap and such a treaty would have been stillborn. Therefore it was not enough to prohibit just in a general way the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would also be necessary to define channels, forms, concepts, etc. We should attempt to put this more precisely in the text of the treaty. This is a problem, which must be solved, no matter who puts their heads together. The Secretary proposed that this question be considered again by looking at some language to be drafted before the meeting Saturday evening and Mr. Gromyko agreed. The Secretary further proposed that the press merely be told that some preliminary discussions on questions of mutual interest had been held at the present meeting. Mr. Gromyko agreed. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Approved in S on September 26. The conversation was held at the Waldorf Towers. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko headed their respective delegations to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly. 2 See footnote 2, Document 151 . 3 The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee met in Geneva June 14-August 25. 4 The discussions between Fisher and Roschin have not been further identified. 5 The discussion in 1965 by Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh and the current Indian position on nonproliferation have not been further identified. 6 See footnote 5, Document 97 . 7 For the record of the Rusk-Gromyko meeting on September 24, see Document 153 . 153. Memorandum of Conversation 153. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30–11 p.m. US/MC/16 SUBJECT Non-Proliferation (Part I of II) 2 PARTICIPANTS US Participants Secretary Dean Rusk Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Ambassador Foy D. Kohler Ambassador William C. Foster Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson Mr. William D. Krimer (Interpreter) USSR Participants Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko Ambassador Nikolai T. Fedorenko Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Mr. Lev I. Mendelevitch Mr. Alexei A. Roschin Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter) Non-Proliferation Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he would like to take the present opportunity to express his thoughts on non-proliferation in the most precise words and asked that both sides be outspoken in order to clarify as accurately as possible whether or not a sound foundation for a non-proliferation treaty existed. Personally, he did note a certain rapprochement between the two positions. If this was indeed the case, he suggested that both sides join in a concerted effort to work out appropriate language for a treaty. After the discussion which had been held during the past two days his representatives had informed him of such rapprochement, but it still remained unclear how to express this in mutually acceptable language. He wanted to repeat what he had said many times, namely that we should not sign a treaty which could be open to misinterpretation, for, after all, after its signing the principals would go their separate ways to Washington and Moscow and would not be in a position to resolve differing interpretations. For this reason it was not enough to word the treaty in general language only, we had to be more precise so as to avoid misinterpretations. In addition, it seemed to him that both sides must try to put aside purely diplomatic formulations; the interests of both countries as well as of others, indeed of the entire world were involved, and this in itself precluded the signing of a non-proliferation treaty which was not worded precisely and accurately. He emphasized once again that he hoped both sides would be frank and outspoken in their search for agreement. The Secretary wanted to comment briefly on the problem as he saw it. He was going to be frank and would rely on the Soviet side's complete discretion. First, he wanted the Foreign Minister to understand that if we would be able to find mutually acceptable language, we would have to consult our allies before we said finally that we agreed. The Secretary therefore reserved the right to carry on such consultations. Secondly, he felt that Mr. Gromyko was seriously underestimating the depth and the strength of our interest in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also the depth and the strength of the opposition of certain countries to such a treaty. Yet, it was a matter of quite harsh and selfish American policy, our purely national policy, that caused us utterly to oppose any arrangement which would involve our providing nuclear weapons to other countries. Further, within NATO there was strong opposition to providing the FRG with an independent nuclear capability. We knew very well that Soviet policy was frequently affected by memories of World War II as far as the Germans were concerned. But, Mr. Gromyko must also realize that in the NATO alliance many other countries also have dark memories of World War II—France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain and others. Thus there were strong reasons in NATO against the FRG receiving nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the Secretary wanted Mr. Gromyko to know that President Johnson was utterly serious in his determination to resolve this question. We had no doubt that US and Soviet policy on non-proliferation was truly identical. In the past the Soviet Union had raised some issues in connection with non-proliferation, which really were quite extraneous and had nothing to do with non-proliferation. But he thought that if we now concentrated on the heart of the matter it should not be impossible to find the language which would express the common policy of the two sides. He quite agreed that it was important not to use language which would conceal the true points of view; on our side a treaty would be open to examination by the Senate, indeed it would be open to very broad public examination, so that all our agreements with the Soviet Union would inevitably become public. The Secretary did believe that some progress had been made during the past days and weeks, undoubtedly because both sides recognized the urgency of the time factor. The longer we delayed the more difficult it would become to get other countries to join in the treaty. The Secretary was not thinking so much of the FRG in this respect as of other non-nuclear-weapon states such as Japan, India, Israel and others. It was important and urgent to act now, before the horse escaped the stable; then it would be too late to close the door. The Secretary urged Mr. Gromyko not to worry about the ghosts of the future but rather to help us now draft a treaty. We were opposed to furnishing nuclear weapons or nuclear information to any country which was not now a nuclear-weapon state. We thought that the Soviet side was equally opposed to this. The Secretary hoped that we could find simple language to express this serious interest of both sides without trying to write into the treaty provisions that would cover every possible future contingency, however remote. He thought that during the last two days we had exchanged language which would help us move closer together. He had had no chance to consult with the President since his last meeting with Mr. Gromyko because the President was in Texas. But he knew of the President's serious concern with the urgency of the matter. He was concerned that it might be too late unless we took quick action to induce other governments which were active in a nuclear direction to join in the treaty, governments which neither we nor the USSR could control. He therefore hoped that we could work this out while Mr. Gromyko was still here. Each of us would probably have some difficulties with our respective allies, and both of us with countries not in either alliance; but, the very first step had to be for both of us to reach agreement. If we concentrated on the essence of the matter and left aside considerations which were not realistic we could move ahead. We should deal with this essence without any delay because of theoretical considerations. Mr. Gromyko referred to the three alternative versions worked out by the negotiators this afternoon and asked for clarification in answer to one specific question. Could we have agreement that no nuclear-weapon power would transfer nuclear weapons, etc., directly or indirectly to any non-nuclear-weapon state individually or by virtue of such non-nuclear-weapon state's membership or partnership in a grouping of states, alliance or bloc? This question, in his view, had not been answered so far, although if he understood the Secretary correctly both countries were thinking in the same direction. How could it then be possible that we could not reach agreement? There should be no possibility of a 50-50 chance of misinterpretation. He proposed that we now discuss the situation from this angle. If we agreed on the content of the treaty, then our representatives could put this down on paper; after all, the purpose of language was to express thoughts and ideas and agreements precisely. It did not matter for the purpose of this discussion whether or not the Soviet Union underestimated one thing or another; we should not be concerned with the past. As for his side, he took careful note of the Secretary's statement concerning the determination of the United States to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that it seemed to him that we did not have agreement on 99% of the problem. This concerned three very simple propositions: 1) that we not transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear country directly or indirectly; 2) that we not assist any non-nuclear-weapon state become a nuclear power in any possible way; 3) that we never delegate the right to fire US nuclear weapons to anyone else. It seemed to the Secretary that the controversy over the remaining 1% was really just a controversy over concepts. For example, the notion of ownership seemed to cause some difficulty. The non-nuclear-weapon states in NATO were, after all, the targets of Soviet nuclear weapons; it could very well be that some non-nuclear state in the alliance would make a financial contribution toward the maintenance of American nuclear weapons on its territory. The Soviet Union might well object to this, but in reality this had nothing to do with non-proliferation. Another such concept was represented by the word “control.” We could not tell our allies that they would have no voice in any decision to go to war. The concept of access was another difficulty. If, however, we would concentrate on these three simple ideas: not to transfer nuclear weapons, not to provide nuclear-weapon technology to any non-nuclear state, not to delegate the firing of nuclear weapons, then we did really have 99% agreement. Mr. Gromyko said he had two remarks to make concerning the Secretary's statement. When the Secretary said that allies must participate in any decision to go to war he raised a question which would lead the discussion very far afield. Mr. Gromyko had not raised this question, although he might well return to it later. Secondly, he, Mr. Gromyko, had asked the question concerning access of non-nuclear-weapon states to nuclear weapons in their capacity of participants or members in a group of states or an alliance. This was not just a question he was raising by himself, rather it was a question posed by life itself. Suppose that agreement were reached concerning transfer of nuclear weapons into the national hands of a non-nuclear-weapon state, the question concerning transfer to an alliance which included both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states still remained unanswered. Would in such a case non-nuclear-weapon states participate in the decisions of the alliance, in ownership, control and use of nuclear weapons, as members of the alliance? Mr. Gromyko thought they should not so participate. This was what he meant by using the word “indirect.” The Secretary asked Ambassador Foster to clarify the three alternative drafts of Article I of the proposed treaty. Was the first alternative based upon the suggestion of the Russian colleagues? Ambassador Foster said that both sides had contributed to it. Inasmuch as the concept of “right to fire” required further qualification from the American point of view (i.e. “except at the direct orders of the President of the United States”) and the concept of “access” had raised difficulties, both concepts had been struck from the draft of Article I. The Soviet side had suggested adding the words “control over” and we had accepted this as useful. This afternoon the Soviet negotiators had presented a second alternative which included a prohibition against transfer of nuclear weapons to military alliances or groups of states, instead of the former formulation “through military alliances or groups of states.” We had taken the position that, while this provision would be in full accord with our national legislation, which we had no intention of amending, it would at this moment in history be politically unwise to word it just that way. A third alternative draft had then been suggested, which would not specify the possible recipient, but would merely use the words “to any recipient whatsoever.” Ambassador Foster thought that this alternative answered everything. Mr. Gromyko said that he had seen all three alternative drafts and that what he had just said had been in answer to them. To Ambassador Goldberg's question as to what he objected to specifically in alternative three, he replied that all the American versions spoke of groups and alliances as mere transmitters of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology instead of prohibiting ownership, control and disposal of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states individually as well as in their capacity of participants in groups or alliances. Supposing that the American side did not attach any great importance to these points; it should, however, consider the fact that the Soviet side did think them important and therefore attempt to find language to close the door to all possible loopholes as they were seen by the Soviet side. Ambassador Foster replied that he thought the third alternative draft accomplished exactly that by speaking of “any recipient whatsoever.” Secretary Rusk pointed out that we were discussing a situation in the absence of a state of war. If war did occur, then, of course, all bets were off. We were therefore only speaking of conditions in times of peace, up to the beginning of a war which he sincerely hoped would never occur. Secondly, we were not discussing the question of decisions to go to war. We could not in our alliances reserve this right exclusively to ourselves. It would have to be a decision in which all allies would participate, including, of course, the United States. Mr. Gromyko said that these were political considerations, while we were here discussing nuclear weapons as such. The Secretary pointed out that the more we were talking about the heart of the matter, that is the physical weapons themselves, the more it became evident that we were in agreement. Mr. Gromyko added that the formulation “to any recipient whatsoever” would also be unacceptable because it appeared to prohibit transfer to oneself. It would certainly be open to at least two interpretations. The Secretary asked for clarification by asking the question whether, in the Soviet view, the three Polaris submarines we had assigned to NATO would constitute a violation of a non-proliferation treaty if such treaty were now in force. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know and would ask the same question of the Secretary. In any case this concerned existing arrangements and the present was not yet the time to discuss such existing arrangements. It seemed to him that this begged the question as to whether these subs were an American force or part of a joint force. He restated his question concerning nuclear weapons in national hands of non-nuclear-weapon states, either directly or because of their participation in an alliance. He felt this was a simple question. If the United States intended to create a joint force, then it should say so now and he would know where he stood; the US position would then be clear to him. If no such intention existed, and it was his impression that it did not exist, then there should be no obstacle to working out a treaty. The Secretary said Mr. Gromyko was quite right in believing that we had no intention to give nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states, either directly or indirectly through their membership in alliances. However, we could not say to our allies that the question of war was none of their business; after all, they were sitting on the targets, they were very much involved. We had never had the slightest idea of transferring nuclear weapons and do not now intend to do so. Mr. Gromyko still felt that there was a serious misunderstanding. It was not only a question of transferring nuclear weapons into the national hands of non-nuclear-weapon states, directly or through alliances, but also a question of not granting access to nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states in their capacity of participants in groups or alliances. The United States was a nuclear-weapon power and would remain a nuclear-weapon power regardless of a non-proliferation treaty, but the question of access remained unsolved. At this point Mr. Gromyko used three teacups to illustrate this point visually. The Secretary reminded Mr. Gromyko that he had intended to comment on the question of consultation. Mr. Gromyko said that he was not raising the question of consultation in connection with a non-proliferation treaty . In the Soviet view the treaty should state that which is to be prohibited rather than that which is to be allowed; although he could draw certain conclusions from the Secretary's statement concerning the participation of the FRG in any decision to go to war. The Secretary said that considering the problem for the physical weapons point of view only seemed to simplify it. Here we were dealing with the question of who had such weapons, who could fire them, who could manufacture them, who had nuclear technology, etc. He could not see why it should be so difficult to find appropriate expressions to cover these points. When we said “directly or indirectly,” in our minds we were 100% clear as to what this meant. Somehow we ought to be able to put this down on paper. Mr. Gromyko replied once again that this was open to a 50-50 interpretation. Each side would place its own interpretation on such wording. He could not dispute the right of the United States to interpret such language in its own interests, and naturally other countries would be guided by their particular interests as well. We were dealing with two kinds of entities—national entities and groups or alliances or blocs. The Secretary reminded Mr. Gromyko that he had asked for a frank discussion. He therefore hoped Mr. Gromyko would not mind the following. We assumed that in the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Union retained for itself the decision to use nuclear weapons, although non-nuclear-weapon members of the Warsaw Pact had received nuclear vehicles. Mr. Gromyko wanted to know if this was a question. The Soviet Union had not in the past and is not now taking any steps leading to a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that in the NATO alliance we retained complete control over the firing of U.S. nuclear weapons. He wanted to ask the Foreign Minister a frank question. We do say to our allies that even though we retain the final decision they must be consulted in any group discussion in which we are, of course, a party. Perhaps Mr. Gromyko did not care for this arrangement to become known to his Warsaw Pact partners, who then might ask him for the same kind of thing. Mr. Gromyko said the Secretary had raised two questions. One of these is political. We had agreed to discuss only the question of the physical nuclear weapons themselves. He preferred not to discuss the other question. Secondly, it seemed to him that the Secretary had implied that the question of proliferation and the question of the right to fire were not related. And yet, when plans for mixed manned ships, the MLF and the ANF, were considered in the past, the Secretary had made that distinction. He suggested that question be set aside. If the Secretary was opposed to proliferation to non-nuclear-weapon states as national entities and as members of groups and alliances, then there should be no difficulty. Reservation of the right to fire appeared to point in this direction. The Secretary remarked that this reservation applied to American nuclear weapons only; General De Gaulle had said that he would not give us control over his nuclear weapons. The Secretary said it seemed to him that we had usefully excluded three questions: 1) the situation in the event that war occurs; 2) political decision as to whether or not war does occur; and 3) political relationships among states. Concerning the physical nuclear weapons themselves it appeared to him we were in agreement. The problem was to find the right language to express this agreement without involving extraneous matters. The three latest drafts seemed to have narrowed the gap. Apparently the formulations tried in the last 48 hours had come fairly close but had not as yet satisfied both sides completely. He hoped that the answer could be found while the Minister was still in this country. We did not envisage and had never discussed a situation in which American nuclear weapons ceased to be American nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko suggested that the representatives of the two sides get together again to continue their search tomorrow or Monday. 3 The Secretary said he had instructions from President Johnson to make a maximum effort to reach agreement and he assumed Mr. Gromyko's instructions were the same. After Mr. Gromyko confirmed this fact the Secretary again stressed the importance of finding a solution while Mr. Gromyko was still here. 1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (OPR/LS (Interpreter)) and approved by Thompson (S/AL) and by S on September 26. This conversation was held during Foreign Minister Gromyko's dinner for Secretary Rusk at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Rusk visited New York September 19-25 and October 4-8 during the general debate at the U.N. General Assembly. (Johnson Library, Rusk's Appointment Book) 2 Vietnam was the subject of Part II. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84) 3 No record of conversation on September 25 or Monday, September 26, has been found, but a memorandum of Foster's September 28 conversation with Roschin in New York reports that Roschin “felt that considerable progress had been made and a common understanding reached on the most substantive article of the draft treaty, although the Soviet side had not gotten all it wanted and was not really satisfied.” (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-6) 154. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 154. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 3, 1966. SUBJECT Goldberg Meeting with Gromyko I've had a brief rundown by classified telephone of the Goldberg-Gromyko conversation this morning. A cable will be coming later in the day. 2 There were no significant Soviet reactions except that at the close of the conversation Gromyko referred to the outer space treaty as an hors d'oeuvre which depended on “getting a better picture of the main meal.” This is interpreted to mean in New York Soviet unwillingness to agree to a space treaty without some progress on non-proliferation and possibly Vietnam. 1. Outer Space Treaty Ambassador Goldberg explained the U.S. was eager to reach agreement on a treaty as evidence of a mutual desire for good relationships. He mentioned the problem of equal facilities and expressed willingness to shift from the preamble to an operative paragraph a provision whereby the parties would agree to consider granting of facilities. He did not give Gromyko specific language. Gromyko indicated no real awareness of details but commented this did not get over the problem of discrimination from the Soviet point of view and the U.S. should “show more imagination.” [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] 3. Non-Proliferation Treaty Ambassador Goldberg noted that this was something Gromyko would wish to discuss with the President and therefore he would not go into any detail. He told Gromyko that the President had said to him yesterday that he would not go along with any change in U.S. law that would remove the need for his approval for firing of any nuclear weapons. Gromyko responded that firing was not the whole problem. Goldberg added that the President had also said he would not go along with arrangements where others could tell him where or when the U.S. would employ nuclear weapons. Gromyko just nodded. He asked whether Ambassador Goldberg was telling him the U.S. was really anxious to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. Goldberg said “yes.” Gromyko repeated it would have to be a treaty which avoided any dissemination through the structure of an alliance. [Here follows discussion of Chinese representation.] 1 Source: Department of State,S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, 1966. Secret; Limdis. A copy was sent to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. 2 Not further identified. 155. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach 155. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Popper) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach 1 Washington, October 5, 1966. SUBJECT Latest Developments on Outer-Space Treaty Information Memorandum Yesterday the Soviet Union gave Ambassador Goldberg an advance look at new space-treaty language which they will make public today. 2 In summary, a few problems still remain, although the new Soviet proposals show significant movement towards a workable compromise. With respect to specific provisions, the Soviets have accepted our compromise proposal on access to installations on celestial bodies. They have made only very minor changes in our proposal for reporting activities on celestial bodies, another major point. They have significantly qualified their request for third countries to grant tracking facilities to all parties on an equal basis, by recognizing that the actual tracking station arrangement has to evolve from bilateral negotiations between the countries concerned. The original Soviet demand caused concern to our friends, and we have asked them to seek instructions from their governments on the latest Soviet offer. Ambassador Goldberg will be meeting at 3 p.m. today with the Soviet Representative to give him our preliminary assessment of the new proposals. I understand that Mr. Sisco is telephoning you on this subject. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, SP 4. Confidential. Drafted by Datus C. Proper (IO/UNP). A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the “Acting Secretary saw.” 2 Telegrams 1251 and 1252 from USUN, October 5, transmitted Soviet texts which Morozov gave Goldberg on that day with a view to disposing of outstanding issues in the negotiation of an Outer Space Treaty. (Ibid.) On the same day, telegram 1256 from USUN reported Goldberg's reactions to the Soviet proposals in part as follows: “Morozov gave clear impression of Soviet readiness to proceed to reach agreement speedily on outer space treaty without reference to subjects lying outside space field. He indicated continuing desire to finish the job before outer space item is taken up in First Committee and Assembly.” (Ibid.) Goldberg's consultation with the friendly fifteen (less Argentina, Australia, Iran, Lebanon, and Sweden) is reported in telegram 1264 from USUN, October 5. (Ibid.) 156. Memorandum of Conversation 156. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966. SUBJECT Underground Nuclear Testing PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State The Ambassador [Dobrynin] made the following statement: “On September twelfth this year, there took place an ejection of radioactive products into the atmosphere during the conduct of an underground test of a nuclear weapon at the American proving ground in the State of Nevada. 2 The Soviet side asserts that this is already the ninth case of ejection of radioactive materials in the conduct of American underground tests of nuclear weapons since the conclusion of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. “Since such ejection of radioactive materials contradicts the spirit of the Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Soviet side expects that the American side will present necessary explanations concerning the facts of the appearance of radioactive materials in the atmosphere as a result of these tests and will take precautionary measures in order that compliance with the terms of the treaty will be duly ensured.” I inquired whether it was considered that any atomic debris had gone outside the borders of the United States. After checking his notes, he observed that this aspect was not mentioned. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials Memoranda of Conversation 1966. Secret. Drafted and approved by Thompson(S/AL), October 10. 2 The U.S. Government reported the “accidental release of radioactivity detected off site” as a result of its underground nuclear test named Derringer at the Nevada Test Site on September 12. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , p. 28) 157. Memorandum of Conversation 157. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson Mr. Walt Rostow U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Sukodrev Mr. Gromyko said he would like to raise the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. He had had an exchange of views with Secretary Rusk. 2 The Soviet Union considered that every lost day made the problem more difficult. They believed that every nation in the world was interested in achieving an agreement on this subject. He said that every government had its advisers and there were perhaps some that thought the Soviet Union was not interested in signing such an agreement, but he urged the President not to believe this. The Soviet Union was ready to sign an agreement in two weeks when an agreed text was achieved. The Soviet position was that nuclear weapons must not fall into individual national control of non-nuclear powers or into the collective hands of any grouping that included non-nuclear powers. He would like to have the President's views on this subject and said that if the conditions he had outlined could be met, the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude an agreement and perhaps the Foreign Ministers might meet before the end of the year, perhaps at Geneva for this purpose. The President, in referring to Mr. Gromyko's remark about advisers, said that there were no two men in which he had more trust than Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson. He said when they speak, they have my complete confidence and he said that sometimes he thought he trusted them more than he trusted himself. He said that he had been happy that we appeared to be on the verge of reaching an agreement on civil aviation and he would do all he could to conclude the Consular agreement. He appreciated the Soviet handling of the fisheries question. He was also interested in dealing with the question of trade, and settling other problems. The President said that we had a law in this country which said we could not transfer the power of decision to fire nuclear weapons to anyone else. 3 Mr. Gromyko could be sure that only the President of the United States would exercise power over nuclear weapons. He presumed that the Soviet Government could give a similar assurance, but he did not ask the Soviet Union to tear up the Warsaw Pact and to have no allies. He did not see why we could not get our pencils out and work out an agreement. Sometimes he thought that we did not understand each other. The President concluded the discussion by saying that no country was more against the proliferation of nuclear weapons than the United States. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson (S/AL) and approved by the White House, October 13. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) 2 Document 153 . 3 Reference presumably is to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 42 USC 2122. 158. Memorandum of Conversation 158. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966, 7:30 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary William C. Foster—ACDA Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Governor Harriman John M. Leddy—EUR Malcolm Toon—SOV USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin Alexander I. Zinchuk, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy Counselor of Embassy Vorontsov Ivan I. Ippolitov, Aide to Gromyko The Secretary began the conversation by pointing out that each side has a legitimate interest in insuring that nuclear powers do not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers. This is the heart of the proliferation problem. If we are prepared to commit ourselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into the hands of non-nuclear powers—as we are—then the Secretary felt that this should meet the Soviet concern. What we cannot agree to is the proposition that we consent to an arrangement which in effect would amount to our telling our allies that the nuclear problem is none of their business. Mr. Gromyko must understand that this would be an absolutely untenable position for us and one which would not be understood or supported by our allies since they, after all, are targeted by Soviet nuclear weapons. Gromyko said that the Soviet position on non-proliferation is to provide for an agreement which would insure that nuclear powers not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states or to an alliance to which such states belong. The Secretary said that he wishes to be very frank with Gromyko so that each side would understand clearly what was in the other's mind. We know and we can assure the Soviets that we will not transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear state—ever—or to any group of non-nuclear states. By his insistence on language which would cover the alliance concept, Gromyko seemed to take a position which would result in the erection of a barrier between ourselves and our allies. It was this that we could not accept. Gromyko said that this was not the Soviet intention. The Secretary went on to say that we have never discussed any nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO that we would not be happy to see applied to the Warsaw Pact. Gromyko must understand that we are obliged in our nuclear planning to take into account the views of our allies just as the Soviets would take into account the views of their allies. 2 The Secretary felt that we are perhaps not far apart on basic policy and that the problem might be simply a matter of language. One answer to the problem might be simply to state that we would not transfer nuclear weapons out of our hands without concerning ourselves with the question of “to whom.” An alternative solution might be to adopt Mr. Foster's suggestion of adding “to any recipient whatsoever.” Gromyko said this would not be adequate since the formula did not preclude the possibility of transfer into “collective” hands. To meet this point the wording should provide for a ban on transfer “individually or collectively.” While the Soviets are prepared to accept the proposition that the United Stares intends to retain control and possession of its nuclear weapons there is always the possibility that such control and possession might be shared with others. It is this point that concerns the Soviets. The Secretary said that if the Soviets should be worried about the possibility that some day a United States nuclear weapon might be fired by a German soldier on order of a German government, and without U.S. consent, he could assure Gromyko that this would and could never happen. We are of course not talking about a condition of war. Gromyko assured the Secretary that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept that this is the intention of the United States Government. The Soviet view is, however, that the guarantee should be absolute; the Soviets may be sure of United States intentions but they do not have the same confidence with regard to the intentions of others. The Secretary said that we seemed to be agreed on the heart of the matter—on the basic concept of non-proliferation. Our trouble is that we can't seem to find language that does not involve what we regard as extraneous matters. It is important to recognize that the psychological and political implications of language we should adopt must be taken into account if we are not to jeopardize our alliance relationships. We cannot agree to any wording which would amount to informing our allies that their nuclear defense is none of their business. Mr. Leddy pointed out that the West Germans have never asked us to transfer possession of or surrender our authority to fire nuclear weapons. Gromyko said this may be true but there has been much talk in the past of plans for the creation of joint nuclear forces such as MLF and ANF. Such plans if realized would accord a participating role to the West Germans, and it is this that concerns the Soviets. It is not the prospect of a German “voice” or other “voices” in nuclear defense planning which bothers the Soviets. The Secretary commented that if this were the case then there should be no problem. We should be able to resolve our differences by agreed language so long as we steer clear of the metaphysical and concentrate on the concrete. The Secretary asked if Roshchin would remain in New York after Gromyko's departure. When Mr. Gromyko confirmed that this would be the case, the Secretary suggested that Messrs. Foster and Roshchin continue their efforts to work out language which would satisfy the concerns of both sides. He himself would wish to discuss precise language with the President. The Secretary's view at the moment is that the problem could be met by language which would commit us not to give our nuclear weapons to anybody and not permit anyone else to use our nuclear weapons without our permission. Gromyko said that this was not the whole problem. If, in fact, the United States does not intend to share control with others he failed to see why this could not be reflected in treaty language. The Secretary felt that some way could be found to get around the problem. Gromyko must realize, however, that we cannot accept any language which would be tantamount to our saying to our allies that nuclear defense arrangements are not their business. Mr. Gromyko commented that at times he has the feeling that our positions are similar. He would point out, however, that the views of the United States on the problem are not always expressed in the same terms and occasionally are even somewhat contradictory. The Secretary said that he felt we could make progress if Gromyko would cease to be preoccupied with what seems to be philosophical problem. We did seem to be agreed on the “gut” aspect of the non-proliferation problem and he felt that Roshchin and Foster should be able to work out acceptable language. Gromyko agreed that Foster and Roshchin should continue their efforts in New York. Foster said that he would be in New York Tuesday afternoon and would contact the Soviet Mission at that time. In parting Gromyko said that he wished to thank the Secretary and through him the President for their warm and gracious hospitality while he was in Washington. The Secretary said that he was glad Gromyko could fit the Washington trip into his schedule since it was always pleasant and useful to talk with him. He wished to reiterate the President's thought that our two countries have a special responsibility for the peace of the world and that for our part we are prepared to go more than half way in an effort to resolve the problems which are of vital concern to both of us. Since Mr. Gromyko would face a battery of reporters on his exit from the building, it was agreed that he would take the following line in response to queries: The discussion at dinner focused on disarmament matters including the non-proliferation problem. Both sides agreed that this was a problem of great urgency and that discussions should continue in an effort to reach agreement. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) on October 11 and approved by S on October 13. This conversation took place in the Department of State, probably at an informal dinner that the Secretary hosted in the Madison Room. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) 2 At this point the EUR Bureau typist of this memorandum inadvertently omitted the following paragraph: “Gromyko pointed out that the Soviets do not suggest that a treaty should include a provision banning consultation. This was a separate matter to which he might wish to return, but he did not intend to discuss it in connection with the treaty.” (Memorandum from Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) to John Walsh (S/S), October 18, cleared by Thompson (S/AL); Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246, US-USSR Officials, Memoranda of Conversation, 1966) 159. Memorandum of Conversation 159. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966. SUBJECT Latin American Nuclear Free Zone PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary William C. Foster, ACDA Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Governor Harriman John M. Leddy—EUR Malcolm Toon—SOV USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin Alexander I. Zinchuk, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy Counselor of Embassy Vorontsov Ivan I. Ippolitov, Aide to Gromyko The Secretary said that in his recent visit to New York 2 he had had an opportunity for discussions with some 70 Foreign Ministers, including most of the Latin Americans. As Gromyko was aware the Latin American countries are very interested in reaching agreement on establishing a nuclear free zone in Latin America. There was some difference of opinion among the Latin American Foreign Ministers as to whether they should proceed without Cuba. The Secretary felt that anything Mr. Gromyko could do to urge Cuba to participate would be helpful. Ambassador Dobrynin asked if all Latin American countries were devoted to the nuclear free concept; he had the impression that at least one country had some reservations about this. The Secretary responded that perhaps one country was somewhat bemused with the idea of developing a nuclear capability but he felt strongly that its reservations with regard to a nuclear free zone could be overcome if Cuba were to participate. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, Nuclear Free Zone, 1966. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV), October 18, and cleared in S/S and S, October 19. Although the source text provides no time, this conversation apparently took place at the same informal dinner referenced in footnote 1, Document 158 . 2 See footnote 1, Document 153 . 160. Memorandum of Conversation 160. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966. SUBJECT Plowshare PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary William C. Foster—ACDA Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Governor Harriman John M. Leddy—EUR Malcolm Toon—SOV USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin Alexander I. Zinchuk, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy Counselor of Embassy Vorontsov Ivan I. Ippolitov, Aide to Gromyko After the dinner meeting Mr. Gromyko raised with the Secretary the idea of exchanging views on peaceful uses explosions. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Secretary's discussion on this matter with Dobrynin some time ago 2 and asked where we should go from here. The Secretary said we would be prepared to set up a small group of experts to focus on the problem and Ambassador Thompson could discuss the matter further with Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviets were indeed interested in going forward with such an exchange of views and the arrangement suggested by the Secretary would be entirely acceptable. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV) on October 18 and cleared in S/S and S on October 19. Regarding the location and time of this conversation, see footnote 1, Document 158 . 2 Document 123 . 161. Memorandum of Conversation 161. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 14, 1966, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Nuclear Sharing; Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS UK George Brown, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador Sir Michael Stewart, British Minister Lord Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office US Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Eugene Rostow, Under Secretary-designate for Political Affairs John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs David K.E. Bruce, Ambassador to the United Kingdom Francis Bator, Special Assistant to the President M.D. Goldstein, Acting Country Director, EUR/BMI Secretary Rusk gave the Foreign Secretary a copy of the latest draft of US thinking on nuclear sharing. 2 The Secretary said that the US would try out the new language on the Russians. The Foreign Secretary indicated that he was persuaded that the Russians were now interested in concluding a non-proliferation treaty. He said that he hoped to have British reactions to the new US draft text in a short time. 3 In discussing the principal points of Soviet interest in a non-proliferation agreement, Secretary Rusk mentioned the concern of the Russians about the possibility of a change in US attitudes. Secretary Rusk said that, when he referred to existing US law on nuclear matters and to Congressional resistance to change in this area, he was met with the argument that Congress might change the law in the future. Secretary Rusk observed to the Foreign Secretary that, under our constitutional system, one Congress cannot bind another against changing the law; thus, the Russians must find their protection in the withdrawal clause of the agreement. Secretary Rusk also said that it seemed clear on both sides that there should be no direct or indirect (through an alliance) transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear state. Gromyko was troubled, however, by the idea of transferring nuclear weapons to an alliance. Gromyko seemed to be involved in a metaphysical question; he seemed to think of an alliance as something separate from its members. The Foreign Secretary stated that Gromyko did not seem to be concerned about NATO consultation arrangements on nuclear matters, whether old or new. Secretary Rusk observed that certain things were cleared away in the US talks with Gromyko: Gromyko would not raise questions on NATO consultations and was not interested in what the arrangements would be in time of war or how the Allies might decide to go to war. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 NATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mortimer D. Goldstein (EUR/BMI) and approved in S, October 28. The source text is labeled “Part 2 of 7.” The conversation was held in the James Madison Room of the Department of State. Foreign Secretary Brown was in New York in early October to attend meetings of the U.N. General Assembly and visited Washington to confer with U.S. officials. 2 Reference presumably is to Rusk's October 13 draft of Article 1 of the draft Nonproliferation Treaty. See Tab A to Document 162 . 3 Sir Michael Stewart, Minister of the British Embassy, told Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., on October 19 that “he had been instructed to inform us that the UK thought it very unlikely that the Russians would like the proposed treaty language. The UK nevertheless thought it would be a good thing to do to give them the language to keep the ball rolling. The Foreign Office had requested that he ask the US to tell the UK when we were thinking of giving the language to the Russians and would also like to be informed of their response.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) 162. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 162. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, October 15, 1966. I-27134/66 SUBJECT Discussions on Nonproliferation Treaty I understand that Secretary Rusk has prepared a Memorandum for the President on a nonproliferation treaty which he hopes he may be able to discuss with you and the President some time this weekend, possibly this afternoon (Saturday). 2 Attached (Tab A) is Article I, recommended and drafted by Secretary Rusk. Tab B is a short summary of the events leading to this draft. Comments on Presidential Memorandum The memorandum advises the President that this formulation: 1. Would not disturb existing arrangements. 2. Would not affect NATO's decision to go to war, or the establishment of any NATO nuclear planning committee. 3. Would not prevent assignment of additional Polaris or other US weapons to NATO. 4. Would not rule out the establishment of a multilateral entity in which non-nuclear weapon states participated and contributed so long as this entity did not obtain ownership of the warheads. 5. Would not bar succession by a federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. Note :—The ownership question is implicit, not explicit. Recommendation I recommend you support the Rusk memorandum. John T. McNaughton Tab A 3 DRAFT OF ARTICLE I OF A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives directly or indirectly to a non-nuclear-weapon State, either individually or by virtue of its membership in a military alliance or group of States; not to relinquish its control over its nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. 4 Tab B 5 EVENTS LEADING TO PRESENT DRAFT Monday Evening (10 October) . At dinner Gromyko made it clear that continuation of present AEC law on ownership would meet the Soviet condition on ownership and transfer. 6 Secretary Rusk clearly said that we would be willing to accept an obligation to retain ownership of our warheads . At the end of the dinner, Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Foster to have instructions drafted reflecting these discussions. 7 Thursday Evening (13 October) . Because of differences of view, a meeting was held with Secretary Rusk, Eugene Rostow, Butch Fisher and Bob Bowie attending. 8 The present article was debated and personally drafted by Secretary Rusk. (Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Fisher support this formula. Eugene Rostow and Bob Bowie are opposed.) ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION Bill Foster discussed this problem at some length with Art Barber on Thursday. His chief points were: 1. Gromyko made it absolutely clear that the earlier Foster-Roschin text 9 was acceptable to the Soviet Union without change. 2. Any text which met three basic conditions would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. These conditions were: a. No transfer of nuclear warheads to non-nuclear states. b. No transfer of nuclear warheads to alliances made up of nuclear and non-nuclear states. c. No transfer of warheads to alliances of non-nuclear states. 3. Gromyko, in his discussions with the President and Secretary Rusk, made it quite clear that the Soviets consider a non-proliferation treaty a major objective of Soviet foreign policy which will be pursued despite Vietnam and other difficulties. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, Non-Proliferation, September, 1966. Secret. The source text bears the stamped indicator, “15 Oct 1966, Sec Def has seen.” 2 No record of the proposed memorandum for the President or of the discussion under reference has been found. 3 Secret. 4 In a telephone call to President Johnson in the early evening of October 16, McNamara mentioned that on the previous day he and Secretary Rusk had given him a paragraph on non-proliferation for the President's approval. President Johnson believed, however, that Secretary Rusk had said that he was going to prepare a paper giving the arguments for and against the paragraph. The President then read this paragraph, which he had in front of him. McNamara twice told him that the key sentence concerned the provision restricting the transfer of collective ownership of the warhead. When the President asked what the Germans will think, McNamara said that they will grumble. McNamara continued that he and Rusk favored the paragraph but thought Robert Bowie, Department of State Counselor, was opposed. As for the Soviets, it was not the language Gromyko had proposed, “but we think there's a reasonable chance they'll either accept this or suggest a relatively minor modification of it.” The President said he wanted a memorandum from Secretary Rusk giving the pros and cons of the language, and McNamara said he would speak to Rusk about it. (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Robert McNamara, October 16, 1966, 7:03 p.m., Tape F66.29, Side A) In a telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk a few minutes later, President Johnson inquired about the non-proliferation memorandum, and the Secretary responded that he would have it for the President to read on the plane the next day. (The President was going to give a speech in Doylestown, Pennsylvania.) He also said he favored the language, but there was “not one chance in a hundred that the Soviets will buy it.” In reply to the President's question about Bowie's position, Rusk said that Bowie was for it too and had helped to draft it. “Well, OK, that's fine then,” replied President Johnson. “If you're for it, you give me the memo and I'll try to decide.” (Ibid., Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, October 16, 1966, 7:14 p.m., Tape F66.29, Side A) This memorandum has not been found, but in an October 18 memorandum to the President, Rostow presented in some detail the pros and cons on the non-proliferation language. (Ibid., National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11) 5 Secret. 6 Reference presumably is to Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; 42 USC 2122. 7 Not found. 8 No record of this meeting has been found. 9 Not the one attached (it included the word “ownership”). [Handwritten footnote on the source text.] 163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea 163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea 1 Washington, October 31, 1966, 7:52 p.m. 76255. For the President and Secretary. Following are instructions which we are proposing to send USUN re non-aligned resolution on non-proliferation, 2 in particular that part dealing with non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Begin Text . 1. US Del should vote affirmatively for non-aligned NP res. 2. Operative para 3 which “invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states” provides opportunity for US Govt state public position regarding use of nuclear weapons which of particular timeliness in view possible developments in NPT negotiations. 3. We believe that pressure to gain security assurances through proposals to limit use of nuclear weapons, such as Kosygin proposal for clause in NPT, 3 has been growing and is likely increase considerably as impression grows that conclusion of NPT is becoming imminent. Accordingly, we wish take this opportunity to state conditions, as formulated by United States, under which United States would limit use of nuclear weapons. Since operative para 3 of NP res “invites the nuclear weapon powers to give an assurance,” 4 we believe US Govt can properly respond with unilateral assurance formulated in fashion acceptable to US Govt. Having made public statement, we would then impress upon others as necessary that we do not intend agree to assurances provision in NPT. 4. In explaining affirmative vote of the US, you should state that the US fully understands the security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states which undertake not to obtain their own nuclear weapons. You should state that the US has previously recognized this concern, quoting from President Johnson's statement of October 18, 1964, that non-nuclear weapon states “can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.” 5 You should then point out that it is particularly appropriate for the UN, which was founded for purpose of maintaining international peace and security, to consider question of security for non-nuclear states, and to do so at time when there appears to be increasing opportunity to conclude a non-proliferation treaty. You should express conviction of the US that a non-proliferation treaty will advance the security of all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. You should then state on behalf of the US Govt that the US, taking into account all of these considerations and in view of the invitation contained in operative para 3 of the resolution, declares its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state that is party to a general non-proliferation treaty and that is not engaged in an act of aggression supported by a nuclear weapon state. Finally, you should reaffirm US dedication to purposes and principles of UN Charter and state conviction that both NPT and policy just enunciated by US will strengthen UN. 5. In advance of making above statement, you should explain to US allies and others, in your discretion, US thinking behind decision to make statement. In addition to drawing on considerations in para 3, you should stress following: a. US Govt wishes create most favorable climate for maximum adherence to possible non-proliferation treaty. b. US Govt believes UN is proper forum for consideration question security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states and does not intend agree to incorporating assurances clause in text of non-proliferation treaty. c. Qualification that non-nuclear weapon state must not be engaged in act of aggression supported by nuclear weapon state is essential for US. If questioned about desirability of using words or concepts inherently vague, i.e., “aggression” and “supported by nuclear weapon state,” you may explain that the US would make its own determinations, should this ever be necessary, and that this is situation which exists under present circumstances. d. No implications should be drawn re US policies in Vietnam. End Text . Joint Chiefs “express their opposition to the Kosygin proposal or any variation thereof. Their opposition was based on the reason that such a non-use assurance could provide an impetus toward total prohibition of nuclear weapons and that the total impact could alter the current military balance to the detriment of the US.” They also said that a vote for the resolution would “offset the deterrent effect of US nuclear power and free the non-nuclear states for aggression without fear of nuclear reprisals.” Secretary of Defense and ACDA support affirmative vote indicated in above instructions, as do I. Believe NP resolution in question will be adopted overwhelmingly. All other parts of resolution are free of problems for US. Adoption of this resolution permits US to declare in its own terms the conditions under which it willing to refrain from using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Such a declaration should encourage accession to NPT. Moreover, of more immediate importance, it would give US grounds for resisting proposals for other disadvantageous limitations on use of nuclear weapons. Extent of limitation on US nuclear deterrent resulting from terms of proposed resolution plus declaration would not be significant: Restriction would not apply in the event of any war in Europe in which Soviets gave their support; for declaration to apply to North Korea and North Vietnam they would have to become parties to NPT and would have to keep ChiComs and Soviets from giving them support in any hostilities; and perhaps most important, question of whether an aggression has taken place and whether a nuclear weapon state is providing support would be subject to US determination. I would propose to send the instructions if necessary at the appropriate time if you do not indicate non-concurrence. It now appears, however, very unlikely that vote will come this week. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA/DD); cleared by Fisher (ACDA), McNamara (DOD) (in substance), McNaughton (DOD/ISA), and Sherrod McCall (S/S); and approved by Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach. The President and Secretary Rusk were in Seoul October 31-November 2 to meet with Korean President Park Chung Hee. 2 Reference is to a draft resolution submitted by 32 Latin American, Asian, and African countries in the U.N. General Assembly's First Committee on October 27. (U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.371) 3 See footnote 3, Document 122 . 4 The sponsors of the draft resolution submitted a revised draft in the First Committee on November 9, which among other things replaced paragraph 3 with a new paragraph 4, urging the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to consider the proposal that the nuclear-weapon powers give assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states without nuclear weapons on their territories. (U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.368/Rev.1 and Add.1-6) 5 President Johnson made this statement in a radio and television broadcast. For text see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, pp. 1377-1380. 164. Editorial Note 164. Editorial Note When President Johnson approved Latchkey II on November 3, 1966, the AEC-DOD program consisted of eight underground nuclear tests scheduled for the second quarter of fiscal year 1967. (See Document 134 .) Cabriolet, the first of a series of six nuclear cratering experiments under the Plowshare program was not one of these eight; its authorization still awaited final Presidential approval. The purpose of Cabriolet and other tests like it was to obtain basic technical information about cratering and the subsequent distribution of radioactivity that would be applicable to excavation of a trans-Isthmian canal. It was not until December 20 that Glenn Seaborg received a telephone call from Spurgeon Keeny that the President had approved going ahead with Cabriolet. There was, however, one caveat, as recounted by Seaborg: “there is to be a prior announcement of what we propose to do (spelling out the nature of the test, that it is peaceful in nature, that we see no problems with it, that it has to be done within the Limited Test Ban Treaty, etc., …).” (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 13, page 654.) Cabriolet was scheduled to be set off on February 1, 1967, but was delayed for technical reasons, and rescheduled for February 10. However, on February 9, President Johnson abruptly changed his mind and decided to cancel Cabriolet for the present. Concerns were raised over Cabriolet's potential to hurt the ongoing negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty and the Latin American nuclear free zone treaty, in both of which peaceful nuclear explosions were an important issue. After more discussions with Rostow in April regarding the rescheduling of Cabriolet, Seaborg received a telephone call on May 1 from Rostow informing him that he was to proceed with “the planning of both Cabriolet and Buggy.” However, Seaborg continued, “There was no commitment as to actually conducting the explosions—we were merely to plan—and there was to be no public announcement.” (Seaborg, Stemming the Tide, pages 333-334) 165. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 165. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 22, 1966. SUBJECT Talks with the Soviets on Plowshare (C) I believe there are two points which should be kept in mind relative to the timing of the possible talks with the Soviets on Plowshare: 1. US/USSR talks on Plowshare with their inevitable attendant publicity are likely to increase Indian reluctance to sign a non-proliferation treaty which denied the non-nuclear countries the option to develop peaceful nuclear explosives. The Indians have already raised strong objections to this at the U.N., and their views have carried considerable weight with other non-nuclear countries. 2 Holding these talks coincident with the attempt at the ENDC to induce the non-nuclears to accede to the non-proliferation treaty which had been agreed to by the Soviets could present serious difficulties to the achievement of this critical objective. 2. If Cabriolet is carried out during the period between the agreement to conduct the Plowshare talks and their actual occurrence, and if venting occurs which places radioactive material outside the borders of the U.S., the talks would provide the Soviets with a golden opportunity to belabor the U.S. for violating the limited test ban treaty. Therefore, it would appear desirable not to raise with Ambassador Dobrynin the Plowshare talks until either a decision has been reached to defer Cabriolet or until Cabriolet has been fired and the results evaluated. Adrian S. Fisher 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1966. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: “Secretary Saw.” 2 For an explanation of the Government of India's position on peaceful nuclear explosions and a nonproliferation treaty during this period of U.N. debate, see the statement by the Indian Representative to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, October 31, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 676-686, and his statement the following month, November 7, to the same organization; ibid., pp. 699-705. 166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Talks with the Soviets on Plowshare Recommendation: That you approve a proposal to conduct technical talks with the USSR on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. 2 Discussion: For some time we and the Soviets have been feeling each other out on talking about the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. On March 18 3 I told Ambassador Dobrynin we would be prepared to have technical talks with a view to exchange of Plowshare information, as well as discussions concerning the relationship of Plowshare to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. I mentioned also the possibility of machinery through which the US and USSR might provide Plowshare services to other countries. On October 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko told me the USSR was willing to hold technical talks. 4 He was not precise as to their nature, and it was agreed that Dobrynin and Ambassador Thompson should work out the details. There has been some delay in coming back to the Soviets because of the need for inter-agency review, but we now plan to proceed in this way: We would suggest that the talks be technical in nature, with the attached agenda 5 being used, and that they be held in Moscow as early as may be convenient, perhaps in mid-January. We would send a small delegation of technical people, headed by AEC Commissioner Tape. The delegation would be instructed to stay strictly within the bounds of the technical agenda, assuming the Soviets accept this as a framework for talks. If such talks take place and the Soviets make any formal or informal attempt to widen them, the delegation would say that this is beyond their terms of reference, but that they will be glad to refer this expression of Soviet interest in wider talks to the U.S. Government. As far as public information is concerned, we are thinking in terms of a low-key announcement that US-USSR technical talks on peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being held, but we would not plan any communique or other public statement as to the nature or results of the talks. Appropriate press guidance would be prepared prior to the talks, since it may be difficult or impossible to avoid the fact becoming known that the talks concern nuclear explosives. Press handling as well as other aspects of the talks would of course have to be worked out with the Soviets. I believe a limited probe and discussions of this nature might be very useful in terms of giving us better knowledge than we now have of Soviet interest and intentions regarding peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Such knowledge could help us deal on a more informed basis with such things as the Ball proposal for an international Plowshare arrangement, 6 other matters that have been considered in the Committee of Principals and elsewhere, and forward planning of our own Plowshare program. If technical talks take place they would be carefully handled with the object of avoiding any harm to our non-proliferation and other disarmament activities. I would like to move ahead along these lines in the near future, and unless you think it inadvisable would plan to have Ambassador Thompson call in Dobrynin before the end of November and propose technical talks as indicated. 7 If the Soviet response is to suggest a broadened agenda, extending the talks into political or disarmament areas, we will need to re-think our course, and I will make a fresh recommendation to you. It is also possible they might accept a limited agenda but attempt to broaden the talks in Moscow. In that case, the delegation's instructions would call for referral back to the U.S. Government, and I would anticipate the need to prepare for talks of a different nature. Dean Rusk 8 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AE 6. Confidential. Drafted by Scott George (G/PM) on November 22. A typed notation on the source text reads: “ORIG hand carried to President by Secretary per S/S—JPWalsh.” 2 A typed notation on the source text reads: “Approved by Pres. c. 11/30/66.” 3 See Document 123 . 4 See Document 160 . 5 The attachment, “Agenda for Plowshare Talks,” is not printed. 6 Not further identified. 7 On December 6, Thompson and Dobrynin met for lunch at which Thompson reminded Dobrynin that Foreign Minister Gromyko had told Rusk on October 10 (see Document 160 ) that the Soviet Union was prepared to hold technical talks with the United States on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Thompson suggested at this luncheon that such talks be held in Moscow, beginning January 16, 1967, where AEC Commissioner Tape would head the U.S. Delegation of five or six technical experts. (Memorandum of conversation, December 6; Department of State, Central Files, AE 6) 8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 167. Editorial Note 167. Editorial Note On November 30, 1966, Ambassador Goldberg reported in telegram USUN 2813 that the Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, under the Chairmanship of Polish Representative Lachs, was working to finalize agreement on the Space Treaty, and to resolve several legal problems: (1) assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles; (2) questions concerning the definition of outer space; (3) regulations governing non-prohibited uses of outer space and celestial bodies; and (4) regulations governing space activities which may have effects on the territory of other states. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 4) In a telephone conversation on the morning of December 8, President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg discussed the preparation and agencies' clearances of a presidential statement confirming that the U.N. Outer Space Committee had agreed to a draft text of the outer space agreement. (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Arthur Goldberg, December 8, 1966, 10:15 a.m., Tape F66.12.01, Side B) This statement was released later the same day. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, page 1441. On December 19 the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the “Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,” and requested that three depositary governments: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 4) 168. Memorandum of Conversation 168. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 7, 1966. SUBJECT ABM Systems PARTICIPANTS Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador, Soviet Embassy Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State I referred to the conversation I had had with the Ambassador yesterday on the subject of ABM Systems. 2 I said I had looked up the record and had been surprised to find that I had forgotten that following his conversation with Mr. Foster on March 17, the Secretary had told him in my presence the following day that we would be glad to discuss this matter quietly with the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis. 3 The Ambassador pointed out that this was still not a reply to his remarks to Mr. Foster. I said that in any event, I was authorized to tell him that the President would like nothing better than an agreement on this subject that would hold. 4 When the Ambassador pointed out that this statement when translated into Russian would not be clear, I agreed he could say that the President would like nothing better than an effective agreement on this subject. I continued that we recognized that an agreement would have to cover ICBMs as well as ABMs. I said there were problems that would have to be discussed such as what to do about submarines, if the agreement rested on unilateral means of verification. I said the same might be true for mobile launchers. I said I could tell him that we had already spent four billion dollars on research and development of an ABM System and could now proceed to manufacture and deploy, but said that this would involve an enormous cost. He interjected that according to newspaper reports this could amount to 30 or 40 billion dollars. I said that the cost would depend upon how big a deployment was made but that it could run as high as he had indicated. I said that if we both spend these enormous sums, we would probably both end up still able to inflict terrible damage on the other and we would be prepared to discuss what we could do to avoid this great cost when we both had many other uses for our resources. I said that we would be glad to have the Soviet Union's ideas on what channels should be used for discussion of this subject and when. I pointed out that there were several complications. One was that the Secretary would not return until December 18 5 and that he was very much concerned and interested in this subject. I also pointed out that the Ambassador's return to Washington was also uncertain. I pointed out that we had not taken up this subject with our Allies and that because of the Ambassador's departure, we had moved very fast on this matter and that I could not be very precise about our thinking. Speaking personally, it occurred to me that it would be possible to have a formal agreement, but also that a tacit understanding might be possible in which each of us would refrain from deployment unless we concluded that the other side was going ahead. Dobrynin said he would take this matter up with Brezhnev and Kosygin immediately upon his return. Because of the meetings which would be taking place in Moscow, he could not tell how soon we would have an answer. I pointed out that the urgency of the problem arose from the need of Secretary McNamara to present his budget to the Congress in January. 6 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Thompson. The source text is labeled “Part V of V.” 2 When Thompson brought up the subject of ABMs at a luncheon meeting on December 6, Dobrynin reminded him that the U.S. Government had never responded to the Soviet Government's reply to Foster on March 17 that the question of limitation of ABM systems was worthy of consideration because of the huge sums of money involved. Dobrynin also told Thompson that the ABM question should be considered together with the problem of delivery systems of offensive nuclear missiles. (Memorandum of Conversation; ibid.) In a supplementary memorandum of this December 6 conversation, Thompson added that Dobrynin asked why Secretary McNamara had made statements about the ABM problem that might only stimulate pressure upon him to deploy an ABM system. When Thompson responded that McNamara, by mentioning evidence of a Soviet deployment and by stating that it had already been taken into account in the administration's plans, “had intended to build a kind of backfire against just such a demand,” Dobrynin remarked that he understood and had already come to the conclusion that “this was a kind of anticipatory blow.” (Memorandum, December 7; ibid.) 3 A memorandum of the Secretary's March 18 conversation with Dobrynin on limitations on ICBMs and ABMs is ibid., DEF 18. 4 In a telephone conversation with President Johnson earlier that day, Secretary McNamara said that Thompson wanted authorization to tell Dobrynin at their 4:30 p.m. meeting that afternoon that the President endorsed talks with the Soviet Union on the ABM issue. President Johnson replied, “Yes … Let's go ahead. That sounds good.” He added that he could not think of anything that “would be more desirable” than “an agreement that would hold in that field.” (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, December 7, 1966, 2:16 p.m., Tape F6612.01, Side A) 5 Secretary Rusk was abroad from December 4-18, first visiting Japan, then Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Iran, and finally France, where he attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting December 13-16. 6 For excerpts of McNamara's budget statement, January 25, 1967, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 5-24. 169. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 169. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 10, 1966. SUBJECT ABM Program You have inquired as to what I think the Soviet reaction would be to an ABM deployment by the United States under either Posture “A” or Posture “B” of Secretary McNamara's memorandum. 2 1. It is not presently clear how extensive the present Soviet ABM deployment is. Whether or not they intend presently a full scale deployment, I would assume that the initial reaction of any announcement of a U.S. ABM system would be to encourage and expedite a full scale Soviet deployment. I base this conclusion on the history of Soviet emphasis on defensive systems coupled with the fact that they have already commenced such a deployment. I think the Soviet Union will also be forced to react by increasing its offensive nuclear force to take into account our ABM deployment. While it would clearly be rational to do this immediately—and there is no question about Soviet technical competence in this regard—I am less certain as to how quickly they would react. Ideology and history to the contrary notwithstanding, I think we should assume that they will react in this way, although it may not be their first reaction. The cost of a Soviet ABM deployment and improved and expanded ICBM capabilities might be prohibitive in cost if pursued simultaneously. In this event, the rational thing to do would be to cut back ABM deployment and concentrate on an offensive nuclear force. But the fact that they are defense-minded and that they have already commenced an ABM program might lead them to postpone committing extensive resources to improve ICBMs. I would agree with Secretary McNamara's conclusions that a rational response by the Soviet Union would not essentially change the existing situation; but I believe there is a good possibility that this response (offensive missiles) might be delayed for a period of time. If this is correct, deployment of an ABM system would give us a short term advantage over the Soviet Union, and it might be two, three or four years before the status quo was restored. That it would be restored, I have no substantial doubt. 2. I think the Soviet Government should be approached directly with as candid a statement of the existing situation as security permits—and I think this could be quite candid. I think we should inform them of our intentions, absent an agreement, which would as nearly as possible freeze existing offensive and defensive systems. I think we should state our intention of deploying some ABM system if it is impossible to reach a satisfactory understanding. The Soviets have always linked the need for a freeze on both offensive and defensive systems. I find this both significant and puzzling since it would seem to me that a purely defensive freeze would be clearly to their advantage. The only explanation of this that I can see is that they do tend to think in defensive terms which, to a degree, would support the thesis that they don't approach the problem as rationally as we do. 3. While you have not asked my views on Third Country problems it seems to me that how these are handled is perhaps an equally important problem to be faced. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the source text reads “Mr. Vance has seen.” 2 Reference apparently is to McNamara's December 2 draft memorandum to the President on the Nike-X, which he circulated at a meeting held on Wednesday, December 7. Thompson's account of this meeting is scheduled for publication in volume X . At this meeting, McNamara also asked the participants to comment on probable Soviet reactions to both a light and heavy ABM deployment by the United States, Postures “A” and “B.” For responses by Thompson and Helms, see Documents 170 and 171 respectively. Additional responses are scheduled for publication in volume X . 170. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 170. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 10, 1966. The difficulty of predicting Soviet reactions is compounded by the fact that in the period since the end of the war, their reaction to actions on our part which were known to them were not what we would consider rational or called for in the circumstances. Soviet assessment of a U.S. deployment of a significant ABM system will vary considerably, pending upon whether we were reacting to a major Soviet deployment or whether we had initiated this new step in the arms race. I do not believe we can consider it as established that the Soviets have at this time decided upon a major ABM deployment. The Soviets have clearly embarked upon a plan to increase the number of their ICBMs and to deploy many of them in hardened sites. I believe they will carry this plan to completion. If we initiate major ABM deployment, I feel confident that the Soviet response in the first instance would be to do likewise rather than to increase the number of their ICBMs beyond already planned levels. I would doubt that the Soviets could both deploy a major ABM system and increase ICBMs beyond planned levels without taking drastic action in some other field, such as suspending their space program. If it is clearly the Soviets that initiate ABM deployment and we respond with a similar system, I would even more doubt that they would increase their offensive weapons beyond planned levels during the next five years or so because of the pressure upon their resources of other important programs in the non-military field. I think it quite likely, however, that as the significance of our planned improvement in the quality of our offensive capability becomes increasingly clear to them, they may respond with a similar program of qualitative improvement. I would expect that in any of these situations, the Soviets would increase their submarine launched missile capability. Since the last war, whenever the Soviets have been faced with a choice between the development of offensive or defensive capability, they have generally opted for the defensive. This can partly be explained by their belief in their own ideology, which postulates that Communism would inevitably spread over the entire world and that the principal military problem for the Communist countries is to protect themselves from the danger that imperialism in its death throes might lash out against them in a desperate military gamble. Given the economic problems which the Soviets already face in the allocation of their resources, which are insufficient to meet their goals, I believe that their civilian leaders would welcome an opportunity to avoid incurring the enormous expenditure which the deployment of a major ABM system would entail, at least over the next few years. On the other hand, the civilian leadership is weak in comparison to past regimes and it seems probable that this has automatically increased the relative influence of the Soviet military. As the Soviet military acquire knowledge of the qualitative improvement in our ICBMs, they may well argue that an ABM system is essential to offset or at least raise doubts in our minds as to the efficacy of our offensive capability, since we could never be sure how effective their ABM system was. On balance, however, I believe we have a good chance of negotiating an ABM,ICBM freeze. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Vance has seen.” For context of this memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 169 . 171. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 171. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, December 10, 1966. SUBJECT Soviet Responses to a United States Decision to Deploy ABM Defenses 1. The attached paper provided to me by the Board of National Estimates states some views on likely Soviet reactions to an American decision to begin deployment of an anti-missile system. I am in agreement with the judgments made in this paper, and am therefore passing it along as my response to the request made to each of us in Mr. McNamara's office last Wednesday 2 for a personal statement on the issue posed. 2. Certain considerations which emerge from this study seem to me to be of primary importance. 3. The first is that the difference in scale between the two alternative United States deployment programs proposed would have little bearing on the USSR's reactions. The Soviets would, even in the case of the more modest program, assume that, once embarked upon, the effort would be enlarged. They would impute to us an intention to reduce to a minimum the threat which their offensive systems pose to us, and thereby to escape from the degree of deterrence which they now have. Either program would convey to the Soviets that we were not content to remain in a condition of mutual deterrence but were striving instead to gain a clear power advantage. 4. A second major judgment then follows. Faced with this situation, the primary Soviet concern would be to retain what we call an assured destruction capability, that is, the power to impose vast and unacceptable injury on this country regardless of the circumstances in which nuclear war might begin. The Soviets would therefore deploy ICBM's of such types and numbers as to insure retention of such a capability. In the end, after enormous costs to them and to us, the condition of mutual deterrence would be likely to obtain as before. 5. Finally, the political implications for Soviet society and for Soviet-American relations of such an intensification of the arms race seem to me to be of significant importance. The strains imposed by such an effort would at the very least retard what movement we have thought might be developing toward moderation in the Soviet outlook and toward liberalization in Soviet society. Similarly, a new surge of competitive arming would tend inevitably to sustain tension and mistrust between the two countries, and thereby to limit even more the possibility of moving our relations gradually into more constructive channels. Dick Attachment 3 Washington, December 10, 1966. SUBJECT Soviet Reactions to a US Decision to Deploy ABM Defenses I. General Considerations 1. The Soviet leadership would recognize in a US decision to deploy an ABM system a major move in the Soviet-American power competition. The USSR is very sensitive to US economic and military superiority; it is acutely aware that the US has a GNP more than twice that of the Soviets and now has in numbers of deployed ICBMs roughly a 3 to 1 superiority. The Soviets have recently been engaged in a very rapid buildup of hardened and dispersed ICBMs which we believe will give them, by about 1968, much greater confidence in their retaliatory power and hence in their deterrent. Since 1962, moreover, they have been constructing an ABM system to defend the Moscow area, though we in CIA believe they have probably not yet begun to install ABM defenses elsewhere. 4 , 5 2. We believe that the fact of the US decision to deploy ABMs would be far more important to the Soviets than would the announced size of the US program. 6 The Soviets certainly have considered in their military planning the possibility that the US would eventually build ABM defenses. But an actual decision to deploy an ABM system would probably have a further influence on Soviet policy because it is a major new program with potential impact on the strategic situation. The US decision would tend to lend weight to interests in the USSR which press for larger military programs. 3. The Soviets would almost certainly see the US decision as having been at least accelerated by their own recent programs for missile defense and strategic attack forces. In any event, they would view it as evidence that the US was intent on maintaining and perhaps increasing its strategic advantage over the USSR, even at the expense of a continuation of the arms race. Some elements in the Soviet leadership would see the move as a sign that the US considered nuclear war somewhat more likely over the longer term. Associated US expenditures for a shelter program would probably strengthen the voice of those Soviets advocating this interpretation. II. Possible Soviet Military Responses 4. It is important to remember that Moscow's view of the strategic situation is the obverse of the view from Washington. While we worry about their strengths and our vulnerabilities, they worry about our strengths and their vulnerabilities. The Soviets have long been deterred from deliberately attacking the US by the power of our forces to visit unacceptable damage on their country in retaliation; they have also long feared that their own strength might not be credible enough to deter the US in all circumstances. Faced over the last two decades with the large, diversified, and steadily-improving US strategic attack forces, a major feature of the Soviet response has been straightforward defense measures, whereas our strategy has concentrated mainly on assured destruction. In the past year or so, however, the Soviets have begun the very rapid deployment of hardened and dispersed ICBMs, the bulk of which are SS-11's, useful mainly as citybusters. This intensive program to acquire an assured destruction capability represents a new emphasis in their strategy. They probably now see themselves as catching up with the US in this regard, and expect shortly to gain a kind of deterrent equality with the US. 5. At minimum, therefore, the Soviets will be concerned to prevent any US ABM deployment from robbing them of the assured destruction capabilities they are acquiring. From their point of view, either the Posture A or the Posture B program would threaten eventually to degrade the deterrent power of their strategic attack forces. This is because both programs are damage-limiting in nature—that is, they are designed to protect the population and property in major cities, which are the prime targets of retaliation—and because the smaller program, once initiated, could well lead to the larger. The Soviets would consider it essential to respond by improving their strategic attack forces to the extent required to maintain their assured destruction capabilities. 6. This Soviet requirement would probably not result in any immediate or dramatic changes in the USSR's strategic attack programs following a US announcement. The USSR would have time to weigh the alternatives, because the lead times required to deploy additional strategic attack systems like ICBMs, or to develop and retrofit advanced components like penetration aids, are not longer and in many cases are shorter than ABM leadtimes. The Soviets would have no difficulty in following the progress of our deployment and could plan to reevaluate the numbers and types of weapons they require accordingly. 7 Effect on Specific Soviet Strategic Programs 7. In discussing the following Soviet options and possible courses of actions, we do not wish to imply that if the US does not decide to initiate either the Posture A or B program at this time, the Soviets will not undertake any of the programs discussed. In the strategic missile field, for example, there is always great pressure to advance the available technology through R&D and to deploy new systems and modifications designed to improve the effectiveness of the force. Specifically, the USSR is quite likely to develop and deploy more accurate large missiles with multiple warheads whether the US deploys ABMs or not. In general, we will probably never know the precise nature and extent of Soviet responses to a US decision to deploy, though we are convinced that such a decision would intensify Soviet arms programs in at least some ways. 8. There are a number of options the Soviets could exercise to preserve an assumed destruction capability despite US ABM deployment. Certainly such deployment would generate some upward pressure on numbers of Soviet ICBMs and sublaunched missiles, and it is one of the factors which might cause the Soviet missile force to approach or exceed the high side of our ICBM estimate for the period beyond 1968 (i.e., 1,100 launchers in mid-1971, leveling off to 1,200 in mid-1976). Additional deployment of existing systems would have the advantage of using tooled-up lines and proven techniques. Long-continued deployment of the SS-9 and SS-11 at the recent high rates would result in an ICBM force of as many as 1,600 launchers in mid-1971 and more than 3,000 in mid-1976, virtually all of them hardened and dispersed. 9. On the other hand, the Soviets could respond with more sophisticated measures. If they took the decision soon, we believe they could begin to install very accurate multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in their large SS-9 ICBM or in a follow-on, by about the time our ABM system could become operational. Existing or follow-on systems could be equipped with penetration aids by that time or sooner, depending on the type of such devices the Soviets decide are most effective against our ABM system. The USSR has not flight-tested advanced reentry vehicles as yet, but we believe such testing need not begin more than 2 or 3 years before initial operational capability date in the case of MIRV's, and 1 or 2 years in the case of penetration aids. 10. A US decision might also cause the Soviets to intensify their development of depressed-trajectory ICBM's or fractional-orbit bombardment systems. Several firings from Tyuratam in the past year have suggested feasibility testing of such systems, and we have estimated that if development is pursued, initial operational capabilities could be achieved by late 1967 or 1968. Such systems would probably be less accurate than ICBM's. Used in small numbers against key soft targets, they could evade US warning systems in a Soviet first strike, but they could also be intended to complicate US problems of developing effective ABM defenses. 11. Finally, the Soviets have the option of placing greater stress on aerodynamic vehicles as means of circumventing US ABM defenses. They could intensify their current program of constructing cruise-missile submarines (whose missiles can be used against ship or land targets), perhaps by decreasing planned construction of the new ballistic missile class we believe they have started to build. US deployment of ABMs might even lead them to develop a new manned bomber for intercontinental attack, though we doubt that they would put much reliance on this approach to assured destruction capabilities because of the vulnerability to attack of bombers on the ground. 12. Of the several options we have examined, the Soviets will choose whichever combination they judge to be most cost-effective in the light of the nature and pace of the US ABM program, regardless of whether our initial decision calls for Posture A or B. Retrofitting advanced reentry vehicles into existing systems might be the cheapest approach for the Soviets, though reliance on such modifications to assure penetration involves some risk. Additional deployment of existing systems, on the other hand might prove a more visible increase in retaliatory power and therefore might appeal to the Soviets. In any case, we agree with the Secretary of Defense that the Soviets will act to maintain the deterrent of an assured destruction capability, and that they have the technical and economic power to do so. Effect on Soviet ABM Program 13. The Soviets' own ABM program might also be affected by a US ABM decision, but in ways which are less readily definable. In general those Soviets who urge bigger, faster ABM development and deployment would speak with louder voices, if only because the US had adopted a similar program. A US decision in the near future might have greater pertinence in this respect if, as we in CIA believe likely, the USSR is now deploying an ABM system only at Moscow and has not yet begun to install such defenses at other locations. 14. In our recent estimates we have judged that, regardless of US ABM decisions, the Soviet predilection for strategic defense and the massive threat they see in the US strategic attack forces would probably cause the USSR to extend ABM defenses more widely during the next 10 years. We have allowed, however, for the possibility that the Soviets might decide that sufficient ABM deployment for the general defense of the USSR was too costly. We think the costs for the Moscow system alone will be the equivalent of at least $3 billion (excluding R&D costs) over the eight years apparently required to deploy it, from 1962 to about 1970. Soviet willingness to spend such a sum is consistent with the high priority which has long been assigned to strategic defense and especially to the defense of Moscow. There is no question that the USSR could spend the equivalent of tens of billions more on future deployment of ABM defenses. But the Soviet economy is perennially stretched tight, and strains which might arise from still larger strategic expenditures could come to require the USSR to cut back on other desired military and economic programs. A Smaller US ABM Program 15. The US could, of course, initiate an ABM program of much more modest character than either the Posture A or B programs. We think that the more general Soviet concerns we have described would also be elicited by smaller programs, because the Soviets would expect any US decision to lead eventually to larger-scale deployment. Certainly they would not believe that any US deployment was intended solely to counter the type of threat which might eventually be posed by China. But Soviet military responses would be tempered by the lesser impact of smaller programs on the Soviet strategic position. Indeed, there is at least some chance that the Soviets would see a program to defend US ICBM forces in a quite different light than they would view the Posture A and B programs, recognizing that it strengthened US assured destruction capabilities while posing no challenge to their own such capabilities. Thus a US program to defend its ICBMs might cause the least adjustment in Soviet strategic forces. III. Some Political Implications 16. The foregoing discussion of measures the Soviets would probably take to counter a major US ABM program forecasts very considerable exertions by them to prevent the US from increasing its margin of strategic advantage and reducing their capacity to deter. The net result would be to leave both sides with a high degree of deterrence, much like that which now obtains, though obviously in a much more complicated and costly weapons environment. While the power equation would thus not be altered, some significant political effects would flow from the process of raising it to a higher level. 17. The new round of competition in nuclear arms would have a negative effect on the climate of Soviet-American relations. The arms race is not only a consequence of the power competition, but a stimulus to it. The tensions which arise from fear that the opponent is moving to acquire a decisive advantage would be increased, and the still more complicated array of weapons on both sides would enlarge the obstacles to arms control and reduction. 18. This general result would not follow because the US decision to deploy ABMs would give rise to a sudden alarm on the Soviet side. The Soviets have known for a decade that we were working on ABMs, they have claimed successful development of such weapons themselves, and they would know that the US decision to deploy could not alter the relation of forces suddenly. The negative effect on the prospects for improvement in Soviet-American relations would be the result rather of keeping alive on both sides the sense of the inevitability of a continuing arms competition. Against this background the likelihood of the kind of small but meaningful political undertakings which could over time move Soviet-American relations in a constructive direction would be greatly reduced. Moreover, the elements within the Soviet leadership which reject the possibility of any fundamental detente in Soviet-American relations would probably gain in weight and influence. 19. The Soviet economy will in any event be under strains resulting from the presently foreseeable military programs. A new round of costly competition in arms expenditure would impose additional strains on the Soviet economy. This would be unlikely to cause a breakdown, but it would mean that other highly desired programs would have to be cut back or foregone. In particular, hopes for any significant improvement in living standards would have to be disappointed for some time longer. This would mean in turn an increase in tensions in the society generally and probably sharpened conflict within the leadership over the allocation of resources. While these tendencies would not in our view go so far as to bring a reversion to anything like “Stalinist” rule, at a minimum the prospects for further advance toward internal liberalization would be retarded. In general, the strains arising from intensified arms competition can, we believe, only have an adverse effect on such internal forces as do work for constructive and moderating change in the Soviet system. Sherman Kent Chairman, Board of National Estimates 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4662, 471.94, ABM, November-December, 1966. Top Secret. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Vance has seen.” 2 December 7; see footnote 2, Document 169 . 3 Top Secret. 4 There is, however, a differing view within the intelligence community, which is that another system (the Tallinn system) now being widely deployed in the USSR is likely to be an ABM; the implication of this view is that the Soviets are already several years down the road of widespread ABM deployment. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 See NIE 11-8-66, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack,” dated 20 October 1966, and NIE 11-3-66, “Soviet Air and Missile Defenses,” dated 17 November 1966. [Footnote in the source text. The summary portions of both are scheduled for publication in volume X .] 6 We refer here to the Posture A and Posture B programs which have been considered by the Secretary of Defense. Both programs contemplate ABM deployment for defense of key US cities; they differ in the level of defense to be provided. [Footnote in the source text.] 7 There is even a possibility that Soviet planning has already taken full account of the contingency that the US would deploy ABMs, and that the Soviets would therefore not feel the need to alter their future strategic attack programs at all. We think this unlikely, however, because it has been unnecessary for the Soviets to authorize any expensive new adjustments prior to an actual US decision. They must be aware of the favorable lead-time relationship referred to above, and they can be confident that major US decisions of this sort will be made public. [Footnote in the source text.] 172. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk 172. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 11, 1967. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Clause (C) Our discussions with the Soviets about a safeguards article have revealed a unique opportunity to take a major step toward preventing the clandestine diversion of peaceful nuclear programs to military purposes if our Euratom allies are willing to accept the application of IAEA safeguards after an agreed transition period. The Soviets have indicated they can accept a binding safeguards article provided it specifies IAEA safeguards and does not call for inspections of nuclear-weapon parties (Article III acceptable to Soviets attached at Tab A). 2 Having firmly rejected our initial proposal calling for IAEA or “equivalent international safeguards,” the Soviets also rejected our suggestion to substitute “effective international safeguards” for their language referring only to “safeguards of the IAEA.” However, they acknowledged the need for an agreed transition period (as yet undefined) before IAEA safeguards could be phased into the Euratom area and said this period could be fixed by a protocol or declaration of understanding. The Soviets make the following arguments for their position: (a) just as we have insisted on having US inspectors involved in inspection in the Soviet Union in connection with a test ban treaty, the Soviet Union will not entrust inspection of Germany to a group of NATO allies in the case of a non-proliferation treaty; (b) if their Eastern European allies are to be subject to inspection by the IAEA, there must be equality of treatment, with allies of the US (particularly Germany) being subject to the same international IAEA inspection; (c) it is unsound to endorse and perpetuate a regional approach to safeguards; and they ask what our view would be if some of the Arab League countries formed a Near East safeguards organization and who would judge if it was “equivalent to IAEA” or “effective. We see no reason to expect the Soviets to yield on this matter. They know their position will be endorsed by an over-whelming majority of potential signatories. Moreover, with no safeguards clause at all, the Soviets would expect Euratom safeguards to continue to apply to the FRG. We must, therefore, take at face value their statement that if we cannot accept the kind of article they can support, they would prefer no safeguards article at all. In this case they would be strongly supported by such potential nuclear weapons states as India, Sweden and the UAR. These countries have indicated their reluctance to accept the IAEA safeguards if some countries will have the privilege of being inspected solely by their allies. We, therefore, face a critical choice: Either we grasp this unique chance for US-Soviet agreement on an article applying safeguards to all non-nuclear countries, in circumstances where such joint support is essential to its general acceptance, or we defer to anticipated concerns of certain Euratom members and settle for a treaty lacking any meaningful safeguards provision, thus abandoning one of our major arms control objectives. The non-proliferation treaty provides our best (and probably our only foreseeable) chance to achieve the stated US goal of a single, effective system of nuclear safeguards applied worldwide. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards under a non-proliferation treaty would be a major step in establishing the validity of our concept of appropriate verification of major arms control undertakings. It would be accomplished through an institution established at our initiative and operating according to our concepts of international organization. Other US interests would also be served. The active and joint participation of Eastern and Western Europeans in the functioning of IAEA safeguards would foster practical cooperation in dealing with the major East-West issue of nuclear controls in Europe. Regarding the Near East, the inclusion of a binding safeguards article would offer our best prospect for achieving the safeguards which thus far the Arabs and Israelis have resisted. A treaty lacking a meaningful safeguards provision would encounter strong criticism in the Senate when it became known that our deference to Euratom had prevented US-Soviet agreement on such a provision. While such criticism probably would not be strong enough to affect seriously the treaty's prospects for ratification, it would give rise to the argument that our order of priorities is unsound in that we would have sacrificed an important principle in arms control (verification) in order to protect an element of Euratom's overall function which will become non-essential if IAEA safeguards are generally applied. In addition to enjoying strong Senate support, a binding safeguards article would also have the firm support of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. Letters expressing such support are attached at Tab B, along with a similar letter from the US Representative to the IAEA. 3 Acceptance of IAEA safeguards in the Euratom area need not impair Euratom's effectiveness or substantive functions. We and others would continue to treat with Euratom as a corporate entity. France, which can be expected to oppose IAEA safeguards in the Euratom area, would in fact not be directly affected since, as a nuclear-weapons state, it would not be subject to IAEA safeguards. Moreover, there would be no objection from the Soviets if Euratom wished to maintain its safeguards while accepting those of IAEA. The FRG would suffer no discrimination. We would, of course, consult with the FRG in working out means for dealing with anticipated attempts by the GDR to enhance its status under the treaty. Accordingly, I recommend the following course of action: 1. We should promptly inform our ENDC allies and the FRG initially, and then immediately other Euratom members, of the results of our negotiations to date with the Soviets on this matter, making clear we see no appreciable flexibility in the Soviet position. 2. We should tell them we attach major importance to inclusion of a meaningful safeguards article and that, accordingly, we plan to explore with the Soviets, still ad referendum pending further consultations with our allies, the following possible arrangement: a) Inclusion in the treaty of an Article III along the lines of that appearing at Tab A, with the addition of the words “as soon as practicable” at the end of the first sentence, and provided we achieve agreement on the modalities and timing of a transitional arrangement which would be specified in a public declaration; b) the transitional arrangement would inter alia provide: (i) that upon the entry into force of the non-proliferation treaty, Euratom and IAEA would exchange technical information on their respective safeguards procedures with a view to facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards in the Euratom countries; meanwhile IAEA safeguards would apply to Euratom nuclear exports sent to non-nuclear weapon countries outside the Euratom area; (ii) that at such time as IAEA will have completed arrangements for applying its safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of other advanced nuclear countries (informally agreed to comprise India, Sweden, Israel, etc) it will also apply such safeguards in the Euratom non-nuclear weapon countries (the modalities having been agreed between the two organizations during the transition period); the public declaration might have to include an agreed understanding regarding the time period within which the application of safeguards to all non-nuclear states is to be completed. 3. We should then seek to work out with the Soviets a concrete but ad referendum proposal along the above lines, including in these discussions our respective representatives to the IAEA. 4. If you approve this course of action, ACDA will collaborate with the appropriate Bureaus in the Department of State in preparing the necessary instructions to our Embassies for your approval. 4 William C. Foster 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret;Limdis. 2 Tab A entitled “Safeguards Article acceptable to Soviets” is not printed. 3 Tab B consists of three letters: Seaborg to Rusk, December 23, 1966, Dr. Smyth to Rusk, December 20, and John McNaughton to Fisher, December 21. None is printed. 4 A handwritten approval line at the end of the source text is checked. 173. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 173. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Production and Deployment of the Nike-X A number of events have occurred during the last year which, taken together, tend to bring to a head the long-standing issue of whether to produce and deploy a U.S. anti-ballistic defense: 1. The Soviet Union has accelerated the deployment of hard ICBMs beyond the rates forecast in last year's NIE 2 (but not beyond the “higher than expected” case on which the U.S. Defense Program was based). 2. The Soviet Union has started the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow and a second type of system, which may have an ABM capability, in other parts of the country. 3. The Chinese Communists have launched and demonstrated a nuclear-armed, intermediate range ballistic missile, 3 and there is some evidence that they may be preparing to test a booster in the ICBM range. 4. Our own anti-ballistic missile system, the Nike-X, has now reached a stage of development where it may be feasible to start concurrent production and deployment. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an initial operational capability in FY 1972, 4 a Nike-X system which would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and local defense of 25 cities against a “low” Soviet threat. 6. The Congress for the first time since 1959 has appropriated funds to prepare for the production and deployment of an ABM defense system. There are three somewhat overlapping but distinct purposes for which we might want to deploy an ABM system: 1. To protect our cities (and their population and industry) against a Soviet missile attack. 2. To protect our cities against a Chinese Communist missile attack in the mid-1970s. 3. To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces (i.e., Minuteman) against a Soviet missile attack. After studying the subject exhaustively, Mr. Vance and I have concluded we should not initiate ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that: 1. The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force with the result that: a. The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not be further decreased. b. The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense. The foundation of our security is the deterrence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength to impose unacceptable damage on them (e.g., destruction by blast and radiation alone of approximately 20%-30% of their people and 50% of their industry). We have such power today. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces to offset actual or potential changes in theirs. 5 There is nothing I have seen in either our own or the Soviet Union's technology which would lead me to believe we cannot do this. From the beginning of the Nike-Zeus project in 1955 through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have invested a total of about $4 billion on ballistic missile defense research—including Nike-Zeus, Nike-X and Project Defender. And, during the last five or six years, we have spent about $1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help ensure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses. As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already in hand to counter any offensive or defensive force changes the Soviet Union is likely to undertake in the foreseeable future. We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or “Assured Destruction” 6 force as the U.S. Therefore, deployment by the U.S. of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before. 2. With respect to protection of the U.S. against a possible Chinese Communist nuclear attack, the lead time required for China to develop a significant ICBM force is greater than that required for deployment of our defense—therefore the Chinese threat in itself would not dictate the production of an ABM system at this time. 3. Similarly, although the protection of our land-based strategic offensive forces against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack the Soviets may be able to mount in the late 1970s might later prove to be worthwhile, it is still premature to produce and deploy the Nike-X for that purpose. [Here follow 27 pages of text, which explore in detail the bases for these conclusions.] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2752. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A typewritten note on the source text reads “Draft 1/4/67 (Revised 1/17/67).” 2 Presumably a reference to NIE 11-8-65, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack,” October 7, 1965, the conclusions of which are scheduled for publication in volume X . 3 On October 27, 1966, the People's Republic of China successfully launched a guided nuclear missile weapons test. For an excerpt from the communique issued by the Chinese Government, October 28, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 676-677. 4 Reference is to JCSM-742-66, December 2, 1966, which is scheduled for publication in volume X . 5 Last year, as a hedge against a “higher-than-expected” Soviet threat—i.e., the deployment of a full-scale ABM defense and the incorporation of multiple, independently-aimed reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in their large, hard ICBMs—we proposed in the FY 1967 Budget, and the Congress supported, the following improvements in our strategic offensive forces: 1. The acceleration of the development of the Poseidon missile, including area penetration aids, on a schedule which could make it operationally available in the summer of 1970. 2. The production and deployment of the Minuteman III with three MK-12 multiple independently-aimed reentry vehicles each. 3. The production and deployment of the MK-17 reentry vehicle for the Minuteman II (the MK-17 promises a kill probability against 300 psi targets of about [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] compared with [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] for the MK-11 now used on the Minuteman II). 4. The replacement of all Minuteman I by FY 1972. 5. Initiation of engineering development of new area penetration aids packages for all Minuteman missiles and of a terminal penetration aids package for the Minuteman III. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 A term used to describe one of two nuclear force capabilities. For a detailed explanation by Secretary McNamara, see an extract of his Military Posture Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25, 1967, in Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 5-24. 174. Memorandum of Conversation 174. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 18, 1967, 7 p.m. SUBJECT U.S.-Soviet Discussion of Strategic Nuclear Weapons PARTICIPANTS Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler The Secretary received Ambassador Dobrynin at 7:00 p.m. at the latter's request. Ambassador Dobrynin read the following oral statement: “They have reviewed in Moscow the communication of Ambassador Thompson in a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador on December 6, 1966, with respect to an exchange of views between Soviet and American representatives on the question of the possibilities of reaching a mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. relating to anti-missile defense systems. “This question, raised in the meeting of December 6 of last year, deserves attention. Indeed, the deployment of anti-missile defense systems involves enormous expenditures, and it would be desirable to avoid them. The Soviet Union has always come out for, and comes out for, the reduction of military expenditures, for the limitation or cessation of the arms race. “The Soviet Union constantly strives to reach an agreement on the liquidation of the threat of a nuclear missile war. That would be responsive to the interests of both of our two countries, and of all peoples. The question of reaching a mutual understanding with respect to anti-missile systems could be considered simultaneously with a solution of the problem of offensive means of delivering nuclear weapons and in close association with the problem of general and complete disarmament. If the Government of the U.S.A. has any reflections in this respect, these reflections could be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government.” Ambassador Dobrynin left behind the Russian text of his oral statement (attached). 2 In the ensuing discussion, Ambassador Dobrynin clarified that it was his understanding of his instructions that the Soviet Government was prepared in principle to enter discussions on this subject on the understanding that the discussions would cover offensive as well as defensive missile systems. The Ambassador added that he had alerted his Government to the urgency of the matter after his talk with Ambassador Kohler last Saturday, January 14, 3 in order to obtain a reply prior to the President's presentation of his budget to the Congress. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3541. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. 2 Not printed. 3 Not further identified. 175. Memorandum of Conversation 175. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, January 18, 1967. SUBJECT US-Soviet Technical Discussions on Nuclear Explosions PARTICIPANTS Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler The Secretary received Ambassador Dobrynin at the latter's request. Ambassador Dobrynin made the following statement: “I am authorized to confirm in principle our readiness to exchange opinions on the technical level in connection with the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, as this was discussed by you at the time of the 21st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As regards the time of the exchange of opinion, it would be possible to revert to this question a bit later.” Ambassador Dobrynin left the Russian text of this oral statement. (Attached.) 2 In an ensuing discussion the Secretary stressed the urgency and importance of this question in relation to consideration of a non-proliferation treaty. He said that the subject had been raised by many non-nuclear countries during our consultations. It was necessary that the Soviet Union and the United States be in a position to say that we were not foreclosing the possibility that non-nuclear countries could have access to the benefits of nuclear explosions. We should be in a position to offer to conduct nuclear explosions for justified projects. Ambassador Dobrynin said that this was a political question; whereas, what was now contemplated were purely technical talks and asked whether the Secretary was broadening his proposal. He pointed out that the technical talks would involve a certain group of experts, whereas, questions relating to non-proliferation were handled by another group on a political level. The Secretary said he would clarify the question. We had proposed technical talks as a beginning, and these would be useful. Such technical talks would lay the basis for coming to grips with the political aspects. The problem had protruded itself and become related to the question of a non-proliferation treaty. Ambassador Dobrynin said he understood this, but that he also understood that the Secretary was not proposing to marry the technical and political aspects at this time. The Secretary confirmed this understanding but stressed that the relationship with non-proliferation made it urgent that we get ahead more quickly with the technical talks than seemed to be contemplated by the Soviet side. He, therefore, hoped that Ambassador Dobrynin would ask his Government to put forward an early date for the beginning of the technical talks. Ambassador Dobrynin agreed to do so. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Confidential;Nodis. Drafted by Kohler. This conversation is presumably part of the 7 p.m. meeting between Dobrynin and Rusk. See Document 174 . 2 Not printed. 176. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 176. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 19, 1967. JCSM-30-67 SUBJECT Questions Relating to a Possible Freeze Agreement on Strategic Forces (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 18 January 1967, 2 on the above subject, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft position paper, dated 13 January 1967, 3 on the above subject, prepared in the Department of State in consultation with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 2. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft position paper and interpose no objections to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling off strategic offensive and defensive missile forces. However, they reaffirm their recommendation that a decision be made now to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an initial operational capability in FY 1972. They do not believe that Soviet decisions as to future development of their offensive missile force are as directly dependent on the US ABM decision as is implied in the draft position paper. They believe that the Soviet problems and uncertainties of coping with a US ABM defense would reduce the risk of a Soviet attack. Accordingly, they believe that consideration of arms control agreements should not be permitted to delay a decision for an initial deployment of a US ABM system. If the Soviets are interested in an ABM deployment freeze, a prior announcement by the United States of a decision to initiate deployment of Nike-X should provide pressure on them to seek an agreement. 3. (S) Examination of various, previous strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV) freeze proposals has emphasized the many complexities in finding practical solutions to the conditions necessary to make a freeze concept acceptable from the standpoint of national security. The discussions presented in the draft position paper indicate the complexities inherent in attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Union in this area. The following are assumptions and conclusions which are in the draft position paper and which are subject to serious reservations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. The exclusion of current construction of the Tallinn 4 System, a most significant strategic deployment, from the freeze. b. The dependence upon unilateral intelligence for verifying possible freeze agreements, and the stated acceptability of arrangements that cannot be effectively verified. c. The assumption that full scale testing is required before deploying MIRVs and penetration aids. d. The apparent assumption that a US ballistic missile defense deployment would not provide a useful contribution to the total US strategic posture with regard to both the USSR and Communist China. 4. (C) In view of the lack of interest expressed by the Soviets in this subject, it is believed that any US Government approach to the problem should be to determine, first, whether or not the Soviets are interested, in any way, in any form of an SNDV freeze and, if so, when and to what extent, including or excluding ABMs. 5. (C) If the Soviet representatives show any interest in this matter and indicate specific areas to be explored, the provisions of a freeze proposal should be developed with full, deliberate consideration, including review and analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prior to any commitment outside the US Government. 6. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently held that any arms control agreement should provide for adequate verification other than by complete reliance on unilateral intelligence. Disagreement within the US intelligence community on the ABM capability of the Soviet Tallinn System reinforces this position. Exploratory talks need not be blocked by failure to agree on verification procedures. The USSR should be informed early in the discussions that it will be necessary to establish appropriate verification procedures in conjunction with reaching a general area of understanding on forces to be frozen before there can be a formal agreement. 7. (C) Although the proposal would not preclude research, development, and testing, there is a seeming inconsistence in the discussion which indicates that under certain conditions the United States should agree to refrain from making the qualitative improvements now planned for strategic offensive forces (Poseidon, Minuteman III, and MIRVs) and that flight testing of MIRVs and other penetration aids should be precluded. In contrast to this, it is proposed in the paper that, since unilateral intelligence is incapable of detecting changes incorporated in missiles to improve their performance, no limit be placed on changes in missile characteristics as such. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, in order to avoid Soviet technological surprise and resulting degradation of US military posture, research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted under any freeze agreement and that US-planned improvements in its missile characteristics must be pursued. 8. (S) It should be noted that the US force posture and development/deployment actions are extremely sensitive to the possession of a MIRV capability by the Soviets. Therefore, the DOD established policy for its agencies on this subject is that all papers and discussions will be classified Secret-NOFORN Except UK and Canada. This policy was adopted to prevent acceleration of any potential Soviet MIRV capability resulting from failure to safeguard the concept and its strategic advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff oppose initiating any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR. However, they recognize that the Soviets may raise this subject and that US participants in any such discussions must be prepared to respond. 9. (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the draft position paper that the United States should in no way indicate its willingness to consider a trade-off of a freeze on manned bombers for a freeze of SAMs, with or without ABM capability. Any consideration of an ABM freeze must include SAMs with a significant ABM capability. 10. (C) With reference to discussion in the draft position paper of the nature of the agreement to be sought, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that exploratory talks should be conducted informally until a basis for an agreement is reached or it is evident that no agreement is possible. However, should an agreement be reached between the United States and the USSR limiting strategic arms, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider it essential that such agreement be formalized as a treaty. 11. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Interpose no objections to exploring with the Soviets means of leveling-off strategic offensive and defensive forces. However, this should not be interpreted as affecting their previous recommendations to initiate deployment of Nike-X for an operational capability in FY 1972. b. Believe that any US Government approach should be to determine first whether or not the Soviets are interested in a limitation on strategic arms and, if so, to what extent. c. Consider that any specific arms control proposal, prior to committing it outside the US Government, should be provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. Such proposals should be analyzed in the light of the then current situation; for example, the required flexibility for handling the Chinese threat. d. Believe the USSR should be informed early in the discussions that the United States intends to address the subject of verification after a general area of agreement is determined. e. Consider it essential that research, development, and prototype testing must be permitted and US planned improvements in missile characteristics must be pursued. f. Oppose initiating any discussion of MIRVs with the USSR. g. Believe that any consideration of an ABM freeze must include SAMs with a significant ABM capability. h. Consider it essential that an agreement between the United States and the USSR limiting strategic arms be formalized as a treaty. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 5 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Department of Defense, Vol. IV, June 1966. Secret. 2 Not further identified. 3 Not further identified. 4 In the mid-1960s the Soviets began deploying a swath of radars and interceptors across the U.S. ICBM corridor. This system, code named Tallinn because it first appeared near the Estonian capital city of this name, may or may not have had ballistic missile defense capabilities. (Simon P. Worden, SDI and the Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), pp. 38-43) 5 Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original. 177. Editorial Note 177. Editorial Note On January 20, 1967, Leonard Meeker and Joseph Sisco wrote a memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk informing him of the preparations to sign the Outer Space Treaty. As summarized in the memorandum, it was proposed by the United States to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union that the signing take place in three depository capitals: Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, and that President Johnson host the Washington ceremony scheduled for 5 p.m. at the White House. (Department of State, Central Files, SP 4) The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union subsequently agreed to the proposed signing date. After Secretary Rusk and U.S. Ambassador Goldberg signed the Treaty on behalf of the United States, the British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, and the Ambassador from the Soviet Union, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, signed it on behalf of their respective countries. For remarks by President Johnson at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pages 91-92. Signing ceremonies were also held in London and Moscow. Telegram 5985 from London, January 27, reported that the Outer Space Treaty was signed at 10:50 a.m. by Foreign Minister George Brown, Soviet Ambassador Smirnovsky, and U.S. Charge Kaiser. Foreign Minister Brown, the telegram related, “welcomed the Treaty as enlarging field of international agreement and as significant step forward in building mutual trust, understanding, and agreement in East-West relations.” Smirnovsky also welcomed the Treaty as opening up an “era of cooperation in outer space.” (Department of State, Central Files, SP 7) The Treaty was subsequently signed by the representatives of 57 other nations. On March 7, March 13, and April 12, the Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings to consider granting its advice and consent to the Treaty. ( Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session ) Following his 2-1/2 hour testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session on March 13, Goldberg telephoned President Johnson to report that “the Space Treaty has clear sailing because there appears to be no objection.” The President interjected, “wonderful.” Goldberg then continued that “there will be no reservations to the Treaty; there will be no understandings. The Committee report will reflect my interpretation of what we negotiated.” He then indicated that he was able to satisfy the lingering doubts of certain Senators on the Committee. In concluding their conversation, President Johnson lavished praise on Goldberg: “I salute you and honor you for a job well done… . God bless you; you did wonderful[ly].” (Johnson Library, Records and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, March 13, 1967, 12:38 p.m., Tape F67.08, Side B) On April 25 the U.S. Senate gave its unanimous consent to the Treaty's ratification, and it entered into force on October 10, 1967. For text of the Treaty, see 18 UST 2410. 178. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 178. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, January 21, 1967. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have asked Mr. Thompson to return to the Soviet Union as my Ambassador 2 because of the great importance I attach to the improvement of relations between our two countries. I have full confidence in him, and I hope that you and your colleagues will feel as free to discuss our mutual problems with him as you would with me if we were able to sit down together. I am, of course, always available to your Ambassador here through the channel we have established, or directly whenever necessary. 3 I have arranged for Ambassador Thompson to have a channel of communication which will be open only to Secretary Rusk and myself. I have directed Ambassador Thompson as a matter of first priority to discuss with you and the appropriate members of your Government the possibilities of reaching an understanding between us which would curb the strategic arms race. I think you must realize that following the deployment by you of an anti-ballistic missile system I face great pressures from the Members of the Congress and from public opinion not only to deploy defensive systems in this country, but also to increase greatly our capabilities to penetrate any defensive systems which you might establish. If we should feel compelled to make such major increases in our strategic weapons capabilities, I have no doubt that you would in turn feel under compulsion to do likewise. We would thus have incurred on both sides colossal costs without substantially enhancing the security of our own people or contributing to the prospects for a stable peace in the world. I was accordingly glad to receive your message from Ambassador Dobrynin 4 indicating that the Soviet Government is likewise concerned about this question. We have no inflexible views as to how to proceed and would welcome yours. Perhaps after Ambassador Thompson has made an initial exploration of this matter with your Government, it may prove desirable to have some of our highest authorities meet in Geneva or another mutually agreeable place to carry the matter forward. Similarly, we have no inflexible views as to the nature of an understanding between us. Our objective should be a mutually acceptable and stable balance of forces, verifiable to the maximum extent possible by our national means. I trust you will agree that this is a question not only of the greatest importance but of considerable urgency. May I express the hope that in the coming year peace will return to this troubled world, and that we may find ways to cooperate in dealing with the problems that face mankind today and for which our two countries, by their very size and importance, carry a heavy responsibility. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. Secret. The source text, which the President had cleared on January 14, was submitted for the President's signature under cover of a January 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President. 2 Llewellyn Thompson was appointed to his second ambassadorship to the Soviet Union on October 13, 1966, and presented his credentials on January 23, 1967. 3 The special “channel” refers to a direct line of communication first established in 1963 between Khrushchev and President Kennedy through which views on pressing issues were exchanged. Periodically during President Johnson's administration, he revived this channel to communicate directly with Chairman Kosygin. These communications were labeled “Pen Pal Correspondence.” 