FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME IV, VIETNAM, 1966 Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968 Volume IV Vietnam, 1966 United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. Vietnam, 1966 (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV) Contents Preface Sources Abbreviations and Terms Persons Vietnam, 1966 January 1–31: Peace Negotiations During the Bombing Pause; The Decision to Resume Bombing (Documents 1-57) January 31–March 8: The Honolulu Conference; Congressional Hearings on the War (Documents 58-90) March 9–June 28: Buddhist “Struggle Movement”; Emphasis on Non-Military Programs; Escalation of the Bombing (Documents 91-164) June 29–September 18: Exploring Negotiations With North Vietnam and Contacts With the Viet Cong; Reassessing Pacification (Documents 165-238) September 19–November 27: Manila Conference; Debates Over Pacification and Stabilization of the War (Documents 239-317) November 28–December 31: Planning for 1967; Marigold and the Controversy Over Bombing (Documents 318-356) Index Sources Sources The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Departmentʼs Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. When this volume was being compiled, all Department of State records consulted were still under the custody of the Department, and the footnotes citing Department of State files indicate that the Department is the repository. By the time of publication, however, all the Departmentʼs indexed central files for the 1964–1968 period have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Departmentʼs decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period will also be transferred from the Departmentʼs custody to Archives II over the next several years. The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Johnson and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies, including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Agency. The Department of State arranged for access to the many audiotapes of President Johnsonʼs telephone conversations that are held at the Johnson Library. These audiotapes include substantial numbers of telephone conversations between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and key members of Congress. The editor of this volume listened to the audiotapes of President Johnsonʼs 1966 telephone conversations dealing with Vietnam. Transcriptions were then prepared for those portions selected for use in the volume. Although the transcriptions give the substance of the conversations, readers are urged to consult the recordings for a full appreciation of those dimensions that cannot be captured fully in a transcription, such as the speakersʼ inflections and emphases that convey nuances of meaning. At the time of the publication of this volume, the 1966 portion of the Johnson audiotapes had not yet been opened for public review but such opening is expected as part of the program that included the release of the audiotapes for the 1963–1964 period. Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Central Intelligence Agency provides access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency and at the Presidential Libraries. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of identifying the key portions of the intelligence record. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of these agencies, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration. The following list identifies the files and collections the editor used in the preparation of this particular volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of these records is in process. Many of the records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12958, under which all records over 25 years old, except for file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President, should be reviewed for declassification by 2000. Unpublished Sources Department of State Central Files . See National Archives and Records Administration below. Lot Files Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961–1966. Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240 Files of William P. Bundy as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1964–1969. EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lots 69 D 277, 69 D 412, and 70 D 380 Files on Vietnam peace negotiations, including material on the positions and efforts of Communist and non-Communist countries and groups, international organizations, and individuals, 1964–1968. EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167 Files on political and military issues in Vietnam and on trips and meetings of President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and others, 1963, 1965–1969. EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lots 70 D 102, 70 D 233, and 72 D 219 Files of the interagency Vietnam Working Group, 1964–1967. INR Files: Lot 81 D 343 Consolidated files of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99 Copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates. INR/IL Historical Files Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271 Files of Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, 1966–1969. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163 Correspondence between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and between other high officials of the two countries, 1961–1969. Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969, including texts of speeches, miscellaneous correspondence files, White House correspondence, chronological files, and memoranda of telephone conversations. S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 305 Files on Secretary Ruskʼs trip to the Far East, January 1966. S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586 Files on the Manila Conference and the Presidentʼs Asian trip, October-November 1966, and on Secretary Ruskʼs Asian trip, December 1966. S/S-Miscellaneous Vietnam Reports: Lot 70 D 48 Miscellaneous Vietnam reports and briefing books for the years 1949–1968. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265 Master set of papers pertaining to National Security Council meetings, including policy papers, position papers, and administrative documents for the years 1961–1966. S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207 Negotiation books, negotiation background papers, briefing books, and miscellaneous documents on Vietnam, 1965–1968. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files ORG 7 S, trips by Secretary Rusk POL UK-USSR, political relations, United Kingdom-Soviet Union POL US–USSR, political relations, U.S.-Soviet Union POL VIET S, political relations, Vietnam POL 7 CAN, visits and meetings, Canada POL 7 US/LEONHART, visits, William Leonhart POL 14 VIET S, Vietnamese elections POL 15 VIET S, Government of Vietnam POL 15–1 VIET S, Vietnamese head of state/Executive Branch POL 23–8 VIET S, demonstrations, riots, and protests in Vietnam POL 27 VIET S, military operations in Vietnam POL 27 VIET S/PINTA, peace negotiations during the 37-day bombing pause POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA, use of foreign country forces in Vietnam POL 27–7 VIET, prisoners of war POL 27–14 VIET, truce, cease fire, armistice POL 27–14 VIET/ASPEN, peace negotiations code named Aspen POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE, negotiations code named Elmtree POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD, peace negotiations code named Marigold POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ, peace negotiations code named XYZ POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH, defectors from the National Liberal Front Center of Military History, Washington, DC William C. Westmoreland Papers Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia DCI Executive Registry: Job 80–B1676R DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B01285A DDO/EA Files: Jobs 78–000032R, 85–00329R, 92–00428R George Carver Files: Job 80–R01720R GAC Chron O/DDI Registry: Job 79–R01012A Department of Defense, Washington, DC Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson National Security File Agency File McGeorge Bundy Files Country File, Vietnam International Meetings and Travel File Robert W. Komer Files Komer-Leonhart File Memos to the President Name File National Intelligence Estimates National Security Actions Memorandums National Security Council Histories National Security Council Meetings File Walt W. Rostow Files Bromley Smith Files Office Files of the White House Aides S. Douglass Cater Harry C. McPherson Bill D. Moyers Special Files Meeting Notes File Office of the President File Presidentʼs Appointment File (Diary Backup) Presidentʼs Daily Diary Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings White House Central Files Confidential File Subject File Other Personal Papers George Ball Papers McGeorge Bundy Papers Public Statements of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk Papers, Personal Appointment Books Paul Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files William C. Westmoreland Papers Hoover Institution, Palo Alto, California Edward Lansdale Papers Library of Congress, Washington, DC Averell Harriman Papers National Defense University, Washington, DC Maxwell Taylor Papers Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470 Files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961–1968. McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075 Vietnam files of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, 1961–1968. OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 70 A 4662, 70 A 6648, and 70 A 6649 Subject files on Vietnam, 1966, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 70 A 4662, 70 A 6649, 70 A 6648, and 71 A 6489 Subject Files on Vietnam, 1966, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Published Sources Documentary Collections Herring, George, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin, 1983. The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. The Senator Gravel Edition. 4 vols. Boston, 1971. United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Study Prepared by the Department of Defense. Washington, 1971. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). Volume XVIII. Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session, 1966. Washington, DC, 1993. U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966. Washington, 1969. ————. Department of State Bulletin . Washington, 1966. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966. Washington, 1968. The Vietnam Hearings. New York, 1966. Memoirs Ball, George. The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs. New York, 1982. Bui Diem, with David Chanoff. In the Jaws of History . Boston, 1987. Colby, William. Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of Americaʼs Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam. Chicago, 1989. Cooper, Chester. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam . New York, 1970. Gittinger, Ted, ed. The Johnson Years: A Vietnam Roundtable. Austin, Texas, 1993. Humphrey, Hubert. Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics. Garden City, N.Y., 1976. Johnson, Lyndon Baines. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 . New York, 1971. Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US–GVN Performance in Vietnam . Santa Monica, California, 1972. McNamara, Robert S., with Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lesson of Vietnam. New York, 1995. McPherson, Harry. A Political Education . Boston, 1972. Nguyen Cao Ky. Twenty Years and Twenty Days. New York, 1976. Rostow, W.W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York, 1972. Rusk, Dean, as told to Richard Rusk. As I Saw It. New York, 1990. Salisbury, Harrison E. Behind the Lines-Hanoi, December 23, 1966–January 7, 1967 . New York, 1967. Taylor, Maxwell. Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir. New York, 1972 Thant, U. View From the UN. Garden City, New York, 1978. Valenti, Jack. A Very Human President. New York, 1975. Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, New York, 1976. Abbreviations and Terms Abbreviations and Terms AAA, anti-aircraft artillery AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AFC, Armed Forces Council ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States AID, Agency for International Development AP, Associated Press Arc Light, code name for U.S. B–52 bombing strikes in Southeast Asia ARVN, Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam ASA, Association of Southeast Asia ASPAC, Asian Pacific Council Aspen, code name for U.S. peace negotiations through Swedish channels Barrel Roll, code name for U. S. air operations over northern Laos CAP, series indicator for outgoing White House telegrams; combat air patrol; combined action platoon CAS, controlled American source ChiCom, Chinese Communist CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CIAP, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress CIDG, Civilian Irregular Defense Group Chieu Hoi, South Vietnamese Governmentʼs repatriation program for the Viet Cong CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet CINCUSARPAC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific CIP, Commercial Import Program CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff COMUSMACV, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam CONUS, Continental United States CY, calendar year DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission DepSecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deptel, Department of State telegram DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DepCOMUSMACV, Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam DirGen, Director General Dissem, dissemination DMZ, Demilitarized Zone DOD, Department of Defense DTG, date-time-group DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs prior to November 1, 1966), Department of State EA/ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State EA/DDO, East Asia Division, Directorate for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency EA/VN, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State Elmtree, code name for U.S. contacts with Nguyen Khanh and Le Van Truong in Paris Embtel, Embassy telegram EST, Eastern Standard Time EW, electronic warfare Exdis, exclusive distribution FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FE/VN, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FNL, National Liberation Front FMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office FonMin, Foreign Minister FRC, Federal Records Center FULRO, Unified Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, a movement for Monta-gnard autonomy FW, Free World FWF, Free World Forces FWMAF, Free World Military Assistance Forces FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information George, code name for Paul Sturm in Elmtree contacts GOF, Government of France Gp, Group GRC, Government of the Republic of China GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare HMG, Her Majestyʼs Government Hop Tac, South Vietnamese Governmentʼs program for pacification of Saigon and surrounding provinces; literally “victory” ICC, International Control Commission ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross IMF, International Monetary Fund Info, information INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs JCRR, Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum JGS, Joint General Staff, Vietnamese Armed Forces JUSPAO, Joint United States Public Affairs Office KIA, killed in action Limdis, limited distribution LOC, line of communication Louisiana, code name for U.S. effort to secure additional foreign country forces for the Vietnam War M, million MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MAP, Military Assistance Program Marigold, code name for U.S. peace negotiations through Polish and Italian channels McN, Robert McNamara MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs MIG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO, non-commissioned officer NFLSV, National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam NLF, National Liberation Front NIE, National Intelligence Estimate Nina, code name for Department of State communications concerning the decision in late June 1966 to bomb POL installations NM, nautical miles Nodis, no distribution Noforn, no foreign distribution NSA, National Security Agency NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NVA, North Vietnamese Army NVN, North Vietnam OAS, Organization of American States OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense O/B, order of battle O/DDI, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency ONE, Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency OCO, Office of Civil Operations OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense P, President; piasters PAT, Political Action Team PAVN, Peopleʼs Army of (North) Vietnam PF, Popular Forces PFF, Police Field Forces; usually referred to as National Police Field Forces (NPFF) Pinta, code name for U.S. peace negotiations during the 37-day bombing pause P.L., Public Law PM, Prime Minister POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants POLAD, Political Adviser POW, prisoner of war PW, prisoner of war PX, post exchange Ray, code name for Nguyen Khanh in the Elmtree contacts RD, Revolutionary Development Recce, reconnaissance Reftel, reference telegram RF, Regional Forces RG, Record Group ROK, Republic of Korea Rolling Thunder, code name for long-running program of U.S. air operations in North Vietnam RT, Rolling Thunder RVN, Republic of South Vietnam RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces S, Secret SAM, surface to air missiles SANE, National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy SAR, search and rescue SAVA, Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency SEA, Southeast Asia SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SecDef, Secretary of Defense Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washington Septel, separate telegram SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate Sitrep, situation report S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State Steel Tiger, code name for U.S. air strikes against the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos SVN, South Vietnam SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations Tac, tactical TAOR, tactical area of responsibility TCC, troop contributing countries Thich, Venerable (title for Buddhist monk) Thrush, code name for U.S. operation to secure the defection of National Liberation Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from Washington TS, Top Secret U, Unclassified UBA, Unified Buddhist Association UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations Uncle, code name for Nguyen Huu An in the Thrush contacts UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UPI, United Press International Urtel, your telegram USAID, United States Agency for International Development Mission (in Vietnam) USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USOM, United States Operations Mission USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations VC, Viet Cong VIP, very important person VIS, Vietnamese Information Service VN, Vietnam; Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State VNAF, (South) Vietnamese Air Force VNCC, Vietnam Coordinating Committee VNQDD, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party) VP, Vice President WAC, Womenʼs Army Corps WAVES, Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service WH, White House X, code name for Mai Van Bo XYZ, code name for unofficial U.S. contacts with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through Mai Van Bo Y, code name for Paul Sturm in the XYZ contacts Z, Zulu or Greenwich Mean Time Persons Persons Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State, 1949–1953 Akalovsky, Alexander, Political Officer at the Embassy in the Soviet Union Albert, Carl, Representative (D-Oklahoma), House Majority Leader Alsop, Joseph W., journalist, author, and syndicated columnist Arends, Leslie C., Representative (R-Illinois), House Minority Whip Armstrong, Oscar Vance, Consul in Hong Kong until August 1966 Ayub Khan, Field Marshal Muhammad, President of Pakistan Baldwin, Hanson W., author and Military Editor for The New York Times Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State until September 30, 1966 Bates, William H., Representative (R-Massachusetts), ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee Bell, David E., Administrator of the Agency for International Development until July 1966 Black, Eugene, Special Adviser to the President for Southeast Asia Blouin, Rear Admiral F. J., USN, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Boggs, Hale, Representative (D-Louisiana) Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France Bolton, Frances P., Representative (R-Ohio), ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee Bow, Frank T., Representative (R-Ohio), ranking Republican on the House Appropriations Committee Bowles, Chester, Ambassador to India Bradley, General Omar N., USA, Ret., former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Brown, George, British Foreign Minister from August 10, 1966 Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador to the United Kingdom Bui Diem, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister and then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Ambassador to the United States from December 1966 Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966 Bundy, William P., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (retitled Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on November 1, 1966) Byrnes, James F., Secretary of State, 1945–1947 Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to Burma Califano, Joseph A., Jr., Special Assistant to the President Cao, see Huynh Van Cao Cao Van Vien, General, ARVN, Chief of the Joint General Staff Carver, George, member of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, until late September 1966; thereafter Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency Castello Branco, General Humberto de Alencar, President of Brazil Christian, George, Press Secretary to the President from February 1, 1967 Chuan, see Nguyen Van Chuan Church, Frank, Senator (D-Idaho) Clifford, Clark M., lawyer and one of the “Wise Men” who served as unofficial advisers to President Johnson Co, see Nguyen Huu Co Colby, William E., Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency Cooper, Chester, member of the National Security Council Staff until April 1966; Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman from September 1966 Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Foreign Minister Dang Van Quang, General, ARVN, Commander of IV Corps until November 1966 De Gaulle, Charles, President of France Dean, Arthur, lawyer and one of the “Wise Men” who served as unofficial advisers to President Johnson Dean, Sir Patrick, British Ambassador to the United States Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, President of Mexico Dirksen, Everett McKinley, Senator (R-Illinois), Senate Minority Leader Do, see Tran Van Do Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States DʼOrlandi, Giovanni, Italian Ambassador to Vietnam Douglas, Paul H., Senator (D-Illinois) Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961 Emrick, Lieutenant General Paul S., USAF, Chief of Staff, Pacific Command Fanfani, Amintore, Italian Foreign Minister Fenoaltea, Sergio, Italian Ambassador to the United States Ford, Gerald R., Representative (R-Michigan), House Minority Leader Fortas, Abe, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court and unofficial adviser to President Johnson Fowler, Henry H., Secretary of the Treasury Franco y Bahamonde, General Francisco, Spanish Prime Minister and Chief of State Freeman, Orville H., Secretary of Agriculture Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Gandhi, Indira, Indian Prime Minister from January 24, 1966 Gardner, John W., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Gaud, William S., Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development until August 1, 1966; thereafter Administrator Gavin, Lieutenant General James M., USA, Ret., author of War and Peace in the Space Age and former Ambassador to France George, see Sturm, Paul Giap, see Vo Nguyen Giap Ginsburgh, Colonel Robert, member of the National Security Council Staff from summer 1966 Gleysteen, Culver, Political Officer at the Embassy in France until September 1966 Goldberg, Arthur J., Representative to the United Nations Gonard, Samuel, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Goodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew J., USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to July 31, 1966; Director of the Joint Staff from August 1, 1966 Gore, Albert, Senator (D-Tennessee) Greene, General Wallace M., Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister Gronouski, John A., Ambassador to Poland Gullion, Edmund, unofficial U.S. envoy (“X”) in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van Bo Habib, Philip C., Political Officer at the Embassy in Vietnam Hammarskjold, Dag, former Secretary-General of the United Nations Harkins, General Paul D., Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1962–1964 Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador at Large Hayden, Carl, Senator (D-Arizona), President Pro Tempore and Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee Helble, John J., Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until June 30, 1966; thereafter Director of Central Intelligence Hickenlooper, Bourke B., Senator (R-Idaho) Hoang Xuan Lam, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps from May 1966 Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Ho Giac, Buddhist leader and orator Holt, Harold, Australian Prime Minister from January 26, 1966 Holyoake, Keith, Prime Minister of New Zealand Hoopes, Townsend W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Hornig, Donald F., Special Assistant to the President Hughes, Thomas L., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States Huynh Van Cao, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps from mid-May to late May 1966 Janczewski, Zbigniew, Polish Foreign Ministry official Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R-New York) Jean, see Vo Van Sung Jenkins, Walter E., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Poland from July 1966 Johnson, General Harold K., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until October 9, 1966; Ambassador to Japan from November 8, 1966 Jorden, William J., member of the National Security Council Staff from May 1966 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Attorney General until September 1966; Under Secretary of State from October 3, 1966 Kennan, George F., author and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Kennedy, John F., President of United States, January 20, 1961–November 22, 1963 Kennedy, Robert F., Senator (D-New York) Keppel, Francis, Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare until April 1966 Khanh, see Nguyen Khanh Kissinger, Henry, professor of Government at Harvard University and Consultant to the Department of State Kistiakowsky, George B., professor of Chemistry at Harvard University and Vice President of the National Academy of Sciences Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until November 14, 1966; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from November 29, 1966 Komer, Robert W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until March 28, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President; Acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during March 1966 Koren, Henry L. T., Deputy to Deputy Ambassador Porter from July 1966 Kosygin, Alexei N, Soviet Premier Kraft, Joseph, journalist, author, and syndicated columnist Krulak, Lieutenant General Victor H., USMC, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Kuchel, Thomas H., Senator (R-California) Ky, see Nguyen Cao Ky Lam, see Hoang Xuan Lam Lansdale, Edward G., Special Assistant to Ambassador Lodge Leoni, Raul, President of Venezuela Leonhart, William K., Deputy to Robert W. Komer from March 28, 1966 Le Van Truong (code named “Mr. Out”), Vietnamese proponent of Cochinchinese autonomy residing in Europe in 1966 Lewandowski, Januscz, Polish Representative to the International Control Commission Lippmann, Walter, author and journalist Loan, see Nguyen Ngoc Loan Lodge, Henry Cabot, Ambassador to Vietnam Long, Russell B., Senator (D-Louisiana), Senate Majority Whip Lovett, Robert A., banker and one of the “Wise Men” who served as unofficial advisers to President Johnson Lynd, Staughton, history professor at Yale University Lucet, Charles E., French Ambassador to the United States Mahon, George H., Representative (D-Texas), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee Mai Van Bo (code named “Rupert”), Commercial Representative in Paris of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Manacʼh, Etienne, Director of Asian Affairs, French Foreign Ministry Mann, Charles A., Director of the USAID Mission in Vietnam until August 1966 Mansfield, Mike, Senator (D-Montana), Senate Majority Leader Marcos, Ferdinand, President of the Philippines Marks, Leonard H., Director of the United States Information Agency Martin, Graham A., Ambassador to Thailand Martin, Paul J., Canadian Foreign Minister McBride, Robert H., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in France McCafferty, Arthur, Supervisor of White House Situation Room McCarthy, Eugene J., Senator (D-Minnesota) McCloy, John J., lawyer and one of the “Wise Men” who served as unofficial advisers to President Johnson McConaughy, Walter P., Ambassador to Pakistan until May 17, 1966 McConnell, General John P., Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force McCormack, John W., Representative (D-Massachusetts), Speaker of the House McDonald, Admiral David L., Chief of Naval Operations McGovern, George S., Senator (D-South Dakota) McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense McNaughton, John T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs McPherson, Harry C., Jr., Special Counsel to the President Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Adviser to the Department of State Menzies, Robert G., Australian Prime Minister until January 26, 1966 Michalowski, Jerzy, Director-General, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Miller, Robert H., Director, Vietnam Working Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State Molotov, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Foreign Minister, 1946–1949 Morgan, Thomas E., Representative (D-Pennsylvania), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Morse, Wayne, Senator (D-Oregon) Moyers, Bill D., Special Assistant and Press Secretary to the President Mundt, Karl E., Senator (R-South Dakota) Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of the United Arab Republic Nehru, B. K., Indian Ambassador to the United States Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Vice Marshal, VNAF, Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Chanh Thi, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps until March 10, 1966 Nguyen Chi Thanh, General, Head of the Central Office for South Vietnam, the headquarters for North Vietnamese control of Vietcong forces Nguyen Duc Thang, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Minister of Rural Construction/Revolutionary Development Nguyen Huu An, Permanent Secretary of the Vietnamese Red Cross (code named Uncle in the Thrush contacts) Nguyen Huu Co, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front Nguyen Khanh, former Vietnamese Premier and intermediary in the Elmtree contacts with Le Van Truong Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Colonel, Director of the Vietnamese Military Security Service; Director General of the National Police from April 1966 Nguyen Van Chuan, General, ARVN, Commander of I Corps, March-April 1966 Nguyen Van Thieu, General, ARVN, Vietnamese Chief of State Nhuan, see Pham Xuan Nhuan Nilsson, Torsten, Swedish Foreign Minister Nkrumah, Kwame, President of Ghana until February 24, 1966 Out, see Le Van Truong Owen, Henry D., Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from June 19, 1966 Park, Chung Hee, President of Korea Pearson, Lester, Canadian Prime Minister Pell, Claiborne, Senator (D-Rhode Island) Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Pham Xuan Nhuan, General, ARVN, Commander of the 1st Infantry Division from March to June 1966 Phan Huy Quat, Vietnamese Premier, February 16–June 11, 1965 Pike, Douglas E., Attache and Assistant Chief of the Planning Division at the Embassy in Vietnam Poats, Rutherford, Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development Pompidou, Georges, French Premier Porter, William J., Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam Quang, see Dang Van Quang Quat, see Phan Huy Quat Raborn, Vice Admiral William F., Jr., USN, Ret., Director of Central Intelligence until June 30, 1966 Rapacki, Adam, Polish Foreign Minister Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department Reedy, George E., Special Assistant and Press Secretary to the President until July 8, 1965 Reischauer, Edwin O., Ambassador to Japan until August 19, 1966 Reston, James B., journalist and Associate Editor, The New York Times Ridgway, General Matthew B., USA, Ret., Army Chief of Staff, 1953–1955 Rivers, L. Mendel, Representative (D-South Carolina), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Roche, John P., Special Consultant to the President from September 8, 1966 Ronning, Chester, retired Canadian Foreign Service officer who met with North Vietnamese leaders in March and June 1966 Ropa, Donald W., member of the National Security Council Staff Rostow, Eugene V., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966 Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council until March 31, 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President Rupert, see Mai Van Bo, Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Russell, Richard B., Senator (D-Georgia), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sainteny, Jean, former French colonial official in Indochina who met with North Vietnamese leaders in July 1966 Saltonstall, Leverett, Senator (R-Massachusetts) Sato, Eisaku, Japanese Prime Minister Sharp, Admiral Ulysses S. Grant, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Shastri, Lal Bahadur, Indian Prime Minister until January 10, 1966 Shelepin, Alexandr N., Secretary of the Central Committee, Soviet Communist Party Shiina, Etsusaburo, Japanese Foreign Minster until December 3, 1966 Sieverts, Frank, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State from March 1966 Smathers, George A., Senator (D-Florida) Smith, Bromley K., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Sorensen, Theodore, Special Counsel to President Kennedy and Special Counsel to President Johnson until February 1964 Souvanna Phouma, Prince, Laotian Prime Minister Sparkman, John J., Senator (D-Alabama) Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until September 1966 Starbird, Lieutenant General Alfred D., USA, Director, Defense Communications Agency Steadman, John M., Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Stearns, Monteagle, Special Assistant to Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman Stewart, Michael, British Foreign Minster until August 10, 1966 Stewart, Michael N.F., Minister, British Embassy in Washington Sturm, Paul, unofficial U.S. envoy (“Y”) in the XYZ negotiations with Mai Van Bo and Vo Van Sung; unofficial U.S. envoy (“George”) in the Elmtree contacts with Le Van Truong Sullivan, William H., Ambassador to Laos Symington, Stuart, Senator (D-Missouri) Tam Chau, leader of Buddhists in Saigon Tam Giac, Buddhist leader Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Ret., Special Consultant to the President Thai, see Vu Van Thai Thanat Khoman, Colonel, Thai Foreign Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal, Thai Prime Minister and Defense Minister Thang, see Nguyen Duc Thang Thant, U, Secretary General of the United Nations Thi, see Nguyen Chanh Thi Thien Minh, Buddhist leader Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu Tho, see Nguyen Huu Tho Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador at Large until December 26, 1966 Thomsen, Samuel B., Principal Officer at the Consulate in Hue until August 1966 Thomson, James C., Jr., member of the National Security Council Staff until September 1966 Tran Quoc Buu, Vietnamese labor leader Tran Van Do, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tri Quang, Buddhist leader and key figure in the direction of the Struggle Forces Tubby, Roger W., Representative-designate to the European Office of the United Nations Unger, Leonard S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Valenti, Jack, Special Assistant to the President until May 15, 1966 Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense Vien, see Cao Van Vien Vinh Loc, General, ARVN, Commander of II Corps Vo Nguyen Giap, General, PAVN, Minister of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam Vo Van Sung (code named Jean), Deputy to Mai Van Bo Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Walt, Lieutenant General Lewis W., Commander of the U.S. III Marine Amphibious Force and I Corps Senior Adviser Wehrle, Leroy S., Associate Director and Economic Counselor, USAID Mission in Vietnam Westmoreland, General William C., USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 23, 1966 Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister Wilson, Samuel V., Saigon Mission Coordinator X, see Gullion, Edmund Y, see Paul Sturm Zorthian, Barry, Minister-Counselor for Information at the Embassy in Vietnam and head of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office January 1–31: Peace Negotiations During the Bombing Pause; The Decision to Resume Bombing January 1–31: Peace Negotiations During the Bombing Pause; The Decision to Resume Bombing 1. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, January 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:04 a.m. 2. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 3, 1966, 11:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 3. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 3, 1966, 12:55–2:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes by hand; they were typed later, apparently shortly after President Johnson left office. The editor has checked this typescript and the typescripts of all subsequent Valenti notes for accuracy against Valentiʼs handwritten notes and has made minor corrections. (Ibid., Office of the President File, “Valenti, Jack, Notes Taken at Various Meetings During 1965 and 1966”) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) 4. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, January 3, 1966, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; XYZ. Drafted by Paul Sturm (identified as “Y” in the telegram) and authenticated by Culver Gleysteen. For documentation on earlier contacts of Edmund Gullion (“X”) of the United States with Mai Van Bo (“Rupert”) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 312–316, 319, 328–332, 334–337, and 367–371. 5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, January 4, 1966, 9:42 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Unger and by McGeorge Bundy in substance, and approved by William Bundy. 6. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, January 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 a.m. and passed to the White House at 9:40. McGeorge Bundy forwarded it to President Johnson at 2:30 p.m. under a covering memorandum that stated: “Here is an important dispatch from Lodge. As you can see, he is still pulling hard for a quick end to the pause.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 7. Summary Notes of the 555th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, January 5, 1966, 5:45–6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 8. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) New York, January 6, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. In a January 7 covering memorandum under which he forwarded the letter to Read for dispatch to Saigon, Sisco noted that it had been requested by the President and read and approved by Rusk and Ball. (Ibid.) 9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, January 6, 1965, 5:07 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Literally Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and in substance by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the White House. 10. Memorandum From James Thomson and Donald Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret. 11. Memorandum From Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Fortas to President Johnson Washington, January 7, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966. Secret. The source text is stamped: “Sec Def has seen, 8 Jan 1966.” 12. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State Tokyo, January 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:18 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this telegram to President Johnson at 1:30 p.m. on January 8 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Harriman fires all his arguments at us on keeping the Pause going.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 13. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. McNamara forwarded the memorandum to Rusk on January 19. (Ibid.) 14. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 10, 1966, 1:10–2:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. 15. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 11, 1966, 1:05–2:05 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. In a memorandum written at 1 p.m. on January 11, McGeorge Bundy told President Johnson that the “main point” of the meeting with Bell was “simply to emphasize the importance of the non-military effort by having Bell report on the record to you.” (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 11, 1966, 8:55 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-XYZ. Drafted by Read, Springsteen, and William Bundy and approved by Ball. 17. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Honolulu, January 12, 1966, 0205Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV, and passed to the State Department and White House. 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, January 12, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:33 a.m. 19. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) Washington, January 12, 1966, 2:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II. No classification marking. 20. Telegram From the Embasy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, January 13, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:52 a.m. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to President Johnson at 11 a.m. on January 13 under cover of a memorandum stating that Lodge “is as optimistic as McNamara is pessimistic about the timing and likelihood of straight military success as against pacification. But I think he is right in his notion that the two should be kept separate in our minds.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 21. Report Prepared by the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Porter) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) Washington, January 13, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Jan 1966. Secret. Drafted by Unger. The report was addressed to Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Bell, McGeorge Bundy, and Lodge. 22. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 14, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. Secret. 23. Memorandum of Conversation Saigon, January 15, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Prepared by Habib. The meeting was held at the Gia Long Palace in Saigon. A memorandum of Secretary Ruskʼs conversation with Prime Minister Ky on the same day is ibid. On January 16 Rusk and Ky issued a joint communique, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 31, 1966, pp. 155–156. Ruskʼs stopover in Saigon followed his visit to New Delhi January 12–13 to attend Prime Minister Shastriʼs funeral and his meeting in Bangkok on January 14 with senior Thai officials. Rusk met with President Marcos in Manila on January 16 and returned to Washington on January 19. 24. Editorial Note 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, January 17, 1966, 7:16 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House. 26. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 17, 1966, 9:15 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.02, Side A, PNOs 1 and 2. No classification marking. The transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 27. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, January 18, 1966. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 54, Folder B, “Joint Staff Papers, 1965–66.” Top Secret. 28. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson Washington, January 19, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret; Limited Distribution. In his January 20 covering memorandum forwarding Bellʼs report to the President, McGeorge Bundy stated: “I think you will find it well worth reading all the way through. I agree with nearly all of it, and so does Bob McNamara.” (Ibid.) See Document 15 for Bellʼs oral report to the President on his trip. 29. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson Washington, January 19, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7 p.m. on January 19, noting in his covering memorandum that he agreed that it was right to follow up quickly Hanoiʼs approach to Souvanna but that he thought that Ball “somewhat overstates its significance.” (Ibid.) 30. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, January 20, 1966. Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam—Intelligence Estimates. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. A copy is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. 31. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 20, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Also sent to Ball. 32. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 20, 1966, 5:54–6:31 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) 33. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State Rangoon, January 21, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:46 p.m. and forwarded to President Johnson by McGeorge Bundy at 4:15 p.m. with the observation that “the man from Hanoi has nothing to say.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19) 34. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. 35. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 22, 1966, noon-2:12 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, January 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII, Late Vietnam. Top Secret. Neither the original nor a copy of the memorandum has been located in the White House files at the Johnson Library. 37. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State Moscow, January 24, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:30 p.m. and passed to the White House. 38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. For text of Ruskʼs testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. XVIII, pp. 133–187. 39. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 24, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a note from Juanita Roberts, the Presidentʼs secretary, dated January 24, 6:10 p.m., that reads: “For your meeting at 6:15 p.m.” 40. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 24, 1966, 6:30–7:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 41. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson Washington, January 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Secret; Nodis. During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on January 26, President Johnson discussed this memorandum briefly with Ball and Rusk and indicated that he had read it. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 42. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson Washington, January 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Top Secret. 43. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 25, 1966, 5:30–7:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 44. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, January 26, 1966. Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 45. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:40 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 46. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 26, 1966, 1:25–1:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 47. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 26, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–7 VIET. Top Secret. 48. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 26, 1966, 7:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Secret. 49. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:55 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. In response to a request from the President, General Wheeler prepared a 2-page commentary on the message from Pakistani President Ayub Khan, explaining why he disagreed with Ayubʼs major points and noting that the Joint Chiefs had “previously given such alternatives full consideration” and had “rejected them.” (CM–1146–66, January 31; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Vietnam 381, Jan-Sept 66) 50. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 27, 1966, 6:20–8:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 51. Memorandum Washington, January 28, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. The source text is unsigned but the memorandum was presumably prepared by William Bundy. 52. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 28, 1966, 1:20–3:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President was out of the room from 2:40 to 2:55 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 53. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 29, 1966, 11:35–12:40 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Presidentʼs office. 54. Notes of Meeting Washington, January 29, 1966, 12:45–1:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Presidentʼs office. 55. Summary Notes of the 556th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, January 29, 1966, 1:20–2:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Valenti also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) 56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, January 29, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret; Nodis; Pinta. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. (Ibid.) 57. Editorial Note 1. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, January 1, 1966. 2343. For the Secretary from Lodge. 1. Thank you for your 1851 2 and 1853. 3 It is good to know of the efforts which we are making to end the bloodshed and bring this war to the conference table. I only hope we are successful. 2. However, one thing in your messages is most disturbing. That is the reference to possible independent Viet Cong participation in the talks. 3. Our traditional—and commendable—position on that subject has been that the Viet Cong can then [participate?] as part of the Hanoi delegation or that they would have no difficulties making themselves heard, presumably through the Hanoi delegation or some other indirect means. This position combines firm adherence to principle with a demonstrated desire to be conciliatory and not to let little things stand in our way. 4. Actually inviting the Viet Cong to the table, however, under any formula, would be no little thing. It would have the most serious consequences here in Viet Nam and of our international position, and would be very unwise, for the following reasons: A. Even if the Viet Cong did not join the talks, our invitation would automatically give an aura of legitimacy to the apparatus of terror and intimidation which the Viet Cong have set up in South Viet Nam. Viet Cong cells and agents would immediately stand up and claim to represent the true government. They would initiate an even more ruthless campaign of terror in the country and would also rapidly take over administrative functions. The population would be at their mercy. Nobody would dare to resist them because they would be able to claim that they are no longer bandits but members of a legitimate organization whose claim to speak for the people of South Viet Nam has been recognized by the United States. The result is that we would find the country literally swept out from under us. B. Affirming the position of GVN as sole legitimate government of South Viet Nam will be pretty empty talk if we have accepted a Viet Cong regime competitive with it. We should realize that such a blow is one which the present [government?] cannot survive. It would produce political chaos among democratic elements in South Viet Nam, and would prompt fence-sitting elements to go neutralist quickly and pave the way for a Communist take-over. It would thus undercut our military effort. C. The formula suggested by Rapacki is even more dangerous. If the Soviets invite the Viet Cong to sit at the table, and we invite the GVN and the Buddhists, Catholics, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and others, then the Viet Cong, which claim to represent all South Viet Nam political, religious, and minority groups, would be unaffected by the other invitations. Only the power and influence of the GVN (if it could even consent to such an arrangement) would suffer from such a situation. The Viet Cong, having been legitimized by our invitation to the conference table, would claim to represent the wave of the future. Other groups would try to make their peace with them, and we would have no choice but to accept defeat and to leave Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, equating the Viet Cong, which is a rebel murder group, with peaceful law abiding organizations, in particular the great and noble Roman Catholic Church can only make sense to a Communist. It strikes at the heart of our moral position in Viet Nam. If “world opinion” believes otherwise, it is up to us to educate world opinion rather than yield to it. We cannot in good conscience ignore the facts. D. We appear politically and morally unaware when we take at face value and unquestioningly accept the Viet Cong description of themselves as a “National Liberation Front” or Hanoiʼs description of itself as the “Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.” Actually, the Viet Cong is an “enslavement front,” and the Hanoi regime is not only not democratic nor republican but dictatorial and Communist. E. In attaching importance to the role of the Viet Cong we are focusing on a question which does not concern Hanoi very much but which does concern Saigon and our position vitally. Hanoi has often told us that it does not consider the presence of the Viet Cong at the bargaining table to be as important an issue as several other questions. Therefore, if we cave in on the Viet Cong representation question, we are not going to get much in return from Hanoi but we will have struck a deadly blow at the non-Communists in South Viet Nam. F. By offering recognition and a direct voice to the Viet Cong, we would be making another concession in an effort to bring about talks, whereas Hanoi so far has made none. Hanoi would assume that we are anxious for talks, that we would make further concessions, and they would toughen their attitude rather than soften it. We would therefore be strengthening the voice of those elements in Hanoi which claim that America is a paper tiger and that we cannot maintain our determination in a long struggle. 5. I cannot help but be reminded of the Communist effort in 1953 to get the Soviet Union seated as a neutral at the Korean peace conference. It was a particularly outrageous and thoroughly impotent attempt inasmuch as the Soviet Union had actively sided and abetted the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans. But Krishna Menon and others were able to wrap it up in the cotton wool of sophistry and some of our “enlightened” press and politicians discussed it more solemnly and respectfully than they did most State Department proposals. We had to work hard for several months to get rid of it. To propose treating these murderous Viet Cong dragonʼs teeth in Viet Nam as a respectable government is just as outrageous and it would be wiser to step on it early rather than let it gain currency—and respectability—among the unthinking. 6. I have discussed this issue at great length in this telegram because I believe it is so vital to our position here that we cannot afford to yield on it if we want to keep our position in Southeast Asia and to maintain the integrity of our commitments around the world. It would collapse the GVN, would be regarded as the beginning of a Communist take-over, and would disintegrate virtually everything that we have worked so hard to create. This is not a simple matter of stubborn adherence to meaningless legalism but a crucial issue of substance. I hope that you and our emissaries abroad at this critical juncture will quickly and unequivocally reaffirm our previous stand. 7. If I may comment on 1851, let me submit that para 3 (A) is dangerously unrealistic. All experience shows that “a period of calm and tranquility” is not conducive to Communist cooperation. On the contrary, results can only be expected in negotiations with the Communists by the application of military pressures before the talks begin and while they are in progress. See Panmunjon. 8. The statement in 3 (A) of 1851 that “the U.S. expects that the Vietnam side will reciprocate with a parallel gesture” is an unsound expectation which would only be valid if Hanoi consisted of Americans who value human life and deeply want peace, but, as Hanoi consists of Communists who are contemptuous of human life and want to conquer, the expectation is false. Also, the reference to “mutual desire” is not clear since the Communist side has made none. 9. Para 3 (C) of 1851 states that the U.S. is “flexible” concerning the Viet Cong and “is ready to consider the possibilities of talks in all variations and with different participants including also the National Liberation Front.” This is dangerous for the reasons stated above. This is one issue on which flexibility can be fatal. 4 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 2:04 a.m. 2 Dated December 31, 1965, telegram 1851 was a retransmission of telegram 1073 from Warsaw, December 30. For text of telegram 1073, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 751 – 753 . 3 For text, see ibid., pp. 753 – 755 . 4 In telegram 1865 to Saigon January 1, Rusk thanked Lodge for telegram 2343 and responded: “Your reasoning is compelling and reflects my own evaluation of problem of Viet Cong representation.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 2. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 2. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 3, 1966, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECT The Peace Offensive—where we are today 1. With the Communists The Communists directly engaged—Moscow, Peking and Hanoi—have made no diplomatic comment and their propaganda continues to be negative. But only Peking takes an absolute position. The most recent semi-official Hanoi statement 2 should not be taken as final. It is an excellent example of the continuing effort by Hanoi to secure major concessions on the four points, 3 while seeming to be reasonable. The key word this time is that the U.S. should “acknowledge” the points. Hanoi also asks for a complete and unconditional cessation of all attacks on North Vietnam. The Communists who are interested in getting negotiations started—the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Yugoslavs—are still at work, and we have no reports back. All three of them have emphasized the need for time—the Hungarians speak of the problem of communicating with the jungle; Tito speaks of the need to let differences ripen in Hanoi. 2. Less direct mediators These include the British, the Canadians, the Vatican, U Thant and Nasser. The British are simply telling the Russians how serious and sincere we are, and the Canadians have already done likewise. The Vatican is sending Monsignor Rodhain to Saigon, and if possible to Hanoi. The Algerians have agreed to talk to all their Communist contacts, including the NLF. Harriman sees Nasser tomorrow. Here again, the lines are nearly all out, but we have no diplomatic answers back. One additional possibility is Japan. 3. The French De Gaulle is in a class by himself. He has been fully informed and has expressed his warm appreciation. At the same time, he has made clear his conviction that nothing will happen until we announce that we will definitely withdraw at the end of negotiations. 4 His Foreign Minister emphasizes the importance of a recognized role for the NLF. De Gaulle has sneered at our efforts in a private conversation with the British Ambassador. 5 We have not asked the French for anything. This was wise. 4. Our Pacific allies These are more sympathetic to the peace offensive than we might have expected. There was slight nervousness in Taipei and Bangkok, but the Vice President has calmed one and the Secretary of State the other. There is deep understanding and support for our effort in Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. So far we have not sent presidential messages to Menzies and Holyoake, and I have requested drafts today. Their governments have been kept very fully informed and there has been no complaint. 5. The Latin Americans Here we have had unusually strong response from Diaz Ordaz, Leoni, and others, but no reply yet from Castello Branco. It remains for consideration whether we should follow up one suggestion and have an OAS meeting to reaffirm the need for peace. 6. The Africans The response to Governor Williamsʼ trip 6 has been excellent so far. He has been in Morocco, Tunis, Algiers, and Ethiopia, and is in Kenya and Tanzania today. Except for Algiers, there is no active interest so far in joining the diplomatic game, but there is general support. 7. The United Nations This is a special case. Goldberg recommends a letter which would become a Security Council document, and a draft will be at hand at noon. 7 It has also been suggested that U Thant be asked to organize an advisory group of neutrals. I find the strongest opposition to this idea from McNamara and Rusk. Both of them feel that we must not hand over the diplomatic scales to this kind of a third party. Most of the world would like nothing better than to recognize the NLF in ways that would be very damaging in Saigon. This is only one of a number of issues on which we must do our own bargaining, because no one else can be relied on to do it for us. Issues for Discussion 1. Immediate tactical steps a. Harriman to Japan b. Letters to Menzies and Holyoake c. Letter to U Thant 2. Public position for this week Our 14 points 8 have only begun to get the attention they deserve, and they have had a reaction of affirmative interest from such surprising quarters as Algiers, and even indirectly the New York Times . We should develop and expand them on a background basis, and we should challenge all concerned to say why they are not a perfectly solid basis for discussion. This job will best be done under the direct supervision of the Secretary of State. We should continue to avoid any discussion of the duration of the pause, and we should continue to bat down any discussion of an ultimatum. By the end of the week, attention will begin to move toward the State of the Union message. 9 We should have a firm position as to what we do and do not say ahead of time on that subject. So far we have had almost no public criticism of the pause. But Senator Symingtonʼs cable 10 is a sample of what we will get more of as the days go by. Since it is entirely clear that the diplomatic power of the pause is directly related to its length, we need to study additional ways of maintaining its momentum. Properly orchestrated, the 14 points can help us through this week. Can the State of the Union take us as far as Tet? McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Probably a reference to the commentary by “Observer” in the January 3 issue of Nhan Dan , which was carried by Hanoi radio in English at 12:31 a.m. EST on January 3. (Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives) 3 The four points were set forth on April 8, 1965, by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, pp. 544 – 545 . 4 De Gaulleʼs views on Vietnam were reported in telegram 3701 from Paris, December 31; for text, see ibid., vol. III, pp. 757–760. 5 Reported in telegram 3709 from Paris, January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 6 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams visited Africa January 3–6. His draft conclusions and recommendations were transmitted in telegram 501 from Dakar, January 7. (Ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 412, Nodis/Pinta, Series 1, Vol. 1) 7 Goldbergʼs January 4 letter to U Thant is printed in American Foreign Policy : Current Documents, 1966, pp. 744–745. 8 Drafted by Secretary Rusk in late December 1965, the fourteen points were included in an “Outline of U.S. Position on Viet-Nam” made available to the press on January 3 by Vice President Humphrey and released separately by the Department of State on January 7 under the title “United States Official Position on Viet-Nam.” For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 704 – 707 , and Department of State Bulletin , January 24, 1966, p. 116. 9 Delivered January 12; see footnote 3, Document 19 . 10 Not further identified. 3. Notes of Meeting 3. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 3, 1966, 12:55–2:35 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, Bundy, McNamara, Ball, Moyers, Valenti 2 Rusk: Been in touch with all 113 nations/resp. from 40. Gen. reaction good. DeGaulle unsatis. Question: President: Did DeG. exp. this to Goldb. Rusk: Yes, in substance. He says we underestimate Hanoi. They wonʼt give up. FMin of Fr. has not seen Chaval—and wonʼt let our people see Chaval. President: Chaval made some statements, didnʼt he. Rusk: Yes, but it was out of context. Rusk: In Korea, Formosa, Thailand, there was some worry about their security. President: How did Ky take it. Rusk: He took it well when Lodge told him. President: How about Lodge, any roadblock. Rusk: Not yet, perhaps later. We got a telegr. from Symington. 3 President: That prob. comes from Air Force people. President: You see anything from any of these conversations that would be encouraging? Rusk: Not yet. But Yugoslavs say we have put Hanoi under tremendous pressure. I take a little encouragement that Hanoi and Peking have not commented directly on the peace offensive. Little too early. Need to wait to see effects of Shelepin trip. 4 Thompson says ought to see Dobrynin about time Shelepin leaves. Have to watch Brit. a little. Theyʼd be inclined to give away too much. We donʼt want to lose cards we need to deal with. We must be clear with Brit. President: A little amazed that Brit. would be puzzled. I would want to talk to Wilson while at same time, Wilson says he was pleased. Rusk: A little snafu. Donʼt think PM was involved. Next prob. is whether we send Harriman to Japan. Bundy: Weʼve been playing it that VP was doing this. Perhaps we could say VP wanted him to go. Rusk: Shall we continue the pause. Do you see any prob. President: I see lots of problems, but we should continue. Rusk: Donʼt think we should resume it while Shelepin is in Hanoi. McNamara: I told Chiefs I would advise to resume the bombings if Chiefs could show me how we were being hurt in the So. No answer from them, which is very encouraging. We have re-instituted full reconnaissance of NVN. Rusk: The Speaker, Hickenlooper seem relaxed. Mrs. Bolton likewise. Ball talked to Mansfield, Dirksen and Fulbright. McNamara: Talked to Rivers, he is ready to resume bombing. He is in foul mood with me because we have cut back a const. project in S.C. President: Orig. intended to go to New Yr. After a couple of weeks, intended to go back, now, what do you advise we do—wait until we hear— Rusk: So far as other side, theyʼve had reasonable assurance, the pause will go to middle of next week. President: Any significance that on the first pause, they said NUTS. Now they havenʼt said anything. Rusk: Yes, that is good. President: Are all your senior officials asking? Rusk : Yes. Bundy: Pres. recollection is precise and right. (reads P. telegram to Lodge which pinpoints the pause continues til middle of this week.) 5 Rusk: Perhaps we ought to give Lodge a country-by-country rundown on resp. to peace offensive. President: Anything to be gained by Lodge talking to Harriman. Maybe Harriman can tell him exactly what he has learned. It would give us time. President: Think we might want to think about it. Though it would appeal to Lodge to want to find out what H. [Harriman] found out. (Rusk, Ball, McN and B. all agreed this was good idea to send Harriman.) (Vice Pres. entered the room at this time.) President: Been talking about how to keep Saigon in with us—before hard liners move in on us. Thinking to send Harriman to Japan, then on to Saigon with Lodge and Westmoreland. How long will Shelepin stay in Hanoi—(to Rusk). Answers: 5 days. Could it be Hanoi is gaining any substantial military adv. while we are pausing. McNamara: No. We can knock out any bridges they repair. Bombing them has not reduced infiltration. Bundy: When we will resume bombings and when we lose planes (?) some will blame the pause. President: Any question that we have to go back to bombings after a pause. (No objections) McNamara: I am very encouraged by resp. political leaders Goldb . and H . talked to. You will lose this if you resume bombing on Wednesday. If we resume, people will say itʼs a fraud. President: What do the pause advocates say? Bundy: For the first time we have made headway with NY Times. Rusk: I told Reston that no matter how long we stopped bombing it will never be long enough for Times. Ball: I think this will disarm our critics in the Congress. President: I believe weʼll have to go on over for several days. See no real reasons for starting it now. Conversations with others give me hope and weʼll continue. Our big problem will be theyʼll let us stew in our own juice. Then weʼll stew in theirs. This will be a bad week, a bad month. What do you do with Goldberg? I think the “I told you so” boys will say it wasnʼt handled right. I brought in VP, H., G. [Goldberg] and Williams. Think they will say it wasnʼt handled properly in the beginning. Rusk: The resp. from all over the world has converted everyone. President: I think Alsop and Reston are unhappy because they werenʼt consulted. Rusk: 50/50 chance weʼll get something back from some Comm. country by Wed. President: How to get Goldberg to report—without being dramatic, or building up hope. You know how I feel about keeping this at low key. See nothing wrong with saying they told all the people they saw we were ready to talk instead of fight. Bundy: I think the resp. from Poland and the Vatican is worth entire expedition. Rusk: Tomorrow, suggest Goldberg report to you tomorrow, and then report to U Thant. Perhaps later, a letter from Goldberg to U Thant. Moyers: Goldberg thinks it is time to get out Popeʼs letter— President: Does that pump up things—like we are dramatizing it all. Moyers: No. Rusk: Another element is timing. Harriman is 74. He needs a dayʼs rest. President: I agree. Rusk: Question of OAS resolution—can probably get a resolution. But worried that some like Frei 6 would feel constrained about saying the pause shouldnʼt be resumed. President: Counter the suggestion—compliment them—and suggest they talk to other countries on their own. Better way to serve the cause of peace. Then you will take steps to get in Goldberg tomorrow. Rusk: Releasing Popeʼs letter 7 tomorrow will give good cause for not resuming bombing. President: Do we want to release Popeʼs letter? Rusk: Might put pressures on you to release other messages. I gather the Pope is already putting out this kind of message. Rusk : Then weʼll meet with Goldberg tomorrow. (to B. [Ball], McN) What do you think Hanoi is doing now? McNamara: Possibly daylight traffic on the roads, and rebuilding bridges. I am concerned over inc. infiltration into SVN. This is not a result of cessation of bombing. Ball: Also a situation of MIG 21 coming in. McNamara: I believe that when we resume bombing—in six mo. weʼll be in air battles with Hanoi aircraft—and in year weʼll battle Chinese aircraft. Ball: Thais are also worried that we didnʼt push China to the wall. (Pres. asked HH to give any views he had on trip) President: What else can we do—we have dispatched people all over the world. What can we do further? We know that our bombing resp. has not done the job. Valenti: Why not direct contact—possibly thru the Frei types? Bundy: We are doing a great deal of this. We need to do more. President: If we try to hold too long without backgrounding, to let everyone [know] we are (genuine?), theyʼre going to hammer at us that we over-dramatize. Let the press know about the shape of responses. Bundy: Could tell press to go after the Ambassadors and it would be more persuasive to let them say it, not us. President: All right, we wait to see Goldberg. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes by hand; they were typed later, apparently shortly after President Johnson left office. The editor has checked this typescript and the typescripts of all subsequent Valenti notes for accuracy against Valentiʼs handwritten notes and has made minor corrections. (Ibid., Office of the President File, “Valenti, Jack, Notes Taken at Various Meetings During 1965 and 1966”) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) 2 According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, Vice President Humphrey was also present. (Ibid.) 3 See footnote 10, Document 2 . 4 Shelepin led a five-man Soviet mission that visited Hanoi January 7–12. For speculation in the Department of State about the purpose of his visit, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 753 – 754 . 5 Telegram 1805 to Saigon, December 28, 1965; for text, see ibid., pp. 717–719. 6 Reference is to President Eduardo Frei of Chile. 7 Transmitted in telegram 1661 from Rome, December 30, 1965, the Popeʼs letter was released on January 4, 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA) 4. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 4. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, January 3, 1966, 8 p.m. 3732. Literally Eyes Only Secretary from McBride. 1. Vo Van Sung (henceforth referred to as Jean) received Y at 4 afternoon third at 6 Rue Vineuse in apartment double living room of which arranged as office; Jean on one side closed French doors, unidentified French woman secretary remained on other side. Y expressed regret Rupertʼs illness and hope his early recovery. Jean indicated illness no more than a cold. 2. Y handed over text Rangoon aide-memoire, typed on plain paper, together with hand-written French translation. Y said instructions to Ambassador had been to pass to DRV representation Rangoon. 2 Jean quickly described this as Consulate General. Fast response plus failure indicate any surprise or particular interest suggest he may have had prior knowledge of transmittal, but this is only supposition Yʼs part. In any case, Jean read document carefully and raised no question about accepting it. Y carefully spelled out what possession this document meant with regard Yʼs bona fides. Y added he could henceforth be considered authentic spokesman and Paris channel for any USG communications with DRV. Jean registered comprehension. Y said Xʼs role and his hitherto dictated by need maintain entire secrecy of contacts. Jean murmured agreement such need existed. (At end of interview Y said he was seeing no French in Paris and no other Vietnamese.) 3. Thereafter Y handed over French translation Xʼs version of DRV four points, 3 with explanation of background. He added USG continued ready serious conversations and spoke of amended version of four points as offering good point of departure, since it included what seemed to us as essentials, i.e., eventual US military departure and reunification country in accord freely expressed wishes people of Vietnam north and south. Jean asked why USG unable accept DRV four points as they were published. Y replied USG unable accept proposition South Vietnam could be bound to program of NLF. Jean said, “Then you ignore wishes of the people”. Y rejoined NLF was far from constituting all the people, but that they could be consulted like anyone else. He then reminded Jean this was same old ground trodden many times, and perhaps it would be useful pass on to other matters. In conclusion he referred to President Johnsonʼs statement US was putting everything in basket of peace except liberty of people of South Vietnam. 4 Jean snorted at this, saying “You talk of peace and negotiations, but all your actions are warlike. What about McNamaraʼs statement after bombing Haiphong power plant that war would go on? 5 What about the reinforcements that are pouring in?” Y replied that the business of the military and of defense ministers was to wage war until they were told to wage peace. The same was true of his military as of ours. Ardent wish of President and American people was to find acceptable end to Vietnam war, but until this was found, there was no option but to continue military build up, for our own sake and sake of our friends. Jean queried sourly, “Do you think government of South Vietnam really exists?” 4. Y mentioned visits of presidential emissaries to various capitals and explained carefully purpose of missions was to indicate to heads of government that USG intention was to give DRV opportunity make useful response which could be first of series of steps leading to peace talks. While war could and no doubt would be resumed, this was only a fact of life and near certainty of resumption in absence DRV response could not be interpreted as ultimatum. 5. Jean wondered aloud what response would be possible so long as USG refused accept DRV four points. Y said he had always been puzzled by sense and importance DRV attached to four points. Of course we agreed that anybodyʼs four points, assuming the anybody to have a valid interest in the matter, could be considered in negotiations. Was admittance of them to an agenda enough? If so, there was no problem. Jean said, quite clearly, DRV four points must be basis of solution. 6. Jean indicated he would pass papers to Rupert but added that if Y were at any time unable reach Rupert, Y could reach Jean at Trocadero 08–23. Comment: this may indicate Rupert is away from Paris or does not wish personally continue contact. On other hand, it may be evidence of desire maintain contact unbroken. Y told Jean he could be reached at any time at his hotel and that if for any reason he left Paris he would inform Rupert in writing how he could be reached. 7. At no time did Jean indicate he had other than a listening brief, despite comments he made. He was entirely willing to accept papers passed to him. He had no message to transmit. Making polite conversation at end interview, Y asked Jean which part of Vietnam he came from. Jean said he came from the south but had been north since 1955; for this reason he knew what the people of the south were thinking. McBride 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; XYZ. Drafted by Paul Sturm (identified as “Y” in the telegram) and authenticated by Culver Gleysteen. For documentation on earlier contacts of Edmund Gullion (“X”) of the United States with Mai Van Bo (“Rupert”) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 312 – 316 , 319 , 328 – 332 , 334 – 337 , and 367 – 371 . 2 For text of the aide-memoire and instructions to Ambassador Byroade, see ibid., pp. 721–722. 3 For text, see Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , p. 97. 4 This statement appeared in a paper prepared by Rusk on December 27, 1965, for use by U.S. officials sent abroad to promote the peace process; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 704 – 707 . 5 Reference is presumably to McNamaraʼs statement at a press conference on December 16, 1965; see Public Statements of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 1965 , vol. V, p. 2237. (Johnson Library) 5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, January 4, 1966, 9:42 p.m. 1889. For Ambassador and David Bell. 1. President is most anxious to show in every possible way our concern for peaceful development and progress of SVN and our emphasis on non-military measures. To this end, we would like to be able to announce on Bellʼs return constructive and visible initiatives in economic and welfare areas. One such initiative has been proposed by Secy Freeman in the form of visit of agricultural experts who might dramatize what is being done now in SVN, how VC are striking at the chance for peaceful progress, and what could potentially be done in future if VC menace were removed. This might include demonstration of potential for electric power in local areas and demonstrations of such possibilities as timber development using simple equipment. 2. This is one example of kind of public visits by experts that would both assist in present task and dramatize our whole peaceful emphasis. Would greatly appreciate it if Ambassador and Bell could consider other possibilities so that Bell could be prepared consider early initiatives that might be announced by President shortly after his return. 3. We are well aware of great economic burden of current construction and other activity, and are not necessarily considering any immediate dramatic additional action projects. However, technical visits on comparatively small scale might have dramatic impact and show by example what would now be possible but for VC, and what could become possible in future. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Unger and by McGeorge Bundy in substance, and approved by William Bundy. 6. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 6. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, January 5, 1966. 2399. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Bombing Pause The following are straws in the wind as regards Viet Cong and Vietnamese reaction to the bombing pause: A. On Christmas day, about 1,000 North Vietnamese soldiers were reliably observed entering South Viet Nam. B. Incidents during the period December 26 through January 1 total 1,133. This is the highest total of incidents ever recorded in one week since the Communist aggression began. This includes the bombing of an American enlisted menʼs billet at Dalat. C. Prime Minister Ky told me Monday that one result of the bombing pause was sharply to reduce the number of returnees coming into the Chieu Hoi camps. He said that when bombing resumed, more people would come into the camps. As you know, we are planning a big Chieu Hoi effort at Tet time for which we have great expectations. I am glad to say that for the week just ended the number of returnees has shown a modest increase in line with the general trend. D. Vietnamese newspaper Tien Vang saw the bombing pause as an invitation for Hanoi to appraise the United States as weakening in its determination to carry on the war. E. The Vietnamese newspaper Saigon Daily News carried four column cartoon showing masses of B–52ʼs flying over the Vietnamese countryside with two Vietnamese men standing looking up at them. One of the men says to the other: “Are they going north”? The other says: “No.” And the first man says: “Let us move to the north then.” F. The Vietnamese newspaper Tu Do, referring to VC peace gestures, warns: “You can make any concessions you want on your part, but you cannot depart from what has been held dear to us: South Viet Nam must be the place for Vietnamese nationalists only. Under no circumstances can any Communist be allowed to set foot here.” G. Col. Pham Van Lieu, Director of National Police, seemed unhappy with the pause saying that the United States should not try to talk with Hanoi. “You Americans should talk to the Russians and the Chinese, and if there is any talking to be done with Hanoi, we should do it.” H. If resumption of bombing is delayed much longer, you may find that, when you decide to resume the strikes, it will be near the beginning of Tet—a celebration full of meaning for all Vietnamese. Resumption near Tet—say within the week or so immediately preceding it—might subject us to the criticism that while the United States observed the Christian spirit of Christmas, we violated the spirit of Tet. Such criticism could well force you to postpone resumption of the bombing until the very end of January or early February. 2. Letter to Menzies In telegram transmitting text of your letter to Menzies 2 you ask for my comments, which are as follows: Seen from Saigon, the bombing pause is not only not evoking any reciprocal cessation of Communist military activity, it is marked by a definite increase. It is also interpreted as a sign of weakness, although Vietnamese in the government familiar with American ways understand the motivation behind it. The presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet Nam added to the increase in VC incidents seems to me to make the bombing indispensable. It creates the need to hit this NVN army wherever we can hit it: in the sources of its power in the north, along its line of communication through Laos, in the high plateau of SVN and, if need be, on the SVN coastal plane. The resumption of bombing is, therefore, necessary from the standpoint of the purely military action against the army of North Viet Nam. It is also highly desirable as regards the psychological war against the Viet Cong, which, until the bombing pause, was definitely going in our favor. My last talk with General Ky on this subject, other than his casual comment on January 3 repeated above, was on December 29. At that time, I told him, based on Deptel 1805, 3 that the bombing would probably resume by the middle of this week. Of course, I have no first hand contact with whatever results the bombing pause may be achieving outside of this area and do not know how widespread the appeal of the pause is as regards American public opinion and Congress. I realize that you must measure results here against results achieved elsewhere. But in this area, the pause has not only done us no good; it has definitely caused losses, as the “straws in the wind” mentioned under paragraph 1 clearly shows. From this vantage point, therefore, it would be well if you followed intentions set forth in Deptel 1805 and resumed bombing now. 3. U.S. opinion re Viet Nam A. I try to share your worries in the hope that I can produce some helpful advice. In this spirit I cogitate about American public opinion and the attitudes in Congress. I recognize that I am far away from home and yet I see a great many Congressmen and I have quite a lengthy experience in back of me, notably as a U.S. Senator during the Korean war when I was closely in touch with public sentiment in the face of mounting casualties. B. I will of course, always exert maximum pressure for the speediest possible results. I believe that as prudent men we must also make plans on the basis that the Vietnamese struggle will not be quickly ended. I notice that even Senator Morse admits that we cannot withdraw from Viet Nam. Also, I believe the Communists are determined to drag this thing out until the ʼ68 elections. C. This raises the question of whether an effort should not be made to get the American people to understand that this Chinese Communist imperialism, which manifests itself in so many subtle and disguised forms, is something with which we are going to have to live year in and year out. 4 I remember in the late 40ʼs and early 50ʼs we thought in terms of “cleaning up” the situation in Europe. I can remember that dates were discussed by which time the situation in Europe should be cleaned up. We were impatient and somewhat petulant. Then we learned how to live with the cold war. I think one of General Eisenhowerʼs contributions as President was educating people to the idea that we had to live with the cold war, year in and year out. In those days when we said cold war, we meant the Soviet Union. D. I realize that public opinion will support greater or lesser casualty figures depending on the degree of feeling and conviction which it holds about the war. Also, for some reason, it accepts casualties on the highways for no particular cause more easily than it does casualties on the battlefield for causes that are noble and deserving of sacrifice. Psychologically, the thing is complicated because, concurrently with all these feelings is the view that we must “fish or cut bait or row ashore” and this argues for more drastic measures. And more drastic measures in turn can sometimes mean fewer casualties. E. I believe it simplifies thinking to have a clear idea in oneʼs own mind of what constitutes a satisfactory outcome. I do not say a “perfect” outcome. I notice one administration spokesman described a satisfactory outcome recently as one in “which the people of South Viet Nam can determine freely their own government in the future.” Does this mean elections which are free from intimidation all over the country? If so, I do not think we need to go that far in order to feel that we have achieved a satisfactory result. Neither do I think that we should insist on such goals as utterly destroying the North Vietnamese military potential or seizing the valley of the Mekong in the Laos panhandle. “Satisfactory outcome,” as the U.S. Mission tried to define it in Saigon 1377, 5 still seems one reasonable definition, although undoubtedly not the only one. But even this implies heavier punishment of North Viet Nam. F. One conclusion from all this is that if public opinion is accustomed to the idea that we have to live with this dangerous and complicated Chinese Communist aggression year in and year out, it will stand casualties better and will not be as impatient because quick results have not been achieved. Also casualties will probably be fewer. And if we should get a few breaks and things started to go our way rather quickly, success would be especially sweet if it came at a time when no one really expected it. 4. David Bell I am most grateful to you for sending David Bell. His visit has been a great success because he brought with him from Washington carefully thought out, constructive and concrete measures for the problems which are bothering the GVN most. His recommendations concerning the port of Saigon and the threat of inflation are sure to make a tremendous difference. We can always use visitors like him. 5. Economic Retail prices in the Saigon area rose slightly in the week ending December [garble], but these increases represented more or less normal market fluctuations. USOMʼs index of both food and non-food prices remains virtually the same as it was one month ago. Gold and dollar prices receded from last weekʼs high level. Saigonʼs power situation was much improved on December 27 when a new plant producing 20 megavolts eliminated almost 50 percent of the power shortage which has prevailed for the last 7–1/2 months. Another big American contribution! Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 a.m. and passed to the White House at 9:40. McGeorge Bundy forwarded it to President Johnson at 2:30 p.m. under a covering memorandum that stated: “Here is an important dispatch from Lodge. As you can see, he is still pulling hard for a quick end to the pause.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 2 Telegram 1882 to Saigon, January 4. President Johnsonʼs letter to Prime Minister Menzies summarized the progress of the peace offensive and discussed the possibility of continuing the bombing pause “at least into next week.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 717 – 719 . 4 Lodge qualified this comment in telegram 2514, January 13, Document 20 . 5 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 470 – 473 . 7. Summary Notes of the 555th Meeting of the National Security Council 7. Summary Notes of the 555th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, January 5, 1966, 5:45–6:30 p.m. Peace Offensive Regarding Vietnam The Vice President: reported on a recent trip, to Japan, Korea, Formosa, and the Philippines. 2 (Copies of the Vice Presidentʼs memoranda are attached.) 3 He said the theme of his report was expressed in a sentence in Philippine President Marcos ʼ speech: “Those who fight for liberty fight for us.” This sentence describes the attitude of the four countries visited. There is recognition by Asian leaders that Asians must do much more about their own problems in the Asian area. The Japanese are elated over our peace offensive and are supporting it by talking to the Russians. The Philippinos are prepared to commit additional forces in Vietnam but they welcome the peace offensive. In Taiwan, skepticism was expressed about the peace offensive. They believe the enemy is Communist China more than North Vietnam. In Korea, the attitude toward the war is the best of the four countries. If the Koreans are asked to send more troops to Vietnam, they will want assurances covering their security. They doubt that the peace offensive will affect morale. Negotiations do not affect the commitment to South Vietnam. In general, the peace offensive is supported, but doubts are expressed that it would produce any results. Ambassador Goldberg reported on his conversations with UN Secretary General U Thant, the Pope, Italian leaders, De Gaulle, and Prime Minister Wilson. a. UN Secretary General U Thant said the peace offensive would test whether Hanoi was dominated by Communist China. b. The Pope accepted our sincerity, said he believed we were sincere in seeking peace, adding that he would do everything he could to work for a settlement. c. Italian leaders favored the bombing lull. They believed our action had been helpful to the Moro government. d. De Gaulle was polite but expressed his lack of confidence in the peace offensive. For him, the only course of action is U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. Foreign Minister Couve took a slightly different position, arguing that the National Liberation Front should be part of a coalition government before negotiations could be undertaken. e. Prime Minister Wilson spoke of a new British initiative as ICC co-chairman. He asked that the peace offensive be prolonged long enough for the Soviets to react on the basis of Shelepinʼs visit. USIA Director Marks summarized world press reaction to the peace offensive. The USIA summary is attached. 4 In general, the peace initiative is welcomed but doubts are expressed that it will produce results. Some writers think the peace offensive is merely a prelude to further military action. The Japanese press is not helpful despite the favorable view of its government. In Latin America, the press gives unreserved support. In the Middle East, press reaction is mixed. Secretary Rusk summarized the scope of the peace offensive. Of the 113 countries which have been contacted since the offensive was launched December 28, 70 have responded. Of these, 57 countries have responded favorably, six countries received our representations without comment, two countries (Thailand and South Korea) have indicated they think the U.S. suspension of bombing is a mistake. The South Vietnamese are noncommittal, having stated no objection so far. Special emissaries have been sent to 34 foreign governments. (Further details are contained in a State Department memorandum attached.) 