4 See Document 174 . 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, January 22, 1967, 1:27 p.m. 123253. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. In your meeting with Gromyko you should make following oral reply concerning talks on strategic weapons question. You may leave an informal copy of your oral remarks. “The United States has studied the oral statement of Ambassador Dobrynin on January 18, 1967, 2 concerning an exchange of views between Soviet and American representatives on the possibilities of reaching a mutual understanding concerning anti-ballistic missile systems. “The United States Government accepts the Soviet Government's position that discussions should include offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems as well as anti-missile defense systems. This position is, of course, without prejudice to whatever solutions may arise in the discussions with respect to possible understandings on feasible combinations of weapons systems which might be curtailed in order to curb the strategic arms race. “Today both sides realize that a nuclear war would be disastrous for both and that our strategic weapons can serve only to deter such a war. In this light, it seems that the present strategic situation may be the most stable we can hope to achieve in the near future. We each have large numbers of well-protected weapons, and each has the ability with high confidence to inflict terrible destruction upon the other, even after having received an initial attack. Therefore, the initiation of such an attack is not now rational. “There are, however, disquieting signs that suggest that this situation may become seriously altered in the near future. During the past several years, the United States has consciously restricted its deployment of strategic missiles and refrained from deploying ballistic missile defenses, hoping to see a corresponding display of restraint on part of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, it now appears that there is an acceleration in the deployment of Soviet systems. Although your deployments are no doubt prompted by concern to protect your people, we believe we should both consider whether this action, and whatever reactions on our part it will necessarily cause, are in the interest of either of our countries. “We believe that we understand your feelings on this point because they are probably very similar to our own. The safety and security of our countries must be the first concern of each of us. “It is in this context that we believe we should discuss the implications of the continued deployment of strategic missile and anti-missile defense systems. It seems clear to us that if unchecked your deployments could raise serious requirements for us with respect to our own deterrent. We will be forced to increase our offensive forces and perhaps start to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. These actions on our part could negate your new deployments and lead you to decide on still further increases in your strategic forces. All of this would be at great cost to both of us and might well lead to greater rather than lesser risks due to the upward spiral in the arms race. “It is also true that any evidence of progress in these talks would make easier the accession by certain non-nuclear states to the non-proliferation treaty which we both hope is nearing agreement between us. “It is for these reasons that we believe we should discuss urgently whether it is possible to curtail the arms race in strategic weapons systems. “High level representatives should, we believe, discuss a prompt cessation of deployment of additional strategic offensive missile launchers, and anti-missile launchers and associated launch facilities. It will be necessary to discuss respective strategic weapons systems of both sides in order to reach agreement on precisely which systems would be involved. It will also be necessary to be precise with respect to the undertakings regarding cessation or curtailment of further expansion of deployment. “The United States would be prepared to discuss the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification to meet the major objectives of ceasing further deployment of new missile and anti-missile launch facilities without requiring inspection on either party's territory. If discussions suggest that dependable curtailment of some aspects of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems would require on-site inspection, such questions too could be included. “We recognize that these and other complex questions will require careful consideration by our representatives. “The United States places no preconditions on these discussions. We do, however, note that, especially since the discussions may extend for some time, insofar as either side may make major changes in strategic offensive or defensive weapons system deployment during the negotiations, such changes might compel the other side to take the steps necessary to offset such further changes. “We suggest deferring consideration of the form in which an understanding between us might be expressed until we see what such an understanding might cover. And, after we have determined that such an arrangement is working to our mutual satisfaction, we might achieve the climate for broader, as well as more formal, agreements in the strategic arms area.” Rusk 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3543. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Fisher (ACDA) and Garthoff (G/PM); cleared by Rostow , McNamara, Kohler, Foster, and Walsh; and approved by Secretary Rusk on January 21. 2 See Document 174 . 180. Memorandum of Conversation 180. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, February 8, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–1 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty PARTICIPANTS Americans The Secretary The Under Secretary ACDA Director Foster Under Secretary Rostow Deputy Under Secretary Kohler Assistant Secretary Leddy Counselor Bowie Ambassador McGhee Ambassador Cleveland Mr. Puhan Germans Vice Chancellor Brandt Egon Bahr, FRG Foreign Office Ambassador Knappstein, FRG Embassy Minister von Lilienfeld, FRG Embassy Counselor von Staden, FRG Embassy Dr. Hans Arnold, FRG Foreign Office Mr. Weber, Foreign Office Mr. Soenksen, Foreign Office The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming Vice Chancellor Brandt and conveying the President's greetings. He characterized the achievement of a Non-Proliferation Treaty as a very serious task facing the world. He called it tragic that the Baruch proposals of 1946 had not been accepted. 2 We therefore, he said, now have five nuclear powers and that is five too many. He assured Brandt that we don't yet have agreement with the USSR and, indeed, as far as draft language was concerned the Germans have seen more of the proposed American position than the USSR had. He added that we will see the Russians again at Geneva at the conference on February 21. 3 Brandt was grateful for this early opportunity to meet. He pointed out that, while some reports may differ from what he was about to say, there were strong links between Germany and the United States. He referred to the Kiesinger policy statement 4 and reiterated that Atlantic partnership was an essential of German policy. Brandt stressed that they had no objection to the idea of an NPT. What concerned Germany was to make peace safe. This did not mean less interest in solving the German problem. Their principal objective remained the solution of the German problem. Nevertheless, the FRG had problems with the treaty. He conceded that the US had [also] serious problems, domestic as well as with its allies. Brandt said he wanted to talk about those things which would gain the support of the Bundestag for the NPT. He noted that the FRG Embassy had communicated the main German concerns. He said the Germans wanted strong links with disarmament. They were concerned about nuclear blackmail. His main point, he said, was that the NPT should not be used as an instrument of discrimination against the FRG in the peaceful development of atomic energy. He mentioned in this connection a German firm which was on the verge of a sale of a reactor to another country but subsequently was told by the prospective customer that an American firm had raised the question of German ability to guarantee an adequate supply of reactor fuel. By contrast, the Americans could guarantee delivery. In Brandt's mind this example raised the specter of potential unfair competition. On controls, Brandt stated his understanding that the USSR would not accept Euratom controls and wanted the IAEA system. He pointed out that if we get IAEA controls over civilian fields, any advantages the Germans may have attained would be exposed. He was concerned about industrial espionage. In addition, Brandt wanted assurances that the FRG's concerns regarding disarmament would remain in our minds, as well as problems which might develop with other allies. Brandt said the Germans, in common with others, wanted a letter or some other document in hand setting forth our interpretation of the meaning of the draft treaty language. This would be needed for domestic reasons. If they had to wait until we explained the treaty to the Senate that would be too late. Brandt said he therefore wanted to ask again for a letter giving our interpretations of the NPT. On the European clause, Brandt said that he and the Chancellor had agreed they could live with the American interpretation. Not all of his colleagues, however, were in agreement. By a united Europe he thought the United States meant a political organization which has common control over defense and political policy. Perhaps it would be best if we had some mechanism to cover the interim stage as well. The Secretary said he would comment on Mr. Brandt's observations. On problems of interpretation, the Secretary saw no great difficulty. He noted that, unless there was a meeting of the minds by the nuclear powers on essentials, there could be no treaty. If there are real differences on interpretations, there is no agreement in the long run. If significant disparities existed between the US and the USSR, we should know about them—if the Soviets denied our public position, then there would in effect be no agreement. Mr. Foster noted at this point that almost all of the above points had already been made to the USSR and therefore constituted no surprise. He agreed to give the Germans a formal note which he hoped would cover their concerns and which the Soviets could see. The Secretary said on the question of disarmament that all of us had undertaken the obligation to work toward disarmament. He thought a preambular statement on disarmament might be possible. He admitted that a downward trend in the arms race was not yet in sight. He mentioned as an example the ABM problem, which Brandt noted was a problem for Europe too. The Secretary said ABM production on both sides could lead to staggering multiplication of defense costs without a parallel rise in security for either side. On nuclear blackmail, the Secretary thought that this question should not trouble our NATO allies or Japan, but could be a real problem to nonaligned states such as India. There was the question of how we could risk 200 million American lives without receiving something in exchange—commitment was really difficult without a treaty such as the NATO agreement under which an attack on one is an attack on all. On peaceful uses, the Secretary said the treaty applied only to explosives and he didn't see how nuclear explosives, since they are weapons, could be excepted. Outside of explosions, there would appear to be no problem. He wondered to what extent it was real to think of technological benefits flowing from weaponry. He added that he had recently raised this question with Mr. Foster and that the only positive answer he had received concerned some applications to metallurgy involving perhaps $50,000 worth of business a year. The Secretary added that he did not really see where the example Brandt had raised earlier involved the treaty. Euratom controls, the Secretary recognized, were a genuine problem. Looking ahead to 1980, with plans by many countries for rapid use of nuclear power, the Secretary thought there would soon be enough material to make several nuclear weapons a day, adding that unless there was some control this was a danger for everyone. He said we were trying to work out parallel arrangements of IAEA and Euratom, recognizing that there would be a real problem if France objected. In this connection the Secretary said he really did not know what French views were, quoting one high French source as saying that if a nation has the capability of making nuclear weapons it has the obligation to do so, but others say that while France may not join an NPT it would have no objection if others did. The Secretary pointed out that happily no atomic weapon has been used in twenty-two years, adding that if proliferation continued, however, he was not sure this would always be so. He wondered whether a general acceptance of Euratom and IAEA controls might be helpful in providing a solution. On the question of a European option, the Secretary pointed out that it was hard to talk about something that did not as yet exist and the shape of which was not clear. What he could understand and what he thought we should avoid would be to interpret participation in the treaty as an obstacle to an integrated Europe. The Secretary thought that European political unification could justify the invocation of the withdrawal clause of the treaty. He mentioned again that the principal adherence problems should not properly lie in an East-West context but rather with countries such as India. He hoped that the problems raised would be manageable. Mr. Foster said he would like to give the Germans some suggestions on safeguards to allay their concern on questions such as technological spin-off. Brandt asked whether a signed treaty would be presented to the ENDC or would it be an open draft subject to amendment. The Secretary said there was no final view on this matter within the US Government as we were trying to interpret the results of our talks with the Soviets. He mentioned that we had not sought an “agreement” with the Soviets on Article I and thought that at Geneva the US and Soviet co-chairman would sit down to see where we both stood. He emphasized that we would not agree to language not previously circulated to NATO allies. Mr. Foster said that the present plan was to hold discussions in Paris with other allies in each case before submitting new treaty language to the ENDC. He assured Brandt on prior consultations in the event of any changes in the text that had been discussed. The Secretary added that there were seventeen countries in Geneva, some of which had not been consulted yet. He believed that more consultation would be required as well as a period of private and public debate. He thought that there would be some time “before this ship could be brought into harbor.” He again pointed out that if there were different Soviet interpretations on significant points there could be no agreement. Brandt thanked the Secretary for his comments, calling them very helpful. He wondered, however, since both the US and USSR had voted on a UN resolution to curb vertical as well as horizontal proliferation why it was so difficult for both sides simply to reaffirm this position. 5 As for nuclear blackmail, Brandt stressed that this was a problem for non-nuclear states. It gave nuclear powers an opportunity to use methods to intervene on technological spin-off. He said that the problem of explosions mentioned by the Secretary was not the main problem and returned to the question of controls, specifically control of peaceful uses. As an illustration he mentioned the Soviet note of January 28, 6 calling into question the peaceful purposes of the German nuclear program, and wondered if propaganda blasts of this kind would not be multiplied. The Secretary thought that the IAEA system involved the acquiescence of the host country to the modalities. He asked Mr. Foster how IAEA dealt with the question of industrial secrets. Mr. Foster confirmed that the country composition of the IAEA inspection team must be agreed to by the host country. He added there was no limitation on research for peaceful uses but that the controls were simply an effort to account for fissionable materials, either those remaining in the producing country or, if exported, subject to an end-use check to assure that they remained in the country of destination for the purposes intended. He saw little danger of a leak of industrial secrets, citing an American reactor in Massachusetts that had been subjected to voluntary inspection four times. A concurrent meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum at that time concluded that no danger existed of diversion of industrial secrets. He added that a country can turn down an undesirable individual inspector if it so desires. The Secretary returned to what he considered the kernel of the problem which he said has been raised by a number of countries—whether the option of becoming a nuclear power was ruled out by the treaty. He admitted this was an important question for any country but it was the heart of the matter. Brandt wondered whether the treaty did not bring about nuclear discrimination by dividing the world into three groups, the nuclear states with two not signing, those who will sign, and a group of about twenty states like Germany which are capable of producing nuclear weapons and would be inhibited from doing so by the treaty. The Secretary noted that the third group would grow as fuels become available. He noted that the possessor of a high school physics text and an ordinary reactor would soon be able to make a nuclear explosion. It was much simpler, however, if one did not have to start from the beginning. The Secretary asked if Mr. Brandt wished to designate someone to discuss further the questions of industrial secrets, controls, etc. Brandt thought that the experts might have some of these answers. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Alfred Puhan (EUR/GER) and approved by S, M, and G on February 17. The source text is labeled “Part 1 of 2.” The meeting was held in the Secretary's conference room. 2 For text of Baruch's proposal, June 14, 1946, which was delivered in the form of a statement to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, Vol. I, pp. 7-16. 3 During 1967, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee held two sessions in Geneva; the first from February 21 to March 23, and the second from May 18 to December 14. As in previous years, all the members of the ENDC except France participated in the work of the Committee. 4 Given by Chancellor Kiesinger on December 13, 1966, before the Bundestag on the foreign policy goals of the Federal Republic of Germany. See Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 935-941. 5 Presumably a reference to U.N. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) adopted November 19, 1965, by a vote of 93 to 0 with 5 abstentions (Cuba, France, Guinea, Pakistan, and Romania). For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 532-534. 6 Not further identified. 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, February 15, 1967, 9:15 p.m. 138194. Eyes only for the Ambassador. 1. Of prime importance among subjects you will take up with Kosygin is, of course, proposal for talks on strategic arms control. Kosygin will presumably be familiar with the President's letter 2 and your oral remarks to Gromyko (State 123253), 3 and we hope will be prepared respond. You should stress strong highest level US interest in subject; and desire to proceed with talks. 2. You may wish to repeat salient points your earlier statement. In particular, at your discretion, we suggest stressing; (1) fact that US prepared consider strategic offensive missile systems as well as defensive anti-missile systems, (2) need as urgent first step to seek agreement to head off escalation of arms race in such strategic-missile and anti-missile systems, and (3) US readiness rely to fullest extent on unilateral verification and belief that major step in freezing strategic systems possible on that basis without on-site inspection. 3. As you will have noted in London's 6503 to Department, 4 repeated info to Moscow, Kosygin seems to rest on simple proposition defensive strategic systems morally superior to offensive ones. If he makes this point to you, you may wish note interaction and interrelation two sides of same coin of strategic relation of forces, and that as indicated US prepared discuss and reach agreement with respect to curbing both. 4. Kosygin may raise question of reductions in strategic forces. You should say that possibility agreement on reductions would certainly be enhanced by prior agreement not to make additional deployments, but we believe necessary first learn to walk before we can run. Also note that unilateral verification probably more difficult for reductions, though without implying that any and all reductions would necessarily require inspection. (You may also wish note one important difference from 1964 strategic nuclear delivery freeze proposal 5 is focus on launchers, rather than on production of missiles, which latter would require on-site inspection for verification.) FYI: Current consideration US position focuses on launcher freeze, and not on reductions, which we wish defer. Special NIE 6 has just been prepared which confirms very substantial, though of course not unlimited, capabilities for unilateral verification of measures along lines now being considered for strategic launcher freeze. End FYI. 5. If Kosygin displays concern over stated need to discuss “respective strategic systems of both sides” you should stress that our only objective is have clear mutual understanding, not probe into Soviet military secrets. We will be prepared to limit focus our attention to matters directly relevant and necessary to reach agreement. At same time, Kosygin might bear in mind that to extent important uncertainties exist with respect nature and capabilities given system, elementary prudence will require defining categories of weapons systems or resolving doubts in favor of more formidable alternatives. May, therefore, be mutual advantages in clarifying certain ambiguities. This of course question requiring expert discussion. 6. If Kosygin asks what US regards as “offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems,” you may note that we would expect discuss with Soviet representation but assume our general approach would be missile systems of medium and intercontinental ranges, land and sea based. With respect defensive anti-missile systems, would have to include systems capable of countering strategic missiles, including defensive systems having dual anti-aircraft and anti-missile capability. Again, we assume this type of question would be discussed more concretely in further discussions. FYI: Disarmament Principals have not yet met in proposed talks. Deputies reached consensus on including above indicated offensive and defensive systems: MRBMs and IRBMs, ICBMs, SLBMs and SLCMs, and ABMs and “SAMs which may have significant anti-missile capability.” (We recognize difficulty in defining last named category.) However, final decision on categories US would propose or be prepared to include, on such questions as mobile land-based strategic missiles, not yet taken. Current consensus not to bring in bombers. You should not, therefore, go beyond general remarks this paragraph, and use them only if Kosygin raises question and if in your judgment such comments will be helpful in eliciting positive Soviet reaction. End FYI. 7. No decision yet taken on question what to do about deployments underway at present time or at time of possible agreement. We therefore wish avoid this question at this time. If Kosygin raises issue, you may note that we recognize question of facilities already under construction as problem which would need be addressed in the [future?] 7 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3539. Top Secret; Nodis; Priority. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on February 15; cleared by Walsh, Kohler, Fisher, and Malcolm Toon (EUR/SOV); and approved by Katzenbach. 2 See Document 178 . 3 See Document 179 . 4 Telegram 6503, February 15, describes talks held in London between Wilson and Kosygin on arms control and security problems. Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 147, February 11-28, 1967) 5 See Document 21 . 6 Presumably a reference to SNIE 11-10-67, “U.S. Capabilities To Monitor Certain Limitations on Strategic Weapons Program,” February 14, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4) 7 The telegram is unsigned. 182. Message From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 182. Message From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, February 18, 1967. SUBJECT On Kosygin—ABM's 2 1. I raised the ABM question by recalling our proposal for talks about ABM's and delivery vehicles, such as ICBM's, 3 noting it had been made in hope that arrangements could be worked out to stop armaments race in this most expensive area. Of course, if we had to install an ABM system we would be capable of doing so as well as USSR could. We had spent four billion dollars on research in anti-missile defense, about half of it on ABM research. While no one knew exactly how much a full system would cost, there were estimates that up to 40-50 billion dollars would have to be spent on a system covering entire country. Yet we believed that by time U.S. finished installing its system and USSR took steps it could take in this area, both sides would be where they had started from in terms of their security. While President subject to great deal of pressure from some military men, manufacturers and Congressmen to go ahead with ABM's, he resisting that pressure in hope that two sides could find way of avoiding another step in arms race. Noting that one of major difficulties in arms control discussions had been question of inspection, I pointed out that we now prepared to rely, to extent possible, on national means of verification. As to our ABM research, it had been successful and we had developed a good system, but we believed that installation by U.S. and USSR of such systems would be destabilizing not only as far as these two countries concerned but also would raise problems in world generally. 2. Kosygin responded by saying he would not put problem in context in which I had placed it. Question was not that of whose system better and whose worse. He could not agree to a discussion of problem in this framework. If two sides wanted discuss this problem, it was important to establish confidence. He did not have good knowledge of U.S. system, and neither did I know well about Soviet system. As far as he was concerned, perhaps U.S. system hundred times better than Soviet one. He said he wanted to stress that he regarded President's proposal from an entirely different standpoint, i.e., he believed that President wanted to have serious discussions of how arms race and related expenditures could be curbed, without any comparison of respective systems. Discussions could take place in that framework but not in the other. 3. Referring to my comment on verification and our willingness rely, to extent possible, on national means, Kosygin said this question of interest and could be subject of discussion. However, he wished to stress once again that main problem in this connection was confidence as no U.S.-Soviet agreement possible in absence mutual confidence. Soviets desire such confidence; Soviets want reliable arrangements under which parties would keep their word, and USSR certainly would do so. If a U.S.-Soviet arrangement, and particularly treaty, were achieved, USSR would not want to see it torn up next day, as tranquility would not be possible under such circumstances. 4. As to President's proposal, Kosygin said we already knew that USSR would want to discuss this problem. However, USSR still considering all aspects of problem and this was reason for delay in formal reply to President's message. He wanted me to report to President that delay in response was due to Soviet desire give a constructive reply and not to any underestimation of President's proposal. However, he could say even now that discussion could not be only about defensive weapons. As he had stated publicly in London, USSR could not hold any discussions in framework of now it is cheaper to kill; as Socialist country, USSR could not take such stand. Thus, it important to discuss entire complex of problem. As everybody knew, any weapons system could be overcome by another, and unfortunately progress in this area could be made much faster than in area of agriculture production and general increase of standard of living. This problem unquestionably complex, but I should report to President that Soviets seriously considering his message. Kosygin reiterated that Soviets want to weigh all aspects of problem and want their reply to be constructive. 5. Referring to Kosygin's assertion that I had compared U.S. and Soviet systems, I said I had no intention of doing so. Indeed, I did not know what Soviet system was. Only point I wanted to make in mentioning our research was that we also capable of installing an ABM system. Also, I did not mean to push for a speedy reply; we knew that problem very complex one and we prepared wait as long as necessary. Reason why we believed agreement in this area possible and desirable was that it would not only promote trust between our two countries but also enable them to spend their money on more constructive things. 6. Kosygin observed he had not understood me as pressing for an early reply, although he would not have objected if I had done so. Point he had tried to make was that, in his view, my remarks smelled of ultimatum. While he did not want to make this point a point of contention in our discussion, he did not believe discussion should be conducted in this vein. As to Soviet reply to President's message, 4 he would have liked to reply sooner. 7. When I said again I had not sought to compare our respective systems, Kosygin agreed but insisted tone of my initial remarks had been such as to convey ultimatum. I denied any intention of conveying ultimatum and reiterated that only reason why I had mentioned research was to indicate that we proposing agreement not because we incapable of installing an ABM system ourselves; in fact, we could do it if need be. I said I was sorry if I had perhaps expressed myself in way creating different impression. 8. Kosygin said this of course different question. Soviets wanted discuss problem as raised by President: President had not compared our respective systems. He had simply suggested that no system be installed. Soviets believed this was serious question which should be considered. In any event, Kosygin said he thought that if he and I were to pursue this discussion it could lead us very far. 9. I observed that if I had talked of who was ahead I would have had to say that it was USSR because we had not yet installed any ABM's. I then repeated my explanation of why I had mentioned our research in ABM field and reiterated my apology for conveying perhaps a different impression. 10. I asked whether discussion should turn to another subject, such as Vietnam. Kosygin had no objection and inquired if I was satisfied with his answer re ABM's. He repeated I should report to President that delay in his response to President's message due not to Soviets underestimating proposal but rather to their desire seriously consider problem. Thompson 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. Secret; Nodis. The source text is a typewritten copy of telegram 3560 from Moscow. 2 The word “Arms” has been crossed out, and “ABM's” has been inserted by hand. 3 See Document 181 . 4 See Document 178 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 183. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 183. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 25, 1967. SUBJECT Plan of Action for Non-Proliferation Treaty Negotiation There are three immediate problems facing the United States in non-proliferation negotiations: The first relates to the manner in which we make it clear that a non-proliferation treaty will not prevent the creation of a federated European state. The second relates to the development of an acceptable article dealing with the safeguards problem. The third relates to a variety of other problems, some dealing with NATO security arrangements but more dealing with competitive problems in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, some dealing with clarification of the proposed treaty but more dealing with U.S. intentions. I. With respect to the first point, the objective which we wish to achieve is Soviet silence, or non-contradiction, when our allies and later the United States, state that the treaty would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. We cannot realistically expect the Soviets to say that they have agreed to the creation of such a new federated European state since they would have political objections to such a merger which transcend the problems of non-proliferation but we can expect them not to assert that this treaty bars it. We have already agreed with the FRG on the broad outline of a plan to achieve this objective. We have given the Germans a Draft Summary of the Interpretations dealing with the effect of the draft treaty formulations on the problems of European unity. 2 The Note stated that the draft treaty: “… does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. It would bar, however, transfer (including ownership) of nuclear weapons or control over them to a new multilateral or other entity lacking the attributes of a federated state essential to bring into play the legal doctrine of succession.” 3 In this Oral Note we also told the FRG that we would give our interpretations to the Soviets as soon as possible after we had agreed on the text of the provisions to be introduced into the ENDC. In the Oral Note we also stated that, pursuant to your discussions with Mr. Brandt we were agreed that it would not be desirable to request comments from the Soviet Union but that we would inform the Soviets that we are providing them with a summary in order to inform them of explanations we have given to our NATO allies in response to their questions. This exchange with the FRG still leaves unresolved the time at which we should make such a statement to the U.S.S.R. and how such a statement should be made. Mr. Foster, as you know, believes that at this delicate period of the negotiations we should hold off raising this matter with the Soviets, unless they raise it with us and wait until a complete text is agreed upon and raise the federation question only at the time we submit the full list of interpretations to them. On the other hand, I am aware of your concern that we should not go through the arduous task of further negotiations and consultations with our allies on the treaty text if the Soviets are going to publicly challenge an interpretation which the treaty supporters in Europe will have to make public if they are to be able to support the treaty. My own view on timing is largely influenced by the fact that, although Roshchin has not disagreed with Mr. Foster's statement to him that the treaty would not bar a federated Europe, his principal assistant, Grinevsky, has raised this question twice with members of the U.S. delegation and stated that the Soviets would have to object once the U.S. stated its position on this matter. These statements, in my judgment, point in the direction of a prompt statement of our position to the U.S.S.R. I do not believe we should make this statement, however, until we have had an adequate opportunity to satisfy ourselves that the statement we propose to make will satisfy the concerns of our NATO allies—particularly the FRG. We should therefore request information of Ambassador McGhee on the point and, at the same time, ask him to point out if the discussions going on between Bonn and the U.S.S.R. have produced any information which would cause us to change our plan. Once this has been done, I believe that in order to assure that the Soviets understand the seriousness of this matter an approach to them should be made simultaneously in Geneva and by you to Dobrynin. The approach would not ask for Soviet concurrence with our interpretation or with the desirability of a Federated Europe but would seek their assurance that they will not challenge our interpretation. This latter point would, I believe, alleviate most of the concerns expressed by Mr. Foster in Geneva's 2467. 4 II. Regarding Article III, I propose we proceed along the lines which the Delegation and USRO have recommended for NAC discussions of that article in the general discussion of a complete draft treaty text. We would plan, therefore, to circulate to our NATO allies (and also to Japan) those parts of the text which they do not yet have. This would involve the preamble (the receipt of which would be helpful in meeting concerns about peaceful uses and desires to have the treaty set in the context of a first step toward general disarmament), the text of the definition of a nuclear weapons state (which we have already told our allies we intend to insert in the treaty), and a revised Article III (which would clarify the present language to meet some of the concerns that have been expressed). We would plan to ask for early NAC discussion on the basis of this complete text with a view to obtaining a “no objection” acceptance by the Council to our proceeding to table the text with Article III with the Soviets as a joint recommendation of the Co-Chairmen, with the understanding that further discussions and consultation will continue as the text is discussed in Geneva. As I indicated at your staff meeting, I think it would help overcome the fears of the FRG and others that safeguards would hinder peaceful nuclear programs and involve risk of industrial espionage, if we would indicate that we are considering an offer to invite IAEA to apply safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities at such a time as IAEA safeguards are applied to non-nuclear weapons states under a treaty calling for mandatory safeguards on their nuclear activities. The offer would be made after determining that it would significantly facilitate acceptance of our safeguards article by key non-nuclear weapons states. We have already had positive indications that it would do so. This matter is sufficiently important so that I recommend that we not initiate this course of action without the approval of the President. I have sent you, under separate cover, a memorandum to the President on this subject. 5 III. With respect to the other articles of the treaty we would anticipate that the Oral Note which Ambassador McGhee gave Kiesinger on February 22 will meet most German requirements. There are various other German concerns and requests which were contained in the presentation which Minister von Lilienfeld made to me on February 22; some of these we can probably meet although some of them, such as the request for a simultaneous U.S.-German treaty assuring the Federal Republic of American supplies of fissionable material, we cannot meet but they were probably not put forward seriously. In any event, resolution of most of the additional points which the Germans wish to discuss with us need not be obtained before tabling the draft treaty but rather would have to be resolved before the Germans were faced with the question of ratifying a final text. What we will need to nail down with the Germans in order to obtain their “no objection” to our tabling a draft will be the question of whether the interpretations of the treaty which we have given them are satisfactory. We therefore will seek an early German response to our Oral Note. I believe that the question of whether the Italians can be persuaded to acquiesce in the “no objection” formula will be dependent upon whether we have the Germans on board at that time. The Italians are not likely to object if, at the time of the NAC discussions, they are the only holdouts. In any event, a letter from you to Fanfani might be in order. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Secretary Saw.” 2 On February 21, Ambassador McGhee was instructed to give Kiesinger a draft summary of interpretations. McGhee received these instructions in telegram 141946 to Bonn, February 21. This telegram has not been found. The following day, February 22, Fisher discussed these interpretations with Charge von Lilienfeld in Washington. 3 This was the sixth and last paragraph of the Oral Note. The full text is printed in the ACDA historical study, The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration, Vol. II (1969), pp. 125-126. 4 Foster sent this telegram from Geneva, February 23, in which he emphasized, among other things, his belief that the United States should not push the Soviets to agree or disagree with the U.S. position on this issue. Foster suggested that “If it should be deemed necessary to challenge them [Soviets] on this issue, it would seem to us far preferable to do so after they had committed themselves to tabling agreed draft text.” (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 147, February 11, 1967-February 28, 1967) 5 A handwritten notation at the end of this paragraph indicates that this memorandum from Fisher to the President was clipped to the source text; however, it is not attached. On February 28 Fisher wrote a memorandum to Rusk preparing him for his luncheon that afternoon with the President. In this memorandum, Fisher reminded Rusk that he had sent separately to the President a February 25 memorandum in which he recommended that the U.S. Government put U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. (Washington National Records Center,RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967) 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, February 26, 1967, 7:48 p.m. 144310. Literally Eyes Only for Foster From Secretary. This is not an instruction but a sharing with you of my increasingly grave concern about the possibility that we shall be in a false position on the NPT in the absence of a meeting of the minds with the Russians. I have in mind, of course, the effect of an NPT on European unity. 2 I find it hard to see how we could pretend that there was a treaty if the public interpretation given to it by the USSR and the US is directly contradictory on a crucial point. If the Soviets were to permit our public statement of interpretation to stand unchallenged, we would be in a strong position some years hence if the point became operational. But if they challenge it openly and publicly, then they are in position to employ maximum blackmail, threats and pressure to oppose European unity. I realize that the Germans do not require the Soviets to agree with our interpretation but I think we would have a different problem if the Russians were publicly to oppose it. This would give all those in Germany and Italy who might be looking for a pretext a major point on which to oppose the NPT. This causes me to be very dubious about our joining with the Russians to submit an NPT to the conference with this problem of interpretation unresolved. 3 We would look rather silly to join in submitting a treaty and have it become immediately apparent that we and the Russians do not agree at all. Please give me your best thinking on this point because I am not at all sure we have yet reached the right answer. I will be wanting to discuss this matter with the President very shortly and I want to have your full views. Best regards. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Nodis; Priority. Drafted and approved by Secretary Rusk on February 26. 2 See Document 180 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 180 . 185. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 185. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 1 Moscow, February 27, 1967. Dear Mr. President: We have carefully studied your message transmitted by Ambassador L. Thompson. 2 Your words about what great importance you attach to the improvement of relations between our two countries cannot but meet with a favorable response on our part. The confidential exchange of views through the communication channels mentioned in your message 3 is undoubtedly useful both from the standpoint of a search for possible ways for a solution to certain international questions and from the standpoint of at least a better understanding of the positions of both sides on various problems. As to the question referred to in your message regarding the possibility of reaching an understanding between us which would contain the strategic armaments race, the Soviet Government has always advocated and still advocates the curtailment of a race regarding any and all armaments. We are deeply convinced that a real guarantee of peace and actual means of strengthening national and international security can be provided only by concrete steps in the field of disarmament, including nuclear, rather than by a desire to solidify some “balance of power”—which in any case each side understands in its own way. Proceeding from this understanding of the problem, we are prepared to continue the exchange of views on questions relating to strategic rocket-nuclear weapons. As we understand it, you are in agreement with our view that such questions must be considered as a complex, including both offensive strategic nuclear delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Certain additional considerations of the Soviet side regarding an approach to a solution of these questions are being transmitted through Ambassador Thompson. 4 Nor do we exclude the possibility of holding in the future, as you suggest, a special meeting of our appropriate representatives for a more detailed discussion of this entire problem. Naturally, much more favorable conditions for businesslike consideration of this as well as other problems of mutual interest would be created if the situation in the world as a whole were normalized and above all such hotbeds of tension as that in Vietnam were liquidated. In this connection, one would like to think that the hope expressed by you that peace will return to our planet will be supported by appropriate practical action on your part. Respectfully, A. Kosygin 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Box 11, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. 2 See Document 178 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 178 . 4 See Document 186 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 186. Oral Statement Delivered to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) 186. Oral Statement Delivered to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) 1 Moscow, February 28, 1967. ORAL STATEMENT MADE TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSON FEBRUARY 28, 1967, RE: KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF FEBRUARY 27, 1967 2 We note with satisfaction the agreement of the US Government with the opinion of the Soviet side that the question concerning achievement of a mutual understanding on anti-missile defense systems should be considered simultaneously with the solution of the question of offensive nuclear delivery means. Such a combined approach is in this case the only correct one, since it would permit a real discussion of the broad objectives concerning both containment of the arms race and disarmament. However, as can be understood from your statement, the American side proceeds from the premise that as a point of departure for consideration of these problems it is necessary to recognize the present strategic situation as “most stable” and to seek to preserve it for the future. Unfortunately, in real life such “stability” by no means precludes the risk of nuclear conflict. This is especially true in the present situation which is characterized by the existence of dangerous hotbeds of international tension. A buildup of the means of nuclear attack which is being carried out in the US and the militant mood of certain US allies which is finding support among influential American circles further exacerbate the tenseness of the situation. The presently existing strategic situation, which you call stable, has another dangerous aspect. As a matter of fact, one can speak of the concept of “stability” at any given moment only in very relative terms, as of a combination and interaction of many factors which are understood differently by the parties. Such “stability” creates in practice a situation where one party in providing for its security is compelled, in response to the accelerated production and accumulation of offensive strategic rocket-nuclear means by the other party, to take steps for strengthening its defense capabilities, while the other party in turn sees in this reason for moving to a new and higher level in the armaments race spiral. We believe it necessary to find a way out of this vicious circle. This in our view can be done only if we seek equally to ensure the security of each side rather than attempt to solidify such a correlation of forces as this or that party regards at a given moment to be advantageous to it. Such an approach, in our view, would meet the interests not only of our countries but also of other nations, and it would meet the interests of the world at large. It seems to us that the best way towards nuclear disarmament which would take into account the considerations expressed above would be to destroy all offensive weapons and, in any event, to reduce to a minimum the arsenals of means for a rocket-nuclear attack, leaving—and then only temporarily—only strictly limited amounts of such means. In such a case apparently no great difficulties would arise for the solution of the anti-missile defense problem either. In our view, it is important first of all to reach some common understanding with regard to the approach itself to the solution of this problem, after which one could move to a discussion of more specific questions. We would be prepared to consider any additional considerations which the American side might wish to express on this matter. In this connection, we do not exclude holding in the future, if it proves necessary, a special meeting or meetings of our appropriate representatives for more detailed discussions of this entire problem. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 See Document 185 . 187. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 187. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, February 28, 1967, 1345Z. 3682. Ref: Moscow 3674, 2 , 3675, 3 3676. 4 1. I interpret Kosygin's letter and Gromyko's statement as effort to establish good negotiating position rather than intention avoid serious discussion. Although not spelled out, implicit in Gromyko's remarks is Soviet unwillingness to freeze present strategic balance which we have publicly boasted is in our favor. This, however, is difficult for Soviets to admit. 2. Possible approach to solution would be agreement by which Soviet would maintain present ABM deployment around Moscow, agree not to complete or activate other ABM launchers, and Soviets would be allowed to complete or harden agreed number of additional launchers which number would still be less than ours in view of their Moscow ABM deployment, larger territory and greater dispersal their targets, large size some of their warheads, etc. Both sides would be free to improve quality of their missiles. Since Soviets doubtless have a number of missiles in their production pipeline, our agreement for increase on their part would have some practical appeal. The alternative of some decrease in our missiles would make it easier for them to justify abstention from ABM deployment and would have greater appeal to world opinion. If we decide insist on deactivization Moscow complex they will probably demand parity in number of launchers. 3. Best way to proceed to rapid agreement would be for us to present concrete proposal but I realize this is difficult in view of uncertainty about their present deployment ABMs. 4. While would be useful to have expert assistance here, each step in negotiation at this stage will have to be considered at top level here which will be time consuming and I doubt if presence of expert yet justified. 5. I trust that any public statement on our part will be confined to announcement receipt of reply to President's letter and fact that discussions taking place in Moscow with no indication of position taken. Thompson 1 Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. Top Secret; Nodis. 2 Telegram 3674, February 28, is the translation of Kosygin's letter to President Johnson ( Document 185 ). A copy of the telegram is in Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. 3 Telegram 3675, February 28, is the translation of Gromyko's oral statement delivered in connection with Kosygin's letter to President Johnson ( Document 186 ). A copy of the telegram is in Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, Pen Pal Series, 1963. 4 In telegram 3676, February 28, Ambassador Thompson noted that “at nine-thirty this morning Gromyko handed me Kosygin's reply to President's letter on ABMs and made some oral remarks.” In this same telegram, Ambassador Thompson inquired about the possibility of a Department of State or White House response to Gromyko's statement and he asked for press guidance. A copy of the telegram is ibid. 188. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 188. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 4, 1967. SUBJECT NPT Safeguards Article: Action Memorandum Attached (at Tab A) is a draft revision of Article III which, in accordance with our discussions of a few days ago, specifies the possibility of IAEA verification of Euratom safeguards. The draft article contains three other changes which should be helpful to our Allies. In response to concerns expressed to us, the new draft makes clear that there is the same substantial transition period for all undertakings in the article. There is no longer a provision requiring safeguards on the exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment. And there is a statement that the purpose of the article is to prevent diversion of materials to nuclear weapons manufacture. These last two changes could be quite helpful to gain FRG assent since the FRG, as you know, has feared that the present article might be a basis for communist espionage or for interference in peaceful industrial and scientific endeavors. The key question is whether we put an article along these lines to the Soviets before we discuss it with our allies. We feel strongly that we should. However, there is difference of view on this question. I would, therefore, recommend that you hold a meeting to discuss the issue, to which you might want to invite Mr. Rostow, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Leddy and myself. I believe that the case for proceeding with the Soviets first rests on the fact that, while the chances of the Soviet's acceptance of the revised Article may be great enough to justify proceeding with it, we will have considerably greater difficulty in selling the revised Article III to them than we will to our Allies. If we have developed the Article with our allies first and are unable to negotiate it with the Soviets, we have started a chain of events which may result in our inability to obtain any effective safeguards Article at all. We believe the Russians may fear that under the proposed article the US and its influential Western friends in the IAEA will fight strenuously for IAEA acceptance of Euratom safeguards with only a minimum of IAEA verification. They may thus want to avoid a situation in which they might be forced to utilize obstructionist tactics in the IAEA to ensure what they believe would be reliable IAEA verification of Euratom. The Soviets have also emphasized with us that safeguards must be exactly equal for Soviet allies as for US allies. The Soviets may not wish to place themselves in a situation in which, for whatever reason, they may feel compelled to establish parallel regional safeguards in Eastern Europe. It is of course clearly in our interest to avoid this also. If our doubts about negotiability with the Soviets should prove correct and if we should have proceeded with our allies first, we would then face a very difficult and possibly unmanageable situation. We would have far less prospect of a safeguards article for inclusion in the treaty, and we might have lost a month or more of valuable time. I also attach (at Tab B) draft talking points which we could use with the Russians when presenting this article for their consideration on an urgent basis within the next day or two. We would of course try to get an answer from the Russians as quickly as possible. But even on the assumption that no answer came back before Foster held his talks in Bonn, he could still have valuable safeguards discussions with the Germans. Among other things he could: 1. Explain to the Germans some possible amendments which we think in any event would be sellable to the Soviets, i.e., making clear that purpose of the article is to prevent manufacture of nuclear weapons, deletion of requirement for safeguards on exports of non-nuclear materials and equipment, and specification that there is a substantial transition period on all undertakings in the article; 2. Ask the Germans if it would be helpful for the US to undertake IAEA safeguards on a large segment of its peaceful nuclear facilities (assuming, of course, that Presidential approval for the offer is obtained); 3. Tell the Germans that we fully support the principle that non-nuclear countries should be inspected by IAEA inspectors of non-nuclear nationality (this is possible under existing procedures of the IAEA); 4. On verification of IAEA by Euratom, tell the Germans that we are in fact pushing with the Soviets the concept of IAEA verification of Euratom but we cannot be certain whether this can result in a change in the safeguards article; 5. Undertake with the Germans to give prompt study to any possibilities of developing additional automatic means of inspection, e.g., “black boxes.” As Director of ACDA, Mr. Foster might state the willingness of ACDA to launch an immediate research program with ACDA funds. Recommendation: That you hold a meeting with Messrs. Rostow , Kohler, Leddy, and Fisher during the weekend or on Monday morning to discuss Article III. 2 Tab A 3 ARTICLE III (Safeguards) For the purpose of providing assurance that nuclear materials used or produced in peaceful nuclear facilities are not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Parties agree upon the following provisions. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept, on all its peaceful nuclear activities, the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency or international safeguards the operation of which that Agency accepts and verifies as equally effective. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless the material is subject to such safeguards. The safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years after the entry into force of this Treaty, except with respect to activities or materials to which other international safeguards are being applied that meet the foregoing requirements of acceptance and verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Tab B 4 TALKING POINTS Revised Article III To Be Transmitted to Soviet Union 1. New article contains changes which we believe will greatly increase chance its final acceptance by US's Western European allies. However, amendments do not lessen fundamental effectiveness of article. 2. Article now requires IAEA safeguards or international safeguards the operation of which the IAEA accepts and verifies as equally effective. If the IAEA does accept and does verify as equally effective any regional system of safeguards, we believe this will provide reliable assurance to the IAEA and its members that effective safeguards are being applied. As practical matter, Soviet Union should take into account that IAEA countries subject to IAEA safeguards will not permit IAEA to accept any other safeguards as equally effective unless agreed verification arrangements with the IAEA are in fact reliable. 3. New article provides for transition period of three years from entry into force of treaty. Soviet representatives have previously informed US that transition period could be one, two, or three years. 4. New article states that purpose of article is to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not diverted to manufacture of nuclear weapons. We do not believe this changes any basic assumptions, but it will be helpful for many of our allies who wish reassurance that safeguards will not be used as basis for intervening in peaceful nuclear activities having no relationship to manufacture of weapons. 5. The article no longer contains requirement that exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment will be subject to safeguards. We believe this is not a significant change since there remains clear requirement that all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear weapon parties will be subject to safeguards. 6. US remains strongly committed to negotiating an effective safeguards article in the NPT. We believe changes described above should meet all concerns expressed to us in the past by the Soviet Union and could result in widespread acceptance by the Western European countries, whose acceptance of the article is essential. 7. We request the Soviet Union to provide us its acceptance or comments on the new article as rapidly as possible since we are anxious to submit it to our allies. If a favorable response can shortly be received from the Soviet Union, we would be hopeful of including such an article in a co-chairman's NPT text to be submitted in the near future at the ENDC. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State 1967. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of a March 4 memorandum from Mildred J. Asbjornson (S) to the Secretary informing him that “Mr. Gene Rostow has asked if you would meet with him and Messrs. Leddy, Kohler, possibly this afternoon on the trilateral talks.” The handwritten initials “DR” next to an approving line indicate that Rusk agreed to meet at 3:30 p.m. that afternoon. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Sir: A dissenting memorandum from EUR is at Tab C.” This attachment, not printed, consists of two parts. The first, undated telegram drafted by George S. Springsteen (EUR), cleared by Leddy (EUR), Hinton (EUR/RPE), Baker (EUR/RPM), Fisher, and Rostow, and approved by Rusk, expresses EUR's principal view that alternative suggestions should be considered to gain our Allies agreement on Article III which could then be broached to the Soviets. Specifically, Springsteen wrote, “We are prepared to take account of two suggestions they [the Europeans] have advanced. One would concern compatible treatment of transition period throughout draft and other would deal with definitional problem of special materials and equipment.” Part two is a March 4 covering memorandum from Leddy to Rusk. 2 This sentence, along with the preceding word “Recommendation,” has been inserted by hand on the source text. 3 Secret. 4 Secret. 189. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 189. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 5, 1967. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Negotiations Attached is a proposed memorandum to the President drafted to carry out the decisions you made at our Saturday meeting. 2 The memorandum and its enclosure have been cleared with EUR. At the risk of sounding like a stuck whistle and at the risk of overloading even your magnificent quality of patience, I can't help but say that I believe this course of action would be a mistake. Myron Kratzer of the AEC, who has just returned from intensive technical consultations in the FRG, is of the view that a safeguards article along the lines we have been previously discussing could be agreed on with the FRG if we took care of certain of their objections. 3 I have attached a safeguards article which I would recommend. It contains three changes helpful to the FRG. The new draft makes clear that there is the same substantial transition period for all undertakings in the article. The provision relating to safeguards on the exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment makes it clear that it is only the fissionable material produced with these items, and not the items themselves, which are subject to safeguards. And there is a statement that the purpose of the article is to prevent diversion of materials to nuclear weapons development or manufacture. These last two changes could be quite helpful to gain FRG assent since the FRG has feared that the present article might be a basis for communist espionage or for interference in peaceful industrial endeavors. Mr. Kratzer also believes the FRG can be satisfied that they will not have to accept Soviet inspectors from the IAEA by getting the FRG to understand that this is the case under the present IAEA rules, provided this interpretation is given them in writing and we assure them of our support in case their rejection of Soviet inspectors is challenged in the IAEA. I have discussed this matter with Mr. Leddy and he does not agree with the views expressed in this memorandum except that he does agree with the Memorandum to the President. Adrian 4 Attachment 1 5 ARTICLE III (Safeguards) For the purpose of providing assurance that nuclear materials used or produced in peaceful nuclear facilities are not diverted to the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices: (1) Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities. In assisting non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide to any such non-nuclear-weapon State: (a) source material or special fissionable material unless the material shall be subject to such safeguards; or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of fissionable material unless the fissionable material shall be subject to such safeguards. (2) The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied as soon as practicable but not later than three years after the entry into force of this Treaty. Attachment 2 6 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Negotiations We are now entering a new phase in our consultations with our allies on non-proliferation. Bill Foster will be visiting key European capitals—Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels—during the next two weeks to further clarify questions that have been asked about the treaty draft, and hopefully to convince key leaders that their legitimate concerns are or will be taken care of. We will also consult with the Japanese and Canadians here in Washington—though their concerns are in some instances different than those of our other allies. As part of the consultation process we have already given key allies an Oral Note which includes draft Summary of Interpretations of the present treaty text, 7 which we would propose to show the Soviets after this phase of allied consultation, but before a treaty text is actually tabled in Geneva. We have also given our allies a fuller version of the treaty text. This version is complete except for Article III, dealing with safeguards, the text of which is still under consideration. This Article will be considered as part of new consultations. It is my hope that these new consultations would end in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held as soon as possible after Mr. Foster's trip. At the Council meeting we will seek a “no objections” agreement to the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen tabling a joint draft in Geneva which would be recommended by the two governments for consideration by the Conference. The problems which will be dealt with during these talks fall into three general areas: The first relates to the development of an acceptable Article dealing with safeguards. The second relates to the manner in which we make it clear that the non-proliferation treaty will not prevent the creation of a federated European state. The third relates to a variety of other problems, some dealing with NATO security arrangements but more dealing with problems of national competition in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. I. I am attaching as Tab A a draft revision of Article III which, in accordance with our discussions of a few days ago, specifies the possibility of IAEA verification of Euratom safeguards. 8 The revised draft contains changes which should be helpful to our allies. The key question with respect to the handling of this proposed revision relates to the timing of the discussions of this revised Article III with our allies. In view of the strong feelings of our Euratom allies on this subject, I would propose that ideas in the revised Article III be discussed by Bill Foster with our allies on his forthcoming trip. I would hope that one of them can be persuaded to sponsor the text of a revised Article III as its own; I have either the Federal Republic of Germany or Belgium particularly in mind for this purpose. It is not at all certain, however, that an Article of this kind will be negotiable with the USSR because, among other reasons, of the implied blessing they might feel that it gives Euratom. I am particularly anxious to avoid a situation in which we lose a month or so of valuable time, or having agreed with our allies with an Article III which the Soviets reject, find ourselves under increasing pressure from both allies and Soviets to drop the safeguards article. To initiate Soviet consideration of this approach I am instructing Bill Foster to indicate the concept, but not the details, of this particular solution to his Soviet counterpart before he leaves Geneva. At the same time the allies should be advised that if the revised Article III should prove non-negotiable with the Soviets, it would not mean that we would lose interest in the subject of safeguards, but we would be considering other approaches, including those along the lines of the original Article III that has been the subject of our recent consultation. It would help overcome some allied fears that safeguards would hinder peaceful nuclear programs and involve risk of industrial espionage, if we would indicate at a propitious time that we are considering an offer to invite IAEA to apply safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities at such a time as IAEA safeguards are applied to non-nuclear weapons states. In concert with the AEC, I have instituted a program of consultations with key Congressional leaders on this point. The initial reaction has been favorable, but I will let you know when we have carried this program somewhat further. II. With respect to the federated Europe problem, the objective which we can realistically hope to achieve is Soviet silence, or non-contradiction, when our allies and later the United States, assert that the treaty would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. We cannot realistically expect the Soviets to say that they have agreed to the creation of such a new federated European state since they would have political objections to such a merger which transcend the problems of non-proliferation, but we can expect them not to assert that this treaty bars a federated Europe with nuclear weapon capabilities. The Oral Note which we have given key allies contains a number of our interpretations dealing with the effect of the treaty. One of them, dealing with the problem of European unity, states that the draft treaty: “ … does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralised as to assume all governmental functions. It would bar, however, transfer (including ownership) of nuclear weapons or control over them to a new multilateral or other entity lacking the attributes of a federated state essential to bring into play the legal doctrine of succession.” This is based on the principle that the treaty deals only with what is prohibited. We will state that this is what we have told our allies, that this is what we will be required to state in our Congress and if they publicly contradict us, by stating that the Treaty prohibits a federated Europe succeeding to nuclear assets of component states, such contradictions would undoubtedly result in the collapse of the Treaty. III. With respect to the other articles of the treaty we would anticipate that the Oral Note Ambassador McGhee gave Kiesinger on February 22 will meet most German requirements. There are various other German concerns and requests; some of these we can probably meet although some of them, such as the request for a U.S.-German treaty assuring the Federal Republic of continued American supplies of fissionable material, special nuclear guarantees beyond our commitments involved in NATO, and veto rights on the use of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on German territory, we cannot meet in the context of the negotiations on the draft text to be tabled in the ENDC. We can at this time tell the Germans that we are prepared to discuss the question of assuring the continued supply of fissionable materials—though not in treaty form. We should also tell them that we are prepared to work out veto arrangements similar to those we have with some of our other NATO allies. We do not believe we can or should give any encouragement to their request for further security guarantees. A favorable response to the first two requests may prove to be strong inducements for German support for the Treaty. In any event, resolution of most of the additional points the Germans wish to discuss need not be obtained before tabling the draft treaty but rather would have to be resolved before the Germans were faced with the question of ratifying a final text. What we will need to nail down with the Germans in order to obtain their “no objection” to our tabling a draft will be the questions of the text of Article III and whether the interpretations of the treaty which we have given them are satisfactory. We therefore will seek an early German response on these points. I believe that the question of whether the Italians can be persuaded to acquiesce in the “no objection” formula will be in large part dependent upon whether we have the Germans on board at that time. The Italians are less likely to object if, at the time of the NAC discussions, they are the only holdouts. A letter from me to Fanfani might be in order and perhaps one from you to the Prime Minister. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. 2 This meeting with Rusk at 3:30 p.m., Saturday, March 4, was attended by Eugene Rostow, Kohler, Leddy, and Fisher. At this meeting an action memorandum was circulated on the topic of the nonproliferation safeguards article; see footnote 1, Document 188 . 3 On Monday, March 6, AEC Chairman Seaborg met with Myron Kratzer and other members of the Atomic Energy Commission to discuss Rusk's recommendation that Article III be modified to accept verification of Euratom safeguards by the IAEA. For documentation on the AEC's position on and objections to Rusk's proposal, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 272-275. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Fisher signed the original. 5 Secret. 6 Secret. 7 See Document 183 . 8 Not printed. 190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, March 8, 1967, 6:05 p.m. 151197. For Foster from the Secretary. Subject: NPT Safeguards article. Following is for your use in the consultations which you will be conducting on your current trip. 2 Aside from European successor state problem, principal remaining NPT issue troubling Europeans is Article III on safeguards. Believe we well on road to providing effective explanations of many of technical issues raised by our proposed article. Unresolved are political issues raised by Article III which are concentrated on Euratom and its members. A variety of factors lie behind US objective to establish a worldwide system of safeguards. Such a safeguards system will be more attractive to the potential nuclear powers outside of Europe who will see in an exception designed to take care of Euratom a special concession not granted to other countries of the world. Soviets objection to acceptance of Euratom safeguards on basis it involves allies inspecting allies has basis in principle; they could not accept unless they were in a position to create a Warsaw Pact mirror image of Euratom, something they might not now be able to do and which would not be in our nor FRG interest for them to do. U.S. nevertheless has accepted Euratom inspection as workable and effective and recognizes that question may be raised as to why necessary to impose additional inspection by IAEA and fear that nuclear version of Gresham's law may develop and drive out Euratom safeguards. U.S. sees, however, as more important issue the political issue growing out of feeling of discrimination resulting from inspection system contemplated Article III among Euratom members. Whereas Euratom safeguards apply to peaceful activities in all Euratom states, Article III safeguards would be applicable to only five of six members. Since France will be excluded from IAEA safeguards, some believe France will then become choice location for all nuclear research and development within Euratom community. In addition, from foregoing flow questions of continued life for Euratom and future of European unity if equality among Community members is impaired. FYI: While one may question rationale of some of this argumentation, fact is that discrimination argument is one France can play to her advantage and against us and our interests, and is subtly doing so now. Also clear from what Germans and Italians have told us Article III as presently drafted and in present state understandings between us not acceptable to them. We also know others in and out of Euratom have problems of sufficient magnitude as to invite opposition to inclusion present language this article in any draft NPT. End FYI. Because NPT provides an unparalleled opportunity to move forward on achieving an internationally accepted safeguards system, we wish to obtain maximum support of our allies before pushing forward. In considering text of a safeguards Article U.S. prepared to redraft it to take into account three suggestions allies have made. First would be to establish overall substantial transition period of three years for entire article. Second, to rewrite the provision relating to safeguards on the exports of non-nuclear materials or equipment to make it clear that it is only the fissionable material used or produced with these items, and not the items themselves, which are subject to safeguards. Third, to insert a statement that the purpose of the article is to prevent diversion of materials to nuclear weapons development or manufacture. You could point out that these last two changes should reduce their fears that safeguards could be a basis for communist espionage or for interference in peaceful industrial endeavors. In addition you could point out following two points that we could make outside the agreement which should alleviate FRG and others concerns. First, we can assure them that they will not have to accept Soviet inspectors from the IAEA by getting the FRG to understand that this is the case under the present IAEA rules, provided this interpretation is given FRG in writing and we assure them of our support in case their rejection of Soviet inspectors is challenged in the IAEA. Second, we can assure them that U.S. will continue to assure adequate fuel supplies for their peaceful nuclear program, including reactors which they export. Latter assurance will be dealt with more detail septel. FYI: Congressional consultation placing broad range of U.S. peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards proceeding favorably but not yet at point where Presidential decision appropriate. However, if your discussions with allies take a turn where it appears that concern over discrimination and potential industrial espionage is really based on fear of competitive disadvantage with U.S. in reactor sales, you could ask if this is the case and indicate we can take appropriate action to allay such concerns. End FYI. You should also indicate desire to Euratom countries to consider with them following changes in safeguards article which might be discussed with Soviets after this phase allied consultation completed. Indicate that we have no draft to propose of such a revised article but prepared to consider idea of Article III requiring IAEA safeguards or international safeguards accepted by IAEA under verification procedures mutually agreed with Euratom. We wish to describe ideas which might be incorporated so that they can be considered. This approach, like that of the Article we have been discussing would provide for a transition period of three years and if the IAEA and the agency administering the other international safeguards system (in this case Euratom) did not come to an agreement during that time, then IAEA safeguards would apply to the countries concerned. The U.S., however, feels strongly about effective safeguards article in NPT and would appreciate allied reaction to these ideas or any other ideas allies have which would produce a similar result. In this context allies should be aware that if the new element in the approach, verification of regional systems by IAEA, should prove non-negotiable with USSR we would have to consider other approaches, including those along the lines of a redrafted Article III that has been the subject of our recent discussion. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis; Immediate; Priority. Repeated to Bonn. Drafted by Fisher (ACDA/DD); cleared by Leddy (EUR), Rostow (M), and Walsh (S/S); and approved by Rusk. 2 ACDA Director Foster visited several European cities March 9-16, including Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels to consult with NATO allies on the non-proliferation treaty. 3 See Attachment 1, Document 189 . 191. Notes of Meeting 191. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, March 14, 1967. [Here follow discussion of the selection of a new director for the Argonne National Laboratory and an account of the opening of a symposium on outer space exploration.] At 4 p.m. I attended a meeting of the Principals in Secretary of State Rusk's conference room. Present were: Rusk, McNamara, Wheeler, Hornig, Helms, Rostow, Fisher, Webb, Kohler, Katzenbach, McNaughton, Marks, Scoville, plus Labowitz, Barber, Garthoff, et al. Rusk opened the meeting by calling on Fisher. Fisher referred to the State/ACDA paper, “Proposal on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Missile Systems,” 2 that had been circulated before the meeting, and said this is a simple plan that would not go all the way that the Soviets want toward complete disarmament. Kohler went on to say that this plan has been essentially agreed to by all the Deputies. He said its potential success depends on the dependability of the unilateral detection system. Rusk mentioned that there are a couple of places in the paper in which it is suggested that the U.S. make concessions, even before the Soviets have said, no, and he thought we should at least feel them out before establishing these less desirable positions as the U.S. position. Rusk then called on General Wheeler for his reactions. Wheeler said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the paper and came to the following five or six conclusions. They want a plan that would maintain the strategic superiority of the U.S. at all times. They would insist on on-site inspection. If on-site inspection was impossible, they would limit the plan to those systems that could be verified unilaterally, and this would mean only the fixed land-based systems. They do not wish to forego the possibility of the U.S. deploying an ABM in the future. They believe that the plan should be formalized as a treaty. They think there should be withdrawal provisions to come into effect if there were 1. hostile actions interfering with our information-collection systems, 2. attempts to deceive, or 3. deterioration of our ability to detect. Rusk then called on McNamara who said he does not think the U.S. is ready to put forward such a plan in written form. He also said that he thinks the U.S. should not agree to anything we couldn't check ourselves. Rusk then asked me for my opinion. I said I agree with McNamara. Rusk found it a frustrating situation because he felt we should do something along these lines, but we shouldn't do anything that we couldn't check, and that doesn't leave very much. Rusk called on Webb who said that he could live with the plan. Rusk called on Helms who said he is queasy about our ability to carry out the unilateral verification under the plan. Rusk called on Hornig who said he agrees with McNamara, but thinks some steps should be taken, and the question is how to begin. Rostow said he is especially interested in the nature of the Soviet Tallinn system, 3 and thinks we should somehow learn more about it. This led McNamara to suggest that our first objective should be to try to establish the nature of the Tallinn system. He thinks we might use this as a basis for opening a dialogue with the Soviets, and perhaps we might be successful in a 6-12 month period of time. If we aren't successful, this particular plan is no good; and if we are successful, we might be in a position to proceed further. He said he thinks we should start with some exchanges on our capabilities, and maybe even show each other reconnaissance photographs. Rostow said, when we reach such a point, that might be the proper time to table a paper. Fisher pointed out that we have been talking a long time, and that we must talk in a context of holding down offensive missiles. Kohler agreed with Fisher and expressed doubt that the dialogue approach that had been suggested would be possible with the Soviets. Katzenbach also indicated that he doubts such discussions would be successful, but that there might be a by-product, namely, we might end up in deciding on a mutually advantageous unilateral showdown. McNamara said he doesn't think we are very close, that is, within a year or two, to an agreement with the Soviets on any of these matters. (He left the meeting about 4:45 p.m.) Rusk made the important point that he regards detection by national means as limited to means within the power of the U.S. itself. He said he would have another go at this with Kohler and Fisher in order to prepare a cable for Thompson, to give him (Thompson) guidance to begin the dialogue with the Soviets. These instructions would perhaps be along the lines of probing further on three or four points. Rusk went on to say that verification is a key issue, and that we are already having difficulty on verification. He referred in this regard to the Space Treaty 4 and to “Dr. Seaborg's treaty” (the NPT). I said I bought the idea of this being my treaty provided there were proper safeguards in Article III. Rostow expressed optimism that the dialogue with the Soviets would be successful. Rusk expressed the interesting thought that, as time goes on, we will find ourselves in the situation that we won't be able to make progress in these matters in bits and pieces; that we will need something dramatic to take a big step, and this within a few years. Rusk ended the meeting by saying he would circulate to the Principals the instructions that will be sent to Ambassador Thompson. [Here follows a note on Seaborg's biweekly report to the President.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 304-306. No classification marking. 2 Not found. 3 See footnote 4, Document 176 . 4 See Document 167 . 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, March 18, 1967, 4:55 p.m. 158191. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Subject: US-Soviet Strategic Weapons Talks. 1. On basis Principals' discussion and your 3928, 2 we have decided to proceed by your presenting paper transmitted by this telegram, calling for talks to begin on April 12. For such talks we contemplate sending small team of senior officials to assist you. 2. Text of Oral Statement to be delivered to Gromyko, copy of which you may leave, follows (paras 3 through 8 below): 3. “The US Government has carefully studied Chairman Kosygin's letter to President Johnson of February 28 3 and your statement 4 to me on that same date. Despite some differences in approach, we see a common interest in ensuring the security of each side, without jeopardy to the security of the other, by avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of the strategic arms race, and by creating the basis for reductions in existing forces. Accordingly we believe it possible and desirable to proceed promptly with discussions between our two Governments. 4. “US Government shares the desire of the Soviet Government not merely to prevent possible disruption of the strategic balance, but to move beyond this to reductions of existing forces. We see the forthcoming discussions as the best means to work together to increase the mutual understanding that is necessary to make progress toward this common goal. 5. “While the US Government hopes that it will be possible to move rapidly toward agreement on strategic arms reductions, it may be feasible in the interim to find a way to 'level-off' strategic offensive and defensive forces. We agree that measures for this purpose would have to be designed to ensure the security of each side rather than attempting to solidify the precise current correlation of forces or to freeze an advantage to one or the other side. In other words, we recognize that some appropriate adjustments in the present forces of each side might be necessary and would still be consistent with our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the possibly disruptive effects and the great costs of continuation of a strategic arms race. It will of course be necessary to discuss the respective strategic weapons systems of both sides in order to reach agreement on precisely which systems would be involved, and what undertakings with respect to them would be agreed. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on unilateral means of verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. With all of these considerations in view, we suggest that measures of agreed limitation on deployment should apply to all strategic offensive missile systems (launchers) and to all defensive strategic missile systems (launchers and radars) having a significant anti-ballistic missile capability. We can see now how stationary systems can be part of such an arrangement, but we will need to work out a way to include mobile systems. 6. “We continue to believe that it would be premature to consider the form in which agreements or understandings between us might be expressed—treaty or otherwise. The form would depend upon the content and nature of the understanding. 7. “The United States Government believes that a thorough and frank discussion of the general problem will in itself be of great value to both sides. Increased understanding should not only assist us in reaching agreements to limit and to reduce strategic forces, but can also assist in dispelling uncertainties which lead each side to hedge against doubts by acquiring larger forces than it might otherwise do. This in turn triggers the other side to do the same, activating a spiral in the arms race. 8. “In view of the complexity of this general question, the US does not believe that a formal agenda should be fixed. The US would welcome the comments of the Soviet Government. The US Government is prepared to send appropriate senior officials from Washington to support Ambassador Thompson in these discussions. It proposes that the discussions begin in Moscow on April 12, and it hopes that the Soviet Government will find it possible to agree to that date.” 9. FYI: It has been decided to open the discussions without presentation at this time of a detailed US proposal. (The draft position paper pouched to you has not been decided upon.) As a result of our discussions, it has been concluded that our proposal in the first instance should be limited to elements outlined in paragraph 5 above. We hope it will be possible on this basis to engage in the dialogue necessary before we can settle on a specific proposal. At the same time [we]recognize the reserved and suspicious attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward discussions of the strategic balance. We hope that the positive reference to the long-term possibilities of agreements on reductions, as well as the broad and loose framework for possible mid-term “leveling-off” agreements, will provide a context in which it will be possible to introduce a more sophisticated approach to the whole problem than the Soviet Government has hitherto displayed. With respect to the short term, we hope that it will be possible to establish a dialogue in which we can, for example, demonstrate to the Soviets that it would be in their interest not to preserve secrecy with respect to the mission and performance capabilities of the Tallinn system which results only in the need for the US to assume the worst in planning our own [future] programs. The dialogue may assist each side to make better unilateral decisions, and to hold down the arms race, even if no agreements are reached. (We recognize that care must be taken to avoid the impression of an intelligence fishing expedition.) Increased understanding of the current and prospective strategic situation could lead to unilateral slowdowns in specific areas pending broader and perhaps more formal bilateral agreements. 10. Our flexibility is designed not only to leave open the possibility for an agreement under which the Soviets would be permitted, for example, to keep their current Moscow ABM and their current ICBM deployments, which we are virtually certain they will insist upon doing, but also to permit us to hold open the option for a limited ABM deployment. 11. At your discretion, you may wish to indicate to the Soviets the level of representation from Washington in your support in forthcoming talks. It will be from State, DOD, and ACDA—probably McNaughton, Garthoff, Fisher or another ACDA official, a representative of the Joint Staff, and a scientist. End FYI. Rusk 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3546. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff (G/PM) on March 16; cleared by Kohler, McNaughton, Fisher, Stoessel, Walsh, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. 2 Not found. 3 See Document 185 . 4 See Document 186 . 193. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson 193. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 6, 1967. SUBJECT Offer to Put U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Facilities under IAEA Safeguards (C) In the course of our intensive consultations during the last few weeks, many of the non-nuclear-weapon countries, including many of our important NATO allies, have expressed concern that the proposed safeguards requirements in our draft non-proliferation treaty might hinder their peaceful nuclear programs and leave them vulnerable to industrial espionage. It might help to overcome these objections if the United States were to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities. The justification for the exclusion of any U.S. facilities from the IAEA safeguards offer would be only on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons. Such an offer would be made to apply at such a time as mandatory safeguards as specified in the non-proliferation treaty are applied to non-nuclear-weapon states. I recommend that you approve a statement to this effect to be made at such time as would best help to achieve a satisfactory safeguards article in the treaty. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission concur in this recommendation. This concept has been discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission with representatives of the major U.S. industrial and utility concerns involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many of these representatives think it is quite a good thing to do in order to achieve an effective worldwide safeguards system, although some of them point out that there will be problems in implementation of the offer which will have to be worked out in the course of negotiating the necessary arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. These arrangements will not only advance our national interest in achieving safeguards, but will promote industrial interests by establishing conditions which favor the widest possible export of nuclear materials and equipment under safeguards. It is our intention in making this offer to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of the U.S. nuclear industry in implementing it, and our consultations have given us confidence that this cooperation will be forthcoming. However, if it becomes necessary in a few instances to rely on the Commission's regulatory powers to require the participation in the inspection system by specific companies, the Attorney General would have to determine whether the Commission's current authority extends to requiring a licensee to open his facilities to inspection by an organization other than the Commission or other U.S. agencies. If not, some clarifying legislation might be necessary to ensure enforcement in the unlikely event that the Commission's authority in this field were challenged. The British have indicated privately to us that if the United States were to make such an offer, the United Kingdom would do likewise. The proposed offer has been discussed with Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, who concur. Senator Gore, Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, indicated general agreement. Senator Hickenlooper expressed interest but did not commit himself; in my judgment, he will support the idea because of his past support for IAEA safeguards, because what we are planning appears reasonable under the circumstances, and because it would not adversely affect industrial uses of atomic energy. Senators Mansfield and Dirksen were both noncommittal, but I think they will rely on the views of Senators Pastore and Hickenlooper, respectively. William C. Foster 2 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 71 A 4546, 388.3, March-May, 1967. Confidential. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Mr. Barber has seen.” 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Foster signed the original. 194. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 194. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 8, 1967, 1:20 p.m. Mr. President: In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk endorses a memorandum from Bill Foster 2 requesting that you approve an offer on our part to let the International Atomic Energy Agency apply its safeguards on “a broad scale” to our peaceful nuclear facilities in connection with the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The draft safeguards article in the NPT would apply IAEA safeguards only to the peaceful facilities of non-nuclear-weapons states since it is clear that the Soviets will not accept IAEA inspection on their facilities at this time. This is considered discriminatory by some non-nuclear-weapons states and has also led to the charge that it might permit industrial espionage to the advantage of the existing nuclear-weapons states. This voluntary action on our part would help to answer these objections to the treaty. It is proposed to rely on voluntary cooperation of U.S. industry to implement this offer. However, if it became necessary, the government would determine the additional action required to enforce it. Sec. McNamara and Chairman Seaborg concur in this proposal, as do Senator Pastore and Representative Holifield, and it is reportedly acceptable to the atomic energy industry. Nick 3 called this morning to urge that you clear this for presentation next week in NATO, because our willingness to do this may prove the key to solving the Euratom safeguards problem in the NPT context. Walt Approved, without further review 4 Approved, subject to White House clearance of statement Disapproved Discuss 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “rec'd 1:45 P.” Another reads, “4/9/67—Mr. Rostow telephoned Mr. Katzenbach.” 2 Not attached; presumably a reference to Document 193 . This proposal had been introduced earlier by ACDA in a February 21 memorandum from Fisher to Rusk, McNamara, Seaborg, Wheeler, Rostow, and Hornig. Fisher wrote “Several non-nuclear-weapon countries have expressed concern over the discriminatory aspects of the safeguards Article (III) for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fear that this would leave them vulnerable to industrial espionage. One method which has been suggested for overcoming these objections would be for the U.S. to offer to apply IAEA safeguards on a broad scale to U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities.” Fisher requested that the addressees of this memo concur, by noon February 23, on a draft instruction cable to the U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council authorizing him to explore the U.S. offer with the Council. A special North Atlantic Council meeting was expected to convene Friday, February 24, to discuss Article III. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files:FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of Defense 1967) 3 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. 4 This option is checked. 195. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 195. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, April 15, 1967, 11:09 a.m. CAP 67291. Literally Eyes Only for the President From Walt Rostow. April 15, 1967. Herewith Sec. McNamara's account of his talk with Dobrynin. It is an important document and should help those in Moscow who are serious about stopping the arms race. You will also note Dobrynin believes serious Vietnam negotiations must begin secretly and without third parties. Early in April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy called me to say that during a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, 2 Dobrynin had suggested it might be useful if he and I had a conversation. I mentioned Mac's suggestion to the President and to Dean, both of whom urged me to arrange to see Dobrynin. On April 5, I called Dobrynin and reported to him Mac's conversation with me. Dobrynin hedged a bit as to whether he or Mac had suggested we meet. In any case, he accepted my invitation for lunch on April 11. I gave him the choice of lunching at the Pentagon or at my home. He chose the latter. We met there for approximately two hours today. Among the subjects we discussed were the following: 1. Non-Proliferation Treaty . Dobrynin asked my view of the prospects for the Treaty. I stated I was uncertain of the attitudes of India and certain of the non-European powers, but believed that after possible clarification of a few points, western European nations, excluding France, would support the Treaty. He asked whether I believed the Federal Republic was really concerned about the U.S. and Soviet Union making a “deal” which would advance their interests at the expense of Germany. I replied that although we had no intention of doing so, many Germans feared we would—this was a factor which both we and the Soviets must take into account in connection with the proposed Treaty. 2. The Communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group . 3 Dobrynin referred to a sentence in the communique which stated that Schroeder “led a discussion on the role of host countries in allied arrangements for the planning and use of nuclear weapons.” He asked whether we planned to dilute the authority of the President in the control of nuclear weapons. I replied we had no intention of doing so; under the law we had no authority to do so; we had no plan for asking for a change in the law; and if we were to ask for a change in the law for this purpose, the Congress would probably not accede to our request. I added that no member of NATO had asked that we give up Presidential authority over the use or release of the weapons. The German interest in the role of host countries was associated with their desire for discussion of a possible veto [by?] host countries of the use of such weapons. I stated that heretofore such subject had not been discussed among the nations of NATO—this was one of the reasons why the non-nuclear powers had felt removed from the planning for weapons which were so fundamental to their security. It was to meet this problem that the nuclear planning committee had been established. While discussing the President's command of nuclear weapons, I emphasized the steps we had taken to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of such weapons (the emphasis on safety precautions and the introduction of such devices as “Pal”) and I indicated our uncertainty as to whether the Soviet Union had given equal attention to these matters. Although he professed that they had, it was clear that he himself had very little knowledge of the extent to which they had protected against accidental detonation or unauthorized use. I emphasized that as the number of nuclear weapons increased it was becoming increasingly important for the political authorities to monitor the steps that the scientists and military commanders have taken to assure that the weapons would be used only when authorized by appropriate political authorities. 3. U.S.-Soviet Strategic Weapons Talks . It was clear that this was the primary subject in which Dobrynin was interested. He asked how we expected to approach the talks. I replied that Ambassador Thompson had outlined a possible approach to Gromyko on March 23 4 and we were surprised that to date we had received no reply to our suggestions. He seemed somewhat embarrassed to have to justify the delay and he indicated that it reflected some difference of view in his government as to how to proceed. He stated he would indicate to his colleagues in Moscow the importance we place on such talks and his own view that it would be wise to proceed with them. He asked on what philosophy we would approach discussions of strategic weapons systems. I replied as follows: (A) We believe we must be capable of deterring nuclear or large-scale conventional attacks by members of the Warsaw Pact on any nation of NATO. (B) We can be assured of having such a deterrent power only if we have a force so strong as to be able to absorb a surprise attack and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable damage on the nations of the Pact. (C) We believe we have that force today; we must provide it in the future; and the quantity of force required for the future will depend to considerable extent upon the actions of the Soviet Union, i.e., we will react to changes in their offensive or defensive force structure. (D) We believe the Soviets' requirement for a deterrent is the same as ours. We believe they have that deterrent today. We believe we cannot prevent them from maintaining it in the future if they act intelligently and if they are willing to use the resources available to them for that purpose. (E) Based on this philosophy, we conclude that if they deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, we must react to it by adding to our offensive power. We have already started to do so. Similarly, if we were to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system to protect our population against a heavy Soviet attack, they would react by increasing their offensive power. Because each of us would be faced with uncertainties, and we more than they, it is probable that after the installation of the defensive system, we would not only be worse off financially but that our security would be less as well. (F) For these reasons, we believe it may be possible to develop a series of actions to be taken by each side, which would reduce the military risks and reduce the financial costs without reducing the deterrent capability of either party and without changing the military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. I gave Dobrynin a copy of George Wilson's article from the Washington Post of April 9 and told him the article was based on a “background” conversation with me on Saturday, April 8. Dobrynin probed for specific actions we would be willing to take in return for actions by the Soviet Union, but I refused to give any indication of any particular points we would be willing to agree on, stating that I believed extensive discussion of the philosophy I had outlined above would be required before we could come to any possible agreement, formal or informal, on specific points. [Here follows discussion of events in Vietnam and China.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, ABM Negotiations (I) 1/67-9/68, Box 231. Top Secret. A typed notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 2:20 p.m. on April 15. 2 Not further identified. 3 On December 14, 1966, Ministers of the Defence Planning Committee approved recommendations of the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers which had been formed in 1965. The recommendations called for the establishment of two permanent bodies for nuclear planning: the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, open to all NATO countries; and a smaller Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) of seven countries. The NPG's first meeting was held April 6-7, 1967, in Washington. For text of the communique, April 7, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 285-286. See also Foreign Relations, vol. XIII, Document 246 . 4 Not further identified. 196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Proposed Tabling of a Non-Proliferation Treaty at the ENDC The Federal Republic of Germany has objected to our proposal to table a Non-Proliferation Treaty jointly with the U.S.S.R. with the safeguards Article (Article III) left blank subject to further U.S.-Soviet efforts to achieve a joint proposal. They take the position that this might result in a safeguards Article which is harmful to the interests of Euratom. They also propose that we introduce a U.S. draft which would include our safeguards Article, with an additional clause to make clear that inspectors are to be drawn only from countries accepting safeguards inspections on their territory, and with certain other additions to the text which has been shown the Soviets. On Sunday 2 the Germans, acting on instructions from the Foreign Minister, changed the emphasis on this approach to indicate that, although their basic position is that they still favored tabling two separate complete drafts, they would accept as a fall-back the tabling of a joint draft with Article III left blank, provided we assured them (1) that we would obtain an understanding with the Co-chairman that we would attempt to negotiate out an Article III privately, and (2) that if the subject of Article III was nevertheless raised in the Plenary, the U.S. would state that it considered an Article III like that which we have been discussing with the FRG as an essential condition for Western approval. In this fall-back position the Germans are now, in effect, asking that if, as is most likely, the Soviets won't at this time accept the German-preferred Article III and we table a joint draft with a blank Article III, the U.S. would in any future discussion of safeguards in Geneva become the spokesman for the German position. The fact that the Germans are backing off from their opposition to the tabling of a joint draft with Article III blank is in itself an encouraging sign. I believe a decision to table a separate U.S. draft treaty now would seriously jeopardize the prospect of achieving U.S.-Soviet agreement on a treaty. It would leave the Soviets free to introduce—or reintroduce—various ideas of their own which we and the FRG would find unacceptable. It is most unlikely that any worthwhile treaty could be concluded in the absence of U.S.-Soviet agreement. Nor can we object to the first of their conditions, namely that the U.S. would obtain an understanding with the Soviets that we would attempt to negotiate out an Article III privately and that multilateral discussion at the Conference of safeguards would be suspended pending availability of language protecting Euratom interests to which the Soviets could agree. My recommendation is that, if the Soviets will agree to this procedure—as I believe they may—we proceed to table a jointly-recommended draft in the ENDC with Article III, safeguards, initially left blank. I have considerable difficulty with the second German condition. The German condition is based on a realistic assumption; it is certain that the Indians and others among the Eight will take an initial position that a safeguards Article should apply to the peaceful activities of all countries, both those which do and those which do not have nuclear weapons. We can accept this, but it will put great pressure on the Russians who will reject it. There is no reason that this discussion should be to our disadvantage. The United States need not assume the responsibility for the fact that the ENDC is not considering such an Article. We are justified in making it quite clear that it is the continuing refusal of the U.S.S.R. to accept safeguards on its territory that prevents acceptance of a non-discriminatory article. We can use this position as a basis for establishing a consensus at the ENDC in support of the position recommended by the FRG that IAEA inspectors are to be drawn only from countries accepting inspectors on their territories. It is not clear that this tactical advantage would extend to obtaining general support for the relationship between regional inspection systems (in particular, Euratom) and IAEA which the FRG has in mind. We should make every effort to reach agreement on this point and we should tell the Germans that we will do so. However, we should not now lose all flexibility on this subject by promising that it will be our current draft of Article III or nothing. We should rather indicate to the Germans that if we fail to obtain agreement on this approach, we would have to reassess the entire safeguards issue if it continues to stand in the way of an otherwise worthwhile treaty. We should indicate that we will do so through full NATO consultation and taking into account the views of all our allies. We should point out that the purpose of this negotiation is not to impose a treaty on anyone but to reach a treaty which all governments can accept in good spirit. This will involve extended negotiations in the period ahead which will be carried on in full consultation with our allies both in NAC and in capitals. We will expect the Western Four in the ENDC to be fully alert to protect the interests of NATO. The further point made by Minister von Lilienfeld on behalf of Chancellor Kiesinger to Walt Rostow was for a treaty of limited duration. The suggestion was that the treaty should either be limited to a period of 20 years or signatories should be able to accede for a limited period. The Italians have suggested an even shorter duration clause and I believe that other key countries will also want to limit the treaty's duration. It is most unlikely, however, that we could, at this time, negotiate a limited duration clause with the Soviets who would see it as the result of German pressure. This problem would be eased with the Soviets if it became clear that it was being raised by other countries. Moreover, the question of duration is closely linked with the amendment, review, and withdrawal provisions that are finally agreed upon. We, therefore, believe we should defer consideration of the duration issue until such time as we can see that a meaningful treaty is taking shape. If, as we expect, a number of other governments raise the duration issue, we ought to be prepared to think seriously about a treaty of limited duration provided it is long enough to accomplish the purpose of the treaty. We should not indicate to other governments anything specific on this subject at this time but rather indicate our willingness to consider all relevant questions with respect to the treaty, including the question of duration, in consultation with other governments and our own Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I recommend that you authorize me to convey these views to the FRG and, while recognizing the Chancellor's political problems, to indicate that the possibility of achieving a mutually satisfactory resolution is increased if the idea of a treaty of limited duration does not appear to be a German initiative. Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/22/66, Vol. I, Box 26. Secret; Nodis. The source text is undated; however, it was submitted to the President under cover of two May 16 memoranda both from Walt Rostow. The first memorandum, 11:05 a.m., informed the President that “Secretary Rusk will probably wish to raise this at lunch today.” The second, 4 p.m., requested that the President make a decision urgently in time for Secretary Rusk to send a letter to Foreign Minister Brandt explaining the U.S. position before the North Atlantic Council meeting scheduled for the following day, May 17. The approval block of this memorandum is checked. 2 Presumably May 14. 197. Editorial Note 197. Editorial Note AEC Chairman Seaborg wrote President Johnson on June 2, 1967, requesting approval of Crosstie, the FY 1968 underground nuclear weapons testing program. (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 14, page 688) At a June 20 meeting of the Annual Briefing of the 307 Committee (Review Committee for Underground Nuclear Testing), Seaborg and other AEC members presented the Crosstie program which consisted of 48 tests, including 2 nuclear excavation tests, Cabriolet and Buggy I. (Ibid., page 772) President Johnson indicated his approval of Crosstie on a June 30 memorandum from Walt Rostow. However, the two nuclear excavation tests were not granted specific approval and thus were not included in the first quarter authorization. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) On July 3, Seaborg wrote Rostow that substitutions had been made in Crosstie I, the first quarter test program. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) On July 6, Rostow sent a memorandum to Seaborg informing him that President Johnson had approved Crosstie and Crosstie I, but that specific approval would be required for “cratering experiments or tests to be executed outside the continental United States.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) Crosstie I consisted of 11 AEC weapon development tests, 1 AEC test for peaceful applications, and 1 Department of Defense weapons effects test. All tests took place at the Nevada Test Site. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , page 30) In a September 15 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg requested Presidential approval of 15 tests in the second quarter test program, Crosstie II. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memoranda to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 44, Box 23) An October 10 entry in Seaborg's Journal reveals that Rostow sent Seaborg a memorandum indicating Presidential approval of Crosstie II. (Seaborg, Journal, Volume 15, page 377) This memorandum, however, has not been further identified. A total of eight nuclear weapons tests were conducted under Crosstie II, including Gasbuggy, a Plowshare test, which was tested at Farmington, New Mexico; the remaining tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , page 30) A request for approval of Crosstie III was forwarded to President Johnson in a December 22 letter from Seaborg. Crosstie III consisted of 18 tests including 6 deferred from Crosstie II due to “programmatic and technical difficulties.” Specific requests for approval of Cabriolet and Buggy I, the two Plowshare cratering experiments, were not included in Seaborg's letter. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) President Johnson indicated his approval of Crosstie III on a January 5, 1968, memorandum from Walt Rostow. Sixteen tests were approved including Cabriolet; authorization for Buggy I continued to be handled as a separate matter. (Ibid.) A total of 14 nuclear tests were executed, including Cabriolet and Buggy I. All tests took place at the Nevada Test Site, except for Faultless which was conducted in Central Nevada. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , pages 31-32) The Crosstie IV program consisted of 19 proposed tests including 2 Department of Defense weapons effects tests to be conducted in the fourth quarter of FY 1968. Seaborg requested authorization for this program in a March 13 letter to President Johnson. (Johnson Library, National Security Policy, Subject File, Nuclear Testing Program FY 1968, Volume VI, Box 28) In a March 25 memorandum from Rostow to the President, Rostow requested the President's approval of Crosstie IV. The President approved Crosstie IV on March 26, and Rostow wrote Seaborg on the same date relaying Presidential approval. (Ibid.) A total of 15 tests, all conducted at the Nevada Test Site, took place. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , pages 32-33) A summary history of this test series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Crosstie and Bowline: Events—Door Mist, Dorsal Fin, Milk Shake, Diana Moon, Hudson Seal, and Ming Vase, 31 August 1967-20 November 1968 (DNA 6322F, 1985). 198. Memorandum of Conversation 198. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, June 23, 1967. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty; Assurances to Non-Nuclear Powers; Latin American Nuclear Free Zone PARTICIPANTS Secretary Dean Rusk Foreign Minister Gromyko Gromyko asked: How soon could the obstacles be overcome and a non-proliferation treaty completed, including the achievement of agreement among the eighteen nations at Geneva? Secretary Rusk replied that once we tabled a draft, with or without an agreed paragraph on controls, the problem would lie with governments who have not yet seen the text; for example, India and Japan. He made clear that the U.S. does not have pledges from other governments. The U.S. and the Soviet Union may present the draft but then these principal problems would arise: —assurances for India; —the question of the length of the treaty, where the Italians and others seek a length that is something short of eternity, perhaps 25 or 30 years; —finally, both U.S. and Soviet Union will be pressed on the question of reducing and controlling nuclear arms as between themselves. Gromyko interposed that if you accept general and complete disarmament, that would settle it; or we might have a general provision in the preamble of the treaty indicating we would do our best to move towards disarmament. Gromyko then asked if we had seen the draft given by Soviet Union to India. 2 Secretary Rusk said we have an important constitutional problem in giving nuclear assurances from the Executive Branch. This would require putting the matter as treaty to Senate, where a 2/3 majority vote is required. If we worked via a resolution in the Security Council, we could avoid this difficult constitutional and procedural matter. Gromyko said the Soviet draft was based on and rooted in the Charter of the UN. Secretary Rusk asked Gromyko if he had also gotten the impression the Indians had separated the non-proliferation treaty from the matter of assurances. Gromyko replied that he had always thought the statements of assurances would be made in connection with the treaty. They were flexible as to whether they would be attached in some way or be made as an accompaniment to the act of concluding the treaty. Secretary Rusk repeated the point that if we made a unilateral statement of assurance we would have to be careful because of the constitutional problem involved for the Executive Branch. Operating through the Security Council would be easier. Secretary Rusk then said: What would our position be if the Indians did not insist on assurances, and asked if Gromyko had any more information. Gromyko said Indians had raised the matter in connection with the NPT. Secretary Rusk said one problem might arise: If the Indians asked for assurances, the other non-nuclear powers might ask for them. Gromyko replied that the statement made would not be adapted specifically to India but to non-nuclear powers in general. Secretary Rusk said there might be differences of views as among non-nuclear powers as to what kind of assurances are required: Some might want stronger language than in the draft the Soviet Union gave to India. Secretary Rusk then asked if the U.S. and USSR tabled an incomplete draft soon, could the treaty be completed—perhaps by October? Gromyko said that seemed reasonable if the main obstacles were removed. Secretary McNamara agreed: Let us try for October. Gromyko repeated: That is reasonable, very reasonable. Secretary Rusk said we must wrestle with problems of control. Gromyko said that except for Western Europe, there is no problem. Secretary Rusk said we can't command Western Europe. The three communities of Western Europe have a new chairman, Mr. Rey, a Belgian. He had urged him to go deeply into the matter of the Euratom-Geneva control question. The ultimate problem is with General De Gaulle. Gromyko said he had gotten the impression in Paris that the French favor the treaty. They probably do not plan to sign it, but they are not definite even on this point. Secretary Rusk said they also take the view that Euratom must exercise its own controls. Gromyko replied: Let Euratom also use IAEA safeguards. Secretary Rusk said U.S. is not member of Euratom. We engage in technical cooperation with it but we have no direct interest. Gromyko said: Try to explain to them that their position makes trouble for the NPT: The question poses great difficulties. It is impossible to combine bloc and international principles of control. The three-year transitional period doesn't help. They must have an international system. Secretary Rusk said if the French were to discover its attitude were an obstacle to the treaty, it is possible they would change their mind. Gromyko said it is better you explain this to the French. Secretary Rusk said our ability to persuade General De Gaulle is somewhat limited. He then went on to ask Gromyko if he anticipated that the Soviet Union would be willing to have its peaceful atomic installations inspected by IAEA. Gromyko said that is a U.S. privilege; the USSR shall not do so. Secretary Rusk asked: What are the difficulties? Gromyko said there is no need for it. If you wish to, that's all right. But not for the Soviet Union. Secretary Rusk pointed out that acceptance by the Soviet Union, as well as by the U.S., would have good effect on Japan and India which were concerned with discrimination. In cases where discrimination is not required for non-proliferation, it would be wise to avoid it. It would be helpful if Soviet Union and U.S. would demonstrate that fact themselves. It would make a deep impression on countries which might make trouble in accepting the treaty. Gromyko concluded that when the text is sent to the Committee of Eighteen, four months ought to be enough to complete work. The target date of October was good. If possible, the treaty ought to be concluded sooner. Secretary Rusk asked when we would have a common text. Gromyko said that depends on when we overcome our differences on controls. On other matters, we are closer than before. Perhaps the Chairman and the President are now talking about it. He urged U.S. to pay attention to the question of controls, which must be international. Secretary Rusk said we find ourselves in a difficult situation. If we could give ourselves three years beginning now, we could gain time. Gromyko said what happens if the three years run out and there is no solution? But, he said: We do not exclude the possibility of submitting the treaty with a blank Article III. Secretary Rusk said we would work hard on this question. Gromyko urged Secretary Rusk to look into it again and try to find common ground and try to convince our allies. Secretary Rusk asked if the Soviet Union had again talked to the French. Gromyko said: Just in passing. He thought that Debre had mentioned Euratom. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the problem was not Euratom installations in France. France, as nuclear power, takes the view that the Geneva safeguards cannot be applied on its territory. Gromyko said: Why not have both Euratom and IAEA safeguards. Secretary Rusk said Soviet Union may underestimate the strong interest within the Euratom group against further nuclear powers in Europe; for example in Belgium and Netherlands. The Soviet Union should have more confidence in the Euratom safeguards system. Gromyko said he was not against the system but there was no organic connection between an international system and regional system. The two systems are different in scope and membership, although presumably many tasks would be similar. Secretary Rusk asked if the Soviets had a non-proliferation expert on their delegation? Gromyko said: Yes, Vorontsov. Secretary Rusk said perhaps Mr. Adrian Fisher could get together with him later. Secretary Rusk noted that the Latin Americans had concluded an agreement on a nuclear free region. Gromyko asked: Was the agreement formalized? Secretary Rusk replied, not yet. They have to clear up the alleged distinction between a nuclear explosion and nuclear weapons. But the missing piece of the puzzle is Cuba. Did Gromyko have any idea what the Cuban position was. Gromyko said he didn't know but thought they had stated their position two years ago. So far as he knew, their position had not changed. Secretary Rusk said he had the impression the issue had been raised by some Latin American countries with Cuba and they had gotten a negative reaction. He expressed the hope Gromyko would use Soviet influence to get them to join the Latin American agreement. Gromyko said he didn't know much about it. The Soviet Union had not been consulted. The question does not relate to the Soviet Union; but he thought Cuba had stated its position before at General Assembly in 1965. Secretary Rusk said he thought the Latin American agreement a good idea as example for other regions—the Middle East, for one. But these agreements don't work if there is one country outside. Gromyko said: But if the Middle Eastern nations sign a non-proliferation agreement, the problem would be solved, although he recognized that a treaty on a nuclear free zone went beyond a non-proliferation agreement. Secretary Rusk asked: Do you expect all Warsaw Pact countries will sign a non-proliferation agreement? Gromyko said that each will have finally to state its own position. Secretary Rusk asked whether the non-proliferation question came up in conversation with Prime Minister Moro and the Chairman. Gromyko said virtually not at all. Secretary Rusk said Italy is against a treaty for eternity. Gromyko said it is still a Catholic country. He had talked, however, at great length with Fanfani, perhaps two hours. He had explained in great detail the non-proliferation treaty and carried away the impression some points had been misunderstood: For instance, that the Soviet Union was against peaceful uses of atomic energy. He pointed out the Soviet Union was for unlimited uses of atomic energy for science and industry. He had the impression that his explanation to Fanfani had been helpful. Secretary Rusk said some countries misunderstood this question of the industrial uses, but those misunderstandings had now been overcome. Gromyko stated also on question of nuclear explosions, Fanfani understood better than before that there was no difference between explosive devices and weapons. Secretary Rusk said there were two points he would like to make. First, he would greatly regret if the tabling of the draft were delayed because of differences over control, and second, the US was ready to go to work on the question of control with the Soviet Union, but there should not be substantial delay. Gromyko replied, it would be better if we could agree. It would save time in the future. But he didn't exclude tabling the draft with a blank Article III. The Soviet Union was against “family control.” There could be several layers of control, if people wished. The Soviet Union is interested in only one layer. Secretary Rusk said it could all be done very quickly if the USSR would say yes to our draft. Gromyko said this was also true, if the US said yes to the Soviet draft. Secretary Rusk asked: As you interpret your draft on the question of assurances to the Indians and others, would that instrument be put forward inside or outside the Security Council? Gromyko said that the UN Charter was the basis for their draft. The Indians wanted something more definite. Secretary Rusk said he was not being negative, but we have problems unless the Security Council has passed a resolution. We can vote for a Security Council resolution. Gromyko said the Soviet formulation would be all right for given problems in the United States. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 79 D 246. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Walt Rostow and approved in S on July 5. 2 Not further identified. 199. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 199. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, June 24, 1967. SUBJECT Safeguards Article for Non-Proliferation Treaty This is a follow-up on our telephone conversation of yesterday evening. For your background I am attaching a copy of the U.S. Draft Article III and the Soviet Draft Article III which we have exchanged to date. As you can see, the primary differences are that the Soviet draft merely provides for the acceptance of IAEA safeguards and, by having no time schedule for their application, presumably provides that they should be immediate, while the U.S. Draft holds open the possibility that negotiations between the IAEA and the authorities of another international safeguards system (e.g. Euratom) should come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement under which the IAEA verifies the effectiveness of the other system. The Euratom countries, and in particular Germany, have a variety of interests in preserving the Euratom system. The first is the very simple one of keeping Euratom going and their feeling that they could not do so if they attempted to put Euratom facilities under the IAEA safeguards over the objection of one Euratom member, that is, France. If Euratom safeguards were to disappear, then an element of discrimination would be injected into the Community in that France would be the only Euratom country without safeguards on its peaceful activities. The problem is complicated by the common ownership of nuclear fuels and the presence on the territories of four members of facilities which are owned and operated by Euratom and, hence, immune from the jurisdiction of the state on whose territories they are located. Another concern is, of course, based on the feeling of Euratom members that the economic and political objectives which they hope to obtain through Euratom will be jeopardized if they do not negotiate with the IAEA on a group basis so far as matters within the competence of Euratom are concerned. One possible way of handling this concern has been suggested by a variety of sources, including an informal suggestion by a Soviet delegation officer in Geneva. It would provide for negotiation of “bilateral or multilateral” agreements with the IAEA. This concept is similar to that of the safeguards provision of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (LA-NFZ). 2 It would permit individual or collective negotiations, and thus permit Euratom countries to deal as a group with the IAEA to safeguard their common interests. If you would like new draft treaty language along these lines before your discussions with the Soviets at Glassboro tomorrow or any other time, I will be available on an on-call basis. You will recall that, in your letter to Willy Brandt, 3 you indicate we would not depart from the NATO agreed Article III language without further consultation. Minister von Lilienfeld made a demarche yesterday stressing the importance of adhering to this understanding. You also may wish to discuss with the Soviets the possibility of facilitating the handling of the Euratom point by having both the U.S. and the Soviets make an offer to put at least some of their peaceful activities under safeguards. This would, to all intents and purposes, eliminate the Euratom arguments. We believe that the Soviets have a number of facilities (e.g. power and research reactors) devoted solely to peaceful purposes which they could offer to be safeguarded by the IAEA without affecting their military programs. A talking paper on this subject is attached. Adrian S. Fisher Attachment 1 4 April 25, 1967. U.S. DRAFT TREATY ARTICLE III For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material covered by this Article is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices: 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to have international safeguards meeting the requirements of this Article on all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory or under its jurisdiction. In cooperating with any non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of such State, each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide (a) source or special fissionable material unless the material shall be subject to such safeguards; or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material unless the special fissionable material shall be subject to such safeguards; 2. After the original entry into force of this Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has activities subject to any international safeguards system other than that of the International Atomic Energy Agency undertakes to facilitate verification by that Agency of the effectiveness of the international safeguards system applied to such activities; 3. To meet the requirements of this Article, international safeguards (a) shall be either those of the IAEA or such other international safeguards generally consistent therewith as are accepted by the IAEA under verification procedures mutually agreed by the authorities of the IAEA and the authorities of the other international safeguards system concerned, and (b) shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty; 4. Agreement on the implementation of IAEA verification of another international safeguards system, as provided for in this Article, shall be reached as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty; and 5. The international safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technical development of the Parties having them. 5 Attachment 2 6 May 20, 1967. SOVIET DRAFT TEXT ARTICLE III Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards. Attachment 3 6 TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS 1. US considers that, to overcome charges of discrimination in safeguards article requiring mandatory safeguards and to gain acceptance of such article, it may well prove necessary for nuclear-weapon signatories to offer to accept IAEA safeguards on at least some of their peaceful nuclear facilities. Such an offer would apply only after entry into force of an NPT with the desired safeguards article. The justification for exclusion of any facilities from offer would be on military or security grounds and not for any commercial reasons. 