5 The reaction from the other side is not what it was last May when Hanoi rejected our note, 6 Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said the note was insulting, and the press from the first day said the pause would not lead to negotiations. This time, none of these things happened. Twenty-five secondary demarches are under way. The Yugoslavs tell us that Hanoi is under great pressure. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation in Southeast Asia began in Vienna with President Kennedy. A serious effort is being made to find a solution and it is generally believed that if this fails, our full military effort in South Vietnam will be renewed. However, if we resume the bombing, we will lose the support of almost all those who now support us. Mr. Shelepin leaves tomorrow but we do not know how long he will stay. On the political side, we have had a plus for the last ten days, but the situation in South Vietnam has not improved. Our position will erode here if we wait much longer to resume the bombing but abroad we will lose support if we resume. Secretary Rusk said he wished to discuss privately with the President on the next moves. 7 Secretary McNamara said the problem of timing the resumption of the bombing was serious. The American people looked at the situation soberly. The Administration is speaking with one voice. It is very helpful that divergent views are not being publicized. The President: We are in a difficult position but it is a much better position than if we had not responded to the urging that we hold off bombing to see whether this would lead to peace. We have made the record clear. We can return to the earlier situation if the pause does not work. We have a better basis to call on the U.S. people not only for their sons, but also their treasure. Americans feel better if they know we have gone the last mile even if we have had grave doubts about doing so. The basis for a supplemental budget to pay the increased costs of the war has been laid. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg will pursue whatever leads they may get. We donʼt intend to become weaker in Southeast Asia. We are following a course to unite our people and make possible a follow through. The diplomatic offensive boils down to saying that we are ready to reason this out. One poll shows that 73 percent of the American people wanted us to increase our diplomatic efforts. In the last twelve months, 200 conferences have been held by Secretary Rusk in an attempt to get negotiations going. But his efforts are not known publicly. Tonight, more people in the U.S. and the world think we want peace than thought so two weeks ago. This is an asset. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 Humphrey returned to Washington on January 3 from a 5-day tour. 3 Attached but not printed. 4 Attached but not printed. 5 Attached but not printed. 6 For text of the note, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, pp. 637 – 638 . 7 The President met in his office at 6:45 p.m. on January 5 with Rusk, Humphrey, McNamara, Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Goldberg to discuss two possible moves: 1) taking the issue to the United Nations, and 2) calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, DRV, GVN, and Communist China. Ball proposed the second alternative in a January 5 memorandum to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) Valentiʼs brief notes of the meeting are ibid., Presidentʼs Appointment File. 8. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) 8. Letter From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) 1 New York, January 6, 1966. Dear Cabot: I am writing you from your old hot seat, having just returned from my brief trip to the Vatican, Paris and London, which I undertook at the Presidentʼs request. 2 From these two vantage points, I thought you might be interested in my own feelings regarding the key decisions ahead—particularly those relating to the resumption of the bombing. First, and of overriding importance: the envoys and messages despatched by the President during the past two weeks, as well as current discussions with foreign diplomats in Washington, have one essential purpose: to enlist the aid of others in finding out whether, as often claimed by both our friends and foes, our bombing of North Vietnam has in fact been a decisive obstacle to Hanoiʼs agreement either to begin negotiations or to reduce its military activities against South Vietnam. In my view, it is vital that the initiatives we have thus set in train be allowed a reasonable time to produce a convincing answer to this question. Further, I believe that during this period it is essential the United States avoid any action which would lay us open to charges of insincerity or bad faith in our current peace offensive or, at the minimum, of being too impatient to permit adequate time for a meaningful response from Hanoi. I am convinced that an immediate resumption of the bombings would lay us open to such charges—not only from friend and foe, but also from some of the very parties whose assistance we have sought in the past two weeks. Finally, along this same line of thought, I believe that a resumption of the bombing prior to or during Shelepinʼs forthcoming trip to North Vietnam would not only be widely considered provocative but would be almost certain to rule out whatever chance there may be of his advising Hanoi that it should react in a forthcoming way to our current peace offensive. Second: It goes without saying that the Administration is approaching a time of great decision concerning our future actions in Vietnam—decisions which will directly and substantially affect the lives and fortunes of all Americans. While I do not doubt the American people will accept whatever sacrifices are necessary to protect vital national interests, I think it would be a serious political mistake for the Administration to make and carry out these decisions—without first demonstrating beyond any reasonable doubt that no stone has been left unturned in the effort to begin negotiations on Vietnam. To do this, I consider it necessary that the suspension of bombings be continued long enough so that no significant number of Americans will believe or can claim the Administration has not fully tested Hanoiʼs willingness to negotiate. As you have probably seen, the latest opinion poll shows that over 70% of the American people favor the bombing pause. In my view, a full test of its impact is even more necessary if, as you suggest, the Communists are determined to drag out the conflict in Vietnam until the 1968 elections. 3 If such is the case, our task at home will not be to convince the American people they must live with a cold war—as in Europe during the late 1940s and early 1950s; rather, it will be to convince them to learn to live with a hot war of growing proportions and costs for three more years. Let me say in conclusion that I would, of course, want to reconsider the position I have outlined above if there were convincing evidence that the political disadvantages, both domestic and international, which I see to an immediate resumption of bombing were outweighed either by the military disadvantages of prolonging the suspension or by the growth of significant dissatisfaction with our actions among South Vietnamese leaders. In all frankness, however, I must say that the information available to me from Washington sources is far from convincing me that such is now the case. I shall of course follow your future reports with the closest attention, particularly in regard to these two points. Sincerely, Arthur J. Goldberg 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. In a January 7 covering memorandum under which he forwarded the letter to Read for dispatch to Saigon, Sisco noted that it had been requested by the President and read and approved by Rusk and Ball. (Ibid.) 2 Goldberg returned to Washington on January 2 following his European tour. 3 See paragraphs 3A and 3B of telegram 2399, Document 6 . For Lodgeʼs response to Goldbergʼs comments, see Document 20 . 9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, January 6, 1965, 5:07 p.m. 1907. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. We have all read and carefully noted your 2399 2 concerning the current position and Vietnamese reaction to it. Also your comments on the Presidentʼs letter to Menzies. 2. As the Menzies letter indicates, we have reaped very considerable dividends from this whole effort in terms of both present and future support. At the same time, the intense activity already evident in the Communist bloc, and particularly Shelepinʼs visit to Hanoi, 3 have convinced us that suspension must continue for the present, partly on the slight chance that Hanoi may respond, and also to maintain and solidify domestic and international support. In reaching this decision, we have of course weighed the serious arguments contained in your 2399, but believe that the wider factors must be over-riding for the time being including strongly affirmative response from 40 or 50 nations and widely encountered pleas that we give adequate time for response from Hanoi. 3. Accordingly, we believe you yourself should now see Ky to get his understanding and concurrence in continuation, and that message should also reach Thieu, Do, and others, as you think best, so that possibilities of misunderstanding are minimized. Following are points you may draw on in your presentation. a. You may draw fully on account of diplomatic activity in Menzies letter. You may explain that this activity has in itself greatly strengthened worldwide support and understanding for GVN/US position and has created situation in which, if Hanoi fails to respond and we resume, we will do so with very wide and strong worldwide and domestic support. In short, we are clearing the decks for whatever action may be necessary, and GVN should have no doubt that we will in fact do whatever is necessary as we have done in the past. b. We need the additional time period to drive this point home, particularly in light of Shelepin visit. c. You should frankly explain, to extent you may not already have done so, that one major purpose of our effort is to exploit differences of view within Communist bloc. While we have no concrete reason to expect that Sovs will in any way be helpful, this suspension may well have sharpened divisions between Sovs and their friends, on one hand, and Chicoms, with favorable implications for the future of a free South Viet-Nam. d. As stated in Menzies letter, there has been no change in Hanoi position and we have no intention of being taken in by mere gestures. Our military action in the South and our reinforcements have continued and will continue. We believe Hanoi is under no delusion that our action has reflected any change whatever in our determination to see this thing through. e. Next week President will submit supplemental appropriation for all aspects of effort in Viet-Nam at level presently estimated to be $13 billion. This sum for over-runs in Fiscal 1966 will bring home to Congress and country full magnitude of stakes in Viet-Nam and Congress needs full demonstration that every possible opening for peace is being explored. f. We of course recognize that suspension of bombing gives other side some temporary military advantages. At same time, Ky well knows that we have continued heavy attacks on infiltration routes in Laos. He should also be aware that resumed bombing can deal fairly quickly with any repairs Hanoi has been able to make in communications routes and other military targets that we would expect to attack promptly upon resumption. g. There may well be some sort of climax during Shelepin visit. If there should be any sign of a substantive change in Hanoiʼs position, or on other hand if Hanoiʼs lack of response becomes clear, we will be in urgent consultation with GVN. They can count absolutely on our maintaining fundamental positions stated in 14 points (which you should give them). Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Literally Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and in substance by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to the White House. 2 Document 6 . 3 Indian Prime Minister Shastri reported to President Johnson in a January 6 letter that Kosygin had told him that Shelepinʼs visit was “intended to help the cause of peace.” (Telegram 1218 to New Delhi, January 7; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 10. Memorandum From James Thomson and Donald Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 10. Memorandum From James Thomson and Donald Ropa of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 7, 1966. SUBJECT The New Year in Asia VIETNAM The Program Front Political Dynamics . South Vietnam, under the rule of a ten-man military Directorate, for almost seven months has experienced greater political stability than at any time since early 1963. However, the political rivalries and conflicts within the Vietnamese social fabric have not been resolved nor eliminated. Rather, the absence of serious political turmoil appears in large part a result of the assumption of authority by the one element currently strong enough to wield it—the leaders of the armed forces. Additionally, political improvement is the result of the more concrete U.S. military and political commitment of the past year, which has checked the previous prospect of accelerating internal collapse and Communist takeover. The present military regimeʼs surface display of unity to date is largely the result of a diffusion of real power among four or five generals. None of these seems so far to have sufficient personal strength or motive to upset the balance. This alliance, however, clearly remains tenuous, and the strains among the ruling generals have resulted, in recent weeks, in renewed rumors of coup plotting . Kyʼs government is not in imminent danger, but an eventual coup attempt cannot be discounted. Our people in Saigon believe that Ky would step down if so requested by the Directorate, but he displays no obvious signs of discouragement and voices no concern over possible coup attempts. To date Kyʼs government has been notably unsuccessful in developing significant popular enthusiasm or positive political support . Ky grasps the countryʼs problems in general, but his ambitious programs of political, social and economic reforms have made only marginal headway. Neither increased security nor government presence have been brought to any significant new portion of the rural population. Still, conditions have not deteriorated . Ky has demonstrated considerable adroitness in balancing competing pressures from Buddhists and Catholics and other factions. Civilian groups at present appear reluctant to take political initiatives without adequate power to assure the outcome. However, a greater test of the government may come as the war intensifies and demands on it increase, particularly in the economic and pacification fields. Already, the government is under growing pressure from religious and political groups to broaden the area of civilian participation and to provide some legal framework toward the eventual restoration of civilian control. Although some generals, particularly Ky, are reluctant to open up any official channel for disruptive civilian tactics, the Directorate intends to establish early this year a council with some advisory authority. The advisory council will be tasked with drafting a permanent constitution. Although Embassy surveys have so far uncovered little adverse popular reaction to the U.S. military role—including air-strikes—in intensifying the war, the Embassy has reported considerable public apprehension over growing civilian casualties . There is some danger that prolonged and more intensive fighting will generate resentment against the U.S. or the Saigon government, and pressure for peace-at-any-price by pacifistic elements such as the Buddhists. Currently, Saigonʼs ruling generals continue to express opposition to any negotiations under conditions of near-stalemate , or to any settlement in which the South Vietnamese would be forced to compete politically with the Viet Cong. Economic Dynamics. The Economy of South Vietnam operated under considerable inflationary pressure during 1965 , and this pressure is expected to intensify during 1966. A large deficit in the GVN budget, the increase in U.S. forces, and the increase of local spending for military and civilian construction placed new demands on the economy during 1965. Supply problems were exacerbated by port bottlenecks, Viet Cong interdiction of transportation routes, and a shortage of labor. The resulting imbalance between demand and supply generated price rises of at least 35 to 40 percent in Saigon and in areas where Viet Cong activity and the U.S. force buildup were intensified. During 1966, the GVN budget deficit could rise from 15–18 billion piasters estimated for 1965 to 20 billion piasters or more. U.S. and other foreign troops spending and local purchases for construction may jump from about 10 billion piasters in 1965 to an estimated 30 billion piasters in 1966. The total of 50–55 billion piasters for budget deficit and foreign spending (compared to about 29 billion piasters in 1965) is equivalent to about one-third of all goods and services available in Vietnam in 1965 and is substantially more than the present money supply of 42 billion piasters. Since these inflationary pressures will be working against a far smaller stock of idle resources in the economy, their impact will be more severe and more difficult to contain than during 1965. The major factor restraining inflation has been the supply of AID-financed commercial imports and PL 480 commodities. A second factor has been the willingness of the Vietnamese to hold a part of additional income in the form of money. During 1965, there was some evidence that price rises have begun to discourage money holdings and to increase the demand for goods. This trend poses an added threat during 1966 . Shortages of construction materials and luxury items resulted in sharp price increases during 1965, and specific material resources will continue to be in short supply during 1966. Anticipated increases in 1966 U.S. expenditures for construction in Vietnam will have additional repercussions in the manpower sector of the economy. Wage rates for most categories of skilled construction workers have doubled during the last year. Wages for unskilled labor have not increased as sharply but are estimated to have increased by at least 50 percent in Saigon. With the exception of rural labor in isolated areas, Vietnamese manpower resources are now fully employed. Control of the inflationary threat to economic (and hence political) stability during 1966 is clearly dependent on U.S. and GVN countermeasures . For example, the U.S. could meet the bulk of the requirements for skilled labor and critical commodities needed to expand port facilities and for military construction, from sources outside of South Vietnam. Additional measures to control in-country spending by foreign personnel are possible. Similarly, new GVN fiscal measures, such as increased taxes, are under consideration to soak up excess purchasing power. But even under the best of circumstances, the problem is to limit inflation to manageable levels in 1966, not to aim for price stability . Pacification . Pacification on a nationwide basis made very little tangible progress during the past year . The pacification program in the Hop Tac 2 area around Saigon, which was fairly active until May 1965, was one exception. Overall, however, much of the military manpower necessary to provide security as well as to clear areas in the initial phases of pacification operations was diverted to replace battle losses inflicted by the stepped up pace of Viet Cong military action. Moreover, assets devoted to pacification have been largely diverted to handling the large flow of refugees. With the general deterioration of the security situation in many parts of I, II, and III Corps, pacification has largely been confined to areas immediately adjacent to centers of government control such as major urban areas and provincial or district capitals. At best, pacification efforts in these three Corps areas can only be termed minimal. In the IV Corps area, government control expanded somewhat. In this region, however, the Viet Cong still control large amounts of territory which have not experienced any government influence or presence for several years. The pacification effort has also suffered from the successive changes of government that occurred in 1965. Advances have been difficult to measure . However, plans have been made and initiated which could have a beneficial effect on the pacification effort. The Ky government has decided to institute three high priority programs which will point the way for a greater overall effort in years to come. These areas are the Qui Nhon area of Binh Dinh Province, Quang Nam Province, and a showcase area near Saigon—located in the now dormant Hop Tac area. Other planned improvements include reorganization to effect more direct civilian control down to the province level, and the restructuring and consolidation of the various cadres now existing into a single national pacification cadre corps. Much of the GVNʼs thinking is still in the formative stage , and it remains to be seen whether this can be translated into effective action. Some laudable steps have been taken to get the 1966 program underway on time , but many problems remain to be solved before an effective pacification program can be effected. Land Reform . The Ky government is giving renewed emphasis to the land reform program begun under the Diem regime in 1955, and is making limited progress. The present program is still plagued by the dissatisfaction of expropriated landlords , numbering only about 2,000, and their political backers. The major obstacles to a psychologically and politically productive program, however, continue to be the lack of security in the countryside , which inhibits the work of surveyors and investigators, the slow trickle of funds from Saigon to the provinces, and a shortage of manpower resulting from the stepped-up military draft. Under the new government policy, permanent titles are being granted to farmers who purchased land under the old ordinance, and the period of payment has been extended to 12 years. Additionally, former French lands, totaling 225,000 hectares, are being subdivided and sold to the farmers who till them. State-owned lands, totaling some 300,000 hec-tares, are also to be distributed to 180,000 farmers now occupying them as squatters. Changes have been made in the terms governing rental of farm lands , with all leases being extended to five-year contracts, and collection of back rentals has been eliminated in newly secured areas. Finally, competitive bidding for the rental of communal land—a procedure devised by the Diem regime to raise national and local taxes—has been eliminated, but new procedures for making this land available to landless farmers have not yet been worked out. These recent changes are designed as short-term measures. A long-term program contemplates reduced retention of land by landlords, further extension of tenancy contracts, and further distribution of public land . A major unresolved problem is that of conflicting ownership rights resulting from land distribution activities by the Viet Minh during the Indochina War and by the Viet Cong more recently in areas under their control. The problem is under study, but the government program, with its provisions for farmer payments for the purchase of expropriated land and its collection of land rentals, has long been at some disadvantage vis-à-vis the Viet Cong program. Increasingly harsh Viet Cong taxation policies of the past two years , and increased Communist requisition of rice from the peasants, will probably help the government in this problem area . The Refugee Problem . This has expanded to tremendous proportions during the past year , particularly since July. At latest report, a cumulative total of 745,800 persons has been processed by the government. More than half of the present refugee population—463,000—is still living in temporary refugee shelter areas at what is little more than a subsistence level of existence. The large influx of refugees has been caused by a combination of circumstances: natural disaster, a decline in security which has resulted in mass movement of people to safer areas, and the increased level of large-scale friendly operations. At the present time over ninety percent of the current refugee population is concentrated in the coastal lowlands area of I, II, and III Corps zones and is a serious strain on the refugee relief machinery. Although the refugee situation remains serious, it had not reached the proportions by the end of 1965 that GVN and U.S. officials had anticipated . However, most of the effort that would have been devoted to pacifying and developing the countryside has had to be diverted to care for refugees. This situation will prevail until refugees can either be relocated to permanent settlements or returned to their home areas. Moreover, the large refugee population remaining in temporary shelters is fertile ground for the Viet Cong to sow discord. It may be expected that the refugee problem will intensify if the tempo of military operations, particularly in the central coastal lowlands, continues to increase . Chieu Hoi . 3 The Chieu Hoi program has shown signs of improvement in techniques of exploitation and programming in the past several months with several significant and successful psychological warfare operations being mounted against the Viet Cong. This has been especially true in rapid follow-up action to ground operations. However, the program still has several glaring weaknesses , especially in processing and providing for the Chieu Hoi returnee. Crowded returnee centers, a shortage of administrative personnel, and a lack of facilities to rehabilitate the returnee have hampered the total effectiveness of the effort. Some first steps have been taken by the government to correct these inadequacies, but much work remains to be done . During 1965, according to government reports, a total of 42,552 persons returned to the government side. Although the majority were civilians, there were a total of 10,391 military personnel who also “rallied” to the government cause. In 1964, there was a total of 14,465 returnees, of whom only 1,903 were military defectors. The Montagnards . Although an uprising by dissident tribesmen in the central highlands area in mid-December was promptly quashed, there is little prospect of an early resolution of the problem of tribal unrest and loyalty. Mutual antipathy and distrust between ethnic Vietnamese and the approximately 500,000 ethnic Malayan tribesmen inhabiting the highlands has deep historic roots. The appeal among the Montagnards of FULRO, the tribal autonomy movement, is traceable not only to long-standing tribal aspirations for autonomy and preservation of tribal customs, but to a series of grievances with the Vietnamese governments of the past 10 years . These grievances range from ethnic Vietnamese encroachment on their communal lands during the Diem regime, to lack of fulfillment by Diemʼs successors of promises of increased aid and political representation in Saigon. Although the current Saigon officials apparently plan to deal leniently with most of the rank-and-file FULRO sympathizers, the execution of four FULRO leaders, and the sentencing of about 30 others, have probably stirred new tribal resentment and anticipation of harsh government treatment. There is evidence that Montagnard leaders previously supporting the government are increasingly sympathetic to FULRO . There is no evidence to date that FULRO leader Y-Bham Enoul or his top lieutenants are cooperating with the Viet Cong . On the contrary, reports indicate that propaganda attacks, and a few minor clashes, have occurred between FULRO and the Communists, who have long sponsored their own tribal autonomy movement. There are nevertheless reports of some Communist penetration of FULROʼs second-level hierarchy. Such elements may be deliberately seeking to harden FULROʼs demands and force a final break with the government. At present, even a renewed government determination to carry out reforms and aid programs for the Montagnards seems likely to have little prospect of banishing tribal suspicions—or Vietnamese snobbery—in the early future. The reliability and effectiveness of the numerous tribal paramilitary units will thus probably remain uncertain for the next year or so, and the opportunities for the Viet Cong to exploit the situation, or to win increasing cooperation from the tribes, may be enhanced. [Here follows discussion of Northeast Asia, the “two Chinas,” the Southwest Pacific, and Southeast Asia.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Secret. 2 A program initiated in 1964 to pacify six provinces around Saigon. 3 The Government of South Vietnamʼs amnesty program designed to win back the allegiance of Viet Cong. 11. Memorandum From Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Fortas to President Johnson 11. Memorandum From Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Fortas to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 7, 1966. RE Viet Nam Suggestion: The U.S. by formal note, perhaps to U Thant, would state that: 1. We will commence withdrawal from Viet Nam as soon as a cease-fire is agreed to and we will complete withdrawal within the shortest reasonable time, not later than 3(?) years thereafter. (We might express the hope or “assumption” that appropriate provision for U.N. inspection or other implementation will be made.) 2. We have no interest in acquiring, establishing or maintaining any military bases in Southeast Asia (with such restrictions or qualifications as need be made). 3. I would hope that we could go further and say that we would accept a cease-fire on terms acceptable to a representative group of states. This could be defined in various ways: The Geneva Conference group as reconstituted; a group designated by the Secretary General or elected by the Assembly; etc. Appraisal of Present Situation: 1. There persists widespread doubt as to the integrity of our intentions—despite all that has been done. The articulate doubts are principally based upon (1) the ambiguity of our statements as to the time of withdrawal, and the interpretation that we will not withdraw until a non-Communist Government is established for South Vietnam; and (2) our continued silence as to whether we will “deal with” the NLF. 2. I anticipate that the Soviet Mission will result in a Soviet bomber and missile buildup in North Vietnam. The net effect may be a substantial Soviet “presence” in North Vietnam. This is a threat, but it may have advantages as follows: (1) It will accentuate the Soviet-Chinese confrontation. (2) It may reduce the disadvantages of U.S. withdrawal and result in a positive benefit, perhaps confined to the short-range. Substantial Soviet “presence” in North Vietnam would mean that (a) the Chinese route to domination of Southeast Asia would be in check by the Soviet Union; (b) the two great Communist powers would be in potential conflict at a new and critical point; (c) the Soviet Union would have an additional and vexatious burden. It is necessary to realize that, long-range, this, or anything short of our military victory in the theatre may underline the danger of Communist (Soviet or Chinese) domination of Southeast Asia. But it is possible that we can deal with the long-range, with future problems, more advantageously if we are out of Viet Nam than if we are there, engaged in what appears to be a long war of dubious extent and debatable outcome. A.F. 2 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966. Secret. The source text is stamped: “Sec Def has seen, 8 Jan 1966.” 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 12. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 12. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State 1 Tokyo, January 8, 1966. 2391. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. 1. Having found myself with my first relatively free day here in Tokyo, I feel that it might be useful to summarize my reactions to my trip so far. 2 2. Reischauer tells me that the reaction here during the first several days of what everyone now calls President Johnsonʼs peace offensive was tinged with a certain amount of skepticism. The government in Japan has supported our efforts in Vietnam, but even in Foreign Ministry circles, I am told, there was some feeling that the bombing pause and the peace offensive might be aimed more at justifying to the American people a subsequent expansion of military action than at a real desire and expectation that peace might be attained. As the facts have come out about what we have done and are doing to bring about negotiations and a peaceful settlement, there has been a steadily growing acceptance of the Presidentʼs effort. This is being accompanied by a willingness on the part of the Japanese Government to seek ways in which they can help to bring influence to bear on Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps on Peiping, to reduce the tempo of fighting and move towards a peaceful solution. 3. This experience in Japan is generally similar to what I have observed at other stops along the way. All the government leaders I have seen have agreed to use their influence where they considered useful but have said time was necessary to achieve results and they urged patience. 4. I do feel the tide of support and understanding for our position in Vietnam is rising. During the past two weeks, I believe, the seeds of the Presidentʼs peace offensive have been planted and are showing promising signs of healthy growth. 5. It is too early, however, to expect a real harvest either in the form of consolidating world opinion on our side or of bringing North Vietnam to the conference table. If we were to cut short our efforts at this time and resume the bombing we would end up with few if any gains. In fact those leaders who had started to take actions on behalf of the peace offensive would feel let down and there might be such general disillusionment as to leave us in no better position in world opinion and perhaps worse in some countries than we were before. 6. On the other hand enough progress has been made in world public opinion to justify continuation of the pause long enough to allow this opinion to solidify on our side. This in turn would increase pressures on Hanoi that might produce some favorable response now or in the future. 7. I hope very much, therefore, that, barring a major provocation clearly attributable to the initiative of Hanoi, the pause in the bombing will be continued until the end of the Vietnamese new year period (Tet, which I understand ends January 23) particularly since there are, I hear, proposals for a cease-fire during the Tet period. Reischauer strongly agrees with me, pointing out that we are making more progress with Japanese public opinion during this period than in the whole of the preceding twelve months. I believe that all the other U.S. Ambassadors I have visited would also be in agreement. I realize the pause is being bought at the cost of certain military disadvantages but I feel that these are definitely outweighed by the importance of gaining the support of governments and worldwide public opinion. Reischauer 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:18 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10. McGeorge Bundy forwarded this telegram to President Johnson at 1:30 p.m. on January 8 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Harriman fires all his arguments at us on keeping the Pause going.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 2 Between December 29 and January 7, Harriman met with foreign leaders in Poland, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, Iran, the United Arab Republic, Thailand, and Japan. 13. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 13. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 8, 1966. JCSM–16–66 SUBJECT Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U) 1. (C) This memorandum provides the views and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on air strikes against North Vietnam (NVN). It reflects their conviction that continuation of the stand-down is placing our forces under serious and progressively increasing military disadvantage. 2. (S) Air strikes against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) are an essential complement to US/Free World military operations in South Vietnam (SVN). The direct pressure of these air strikes is a principal means of persuading the DRV to cease its support and direction of the insurgency in SVN. The present stand-down contravenes that purpose and greatly weakens US negotiating leverage. Increased military actions in Laos or in SVN do not compensate for the loss of this leverage on the DRV nor for cessation of interference with the lines of communication (LOCs) in the DRV. 3. (S) There is increasing evidence that considerable effort to repair damaged LOCs in NVN is now underway. Air defense capabilities are being improved, and a general recovery program is underway. While intelligence is lacking, DRV self-interest dictates that an increased flow of personnel and war material is moving to SVN. On the basis of past experience, confirming evidence may not become available until personnel and material are identified in SVN or until new units make contact with friendly forces. Of additional concern is the growing ability of the DRV, through reconstitution of its LOCs, to support overt aggression in the south. Thus, the results of our costly air effort against the north will have been negated unless operations of expanded scope are soon resumed. The decision to resume air strikes should be based on enemy capabilities to improve their posture. It should not be contingent upon obtaining hard evidence of infiltration and build-up in SVN. 4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the merits of peace offensives, especially with respect to their impact on US and world opinion. However, experience cautions against the substantial risk in an all-out effort for negotiations during a stand-down. As time passes, it will become increasingly difficult to disengage from the stand-down. Protracted negotiations under these circumstances may, as in the Korean case, prove costly in American lives. 5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the early resumption of offensive air operations essential if we are to avoid a misinterpretation of US resolve in Southeast Asia, redress advantages accruing to the DRV from the stand-down, and enter into meaningful negotiations from a position of strength. 6. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommended that a policy decision be taken now to terminate the stand-down of offensive air operations against the DRV 48 hours subsequent to Shelepinʼs return to Moscow from Hanoi, by which time the Soviets would have had opportunity to communicate to us any substantive results of his visit. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 2 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. McNamara forwarded the memorandum to Rusk on January 19. (Ibid.) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original. 14. Notes of Meeting 14. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 10, 1966, 1:10–2:10 p.m. PRESENT President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Helms, Ball, Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti SUBJECT Peace Offensive, discussions with Congressional leadership, next steps, diplomatic and military Rusk: Will brief Congressional leadership. Need to work out some procedures in conjunction with peace. Some hardening of Soviet position since Chicom attacks on them. President: Have 25 men who advise on foreign policy. Lippmann, Alsop, etc. All these fellows will be speaking their judgment. A minority will recommend their own too. 535 members have to give their report. Hardest thing is to say: “I donʼt [know] anything.” Ought to give serious thought not to getting the leaders down here but have the men around this table to appear at as many hearings as possible—and give them something to have to chew on before their mind hardens. To lay our case before them. We have asked each person who has come back to town (Congressmen). Of the 104 who have been queried, only 8 or 9 have problems economically. What most interests him is Viet Nam; 80 feel we ought to follow current course, 10% want out, 10% want to go on. Rivers wants us to go on with bombing. Morse wants us to get out. and youʼll have this dichotomy. Think Russell will be less likely to comment on his opinions after Rusk testifies. People will be upset and AP and UPI will provoke them. Sat down with Dirksen and Mansfield—and if we can get our story over to appropriate committees, it would be better. McNamara: Supposed to start the 19th. President: I guess thatʼs all right. They will start talking the Mansfield report 2 on Friday 14th. What better way do we have to tell our story except through the Secretaries and the Committees? Rusk: Perhaps give a luncheon for official leadership of two Houses—and talk with them. President: That is excellent: Speaker Boggs Long Ford Dirksen Kuchel Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Appropriations Mansfield Albert Russell Fulbright Hayden Rivers Morgan Mahon Now what about our military and diplomatic situation? When do we announce Harrimanʼs visit to Viet Nam? Bundy: Weʼd rather have VN Government announce this. President: Iʼd like to get it out today. Bundy: If we go out there right now, it will be out here this evening. President: Should we say anything about a proposal in VN in our Soviet message? Rusk: No, unless we get something concrete today from Goldberg. President: Can we summarize where we are now? Rusk: Good deal of activity on the other side. Some statements are aimed at each other as well as us. Some Soviet statements have been aimed at Peiping. Donʼt have clear answer to what weʼve been doing. Donʼt think we are going to get a clear cut answer—probably some complicated answer. 5–10% chance weʼll get something less than a harsh rejection. Will take a few days to get anything. Shelepin will wind up by Wednesday 3 I believe. Leave SOTU 4 for revision pretty close to actual delivery in case of Hanoi and Shelepin developments. About 3:00 p.m. will be satisfactory. Bundy: You can announce Harriman this afternoon—if you choose. President: Good. Rusk: We have word of 600–700 suspects picked up by Koreans—how many are actually guilty? Wheeler: About 10–15% turn out to be VC or sympathizers. Vietnamese and village chiefs do the interrogating. President: What do you think about VN, General Taylor? Taylor: Extension of bombing pause after Christmas was good—if only to show Government sincerity. But now value is wearing off—danger of extending it—and get trapped into premature negotiations. We need to get word of caution out—2 years of negotiating in Korea. Being successful in getting a conference might be a failure. President: Why canʼt we get on with bombing after Shelepin leaves? Rusk: Serious political disadvantages if we break the Christmas through Tet pause. If we start bombing again, we would have to start all over again. There is no political advantage. There may be military advantage to bombing again. McNamara: Donʼt think there is a military disadvantage in starting up 3 or 4 days earlier. We are ready to bomb again within 12 hours. We are running all sorties over Laos instead of NVN. Weather. President: Reconnaissance show anything alarming? McNamara: Renewing daytime operations—building bridges. Even during bombing they were building up infiltration. Wheeler: Disagree, Bob. Every day makes a difference. We know both arms of railroad are operational. Assume getting full benefit of supplies. Full scale daylight operations are going on. Every day increases their capability in the South. Chiefs conclude we should make policy decision to resume air operations against Hanoi as soon as Shelepin leaves. They are improving anti-aircraft defenses. Rusk: We have to keep this on a day-to-day basis. Keep looking. Bundy: Real problem is we decide on interval basis to bomb again. We need to put out the Wheeler info before we bomb again. While it was right to get the pause going, we need now to be saying all these things to clear the way for bombing resumption. As you pointed out, we have done enough to satisfy the world, but no matter when we start someone will say we should have waited one week longer. At least 30% of our accredited nations will protest bombing resumption. Taylor: We have 3 blue chips—bombing—large number of troops—withdrawal. Under what circumstances do we continue cessation of bombing—which means no way of pushing pressure on the other way. No way of proving cease-fire violations. Wheeler: We simply cannot prove that NVN are there—until we absolutely capture them. Taylor: We could adjust our bombing to the ratio of incidents. President: Whatʼs the net of your testimony to the Congress, Dean? Rusk: On VN, run over the summary of diplomatic negotiations. Key question is how much we tell them in so far as sensitive info is concerned. Problems posed by Lynd. 5 Pres: I would answer “No good purpose to be served by going into details. Lynd is uninformed man.” Ball: We have avoided official confirmation of any direct contact in VN. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. 2 Presumably a reference to a report made by Mansfield and Aiken on a trip that they and three other Senators took to Vietnam in December 1965. Mansfield and Aiken reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in excutive session on January 11. For text, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) , vol. XVIII, pp. 3–38. Mansfield sent the President a written report, “Vietnam: The Situation and Outlook,” December 17, 1965. (Johnson Library, Confidential File, MC/CO) A modified public version, “The Viet Nam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow,” was published as a committee print by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1966. 3 January 12. 4 State of the Union message. 5 Telegram 1947 to Saigon, January 9, reported: “ New York Times today carried Moscow story of Lynd interview in which Lynd claims that he and others asked Pham Van Dong whether USG had approached DRV through Ambassadors or directly since Dec. 20. Pham Van Dong is quoted as answering in categorical negative.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Staughton Lynd elaborated on his interview with Pham Van Dong in a debriefing by James Leonard of INR on January 11. (Memorandum of conversation, January 13; ibid.) 15. Notes of Meeting 15. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 11, 1966, 1:05–2:05 p.m. PRESENT The President, McNamara, Bill Bundy, Mac Bundy, David Bell, Alexis Johnson, Bill Moyers, Jack Valenti 2 SUBJECT David Bellʼs return 3 Bell: Four essentials: 1. Pacification for rural construction. 2. Resources allocation and inflation. 3. Emphasis on non military aspects. 