2. Accordingly, US is prepared to make such an offer in order to facilitate acceptance of a safeguards article which requires mandatory safeguards and which is mutually acceptable to the US and the Soviets. We have indication that UK prepared to join us in offer. 3. While US and UK offer may be sufficient to gain widespread agreement on acceptable safeguards article, such agreement may also require some degree of Soviet acceptance of IAEA safeguards. US hopes that USSR would be able to offer to place at least some of its peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards, and accompany US and UK in a joint or parallel offer at the appropriate point in the negotiations. However, US for its part would be prepared to make offer without Soviets and without UK. 4. Properly presented, such a US-UK-Soviet offer should not only greatly facilitate acceptance of safeguards article, but could go far toward meeting non-nuclear-weapon states' demands for balanced obligations. 5. If Soviets are interested, we are agreeable to coordinating timing and manner of presenting offers for maximum beneficial effect. Background-Noforn 1. Recent cables indicate Soviet knowledge of possible US offer to accept IAEA safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and Soviet thoughts on making similar offer. 2. The approximate numbers of Soviet peaceful nuclear facilities which could be placed under IAEA safeguards are nine power reactors and twenty-three research reactors (including reactors estimated to be operational by 1968). The above totals exclude reactors designed for military use or for dual plutonium/power production, maritime reactors employing Soviet submarine reactor technology, and reactors located in or very near sensitive installations. 3. The Soviets could probably afford to have IAEA safeguards applied to all, or at least most, of the thirty-three reactors listed above without significantly impairing their plutonium supply for weapons purposes. The amount of plutonium produced in these reactors is estimated to be only a small percentage of the plutonium the U.S.S.R. produces and will produce for weapons purposes. 4. The Soviets have peaceful uses for significant amounts of plutonium. For example, at present a single Soviet research reactor uses a quantity of plutonium in its core which is almost equivalent to the total estimated annual amount of plutonium presently produced in all peaceful reactors. Also, they will need a large quantity (1000 kg) of plutonium for peaceful purposes in the early 1970's for the plutonium core of their BN-350 fast breeder reactor, presently under construction. 5. The Soviets have held closely the location and technology of fuel fabrication and fuel reprocessing plants, and we do not expect any such plants to be part of any offer to accept IAEA safeguards. Most probably all such plants are mixed military/peaceful facilities to some extent, but undoubtedly have primary emphasis on their military aspect. 6. The following tabulation, listed for purposes of comparison with the U.S.S.R. peaceful program, includes approximate totals of peaceful U.S. and U.K. nuclear facilities which could be offered for IAEA safeguarding. The totals include facilities estimated to be operational by 1968. U.S.: Power Reactors—19 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards) Research Reactors—over 100 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards) Fuel Reprocessing Plant—1 Fuel Fabrication Plants—10 (while fabricating peaceful uses fuel) U.K.: Power Reactors—17 (plus 2 reactors already under IAEA safeguards) Research reactors—20 (Included in power reactor listings are experimental power reactors and power demonstration reactors.) 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. 2 The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in Mexico City on February 14, 1967, and entered into force April 22, 1968. The United States is not a party to this Treaty. For the English language text of the Treaty, see 22 UST 762. For specific reference to Article 13, the safeguards provision, see ibid., 772. 3 Not found. 4 Secret. 5 The substance of most of the remainder of this paragraph as it appeared in the April 25 draft we gave the Soviets has been incorporated in Article V of the draft Treaty prepared by the Co-Chairmen on June 7. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Secret. 6 Secret. 200. Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk 200. Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 4, 1967. Dear Dean: Bill Foster's reply to Mrs. Myrdal at the ENDC meeting of July 11, 1967 on the subject of our attitude toward a comprehensive test ban was quite appropriate in the light of our stated policy. 2 On the other hand I am concerned that our present commitments to our defense requirements may be in conflict with the interpretation made by some that given adequate inspection we are prepared to accept immediately a comprehensive test ban treaty. You will recall that at a Meeting of the Principals about a year ago, 3 we discussed our policy regarding a possible threshold test ban treaty of a comprehensive test ban treaty. At that time certain estimates were made regarding the period of underground testing that might be required in order to complete the accelerated testing of nuclear weapons that then might be regarded as indispensable for future security. Since that time our requirements for these new weapons have been further clarified and our careful and detailed analysis of possible accelerated weapons development and test programs has given us sufficient additional information to indicate that the time estimates of a year ago cannot now be considered to be realistic. Therefore, the Atomic Energy Commission believes that it might be useful to give you a brief assessment of the situation as it now exists. As you know, the DOD and AEC are currently developing a complete new generation of weapons for the strategic offensive forces. Both development and proof tests are required for these high priority systems. Additionally, since these new systems will constitute the major U.S. response to the Soviet ABM deployment, it is vitally important that there be assessments of their vulnerability to nuclear attack. This requires exposure of components and assemblies to large fluxes of neutrons, gamma and X-rays that can only be provided by nuclear detonations. The development of the techniques for carrying out these nuclear effects tests within the constraints of the limited test ban treaty has been an important achievement of recent time. The requirement for continued underground testing is further emphasized by the Spartan 6 MT, “hot” X-ray ABM warhead. Development and confirmation testing of this warhead by underground techniques involves efforts at least through 1970 because a capability to test at this yield must also be developed. The need to test has not been and presumably will not be entirely dependent on developments for the future stockpile. There have been instances in which nuclear testing was the only solution or that which offered the highest degree of confidence with respect to the urgent correction of defects found in stockpile weapons affecting either operational reliability or safety. I had personally hoped that the necessary underground testing associated with the development of the DOD weapons systems could be accelerated so that the results would be available at an earlier time; however, I cannot find a way, despite a great deal of personal attention to the problem. I realize the advantages of taking steps beyond the present limited test ban treaty as soon as it is feasible and I continue to be hopeful that we can reach some broader agreements with the Soviets. I thought that this information might be useful to you, and I would be pleased to discuss it further with you if you believe that this would be helpful. Cordially, Glenn 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Committee of Principals Record Book, January-December, 1967. Secret; Restricted Data. The source text was sent to Rusk under cover of an August 14 memorandum from Kohler requesting Rusk's approval to circulate the source text to the members of the Committee of Principals. Rusk indicated his approval with a checkmark on the covering memorandum with the date “8/15/67” next to it. 2 For Foster's reply, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 294-298. On June 29 Mrs. Myrdal, the Swedish Representative to the ENDC, delivered a statement to the ENDC in which she urged that a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests be considered in any discussion of a comprehensive test ban. (Ibid., pp. 272-278) Several days later Charles Johnson informed Walt Rostow in a July 7 memorandum of the views of several agencies on Foster's proposed draft response to Mrs. Myrdal's statement. In his memorandum, Johnson emphasized to Rostow that “ACDA believes strongly that we must rebut Mrs. Myrdal's charge that we have lost interest in the CTB because failure to do so would have a very adverse effect on our position on the NPT negotiations.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. III, Box 6) 3 Regarding this meeting, see Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 312-316. 201. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 201. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 10, 1967. Mr. President: Bill Foster called to say that the Russians have informed him that they are prepared to table the NPT jointly with us with a blank Article III. 2 There are two Soviet proposed amendments 3 to work out; but they look to Foster manageable. He will inform the Gore sub-committee tomorrow morning; testify before the Appropriations sub-committee tomorrow afternoon; 4 return to Geneva, leaving Dulles at 8:00 p.m. Saturday. Now the game will move to the non-nuclear powers; and some months of negotiations lie ahead. But it is something of an event. He is, of course, available if you wish to see him. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “rec'd 1:46 p.m.” 2 For a discussion of this Article, see Foster's statement, August 24, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 342-347. 3 Foster sent President Johnson a memorandum, August 10, on the “Proposed Submission by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the Geneva Conference.” This memorandum was also sent to Secretary Rusk. In this memorandum Foster informed the President that in the U.S. text of the Treaty which was recommended to the Soviets, Article V, the amendments' clause, contained two alternatives. Foster wrote, “The first alternative provides only the nuclear weapon parties with a veto on amendments, but does not oblige any party to accept amendments which it does not approve. The second alternative provides a veto for the nuclear weapons parties and all other parties who are members of the IAEA Board of Governors, but also provides that once adopted amendments are applicable to all.” The United States preferred the first, and informed the Soviets and its allies of this, though either was acceptable. The Soviets, however, preferred the second. (Memorandum for the President; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the White House, 1967) 4 For Foster's testimony on the afternoon of August 11, see Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968: Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session. (Washington, 1968), pp. 989-1019. 202. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 202. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 28, 1967. SUBJECT Arms Control Considerations of a U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Deployment Decision (U) On several occasions over recent years the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has made clear that a U.S. decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system would have serious consequences for U.S. arms control objectives. In a speech to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [ Committee ] on August 16, 1966, 2 the U.S. pointed out how we believe that ABM deployment would exacerbate the strategic arms race. This effect was also made clear in Secretary McNamara's statement to Congress on January 23, 1967, 3 and was a basis for President Johnson's suggestion to Premier Kosygin that U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions should be held in order to control this race. 4 Even though the ABM deployment were limited, we still believe it would pose serious risks to our arms control objectives, in the first instance the non-proliferation treaty. The ultimate decision with respect to deployment of an ABM system will, of course, be made in the light of the total range of considerations affecting U.S. security, including the Chinese Communist build-up and the Soviet failure to date to agree to the initiation of discussions on controlling the strategic arms race. If these considerations were to lead to an early U.S. decision to initiate deployment of an ABM system notwithstanding the adverse effects of such a decision on U.S. arms control objectives, I believe it would be essential that certain actions be undertaken by the U.S. Government in order to minimize insofar as possible these adverse effects. In particular, every effort must be made to avoid such a U.S. decision from preventing the maximum acceptance of and continued adherence to a non-proliferation treaty by non-nuclear-weapons countries. With this objective in mind, I am forwarding herewith for your consideration a paper suggesting various actions which might be taken by the U.S. Government in the event of a U.S. decision to deploy ABMs. I and my representatives will be glad to discuss this with you and your staffs at your earliest convenience. Adrian S. Fisher Enclosure 5 August 25, 1967. CONTINGENCY PAPER ON THE ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS OF A U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT DECISION If a U.S. decision were to be made to deploy an ABM system along the lines of the “I-67 Program” (an area defense system with hard-point defense of some Minuteman complexes), then extremely important arms control considerations would have to be taken into account prior to the announcement of any such decision. Such a deployment would probably be based upon and justified by the emerging Chinese ICBM capabilities and the continued Soviet offensive missile buildup; the area defense component would provide protection against Chinese ICBM's and possible accidental launches, and the hard-point defense of Minuteman would decrease the vulnerability of this component of our assured destruction capability by raising the “cost” to the Soviets should they attempt a counterforce first strike. Such a U.S. ABM deployment decision at this time could have adverse effects on at least four important U.S. arms control objectives: 1. Preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by obtaining maximum acceptance of and continued adherence to a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); 2. Controlling the offensive and defensive strategic arms race between the U.S. and the USSR; 3. Assuring the continued adherence to existing arms control agreements; specifically, the “Limited Test Ban” (LTB) treaty; and 4 Maintaining continued U.S. Government support of stated U.S. policy positions on important arms control proposals; specifically, the cutoff in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (“Cutoff”) and the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). The potentially adverse consequences of a U.S. ABM deployment decision on the foregoing arms control objectives could be minimized by the following recommended specific actions: 1. Private discussion with the USSR prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision emphasizing: a. The emerging Chinese ICBM threat as a primary basis for our decision; b. The “limited” nature of the planned deployment and our intentions to keep it “limited”; c. The hard-point defense of Minuteman as a partial response to continued Soviet offensive missile buildups, and as posing no threat to the USSR per se; d. The increasing importance of achieving meaningful private discussions between our two nations on ways of controlling the strategic arms race in order to prevent any misunderstanding as to the nature of any deployment and to avoid further escalation of the strategic arms race; e. The importance and urgency of showing some progress in other arms control areas, such as meaningful discussion on controlling the strategic arms race, in order to secure the widest possible acceptance of and adherence to the NPT; and f. The increasing pressures of many of our respective allies for their own offensive and defensive strategic systems and associated nuclear warheads if they observe a continued strategic arms buildup by the USSR and the U.S. 2. Private discussions with NATO prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision, 6 emphasizing the first four points under “1” above as well as: a. The emerging Chinese missile threat is not directed towards Europe; b. There are no hardened strategic missile deterrent forces in Europe suitable for hard-point ABM defenses (FYI, future French solid IRBM silo deployments are not a part of U.S. NATO strategic missile deterrent); c. ABM defenses of overall urban populations against present and future Soviet offensive missile capabilities are not feasible at this time for either Europe or the U.S.; d. Some U.S. defense against the emerging Chinese ICBM threat can provide the U.S. more flexibility in its actions in support of its allies and friends around the world; e. The fact that the Soviets were the first to initiate ABM deployment and the very limited nature of our ABM deployment need not cause a new spiral in the U.S.-USSR strategic arms race; and f. Such an ABM deployment decision should not decrease in any way importance and desirability of an equitable NPT to other nations. 3. Private discussions with Japan prior to announcing our ABM deployment decision emphasizing: a. The continued deterrent value of the overwhelming strategic superiority that the U.S. will possess for the foreseeable future over the Communist Chinese, and the continued utility of this strategic deterrent in protecting the vital interests of Japan; b. Our ABM deployment in face of an emerging Chinese offensive missile capability is supplemental to our strategic deterrent forces and is designed to decrease U.S. vulnerabilities to possible Chinese threats of attack and thereby enhance the credibility of our commitments to Japan and other friendly nations (we do not consider China to be an irrational adversary); c. The U.S. is firmly committed to achieving an equitable NPT and does not consider that a U.S. ABM deployment decision should in any way decrease the desirability of an NPT to other nations. In fact, for the reason indicated in “b” above, the need for nuclear weapons by nations friendly to the U.S. will be reduced as will the utility of nuclear weapons to nations which may be enemies of the U.S.; and d. Our willingness to continue to hold detailed discussions with Japan on the overall ballistic missile defense problems—technical, military, economic, and political. 4. India will also require timely consultations, particularly in light of the growing Chinese threat and current NPT negotiations. Shortly after the announcement of our ABM deployment decision, a high-level discussion with Indian representatives should take place emphasizing the same first three points made with Japan (see “3 a, b, and c” above) and the points to be made public under paragraph “5” below. With India one should also emphasize that the U.S. ABM deployment decision is one of the least provocative U.S. responses to the continuing Soviet offensive missile buildup and the emerging Chinese missile capabilities. 5. At the time that the U.S. ABM deployment decision is made public, the following points should be clearly stated and emphasized by senior U.S. officials: a. While the U.S. has demonstrated its reluctance to initiate ABM deployment, this was the only prudent decision in face of an emerging Chinese ICBM capability and our need to protect our Minuteman force against the continued buildups in Soviet offensive missile capabilities; b. The limited scope and purposes of the planned ABM deployment emphatically stating that such deployment need not trigger a new strategic arms race between the U.S. and the USSR, and that the U.S. still desires meaningful discussions with the USSR on ways for controlling the overall strategic arms race involving both offensive and defensive weapons systems; c. The U.S. continues to consider the achievement of an equitable NPT as a priority goal; d. The U.S. ABM deployment decision in no way interferes with or detracts from stated U.S. positions involving important U.S. arms control objectives; and e. The planned ABM deployment will not require any nuclear tests which are inconsistent with the present LTB. 6. Specific talking papers on the arms control considerations of our ABM deployment should be prepared for use by our ambassadors and other senior officials in various private and public forums shortly after our ABM deployment decision is made public. Early consultations within the U.S. Government on the above-proposed course of actions should be held and specific actions agreed to in order that necessary staff-level preparations may be completed on a timely basis. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret; Noforn. 2 Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher; see Documents on Disarmament, 1966 , pp. 562-567. 3 Presumably a reference to McNamara's military posture statement given to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25; for text, see ibid., 1967, pp. 5-24. 4 See Document 178 . 5 Secret; Noforn. 6 Note: The U.S. must be prepared to discuss the issues involved in ABM deployment at the Disarmament Experts' Meeting in Paris, September 12-15, 1967, and at the Ankara NPG Meeting, September 28 and 29, 1967. [Footnote in the source text.] 203. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 203. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 29, 1967. SUBJECT McNamara Speech Having reflected on it overnight, I am convinced that it would be very undesirable, domestically and internationally, to announce in mid-September a decision to deploy a limited ABM system. The unusual procedure of a special mid-September announcement 2 would focus domestic and international attention on the decision and associate an undesirable urgency with the program. If the decision must be made, I believe it would be much wiser to announce it in January in connection with the many issues in the FY-1969 budget. Domestically, I do not believe that the announcement will make anyone happy. Those opposed to ABM deployment will not be mollified by the limited nature of the system which they will consider as simply a foot in the door for a major deployment. Those in favor of an ABM deployment will consider it an inadequate program that does not serve the basic purpose for protecting the US population from Soviet attack and will immediately press for an expansion of the system. The military strategists who desire further protection of our retaliatory missile force will consider the program entirely inadequate since it backs off from the minimum program previously considered in the Pentagon and apparently eliminates all hard-point defense for Minuteman. If made in January, the announcement would be submerged to some extent in the many other problems and decisions in the FY-1969 budget. The anti-ABM forces would probably be somewhat appeased by the restraint on other strategic systems where McNamara will presumably be holding the line against the military; and the pro-ABM forces would be more aware of the competition for funds and the severe budgetary limitations on a broader system at this time. Internationally, the decision will be received, no matter what McNamara says, both as a major step-up in the nuclear arms race and as an impressive demonstration that the Chinese have achieved the status of a major nuclear power. In this context, a mid-September announcement would have a particularly adverse effect on the prospects for the NPT. It would clearly be seized upon by India, which has not yet committed itself on the NPT and has always called for a reversal in the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, as an additional reason for not supporting the treaty. This will still be a problem in January. However, if we can get India further committed on the NPT in the next few months, we might then have more success with the argument that India and others would have greater assurance that we would in fact respond to Chinese nuclear aggression provided we had a limited anti-Chinese ABM deployment. With regard to the Soviets, while the argument can be made that an early deployment decision would increase the pressure on the Soviets to discuss the ABM problem, I think that on balance it would reduce whatever small prospects there might otherwise be for such talks this year—certainly given McNamara's emphasis on our massive strategic superiority. In summary, I can see no real reasons or political advantages in announcing an ABM deployment decision at this time and some real problems that such a decision would create for the Administration. I recommend therefore that if the decision must be made it should be announced in January in the context of the FY-1969 budget. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR,ABM Negotiations (II), Box 231. Secret. 2 In a speech delivered on September 18 to the United Press International Editors and Publishers, McNamara discussed the current U.S. defense policy toward prevention of a thermonuclear war, and specifically about the possibility of deploying an ABM defense system. For text of this speech, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 382-394. Additional documentation on the origins and drafting of this speech is scheduled for publication in volume X . 204. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) 204. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to the Representative to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (Foster) 1 Washington, September 1, 1967. FOR MR. FOSTER ONLY Dear Bill: This letter is for the purpose of keeping you abreast of developments in the ABM field. You will have received my August 28 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Walt Rostow on “Arms Control Considerations of a U.S. Anti-Ballistic Missile Deployment Decision.” 2 When it became apparent that things were moving toward a decision to initiate deployment of an ABM system, I spoke to Secretary Rusk and to Secretary McNamara urging that the announcement of such a decision be delayed, and pointing out its adverse effects on the NPT negotiations. A decision, however, has been made to have Secretary McNamara announce the U.S. plan to deploy a thin ABM system in a speech which he will make on September 18. 3 It is presently planned to inform NAC on September 14; the Perm Reps will probably then join the Disarmament Experts Meeting later in the afternoon of the same day for a discussion of some of the implications, including those relating to arms control. I know that the announcement on September 18 will pose very real problems for the current NPT negotiations. Hopefully, we will be able to arm you with the kind of statements recommended in Recommendation 5 of the contingency paper which I circulated in my memorandum of August 28. 4 We will be working on a contingency statement that you can use in Geneva to meet the excepted charges by those who would see a U.S. ABM deployment as a peg on which to hang criticism of the NPT effort. In any event I did want you to be forewarned of the planned announcement. I am sure you will want to take the September 18 announcement into account in weighing the pros and cons of an early ENDC adjournment. It certainly will not be easier in Geneva after the 18th and it might well be better not to provide some of the opponents of the NPT with a ready-made forum after the 18th. The September 18 announcement is being treated here as a most sensitive subject and I would suggest that you limit knowledge of it to yourself and George Bunn. Sincerely, Adrian 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 80, Miscellaneous Papers. Secret; Exdis. 2 See Document 202 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 203 . 4 See the enclosure, Document 202 . 205. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 205. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1909Z. 703. Disto. Subject: Co-Chairmen's Meeting —Soviet Recommendation on Article III. For Secretary and Fisher from Foster. 1. Summary: At September 1 Co-Chairmen's meeting at Roshchin's initiative, Soviets presented Foster with text of draft Art III (sent septel). 2 Roshchin said there were many elements of draft which would be troublesome for Moscow to accept, but that his delegation had taken into account views presented by US regarding special Euratom problems. Roshchin said he considered draft best possible compromise between US and Soviet positions. He could not predict whether it would be acceptable to his superiors but would recommend it to Moscow for acceptance. Foster said he would report draft presented by Soviet delegation as basis for solution to Art III impasse. Foster said not sure that Washington would find Soviet draft satisfactory either to US Govt or its allies. However, he recognized that Soviet draft represented considerable departure from earlier Soviet position on NPT safeguards and that it had been the result of fruitful exchange of views between delegations. Foster said he would recommend Soviet draft to Washington as something US Govt should try out on US allies. 2. Details: Roshchin asked for Co-Chairmen meeting Sept 1 in order to present Soviet compromise proposal for Article III. Roshchin noted that Bunn and Gleysteen on US side and Antyasov and Shustov on Soviet side had debated two drafts following Aug 26 Co-Chairmen's meeting (Geneva 629). 3 Soviets had obtained greater insight into safeguards problems as result Aug 26 and earlier Co-Chairmen's meetings and problems their draft Article III posed for US and its Euratom allies. These points had been further clarified during informal meetings of Deloffs. Foregoing had made it possible for Soviet delegation to present draft Art III which Roshchin thought takes into account problems of US and special interests of Euratom allies. Roshchin said Soviet draft had not been discussed with Moscow and he was not sure whether it would be acceptable, but he was prepared to recommend it as best possible compromise between Soviet position that IAEA safeguards apply to all non-nuclear-weapon signatories and US position that Article would have to take into account political realities of US alliance structure. 3. Foster said he would recommend Soviet draft as something to try out on Washington and on our allies. Foster said that while we are anxious to resolve Art III issue before NPT draft is moved on to UN, we of course would have to obtain views of allies before tabling any Co-Chairmen draft on Art III. While he personally hoped Soviet draft might provide basis for compromise of conflicting interests and recognized that Soviets had made important concessions, he could only say he would recommend draft to Washington for presentation to US allies. 4. Foster and Roshchin agreed that utmost discretion required to avoid leaks. 5. Several days after Co-Chairmen's meeting of 26 Aug, Antyasov and Shustov invited Bunn and Gleysteen to meet. Soviets suggested that Soviet Art III be utilized but that following language be added to it: “The above-mentioned guaranties shall apply to the states as provided for in the statute of the IAEA and the document on safeguards.” Soviets contended that our Euratom allies could enter into “bilateral or multilateral” arrangements with IAEA because they were provided for in IAEA statute and safeguards document. They also said they thought some of our allies would like a specific reference to the IAEA safeguards document. 6. We said Soviet suggestion inadequate because it did not contain language from US Art III on following points: (1) Clear statement of purpose of safeguards in beginning; (2) Right of Euratom members to enter into verification agreement with IAEA through Euratom and related provisions recognizing important role of Euratom; (3) Application of safeguards to “source or special fissionable material within its territory or under its jurisdiction” rather than to “its nuclear activities” as in Soviet text; (4) Three-year transition period; (5) Language re economic and technological development and safeguarded international interchange of nuclear materials and equipment; (6) More precise language for export provision. 7. Subsequently Soviet Deloffs presented US Deloffs with text substantially same as text reported septel except for first sentence. They said they could not accept US statement of purpose because it referred to “source or special fissionable material” and Moscow would suggest addition of “principal nuclear facility.” As to other references to “source and special fissionable material” in US text, they could perhaps be accepted provided language from safeguards document on when procedures applied to principal nuclear facilities could be added. (See second and third sentences of para 1 of text reported septel.) 8. Soviet Deloffs could not accept language US Art III referring to other safeguards systems and verification agreement for Euratom although they understood Euratom would enter into an agreement with IAEA on behalf of its members covering their NPT safeguard obligations. Soviets said Moscow would reject word “multilateral” but language “individually or together with other states” might be acceptable. They would not accept three-year transition period; they had guidelines permitting only year and one-half transition; but perhaps language of para 4 which based on LA-NFZ Treaty 4 would satisfy Moscow as compromise. However, Soviets could not accept language like first sentence of provision in LA-NFZ Treaty; an undertaking to accept safeguards was required for them. US Deloffs said they would report above to Foster. 9. At the Co-Chairmen's meeting which occurred today, Roshchin asked Foster to consider the first sentence of the text reported septel as a substitute for the US language on statement of purpose. Soviet Deloffs said “nuclear energy” was vague and should be understood to include “source and special fissionable material” which they could not accept in first sentence of treaty. (Comment: It clearly does not include nuclear “facilities.”) Brodie 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 2 For the Soviet draft of Article III, see Document 206 . 3 Telegram 629 from Geneva, August 26, reports: “At August 26 Roshchin luncheon, Foster reviewed tactical situation in ENDC, saying it most important to have ENDC recommendation of NPT in some form before draft passed on to UNGA. Roshchin said ENDC could not endorse NPT as a committee without unanimity, but saw no problem in finding procedural means to report to UNGA submission NPT by Co-Chairmen and status of debate on it in ENDC. Roshchin considered it essential to reach Co-Chairmen agreement on safeguards and security assurances as soon as possible in order that NPT would be easier defend at UNGA. Foster gave long review of U.S. and Soviet drafts on Art. III, pointing out deficiencies and loopholes of Soviet draft. Foster also pointed out need for Soviets to start moving on ABMs and conventional arms transfers before too late.” (Department of State, S/S-I Files, Exdis/Limdis Telegrams/Airgrams, Reel 163A, August 25, 1967-September 9, 1967) 4 On February 12, 1968, Rusk advised the President to sign Protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; see Document 226 . The United Stares is not a signatory to this treaty, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. For text of Protocol II, see footnote 2, Document 226 . For text of the treaty, see 22 UST 762. 206. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 206. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, September 1, 1967, 1910Z. 704. Disto. For Secretary and Fisher from Foster. The text of the Article III suggested to us by the Soviet Delegation today is as follows: Begin verbatim text : Draft Article III. 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this treaty. As provided in the Agency's safeguards system, procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or outside any such facility. These procedures shall also extend to facilities containing or to contain such materials, including principal nuclear facilities. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out by it anywhere. 2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) Source or special fissionable material, or (b) Equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty may conclude agreements with the IAEA to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other states as provided in the statute of the IAEA. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this treaty. For states depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. End verbatim text . Brodie 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, September 2, 1967, 1000Z. 896. Ref: State 30165. 2 Subject: Strategic Arms Control Talks. 1. Implication of reftel is that decision announce light deployment 3 already made or at least will probably be made even if Soviets agree schedule talks. If this is the case I strongly believe we should not make further approach to Soviets unless we can tell them frankly that announcement will be made. Otherwise they will have good case for charging bad faith and canceling talks with great damage to our position before world opinion. If not possible tell them our intentions now, believe we should proceed promptly with announcement at same time expressing our desire proceed with strategic arms control talks. While our announcement would make more difficult Soviet agreement to talks, we could stress that they are already carrying out deployment. 2. If we can give firm indication our intention make announcement, I believe would be useful for me to take up the matter informally with both Gromyko and Dobrynin, particularly if I could tell them that if they schedule talks we will be prepared present more concrete proposal. 3. My own view is that we should go further and put forward proposal now. We know Soviet military opposed and in absence of specific proposal they can conjure up all kinds of pitfalls in arguing against talks as well as argument that US not sincere and merely wishes obtain information on Soviet capabilities and plans. (Dobrynin indicated to me civilians found it difficult to counter military arguments on this highly technical subject.) Also in event Soviets continue fail to open talks we will be in much stronger position when our decision deploy announced if we had put forward serious proposal. I believe if specific proposal made Soviets will in fact at least agree to discuss it. 4. Since Soviet military position clear, believe attempt to advance consideration through military channels likely be counter-productive. 5. Re last question reftel, from Soviet point of view public emphasis that deployment necessitated by Chicom developments has both pros and cons. From ours I am inclined to view we should avoid taking any official position on this as uncertainty would bring more pressure on Soviets to negotiate. Might be helpful state that our basic position based on deterrence. We recognize interest of Soviets that deterrence be mutual and that we always stand ready to work out arrangements for both sides to achieve security at lowest practical level. Thompson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret; Nodis. 2 Not found. 3 Regarding the development of the proposed ABM deployment, see Documents 173 , 202 - 204 , and Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume X . 208. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 208. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 5, 1967. SUBJECT Talking Points for your lunch with the President today. Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article III Proposal. The Soviets have proposed a compromise Article III dealing with safeguards which represents movement from their earlier position. 2 The key to their suggested language is their willingness to have non-nuclear weapon states enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA “either individually or together with other states as provided in the statute of the IAEA” and the statement that the “exclusive purpose” for which IAEA safeguards are to be accepted is “verification of the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this treaty.” These two factors appear to indicate that the Soviets are prepared to permit arrangements under which IAEA could make use of the Euratom system in performing the task of “verification” under such an Article. The Soviets also appear willing to have an Article III which permits the Euratom countries to negotiate with IAEA through Euratom. The new Soviet article also contains a two-year implementation period after the treaty's entry into force within which agreements with IAEA could be negotiated. We have told the Soviets that, while we are anxious to resolve the Article III problem before the non-proliferation treaty is discussed in the U.N. General Assembly we would now have to obtain the views of our allies on the Soviet compromise proposal. We now propose to discuss the matter at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held tomorrow, September 6. A S Fisher 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967. Secret. 2 For text of the Soviet proposal submitted by Roshchin at the Co-Chairmen's meeting held on September 1 in Geneva, see Document 206 . For Foster's summary of this meeting, see Document 205 . 209. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 209. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, September 6, 1967. SUBJECT Specific Strategic Freeze Proposal In his Nodis cable, dated September 2, 2 on strategic arms control talks, Ambassador Thompson recommended that we put forward a specific strategic freeze proposal prior to the announcement of the ABM decision. Although I recognize that on the present schedule there is probably not enough time to work out any proposal within the US Government, I have nevertheless given some thought to what form such a proposal might take. In order to be useful in the present circumstances and time scale, the proposal would have to have the following characteristics: —simple in concept so that it can be easily understood without complex explanations; —acceptable to all the interested elements within the US Government (DOD, JCS, and State). This means that from the US point of view it must clearly be to our over-all military advantage and consistent with the ABM deployment decision; —interesting to the Soviets and difficult politically for them to ignore. To this end, it should be forthcoming in accepting some Soviet position and/or containing some new element in their interest. I believe the proposal outlined below would be consistent with the above criteria and would provide a reasonable basis on which to start discussions. Although it lacks some of the elements that have been considered in the past, such as an ABM freeze, it would certainly be better than nothing. My proposal would consist of the following specific elements: 1. Freeze on any new starts on fixed land-based strategic missile launchers (ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs) . This provides a substantial basis of interest for the Soviet Union since they would be allowed to complete the large number of ICBM sites now under way. Although it has been generally recognized inside the US Government that we would have to make this concession in any negotiable proposal, we have never to my knowledge specifically made the offer to the Soviets. If we make it clear that we are not trying to undercut the current Soviet building program, the Soviets would have a real incentive to agree before we start an expansion of our force. 2. Freeze on new construction of ballistic or cruise missile submarines . We have hedged on this proposal in the past apparently on the grounds that unilateral intelligence is inadequate. Actually, our intelligence on launched subs is extremely good. Any subs that have not already been launched would have to be declared to be permitted. This proposal would appear very forthcoming on our part and would be greatly to our military advantage. Even the Navy should be able to recognize that it could be to our advantage to stop or drastically limit the construction by the Soviets of the new class of Polaris-type (16 or more missiles) submarine which recent intelligence has identified. 3. Choice of either (a) no restriction on ABM deployment, or (b) limitations on ABM deployments for population defense to the same negotiated number of launchers (or missiles) in the US and Soviet Union . While expressing a preference for the latter approach, we would leave the choice to the Soviets since they have questioned the desirability of placing any limitations on defense. The approach of limiting launchers (or missiles) to the same number would leave open the question of the function of the Tallinn system for the time being. In the unlikely event it indeed has a significant ABM capability, we would have the option of a rather substantial ABM deployment. If the Soviet deployment is limited to the Moscow system, we would have placed a reasonably tight ceiling on ABM deployments while retaining the flexibility to undertake part or all of the proposed 1-67 Nike-X deployment. 3 Time and negotiations would clarify this situation. Even though it complicates the verification job, we probably should use missiles rather than launchers as the unit of measure since we know that both the Tallinn and Moscow systems have more than one missile per launcher while the proposed US system would have a separate launcher for each missile. As a starter, this formulation would exclude deployments intended exclusively for the hardpoint defense of strategic missiles since these might be particularly difficult to sort out from air defense and would in any event only contribute to a secure deterrent posture. 4. Verification of the agreement would be based solely on unilateral capabilities . This would accept the Soviet position on verification. Although our own thinking has also been based on this premise, our previous proposal to the Soviets was ambiguous on this point and could have been interpreted as meaning that we wanted to include provisions in the agreement that would require formal verification or inspection. 4 Since that which is not prohibited would be permitted, we and the Soviets would both be able to pursue qualitative improvements in our existing missile systems to whatever extent we desired. We, for example, would presumably continue the Poseidon, MIRVs, and Pen Aids; and the Soviets would presumably continue FOBS (fractional orbiting bombardment system) and whatever other qualitative improvements they have in mind. I am not very hopeful of getting the Government to focus on this issue at this time. I do believe, however, a proposal along the above lines would be mutually advantageous to the Soviets and ourselves and would give the Soviets a concrete proposal to consider if that is what they need to force a decision to initiate the proposed strategic discussions. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR,ABM Negotiations, 1/67-9/68, Box 231. Secret; Nodis. 2 See Document 207 . 3 See footnote 3, Document 207 . 4 Not further identified. 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, September 14, 1967, 0019Z. 37035. NATUS. For Cleveland from the Secretary. (Paris deliver to Cleveland 8:00 A.M. September 14) You should make following statement in special NAC meeting Thursday, September 14. Because of importance that language in variety of US statements be consistent statement should be given verbatim as follows: “I would like today to give you a further report on the US Government's thinking with respect to the ABM problem. I should here stress to you that there has as yet been no announcement in the US of the decision of my Government, described below, concerning ABM deployment. We expect to make this decision known shortly, but we wanted you to be aware of it in advance in line with the promise that I made last March to keep you advised of our thinking on this matter. Meanwhile, I must urge that what I say here today be held in the strictest of confidence. Of course, you will wish to advise senior officials in your own governments about the major points made in my statement. The ABM problem has, as you know, been a matter of interest in the Alliance for some months. Last March I described to the Council our efforts to open discussions with the Soviet Union to limit competition in strategic arms. 2 Since then we have made several efforts to open discussions with the Soviet Union, and the matter was discussed at the Glassboro meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin. 3 I must report to you again that the Soviets have thus far not agreed to initiate serious talks. We are, however, continuing to press them to begin conversations. Meanwhile, our own analyses of the ABM problem and the difficult and complex examination of whether or not to begin deployment of any ABM system has continued, and has brought us to the point where we expect now to announce soon a decision to deploy a limited system consisting of an 'area' defense of the United States together with a 'terminal' defense of some Minuteman sites. In general, the planned deployment has two purposes: to provide protection against the sort of missile attack which the Chinese might be capable of launching during the 1970's, and to protect our Minuteman missiles against a possible counterforce attack by the Soviets. We expect to have an initial operating capability in 1972. The deployment in question is scheduled to be completed by 1974. I also want you to understand why it is that we are proposing to initiate this deployment. As I indicated above, we are doing this for two reasons—to provide area protection for the US against the sort of unsophisticated attack which the Chinese might be able to mount in the 1970's and to protect Minutemen missiles. These two points may be considered separately. With respect to China, I should start with a brief summary of our current estimate of Chinese objectives and capabilities. It is clear that the Chinese are placing a high priority on the development of nuclear weapons and means of delivery. It now appears to us that a principal CPR objective is to develop as rapidly as possible an intercontinental missile force capable of delivering nuclear weapons. We believe that they could have an initial ICBM operational capability as early as the early 1970's, and that they might deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs by the mid-1970's. Their initial system will be relatively crude and highly vulnerable, and they will not be capable of penetrating even a thin ABM defense such as we have described above. With respect to defense of the Minutemen, let me stress that by doing this we are hedging against a possible future improvement in the Soviet force, not against the present threat. We have, over the past several years, examined several ways of improving the survivability of the Minuteman. We have concluded that an ABM defense for at least a portion of our Minuteman force is the best means of insuring their survivability. We will thus insure the undiminished assured destruction capability of our landbased strategic missile forces. I may add that it is to this assured destruction capability, and not to any defensive measures, that we look and will continue to look for the deterrence of a Soviet attack against our own populations and those of our Allies. As Secretary McNamara made clear at the NPG meeting last April, 4 we will not attempt to defend our cities against the sort of sophisticated missile attack the Soviets are already capable of launching. We believe that the Soviets, like ourselves, can and will respond to any threat to their Assured Destruction capability by making the appropriate offsetting improvements in their offensive forces. We have no plans to create a large scale urban defense directed against Soviet missiles. We intend to make this clear to the Soviets. We also believe, on the basis of discussions with some of the major Asian countries, that our deployment of a limited ABM defense will help to reassure them and will reduce the pressures for acquisition of independent nuclear capabilities in Asia. We intend to explain our decision to our friends in Asia as we have to you, making particularly clear that it is not based on any major changes in our assessment of the Chinese threat, but is a prudent security measure which will enhance the security of all. We believe that it remains highly desirable and feasible for the US and the Soviet Union to discuss means of limiting competition in strategic arms. In fact, our current action may even stimulate more serious interest in such discussions by the Soviets. We think there are ways in which to define an agreed limited level of ABM deployment which would meet the objectives outlined above and not require other complex compensatory actions by the two major powers. As I have told you, we have not had much success in developing such discussions to date but we intend to keep trying. We are informing the Soviet Union of our decision and forthcoming announcement, and at the same time strongly reaffirming our belief that we should promptly enter into discussions on possible ways to limit the strategic arms race. We also believe that this decision should in no way interfere with the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. In so far as the defense is directed against China, it should in fact make clear that the US intends to counter Chinese nuclear capability. Thus, those countries which fear the growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities need not feel that their only alternative is to create a costly nuclear arsenal themselves. We are prepared to continue to consult through such mechanisms as the Disarmament Experts who will be meeting today, and the NPG which will be meeting later this month. 5 In closing, may I once again request that my Government's thinking and decision concerning the ABM problem, as I have described them above, be held in strictest confidence. Thank you.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM) on September 13; cleared by Philip J. Farley (G/PM), Wyle (DOD/OSD/ISA), Leddy (EUR), Fisher (ACDA), and Robert G. Houdek (S/S-S); and approved by Rusk. Beginning in mid-1967, the dates and transmission times of all outgoing Department of State telegrams were in six-figure date-time groups. The “Z” refers to Greenwich mean time. 2 No specific record of this communication with the Council or of a Council meeting has been found. However, Fisher expressed hope in his undated Memorandum for the President (see attachment 2 to Document 189 ) that following Foster's March 9-16 European trip to consult with the NATO allies on the NPT, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council would be held as soon as possible. 3 President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met for personal discussion of world problems in two separate sessions, June 23 and 25 at Glassboro, New Jersey. The two leaders devoted their discussions primarily to the crisis in the Middle East, the Vietnam war, efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limitations on anti-ballistic missile systems, and bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations. Documentation on this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964-1968, volume XIV . 4 See footnote 3, Document 195 . 5 See footnote 6, Document 202 . 211. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson 211. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 2, 1967. Dear Mr. President: Mr. Fisher has been instructed to inform Ambassador Roshchin that the U.S. Delegation is prepared to stay in Geneva as long as necessary to reach agreement on Article III of the NPT. We would fully expect, however, to reach agreement by the end of October because as a practical matter it would be very difficult to defer an ENDC report to the UNGA much beyond that time. The EEC Council of Ministers is meeting today and tomorrow 2 and it is hoped that they will develop a Euratom position on the draft Article III proposed by the Soviets. We expect to learn by tomorrow whether we shall be receiving these views before the NAC meeting on October 6. If we are not going to have Euratom's position before October 6, we propose to inform all NATO capitals on October 4 of U.S. views on the Soviet proposal and what amendments and understandings we believe to be negotiable with the Soviets. 3 If we are unable to bridge the gap between our Euratom allies and the Soviets in the next week or two, there is danger that the whole NPT project might be jeopardized because treaty drafting might get out of control of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as Co-Chairmen of the ENDC. Faithfully yours, William C. Foster 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, ACDA, Vol. III, Box 6. Secret. 2 The EEC Council of Ministers met in Brussels. 3 In an October 2 memorandum from Foster to Rusk, Foster recommended that the United States inform its NATO allies of its position on the Soviet Article III draft. According to Foster, “If we were to wait until next week to make our position known to our allies, precious time will be lost and might result in a situation in which we found ourselves having to start discussions in Committee I with a blank Article III. This in turn would encourage non-aligned countries to make other unacceptable suggestions. If this were to happen matters could easily get out of our control and that of the Soviets.” Foster further proposed that all NATO capitals except Paris receive an aide-mémoire to be delivered on October 4 outlining the U.S. Government's position. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1967) 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Foster signed the original. 212. Memorandum of Conversation 212. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 4, 1967, 1:15 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty ABMs PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin, U.S.S.R. Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA Following discussions in New York at dinners between U.S. and Soviet officials, and consistent with the suggestion of Messrs. Rusk and Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin invited me to luncheon at the Soviet Embassy to continue discussions particularly concerning non-proliferation. I reported to Ambassador Dobrynin that the Euratom meeting at which we had hoped for additional comments on the Soviet compromise draft Article III did not consider this subject. In view of that we were continuing our efforts to obtain the views of our allies and Euratom but that a further delay would occur. We went over once more the problems already foreseen with the present Soviet compromise draft mainly having to do with the question of facilities and the references to IAEA and its negotiating authority in relationship to that of Euratom and of the maintenance of Euratom as an entity owning materials and facilities as well as operating a safeguards system. I stated that we had not submitted the latest revision of paragraph 4 of the Soviet compromise draft since to start with we thought it was a retrogressive step and we hoped that they would accept our suggestion for rearrangement of the first sentence of paragraph 4. He did not seem concerned about the possibility of their accepting our suggestion on this but did not wish to comment in detail in view of my statement of possible further changes. In the circumstances he asked whether there was anything for them to do on this article at the moment, and I said I thought not but that, hopefully, we would soon be back to them with possible other suggestions felt to be essential by our allies. We then discussed suggestions the Mexican, Indians, UAR, and Sweden made in recent meetings at Geneva. It was his feeling that we should attempt to get all suggestions on the table for consideration by the Co-Chairmen and recommendation to the Committee when all suggestions were in. He thought, as we do, that certain of the Mexican proposals 2 were possibly acceptable but felt that many of the others could not be accepted. I indicated that some of our allies were concerned about unlimited duration for the treaty and wondered whether the Soviet Union had given consideration to this question since Messrs. Rusk and Gromyko talked about it in June. 3 He said that they had not since they continued to believe that an unlimited duration treaty was important and he mentioned once more the thousand year figure. I asked whether Foreign Minister Miki of Japan in his talks on the NPT had mentioned the Japanese suggestion of periodic five-year conferences. 4 Dobrynin said he saw no real purpose in such periodic reviews. I also raised the question of the difficulties which some of the ENDC members have brought up concerning the very rigid amendments procedure and got no substantive response. On other non-proliferation matters such as the ENDC recess, the sanctity of Articles I and II, assurances, nothing new was added to the discussions at the New York dinners or in my discussion yesterday with Mendelevich. 5 On another subject, we had an interesting and fairly lengthy discussion of the ABM/ICBM limitation proposal made by the U.S. in January. 6 He said that the reason for no response was not the lack of interest nor lack of attention having been given to the subject, but was because of the differing points of view within the Soviet Government on it. He stated that, unlike the U.S. Government where there appeared to be ready means of coordination on both the political and military aspects of such a proposal, in the Soviet Government the Foreign Ministry dealt primarily with political questions and all military matters were the responsibility of the Defense Ministry. In the Foreign Ministry there were few, if any, individuals having experience and competence in a subject of this sort and the military were unwilling to let the Foreign Ministry discuss the question in any way except what he characterized as “meaningless general terms.” I told him that the U.S. Government had been studying this question not only intensively over the last couple of years but indeed, as he knew, had begun to broach it in the Surprise Attack discussions in 1958. He commented, however, that it was his opinion that when our decision was made to deploy a limited ABM system it really was a completely political decision. He wondered therefore whether there could be serious talks about specific military limitations when politically most of the emphasis appeared to be that the U.S. had a superiority of two to three to four times over that of the Soviet Union and that the Congress and the Pentagon in public pronouncements emphasized that the U.S. intended to maintain that. This made it very difficult for those in the Soviet Union who felt that such talks might be useful to convince the military that any serious discussion of limitations and possible reductions was in the Soviet interest. He said, nonetheless, considerations were continuing about how to approach this and he had personally been glad to hear Secretary Rusk's statement at dinner last week 7 of the willingness of the U.S. to undertake detailed discussions at any level and anywhere that the Soviet Government might suggest. The luncheon broke up at 3 p.m. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Volume I, 11/63-4/68, Box 229. Secret. Exdis. Drafted by Foster on October 5 and approved in S/S on October 6. The conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy. 2 For text of Mexican Representative Castaneda's statement to the ENDC, September 19, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 395-401. 3 Following the Glassboro Summit in New Jersey June 23-25, Rusk met with Gromyko who was attending the U.N. General Assembly in New York on June 26 and 27. There they continued to discuss the topic of disarmament that President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin had earlier discussed at the Summit. For an account of the June 23 meeting, see Document 198 . 4 Foreign Minister Miki delivered an address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 22, on the Japanese Government's views on the NPT; see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 413-415. 5 Not further identified. 6 Presumably a reference to Secretary McNamara's military posture statement delivered before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, January 25, 1967. For an extract, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 5-24. 7 Presumably during Secretary Rusk's attendance at the 22d Session of the U.N. General Assembly held in New York September 25-29. 213. Editorial Note 213. Editorial Note In a letter, October 10, 1967, to Walt Rostow, Glenn Seaborg requested specific execution authority for Cabriolet. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) Regarding earlier delays of this Plowshare event, see Document 164 . Following the submission of Seaborg's October 10 letter to Rostow, a lively debate ensued about the costs and benefits of granting the Atomic Energy Commission permission to execute Cabriolet. For example, Foster wrote a memorandum to Walt Rostow on October 17 recommending disapproval of Seaborg's request. Foster feared that Cabriolet could violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty and complicate, perhaps fatally, current negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Nuclear Testing—Plowshare Events, Volume 2, Box 29) For an extract from this memorandum, see Seaborg's Stemming the Tide , page 335. The following day, in an October 18 memorandum to Under Secretary Katzenbach, Leonard Meeker recommended an indefinite postponement of Cabriolet and underscored Foster's reservations. Meeker argued, in part, “It is difficult to imagine a more unfortunate time for the conduct of Cabriolet. The situation at the General Assembly seems virtually certain to ensure that there will be well-publicized charges of treaty violation, with the U.S. being taxed for shaving its own obligations at the same time it was asking the non-nuclears to engage in a further round of self-denial. The domestic political repercussions could be substantial.” (Department of State, Central Files, AE 6) However, on the same day, Herman Pollack, Director, Office of International Science and Technology Affairs, Department of State, wrote a memorandum, October 18, to Ambassador Kohler arguing that Cabriolet should be executed because it could help rather than impede the NPT negotiations. “Conduct of the Cabriolet test on an open basis would demonstrate that we are seriously proceeding with our plans for learning all that is necessary about the yet untested technology in order to make its benefits eventually available to the rest of the world. On the contrary, our sincerity might well be challenged if on the one hand we exhort other countries not to work on Plowshare because they will have access to our services as soon as we develop the technology, and then on the other hand we decline to follow the orderly path of experiments which many scientists throughout the world recognize as necessary to develop our capacity to provide the services we have offered.” (Ibid.) Under Secretary Katzenbach, however, agreed with Foster and Meeker that Cabriolet should be postponed. In an October 20 memorandum to Walt Rostow, Katzenbach wrote: “The NPT negotiations are at a critical stage. We simply cannot chance giving the FRG, the Italians, Indians, etc., an opportunity to charge us with playing games with our own treaty obligations …. I am persuaded that the possible dangers to the NPT—which is vital to the President—and the hell we would probably catch in the UN (and at home) if we went through with the test, are simply not worth the price.” (Ibid.) For Seaborg's later critique of the several postponements of Cabriolet, see Stemming the Tide , pages 327-339. For the final decision on Cabriolet, see Document 217 . 214. Memorandum of Conversation 214. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 2, 1967, 1:15 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA Mr. Foster told Ambassador Dobrynin that Mr. Fisher had presented a copy of the Five Principles of the five non-nuclear weapon Euratom countries and a draft Article III embodying these principles to Ambassador Roshchin in Geneva on November 2. 2 Mr. Foster said that the U.S. was authorized by its allies to work out an Article III with the Soviet on this basis. However, our allies wish to be consulted before an Article III is tabled. We will try to conduct such consultations in Geneva, but the Soviets should be aware that another meeting of the NATO Council may be necessary. Mr. Foster pointed out that the last two months have involved difficult and intensive consultations. We regret the delay in the ENDC's work, but the difficulties we ran into were genuine. These difficulties arose not only from the FRG but also from other Euratom countries. It should be stressed that the “five principles” are backed by all “Five.” 3 The French apparently played a passive role. Mr. Foster also pointed out that if the Soviets would accept safeguards in some fashion they would find that other countries would be able to accept safeguards much more readily. A lot of objections to particular provisions of Article III would be forgotten if the Soviets themselves were prepared to accept safeguards on their peaceful activities. Mr. Foster expressed the hope that the Soviets can be flexible in considering our proposals for a compromise Article III. He said there would be no need to alter the basic framework of the September 1 draft. 4 The Soviets should assume the meaning of Article III realistically and be flexible about wording. Mr. Foster then said he understood that Committee I in New York can be kept occupied with non-disarmament items at least until November 15. Perhaps breaking out the Secretary General's report on nuclear weapons would provide additional time. In any event, there is need for speed in working out an agreed Article III. We should aim to complete the NPT by November 20 at the very latest since the U.S. and U.S.S.R. share an interest in having it passed through the UNGA this year and signed as soon as possible thereafter. Mr. Foster then read the first sentence of the draft Article III presented by Mr. Fisher to Ambassador Roshchin. He said that Ambassador Roshchin had told Mr. Fisher that the omission of “IAEA” before safeguards was impossible for the Soviets to accept and represented a major stumbling block. Mr. Foster argued that inclusion of “IAEA” would not alter the fact that agreements between the IAEA and Parties to the Treaty would have to be concluded. He stressed the importance of making Article III acceptable to the Euratom countries. Ambassador Dobrynin copied down this first sentence and said he would report the issue to Gromyko. Mr. Foster then read the rest of the first paragraph and noted that Ambassador Roshchin had objected to Mr. Fisher over the absence of any reference to facilities. Mr. Foster pointed out that reference to facilities was not essential since this aspect of the problem of effective safeguards is covered by reference to a statute of the IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system. Mr. Foster then outlined the problem concerning the phrase “or carried out under its control anywhere” as a substitute for “carried out by it anywhere.” Ambassador Dobrynin did not seem to think this was an important issue but he noted that this was a matter for experts. Mr. Foster then raised the question of the treaty's duration and said that “1,000 years” does not seem reasonable to many countries. Likewise there are genuine objections to the amendments provision which is too rigid and in practical effect would mean that no amendments to the NPT probably could ever be adopted. Moreover, politically speaking we had encountered objections to giving a veto to states who were members of the IAEA Board of Governors on the score that some important countries are not permanent members of this Board. Mr. Foster thought that the provision in the first alternative amendment's provision discussed last summer, which would not make amendments apply to states which did not accept them, was better. 5 Ambassador Dobrynin made no response to these points. Mr. Foster then raised the subject of the Soviet draft convention on non-use. He asked whether the U.S.S.R. could really deny itself the option to use of nuclear weapons in a major war. Apart from the circumstances of the Soviet draft convention which will create difficulties for us, we think it is not advisable to raise this subject at the present time when we shall need to cooperate in order to smooth the path for the presentation of the NPT at the UNGA. It would be very important for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to avoid having the NPT go back to the ENDC next year. This would mean that the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States would convene in the spring of 1968 and that further difficulties for the nuclear weapon states in connection with the NPT would be created. Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether we thought that India and Brazil would go along with the NPT. Mr. Foster replied that he did not know. It is possible that the security assurances which we are already discussing with the Soviets would make it easier for India to sign. Ambassador Dobrynin said he recognized the urgency of completing the NPT and hoped that there would be a Soviet response to the proposals presented by Mr. Foster in Geneva, after November 7th. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Foster on November 2 and approved in S/S by Walsh on November 10. The meeting took place in Foster's office. 2 See Document 216 . 3 See Document 216 . 4 Not further identified. 5 See footnote 3, Document 201 . 215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 7, 1967. SUBJECT Germany and the N.P.T. This is a good time to get Secretary Rusk's appraisal of where we are going on the N.P.T. Last week we made good progress on Article III (the safeguards clause): —The Euratom countries could not get together on their own Article III (only the Germans presented an “illustrative” draft) 2 and contented themselves with giving us five “principles,” 3 which we probably can live with. —We were able to hand to the Russians at Geneva on Thursday 4 a revision of their own draft Article III incorporating much of the five Euratom principles, plus some key language from the German “illustration.” Preliminary Russian reaction was reasonably forthcoming. We still must be particularly careful with the Germans. There is a strong possibility that they will not ratify the N.P.T. even if (as seems likely) they grudgingly sign it. German adherence, however, is vital to the success of the Treaty. Yet we cannot afford to put so much pressure on them that we give nationalists an easy means of attacking Germany's U.S. ties. The political situation comes down to this: —Attitudes among top German politicians and officials range from total hostility, represented by people like Strauss 5 and the right-wing press, to grudging acceptance, represented by Kiesinger and Brandt. —The basic German dissatisfaction with the Treaty makes it easier for people like Strauss to propagate the view that the N.P.T. represents a U.S.-Soviet “deal” made behind Germany's back at her expense. —The N.P.T. is not yet a big public issue; so far the issues it presents have been too complex to capture popular attention. We can be grateful, in fact, that opposition has focused on Article III, perhaps the most complicated aspect of the Treaty, rather than on basic principles. Nevertheless, the danger we face is that someone like Strauss will try to blow the Treaty up into a nationalist issue. We do not yet know how the Russians will finally react to our revised Article III. If they insist on their original formulation we will face a dilemma: —We must push the Russians hard to meet German concerns regarding Article III. Not to do so would give the Germans an excuse for rejecting the Treaty, and would seriously damage our relations with them. (We can ease things some by close and high-level consultations.) —On the other hand, an impasse with the Russians now would probably make it impossible to put a draft Treaty before this year's UN General Assembly and thus could delay the Treaty for as much as a year, if not kill it altogether. You will want to get Secretary Rusk's assessment of these risks. W.W. Rostow 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret. 2 Not further identified. 3 See Document 216 . 4 November 2; see Document 214 . 5 Strauss and his followers, who represented one of two powerful, often opposing wings of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, the former Gaullists, feared that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would preclude the creation of a European Nuclear Force which they considered to be a necessary step toward European unity. 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 216. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 216. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, November 11, 1967, 2257Z. 68052. Subject: Status US-Soviet NPT Safeguards Negotiations. Disto/NATUS/Busec. 1. You should leave following Aide-Mémoire with FonOff on Monday, November 13. 2. For USNATO : You should circulate Aide-Mémoire to PermReps and Brosio. 3. For USEC : You should deliver a copy of Aide-Mémoire to Commission. Begin Text Aide-Mémoire . The U.S. wishes to inform its allies of the status of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1. The U.S. draft of November 2. On November 2, 1967, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the ENDC proposed to the Soviet Co-Chairman the draft Article III which is attached. At the same time, the U.S. Co-Chairman gave the Soviet Co-Chairman the five principles set forth below as well as the text of the interpretations contained in the Aide-Mémoire of October 5, 1967. 2. The U.S. November 2 draft and the five Euratom member principles. We believe this text and these interpretations protect the five principles agreed by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in the following manner: Principle 1: “Safeguards under the NPT would be applied to source and special fissionable material and not to facilities.” The November 2 U.S. draft deletes the third sentence of the Soviet compromise text which provided that safeguards procedures “should also extend to facilities …” (Emphasis added). As suggested by some of our allies, the second sentence is retained except for its reference to the IAEA Safeguards System. Principle 2: “There should be no misunderstanding that as far as EA member states are concerned, safeguards under NPT will be applied on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between EA and IAEA.” The first sentence of the November 2 U.S. draft adds language stating that safeguards under NPT would be “as set forth in an agreement to be … concluded with the IAEA.” It also makes clear that these safeguards would have to be “in accordance with the statute of the IAEA ….” The fourth paragraph of the text would permit non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude IAEA agreements “either individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the IAEA.” In presenting the revised text to the Soviet Union, the U.S. Representative made clear that the U.S. relies on the provisions of the IAEA Statute dealing both with “bilateral and multilateral arrangements” for safeguards and with “relationship” agreements between IAEA and other international organizations the work of which is related to that of the IAEA. He stated: “The U.S. is of the opinion that this language permits parties to the treaty to negotiate and conclude an agreement with the IAEA through Euratom to carry out their safeguards obligation and that an IAEA-Euratom agreement would result from these negotiations.” Finally, the U.S. Representative told the Soviet Representative that the U.S. would state the following interpretation to the ENDC and to the IAEA Board of Governors: “The first sentence of paragraph 4 of the draft Article III permits the IAEA to enter into an agreement, concerning the safeguard obligations of the parties, with another international organization, the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned.” Principle 3: “The agreement should be based on the principle of verification of EA safeguards by IAEA: the implementation of this principle shall be negotiated between the two organizations.” As this principle recognizes, its implementation must occur in the Euratom negotiations with the IAEA. As indicated above, the November 2 U.S. draft would permit such negotiations. In addition, the November 2 draft continues the earlier language stating that acceptance of NPT safeguards would be for the exclusive purpose of “verification of the fulfillment” of obligations of the treaty. Moreover, the new language avoids calling NPT safeguards “IAEA safeguards.” It makes clear, of course, that they must be in accordance with the IAEA statute and safeguards system. There is considerable flexibility in both. Interpretive principles dealing with the nature of the IAEA-Euratom Agreement which would be permitted by Article III were also presented to the Soviet Representative. These are the three points set forth in paragraph 5 of the U.S. Aide-Mémoire of October 5. They are as follows: 1. “There should be safeguards for all non-nuclear-weapon parties of such nature that all parties can have confidence in their effectiveness.” 2. “In discharging their obligations under Article III, non-nuclear-weapon parties may negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA bilaterally or together with other parties, and specifically, an agreement covering such obligations may be entered into between the IAEA and another international organization the work of which is related to the IAEA and the membership of which includes the parties concerned.” 3. “In order to avoid unnecessary duplication, the IAEA should make appropriate use of existing records and safeguards, provided that under such mutually agreed arrangements the IAEA can satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Principle 4: “Pending the conclusion of the agreement between Euratom and IAEA, EA member states concerned wish to stress that there should be no misunderstanding that the obligations with regard to Euratom (or to its member states) entered into by any party to a NPT shall not be affected by provisions of Article III dealing with supply.” The United States takes this to be more directed toward future action of the U.S. than toward the provision of Article III dealing with supply. This provision is essentially the same as the corresponding provision of the U.S. draft approved in NAC on April 20, 1967. 2 Like the April 20 draft, the undertaking concerning safeguarded supply of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon states does not apply until a specified period after the treaty enters into force. This period does not begin to run until a substantial (30-40) number of non-nuclear-weapon states have ratified. These ratifications will probably require substantial time. The U.S., whose ratification is also necessary to entry into force, will obviously have to take into account the status of the IAEA-Euratom negotiations before ratifying. We do not expect any conflict to arise between our NPT obligations and the supply obligations we have to Euratom and its members. We believe the time available for conclusion of an IAEA-Euratom agreement is sufficient, and we do not contemplate failure to achieve agreement in that period. Principle 5: “Euratom member states concerned, determined to act in common, have to be sure that the position of Euratom when negotiating to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with IAEA will not be prejudiced by any eventual provision of Article III, as for example on a time period.” Like the U.S. draft approved in NAC on April 20, 1967, the November 2 U.S. draft contains a time period for conclusion of Euratom's negotiations with IAEA. Unlike the April 20 draft, the November 2 draft makes that period applicable to IAEA negotiations with all states, not just with Euratom members. Without some time period, we see no way to secure worldwide implementation of NPT safeguards. We believe the time period is adequate if there are good faith negotiations on both sides. To sum up our views with respect to the five principles, we believe the November 2 U.S. draft protects them to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances. Insofar as this protection appears inadequate to our allies, they may follow procedures available to any sovereign state to insure that a satisfactory agreement with the IAEA is worked out. 3. Other provisions in November 2 draft. There are two other significant changes reflected in the November 2 draft which do not relate to the five principles but are designed to meet the requests of certain Euratom members. The first is to add the word “control” to the last sentence of paragraph 1 so that safeguards would be applicable to nuclear material in a peaceful nuclear activity of a non-nuclear-weapon party “carried out under its control anywhere.” In presenting this change, the U.S. Representative made clear again that Article III would not require the application of safeguards to the French-Belgian or French-German facilities in France. The second such change is to add a provision to paragraph 3 referring to the preambular principle on instrumented safeguards. The last phrase of paragraph 3 would be amended to make clear that safeguards would be implemented in accordance with “the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.” 4. Soviet response to U.S. November 2 draft. At first, the Soviets objected to several key points of the U.S. draft and questioned some of the interpretations. Then, at a meeting on November 9, 1967, the Soviet Co-Chairman said that he would recommend to his Government as a package all U.S. proposals of November 2 provided the U.S. agreed to a reformulation of the first sentence. He said he would forego introducing other changes only because of the need to make progress as quickly as possible. He said he would wish to make an ENDC statement to the effect that IAEA safeguards would be generally applicable as the NPT safeguards system. He added that he would not take issue with the interpretive statements planned by the U.S. The reformulation of the first sentence involves the deletion of the word “negotiation,” which the Soviet Representative said was superfluous, and a rearrangement of two phrases, which he said was very minor. As revised, the first sentence would read: “Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” 5. U.S. response to Soviet reformulation. The U.S. Representative said he could not recommend this reformulation to his Government since he believed the Soviet should accept the U.S. formulation. The U.S. is now urging Soviet reconsideration at high levels of the November 2 U.S. draft as the one best designed to ensure wide adherence to a non-proliferation treaty. End Text Aide-Mémoire proper. Begin Text of Annex to Aide-Mémoire. U.S. Draft Article III Submitted to Soviet Union November 2, 1967 . 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed, or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon state for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article. 3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article III of this treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty shall conclude agreements with IAEA to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other states in accordance with the statute of the IAEA. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this treaty. For states depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. End Text Annex to Aide-Mémoire . Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by George Bunn (ACDA/GC); cleared by Culver Gleysteen (ACDA/IR), Fisher (ACDA/D), George S. Springsteen (EUR), Vincent Baker (EUR/RPM), Abraham Katz (EUR/RPE), Walsh (S/S), Allan Labowitz (AEC) (informed), and Morton Halperin (DOD) (informed); and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. The telegram was sent to all NATO capitals, Tokyo, Moscow, and to the Mission in Geneva. 2 Not further identified. 217. Notes of Meeting 217. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, November 28, 1967, 12:10–1:20 p.m. NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING ON PROJECT CABRIOLET The President: We are confronted with a difficult decision here on “Cabriolet.” Secretary Rusk: These are the issues: You are being asked to approve a “cratering” shot important to the future of “Plowshare” program. This is directly related to the Interoceanic Canal and peaceful application of the atom. We first thought that the test ban treaty would not conflict with “Plowshare” program. Now we do not know. We must ask if this shot is sensible only if it is to be followed by other shots which infringe on the test ban treaty. We must ask to what extent do we support Plowshare? There is a problem of possible violation of the test ban treaty. The President should know the parameters of the problem. If there is a 50-50 chance of leakage, we could be in violation of the test ban treaty. We face a 50-50 chance of leakage on these tests. We are at a time when this could get in the way of NPT. It is therefore a decision between “Plowshare” vs. the test ban treaty. The treaty requires you to keep the debris from these tests at home. The President: The question is would Cabriolet violate the treaty? Secretary Rusk: There is a 50-50 chance and a danger of a small degree of leakage on this test. Chairman Seaborg: I gave assurance to the Senate the “Plowshare” experiments could be carried out. That was important to getting the treaty passed. 2 Probably, there would not be “more hazardous” tests to follow. There would be a need for an amendment to the treaty at a later date for the test ban treaty. On the matter of leakage, the first assumption is that we would have a 20 percent chance of leakage. At 50 hours after the test there might be ten picocuriers at the border with Canada. In the air normally were about 100 picocuriers. Of this would only be a very small amount which is way below any health hazard and below any sensible level to cause a problem. This would be below the amounts which have resulted from the Soviet test. Chairman Seaborg said at the time of the treaty Secretary Rusk wrote the Congressional Committee that the U.S. would feel free to interpret the treaty more liberally if the Soviet were to. 3 To drop Cabriolet would be to drop “Plowshare.” Brazil and India want a nuclear explosion system of their own. In order to prevent this, we have offered them the Plowshare program. The President: Could you conduct Cabriolet without violation of the test ban treaty? Chairman Seaborg: Yes, under a liberal interpretation of the treaty. If debris crosses the U.S. border, it would be detected by our own public health service. The President: Is it your position that in order to keep faith with Secretary Rusk's letter to the Senate we should conduct these tests? Mr. Robert Anderson: The Congress will not give us any more money until this question is resolved. There is no agreed position on the level of radiation that will constitute a violation of the test ban treaty. Mr. Anderson said if we postpone Cabriolet indefinitely then we postpone indefinitely the development of nuclear excavation. He said if we start tomorrow it would take the next fifteen years before we could put the first ship through the proposed oceanic canal. “I do not want to debate what is in violation of the treaty. But it is unfortunate if we have gotten ourselves into the position where we cannot use this type of energy to do this work.” “It will only be after all of these tests are completed that we will actually know if we can go through with a canal by nuclear excavation.” “It is not reasonable for us to impose that fine distinction which will permit the Soviets to do what they have done and not permit us to conduct our test.” “I propose that we announce these tests publicly and give the world time to prepare for it. We should be forthright and honest.” (Inserted as an appendix to these notes is a summary of the recommendation by Mr. Anderson and the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission.) 4 Dr. Hornig said he was opposed to the proposal. Dr. Hornig said that this test would require only 2,500 tons of explosive while about 10 million tons of explosive was needed for the canal. Many think that a one million ton test and a 10 million ton test will be necessary before we can actually decide to go ahead with the canal. Chairman Seaborg: But these tests would not be for more than three years. Dr. Hornig: In any case you cannot go further with these tests without modifying the test ban treaty. Secretary Rusk: Why don't we go to the Soviets now or to the Security Council and work this thing out for the first test? Why not get international participation including asking the Soviets to come over here and deal with us in this program. Mr. Robert Anderson: The Corps of Engineers say we must conduct these tests before we can determine whether to build a canal. We need this first test so we can learn from it what will be necessary to avoid another delay. Director Schultze: These tests escalate as you go along. I question whether we should invest money in the research and development test that you recommend when you ultimately know you are going to have to ask for changes in the treaty. It does not make sense economically to spend this money on tests when you are uncertain whether or not you will be able to make meaningful use of this when larger shots are required. The most responsible estimates show that it would not hurt to have a two to three year delay on this. I believe, Mr. President, that we should get the diplomatic problem out of the way first. Chairman Seaborg: We've tried to talk to the Soviets for two years and we haven't gotten anywhere. Mr. Adrian Fisher: Ambassador Kohler has been in touch with the Soviets on this and has gotten nowhere. Director Helms: The Soviets have conducted 14 tests between March 1964 and February 1967. We are talking about only kilotons in this test. The Soviets have conducted tests ranging as follows: 450 kilotons, 200 kilotons, 85 kilotons, and 220 kilotons. Dr. Hornig: But the Soviet tests were well below the surface. Their seepage was highly fractional. These U.S. tests will be near the surface with a better than 50 percent chance of seepage. Undersecretary Katzenbach: There will be a radioactive cloud. We would be violating the treaty. The fact this cloud would go over Canada would make it extremely difficult politically. The Soviets have never taken another interpretation. They have never admitted their actions. Dr. Hornig: There will be two types of reaction. Here in this country I know the reaction will be that we have violated the treaty. If the test is detected by other countries, the reaction by them also will be that we have violated the treaty. Chairman Seaborg then read a statement which the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had submitted. In this statement, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed its deep concern over the fact that the Plowshare program had not been carried out as planned. The Committee said it did not like a strict interpretation being placed on the treaty. It pointed out that the Soviets have proceeded with testing very vigorously. The meeting adjourned with no decision being reached. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Box 1. No classification marking. An attached December 4 cover memorandum from Tom Johnson to the President notes the time of the meeting and lists the participants as McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler, Helms, Schultze, Hornig, Seaborg, Spurgeon Keeny, Robert Anderson, Tape, Fisher, and Foster. 2 Reference apparently is to Seaborg's Congressional testimony in support of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. See, for example, his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 14, 1963, reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 6, pp. 162-226. 3 Not further identified. 4 Not found. 5 A detailed account of this meeting also appears in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 545-548, and in his book, Stemming the Tide, pp. 335-338. Cabriolet was eventually conducted at 11 a.m. on January 26, 1968, at the Nevada Test Site after the AEC had publicly announced that it planned to do so on January 25. (Ibid., pp. 338-339; United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , p. 31) For further discussion of this test and others in 1968, see Document 227 . 218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Status of NPT Negotiations We have reached a point in our NPT negotiations where we are faced with several alternatives. The treaty is almost complete, except for the difficult safeguards article, Article III, and the question of the NPT's duration, which we shall want to reopen. I am bringing the matter to your attention at this time because, at the end of this week or the beginning of the next, there may be some public indications by the non-aligned that the Geneva Conference is failing because of our inability to make progress on this issue. With respect to the safeguards article, the Soviets have accepted all the changes which we have proposed, except one. They have agreed that safeguards under the NPT should be applied pursuant to an agreement with the IAEA concluded pursuant to the IAEA Statute. Their position, however, is that the safeguards to be established pursuant to a Treaty should be characterized in the Treaty as “IAEA safeguards.” I have urged Gromyko to reconsider this position but the Soviets are sticking to it. Mr. Foster is of the opinion that their position on this is definitive (see attachment 1—Geneva telegram 1861). 2 The area of disagreement is reflected in three possible formulations of the first sentence of Article III (see attachment 2). We have asked urgently to have the views of our Allies on these formulations. Alternative courses of action now open to us appear to be as follows: A. We could press the Soviets to accept our November 2 formulation (which does not so clearly characterize as “IAEA” safeguards the safeguards to be established pursuant to agreement with the IAEA) indicating that this is essential to us and that we must continue to insist on it despite Soviet rejection. 3 B. We could yield to strong non-aligned pressure to interrupt negotiations at Geneva and present an incomplete NPT to the UNGA with a blank Article III. C. We could tell our Allies that only the second or third formulations in attachment 2 (which more clearly characterize the safeguards to be established pursuant to agreement with the IAEA and “IAEA” safeguards) offer a realistic basis for negotiations. We could add that prompt agreement along such lines would improve prospects for getting Soviet agreement to a limited duration clause. Implicit in the selection of the language for Article III is the problem of what sort of an agreement we contemplate between IAEA and Euratom, or, for that matter, between IAEA and the various countries whose nuclear activities are to be put under IAEA inspection. It is my view that such an agreement should provide for full use of existing safeguards systems, such as those of Euratom or those of our own AEC safeguards system, but that it should involve more than a mere examination of the paper records of those systems; it should be deep enough so that IAEA could satisfy itself that no diversion was taking place. Alternative A, insisting on our November 2 draft which does not so clearly characterize the safeguards as IAEA safeguards, will be the most acceptable course to the FRG, Italy and, apparently, Belgium among our NATO allies as it would strengthen the hand of Euratom negotiating with IAEA. None of these states (with the possible exception of the FRG) has indicated that we should insist upon this formulation even if it means the failure of the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty. On the other hand, our allies who are not in Euratom, as well as the non-aligned, are not interested in pressing for treaty language which appears to preserve a special position for Euratom which has overtones of self-inspection. Many of them have indicated that the U.S. should not press this position to the point of deadlock in the negotiations. Insistence on alternative A to the point of deadlock might lead to alternative B if an apparent stalemate in Geneva leads to pressure to break off the negotiations there and to take the issue to the UN General Assembly with a safeguards Article left blank. This alternative carries a risk that the Article III ultimately agreed upon would offer less protection to Euratom than the formulations currently under discussion. It probably would touch off a round of propaganda recriminations which would not promote prospects for early agreement on an NPT. Following the third alternative, characterizing the safeguards system as IAEA safeguards, would permit the prompt conclusion of the negotiations with the Soviets and prevent any talk of deadlock in the negotiations at Geneva. It would cause difficulties with the FRG, and to a lesser extent with our other allies who are in Euratom because of their feeling that this characterization would drastically weaken Euratom's bargaining position in the future negotiations with IAEA. The difficulties with the FRG might be particularly acute as the FRG would be forced to decide, on its own responsibility, whether it could accept a characterization of safeguards as IAEA safeguards. Accepting the characterization of the safeguards as IAEA safeguards, however, would be in the long range U.S. interest as far as the countries outside of Euratom are concerned. We have a long range interest in promoting IAEA safeguards as such. It is this interest which underlies our own willingness to place our own peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and it is not served by a refusal to characterize the safeguards of an NPT as IAEA safeguards. Dean Rusk 4 Attachment 2 5 November 28, 1967. Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III 1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to Euratom Allies) “1…. Undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system ….” 2. Modification of a UK Proposal (most likely to be acceptable to Soviets; rejected by FRG; less acceptable than 1 to Italy but more acceptable to UK and Dutch than 3) “1…. undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA ….” 3. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether later rejected by Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG and Italy) “1…. undertakes to accept safeguards in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA ….” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. 2 Telegram 1861 from Geneva, November 25, drafted by Foster for Secretary Rusk, is not printed. (Ibid.) In this telegram, in addition to a discussion of failed U.S. efforts to convince the Soviets to omit mention of “IAEA Safeguards” from their draft Article III proposal, Foster expressed the following about our European allies, particularly the FRG: “I recognize and support the strong feeling of Euratom members that their safeguards must continue and that Euratom, as such, must have the right to negotiate whatever verification procedures by IAEA are ultimately applied. Nonetheless, it seems to me that as a Co-Chairman we are now being asked to fight mainly for the interests of only one of our allies, as against our own national interests and those of the most of the rest of our allies and most of the rest of the world.” 3 For text of November 2 U.S. Article III draft, see Document 216 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 5 Secret; Exdis. 219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 Washington, December 5, 1967, 1602Z. 79423. Disto/NATUS/Busec. For Cleveland from Secretary. Subject: NPT. Ref: USNATO 815. 2 1. The November 30 NAC meeting on NPT seems to me to have ended rather inconclusively. What we need now are the definitive views of the Euratom countries and particularly those of Germany and Italy. 2. Therefore, in advance of this week's NAC meeting, 3 you should urge the Germans and the Italians to give their definitive views on the alternatives before them, taking into account your presentation on November 30, so that we will then be in a position to know whether we can take advantage of delay in ENDC recess until mid-December to attempt to complete the NPT. You should make clear that delay in ENDC recess was accomplished solely for this purpose. 3. It seems that our allies have had sufficient time to try to pull themselves together and give us specific governmental positions. Since the last effort to reach an agreed Euratom solution was not successful, I am not too sanguine that any multilateral session as proposed by Dutch would produce a favorable result. Therefore we prefer handle discussions on this subject bilaterally. 4. I concur that my presence at NATO Ministerial will provide occasion, if necessary, for further consultations on unsolved NPT problems. 4 However, I would not want to become involved in multilateral negotiations on complex Article III problem which has highly technical overtones. Moreover, by time of Ministerial meeting I would hope that we would already have had clear indication as to where our allies stand on clear alternatives already presented to them. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Also sent to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, the Mission in Geneva, and USUN. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 Scheduled for December 6. 4 A Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, attended by the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the 15 member countries, was held at the Council's new temporary headquarters in Brussels December 13-14, under the chairmanship of French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, President of the Council for 1967-1968. 220. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 220. Letter From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 5, 1967. Dear Mr. President: We have had no further word from our Allies regarding the alternative formulations of the first sentence of Article III since the November 30 meeting of the North Atlantic Council when a number of them gave us their reactions. 2 At that time it appeared that those allies who are not members of Euratom could accept any of the alternatives. This is also true of Japan, whose views we also solicited. The Netherlands representative in NAC highlighted the point that the November 2 draft is no longer a viable alternative. 3 However, there has been no clear indication of the FRG's views. Mr. Foster succeeded, with Roshchin's cooperation, in keeping the ENDC in session until the middle of December. The other ENDC delegations were willing to go along with this on the assumption that this would facilitate the efforts of the Co-Chairmen to reach agreement on Article III before the ENDC recesses. 4 If we are unable to table an Article III before the ENDC recesses, there is likely to be a sense of heightened frustration on the part of the non-aligned delegations who have been kept waiting, first by the Soviet delay in agreeing to tabling a draft treaty with a blank Article III until August 24, and later by the delay in an evolution of a definitive Western position on Article III, a phase we are still in. Ambassador Cleveland has been instructed to tell his colleagues that we would like to have the definitive views of the Euratom countries, and especially those of the FRG and Italy, at the Council meeting scheduled for December 6 5 in order to permit us to determine if there is a basis for tabling an Article III before the ENDC has to recess in mid-December. If the FRG and Italy do not give us their views at the December 6 NAC meeting, or if they insist that we continue to push the November 2 language which the Soviets reject, the completion of the NPT will have to be put off until next year. Official reaction in the FRG and Italy to your December 2 speech offering to place U.S. peaceful facilities under IAEA safeguards has been very favorable. 6 We hope the speech will help in producing a more favorable position on Article III in these countries. Faithfully yours, Adrian S. Fisher Enclosure 7 Alternatives for First Sentence of Article III 1. November 2 US Draft (rejected by Soviets but most acceptable to Euratom allies) “1… . undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system … .” 2. November 9 Soviet Delegation Proposal (not clear whether now acceptable to Soviets; not clear whether acceptable to FRG; apparently rejected by Italy; acceptable to most other allies) “1… . undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency's safeguards system, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA … .” 3. Modification of a UK Proposal (most likely to be acceptable to Soviets; rejected by FRG; not clear whether acceptable to Italy; acceptable to most other allies) “1… . undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be concluded with the IAEA in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA … .” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. Secret.1 2 Not further identified. 3 For text of November 2 draft, see Document 216 . 4 In 1967, the second session of the ENDC convened in Geneva on May 18 and recessed on December 14. 5 See Document 219 . 6 For text of President Johnson's address on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the first nuclear reactor, December 2, 1967, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book II, pp. 1083-1085. 7 Secret. 221. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 221. Letter From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 5, 1967. Mr. President: In a telegram of December 2 (Tab A), 2 Amb. McGhee raised a number of important questions about our negotiations on Article III of the NPT. He warned that we may be faced with a choice between the NPT and keeping Germany as an ally. He subsequently reported that the Germans recognize that there are dangers in getting too far out in front in their opposition to the NPT and that Chancellor Kiesinger had turned down a proposal to send you a “stiff letter on the NPT.” In addition, Foreign Minister Brandt publicly described your announcement that the US would place its civilian nuclear program under IAEA controls when the NPT becomes effective as a “significant step” toward resolving the problem of safeguards under an NPT. The specific points raised by Amb. McGhee are as follows: 1. Duration . He urged that we give the Germans a draft of the new proposed Duration article. We now plan to do this at the NAC meeting on Wednesday. 3 This article, which was given to the Soviets on Saturday, 4 provides for a conference after 25 years to determine by a majority vote whether the treaty should continue indefinitely or for another fixed period, and would permit any party to withdraw from the treaty at that time. 2. IAEA/Euratom Negotiations . He proposed that Euratom begin preliminary discussions with IAEA on the form of a safeguards system while we continue negotiations on the text of Article III. Such informal discussions should pose no problem; however, formal meetings could result in delaying a resolution of Article III. 3. US Ratification . He believes that we should give the Germans clear assurances that the US would not ratify the NPT if Euratom could not negotiate a satisfactory agreement with IAEA. (Euratom members fear that the NPT might preclude our selling them enriched uranium if they had not worked out an agreement with IAEA.) So far, State and ACDA have not wanted to go beyond stating we would “take into account” the status of IAEA/Euratom negotiations as part of our ratification process. 4. US-Euratom Consultation . Amb. McGhee believes that we should accept the Dutch and Belgian proposals to work out the language for Article III in a special meeting with representatives of Euratom minus France—so far our negotiations have been either bilateral or in NATO. With regard to the current status of the consultations on Article III, we are meeting on this problem with NATO on Wednesday (Dec. 6). At that time, we should learn the position of the Germans and the other NATO members on language for Article III that we think will be acceptable to the Soviets. If the Germans are willing to let us negotiate with the Soviets on this language, there should be no problem with the other Euratom countries. If they are not willing, I believe we will have to be ready for high-level consultations with the Germans. Amb. Cleveland suggested yesterday that the NATO Ministerial Meeting next week 5 would provide Sec. Rusk with a unique opportunity to get together with Foreign Minister Brandt and the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, and Netherlands to resolve the Article III issue. There is a question as to whether we should pursue this with Euratom or bilaterally with Germany. In any event, Sec. Rusk will be able to discuss the NPT in his private talks with Brandt. I suggest that you may wish to discuss the timing and tactics of this issue with the Secretary at lunch today. W.W. Rostow 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President, July thru December 1967, Box 1. Secret. The typewritten date of December 4 has been corrected by hand to read December 5. 2 The attached telegram, telegram 5839 from Bonn, is dated November 2, not December 2. Another copy is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. 3 For instructions to Ambassador Cleveland from Secretary Rusk in preparation for the December 6 NAC meeting, see Document 219 . 4 December 2. 5 See footnote 4, Document 219 . 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany 1 Washington, December 11, 1967, 0353Z. An undated memorandum from Leddy to Rusk, attached to the source text and its cover memorandum, indicates that EUR had prepared for the President a reply to Kiesinger's December 8 letter to Johnson, and that EUR had additionally prepared a draft telegram for the Embassy in Bonn for the Secretary's and President's approval containing instructions to deliver the reply to Kiesinger on Monday, December 11. Handwritten notations on the December 9 cover memorandum indicate that the EUR letter was not approved, but that a new text—printed here—was the final version sent to Bonn on December 11. 82479. Disto Tosec 5. US Mission NATO for the Secretary. 2 Please deliver following letter at earliest convenient time to Chancellor Kiesinger: “Dear Mr. Chancellor: I was heartened by the warmth and hopefulness of your recent letter. This has been an eventful year for each of us, both our nations, and the international community our partnership serves. Our closeness of mind and heart has given vital momentum to the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is moving now in the direction we desire. I share your hope that the Soviet Union may accept the concept of verification of Euratom safeguards by IAEA. You can be certain that the United States will continue to press for that with all vigor and persuasiveness. The momentum of the European integration movement must be maintained. A free flow, from country to country, of nuclear materials for peaceful uses is crucial to Europe's progress. The Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper such traffic between nations who enter into the treaty and carry out its obligations in good faith. We have consulted with our allies in the North Atlantic Council on further action to obtain an effective safeguards article that also protects the principle of verification. Our Geneva delegates are instructed to tell the Soviet Co-Chairman of our firm belief that the road to agreement on Article III is through the draft on November 2. 3 The Soviets, as you know, have so far rejected this language. They claim it constitutes self-inspection by Euratom members of Euratom members. This is not so. Every effort will be made to reassure the Soviets of that. We have emphasized to them the clear and basic intent of this article. The agreement between IAEA and Euratom seeks only to assure all Treaty parties that safeguards will be effective in practice. It intends only that IAEA can be certain that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I am assured that these key principles are consistent with the German position. Secretary Rusk is now en route to Brussels, and I have asked him to review the entire matter of non-proliferation with your Foreign Minister. Your own journeys to London and Asia have given me real and timely encouragement. The British quest to join the Common Market is strengthened by your support. My own hopes for peace in Asia are lifted by the promise you found, and the example you left. I am no less grateful for your government's recent policy statement on defense. These are initiatives all the world can value. They speak eloquently and optimistically of your personal commitment to a world at peace, and your people's determination to advance that joyous day. Its coming is hastened by Germany's efforts to draw her eastern neighbors closer in one community pledged to the betterment of all. Americans are proud to share that vision with you. For myself, it is a comfort to know the warmth of your friendship and the strength of your partnership in these trying days. With freedom at test and the future in hazard, it is good to recall the resolve we shared in our Bonn and Washington meetings. It will sustain me, and inspire all who work with us, in the new year that approaches. May it bring us the blessings of peace and freedom that we seek. Should it also bring you back to my country, that too would be a blessing. Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to the happiness of showing you more of America and her people. We speak for all of them in sending you and Mrs. Kiesinger our kindest regards and best wishes. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.” Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Repeated to the Mission in Geneva and to USNATO for Secretary Rusk. The text of the telegram was received from Walt Rostow at the White House and cleared for transmission by Under Secretary Katzenbach and Samuel G. Wise (S/S-O). The telegram text was submitted under cover of a December 9 memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson. Rusk recommended that it be sent in response to Chancellor Kiesinger's December 8 letter to President Johnson which “discussed unresolved German concerns over the Non-Proliferation Treaty … other bilateral issues and his recent trips to London and Asia.” Rusk also suggested that “Since I shall be seeing German Foreign Minister Brandt in Brussels on December 12 and shall raise the Non-Proliferation Treaty with him there, I think it would be helpful for you to send the enclosed letter [the text printed here] in time to reach Chancellor Kiesinger before that meeting.” 2 Secretary Rusk left Washington December 10 to attend the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels December 13-14. 3 See Document 216 . 223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 223. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, December 15, 1967, 1523Z. 2078. Disto/NATUS/Busec. Subject: Co-Chairmen Meeting on NPT, December 15, 1967. 1. Safeguards: Foster said that, as was the case with the procedure used to find a solution for Articles I and II, we should deal with heart of the matter as regards Art III and avoid complicating solution we both want by attempting to use politically unacceptable labels. After exhaustive allied consultations, US has concluded the road to solution lies through Nov 2 formulation. 2 Roshchin wondered whether the expression “road lies through Nov 2 formulation” meant that solution would have to be based exactly on that formulation or something similar. Foster said US has now made clear its firm view and he felt Sovs should be able to evaluate meaning of this expression. Foster reiterated we need deal with reality of Euratom's existence, its ownership of fuels, and its common facilities. Verification by IAEA would have to avoid extremes of complete duplication on one hand or mere paper check on the other. He was sure that arrangement resulting from agreement to be concluded with IAEA would provide equal treatment for nonnuclear parties as regards safeguards to guard against diversion of fissionable materials to weapons. Roshchin felt situation complicated by fact that US resting on Nov 2 formulation while Sov prefer Sept 2 3 and there is very little time left in which to bridge the gap. He wondered if Foster had any ideas as to the direction in which the US could move in order to help find a solution to Art III. Foster repeated that the Nov 2 formulation was the only one which could be made acceptable to our allies and he was not in a position to suggest any changes. 2. Amendments : Foster expressed preference for going back to first alternative amendments clause considered earlier. 4 If this not possible for Sovs, however, he suggested following language as way to make present amendments article more widely acceptable: “2. Any amendment to this treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each party that deposits its instrument of ratification upon the deposit of instrument of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instrument of ratification of all nuclear-weapon states party to this treaty and all other parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other party upon the deposit of its instruments of ratification.” Roshchin made no comment other than to say he would report language to Moscow. 3. Duration : Foster expressed hope Moscow was considering our proposal regarding duration. 5 We believe such a clause will help gain adherence of several key position nuclear powers. He added that Sovs now had received all of our ideas concerning essential elements for NPT and were now in position to look at treaty in terms of a final overall solution. Roshchin expressed concern over tendency to reconsider understanding previously reached between US and Soviet Union and felt this could lead to interminable discussion with no result. As regards duration clause, he also wondered if US having suggested 25-year duration, others would suggest various shorter periods. Foster stressed US still prefers unlimited duration but convinced that this matter required further consideration by US and Soviet Union if we are to obtain necessary signatories to treaty. It was pointed out that clause suggested by US was not designed to limit treaty to 25 years, but on contrary to provide for extension of treaty after 25 years. Foster added that if USSR and US reach agreement on such clause, they could stand fast against attempt to provide for shorter period. 4. Assurances : Roshchin said that he was not clear as to the meaning of proposed US clause on non-use of nuclear weapons (paras 6 and 7 state 74017). 6 What was meant by the phrase “Not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state?” Would it mean in practice that this assurance would not apply to members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Foster replied that US and Sovs would have considerable freedom in determining circumstances in which assurances would or would not apply. He believed it was clear that if member of one of these alliances attacked member of another, it would be presumed that it had the assistance of its nuclear ally. In any event each nuclear power was free to make this determination on the basis of its own judgment. Foster gave the same reply when Roshchin asked if the same situation would obtain with respect to a country like Spain or some other ally of US. Roshchin then inquired whether the declaration to be made on the subject of assurances would have to be similar or whether there could be some difference. Foster said that they should be at least similar in order not to detract from their value. Perhaps they need not be identical but two governments should consult in advance and compare their proposed statements. 5. Limiting Nuclear Arms Race: Foster took opportunity to remind Roshchin that US remains eager to discuss problem of halting and limiting arms race in strategic nuclear vehicles and hoped that Moscow was continuing to give matter favorable consideration. Roshchin repeated that his delegation had no instructions on this matter but that he would report Foster's view to Moscow. Tubby 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Moscow, Rome, New York, Tokyo, and to the Mission at NATO. 2 See Document 216 . 3 The September 2 Soviet draft has not been further identified. 4 See enclosure to Document 220 . 5 See Document 221 . 6 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of telegram 74017 to the Mission to NATO, November 23, read: “6. New paragraph D for our draft UNSC Resolution: 'D. Welcomes the intention expressed by nuclear-weapon states to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or devices, and that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state:' 'New paragraph 6 for our draft US Declaration (the existing para 6 to become para 7):' 6. The United States affirms its intention to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or devices, or control over such devices, and that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon state.'” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) 224. Memorandum of Conversation 224. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 26, 1967, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Reconvening of the ENDC (U) PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA At my request Ambassador Dobrynin came to my office today to discuss the situation with reference to the reconvening of the ENDC on January 18. I briefly recounted the proceedings at the last two or three meetings of the Co-Chairmen in Geneva with which he appeared to be generally familiar. I emphasized the necessity of our using the brief time between now and mid-January in an attempt to find some way of making progress on the remaining questions between us on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As had Ambassador Roshchin, Ambassador Dobrynin asked for any suggestions we might have as to changes in the first sentence of Article III. I emphasized to him, as I had to Ambassador Roshchin, that the November 2 formulation had been developed after intensive consultations with our Allies and met the five principles which Euratom had convinced our Allies were essential in order for the NPT to be acceptable to them. 2 Since it is most important that these Allies do find the NPT acceptable in order for it to be of greatest value, it therefore appears clear that we must find a way to proceed along the lines of the November 2 formulation and only through this method does such progress seem possible. I briefly sketched the remaining open questions on duration, amendments, and review conferences and the Ambassador stated he was aware of these points but had no specific new information on them. I reviewed the important timing questions starting with the necessity of the Co-Chairmen meeting in Geneva about the 15th of January if the ENDC is to reconvene on January 18. The meeting of the ENDC on the 18th would allow approximately two months at Geneva in order to be able to meet the deadline of the U.N. Resolution which in turn leaves little time for other formalities prior to the scheduled meeting of the non-nuclear-weapon nation states on August 29. The Ambassador agreed with these concerns and felt that time indeed is running out since any substantial delay, in his opinion, would lead to decisions being made on the part of certain countries which would make it impossible to achieve limits on proliferation. I told him that the discussions between Mr. Fisher and Minister Kuznetsov in New York covering the possibility of Mexican and other amendments being accepted and put before the ENDC on January 18 might allow a little more time for discussions on Article III between the Co-Chairmen, but not much time. We also discussed the possibility of a meeting of Foreign Ministers at Geneva if sufficient progress had been made so that the completion of the NPT appeared close to achievement. He said he would report our discussions to Moscow but hoped that we too would consider the possibility of flexibility on the first sentence of Article III, Paragraph 1. 3 I made known to him that I expect to be out of circulation for a period due to the probable necessity of an operation this week. He asked who would head the delegation at Geneva, and I said either Mr. Fisher or Mr. De Palma, at least at first. In concluding, I mentioned again the deep interest that the United States Government has in the possibility of discussions on the limitation of offensive and defensive delivery systems. He responded that he was aware of this, having recently heard the same thing from Secretary McNamara. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Volume I, 11/63-4/68, Box 229. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Foster on December 26. The conversation was held in Foster's office. 2 See Document 216 for the text of the November 2 draft and the relevant five Euratom principles. 3 For a discussion of the negotiations over the first sentence of Article III, paragraph 1, see the enclosure to Document 220 . 225. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 225. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 28, 1968. SUBJECT Situation Report—NPT Upon my arrival back from Geneva I can report on the NPT situation as follows. There have been no speeches at the ENDC by the non-aligned since the new text was presented on January 18. 2 All speeches to date have been by US or Soviet allies which wished to register prompt support for new text. It is highly possible there will be no speeches at all at the next plenary on January 30. Two things seem to account for this: lack of time to obtain considered reactions from capitals and the opening of UNCTAD meeting in Delhi next week, which will take several prominent non-aligned delegates to ENDC away from Geneva temporarily. I believe the slow pace at the ENDC in the next few weeks has certain advantages for us. (1) It will give us an opportunity to make special representations on behalf of the new draft in the capitals of the Eight non-aligned members of the ENDC. (2) It will give us more time to work out the security assurances problem with the Soviets before non-aligned views start to jell in Geneva. (3) The non-aligned, and not we and the Soviets this time, are under pressure to state their positions before the March 15 deadline for a report to the UNGA. The non-aligned will wish to put some stamp on the treaty. It is recognition of this which may have motivated the Soviets to refuse to agree to include a provision on periodic review conferences in the January 18 draft. I believe the Soviets will probably agree to such a provision but that they will not agree to loosen up the duration clause further. It thus seems to be in our interest to canalize non-aligned activities to getting a periodic review provision into the treaty and perhaps also to include the original Italian suggestion of relating the purposes of the preamble to provision for review conferences. This would have the effect of giving the non-nuclear countries periodic opportunities to assess what progress is made on further arms control measures and thus help to meet the argument that the NPT is not sufficiently balanced with regard to obligations of the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. We are expecting a representation from the FRG regarding “flexibility.” I think we should from the outset discourage the Germans from expecting any change in the duration clause, pointing out there seems to be a definite relationship between it and Soviet acceptance of the November 2 formulation for Article III. However, I would recommend telling the Germans that we shall seek to make the treaty more flexible through pressing for a provision for periodic review. At the same time I think we should avoid giving the Germans the impression that we shall insist on changes in the January 18 draft, since in any event such changes are unlikely to satisfy Strauss, who apparently is Kiesinger's main problem with the NPT. Adrian S. Fisher 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Secretary saw.” 2 For Fisher's detailed statement on the revised treaty draft of the NPT to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, January 18, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 11-17. 226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 226. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 12, 1968. SUBJECT US Adherence to Protocol to Treaty Creating Latin American Nuclear Free Zone 1. In my memorandum to you of October 25, 1967 (Enclosure A), I recommended that you inform President Diaz of Mexico that the United States intends to sign Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Enclosure B). 2 This Treaty, which has been signed by 21 Latin American countries and ratified by Mexico and Brazil, would prohibit Latin American Parties from producing, testing, or possessing nuclear weapons in their respective territories; it would also forbid the receipt or installation of any nuclear weapons in such territories. In addition, Latin American Parties to the Treaty would undertake to use nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes. The Treaty contains two protocols which are open for signature by the United States. 2. Protocol I calls for countries outside the Treaty zone to undertake the obligations of the Treaty with respect to their territories within the zone. US adherence to this Protocol would result, for example, in the incorporation of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in the zone. On December 10, 1965, Bill Foster wrote the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America that: “We do not wish to have included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with the United States. In the case of both of these areas, the United States must deal with disarmament policies affecting other nuclear powers …” 3. Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon states to agree to respect the obligations set forth in the Treaty and to promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties to the Treaty. 4. On October 26, 1967, you informed President Diaz 3 that the United States intends to sign Protocol II with an interpretive statement after consultations with the Congress (Enclosure C). These consultations, necessary because ratification of Protocol II will require the advice and consent of the Senate, are now complete. Both the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Foreign Relations Committee have been briefed in executive session on the Treaty and on our plan to sign Protocol II. Except for Senator Curtis who questioned the reference to general and complete disarmament in the preamble (a similar reference appears in the preamble of the Limited Test Ban Treaty) no objections were raised. At Senator Fulbright's request, a personal call was made to Senator Hickenlooper who had been present at the Joint Committee but not at the Foreign Relations meeting. Senator Hickenlooper, without committing himself, indicated that, on balance, he would not object to signature of Protocol II with a statement of interpretation, but that he thought ratification should depend on the degree of acceptance of the statement of interpretation by Latin American countries. In addition, Senator Dirksen, the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee have been advised that we are giving sympathetic consideration to signing Protocol II. No objections have been expressed. 5. As indicated in my memorandum to you of October 25 (Enclosure A), I believe that, by adhering to Protocol II, the US would not only be identified with a major arms control measure of special significance to our hemisphere relations, but would also be in a better position to influence the implementation of the Treaty in a manner favorable to our interests. The interpretive statement (Enclosure D) which I would recommend to accompany signature is designed to resolve five matters of concern to the United States. The statement would: 1) make clear that ratification of Protocol II would not constitute United States acceptance of the territorial claims of Latin American Parties; 2) emphasize that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon our transit rights in Latin America; 3) explain our pledge in Protocol II “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Contracting Parties” so as to permit a nuclear response in the event of an armed attack by a Latin American Contracting Party in which it is assisted by a nuclear-weapon state; 4) reiterate the position of the United States that this Treaty prohibits Contracting Parties from acquiring nuclear explosive devices even if intended for peaceful purposes, but permits the United States to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for the Contracting Parties; and 5) state that the United States would act in the same manner with respect to the Latin American territories of Protocol I adherents as it would with respect to the territories of the Contracting Parties to the Treaty, thereby encouraging the Netherlands, 4 France, and the United Kingdom 5 to ratify Protocol I and providing additional evidence of our support for the proposes of the Treaty at negligible cost. Our “interpretations” would not constitute “reservations” which are prohibited by the Treaty and they would serve to offset interpretations which differ from our own. (For example, the dominant Latin American view, with which we concur, that Contracting Parties cannot acquire nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is not shared by Brazil and Argentina.) 6. The Latin American countries are observing US actions on Protocol II closely as an indication of our support for the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and arms control measures generally. An early public announcement, prior to signature of the Protocol, would be highly desirable in order to encourage ratification of the Treaty by additional Latin American nations and to obtain their support in the NPT negotiations. Recommendations 1. The United States should not sign Protocol I at this time because of security requirements. 