4. Miscellaneous. Number one problem is rural pacification. Today SVN army can no longer clear any area; must have our troops. But even so canʼt hold it. Difficult problem. Must restore some kind of government system that serves the people. A new spirit is needed—local security is needed. Is not being done now. Some areas are thoroughly pacified but have always been historically. We are not yet following up and increasing hold so people can see positive future for themselves. Nothing new—but did find neither the SVN nor Americans are adequately on top of this problem. General Khanh has done a good job to learn this task. His deputy Col. Chon is one of the best—now recruiting and training Vietnamese teams. Ben de Pugh on our side understands the problem. Col. Sam Wilson also good. Plans to concentrate in 4 limited priority areas. If they accomplish even this, they will have affected 1/20 or 1/10 of rural population but it will be first time this has happened. Key question—can we get even this little done. Will take 80 man teams to go into each hamlet and village and stay for months at a time. Begin to build a political system and root out VC. Takes heavy volume of VN manpower to do this. Strong back-up needed also—(AID, CIA, USIA, etc.). Disturbed because in general setup of U.S. mission, no one is really in charge of this sort of operation. Tentative conclusion is (agreed to by Westmoreland, Mann, Lodge) to place responsibility on Ambassador Porter, give him small staff, integrate the overall program. Can bring in wholly new man but this has drawbacks. This is number one objective save for the actual fighting to be undertaken in coming year. Resource Allocation VN economy has changed—now in boom situation. Resources over-strained, prices going up. Plans are not made as to how to distribute manpower. Canʼt do anything about land reform because no men available. Need someone in U.S. mission akin to James Byrnesʼ job in WW II. Would identify resources and spotlight issues. Requires office and man not now in VN. Checked with Ambassador Lodge but neither of us are sure about this. Did a lot of work on inflation. Laid out a complete set of measurements to control inflation. Principal one is to limit VN budget expenses. Increase taxes (agreed not yet done). Limit to maximum possible extent the spending by American troops. (Budget deficits, troop spending, military construction program are three big sources of inflation.) Difficult to really prevent American troop spending. Think we have the impact of spending and construction as low as possible. U.S. and VN are agreed on approximate volume of imports required. About double the imports over last year. From $200M to $400M AID. Demand for increased imports are already on us. Already have to transfer funds to get us through January. Finally, over and above this will be necessary to take monetary action, even to devalue currency. Not now because of volatile situation. Meantime, series of actions suggested—putting some money through black market in Hong Kong. VN wanted to sell gold but told them it was out of the question. Inflation problem is not fully met today. Ports Badly jammed. Coastal ports are being worked on and in few months will be able to handle traffic. Saigon is another problem. 500,000 tons by next October. We have man out there from New York Port Authority who is good man. Through the coming year need to take series of steps which will improve the port. Canʼt be done now because of administrative set up. Recommend Ky establish a single-headed Port Authority—put tough guy in charge. Put high ranking military man along side him. Ky accepted recommendation in principle—has not carried it out. Non military aspects Satisfied that Lodge, Zorthian, Mann et al. doing all they can in field. American reporters file a good deal of this non military work but little of it gets printed. Lodge says it would be helpful to have series of visits—if they are well prepared and substantive. But there is plenty for such groups to do. Careful preparation can be done. Recommend such groups go out: Agriculture-Education-Health—in that order. First visit by Freeman be held in February. Other visits later. Miscellaneous Checked on refugee camps. Rather pleased at what I found. Refugees being fed, not hungry, reasonably clothed. Housing varies. Some very good, some very bad. Too crowded, dangerous from health view. Refugees relatively static. Coming in, but others re-settled. Around 700,000 now. Can handle that number okay. Economic Warfare Diversion of American materials to VC—Committee working on this. Difficult to manage. VC can send purchasing agent to Saigon and buy what they need. It is difficult to get to VC. Easier to block it via transportation rather than marketplace. Long, detailed process to find out about the flow—and to stop it. AID expanding—1,000 Americans and 200–300 contract people. Bulk of additional people going in the field. All this, of course, has nothing to do with military. President: Mac, analyze written report and let us find out what we need to do. Bundy: Most important is pacification. 4 Not clear we can handle resource allocation in as straightforward way as David suggests. Two kinds of civilian leadership problem—pacification and resource allocation. President: Gather pacification has gone backwards. Bell: Possibly—though not much. Asked provincial men how much of their area is reachable—varied—much by day—less by night. Reporters I talked to didnʼt seem to know much. AID people (Roy, Wehrle) are worried. Worried about thinness and weakness in VN government. Only 2 or 3 strong men in government. General Thieu and two others. When you talk as I did for long hours with these men, you find they are not broad gauged. Wehrle is troubled by this. But people in the country side are not worried—high morale and working like dogs. Superb morale. Far better understanding displayed today by VN leaders in the “village campaign.” VN men in charge do see the problem, making plans but they are still plans. McNamara: Donʼt think thereʼs single area pacified. President: What about Lansdale? Bell: Has good effect on VN side—divisive effect in American community. His personality is the reason—Deutsch is real problem. Key question is whether he is worth the cost. Lansdale however is rated valuable above his cost. President: What is relationship between the American leaders? Bell: Excellent. President: Anyone make any contribution to the pause? Bell: Didnʼt go into that. Thailand problem is troublesome—corrupt man in charge. Everyone in Thailand is aware of it. Pleased with AID program in N.E. Thailand. Still a long way from a popular based program and government. Still handing down largesse from on high. Laos not hopeless—real base to build on in terms of development. No Taiwan, but clearly not a sink-hole, hopeless. They can improve in a good many ways. Ball: Just spent three hours before House Foreign Affairs Committee. And itʼs not the same committee I knew before. President: I think it is going to get worse. Viet Nam is number one thing on their mind. But when you get to specifics they wind up doing the same thing. Donʼt think the polls are far wrong—55–45. Senate will be worse than House. Must ride out the waves created by 100 experts who visited there. Ball: One question: Why doesnʼt Adm. allow it to debate? Told them they could debate anytime. President: Are they critical of pause? Ball: No, on the whole they rather like it. This has been Gung Ho committee but now they are softer—looking for a way out. President: What would your conclusion be? Ball: They have no solutions—just deeply troubled. Bell: Followed Harriman—and his visits were excellent. Complimentary of what he is doing. Committee not critical of peace effort—worried about where we go. President: Articles in last few days have spurred them on (Lippmann, etc.). 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. In a memorandum written at 1 p.m. on January 11, McGeorge Bundy told President Johnson that the “main point” of the meeting with Bell was “simply to emphasize the importance of the non-military effort by having Bell report on the record to you.” (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 2 The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that Ball was also present. (Johnson Library) 3 Bell visited Vietnam January 1–5. For his written report to the President, see Document 28 . 4 In a memorandum to the President written at 5:30 p.m. on January 11, Bundy stated: “My basic conviction is that the things Dave Bell was talking about this morning are very much more important than bombing the North. This is why I think the State of the Union should keep attention focused on the effort in the South.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 16. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France 1 Washington, January 11, 1966, 8:55 p.m. 3176. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Refs: Your cables 3897, 3912, 3913, 2 3914. 3 Agree with you it would be timely and useful for Y to seek early appointment with Rupert, even though latter probably lacks definitive instructions pending conclusion Shelepin Hanoi visit. We assume Rupertʼs “illness” 4 is over since he met with Manacʼh at Quai January 6 and kept other appointments reported by [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Gottlieb. If Rupert still claims indisposition, Y should seek appointment with Jean 5 but from here appears Rupert would be more desirable target. At such appointment Y should take following line: (1) Indicate that USG has received information that Rupert has been receiving a number of American visitors and exchanging messages with them. Among these messages there appeared to be a suggestion that Rupert would be happy to receive a “mandated” US representative. 6 (2) Y should make clear that he is the “mandated representative of the USG” suggested by Rupert and that none of his other contacts can claim similar credentials. Y should express surprise that Rupert should be talking to Americans who apparently include journalists about this desire, since USG had assumed that if conversations were to have any usefulness they should be private in first instance and not used by other side for propaganda purposes. Y is and has for long time been prepared to discuss in detail situation in Viet-Nam and its people as Rupert has requested. (3) Y should then repeat what he told Jean earlier 7 that USG continues ready for serious discussions and remind Rupert that we have had no response to written copy of French translation of 4 points discussed on November 18 and handed to Jean subsequently. Y should ask again whether Rupert and his superiors cannot address themselves to some such formulation which prejudges nothing and emphatically reaffirms such points as USG readiness for ultimate withdrawal and acceptance of principle of reunification resulting from freely expressed will of people in both NVN and SVN. (4) Y should note that suspension of bombing of DRV is now in (Blank) day from its origin on December 24 and note the complete absence of private Hanoi responses in words or deeds and reiterated public negative statements issued by DRV during suspension. Taking care to avoid any implication of an ultimatum, Y should note that unilateral restraint by USG cannot continue indefinitely without clear affirmative response of some kind by Hanoi which would give us basis for continuing present suspension or taking further actions leading towards peaceful solution. (5) Y has been advised that Rupert told recent French visitor (FYI: Director of Center of American Studies (CHEA), who may use story in CHEA newsletter) that DRV is ready to participate in, but not initiate, an international conference taking into consideration 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords and attempting to establish basis for lasting Indo-China peace. Could Rupert confirm whether this is correct statement of his views, which would be of interest to USG? (6) Y should be aware Rupert also reported in same contact to have insisted negotiations be preceded by complete “cessation of hostilities” though not US troop withdrawal. Since cessation of hostilities involves numerous pitfalls, Y should not refer to that as reported condition of Rupertʼs but be alert to report any such qualification. If pressed Y could note without amplification US Point 5: “a cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be subject of preliminary discussion.” (7) If Rupert criticizes USG spokesman statement that it is a “safe deduction” that there has been a direct US–DRV contact, 8 Y should respond that this minimal admission, which USG has been careful not to expand on, was necessitated by Pham Van Dongʼs flat statement for publication to Professor Lynd in Hanoi earlier this month that there had been no such contact. 9 Comment: We are concerned by Rupertʼs increasing contact with French and now US newsmen in preference to contact with Y. We believe he may be building record for use against us in charging openings which we have not taken advantage of following resumption of bombing of DRV. 10 Re your 3914, you are authorized to give [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Chief on purely personal basis minimum knowledge of this operation you think desirable. We have spoken here with Helms who will advise [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] Chief that he should discuss with you or McBride knowledge that comes to his attention regarding this operation. You should file his reports directly bearing on XYZ contacts with Rupert through XYZ channel. Other contacts relating to Mai Van Bo he may file through his regular channel, but when in doubt on these types of reports, should consult with you or McBride who will have discretion on deciding on appropriate channel. As practical matter, however, reports on Boʼs contacts, such as those relating to “mandated” representative or discussion with CHEA Director, should be filed preferably through XYZ channels only, in order that we can appropriately funnel them promptly into consideration of XYZ operation. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-XYZ. Drafted by Read, Springsteen, and William Bundy and approved by Ball. 2 In telegram 3913, January 11, Bohlen discussed Mai Van Boʼs (“Rupertʼs”) considerable interest in encouraging intermediaries other than Sturm (“Y”), including the contacts reported by Bohlen in telegrams 3897 and 3912, January 10 and 11. Bohlen proposed that Sturm seek another appointment with Mai Van Bo. (All ibid.) 3 In telegram 3914, January 11, Bohlen proposed informing [ text not declassified ] Paris about the XYZ operation. (Ibid.) 4 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, p. 371, footnote 6 . 5 Vo Van Sung. See Document 4 regarding the designation of Vo Van Sung as “Jean.” 6 This message was reported in telegram 3897 from Paris, January 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ) 7 See Document 4 . 8 At a White House press briefing on January 10, Bill Moyers stated that Staughton Lynd and two associates were “incompletely informed” in asserting that the United States had failed to make direct contact with the North Vietnamese Government (see footnote 5, Document 14 ). Asked whether a conclusion could thus be drawn that there had been direct contact, Moyers stated: “Thatʼs a safe deduction.” ( The New York Times , January 11, 1966) 9 See footnote 5, Document 14 . 10 Telegram 3992 from Paris, January 13, reported on Yʼs meeting on January 13 with Jean (rather than Rupert, who indicated he was “too busy” to receive Y). Y made the points outlined in his instructions, but for the most part the “conversation consisted of little more than dropping letters in mailbox.” Nevertheless, “Jean on surface seemed friendly,” and “one cannot avoid the thought that this is the end of a very long line leading to Hanoi.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/XYZ) 17. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 17. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Honolulu, January 12, 1966, 0205Z. JCS 46895. The Relationship of Military Operations Against NVN to the Overall Strategy of the War in SVN (U). 1. One of the key elements of the strategy in Vietnam has been the application of steadily increasing military pressure against North Vietnam to force cessation of support to the VC, and to bring NVN to the negotiating table. Surely a negotiated solution to the problem of peace and security for SVN is infinitely preferable to a long, bitter and costly war. We recognize that the effectiveness of military pressure depends partly on a significant combination of moves toward negotiation which clearly indicates to the DRV our continuing readiness to negotiate. The current pause is such a move, and it is to be hoped that it will be quickly successful. 2. Based on reactions so far, however, Hanoi has shown no inclination to negotiate and may continue to spurn all our efforts unless forced to take some other course. We should plan now to resume effective operations against NVN, as indeed we must if negotiations do not bring an early cease fire. 3. It is essential, therefore, that the vital relationship of military operations against NVN to a coherent overall strategy for Vietnam be recognized. This overall strategy is based on three undertakings. These are: A. To deny to the Communists in SVN the effective direction and assistance from NVN so vital to their war making capability. B. To assist the RVN in providing protection of the South Vietnamese people from Communist subversion and oppression, to liberate areas dominated by the VC, and to assist in the establishment of a stable economy and the continuation of an independent non-Communist government. C. To defeat the VC and PAVN forces and destroy their base areas in the RVN. Germane to the interdependent nature of these three elements of strategy is the necessity that success be achieved in each and that each of the three undertakings be subject to a simultaneous application of appropriate military force. 4. When we resume operations against NVN, the air campaign should be conducted in the most effective manner to accomplish sub para 3.A. above. This will require operations quite different from the pre-cease fire pattern. The vital external assistance to NVN required to sustain effective internal military operations and external aggression must be denied. Resources already in NVN most needed to support aggression should be destroyed in depth. All known military material and facil-ities should be destroyed and military activities and movements should be continuously harassed and disrupted. 5. It appears that the very foundation of the enemyʼs morale and resultant tenacity stands squarely on the belief that our patience will run out before his. Hanoi has publicly stated that the enormous costs of long lines of communications and the casualties they intend to inflict on U.S. forces will cause us to negotiate on their terms. We should consider the consequences of NVN secure from attack, supported by both Russia and China, infiltrating into SVN troops equipped with the latest weapons, fully trained, and continuously supplied. Of even greater importance would be the freedom of Hanoi to exercise unhampered direction of operations in SVN and the concomitant beneficial morale effects upon the PAVN/VC forces. Vietnam Communist history and doctrine and current experience lead only to the conclusion that they are willing to expend lives at a rate which we would consider unacceptable to achieve their objectives. Therefore, we must accept as reality that an exorbitant expenditure of lives by the enemy in SVN over a long period of time would be endured as long as success appeared possible. The implications of this fact are enormous. Viewed in this context then, Hanoi may not have been idly boasting when they claimed that Operation Starlite, 2 near Chu Lai, and the battle of Ia Drang 3 were actually victories for their side. Unfortunately, this could be true in a strategic sense unless our strategy makes full use of our superior air power to reduce casualties and foreshorten the time required to achieve our limited objectives. 6. Again, as they did in one phase of the war against the French when faced with superior regular military forces, the Communists are currently avoiding costly engagements at our initiative in SVN and are concentrating on terrorism and destructive attacks on small outposts and garrisons. This technique can be used any time success seems to elude them temporarily. A PAVN/VC force using this strategy and supported as visualized can extend the time period before we gain any real military successes or reconstruction progress. A long stand-down in air attacks against NVN while NVN continues to support PAVN/VC intensive operations in SVN would vitiate U.S. strategy for bringing the war in Vietnam to an acceptable conclusion. For political, economic and psychological reasons of great importance in both the U.S. and SVN there is an urgent need to make rapid progress toward security for the SVN people and the destruction of PAVN/VC forces and base areas. The adverse consequences, both in the U.S. and SVN of very slow progress in the war, could be incalculable. 7. The Communists have a total disregard for the human values held by the Western world. By our standards, they will endure staggering losses of human lives to achieve their objectives. They are keenly aware of our attitudes and have announced that U.S. troop casualties, rather than victory in battle, will govern their strategy in SVN. At the same time, they know that we would choose to exploit full use of air power as a technological alternative to human loss. To prevent this, they have staged a remarkable world-wide political and propaganda campaign. They anticipate that the VC, fully supported by NVN, can inflict sufficient casualties to generate internal U.S. pressures to end the war far short of the objectives we seek. They have correctly determined that a crucial battle of the war is the political battle. They are not fighting to attain a permanent stand-down. We must not permit them to win it. 8. With these thoughts in mind, a review of the changed situation since RT operations began is in order. We began RT with very limited objectives, at a time when PAVN infiltration was of less significance than it is now. Our build up in SVN was visualized as a moderate and sustainable assist to the ARVN in maintaining effective mobile reserve forces and in gaining and maintaining security for reconstruction. It was visualized that such assistance was politically and economically supportable for an indefinite period while the GVN made the required progress. 