2. The United States should sign Protocol II as soon as possible, accompanying signature with the interpretive statement set forth in Enclosure D. 3. You should publicly announce at an early date that the United States is prepared to sign Protocol II. These recommendations are concurred in by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. Dean Rusk 6 Enclosure A 7 Washington, October 25, 1967. MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty I believe the President of Mexico will ask you whether the United States is prepared to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, better known as the “Treaty of Tlatelolco.” I recommend that you tell him that the United States intends to sign Protocol II. Signing Protocol II with appropriate interpretative statements is in our view the best way of protecting our transit rights in Latin America for ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons. We believe that the most satisfactory method of achieving an effective interpretation on transit rights is to accompany our signature to Protocol II with an interpretative statement which would be circulated routinely to all signatories, including the 20 Latin American nations which have already signed. We may also wish to inform certain Latin American Governments in advance of the interpretative statements we would plan to make accompanying our signature of Protocol II. We believe the negotiating history of the Treaty makes it clear that our interpretation is the correct one, but we want to do what we can to assure that this interpretation is not contested by important Latin American Governments. By signing Protocol II, we would agree first, to respect the status of denuclearization of Latin America and second, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on the territory of Contracting Parties. The second obligation would limit to some extent our flexibility of response with nuclear weapons in Latin America. However, we do not believe this limitation to be unreasonable in light of the agreement of the Contracting Parties not to acquire nuclear weapons. With an interpretative statement, we believe the United States' interests will be protected. The circumstances present in Latin America are such as to justify a departure from our past policy concerning limitations on our freedom of response with nuclear weapons. There are three other questions which would be dealt with in an interpretative statement to be made at the time of signature. These would be designed to make clear our views on peaceful nuclear explosive devices, on the territorial extent of our Protocol II obligations, and on a definition of territory as it applies to sea and air space. An interpretative statement is not being worked out within the Government and need not be discussed with President Diaz at this time. Recommendations: 1. That, if asked by the President of Mexico, you might reply along the following lines: “I congratulate you, Mr. President, on an achievement of which your Government can be justly proud. This is the signature by 20 Latin America governments of the first treaty establishing a nuclear free zone. The American people join with me in saluting this unique achievement. We hope this treaty will be a milestone toward world-wide agreement to a non-proliferation treaty and further steps of disarmament. We have followed your efforts with great expectation and have given careful thought and much study to the treaty. We intend to provide you and the other Contracting Parties with a statement of our understanding of the scope and effect of the treaty, and on this basis we intend to sign Protocol II.” 2. That, if you are asked when the United States will sign, you might state: “I am as anxious as you are to move forward on this important treaty as promptly as possible.” 3. That, preferably, no public announcement be made of our intention to sign Protocol II at this time since we are not yet actually ready to sign it. If the subject of Protocol II is discussed privately, the communique should read: “The two Presidents discussed the nuclear free zone treaty. President Johnson congratulated President Diaz on this outstanding example of Latin American statesmanship and stated that we are giving our most sympathetic consideration to signing Protocol II.” 4. That, if you are asked whether we will sign Protocol I, you might state: “Our serious difficulties with Protocol I have already been made known to your Government.” (FYI—the United States cannot sign Protocol I because to do so would require denuclearization of our territories in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. End FYI) These recommendations are concurred in by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke. Dean Rusk 8 Enclosure C 9 Washington, November 9, 1967. MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Ben Read Executive Secretary Department of State—S/S SUBJECT Latin American Nuclear Free Zone In his conversation with President Diaz Ordaz, the President told him that we intend to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement after consultations with the Congress. State and ACDA are authorized to proceed with consultations. The results of the consultations should be reported to the President, together with recommendations for the handling of the announcement. Walt Enclosure D 10 Washington, January 14, 1968. DRAFT STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY SIGNATURE OF PROTOCOL II “In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States Government wishes to make the following statement: I “The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims. “The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. “As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty. II “The United States wished to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand the definition contained in Article 5 as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. “The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear-weapon states in a commitment to do so. III “The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in Article 4, Section 2 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties.” 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Secret. The source text was submitted under cover of an undated memorandum from Fisher to Secretary Rusk, which enclosed for Rusk's approval “a self-explanatory Memorandum to the President recommending that the United States sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement.” 2 Enclosure B, entitled “Text of LANFZ Treaty” is not attached. For text of Protocol II, see 22 UST 754. The United States is not a signatory to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which was signed by 14 Latin American nations at Mexico City on February 14, 1967. Vice President Humphrey signed Protocol II to this Treaty on behalf of the United States at Mexico City on April 1, 1968. 3 At the invitation of President Johnson, President Diaz of Mexico made a State visit to the United States October 26-28. For text of the joint communique issued by Diaz and Johnson on October 27 following private discussions, and for other remarks issued by both during this visit, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson , 1967, Book II, pp. 945-962. 4 The Dutch have expressed concern to us that Protocol II does not expressly apply to their Latin American territories. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 The United Kingdom signed Protocols I and II on December 20, 1967. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original. 7 Secret. 8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 9 Confidential. 10 Secret. 227. Editorial Note 227. Editorial Note On February 21, 1968, ACDA Director Foster wrote a memorandum to Walt Rostow recommending disapproval of the Atomic Energy Commission's request to execute the nuclear testing cratering experiment Buggy I, a row charge experiment of five simultaneous detonations. The initial AEC request for this experiment and others was submitted on June 2, 1967, under the Crosstie authorization plan. Regarding the Crosstie test program, see Document 197 . Foster argued against the approval of Buggy I “on the ground that it involves a very substantial risk of causing radioactive debris to be present in Canada in amounts that will be detected, publicized, and used to support charges that we have deliberately violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Such charges would, among other consequences, have a decidedly adverse impact on our efforts to secure acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing—Plowshare Events, Vol. 3, Box 30) On February 22, Paul Nitze, Deputy Secretary of Defense, wrote a memorandum to Rostow in response to Rostow's request for comments and advice on Buggy I. Nitzere commended going ahead with the experiment on the grounds that the behavior of the radioactive debris released from the firing of another Plowshare experiment, Cabriolet, on January 26 had followed an expected path within the U.S. boundary.(Ibid.) In a February 29 entry to his Journal , Seaborg wrote that he received a letter that day from Rostow, which informed him of President Johnson's approval to execute Buggy I. (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 16, page 165) This letter has not been found. Buggy I was fired at approximately 12 noon on March 12 at the Nevada Test Site; it created a crater measuring 300 by 900 feet and 80 feet deep. (Ibid., page 201) 228. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 228. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 15, 1968. SUBJECT Euratom-IAEA Safeguards Agreement (U) As you know, an essential element for the success of the NPT is the achievement of the required safeguards agreements, including one between the European Community and the IAEA. We have already made known to both organizations our willingness to assist them in any appropriate way to reach agreement. To formulate and coordinate a program for such U.S. assistance, and to provide continuing guidance in achieving our objective, I recommend that we establish a special task force, which would include representatives of the Department of State offices most directly concerned (EUR and SCI) along with AEC and ACDA. The task force will maintain close consultation with Ambassador Smyth and Ambassador Schaetzel. I recommend that we designate as chairman of this task force Myron B. Kratzer, the AEC's Assistant General Manager for International Activities. I believe Mr. Kratzer is eminently qualified to undertake this task. Chairman Seaborg is willing to make Mr. Kratzer's services available for this purpose. 2 If you approve this recommendation, I will so notify the members of the Committee of Principals. 3 Adrian S. Fisher 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to the Secretary of State, 1968. Confidential. The source text bears the concurrences of Leddy, Pollack, and Tape. 2 At the AEC's Information Meeting 777, March 4, Seaborg and the Commissioners agreed that Kratzer should be designated Chairman of the Task Force. (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 16, p. 173) 3 Rusk initialed his approval on March 18. 229. Memorandum for the Record of the 584th Meeting of the National Security Council 229. Memorandum for the Record of the 584th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, March 27, 1968, 1 p.m. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] The President thanked General Abrams and asked Amb. William Foster to discuss the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Amb. Foster reported that two weeks previously the US and Soviet Union had jointly submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva identical drafts of a complete NPT. 2 They had also agreed upon a draft resolution on security assurances for the UN Security Council. The US, USSR, and the UK had also agreed on essentially identical declarations that they would each make in connection with the Security Council resolution. 3 He emphasized that the security assurances did not constitute a new commitment for the United States but rather gave promise of action by reaffirming our existing commitments under the UN Charter. He reported that the ENDC had now submitted to the UN its report forwarding the draft text of the treaty and Security Council resolution. 4 A Special Session of the UNGA on the NPT will begin sometime between April 17 and 24. He noted that we still had problems and that India and Brazil had indicated their reservations about the treaty. He stated that we shared with the Soviet Union a desire to convey the feeling that the present draft was the text of the NPT and not simply a proposal subject to general amendments. At the same time, however, we did not wish to join the Soviet Union in an attempt to railroad the treaty through the Special Session of the UNGA. He believed that it was important to give everyone an opportunity to talk the issue out completely. If the treaty did not run into serious problems in the Special Session, it could then be opened for signature later this spring. He reported that Ambassadors Goldberg and Malik were working out the tactics for the Special Session, and that we were working on India, Brazil, the FRG, etc., through regular diplomatic channels in an attempt to overcome their reservations. There is no question that there would be an effort by some countries to delay action on the NPT in the Special Session by attempting to amend it, to return it to the ENDC for further consideration, or to defer it to the next session of the UNGA. He noted that if the Special Session goes well, we sign, and the Senate approves, we will then have to decide, on the basis of the existing situation, whether to ratify and deposit the treaty immediately or to defer this action. He noted that, even if we have problems in the UNGA, we could still open the treaty for signature since there would in any case be very large support for it. Amb. Foster then raised the question as to what would happen after the NPT since it calls on the nuclear weapons states to negotiate “in good faith” toward nuclear disarmament. He noted that we had already made several major proposals—the comprehensive test ban; cut-off of production of nuclear materials for weapons; and the freeze on offensive-defensive strategic weapons systems. A new proposal is now being considered within the Government concerning the control of the seabed. In this connection, the Soviet Union the previous week had formally made a proposal to prohibit use of the seabed for military purposes beyond the 12-mile limit. 5 He thought therefore that we should quickly develop a forthcoming position on this issue. He noted that our policy was to support a comprehensive test ban provided there was adequate on-site inspection and that we had a forthcoming position on the nuclear cut-off. As for the freeze on offensive-defensive strategic systems, we were still waiting for a Soviet response. In response to the President's question as to his views on the status of the NPT, Under Secretary Katzenbach stated that he had nothing specific to add except the thought that bad things happen quickly and good things happen much more slowly. He thought that, while the prospects for the NPT were favorable, there were still many problems ahead. Amb. Goldberg stated that the NPT would be the most momentous achievement for peace since the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 6 The President and Amb. Foster deserve the most credit for this accomplishment. The full significance and effect of the treaty had not yet fully sunk in with the public. With regard to the scenario, he stated that it now looked as though the Special Session would begin on April 24 although we had originally wanted to meet earlier. He would be conferring with the Soviets on tactics during the next few days. In general, it appeared we believed in a softer sell than the Soviets. There were clearly problem spots such as Italy; however, he thought these problems could be resolved. He thought the biggest problem would be the effort by opponents to delay action on the treaty until after the caucus of the non-nuclear states in August so that the debate could be resumed in the next session of the UNGA next September. With regard to the location of the signing, he favored independent signing in the three capitals—Washington, London, and Moscow. With regard to follow-on measures, he noted that the seabed problem was a very complex, sensitive subject. He would propose to send it back to the ENDC for full debate to avoid any premature commitments in the Special Session of the UNGA. He stated that while he was not as optimistic about the outcome of the NPT as Amb. Foster, he thought it could be accomplished but emphasized that this would require hard work. He estimated that the Special Session would last about five weeks. If the treaty were then opened for signature, there would still be time to permit its submission to the Senate before adjournment. The President asked what the status of the seabed proposal actually was. Amb. Foster replied that ACDA was now circulating a specific proposal at the working level and that a final version would shortly be sent to the Committee of Principals. 7 He agreed that the ENDC was the right forum. He observed that the introduction of this new proposal would take some of the pressure off of us on the comprehensive test ban issue. The President asked about India's position on the NPT. Amb. Foster replied that the measure was now before the Indian Cabinet and had not yet been decided. In the end, however, he believed that India may well sign. He noted that arrangements had been made for Dr. Jerome Wiesner to meet in Geneva with Dr. Sarabhai, head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, who has emerged as the principal Indian opponent of the NPT, in order to try to persuade him to modify his views. Amb. Goldberg said he thought the Indian problem would be more difficult than this and he had encountered outright opposition from their representatives in New York. The President asked what other countries presented problems. Amb. Foster replied that Italy had been quite difficult. However, the Italian Parliament was definitely in favor of the NPT and it would be difficult for the Italian government to oppose it. Brazil opposed the treaty on the grounds that it wants to be able to develop independently nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes in order to help its economy. He stated, however, that such an exception would completely undermine the treaty since peaceful nuclear explosives suitable for peaceful purposes were equivalent to the most advanced nuclear weapons. He noted that Brazil's position might change since some strong counterforces were developing there on this issue. With regard to the FRG, he was very hopeful that they would support the treaty. He noted that in the course of the long negotiations with our allies the FRG had written half of the treaty. The President expressed his pleasure with the success that had been achieved so far on the NPT and congratulated Ambassadors Foster and Fisher for their accomplishments. He then adjourned the meeting. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 5, Tab 66, 3/27/68, Draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Secret. 2 On March 11, Foster and Roshchin introduced to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee a joint U.S.-Soviet draft on the NPT as a revision of the January 18 draft (see footnote 2, Document 225 ). For text of the March 11 draft, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 162-166. For statements by Roshchin and Foster to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on this draft, see ibid., pp. 172-174, and pp. 174-177, respectively. 3 For text of the Tripartite Security Assurances Proposal, March 7, submitted by the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom to the U.N. Security Council, see ibid., pp. 156-158. On June 19, the Security Council approved the resolution by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions. Canada, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, Hungary, Paraguay, Senegal, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States voted in favor of the resolution; Algeria, Brazil, France, India, and Pakistan abstained. 4 For the report, March 14, 1968, submitted to the ENDC, and for cross references to revised texts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the draft U.N. Security Council resolution, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 192-193. 5 Presumably a reference to the statement delivered on March 20, 1968, by Soviet Representative Malik to the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the National Jurisdiction; see ibid., pp 194-196. 6 See Document 3 . 7 See footnote 4, Document 233 . 230. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 230. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, March 29, 1968. Dear Glenn: Your letter of March 15, 1968 enclosed a draft letter to Euratom and asked me to agree that such a letter should omit any reference to the potential relevance of the NPT. 2 I agree that it would be wise to omit the reference to the NPT and thus avoid the political repercussions of such a reference at least until the negotiation of specific long term supply contracts. I would appreciate it, however, if you would consult the State Department and ACDA before undertaking such contract negotiations. In my view, the omission of any reference to the NPT makes it desirable to make certain modifications in your draft letter designed to remove any basis for Euratom to claim that the letter itself constitutes a commitment to supply additional fuel or that it contains a complete list of the conditions under which such fuel will be supplied. A marked copy of the draft letter indicating such modifications is enclosed. Sincerely, Dean Attachment 3 Dear Mr. Spaak: As you are aware, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission recently received statutory authorization, through an amendment to the Euratom Cooperation Act permitting the transfer to Euratom of up to a maximum of 1,500 kilograms of plutonium (an increase of 1,100 kilograms over the previous authorizations) and up to 215,000 kilograms of contained uranium 235 (an increase of 145,000 kilograms). In this letter, I would like to describe general arrangements 4 that we would consider applicable to the transfer of this material. These conform to the proposals that I outlined to you in our meeting in Washington on January 25. With this new statutory authority, the Commission will be in a position to transfer or to approve the transfer of additional quantities of plutonium and uranium 235 to the Community within the newly authorized amounts. 5 Plutonium 1. Of the 1,000 additional kilograms of plutonium to be made available, acquisitions from private operators in the U.S. would not exceed at any time 50 percent of the total plutonium which the Community has obtained or has commitments to obtain from the United States. Further, no more than 75 percent of any one private operator's plutonium would be so made available to the Community. The remainder of the plutonium to be supplied under the new authorization would be obtained from the USAEC. The price for the AEC material would be the Commission's established price in effect at the date of delivery, which currently is $43 per gram of fissile isotopes in the form of plutonium nitrate. 2. The research and development work to be performed with the additional 1,000 kilograms would be covered by appropriate information exchange arrangements under which the USAEC would obtain the information derived from the use of the material. 3. Any transfer of such additional plutonium would, of course, be subject to the provisions of our Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended. We would appreciate receiving as soon as practicable your best estimates concerning the quantities and quality of plutonium desired by the Community, including a schedule of anticipated deliveries. Enriched Uranium 1. Insofar as the additional quantity of enriched uranium is concerned, it is our understanding that your estimates for the next five years include the entire additional 145,000 kilograms of U-235 that has been authorized. We would appreciate receiving confirmation from you to this effect. Upon receipt of such confirmation, we will consider 215,000 kilograms of U-235 as the new ceiling quantity transferable under our additional Agreement for Cooperation, and pursuant to the necessary contracts. 6 The five-year period contemplated in Article I of the Additional Agreement would commence for the additional quantity on the date of your written reply. 2. The supply of the uranium 235 would be in accordance with the current AEC “net amount concept” which was the basis used by Euratom and the USAEC for calculating the U-235 increase. A definition of the “net amount concept” is appended to this letter. 3. The AEC normal mode of supplying the enriched uranium to the Community for power reactor applications would be through toll enrichment while comparable services are made available to licensed users in the U.S. The Additional Agreement contains wording broad enough to encompass toll enrichment. Accordingly, it would provide a basis for the performance of such services in connection with projects within the scope of that Agreement, including joint program projects to the extent that both parties wish to employ toll enrichment. In conformance with its current policy,AEC sales of the newly authorized quantities of enriched uranium to Euratom would take place only on a single transaction basis rather than through long-term contracts. All of these terms regarding the availability of enriched uranium are fully consistent with U.S. supply policies which have been discussed in public in recent months. 7 We look forward to receiving confirmation from you that the understandings set forth in this letter are acceptable to the Community. Sincerely yours, Myron B. Kratzer 8 Assistant General Manager for International Activities 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. 2 Seaborg's March 15 letter to Rusk is reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 222-224. An unedited version of the March 4 draft letter to Spaak is ibid., pp. 225-228. 3 This draft attachment is an edited version of the draft cited in footnote 2 above. The final text of the letter, which was sent to Cancellario D'Alena (not Spaak) on May 1, is scheduled for publication in volume XXXIV . 4 The original text of the first part of this sentence reads: “In this letter, I would like to delineate the general conditions that we would consider applicable to the transfer of this material.” 5 The original text of this paragraph continues with: “under the conditions set forth in this letter. The following paragraphs summarize the general conditions which, in accordance with AEC policy, will be applicable to the transfer of the additional plutonium and enriched uranium to the Community.” 6 The original text of the latter part of this sentence reads: “Agreement for Cooperation, subject to the various terms of the Agreement for Cooperation including the conclusion of the necessary contracts.” 7 The original text continues with an additional paragraph which reads: “The transfer of the plutonium and the enriched uranium referred to in this letter will be subject, of course, to mutually satisfactory safeguard provisions in accordance with the terms of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation.” 8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 231. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk 231. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 5, 1968. ACDA-2915 SUBJECT US-Soviet Strategic Missile Negotiations On March 16, following a briefing which ACDA gave you, you instructed me to form a committee to examine the ACDA recommendations on controlling the strategic arms race. This review has now been completed by representatives of the Department, ACDA, and DOD/ISA, and I wish to submit for your consideration and approval the following proposals. Though the working group was initially in substantial agreement on these proposals, I understand that Ambassador Foster has certain reservations and will be submitting to you a separate memorandum on the subject. However, the proposals set forth in this memorandum have the full approval of Ambassador Thompson and DOD/ISA. They will be presented simultaneously by DOD/ISA to Secretary Clifford. If you and Secretary Clifford agree on them, they will be checked with the JCS prior to submission to the President for his approval. Objectives The main aim of the US in engaging the Soviets in negotiations on strategic missiles would be to reach an agreement which would maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship, primarily by controlling the number of offensive and defensive missile launchers. Even if unsuccessful in this quest, the US would benefit indirectly from such talks. They would promote a better understanding of the concerns each side has in the developing missile race. Also, a new US-Soviet agreement to hold such talks, if announced in the near future , would help secure support for the NPT (see below). Initial Negotiating Position The US should be prepared to submit a concrete initial negotiating position to the Soviets even prior to their agreement to set a date for talks. Some Soviet contacts have intimated that such a step would help the Soviet Government (i.e., those favoring talks) to reach a positive decision on this matter. It would be taken as an earnest of our intent and help remove doubts that, in proposing talks, we were merely bent on an intelligence fishing expedition. The attached initial negotiating position (Tab A), drafted in the form of an oral statement to be presented by Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, is a revised version of the paper submitted to you, the Secretary of Defense, and the Acting Director of ACDA in early March. 2 It incorporates recommendations made by ACDA relating to the general principles which would underlie a strategic arms agreement. However, like its immediate predecessor, it essentially is based on the draft proposal approved by you on September 23, but modified to take account of objections subsequently voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3 Whatever may be the decision on the timing of the delivery of this oral statement, it would be desirable to reach agreement now within the US Government on an initial negotiating position, so as to provide a base for further examination of the problem and to be prepared for talks should they eventuate. Timing of Presentation As for timing the proposed initiative, both you and Secretary Clifford indicated in early March that the time was not ripe for such a move. This may still be the case today. However, new considerations have arisen. The President's initiative, and the North Vietnamese response, on limiting bombing have cast a better international climate in regard to the Vietnam War. Also, on March 14, the ENDC completed its work on the NPT and submitted a draft treaty to the UN General Assembly for its consideration and endorsement. Preliminary soundings indicate that General Assembly support for the NPT may be anything but overwhelming. A number of non-nuclear weapons states have complained, among other objections, that the nuclear powers have assumed no meaningful obligation under the NPT to move forward with the business of disarmament. In order to dispel this charge, as well as to hold out an added inducement to the Soviets to agree to talks, it is recommended that Ambassador Thompson deliver the proposed statement under Tab A promptly after his return to Moscow (April 17) and that he preface this statement with a message from the President to Chairman Kosygin (Tab B), arguing that it would be advantageous to the cause of the NPT if the US and USSR were to announce during the General Assembly session their agreement to commence on a given date bilateral discussions of limitations on strategic arms. 4 Negotiating Tactics Once negotiations begin, we should pursue in parallel discussions of concrete proposals and of principles, embodying the concept of an agreed limitation on the strategic arms race. The latter dialogue would be helpful in convincing the Soviets of the desirability of our proposal, as well as in obtaining a clearer idea of Soviet thinking on this arms-disarmament complex, which in turn might influence our final negotiating position. The general principles contained in the ACDA briefing paper of March 16 could serve as guidelines for such a discussion. Negotiating Problems and Alternatives It is recognized that our initial negotiation position contains a number of significant omissions and almost certainly would be challenged by the Soviets on certain points. Several of them were examined in the ACDA study. In some problem areas, it would be relatively easy to construct convincing rebuttals. In other cases, we might at some point want to reconsider our position. However, I do not recommend that decisions on these problem issues be made at this point. This would have to be done after negotiations have been in progress for some time and we have a clearer idea of Soviet intentions. I understand that S/P, at your instruction, is preparing a separate study on the problem of strategic arms control and that it proposes a rather substantial reduction of missiles. This study will be given careful consideration and may prove useful for future contingencies. However, I believe that, at this stage at least, our aim should be to obtain Soviet agreement to level off the strategic arms race. Alternative contingency proposals such as this could be considered by the Committee of Principals. Recommended Action (1) That you approve the proposed oral statement set forth in Tab A, either to be delivered shortly (see below) or to be held as a contingency position. (2) That you approve the proposed Presidential letter to Chairman Kosygin (Tab B), to be delivered along with the above oral statement by Ambassador Thompson on his return to Moscow. 5 Tab A 6 Action: AmEmbassy Moscow. Subject: Strategic Missile Talks. 1. You should seek earliest opportunity to approach Kosygin or highest available responsible Soviet official to request again a favorable response to our proposal 7 for early talks on strategic missile controls. You should outline our views on possible strategic missile controls and on desirability of early talks, as set forth below; text of your oral remarks may at your discretion be left with Soviets. 2. Begin Text : The United States Government initially proposed discussion on strategic anti-ballistic missile systems because of our belief that deployment of such systems, even if justified in military terms, could not help but spur on a new and costly cycle of the strategic nuclear arms race. We agreed, however, in the very first exchange of views with the Soviet Government's suggestion that such discussions should include offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems, as well as anti-missile defensive systems. This has remained throughout, and continues to be, the position of the United States Government. 3. The United States Government has proposed these talks within the framework of the Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961, 8 accepted by our two Governments as a basis for disarmament negotiations and as offering the best means to begin to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. As we have noted earlier, we believe that it should be possible to reach agreement more quickly on important limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without waiting for agreement on all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that measures to curb the strategic arms race would help pave the way for substantial reductions, and would have great value in themselves inasmuch as they would avoid a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of strategic missile deployments. The first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms control should be to restrain the further growth of strategic forces. It may not prove easy to find mutually acceptable limitations, but we are prepared to work earnestly toward that end, and we assume what you will as well. 4. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race, and even to make reductions in existing forces, without the necessary participation of others. Moreover, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would sign and continue to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We will be demonstrating that we are moving toward disarmament as we are committed by the treaty to try to do. 5. Over a year has passed since we first proposed these discussions. Not only is delay regrettable, but the problem which we are facing can become more difficult with time. However, our task is to take account of the existing situation in devising mutually acceptable measures to curtail the strategic arms race. As each month goes by, the existing situation is one of greater and more complex armaments on both sides. An agreement a year ago, when the United States first proposed talks, might have prevented many of the increases on both sides which are now in process. An agreement today to curtail future deployments would have the same effect as an agreement a year from now to effect a reduction in deployed weapons; it should also be easier to negotiate, and would result in important savings of resources for us both. 6. We recognize that limiting strategic arms consistent with our mutual interests and common goals is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we start with a common understanding of a problem and are striving for similar goals. In this context, we believe that there are some basic principles underlying the early achievement of any such mutually beneficial restraints on the strategic arms race. 7. Any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should include both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. It would be futile for us to attempt to define such concepts as “superiority” or “parity”, these notions have little meaning in a situation, such as the present, in which each of us is certain that the other has the capability under any circumstances to inflict unacceptable damage. We recognize that some adjustments in the deployment of the strategic forces of each side might be appropriate. Such adjustments would be designed to meet our common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding possible disruptive effects and the great cost of a continuation of the strategic arms race. 8. Our respective national means of verification should be adequate for achieving meaningful strategic arms control constraints. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on such verification of limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. For other more comprehensive measures, some supplementary inspection arrangements may be required; we would be prepared to include the minimum inspection necessary for effective verification. Our position on this subject is flexible and is governed by the principles that verification of compliance with agreed undertakings is necessary, that maximum reliance should be placed on unilateral ability to verify compliance, and that when additional procedures are required for adequate verification, they must, of course, be provided. 9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States suggests that consideration be given to cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. This weapon category should include strategic missiles of medium and intermediate range (ranges greater than 1,000 KM), as well as longer-range intercontinental missiles. If the agreement were to be limited to fixed land-based missile systems, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. In view of the difficulty of verifying through national means the deployment of sea-based or mobile land-based strategic missile launchers, the possibility of an agreed limitation applying to these weapons could be the subject of discussion. 10. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-missile systems is more complex. While some ABM systems may be required in light of the offensive strategic missile systems of other countries, we must recognize that as far as our own two countries are concerned they may also be an important factor in the strategic balance between us. This importance will, of course, be increased if there are agreed limitations on offensive missile systems. In general, it would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be an agreed number of anti-missile launchers and associated radars which each side could deploy. As in the case of strategic offensive missile systems, we believe that national means of verification would provide assurance with respect to the scale of deployment of fixed land-based defensive anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars. Concerning land-mobile or sea-based anti-ballistic missile systems, the same considerations would prevail as are noted above in regard to mobile offensive systems. 11. The United States Government has presented these views in the expectation that representatives of our two Governments will meet shortly to discuss these matters. End Text . 9 Tab B 10 Action: AmEmbassy Moscow. Subject: Strategic Missile Talks. 1. You should deliver without delay the following personal message from President Johnson to Kosygin: Begin Text : Dear Mr. Chairman: Ambassador Thompson has informed me of the talk he had with Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 26. Concerning the proposal for our two governments to hold discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race, I understand Foreign Minister Gromyko to say that the Soviet Government is still studying the problem and that it attaches great importance to it. I am gratified with the latter statement because it corresponds to my deep conviction about the need for such negotiations. I am concerned, however, about the necessity to initiate meaningful discussion as soon as possible. As the United States Government has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter as, from a technical and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional consideration, which leads me to write you this letter. As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments. I am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum number of adherents. During the resumed GA session our efforts to achieve a treaty that can be opened for signature in the near future with the prospect of obtaining a maximum number of adherents will face a most critical test. Efforts undoubtedly will be made by some states to postpone the opening of the treaty for signature at least until after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has been held in the fall of this year. It is important that our two governments do everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world sentiment favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early date. To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to commence bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the announcement. I am convinced that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through these private bilateral discussions it should be possible for our two countries to reach some agreement on initial steps for curtailing the strategic arms race. We believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we can reach a common understanding of the problem and are striving for similar goals. In our view, any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should include both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. We continue to believe that meaningful strategic arms control constraints involving limitations on the deployment of certain strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems can be adequately verified by relying on our respective national capabilities. Progress on controlling the strategic arms race, while important in itself, will also contribute to our mutual objective of achieving and maintaining the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I hope and trust that these actions will bring our two governments into closer working relationships. Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson End . 11 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 2915. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM) on April 2. There is a typed notation on the source text for Ambassador Thompson's concurrence, but it is not initialed. 2 The paper sent to Rusk, Clifford, and Fisher in March has not been further identified. 3 The draft proposal approved by Rusk on September 23 has not been further identified. 4 Tab B is a telegram to Moscow, drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM), Sidney N. Graybeal (ACDA) and Lawrence D. Weiler (ACDA) on April 24; cleared by Ambassador Bohlen and Foster (ACDA); and approved by Secretary Rusk. A typewritten notation on Tab B reads: “Draft. See OD-ACDA-2915 dated April 5, 1968, (not sent in this form, per Mr. Shaw).” Tab B was apparently revised and incorporated into a May 2, 1968, message which was sent directly from President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin. See Document 237 . 5 There is no indication whether Secretary Rusk approved or disapproved these recommendations. 6 Top Secret; Nodis. It is uncertain if this undated, unnumbered telegram was ever sent to Moscow. It was drafted by John P. Shaw (G/PM) and Mort Halperin (DOD/ISA) on April 3, and prepared for clearance by Bohlen, Clifford, and Thompson, and for approval by Rusk, but no initials appear on the source text. 7 On March 2, 1967, President Johnson held a news conference at which he revealed that Chairman Kosygin had responded on February 27 to his letter of January 21, 1967 (see Document 178 ), to enter into discussions on limiting defensive and offensive nuclear missiles. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 , Book I, pp. 259-260. For background on the ABM issue, see Documents 173 and 174 . Regarding subsequent high-level exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union, see Documents 178 , 179 , 185 , and 186 . 8 For text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, transmitted to the 16th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 20, 1961, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961 , pp. 1091-1094. 9 Printed from an unsigned copy. 10 Top Secret; Nodis. 11 Printed from an unsigned copy. 232. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 232. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, April 10, 1968. Dear Mr. Secretary: Before you go to The Hague for the Nuclear Planning Group meeting on April 18-19, I believe you should be familiar with the US interpretations of Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regarding alliance arrangements for nuclear defense. The FRG has requested in particular that we make it clear that the realization of the NPT will not affect the work of the NPG. The language of Articles I and II of the NPT was chosen in order to protect alliance consultations on nuclear defense as well as on nuclear defense deployment arrangements. These are not explicitly sanctioned by Articles I and II, since the USSR was not prepared to provide such an endorsement of NATO arrangements. In Secretary Rusk's October 10, 1966 talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko, 2 it was clearly understood that Articles I and II of the NPT deal only with what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Article I of the NPT prohibits the transfer of ownership or control of nuclear weapons (understood to mean warheads and bombs and not delivery vehicles). It does not mention alliance consultations or deployment arrangements not involving a transfer of nuclear weapons. We worked out interpretations on these and other aspects of Articles I and II with our allies (and in particular the FRG) which were presented to the Soviets on April 28, 1967 in the form of answers to questions posed by our allies (Tab A). The FRG agreed with us that it would not be desirable to request comments from the USSR on these interpretations, since the USSR could not be expected to be bound by unilateral interpretations or a treaty made by others. However, the Soviets were informed that if they took an official position in opposition to these interpretations, a very serious problem would arise. The Soviets also were told that we expected that during ratification hearings the US Senators would ask similar questions as allied governments, and we expected to make the same responses on our understanding of Articles I and II. We have not heard from the Soviets any indication that they will contradict the US interpretations when they are made public in the process of consideration of the treaty either by the US or by our allies. This does not mean that they will necessarily agree with them. We do not believe it would be in our interest or that of our allies to have a public discussion of the US interpretations prior to the time when the NPT is submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. On March 13 the FRG Embassy here requested that a statement be made by you at The Hague NPG meeting and also at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in May to the effect that the NPT will not hinder the work of the NPG or further nuclear defense arrangements within the alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the NPT. (Memcon and FRG working paper attached as Tab B.) We think it would be useful for you to make such a statement on both occasions suggested by the FRG and see no objection to using substantially the language proposed by the Germans. We have slightly rephrased the FRG language (Tab C). I suggest that you include such a statement in your presentations both to the April 18-19 NPG Meeting and at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in May. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Tab A 3 April 28, 1967. QUESTIONS ON THE DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ASKED BY U.S. ALLIES TOGETHER WITH ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES 1. Q. What may and what may not be transferred under the draft treaty? A. The treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. It prohibits transfer to any recipient whatsoever of “nuclear weapons” or control over them, meaning bombs and warheads. It also prohibits the transfer of other nuclear explosive devices because a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve bombs or warheads. 2. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit consultations and planning on nuclear defense among NATO members? A. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results. 3. Q. Does the draft treaty prohibit arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons owned and controlled by the United States within the territory of non-nuclear NATO members? A. It does not deal with arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling. 4. Q. Would the draft prohibit the unification of Europe if a nuclear-weapon state was one of the constituent states? A. It does not deal with the problem of European unity, and would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its former components. A new federated European state would have to control all of its external security functions including defense and all foreign policy matters relating to external security, but would not have to be so centralized as to assume all governmental functions. While not dealing with succession by such a federated state, the treaty would bar transfer of nuclear weapons (including ownership) or control over them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity. Tab B 4 Washington, March 13, 1968. Memorandum of Conversation SUBJECT The NPT and the NPG PARTICIPANTS Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, German Embassy Adolf von Wagner, Third Secretary, German Embassy John M. Leddy, Asst. Secretary for European Affairs Edwin D. Crowley, EUR/GER Minister von Lilienfeld said he called on instructions of his Government to express German concern as to possible effects on the work of the NPG of the Soviet exploitation of the NPT. He gave Mr. Leddy the attached paper containing talking points which he described as a “non-paper” having no official status. He recalled that the NPG was closely connected with the earlier MLF to which the FRG had attached importance. The FRG also attaches a great deal of importance to the work of the NPG both from the standpoint of defense policy and from the psychological point of view. Mr. Leddy, referring to the talking points, asked the Minister whether he considered our participation in the NPG had had a restrictive effect. Minister von Lilienfeld said there is a feeling in German circles, especially in military circles, that the US is resisting the sharing of knowledge and decision-making in the nuclear field. Mr. Leddy pointed out to the Minister that the NPG was established to meet the problem to which the Minister referred and that he thought it was doing good work. He was not aware of any basis for the reported German concern that our participation has had a restrictive effect. As to the desire expressed by the Minister that the Secretary of Defense make statements at the NPG Ministerial meeting on April 18 and at the NATO Ministers' meeting in May, we would look into the matter. He said we certainly will not talk to the Soviets about the NPG. The situation is clear on that score. The Minister explained that it was not the desire of his Government that the Secretary of Defense make formal declarations. The German Government had in mind that the Secretary would include in his remarks at these meetings statements along the lines set forth in his talking paper. Attachment 5 Undated. Talking Paper I have instructions to raise the question of the possible repercussions which the non-proliferation treaty might have on the nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. We raise this question particularly with respect to the ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group schedule in the Hague on April 18 and 19. The interpretations which the US delegate in Geneva handed the Soviet Co-Chairman on April 28, 1967 deal with this problem. These interpretations had been the subject of consultations within the Alliance and also bilaterally between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The interpretations safeguard the nuclear arrangements as they presently exist within the Alliance. We consider it desirable, however, that the US Government make it clear vis-a-vis its allies that the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not impair the future work of the Nuclear Planning Group nor the further development by the Nuclear Planning Group of nuclear arrangements already existing. We are motivated by the fact that the Soviets have time and again criticized the already existing nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. We, therefore, have reason to expect that—by referring to the Non-Proliferation Treaty—they will attempt to block any further development of such arrangements, especially in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group. Although the legal validity of such attempts were to be doubted, they could produce a dangerous political impact, thus hindering the future work in the Nuclear Planning Group and jeopardizing concrete improvements in the field of consultation on nuclear matters. We recognize that the Nuclear Planning Group already has produced some good results and has done important preliminary work for an improvement of nuclear consultation within the Alliance. But we share the opinion of other members of the Alliance that there is still a long way to go before satisfactory and final arrangements of the problems the Nuclear Planning Group is dealing with are reached. Work within the Nuclear Planning Group proceeds slowly and sometimes there is the impression that a certain restrictive tendency impedes faster progress. As far as we know, Secretary General Brosio occasionally has expressed similar concerns on this matter. All these reasons make it even more urgent that the US Government gives the clarification we request. We feel, however, that this should not be done through interpretations to be handed to the Soviets. We, too, would consider it prejudicial if hereby a discussion about the Nuclear Planning Group would be initiated with the Soviets. We would appreciate it if the Secretary of Defense at the ministerial meeting at the Hague on April 18 and at the Conference of the NATO Defense Ministers in May 1968 could make such a statement. In our view it would be desirable if such a statement would state —that the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not interfere with the determination of the US Government to further actively the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and to cooperate in the aim of finding a solution satisfactory to the non-nuclear partners of the Alliance for the formulation and execution of nuclear planning within NATO; —that the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not hinder the further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the Alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the NPT. Tab C 6 Proposed Statement to be Included in Presentations by Secretary Clifford at April 18-19 NPG Meeting and May NATO Defense Ministers Meeting The US Government holds the view that the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will not interfere with the work of the Nuclear Planning Group. The US Government intends to continue to pursue actively the work of the Nuclear Planning Group and to seek to find solutions satisfactory to its non-nuclear partners in NATO for the formulation and execution of nuclear planning within NATO. It also is the view of the US Government that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will not hinder the further development of nuclear defense arrangements within the alliance compatible with Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and Leon Sloss (G/PM). The source text was sent under cover of an April 15 memorandum from Foster to Katzenbach, in which Foster recommended that Katzenbach send the letter to Clifford “informing him of the background of the U.S. interpretations of Article I and III before he (Clifford) goes to the NPG meeting at The Hague, April 18-19.” Foster also proposed to Katzenbach that he suggest that Clifford make a statement “setting forth our opinion that the NPT will not affect the activities of the NPG. The FRG has requested that such a statement be made. Messrs. Bohlen and Leddy concur.” 2 On October 10, 1966, Rusk met with Gromyko at a working dinner at the Department of State to discuss the status of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; see Document 158 . 3 Secret. 4 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. 5 Secret. 6 Secret. 233. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals 233. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, April 12, 1968. SUBJECT Arms Control on the Seabed (U) Last December, the U.N. General Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to consider future uses of the seabed and ocean floor. 2 During the recent meetings of this Committee, there was widespread interest in applying arms control measures to the seabed. The kinds of measures which were mentioned fall into the following three categories: a) Demilitarization of the seabed. b) Reservation of the seabed for peaceful purposes. c) Prohibiting the stationing of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. On the basis of our studies of the desirability and feasibility of an arms control measure, and as a result of staff-level discussions with other agencies, ACDA has concluded that the proposal for demilitarization of the seabed would be inimical to U.S. national security because of its effect on critical U.S. underwater surveillance systems. The reservation of the seabed for peaceful purposes would require careful definition of the meaning of such a reservation in order not to preclude the use of such surveillance systems. Further study is required before the U.S. position on a peaceful purposes proposal can be determined. Since a proposal to reserve the seabed for peaceful purposes only can be expected to attract wide support, ACDA believes that its implications should be explored on an urgent basis. I do believe that the U.S. should urgently adopt a policy in favor of negotiating a treaty to prohibit the stationing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. I believe that such an arms control measure would be in the U.S. interest. Taking such a position will enable us to fend off more general proposals that might adversely affect our security interests. It should be noted that in the period following the NPT, the U.S. will be under considerable pressure to demonstrate that it is prepared to negotiate further arms control measures as required by Article VI of the NPT. A seabed arms control proposal appears to be the most readily acceptable measure for multilateral negotiation in light of the Soviet announcement of March 20 at the U.N. that they favor discussing it in detail at the ENDC. 3 A proposal for arms control on the seabed is herewith enclosed for consideration by the Committee of Principals. 4 It is recommended that the Principals approve the following: That the U.S. attempt to negotiate in the ENDC a treaty, or the relevant provisions for a more general seabed treaty, in which each state party to the treaty undertakes not to station or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath, or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state. It is proposed that this subject be discussed at a meeting of the Committee of Principals which will be called some time after April 29. William C. Foster 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (1), Box 20. Top Secret; Noforn. A stamped notation on the source text reads: “Sec Def has seen Brief.” 2 On December 18, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly established a 35-member Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The Ad Hoc Committee held three sessions in 1968. The first two were held at U.N. headquarters in New York; the first March 18-27, and the second June 17-July 9. The third was held in Rio de Janeiro, August 19-30. 3 For a summary of the statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik), see Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 194-196. 4 An attached 15-page draft paper entitled “U.S. Proposal for Arms Control on the Seabed” is not printed. 234. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford 234. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, April 15, 1968. JCSM-235-68 SUBJECT Arms Control Proposals for the Ocean Bottoms (U) 1. (S) The USSR, at the organizational meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee for the Oceans, on 21 March 1968, proposed that the UN General Assembly adopt a principle to ban military activities as well as nuclear weapons from the seabeds beyond the boundaries of national jurisdiction. 2 In appraising this Soviet initiative, the US Ambassador to the United Nations indicated that the proposal is certain to have a prominent place on the forthcoming agenda of the UN Ad Hoc Committee. He predicted that the Soviet proposal will receive broad support from nonnuclear states and asked the Secretary of State for an urgent determination as to what the United States would lose by agreeing to ban the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean bottoms, provided effective control methods could be worked out. He stated that a negative US stance could have highly unfortunate effects on deliberations concerning the nonproliferation treaty. 3 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the US Ambassador to the United Nations that the United States should prepare an effective counter to the Soviet proposal. 4 Whatever the Soviet motive—which might well be entirely political—international acceptance of their resolution would have grave consequences for US national security interests. A demilitarization agreement according to the Soviet format could easily entail an interpretation making the US Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) illegal, with consequent severe impact on our antisubmarine warfare capability. The Soviet proposal could also prevent the development and/or deployment of future military systems which may be required for US national defense. 3. (S) Another consideration is that an agreement to demilitarize the seabeds could, by implication, lead to international pressure to extend controls and prohibitions to the surface and subsurface of the oceans. 4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while noting the opinion of Ambassador Goldberg that acceptance of a denuclearization proposal might serve the immediate political purpose of helping to develop a climate of opinion favorable to the nonproliferation treaty, believe that the long-range consequences of banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds would be detrimental to the security of the United States. If, in the future, the US nuclear capability were to depend in part on the emplacement of weapons and devices on the ocean bottoms, our option for their use would be politically foreclosed by the terms of this proposed agreement. While it is premature to decide whether the United States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a requirement is a distinct possibility. As new technological or political factors are introduced into the strategic posture of nuclear weapons nations, new concepts are being explored to meet the changing threat. It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it is not a question of current programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal. 5. (TS) Possible future risks to the US nuclear forces include enhanced effects of nuclear weapons, such as X-rays and electromagnetic pulse, on US strategic missile systems. Another risk can be identified in terms of the advancing technology in long-range underwater surveillance systems. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that scientific or technological breakthroughs could make US strategic offensive and defensive missile systems vulnerable to enemy attack. To avoid this eventuality, the United States might well be required to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. In this context, an arms control agreement which would restrain the United States would be detrimental to US security. 6. (TS) If “pindown” and submarine vulnerability were to become a reality, the geographical features of the United States and the USSR would become of great importance. The fact that the Soviet Union has a land area over twice that of the United States would give it an obvious land-deployment advantage over the United States. However, the United States has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. Its coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range or site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. Clearly, it would be advantageous to the USSR if it could offset these geographical handicaps with an international arms control measure. 7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not oppose the consideration of arms control measures, including those affecting the ocean environment, if an effective control system is established and provided such measures will not have the effect of weakening the relative strategic posture of the United States. The United States does not have a verification capability now, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation has now or will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an effective control system for either a seabed “demilitarization” or a seabed “denuclearization” agreement could not be developed satisfactorily. In sharp contrast, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations have the present technology to emplace weapons of mass destruction and other military devices on the ocean bottoms with virtually no risk of detection. For example, the United States has been able to plant extensive SOSUS networks from surface ships, despite difficulties in avoiding and deceiving Soviet surveillance ships. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that no demilitarization (including denuclearization) agreement could be verified effectively. 8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the establishment of a Johnson specialized agency to encourage international cooperation in oceanography is in US interests. It is their opinion that discussion and/or negotiations concerning the undersea environment should be limited at this time to such matters as scientific research, exploration and exploitation of resources, and establishment of marine parks and preserves. Although future marine research and exploration may well indicate that there are arms control measures which, if verifiable, would be in the national interest, US support for arms control measures on the seabeds or in the ocean space would not be in the national interest at this time and, in fact, would bear a potential for grave harm. 9. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that their views on arms control in the seabed be forwarded to the President. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Harold K. Johnson Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy Files: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3566. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text was sent under cover of a April 18 memorandum from Clifford to President Johnson forwarding the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on possible proposals on arms control on the seabed. Clifford further related he had just received from ACDA a proposal on arms control on the seabed which was under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by his staff. Clifford proposed that a Committee of Principals meeting be held to discuss the ACDA proposal, after which their views on the proposal would be forwarded to President Johnson. 2 Specific reference to Malik's proposal delivered on March 21 has not been further identified; however, Malik addressed the same U.N. Committee on March 20 and delivered a statement advocating such a proposal. For a summary of his March 20 statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 194-196. 3 Ambassador Goldberg's statement in response to the Soviet initiative has not been further identified. 4 Presumably a reference to the ACDA proposal cited in footnote 4, Document 233 . 235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 23, 1968. Mr. President: Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Foster recommend that you send the attached letter to Chairman Kosygin 2 proposing that the US and Soviet governments announce during the UNGA debate on the NPT that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations within a specific time period on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles. Such a declaration could be very helpful in countering the anticipated basic complaint that the Soviet Union and the US are not themselves undertaking steps toward nuclear disarmament while calling on the rest of the world to adhere to the NPT. It would also bring to fruition our efforts of more than a year to engage the Soviets in a discussion of this subject. 3 Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Foster also recommend that you approve the attached message, which would be delivered at the same time as your letter, outlining in more detail our views on the strategic talks. In addition to setting forth the arguments for an early agreement in this field and the principles on which we would be prepared to negotiate, the message presents a specific new proposal for consideration (paras. 9 and 10). Specifically, we would propose a cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. Moreover, if this agreement were limited to land-based missiles, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. We would also propose to limit strategic anti-missile defense systems to an agreed number of launchers and associated radars. This would also be monitored by national means of verification in the case of fixed land-based systems. We would also be prepared to discuss the problem of monitoring more extensive agreements. 4 It is believed that a reasonable, concrete proposal would help convince the Soviets of our serious intent in these negotiations and help remove doubts that, in proposing talks, we are not merely on an intelligence fishing expedition. Some Soviet contacts have also intimated that a concrete proposal would help those in the Soviet government favoring talks to obtain a positive decision on this matter. Secretary Clifford has not yet cleared the letter or statement, although I understand that he and Paul Nitze had previously supported the proposal in principle. The JCS yesterday afternoon came out against the proposal and, I understand, want to delete all of the oral message starting with the last sentence of para. 6 on page 3 through para. 10 on page 5. If this is to have a useful impact in the UNGA consideration of the NPT, a decision should be taken on the letter and message as soon as possible. 5 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret. 2 Not found; however, for the letter later signed by President Johnson, see Document 237 . 3 For documentation on the development of this issue beginning with President Johnson's initial statement of January 1967 regarding curbing strategic defensive and offensive nuclear missiles, see Documents 174 , 175 , 178 , 179 , 185 , and 186 . 4 See Tab A, Document 231 . 5 A handwritten notation by Rostow at the end of the source text reads: “Mr. President: I believe this requires a special meeting.” 236. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford 236. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, April 27, 1968. JCSM-272-68 SUBJECT Arms Control on the Seabed (U) 1. (TS) Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-35409/68, dated 16 April 1968, subject as above, which requested the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft position paper prepared by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 2 b. JCSM-235-68, dated 15 April 1968, subject: “Arms Control Proposals for the Ocean Bottoms (U),” which recommended that the Secretary of Defense forward to the President the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that US support for arms control measures on the seabeds would not be in the national interest at this time and, in fact, would bear a potential for grave harm. 3 2. (S) ACDA proposes a treaty in which “each state party to the treaty undertakes not to station or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state.” ACDA also proposes that any verification required for compliance with the seabed arms control agreement would be by “unilateral verification capabilities.” 3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not oppose the consideration of arms control measures provided such measures will not have the effect of weakening the relative strategic posture of the United States and if an effective control system is established. Reference 1b sets forth the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the broad subject of arms control measures on the seabeds. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm those views at this time. In that memorandum, while noting arguments that acceptance of a denuclearization proposal might serve the immediate political purpose of helping to develop a climate of opinion favorable to the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the long-range consequences of banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabeds would be detrimental to the security of the United States. If, in the future, the US nuclear capability were to depend in part on the emplacement of weapons and devices on the ocean bottoms, the option for their use would be politically foreclosed by the terms of this proposed agreement. While it is premature to decide whether the United States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capacity in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a requirement is a distinct possibility. It is not a question of current programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal. 4. (TS) Possible future risks to the US nuclear forces include enhanced effects of nuclear weapons, such as X-rays and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), on US strategic missile systems. Another risk can be identified in terms of the advancing technology in long-range underwater surveillance systems. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that scientific or technological breakthroughs could make present US strategic offensive and defensive missile systems vulnerable to enemy attack. To counter this possibility, the United States might well be required to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. 5. (TS) If “pindown” and submarine vulnerability were to become a reality, the geographical differences between the United States and the USSR would become of great importance. The fact that the Soviet Union has a land area over twice that of the United States gives it an obvious land-development advantage over the United States. However, the United States has a conveniently located territorial base for the effective use and control of a wide range of deep seabed areas in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whereas Soviet access to the deep oceans is relatively restricted and environmentally difficult. Soviet coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range of site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. Clearly, it would be in the best interests of the USSR if it could offset any US geographical advantages with an international arms control agreement. 6. (S) A distance limit in connection with a seabed arms control proposal would prejudge and reduce the credibility of our current position on territorial seas. This could adversely affect the US bargaining position in forthcoming discussions on the breadth of the territorial sea. 7. (S) The United States does not have a verification capability now, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation has now or will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. In their opinion, an effective control system for a seabed denuclearization agreement could not be developed satisfactorily, and an international agreement by itself accomplishes little unless it can be effectively enforced. An unverifiable agreement could encourage a false sense of security in the United States. Lacking a dependable US detection/verification system, the USSR could probably emplace significant numbers of weapons on the seabeds. It is important to note that even a few nuclear weapons, if properly located, can seriously threaten US security as was amply illustrated by Soviet clandestine emplacement of a few missiles during the Cuban crisis. 8. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that discussion and/or negotiations concerning the undersea environment should be limited at this time to such matters as scientific research, exploration and exploitation of resources, and establishment of marine parks and preserves. Although future marine research and exploration may well indicate that there could be arms control measures which would be in the national interest, adoption of the present ACDA proposal would not be in the national interest and, in fact, has a potential for grave harm. 9. (U) In view of the wide variety of argumentation presented in the ACDA proposal, additional specific comments are provided in the Appendix. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Attachment 4 Undated. JCSM-272-68 APPENDIX Specific Comments on ACDA Proposal The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the rationale contained in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) proposal are as follows: A. (C) Background ACDA implies that the Pardo proposal 5 was adopted by the UN General Assembly; whereas, in fact, it was not adopted. The UN General Assembly did adopt a US sponsored resolution to establish an ad hoc committee to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor. B. (TS) Political 1. The statement that the United States should develop a position with regard to the seabed now, before technological possibilities become operational programs, is not supportable. The fact that we do not know the ultimate use of the seabed is reason enough for the United States to retain the option for its future use. 2. ACDA states that the proposed measure could be used to counter less acceptable measures which have been suggested in the UN General Assembly Committee One and the ad hoc committee. It is not appropriate to “counter less acceptable measures” with other unacceptable measures. 3. ACDA's assumption that its proposal would “preserve the nuclear-free status of the seabed” is insupportable. The value of any agreement which does not include all nuclear-capable nations is questionable. 4. ACDA stresses that its recommended US position would: appear to be forthcoming with respect to the Soviet demilitarization proposal; soothe purported feelings of resentment concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and demonstrate continued cooperation with the USSR in dampening strategic nuclear competition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a potentially vital US strategic advantage should not be offered as a negotiation tactic, believing it to be harmful to the national interest and dangerous to the security of the United States. The NPT should be debated on its own merits. Whatever derivative political benefits might result from the ACDA seabed proposal in terms of approval of the NPT are not at all clear and in no case match the potential substantive US strategic advantage that might thus be lost. 5. ACDA assumes that the 12-mile proposal would: a. Be more acceptable than other possible formulations. b. Avoid the issue of the extent of national jurisdiction. c. Not affect recognition of the breadth of the territorial sea. These assumptions are not supportable. There is currently substantial support in the world community for a 12-mile territorial sea. The endorsement of a 12-mile limit in connection with an arms control proposal would further reduce the credibility of our current 3-mile position. This could adversely affect the US bargaining position in forthcoming discussions with the USSR on the subject of the breadth of the territorial sea, and weaken US ability to obtain navigational rights for vessels and aircraft which are necessary before a 12-mile limit can be accepted. C. (TS) Military 1. A prohibition on the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed could be contrary to the security interest of the United States. The USSR and Communist China have a combined land area almost 3-1/2 times that of the United States and its possessions; thus the land-deployment base of our most powerful potential enemies is greatly superior to our own. Conversely, the United States enjoys greater access to ocean areas than do the USSR and Communist China. The ACDA statement, that the emplacement of weapons on the seabed does not appear to offer us any significant strategic advantage because the United States currently has no such program, is not supportable. Although strategic, technological, and economic factors thus far have caused exploitation of the seabeds to be a matter of lesser urgency than other development programs, there is not justification for assuming that this condition will continue to exist indefinitely. Strategic factors such as EMP X-rays and submarine vulnerability may require the United States to expand its nuclear weapons deployment base to the seabeds. It is not a question of current nuclear programs but the risks to future US strategic nuclear programs that must be the primary consideration in appraising a seabed denuclearization proposal. 2. The statement that the Soviets would forego the same options to use the seabed as a potential area for deployment as the United States is misleading. If it should become necessary to use the seabed because of possible US strategic vulnerability, giving up options to utilize the seabed could be of greater disadvantage to the United States than to the USSR. Soviet coastal control of sea bottom nuclear sites and its range of site deployment would be significantly inferior to that of the United States. 3. The ACDA statement that, within 12 miles of our coasts, the proposal would still leave us with over 140,000 square miles of underwater area for weapon deployment is misleading. Weapon dispersal considerations and the US geographical land deficiency compared to the USSR could dictate seabed weapon deployments in the deep oceans. D. (TS) Verification 1. ACDA proposes reliance on unilateral verification. It can be stated categorically that the United States does not now have the necessary technology for unilateral verification. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that any nation will obtain such a capability in the foreseeable future. Any arms control agreements which lack effective verification could work more to the detriment of the security of the United States than no arms control agreement at all. An unverifiable agreement could encourage a false sense of security in the United States while creating an opportunity for nations disposed to exploit or circumvent international agreements to gain significant military advantages. 2. The ACDA assumption that undetected weapons could be limited to “a few” is not supportable. Lacking a dependable US detection/verification system, the USSR could probably covertly emplace significant numbers of weapons on the seabeds. It is important to note that even a few nuclear weapons, if properly located, can seriously threaten US security as was amply illustrated by Soviet clandestine emplacement of a few missiles during the Cuban crisis. In short, in the absence of a detection/verification capability, there can be no real substance to an arms control agreement—only trust—and history testifies to the ineffectiveness of trust in restraining potential enemies. 3. Throughout the paper, ACDA states that the existence of a seabed treaty should deter weapon emplacement and should help the United States to obtain widespread “international support” for whatever response to weapon emplacement on the seabeds by other nations the United States would choose to promote. The degree and effectiveness of this “support” is doubtful. Neither the existence of the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor world opinion against atmospheric testing has restrained Communist China and France from continuing such nuclear tests. 4. ACDA states that its proposal was drafted to provide assurance that the collective security interest of the United States and its allies would be protected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposal has a potential for grave harm and that some of our allies may take the same view. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, January 1968. Top Secret. 2 The ISA memorandum of April 16 has not been further identified, but the “draft position paper” is presumably a reference to ACDA's April 12 proposal to the members of the Committee of Principals on arms control on the seabed; see footnote 4, Document 233 . 3 See Document 234 . 4 Top Secret. 5 For the statements by the Maltese Representative, Pardo, to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, November 1, 1967, in which five proposals for inclusion in a treaty on the peaceful uses of the ocean floor and seabed were advocated for adoption by the United Nations, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967 , pp. 547-554. 237. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 237. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, May 2, 1968. Dear Mr. Chairman: I have endeavored to use this channel only when I consider that the matters to be discussed are important and urgent. 2 In that spirit I communicate with you now on the following subjects: (1) The question of arms limitation in the Middle East, and (2) the long overdue question of our discussion in regard to offensive and defensive ballistic missiles. [Here follows discussion of the Middle East crisis.] The other subject I wish to take up with you again is my proposal, which goes back to December 1966, 3 in regard to holding discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race. I understand from Ambassador Thompson that Foreign Minister Gromyko told him on March 26 of this year that the Soviet Government was still studying the problem and that it attaches importance to this subject. As the United States Government has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter as, from a technical and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional consideration which leads me to raise this matter with you now. As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments. 4 I am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum number of adherents. During the resumed General Assembly session our efforts to achieve a treaty that can be opened for signature in the near future with the prospect of obtaining a maximum number of adherents will face a critical test. Efforts undoubtedly will be made by some states to postpone the opening of the treaty for signature at least until after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has been held in the fall of this year. 5 It is important that our two governments do everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world sentiment favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early date. To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to begin bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the announcement, as well as proceeding to discuss the related matters mentioned above. I would hope that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I very much hope you will reexamine the question of holding these discussions, whose importance I hardly need emphasize in this communication. I very much hope to hear from you in the near future. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special U.S.-U.S.S.R. File, Pen-Pal Series, 1968. Top Secret. On May 3, at the request of Secretary Rusk, Dobrynin met with him confidentially to receive a copy of this letter, and was asked to deliver it to Kosygin. Bohlen also attended this meeting. (Ibid.) The text of the letter was also telegraphed to the Embassy in Moscow on May 7. 2 See footnote 3, Document 178 . 3 Not further identified; however, at Secretary Rusk's December 21, 1966, news conference questions regarding a possible freeze on antiballistic missiles were posed to him. Rusk replied “we would regret very much the lifting of the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major expenditures [for antiballistic missiles].” See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967 , p. 509. 4 On March 11, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to the ENDC. For text of this joint draft, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 162-166. This draft became the subject of an extensive debate in the General Assembly, which reconvened on April 24. 5 The U.N. Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States convened in Geneva on August 29 and adjourned on September 28. 238. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 238. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, May 14, 1968, 4:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 REFERENCES Memorandum for the Members of the Committee of Principals dated April 12, 1968, from William C. Foster, Director, ACDA, Subject: Arms Control on the Seabed (U) 3 Summary of Action The Committee of Principals discussed an ACDA proposal to prohibit the fixing of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond 12 miles from the coast of a party and up to the coast of other countries. It was concluded that the Deputies to the Committee of Principals should meet promptly to prepare an agreed analysis of particular issues to serve as the basis for recommendations by the Principals to the President. Since a U.S. position will be needed by June 17, the Deputies were directed to prepare such an analysis in time for Principals' consideration by June 5. Discussion Secretary Rusk put a broad policy question before the Principals: Should the U.S. support international action to prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the deep ocean? Putting aside for the moment what the exact boundaries should be, is it advisable to create a nuclear free environment in the deep oceans like that in the Antarctic 4 and outer space? 5 Secretary Nitze said that, to answer this question, one should ask another question: What kind of an area would the U.S. want as a platform for its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles? Would we want it to be small, limited and closer to cities? He thought the answer to this question was negative. The Soviet Union has a larger land mass than the United States. The U.S. has better access to the sea than does the Soviet Union. The sea was, therefore, a better place for the U.S. to put nuclear weapons than for the Soviet Union. General Wheeler added that the Principals should consider what the problems might be in 20 years. There were now developments in Soviet weapons which give us difficulty. In the future, with further developments on the Soviet side, ocean bottoms could be a desirable deployment area for U.S. strategic weapons. Dr. Wenk pointed out that the ACDA proposal was limited to fixed emplacements . He asked whether it would embrace the anchoring of Polaris submarines. Mr. Foster replied that the ACDA proposal would not affect anchoring incidental to the purpose of navigation or perhaps for other reasons. Secretary Rusk said that if there were fixed anchoring, the submarine would be in trouble under the proposal. Mr. Foster then asked General Wheeler exactly what kinds of systems the DOD was considering for the bottom of the sea. General Wheeler listed the “ULM” (a submarine mobile platform carrying ICBMs), the “Turtle” (a bottom crawler or sitter), the “Sinbad” (a three-section submersible, the midsection remains on station and the end sections provide transportation and support), and tunnels for encapsulated missiles (“Rocksite”). He added that none of these devices were in today's 5-year program for DOD developments. However, they are under consideration, and there might come a time when they would be desirable. Mr. Foster pointed out that it was U.S. policy to move toward halting the nuclear arms race in all environments, and that non-armament was usually much easier than disarmament to accomplish. He added that the proposals of the Soviet Union and many other countries went much further than did ACDA's proposal. The UN debates had considered complete demilitarization of the seabed and reserving it for peaceful uses only, whereas the ACDA proposal dealt only with weapons of mass destruction. He thought the best defense against other proposals was a good offensive, namely, a good proposal of our own. He listed the political advantages of the proposal and added that he thought it would contribute to U.S. security. Dr. Hornig pointed out that whenever a new class of weapons was discussed there was a fundamental dilemma: Was there greater risk in limiting such an expansion of the nuclear arms race and foreclosing future military options than there was in developing and deploying the new weapons? Secretary Nitze thought that the problems involving arms control of the deep ocean bed had not been thought through to the same degree as had been the problems involved in the test ban. He pointed to two specific problems: (1) What was the relationship of the ACDA proposal to the Law of the Sea? 6 He added that we have disagreements with the Soviet Union on where the baseline is from which to measure the breadth of the territorial sea. We are now working on developing a position concerning a new Law of the Sea treaty. The relationship of the Law of the Sea problems to the ACDA proposal must be thought through. (2) The most significant arms control measure to be discussed with the Soviet Union was a freeze on offensive and defensive missiles. For that discussion, it had been decided to exclude mobile land-based intercontinental missiles because the verification problem was difficult. In Secretary Nitze's view, the verification problems involved in the deep oceans were far greater. Under these circumstances, Secretary Nitze questioned whether we should be considering arms control for the deep oceans. He added that the ACDA paper was more polemical than analytical. He thought that a subcommittee of the Principals should work out an agreed analysis to form the basis of the US position. Dr. Seaborg stated that precise definitions of what was prohibited and what was permitted were necessary. Mr. Foster agreed that the strategic missile freeze was a more important measure but pointed out that it could only be discussed bilaterally with the Soviet Union at the present time. The seabed proposal was already being discussed at the UN on a multilateral basis, and the U.S. needed to have a position. He thought the ACDA proposal would not interfere with the Law of the Sea negotiations. Secretary Rusk added that, in any event, countries favoring the 3-mile limit were a disappearing breed. He didn't think differences over the breadth of the territorial sea should be conclusive of the Government's decision on the ACDA proposal. Secretary Rusk then spoke of the need to prevent further diversion of scarce national resources to the development and deployment of more sophisticated nuclear weaponry. He pointed out that both sides already had enough weapons to destroy the US, Soviet Union and Europe, and he doubted that our large stockpiles had increased the security of the American people. He hoped, if possible, to avoid pursuit of a higher plateau in the nuclear arms race which would not increase our security. If the Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons on the bottom of the sea, he said, their target would be U.S. cities. We could not transfer the Soviet target for these or other ballistic missiles to the ocean by our deploying nuclear weapons on the ocean bottom. He asked why the same considerations which have resulted in placing Antarctica and outer space off limits should not apply to the seabed. He thought that such deployments would be a futile exercise and very expensive. Unless the human race found a way to limit the arms race and prevent further massive diversion of resources to weapons, we were in deep trouble. Dr. Seaborg suggested a fast staff study for the Principals. Mr. Foster said the Deputies to the Principals could handle such a study. Secretary Rusk thought they should consider such problems as (1) whether the baseline should be that set forth in earlier Law of the Sea treaties, or simply the low water mark, (2) whether the proposal should deal with “emplacing” nuclear weapons on the seabed and (3) whether the proposal could be simplified for further discussion. Dr. Seaborg added that the problem of how long a submarine could sit on the bottom should be dealt with by the Deputies. Secretary Rusk asked how accessible the deep ocean bed was now. Secretary Nitze said that by 1969 we would be able to go down 4,000 feet deep in the ocean. Dr. Wenk said that this was with one small, experimental submarine designed in 1960. He added that there was a long way to go and a lot of money involved before deployment of a strategic weapons system would be possible. The small research submarine had cost $60 million. Effective nuclear weapons systems would be enormously more costly. Dr. Hornig pointed out that the deep ocean was not an attractive prospect for strategic weapons deployment now. He didn't see how one could really study the possibility in great detail since so little was known. Dr. Seaborg suggested that the tops of under water mountains might be attractive locations for deployment. Dr. Hornig replied that they might be and that the Bering Sea might also be attractive, but a very major deployment expense was involved in either case for either side. Dr. Wenk pointed to the recent Presidential statements concerning the peaceful uses of the sea. 7 He added that the Principals needed to keep in mind that the ad hoc UN committee chairman had pointed out two proposals which the UN should consider in the near future: (1) the U.S. proposal for a decade of international development of the sea, and (2) the Soviet proposal for demilitarization of the seabed. 8 Dr. Wenk referred to a Navy paper which contained a spectrum of the arms control possibilities for the seabed. 9 The ACDA proposal was the least restrictive of any of the arms control measures listed in the Navy's paper. Dr. Hornig indicated that stationing nuclear weapons on the seabed would involve a host of problems such as how to protect the weapons from theft or accidental triggering. He doubted that the U.S. would want to put many nuclear weapons at remote distances from its shore. Mr. Foster added that to do so would be destabilizing. Dr. Wenk asked who would benefit by moving in this direction. The ACDA paper, he said, suggested that a nation with a few nuclear weapons might use them for crude nuclear mines. He added that with the ACDA proposal in effect, the U.S. would be in a better position to get wide political support for dealing with such a deployment. Secretary Nitze replied that countries didn't ordinarily deploy mines in peace time. In war time, the treaty would be ineffective. Dr. Wenk thought that it was still the country with the small nuclear force which might find deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed advantageous. He suggested that the Chinese Communists might do so and that the ACDA paper would give the U.S. a better political basis for dealing with the problem if they did. Secretary Rusk asked when a U.S. position was needed. Mr. Foster replied that the UN ad hoc committee would meet on June 17 and that the NATO POLADs would meet on June 30. Secretary Rusk asked whether the Soviets knew about our SOSUS system. Admiral Taylor said they did. Secretary Rusk suggested that if our proposal dealt with weapons of mass destruction and the Soviet proposal dealt with complete demilitarization, there would probably be a standoff between the two. Dr. Seaborg asked whether the ACDA proposal would be violated if the U.S. lost another nuclear weapon on the bottom of the sea. Mr. Foster replied there would be no violation. Secretary Rusk asked about the problem of verification. Mr. Helms replied that this was a difficult problem because the sea was so vast. If you know where to hunt, you may well find a nuclear weapon deployed on the bottom of the sea. If there is a large-scale construction involved, you could probably detect it. On the other hand, he was not happy about verifying deployment of one or a few nuclear weapons on the seabed. But this problem was with us with or without the ACDA proposal. Secretary Rusk said that this sounded similar to the problem of verification involved in the Outer Space Treaty. Dr. Hornig pointed out that a country deploying strategic weapons system on the seabed which might threaten us would need an adequate command and control system which would probably involve a communications system which could be detectable. In addition, the country would need to move a great deal of material. Clandestine deployment would be quite difficult. Mr. Helms agreed. If there were a large deployment, he added, we would find it. If it was sneaky and small, it might escape our detection. Secretary Nitze said he was sympathetic to the need for a U.S. position but more precise staff work was needed. Secretary Rusk added that, at a minimum, we must have speech material for the U.S. representative by June 17. He pointed to the need for giving the President sufficient time to deal with this problem and hoped we could avoid presenting it to him at the last minute. He asked for a initial paper to be submitted by the Deputies to the Principals for consideration by June 5. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File:FRC 85 A 83, Principals Meeting, May 14, 1968. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal and George Bunn of ACDA are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. 2 Not printed. 3 See Document 233 . 4 The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959, (entered into force June 23, 1961) by the United States, Soviet Union, and ten other countries in Washington to demilitarize the Antarctic continent. For text, see 12 UST 794. 5 The Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies was signed on January 27, 1967, in Washington, London, and Moscow, and entered into force on October 10, 1967. For text, see 18 UST 2410. 6 The Law of the Sea Treaty on fishing and conservation of living resources of the high seas was signed by 35 nations on April 29, 1958, in Geneva and entered into force on March 20, 1966. The U.S. signed the Treaty with an understanding. For text, see 17 UST 138. 7 Presumably a reference to President Johnson's special message to Congress on conservation, delivered on March 8, in which he proposed an “International Decade of Ocean Exploration for the 1970's.” See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , pp. 355-370. 8 Presumably a reference to Soviet Representative Malik's statement to the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, delivered on March 20, 1968; see footnote 3, Document 233 , which the Soviets subsequently presented as a specific initiative in the Committee on June 20. See Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , p. 445. 9 Not further identified. 239. Memorandum of Conversation 239. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 17, 1968, 1–3:15 p.m. SUBJECT Nonproliferation Treaty PARTICIPANTS For the United States : The Secretary G—Ambassador Bohlen EUR—John M. Leddy For the Soviet Union : Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov About two-thirds of the 2-hour luncheon was devoted to the NPT. US-Soviet Cooperation Both the Secretary and Kuznetsov expressed their appreciation for the close cooperation which had taken place at the UN between the Soviet and American delegations on the handling of the NPT. The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that this close collaboration should continue; that the two governments should stand firm against any changes, certainly for the time being; and that if, at the very end, and if both agree, there were minor changes in the text of the Treaty which would not affect basic substance, and if by these changes it would be possible to get significantly wider adherence to the Treaty, the two governments would then consider whether these changes could be accepted. Kuznetsov emphasized that he was under instructions to agree to no changes at present and stressed the problem of opening a Pandora's box if alterations were to be considered at this stage. The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that the two countries could be more flexible in dealing with the proposed GA resolution endorsing the NPT than with the text of the NPT itself; but that any changes in the text of the GA resolution must also be acceptable to both the US and the USSR. Significance of the Latin American and African Vote Kuznetsov said that before coming to Washington he had had a talk with Robles, the UN Delegate of Mexico, which was the leader of the Latin American group. He stressed the importance of bringing around the Latin American vote and urged that the US do everything it could to bring the Latin Americans into line. The outlook was not discouraging, but US help was needed. The Secretary said that we would do everything that we could on an urgent basis. According to Kuznetsov, Robles had said that the Mexicans would sign the NPT even if there were no changes in the text, but Robles urged changes in order to bring around the rest of the group. The Secretary observed that Robles was probably more Mexican than the Mexicans. He pointed out that Carrillo Flores, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, was personally strongly in favor of the Treaty. Kuznetsov said that the Mexican proposal 2 to include in the NPT Treaty—or possibly in the GA resolution—a reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 3 would cause serious difficulties for the Soviets. Such a reference in Soviet eyes would bind them to the principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which they are still considering and about which they have reservations on two main points: (1) On the principle of permitting peaceful explosion by non-nuclear weapon states—(Art. 18) and (2) on the huge area covered by the treaty, which embraces half the Atlantic and half the Pacific. 4 Turning to Brazil, the Secretary told Kuznetsov that the US was not in agreement with the Brazilians on their proposed amendment regarding peaceful nuclear explosive devices (Pineds). 5 He said that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had told him that the Brazilians would not press their amendment on this subject or urge the other Latin Americans to support it. He thought the Brazilians would probably not sign the NPT now but might come along later. He observed that the Brazilians, like a number of other countries, were attempting to use the NPT in order to get bilateral bargaining advantages from the US on such questions as fuel supply, peaceful uses, the S.W. Africa issue, etc. Kuznetsov said he hoped we would make good use of our bargaining power to get adherence to the NPT. Reference was made to the fact that Mexican Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores was now visiting Moscow. It was suggested that the Soviets could raise the NPT with him during his visit, while the US would approach the Mexicans in Washington or Mexico City. Kuznetsov said that the Africans were being troublesome. The African opposition bloc was led by Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. Their tactic is to promote a resolution which would postpone consideration of the NPT until the 23rd GA. Kuznetsov had had a talk with the UN representative of Kenya within the last few days and had ascertained that an important element in the African position was the attitude of South Africa on the NPT. If the South Africans could be brought to support the NPT unequivocally, this could be very important in swinging the entire African vote. At this point the Secretary showed Kuznetsov a telegram which the Department had received this morning from our Mission in South Africa, explaining some of the South African preoccupations and recommending that a US technical expert be sent to Pretoria in order to clarify these problems. The Secretary said that the US would take steps to do this immediately in an effort to help the situation. The Secretary asked whether the Soviets felt that the negative Tanzanian attitude was influenced by the Chinese. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets were quite certain of it. The Tanzanians had said at the UN that the NPT was nonsense and what really mattered was disarmament. Their whole idea is to postpone the NPT with the hope it will be killed. In response to Kuznetsov's question as to whether the US could do something with Tanzania, the Secretary replied that our relations were only fair, but we would do what we could. The Secretary asked whether Kuznetsov felt that the Africans were attempting to use the NPT as a means of pressing their views on S.W. Africa. Kuznetsov confirmed that they were and referred to a recent Asian-African meeting at which a decision was reached that there would be no action on NPT until the S.W. African problem was solved. The Secretary said that this created real difficulties. Ambassador Bohlen asked Kuznetsov what he felt was the attitude of the francophone Africans. Kuznetsov said “not good”; that according to a recent talk he had with Bernard (French Ambassador to the UN) the French would be neutral on NPT although it really favors the Treaty. Mr. Bohlen recalled that De Gaulle had said a few years ago that he did not believe in treaties which have no real powers of enforcement. Concluding this aspect of the discussion Kuznetsov once again emphasized the importance of the Latin American vote and the importance of US efforts with the Latin American countries to obtain favorable results. FRG Activities at the UN Kuznetsov said that the FRG observer at the UN (Von Braun) had recently distributed a press release (which he said had been prepared over a year ago, but with new thoughts introduced) designed to bring uncertainty and doubt about the NPT. The Soviets were wondering whether they should not speak out against this action. From the Soviet view, the FRG is trying to sow seeds of doubt. Meanwhile, while the FRG has two people at the UN the GDR can't get visas from the US to be present at the UN, and the Soviets think that they should. The Secretary said that, speaking very frankly, he would like to offer the Soviets some advice. There was an internal problem in the FRG on the NPT. Some were hostile to it, but others, including Kiesinger and Brandt, were prepared to move. Birrenbach was troubled; Strauss was not in favor. The Secretary thought that the FRG would sign the NPT, but he advised the Soviets not to make an issue about the FRG observer's statement; this would only complicate an already serious problem both for the FRG and for the US and would make more difficult FRG support for the Treaty. In any event, he said, the question of a GDR observer at the UN raised a difficult problem in itself. (Mr. Bohlen briefly mentioned the recent GDR interference with the travel of West German citizens over the autobahns to Berlin. Kuznetsov quickly said this was an entirely different question and had nothing to do with the NPT. Mr. Bohlen said he had raised the matter only because Kuznetsov had mentioned the question of visas for GDR observers at the UN.) The Secretary said one of the reasons for the internal opposition in the FRG to the NPT was the thought of making a commitment to the Soviet Union for nothing in return. The US would like to keep the NPT quite separate from all extraneous matters and he again urged that the Soviets take no action regarding the FRG statement at the UN. He added that the members of NATO were strongly interested in assurances of FRG adherence to the NPT for reasons which would be understood. US-Soviet Talks on Nuclear Weapons Kuznetsov acknowledged that if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to start bilateral talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons this would be helpful at the UN on the NPT. However he could only say that Moscow was still considering the US proposal that talks begin. Security Assurances Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that there is considerable dissatisfaction at the UN over security assurances. There was the problem of when to put the draft resolution to the Security Council. The membership problem was not encouraging and it would not be easy to find 9 members in support of it. He had tried to find out what the French attitude would be. The French delegate had told him that he would not be active, but had no answer on the final French position. Probably they would abstain. India would probably also abstain. Ethiopia and Pakistan were doubtful. The Secretary thought that Japan and India face the most serious problem in connection with security assurances. He said that he personally was 1000% against India becoming a nuclear-weapon state; but that if he were the Foreign Minister of India he would certainly understand the difficulties confronting India in view of the Chinese threat. Kuznetsov said the Japanese were very active in the GA and have prepared a draft statement. Japanese reservations relate to the questions of security assurances, peaceful uses and disarmament. The Secretary said his personal view was that Japan would sign; Kuznetsov thought that they and others would nevertheless try to postpone. Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that he had no definite answer from the Romanians. The Romanians were not active in the UN. His best guess was that the Romanians would not vote in favor of the GA resolution endorsing the NPT, but would abstain. The Secretary emphasized two points in connection with security assurances and the position of the US: 1. The US is not prepared to enter into any additional commitments of alliance in order to give security assurances relating to the NPT. We have enough allies as it is and the Senate will not approve any additions. 2. The US is not ready to entertain the prospect of a possible war with the Soviet Union in order to get the NPT. Therefore, the Security Council approach which we had agreed upon with the USSR is the only approach possible for the US. The Secretary added that there are few people who truly understand the real meaning of nuclear war—perhaps not more than 25 or 30 in the US. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union understood it very well. The NPT had been under the highest consideration in the USSR which had concluded that the NPT negotiations were of the highest importance and the only way to stop proliferation. He returned to the importance of solidarity between the US and Soviet Union in not making any material changes in the Treaty except as outlined above. Procedures for Signing NPT The Secretary said that the US has not made up its mind on the procedure for signing the NPT. This would have to be discussed with the President. The US had no strong objections to signing the Treaty at the ENDC in Geneva. But if this procedure were adopted two problems would arise. If signature of the Treaty were open to all on this occasion, then the question of the non-recognized (implicitly the GDR) would arise. If signing were limited to members of the ENDC, there is the question of how many members we could get to sign. Perhaps it would be less complicated to use the formula followed in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, i.e., to sign in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets favored signing in Geneva in order to maximize public attention to the importance of the treaty. This would be analogous to the procedure followed for the Test Ban Treaty (which was signed at one place, in Moscow). He said that if problems should arise about non-recognized states (presumably referring to GDR) in a Geneva ceremony, he thought that this could be taken care of. The Secretary then made a personal suggestion, which he asked the Soviet side not to report, that perhaps there could be an initialing of the text in Geneva with formal signatures taking place in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. He said that he would talk over this whole question with the President. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leddy (EUR) and approved for distribution by J.P. Walsh (S/S) on May 20. The source text is labeled “Part I of V.” The conversation took place in the Secretary's dining room. 2 For a detailed account of Mexico's position on the non-proliferation treaty and its relationship to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, see Garcia Robles' statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly, May 16, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 345-357. 3 See footnote 2, Document 226 . 4 On May 20, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov delivered a statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At this time, he expressed, in broad terms, the reservations held by the Soviets about the Mexican proposal. See Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 368-378. 5 Brazil was one of several ENDC members which urged that peaceful nuclear explosions should be exempt from prohibition under Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty because Article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see footnote 2, Document 226 ) specifically permitted the signatories to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under international inspection, either with their own resources or in cooperation with third parties. See the statement by Brazil's Foreign Minister de Magalhaes Pinto to the First Committee of the General Assembly, May 3, regarding Brazil's proposed amendments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 278-283. 240. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 240. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 24, 1968. SUBJECT Material on NPT for Presidential Speech June 4 at Glassboro 2 The timing of the NPT debate in the UNGA makes it extremely opportune for the NPT to be a central theme in a speech delivered in Glassboro on June 4. The plan is now to submit to Committee I on Wednesday of next week 3 the agreed text of a resolution endorsing the NPT, together with a final version of the treaty. There is every indication that there will be a very substantial majority voting for it although some of the key countries will abstain. In order to minimize the possibility of further amendments, it is planned to bring the resolution to a final vote as soon as possible. It is now estimated that the vote on the resolution will come on June 4! The resolution will then be referred to the Plenary session of the UNGA and will be voted on there again after a week or so. Although normally the vote would be the same in both forums, there is in this case a real possibility that some of the expected abstentions in Committee I might change to positive votes in the Plenary. The fact that the vote in Committee I and the speech may be on the same day presents the speech writer with some problems. We might be able to speed up the vote by one day and we could certainly delay it a few days. After the vote, the speech could welcome the first international endorsement of the NPT and at the same time to maintain the pressure looking toward an even stronger vote of endorsement in the Plenary of the UNGA. Before the vote, the speech could anticipate the international endorsement and maintain pressure on those who were undecided whether to vote yes or abstain in Committee I. I think the President might make the following points: 1. Welcome, or encourage, endorsement of NPT by Committee I. 2. Identify critical nature of nuclear proliferation problem. 3. Note the three purposes served by the NPT: a. Prevent proliferation. b. Permit peaceful uses of the atom without fear of diversion to nuclear weapons. c. New impetus on negotiations to halt arms race. 4. Treaty represents the collective efforts of the major nuclear powers and most of the rest of the world—first in ENDC, now in UNGA. 5. UNGA support for NPT represents an historic vote of confidence in man's ability to control his destiny—to create an environment in which nuclear energy will not be an ever-expanding threat but a benefit to all mankind. 6. NPT convincingly demonstrates ability of major nuclear powers to work together closely and effectively on matter of critical importance to all. 7. We and the Soviets must pursue negotiations for further steps on arms control and disarmament as called for in NPT. 8. Restate call for discussions on strategic weapons freeze. 9. Call on Committee I or UNGA Plenary for strong endorsement of NPT, depending on timing of speech. 10. Express expectation that treaty can be signed and submitted to this session of Congress. I am attaching for your reference the text on the NPT prepared by Bill Foster for the ACDA bill signing but held back for the “Swords into Plowshares” award. 4 I understand that this ceremony has now been deferred until June 6 and will be a small, private affair, so this material could better be used in connection with the Glassboro speech. I think you will find this text, which covers some of the above points, useful. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Glassboro State College, 6/4/68 Commencement Speech, Box 11. Confidential. 2 For text of President Johnson's speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book I, pp. 679-684. 3 May 29. 4 Not found. 241. Report of Meeting 241. Report of Meeting 1 Washington, undated. REPORT OF THE DEPUTIES MEETING ON ARMS CONTROL ON THE SEABED At the meeting of the Deputies to the Committee of Principals on May 27, 1968, the Deputies discussed the ACDA proposal as amended and the key issues identified by the Committee of Principals at its meeting on May 14, 1968. 2 This report represents the extent of agreement reached by the Deputies with the exception of the representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who does not concur in any portion thereof. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are attached hereto as Tab A. 3 In order to avoid legal complications and to clarify the fact that the proposal would not limit the deployment of submarines, we recommend that the proposal be amended to read as follows: “Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to [ station ], 4 emplace , or fix 5 nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath, or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other state. For the purposes of this Treaty only, the term 'coast' is defined as the [ baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. ] low water line along the coast.” At the meeting of the Principals, the Secretary of State indicated that a U.S. position concerning arms control on the seabed is required in advance of the resumption of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on June 17, 1968 in order to be able to respond to views expressed by other governments. The U.S. needs a position in order to deal effectively with the proposals of other nations which could adversely affect U.S. security interests. A “demilitarization” proposal is clearly unacceptable. The “peaceful purposes only” approach would require carefully considered qualifications to be compatible with certain defensive military purposes. Adoption of a basic position on denuclearization would enable the U.S. to take a positive approach to arms control in a new environment, and at the same time fend off other less acceptable proposals. The Principals instructed the Deputies to analyze certain particular issues to serve as a basis for a recommendation by the Principals to the President. The following paragraphs present the views of the Deputies on the four major issues. 1. There is general agreement on the intended interpretation of what would be prohibited or permitted under the ACDA seabed proposal as amended. This interpretation is based on the illustrative listing in Tab B attached hereto. 6 2. The Legal Adviser of the Department of State advises that the ACDA proposal, as amended, when coupled with explanatory comments as to our position, will not adversely prejudice future U.S. legal positions concerning the law of the sea. 7 3. Although we see no military advantage to the ACDA proposal, it is our belief that this measure is in the overall net U.S. interest. 8 There are no planned systems in current DOD plans which are prohibited. The option to employ mobile sea-based systems (submarines) is preserved, and such systems can probably redress foreseeable asymmetries; permanently fixed sea-based systems are probably not necessary for this purpose. We recognize that future technological breakthroughs might jeopardize some of our existing weapons systems; however, we believe that the economic savings and political benefits from proscribing the emplacement of nuclear weapons in this new environment may outweigh these rather remote and unforeseen contingencies. 4. U.S. capabilities to verify unilaterally compliance with the Treaty would vary in different circumstances. We could not count on detecting and identifying a seabed system in the Ramp;D phase, but there is a good chance that we would detect the fact of development of most such systems before they become operational. The detection and identification of an encapsulated weapon system would be less likely than in the case of other new systems. Deployment of nuclear weapons in fixed installations which require substantial construction under the open ocean would almost certainly be detected. Our capabilities to detect the deployment of a few “bottom crawlers” or other similar systems which rested on the bottom, or of individually encapsulated weapons would be minimal. The fact of deployment of a large number of such weapons would probably be detected. Once we had learned that such weapons had been deployed, and the approximate location of such deployment, our capability to verify the deployment and the nature of the weapon 9 would be good. 10 We believe it highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would deploy large numbers of unprotected systems, such as individually encapsulated nuclear missiles, on the seabed due to the problems of command and control and the risk of one or more being discovered and acquired by the U.S. 11 The verification capability indicated above appears to be adequate to protect U.S. security interests when considered in conjunction with the current and projected strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of clandestine deployments of this kind on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (1), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “latest draft.” There are many brief handwritten inserts throughout the text in addition to those cited below. 2 See Document 238 . 3 See Document 236 . 4 All brackets are in the source text. 5 The Department of Defense prefers to use, “implant nuclear weapons or other weapons … ” [Footnote in the source text.] 6 This attachment, entitled “Weapons Systems Prohibited or Permitted under ACDA Seabed Proposal,” is not printed. 7 See footnote 6, Document 238 . A handwritten notation next to this paragraph reads: “DOD questions this.” 8 A handwritten notation next to this paragraph reads: “uneasy that State believes we have been mousetrapped [ sic ].” 9 A handwritten notation inserted after this word reads: “by obtaining at least one sample.” 10 A handwritten notation at the end of this sentence reads: “in the probable time scale implied.” 11 A handwritten notation next to this paragraph reads: “other than Sovs?” 242. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 242. Record of Meeting of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, June 3, 1968, 4:30 p.m. ACDA-2927 PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 REFERENCE Report of the Deputies Meeting on Arms Control on the Seabed, May 27, 1968 3 Summary of Action The ACDA Proposal 4 was remanded to the Deputies with instructions to prepare a statement reflecting a U.S. position in time for the June 17 meeting of the UN Ad Hoc Committee. The intelligence community was requested to review its position on U.S. unilateral verification capabilities. Mr. Meeker was to be requested to meet with R.Adm. William Hearn (U.S.N. JAG, Ret.) and reach agreement on the inner and outer limits of that portion of the seabed adjacent to the coast of each signatory state within which the prohibition will not apply. Discussion Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Foster to summarize the Report of the Deputies. Mr. Foster commented on the four principal points made in the Deputies Report of May 27. Secretary Rusk queried whether there was not a rough analogy in this situation to the Outer Space Treaty 5 negotiations. Mr. Helms said it was roughly the same. Mr. Nitze stated there was a problem. Under the Outer Space Treaty, the Soviets could orbit everything but the nuclear warhead. Under the ACDA proposal, the Soviets could deploy the weapon system on the seabed, to be armed with nuclear weapons at a time of their choosing—without (until the moment of arming) there being a violation of the treaty. They could aim for a first strike capability. Mr. Foster said we would know if the Soviets made a substantial deployment—we can keep track of the changes in their strategic position. Mr. Helms said Secretary Rusk's statement remains accurate: the ACDA proposal involves a rough analogy to the Outer Space Treaty. Mr. Nitze said that the seabed proposal would face a difficult time in the Senate. The Senate was much concerned with the Soviet FOBS development which followed on ratification of the Outer Space Treaty. He added that he had problems with each one of the four conclusions in the Deputies' Report. As to the first which stated that the Deputies were in general agreement on the interpretation of what would be permitted and what would be prohibited, Mr. Nitze disagreed saying that the Soviets could, without treaty violation, deploy the weapons system minus warheads. With respect to the second conclusion to the effect that the ACDA proposal, as amended, would not adversely prejudice future U.S. legal positions concerning the law of the sea, 6 R.Adm. Hearn doesn't share Mr. Meeker's views. Adm. Hearn believes that substantial questions are involved such as the 12-mile territorial sea. The definition of the coast in the draft treaty text annexed to the proposal is tautological and does not take into account the USSR views on their so-called “internal seas.” Secretary Rusk said such a definition probably was prejudicial to Soviet views on territorial seas but not to the U.S. Use of the 12-mile exclusion zone raises a presumption that we are getting involved in the territorial sea, but we can make clear that this proposal has nothing to do with the law of the territorial sea. Perhaps we could accept some other outer limit such as 25 miles. Adm. Taylor asked if the 100 fathom isobath was practicable as the outer limits. Dr. Wenk said that isobath would have a tendency to be confused with the 200 meter isobath defining the outer limits of the continental shelf which, in some cases, is found at a distance of 156 miles from the coast. He believes that any line in terms of distance was less harmful than one in terms of depth. Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze if JAG's views would be met if we separated completely the outer limits of the exclusionary zone in the ACDA proposal from the law of the territorial seas? Mr. Nitze replied that he wasn't sure. Mr. Foster noted that it would solve a psychological problem. The considerations involved in the proposal differ from those involved in the law of the sea. Secretary Rusk said he saw no disadvantage in the ACDA proposal in an outer limit of the coastal zone which is clearly not related to the law of the sea. He suggested that Mr. Meeker and Adm. Hearn meet to resolve any differences. Mr. Nitze said he also had difficulties with the third paragraph in the Deputies' Report relating to the absence of military advantages and to the presence of economic savings and political benefits in the ACDA proposal. He could not see any economic savings since we may never wish a seabed deployment at all. We are talking of possibilities which may occur some 10 to 20 years in the future in the light of a technology much more advanced than it is today. We could be interested in alternatives to land based or submarine launched missiles. The seabed could offer the most economical alternative—unless we are to assume that we should not want such a deployment. Mr. Foster said the basic economic savings would be to avoid any expense by precluding an arms race on the seabed. Secretary Rusk asked if the Antarctic 7 situation did not provide an analogy. Mr. Nitze said that was not necessarily so. Mr. Foster stated it was U.S. policy to eliminate nuclear weapons in the entire world. First in Antarctica, then testing in the atmosphere, next deployment in Outer Space and now on the seabed. We can't eliminate such weapons in one day but the seabed represents an additional environment. When one considers the astronomical estimates of deployment costs reflected in the JCS staff paper, 8 one is astonished. A movement in this direction would conform to our overall arms control policy. Mr. Nitze replied that the same principle could be applied to submarines even though it was more expensive to deploy missiles on land where it costs more than submarine systems to get the same degree of assured destructive capability. He found the logic of the situation wanting. Dr. Seaborg said we would have to assume the seabed had as much potential as submarines to make such an argument. Secretary Rusk added that if we decided in favor of such deployment, enormous defense budgets for this purpose would be inevitable. Dr. Tape said that the economic savings conclusion in the Deputies' Report was based on the assumption that we would retain submarines, and that no other system appeared more useful. Mr. Nitze replied that a mobile force was less costly and would not involve giving up anything. Dr. Tape said that any missile silo (Rocksite) program would be prohibitively expensive, so why do it. Secretary Rusk said it was his personal view that it was a military disadvantage to even have invented missiles. Mr. Nitze added that thermonuclear weapons were terrible. Gen. Wheeler stated that the same opinions had been expressed some 400 years ago with regard to gunpowder. Dr. Seaborg said that the same disadvantages were cited years ago against the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 9 Obviously other reasons had been found to more than compensate for the disadvantages. Mr. Marks said that the argument applied to every new weapons system, and that this renunciation of a military option was a cheap price to pay for lessening of tension. Secretary Rusk queried whether the LTBT had resulted in a reduction of expenditures for testing. Dr. Seaborg replied that underground testing was extremely expensive. Mr. Nitze replied that any advantage in ACDA's proposal would be political, but that he had not seen much analysis of political gains. The proposal, if agreed, would be unverifiable, however. Dr. Hornig asked whether we would stand for the deployment of such a seabased weapon system, without warheads? Mr. Foster said we'd denounce the treaty. Gen. Wheeler said he also had thought we would denounce the Outer Space Treaty under a similar situation, but now had serious doubts that we would denounce either treaty under such conditions. Dr. Wenk gave his views on the economic savings and political benefits. The first related to the arms control measure which involved trade offs. The second involved international cooperation and collaboration in the sea—through the UN and other agencies. He believed that the present set of U.S. proposals on seabed resources could not proceed without an arms control measure. The political benefits were of an immediate nature which had to be weighed against the hypothetical long term military contingencies. The U.S. would be in a far weaker position on its overall long term seabed policy if it took a negativistic point of view towards arms limitations. The ACDA proposal represents almost the least we can do. Mr. Nitze replied that the ACDA proposal, if adopted, may not be acceptable to other nations and we'll be pressured to go further. Mr. Foster said he didn't think the proposal would be unacceptable to other nations. The Soviet “demilitarization” proposal would knock out SOSUS. ACDA's proposal is realistic. We wouldn't negotiate a treaty at the U.N. but rather in the ENDC. We would state a general arms control principle at the U.N. to accomplish the U.S. policy of limiting nuclear weapons. Secretary Rusk said this proposal would take care of 98% of the apparent objectives in the Soviet Arms control proposals. Dr. Wenk added he did not believe the Soviets were serious about their “demilitarization” proposal, but they would capitalize enormously on the political level if the U.S. were to do nothing in this field. Gen. Wheeler said he joined Mr. Nitze in the latter's stated views. He pointed out that if the Soviets were to deploy large numbers of weapons on the ocean floor, we could detect a massive underwater undertaking but nothing more. The JCS disagreed with the Deputies' judgment on U.S. verification capabilities as reflected in their report. He added that he did not believe that the Soviets would most likely not opt for seabed deployment. The U.S. had not seen that FOBS were in the net U.S. advantage, but the Soviets had concluded it was to their advantage. Secretary Rusk asked if we had any information whether the Soviets were deploying that kind of system (FOBS). Mr. Helms said the Soviets appeared to be flight testing FOBS. Dr. Hornig said it was not clear whether the Soviets were developing FOBS or ballistic missiles with depressed trajectories and deboost capabilities. Secretary Rusk asked whether we had any indications that the Soviets were contemplating a seabed nuclear weapon system. Adm. Taylor said that we had no indications and that it did not appear that the Soviets require a system of this type. The U.S. verification capabilities are based on a combination of sensors. We have to consider that the magnitude of the task of emplacement would be detectable. Once the emplacement was located, underwater verification should be adequate for U.S. to know what the Soviets are doing. Dr. Wenk added that the last paragraph of the Deputies' Report on the adequacy of U.S. verification capabilities must be read with its operating phrase “in conjunction with” (“the current and projected strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of clandestine deployments of this kind on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments”). The entire thought does not support Gen. Wheeler's judgment. Moreover, the Soviets are retarded in deep sea technology, and for the Soviets to develop such technology would be visible to the intelligence community in the Ramp;D stage. The Soviet interest in purchasing the Star III, for example, supports this view since the technology represented in the Star III as constructed is 8 or 10 years behind the current state of technology. Adm. Taylor added that the basic question is the direction of Soviet oceanographic interest—the evidence points to increasing Soviet capabilities for fisheries resources. Secretary Rusk said that perhaps we could attempt to cooperate with the Soviets in exploiting and exploring the deep sea resources. Adm. Taylor thought it was a good idea, adding that we could then check on their technology. Secretary Rusk noted that without large expenditures it would be a long time before deep sea capabilities would come into being. Dr. Wenk said that most of the existing U.S. deep submergence vehicles were built by aerospace industries. Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Nitze the reason for his interest in reserving the seabed for possible future nuclear weapons deployment. In view of the Antarctica, LTBT and the Outer Space treaties, an agreed restraint in this new environment would appear very real. Mr. Nitze said that the reason for DOD's support of the LTBT was to avoid further contamination of the atmosphere. Gen. Wheeler added that JCS support for the LTBT almost did not come to pass, and that the U.S. was paying a penalty for ratifying the treaty in the constraints the U.S. had accepted. The U.S. is performing underground tests at a much greater expense and delay than if the tests were conducted in the atmosphere. As for the Antarctica Treaty, no one wanted to fight over the Antarctic. It is easier to verify compliance with the Outer Space Treaty than under this proposed treaty. Secretary Rusk asked if DOD was concerned for the immediate future or for the naval officer of year 2000 who is going to be penalized for this decision. Would a duration clause make a difference? Gen. Wheeler said it seemed that we were giving up possible future strategic capabilities in return for a small political gain. Further, this might be only the first step toward a strategic straight jacket, particularly in view of U.S. verification capabilities. Mr. Foster said we must consider constraint in nuclear weapons. Was the U.S. sincere in seeking arms limitations on nuclear weapons? This proposal is a thoroughly consistent follow-up to Antarctica, LTBT, and Outer Space Treaties. It is a logical next step, and not a minor political advantage. Secretary Rusk said the U.S. better start finding some acceptable constraints. He wondered where we would come out if we continued the arms race in offensive and defensive missiles. As for the possibility of preprogrammed computerized missiles, there would be no decisions left to make and it would make the human condition appalling beyond description. There exists a real danger in having nuclear weapon systems: they may be beyond the control of human intelligence. Dr. Seaborg said he had no strong feelings on the ACDA proposal. He could appreciate the problems of Gen. Wheeler and Mr. Nitze. He could also see the political advantages. If we failed to give up an option, we could be doing ourselves a great deal of harm. We must make progress and show that we are taking steps to control the arms race. The NPT is in the U.S. interests. There does exist a dilemma with respect to verification of the seabed proposal. Perhaps this problem should be recognized for what it is and we all agree that it is overweighed by the political advantages. Congressional approval will be difficult to obtain. The proposal has not been presented as well as would be required to avoid Congressional difficulties. Gen. Wheeler said that Congress had recently queried him three times on whether FOBS constituted a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. There still exists grave doubt on this point in Congress. Secretary Rusk said that there doesn't exist that much difference in verification capabilities under the Outer Space Treaty and the ACDA proposal. It is very difficult to determine if a particular object in orbit is carrying a nuclear weapon. Adm. Taylor said he disagreed with the JCS on U.S. verification capabilities. He thought the estimative judgment in the Deputies' Report was supportable but was as strong a judgment as could be made. Secretary Rusk said the U.S. was faced with a problem of what to tell the Soviets and others in June and July. Mr. Foster said we could announce at the June 17 meeting our belief that restraints on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in the seabed environment are possible, and hopefully discuss the matter in the ENDC in July or August. If we do nothing we face difficult political problems. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text, although Sidney Graybeal (ACDA) and C. Normand Poirier (ACDA) are listed as reporting officers on the attached list of participants. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. 2 Not printed. 3 See Document 241 . 4 See Document 233 . 5 See footnote 5, Document 238 . 6 See footnote 6, Document 238 . 7 See footnote 4, Document 238 . 8 Presumably a reference to Document 236 in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented extensively on the ACDA proposal. 9 See Document 3 . 243. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 243. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, undated. SUBJECT Arms Control on the Seabed (U) Recommendation That the U.S. Government adopt the position that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction shall not be emplaced on or within the ocean seabed, and that it is prepared to enter into serious discussions in order to achieve an appropriate international agreement in this area. Discussion The U.S. Government is strongly supporting international cooperative efforts involving the ocean, including your most recent proposal on “An International Decade of Ocean Exploration”. A positive arms control approach to the seabed complements our current stated policies involving the ocean and its resources. It is important in its own right by prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in a new environment, will provide a means for fending off less acceptable seabed arms control measures which have been suggested by other nations, and could lead to further steps in controlling the strategic arms race. This position, if implemented, would prohibit the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on or in the seabed. It would not prohibit any U.S. military systems in current DOD plans; the deployment of submarines and necessary surveillance and detection systems would not be limited in any way. Verification problems of this position are similar to, but somewhat more difficult than, those associated with the banning of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. I believe that our verification capabilities are adequate to protect U.S. security interests when considered in conjunction with the current and projected overall strategic balance, the limited relative advantage to the Soviet Union of limited clandestine deployments of such weapons on the seabed, and the political penalties attached to the detection of such deployments. Your approval of the recommended position will permit the U.S. Government to take a positive approach to arms control on the seabed at the meeting of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed opening June 17. It would serve as a basis for subsequent discussions at the resumed session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [ Committee ] in Geneva and the UN General Assembly. 2 I believe that the foregoing represents a consensus of the views of most members of the Committee of Principals. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Deputies—6/4/68, “Arms Control on the Seabed.” Secret; Noforn. The source text was submitted under cover of a June 4 memorandum from Foster to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals informing them that, in accordance with the decision reached at the June 3 Committee of Principals meeting that he was forwarding for their concurrence a memorandum in draft form that recommended a U.S. position on arms control on the seabed. 2 The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed meeting on July 18, after having been in recess since March 14. It reconvened for a period of approximately 6 weeks during which time the U.S. Delegation was headed by Foster. 244. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 244. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 1 Washington, June 7, 1968. Dear Bill: Your proposed draft memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, circulated on 4 June 1968, has been reviewed within the Department of Defense. 2 I believe it would be unwise to take a definite position on an arms control proposal banning weapons of mass destruction until we have a clearer determination of what kind of proposal, if any, is in the best interests of the United States. Based on the discussions between Mr. Meeker and Rear Admiral Hearn, I believe that a more acceptable formulation of ACDA's specific proposal would be: “Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to emplace implant or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, or beneath or to the seabed beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast and up to the coast of any other State. A narrow band along the coasts of each State will be exempt from the provisions of this Treaty; the width of this band to be determined by negotiation .” This statement cures the most immediate problem the Department of Defense has with respect to the legal aspects and affords better protection to various operating options we may wish to exercise in our mobile seabased strategic systems. The most important issue to be decided by the President is whether or not the support of arms control measures for the seabeds is in the best over-all interests of the United States. I recommend that your proposed memorandum be altered to emphasize this basic issue and that you append to it the attached memorandum from the Secretary of Defense. This SecDef memorandum outlines some of the considerations which the President should have in mind before deciding this issue. Sincerely, Paul Enclosure 3 Washington, undated. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson SUBJECT Issues Raised by the Committee of Principals on ACDA's Seabed Arms Control Proposal At the recent meetings of the Committee of Principals on ACDA's proposal for arms control on the seabed 4 there were four areas in which the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not reach agreement with the other members of the Committee. These issues are set forth below for your information, together with the extent of agreement and disagreement: Issue 1 . What is permitted and what is prohibited. Agreed : 1. Intent of proposal is to ban emplacement or establishment of permanently fixed weapons of mass destruction from seabeds. 2. The banning of fixed sea-based systems is the least harmful possibility from a national security point of view. Not Agreed : 1. That we can really know what is being prohibited because of difficulty in determining exactly what is the precise meaning of “deployed,” “implanted” or “emplaced.” 2. That the language of the proposed treaty article insures against inadvertent banning of systems or operational modes intended to be permitted. 3. That such a treaty will not serve as a device for “legal” military and industrial espionage. 4. That weapon systems to be banned may not be useful at some future time for the safety and security of the U.S. Issue 2 . Legal considerations involving relationship between Law of the Sea 5 and ACDA's proposal. 6 Agreed: 1. That the most apparent and immediate legal defects of the draft ACDA proposal could be cured by redrafting. (This has been done.) Not Agreed: 1. That the legal aspects of any seabed arms control agreement reached at this time will not be the genesis of new and disturbing legal theories and precedents affecting the ongoing development of other seabed legal and jurisdictional regimes. 2. That it is possible at this time to determine the amount of sea room which may be required for the deployment of sea-based strategic weapon systems. 3. That we can reach an accommodation with the USSR with respect to a baseline from which the limits of prohibition are to be measured. Issue 3 . The relative military value of future weapon systems options. Agreed: 1. That most fixed sea-based systems would be more costly from a fiscal, industrial and manpower resource standpoint than either mobile sea-based or fixed land-based systems. 2. That existing geographic and demographic asymmetries make the possible use of seabed strategic weapon systems more attractive to the US than to the USSR. 3. That ACDA's proposal does not afford the US any military advantage. 4. There are no weapon systems in current or projected DOD plans which would be prohibited by this proposal. Not Agreed: 1. That economic savings purported to arise from ACDA's proposal can be identified. 2. That the issue of economic savings is germane to discussions of ACDA's proposal. 3. That the long term political advantages to be gained from adoption of ACDA's proposal have been sufficiently identified. 4. That the possible economic savings and political advantages outweigh the possible strategic and military disadvantages which may accrue. Issue 4 . Verification problems associated with proposal. Agreed: 1. There is a high probability that we could detect the development of a prohibited system before it became operational. 2. We could almost certainly detect large scale construction activity on the seabed but to determine exactly what was being constructed is a difficult problem. 3. It is unlikely that we could detect small scale deployments of some types of prohibited systems but could probably detect large scale deployments of these systems. Not Agreed: 1. That it is unlikely that the USSR would deploy large numbers of unprotected strategic systems. 2. That the extent of our agreed verification capability is adequate to protect our national security interests. 3. That the existing verification capability is capable of timely detection of a treaty violation. Concerns about the verification of a seabed arms control agreement lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff to believe that the adoption of a specific arms control proposal at this time would not be in the national interest and has a potential for grave harm. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Arms Control on the Seabed (2), Box 20. Secret; Noforn. 2 See footnote 1, Document 243 . 3 Secret. 4 See Documents 238 and 242 . 5 See footnote 6, Document 238 . 6 See Document 233 . 245. Editorial Note 245. Editorial Note On June 11, 1968, AEC Chairman Seaborg wrote President Johnson requesting approval for the FY 1969 underground nuclear test program, Bowline, consisting of 57 tests: 45 for weapons development and the remaining 12 consisting of 6 Plowshare tests sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission and 6 weapons effect tests sponsored by the Department of Defense. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1969, Vol. VII, Box 29) On June 27, Rostow wrote a memorandum to the President informing him of Seaborg's June 11 letter, and requesting the President's approval of Bowline. Bowline included one large excavation test, Schooner, scheduled for execution in the second quarter. However, Rostow advised that specific approval for it should be requested under separate cover, well in advance of the expected firing date. In fact, any large-yield test that “might cause domestic problems” was also to be submitted for Presidential approval under separate requests. A checkmark next to an approving line appeared on the source text which indicated President Johnson 's approval of Bowline. (Ibid.) In a June 28 memorandum to Seaborg, Rostow informed him that Bowline was approved “with the understanding that specific Presidential approval must be obtained for all nuclear excavation experiments, for all tests to be conducted outside the National Test Site, and for all tests with yields of one megaton or more.” This memorandum also granted approval for Bowline I, the first quarter test program which consisted of 15 Atomic Energy Commission weapon development tests, 1 Plowshare experiment, Stoddard, and 2 Department of Defense weapon effects tests. (Ibid.) A total of 10 tests, including Stoddard which was fired on September 17, took place at the Nevada Test Site. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992 , page 33) Also on September 17, Seaborg wrote President Johnson a letter in which he requested the President's permission to execute Bowline II, the second quarter underground test program. Bowline II included 18 tests: 16 to demonstrate the performance, reliability, and safety of prototype warheads, and 2 other tests that would require specific execution authority under separate requests. These were Schooner, the one Plowshare cratering experiment, and Benham, the Spartan development event. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-U.S. Testing Program FY 1969, Volume VII, Box 29) Rostow wrote President Johnson a memorandum, September 27, informing him of Seaborg's September 17 letter on Bowline II. President Johnson's approval of Bowline II is indicated by a checkmark on Rostow's memorandum. (Ibid.) The following day, September 28, Rostow wrote Seaborg informing him that President Johnson had approved Bowline II with specific approval withheld on Schooner and Benham. (Ibid.) Specific request for Schooner was made in an October 16 letter from Seaborg to Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing-Plowshare Events, Vol. 3, Box 30) Objections arose, however, from Foster over Schooner's potential to violate the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In a letter to Rostow, October 30, Foster wrote, “I cannot recommend approval of the AEC request to execute the nuclear cratering experiment Schooner, since it involves a very substantial risk of causing radioactive debris to be present in Canada in amounts that will be detected, publicized, and used to support charges that we have deliberately violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Such charges would, among other consequences, have a decidedly adverse impact on our efforts to secure adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” (Ibid.) On November 16, Rostow wrote President Johnson a memorandum which informed him of Seaborg's request to execute Schooner and of the support given to it by the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Bureau of the Budget. All agencies but ACDA, Rostow wrote, recommended granting approval to Seaborg to conduct Schooner. Rostow himself advocated approval and the President agreed by placing a checkmark on the approving line which appeared on Rostow's memorandum. (Ibid.) Schooner was eventually fired on December 8, and Benham, yet another Plowshare experiment, on December 19. In all, 17 Bowline II tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site. ( United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September 1992 , pages 33-34) A summary history of this test series is U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency, Operations Crosstie and Bowline: Events—Door Mist, Dorsal Fin, Milk Shake, Diana Moon, Hudson Seal, and Ming Vase, 31 August 1967-20 November 1968 (DNA 6322F, 1985). 246. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 246. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) 1 Washington, June 18, 1968. SUBJECT Arms Control and the Ocean Floor At Tab 1 is a revised recommended US position on arms control for the ocean floor. You will note that we have added “and should be subject to the appropriate means of verification” to the end of the last sentence. My people tell me that we can live with this addition. Since it meets your basic objection, I hope that DOD can now join State in recommending its acceptance by the President. 2 Frankly, the basic issue we must face is how we avoid a bloody nose in handling the Soviet initiative in New York. While I recognize that there is merit in DOD's position, I doubt that it is wise from a public relations point of view. Our failure to advance any proposal will clearly not inhibit other UN delegations from making proposals. Ambassador Malik in New York has informed our delegation that the USSR will press for a complete demilitarization of the ocean floor when he makes the Soviet speech later this week. If we have no affirmative and reasonable proposal of our own to put forward, we run the risk of being isolated by the Soviet tactic. In addition, we run the risk that the UN Ad Hoc Committee may adopt the Soviet proposal or something like it. I think you will agree that the latter result would be far less acceptable from your point of view than what we have here suggested. By putting forward a sound proposal of our own, we at least have some chance of directing the debate along lines that would produce an outcome we could live with. Since this is likely to be a luncheon topic tomorrow, I would appreciate your urgent consideration of the above. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Tab 1 3 ARMS CONTROL AND THE OCEAN FLOOR “The United States is prepared to enter into serious discussions at an international forum such as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference [ Committee ] in order to achieve an appropriate international agreement pursuant to which each party would agree not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other State. The width of this narrow band would be determined by negotiation. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed not only at the weapons themselves but also at launching platforms or delivery systems for such weapons, and should be subject to appropriate means of verification.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret. 2 For the position taken by the Department of Defense, see Document 244 . 3 Secret. 247. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 247. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 1 Moscow, June 21, 1968. Dear Mr. President: We have in mind your messages of January 22 2 and May 2 3 of this year in which you spoke out in favor of reaching an understanding on questions concerning restraint in the strategic arms race. As we informed you earlier we for our part also attach great importance to these questions, having in mind that they should be considered together, systems for delivery of offensive strategic nuclear weapons as well as systems for defense against ballistic missiles. All aspects of this complex problem are now being carefully examined by us, and we hope that before long it will be possible more concretely to exchange views with regard to further ways of discussing this problem, if of course the general world situation does not hinder this. Sincerely, A. Kosygin 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. The date is the day the letter was received. 2 Not printed. (Ibid., Vol. II, Box 11) 3 See Document 237 . 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 248. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 248. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, June 22, 1968. Dear Mr. Chairman: I was greatly encouraged by your letter on strategic arms talks, which was delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 21. 2 As you know, the non-proliferation treaty, on which our representatives have worked so hard and so well in Geneva and New York, will be opened for signature in our two capitals as well as in London on July 1. I think it would be particularly fitting if, on that date, we could jointly announce our agreement to hold talks on the strategic missile problem. I believe this would do much to advance our common aim of achieving the widest possible endorsement of the treaty. I look forward to further work from you when you have completed your deliberations in Moscow. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. 2 Document 247 . 249. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 249. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 1 Moscow, June 27, 1968. Dear Mr. President: My colleagues and I have carefully considered your letter of June 22, 1968, 2 concerning talks on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons delivery systems. We are prepared to publish in the Soviet press and over the radio on July 1 the following statement of the Soviet Government: “On the forthcoming talks on questions of curbing the strategic arms race. “An agreement has been reached between the Government of the USSR and the USA to enter in the nearest future into talks on limitation and reduction of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems as well as systems of defense against ballistic missiles.” We have no doubt that a statement in such a spirit made by our Governments should, undoubtedly, also further the task of inducing the adherence of the greatest number of states to the non-proliferation treaty. Sincerely, A. Kosygin 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. I, Box 11. 2 Document 248 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 250. Editorial Note 250. Editorial Note On July 1, 1968, at a ceremony attended by representatives from 56 nations in the East Room of the White House, President Johnson made a statement endorsing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was opened for signature that day in Washington, London, and Moscow. For text of the President's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book II, pages 763-765. In his statement President Johnson also announced: “Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.” (Ibid., page 765) For Kosygin's suggested wording of this announcement, see Document 249 . Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the U.S. Government at this ceremony, and many other nations, including the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, also promptly signed it. For text of the remarks of Secretary Rusk, British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean, and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the White House ceremony, see Department of State Bulletin , July 22, 1968, pages 87-88. On July 9, President Johnson transmitted the treaty to the Senate. His accompanying message urged “that the Senate move swiftly to enhance our security and that of the entire world by giving its consent to the ratification of this treaty.” For text of his message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pages 801-803. Testimony on the treaty is in Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session (Washington, 1968), Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session (Washington, 1969), Part 2, and Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session (Washington, 1969). Regarding the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's favorable report on the treaty on September 17, see footnote 2, Document 283 . Because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August and preoccupation with the Presidential election campaign, however, full Senate action on the treaty was delayed until the incoming Nixon administration. The Senate gave its consent to the agreement on March 13, 1969, by a vote of 83-15, and the treaty, which required the ratification of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and 40 other states, finally entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification at Washington, London, and Moscow on March 5, 1970. For text of the treaty, see 21 UST 483. Regarding the position of the West German and other foreign governments on the treaty, see Documents 259 and 283 . A survey and analysis of the status of the treaty in foreign nations is in CIA Intelligence Memorandum, No. 1582/68, “Prospects for the Nonproliferation Treaty,” November 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Volume II, Box 26) For discussion of issues relating to Senate consent to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see Document 293 . Additional documentation on this question and U.S. ratification of the treaty is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6, and DEF 18 UN; and Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26. 251. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Members of the Committee of Principals 251. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Members of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, July 2, 1968. SUBJECT Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapon Purposes (U) For several years the United States has been proposing in Geneva that the nuclear-weapons powers agree to halt the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Since agreement on this proposal would clearly be in the U.S. net interest, we expect to propose it again at the forthcoming ENDC session this summer. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose updating one aspect of the verification arrangements for a cutoff treaty. The other aspects of the U.S. position on this measure would remain as we have previously described them in Geneva. The plants engaged in production of enriched uranium or plutonium for use in nuclear weapons would either be shut down or their product would be utilized for purposes other than nuclear weapons. Each country would provide a list of all its nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to ascertain that none of the produced fissionable material was being used for nuclear weapons. This would involve a major opening up of the Soviet nuclear energy program to international inspection. When the United States described this proposal to the ENDC four years ago, we dealt with the possibility of undeclared production facilities by stating, “There would be agreed rights to conduct a limited number of inspections of suspected undeclared facilities on an adversary basis.” 2 In the light of our current unilateral capabilities in this field, I recommend that we withdraw this 1964 formulation, and rely instead on our unilateral capabilities to verify that other parties to the treaty are not operating significant undeclared nuclear material production facilities. My reasons for this recommendation are as follows: 1. The U.S. has high confidence that it has identified all current Soviet fissionable material production facilities which are capable of making a significant addition to the already large existing Soviet weapons stockpile. 2. [ 3 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ] 4. Such elimination would remove a potentially troublesome discrepancy between the verification arrangements we would be willing to accept for a cutoff and those we have asked other countries to accept under the non-proliferation treaty. It is difficult to justify treaty rights to search for undeclared plants in a country which already has large stockpiles of fissionable materials, when the NPT does not set forth such rights for nations in which a small clandestine plant might be significant. A more detailed discussion of the proposed modification of verification arrangements will be found at Tab A. The United States initially proposed the cutoff in 1956 3 after determining that such a measure would be in our net interest, and has reaffirmed this proposal on frequent occasions since that time. The relevant factors have recently been reviewed to determine whether that conclusion still obtains, and we have found that it does. The results of these studies are summarized at Tab B. Accordingly, I recommend for your consideration that when we next propose the cutoff, we authorize the U.S. Delegation to describe the verification arrangements as similar to those of the non-proliferation treaty. William C. Foster Tab A 4 Verification of a Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapon Purposes The proposed modification in the U.S. position relates only to verification for undeclared plants. No change is proposed in the procedures the U.S. has previously set forth for verification with respect to declared plants. Nevertheless, the latter procedures are also summarized below to facilitate evaluation of the overall verification requirements. A. Verification for Declared Production Facilities The United States has proposed that the IAEA would apply safeguards in order to verify compliance with the obligations of the cutoff treaty. These safeguards would be similar to those applied under the non-proliferation treaty. The IAEA would safeguard not only nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment facilities, but also the fissionable material in every other peaceful nuclear facility in each country, in order to ascertain that no fissionable materials produced was being used for nuclear weapons purposes. While the IAEA has not yet developed detailed procedures for safeguarding either uranium enrichment facilities or shutdown reactors, U.S. and U.K. studies have been made which can provide a basis for IAEA safeguards techniques for such plants. These techniques would be effective in detecting any significant Soviet diversion of fissionable material to weapons use. On December 2, 1967, President Johnson offered to accept IAEA safeguards on all U.S. nuclear facilities, except those directly related to national security, when NPT safeguards go into effect. 5 During the last session of the ENDC, several speakers urged the Soviet Union to accept IAEA safeguards on its peaceful nuclear programs. The Soviet delegate replied that such acceptance would not be relevant to the proliferation problem. While the U.S.S.R. has always resisted proposals for inspection on its own territory, the Soviets may find it difficult to explain why they are unwilling to accept relevant inspection for the cutoff proposal when the inspection is essentially the same as the IAEA safeguards which the U.S.S.R. has urged other states to accept under the NPT. B. Verification for Undeclared Production of Fissionable Material To verify that other parties to the treaty are not operating significant undeclared nuclear material production facilities, each party would rely on unilateral capabilities. [ 7-½ lines of source text not declassified ] Since the Soviets would realize that any significant violation would run a very high risk of detection, they can be expected to refrain from violations as long as they want the treaty to continue in force. If the Soviets wanted to terminate the treaty, they probably would find it preferable to do so by use of a treaty withdrawal clause, rather than by risking the onus of being caught in a violation. An early test of Soviet good-faith compliance with the treaty would be their initial declaration listing their nuclear facilities. If this initial declaration is complete, and coincides with U.S. present highly reliable information on this subject, and the IAEA is permitted to safeguard freely all such Soviet nuclear facilities, it would seem quite unlikely that the Soviets would then attempt to build a new series of clandestine nuclear plants which involve no shipments to or from any of their declared, inspected facilities. If they did build such plants which would add significantly to their already large stockpile, the U.S. would have a very high probability of detecting such a violation. [ 1 paragraph (14 lines of source text) not declassified ] A Soviet refusal to permit such a non-intrusive inspection would provide a basis for the U.S. to explain its withdrawal publicly if withdrawal became necessary. The Soviet refusal would be assessed by other states in the light of the U.S.S.R. having already accepted extensive inspection of its nuclear facilities. Tab B 6 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT ON U.S. INTERESTS OF A CUTOFF OF PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS USES The U.S. has proposed many times at the ENDC that the nuclear-weapon states halt all production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. transfer from their weapons stockpiles to peaceful uses agreed amounts of uranium-235 and plutonium. We have said that the U.S. would so transfer 60,000 kg of uranium-235 if the U.S.S.R. would transfer 40,000 kg. We have suggested that this transferred uranium could be obtained by demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, and that we would transfer to peaceful uses the associated plutonium from these weapons in amounts to be negotiated with the U.S.S.R. in advance. This combined proposal will be referred to below as the “cutoff-transfer” proposal. A. Impact on U.S. Strategic Posture 1. U.S. Military Requirements The U.S. has recently concluded that our military requirements for plutonium can be met by operation of four production reactors at Richland. We have already shut down five plutonium production reactors at this site. Presently planned nuclear weapons requirements can be met from the uranium-235 and plutonium on hand. (This includes weapons in stockpile awaiting retirement and materials in the pipeline.) Reactor development and research are absorbing most of the current plutonium production at Richland. A small amount of plutonium metal is being stockpiled to meet contingency plans. (Three reactors at Savannah River are being used principally for production of tritium. Two similar reactors there have been shut down.) Based on current plans, U.S. weapons requirements for the mid-1970's can be met from fissionable materials on hand now. Even with a transfer of 60,000 kg of uranium and agreed amounts of associated plutonium from destroyed weapons to peaceful uses, all strategic U.S. military requirements for the near future can be met from existing stocks. 2. Soviet Military Requirements It appears that the Soviets could meet their priority strategic requirements from existing stocks, even with a transfer of [ 1-½ lines of source text not declassified ] from destroyed weapons to peaceful uses. However, they would not have enough fissionable material to MIRV their ICBMs and deploy an extensive ABM system. 3. Future Stockpile Comparisons Recent studies have shown that the earlier a cutoff-transfer measure is implemented, the more it would be to the advantage of the U.S. Such an agreement would be to our advantage now and would remain so until about 1976. Following 1976, the proposed measures would not present a significant military advantage to either country. By that time, both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would have accumulated such large stockpiles of fissionable materials that any cutoff of production for weapons uses would be of little military significance. [ 1 paragraph (10 lines of source text) not declassified ] A cutoff in 1968 to 1970 would slow down the accumulation of fissionable materials by both countries but would be more advantageous to the U.S. A cutoff in 1972 or later would have only a small effect on the accumulation of that amount of fissionable materials calculated to be necessary for both U.S. and U.S.S.R. top priority and second priority military requirements. A cutoff in 1976 or after would appear to have no direct military effect, because the availability of fissionable materials for military uses will be more than any predicted requirements can utilize. 4. Miscellaneous Aspects When the U.S. first offered in September 1965 to obtain the 60,000 kg of uranium-235 for transfer from demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons, it was determined that this could be done [ 2-½ lines of source text not declassified ]. Tritium was dealt with in the U.S. cutoff-transfer position paper of February 15, 1966, along the lines outlined below. There have been no developments since then which call for changing this position. Since tritium is not a fissionable material, it has not been covered in our past cutoff proposals, and we do not plan to initiate any discussion of tritium. (Of course, nuclear reactors, including tritium production reactors, would be subject to IAEA safeguards under a cutoff agreement.) If the U.S.S.R. should urge limitation of tritium production under the cutoff, however, the U.S. delegation has the following contingency guidance: If progress in negotiations warrants it, the Delegation may request approval to discuss tritium production limitations with the U.S.S.R. However, the disposition of tritium from weapons submitted for destruction should not be discussed. It is the U.S. position that enough production of tritium should continue under a cutoff to compensate for the radioactive decay of the tritium in the weapons inventory and the stockpile, and to provide for non-weapons uses. Uranium-235 required to fuel reactors for producing tritium for weapons replenishment would be obtained from existing stockpiles. A possible limitation on the amount of allowed production of tritium might be obtained by requiring that equivalent amounts of helium-3 be turned in. Results of an AEC study have shown that the decay of tritium is the only practical source of significant quantities of helium-3. However, tritium production rates are highly classified at this time and declassification would be necessary before any discussions that would reveal these rates could take place. B. Political Considerations Regarding Cutoff-Transfer Proposal Pressures from the non-nuclear-weapon countries for concrete measures of armaments reduction by the nuclear-weapon powers are likely to increase, particularly during the period when the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has been signed but not yet ratified by many countries. Key non-nuclear-weapon states will probably demand that the nuclear powers make progress toward disarmament by agreeing to measures that would constitute a “balance of obligations.” While the non-nuclear-weapon nations will be serving their own interests by accession to the NPT, they will nevertheless strongly urge that the nuclear-weapon powers also contribute to the stability of the international scene and take steps to reduce the likelihood of a future nuclear conflict. It is likely that some non-nuclear-weapon states will attempt to make such steps by the nuclear-weapon powers a condition for their signature, ratification, or continued adherence to the NPT. One measure that the non-nuclear-weapon states have suggested as contributing to a suitable balance of obligations and which the United States has already proposed is a complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons uses. The destruction of a number of nuclear weapons and the transfer of the resulting fissionable materials to peaceful uses is a related measure which the U.S. has also proposed at the ENDC. These measures would constitute a logical post-NPT approach by the nuclear-weapon powers to a “balance of obligations.” 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Committee of Principals Memo dated July 2, 1968 re “Cutoff.” Secret; Limited Distribution. 2 ENDC/134, June 25, 1964. [Footnote in the source text. Regarding this 1964 initiative, see Documents 30 , 32 , 33 , and 35 , especially footnote 6 thereto.] 3 Regarding the 1956 initiative, see Foreign Relations , 1955-1957, vol. XX, pp. 320 , passim. 4 Secret. 5 See footnote 6, Document 220 . 6 Secret; Restricted Data. 252. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals 252. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, July 8, 1968, 5 p.m. PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 REFERENCE Memorandum for the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals from the Acting Director H. Scoville, Jr., dated July 4, 1968, Subject: Strategic Missile Talks (C)-ACDA-2935 and ACDA-2936 3 SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 1. A Working Group, composed of senior representatives of each of the agencies represented on the Executive Committee and chaired by Mr. Fisher, ACDA, was established to develop positions and issues for consideration of the Executive Committee. 2. The Department of Defense was asked to draft a substantive opening statement which could be considered by the Working Group along with the draft opening statement already distributed to the Executive Committee. 3. In drafting the opening statement, consideration should be given to the possibility of consulting on the completed statement with Congress, but no consideration should be given to release to the press. In the meantime, answers to Congressional queries should be limited to statements that no date and place have yet been selected and that we are studying the substantive problems involved. 4. The Committee endorsed the USIB action to prepare an updated SNIE on U.S. capabilities to verify various strategic arms control measures. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by pointing out that the President had worked hard over a period of eighteen months to get the Soviets to agree to discussions on controlling the strategic arms race. He was concerned that the race would spiral to new plateaus with even greater expenditures without any increase in security. All agreed that the problems were very complex and that the difficulties of achieving a successful agreement should not be underestimated. However, it was the job of the Committee to translate this general policy into specific proposals for controlling the arms race. We had no indications from the Soviets as to the time and place, but they had urged the discussions be held in the nearest future. He pointed out that Mr. Foster would be returning to Geneva on Thursday, 4 but he need not get into this question in his discussions with Roshchin. He believed that the Government needed some special machinery to develop the U.S. position for these discussions and the present Executive Committee of Principals was established for this purpose. He also circulated an organizational paper, which had been previously coordinated informally. 5 This paper established an inter-agency working group under the Chairmanship of Mr. Fisher, ACDA, to develop U.S. positions and issues for consideration by the Executive Committee. He stated that he had studied the draft Opening Statement (See Reference) and had no particular problems with it although he would welcome a few word changes. For example, he believed the term, “unacceptable damage,” might be altered. Secretary Clifford said he had studied the State-ACDA draft opening statement and position paper together with the analysis of the position paper that had been prepared in the Department of Defense. He thought these were useful first efforts but that it was too early to proceed further with substantive positions, as in the draft opening statement. He believed that the discussion should start on a very general plane without any concrete proposals or U.S. concessions, since the Soviets would take these as agreed to begin with and move on to obtain further concessions. He thought the first sessions would be primarily administrative in nature in which we would have an opportunity to test the sincerity of Soviet intentions. He thought it was important to determine what the Soviets wished to accomplish as a result of these discussions. He considered verification to be the most important problem since he was worried about the Soviet attitude in this area. He wished to test them out and was not sure that we should depend on unilateral verification except as a fall-back. The discussions should be approached very carefully to assure that national security would not be jeopardized. He was reluctant to start with the position which should be reserved until the generalities had been thoroughly discussed. Deputy Secretary Nitze emphasized that we must understand all the facts on any positions before they are adopted. For example, the proposal to freeze land-based ICBMs was, in fact, a freezing of the launch holes. Since the Soviet holes are larger than the U.S. holes, they could exploit these to Soviet advantage. He thought that even though the verification might be difficult, throw weight might be a better criteria for control than launchers. One must assume that in time the U.S. would lose its technological advantage. It was important that we obtain fact sheets on each issue as had been done with the test ban. General Wheeler also emphasized the importance of the verification problem. He thought we should determine what are the critical parameters in missile capabilities and agreed that throw weight was important. He recommended that the Working Group list each issue which would become the subject of a separate paper since lumping all issues together often confused them. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the draft opening statement was intended to be the first substantive presentation, since the administrative arrangements could be handled without difficulty. Since the U.S. had been pressing the Soviets for talks for eighteen months, it was logical for them to expect us to state what we had in mind early in the negotiations. He expected some sparring, and we might get some very unrealistic suggestions related to complete disarmament or the Gromyko Proposal. He agreed that any U.S. proposals must be in the security interests, but he did not feel we would be moving into the area of insecurity by the talks. Rather, a failure to control the arms race would decrease security. He was not sure what the Soviets wanted out of the discussions; at best, they might have reached that conclusion that a new plateau with great expenditures without changing the net security situation should be avoided. In the worst case, they might hope that these talks would be demonstrations to the non-nuclear countries of their desire to halt the arms race but have no hope of agreement. They might make far-reaching proposals which might be attractive to the non-nuclear countries and would cause U.S. propaganda difficulties. Obviously, both sides would be seeking advantages from the talks. Deputy Secretary Nitze stated that hopefully we might find a position in which both sides gain, but the difficulty would be that each side hoped to make relative gains. Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen believed that there was undoubtedly opposition in the Soviet Union to the talks, but they may have been worried about increasing expenditures for new strategic systems. The Soviets may also have been motivated to counteract the U.S. offer for talks to improve their image in the context of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He was struck by the association of these talks to the Kosygin Nine Points for the ENDC which had many of the standard arms control proposals; 6 although the Soviets had agreed to bilateral discussions, he doubted Mr. Foster could have private discussions in Geneva without informing the other members of the ENDC. Mr. Foster indicated that it would be possible to have private talks in Geneva; all the other nations had plenty of experience with U.S.-Soviet private discussions at the ENDC and would undoubtedly take it in their stride. Secretary Rusk tended to agree. Under Secretary Bohlen felt that we might consider attempting to get the Soviets to agree to inspections. While they had always been adamant against these, the Soviet requirements for secrecy no longer made sense and their attitudes might be different now. Secretary Rusk agreed that verification was a key problem since we must have confidence that any agreement would not adversely affect our security. Mr. Helms stated that USIB was in the process of updating SNIE 11-10-67 7 at General Wheeler's request and hoped to consider it by July 18. He did not believe that the conclusions would change, but it would be useful to make sure that it was still current. He urged that in developing U.S. position papers, all groups use common intelligence estimates in order to avoid unnecessary discrepancies in the studies and indicated that Mr. Bruce Clarke, CIA, would be the central point for providing such information. Mr. Foster indicated that studies on methods of controlling the strategic arms race had been going on for seven years; that we had accumulated large amounts of information which would provide a good basis for developing the U.S. positions and support for the discussions. He pointed out that we have already told the Soviets, with the President's approval, that the U.S. was prepared to consider using unilateral sources insofar as possible to verify any agreement and that it would be hard to backtrack from this position. Secretary Rusk indicated that unilateral information might be satisfactory for limiting the strategic arms race, but might not be for reductions. He indicated that if the verification problems could be solved, he might be in favor of the Baruch Plan since he thought it would be desirable to scrap all nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster suggested that one might agree on the basic principles to be accomplished in controlling the arms race before one got down to specifics. Secretary Rusk indicated that we need something like the draft opening statement which dealt with the substance and suggested that Department of Defense representatives try their hand at another draft. How it was actually used might depend on how the discussions develop. He thought Secretary Clifford should act as if he were the chief negotiator in Moscow and the Soviets asked him what he was proposing. Secretary Clifford indicated that Department of Defense would undertake such a draft which could be forwarded to the Working Group for consideration along with the present draft. Chairman Seaborg said he had only a limited time to study the papers but they left no doubt on the principles involved. He understood that the proposals did not include the controls on the development of the front end technology and particularly nuclear warheads. Secretary Rusk suggested that the Soviets might bring up the question of MIRVs immediately. Chairman Seaborg said he still had a job to do, such as warheads for Spartan. He agreed that we should have a substantive position for initiating the talks, but that perhaps we might hold back on the unilateral verification. Deputy Under Secretary Bohlen thought we should initially hold back on national systems and that the statements on Page 5 of the draft opening statement went too far. Mr. Fisher referred to the presentation (State 158191, March 18, 1967) made to Mr. Kosygin by Ambassador Thompson on March 28, 1967, 8 which was essentially identical with that in the opening statement. Secretary Rusk indicated that we should rely on national means for what they were capable of verifying. He was pleased that USIB was updating the SNIE. For items which could not be adequately verified by national means, we would have to negotiate other verification arrangements. In summary, Secretary Rusk directed the Working Group to start immediately developing a position with the necessary back-up studies. Secretary Clifford indicated that Mr. Warnke would head the Department of Defense working team and be their representative on the working group. Secretary Rusk asked the Department of Defense to draft another opening statement to be considered by the working group along with the present one. Mr. Fisher asked guidance on the Congressional consultation. He suggested that for the present we should say that no time or place had been agreed upon and that we are still studying the nature of the U.S. position. Secretary Rusk hoped that the dates would not be announced for the next few days until the NPT was out of the way. One should consider in drafting the opening statement the possibility of consulting with the Congress on it, but he did not believe it would be desirable to make this statement available to the press since the subject was much too complicated at this stage. He stated he had seen too many occasions where we allowed details to block major U.S. policy objectives. He cursed the day when the Baruch proposal was turned down. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17-18. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Another record of this meeting is in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 17, pp. 18, and 24-25. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11) The two ACDA papers attached to Scoville's memorandum are entitled respectively: “Strategic Missile Talks: Basic Position Paper,” and “Strategic Missile Talks: US Opening Statement.” Both are undated. 4 July 11. 5 Reference apparently is to an unsigned procedural memorandum, July 8, which described the creation of a special interagency committee, with ACDA as chair, to prepare for the upcoming talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic missile systems. The procedural memorandum included Secretary Rusk's request that it should be circulated to all officers and agencies concerned with these discussions. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18) 6 Reference presumably is to the nine-part Soviet memorandum (A/7134), July 1, 1968, on further measures to stop the arms race; text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 466-470. 7 See footnote 5, Document 253 . 8 See Document 192 . Ambassador Thompson's presentation on March 28, 1967, has not been further identified. 253. Summary of Meeting 253. Summary of Meeting 1 Washington, July 10, 1968. SUMMARY OF JULY 10, 1968 MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS Schedule for Preparation Mr. Fisher said although no specific time for the talks appears yet to have been set, we must, for planning purposes, assume that the U.S. should be ready by the middle of August. He also said that when the President returns on July 21 2 he will undoubtedly want to have a report on where we are in our preparations. Mr. Halperin said that it would be better if we could have until the end of August to complete our preparations. Mr. Fisher hoped we could have the DOD/JCS re-write the opening statement by the first of next week. Mr. Halperin said they would try to get the opening statement by some time early next week. He said they could get the first part of it—dealing with principles and introductory material—to us by then but it was difficult to get the section dealing with a specific proposal agreed in the Pentagon until the basic position had been agreed upon. Mr. Bohlen said we would have to have a specific proposal when we start talking with the Soviets. Mr. Fisher noted we had already told them we would have a specific proposal when the talks start. Mr. Shaw 3 noted there had been some misunderstanding regarding the message containing the later commitment and that DOD thought we would say we expected both sides to have proposals. Mr. Halperin said DOD would go on working on the specific proposal but would send around the first part of the opening statement so that the Working Group could get at that part at an early date. Mr. Fisher said if we were to have a position approved by the President by August 15th, the Working Group would have to have issues and recommendations before the Principals by around the 2nd or 3rd of August. Mr. Halperin thought it would take four weeks for DOD and JCS to have a suggested basic position for consideration by the Working Group. Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Keeny said such a schedule would not fit the need to have an agreed position by August 15. Mr. Keeny said we could not go to the President for a decision two or three days before the 15th since this would give him no time for any Congressional consultation. It was agreed by General Evans and Mr. Halperin that we should try to have a position ready by August 15. Verification It was noted that SNIE 11-13-68, 4 which will replace SNIE 11-10-67 5 on verification capabilities, will be ready July 18. Mr. Bohlen thought we should somehow find a way for the U.S. Delegation to probe the Soviets to see what we could get from them on on-site inspection. He and Mr. Fisher thought the U.S. had clearly implied in previous communications with the Soviets that national capabilities would be sufficient for fixed installations, Mr. Bohlen thought we had also indicated that mobile systems would have to have on-site inspection, but Mr. Fisher and Dr. Scoville said this decision had not been taken. General Allison said the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the earlier reference to “maximum reliance” on national capabilities left open the question of whether on-site inspection might be necessary even for fixed installations. It was agreed, however, that the verification question should be addressed after we receive SNIE 11-13-68, although preliminary work could be started on the assumption, reinforced by the remarks of Mr. Clark of CIA, that the new SNIE would not make major changes from SNIE 11-10-67. In connection with the verification question, Mr. Halperin said we should soon begin to address the question of what we say publicly and to members of Congress with respect to our existing national capabilities and suggested that the Bohlen Committee should address this question. Mr. Shaw felt we should wait awhile on this. Mr. Halperin did not agree. Mr. Clark pointed out that the Director of CIA has a statutory responsibility in this area which presents some problems unless a new look is taken at what we say about national capabilities. Mr. Fisher agreed that we should for the moment wait until we see how our position is developing before we address the question of some new decision by the Bohlen Committee. Mr. Halperin said we needed to look at what we would do with any Soviet agreement to permit some kind of on-site inspection. He said we need to know what kinds we would want if we could get on-site inspection and we need to look at the kind we might be offered by the Soviets. It was agreed that ACDA would do a paper on this subject. Mr. Shaw said he had an input for such a paper concerning the negotiating problems on raising on-site inspection. Mr. Fisher agreed to have a working group look at this question, but did not want to give it priority over other issues that the Working Group has to address. Mr. Halperin said one issue on verification we should be thinking about was what understanding we should have with the Soviets concerning the continuation of the capabilities for national verification; he said clearly we should have an understanding that neither side would interfere with certain existing national capabilities, and perhaps we should also have some form of understanding—though he recognized this was more difficult—that neither side would attempt to conceal what they are now not concealing. It was agreed the Working Group should give further thought to this issue. Additional Studies Mr. Fisher raised the question of additional studies or papers that the Working Group should have underway. He said ACDA would do a contingency paper on how we handled a Soviet “Gromyko proposal” should it be made in the bilateral talks. Mr. Shaw circulated the following proposed work program: 1. Covering Memorandum to the President (draft last) 6 2. Position Papers a. Opening Statement (drafted and circulated) b. Basic Position Paper (drafted and circulated) 7 c. Modalities (drafted) d. Consultations 3. Background Papers a. Military Effects Study (being drafted) b. Economic Effects Study (being drafted) c. Specialized Military Studies 4. Intelligence Estimate—SNIE 11-10-67, evaluating verification capabilities, is being up-dated. Mr. Halperin said DOD was doing a military analysis paper. He said he hoped to circulate soon an uncleared version of this paper. It was agreed that with respect to allied consultations we would have to prepare a cable to USRO for the NAC Meeting of July 15, in which we would give Cleveland guidance that would indicate to him that he could not expect to treat the strategic talks as we had the NPT as far as consultations were concerned. State and ACDA were to draft this message. Mr. Halperin said DOD wanted a study on what the Soviet military posture is likely to be, assuming an agreement of the State-ACDA type. He said this study should address what the Soviets are technically capable of doing within the framework of a State-ACDA type of agreement and also what they are likely to do. He said this would be complementary to a study DOD is doing of what they would be likely to do without an agreement. Mr. Shaw said this would have to be balanced by an assessment of what the U.S. could also do, and Mr. Halperin said this part would be done by DOD as part of its analysis. (Mr. Halperin mentioned in the course of the discussion that DOD's thinking was that the agreement would have to prevent silo hardening rather than attempt to prevent increase in the size of holes since it would be most difficult to determine whether holes were increased in size if construction for hardening was taking place.) With respect to the DOD suggested study, Dr. Scoville said the technical facts would not be difficult to assemble and could be done very quickly but that the basic question of a judgment on what the Soviets would do with technical capability would be the critical issue and might take more time. Mr. Clark agreed to prepare terms of reference and consult with other members of the group on them and to aim at a target date of August 1 for the paper. Mr. Halperin said the Working Group should also be thinking about what our position should be if, after a period of time, the ChiComs continued their strategic buildup; he said clearly we would not want to continue a Soviet-U.S. agreement indefinitely without modification in this event, and that we should provide in some way in the agreement for an understanding to this effect. It was agreed further thought should be given to this point. Mr. Shaw said that while we are waiting for DOD/JCS views on the basic position paper we ought to be reviewing it to see if any “corrections” need to be made of a factual nature. Mr. Clarke said there were some more recent figures that should be incorporated in the paper and he would be in touch with Dr. Scoville. Other Matters Mr. Bohlen raised the question of the impending initiation of MIRV testing in August and said this might well coincide with the opening of the strategic talks. He said he felt that these tests should be postponed. He said that as a minimum they should not be publicized in the manner presently contemplated. Mr. Halperin noted that the draft paper on the public announcement of MIRV testing had not yet been cleared in DOD. Mr. Fisher said we ought to look at this question at a further meeting. Next Meeting of Working Group It was agreed the Working Group would meet next week with the exact time to be set by telephone. Mr. Fisher said he would want to consult with members of the Working Group by telephone in the meantime on other questions that we might need to look at. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Working Group-Strategic Arms Talk-Meeting, July 10, 1968. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. A July 9 date on the source text has been corrected by hand to read July 10. 2 President Johnson was in Honolulu for talks with President Thieu of South Vietnam July 18-20. 3 Probably John Shaw, Special Assistant for Communist Politico-Military Affairs (G/PM). 4 Document 257 . 5 “U.S. Capabilities to Monitor Certain Limitations on Strategic Weapons Program,” February 14, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4) 6 Not found. 7 See footnote 3, Document 252 , for the opening statement and the basic position paper. 254. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 254. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Brussels, July 12, 1968. Dear Mr. Secretary: I gather that among other uncertainties about strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians, the question is still open as to just how our bilateral negotiations will be related in practice to the consultative machinery of the North Atlantic Council. Since it is a special responsibility of mine to try to think hard about this, I want to set down for your consideration my thoughts on this matter as you prepare our national position on what may turn out to be an historic undertaking. My net conclusion is that we can manage to meet our commitments to allied consultation in a way which avoids either interfering with the inherently bilateral character of direct negotiations or appearing to play loose with our allies. To put it the other way around, our interests and the interests of our allies in this affair can be reconciled handily in practice. As to the interests of our allies, it is already clear from concerned conversations which my colleagues here have opened up with me that they are in no doubt whatever that when we negotiate with the Russians about the western half of the nuclear deterrent, we are negotiating about their vital national interests as well as our own. The dependence of our non-nuclear allies on our nuclear arsenal has just been copper-bottomed by the NPT; and their sense of involvement in our negotiations about nuclear missiles can only become more acute as the implications of this enterprise become more clear. As for our own interests, we have the positive one of continuing to nourish western unity and the negative one of avoiding the kind of divisive and potentially ruinous hassle we had over the MLF. With a lot of hard work and very late in the day, a dangerous drift on the military side of nuclear affairs was reversed by establishing the Nuclear Planning Group; now, we have to tackle just as creatively the parallel problem on the arms control side of nuclear affairs. And surely it is deeply important to us—in domestic political, as well as foreign policy terms—to choke off that irrational but just-beneath-the-surface possibility that the European politicians and press would feel inspired to revive the specter of “nuclear complicity” by the “Soviet-American condominium.” Our proper course in these circumstances, it seems to me, is really quite simple. Consultations in the NAC must of course be geared to progress, or lack of it, in the bilateral channel. But it is easy enough to foresee an opening phase which I should think would take us through the summer and into the early fall. In this phase, our role in the NAC should be to explain the background, the environment, and the political and technical context, without the need to predict substantive US positions before we are clear about them ourselves. I already have speculated in the Council, along the lines of an INR analysis, about what may have inspired the Soviets to answer their mail on this subject at this moment of time. By inviting the speculations of others on the same subject, we have opened a “consultation” with no conceivable damage that I can imagine to US interests. On the other hand, I can well imagine spinning out this manner of consulting within the Alliance over the period it may take the US Government to pull itself together internally. At a second, later stage (say, early fall) I can imagine our floating some general propositions as a basis for NAC discussion. Surely we could, without danger to our own position, invite discussion of the kinds of rather bland “principles” we wrote into the Reykjavik Declaration on Mutual Force Reductions. At a still later stage it might help to induce a more pervasive sense of “participation” if the NPG-NDAC machinery were brought into play—not in direct relation to any specific aspect of the bilateral talks, but to review its own work on, for example, the level of assured destruction which is essential to the allied concept of nuclear deterrence. Surely it would be futile to attempt to foresee at what point and in exactly what way we are going to need the understanding and support of our Western allies in this affair. But just as surely, in my view, we would be derelict if we did not begin the process of education on which that understanding and support eventually must rest. We have persuaded our allies to continue to forego nuclear weapons by accepting NPT; we have predicted that sooner or later we are going to bring home some of our forces from Europe; we are now proposing to discuss possible limitations on the nuclear deterrent which we have persuaded them is the foundation of their security. I do not think it is alarmist to fear that out of such a sequence of events our European friends might be tempted to reassess their interests in directions which would not serve any US interests. In any event, we should certainly not risk losing any important opportunity for us to participate, via the consultative process, in their thinking about these matters. Warmest regards, Sincerely, Harlan 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab B to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk. 255. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson 255. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 13, 1968. Dear Mr. President: I am writing to comment on the proposed Presidential message recommended by ACDA to Secretary of State Rusk and to you for use at the forthcoming opening of the ENDC. 2 I and my fellow Commissioners have problems with Presidential reiteration or endorsement at this time of two of the measures which are suggested as part of the disarmament agenda. We feel that it would be a mistake to reiterate at this time our previously stated aim to “seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.” We feel strongly that this is unrealistic in view of the absolute necessity for underground testing in order to meet our announced commitments in the field of strategic offensive weapons such as Poseidon and Minute Man, and strategic defensive weapons such as the Sentinel (ABM). Our second item of concern is a Presidential request at this time to reach agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for use in making nuclear weapons. As you know, we have shut down already seven out of fourteen of our plutonium production reactors and reduced our uranium-235 production by two-thirds. At a minimum, this would require further careful study; the last comprehensive study on a government-wide basis was made in 1964. If something needed to be said on this subject at this time, credit could be taken for what we have already done. Perhaps these measures should be studied by the Committee of Principals before any further public statement is made on them. 3 Respectfully, Glenn T. Seaborg 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ENDC, vol. III, Box 13. Confidential. 2 Seaborg wrote this letter after Fisher informed him by phone at 10:45 a.m. the same day that he was going to recommend to President Johnson that he include in his message to the opening of the ENDC “a plea for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a complete cutoff of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.” Fisher, who already knew of the AEC concerns in these areas, agreed that Seaborg would write an accompanying statement giving the AEC's point of view. (Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 17, p. 47) The letter printed here is this statement. 3 Regarding the President's decision on his ENDC statement, see Document 256 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Seaborg signed the original. 256. Editorial Note 256. Editorial Note After Glenn Seaborg had written his July 13, 1968, letter to President Johnson ( Document 255 ), he sent it to ACDA Acting Director Fisher for possible inclusion with the draft Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee statement to be forwarded to the President. On the same afternoon Fisher telephoned Seaborg to say that in view of Seaborg's letter, Secretary Rusk asked that a second version of a Presidential ENDC statement be drafted, offering the President a choice. The second version would not reiterate the concerns expressed in Seaborg's letter but simply reference the fact that such offers had been made before. Fisher, DePalma (ACDA), and Allan Labowitz, Seaborg's disarmament assistant, drafted an alternative statement the next day which, according to Seaborg, “merely recites previous U.S. statements regarding a comprehensive test ban and fissionable material cutoff but does not press for them.” (Seaborg, Journal , Volume 17, p. 47) Under cover of a memorandum to President Johnson, July 15, Walt Rostow forwarded a July 15 memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Johnson which attached a draft Presidential message to the resumption of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee the following day. This draft message contained bracketed language reviewing U.S. support for a verifiable comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials. Secretary Rusk explained in his memorandum that he preferred to include the bracketed language, but then continued, “in view of the importance of having a Presidential statement at the opening of the ENDC and the difficulty of resolving conflicting views in the short time available, I recommend that you issue the statement with the bracketed language deleted. At the same time, however, I recommend that you authorize the delegation to the ENDC to reply in the negative if asked by the press or by other delegations whether the lack of any reference to these two items means a basic change in the U.S. position with respect to them.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, ENDC, Vol. III, Box 13) In his covering memorandum, Rostow advised President Johnson to “proceed, as Secretary Rusk recommends, with the bracketed language deleted.” The approval line, which reads “Statement cleared with bracketed language deleted,” is checked. For text of the President's ENDC statement, July 16, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book II, pages 815-817. 257. Special National Intelligence Estimate 257. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, July 18, 1968. SNIE 11-13-68 US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR CERTAIN LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS The Problem To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor by national means limitations on certain Soviet strategic capabilities over the next five years or so. Note The Intelligence Community has been asked to review SNIE 11-10-67, titled as above, dated 14 February 1967, and to update that estimate because of the recent Soviet proposal regarding the discussion of certain arms control measures. 2 In this estimate we give primary consideration to the ability of intelligence to monitor the deployment of certain strategic weapon systems, but we also consider the likelihood of our detecting certain qualitative improvements to various weapon systems. Conclusions A. In the continued absence of a large-scale Soviet program of deception and concealment , we believe that we would almost certainly detect any extensive new deployment in strategic forces, although the Soviets could probably effect small-scale increases without our knowledge. The timing of detection and identification would vary with the nature and size of the program. We probably would identify a land-mobile offensive system, for example, but [ 1-½ lines of source text not declassified ] it would be difficult to determine the magnitude of such a force. B. We would almost certainly detect any large-scale test program, but we could not always expect to assess accurately the test objectives or even the precise nature of the system being tested. Our capabilities are generally better in the case of offensive than of defensive weapons. We believe, for example, that we could detect and identify Soviet testing of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for intercontinental ballistic missiles. We could probably also detect test activity associated with an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, [ 1-½ lines of source text not declassified ]. C. Our capabilities for detecting qualitative improvements in the deployed forces are better in the case of defensive weapons than offensive ones. To optimize a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system for an ABM role would require such extensive changes that some would almost certainly be detected and identified [ 2-½ lines of source text not declassified ]. We see no prospect of determining whether MIRVs (if developed) or other significant improvements had been incorporated in deployed offensive missiles. D. Soviet employment of deception and concealment on a large-scale would, of course, degrade our capabilities. While we still believe that substantial new deployment would almost certainly be detected, detection would come later in the program, [ 6 lines of source text not declassified ]. E. Factors affecting intelligence collection will vary over the period of this estimate, but intelligence is not expected to be able to guarantee that the Soviets have not violated one or more provisions of an agreement. F. [ 4 lines of source text not declassified ] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; [code word]; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. 2 See footnote 6, Document 181 . 258. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) 258. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Cleveland) 1 Washington, July 22, 1968. Dear Harlan: The problem of alliance consultation on the prospective strategic arms limitation talks, to which you refer in your letter of July 12, 2 is one which we here have fully in mind in our planning. In general, I share your conclusion that our interests and the interests of our allies in this matter can be reconciled. I am glad to have your projection of various possibilities for use of alliance consultative machinery in coming months. Until our positions are more fully developed and the course of the talks becomes clearer, we cannot commit ourselves to any specific longer range program of action in alliance consultative and planning bodies. You should continue to make clear as you have already done, that we plan to consult in NAC as the situation develops. At this time, the exchange of views already underway in NAC on possible Soviet motivations and objectives is, in my view, an appropriate starting point for such consultations. You may also cite as appropriate the President's message of July 16 to the ENDC and its indication of an initial emphasis on a limitation or leveling off of strategic delivery systems to be followed by consideration of reductions of existing systems. If it would be useful in further allaying unwarranted concerns, you may point out to our allies that since the US, for sound reasons of national interest, could not conceivably agree to impair its deterrent, the interests of allied governments in maintaining this deterrent would not be affected. At present, there are certain difficulties which you should be particularly alert to avoid. I believe that studies by the International Staff, the NPG, or Polads at this stage could only be detrimental to US freedom of action as we approach discussions in this sensitive area. Moreover, we would not be able to make sufficient data available to them to assure a realistic analysis. Accordingly, you should seek to anticipate and avoid, insofar as possible, any actions or proposals to institute such studies, and continue to concentrate on the numerous other areas of disarmament activity already under consideration in the alliance. It is also important, when the limits of useful consultation cannot yet be delineated, to avoid any actions which would give rise to excessive expectations. As regards the substance of our position, you should be particularly alert to avoiding speculation and discussion of the issue of verification, which is, as you will appreciate, extremely sensitive. We will be giving consideration to a draft statement when the time comes for a fuller statement in the Council. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret; Exdis. The source text is Tab A to a July 17 memorandum from Springsteen to Secretary Rusk. 2 Document 254 . 259. Memorandum of Conversation 259. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, July 23, 1968, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Alfred Puhan, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR Edwin D. Crowley, EUR/GER His Excellency Franz Josef Strauss, Finance Minister, FRG His Excellency Heinrich Knappstein, German Ambassador Dr. Walter Rieger, Personal Assistant to the Minister Secretary Rusk asked Minister Strauss what was at the heart of the German problem on the NPT. Strauss said he would express opinions which were his and not those of the Cabinet nor of the SPD. He was aware that his government had inquired concerning a number of details and he did not want to go into them further. The FRG had been satisfied on most of them. He agreed with the goals of the Treaty. Who would want Nasser, etc., to have a nuclear weapon? The German problem is what will be the political changes over the longer range as a result of the Treaty. If the FRG does or does not sign, it will not change the real situation. He continues to agree that the FRG should not have a nuclear potential. This would be wrong for political reasons. He wondered what rights the Soviets might get from the Treaty for permanent intervention in Germany. Secretary Rusk said he did not quite understand how the Treaty gave the Soviets any new power in that respect. Minister Strauss said the Soviets gave up nothing but got everything including a permanent right of accusing the FRG of doing things it should not do under the Treaty. They will never be satisfied. The USSR would never give access to nuclear weapons to their friends. China already has them. He was also worried whether the Treaty would discourage or encourage unification of Europe. One had to live with the bomb just as one had to live with de Gaulle. Secretary Rusk said he did not see how the Soviets could interfere on the basis of the Treaty. The FRG did not have to accept Soviet safeguard inspectors. Mr. Strauss said his concerns were strengthened by the Soviet communication to the FRG of July 5. He was particularly concerned with references to Article 53 and Article 107 of the UN Charter. In the U.S. view, he knew that their application was overtaken by events. However, the Soviets continued to maintain their right to use military means against those defeated in World War II. Chancellor Kiesinger agreed with him, although he did not say it publicly, that there should be more assurance on interpretations. We have them from the U.S. but not from the Soviets. Secretary Rusk recalled we had gone over the interpretations in NATO. We have told the Russians what we are going to say. We do not expect their public agreement. It is clear if they object, the question arises as to whether there is a Treaty. He said the Russians were fully aware of our view on this subject. He understood it to be the clear desire of the FRG not to leave an option for the FRG but for Europe. The Soviets might object to unification even without a Treaty. France and the UK were not going to give up their nuclear weapons. Strauss said in the case of European unity they eventually would have to transfer them to the unified Europe. Secretary Rusk did not see the use of the withdrawal clause as any more difficult than a decision not to sign the Treaty. If the FRG did not sign, they would still be open to accusations. Strauss said we should not always worry about Soviet accusations. Secretary Rusk recalled that these problems did not just come from the East but from the West. Under Secretary Rostow said, with regard to Strauss' concern about the European option, he had discussed the problem at length with several, including Birrenbach. 2 As a result, he had reviewed the international law of succession, and concluded that whether Europe was formed federally or confederally, the doctrine applied when the parties said it did. Minister Strauss agreed. He recalled that the Secretary once said that the FRG should get rid of the Mercator Projection. It was a fact that the USSR had three neighbors—the United States, Communist China and Europe. If he were a Russian leader, he would do anything to avoid a unified Europe, even a unified Communist Europe. Secretary Rusk said that is why we want a unified Europe since if Europe were secure there would be no reason for war between the USSR and the US. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Edwin D. Crowley (EUR/GER) and approved in S/S on August 5. The source text is labeled “Part IV of V.” The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. 2 Kurt Birrenbach, prominent West German businessman and member of the Bundestag. 260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 260. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 24, 1968, 12:25 p.m. Mr. President: Sect. Rusk reports as follows on timing of strategic missiles talks: —He raised the matter with Dobrynin. Dobrynin said he had no answer and assumed this was because the leaders in Moscow were “very busy.” —Sect. Rusk assumes this is due to their preoccupation with the Czech crisis. —If the Soviets intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia, he assumes that the President would wish to consider afresh the timing of these talks. —If, as a result of the current Soviet-Czech meetings the situation is peacefully resolved, he would propose going back shortly to Dobrynin and press him again. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the memorandum was received at 12:32 p.m. 261. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 261. Letter From Chairman Kosygin to President Johnson 1 Moscow, July 25, 1968. Dear Mr. President, We already have agreed between our governments to enter in the near future into the negotiations on the curbing of the strategic armaments race. My colleagues and myself attach great significance to the negotiations on this question. In fact this is one of the major questions of disarmament, which were discussed during the last 20-odd years. A complex 2 limitation and then a reduction of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles would answer the interests of our countries and not only of our countries. Successful outcome of these negotiations would create favourable conditions for the solution of other big questions in the field of disarmament. It is also, we believe, far from being all the same for 3 our countries that the reduction of the strategic armaments would lead to a great saving of money which is being spent now for these purposes. We have no doubts that you are now considering, just as we are, all aspects of this problem. We think that within one month or a month and a half the representatives of both our countries could start the exchange of opinions on this question. Our view is that Geneva could be a suitable place for the negotiations. A concrete date of the negotiations could be agreed upon additionally and we will be glad to hear your considerations to that effect. Of course I must tell you frankly that whatever approach to the solution of the problem of curbing the strategic arms race might be it is impossible to consider it in isolation from the whole international situation, from the tension that exists at present in the world. I think that you too, Mr. President, understand this perfectly well. That is why it is necessary to exert all efforts in order to ensure most favourable conditions for the success of negotiations on this extremely important problem. Sincerely, A. Kosygin 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Control Messages Exchanged Between President Johnson and Chairman, USSR, Vol. 1, Box 11. No classification marking. A typed notation on the source text identifies it as an unofficial translation. 2 The word “overall” has been inserted by hand above this word as an alternate translation. 3 Above the phrase, “far from being all the same for,” has been inserted by hand as an alternate translation, “not a matter of indifference to both.” 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 262. Intelligence Memorandum 262. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, July 26, 1968. SR IM 68-20 MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND THE SOVIET INTEREST IN STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS Summary The Soviet decision to begin strategic arms limitation talks with the United States marks a point of convergence for widely differing views within the Kremlin leadership on internal economic goals, military force structure, and the use of military power. Central to the disagreement is the prospect that the relationship of Soviet to US strategic capabilities—which the Soviets have improved in the past few years through expensive weapons development and deployment programs—will erode in the 1970's as the US implements widely publicized plans for improving its strategic weapons. There is probably considerable doubt within the ruling Politburo about the technical prospects and economic effects of trying to counter these developments at this time with new weapons programs. Basic policy controversies may be sharpened as Soviet leaders attempt to formulate positions to be taken in the talks and decide what to do with the freed resources after an arms limitation agreement. Some Politburo members probably hope to divert resources from strategic arms to investment programs. A freeze on deployment of strategic weapons could eventually release as much as 2-½ billion rubles a year—equivalent to 13 percent of the total investment in industry in 1967—for other objectives, such as economic growth or an increase in funds for consumer welfare. It is also possible that strong elements within the Politburo see the prospect of stabilizing the strategic arms race as an opportunity to improve Soviet conventional forces and make them a more flexible and responsive arm of political power. The military has not publicly placed its stamp of approval on the talks. On the contrary, it has continued to stress the theme of international dangers and the concomitant requirement for strengthened Soviet defenses. There are, moreover, signs of a debate in military circles whether to pursue further improvements in strategic capabilities or to settle for a stable strategic relationship and broaden the capabilities of the conventional forces. The Kremlin View of the Future US-Soviet Strategic Relationship 1. Recent decisions in the US concerning the Sentinel ABM system probably were read by Soviet leaders as indicating that the US is willing to continue the strategic arms race despite pressures for economizing. On 27 June, Foreign Minister Gromyko included in his address to the Supreme Soviet a statement of Soviet readiness to hold arms control talks. 2 This was followed the next week by a nine-point disarmament proposal by Premier Kosygin. 3 2. While the USSR currently is in the final stages of its third-generation ICBM deployment and has an effective deterrent, this capability will begin to erode in the early 1970's if Moscow does not match announced US plans for upgrading its strategic defense and attack capabilities with the Sentinel, Poseidon, and Minuteman III programs. The USSR will have to improve its strategic forces substantially—qualitatively or quantitatively—to maintain its current position relative to the US. 3. What is probably most ominous to the Soviet authorities is that planned US force improvements may threaten the Soviet capability for deterrence. Thus they are faced with the possibility that despite all their planning, effort, and spending on strategic forces over the last 20 years, they will still have reason to be dissatisfied with the future strategic relationship. Guns or Growth: Alternative Uses of Economic Resources 4. Given such strategic considerations alone, Soviet leaders could have come to the conclusion that they had much to gain by breaking the 18-month period of indecision on accepting US proposals for talks on strategic arms limitations. The Politburo as a whole, however, probably opted for talks at this time because of divergent policy views reflecting still unresolved controversies regarding internal economic goals, military force structure, and the utility of various forms and levels of military power. Indeed, basic policy issues may be sharpened as political leaders struggle to form a consensus on a coherent negotiating position while proposals for arms control unfold. 5. Even the announcement of Soviet willingness to negotiate has exposed differences of opinion among leading spokesmen and interest groups. The government organ Izvestiya has endorsed the arms control initiatives contained in the speeches of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Premier Kosygin. Party chief Brezhnev endorsed the talks on 3 July, but qualified his approval at the 8 July military graduates' assembly when he reasserted the military spenders' line that “as long as imperialism exists” the socialist countries will take “every measure to strengthen their defense.” The military press has chosen to highlight the harsher aspects of Brezhnev's line, while remaining silent on the desirability of arms limitations. 6. One issue likely to be divisive among the top Soviet leaders is the matter of where to reallocate any resources freed by an agreement. Owing to the vagaries of Kremlin politics, there is no basis for predicting exactly how the Soviet leadership might utilize the resources released by an agreement to limit the expansion of strategic forces. 7. It is possible that among those Politburo members who favor negotiations, strong elements see stability in strategic armaments, if achievable, as an opportunity to turn conventional military forces into a more flexible, efficient arm of political power. Strategic power, nevertheless, appears to hold top priority among these men, some of whom may press for continued qualitative upgrading of the existing strategic forces and an intensification of research and development on new weapon systems. Some Politburo members may not seriously expect that talks would, over the long run, be successful in stabilizing matters. But in the short run, the Politburo as a whole probably has serious reservations about the technical and economic desirability of countering currently programmed US weapons improvements. The majority could thus regard strategic arms talks at this time as a way, at the least, of exploring the US position and seeking to delay US programs at little cost to the USSR. 8. Another group within the Politburo—the more ardent advocates of economic growth—can make a strong case for a major reallocation from defense to the civilian economy at the present time. Increases in consumer welfare, coming on top of expanded military expenditures, are necessarily being accomplished at the expense of investment. The Soviet leadership is thus running the risk of slowing down the rate of economic growth, that is, of impairing future capacity for supporting military as well as civilian programs. Moreover, the substantial increases in defense spending that would be necessary to halt the erosion of the present Soviet strategic position would almost certainly cause long-term economic problems. 9. A precise calculation of the potential savings of any contemplated arms control agreement cannot be made until the detailed terms of the agreement are available. A general appreciation of the possible savings can be obtained, however, by examining the estimates of future Soviet expenditures for the deployment and operation of certain strategic weapons systems—long range bombers, strategic missile and space systems, ballistic-missile submarines, and the ABM—and assuming that there would be a complete moratorium on further deployment of these systems. Under these conditions, the Soviets could reduce expenditures on the average about 2.5 billion rubles a year for the period of the early 1970's. This calculation assumes that the Soviets maintain their current high levels of expenditures for research and development, space efforts, and nonstrategic defense programs. 10. The allocation of the presumed savings in defense expenditures to industrial investment programs would provide a base for accelerated growth in the economy—2.5 billion rubles representing about 13 percent of total Soviet investment in industry in 1967. Since these particular resources include the best managerial and technical talents available, their contribution to the sorely needed modernization of the Soviet economy would probably be even greater than indicated by monetary measures alone. The Military Debate: Strategic Power Versus Usable Power 11. The professional military may have different considerations in mind. In fact, they seem to be of at least two minds on the goals to be sought: one, to pursue a costly attempt to attain a “massive retaliation,” or even a first strike, capability; two, to settle for a stable strategic relationship through an arms limitation agreement and to refurbish and expand conventional capabilities to permit more flexible application of military power. Perhaps the division within the military leadership—in conjunction with the other considerations mentioned earlier—facilitated the decision to discuss arms limitations at this time. 12. At any rate, future force structure discussions within the Soviet military have recently carried a particularly polemical tone. For example, Colonel I. Grudinin writing in the late May 1968 issue of Communist of the Armed Forces referred to “certain authors” who fail to emphasize the necessity for “overwhelming” strategic superiority. In contrast to Grudinin-like arguments, Colonel General Povaliy, the planning chief on the Soviet General Staff, had noted two months earlier that overwhelming strategic superiority—or “massive retaliation”—had become “quite unrealistic and unconvincing.” 13. The Povaliy article, in the 12 March Red Star , observed that NATO and the United States endorse the policy of fighting future wars with the weapons that “correspond to the nature of the possible clash.” It went on to stress that the “imperialists” will continue to try to achieve their goals with the use of only conventional weapons or tactical nuclear weapons. Under the concept of more flexible options, according to Povaliy, a state need not run the risk of nuclear war “in every situation in which its allies become involved” and can pursue its own military-political objectives with the least threat to its security. 14. Certain military leaders are wary of the current trend in Soviet doctrine toward rejection of the “massive retaliation” doctrine as the cornerstone of Soviet strategy. They have argued that the use of conventional forces does not undermine the reliance on nuclear weapons. The development of strategic attack forces, in their view, must continue to command priority. Advocates of this “massive retaliation” view remain a strong force within the Soviet military. French Defense Minister Mess-mer reportedly stated after a visit to Moscow in April that “old Russian generals are really old”—that they cling to a strategy of immediate all-out nuclear retaliation, uninfluenced by any of the recent military doctrines advanced in the US and elsewhere. 15. One well-known old Russian marshal, the late V.D. Sokolovskiy, was a proponent of strong strategic nuclear forces. His book Military Strategy , reissued late last year, reflected the view that any war between nuclear powers will “inevitably” escalate into a general nuclear conflict. The initial period of war will be decisive, the marshal claimed. He added that the Soviet Union will be able to detect preparations for a “surprise nuclear attack” and must have the means to deal the enemy a “crushing blow of decisive significance.” 16. Sokolovskiy's views appear to be under attack within the military establishment by advocates of a flexible-response strategy. One such advocate mentioned above, Colonel General Povaliy, remarked to a US military attache that Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy was “obsolete,” explaining that Soviet strategy has no label but that the Soviet Union is “ready to meet whatever the situation requires.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. At the bottom of the first page is the following typewritten note: “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence, Economic Research, and National Estimates.” 2 Movement on the decision to enter into strategic arms talks was first presaged in Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov's 26 April UN proposal for limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic arms. Soviet media remained silent on Kuznetsov's proposal until he reiterated the line for arms limitations in another UN speech on 20 May. Gromyko's 27 June acceptance of US proposals to talk was promptly published in the Soviet press, with the notable exception of the military press—an indication that important pressure groups within the military had not become reconciled to the Soviet policy change over the previous two months. [Footnote in the source text. For texts of Kuznetsov's April 26 and May 20 statements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964 , pp. 234-243 and 368-378, respectively. For an excerpt from Gromyko's June 27 statement to the Supreme Soviet, see ibid., pp. 450-452.] 3 See footnote 6, Document 252 . 263. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 263. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, July 30, 1968. Dear Mr. Chairman: I was much interested in you letter of July 25 2 on the subject of talks about curbing the strategic arms race. I agree with your remarks about the great importance of this question to both our countries, to other nations as well, and to the general and urgent problem of disarmament. We agree that Geneva would be a suitable place for the negotiations. You indicate that a period of a month to a month and a half would provide a suitable interval for preparations. This time period of “a month to a month and a half” is acceptable. As for the level at which the talks might begin, we would be ready to initiate the discussions at the level of Chiefs of Government, Foreign Ministers, or heads of special delegations in Geneva. We will be glad to have your suggestions as to the exact dates and the level of representation. We should also consult upon when and how an announcement of the meeting should be made. There could be some advantage if the general situation would permit an announcement to be made before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Conference in late August. 3 I do hope that our forthcoming discussions on the strategic arms race can produce constructive results because I believe that our peoples would join in a common desire for a successful outcome. We share, of course, your understanding that it is essential for both of us to make every effort to create the most favorable climate for these talks. If problems arise in the general situation which complicate prospects for success, we can of course be in touch with each other. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin, Box 10. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a July 30 note from Bromley Smith to the President which reads: “This is the retyped letter containing the revisions you suggested in paragraph 2.” Other drafts of this letter have not been found. 2 Document 261 . 3 The Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, sponsored by the United Nations, met in Geneva August 29-September 28. See Documents 284 and 286 . 264. Paper Prepared by the Interagency Working Group 264. Paper Prepared by the Interagency Working Group 1 Washington, July 31, 1968. STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS PROPOSAL The elements of a U.S. proposal for the proposed U.S.-USSR strategic missile talks are outlined below. This proposal should be viewed as an entity since that is the basis on which it has been evaluated. I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles. II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range. III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems The proposal would impose a complete ban on the deployment of mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed. IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems A. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited. B. There would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. V. ABMs The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equal number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed. VI. Aircraft and Anti-aircraft Systems The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems. VII. Technological Improvements There would be no prohibition of technological improvement within the constraints of the agreement. VIII. Verification The limitations described in paragraphs I through V are proposed to be verified by national means. IX. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal A. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions. B. Ten years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the 10-year period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months notice prior to 11 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated. C. Either party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Top Secret; Nodis. According to a memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, July 31 (reproduced in Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 26, pp. 341-342), this paper is a revision of an earlier draft sent to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals on July 26. A copy of the July 26 draft is in Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. A revision of the July 26 paper, marked “ACDA-2956/Rev.2,” dated July 30, and containing proposed last-minute changes by DOD, is attached to a memorandum from Shaw (G/PM) to Bohlen, July 31, with recommendations on the positions Bohlen should take on these proposed changes at the interagency working group meeting that afternoon. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12) 265. Memorandum for the Record 265. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, August 5, 1968. CM-3549-68 SUBJECT Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin 1. On the evening of 5 August, I attended a dinner at the residence of the Netherlands Ambassador in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Walter Stoessel,Ambassador-designate to Poland. Among the guests were Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. After dinner, when we were joining the ladies, Ambassador Dobrynin took the opportunity to engage me in conversation in company with our former Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Gronouski. Mr. Gronouski moved away after a few moments, leaving Ambassador Dobrynin and me alone until the gathering broke up more than 30 minutes later. 2. The early part of Ambassador Dobrynin's remarks were of a general nature. He commented on the differences in the roles of the top military in the Soviet Union and the United States, citing the fact that I regularly attend the Tuesday White House luncheons while the Soviet military never appear at the weekly meetings of the seven-man top ruling group of the Soviet Union and only attend the Politburo meetings when a specific item of a military nature is on the agenda. He commented also on the composition of the classes at our National War College and said they had nothing of a similar nature in the Soviet Union. After about ten minutes, he switched to the subject of the upcoming talks on limitations of strategic missiles which, because he repeated each point several times during the ensuing 25 minutes or so, I presume was the real purpose of his conversation with me. 3. Ambassador Dobrynin made, several times over, the following points: a. In a sense the United States has established goals which the Russians are determined to reach or even surpass. (In the context of his remarks, I was persuaded that he was speaking in this instance of non-military matters.) b. The upcoming Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) could be extremely important because they could lead to further improvements in relations and unspecified benefits to all. c. The Soviets are unsure as to exactly what we want to achieve. Is it a freeze? This doubt has been fertilized by statements by United States officials as to our military superiority in the strategic area. These statements lead to demands for more forces (missile, I assume)—100, 200, 300 more. d. The United States and the Soviet Union are both great nations. If we approach the talks on the basis of equality, results can be achieved. (By inference, Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed the impression that any other approach would negate achievement.) 4. Comment : Ambassador Dobrynin's manner throughout our conversation was very friendly and sincere. Obviously he was determined to make his points with me because he twice refused to be persuaded by our hostess from taking a seat with a group of ladies. He emphasized the importance of us approaching the talks on the basis of “equality.” From the way in which he used this word, I gained the impression that he meant two things: First, the recognition on our part that we would be dealing with a militarily equal nation. (Of interest is the fact that the Ambassador said they believed themselves to be ahead of us in certain military areas while recognizing that we were ahead of them in others.) The other meaning which I think he conveyed by his use of the word “equality” was parity of forces; however, he did not at that time elaborate on this aspect nor did he use the word “parity” at any time. 5. As the dinner party broke up, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had enjoyed very much talking to me and hoped to be able to renew our conversation at an early date. Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (2), Box 22. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by General Wheeler on August 6. 266. Notes of Meetings 266. Notes of Meetings 1 Washington, August 7, 1968. [Here follows discussion of a telephone conversation with Donald Hornig on the upcoming IAEA Conference, testing, and the Fermi Award.] At 10:30 a.m. I met with the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals in the Secretary of State's Conference Room. Present were Rusk (Chairman), Foster, Fisher, Bohlen, Hornig, Keeney, Helms, Scoville, Harold Brown, General Wheeler, Nitze, Clifford, Warnke; plus Labowitz, Kirby Gean, Ivan Selin (DOD), et al. Rusk opened the meeting by emphasizing that there is a need for finding positive ways to make progress in arms limitation. He suggested that the meeting start with a status report on the work of the interagency Working Group, and called on Adrian Fisher to give the report. Fisher called attention to the fact that the Working Group's conclusions were summarized in his memorandum to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, dated July 31, 1968 (copy attached), which enclosed the summary paper, “Strategic Missile Talks Proposal.” 2 He said that, in view of this, and assuming that the Principals have read the paper, he would not take the time to describe it here. He said that it deals solely with a freeze on missiles and not on the production problem. Fisher also referred to the CIA documents analyzing the national detection capabilities. He said we don't yet have individual agency positions on this matter, but we do have a DOD analysis on the military effectiveness of the strategic missile proposal. Rusk then called for the DOD report. Clifford said that this has been a priority item within DOD and Selin would present the briefing. He stated that this material has not yet been evaluated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Selin then made an analysis comparing the U.S. and USSR strategic forces and their effectiveness in first strikes and retaliation from first strikes with and without an agreement on limitation of strategic missiles. He gave us a paper that summarized his remarks. Secretary Clifford then called on General Wheeler to give us his views. Wheeler said that such an arrangement to limit strategic missiles would lead to political problems; one of these would be that it would create a strain within the alliance, another was the possibility the Soviets would clandestinely increase their land-based mobile system, which would be possible because we don't have means of verification. Another problem would arise if we should attempt to limit the radars because we can't verify this. He said he thought the limitations on the ABM might be the core of the problem, that this could make us vulnerable to attacks from Nth countries. Rusk raised the question whether we couldn't establish a Joint U.S.-USSR Commission on Strategic Missiles to serve as a forum to discuss the problems on a day-to-day basis and to monitor the progress in missile limitation. Such a Commission would look into any allegations of violations. This might be better than a formal treaty such as we have for the test ban. In this connection, he asked Foster to think of the form as well as the content of a strategic missiles limitation. Wheeler said he could visualize such a Joint Commission within a treaty, but that a Joint Commission alone would not receive the approval of Congress because they would want to have the terms spelled out. Both Rusk and Foster responded by saying they thought the Joint Commission could be put in a form so that Congress would approve; perhaps a joint resolution of Congress could be used for this purpose. Rusk asked me whether I had any comment. In referring to the briefing by Selin, I said I thought the Soviets surely would go to the building of MIRVs. I asked why this was considered as an uncertainty concerning Soviet intentions. Rusk said that they might want to seek an agreement to prohibit MIRVs, but that if MIRVs were not prohibited, it would seem like the Soviets would add them to their arsenal. I said we should make an analysis of the consequences of both sides eliminating MIRVs and bombers. We then turned to the third agenda item, even though Clifford had left the meeting to take a phone call. Nitze introduced this item, which had to do with the U.S. MIRV test program. He gave us a paper covering this item. 3 Rusk raised the question as to why MIRVs are better than separate re-entry vehicles, and was told by several people present that, for a given launch capability and cost, more coverage could be accomplished with MIRVs than with separate re-entry vehicles. Rusk asked when the first MIRV test is scheduled to take place and Nitze indicated it would be on August 15th or 16th. When Secretary Clifford re-entered the room, Foster asked him whether he thought it was wise for him (Clifford) to hold a press conference announcing the MIRV test program. Foster asked whether it wouldn't be better to have a DOD press officer, such as Phil Goulding, announce it. Rusk suggested that another alternative would be just to issue a written statement. He said there was some belief, for example in the recent Times article, that starting the testing of MIRVs forecloses the possibility of ever prohibiting them. I said it should be remembered that the AEC has an accelerated, or crash program, for the construction of the nuclear warheads for the MIRVs, for Poseidon and for Minuteman III, and that authorization and commitment has already been undertaken for hundreds of millions of dollars worth of construction for this purpose, which is already underway. Rusk summarized the discussion by asking whether anyone was suggesting a postponement of the MIRV tests, and it was apparent that no one was suggesting such a postponement. Rusk indicated that McCarthy might make an issue in the election of suggesting a postponement. On the other hand, if the MIRV tests were postponed, Nixon would make an issue of it. Rusk suggested that DOD try to issue the most unexciting press announcement possible, and as soon as possible. He asked whether the press is always present at the MIRV test launchings, and Nitze said, “Yes, this has been the best policy.” Rusk closed the meeting by indicating that the Principals would meet again a week from today, at the same time. I met with Secretary Rusk at 12 noon, at his request, following the Meeting of the Principals. [Here follows discussion of visas for an Israeli and South African to a Soviet conference. At the conclusion of this private meeting, Seaborg noted:] I indicated to Rusk that I have the impression the U.S. is depending very much on the MIRVs for its strategic offensive and deterrent capability and that it would be difficult to get agreement for any treaty which included as a provision the prohibition of MIRVs. [Here follow telephone conversations on the AEC General Advisory Committee and a proposed conference on nuclear power.] 1 Source: Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 128, and 132-133. No classification marking. 2 See footnote 1, Document 264 . 3 Not further identified. 267. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 267. Memorandum From Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, August 12, 1968. SUBJECT Status of Preparations for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks The Committee of Principals is scheduled to meet at 10:30 am, Wednesday, August 14, to review and prepare recommendations for the President on our proposed position (Tab A) 2 for the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). On Saturday, the JCS completed its review of this specific proposal that has been developed by an Interagency Working Group. On the basis of the JCS recommendation to Secretary Clifford, I believe that the Committee of Principals should be able to agree upon a favorable recommendation to the President on a slightly revised version of this proposal. The JCS, except for the Navy, bought the interagency proposal, subject to four clarifying changes, which should be acceptable to all the other agencies involved. The Navy split was in the form of a proposed modification favoring Navy systems which was not acceptable to the other Chief on the grounds of security. (General Wheeler prepared a separate strong paper rebutting the Navy position.) 3 I assume, therefore, that Secretary Clifford will support the proposal subject to the changes proposed by the majority of the JCS. (Bob Ginsburgh has presumably obtained an advance copy of the JCS paper for you.) 4 At a meeting of the Committee of Principals last Wednesday, August 7, the status of preparations for the talks was reviewed, and the Committee endorsed Secretary Clifford's decision to proceed on August 16, as scheduled, with the first all-up test launch of the Minuteman III with a MIRV. (See attached Minutes, Tab B.) 5 As you know, the latter point has been made a major issue by Senator McCarthy and Bob Klieman (New York Times), among others, on the grounds that the successful test of a MIRV would make a strategic freeze impossible. It was agreed that, on the contrary, quite aside from security considerations, a unilateral moratorium on such testing at this time could hurt the prospects for a agreement by its effects on the attitudes of both Congress and the Soviets. The staff preparations for the talks are on schedule, and I believe in general are in reasonably good shape. The proposed position developed by the Interagency Working Group (Tab A) has been carefully drafted to take into account specific problems that have been advanced while retaining the form of a general commitment. There should be no misunderstanding as to the nature of the proposal on which interagency agreement and Presidential approval are being sought. Systems Analysis has prepared the attached detailed study of the proposal which was summarized for the Committee of Principals last Wednesday. (Presentation to Committee and complete study, Tab C.) 6 You should read at least the summary presentation to the Committee. Although not formally agreed to within the Pentagon, it appears to be generally accepted as the point of departure in evaluating the proposal. The basic point is that our forces are so large and diverse that our assured destruction capability is relatively insensitive to most forms of qualitative improvements, cheating, or abrogation scenarios. The most serious threat appears to be the rapid clandestine deployment of a massive, highly effective ABM system; however, even in this case, there would be compensatory actions we could take to maintain a high level of assured destruction. CIA has prepared the attached SNIE 11-13-68 (Tab D), 7 which was approved by USIB, estimating the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor the proposal by national means. This is, in general, an excellent, responsible job, which comes directly to grips with the problem and does not hide behind qualifying uncertainties. You should read it in its entirety. It does not, however, answer all the questions. In particular, I am not satisfied with the treatment of MIRVs which, although not now covered in our proposal, could be subsequently introduced by the Soviets or ourselves. While on balance the judgment may well be correct that we would probably detect a Soviet MIRV test program, I am not yet convinced of the intelligence community's ability to back up this conclusion in the face of critics fearful of a Soviet clandestine program. CIA and DIA have also prepared a detailed report (Tab E) 8 concerning the critical problem of the possibility of upgrading the Tallinn SAM system into an ABM system unknown to our unilateral intelligence. As I indicated above, the military analysis concluded that this type of development was the most serious threat we would face under the agreement. Unfortunately, this report is somewhat confusing since, although it concludes that the system could be upgraded to have ABM capabilities without our knowledge, it also concludes that the resulting system would have quite limited capabilities and be extremely vulnerable. The problem of defining present and future capabilities of the Tallinn system clearly remains one of the most serious and difficult issues to be dealt with in these talks. In view of the above, I think we can now count on being able to pre-sent an agreed-upon, forthcoming specific proposal, which has been staffed in considerable depth, in the event the talks begin in the next few weeks. There are, however, still some major tactical issues that will have to be resolved before the initiation of the talks. I believe the most difficult of these will be how we deal with the question of on-site inspections. Although it is agreed that our present proposal could be monitored by unilateral means, it is also obvious that it could be more effectively monitored if there were provisions for on-site inspection of critical facilities or suspicious activities. The JCS has specifically asked that an effort be made to obtain provisions for on-site inspections. How this is to be done in an effective manner in the talks without jeopardizing the prospects of success, since we have certainly implied our proposal would not require on-site inspection, will be a major challenge to the skill of our negotiators. There are also a number of major unresolved substantive issues which preferably should be resolved before the talks but will certainly have to be resolved early in the negotiations if they appear to be going anywhere. The most important of these is what level of limitation on ABM deployment we wish to achieve. Our present position calls only for a “set and equal number,” and we have not as yet agreed on a preferred level. Consideration is currently being given to the relative merits of 0, 100, 600, and 1000. Closely related is the difficult issue of how to deal with the Tallinn system in defining its present capabilities and controlling future upgrading. Finally, there is the general question of whether the agreement should be in the form of a detailed formal treaty or some form of informal understanding. Spurgeon 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret. 2 Not found. Reference presumably is to a draft of Document 264 . 3 General Wheeler expressed these views in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Clifford, August 9 (CM-3572-68). (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) 4 The JCS position was contained in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford, August 9 (JCSM-498-68). Robert Ginsburgh, NSC Staff Member, forwarded this paper under cover of an August 10 memorandum to Rostow which summarized the paper. (Ibid.) 5 Not attached. Seaborg's notes ( Document 266 ) are the only record of the August 7 meeting found. 6 Not found. 7 Document 257 . 8 Dated August 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) 268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson 268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 13, 1968. SUBJECT Proposal for Limiting Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems I. We have examined the Arms Control Proposal as described in Tab A, 2 and have found that, on balance, and subject to the assumptions and conditions set forth in Section III below, an agreement based upon it 3 would allow the actions necessary to preserve U.S. security. Specifically, we conclude that within the terms of such an agreement we would be able to: a. maintain the U.S. deterrent posture; b. leave the Soviet Government and world opinion in no doubt as to the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent posture; c. be confident within the terms of the agreement that our deterrent posture could not be eroded by the actions of the Soviet Union, or any other nuclear power, alone or in combination; d. maintain a U.S. capability to limit damage to the United States by Soviet forces if deterrence fails, at least as effective as that which we can expect to obtain in the absence of an agreement; and e. provide a strategic capability that would prevent nuclear powers other than the Soviet Union from threatening the stability of the agreement. II. Our conclusions in regard to the agreement are based on an analysis of the next 8-10 years. However, we cannot predict new Soviet weapon systems more than a few years ahead, and, therefore, we must continually have the freedom to reassess and to revise the agreement, or withdraw. We know of no way to determine whether the agreement—if it should remain unchanged—will continue to be in our interest. It is contemplated that we would exercise our right to terminate the agreement if we conclude that our national interest can be better protected in a different way. We must be prepared to withdraw at any time if our security requires us to do so. We also believe that the agreement proposed may well need modification from time to time if it is to continue to preserve our security. In particular, we are concerned that freezing the location and inhibiting our ability to harden existing land-based silos could over time lead to a situation of instability, in that our land-based missile force might be destroyed in a first strike by the Soviet offensive missile forces; this situation could develop if the Soviets were to exploit their potential for substantially increasing their present advantage in throw weight and installing MIRV's, both of which are permitted under the agreement. Over the next few years the proposed agreement cannot lead to major budgetary savings and could even require some increases in spending; over a longer period the savings could be substantial if we were able to forego the new programs that might be rendered unnecessary by Soviet acceptance of the agreement and the Soviets decided unilaterally to forego upgrading systems not limited by the agreement. Of greater importance, we believe that the agreement could lead to greater security for the United States over the next 8-10 years, provided that we take the necessary actions to maintain the effectiveness of our strategic forces and remain in a position to react promptly if the agreement is suddenly terminated. III. Our conclusion that the agreement would preserve the security of the U.S. is based on the following assumptions and conditions: a. We must be confident that we possess a means of verifying an adequate degree of compliance with the agreement. Based on both the assessment of the Intelligence Community concerning their capability to verify compliance and the sensitivity of U.S. security to Soviet cheating or abrogation, we believe that national means of verification would enable us to monitor the various specific limitations in the agreement, with varying degrees of effectiveness. We have confidence that we would be able to monitor the agreement in terms of numbers of fixed, land-based offensive and defensive missile system launchers of known characteristics. However, within the fixed offensive systems we have low confidence that we can verify the prohibition against upgrading IR/MRBM launchers to an ICBM capability and defensive missile systems to a BMD capability. We also have low confidence that national means of verification would permit us to monitor the terms of the agreement as they pertain to mobile offensive and defensive systems. We must therefore: (1) make a concerted effort to secure Soviet consent to some form of inspection involving intrusion into each other's territory and air space to verify limitations on systems other than those which we have reasonable confidence of verifying through unilateral means alone. Such agreed inspection procedures would increase the confidence of each side in the other side's compliance with the agreement, as well as the general confidence of allies that the results of the agreement are likely to be beneficial. It would permit a more comprehensive agreement. It also is likely to increase the stability of conditions and relationships; (2) be prepared to use the necessary information from intelligence sources to call possible violations to the attention of the Soviet Union; (3) be prepared to withdraw from the agreement, if necessary, justifying our actions by the public disclosure of data from intelligence sources; (4) be prepared to withdraw from the agreement if the Soviets take steps which erode our ability to monitor their compliance, since our verification capability would be significantly degraded by Soviet efforts at concealment, evasion, or interference. b. An upper limit on ABM defense should be set at an equivalent number of fixed land-based BMD-capable launchers and associated missiles, including reload missiles. The exact ABM limits would be determined during the course of negotiations with the Soviet Union, based upon an assessment of Soviet ABM-capable launchers and missile levels and our overall security objectives as they relate to other nuclear powers and to all the provisions of the agreement. The number should take cognizance of the need to defend against a threat from the CPR or other nuclear power during the period of the agreement. c. We must have satisfactory assurances that present and future antiaircraft missile systems are not and will not become BMD systems. We should take the initial position that, unless the Soviets can assure us that SA-5 (Tallinn) is not and will not become a BMD system, it must be included in the Soviet ABM launcher limit. The degree of assurance required will depend on the results of technical study of our ability to detect a Soviet program to upgrade Tallinn to achieve various degrees of BMD potential. d. [ 3-½ lines of source text not declassified ] We must be assured that the Soviets do not replace existing IR/MRBM missiles unless they can satisfy us that the new missiles do not possess an ICBM capability. We would consider their failure to provide us with adequate assurances, as needed, as constituting grounds justifying our withdrawing from the agreement. e. The agreement covers only what is prohibited and not what is permitted. Specifically, there will be no prohibition on the development or deployment of aircraft and air defense systems (except to prohibit their acquiring a BMD capability), on civil defense, or ASW, on research and development, or on the qualitative improvement of forces within the constraints specified in the agreement. The development and deployment of improved post-boost vehicles capable of delivering MIRV's to individual targets or on depressed trajectories would not be prohibited. f. Our judgment of acceptability is based on examination of the proposal as a whole. We have not considered whether separate parts of it would constitute an acceptable agreement. We would want to examine any proposal which was confined to such separate parts, or which proposed an agreement of wider scope. g. When and if a proposal is approved for negotiation with the Soviet Union, we would want the opportunity to comment on negotiating strategy and tactics, instructions to the delegation, and on the initial presentation and other statements of the U.S. position. h. The agreement must be in the form of a treaty to be ratified by both countries. 4 i. The U.S. must make it clear to the Soviet Union that either party would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated—and in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement—under any of the following circumstances: (1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened; (2) if events lead either party to believe that its deterrent capability is threatened; (3) if there is evidence of substantial concealment of systems affected by the agreement or evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement; (4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other's verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement. j. A system of unilateral safeguards must be established to insure that the agreement continues to be in our interest and to insure that if the Soviets violate or abrogate the agreement, or we decide for other reasons to withdraw from the agreement, that we are in a position to take the steps necessary to maintain our security. IV. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concur in this memorandum. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force concur in full in this memorandum. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps concur in the memorandum except that they believe that the proposal should be modified as shown at Tab D. The views of the Joint Chiefs are at Tab B. 5 The views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on the CNO/CMC position are at Tab C. 6 Clark M. Clifford 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Not found. 3 The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps believe that the proposal should be revised as indicated in Tab D. [Footnote in the source text. Tab D is an undated paper, “Modification of the Proposal Proposed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.”] 4 A handwritten notation in the margin next to this sentence reads: “Sect. Rusk questions this. W[alt].” 5 See footnote 4, Document 267 . 6 See footnote 3, Document 267 . 269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 269. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 15, 1968. SUBJECT Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets The Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals has developed and evaluated a U.S. proposal for Strategic Arms Limitation for discussion with the Soviets (Tab A). The recommended proposal would prohibit the initiation of further deployments of offensive strategic missile systems and limit the deployment of ballistic missile defensive systems. No reductions in forces would be called for, and qualitative improvements would be permitted. No limitation would be placed on strategic aircraft or on defenses against aircraft. The limitations in the proposal are proposed to be verified by external means. The Executive Committee has unanimously concurred in this proposal as a basis for discussion with the USSR. They have concluded that within the terms of such an agreement the U.S. would be able to: a. maintain the U.S. deterrent posture; b. leave the Soviet Government and world opinion in no doubt as to the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent posture; c. be confident within the terms of the agreement that our deterrent posture could not be eroded by the action of the Soviet Union, or any other nuclear power, alone or in combination; d. maintain a U.S. capability to limit damage to the United States by Soviet forces if deterrence fails, at least as effective as that which we can expect to obtain in the absence of an agreement; and e. provide a strategic capability that would prevent nuclear powers other than the Soviet Union from threatening the stability of the agreement. The specific views of the Department of State and ACDA are appended at Tab B. The views of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff are appended at Tab C. 2 I am preparing instructions for the U.S. Delegation based on this recommended proposal and would forward those instructions to you if you concur with the recommended proposal. Recommendation That you approve the attached proposal as a basis for discussion with the Soviet Union. 3 Dean Rusk Tab A 4 Washington, August 14, 1968. Paper Approved by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals 5 STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS PROPOSAL The elements of a U.S. proposal for the proposed U.S.-USSR strategic missile talks are outlined below. This proposal should be viewed as an entity since that is the basis on which it has been evaluated. I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles. II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles of intermediate or medium range. III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km). Missile systems with such ranges carried by waterborne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed. IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems A. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited. B. There would be no replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. V. ABMs The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles including reload missiles. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed. VI. Aircraft and Anti-aircraft Systems The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems. VII. Technological Improvements There would be no prohibition of technological improvement within the constraints of the agreement. VIII. Verification The limitations described in paragraphs I through V are proposed to be verified by external means. IX. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal A. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions. B. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months' notice prior to ten years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated. C. Either party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Tab B 6 Washington, August 15, 1968. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Johnson SUBJECT Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets The proposed strategic missile limitation agreement which has been concurred in by the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals, would, if successfully negotiated, be demonstrably in the net interest of the United States and, we believe, in the interest of the Soviet Union as well. By imposing limitations on the numbers of strategic offensive and defensive missiles which each side could deploy, the proposed agreement would contain the strategic arms competition and avert a likely dangerous and costly new spiral in the arms race between the two superpowers. The achievement of such an agreement would also demonstrate to others the common determination of the U.S. and the USSR to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus contribute to the goal of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would increase the chances of reaching more comprehensive agreements involving reductions in strategic arms and, hopefully, facilitate agreement on other bilateral and multilateral arms control measures. The agreement could be a major factor in reducing the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war and in promoting a meaningful detente. Above all, an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR of this nature could profoundly alter the complexion of East-West relationships and provide a climate wherein cooperative efforts could be directed toward solving other critical world problems. The agreement would specifically enhance strategic stability between the U.S. and the USSR because of two primary factors: 1. Each side would retain a secure deterrent force, with minimum incentive for launching a first strike in times of crises; 2. The foundation would be laid for a continuing exchange of views on strategic matters, thus helping to avert the mutual suspicions and overreactions which have characterized the past strategic situation. The effect of the proposed agreement on the strategic balance should be compared with the future strategic environment which is most likely to prevail in the absence of such an agreement. Without the constraints imposed by the agreement, we estimate that the Soviet Union, by the middle 1970's, could have deployed at least 1,500 ICBM's, a submarine-launched ballistic missile fleet comparable to our present Polaris force, some new land-mobile offensive missiles, and an ABM system containing almost three times as many interceptor missiles as the planned U.S. Sentinel system. The Soviets are, of course, capable of deploying a strategic force even larger and more powerful. While our presently programmed strategic forces are adequate to cope with the probable future Soviet threat, we might be obliged to procure substantial qualitative and quantitative additions to maintain our deterrent if we were to see signs that the Soviets were moving towards more extensive offensive and defensive programs. If, however, the agreement were acceptable to the Soviet Union, Soviet strategic forces would be constrained in four important ways: 1. The rapid recent expansion of Soviet ICBM deployments would be halted at numbers of launchers essentially equal to the U.S.; 2. The number of new-generation Soviet Polaris-type submarines would be held to a level well below half of the U.S. force; 3. The otherwise very likely deployment of Soviet land-mobile ICBM's would be precluded; 4. The level of Soviet ABM's would be limited to an equivalent of a U.S. deployment. At the same time, the proposed agreement, if accepted in its present form, would have no significant effect on present U.S. plans regarding strategic weapons systems. We would still have the options of going ahead with the current programmed improvements in our capabilities, including advanced offensive missiles with MIRV's (Poseidon and Minuteman III). However, with the constraints placed on Soviet strategic forces under the proposed agreement, the United States would not have to procure major new strategic offensive systems, or an extensive ABM system, in order to maintain an adequate deterrent. Although we consider that limitations on radars for ABM systems is a most significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of the JCS concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The Executive Committee agreed that the problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn antiaircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations. Because of the strategic situation which would exist under the agreement, both our absolute and relative strategic deterrent posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or any other nuclear power or combinations thereof—in terms of our assured destruction and damage-limitation criteria—would be at least as good as, and in many circumstances considerably better than, would probably be the case in the absence of an agreement. The United States Intelligence Board has prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate which evaluates our external capabilities; i.e., those that do not depend upon agreed access to the USSR, to verify strategic arms control agreements. Using external means alone, we have in some instances very high confidence of detecting Soviet violations at an early state; in all others, we are confident of detecting violations well before they could measurably alter the strategic balance. In those areas where our capabilities are lowest, it would still be in our interest to propose limitations since potential violations would not significantly affect our security and the limitations would provide inhibitions to Soviet actions which they might otherwise freely undertake if no agreement existed. Thus, we conclude that our ability to verify the agreement by external means alone is adequate, even taking into account the margin of uncertainty in some of our external verification capabilities and our need for adequate safeguards against possible Soviet violation or abrogation. This is reinforced by the fact that the agreement would not affect present U.S. programs but would constrain Soviet forces below the threat levels used to justify these programs. Therefore, we estimate that the potential risks to our deterrent due to possible Soviet evasion of the terms of the agreement are less serious than the risks we would face in the absence of an agreement. All of this, however, does not exclude the possibility of probing Soviet receptivity to a supplementary verification arrangement which would increase confidence in the viability of the agreement. No agreement dealing with the extraordinarily complicated question of limiting strategic armaments can be initially designed to solve all possible problems which could arise from technological or political changes which may occur after the agreement is reached. Recognizing this, the proposed agreement allows for mutually agreeable revisions to be made to the basic agreement in order to preserve its stability and satisfy the security interests of each party. It also contains a withdrawal provision in the event that one side comes to believe that its vital security interests have become endangered by the agreement. It may also be desirable to create some bilateral consultative machinery to ensure the viability of the agreement on a day-to-day basis. No recommendations are made at present as to tactics on how this proposal will be negotiated with the Soviets, but we do not believe that all elements in it should be presented to them at once. We recommend that you approve the attached proposal as a basis for the initial discussions with the USSR on limiting the strategic arms race. Dean Rusk Secretary of State William C. Foster Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. 2 Document 268 . 3 There is no indication whether President Johnson approved or disapproved the recommendation. 4 Top Secret; Nodis. 5 This paper was agreed to at the August 14 meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals. No formal record of this meeting has been found, but an earlier draft of this paper, ACDA-2956/Rev. 4, August 13, is identical to the source text except for the substitution in Part VIII of the word “external” for “national” in the August 13 draft. An August 13 memorandum from Fisher to the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals attached to the August 13 draft lists the changes in the August 13 draft from a earlier unidentified draft and indicates that the changes were suggested by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11) For text of an earlier draft of this paper, dated July 31, see Document 264 . Neither the July 31 or August 14 draft bears an ACDA document number. 6 Top Secret; Nodis. 270. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 270. Letter From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 15, 1968. Dear Dean: The proposed memorandum for the President concerning Arms Control on the Seabed has been reviewed within the Department of Defense. 2 I agree that there may be serious disadvantages in a United States refusal to be forthcoming on the issue of peaceful purposes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in this view. However, we have certain difficulties with the specific arms control proposal set forth in the draft formulation of a U.S. statement on this subject. I am therefore enclosing an alternative draft statement incorporating some changes which I believe will cover the concerns expressed in the discussion portion of the draft memorandum while affording more adequate protection for the national security interest. 3 I am in general agreement with the discussion which supports the proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested some changes in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this section which will more accurately reflect their previously expressed views. I agree with these suggested changes so they are also attached. 4 Sincerely, Clark Tab A 5 Washington, undated. Memorandum for the President SUBJECT Arms Control on the Seabed Recommendation: That, during the August 19-30 meeting of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed, the United States Representative be authorized to state: “The United States supports the adoption of a General Assembly resolution declaring that the seabed and deep ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The United States has previously supported, in the Space Treaty of 1967, the use exclusively for peaceful purposes of the moon and other celestial bodies. As we said then we understand that the test of whether an activity is 'peaceful' is whether it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations of international law. “We believe it is important to prevent the spread of the arms race to new environments. It is appropriate that the General Assembly should go on record in support of this proposition as the Assembly addresses itself to the future use of the seabed and deep ocean floor . A resolution declaring that the deep ocean floor should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes . It is evident that preventing the spread of the arms race to this new environment requires meaningful and effective measures of arms control, and to that end the careful elaboration of legal instruments taking the form of an international agreement. There must obviously be reliable and effective means for verifying compliance with such an agreement . However, considering that the term 'peaceful purposes' does not preclude military activities generally, specific limitations on certain military activities will require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agreement . “To that end the United States proposes that the ENDC undertake negotiations with a view to achieving an examine the question as to whether a viable international agreement pursuant to may be achieved in which each party would agree not to emplace or fix weapons of mass destruction on the seabed or deep ocean floor, beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other State. The width of this narrow band would be determined by negotiation. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed at launching platforms and delivery systems as well as weapons themselves . These discussions must also consider the need for reliable and effective means for verifying compliance with such an agreement. Other military activities would continue to be conducted in accordance with the principle of freedom of the seas and exclusively for peaceful purposes . “We propose that (this Committee or General Assembly) request the ENDC to take up this question.” Tab B 6 EXCERPT FROM JCSM-497-68, dated 10 August 1968 “3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have no objection to the”Discussion” provided the following changes are made: a. Substitute the following for paragraph 5: “5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understandably have been concerned about the question of verification of a ban on seabed emplacement of nuclear weapons. On 27 April 1968, they stated that the United States did not have a verification capability. 7 They also stated that they did not believe that any nation had such a capability. However, this issue is now under intensive study by the intelligence community. In any event, during discussions in the ENDC there will be a full opportunity to investigate the problems of verification and to satisfy ourselves as to how they will be handled before we enter into new treaty commitments.” Reason : Accuracy. b. Substitute the following for paragraph 6: “6. Although there is no formally planned weapons system on the deep ocean bottom, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel strongly that the option of a future nuclear weapons system in this environment should remain open. Should technological developments by the United States make this option feasible, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the use of the deep ocean bottom would be more advantageous to the United States than to the USSR. Paragraph 3 of the recommended statement uses the language you recently approved for use in the United Nations. This language was carefully formulated so as not to foreclose any military options prematurely. We have taken action to reassure our NATO Allies that it is not our intention to foreclose this option but only to define those factors vital to the consideration of an agreement in this area. The definition of these factors, along with the progress made in the strategic missile talks to which a seabed agreement is a logical corollary, may determine whether an agreement in this area should be pursued.” Reason : To make the discussion support the recommended change to paragraph 3 of the proposed statement and to express more clearly the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Pete C. Sianis 8 Major General, USAF Deputy Director, Joint Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Confidential. 2 Secretary Rusk sent a memorandum to Clifford on July 31, requesting his concurrence on an attached memorandum to President Johnson seeking Presidential approval of a proposed statement on arms control of the seabed to be made by the U.S. Representative to the upcoming conference of the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed at Rio de Janeiro. The memorandum also provided rationale for the proposed statement. Clifford forwarded the memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment; they responded with a memorandum to Clifford (JCSM-497-68), August 10. These documents are ibid. 3 Tab A. 4 Tab B. 5 Secret. Crossed through text on the source text reproduced here as underlined text. 6 Secret. 7 Document 236 . 8 Printed from a copy that indicates Sianis signed the original. 271. Special National Intelligence Estimate 271. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, August 15, 1968. SNIE 11-12-68 EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED The Problem To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor a ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed—defined as the ocean floor outside territorial waters—and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet or third country deployment of such weapons, during the next 10 years or so. Scope For the purposes of this estimate, the following types of weapons are assumed to be prohibited: a. Manned or unmanned installations containing nuclear weapons or missiles, encapsulated nuclear missiles, and nuclear mines, resting on, anchored to, or imbedded in the seabed. b. Nuclear weapon systems designed to operate primarily on the seabed but having the characteristic of mobility. While chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction could theoretically be emplaced on the seabed, the problems of their detection and identification would be the same as in the case of nuclear weapons. Likewise, the considerations affecting intent would be virtually the same. Hence in this estimate, only nuclear weapons are specifically discussed. Mobile strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems of mass destruction whose principal object is to make use of the seas, as opposed to the seabed, are assumed not to be banned and are, therefore, beyond the scope of this estimate. Neither will the temporary anchorage of ships or submarines to the seabed, whether for emergency purposes, for purposes incident to navigation, for purposes of avoiding detection, or for preparations to launch missiles, be considered in this estimate. Conclusions A. We believe that neither the USSR nor any other country would, during the period of this estimate, deploy weapons of mass destruction on the seabed in violation of an agreement banning such deployment. If any signatory decided that it could no longer tolerate the restrictions imposed by the agreement, we believe that it would abrogate the agreement openly rather than try secret evasion, probably after making covert preparations for the prohibited emplacement in advance of the announcement. B. The time required for detection and verification of a violation would vary with the nature, size, and location of the prohibited deployment. It would be difficult for us to identify a seabed weapon system as such prior to deployment. Detection of predeployment activity, however, and of support systems and activities associated with installation, checkout, maintenance, resupply, and command and control, would arouse our suspicions and would probably lead to eventual detection and identification of the prohibited deployment. C. We believe that deployment under the open ocean would be detected before a large number of missiles became operational. The deployment of a small number might escape detection for some time after they became operational. [ 2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] D. Even after detection of deployment, verification of a violation would probably be a costly and time-consuming process, [ 1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified ]. Discussion I. General Considerations 1. In assessing our ability to monitor an agreement of the sort being considered here, it must be remembered that we are dealing with the development and deployment of radically new weapon systems, the characteristics of which we can only imagine on the basis of our knowledge of relevant US and Soviet technology. Essentially, we are faced with consideration of two general types of weapon systems. The first would employ a missile deployed on the seabed and launched to a distant target. Such a system would be highly sophisticated and would use new technology and new methods of operation and control. The other type would consist of a nuclear weapon emplaced on the seabed near its intended target to be exploded without ejection from the water, in the nature of a mine. The characteristics of any such systems would be much different from the characteristics of those weapon systems upon which our past monitoring experience is based. In this respect, any judgments which we make with respect to our capability to monitor a seabed weapons agreement must necessarily be tentative. 2. Our regular sources of intelligence information—SIGINT, overhead photography, and human sources—would be a significant part of our detection capabilities [ 5 lines of source text not declassified ]. 3. [ 11 lines of source text not declassified ] [Here follow Part II: “The Likelihood of Seabed Weapons Deployment” and Part III: “The Monitoring System.”] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. 272. Memorandum of Conversation 272. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 15, 1968. MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN OF THE USSR In a relaxed and extensive informal talk with Ambassador Dobrynin on the evening of Thursday, August 15th, the following points emerged: 1. I pointed out that the alternatives which we had suggested as to the level at which offensive-defensive missile talks might begin were for the purpose of making a prompt reply by the Soviet Union somewhat easier if our original suggestion had caused complications. The alternatives were given in a rough order of priority as far as our own choices were concerned. The Ambassador said that he might have a reply on the 16th or 17th because the Soviet leadership has its meetings usually on Thursdays—similar to our Tuesday luncheons at the White House. I told him that I thought there would be advantage in our being able to announce the time and place of such talks before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Weapons Conference later this month in Geneva. 2 2. On the substance of the offensive-defensive missile talks, Dobrynin reflected great earnestness in the importance of the talks and the seriousness with which he considered the subject. I told him that I thought that these talks might well be the most important talks between our two countries since World War II—and he agreed. He asked about our Poseidon and Minute Man Tests and I told him that it was not possible for us to proceed on the basis that we already had an agreement prior to reaching one. I said that these tests have been laid on for a long, long time and that the timing was not connected in any way with the timing of discussions. He seemed quite relaxed on this point. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and recent Soviet contacts with Senator Mansfield and Richard Nixon.] 6. I reminded the Ambassador that he had telephoned me last week expressing concern about the Euratom countries entering a “reservation” at the time of signing the NPT. I told him that my information was that these countries did not intend to enter a “reservation but were stating that the timing of the ratification of the NPT on their part would be related to an agreement between Euratom and IAEA on safeguards. [Here follows discussion of Gromyko's upcoming visit to the U.N. General Assembly, ratification of the Consular Agreement, Soviet proposals for a communications satellite system, and U.S. domestic politics.] DR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Secretary Rusk on August 16. 2 Regarding this conference, see footnote 3, Document 263 , and Documents 284 and 286 . 273. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 273. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 16, 1968, 3:45 p.m. Mr. President: In the attached memorandum, Secretary Rusk submits for your approval a strategic arms limitation proposal (Tab A) 2 for discussion with the Soviets. The proposal has been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). In the JCS review, Generals Wheeler, Westmoreland, and McConnell concurred in the proposal as submitted to you; however, Admiral Moore and General Chapman recommended certain modifications favorable to the Navy that were not acceptable to the other Chiefs. Paul Nitze and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force also concur in the proposal as submitted. I regard the agreement reached—and the collegial way it was accomplished, on a most difficult issue—as the functioning of the U.S. Government at its best. Attached to Rusk's memorandum are more detailed memoranda to you from Rusk and Foster (Tab B) 3 and Clifford (Tab C) 4 to which are also attached the Chiefs' position and General Wheeler's personal recommendation against the Navy position. In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge that you read these attachments in their entirety. I have also attached, for your information, SNIE 11-13-68 5 concerning U.S. intelligence capabilities to monitor such an agreement, which is a critical issue in evaluating this proposal. This proposal represents the coordinated effort of the community to define a reasonable package, which might be negotiable with the Soviets, within the following basic ground-rule: that the agreement be verifiable by external means alone to the extent necessary to protect U.S. security interests; that is, it goes as far as we can safely go without on-the-ground inspection. Although there is now agreement that the proposal is in a form that can be discussed with the Soviets, there are still certain important unresolved features of the proposal and underlying issues of which you should be aware: —The most important unresolved aspect of the proposal is the level of limitations that would be placed on ABM deployments. Our present position calls only for a “set and equivalent number” of ABM launchers, and we have not yet agreed internally on a preferred number. Our final decision will be influenced by the Soviet position on this subject. —Closely related to this is the very difficult underlying intelligence problem of how we should deal with the Tallinn SAM system in defining its present capabilities and controlling future upgrading that might give it some ABM capability. While it is agreed that the relationship of radars to this question will have to be studied further and discussed with the Soviets, it is not yet agreed precisely how this should be handled and whether it should be formally dealt with in an agreement. —There are also difficult tactical problems yet to be resolved, such as how to deal with “on-site inspections” in the proposal. Although the proposal has been developed on the assumption that it could be monitored by external means alone, there is no question that on-site inspection would be very helpful in building mutual confidence and greatly help unresolved issues such as those presented by the Tallinn system. Secretary Clifford and the JCS have asked that an effort be made to include on-site inspection in the agreement we finally reach with the Soviets. How this can be done effectively with any chance of success without jeopardizing the prospects for the talks presents a major challenge to our negotiators. The community is now working on basic instructions for the negotiating delegation which will deal with this and other tactical problems. As I noted earlier, I believe that the preparation of this proposal is an example of intra-governmental cooperation at its best. If the talks prove fruitful, we will face many difficult issues that can only be successfully resolved if this cooperative attitude is sustained. I recommend that you tentatively approve the proposal as a basis for additional preparations for the talks, subject to a meeting with the Principals as soon as we obtain agreement from the Soviets on the nature and timing of the talks. Walt Approve proposal subject to final meeting with Principals Disapprove Call me 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Arms Limitation Talk, Box 11. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Document 269 , including Tab A. 3 Printed as Tab B, Document 269 . 4 Document 268 . 5 Document 257 . 6 None of these options is checked. 274. Editorial Note 274. Editorial Note During the summer months of 1968, U.S. and Soviet principals explored the possibility of a summit meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. Following the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1 (see Document 250 ), for example, Secretary Rusk and Dobrynin privately explored the possibility and timing of such a meeting which, they agreed, might focus particularly on the strategic missile talks. (Memorandum of Conversation, July 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Trip to Soviet Union, Box 11) Finally, on the afternoon of August 19, Dobrynin handed Walt Rostow a note, which proposed that President Johnson meet with Soviet leaders in Leningrad in early October and also suggested the text of the announcement of the President's upcoming visit. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, August 19, ibid.) Moreover, in an August 20 letter to President Johnson, Kosygin proposed that the missile talks might open in Geneva on September 30 and suggested the text of an announcement of the talks. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, August 20, Walt Rostow wrote: “The agreement announced this morning that the President will confer with leaders within the Soviet Union in early October is the outcome of a long process,” and he proceeded to provide a detailed summary of the background of the steps leading to the anticipated summit meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. He provided all this information to Rusk “for your and my backgrounders tomorrow,” presumably to brief the press on the upcoming summit meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, “Trip to Soviet Union,” Box 11) No announcement of a summit meeting on August 20 has been found, but Rostow apparently meant a public announcement the following morning. Rostow concluded his August 20 memorandum to Rusk, as follows: “Although the opening of the strategic missile talks was probably a catalyst that led to this decision by the two Governments, the meeting of President Johnson with Chairman Kosygin will undoubtedly be the occasion to consult on: —a variety of bilateral matters; —next steps in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; —the possibilities of bringing our positions closer on the Middle East and on Vietnam.” With the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact troops on the night of August 20-21, however, the proposed summit meeting was put on hold. At a meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 8:15–8:42 p.m. on August 20, which Dobrynin requested, the Soviet Ambassador informed President Johnson and Walt Rostow of the military intervention. At this meeting nothing was said to indicate that the summit would not be announced as planned. But at a hastily summoned meeting of the National Security Council from 10:15–11:10 p.m., it was agreed that the summit announcement would be delayed indefinitely and that Secretary Rusk would summon Dobrynin to his office to tell him about the postponement of the summit announcement and to raise the administration's concerns about the military incursion into Czechoslovakia. Records of these meetings are printed in Foreign Relations , volume XVII, Documents 80 and 81 . Context for the changing U.S. position on the evening of August 20 is given in Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pages 487-489, and Seaborg, Stemming the Tide , page 438. Several weeks later, John P. Roche, who had recently resigned as Special Assistant to the President, confirmed that the announcement of the summit was scheduled for August 21 but was not made because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. ( New York Times , September 24, 1968, page 5) Additional documentation on a proposed U.S.-Soviet summit in the latter half of 1968 is scheduled for publication in volume XIV . 275. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals 275. Record of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals 1 Washington, August 22, 1968, 4:30 p.m. ACDA-3024 PARTICIPANTS See Attached List 2 REFERENCES 1. Memo to Executive Committee with attachments, 8/21/68 (ACDA-3010) 3 2. Memo to Executive Committee with Agreed Changes, 8/22/68 (ACDA-3011) 4 Summary of Actions 1. It was agreed that hereafter the term “national” means of verification would be used in place of “unilateral” or “external.” An explanation of this term should be prepared and consideration given as to informing the Soviets of our understanding of its meaning. 2. Paragraph 7 on page 3 of the Basic Position Paper (ACDA-3009/Rev. 2, August 20, 1968, which was attached to Reference 1 above) was revised as follows: “7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations , the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification . The delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the delegation.)” 3. Paragraph V-4 on page 14 was revised as follows: “4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the U.S. Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn launchers must be 5 included in the agreed Soviet ABM level . As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense.” 4. The Secretary of State recommended that consideration be given to modifying Paragraph X-1 on page 22 as follows: “1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Any agreement should be sufficiently explicit to minimize subsequent possible misunderstandings. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time .” 6 5. No comments were made on the other changes agreed and recommended by the Working Group in its memorandum of August 22, 1968 (ACDA-3011). Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by pointing out that the question of going ahead with the talks and the timing were now obviously uncertain as a result of the Czechoslovak situation. 7 However, it was not the purpose of the Executive Committee meeting to consider that, but to give to the President the necessary material to permit him to go ahead with the talks if and when he desired. Mr. Foster reported that, as a result of a suggestion by the Defense Department, the Working Group had met in the morning and prepared some revisions to the draft Initial Presentation and Basic Position Paper previously forwarded to the Executive Committee (Reference 1). With the exception of the four items covered in the memorandum from the Working Group to the Executive Committee (Reference 2), the Working Group agreed on all other changes. Mr. Fisher then discussed point No. 1 of Reference 2 dealing with what term to use to describe certain verification methods. It was pointed out that in previous correspondence with the Soviets the terms “unilateral” and “national” had been used, and that there was some worry that inserting a new word might confuse the Soviets. Mr. Rostow suggested that a word be picked, and then the delegation establish a legislative record in the talks with the Soviets on the meaning of the word, including reference to observations from satellites. Mr. Foster pointed out that the Soviets might object to any formal understanding on this point, although they had already agreed tacitly. Mr. Rostow thought that in this critical case it might be desirable to get a formal understanding. Secretary Clifford stated a preference for either “unilateral” or “national” over the word “external” which had been agreed upon at the last meeting. Secretary Rusk said he was quite willing to return to the term “national” and that it might be useful to have an explanation of the meaning of the term. With reference to point No. 2 of Reference 2 relative to negotiating instructions on the subject of verification, Mr. Fisher stated that discussion had centered on the degree to which the delegation should push for supplementary inspection procedures. With the exception of the Department of State representative, all members of the Working Group had agreed with the underlined wording proposed in paragraph No. 2 of Reference 2. Secretary Rusk stated that in his view the negotiations might proceed as follows: First, a general discussion of verification in which the desirability of supplementary verification procedures would be placed in the record on a low-key basis. Secondly, the discussions would then turn to the details of the items to be limited. After these had been agreed upon, the discussion would proceed to verification required for each of the specific items. He felt that to ensure Congressional support for any agreement it would be necessary to make it clear that we had pressed for that verification which we believed to be useful, if not essential. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that we would have to be careful not to give the impression to the Senate that the Soviets had talked us out of something that was necessary. Secretary Brown felt we should not press vigorously for on-site inspection as a principle, but push for specific cases (e.g., Tallinn) where one could justify that supplementary procedures would significantly improve confidence that the agreement was being complied with. Secretary Katzenbach thought that the inclusion of the words “vigorously” and “fallback” in the proposed instruction might be too strong and suggested deleting “vigorously” and modifying the final clause as follows: “precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification.” The Executive Committee agreed with this substitute formulation. With respect to paragraph No. 3 on instructions re the Tallinn system, Mr. Fisher pointed out that two alternative formulations had been put forth by the representatives of DOD and JCS on the one hand and by State and ACDA on the other. He pointed out that there were two basic differences of views: (1) should we seek assurances that the Tallinn is not now an ABM system in view of the agreed intelligence analysis which had already received considerable publicity that it was not an ABM system; and (2) should we consider the Tallinn launchers and missiles to be included in the agreed Soviet ABM limitations if assurances could not be received that they would be upgraded, or only at such a point as we believed they had been upgraded? Mr. Helms stated that no one in the Intelligence Community really thought that the Tallinn system was now an ABM system, but there were some who thought it might be upgraded to become one. Secretary Nitze agreed that the present deployment was against aircraft, but that it might have a self-defense capability against missiles. Furthermore, if a Dog House were added, it could have increased ABM capabilities and was therefore now an ABM. General Wheeler stated that if it were hooked up to Hen-House, which would be impossible to determine, then they could have some ABM capability today. Mr. Foster asked whether the Soviets informing us that it was not an ABM would satisfy us. Secretary Nitze said it might be useful for them to tell us this, and Secretary Brown said there might be some questions which could be answered which would give us increased confidence. Secretary Rusk stated that he was not in favor of an agreement which justified very large numbers of ABM's. One of the purposes of the discussions was to try to limit ABM's to a low value. He did not like to see an agreement which allowed several thousand ABM's on each side just because we could not obtain any greater assurance than we have already that Tallinn was not an ABM system. Secretary Nitze thought they might give us some interesting information on radars, but Secretary Rusk pointed out that, at the JCS' recommendation, we were not limiting radars. Secretary Nitze said we would have to if we were to prevent upgrading. Secretary Rusk asked the status of the Working Group studies on radars, and Mr. Fisher stated that the Working Group had nothing to report at this time. Mr. Helms pointed out that page 15 of the proposed instruction directed the delegation to raise the question of radars and to attempt to obtain an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn-type radars would be forbidden. Mr. Fisher said he understood that the Tallinn system was of little value without new radars. Secretary Nitze agreed, but said we were not stopping radars. Secretary Brown pointed out that it was not the DOD's objective to have an agreement which allowed large numbers of ABM's, but only to provide a lever to get information from the Soviets which would increase our confidence that the Tallinn system was not an ABM. He also pointed out that since the Tallinn's effectiveness as an ABM would, in any case, be very low, the equivalence between Tallinn missiles and Sentinel missiles would not need to be on a one-for-one basis. Secretary Rusk asked whether we would be in favor of an agreement that banned all ABM's if the Soviets offered this. Secretary Clifford said not necessarily, since we had to worry about China. Secretary Nitze said it might be in our interest, but that was not obvious at this time. Mr. Fisher pointed out that we should keep in mind that the Soviets are likely to raise Nike-Hercules as the counterpart of the Tallinn system and that it might be difficult, even though we were presumably willing to disclose information on Nike-H, to prove to the Soviets that it was not tied in to the Sentinel system. There was no intention to sweep the problems of the Tallinn system under the rug, and he did not believe that any of the proposed wordings did this. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the Tallinn problem would be the first test case of our ability to obtain adequate assurances from the Soviets. Situations will undoubtedly arise on many occasions during the negotiations and after any agreement is in effect. After considerable discussion of alternate language to follow the third sentence of paragraph 4 on page 14 of the Basic Position Paper, it was agreed that the following sentences would be inserted: “The delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn launchers must be 8 included in the agreed Soviet ABM level.” With respect to item 4 on the Instructions re the form of the agreement, Secretary Rusk stated that he could not accept any language which committed us to a formal treaty at this time, even though this might turn out to be the form when the agreement had been reached. He suggested that the following sentence be inserted at the end of paragraph X-1 on page 22 of the Basic Position Paper: “Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time.” There was only a limited discussion of this suggestion, and it was agreed that the Working Group would see if this suggestion would be satisfactory. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Top Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the source text. Typewritten notations on pages 3 and 7 indicate that they were revised on September 11. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Conference Room. 2 Not printed. 3 Attached to the August 21 memorandum, “Initial Presentation of US Position and Basic Position Paper,” are earlier drafts, ACDA-2951/Rev. 3 and ACDA-3009/Rev. 2. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83 Committee of Principals Master Book #2, July-September 1968) 4 The August 22 memorandum is entitled “Suggested Changes in Initial Presentation and in Basic Position Paper.” (Ibid.) 5 Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to insert “limited and” after “must be” in line 5. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to delete second sentence of proposed paragraph X-1 and insert the following sentence at the end: “Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions.” [Footnote in the source text.] 7 See Document 274 . 8 Subsequent to the meeting, it was agreed to insert “limited and” after “must be”. [Footnote in the source text.] 276. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford 276. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford 1 Washington, August 24, 1968. JCSM-519-68 SUBJECT Cutoff of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapon Purposes (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), dated 2 July 1968, subject as above. 2 The response to the reference has been delayed by the decision to give the concerned agencies a chance to analyze the results of the ACDA draft “Interim Report” of the interagency working group established to determine if and when a cutoff of the production of fissionable material would be to the net advantage of the United States. 3 This draft “Interim Report” was distributed to the Deputies to the Committee of Principals (COP) on 5 August 1968. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this draft “Interim Report” and have concluded that: a. It is impossible to determine by the systems analysis approach when and if a cutoff would be to the net interest of the United States. The uncertainties in parameters and multiple scenarios possible in a study of this type do not permit conclusions of sufficient validity and certainty to provide a basis for prudent national security decisions. Areas of these uncertainties in parameters include 30 to 40 percent possible error in intelligence estimates of Soviet cumulative production, similar uncertainties as to the amount of fissionable material that the Soviets plan to use in their weapons, effectiveness of the Soviet's ABM, yield and accuracy of their offensive missiles, and which of many possible options they are likely to select for weapon allocation. Examples of possible variations in scenarios that have not yet been considered include pindown attacks, employment of fractional orbit bombardment systems, and limitations on strategic offensive and defensive systems. b. The study highlights the tremendous complexity and uncertainties associated with attempting to determine precise weapon requirements and associated fissionable material. Because of this complexity and the conservatism appropriate to decisions involving the national security of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the study be terminated and the future primary criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff be the adequacy of the fissionable material available at the time of cutoff to meet the Nation's forecast weapon requirements. 3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also reviewed the reference, which proposes a revision of the US position on cutoff of production of fissionable material and transfer to peaceful uses. Primarily, this proposed revision would result in a changed US position on verification of adversary nuclear production facilities. This proposed amendment would result in a verification procedure similar to that of the Nonproliferation Treaty; namely, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for verification of declared production and operating facilities and unilateral intelligence for the discovery and verification of undeclared facilities. Although the United States has the capability to detect with high confidence any facilities large enough or numerous enough to make a significant addition to the large amounts of fissionable materials already in the Soviet stockpile, the type and rate of production cannot be determined accurately. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the procedure proposed in the reference, provided the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of US detection methods. Acceptance of this modification regarding verification is germane only if, at some future date, a decision is reached that a cutoff would be in national security interests. 4. (S) The 2 July ACDA proposal states, “The other aspects of the U.S. position on this measure would remain as we have previously described them in Geneva.” To assure a clear understanding by the COP as to what the US position is on the “other aspects,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, if ACDA desires to pursue any aspects of the subject proposal, it develop a position paper for the COP which would consolidate and define all aspects of this proposal. The remarks in the Appendix hereto 4 represent the current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the US position that is reflected in Ambassador Goldberg's statement to the General Assembly on 23 September 1965, 5 as supplemented by the Presidential Statement read at the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference on 27 January 1966. 6 5. (S) In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Recommend that the study being performed by the interagency working group to determine if and when a cutoff of production of fissionable material would be to the net advantage of the United States be terminated and that in the future the criterion for determining the feasibility of a cutoff be the adequacy of the available fissionable material at the time of cutoff to meet forecast weapon requirements. b. Do not object to the changed US position on verification providing the United States is prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal from the agreement in the event of detection of clandestine facilities and without compromise of US detection methods, if at some time in the future a cutoff is clearly in the US national interest. c. Oppose a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for weapons as it would not be in the national interest of the United States at this time. If a cutoff had been effected in 1965, there would have been some uncertainty as to its relative implications, but, on balance, the degree of such uncertainty was sufficiently limited to permit an assessment of US advantage within a reasonable margin of risk. Such is not the case at present nor can such be forecast for the coming 5- to 10-year period. The magnitude of uncertainties both as to weapon requirements and material availability for both sides makes it impossible to rule out, with reasonable risk, a potential for significant disadvantage to US interests in a cutoff proposal. These many basic uncertainties are further compounded by uncertainty related to possible strategic nuclear arms limitations discussions with the Soviets. Until the prospects for, general outlines of, and possible implications of such talks become more clear in the months to come, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a cutoff proposal would, at best, be imprudent and could involve major risks to US security. d. Prefer the United States not enter into a transfer to peaceful purposes agreement. e. Do not oppose a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons agreement provided: (1) US weapons design and construction would not be compromised. (2) Procedures would guarantee that the USSR was positively destroying nuclear weapons. (3) An inspection and verification system is tested to assure feasibility and practicality. (4) Only weapons scheduled for retirement are destroyed. f. Oppose a plant-by-plant shutdown. g. Recommend, if ACDA desires to pursue any aspects of the subject proposal, that it develop a position paper for the COP which would consolidate and define all aspects of this proposal. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Secret. The source text was sent under cover of a September 6 memorandum from Halperin to Fisher, which reads as follows: “The current views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a possible cutoff of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes are forwarded for your information. You will note that the JCS oppose a cutoff of production at this time. I believe that it would be useful if ACDA would circulate substantially in advance of the reconvening of the ENDC (or the GA if the issue will come up there) a proposed U.S. position on the range of issues related to the cutoff question.” 2 Document 251 . 3 This draft report has not been found but is elsewhere identified as an “ACDA study on the impact of a cutoff on the assured destruction capability of the U.S… . This report (Project Impact) was distributed on August 5, 1968, and it concludes that our assured destruction capability would be maintained with the postulated cutoffs.” (Rationale for Approval of Draft Speech to ENDC on Cutoff, undated, Attachment 2 to memorandum from Foster to Clifford and Seaborg, August 16; Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 52, Memoranda to Secretary of Defense, 1968) The ACDA study was undertaken after General Wheeler objected that the report transmitted under cover of ACDA's July 2 memorandum had “not been coordinated with nor distributed to the member agencies,” and he argued that it was “premature to review the current verification arrangements until further analysis proves our capability to be good enough to warrant a change to presently proposed verification methods.” (Memorandum from Wheeler to Secretary Clifford, July 9, CM-3460-68; ibid., RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, May-July 1968) 4 Entitled “Additional Comments”; not printed. 5 For an extract from Ambassador Goldberg's statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965 , pp. 433-436. 6 See Document 117 . 277. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 277. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 29, 1968. Mr. President: In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk submits for your approval 2 the Initial Presentation (Tab A) of the US position and the Basic Position Paper (instructions for the delegation) (Tab B) for use in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. These papers have been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). The papers are based on the specific proposal, which was previously submitted to you with the unanimous endorsement of the Committee of Principals. The preparation and agreement on these papers are a further example of the excellent intra-governmental cooperation that has been achieved on this subject. In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge you to read the two papers in their entirety. I call your particular attention to the manner in which the difficult question of verification is dealt with in the Initial Presentation, pages 6-7 (para. 12-14) and in the Position Paper, page 2 (para. 7). The basic proposal has been developed on the basis that we could agree to rely exclusively on verification by “national” means, which is now the agreed term to describe all intelligence resources that do not involve direct access to Soviet territory. However, in keeping with the desire of OSD and the JCS that an effort be made to obtain some inspection, the Initial Presentation calls for consideration of procedures for “selective direct observation on US and Soviet territory,” which is the new term for “on-site inspection,” as a desirable means of increasing the confidence of each side in the agreement. In the Position Paper, the delegation is instructed that “This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification.” I also call your attention to the instructions to the delegation in the Position Paper, pages 8-9 (para. 4) on how to handle the extremely difficult and important issue of the Tallinn SAM system. The resolution of this problem in the negotiations to our satisfaction is central to the acceptability of the agreement. Moreover, this can establish the necessary precedent for a continuing dialogue on how to deal with suspicious or controversial problems which arise under an agreement. You should also be aware of the question of the form of the agreement in the Position Paper, page 14 (para. 1). Although there is complete agreement on the instructions to the delegation to defer this issue, this bypasses a substantive issue since the JCS believe that any agreement should be in the form of a treaty while Sec. Rusk wishes to maintain the option for consideration of less formal understandings. I recommend that you tentatively approve these two papers as the basis for further preparations for the talks. Walt Tentatively approve Initial Presentation and Basic Position Paper 3 Disapprove Call me Tab A 4 Washington, August 24, 1968. STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS INITIAL PRESENTATION OF US POSITION 1. On behalf of my Government, I wish to express deep satisfaction that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Socialist Republics are now meeting to discuss the limitation and eventual reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. 2. There is perhaps no more important step in the field of foreign relations which our two Governments might take than to reach an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would enhance the security of both sides, could permit each side to devote to peaceful endeavors substantial resources which could be saved from future military expenditures, and would contribute to world stability overall. It would also constitute a most important step in fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by our Government under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would ratify and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 3. The United States has presented to the Soviet Union over the past year and a half several messages relating to the subject of these talks. It remains the position of the United States Government that our discussions should include both offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. 4. We believe that it is important, and should be possible, to reach agreement on limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without resolving all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that the first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms limitations should be to restrain further increases of strategic missile forces. Such a step would be of value in avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous upward spiral of strategic missile deployments, and would help pave the way for reduction of strategic arms. 5. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race. 6. The problem we are facing is urgent. As each month goes by, armaments increase and grow more complex on both sides. An agreement should be easier to negotiate today before further deployments take place than it will in the future, and it could result in important saving of resources. 7. We recognize that achieving strategic arms limitations which meet our separately perceived requirements of national security is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. Moreover, we recognize that in reaching an agreement some adjustments from currently deployed strategic forces may be necessary. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained. 8. We believe that the US and the Soviet Union have the following strategic arms limitation objectives in common: —To achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles. —To enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating US and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces. —To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. —To improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of meaningful discussion of issues arising from our strategic relationship. 9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States proposes an agreement comprising the following basic elements. The U.S. Delegation will be prepared to discuss these elements in greater detail at an appropriate time after hearing the views of the Soviet Government. 10. The United States suggests cessation of the initiation of construction of additional strategic offensive land-based ballistic missile launchers. This weapon category should include launchers for offensive ballistic missiles of intermediate and medium range (i.e., missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 km), as well as for longer-range intercontinental missiles. There should also be a prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines, and on installing on surface ships facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles. The difficulties in verifying limitations on specific numbers of deployed mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles and launchers are such that the United States proposes that there be a complete ban on mobile, land-based strategic offensive missile systems. 11. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-ballistic missile systems is more complex. It would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be a set and equivalent number of fixed anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles which each side could deploy. The U.S. also proposes that the deployment of mobile ABM launchers and associated missiles be totally prohibited. 12. There must, of course, be adequate verification of any agreement. In previous discussions leading up to these talks, we have indicated that the United States is prepared to rely to the maximum possible extent on verification by national means available to the two governments in order to verify an agreement limiting the deployment of strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons systems, and we indicated that major steps in limiting the deployment of strategic missile systems should be possible on that basis. 13. An agreement of the scope just outlined may, however, involve certain aspects which will be difficult to verify with full confidence through national means alone. To meet these potential problems the United States believes that consideration should be given to supplementing national means of verification by some mutually arrived at arrangements for reassurance. Such agreed procedures would increase the confidence of each government in the other's compliance with the agreement and could permit a more comprehensive agreement. Therefore, we should explore at an early stage of our discussions what supplementary means of reassurance could be agreed. 14. It would appear that arrangements involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on U.S. and Soviet territory are the best way of providing this reassurance; there may be other means of contributing to reassurance. The essential point is that each state needs to be able to satisfy itself that the other state is living up to the agreement. 15. The United States Government believes these talks can lead to an agreement beneficial to both sides. By our agreement, we could demonstrate to the world at large that our two nations, each endowed with great military power, can act to limit that power. The U.S. Delegation would welcome hearing your comments on the U.S. proposal and any other views the Soviet Delegation is prepared to advance. We hope the Soviet Delegation will agree that the position we have outlined today provides a sound basis for an agreement. Tab B 5 Washington, August 24, 1968. STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS BASIC POSITION PAPER (Instructions for the Delegation) General Introduction 1. This paper presents guidelines governing the U.S. position during the first phase of U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic missile limitations. 2. It is not possible to draw up a detailed scenario covering the talks; much will depend on initial Soviet reaction and how we choose to respond to it. It is also for this reason that, with few exceptions, no attempt has been made to spell out alternate U.S. positions, which will have to be developed later through normal U.S. Government procedures. Tactics 3. This paper deals with the major issues likely to arise in connection with the presentation of our proposal. A certain amount of discussion and clarification of individual features, in isolation from other factors, will be necessary. However, we wish to stress in the discussions that the U.S. proposal should be viewed as a comprehensive entity. We wish to avoid conceding to the Soviets the advantage of concentrating on the inequities of this or that measure. We should point out that, because of the asymmetries in the respective strategic postures of the U.S. and USSR, it would be unrealistic and unnecessary to strive for equality in each category of strategic weapons. Rather we should accept existing asymmetries as a point of departure and strive for an agreement which, in its overall effect, would satisfy the security interests of each side. 4. The Delegation should proceed with due caution in presenting the U.S. position. We do not wish to engage in a protracted discussion of generalities, but neither do we wish to show our entire hand without having first obtained at least a general impression of the Soviet approach. 5. After settling on formalities, the Delegation should give the “Initial Presentation of U.S. Position” (see separate paper) which contains, in general skeleton form, the outlines of the U.S. proposal. 6. It should be emphasized that, in the ensuing discussion of the U.S. position, the Delegation is not required to present the totality of the position as it is written below for a particular category of weapons in its initial presentation. It may wish to withhold some of the details, particularly on highly technical matters, until later stages in the negotiations. 7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The Delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The Delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the Delegation.) U.S. Verification Capability 8. The judgments of the Intelligence Community on our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the proposed agreement are contained in SNIE-13-68 and various supplementary documents which are available to the Delegation. U.S. and Soviet Forces 9. The Delegation has available to it a series of Intelligence Community reports and DOD official documents showing the currently existing and possible future Soviet and U.S. strategic systems. Specific Items in Proposal I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers U.S. Position 1. The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more that 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed, including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles. Development of U.S. Position 2. In presenting this position, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of the technical details concerning the issue of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition. 3. At some point it should be made clear to the Soviets that the prohibition on additional deployments applies to the deployment of new launchers for partial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems. II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers U.S. Position 1. Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km.) would be prohibited. The retrofitting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles or intermediate or medium range. Development of U.S. Position 2. As in the case of ICBM launchers, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition set forth in the first sentence of the above paragraph. 3. The U.S. Delegation may, at its discretion, point out that the Soviet Union at the present time has deployed a large number of this type of missile which presumably are targeted at Western Europe. The United States has no such missiles at its disposal. Thus, the inclusion of this category of missiles in a mutual “freeze” agreement would concede to the Soviet side a certain advantage. This is one of the asymmetries in the Soviet and U.S. strategic forces which an arms limitation agreement must take into account. If we are willing to concede an advantage to the Soviets in this category of weapons, they should be prepared to tolerate a certain advantage to the U.S. in another category. III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems 1. The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km.). Missile systems with such ranges carried by water-borne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed. Development of U.S. Position 2. The Delegation should stress that prohibition should be placed on mobile land-based offensive systems, since under conditions of a ban on further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers, the arms race could be diverted to the deployment of mobile systems, thus negating the value of the agreement. 3. In justifying a total ban, the Delegation should point out that verification by external means of an agreement limiting mobile missile systems to a specific number would be difficult. The possibilities of concealment and redeployment are obvious. However, verification of a total ban would be very much simpler, as the detection of any such system or part thereof clandestinely produced or deployed would be more likely and thus establish a violation. 4. The Delegation should point out, at some appropriate stage, that the ban, in addition to prohibiting production and deployment, also would prohibit the testing of missiles in a mobile system configuration. This ban would otherwise not extend to R&D. IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems 1. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number. There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBM's or SLCM's, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped, i.e., ballistic or cruise missiles. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited. Development of U.S. Position 2. In initially presenting the above position, the Delegation should omit any reference to the completion of the construction of submarine starts underway, and refer simply to a “prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines,” as stated in the Initial U.S. Presentation. The reason for this caution is the uncertainty concerning the exact number of such submarines the Soviets have under construction; we wish to avoid leaving them an open field for their making exaggerated claims in this regard which would be difficult to refute with hard evidence. 3. The U.S. can accept the completion of the ballistic missile submarines the Soviets have under construction as of September 1, 1968, provided a satisfactory understanding were reached on the exact number. If the Soviets raise the issue of completing submarines under construction, the U.S. Delegation should ask the Soviets to indicate the number of submarines under construction. The Delegation should seek instructions based on the number indicated by the Soviets. 4. Even with this understanding, Soviet negotiators would almost certainly object to the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it preserved a distinct advantage for the U.S. and cut short a major Soviet weapons expansion program. Our response should be that certain asymmetries are inevitable in an arms limitation agreement of this sort. Just as we accept the preponderance of Soviet IRBM/MRBM launchers, they should accept the imbalance of SLBM forces. We should also point to the substantial Soviet force of submarine-based cruise-type missiles which can be directed at land targets and which have no U.S. equivalent. 5. The proposal contemplates an understanding concerning the problem of the growing obsolescence of existing submarines over an extended period of time. The proposed form of such an understanding would be to provide that there would be no initiation of construction for replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period, the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. 6. The Soviets may raise this issue themselves as, over the short run at least, they would benefit more from a replacement program (many of their missile-launching submarines are obsolescent) than would the U.S. The Delegation, therefore, should not initially raise the issue but should await a Soviet initiative. But the Delegation should raise the issue at some point if the Soviets do not. 7. In presenting the U.S. proposal, the Delegation should make clear that we consider strategic ballistic and cruise missiles (launched from submarines) of any range as falling within the definition of offensive strategic weapons whose launchers are subject to the limitation. Antisubmarine weapons would not be considered strategic missiles. New ballistic missiles may be retrofitted in ballistic missile submarines and new cruise missiles but not ballistic missiles in cruise missile submarines. 8. While cruise missiles carried on submarines can be defined as having strategic capabilities, those on surface vessels are more difficult to use for strategic purposes. Therefore, no restrictions would be imposed on cruise missiles aboard surface vessels. The proposal would, however, prohibit the installation of facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles on surface ships. V. ABMs U.S. Position 1. The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles, including reload missiles. A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed. Development of U.S. Position 2. For your information, with regard to the numerical limit on ABM launchers, we do not yet have a position. We wish to see if the Soviets accept our proposal in principle, or if they present an alternative proposal. If an understanding is reached on the principle of set and equivalent numbers of anti-ballistic missile launchers and missiles, we would then discuss the precise numerical limit. 3. There are two reasons why we believe this to be the most feasible approach. On the one hand, each side has announced plans to deploy, or is deploying ABMs. These circumstances, as well as the nuclear forces of third countries, must be taken into account. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that an unchecked race between our two countries in the deployment of ABMs would create pressures on both sides to increase their strategic offensive forces, thus making meaningless or impossible any arms limitations in this latter respect. 4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the US Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM capability (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The Delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn systems must be limited and included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense. 5. In discussing the equivalence of the U.S. and Soviet ABM limitations, the question of reload would have to be considered. If the Soviets deployed Moscow-type ABM launchers having one reload, they might be limited to a lesser number of launchers than we would deploy. On the other hand, the Soviets could agree to deploy an equal number of non-reloadable launchers. 6. Although we consider that radars for ABM systems are a significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn anti-aircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations. VI. Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Systems The U.S. Position 1. The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems. Development of U.S. Position 2. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have described the subject of the discussions as concerning both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, we cannot exclude a discussion of strategic bombers if the Soviets raise the subject. 3. The U.S. Delegation should not refer to bombers unless the Soviets do so. If they raise the issue, the Delegation should say that the U.S. does not believe that bombers should be limited at this time. The Delegation should explain that there is a wide variety of performance characteristics of the aircraft at the disposal of the US and USSR, and it would be difficult to agree on a definition of “strategic” aircraft. Moreover, the strategic effect of these aircraft depends to a large degree on the missions assigned to them. This is a variable factor, subject to change within a very short period of time, and hence less susceptible to a formal agreement. 4. Bombers have not figured importantly in the increase of either side in strategic nuclear delivery capabilities in recent years. In fact, both US and Soviet intercontinental bombers forces have been decreasing in size even without any agreement or limitation on reduction of bombers. Consideration of bomber limitations would also raise the complex issue of air defense. 5. Thus, the US should seek to persuade the Soviets to restrict initial discussion to land and seabased missile and anti-ballistic missile limitations, excluding or if not, possibly deferring, the question of possible aircraft (including air to surface missiles) limitations. If the Soviets present a specific proposal on bomber limitation, the Delegation should say that it will refer the proposal to Washington for consideration. 6. Upgrading of Air Defense systems to give them an ABM capability would be prohibited. VII. Technological Improvements The U.S. Position 1. There would be no prohibition of technological improvements within the constraints of the agreement. Development of U.S. Position 2. Technological improvements in the characteristics of ballistic missiles and launchers have—and will have—an effect on the strategic balance. These include, for example, the size of warheads or throw weight of launchers, the accuracy of missiles, the number of warheads carried by a missile, penetration aids, and the hardening of missile warheads. 3. The Soviets may well raise the question of the announced U.S. MIRV programs. They are likely to cite American sources in support of the argument that MIRVs will give the U.S. an advantage, and that they should be prohibited. The Soviets probably will refer to the commencement of U.S.MIRV testing and may demand that the U.S. stop testing immediately. The U.S. should note that this testing was part of a continuing development program which had been planned for a long time and which would continue for several years before the development was complete. Since the Soviets had continued their development and testing of new systems during the year and a half since President Johnson had proposed the talks, we saw no reason why the U.S. should have altered its plans in anticipation of these discussions. Should the Soviets press this issue, the U.S. should respond by inquiring whether the Soviet Union sees a practical way to provide verification for any limitations on MIRVs and other technological improvements. Any specific Soviet proposal that the U.S. halt MIRV testing or deployment must be referred to Washington for consideration. VIII. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal The U.S. Position 1. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions. 2. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months' notice prior to 10 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated. 3. Either party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Development of U.S. Position 4. The U.S. Delegation should at an early stage in the discussion indicate that the agreement will have to include provision for revision and withdrawal procedures. The presentation of our specific proposal can await progress in determining areas of agreement on limitations. The U.S. Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that either side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated, and in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement. The following are illustrative grounds for revision or withdrawal from the agreement: (1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened; (2) if either side believes that extraordinary events have undermined the stability of the agreement; (3) if there is evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement; (4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other's verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement. IX. Reductions The U.S. Position 1. The proposal is not designed to achieve reductions in existing strategic forces. Development of U.S. Position 2. The U.S. Delegation should, in its opening statement, express its conviction that agreement now on measures to curb the strategic arms race not only could lead to substantial savings of national resources to both sides in terms of avoidance of future expenditures but also would help pave the way for substantial reductions of forces in being. The U.S. would be prepared, at an appropriate stage, to discuss such reductions. But we must acknowledge that an agreement designed to achieve reductions in strategic forces, involving as it would great uncertainties for both sides, would be more difficult to achieve than an agreement on leveling off the strength of these forces, which we now propose. The U.S. is convinced that the necessary first step is an agreement on restricting the present arms race. X. Modalities The U.S. Position 1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time. Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions. 2. The Soviets have already agreed to bilateral discussions, and presumably they will stick to this formula. We should oppose any effort they might make to include British or French forces in an agreement, to shift the discussions into the ENDC, or otherwise to broaden the bilateral discussions and eventual agreement. 3. In addition to the provisions for revision and withdrawal discussed in Section VIII above, the Delegation should make clear the right to call for consultations with respect to developments which may raise the question of possible violation by the other party. Some organizational arrangement such as a standing US-USSR commission would be desirable to provide consultation on a continuous basis. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. II, Box 26. Top Secret; Nodis. Handwritten notations in the margin read: “Jane told Rostow” and “Mr. Rostow notified; also Mr. Keeny.” 2 Secretary Rusk's August 27 memorandum to the President transmitting Tabs A and B is not printed. 3 This option is checked. 4 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, Box 39. Secret; Nodis. The source text has no identifying number; another identical copy bears the number ACDA-2951/Rev. 4. (Washington National Records Center,RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, 388.3, Russia, 1968) 5 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, Box 39. Secret; Nodis. The source text has no identifying number; another identical copy bears the number ACDA-3009/Rev. 3. (Ibid.) 278. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 278. Memorandum From the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 30, 1968. SUBJECT Strategic Missile Talks I have rather hurriedly examined the position papers and instructions for the strategic missile talks 2 and submit the following observations. Although I realize that because of the vital security interest involved, there cannot be much give in our position, the Soviets will recognize that our initial position is loaded in our favor. In general, it will permit us to continue with our own plans while restricting them in carrying out some of their own programs. I am troubled by the position which prohibits hardening of medium range launchers but allows hardening of ICBMs. Not only will this inconsistent position be hard to defend, but it would not seem to be in our interest since the Soviets have a number of soft ICBM launchers, whereas we do not. Since at best it would be some time before any agreement could go into effect, it would seem to me far preferable for us to do any additional hardening we wish to do now and work for an agreement which would prevent any hardening of either MRBMs or ICBMs. I am particularly troubled by the position on the Tallinn system. It will probably be impossible to get any satisfactory evidence from the Soviets on what this system is. They are already suspicious that our purpose in starting these talks is simply to elicit information. I would anticipate that the Soviets would press hard for the inclusion of bombers on the ground that they constitute a delivery system with a range greater than 1,000 kilometers. The instructions provide no argumentation for handling a Soviet move to include the French and British in any agreement reached. I suggest that we should have a clear position on this matter before the talks begin. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Top Secret. Sent through Ambassador Bohlen. 2 See Tab A and Tab B, Document 277 . 279. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 279. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 4, 1968. SUBJECT UN Seabeds Committee completes work The UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds concluded its work at a meeting in Rio de Janeiro which ended August 30. 2 Appreciable progress was registered in major areas of U.S. concern. The work done by the Ad Hoc Committee has thrown basic issues into sharp relief and has educated Committee members on the hard conflicts of interest which must be resolved before comprehensive international cooperation on the seabed can become a reality. The major accomplishments of the Rio Session were as follows: 1. Utilizing the formula you worked out with Secretary Clifford, 3 we were able to join all other members in affirming the principle that the deep seabed should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. We made it clear that it was for the ENDC to take up specific deep seabed arms control measures such as our denuclearization proposal. 2. Through intensive effort we did much to overcome underdeveloped country suspicion of our motives in proposing an International Decade of Ocean Exploration. The Committee welcomed and generally supported the Decade, as an element in long-term UN programs. 3. With unusually solid cooperation from a Western Group, including Japan and Australia, we succeeded in obtaining the support of a number of Asians and Africans for a statement of bedrock legal principles which might govern the exploration and use of the deep seabed. Nevertheless the Latin Americans remained immovable in the light of their fears that their 200-mile claims would be adversely affected, and the Soviet Bloc was unexpectedly rigid in refusing to endorse any principles. The Western formulation will be a starting point for future UN work in this area. 4. There was virtually complete consensus for a Standing Committee to work toward internationally agreed arrangements which will permit the orderly development of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction in the interest of the international community. We are now preparing for General Assembly discussion of the Seabed Committee report. We will attempt to persuade Assembly members that real progress can only be made in this matter by proceeding through consensus rather than numerical majorities. We will stress that this is the only alternative to an open split between underdeveloped and advanced countries, which would frustrate the whole exercise. Dave Popper headed the U.S. Delegation at Rio. Leonard Meeker represented us on legal matters, and Dr. Vincent McKelvey of the Geological Survey, on technical matters. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, 388.3, August-December 1968. Confidential. Drafted by David H. Popper (IO) on September 4. 2 Regarding the formation and early work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed, see footnote 2, Document 270 . For text of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, August 30, which also summarizes developments at the conference in Rio de Janeiro, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 595-615. 3 See Document 270 . 280. Editorial Note 280. Editorial Note Although the Soviet Union's military incursion into Czechoslovakia in late August 1968 abruptly undermined the prospect for an early summit meeting and the opening of the missile talks (see Document 274 ), both initiatives were revived in the last months of the Johnson administration. On August 6, Ambassador Thompson met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to consider these matters. Instructions for Thompson for this talk, August 5, and a memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin are in the Johnson Library, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. At the President's instruction, Walt Rostow then invited Ambassador Dobrynin to come to Rostow's home on September 9 at 8:30 p.m. to discuss a prospective summit meeting between President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin. At their meeting Rostow presented Dobrynin with six points, which Rostow had apparently developed with guidance from the President. These points summarized President Johnson's conditions and proposals for a summit. At his meeting with Rostow, Dobrynin took down these points and repeated them several times to make sure he understood them. The first of these points was, “The President does not wish to launch the missile talks at a meeting lower than the Kosygin-Johnson level.” Concerning the missile talks, Dobrynin said early in their conversation: “He said, as he had said several times to Thompson, that he had seen the position papers of the Soviet Union. They were detailed and highly technical. Moreover, he said that as a diplomat he must report to me in candor that they represented not a final position but a bargaining position. He assumed that our papers would be similar in character. To complete the negotiation on the missile question would, in his judgment, take considerable time. Therefore, if concrete results were to emerge from a first meeting between Kosygin and the President, he thought we should consider two possible steps: “—an early exchange of papers at the Ambassadorial level: via Thompson in Moscow and Dobrynin in Washington. This could be done quietly and would give each side a chance to see what elements in them could be the subject for an interim agreement in principle at the Summit meeting; “—an effort be made, before a Summit meeting, to agree on these matters of broad principle which would guide the negotiations in the wake of a Summit meeting.” (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, September 10; ibid.) The remainder of their long conversation covered the problems in the Middle East, Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia and their relationship to the proposed summit. The six points are contained in an unsigned paper, September 7; ibid. Discussions on a proposed summit and preparations for the opening of the missile talks continued to the end of 1968. See Documents 281 , 282 , 287 , 294 , 295 , 297 , and 299 . 281. Note From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States 281. Note From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States 1 Moscow, undated. (Copy of Ambassador Dobrynin's handwritten paper) (Sep. 13, 1968) 2 1. As before the attitude in Moscow is positive to the idea of meeting with the President of the United States for an exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest. The wish of President Johnson to have some degree of certitude in the positive outcome of his possible visit to the Soviet Union is understandable to us. It is also far from being indifferent to us what will be the result of such an exchange of opinions, though it is obvious that efforts from both sides will be needed to gain a success. There is no objection in Moscow as to a discussion during such a meeting of questions named by the American side: curbing of strategic armaments race, question of Viet-Nam and the situation in the Middle East; this, of course, does not exclude the possibility of an exchange of opinion on other questions too. 2. So far as the question of strategic armaments is concerned, our point of view is that an exchange of opinions on this question during the meeting could result in an agreement that fulfilment of certain restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security. It would be possible to agree further on certain basic principles of limitation and then reduction in complex of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles, having in mind that this would constitute a directive of the two Governments to their delegations to engage then in working out of an agreement on the concrete aspects of this problem. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam, the Middle East, and the long-range importance of a summit meeting for U.S.-Soviet relations.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. An attached memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, September 13, 1:45 p.m., indicates that Dobrynin orally delivered the contents of the note to Rostow just before 1 p.m. on September 13, and also left with him Dobrynin's “handwritten translation from which we typed up his communication, literally.” The handwritten text is ibid. Rostow also summarized the points he raised with Dobrynin following the latter's presentation, as they might pertain to a prospective summit meeting. None of Rostow's points involved the strategic missile talks or arms control. Rostow offered his “very tentative first thoughts” on the Soviet message in a memorandum to President Johnson, September 13, 3 p.m. Concerning strategic missiles, Rostow wrote: “The formula on missile talks is probably as far as one could go unless one were immediately to exchange position papers and try to get a bit more substance into the communique.” Later in the same memorandum, he called this formula “promising.” (Ibid.) In another memorandum to the President, September 13, 6:40 p.m., Rostow related his just completed conversation with Secretary Rusk about the Soviet note. As summarized by Rostow, their discussion did not touch on the missile talks or arms control. (Ibid.) 2 The September 13 date is not included in the handwritten text. 282. Memorandum From the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union 282. Memorandum From the Government of the United States to the Government of the Soviet Union 1 Washington, September 16, 1968. The President has considered very carefully the observations made by Ambassador Dobrynin on September 13. 2 He attaches serious importance to the understanding of Soviet leaders that a positive outcome of a highest level meeting between the two sides is essential to a success; and he agrees that this requires efforts from both sides. The President wishes the Soviet leadership to have his further reflections about how such a success could be achieved. With respect to offensive and defensive missiles, the President agrees that it ought to be possible to establish certain common basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in such nuclear weapons systems. He further agrees that, following an accord on general principles at the highest level, representatives of the two sides would have to address themselves to the translation of general principles into the more concrete aspects of the problem. It would, however, be desirable to go beyond a general statement that “restraining measures in this field would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the task of strengthening international security.” With this in mind, the President would be glad to know whether the Soviet leaders could accept the following general objectives as guidance for our respective delegations or would wish to suggest any amendments for his consideration: —To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles. —To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating U.S. and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces. —To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. —To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation. [Here follows extensive discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking. Originally drafted by Secretary Rusk following Rostow's September 13 meeting with Dobrynin (undated memorandum from Rusk to Rostow; ibid.), with the understanding that Rostow would hand the text of the message to Ambassador Dobrynin, and revised by Rostow (memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, September 15; ibid.). Rostow forwarded the revised message to President Johnson under cover of a memorandum, September 16. Also attached were “rough guidelines for my 'personal' remarks [to Dobrynin] which would be done as reflecting the President's attitude as I've perceived it, with no trace of ultimatum,” and a “paper of issues and actions that lie down the line if you decide to proceed.” (Ibid.) The message forwarded to President Johnson is identical to the text printed here. In a September 16 memorandum for President Johnson, Rostow reported that he handed this memorandum to Ambassador Dobrynin, with whom he met from 6-7:30 p.m. that evening, noting that it had the same status as Dobrynin's September 13 “oral communication.” After reading the memorandum carefully, Dobrynin “said in general that the communication was 'positive and clear.'” Concerning the missile talks, Dobrynin made the following observations: “He understood our objective in proposing an amplification of the principles. He wanted to know, simply, whether the response of the Soviet government should come back through his channel to me or through normal diplomatic exchanges. I said that until we were clearer as to whether the conditions for a Summit were mutually understood and agreed, he might let their response come back to me. I then went through the points that it was agreed that I should make on a 'personal basis' as reflecting the attitude of the President, as he had indicated it to Sec. Rusk and myself.” (Ibid.) 2 Document 281 . 283. Memorandum of Conversation 283. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 17, 1968, 1:15 p.m. SUBJECT Non-Proliferation Treaty (U) PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Mr. William C. Foster, Director, ACDA Ambassador Dobrynin invited me to lunch primarily to discuss the situation with reference to NPT. By the time I had arrived, he had obtained the results of the Foreign Relations Committee meeting and its favorable vote. 2 I gave him the details of the vote as we knew it, in which he was interested. I said this was favorable, and had been done in spite of the action of the Soviet Union in connection with Czechoslovakia. However, it had been very difficult to achieve because of the question of their intentions. I said that if there were further similar events in Romania and Yugoslavia, the NPT and other arrangements between us might just as well be forgotten. He asked why I felt there would be such other events, and I said certainly that there were rumors on a broad enough scale to raise question. He said that he had officially informed Mr. Rusk there would be no further action and he reiterated that assurance to me. It was impossible, he said, to conceive of additional action in connection with Romania and Yugoslavia where conditions were completely different. He was interested as to further appraisal of chances for floor passage of the NPT, which I said were good in my opinion, although the brief period for the remaining weeks of the session made it difficult to be sure as to the passage of any floor bills. I said we continued, however, to be hopeful now that a major hurdle had been overcome in the committee. We then talked about other disarmament items including a possible expansion of the ENDC, which he felt was dangerous since opening the doors to include the Japanese, who were likely candidates, would mean pressure from other nations. We discussed the NNC, 3 regarding which his government had the same concerns that we did, particularly as to the request for greater assurances, free gifts of nuclear equipment, fuels and know-how, and the possibility of regular continuing sessions of a fundamentally irresponsible body. He asked as to our plans for the General Assembly on disarmament. I responded that we would, of course, be prepared to talk on the Report of the ENDC including further discussions on the NPT, the seabed, and CBW, with particular reference on this latter to a Secretary General's study of effects. He informed me that the Soviet delegation to the UNGA would not arrive until September 30 and he was already attempting to make arrangements for the arrival of the special plane for their delegation. He didn't know whether Mr. Gromyko would be coming or perhaps Mr. Kuznetsov, in view of his intimate knowledge of the situation in Prague. He told me of the Soviet inscription in the General Assembly of an item of urgency to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. I emphasized throughout the responsibility which his government had if further advances in arms control were to take place since events such as Czechoslovakia would prevent any progress whatsoever. He again attempted to reassure me that things would be much better rather than worse. It was clear from his conversation that he had had no advance notice of the intrusion into Czechoslovakia. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential;Exdis. Drafted by Foster on September 17 and approved in S on September 18. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. 2 On September 17 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended, by a vote of 13-3-3, that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For text of the Committee's report, September 26, see Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 642-667. 3 Regarding this Conference, see footnote 3, Document 263 . 284. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 284. Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts 1 Washington, September 20, 1968, 0026Z. 241963. Disto/IAEA. Subject: Perpetuation of Non-Nuclear Conference (NNC). 2 1. A primary concern at NNC is likelihood that resolution will be passed either calling for permanent machinery to carry on tasks of NNC or calling for periodic meetings—or both. In view of possible disruptive effects of continuing activity of the sort transpiring at NNC, we believe we should make every reasonable effort to forestall or water down proposals for NNC perpetuation. 2. Unless you see overriding objection, action addressees should approach FonOffs ASAP at most effective level to explain US position as follows. Subjects being discussed at NNC are matters which in one form or another already are being considered constructively in other bodies—security issues in GA; disarmament in ENDC, as well as in GA; peaceful uses in IAEA, General Conference and Atoms for Peace Conference. These bodies will continue to consider and have responsibility for these questions regardless of what the NNC may accomplish. In some cases, such as in GA, such consideration will begin promptly after NNC concludes. It would be relatively meaningless for NNC to carry over what some may consider unfinished business to a later session, since in the meantime these subjects will be actively dealt with elsewhere. Moreover, fact that nuclear powers are not voting participants in NNC is in itself argument for conducting further discussions in existing forums where virtually all interested parties are represented, on equal basis. 3. In view above, you should state that USG does not plan participate in further meetings of bodies organized along lines NNC and cannot support fixing any date for future conferences of this sort. We would not be able to support establishment of any permanent machinery to carry on tasks of NNC because of existence of various organs and agencies charged with responsibility for matters under discussion of NNC. You should accordingly strongly urge that host Govt not support NNC perpetuation. 4. You may also say that one acceptable alternative to NNC perpetuation would be for NNC to recommend putting item on agenda of early GA session (e.g., 24th) which would provide opportunity to re-examine conclusions of NNC in light of progress made in interim by the responsible organs and agencies. You should emphasize we will continue our intensive efforts in these existing agencies and bodies for promotion peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to work towards disarmament objectives. We are convinced that existing organs and agencies provide most practical and realistic vehicle for concrete progress in these fields. 5. Addresses, in case of governments not attending NNC, may at their discretion make above demarche if it would favorably influence position host Govt at UNGA. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by D.L. Aaron and A.F. Neidle (ACDA/IR) on September 19; cleared by officers in ACDA/IR, IO, EA/AA,EUR, NEA, AFI, ARA, and G/PM; and approved by Adrian Fisher. The telegram requested action from all posts except Algiers, Dar es Salaam, Cairo, Kabul, Khartoum, Lusaka, Saigon, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, and Bucharest. 2 See footnote 3, Document 263 . 285. Memorandum of Conversation 285. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, September 20, 1968, 12:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador Dobrynin Assistant Secretary Leddy Ambassador Dobrynin had asked to see the Secretary either today or on Monday. 2 The Secretary agreed to see him at 12:30 p.m. today. Dobrynin began by referring to the question of technical talks on PNEDS (Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices). He said that the idea of the US and the USSR meeting on this subject had been at the US initiative, that the US thought it would be useful with the non-nuclear conference in Geneva and that the Soviets were now prepared to go ahead with the talks on October 7, as suggested by the US. The Secretary asked whether this subject had been discussed with Ambassador Foster when he and Dobrynin met the other day. 3 Dobrynin replied that they had just discussed the NPT and that Ambassador Foster did not wish to discuss the PNEDS talks. The Secretary said that he would have to discuss this question with the President and Ambassador Foster, and that he would let Dobrynin know later. He observed that there were complications. The Secretary said that the Executive Branch, as the Ambassador knew, was attempting to move the non-proliferation treaty through the Senate. In response to the Ambassador's question, he said he thought the matter would not come to a vote before the Fortas nomination had been settled, 4 probably not until the end of the month. [Here follows discussion of Berlin and Germany.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation, Box 11. Drafted by Leddy and approved by John P. Walsh (S/S) on September 24. 2 September 23. 3 Document 283 . 4 President Johnson nominated Abe Fortas, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to be Chief Justice on June 26. 286. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Shaw) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 286. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Shaw) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Bohlen) 1 Washington, October 2, 1968. SUBJECT Strategic Missile Talks A significant result of the otherwise confused Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States was the adoption of a resolution, sponsored by Pakistan and encouraged by Canada, endorsing the US-Soviet agreement of July 1 to hold strategic arms limitation talks and “urging the governments of the USSR and US to enter into such bilateral talks at an early date.” 2 It is particularly noteworthy that the resolution was: 1. Adopted by the largest majority for any resolution which won NNC support (79-0-5); 2. Supported by all of our NATO Allies participating in the NNC, including the FRG (Karl Lahusen, third-ranking member of the German Embassy here, spoke to me approvingly about this action); 3. Supported also by such other US Allies as the entire Latin American bloc, Korea, Vietnam, and the GRC; and 4. Supported by Yugoslavia and Romania. With the exception of Thailand, none of the five abstaining countries (Thailand, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) plays a significant role in international affairs. The abstentions of Tanzania and Zambia presumably reflect Chinese influence. In sum, there would appear to be overwhelming international support for an early beginning of these talks. None of our Allies which are most concerned about the consequences of Czechoslovakia or are generally leery about signs of US-Soviet collaboration either opposed or abstained on the resolution. You may wish to bring this development to the attention of the Secretary, if that has not already been done. 3 JPS 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Limited Official Use. 2 Reference is to Resolution D, approved by the Conference on September 27. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , p. 675. 3 In a September 27 memorandum to President Johnson, Walt Rostow brought this resolution to the President's attention, stressing that “All NATO allies present, including Federal Republic of Germany, voted in favor of the resolution.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Non-Proliferation Treaty, 7/21/67, Vol. II, Box 26) 287. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States 287. Message From the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the United States 1 Moscow, undated. President Johnson's observations on the subject of his meeting with Soviet leaders which were communicated by W. Rostow to the Soviet Ambassador on September 16 2 have been attentively considered in Moscow. In this connection we, for our part, should also like to express some ideas. I. It has been noted in Moscow that the President has reacted favorably to our suggestion that in the course of the meeting there should be established basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in strategic armaments. We, for our part, agree that simultaneously the general objectives of our two countries in this field should be formulated in a more detailed form. On the whole as a result of the exchange of views on the question of restraining the strategic arms race it could, in our opinion, be stated that the two sides had arrived at a conclusion on the expediency and feasibility of achieving a mutually acceptable understanding on this question, and that the implementation of measures to restrain the strategic arms race would answer to the interests of both our countries as well as to the interests of strengthening international security, and that this would also generate more favorable conditions for solving other major issues in the field of disarmament. Specifically, it could be agreed that the two sides would be guided by the following general objectives: —To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic armaments. —To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating Soviet and U.S. willingness to limit their strategic armaments. —To provide mutual assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. —To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation. At the same time it could be agreed that the task of limiting and subsequently reducing strategic armaments should be resolved in compliance with the following basic principles: (1) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out with due regard for the integral interconnection of the two principal components of such armaments, i.e. offensive and defensive weapons systems. (2) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out as a complex including both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems. (3) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantages and that equal security should be assured for both sides. There could also be registered an agreement of the two sides, along with implementation of measures to limit and reduce strategic armaments, to study the question of taking steps to rule out the accidental appearance of conflict-fraught situations involving the use of strategic armaments. In conclusion it could be agreed that special delegations of the two governments, guided by the above-mentioned objectives and principles, would promptly address themselves to devising an agreement on the concrete aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments. Agreement, reached during the meeting, on the above-listed aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments could, in our view, then be set forth either in the final communique of the meeting or in the form of a joint statement of our two governments. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam and the Middle East.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File, Box 12. No classification marking; Unofficial Translation. A handwritten note on the source text reads, “handed to Sec. Rusk by Gromyko on Oct. 2.” Gromyko apparently gave it to Secretary Rusk along with the Russian text. (Ibid.) 2 Document 282 . 288. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 288. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, undated. ACDA-3548 SUBJECT Soviet Memorandum on Strategic Arms Limitations The Soviet memorandum 2 is, in general substance, consistent with the US proposal which has been developed for presentation to the USSR. The memorandum sets forth certain “general objectives” and also the “basic principles” which would be utilized in seeking to reach these objectives. It is contemplated that these objectives and principles would be set forth in a communique or joint statement following an initial meeting. In our view, any such agreed statement should embody the following changes: (1) The first proposed general objective, at the top of page 2, is “to achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrence.” The word “achieve” may be intended to suggest that some adjustment of the present nuclear balance is required to bring about numerical equality in some respects. We should take the position that effective deterrence now exists and that the proper objective is to “maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrence.” (2) The first two “basic principles,” at the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3, phrase differently the subject matter of the proposed arms limitation agreement. The first of these refers to “offensive and defensive weapons systems” and thus would include manned bombers and missile systems designed to defend against manned bombers. The subsequent paragraph refers to the limitation and reduction of “offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.” This would appear to cover manned bombers, but not bomber defenses. Our proposal does not include limitations either on aircraft or on anti-aircraft systems. In view of the fact that the two paragraphs cover essentially the same subject matter, we should propose dropping the second and leaving the first with its general language about “offensive and defensive weapons systems.” This would leave us free in the course of negotiations to determine the advisability of including or excluding bombers and bomber defenses. (3) The third basic principle, contained in the second paragraph on page 3, talks of assuring “equal security” for both sides. Here again, the intent may be to provide for an adjustment in the existing nuclear balance to achieve numerical equality in one or more areas. US and USSR forces are not symmetrical at the present time and our security needs differ in some respects. We should point out that the word “equal” is tautological as a qualifier of “security” and should be deleted. (4) The third paragraph on page 3 does not clearly convey the thought that the two sides should study means for preventing the development of situations which pose the risk of escalation to nuclear war. The word “minimize” might be substituted for the words “rule out” in line 3 of paragraph 3. The word “possible” might be added at the beginning of line 5 of paragraph 3. (5) It is our understanding that the last two paragraphs of the memorandum contemplate that there will be an initial high-level meeting at which agreement will be reached on the “general objectives” and “basic principles” which will then be recorded in a communique or joint statement. Thereafter, special delegations will meet to develop a final agreement, guided by these objectives and principles. The memorandum thus apparently does not foreclose the possibility of a formal treaty although it does not specify the form that a final agreement is to take. Clark M. Clifford 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 86 A 5, Folder 3548. Top Secret. 2 Document 287 . 289. Memorandum of Conversation 289. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 6, 1968, 7:30–10:45 p.m. SecDel/MC/16 SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1968 SUBJECT NPT PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen Ambassador J.R. Wiggins Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko Ambassador Ya. Malik Ambassador A. Dobrynin V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter Ambassador Malik inquired as to the prospects of Japan, Brazil and Argentina signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Secretary Rusk replied that it was his opinion that Japan would sign the Treaty; it would take some time, but he thought Japan would sign before the end of the current year. As for Brazil, he wanted to say in strictest confidence that it was really a matter of their Foreign Minister having some strange ideas to the effect that Brazil needed to retain the right of developing its own nuclear capability for the purpose of carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions. But, in the end, he was confident that the Foreign Minister would not present any obstacles to Brazil's signing the NPT. The main problem, though, was that Brazil's delay created problems for its neighbor, Argentina, and Argentina's delay, in turn, created problems for Chile; it was in the nature of a chain reaction. Ambassador Malik said the situation resembled that of India and Pakistan. The Secretary agreed and said the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had told him he could not sign unless India signed as well. He hoped that the Soviet Union would influence India in the direction of signing the Treaty. To Mr. Gromyko's question as to when the US Senate could be expected to take up the ratification of the NPT, the Secretary replied that he hoped it would be this week. We had a count on the Democratic Senators in this respect and had no problem here. Tomorrow morning he was going to see Mr. Nixon and hoped that he could persuade him privately to press Republican Senators for ratification now. In reply to Mr. Gromyko's question the Secretary said that he hoped Mr. Nixon would approach the problem with proper understanding. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Krimer and approved in S on October 17. The source text is labeled “Part V of VIII.” The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers. 290. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 290. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) 1 Washington, October 9, 1968. Dear Bill: Events in Czechoslovakia seemed to have overtaken any urgency for the ENDC speech proposed in your memorandum of August 16, 1968 2 and thus, the need for my immediate reply. I believe, however, that you would be interested in our general views on the subject of an agreement for a cutoff of production of fissionable material for use in weapons. From the standpoint of AEC's responsibilities, we are principally concerned with the effect that a cutoff would have on the ability of the AEC to meet possible weapon production requirements. To that end, we plan to make a study of our ability to meet foreseeable requirements for fissionable material and tritium under conditions of a cutoff, and will be happy to make the results of that study available to the agencies represented on the Committee of Principals. Changes in US requirements for fissionable material and tritium for weapons, in projected demands for fissionable material for non-weapons use, and in AEC's production operations have occurred since the Committee of Principals last reviewed the US position on a cutoff, several years ago. We believe that another review by the Committee of Principals would be very useful in terms of over-all perspective concerning the desirability of a cutoff. We are also concerned about the present adequacy of the inspection procedures which were outlined in 1964 (ENDC/134) 3 to apply to nuclear-weapon states under a cutoff agreement. In particular, demands for uranium enriching services to provide fuel for nuclear power reactors have expanded at a much greater rate than foreseen in 1964, and this raises a question as to the suitability of the monitoring procedures provided for in ENDC/134. Progress in the development of the technology of uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge has also been substantial. The procedures for monitoring operating uranium enrichment plants were based on the premise that such plants would continue operation at low production rates to meet demands for enriched uranium for non-weapons use, and that those demands would be small relative to existing stocks of fissionable material.ENDC/134 recognized that the monitoring procedures will have to be reviewed “as peaceful uses grow and involve substantially larger quantities of fissionable material.” We believe that it would be desirable to consider whether the monitoring procedures outlined in ENDC/134 are still appropriate in the changed circumstances. Accordingly, we intend to study this question and will make the results of our study available to the agencies represented on the Committee of Principals. In order that our studies may be most useful, we would appreciate your providing us with the specific language of the cutoff proposal you would like to have considered for possible use at the ENDC. With respect to the existing alternate proposal of plant-by-plant shutdowns, we believe that US actions since 1964 require that such a proposal be reformulated. We now have completely shut down two production reactors and have placed five others in standby. The reactors in standby are available for our use, given adequate lead time, for the production of plutonium or tritium for use in weapons or, alternatively, for production of materials for non-weapons use. Furthermore, some of the reactors still in operation are being used entirely for the production of materials for uses other than weapons. Accordingly, we believe that if and when any plant-by-plant offer is restated, consideration should be given to phrasing it in such a manner that it comprehends the following alternative actions: (1) shutting down permanently, under verification, of an operating reactor; (2) placing in standby under verification (for possible subsequent verified operation for permitted uses) of a currently operating reactor; (3) placing under verification a reactor already shut down or in standby, which had previously been a source of fissionable material for use in weapons; or (4) placing a currently operating reactor under verification to assure that the material being produced is only for permitted uses. Cordially, Glenn 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. The letter is also reproduced in Seaborg, Journal , Vol. 17, pp. 332-333. 2 See footnote 3, Document 276 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 251 . 291. Special National Intelligence Estimate 291. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, November 7, 1968. SNIE 11-16-68 THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL 2 Note This paper is addressed primarily to the subject of the Soviet attitude toward negotiation of limitations on strategic weapons systems. It also evaluates briefly the significance of the Soviet nine-point memorandum on disarmament issued on 1 July 1968. 3 The Estimate I. Background 1. Traditionally, the Soviets have appeared to view arms control and disarmament primarily as a field of political warfare. While such considerations have continued to color much of the Soviet attitude during the past few years, the USSR did enter into agreements on nuclear testing in 1963, on weapons in outer space in 1967, and this year on nuclear nonproliferation. There were advantages to Soviet foreign policy in doing so, and in addition, the progress which was being made in their strategic programs gave the Soviet leaders confidence that their relative position would not be disadvantaged by these limited agreements. The willingness of the Soviets to entertain more far-reaching agreements with the West will obviously depend on a very complex interplay of military, political, and economic considerations. 2. The Soviet nine-point disarmament memorandum publicly issued on 1 July 1968 was primarily a propaganda document. With various points addressed to different potential forums, the memorandum was evidently not intended as a package proposal. Probably it was aimed mainly at claiming the initiative for the USSR and obscuring the fact that it was the US which, for more than 18 months, had pressed for a new effort to negotiate limitations on strategic weapons. Most of the proposals contained in the memorandum are old standbys which have been used in a propaganda context for many years (e.g., calls for banning the use of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, for abolishing foreign military bases, and for prohibiting nuclear armed bomber flights outside national frontiers). But a few of them concern matters on which Moscow has expressed interest in other ways, and on which it may see advantage in serious negotiation. Such proposals concern limitation of strategic weapons systems, peaceful uses of the seabed, banning underground nuclear testing, and some measures for regional arms control. None of these is fundamentally new either; all are items that have been periodically promoted by the USSR at the UN and elsewhere. Clearly, the first of these is the most basic in its implications for the relationship between the two powers and the only one now contemplated for bilateral negotiations. 3. The Soviets had, of course, agreed to have talks with the US on strategic arms limitations several days prior to the issuance of the nine-point memorandum, which was released in connection with a Kosygin speech made at the Moscow signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The moment chosen for the USSR's belated acceptance of the US proposal suggests that the motives which underlay the decision must have been complex. The response came during a period when there seemed to be no noticeable relaxation in Soviet propaganda attacks against the West; it coincided with the buildup of heavy military and political pressures against Czechoslovakia; and it was announced only months before a change of administrations in Washington. Moreover, the Soviets had long maintained that major steps toward improving relations with the US were impossible during the Vietnam War. While on the face of things the moment chosen may seem improbable, some of these circumstances may actually have given the Soviets incentives to move when they did. 4. Both political and military factors probably figured in the long delay of the Soviet response. For one thing, the Soviets have customarily responded to US arms control initiatives with a great measure of caution and suspicion. On so complex and sensitive an issue as strategic arms limitations, the misgivings—probably, in fact, the resistance—of certain elements both within and outside the Soviet political leadership must have been considerable. The period of delay permitted a further narrowing of the gap between Soviet and American strategic forces; the Soviets are now approaching the US in numbers of operational inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and are also building a submarine force similar to the Polaris. They must now have strengthened confidence in their possession of an assured destruction capability, and considering qualitative differences in weapon systems such as warhead yield, the target system to be attacked, and damage-limiting capabilities, they may actually consider that they have now achieved rough strategic parity with the U.S. Thus, they must believe that their bargaining position in negotiations has become stronger. 5. The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia has complicated the political environment bearing on arms control. It indicated that Moscow's determination to preserve a secure position in Eastern Europe outweighed other considerations, including its interest in early negotiation on strategic arms control. It is still too soon to evaluate the full implications of the Czech crisis for Soviet policy, and specifically for Soviet attitudes toward arms control. The move toward new disarmament negotiations was probably calculated to help offset the opprobrium the USSR suffered from the Czech intervention. How Moscow's attitude toward strategic arms talks now develops will also depend on the impact of recent events on attitudes and policies in Washington. The Soviets have maintained that the Czech crisis is no one's business except their own and Eastern Europe's and a matter quite apart from questions of mutual interest to both East and West. It was in this spirit, at least, that Gromyko recently reaffirmed Soviet desires to begin talks with the US. II. Considerations Affecting the Soviet Approach to Negotiations The Strategic Relationship 6. Having significantly improved their relative position in strategic forces in recent years, the Soviets probably believe that a considerable sustained effort will be necessary to maintain the position they have now achieved; the Soviets must recognize that the competition in this field will not stand still. They probably fear that projected US programs will once again increase the US relative advantage considerably, unless the Soviets themselves undertake strenuous new efforts. The choices posed for the Soviet leaders at present are: (a) to attempt to keep pace by making the indicated effort; (b) to permit the US to move out far ahead once more; or (c) to attempt by agreement to stabilize the strategic relationship at a point less unfavorable to the USSR than it ever has been. 7. It seems likely that, after the effort they have made and the resources they have expended, the Soviet leaders would find it intolerable to see their improved position degraded. No doubt there would be some who would argue that the forces the Soviets will have under current programs would give them an assured destruction capability for many years to come, regardless of what the US did. But it is unlikely that the pressures of military leaders and the play of Kremlin politics would permit resigned acceptance of a widening gap. The argument for staying in the race, for political as well as security reasons, would probably prevail in the end. 8. Faced, however, with the oncoming US programs—Poseidon and Minuteman III (with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles), and Sentinel—the Soviets must recognize that, if they want to stay in the race, they have their work cut out for them. Not only would there be enormous economic costs, but the Soviets would inevitably have some doubts of their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological development for more advanced systems. Moreover, further large allocations of resources to strategic forces would tighten the squeeze on other military programs. This would be particularly troubling to those military leaders who feel that the general purpose forces are now in pressing need of refurbishing and perhaps enlargement. 9. The outlook for the competition between the US and the USSR in the field of ballistic missile defense probably offers the Soviets grounds for concern. They have a system of limited effectiveness deployed at Moscow, but they evidently realize that more development work is needed before extensive deployment would be worthwhile. 4 They recognize that the US program in this field is still at an early stage and will not affect the balance of strategic power for some years, but they know that development work is going forward in the US and that deployment is planned. While the Soviets, on the basis of the extensive work they have already done, are probably confident that they can sustain the competition in this field, they may also come to believe that the net result would be a vast expenditure of economic resources without any effective return in increased security. 10. Thus, there are incentives for the Soviets to consider more seriously now the option of negotiations to limit strategic forces. They could calculate that an agreement to stabilize the strategic relationship, or at least to slow down the competition, if achieved in the next year or two, would be the best means of preserving the improved relative position the USSR has been acquiring. They might further think that, even if no agreement was finally reached, the process of negotiation itself, because of the expectations it would arouse in the US and elsewhere, would act to slow the pace of the competition for a time. Economic Factors 11. Economic considerations doubtless contributed also to the USSR's decision to discuss strategic arms control. To the extent that the Soviets had been motivated by the desire to limit over-all military costs and free resources for other purposes, they would presumably continue to want to avoid provoking a new surge in arms competition. Soviet spokesmen have, over the past year, repeatedly pointed to the high level of defense expenditures in the US. Though some of these statements were probably intended as arguments for, or justification of, increases in Soviet defense outlays, others almost certainly reflected the Soviets' concern over similar rising costs in the USSR. 12. Over the past several years, the Soviets have been following a policy of expanding strategic programs and increasing investment in the consumer goods and services sectors of the economy while allowing rates of growth of investment in heavy industry to decline. This policy limits the output of producers goods and will ultimately retard the over-all rate of economic growth. Thus, the Soviet leaders probably must divert resources to the producers goods sector of the economy in the near future or risk seriously impairing future capacity for satisfying military as well as civilian objectives. The important question is which claimant is going to yield—the consumer or the military—and when? In the past, the Soviet decision would have been quite predictable: the consumer has traditionally borne the brunt of any resource bind. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the political cost of this course is greater in their society now than it used to be. Therefore, as certain strategic programs approach planned levels, some Soviet leaders might prefer to avoid heavy new expenditures for follow-on military programs. An arms control agreement could reduce the pressures for such programs. 13. It is conceivable that the new military requirements generated by the Czech crisis may aggravate the resource allocations problem and thus add to Soviet incentives to seek strategic arms limitations. The Soviets may consider that their occupation of Czechoslovakia and new uncertainties about the contributions of their allies will require further strengthening of Soviet forces in the European forward area and the reinforcement of their general purpose forces in the western USSR. These requirements, in addition to the ongoing buildup of military forces along the Chinese border, will probably lead to substantial increases in Soviet theater forces in general. The cost of meeting these demands will add to the current record high level of defense spending that already appears to be generating potentially serious economic problems. The Soviets may thus at this time be interested in strategic arms control as a way of conserving some economic resources for other military programs and also as a way of relieving strains in the economy generally. III. Factors Affecting the Course of Negotiations 14. Soviet willingness to enter into arms control talks with the US does not, of course, signify a firm commitment to strive for an agreement. In the early phases, the Soviets would probably concentrate on probing the US position. Should they decide to get down to serious business, the negotiations would inevitably be hard and prolonged. 15. The political climate at the time of talks, and developments on the international scene which might affect it for better or worse, would have a considerable bearing on success or failure. There will be the usual suspicion and mistrust on the Soviet side, and the problem of breaking through resisting layers of bureaucracy to get decisions will be particularly formidable in view of the complexity of the issues. It is likely also that there will be divisions among the top leaders, and that politicking for future place and power will figure in the positions they adopt. Thus, the obstacles to actual achievement of an agreement will be great, especially in the absence of some simultaneous advance toward resolution of the more basic East-West issues and the improved political climate so generated. 16. The Soviets will approach negotiations with one basic criterion in mind: they will want their right to equality in strategic forces acknowledged in principle. In fact, one motive they had for accepting the US invitation to negotiate was probably the belief that the US move tacitly conceded this right, or at least could be so construed by them. Acknowledgment of the claim to equality would be valued not merely on security grounds, but also because of the implication it would carry that the USSR was entitled to a political role in world affairs equivalent to that of the US. Thus, the Soviets would be sensitive to any attempt from the US side to “negotiate from strength” or to claim a permanent advantage in strategic forces. 17. What in fact constitutes equality—in view of the different composition of strategic forces on the two sides and their different geopolitical situations—would be recognized by the Soviets as a proper subject of negotiation. They would surely bargain hard and take every advantage, but would probably be willing in working out the problems of equivalence to consider trade-offs between different weapons systems of the two sides. Their view of the nature of power would lead them to weigh other ingredients than numbers of strategic weapons alone—other kinds of forces, political strengths and influence—in measuring the relative power of the two sides. Once involved in the negotiations, therefore, they would probably not be disposed to break off merely because of difficulties encountered, and they would also recognize the political costs of doing so. 18. The problem of verification which has dogged all previous disarmament negotiations will persist. The Soviets will probably continue to resist verification procedures which require the presence of foreign inspectors in the USSR. Traditionally, the Soviets have regarded such inspection arrangements as militarily disadvantageous and politically harmful. If anything, their fear of ideological contagion is currently heightened. Thus, Moscow is still unlikely to accept an arms control agreement which cannot be verified primarily through national means. 19. In sum, we believe that Moscow's incentives to try for strategic arms limitations and for stabilizing the USSR's strategic relationship with the US are stronger now than they have been. Nevertheless, the forces and institutions in the USSR with a vested interest in stalling and even blocking movement toward arms control continue to be strong, and will weigh heavily against the prospects for achieving an agreement. Moreover, the absence of a political climate of mutual trust between the US and USSR could strengthen the case of those forces in the USSR opposed to serious negotiation and, in general, hamper efforts to achieve agreement. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin—Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence departments of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency; concurred in by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor (Deputy Director, Central Intelligence), Thomas L. Hughes (Director,INR), Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA), Marshall S. Carter (Director, NSA), and Dr. Charles H. Reichardt (AEC). William O. Cregar (FBI) abstained; the subject being outside his jurisdiction. 2 Some of the considerations which bear on this subject are discussed in greater detail in NIE 11-4-68, “Main Issues in Soviet Military Policy,” dated 19 September 1968. Secret. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-4-68 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4.] 3 See footnote 6, Document 252 . 4 For a full discussion of the status and prospects of the Soviet antiballistic missile program, see NIE 11-3-68, “Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses,” dated 31 October 1968. Top Secret, Restricted Data. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-3-68 has not been found.] 292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 14, 1968, 5:30 p.m. Mr. President: Herewith an initial comment on Dobrynin's position at the lunch he initiated. 2 1. Moscow is clearly ready to go—and eager—if you can work it out. 2. Their reasons are quite similar to our own: to create a good backdrop for the NPT in January; to keep the momentum of the work on missiles going into the next Administration; and, therefore, to avoid a long delay in both the NPT and the missile affairs. 3. Reading over the proposed joint communique statement on the missile talks, 3 I have two reflections: —first, they need some staffing out by Sect. Rusk and a few others; —basically, they represent the kind of public commitment that might emerge; although the heart of the matter will lie not in the public statement of principles, but rather in the simple fact that initial positions have been exchanged between the two governments and that further rational negotiation can proceed early in the next Administration. 4. The heart of the matter, then, is not so much in the refinement of the principles, but in persuading Nixon that this is the right course for him, for the President, and for the nation. 5. With respect to a rationale for Nixon, these are key points: —we have been working on this since January 1964, and working intensively since the Glassboro sessions; —we start with a position which is fully acceptable to the JCS and all civilian authorities in the government; —any modifications and negotiations from that position will lie in the hands of the next Administration; —a coming to grips with this matter at an early date would make it easier to get the NPT through the Senate in January; —equally important, if Nixon encourages the President to go forward with this, it will virtually guarantee Soviet restraint on Berlin and Eastern Europe in the first phase of his Administration because once the talks are started, the Soviet Union will have a major interest in not creating circumstances which would require that they be broken off. We have been clear with them about both Berlin and Czechoslovakia. 6. I have no doubt that there will be those who argue to Nixon that he should wait and take this matter in hand himself. I understand very well the leverage we had on him on the Vietnam matter; but I am not clear what leverage the President will have on this issue except: —his power of initiative even without Nixon's assent; —an appeal to statesmanship and self-interest. W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 105, Box 42R. Top Secret; Sensitive; Literally Eyes Only. 2 No other record of this luncheon has been found. 3 Presumably a reference to Document 287 or to an early U.S. draft joint statement; not found. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 293. Summary Notes of the 594th Meeting of the National Security Council 293. Summary Notes of the 594th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, November 25, 1968, noon–1:20 p.m. [Here follows discussion of monetary issues, Vietnam, and current problems before the United Nations.] [Ambassador Wiggins:] d. Disarmament—The issue now is the continuation of the conference of non-nuclear powers. 2 Our position is to oppose a permanent body to deal with this issue. As to the talks on strategic arms limitations, the Soviets have made mention of these talks but we have been non-responsive. The President: What should we do about conducting talks on strategic arms limitation? We have the Czech situation, a new Administration coming in and there is uncertainty as to the possibility of achieving anything in such talks. Ambassador Wiggins: We should proceed with the talks. There is no problem about conducting a parallel policy—attacking the Russians for their invasion of Czechoslovakia each morning and each afternoon talking about strategic arms limitations. The President: The President-elect has slowed down Senate ratification of the non-proliferation treaty. Can we accomplish anything in strategic arms talks if we do not have the NPT ratified? Ambassador Wiggins: We can accomplish something because the Russians are eager to undertake the arms talks. The Russians are embarrassed by criticism of the Czech invasion. They want to undertake arms talks in order to draw attention away from the Czech issue. However, we should not propose a special Senate session to ratify the non-proliferation treaty. The President: Ratification to the NPT has a bearing on the strategic arms talks. The Congressional leaders will be coming here this evening to discuss whether or not to hold a special session. 3 The Germans have been softened up by recent actions in the monetary crisis but we have no leverage on them to ratify the NPT because we have not yet ratified. The same situation is involved with Israel. We have given them the Phantom airplanes but this may not be useful in getting them to accept the NPT unless we have already ratified. In India and Japan, those opposing the NPT can argue that their countries should not act on the treaty before we do. Delaying ratification until the new Senate arrives may mean that the ratification of the NPT is in doubt. The composition of the Senate will be different. Senators Clark and Morse will be out and Goldwater will be in. Senator Russell is in doubt about the treaty and his doubts may grow. Unless we act in December, we may run into trouble. Ambassador Wiggins: It is embarrassing in the United Nations to be able to say only that we think we will ratify the treaty. It would be wonderful if the treaty were ratified. The President: Asked for a paper summarizing the attitudes in the UN as reported by Ambassador Wiggins. 4 Bob Murphy has been told that we believe we ought to go ahead with the NPT now. 5 It is true the Senators didn't want to come back for a special session. The Czech invasion blew up earlier plans for the arms talks. We should get started even if we handle the talks so as not to bind a successor. It is our hope that Mr. Nixon will agree to our going ahead and we have offered to have Bob Murphy as an observer on the delegation. Secretary Fowler: 6 The NATO meeting at Brussels changed the thinking of Europeans. The European situation is different after the NATO meeting as regards their doubt about bilateral or US-USSR arms talks. Secretary Clifford: It is clear that NATO members do not want to return to the cold war. Their concern was that a NATO arms buildup might upset the movement toward detente. The NATO meeting was delayed almost to the point where the Soviet invasion could not be fully exploited in an effort to get them to increase their defense contribution. Most of the Soviet divisions are now out of Czechoslovakia and the threat to NATO members is, in their minds, less than it was a few weeks ago. However, NATO members would welcome US-USSR arms talks. The President: State Department officials had told him the arms talks would cause trouble with NATO members. Secretary Rusk believed that talks would trouble our allies. President-elect Nixon said we should delay the talks because of the Czech invasion. A paper was requested giving all the reasons why the talks should or should not be held which he could use in a conversation with Senator Dirksen. 7 Secretary Clifford: The Germans and British want us to go ahead with the arms talk. They are prepared to have us take the calculated risk that things will quiet down in Czechoslovakia. The rest of the NATO members want us to go ahead but they do not want us to ask them whether we should go ahead. The President: Bob Murphy has been told that a meeting with the Russians might persuade the Soviets to pressure Egypt on the Middle East problem and Hanoi on the Vietnam problem. Secretary Clifford: As to whether a special session on the NPT should be called, we must make a very careful nose count before deciding. There is real concern that the Senate might refuse to ratify the treaty. Senators would resent a special session whereas to the arms talks, such talks would help advance in the NPT here and abroad. The President: We should tell the new Administration the facts of life and then they will have to take responsibility. [Here follows brief discussion of other U.N. issues.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 76, Box 2. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. 2 See Documents 284 and 286 . 3 No record of this conversation has been found. However, in a memorandum to President Johnson, November 25 at 11 p.m., Rostow proposed talking points for a message to President-elect Nixon. Among other things, Rostow's draft message indicated President Johnson had decided to “leave the NPT to the opening days of the next session of Congress in January, at the earliest. (Both Dirksen and Mansfield think this would be wiser than calling a special session.)” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 108, Box 43R) 4 Not further identified. 5 On November 15, President Johnson announced that President-elect Nixon had designated Robert D. Murphy, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to serve as his liaison with the White House and as observer at the Department of State. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book II, p. 1126. 6 Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury. 7 Not further identified. 294. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) and Secretary of State Rusk 294. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson) and Secretary of State Rusk 1 November 29, 1968, 10:30 a.m. I. Gromyko called me to the foreign office at 11:30 a.m. this morning and made following oral statements: “Secretary of State Rusk in a conversation with USSR Ambassador in Washington, Dobrynin, on November 25 of this year 2 touched on a number of questions which, in the opinion of President Johnson, could be discussed in the event of his meeting with Soviet leaders. “In conformity with the desire expressed by Rusk to learn the opinion of the Soviet side with respect to these questions, we would like to report the following for transmission to President Johnson: 1. We proceed from the fact that, concerning the limitation of the strategic arms race, there was agreement in the course of the preceding exchange of opinions between us, on a sufficient number of concrete propositions regarding common goals and basic principles for limiting and subsequently reducing strategic weapons, the approval of which would be completed by a discussion of this question at a possible meeting. As far as we understand, our detailed considerations on this subject, handed to the Secretary of State on October 2 of this year, 3 were positively received on the American side. For our part we are ready as before to review the stated considerations as a basis for the achievement of an initial, principled agreement on this subject. [Here follows discussion of the Middle East and Vietnam.] In the event the American side has any other additional considerations which it would like to express in connection with the consideration of the question of the possible arranging of a meeting between President Johnson and the Soviet leaders, we are ready of course to hear them and to take such considerations into account before final decision on this question.” II. I said that you were sending me the exchange of correspondence on missile talks, but I had not yet received it. I asked if it was Soviet idea that at possible meeting an agreement on principles to guide missile talks would be reached and embodied in some sort of declaration or communiqué and that this would then be followed by detailed negotiations. He said that was his understanding. [Here follows discussion of the Middle East.] IV. Dobrynin has not been able to reach Moscow because of bad weather here. I therefore told Gromyko for his background that I understood we were thinking of December 16 and 17 in Geneva. He said he was not in a position to comment. V. Indicating I was speaking without instructions I said that a two-day meeting would leave little time for any consultation by the principles with their government and that it seemed to me that the more advance preparation the better. He nodded, but did not comment. VI. You will note statement referred to Soviet leaders in the plural. I will try to find out from Dobrynin whom they have in mind. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Kosygin. No classification marking. Ambassador Thompson was in Moscow; Secretary Rusk was in Washington. The time is apparently Washington time. 2 At this meeting Secretary Rusk and Dobrynin explored a wide range of issues. Memoranda of their conversation are ibid., Country File, Europe and USSR, Dobrynin/Thompson Conversations, Box 227. Regarding the relationship between the issue of strategic missiles and a summit, “Ambassador Dobrynin remarked that he thought in regard to the ABM matter that this whole thing had been agreed in principle and there would be no need to redefine the question. The Secretary said that he agreed as far as the ABM was concerned, but he thought that what was involved was a judgment by both of them as to whether or not at this particular time a meeting would be useful.” (Ibid.) A memorandum of their conversation on the nonproliferation treaty is in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. 3 Document 287 . 295. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson 295. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Clifford to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 2, 1968. SUBJECT Strategic Talks with the Soviets Now that Saigon has agreed to come to Paris, I believe that the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of our position on the question of holding Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. In my judgment, we should move forward on this matter at this time, beginning with a meeting at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks. 1. If the Soviets were to accept an agreement along the lines of the one unanimously recommended to you, we would maintain a substantial part of our present strategic advantage; a year from now it will be much more difficult to devise a proposal which takes account of existing strategic forces and is in our interest. Over the next year or two, as the Soviets continue their build-up of ICBM's beyond 1200 and begin to approach parity with us in Polaris-type submarines, our edge in these areas will be eroded and a freeze at a later date could leave us without any significant advantage. Furthermore, the Soviets may well begin to deploy land-mobile systems which would greatly complicate the verification issues associated with a future agreement. 2. If US-Soviet discussions have not yet begun, it is improbable that a new Administration would initiate them immediately; but if Talks were already underway, it is unlikely to call off the negotiations . If we do not move forward now, I believe that it is almost certain that there will be a delay of a year or more while the new Administration examines this question and makes its own determination on strategic policies and force procurements. 3. If we do not initiate Talks now, any future movement on this issue might have to be over the objections of the Joint Chiefs rather than with their concurrence . The Joint Chiefs of Staff's concurrence in the proposal stems from a number of factors, including the freezing of our strategic advantage, which are unlikely to be repeated at any time in the future. Moreover, under a new Administration there is almost sure to be military opposition to a freeze in our strategic arms until it can be seen what forces the new Administration is prepared to buy in the absence of an agreement. 4. The Russian invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia need no longer delay our going forward with the Strategic Talks. a. Indications from our allies have been that they want the Talks to go forward; we should, of course, inform them before any public announcement of our decision to begin the Talks . The Non-Nuclear Conference which ended in Geneva on September 28 unanimously passed a resolution calling upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union to begin Strategic Talks. Both the FRG and Italy voted in favor of this resolution. And at the NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting during the first week of October, representatives from several countries reaffirmed their Government's support of this resolution, with the FRG representatives urging that such Talks begin “at an early date.” Denis Healey of the UK raised the subject with me at the time of the NPG Meeting in October, expressing his belief that we should go ahead with Talks. My conversations with Schroeder and Kiesinger over the past two months persuade me that the Germans would not object if we went ahead. Foreign Minister Brandt, at the meeting of the SPD Executive Board in Bonn on November 22, is reported to have said that direct Talks between the great powers should continue on such matters as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. In my report to the NATO Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee on November 14, I referred again to the importance of strategic arms limitations. None of the NATO Defense Ministers indicated any objection to the initiation of Talks. Their comments stressed only the desirability of advance notice and continued consultation with our NATO allies as such Talks progress. While these discussions did not focus specifically on a heads of government meeting, I do not believe that our allies would object to a businesslike working meeting at that level. b. If the Talks were underway, we could use our continued participation in them as a lever against further Soviet repressive measures in Czechoslovakia, or as a way of deterring Soviet moves against other Eastern European nations . The apparent eagerness of the Soviets for these Talks makes this kind of threat seem plausible. Kosygin's remarks in his meeting with Bob McNamara two weeks ago confirmed their strong desire that such Talks be initiated. 5. Mr. Nixon's public statements after his meeting with you make it difficult for him to object to the Talks . 2 After his meeting with you on November 11, Mr. Nixon asserted his recognition of the need for continuity “on matters like Vietnam, the current possible crisis in the Middle East, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to certain outstanding matters.” He said that in each of these three instances “I gave assurances … to the Secretary of State, and of course to the President, that they could speak not just for this Administration, but for the Nation, and that meant for the next Administration as well.” Accordingly, it seems likely that he would not object to the opening of discussions. 6. The Heads of Government Talks should be held in Geneva and should aim at political agreement on the great importance of limiting and then reducing strategic forces . Opening the Talks at the summit will provide a momentum which will make it difficult for either side to call off Talks without first making a serious effort to reach an agreement. Moreover, agreement in principle between heads of government on the urgent need to control the strategic arms race will greatly facilitate discussions at the working level. You might want to seek agreement with Kosygin on a statement along the following lines: “The President and the Prime Minister discussed their common interest in reaching an agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic offensive missile systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. They concluded that agreement on this question would be of great value not only for the people of their two countries but for all mankind. They directed representatives of their two governments to begin meeting immediately to exchange views and proposals on this question.” 7. Talks at the Foreign Minister or Head of Delegation level should begin immediately following the heads of government discussion of this issue . At these talks the U.S. side would deliver the approved initial presentation of our proposal and proceed to explain the proposal following the agreed set of Instructions to the Delegation. The Soviets would presumably table their own proposal. We could then decide how to proceed, but in any event the discussions would be well launched and the prospects for an agreement clearly established. 8. There now exists an appropriate occasion for moving ahead with missile Talks as a means of reaffirming your undiminished interest in seeking to control the nuclear arms race . In the present climate, criticism of this action, here and abroad, would be difficult to imagine. Coupled with your decision to end the bombing of North Vietnam and the start of substantive negotiations in Paris, the beginning of Strategic Talks with the Soviet Union would create a momentum towards world peace that would last for years to come. Clark M. Clifford 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Sensitive. The date has been inserted by hand. Attached is a memorandum from Clifford to Walt Rostow, December 2, asking Rostow to forward his memorandum to the President. Rostow forwarded Clifford's memorandum to the President under cover of a December 2 note, which noted Clifford's “strong case for beginning strategic talks with the Soviets at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks,” and continued: “If I may say so, the problem with working level talks (as opposed to simply exchanging positions and asking some initial clarifying questions) is: “—We will have to take some time to study throughout the government the Soviet paper; “—We are pretty well committed not to negotiate off our initial position during the life of this Administration. “Perhaps Clark's point could be met if: “—On the first day of the talks the chiefs of government presented their respective positions; “—On the second day working sessions were held to clarify the respective positions while the chiefs of government met separately on Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.” (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R) 2 For texts of President Johnson's and President-elect Nixon's remarks to the press following their November 11 meeting at the White House, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69 , Book II, pp. 1119-1120. 296. Intelligence Memorandum 296. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, December 5, 1968. SR IM 68-28 SOVIET INITIATIVES ON ARMS TALKS SINCE THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS Summary In his meeting with former Secretary of Defense McNamara on 11 November, Premier Kosygin emphasized his wish to avert another round of escalation in the strategic arms race. 2 This was one of a number of official and unofficial Soviet attempts since the intervention in Czechoslovakia to assure the US that the position of the Soviet government on arms talks has not changed. Each of these attempts has stressed the Soviet wish to begin talks at the earliest possible date. The Soviets appear to have several reasons for favoring an early start on the talks. One of them probably is their estimate of the strategic relationship with the US—what it is now and what, in the absence of an agreement, it is likely to be. Without an agreement, the Soviets will be faced with the prospect of another round of rapid increases in arms spending just to keep up with the US. Their alternative would be to lose some of the gains in the strategic relationship recently achieved at great cost. The Soviets, moreover, may doubt that they would be able to match the timing of US technological developments in a new cycle of strategic arms increases. Some leaders may believe that the longer negotiations are delayed the more difficult it will be for the Soviet Union to affect the US deployment of new systems at the levels called for in current US planning. The economic arguments for avoiding a new round in the strategic arms race probably have particular appeal to a Soviet leader who understands the economic realities of the situation as well as Kosygin. It is unlikely that the Soviets would be able to cut other elements of defense spending sufficiently to finance large new strategic programs. Substantial investment in military research and development probably is considered mandatory, and the Czech crisis, the Arab-Israeli war, and Sino-Soviet border tensions have created pressure to beef up Soviet conventional forces. If the Soviets set out to offset fully the impact of new US programs without making compensating cuts elsewhere, annual military spending could rise 25 percent or more by the mid-1970's. This would force a cutback in the rate of growth of consumer programs and could seriously impede long-term economic growth as well. An agreement with the US on strategic arms control could make it possible for Moscow to feel that it could maintain its present strategic position without going beyond current levels of military spending. The Soviets could then continue recently expanded consumer programs and free some of the gains in future production for the badly needed modernization of the economy. At the same time, more resources could be made available for the conventional forces, a vigorous research and development program could be continued, and existing strategic weapons systems could be improved within the provisions of an arms limitation agreement. There are, however, some signs that the consensus within the leadership that led to the decision to agree to US proposals for arms talks was not a particularly strong one. If so, Kosygin may have an additional reason to wish to get the talks under way as soon as possible. He may believe that if there is no progress on this subject in the near future, other factors at home and abroad may intervene and prevent negotiations. The Soviet Initiatives 1. In a number of recent private contacts with US officials and private citizens with official contacts, spokesmen for the USSR have emphasized that the Czechoslovak crisis should not obscure the desirability of discussing strategic arms limitation or unduly delay the initiation of the talks. Publicly, the Soviets have stated in the UN their willingness to begin talks at once. 2. The recent Soviet initiatives might be interpreted as reflecting no more than a general desire to normalize relations with the US in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The frequency—there have been about half a dozen contacts since September—and general tone of urgency, however, suggest that there may be more specific reasons. The Shaky Consensus 3. It was not easy for Moscow to clear away its doubts about achieving security objectives through diplomatic means, and it apparently continues to have trouble in resolving all the diverse issues which underlie its position on arms limitation discussions. The consensus that culminated in Gromyko's June announcement of Soviet willingness to talk probably was shaky at best and recent events, notably the Czech crisis, may have subjected it to additional strains. 4. Externally, most signs point to continuity of the official position expressed in the early summer. These signs are coming primarily from officials and organs responsible to the government apparatus—principally from the foreign ministry and from Kosygin himself. Other signs from internal Soviet political and military forums suggest some continuing opposition to the idea of arms talks or to the scope of the talks as they were defined earlier this year. Lingering misgivings almost certainly remain in the minds of some Soviet political leaders and interest groups—especially the military-industrial complex and the ideological apparatus—about the desirability of achieving a strategic arms agreement with the US. 5. Since Foreign Minister Gromyko's announcement in June of the Soviet agreement to discuss strategic arms limitations, the Soviet military press has frequently handled references to arms talks differently than the government and party press. The most recent example was Red Star's deletion of Gromyko's 3 October remarks in the UN on strategic arms limitations. Such editorial selectivity demonstrates the military's lack of enthusiasm for the talks, but may also reflect an attempt on the part of some in the military establishment to reopen the issue for reconsideration in Moscow's highest policy-making councils, now that the Czechoslovak crisis has held up the talks. 6. The treatment given in the Soviet press to Politburo member Mazurov's 6 November anniversary speech may also indicate that the talks—or some aspect of the scope of the negotiations—remain a sensitive issue. The party, government, and military press all deleted a statement in the broadcast version of Mazurov's speech which expressed readiness “to negotiate with the United States on the whole complex of these questions.” 7. The offer to “negotiate” the basic issues was diluted by Soviet UN representative Roshchin on 28 November 3 when he reaffirmed Soviet readiness to “start a serious exchange of opinions on this question.” This weaker formulation was reported in Pravda on 29 November. Mazurov's speech had already represented a step backward in that it merely referred to “the strategic means of delivering nuclear weapons” and omitted the phrase “both offensive and defensive, including antimissile systems” found in Gromyko's statements in June and October. 8. Although Soviet UN representative Malik repeated the more inclusive Gromyko formulation in his UN address on 13 November, the Moscow press failed to report the fact. The Kremlin's public posture on the scope of the talks, insofar as the domestic audience is concerned, has therefore shifted back to that which prevailed before the USSR had indicated its readiness to discuss the subject of strategic arms limitation. 9. Evidence of high-level byplay at a time when the official government policy is to push the talks suggests that the decision taken in Moscow six months ago to explore the US position is by no means a firm one. If so, it would explain in part the sense of urgency that Kosygin and other Soviet officials have been communicating to their US audiences. Kosygin may believe that if there is no progress on this subject soon, other factors at home and abroad may intervene and prevent negotiations. 10. However fragile the consensus may be, there appear to be good reasons, both military and economic, for diverse elements of the Soviet leadership to see potential advantages in an arms limitation agreement at this juncture. The US-Soviet Strategic Balance 11. The prospect of a decline in the Soviet strategic position relative to the US probably was a major consideration in Moscow's decision to enter into the talks. 12. As a result of concerted efforts since 1965, the relative strategic position of the USSR has improved significantly and Soviet leaders are probably confident that they now possess a secure deterrent. Programmed improvements to US strategic forces, however, threaten to increase the relative US advantage once again, a prospect which Soviet leaders probably find difficult to accept. Those favoring arms talks may consider that they have come close to strategic equality with the US and that now is the most propitious time to explore the possibility of negotiating a halt or a pause in the competition for strategic arms. 13. Should arms limitation talks fail, decisions on new programs must be made soon. Soviet leaders are aware that the US is actively developing new strategic weapons systems at a time when the major Soviet strategic deployment programs are nearing completion. The new US systems—the Minuteman III ICBM, the Poseidon SLBM, and the Sentinel ABM—are programmed for deployment over the next few years. If they wish to offset the impact of these programs, the Soviets probably would conclude that they must deploy costly new strategic systems such as MIRV's and mobile ICBM's and undertake a large ABM program. 14. The Soviets may doubt their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological development for advanced systems—MIRV, ABM, etc.—if they do choose to compete. They might also believe that continued delays in initiating the negotiations—while US weapons testing is continuing—could impair their ability to negotiate effectively on future levels of deployment of advanced systems. Arms and the Economy 15. Economic considerations undoubtedly provided another of the major incentives that led the USSR to agree in June to discuss strategic arms limitation with the US, and also probably lie behind its current interest in initiating the talks in the near future. It seems clear that major decisions on basic economic policy must be made soon and translated into specific plans for directing the course of the economy through the mid-1970's. Resource Allocation Issues 16. For the past several years, the Soviets have been following a policy of expanding strategic military programs and increasing investment in the consumer sector of the economy while allowing the rate of growth of investment in heavy industry to decline. 17. Following three years of relative stability in defense spending in 1963-65, military outlays began to rise sharply. Total expenditures for military and space programs increased at an average annual rate of 7 percent during 1966 and 1967. More important from the standpoint of resource allocations, most of this increase reflected growth in advanced weapons and space programs which absorb the highest quality manpower and machinery. As a result, military hardware purchases and spending for military R&D and space grew an average of 10 percent per year. 18. At the same time, investment in the consumer sector of the economy has also accelerated markedly. Since 1964, total consumer-oriented investment—including agriculture—has grown at an average rate of more than 9 percent, more than double the rate of the previous five years. 19. The expansion of consumer and strategic programs have come at the expense of investment in the heavy industry sector—i.e. at some cost to future economic growth. The average annual growth of investment in heavy industry fell to about 5 percent in the 1965-67 period, even below the low rates experienced in the early 1960's. 20. Preliminary information on the performance of the Soviet economy in 1968 suggests that the effects of this policy are beginning to show up in a decline in the rate of growth of heavy industry output. If this decline is a direct result of the slighting of investment rather than a short-term phenomenon, then the pressure on industrial growth rates could become more acute during the next year or two as the full effects of the recent investment policy take hold. In either case, the current performance would give the Soviet economic planners reason for concern. 21. The Soviet leaders now appear to be faced with this prospect: they must restore a higher rate of growth of investment in heavy industry in the near future or risk impairing future capacity for satisfying military as well as civilian objectives. The important question is which claimant is going to yield—the consumer or the military—and by how much and when? In the past the choice would have been easier to predict: the Soviet consumer has traditionally borne the brunt of any resource squeeze. Now, however, the political cost of cutting back consumer programs could be greater. 22. These issues are apparently very much on the mind of Premier Kosygin in particular. Kosygin emphasized his concern for the economic aspects of the arms race in a meeting with the president of the UK Board of Trade in June, and he was apparently eager to convey a similar message to former Defense Secretary McNamara and to Senators Gore and Pell in Moscow last month. 4 23. As leader of the government, Kosygin is responsible for the performance of the Soviet economy. His experience and the approach he appears to take on the issues of the day would probably predispose him, more than most Soviet military planners or Communist Party leaders, to weigh military programs against long-term economic growth prospects and to look to diplomatic means to avoid unnecessary sacrifice of future strength to present power. The Outlook 24. Soviet leaders undoubtedly realize that an arms limitation agreement would not result in large immediate savings or relief from present military spending levels. They probably hope, however, that it would obviate the need for the large annual increments in outlays that a new round in the arms race would surely entail. If military expenditures could be stabilized at their current level, the entire annual growth in production would be available for other objectives. This relaxation of the military's claim on the growth in output would probably be enough to allow the Soviets to continue their increased consumer-oriented investment programs and at the same time maintain the minimum adequate investment in heavy industry. 25. The economic effects of an agreement cannot be calculated precisely under present uncertainties concerning future Soviet military programs, both with and without an agreement. A general appreciation of the magnitude of resources involved can be obtained, however, by comparing present levels of spending against what would be required if they seek to establish across-the-board equality with the US on a priority basis. Such an objective could easily raise annual Soviet defense spending by about 25 percent or 5 billion rubles by the mid-1970's. 26. Annual increases of about a billion rubles a year for 5 years would represent an annual growth in defense outlays comparable to that of 1966 and 1967. Such allocations would almost certainly force cutbacks in the rate of growth of consumer programs. Should the Soviets choose instead to continue to neglect the heavy industry sector over the next several years, they would be doing so at the cost of seriously impairing capacity for satisfying the whole range of national objectives several years hence. 27. The resources represented by 5 billion rubles are large in relation to the Soviet economic activity. For example, 5 billion rubles compares with current investment programs as follows: —It is nearly equal to current annual expenditures for construction of weapons systems sites plus purchases of all military weapons and equipment. —It is about three times as much as 1967 fixed investment in the iron and steel industry. —It is twice as much as 1967 investment in all consumer goods industries. —It is about as much as recent annual expenditures for plant and equipment for the rapidly expanding chemical and machinery sectors combined. —It equals about one-third of 1967 fixed investment in heavy industry. 28. The Soviets probably would not feel that they could cut other elements of defense spending sufficiently to finance the required new strategic programs. A continuation of their large military research and development program probably is considered mandatory to maintaining strategic strength, and recent events indicate that expenditures for general purpose forces are more likely to increase than decrease. The Czech crisis, the Arab-Israeli war, and Sino-Soviet border tensions have all created pressure for enhancing the Soviet conventional warfare capability. 29. Stabilization of defense expenditures at the current level—the highest in Soviet history—would imply a continued major commitment of economic resources to military programs. It probably would provide an adequate base for maintaining a large military research and development program, modernizing the general purpose forces, and—within the provisions of an arms limitation agreement—improving strategic weapons systems. 30. The Soviets are now drafting the next five-year economic plan, which will cover the 1971-75 period. They probably hope to have a preliminary version completed in 1969 and a final version ready by mid-1970. It will be difficult for the Soviets to proceed very far in the planning process until they have established a fairly firm view of the nature of their future strategic weapons programs. The Soviets probably believe that it will take considerable time for the substance of a final agreement to emerge, and consequently they have a strong incentive to get the talks under way soon. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12. Secret. At the bottom of the first page of the source text is the following typewritten note: “This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared in the Office of Strategic Research and coordinated with the Offices of Current Intelligence and Economic Research.” Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from John P. Shaw to Bohlen, December 12, which reads: “I thoroughly commend for your reading the attached CIA analysis of Soviet motives in seeking the opening of strategic missile talks at an early date. In particular, I endorse the argument—which I have advanced on a number of previous occasions—that the consensus within the Soviet Government in favor of holding talks could well fall apart if the talks are not held soon, and that this possibility partly explains the eagerness of apparently committed Soviet leaders such as Kosygin. The recent evidence compiled by CIA reinforces my earlier conviction on this point. The CIA memorandum also contains a cogent analysis of the economic pressures which increase Soviet interest in the negotiations.” Bohlen's handwritten note on this memorandum reads: “very interesting. CEB” 2 McNamara's conversation with Kosygin was reported in telegram 6409 from Moscow, November 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR) Kosygin's remarks on disarmament at this meeting are analyzed in Intelligence Note 874, which is a memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes (INR) to the Acting Secretary, November 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 105, Box 42R) 3 Text of Roshchin's statement to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, November 28, is in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 739-747. 4 A memorandum of conversation between Senators Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) and Kosygin, November 19, is in Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin-Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. 297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 6, 1968, 8:40 a.m. Mr. President: I have now acquired copies of Sec. Rusk's communications with Thompson in the Cherokee channel. They are attached. 2 You may wish to go through them to see precisely where we stand. They include: Tab A—Sec. Rusk's message on time and place. 3 Tab B—Thompson's evaluation of what could and could not be achieved at the meeting. (His conclusion: mainly announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks.) 4 Tab C—Dobrynin's positive view with respect to Nixon's presence. 5 Tab D—Thompson's talk with Gromyko of 29 November—mainly positive, but with Gromyko “not in a position to comment” on December 16-17 in Geneva. (para. 4) 6 Tab E—Sec. Rusk's instructions for Tommy to get with Dobrynin. 7 Tab F—Thompson's response of December 5 indicating that he has not yet been able to set up an appointment with Dobrynin. 8 W.W. Rostow 9 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 109, Box 43R. Top Secret; Cherokee; Eyes Only. 2 None printed but summarized below. 3 Rusk said that Dobrynin should be informed that the administration wanted the summit meeting to take place in Geneva on or about December 16-17. (Telegram 279345 to Moscow, November 28) 4 The first of this seven-paragraph message from Ambassador Thompson to Secretary Rusk reads as follows: “While appreciate President's desire to advance cause of peace before leaving office, I confess I am skeptical that much can be achieved at proposed meeting except announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks which I gather is already well prepared.” (Telegram 6643 from Moscow, November 29) 5 Regarding Dobrynin's personal attitude toward a summit meeting with Nixon, Thompson reported in part: “He said he was much in favor whether before or after inauguration. I put this information in letter to Bob Murphy dated Nov. 19.” (Telegram 6642 from Moscow, November 29) This letter has not been found. 6 Telegram 6635 from Moscow, November 29. For a memorandum of Thompson's telephone conversation with Secretary Rusk, November 29, on this subject, see Document 294 . 7 Secretary Rusk wondered whether Gromyko's talk with Thompson (see footnote 6 above) was “supposed to be their answer to my conversation with Dobrynin” of November 25 (see Document 294 , especially footnote 2 ), and he thus wanted Thompson to see Dobrynin “as soon as you can” to “try to get some feel from him as to Soviet thinking about a possible meeting now that he has been in town for a few days and may be able or willing to say somewhat more than did Gromyko.” (Rusk to Thompson, December 4, typewritten draft of telegram) 8 Thompson reported in part that Dobrynin had been “delayed in arriving here by weather and Foreign Office now states he has been ill.” (Telegram 6728 from Moscow, December 5) Thompson apparently met with Dobrynin sometime between December 5-11. In a memorandum to President Johnson, December 11, 1968, Walt Rostow noted that Secretary Rusk had reported an additional cable from Thompson as follows: “I failed to report an additional observation of Dobrynin. He said that if the President decided not to go ahead with the meeting, that would be understood in Moscow and there would be no hard feelings.” The President wrote at the bottom of this memorandum, “I'm ready. Are they?” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11) 9 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 298. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 298. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) 1 Washington, December 7, 1968. Dear Glenn: Thank you for your views regarding the cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. 2 We will be most interested in seeing the terms of reference and the results of the study which the AEC is undertaking of the ability of the U.S. to meet foreseeable requirements for fissionable material and tritium under conditions of a cutoff. The DOD is looking at this problem and has also requested that a review of the present U.S. position on cutoff and transfer proposals be made by the Committee of Principals. To this end, I have requested my staff to prepare an updated paper that sets forth the present U.S. position and our proposed modification of the verification aspects. In this connection, the intelligence community is preparing an evaluation of our ability to detect, by unilateral means, clandestine plants in the USSR which could produce significant additions to the existing Soviet stockpiles of fissionable material. I have delayed answering your letter of October 9, 1968, because I had hoped to have data from this evaluation which I could send on for your use. I will forward it to you, along with other material which we are assembling, at a later date. We will consider the range of alternative actions which you outlined in the last paragraph of your letter in reformulating our alternative proposal of a plant-by-plant “shutdown.” Our draft will emphasize the efforts already taken by the AEC in cutting back on production. My staff representatives will coordinate with yours on this subject. Sincerely Bill 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 383, Central Policy File: FRC 85 A 83, Master Book, No. 2 of 3, July-September 1968. Secret. 2 Document 290 . 299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 11, 1968, 1:35 p.m. Mr. President: I gather from Sec. Rusk that both you and he are now cool to the possibility of a Summit on missiles; and I would guess that Moscow is also cool. The reasons are ample: —time is short; —we could not go far beyond the exchange of positions and papers; —we would have to brief in Rogers and Laird; —we would have NATO consultation problems Every normal argument is for leaving it to Nixon. And that may be the correct course. But it may also be a decision we shall regret more than any other in the years ahead. 2 Nuclear agreements are always marginal and tough. If we do not hold the meeting, the new administration may let the NPT and missiles slip in priority. Time will pass. Men and situations will change. And mankind may move down the wrong fork in the road for what will, with hindsight, look like relatively trivial reasons. Therefore, I suggest that the President and Secretary of State make one more assessment of NPT and missile talk prospects in the Nixon administration, before abandoning the concept finally. 3 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Strategic Missile Talks, Box 11. Top Secret; Literally Eyes Only. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was received at 1:40 p.m. 2 The President has circled the words “we shall regret more” and drawn an arrow to the margin where he wrote, “I agree.” 3 The President has also circled much of this sentence and drawn a line down to the same “I agree” referenced above. 300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 24, 1968. SUBJECT Proposed Joint Statement of Agreed Objectives and Principles affecting the Limitation and Subsequent Reduction in Strategic Armaments I am enclosing a proposed Joint Statement of Agreed Objectives and Principles affecting the Limitation and Subsequent Reduction in Strategic Armaments. 2 It is based on the Soviet draft which we recently received but has been cast in the form of a Joint Statement and has been altered to the minimum extent necessary to meet the five points made in Secretary Clifford's memorandum concerning it. 3 The draft and this memorandum have been discussed with Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler. Four of these five points have been met completely; one has been met in substance. This latter point is that the first and second principles in the Soviet draft phrase the scope of projected arrangements somewhat differently, the first indicating that they should deal with “offensive and defensive weapons systems" and the second indicating they should deal with “offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.” The point is made that the second principle would cover manned bombers but not bomber defenses and the suggestion is made that the second principle be dropped. This point is well taken but, consistent with the principle of minimum changes, it has been met by melding the two principles together and using the phrase “offensive and defensive weapons systems" throughout. You should be aware, however, that the phrase being eliminated, “offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems" was used in your July 1 statement as well as the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States and of the General Assembly of the United Nations on this subject. One point made in Secretary Clifford's memorandum and incorporated in the attached draft has implications of which you should be aware. This is the point that focuses on the fact that the third principle in the Soviet draft contains the statement that “… equal security should be assured for both sides.” The point is made (which closely relates to the first point in the DOD memorandum) that the intent may be to provide for substantial adjustments in the strategic arms balance. The DOD memorandum takes the position that, in view of the fact that our forces are not symmetrical and that our security needs differ, we should eliminate the word “equal" on the grounds that it is tautological because the notion of security being “equal" is involved in the very concept of security itself. Perhaps a related reason for the DOD objection is a general objection to the word “equal" because of overtones of “equality" or “parity.” Based on a conversation he has had with Ambassador Dobrynin, General Wheeler is concerned that the Soviets are attempting to use this principle in order to obtain agreement, in principle, on a non-obtainable symmetry (bomber for bomber, sub for sub, missile for missile, warhead for warhead). 4 The “equal" has been eliminated in order to smoke them out to see if that is what they are up to. In putting the language back up to the Soviets with the “equal" eliminated, we might be running a risk that the Soviets would reply by pointing out that paragraph 5 of the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, September 20, 1961, states that “all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage in the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.” This might weaken somewhat the argument based on tautology or redundancy. But read in its entirety, the phrase “so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantage" is sufficiently comprehensive so that the Soviets might be trying to get something else with the concept of “equal security”, and I am not at all sure that we should regard a 1961 formulation as controlling. The last paragraph on page three of the draft Joint Statement that containing agreement that special delegations should meet promptly to work out an agreement, has been put in brackets. This is to bring to your attention the concern that some have felt that it might be difficult to live up to such an agreement in light of the limited time available between now and January 20th, 1969. This is a matter on which I would, of course, defer to your judgment. Dean Rusk 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Soviet Union, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17. Top Secret. An attached December 24 memorandum from Adrian Fisher to Clifford notes that Secretary Rusk still believed “that the phrase ‘equally’ should be inserted in the second principle and will doubtless so indicate to the President when the matter is discussed today.” 2 Not attached; for text, see Document 301 . 3 Document 288 . 4 Perhaps a reference to Wheeler's conversation with Dobrynin on August 5; see Document 265 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 301. Draft Paper 301. Draft Paper 1 Washington, undated. JOINT STATEMENT OF AGREED OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE LIMITATION AND SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS The President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have exchanged views during the last few years on the question of restraining the strategic arms race. In the last few months of this exchange they took note of the action of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States and of the XXIIId General Assembly of the United Nations urging the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic armaments at an early date. As a result of the exchange of views on this subject, the two sides have arrived at a conclusion on the desirability and feasibility of achieving a mutually acceptable understanding on this question. They have also arrived at a conclusion that the implementation of measures to restrain the strategic arms race would serve the interests of both countries as well as the interests of strengthening international security, and that this would also generate more favorable conditions for solving other major issues in the field of disarmament. It was agreed that there should be established basic principles affecting the limitation and subsequent reduction in strategic armaments and that the general objectives of our two countries in this field should be formulated. Specifically, it was agreed that the two sides would be guided by the following general objectives: —To maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrence by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic armaments. —To enhance the credibility of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating Soviet and U.S. willingness to limit their strategic armaments. —To provide mutual assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race. —To improve U.S.-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from the strategic situation. At the same time it was agreed that the task of limiting and subsequently reducing strategic armaments should be resolved in compliance with the following basic principles: (1) Giving due regard for the integral inter-connection of the two principal components of strategic armaments, i.e., offensive and defensive weapons systems, the limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be carried out as a complex including both offensive and defensive weapons systems. (2) The limitation and reduction in strategic armaments should be so balanced that neither side could obtain any military advantage and that security should be assured equally for both sides. It was agreed that [special delegations of] 2 the two governments, guided by the above-mentioned objectives and principles, would promptly address themselves to [devising an agreement on] the concrete aspects of the problem of limiting and reducing strategic armaments. It was also agreed that the two governments, along with the development of measures to limit and reduce strategic armaments, would study the question of taking steps to minimize the possible accidental appearance of conflict-fraught situations involving the use of strategic armaments. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Soviet Union, Talks on Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Box 17-18. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “SecDef has seen 13 Jan 1969.” 2 Regarding the brackets in this paragraph, which appear in the source text, see the last paragraph of Document 300 .2 302. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 302. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1 New York, December 24, 1968. A-2804 SUBJECT XXIII General Assembly: Evaluation of Results in the Disarmament Field SUMMARY The adoption by the XXIII General Assembly (GA) of a moderate resolution (2456A) regarding the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNC) 2 represents in our judgment a significant accomplishment for those who support the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This resolution incorporates the essential points of the U.S. position on NNC follow-up. It will not cause complications for the NPT, and in effect, constitutes an endorsement for the idea that the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states must work together rather than in opposition on nuclear problems. This GA session was also outstanding in demonstrating the virtually unanimous desire that the U.S. and USSR get on with strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), an absence of any serious or active pressure for further security assurances, and broad ignorance and distrust of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as evidenced particularly by the Mexican resolution (2456C) calling for a study by the UN Secretary General (SYG) on peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) services (see USUN 8583). 3 End Summary. PART I—NNC 1. Résumé of Negotiations on the NNC Resolution. Early in the session, the Italian Delegation, strongly supported by Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan, took the initiative in organizing a prestigious group of UN delegations in order to formulate a GA resolution on the NNC which would establish a UN ad hoc committee to pursue NNC recommendations in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and security assurances. Other invitees were Mexico, Chile, Argentina, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Japan. Initial reactions suggested that the Italian effort would be difficult to stop, particularly since many delegations (including the Netherlands) were reluctant to oppose the Italian plan and thereby risk exclusion from whatever committee might be established. The Japanese had initially intended to suggest a resolution establishing a new committee to focus on assurance, but they were dissuaded by the US from pursuing this within the Italian group. The idea of a counter-resolution effort and the first draft of the counter resolution were developed by the US Delegation, which encouraged the Japanese and Netherlands Delegations to establish a counter-resolution group which ultimately also included Finland, Canada, Austria and Australia. At the same time, the US and USSR took an extremely stiff position in the First Committee against the creation of any new body. The efforts of the Italian Mission group then shifted to seeking an early meeting next year of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) (an existing body) to consider peaceful uses and security assurances. The counter-resolution group, which held most of its meetings at the Finnish Mission, advocated positions acceptable to the US, i.e., that no decision to convene a UNDC session should be taken before the XXIV GA and that there should be no revision of the UNDC's terms of reference explicitly to include peaceful uses. The group accepted virtually all of the recommendations of the US regarding the counter resolution and disagreed on only one point. Despite US opposition, the Finnish group maintained that it was essential in order to increase the chances of success for the counter resolution that it “endorse" rather than “note" the declaration adopted by the NNC in Geneva. During a series of lengthy meetings between the Italian and Finnish groups, the latter several times appeared on the verge of collapse but was propped up by frequent reminders that the Italian group would have clear sailing if no counter resolution survived. The crucial turning point came on December 3 when negotiations broke down between the two groups and the Finnish group tabled its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.450), 4 thus gaining the tactical advantage of priority in the First Committee voting. Shortly thereafter the Italian group tabled its resolution (A/C.1/L.451). Further negotiations between the two groups resulted in a “compromise" resolution essentially the same as that of the Finnish group and, in general, in accordance with US desires. 5 The compromise resolution (2456A), inter alia, endorses the NNC declaration; takes note of the NNC resolutions; requests the Secretary General (SYG) to transmit the NNC results to the appropriate bodies; invites these bodies to report on action taken; requests the SYG to place on the agenda of the XXIV GA the question of implementation of the NNC results, including (a) the question of convening the UNDC in early 1970 to consider disarmament and the related question of security, and (b) international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The resolution also requests the SYG to appoint an experts group to prepare a report on the contribution of nuclear technology to the developing countries. 2. Relationship to the NPT. Throughout the session, the U.S. and USSR stressed that the establishment of a new body or a 1969 meeting of the UNDC would, as a practical matter, complicate and delay the acceptance and entry into force of the NPT. Although this argument was not welcomed by some of the prominent NPT abstainers, those who strongly support the Treaty, e.g., the Netherlands, Finland and Canada, shared our concern that the NPT could be prejudiced by procedural steps being pushed by the Italian group. (The Italians professed throughout that only their proposals could “save" the NPT by restoring the confidence of the non-nuclear- weapon states that the nuclear powers would in fact live up to their obligations under the NPT.) The conflict between the groups regarding the NPT was symbolized by the fact that the Italian Mission resolution was co-sponsored by five non-signers of the NPT (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Pakistan) and only one signer (Yugoslavia), a fact alluded to publicly in particularly heavy-handed fashion by the Byelorussian representative. In contrast, the Finnish Mission's resolution was co-sponsored by four NPT signatories (Austria, Canada, Finland, and the Netherlands), and only two non-signers (Australia and Japan). The effectiveness of the argument of the need to protect the NPT was finally demonstrated when Ambassador Shahi (Pakistan), an original member of the Italian groups, stated in his speech introducing the final compromise resolution: “Let me give the assurance, if any assurance is required, that there is no desire that the UN Disarmament Commission, if it is convened, should weaken the positive results which have been achieved in the field of disarmament by way of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other.” 3. Failure of Efforts to Provoke Confrontation Between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. When the session began, there was considerable talk, particularly among non-NPT signatories, about forcing a confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. Several non-nuclears insisted in the corridors that the nuclears would have no choice but to join a new ad hoc committee if one was formed. However, members of the Finnish Mission group, particularly the Japanese, insisted that the cooperation of the nuclear powers was essential to achieve any worthwhile results in the nuclear field. Throughout the lengthy negotiations between the two groups, the Finnish group often rejected proposals solely on the grounds they would be unacceptable to the nuclear powers, i.e., the U.S., since the USSR had by then taken a completely negative stance. The acceptance of the final compromise resolution, which most members knew the U.S. had helped develop, thus represents a recognition that the cooperation of the nuclear powers is essential to progress in the fields of peaceful uses and disarmament. One of the most significant results of this session would appear to be a setback for, and possibly even the burial of, the idea that the non-nuclears can or should organize themselves as a political force, as some attempted at the NNC, for the purpose of confrontation with the nuclear powers. It is also significant that the stress on the need to protect the NPT, in the end, contributed to unifying, rather than dividing, the members of the UN who overwhelmingly supported the final compromise resolution. 4. Role of the United States. The United States effort was fundamentally assisted by our ability early in Committee deliberations to propose an attractive compromise position which we could then stand by. (The U.S. Delegation appreciates the efforts in Washington which resulted in timely and helpful instructions.) The U.S. Delegation's corridor activities were, unavoidably, conspicuously visible. Nevertheless, the members of the Finnish group appeared to welcome the frequency and frankness of their contacts with the U.S. Delegation. Although initially disagreements between the U.S. and a few other delegations, particularly the Italian, appeared fairly sharp, when the final compromise resolution was adopted, there were no appearances of resentment against the U.S. by the Italian group. Members of the Brazilian and Italian Delegations said they were satisfied with the final result. 5. Role of the Non-Nuclears. (a) Italy . The Italians invested considerable effort in promoting a new ad hoc body, as evidenced in part by the heavy reinforcement of their Delegation with senior officials from Rome and Geneva. Because the Italians pursued their aims in company with a number of other prestigious delegations, failure to achieve their main objective, the establishment of a new committee, did not stand out as a purely Italian failure (in contrast to the picture perceived by all in the Italian attempt to amend the Outer Space Treaty). (b) Pakistan . The Pakistanis made a strong effort to preserve their image as the promoters of the NNC. They volunteered to be the rapporteurs for the Italian Mission group and introduced the final NNC compromise resolution even though this resolution was largely the product of the Finnish group. (c) Brazil . Castro, though widely understood to be strongly sympathetic to the Italian group's efforts, did not permit himself to be identified as a leader of the group. His behavior contrasts sharply with what we understand was a heavy-handed performance by da Silveira at the NNC in Geneva. (d) Yugoslavia . The Yugoslavs expressed discomfort at participating in the Italian Mission group with so many prominent non-signatories of the NPT. They hung on, however, in an effort to make some mark on the question of security assurances. (e) India . The Indian Delegation worked actively on both sides of the street. It remained in the Italian group, but allowed the impression to develop that it would welcome the success of the Finnish group's efforts, providing there was no mention of the NPT in the preamble of the Finnish resolution. (Members of the Finnish group felt considerable annoyance when, after deleting all references to the NPT, they did not wind up with Indian co-sponsorship for the final compromise resolution.) The initial Indian concern focused on Pakistan's role. India had considerable misgivings about the creation of any ad hoc committee since this would clearly give Pakistan a major role; but India was even more strongly determined to be on any committee that might be set up and therefore stayed with the Italian group until its failure was assured. A Pakistani delegate delivered himself of several pronouncements to others that India had again played its traditional game of deceit. (f) Mexico . Garcia Robles kept his eyes riveted throughout on objectives of primary concern to Mexico, i.e., the endorsement by the GA of the NNC resolution on the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and authorization for a SYG study on PNE services. Both of these ideas were initially embedded in the Italian Mission draft resolution. When it became apparent that the Italian resolution might not be the one finally adopted, Garcia Robles lost no time in launching separate initiatives to achieve his aims. Although he was successful, we heard a number of expressions of irritation at his performance. Garcia Robles' position appeared particularly strong because of his traditional hold on Latin American votes. Mexico's participation in the Italian group, along with Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, gave the impression that the Latin Americans would vote as a bloc for any product of the Italian group. (g) The Netherlands . Eschauzier played an active and constructive role in the Finnish group, despite the fact that he clearly felt vulnerable to pressures from the Italians because of his Government's desire to maintain the cooperation of the Italian Government in various European projects. (h) Finland . Jakobson was a strong member of his group's negotiating team; he was unquestionably inhibited, however, by the fact that the USSR might not support (and in the event did not support) his group's compromise resolution. (i) Australia . The Australians (Shaw and Evans) played a vigorous and effective role in stiffening the spine of the Finnish group. We have the impression from several conversations that the Australian UN Delegation wished to turn in a helpful performance in order to compensate somewhat for Australia's failure so far to sign the NPT. (j) Japan . Ogiso played a key role, in very close contact with the U.S. Delegation, in developing the counter-resolution effort. This was a particularly ticklish task because the Japanese UN Mission, before Ogiso's arrival in New York, had accepted an invitation to participate in the effort of the Italian Mission group. (USUN believes it would be warranted, assuming Embassy Tokyo thinks it appropriate, for the Embassy to express to Ogiso, and perhaps also to his superiors, the U.S. Delegation's appreciation for the most constructive and skillful role played by the Japanese Delegation and particularly Ogiso.) 6. Role of the Developing Countries (LDC's). A curious feature of the struggle over the NNC resolution was that the LDC's, and particularly the Africans, remained almost totally on the sidelines while two groups of relatively advanced countries argued privately about formulation of their resolutions. Although a number of influential and responsible LDC's were courted, especially by the Finnish group, they refrained from active participation. An interesting insight was provided when Pinera (Chile), an activist within the Italian Mission group, was overheard to tell Kolo (Nigeria) that the Italian group was attempting to promote the interests of the LDC's. Kolo responded tartly that in fact the Italian group was telling the LDC's what ought to be good for them rather than actually obtaining their participation. Kolo's remark is less than fair, however, since both the Nigerian and Kenyan Delegations were initially invited to participate in the Italian Mission deliberations. The Kenyan Delegation never showed up and the Nigerian Delegation only appeared for the first few meetings. The Ethiopians were completely inactive. The great mass of LDC's were, in fact, content to accept in total the results ironed out by the Italian and Finnish groups. We are virtually certain that the LDC's would have accepted any result achieved by the two groups. The LDC's disinterest probably was equally a mixture of their desire to avoid making a difficult choice and their feeling that the details of nuclear issues are much more remote from them than are many other matters with which they are preoccupied at the UN. 7. Role of the USSR. Although initially members of the Soviet Delegation appeared anxious to support the counter-resolution effort promoted by the U.S., Moscow apparently took an extremely negative and tough stance against any NNC resolution that gave stature to NNC results. Moreover, it eventually became clear that the Soviets, who had resorted to the transparent maneuver of directing Bulgaria and Hungary to introduce a negative resolution on the NNC results, had a strong interest in pursuing a resolution containing a formula that would exclude the FRG from participation in NNC implementation activities. (The Bulgarian resolution (A/C.1/L.452) requested the SYG to transmit NNC results “to the Governments of States Members of the UN, to the IAEA, to the specialized agencies concerned and to other international organizations concerned.” The compromise resolution uses the formula “to the Governments of States Members of the UN and members of its specialized agencies and of the IAEA, and to the international bodies concerned.”) This probably explains why the Hungarians, joined by the Soviets, felt compelled to insist on voting, which they lost, on the question of priority between their resolution and the final compromise resolution. When the session was concluded, the Soviets and their allies, who voted against the compromise resolution, were completely isolated. (The other nuclear powers, including specifically France, voted in favor of the compromise resolution.) The introduction of the Soviet-inspired resolution was tactically useful, however, in that it permitted the U.S. and others to argue that the Finnish Mission resolution was a genuine compromise between the extreme positions staked out by the Italian and the Bulgarian-Hungarian resolutions. PART II—SECURITY ASSURANCES 1. Absence of Pressure for Further Assurances. Despite the attention it received at the NNC, the issue of security assurances did not come to life at the XXIII GA. There was, of course, considerable grumbling that the security situation is far from satisfactory. However, we were not confronted by proposals of new formulas for positive assurances or for non-use of nuclear weapons, and virtually no interest at all was shown in introducing or adopting the FRG NNC resolution on the non-use of force. The desire to have the proposed ad hoc committee or the UNDC take up this question was pressed only by Yugoslavia and Brazil. Although at the outset of the session the Brazilian Foreign Minister had proposed a special conference on security, the Brazilian Delegation displayed no initiative whatever in pursuing this idea which thereafter was quietly buried. The security issue was reduced to a passing reference in the final compromise NNC resolution. 2. Effect of US Views. The US views on security assurances appear to have gained some ground. Although Pakistan has been a major supporter of further security assurances, Ambassador Shahi, in introducing the compromise NNC resolution, quoted favorably and at length from the assurances section of Foster's November 19 statement to the First Committee. 6 Lebanon did the same in urging Cyprus to withdraw its resolution (A/C.1/L.449). 3. Reasons for Less Interest in Assurances. There are several probable reasons for this lessened interest in assurances: (a) The Czech invasion demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not the only or necessarily the most relevant element of military power that can affect the security and independence of smaller states. (b) Many countries appreciate our point that the time is not propitious for further efforts with the Soviets towards additional assurances. (c) The Soviets did not pursue vigorously their non-use proposal, partly to avoid trouble for the NPT, partly to keep the Czech situation from being dragged into the disarmament debate, and partly to avoid the possibility of ending up with a GA resolution that would be some variant of the FRG NNC resolution on non-use of force. (d) The states traditionally concerned with assurances, such as Yugoslavia, appeared to be more interested in keeping this issue in front of the public than in coming up with new formulas or arrangements—thus the emphasis was on procedural initiatives such as handing the problem to an ad hoc committee or the UNDC. (e) There appears to be wider understanding of the fact that the assurances question is difficult and complex (and properly a matter for Security Council consideration) and that the principal nuclear powers have gone as far as they can in SC resolution 255 7 and their parallel declarations. (f) Many UN members appear to appreciate that greater security lies in a gradual strengthening of the UN and the achievement of further measures of disarmament and arms control. (A member of the Yugoslav Delegation readily conceded that a pledge not to use nuclear weapons would have had no relevance in deterring the Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.) 4. Conclusion. It seems clear that SC resolution 255 has not put us on a “slippery slope” leading to greater demands for assurances. It is equally clear that we face no urgent pressure to alter our position on the assurances issue. PART III—SALT, USSR MEMORANDUM, GCD, CTB, CBW, AND ARMS TRANSFER REGISTRATION 1. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). A matter on which there was virtual unanimity was the desirability of prompt initiation of US-Soviet strategic arms limitations talks. Speakers in the First Committee frequently referred to the urgency of holding such talks and pointed particularly to the obligations in Article VI of the NPT of the nuclear powers to proceed with disarmament negotiations. It was never in doubt that Pakistan's resolution (2456D), which urged bilateral talks at an early date, would be adopted without opposition (Cuba and France abstained). 2. Soviet Activities—USSR Memorandum and Foreign Bases Item. A noteworthy aspect of the disarmament debate was the decision by the Soviets not to push to a vote their resolution (A/C.1/L.443) on the USSR July 1 disarmament memorandum. 8 This memorandum, which lists Soviet disarmament proposals, was included as a separate GA agenda item at the request of Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Gromyko placed great emphasis on the Soviet memorandum in his speech to the General Assembly.) 9 Although the memorandum was already before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the Soviet resolution requested that it be transmitted to the ENDC by the SYG. The Soviets withdrew this resolution after the US persuaded them and the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC to insert a preambular reference to the USSR memorandum in the omnibus resolution on GCD (2454B). 10 Similarly, the Soviets did not promote their old propaganda item on the elimination of foreign bases. Although listed as a separate agenda item, this subject received virtually no attention. It was disposed of by including a reference to the 1966 GA resolution on bases 11 with other previous UN disarmament resolutions listed in the preamble of the GCD resolution. We made clear to the Soviets early that we would strongly oppose separate resolutions on either of these items. The lack of a greater Soviet effort to press them can be ascribed to their desire (a) to appear moderate and cooperative in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, (b) to preserve for the benefit of NPT an atmosphere of US-USSR cooperation in disarmament, and (c) to avoid questions about the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia and the United Arab Republic which might well have been stimulated by a debate on foreign bases. 3. General and Complete Disarmament (GCD). Led by Sweden, the non-aligned delegations demonstrated a renewed interest in a serious examination of major disarmament steps of the type included in plans for GCD. In fact, collateral measures were not mentioned in the non-aligned draft of the omnibus GCD resolution until we suggested that a reference to them be included. We anticipate that this interest in further work on major disarmament proposals will be registered at the ENDC. 4. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). The Swedes made an effort to sneak into the test ban resolution (2455) 12 their concept that a comprehensive test ban should prohibit all nuclear explosions, including PNE tests. At the insistence of the US, however, the Swedes returned to the language of previous resolutions which refer solely to the suspension of nuclear weapon tests. The US Seismic Investigation Proposal received little comment although the British expressed their interest and support privately to the Soviet and several other delegations. 5. Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW). The Soviet agreement to use the formula “chemical and bacteriological (biological)" throughout the terms of reference (TR) for the SYG's CBW effects study represents an advance in obtaining acceptance of the US position on this issue. This is particularly true in light of the precedent, to which we earlier expected the Soviets to cling, of the term “chemical and bacteriological" in the ENDC report that recommended the SYG study. The US Delegation encountered some difficulty in arriving at an acceptable resolution (2454A) on the CBW study due to the assertiveness of the Polish Delegation and a tendency on the part of the Canadians and British not to fight with the Poles about points that were of more interest to the US than to Canada and the UK. Moreover, a strong UK objection to the TR worked out by the US and Soviet Delegations, and accepted by the Canadian Delegation, almost wrecked US effort to provide the TR to the SYG. The UK Delegation continued to press its objection to the “bacteriological (biological)" formula with the Secretariat and the US Delegation even after the TR had been read to the First Committee and handed over to the Secretariat. The UK Delegation hopes this difference will not affect the CBW study, but the UK and Soviet experts may not be able to avoid a resumption of the dispute when drafting the CBW study report. 6. Arms Transfer Registration. The Danish arms transfer resolution (A/C.1/L.446) 13 ran into trouble from the outset when the Soviets let it be known they opposed it. The Arabs and Indians were successful in convincing most LDC's that arms registration is an unworkable idea and could hurt their interests. Notwithstanding our expressed intention to support the resolution, our NATO allies, including Italy, Belgium and Turkey, were unenthusiastic about the Danish proposal and the resolution was eventually withdrawn. PART IV—FUTURE PROSPECTS Although the post-NNC antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states gave way to an improved atmosphere at the conclusion of the XXIII GA, what happens in the future will depend on developments in the fields of peaceful uses and disarmament. In both fields appearances are important, and so long as work on each appears to be progressing satisfactorily, the present climate can probably be maintained. (Our views on the need to improve the image of the IAEA were expressed in USUN 8583.) The atmosphere in the future will also depend on what is accomplished during the coming year in implementing the constructive proposals of the NNC and in demonstrating that the proposals the U.S. does not like have been carefully evaluated and proved impractical. Even if concrete results are not extensive, evidence of efforts by the U.S. to respond to the issues highlighted at the NNC and active participation by the U.S. in existing bodies will prevent charges that the U.S. is disinterested in problems of great importance to others. Buffum 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle, David L. Aaron, and Richard L. McCormack on December 21, and cleared by Peter S. Thacher, Committee I Executive Officer. 2 Reference is to a four-part resolution (A-D) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 1968. Parts B and D were approved unanimously with some abstentions; Part A was adopted by a vote of 103-7, with 5 abstentions; Part D was adopted 75-9, with 30 abstentions. Text of the resolution is in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 797-801. 3 Dated December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) 4 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 761-762. 5 A/C.1/L.458, December 13, which became part A of Resolution 2456 (XXIII). 6 Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 718-727. 7 Submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 7, 1968 (ENDC/222), it was approved by the U.N. Security Council on June 19 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India, and Pakistan). Text ibid., p. 444. 8 Regarding the Soviet Union's July 1 memorandum, see footnote 6, Document 252 . 9 Gromyko's speech has not been further identified. 10 Parts A and B of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2454 (XXIII) on general and complete disarmament were adopted unanimously on December 20, with a few abstentions in each case. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968 , pp. 793-796. 11 Presumably a reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2165 (XXI), December 5, 1966, which called for an end to foreign bases in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Text ibid., 1966, p. 804. 12 Text ibid., 1968, pp. 796-797. 13 Dated November 21; ibid. p. 728. Index Index Aaron, David L., 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] ABMs. See Anti - ballistic missiles (ABM ) under Missiles . Abrams, Gen. Creighton, 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals (McMillan Panel), 285–286 [ Pgs. 285–286 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] ,313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Adenauer, Konrad, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 299 n [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 116 ] AEDS. See U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System . Aerial overflights, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Africa ( see also Organization of African Unity ), 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Agreements, multilateral ( see also Celestial bodies treaty; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Non - Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ; Seabed treaty; Threshold Test Ban Treaty): Agreement between India and Pakistan for Withdrawal of Troops in Kashmir and Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, Tashkent, Jan. 1966 , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] Antarctica Treaty of 1961 , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 242 ] Cairo Resolution, July 1964 , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 46 ] Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Geneva, July 1954 , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Kellogg - Briand Pact, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. See Treaty of Tlatelolco below . Law of the Sea Treaty, Mar. 1966 , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 238 ] Strategic arms control. See Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems. Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Oct. 1967. See Celestial bodies treaty. Treaty of Tlatelolco, Mexico City, Feb. 1967 , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 549–557 [ Pgs. 549–557 include portions of Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] Agreements, bilateral, with the United States: Additional Agreement for Cooperation with Euratom, 563–564 [ Pgs. 563–564 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Australian - U.S. agreement on use of IAEA safeguards, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] British - U.S. Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Power Applications of Atomic Energy, July 1966 , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] British - U.S. Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, June 1955 , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] British - U.S. Nuclear Defense Systems Agreement, Nassau, Dec. 1962 , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] German - U.S. treaty on nuclear issues, proposed, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 189 ] Soviet - U.S. Air Agreement, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 365 n [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] Soviet - U.S. Consular Convention, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Soviet - U.S. nonaggression pact proposal, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Spanish - U.S. agreement on use of IAEA safeguards, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Air Force, U.S., 285 n [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 110 ] Air Force Technical Applications Center, 335–337 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] Aircraft, 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 710–711 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] Air-launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (AICBMs) ( see also Missiles ), 4–5 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Akalovsky, Alexander, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Albania, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Alessandrini, Adolfo, 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 121 ] Algeria, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Allison, Gen., 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] Amchitka Island, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] Anderson, Clinton P., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Anderson, Robert, 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 217 ] Antarctica, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 242 ] Anti - aircraft weapons, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 710–711 [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 277 ] Anti - ballistic missiles (ABM). See under Missiles . Antyasov (USSR), 503–504 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 205 ] Arab League, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 172 ] Arab - Israeli dispute, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] Arab - Israeli war, 1968 , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Argentina, 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 763–764 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Argonne National Laboratory, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Arms control and disarmament, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] ACDA draft message on, 191–194 [ Pgs. 191–194 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Activities of small countries, 90–92 [ Pgs. 90–92 include portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] Agreements. See Agreements, multilateral ; Agreements, bilateral, with the United States . British - U.S. talks on, 16–20 [ Pgs. 16–20 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 194–196 [ Pgs. 194–196 include portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 289–291 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 112 ] Development of U.S. program for, 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 129 ] French position, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] General and complete disarmament (GCD), 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] JCS position, 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Proposals for Geneva meetings, 3–5 [ Pgs. 3–5 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] Soviet position, 732–738 [ Pgs. 732–738 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Soviet proposals, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 137–138 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 219–220 [ Pgs. 219–220 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 245–256 [ Pgs. 245–256 include portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 333–334 [ Pgs. 333–334 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 720–721 [ Pgs. 720–721 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Summaries, 9–13 [ Pgs. 9–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Swedish position, 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.N. debates on, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] Unilateral disarmament, 89–90 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] World Conference on Disarmament, proposal, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 30 n [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 239–240 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 93 ] Documents, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 282–284 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] ACDA - 2915 , 564–572 [ Pgs. 564–572 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] ACDA - 2927 , 608–614 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 617–619 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 244 ] ACDA - 2935 , 633–634 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] ACDA - 2936 , 633–634 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] ACDA - 3024 , 691–695 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 275 ] ACDA - 3548 , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Arms Control Considerations of a U.S. Anti- Ballistic Missile Deployment System , 496–499 [ Pgs. 496–499 include portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] Draft message on disarmament, 191–194 [ Pgs. 191–194 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Draft paper on non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 97–110 [ Pgs. 97–110 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 112–117 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 119–120 [ Pgs. 119–120 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Programs to prevent nuclear proliferation, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 141–145 [ Pgs. 141–145 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Proposal on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Missile Systems , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Report on modifying test bans to allow peaceful explosions, 357–361 [ Pgs. 357–361 include portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 70–71 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 564–567 [ Pgs. 564–567 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 691–695 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 275 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 495–499 [ Pgs. 495–499 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , and Doc. 203 ] General Advisory Committee on Disarmament, 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 58–60 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 357–361 [ Pgs. 357–361 include portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Prototype testing, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] Seabed treaty, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 587–590 [ Pgs. 587–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 593–597 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 608–614 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616–619 [ Pgs. 616–619 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 335–336 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 342–343 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 141 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 226 ] Uranium sales, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] Army, U.S. Department of the, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Army Corps of Engineers, U.S., 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 217 ] Arnold, Hans, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] Aron, Raymond, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] Arrays, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] Asbjornson, Mildred J., 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Asia, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Associated Press (AP), 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 65 ] Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) ( see also Multilateral Force (MLF)), 178–179 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 226 n [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 264–266 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 153 ] Atlantic - Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 217 ] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 93 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 298 ] Verification issues, 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 59–60 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] Plowshare program, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] Secrecy restrictions, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty 335–337 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 344–345 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 226 ] Uranium/plutonium sales, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Verification Advisory Committee proposal, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Atomic Industries Forum, 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 180 ] Atoms for Peace Conference, 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 284 ] Australia, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Austria, 763–764 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Bahr, Egon, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] Baker, Vincent, 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Ball, George W., 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 156–157 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] Indian development of nuclear weapons, 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Multilateral Force, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 276–277 [ Pgs. 276–277 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Plowshare program, 348–351 [ Pgs. 348–351 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 166 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] Barber, Arthur W., 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 193 ] Baruch, Bernard M., 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 636–637 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] Bator, Francis M., 305 n [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] Beam, Jacob D., 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] Beeley, Harold, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 112 ] Belgium, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 460–461 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Berard, Armand, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] Bering Sea, 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 238 ] Berlin, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Biological warfare. See Chemical and biological weapons . Birrenbach, Kurt, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Blankenbecler, Richard, 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] Blough, Roger, 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Board of National Estimates, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] Bodnar, James S., 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 564–567 [ Pgs. 564–567 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 747 n [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 600–601 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] SALT talks, 635–636 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 638–639 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Bombers: B - 47s, 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Badgers, 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] British reliance on, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Borg, C. Arthur, 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Bowie, Robert J., 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] Bowman, Col. Richard C., 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Brandt, Willy, 435–439 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 539–540 [ Pgs. 539–540 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Brazil ( see also Brazil and Brazilian subheadings under other subjects ), 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Brement, Marshall, 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Brezhnev, Leonid I., 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 262 ] Bridges, Peter S., 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Bridges, Tom, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] British Commonwealth of Nations, 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] Brosio, Manlio, 524 [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 232 ] Brown, Elizabeth A., 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Brown, George, 393–394 [ Pgs. 393–394 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Brown, Harold: Fissionable materials production cuts, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Plowshare project, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 58 ] SALT talks, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 693–695 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 72–73 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 149–150 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 56 ] Brown, Howard, 10 n [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] Bruce, David K.E., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] Bruce, Robert L., 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Brussels Treaty, Mar. 1948 , 299 n [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 116 ] Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Buffum, William B., 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Bulgaria, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 277 n [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 341 n [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] Arms control and disarmament, 3–5 [ Pgs. 3–5 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19–20 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29–30 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 88–89 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 57 ] Military budget levels, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] Multilateral Force, 264–267 [ Pgs. 264–267 include portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] Treaty drafts for, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Nuclear containment, 3–4 [ Pgs. 3–4 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 56 [ Pg. 56 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] Testing of nuclear weapons: Flintlock series, 210–211 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] Niblick series, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] Project Sulky, 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 153–154 [ Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Test ban treaties and, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 188–191 [ Pgs. 188–191 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Whetstone series, 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72–73 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Bundy, William P., 7–8 [ Pgs. 7–8 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Bunn, George, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 502–504 [ Pgs. 502–504 include portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] Bureau of the Budget, U.S., 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Butler, Richard A., 16–19 [ Pgs. 16–19 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] Byelorussia, 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] Caccia, Harold, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Canada ( see also Canada and Canadian subheadings under other subjects ), 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 124–125 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 763–764 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Cancellario d'Alena, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 230 ] Caribbean, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 54 ] Carrillo Flores, Antonio, 599–600 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph F., 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Carter, Gen. Marshall, 7–8 [ Pgs. 7–8 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Case, Eileen, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] Castro (Brazil), 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 608–609 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 242 ] Australian position, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 151 ] British position, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Bulgarian position, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] China, People's Republic of, position, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Hungarian position, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] Italian position, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 302 ] Polish position, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Ratification of, 430–431 [ Pgs. 430–431 include portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Romanian position, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] Soviet position, 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 347–348 [ Pgs. 347–348 include portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 351–353 [ Pgs. 351–353 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 384–385 [ Pgs. 384–385 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 365–368 [ Pgs. 365–368 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 154 ] U.N. draft, 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] U.S. position, 311–312 [ Pgs. 311–312 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 316–318 [ Pgs. 316–318 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 351–354 [ Pgs. 351–354 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 270 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Anti - ballistic missiles, 411–417 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Intelligence Memoranda: SR IM 68–20 , 653–657 [ Pgs. 653–657 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] SR IM 68–28 , 747–754 [ Pgs. 747–754 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] Soviet approach to arms control, 732–738 [ Pgs. 732–738 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty 340, 342 n [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Verification Advisory Committee proposal, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Chalfont, Lord, 230 n [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 232–235 [ Pgs. 232–235 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , and Doc. 92 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 289–291 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 307–310 [ Pgs. 307–310 include portions of Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , and Doc. 123 ] Chapman, Gen., 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Chayes, Abram, 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Chemical and biological warfare (CBW), 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 771–772 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] Chile, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] China, People's Republic of ( see also China, People's Republic of subheadings under other subjects ; Sino - Soviet dispute): Development of nuclear weapons by, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] Effect on India of, 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 132–133 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] Disarmament, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, relations with, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Military budget levels, 252–253 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 97 ] Military situation in, 238–239 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 275 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 79–80 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 44 ] Nuclear war involving, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] Soviet nuclear aid to, 130–131 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 86 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] United States, relations with, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] U.S. policy toward, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 203 ] Vietnam Democratic Republic, relations with, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] China, Republic of, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Chou En - lai, 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Christmas Island, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] Clark, Joseph, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] Clarke, Bruce, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] Cleveland, Harlan, 124–125 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 641–644 [ Pgs. 641–644 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Clifford, Clark M., 760 n [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 301 ] Fissionable material production halt, 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] SALT talks, 565–566 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 634–635 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 663–666 [ Pgs. 663–666 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 669–672 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 744–747 [ Pgs. 744–747 include portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 577–578 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 232 ] Seabed treaty, 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 617–619 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 680–681 [ Pgs. 680–681 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Clifton, Gen. Chester V., 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Cole, Capt., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Commerce, U.S. Department of, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 64 ] Committee on Nuclear Proliferation. See Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation. Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 118–120 [ Pgs. 118–120 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 50 ] Committee of Principals, 11–12 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 285 n [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 615 n [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 243 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 237–243 [ Pgs. 237–243 include portions of Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] Disarmament, 191–192 [ Pgs. 191–192 include portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Fissionable material production and sales, 626 [ Pg. 626 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 298 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29–31 [ Pgs. 29–31 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 231 ] SALT talks, 633–637 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 666–668 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 673–677 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Verification issues, 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 136 ] Military budget levels, 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 122–125 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 229 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 166 ] Prototype testing, 65 n [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Seabed treaty, 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 585 n [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 592–597 [ Pgs. 592–597 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 605–614 [ Pgs. 605–614 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 70 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 334–339 [ Pgs. 334–339 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Common Market. See European Economic Community (EEC) . Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 160–162 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] British position, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 112 ] Canadian position, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 112 ] China, People's Republic of, adherence to, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 93 ] French position, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] JCS position, 282–283 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 285–288 [ Pgs. 285–288 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] Soviet position, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 254–256 [ Pgs. 254–256 include portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Swedish position, 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.S. position, 237–243 [ Pgs. 237–243 include portions of Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Verification of, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 288–291 [ Pgs. 288–291 include portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Conference of Non - Nuclear Weapon States, Geneva, 1968 , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 720–722 [ Pgs. 720–722 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 762–768 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] ,772 Congress, U.S. ( see also Senate, U.S. ): Acts of: Atomic Energy Act, 1954 , 387 n [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] Atomic Energy Act, 1958 , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 64 ] Euratom Cooperation Act, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 230 ] Anti - ballistic missile deployment, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] Freeze on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] SALT talks, 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 266 ] House Foreign Affairs Committee, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] Multilateral Force, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 44 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] Seabed treaty, 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 242 ] U.S. arms sales, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] Containment, nuclear. See Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons. Control Data Corporation, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 56 ] Control post proposal, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 193–194 [ Pgs. 193–194 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 217 ] Cowles, John, 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Cratering, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 362–364 [ Pgs. 362–364 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] Crawford, R.S., 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Cregar, William O., 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Crowley, Edwin D., 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Crowson, Brig. Gen. Delmar L., 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 81 ] Cuba, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Guantanamo base, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] Missile crisis, 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Nuclear - free zone, 244–247 [ Pgs. 244–247 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Curtis, Carl T., 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] Cyprus, 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Czechoslovakia, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Soviet invasion of, 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, effect on, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] SALT talks, effect on, 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 733–734 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 740–741 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 745–746 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 749–750 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 296 ] Summit proposal and, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 280 ] Davis, Jeanne W., 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Davis, Richard H., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 154–156 [ Pgs. 154–156 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 164–166 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] De Martino, John J., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] Dean, Arthur H., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Dean, Jonathan, 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Dean, Patrick, 229 n [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 231 n [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 259 n [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] Debre, Michel, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] Defense, U.S. Department of, 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 298 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 300 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] SALT talks, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 640–642 [ Pgs. 640–642 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 664–665 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 674 n [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 269 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] Nuclear - free zones, 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Seabed treaty, 580–583 [ Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , and Doc. 235 ] , 585–590 [ Pgs. 585–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 616–619 [ Pgs. 616–619 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 680–683 [ Pgs. 680–683 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 200 ] Bowline series, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Latchkey series, 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Whetstone series, 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72–73 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Uranium sales, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 267 ] Delivery systems. See Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems. Denmark, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] DePalma, Samuel, 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Desalinization of sea water, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66–67 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 31 ] Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 549–550 [ Pgs. 549–550 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 553–554 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 226 ] Dirksen, Everett M., 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 740 n [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] Disarmament. See Arms control and disarmament. Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 46 n [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Arms control, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 333–334 [ Pgs. 333–334 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 97 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 546–547 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 224 ] Fissionable material production cuts, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 300 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 405–407 [ Pgs. 405–407 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] SALT talks, 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 661–663 [ Pgs. 661–663 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] , 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Germany, Democratic Republic of, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] Military budget levels, 27–28 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Multilateral Force, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 259–261 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 264–267 [ Pgs. 264–267 include portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 297–298 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 183 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 268–271 [ Pgs. 268–271 include portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 276–277 [ Pgs. 276–277 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 474–476 [ Pgs. 474–476 include portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 520–522 [ Pgs. 520–522 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 720–721 [ Pgs. 720–721 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 520–522 [ Pgs. 520–522 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 720–721 [ Pgs. 720–721 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] Nuclear - free zones, 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 97 ] Desalinization, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 31 ] Excavation, 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 402–404 [ Pgs. 402–404 include portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] Polish nuclear freeze proposal, 25–26 [ Pgs. 25–26 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 189–190 [ Pgs. 189–190 include portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 197–199 [ Pgs. 197–199 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75 ] , 202–204 [ Pgs. 202–204 include portions of Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] U.S. - Soviet relations, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] U.S. - Soviet summit meeting, proposed, 716–717 [ Pgs. 716–717 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 297 ] Dominican Republic, 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] Donnelly, Gen., 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Douglas - Home, Alexander, 19–20 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 51–53 [ Pgs. 51–53 include portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] Dulles, Allen W., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 164–165 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Dulles, John Foster, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] Eastern Europe, 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Egypt. See United Arab Republic . Ehrlich, Thomas, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee ( See also Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons; Non - Proliferation Treaty), 435 n [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] British position, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 46 ] China, People's Republic of, role in, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 72 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Expansion of, 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] Fissionable materials production halt, 626–628 [ Pgs. 626–628 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] SALT talks, 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Verification issues, 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] General and complete disarmament, 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] Military budget levels, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 172 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 502–504 [ Pgs. 502–504 include portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 537–538 [ Pgs. 537–538 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 548–549 [ Pgs. 548–549 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] Drafts for, 235–237 [ Pgs. 235–237 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 505–506 [ Pgs. 505–506 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Security assurances, 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Signing of, 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Polish proposal, 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] President's messages to: Jan. 1964 , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9–11 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Sept. 1964 , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] July 1965 , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Jan. 1966 , 292–295 [ Pgs. 292–295 include portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 276 ] Resumption of talks, 212–216 [ Pgs. 212–216 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 546–547 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 224 ] Seabed treaty, 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Soviet nine - point proposal, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 732–733 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Soviet position, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] Soviet - U.S. talks during, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 116 ] U.S. position, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Vietnam conflict, effect on, 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Electromagnetic pulse, 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 236 ] Erhard, Ludwig, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 305–307 [ Pgs. 305–307 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] Erler, Fritz, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] Eschauzier, H.F., 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Ethiopia, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Euratom, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] British position, 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Additional Agreement for Cooperation with the U.S., 563–564 [ Pgs. 563–564 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] IAEA safeguards for, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 418–420 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 436–439 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 454–465 [ Pgs. 454–465 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 483–484 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 487–488 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 503–504 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 515–517 [ Pgs. 515–517 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 520–529 [ Pgs. 520–529 include portions of Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 533–544 [ Pgs. 533–544 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 272 ] Soviet position, 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] U.S. export of nuclear materials to, 145–147 [ Pgs. 145–147 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 115 ] Europe ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force ; Multilateral Force; Euratom ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Independent nuclear force for, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 146 ] Nuclear freeze in, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25–27 [ Pgs. 25–27 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Proliferation of nuclear weapons in, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] Troop reductions in, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 193–194 [ Pgs. 193–194 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 102 ] Unification of, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 445–447 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 650–651 [ Pgs. 650–651 include portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] U.S. defense commitment to, 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] European Economic Community (EEC), 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Evans, David W., 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Evans, Brig. Gen. Harry L., 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] Export controls, 125–127 [ Pgs. 125–127 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] Faber, Richard, 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 57 ] Falin (USSR), 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] Fallout, nuclear ( See also Radiation ), 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 58–59 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] Fanfani, Amintore, 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 485–486 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Farley, Philip J., 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] Fedorenko, Nikolai T., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] Finland, 763–765 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Finletter, Thomas K., 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] Fisher, Adrian S., 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 61 n [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 267 n [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 674 n [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] Arms control and disarmament, 16–17 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Arms control program development, 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 129 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 289–291 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224–225 [ Pgs. 224–225 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 224 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 7–8 [ Pgs. 7–8 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 495–496 [ Pgs. 495–496 include portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 501–502 [ Pgs. 501–502 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] SALT talks, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 633–634 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 637–640 [ Pgs. 637–640 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 663–664 [ Pgs. 663–664 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 693–695 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] U.S. position, 29–30 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 76–78 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 314–316 [ Pgs. 314–316 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 152 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 396–397 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 445–448 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 548–549 [ Pgs. 548–549 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Safeguards article, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 454–463 [ Pgs. 454–463 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 487–488 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] U.S. position, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Nuclear - free zones, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 244–245 [ Pgs. 244–245 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty 240, 334–339 [ Pgs. 334–339 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Verification Advisory Committee proposal, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Fissionable materials: British production of, 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] British purchases of, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Energy production using, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] French production of, 44–45 [ Pgs. 44–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 48–49 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] French purchases of, 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, purchases of, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Italian purchases of, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Production cuts: British position, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 33–34 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 43–45 [ Pgs. 43–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 48–49 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 51–52 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] French position, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Linkage to freezes on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] Soviet position, 21–23 [ Pgs. 21–23 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 31–34 [ Pgs. 31–34 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 37–40 [ Pgs. 37–40 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 47–53 [ Pgs. 47–53 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25 ] , 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 79 ] U.S. position, 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 7–9 [ Pgs. 7–9 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 36–40 [ Pgs. 36–40 include portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 53–55 [ Pgs. 53–55 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Verification issues, 68–71 [ Pgs. 68–71 include portions of Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , and Doc. 33 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 251 ] Production halt, agreement on, 626–632 [ Pgs. 626–632 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 696–699 [ Pgs. 696–699 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 730–731 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 298 ] Reduction in use of, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 23 ] Soviet production of, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 97 ] U.S. sales to Euratom of, 561–564 [ Pgs. 561–564 include portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] Use in multiple warhead missiles, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 52 ] Fleming, Robert, 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Ford Foundation, 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Formosa. See Taiwan . Fortas, Abe, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] Foster, William C., 3 n [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 342 n [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 533 n [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 615 n [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 243 ] Arms control and disarmament, 90–91 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 191–192 [ Pgs. 191–192 include portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 194–196 [ Pgs. 194–196 include portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] , 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] Development of U.S. program for, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 129 ] Soviet - U.S. talks, 333–334 [ Pgs. 333–334 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 112 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 212–213 [ Pgs. 212–213 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 323–325 [ Pgs. 323–325 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 537–538 [ Pgs. 537–538 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 546–547 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 224 ] Fissionable material production and sales: Cuts in, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 626–628 [ Pgs. 626–628 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 298 ] Euratom purchases, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] SALT Talks, 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 663–665 [ Pgs. 663–665 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 677–680 [ Pgs. 677–680 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 692–694 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] U.S. position, 29–31 [ Pgs. 29–31 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 126 ] Verification issues, 87–89 [ Pgs. 87–89 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Military budget cuts, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 110–112 [ Pgs. 110–112 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , and Doc. 46 ] , 122–125 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Task force on, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Drafts of, 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 396–397 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 558–559 [ Pgs. 558–559 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Duration of, 544–545 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 223 ] Safeguards article, 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 418–421 [ Pgs. 418–421 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 460–461 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 471–473 [ Pgs. 471–473 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 502–506 [ Pgs. 502–506 include portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 515–516 [ Pgs. 515–516 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 520–522 [ Pgs. 520–522 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 373–374 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 152 ] U.S. - German talks on, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 437–438 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 188 ] Nuclear - free zones, 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 272–273 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] Nuclear sharing, 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] President's message, Geneva, Jan. 1964, 10–11 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] Seabed treaty, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 593–597 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 608–610 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 612–614 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 197–199 [ Pgs. 197–199 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 138 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 226 ] Verification Advisory Committee proposal, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Fowler, Henry H., 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] Fractional orbiting bombardment systems (FOBS), 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 209 ] France ( see also France and French subheadings under other subjects ), 64 n [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Atomic Energy Authority, 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Control post proposal, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] Force de frappe, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] Nuclear facilities in, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 216 ] Permissive Action Links, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] United States, relations with, 114–115 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 64 ] U.S. uranium sales to, 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 4–5 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 55 ] Anti - ballistic missiles ( see also under Missiles ), 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 76–77 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 314–316 [ Pgs. 314–316 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 509–511 [ Pgs. 509–511 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 264 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 405–407 [ Pgs. 405–407 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169 ] , 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 709–710 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 277 ] U.S. deployment, effect of, 421–423 [ Pgs. 421–423 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 495–502 [ Pgs. 495–502 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 507–508 [ Pgs. 507–508 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 512–515 [ Pgs. 512–515 include portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] China, People's Republic of, position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Fixed - base systems, 144–145 [ Pgs. 144–145 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 674–675 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 684–685 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 705–706 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 277 ] JCS position, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] Joint statement of objectives for, 758–761 [ Pgs. 758–761 include portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Linkage to fissionable materials cut, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] Mobile systems, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 675–676 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 707–709 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 277 ] Polish proposal, 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25–27 [ Pgs. 25–27 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Radar, 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 192 ] Soviet position, 35–36 [ Pgs. 35–36 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 223 ] Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT): ACDA recommendations, 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 564–567 [ Pgs. 564–567 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Basic position paper, 704–713 [ Pgs. 704–713 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] British role in, 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Canadian position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] China, Republic of, position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Committee of Principals proposal, 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 673–680 [ Pgs. 673–680 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Cuban position, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Draft opening statements, 633–638 [ Pgs. 633–638 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 644–646 [ Pgs. 644–646 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] French position, 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Interagency Working Group proposal, 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Italian position, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] JCS position, 426–429 [ Pgs. 426–429 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 674 n [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Korea, Republic of, position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Multiple Individually - Targeted Re - entry vehicles (MIRVs), 663–665 [ Pgs. 663–665 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] NATO consultative machinery, 642–644 [ Pgs. 642–644 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] Non - nuclear states resolution on, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Pakistani position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Reductions in existing forces, 712–713 [ Pgs. 712–713 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Revision and withdrawal provisions, 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 711–712 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 277 ] Romanian position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Soviet position, 442–444 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 653–657 [ Pgs. 653–657 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 733–738 [ Pgs. 733–738 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 747–754 [ Pgs. 747–754 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] Soviet - U.S. messages, 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 431–434 [ Pgs. 431–434 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 440–441 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 450–453 [ Pgs. 450–453 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 568–572 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 583–584 [ Pgs. 583–584 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 590–592 [ Pgs. 590–592 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 657–658 [ Pgs. 657–658 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Soviet - U.S. planning for ( see also Summit meeting, possible below ), 421–425 [ Pgs. 421–425 include portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 432–434 [ Pgs. 432–434 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Studies for, 640–642 [ Pgs. 640–642 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] Tactics for, 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 704–705 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 277 ] Technological improvements, 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 277 ] Timing of, 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] U.N. position, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.S. position ( see also Soviet -U.S. subheadings above ), 453–454 [ Pgs. 453–454 include portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 666–669 [ Pgs. 666–669 include portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 691–695 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 699–714 [ Pgs. 699–714 include portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 744–747 [ Pgs. 744–747 include portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Verification procedures, 639–640 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 670–671 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 268 ] Vietnam, Republic of, position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Yugoslav position, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Submarines, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 209 ] Summit meeting, possible, 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] U.S. position, 16–20 [ Pgs. 16–20 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 29–31 [ Pgs. 29–31 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 142–143 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 314–316 [ Pgs. 314–316 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 453–454 [ Pgs. 453–454 include portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 466–470 [ Pgs. 466–470 include portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 224 ] Verification of, 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 76–79 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 87–89 [ Pgs. 87–89 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 191 ] Freund, Richard, 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] Frosch, Robert A., 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 240–241 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] Fulbright, J. William, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] Furnas, Howard, 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] Garcia Robles, Alfonso, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Gardner, Richard N., 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] Garthoff, Raymond L., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 118 n [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 470 Gaussen, Gerard, 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] Gean, Kirby, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Geneva Conference. See Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee. George, Scott, 402 n [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] German reunification, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 166–167 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Germany, Democratic Republic of: Acquisition of nuclear weapons, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] Downing of U.S. jet in, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] Soviet arms reductions in, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] Soviet troop reductions in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 31 ] U.N. role for, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] Germany, Federal Republic of ( see also Germany, Federal Republic of subheadings under other subjects ): Acquisition of nuclear weapons, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 100–101 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 103–105 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 129–130 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 64 ] Soviet position, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 274–276 [ Pgs. 274–276 include portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 278–281 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] U.S. position, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 389–390 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 158 ] Agreement with the U.S. on nuclear issues, proposed, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 189 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] Control post proposal, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] France, relations with, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] Military situation, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] Multilateral Force, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 229–230 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 123–124 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 298–300 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 305–308 [ Pgs. 305–308 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 372–373 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 153 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 298–300 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 303–304 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 418–420 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 172 ] NATO Nuclear Planning Group, effect on, 573–574 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 576–577 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] Non - use of force, 768–769 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 133–134 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 102 ] Tactical missiles in, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty 342 United States, relations with, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] U.S. troop reduction in, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 55–56 [ Pgs. 55–56 include portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 31 ] World Conference on Disarmament, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] Ghana, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] Gilpatric, Roswell L.: Assurances to non - nuclear powers, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] Euratom, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] Export controls, 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Multilateral force, 155–157 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 163–164 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Gilpatric Committee. See Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation. Ginsburgh, Bob, 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] Glassboro Summit, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Gleysteen, Culver, 503–504 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Goa, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] Goldberg, Arthur J.: Celestial bodies treaty, 311–312 [ Pgs. 311–312 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 347–348 [ Pgs. 347–348 include portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 366–368 [ Pgs. 366–368 include portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 383–385 [ Pgs. 383–385 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 430–431 [ Pgs. 430–431 include portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Fissionable materials production halt, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 276 ] Indian development of nuclear weapons, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 136 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 383–384 [ Pgs. 383–384 include portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 97 ] Seabed treaty, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 234 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 97 ] Goldberger, Marvin L., 313 n [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] Goldstein, Mortimer D., 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] Goldwater, Barry M., 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 213 n [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 82 ] Gomulka Plan, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 82 ] Goodpaster, Lt. Gen. Andrew J., 292–294 [ Pgs. 292–294 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Gordon, Kermit, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Gordon Walker, Patrick C., 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] Gore, Albert, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 296 ] Gore - Booth, Paul, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Goulding, Phil, 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 266 ] Graybeal, Sidney N., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] Greenhill, Denis A., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] Grinevsky, O.A., 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 183 ] Gromyko, Andrei A., 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 725 n [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 287 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 365–368 [ Pgs. 365–368 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 154 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 254–256 [ Pgs. 254–256 include portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Disarmament talks, 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 35–36 [ Pgs. 35–36 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] SALT talks, 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 451–453 [ Pgs. 451–453 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 654–655 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 749–750 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 296 ] Summit meeting on, possible, 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 297 ] Military budget levels, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] Multilateral force, 90 n [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 132–135 [ Pgs. 132–135 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 259–260 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 129–132 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 245–250 [ Pgs. 245–250 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 270–271 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 274–275 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 106 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 256 n [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 355–356 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 368–384 [ Pgs. 368–384 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 386–391 [ Pgs. 386–391 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 481–486 [ Pgs. 481–486 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] Nuclear - free zones, 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Soviet - U.S. relations, 135–140 [ Pgs. 135–140 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 297 ] Gronouski, John A., 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 265 ] Grudinin, Col. I., 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 262 ] Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 156–157 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 165–166 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Guantanamo base, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] Guinea, 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] Hadow, Michael, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Halperin, Morton H., 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 638–642 [ Pgs. 638–642 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 219–223 [ Pgs. 219–223 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] Harris, John, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Hassan, Abdel F., 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 97 ] Healey, Denis, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Hearn, Rear Adm. William, 608–610 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Heckrotte, Warren, 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] Helium - 3, 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 251 ] Helman, Gerald B., 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Helms, Richard M., 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 411–412 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 608–609 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Henderson, J.N., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Henry, David H., 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] Hinton, Deane R., 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Hitch, Charles, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] Holifield, Chet, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 472–473 [ Pgs. 472–473 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Hood, Viscount, 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] Hornig, Donald F., 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Desalinization, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 26 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29–30 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Seabed treaty, 594–597 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 242 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 189–190 [ Pgs. 189–190 include portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] Hosmer, Craig, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] Houdek, Robert G., 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] House Foreign Affairs Committee, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] Howard, William J., 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 747 n [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 227–228 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 337–339 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Hungary, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Hyderabad, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] ICBMs. See Missiles . India ( see also India and Indian subheadings under other subjects ), 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] Asian multilateral force, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] Assurances against nuclear attack on, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 163–164 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 481–483 [ Pgs. 481–483 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] China, People's Republic of, development of nuclear weapons, effect on, 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 132–133 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Leadership role of, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 152 ] Arms transfer registration, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Soviet position, 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 106 ] U.S. position, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 112–113 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 153 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Safeguards clause, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] Nuclear weapons acquisition by, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 50 ] Cost of, 331–332 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 138 ] Indian position, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 135 ] Soviet position, 250–251 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] U.S. position, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 349–350 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Tashkent agreement, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] United States, relations with, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 202 ] Indian - Pakistani conflict, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] Indonesia, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 250–251 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 365 n [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Inspections. See Verification of arms control agreements. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] Board of Governors, 494 n [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 223 ] British - U.S. nuclear cooperation, 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 162 n [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] Fissionable materials production halt, 627–629 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 276 ] General Conference, 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 284 ] Ninth Session, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Tenth Session, 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] Indian participation in, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] Israeli participation in, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] Japanese participation in, 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Latin America, role in, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 109–111 [ Pgs. 109–111 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 118 n [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 418–421 [ Pgs. 418–421 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Soviet position, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] Nuclear materials, supervision of, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 106–107 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Safeguards, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 488–489 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 502–506 [ Pgs. 502–506 include portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 515–517 [ Pgs. 515–517 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 520–529 [ Pgs. 520–529 include portions of Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] for Euratom countries, 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 418–421 [ Pgs. 418–421 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 436–439 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 454–465 [ Pgs. 454–465 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 483–484 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 487–488 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 503–504 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 515–517 [ Pgs. 515–517 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 520–529 [ Pgs. 520–529 include portions of Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 533–544 [ Pgs. 533–544 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 272 ] French exclusion from, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] for the Soviet Union, 483–484 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 490–492 [ Pgs. 490–492 include portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] for the United States, 447–448 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 471–474 [ Pgs. 471–474 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] Swedish participation in, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] U.S. position, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] International Business Machines (IBM), 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 56 ] International Commission on Radiation Protection, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] International Decade of Ocean Exploration, 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] International Disarmament Agency (IDA), 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 138 ] International Symposium on Fission Product Release and Transport under Accident Conditions, Oak Ridge, Apr. 1965 , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Interoceanic Canal, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] Ippolitov, Ivan I., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] Iran, 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Israel ( see also Arab - Israeli dispute ): Acquisition of nuclear weapons by, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 100–101 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] French military aid to, 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 97 ] French nuclear aid to, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear aid to, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 246–247 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 249–250 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 153 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty 342, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] Italy ( see also Italy and Italian subheadings under other subjects ), 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Jackson, Henry M., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] 239 Jakobson, Max, 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Japan ( see also Japan and Japanese subheadings under other subjects ), 100–101 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 302 ] Nuclear war involving, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Soviet nuclear tests detected in, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 201–202 [ Pgs. 201–202 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] United States, relations with, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] U.S. defense alliance with, 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 202 ] Johnson, Charles E., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] Johnson, Gen. Harold K., 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 198 n [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] Arms control and disarmament, 4–5 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 219–220 [ Pgs. 219–220 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] , 430–431 [ Pgs. 430–431 include portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 1–2 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 21–23 [ Pgs. 21–23 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 38–40 [ Pgs. 38–40 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 46–55 [ Pgs. 46–55 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] British position, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] Soviet position, 31 [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] U.S. position, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Verification issues, 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 251 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 301 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 442–444 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] SALT talks, 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 442–444 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 565–567 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 571–572 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 590–592 [ Pgs. 590–592 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 638–639 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 644–646 [ Pgs. 644–646 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 687–690 [ Pgs. 687–690 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 741–744 [ Pgs. 741–744 include portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Glassboro Summit, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] IAEA safeguards, 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 251 ] Indian acquisition of nuclear weapons, 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Military budget levels, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Multilateral Force, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 168–169 [ Pgs. 168–169 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 297–307 [ Pgs. 297–307 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 376–377 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Soviet position, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 162 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 386–387 [ Pgs. 386–387 include portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] U.S. position, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] Drafts of, 236–237 [ Pgs. 236–237 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Safeguards article, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] Nuclear - free zones, 549–554 [ Pgs. 549–554 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] Desalinization, 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66–67 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 31 ] Plowshare program, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 153–154 [ Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 529–532 [ Pgs. 529–532 include portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Seabed treaty, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 680–681 [ Pgs. 680–681 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Soviet - U.S. messages, 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Soviet - U.S. relations, 135–140 [ Pgs. 135–140 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Glassboro Summit, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Summit meeting, possible, 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Speeches and messages: Address on uranium production cuts, Apr. 1964 , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] Annual budget message to Congress, 1966 , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 86 ] Commencement speech, Glassboro State College, June 1968 , 603–605 [ Pgs. 603–605 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, Jan. 1964 , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 9–11 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, Sept. 1964 , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, July 1965 , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, Jan. 1966 , 292–295 [ Pgs. 292–295 include portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 276 ] General Conference of the IAEA, Sept. 1965 , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Johns Hopkins University, Apr. 1965 , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 97 ] Message of Oct. 18, 1964 , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] Nuclear reactor anniversary, Dec. 1967, 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 220 ] “To Renew a Nation,” 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] Twentieth Anniversary of the U.N., San Francisco, June 1965 , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72–74 [ Pgs. 72–74 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Bowline series, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Crosstie series, 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Flintlock series, 210–212 [ Pgs. 210–212 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Latchkey series, 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] Soviet testing, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] Survey of new sites for, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] Test - ban treaties and, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty 334 n [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 338–339 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 549–554 [ Pgs. 549–554 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] U.S. troop reductions in Germany and, 55–56 [ Pgs. 55–56 include portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 31 ] Visit to Seoul, Oct. - Nov. 1966 , 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] Johnson, Tom, 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 56–60 [ Pgs. 56–60 include portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 282–283 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 285–288 [ Pgs. 285–288 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 8–9 [ Pgs. 8–9 include portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 696–699 [ Pgs. 696–699 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Verification issues, 68–71 [ Pgs. 68–71 include portions of Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , and Doc. 33 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 173 ] SALT talks, 426–429 [ Pgs. 426–429 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 674 n [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Memoranda: JCSM - 128–64 , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] JCSM - 148–64 , 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] JCSM - 187–64 , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] JCSM - 449–64 , 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] JCSM - 348–65 , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] JCSM - 601–65 , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] JCSM - 28–66 , 282–284 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] JCSM - 37–66 , 286–288 [ Pgs. 286–288 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] JCSM - 30–67 , 426–429 [ Pgs. 426–429 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] JCSM - 235–68 , 580–583 [ Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , and Doc. 235 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 236 ] JCSM - 272–68 , 585–590 [ Pgs. 585–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] JCSM - 497–68 , 682–683 [ Pgs. 682–683 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] JCSM - 519–68 , 696–699 [ Pgs. 696–699 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 399–400 [ Pgs. 399–400 include portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Nuclear - free zones, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] Prototype testing, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] Seabed treaty, 580–583 [ Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , and Doc. 235 ] , 585–590 [ Pgs. 585–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 616–619 [ Pgs. 616–619 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 680–683 [ Pgs. 680–683 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 282–285 [ Pgs. 282–285 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 226 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 293–294 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 267 ] Kaiser, Herbert, 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Kashmir, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] Katz, Abraham, 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 573–574 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 621–622 [ Pgs. 621–622 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 693–694 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] Kavanagh, George M., 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 699 n [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Arms control and disarmament, 191–194 [ Pgs. 191–194 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] Arms control summaries, 9–13 [ Pgs. 9–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 93 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 509–511 [ Pgs. 509–511 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 499–501 [ Pgs. 499–501 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] SALT talks, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 666–668 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Task force on, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 256–257 [ Pgs. 256–257 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 603–605 [ Pgs. 603–605 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] Soviet - U.S. talks, 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 333–334 [ Pgs. 333–334 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] Kelly, John, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Kennedy, John F., 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 70–71 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Kennedy, Robert F., 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 91 ] Kent, Sherman, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 171 ] Kenya, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Khrushchev, Nikita S., 431 n [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] Arms control, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] Desalinization of sea water, 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66–67 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 31 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 22 [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 31–34 [ Pgs. 31–34 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 36–40 [ Pgs. 36–40 include portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 46–54 [ Pgs. 46–54 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 94 n [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 79 ] Multilateral Force, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Removal from power, 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] Sino - Soviet dispute, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] Troop reductions in Germany, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 31 ] Visit to the UAR, June 1964 , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 31 ] Kiesinger, Kurt G., 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 541–543 [ Pgs. 541–543 include portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Kistiakowsky, George B., 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 165–168 [ Pgs. 165–168 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Klein, David, 64–65 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Klieman, Robert, 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] Knappstein, Heinrich, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Knox, M. Gordon, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] Kohler, Foy D., 104 n [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] Arms control, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 35–36 [ Pgs. 35–36 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Military budget levels, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 86 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 115–116 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 274–275 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] Safeguards article, 455–456 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 188 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] Kolo, Alhaji S.D., 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Kosygin, Alexei, 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 187 ] Economic situation in the Soviet Union, 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 296 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 301 ] SALT talks, 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 440–444 [ Pgs. 440–444 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 566–568 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 745–749 [ Pgs. 745–749 include portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Soviet - U.S. messages regarding, 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Glassboro Summit, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] Military budget levels, 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 222–224 [ Pgs. 222–224 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Nine - point disarmament proposal, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 186–188 [ Pgs. 186–188 include portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69 ] , 276–281 [ Pgs. 276–281 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 307–309 [ Pgs. 307–309 include portions of Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , and Doc. 122 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 307–309 [ Pgs. 307–309 include portions of Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , and Doc. 122 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 484–485 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] U.S. - Soviet summit, possible, 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Vietnam conflict, 219–220 [ Pgs. 219–220 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 86 ] Kratzer, Myron B., 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Krimer, William D., 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 728 n [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] Kuznetsov, Vasily V., 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 598–603 [ Pgs. 598–603 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 654 n [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Labowitz, Allan, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Lachs (Poland), 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Ladakh, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] Lahusen, Karl, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Laird, Melvin, 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Laos, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] Large Aperture Seismic Arrays, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] Latin America ( see also individual countries ; Treaty of Tlatelolco; under Nuclear - free zones), 598–599 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Lawrence Livermore Radiation Laboratory, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 147 ] Lebanon, 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Leddy, John M., 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 455–456 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] Lilienfeld, Georg von, 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 576–577 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] Long, Franklin A., 313 n [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] Luns, Joseph, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 44 ] Luxembourg, 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] Macmillan, Harold, 68 n [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] Magalhaes Pinto, Juracy, 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] Malik, Yakov, 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 581 n [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 296 ] Mansfield, Michael J., 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 740 n [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] Marks, Leonard H., 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 242 ] Mazurov, Kiril T., 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 296 ] McCall, Sherrod, 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] McCarthy, Eugene, 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] McCloy, John J., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 159–160 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 164–165 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 300 ] McCone, John A., 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Arms control, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 is part of Doc. 33 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 88–89 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 40 ] Military budget levels, 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Project Sulky, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] Task Force on Non - Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] McConnell, Gen. J.P., 285 n [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] McCormack, Richard L., 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] McCormick, Adm., 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] McGhee, George C., 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 539–540 [ Pgs. 539–540 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] McIntyre, Stuart H., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] McKelvey, Vincent, 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] McMillan, William G., Jr., 285 n [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] McMillan Report, 285–286 [ Pgs. 285–286 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] McNamara, Robert S., 69 n [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 225 n [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 279 n [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Arms control and disarmament, 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 16–19 [ Pgs. 16–19 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 129 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] Economic situation in the Soviet Union, 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 296 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 7–8 [ Pgs. 7–8 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 53–54 [ Pgs. 53–54 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 70–71 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems: Anti - ballistic missiles, 29–31 [ Pgs. 29–31 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 41–42 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 421–423 [ Pgs. 421–423 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear capability, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] Indian development of nuclear weapons, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 136 ] Military budget levels, 93–95 [ Pgs. 93–95 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 136–137 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Multilateral Force, 90–91 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 264–266 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 354–355 [ Pgs. 354–355 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Task force on, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 163–164 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] Safeguards article, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Nuclear - free zones, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 15 n [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 72–73 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] Troop levels, 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 88–89 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 40 ] McNamara Committee. See Special Committee of Defense Ministers under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). McNaughton, John T., 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 394–395 [ Pgs. 394–395 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] Meeker, Leonard C., 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 311 n [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 609–610 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Mendelevich, Lev I., 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] Messmer, Pierre, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Mexico, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] Middle East, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 246–248 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 295 ] Miki, Takeo, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] Military bases, foreign, 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 770–771 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Military budget levels, 93–96 [ Pgs. 93–96 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] Base closings, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 54 ] Cuts in, 27–29 [ Pgs. 27–29 include portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 252–253 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 262 ] Increases for Vietnam conflict, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 222–224 [ Pgs. 222–224 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Soviet, 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Mines, 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 271 ] Missile launchers ( See also Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems), 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Missile sites, 144–145 [ Pgs. 144–145 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 611: Missiles: Anti - ballistic missiles (ABM) ( see also under Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems), 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] Casualty reductions from use of, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] Cold X - ray systems, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] Costs of, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] Gamma ray systems, 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] Hot X - ray systems, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 200 ] Nike - X, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 421–423 [ Pgs. 421–423 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 209 ] Sentinel, 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 296 ] Soviet, see ABMs under Soviet Union below . U.S. deployment of, 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 411–417 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 495–502 [ Pgs. 495–502 include portions of Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 507–509 [ Pgs. 507–509 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 512–515 [ Pgs. 512–515 include portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] U.S. testing of, 287–288 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 337–338 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] China, People's Republic of: ICBMs, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 496–499 [ Pgs. 496–499 include portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 513–514 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 210 ] IRBMs, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] Fixed - base systems, 144–145 [ Pgs. 144–145 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 674–675 [ Pg. 674 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 684–685 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 705–706 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 277 ] French IRBMs, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 202 ] Hardening and dispersal of launchers for, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] Minuteman, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 496–497 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 296 ] Mobile systems, 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 675–676 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 707–709 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 277 ] Nike - Hercules, 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 275 ] Nike - Zeus, 344–345 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 173 ] Pershing, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] Polaris, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 269 ] Poseidon, 423 n [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 296 ] Soviet Union, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 268 ] ABMs, 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 408–410 [ Pgs. 408–410 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 415–416 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 295 ] SAMs, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 181 ] Tallinn system, 412 n [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 427–428 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 667–668 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 692–695 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 709–710 [ Pg. 709 is part of Doc. 277 ] U.S. ability to detect, 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Monnet, Jean, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 46 ] Moore, Adm., 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Moro, Aldo, 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Moroncew, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Morozov, Platon D., 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 347–348 [ Pgs. 347–348 include portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Morse, Wayne, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] Moser, G. William, 184 n [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Moyers, Bill D., 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Multilateral Force (MLF) ( See also Acquisition of nuclear weapons under Germany, Federal Republic of; Atlantic Nuclear Force ), 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19–20 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 254 ] British position, 104–106 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] French position, 154–156 [ Pgs. 154–156 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 164–165 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] German reunification as alternative to, 166–167 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] History and objectives of, 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] Italian participation in, 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 44 ] Missile launchers, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 80–82 [ Pgs. 80–82 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 114–116 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 129–135 [ Pgs. 129–135 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 155–157 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 55 ] British position, 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 228–231 [ Pgs. 228–231 include portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] European clause, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 218–219 [ Pgs. 218–219 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 354–356 [ Pgs. 354–356 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Soviet position, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 103–106 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 132–135 [ Pgs. 132–135 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 230–231 [ Pgs. 230–231 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 256–257 [ Pgs. 256–257 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 259–261 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 263–267 [ Pgs. 263–267 include portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , and Doc. 103 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 153 ] U.S. position, 157–160 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] Veto power in, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Multiple Independently - Targeted Re - entry Vehicles (MIRVs), 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 427–429 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 268 ] SALT talks, 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 641–642 [ Pgs. 641–642 include portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 663–667 [ Pgs. 663–667 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 is part of Doc. 296 ] Murphy, Robert D., 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 755 n [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 297 ] Myrdal, Alva, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Nasser, Gamel Abdul, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] National Intelligence Estimates ( see also Special National Intelligence Estimates ): NIE 11-2 - 63 , 83 n [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] NIE 11-14 - 63 , 84 n [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] NIE 11-2 - 64 , 83–87 [ Pgs. 83–87 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] NIE 11-2 - 65 , 206–208 [ Pgs. 206–208 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] NIE 11-8 - 65 , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] NIE 4-66 , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] NIE 11-3 - 66 , 412 n [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 171 ] NIE 11-8 - 66 , 412 n [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 171 ] NIE 11-11 - 66 , 321–323 [ Pgs. 321–323 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] NIE 11-3 - 68 , 735 n [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 291 ] NIE 11-4 - 68 , 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 332: No. 269 , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 58–59 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] No. 282 , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 58 ] No. 294 , 145–147 [ Pgs. 145–147 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 178–179 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] No. 320 , 121 [ Pg. 121 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] No. 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 178–179 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] No. 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 216–217 [ Pgs. 216–217 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] No. 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 129 ] National Security Agency (NSA), 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] National Security Council (NSC) meetings, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] 528 th, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] 584 th, 558–561 [ Pgs. 558–561 include portions of Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , and Doc. 230 ] 594 th, 739–742 [ Pgs. 739–742 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] June 16, 1964 , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72–74 [ Pgs. 72–74 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] June 9, 1966 , 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] National War College, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 265 ] Navy, U.S., 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Near East. See Middle East . Nehru, Jawaharlal, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 59 ] Neidle, Alan F., 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] Netherlands ( see also Netherlands subheadings under other subjects ), 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Nguyen Van Thieu, Gen., 638 n [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 253 ] Nigeria, 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Nine - Power Conference, London, Oct. 1954 , 299 n [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 116 ] Nitze, Paul H., 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] SALT talks, 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 694–695 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 275 ] Seabed treaty, 593–597 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 608–614 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616–619 [ Pgs. 616–619 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Nixon, Richard M., 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] , 740 n [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons ( see also Non - Proliferation Treaty (NPT)): Assurances to non - nuclear powers, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 163–164 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 166–167 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 481–483 [ Pgs. 481–483 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 601–602 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 768–770 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Belgian position, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] British position, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 231–232 [ Pgs. 231–232 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 393–394 [ Pgs. 393–394 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] British - German talks on, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 54 ] Chinese role in, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 46 ] Czech position, 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] European clause ( See also Multilateral Force (MLF)), 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 218–219 [ Pgs. 218–219 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 354–356 [ Pgs. 354–356 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] French position, 154–157 [ Pgs. 154–157 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 305–307 [ Pgs. 305–307 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 435–436 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 438–439 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 445–446 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Italian position, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 485–486 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Netherlands position, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] Non - aligned countries' U.N. resolution on, 398–400 [ Pgs. 398–400 include portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Polish position, 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Sharing of weapons, 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 274–275 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 106 ] Soviet position, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 186–188 [ Pgs. 186–188 include portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 276–281 [ Pgs. 276–281 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 162 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 129–135 [ Pgs. 129–135 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 160–161 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 167–169 [ Pgs. 167–169 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 245–252 [ Pgs. 245–252 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 297–300 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 368–384 [ Pgs. 368–384 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 386–391 [ Pgs. 386–391 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] Swedish position, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] Task force on, 121–123 [ Pgs. 121–123 include portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 145–150 [ Pgs. 145–150 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 154–168 [ Pgs. 154–168 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 172–182 [ Pgs. 172–182 include portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 91 ] U.S. position, 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 118 n [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 127–128 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] ACDA proposal, 97–110 [ Pgs. 97–110 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 112–117 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 119–120 [ Pgs. 119–120 include portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Response to pressures for proliferation, 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] Treaty proposals, 3–4 [ Pgs. 3–4 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 79–82 [ Pgs. 79–82 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 90–91 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 129 ] Verification of, 106–107 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] Weapons technology, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 277 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ( See also Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee; Non- proliferation of nuclear weapons; Verification), 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] Amending process, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 548–549 [ Pgs. 548–549 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Argentine position, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] Article III. See Safeguards article below . Article VI, 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] Assurances to non - nuclear powers, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 163–164 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 166–167 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 481–483 [ Pgs. 481–483 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 601–602 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 768–770 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Australian position, 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Belgian position, 460–461 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] Brazilian position, 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 765–766 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 768–769 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] British draft, 217–218 [ Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 229–230 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 233–237 [ Pgs. 233–237 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 218 ] German position, 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Italian position, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] British position, 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 228–231 [ Pgs. 228–231 include portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] Canadian draft, 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 233–234 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 91 ] Canadian position, 234–236 [ Pgs. 234–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] Chilean position, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] China, People's Republic of, role in, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] Duration of, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 544–545 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] European unification, effect of, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 445–446 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 184 ] Finnish position, 764–765 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Four - nation draft, 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, effect of, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 571–572 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 635–636 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] French position, 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 600–601 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] German - U.S. talks on, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 435–436 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 438–439 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 649–651 [ Pgs. 649–651 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 445–446 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 454–455 [ Pgs. 454–455 include portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 458–465 [ Pgs. 458–465 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 523–525 [ Pgs. 523–525 include portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 536–538 [ Pgs. 536–538 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] IAEA safeguards on U.S. facilities, 447–448 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 471–474 [ Pgs. 471–474 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] Indian position, 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 559–561 [ Pgs. 559–561 include portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 769 n [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Israeli position, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] Italian position, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 560–561 [ Pgs. 560–561 include portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 764–765 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] Japanese position, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Luxembourg position, 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] Mexican position, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Netherlands position, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] NATO Nuclear Planning Group, effect on, 573–574 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 576–578 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] Nuclear sharing ( See also Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) ; Multilateral Force (MLF)), 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 393–394 [ Pgs. 393–394 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Pakistani position, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Romanian position, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 239 ] Safeguards article, 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 418–421 [ Pgs. 418–421 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 454–464 [ Pgs. 454–464 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 483–492 [ Pgs. 483–492 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 502–506 [ Pgs. 502–506 include portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 515–518 [ Pgs. 515–518 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 520–529 [ Pgs. 520–529 include portions of Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 533–544 [ Pgs. 533–544 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 557–558 [ Pgs. 557–558 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Seabed treaty, effect of, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 236 ] Signing and ratification of, 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 625–626 [ Pgs. 625–626 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 739–741 [ Pgs. 739–741 include portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] South African position, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] Soviet drafts, 256–257 [ Pgs. 256–257 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 505–506 [ Pgs. 505–506 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] Soviet position, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 303–304 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 172 ] Soviet - U.S. joint draft, 558–559 [ Pgs. 558–559 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 268–271 [ Pgs. 268–271 include portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 368–384 [ Pgs. 368–384 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 386–391 [ Pgs. 386–391 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 481–486 [ Pgs. 481–486 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] Swedish position, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] Tabling of, 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 494–496 [ Pgs. 494–496 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] Tanzanian position, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] Tests needed before implementation of, 492–494 [ Pgs. 492–494 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 519–520 [ Pgs. 519–520 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] UAR position, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] U.N. General Assembly resolutions on, 598–603 [ Pgs. 598–603 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.S. drafts, 217–219 [ Pgs. 217–219 include portions of Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , and Doc. 86 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 269–270 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 329–330 [ Pgs. 329–330 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 394–397 [ Pgs. 394–397 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] , 488–489 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 494 n [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 528–529 [ Pgs. 528–529 include portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 305–307 [ Pgs. 305–307 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 221 ] Italian position, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 448–449 [ Pgs. 448–449 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 220 ] U.S. position, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 603–605 [ Pgs. 603–605 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] Yugoslav position, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 768–770 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] North Atlantic Council (NAC) ( see also North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Control post proposal, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] SALT talks, 642–644 [ Pgs. 642–644 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] Meetings: Mar. 2, 1966 , 209 n [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 80 ] Apr. 20, 1967 , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 216 ] Sept. 14, 1967 , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] Dec. 6, 1967 , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 220 ] Nov. 30, 1967 , 536–537 [ Pgs. 536–537 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] July 15, 1968 , 640–641 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 253 ] Ministerial meetings: Dec. 1966 , 406 n [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] May 1967, 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] Dec. 1967, 537 [ Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 217–218 [ Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 229–230 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 447–448 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Nuclear test bans, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 112 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ( see also Multilateral Force; North Atlantic Council ): Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 181–182 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 158 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 189 ] Soviet position, 256–257 [ Pgs. 256–257 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 303–304 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] U.S. position, 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] Non - aggression treaty with Warsaw Pact, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, 475 n [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 475–476 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 573–574 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 576–578 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Meeting, Washington, Apr. 1967 , 475 n [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] Select Committee, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] Soviet position, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 269–271 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 298–299 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 116 ] Special Committee of Defense Ministers, 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 265–266 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 475 n [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] U.S. commitments to, 10–13 [ Pgs. 10–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] U.S. position, 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] Novikov, Vladimir, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Nuclear energy. See Peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear fallout. See Fallout, nuclear . Nuclear - free zones: In Africa, 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] Soviet position, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] U.S. position, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 97 ] IAEA inspection of, 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] In Latin America, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Cuban participation in, 244–247 [ Pgs. 244–247 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Nuclear testing, effect of, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Soviet position, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 549–557 [ Pgs. 549–557 include portions of Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] Principles for, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Soviet position, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] U.S. position, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 176–177 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 71 ] Nuclear Planning Group (NATO), 475–476 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 573–574 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 576–578 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Nuclear reactors. See Reactors, nuclear . Nuclear sharing. See Sharing, nuclear . Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Moscow, Aug. 1963, 47 [ Pg. 47 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 242 ] ABM development, effect of, 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 202 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 56–60 [ Pgs. 56–60 include portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] Violations of, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 183–185 [ Pgs. 183–185 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 188–191 [ Pgs. 188–191 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 199–204 [ Pgs. 199–204 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] Nuclear testing. See Testing of nuclear weapons. Nuclear war ( See also Assurances to non - nuclear powers), 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 656–657 [ Pgs. 656–657 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Nuclear weapons. See Weapons, nuclear. Ogiso, Motoo, 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Organization of African Unity (OAU), 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 116–117 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] Ormsby Gore, David, 16–20 [ Pgs. 16–20 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] Overflights, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Owen, Henry D., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] Pakistan, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 769–770 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Palfrey, John G., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Panama, 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] Panama Canal Zone, 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H., 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] Paraguay, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Pardo, Arvid, 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 236 ] Park Chung Hee, 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] Pastore, John O., 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 472–473 [ Pgs. 472–473 include portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy ( See also Plowshare program): Brazilian position, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] British position, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] Controlled fusion, 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Desalinization, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66–67 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 31 ] Finnish position, 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] French position, 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Italian position, 762–764 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] Japanese position, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Mexican U.N. resolution on, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Nuclear proliferation, effect on, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 64 ] Pakistani position, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices (PNEDS): Excavation with, 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 56–60 [ Pgs. 56–60 include portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 357–361 [ Pgs. 357–361 include portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] Technical talks on, 402–404 [ Pgs. 402–404 include portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167 ] , 722–723 [ Pgs. 722–723 include portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Safeguards over, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Soviet electric power program, 206–208 [ Pgs. 206–208 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Soviet position, 349–351 [ Pgs. 349–351 include portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Swedish position, 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.S. position, 180–181 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] Yugoslav position, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] Pell, Claiborne H., 752 [ Pg. 752 is part of Doc. 296 ] Pen Aids, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 209 ] Penney, William, 43–44 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] Perkins, James A., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Permissive Action Links (PALs), 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Petrosyants, Andronik M., 310 n [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Philippines, 154 [ Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] Phillips, Richard I., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Pindown, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] Pinera, Jose, 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Plowshare program ( See also Peaceful uses of nuclear energy), 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 56–60 [ Pgs. 56–60 include portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 167–168 [ Pgs. 167–168 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] Benham test, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Buggy test, 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] Gasbuggy test, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 197 ] International entity for, 348–351 [ Pgs. 348–351 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Project Cabriolet, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 362–364 [ Pgs. 362–364 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 400–402 [ Pgs. 400–402 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 519–520 [ Pgs. 519–520 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 529–532 [ Pgs. 529–532 include portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] Project Sulky, 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 153–154 [ Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Schooner test, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 401–404 [ Pgs. 401–404 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] Spartan project, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] Stoddard test, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 245 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] Treaty modifications to permit, 357–361 [ Pgs. 357–361 include portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Vulcan test, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Whetstone series, 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] Plutonium ( See also Fissionable materials), 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 43–45 [ Pgs. 43–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 48–49 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 561–564 [ Pgs. 561–564 include portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] , 630,731 Poirier, C. Normand, 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] Poland, 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25–27 [ Pgs. 25–27 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Pollack, Herman, 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Pompidou, Georges, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] Popper, David H., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 384–385 [ Pgs. 384–385 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 714 n [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Post, Tray, 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Povaliy, Col. Gen., 656–657 [ Pgs. 656–657 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, 272–273 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] Project Sulky, 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 58 ] Proper, Datus C., 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Prototype testing, 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Puerto Rico, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 226 ] Puhan, Alfred, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Rabi, I.I., 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Raborn, William F., Jr., 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 321 n [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 337–338 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] Radar, 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 275 ] Radiation ( See also Fallout, nuclear ), 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Rathjens, George W., 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 237 n [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 94 ] Rattray, Alexander L., 229 n [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 88 ] Reactors, nuclear: Conversion from military to commercial, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Kiwi - TNT safety test, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 183–186 [ Pgs. 183–186 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 196–197 [ Pgs. 196–197 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] Reciprocal inspection of, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Shutting down of, 1–2 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 7–8 [ Pgs. 7–8 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Soviet, 207–208 [ Pgs. 207–208 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 199 ] Read, Benjamin H., 277 n [ Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 351–354 [ Pgs. 351–354 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 226 ] Reedy, George, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Reichardt, Charles H., 732 n [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Reis, Herbert K., 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Review Committee on Underground Testing of Nuclear Weapons, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 197 ] Rey, Jean, 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 198 ] Reykjavik Declaration on Mutual Force Reductions, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 254 ] Rieger, Walter, 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Rivkin, Steven R., 64–65 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 60 ] Roche, John P., 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 274 ] Rogers, William, 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Romania, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 438 n [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Roshchin, Alexey A., 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 369–370 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 502–505 [ Pgs. 502–505 include portions of Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 520–521 [ Pgs. 520–521 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 525–526 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 537–538 [ Pgs. 537–538 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 543–546 [ Pgs. 543–546 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 296 ] Rostow, Eugene V., 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Rostow, Walt W., 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 458 n [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 481 n [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 672 n [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 744 n [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 295 ] Arms control, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 137 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 646 [ Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] SALT talks, 583–584 [ Pgs. 583–584 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 673–674 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 687–689 [ Pgs. 687–689 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 717 n [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 287 ] , 738–739 [ Pgs. 738–739 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Indian development of nuclear weapons, 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 396–397 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 162 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 522–524 [ Pgs. 522–524 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , and Doc. 216 ] British position, 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] European clause, 354–356 [ Pgs. 354–356 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Safeguards article, 455–456 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 539–541 [ Pgs. 539–541 include portions of Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] U.S. - Soviet summit meeting, possible, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] , 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Rowan, Carl, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Rowen, Henry, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] Ruina, Jack P., 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] Rusk, Dean, 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 515 n [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 672 n [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 717 n [ Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 725 n [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 287 ] Arms control and disarmament, 16–20 [ Pgs. 16–20 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 194–196 [ Pgs. 194–196 include portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] By small countries, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] Development of U.S. program for, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 129 ] Unilateral, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 311–312 [ Pgs. 311–312 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 365–368 [ Pgs. 365–368 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 237 [ Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 239–243 [ Pgs. 239–243 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 254–256 [ Pgs. 254–256 include portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 7–8 [ Pgs. 7–8 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 is part of Doc. 32 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 25–26 [ Pgs. 25–26 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 758–759 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 77–79 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] Multiple Independently - Targeted Re - entry Vehicles (MIRVs), 663–665 [ Pgs. 663–665 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] SALT talks, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178 ] , 564–567 [ Pgs. 564–567 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 633–637 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 644–646 [ Pgs. 644–646 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 677–680 [ Pgs. 677–680 include portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Soviet position, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] Summit meeting on, possible, 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] U.S. position, 29–31 [ Pgs. 29–31 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Verification issues, 87–89 [ Pgs. 87–89 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] German reunification, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] Military budget levels, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 95–96 [ Pgs. 95–96 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Multilateral Force, 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 132–134 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 155–157 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 26–27 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 80–82 [ Pgs. 80–82 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 121–125 [ Pgs. 121–125 include portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] British position, 231 [ Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 393–394 [ Pgs. 393–394 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] French position, 154–155 [ Pgs. 154–155 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Sharing of weapons, 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 129–135 [ Pgs. 129–135 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 245–250 [ Pgs. 245–250 include portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 268–271 [ Pgs. 268–271 include portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 368–382 [ Pgs. 368–382 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 386–391 [ Pgs. 386–391 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] Task force on, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 516–517 [ Pgs. 516–517 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 649–651 [ Pgs. 649–651 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] Assurances to non - nuclear powers, 481–483 [ Pgs. 481–483 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] Drafts of, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 218 n [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 394–397 [ Pgs. 394–397 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] European unification, effect of, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 184 ] Safeguards article, 418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 463–465 [ Pgs. 463–465 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 477–479 [ Pgs. 477–479 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 483–487 [ Pgs. 483–487 include portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 523–524 [ Pgs. 523–524 include portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 533–537 [ Pgs. 533–537 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 540–542 [ Pgs. 540–542 include portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] U.N. General Assembly resolution on, 598–603 [ Pgs. 598–603 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] Nuclear - free zones, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 244–245 [ Pgs. 244–245 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 549–554 [ Pgs. 549–554 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] Nuclear Non - Proliferation Treaty, German - U.S. talks on, 90–91 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 435–439 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 362–364 [ Pgs. 362–364 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 401–404 [ Pgs. 401–404 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] Seabed treaty, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 595–597 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 608–616 [ Pgs. 608–616 include portions of Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Sino - Soviet dispute, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] Soviet - U.S. relations, 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 15 [ Pg. 15 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 336–340 [ Pgs. 336–340 include portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 342–345 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Uranium/plutonium sales, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 561–562 [ Pgs. 561–562 include portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Visits to Asia and France, Dec. 1966 , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] Russell, Richard, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 293 ] SALT talks. See Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) under Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems. Satellites, communications, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Scandinavia, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] Schaetzel, J. Robert, 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Schroeder, Gerhard, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 295 ] Schuldt, Fred, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Schultze, Charles L., 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 217 ] Scoville, Herbert, Jr., 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 122 n [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 50 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 70–71 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 33 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 78–79 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] Sea of Japan, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Seabed treaty, 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Australian position, 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Japanese position, 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] JCS/Department of Defense position, 580–583 [ Pgs. 580–583 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , and Doc. 235 ] , 585–590 [ Pgs. 585–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 616–619 [ Pgs. 616–619 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 680–683 [ Pgs. 680–683 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] Rio Session of U.N. Seabed Committee, 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Soviet position, 580–581 [ Pgs. 580–581 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] U.S. position, 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 592–596 [ Pgs. 592–596 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 605–616 [ Pgs. 605–616 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 621–622 [ Pgs. 621–622 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Verification of, 582–583 [ Pgs. 582–583 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 586–587 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 683–685 [ Pgs. 683–685 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Seaborg, Glenn T., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 75 n [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] Arms control, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224–227 [ Pgs. 224–227 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Euratom, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 36–38 [ Pgs. 36–38 include portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 43–45 [ Pgs. 43–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 53–54 [ Pgs. 53–54 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 730–731 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 298 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] Multiple Independently - Targeted Re - entry Vehicles (MIRVs), 663–665 [ Pgs. 663–665 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] SALT talks, 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , and Doc. 256 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] International Atomic Energy Agency, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 118–119 [ Pgs. 118–119 include portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 191 ] Task force on, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 471 [ Pg. 471 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 235–236 [ Pgs. 235–236 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 530–532 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] Plutonium sales, 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Seabed treaty, 594–595 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 610–611 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 242 ] Testing of nuclear weapons: Bowline series, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Crosstie series, 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Flintlock series, 210–212 [ Pgs. 210–212 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Latchkey series, 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] Niblick series, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 3 ] Palanquin, 199 n [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Project Cabriolet, 519–520 [ Pgs. 519–520 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Project Sulky, 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 153–154 [ Pgs. 153–154 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Soviet, 170 n [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] Survey of new sites for, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] Test ban treaties and, 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , and Doc. 70 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Whetstone series, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72–74 [ Pgs. 72–74 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 336–338 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 138 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] Seamans, Robert S., 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] Second Special Inter - American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Nov. 1965 , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] Selin, Ivan, 663–664 [ Pgs. 663–664 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Semenov, Vladimir S., 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Senate, U.S., 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 40 ] Appropriations Committee, Department of Defense Subcommittee, 423 n [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] Armed Services Committee, 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 494–495 [ Pgs. 494–495 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] Commerce Committee, 58 [ Pg. 58 is part of Doc. 27 ] Foreign Relations Committee, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] Disarmament Subcommittee, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 573–574 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 239 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, ratification, 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 739–742 [ Pgs. 739–742 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 217 ] Seabed treaty, 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 242 ] Soviet - U.S. Consular Convention, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] Senegal, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Shahi, Agha, 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Sharing, nuclear ( See also Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) ; Multilateral Force (MLF)), 262–263 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 393–394 [ Pgs. 393–394 include portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162 ] Shaver, Thomas R., 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 147 ] Shaw, John P., 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 638–639 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 747 n [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Shaw, Patrick, 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 302 ] Shullaw, J. Harold, 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Shustov (USSR), 503–504 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 205 ] Sianis, Maj. Gen. Pete C., 683 [ Pg. 683 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Silveira da Mota, David, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] Sierra Leone, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Singapore, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Singh, Sardar Swaran, 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 152 ] Sino - Soviet dispute, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Sisco, Joseph J., 112 n [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 311 n [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 383–385 [ Pgs. 383–385 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Sloss, Leon, 573 n [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 232 ] Smirnovskiy, M.N., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 177 ] Smith, Bromley, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 739 n [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Smith, Gerard C., 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 56 ] Smyth, Henry D., 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] Sohier, Walter D., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Sokolovskiy, V.D., 657 [ Pg. 657 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] Solbert, Peter, 68–71 [ Pgs. 68–71 include portions of Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , and Doc. 33 ] Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] Sorensen, Theodore, 9–10 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] SOSUS, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] South Africa, Republic of, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] Southeast Asia, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 252–253 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 138 ] Southwest Africa, 599–600 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 239 ] Soviet bloc, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 279 ] Soviet Union ( see also Sino - Soviet dispute; Soviet Union and Soviet subheadings under other subjects ): Agreements with the U.S. ( see also United States, relations with below ): Air Agreement, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 365 n [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] Consular Convention, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Non - aggression pact proposal, 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Atomic energy program, 83–87 [ Pgs. 83–87 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] Disarmament, 16–20 [ Pgs. 16–20 include portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] Downing of U.S. jet by, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Economic situation, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 654–656 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 735–736 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 751–754 [ Pgs. 751–754 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 114 n [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 133–134 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 102 ] Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, relations with, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Military budget cuts, 27–29 [ Pgs. 27–29 include portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 262 ] Military situation, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 656–657 [ Pgs. 656–657 include portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 734–735 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 750–751 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 296 ] Permissive Action Links, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Sweden, relations with, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] United States, relations with ( see also Agreements with the U.S. above ), 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 135–140 [ Pgs. 135–140 include portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 662–663 [ Pgs. 662–663 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Cultural exchange, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Fisheries, 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] Summit meeting, possible, 689–690 [ Pgs. 689–690 include portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 754–755 [ Pgs. 754–755 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 299 ] Summit meeting at Glassboro, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] Vietnam issues, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 287 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 344–345 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 141 ] Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, relations with, 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Spaak, Paul - Henri, 561 n [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 230 ] Spain, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 223 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates ( see also National Intelligence Estimates ): SNIE 11-10 - 67 , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 639–640 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 257 ] SNIE 11-12 - 68 , 683–685 [ Pgs. 683–685 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] SNIE 11-13 - 68 , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 277 ] SNIE 11-16 - 68 , 732–738 [ Pgs. 732–738 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Spiers, Ronald I., 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] Springsteen, George S., 454 n [ Pg. 454 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 642 n [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 648 n [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Staats, Elmer, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Staden, Berndt von, 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] Star III, 612–613 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] Stevenson, Adlai E., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 227–228 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] Stewart, Michael, 194–196 [ Pgs. 194–196 include portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] , 231–232 [ Pgs. 231–232 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] Stewart, Michael N.F., 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 318 n [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 393 n [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] Strategic Air Command (SAC), 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). See under Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems. Strauss, Franz Josef, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 649–651 [ Pgs. 649–651 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] Submarines, nuclear: Freeze on new construction of, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 is part of Doc. 277 ] Polaris, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 is part of Doc. 269 ] Soviet, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 171 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] Vulnerability of, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 236 ] Suitcase bombs, 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] Sukhodrev, V.M., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] Summit Conference of Independent African States, May 1963, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 44 ] Sweden ( see also Sweden and Swedish subentries under other subjects ), 384 n [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Acquisition of nuclear weapons by, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 100–101 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 138 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] Test ban treaties, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] Verification of arms control agreements, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] Switzerland, 131–133 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 97 ] Symington, Stuart, 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Taiwan, 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] Tanzania, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Tape, Gerald F., 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 includes portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 610–611 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 121–123 [ Pgs. 121–123 include portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 145–149 [ Pgs. 145–149 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 154–164 [ Pgs. 154–164 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 166–168 [ Pgs. 166–168 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Documents: Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] Problems Concerning Alternative Course of Action , 150 [ Pg. 150 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 60 ] Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation , 173–182 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 91 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 76–79 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] Nuclear - free zones, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 5 ] Seabed treaty, 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 612–613 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Taylor, Theodore B., 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] Taylor, Vice Adm. Rufus L., 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 291 ] Tcherniakov, Yuri N., 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 239 ] Testing of nuclear weapons ( See also Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Moscow, Aug. 1963 ; Plowshare program; Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)), 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 200 ] Ad Hoc Panel on Technical Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals, 285–286 [ Pgs. 285–286 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Ajax, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Alluvium testing, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 136 ] Atmospheric testing, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Bowline series, 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Charcoal event, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] China, People's Republic of and, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Costs of, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 242 ] Crosstie series, 480–481 [ Pgs. 480–481 include portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , and Doc. 228 ] Derringer test, 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Detection of, 60 [ Pg. 60 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Effects tests, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] Faultless test, 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] Flintlock series, 210–212 [ Pgs. 210–212 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] France and, 44–45 [ Pgs. 44–45 include portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, position, 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] Greeley test, 328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 134 ] Indian position, 520 [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] Italian position, 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 213 ] Kermet test, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 81 ] Kiwi - TNT, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 183–186 [ Pgs. 183–186 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 196–197 [ Pgs. 196–197 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] Latchkey series, 327–328 [ Pgs. 327–328 include portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Long Shot event, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 197–199 [ Pgs. 197–199 include portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] Niblick series, 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Palanquin, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 199–204 [ Pgs. 199–204 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] Puce test, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] Sepia event, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 81 ] Snaptran test, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 67 ] Soviet Union and, 84–87 [ Pgs. 84–87 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 188–191 [ Pgs. 188–191 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 201–207 [ Pgs. 201–207 include portions of Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 109 ] Spert test, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 67 ] Survey of new testing sites, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] Test bans and, 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , and Doc. 70 ] , 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] United Kingdom and, 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 81 ] Weaknesses in U.S. program, 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Whetstone series, 62–63 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 72–74 [ Pgs. 72–74 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 58 ] Thacher, Peter S., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] Thailand, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Thant, U, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 145 ] Thermonuclear weapons, Soviet, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 79 ] Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, Aug. - Sept. 1964, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Thomas, Peter, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 31 n [ Pg. 31 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 46 n [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 196 n [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 297 n [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 231 ] Arms control and disarmament, 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 93 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Euratom, 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] Fissionable materials production cuts, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 142–143 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 151–152 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 453–454 [ Pgs. 453–454 include portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 467–469 [ Pgs. 467–469 include portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 195 ] Anti - ballistic missiles, 405–407 [ Pgs. 405–407 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169 ] , 409–410 [ Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 442–444 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 507–508 [ Pgs. 507–508 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 742 n [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] SALT talks, 451 [ Pg. 451 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 713–714 [ Pgs. 713–714 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Summit meeting on, possible, 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 297 ] Multilateral Force, 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 112–120 [ Pgs. 112–120 include portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 127–128 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 162 ] Soviet - U.S. talks on, 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 386–388 [ Pgs. 386–388 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] Nuclear - free zones, 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 310 [ Pg. 310 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Sino - Soviet dispute, 161–162 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] Testing of nuclear weapons, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 202–203 [ Pgs. 202–203 include portions of Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT): British position, 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 112 ] China, People's Republic of, position, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] CIA position, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] JCS position, 282–285 [ Pgs. 282–285 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] Soviet military programs, impact on, 321–323 [ Pgs. 321–323 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] U.S. position, 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 334–339 [ Pgs. 334–339 include portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 342–345 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 141 ] Timberlake, Clare H., 91 n [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 40 ] Timberlake mission, 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 5 ] Toon, Malcolm, 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 389 n [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] Toumanoff, Vladimir, 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] Trans - isthmian canal, 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Treasury, U.S. Department of, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 64 ] Tritium, 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 630–632 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 730–731 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] Troop levels, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 193–194 [ Pgs. 193–194 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 225 n [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 102 ] Troyanovsky, O.A., 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] Tsarapkin, Semen K., 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 203–205 [ Pgs. 203–205 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 261–263 [ Pgs. 261–263 include portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] Turkey, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Tyler, William R., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] Uganda, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Underwater arrays, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 87 ] Union of South Africa, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] United Arab Republic (UAR), 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, nuclear aid to, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] Leadership role of, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 246–247 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 249–250 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 212 ] Soviet role in, 771 [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] United Kingdom ( see also United Kingdom and British subheadings under other subjects ): Nuclear weapons, retention of, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] Permissive Action Links, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Treaty of Tlatelolco, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 226 ] United States, relations with, 179–180 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 is part of Doc. 176 ] U.S. nuclear aid to, 178–179 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 64 ] United Nations ( see also Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee; U.N. Charter ; U.N. Disarmament Commission ; U.N. General Assembly ), 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Chinese representation, 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] Conference of Non - Nuclear Weapons States, 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] Seabed treaty, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] Security Council, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] Tripartite Security Assurances Proposal, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] UNCTAD, 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 225 ] U.N. Charter, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 270 ] U.N. Disarmament Commission (UNDC), 198–199 [ Pgs. 198–199 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 212–216 [ Pgs. 212–216 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 763–764 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.N. General Assembly: 18th Session, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 105 ] 19th Session, 68 [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 187–188 [ Pgs. 187–188 include portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] 20th Session, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 108 ] 21st Session, 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] 22d Session, 518 n [ Pg. 518 is part of Doc. 212 ] 23d Session, 600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 762–772 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] 24th Session, 722 [ Pg. 722 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 763–764 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 680 n [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Arms control in small countries, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 42 ] Celestial bodies treaty proposal, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 352–353 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 166 , Doc. 167 , and Doc. 168 ] Disarmament debates, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] First Committee, 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 750 n [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 769–770 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] Fissionable material production halt, 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 122 ] , 503 n [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211 ] , 521–522 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 559–560 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 235 ] Debate on treaty resolution, 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] SALT talks, effect of, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 571–572 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 237 ] Resolutions: 1652 ( XVI ), 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 44 ] 1665 ( XVI ), 107–109 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 64 ] 1884 ( XVIII ), 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] 2028 ( XX ), 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 180 ] 2165 ( XXI ), 771 n [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 302 ] 2454 ( XXIII ), 770–771 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 302 ] 2456 ( XXIII ), 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] General and Complete Disarmament, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 398–400 [ Pgs. 398–400 include portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Irish Resolution, proposed, 1964, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 50 ] Uranium: British purchases of, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 20 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Enrichment of, 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 290 ] French purchases of, 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] German purchases of, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Italian purchases of, 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] Peaceful uses of, 630 [ Pg. 630 is part of Doc. 251 ] Soviet production of, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 84–85 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 97 ] U.S. production cuts in, 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 21–23 [ Pgs. 21–23 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 46–54 [ Pgs. 46–54 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] U.S. sales to Euratom of, 561–564 [ Pgs. 561–564 include portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS), 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 130 ] U.S. Intelligence Board, 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 269 ] U.S. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] Valenti, Jack J., 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 37 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 173 ] Verification Advisory Committee (VERAC), 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] Verification of arms control agreements: Black boxes, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 188 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 191 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 288–291 [ Pgs. 288–291 include portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] Fissionable materials: Production cuts, 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] Production halt, 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 251 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 76–79 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 87–89 [ Pgs. 87–89 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 231 ] SALT talks, 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 639–640 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 670–671 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 277 ] IAEA safeguards, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 418–421 [ Pgs. 418–421 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 447–448 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 454–465 [ Pgs. 454–465 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 269 ] JCS position, 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 293–294 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 267 ] Non - nuclear nations and, 106–107 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 44 ] Seabed treaty, 582–583 [ Pgs. 582–583 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 586–587 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 589–590 [ Pgs. 589–590 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 683–685 [ Pgs. 683–685 include portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Soviet position, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 251 ] Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 283–284 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 138 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 141 ] U.S. position, 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] Vietnam conflict, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 375 n [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 294 ] Bombing pause, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Celestial bodies treaty, 347 [ Pg. 347 is part of Doc. 143 ] Eighteen - Nation Disarmament Committee, effect on, 224–228 [ Pgs. 224–228 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Military budget increases for, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 222–224 [ Pgs. 222–224 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Soviet position, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 219–220 [ Pgs. 219–220 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] Soviet - U.S. relations over, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 716–719 [ Pgs. 716–719 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 287 ] U.S. position, 219 [ Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 is part of Doc. 295 ] Vietnam, Democratic Republic of, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Vietnam, Republic of, 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 120 ] Virgin Islands, U.S., 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 226 ] Von Braun (FRG), 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 239 ] Von Hassel, Kai - Uwe, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 108 ] Vorontsov, Yuly M., 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Wagner, Adolf von, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 232 ] Waldheim, Kurt, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 316–318 [ Pgs. 316–318 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] Walsh, John P., 268 n [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 389 n [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 402 n [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 440 n [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 520 n [ Pg. 520 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 524 n [ Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 723 n [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 285 ] Walske, M. Carl., 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] Warnke, Paul, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Warsaw Pact: Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 195 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 198 ] Non - aggression treaty with NATO, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 15 ] Watson, Arthur K., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Weapons, nuclear ( see also Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) ; Multilateral Force (MLF); Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons; Testing of nuclear weapons): Banning from outer space of, 31–32 [ Pgs. 31–32 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] British - U.S. cooperation in, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 53 ] Conversion to peaceful uses, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 97 ] Elimination of, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 291 ] JCS position, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 242 ] No - first - use proposals, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 223 ] Non - Proliferation Treaty, European clause, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 218–219 [ Pgs. 218–219 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 325–326 [ Pgs. 325–326 include portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 354–356 [ Pgs. 354–356 include portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] Presidential authority over use of, 475–476 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 195 ] Production of, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Soviet capabilities in, 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 206–207 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 79 ] Threats from spread of, 173–174 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] Transfer registration, 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 302 ] U.S. policy, 181–182 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 64 ] Webb, James E., 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] Weber (FRG), 435 [ Pg. 435 is part of Doc. 180 ] Webster, William S., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] Weiler, Lawrence D., 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 566 n [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 231 ] Wenk, Dr., 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 611–612 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 242 ] Werth, G., 358 n [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 147 ] Western European Union (WEU), 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 59 ] Western Suppliers Group, 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Westmoreland, Gen. William, 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 57 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 285 n [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 473 n [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 529 n [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Arms control, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 240–241 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 111 ] Fissionable material production halt, 696 n [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Freezes on strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 758–759 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 300 ] SALT talks, 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 635–636 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 661–664 [ Pgs. 661–664 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Non - proliferation of nuclear weapons, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 63 ] Seabed treaty, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 242 ] Test ban treaty proposals, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 125 ] Weapons, nuclear, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 242 ] Wiggins, James R., 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 740–741 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 293 ] Williamson, Larry, 357 n [ Pg. 357 is part of Doc. 147 ] Wilson, George, 477 [ Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] Wilson, Harold, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 302–304 [ Pgs. 302–304 include portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Wise, Samuel G., 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] World Conference on Disarmament proposal, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 257–258 [ Pgs. 257–258 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] World War II, 138–139 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 97 ] Wyle, Frederick S., 512 n [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 210 ] X - rays, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 236 ] Yarmolinsky, Adam, 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 109 ] York, Herbert F., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 166–167 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Yugoslavia, 214–215 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 768–770 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 302 ] Zambia, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 286 ] Zinchuk, Alexander I., 318 n [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] Zorin, Valerian A., 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 300 ]