9. When RT began, there was considerable hope of causing Hanoi to cease aggression through an increasing pressure brought to bear through carefully timed destruction of selected resources, accompanied by threat of greater losses. Presumably this would cause Hanoi to decide to cease support of the VC. But in Feb of last year CINCPAC stated a view substantially as follows: We must face the fact that punitive attacks and the threat of destruction of the capital resources in NVN probably will not bring Hanoi to the conference table. Ho Chi Minh has never doubted ultimate victory. We said that from his point of view the prospect of eventual defeat in SVN would be the unacceptable threat to his long term objectives. Therefore, in order to win in SVN, the immediate objective of RT should be to make it as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and Pathet Lao, thereby contributing directly to our ultimate objective of winning in SVN. 10. However, Rolling Thunder has been conducted with the primary objective of increasing pressure to cause Hanoi to “decide” to cease support of the VC and Pathet Lao and the objective of making it difficult to export aggression has been pursued in a very limited manner. On the credit side, there has been significant disruption upon which we can capitalize when operations are resumed. NVN has had to expend great effort to repair roads and bridges and to prepare defense of urban areas for possible attack. Necessary internal operations have been severely disrupted and military support to the VC and Pathet Lao has been somewhat slowed but not slowed enough. Reconstruction of communication links has been designated as a number one strategic problem and large numbers of people have been organized into repair gangs. The Army has been given supervision of reconstruction in Zone IV, no doubt detracting from their military duties. And as a reflection of the pressure the Vietnam news agency in Hanoi has been increasing the tempo of propaganda relating to U.S. air attacks. These facts and others indicate that Hanoi has felt the pressure and that we were presenting the government with growing internal problems. In light of the limited objectives of the air campaign, RT has done quite well. 11. On the other hand, RT operations have not been conducted in such a manner as to increase the pressure on Hanoi in recent months. Targets vital to effective military operations have not been struck in significant numbers; military and civilian activities have accommodated to the limited operations; and, in fact, the psychological pressure has decreased. But regardless of how RT has been conducted, the important fact now is that the nature of the war has changed since the air campaign began. RT has not forced Hanoi to the decision which we sought. There is now every indication that Ho Chi Minh intends to continue support of the VC until he is denied the capability to do so. He has the unstinting support of the ChiComs which has increased his obligation to that regime. This, together with the pressure from that direction to continue support probably leaves him little alternative. This resolve has caused a significant change in the complexion of NVN support to the VC, while U.S. commitments have dramatically increased. In the light of these greatly increased commitments and the factors already discussed, and with due regard to political realities and current resources, we must do all that we can to make it as difficult and costly as possible for Hanoi to continue direction and support of aggression. In good conscience, we should not long delay resumption of an RT program designed to meet the changed nature of the war. 12. In consonance with the overall concept, military operations against NVN should: A. Deny to NVN assistance from external sources. B. Destroy in depth those resources already in NVN that contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of all known permanent military facilities; and harass and disrupt dispersed military operations. C. Harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials through Southern DRV into Laos and SVN. Denial of external assistance requires interdiction of land LOCʼs from China and closing of the ports. Occasional attacks against bridges on the LOCʼs in the northeast quadrant has had only limited success in disrupting the flow. This area must be opened up for armed recce with authority to attack LOC targets as necessary. In initiating action to close the ports, particularly Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha, it is recognized that political considerations are involved. Highly selective strikes and political action on the international scene to indicate our intentions to continue to deny use of the ports should be undertaken. Reaction of ChiComs while the program gets underway should provide indications of their actual intentions. Nevertheless, if we are to realize our aims, we must take these steps, bold as they may seem. Destruction of resources within NVN should begin with POL. Every known POL facility and distribution activity should be destroyed and harassed until the war is concluded. Denial of electric power facilities should begin at an early date and continue until all plants are out of action. Complete destruction is not required. All large military facilities should be destroyed in Northern NVN as they have been in the Southern area. 13. We should mount an intensified armed reconnaissance program without sortie restriction, to harass, disrupt and attrit the dispersed and hidden military facilities and activities south of 20 deg which have been identified and are continuing to be identified as a result of detailed intelligence analysis. We should concentrate on LOC centers, attacking trans-shipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits into Laos on a nite and day basis. The initial effort should be followed by sustained armed recce surveillance and attack against known and predicted traffic flow areas in order to maintain the harassment and disruption desired. 14. Paralleling an increased tempo of RT operations CINCPAC will maintain intensified photo reconnaissance with all available assets. Previous RT operations have forced the enemy to hide, disperse, and camouflage his military support base, and to take maximum advantage of darkness to move personnel, supplies and equipment over the infiltration routes. All available exploitation resources will be applied to detailed readout and analysis of the frequent coverage that must be obtained, but more may be required. When RT operations are resumed, security of our forces should be given the attention required. We must neither accept losses that could be prevented nor interference with operational flexibility. Plans have been drawn up for constant surveillance of the airfields and their destruction when required. Soon they should be authorized for attack. It will be far too costly to an intensive air campaign to permit the enemy to maintain a SAM capability. Operational commanders will require authority to deal with this threat wherever it jeopardizes operations. 15. In summary, we strongly believe that air operations against NVN should be resumed as one of the three main elements of our strategy in Vietnam. We should use all available force, with due regard to the Presidentʼs intention at this time not to destroy the NVN people and nation, to eliminate Hanoiʼs capability to support the VC. The complementary course in SVN is to employ the combined in-country military force to better protect the South Vietnamese people, liberate areas dominated by the Viet Cong, institute and maintain a pacification rural construction program, destroy enemy base areas, and defeat regular enemy military forces. Success in all three elements of this strategy promises the most rapid progress toward achieving our objectives. Viewing this prospect from both sides, and in consideration of factors discussed, these three tasks well done will bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of support. 4 The alternative appears to be a long and costly counterinsurgency—costly in U.S. and SVN lives and material resources. 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV, and passed to the State Department and White House. 2 In Operation Starlite, August 1965, U.S. Marines trapped a major portion of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment on a peninsula near Chu Lai, 100 kilometers southeast of Da Nang. 3 The Battle of Ia Drang took place in November 1965 in the Ia Drang Valley of South Vietnamʼs Central Highlands. 4 In a 12-page paper, “Viet Nam Prospects,” also dated January 12, Goldberg sought to convince the President that the “limited though considerable escalation now contemplated” would “probably achieve no significant results except to escalate casualties, destruction, costs, and political liabilities.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966) 5 William Bundy responded to Admiral Sharp on January 14, concurring “on the importance of combining political moves toward negotiation with military pressures” but noting that “the key question which always faces us is that of timing.” As for denying assistance from the North to the enemy in the South, Bundy felt that the problem was “to find exactly the right combination of military measures and political initiatives to accomplish this result.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 18. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, January 12, 1966. 2503. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Outlook for 1966. This is the period before the Vietnamese new year and may be a good time for a backward glance, and a look ahead. 2. The change in the situation here since your decision to commit U.S. troops has been spectacular. 3. Before your decision, we were at a smoldering stalemate which was gradually slipping us over the edge. The GVN was even worrying as to whether it could survive or would be forced to give up. The politically minded Vietnamese, being unsure of our position, were trying to make hedges for their own future, with government instability the result. There was real worry as to whether the Viet Cong would succeed in cutting the country in two and setting up a separate “capital” at some place like Kontum or Pleiku. The VC main force units were absolutely impregnable in their jungle underground redoubts and could be counted upon always to destroy the governmentʼs efforts to rebuild the countryside and eliminate terrorism. Underlying all these troubles was the doubt as to whether or not we would stay. 4. Your decision signified an American commitment and, after it, the Vietnamese said to himself in effect, “If the Americans can commit themselves, then I can commit myself.” The present government has thus been in power more than six months instead of the three weeks that was predicted (to be sure, no predictions can yet be made about government stability). Our military have learned how to cope with the main force units of the Viet Cong and with the redoubts, which has created an unprecedented opportunity for pacification and rebuilding the countryside. There is ground for some solid satisfaction because of signs of demoralization of the Viet Cong, which is reflected in the highest monthly total of defections on record during November. If the above paragraph were a complete report, we would all be feeling pretty good today. 5. But on the unfavorable side is the entrance of the Army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam. This has transformed the nature of the war. It is in effect a new war. I believe, however, that while this can delay success, it cannot prevent it. The VC main force and the NVN Army, [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] as of January 6, aggregate about 43,630—about 25 percent of the total Communist manpower. We know much more about how to handle the Communists militarily and we also have made progress on a formula for dealing with Communist subversion/terrorism by means of pacification and rebuilding the countryside. If, therefore, we remain steadfast, I look for fundamental progress in 1966—decisive, perhaps, in the strictly military field and solid achievement as regards pacification. 6. You can thus take tremendous satisfaction from your decision of last summer. Even the bad part—the entrance of the Army of North Vietnam into South Vietnam—is still a direct consequence of the fact that your decision created a favorable balance which they simply could not redress by Viet Cong troops from South Vietnam. Their only chance, therefore, of winning the war was to bring in the soldiers from outside the country. This is a real escalation of the war, and it is grim for us. It richly justifies a new look at the whole scene, as you are wisely doing. But it entails grave risks for them. 7. Hanoi or Peking? Thich Tam Chau is the head of the Buddhist Institute and by any standard is one of the very top Buddhists in Vietnam. I find him sagacious, well-balanced and politically minded. He comes originally from Hanoi and has many connections there, religious and personal. For various reasons, I have built up a very good footing with him over the years. Last week, he surprised me by saying flatly that the Hanoi regime would like to stop the war, and that it was Peking which is stopping Hanoi from doing so, and that Peking had enough influence to stop Hanoi. He felt we were making a mistake when we thought in terms of Hanoi and did not realize that the real problem was Peking. Nothing would ever be settled until we had solved “the problem of China.” He frankly did not know how to solve it but he knew that was where the trouble was. He also published the above in his newspaper. 8. Political. The government plans to announce policies and programs for rural construction, a constitution, and the budget at a convention of the Armed Forces on the eve of the lunar new year holiday (Tet). 9. There were no overt signs of discontent among the Montagnards but the situation remained highly unsettled and potentially dangerous. The government has privately acknowledged the failure of its previous approach. 10. There has been increasing speculation among Vietnamese as to the basic objectives of the GVN and the US. Bill Moyersʼ statement referring to a direct US-Hanoi contact has caused concern/hope the visit of Secretary Rusk and Gov. Harriman will clarify the problem. It is potentially a great danger to the war effort. 2 11. American reporters have also begun to speculate about serious differences between the US and the GVN on the issue of negotiations, and I have instructed everyone here not to discuss the subject with the press. 12. Economic. Retail prices in Saigon rose to their highest level in the week ending January 3. The price increases reflected normal pre-Tet increases plus the consequences of Viet Cong action in cutting the road to Dalot, the center of vegetable production. 13. Dollar and gold prices, which had declined last week, returned to their previous high level. 14. Rice stocks on hand increased, reflecting both imports and increased deliveries from the rice-growing delta area which reached a three-year high in December. It is expected that there will be enough pork for Tet. 15. Military. The level of Viet Cong activity declined during the week while combined Vietnamese-Free World task forces mounted major assaults in Phu Yen Province of Central Vietnam and in the Plain of Reeds southwest of Saigon. In the Phu Yen area, Republic of Korea forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy while suffering their own first serious losses. 16. Statistically the total of Viet Cong incidents dropped from 1,133 for the preceding week to 973. Of this total 17 were attacks or ambushes while 645 were acts of terrorism. The remainder were acts of sabotage, propaganda or anti-aircraft fire. 17. The total number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi program dropped from 705 to 484, a figure which included 285 military and political cadre. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:33 a.m. 2 In his memorandum forwarding Lodgeʼs telegram to the President on January 12, McGeorge Bundy commented that paragraph 10 “argues against a direct reference to our contact with Hanoi in the State of the Union.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) Regarding Moyersʼ statement, see footnote 8, Document 16 . 19. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 19. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball) 1 Washington, January 12, 1966, 2:10 p.m. Pres. cited Lodgeʼs Jan. 12 telegram 2 giving outlook for 1966. Read paragraph 3 as against paragraph 10 and asked if this would cause us to rework our State of the Union message—the portion on direct contact. B felt it was a matter of how we word it. The fact there was a communication is in public domain. Pres. said they had used the language suggested by B this morning. B said he would look at the message and call the Pres. back. 3 Pres. asked how B got along this morning with the SFRC. 4 B told him he had met with them over 3 hours. He got the feeling it was a serious and honest effort to get to the base of the subject. They are troubled; there is not unfriendliness; they are sympathetic with the Presidentʼs problems. B said he had mentioned some of the Presidentʼs thoughts of this morning. B said his testimony was against the background of Mansfield having been with the Committee yesterday in long session. They were aware of the problems and donʼt see any solution other than the course being followed. Ball said one of the Senators told him the Committee suggested to Mansfield that they would like an opportunity to talk privately with the President—to consult in a friendly and sympathetic way, to give the President their ideas. B didnʼt think this would be desirable because it would lead to every other committee wanting to do the same thing. Pres. agreed this wouldnʼt work. B said Mansfield had not promised it to them and B knows he will protect the Pres. on it. So far as the general tone is concerned, B didnʼt get the same feeling that he had before House Committee of an undercurrent of criticism. Their problem is they donʼt know how to talk to their constituents. They donʼt know whether we see the light for a permanent advantage for the US at the end of the road. They are not convinced there is a way out. They are working hard on it and B hadnʼt heard anything about blowing everything up. Pres. asked about Fulbright; B replied he took his familiar line—he didnʼt see where we were going and why the commitment. B continued most questions were on the relationship between the Communist world—the split and what it meant in terms of settlement. They are seeing the whole problem in larger context than they did before. They see it as a serious problem of American policy vis-à-vis Communist effort. There was a much higher level of understanding than in the past and B believes over time we can bring them along on a sympathetic basis. This was true with not only Hickenlooper but Mundt as well. Pres. said he would hate to rewrite the speech and asked that B look at it and give him his judgment. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II. No classification marking. 2 Document 18 . 3 In a 2:25 p.m. conversation with President Johnson, Ball indicated that his preference was not to refer to direct contact between the United States and the DRV. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II) In his State of the Union message delivered to a joint session of Congress that evening, President Johnson reviewed the peace offensive but did not mention direct contact. For text of the message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 3–12. 4 For text of Ballʼs testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) , vol. XVIII, pp. 39–104. 20. Telegram From the Embasy in Vietnam to the Department of State 20. Telegram From the Embasy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, January 13, 1966. 2514. For the President from Lodge. 1. In my weekly telegram no. 2399 of January 5, 2 I referred to the idea of the American public learning to live year in and year out with the Communist China style cold war in Asia as we had learned to live with the Soviet style cold war in Europe. I realize that I may have appeared unaware that it is not reasonable to expect American public opinion to live year in and year out with a hot war, in which substantial numbers of casualties are being incurred. 2. Let me therefore add to my telegram of January 5 this thought: 3. The purely military war against the main force units of the Viet Cong and against the units of the North Vietnamese Army must really have its back broken within the year 1966. (I assume we have the military wherewithal to do it.) But the pacification-uplift program to rebuild the countryside, which the Viet Cong have been systematically destroying for five years, necessarily will take longer. This pacification program, however, is a program which cannot involve heavy American casualties. While it does involve violence and killing, it is of a kind which must be done by the Vietnamese, and largely with police type techniques. The American participation is indispensable, but it is in the way of advice, providing the straight economic and social programs and being political catalysts for the whole. 4. I recommend, therefore: A. That in this new war, which the North Vietnamese have recently inflicted on us and the South Vietnamese by bringing in NVN troops, we take extremely drastic action against everything that pertains to North Viet-Nam, wherever it may be, so as completely and rapidly to neutralize and render harmless their military potential; and B. In South Viet-Nam, continue to help the pacification-countryside-rebuilding-uplift program (which would not involve substantial American casualties) but which would go on for several years and which, I hope, the American public could learn to live with. Your handling of public opinion is so able—particularly at this difficult time—that I do not doubt your ability to do this. 5. Iʼm sorry if I was obscure on this point, but I try in all my telegrams to give you the thing that is preoccupying me at the moment—in a way, to think out loud—hoping that this may be suggestive and helpful. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:52 a.m. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to President Johnson at 11 a.m. on January 13 under cover of a memorandum stating that Lodge “is as optimistic as McNamara is pessimistic about the timing and likelihood of straight military success as against pacification. But I think he is right in his notion that the two should be kept separate in our minds.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18) 2 Document 6 . 21. Report Prepared by the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Porter) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 21. Report Prepared by the Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Porter) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 1 Washington, January 13, 1966. SUBJECT Warrenton Meeting on Viet-Nam, January 8–11, 1966 1. The Warrenton meeting was originally called for mid-December, 1965 in order to bring together senior representatives of the U.S Mission Saigon, the Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee, 2 Washington, and several other individuals (see Annex A) 3 to a) review the joint GVN-US pacification/rural construction program and seek to promote its more effective operation and b) address the problem of the increasingly serious shortages and bottlenecks in manpower, materials and transport in Viet-Nam and to designate priorities and machinery for resources control and allocation. 2. Before the meeting convened on its postponed date (January 8) it had also been agreed to take advantage of the presence here of the Saigon representatives to hold an additional day of meeting in Warrenton to discuss the problems, inter alia, of Montagnards, Chieu Hoi, land tenure and urban questions such as Labor and Youth and to meet 2 days more in Washington on, inter alia, Prisoners of War, Economic Warfare, Free World Assistance, and Elections and Political Parties. This latter set of Washington meetings is still underway as this report is being written. Meanwhile, Messrs. Bell, Poats and Chester Cooper and Mr. Richard Cooperʼs group have visited Saigon to develop emergency programs to meet the grave inflationary threat, the problem of port congestion and to review the organization of the U.S. Mission to handle economic problems. For this reason the Warrenton meeting did not address the first two problems at any length. 3. On the basis of the several daysʼ discussion, considerably assisted by numerous reports from the Saigon representatives, the general conclusions were reached that: a) the military situation although not critical nevertheless continues grave in Viet-Nam with a prospect under the present strategy of several yearsʼ more fighting at least on the current scale before the GVN will be in a position to exercise effective control over substantially all of South Viet-Nam except over Viet Cong base areas; b) there have been some instances of weakening Viet Cong morale, but the Viet Cong, buttressed by continuing infiltration from the North, continue to be a dangerous and effective fighting force; c) the Ky Government continues in relative stability with its collegial division of responsibility, is willing and in a limited degree able to take certain measures long considered necessary to improve its domestic and international position but remains fragile and is failing to live up to its “revolutionary” billing as originally presented by Prime Minister Ky or to produce a fighting force appreciably larger or more aggressive than earlier. 4. In view of this evaluation in general and, in particular, the inter-dependence of military operations and rural construction, it is recommended that a SNIE be promptly produced on the likely development of the politico-military situation over the next two years, based upon present estimates of enemy capabilities and Vietnamese and allied deployment plans, with particular attention to certain outside factors which could produce unanticipated shortfalls in the execution of present plans (identified at Annex B). 5. The sense of the participants also was that it would be advisable to review the current political-military strategy in Viet-Nam and related areas. Such a study (also see Annex B) should include: a) scope and phasing of force deployment (U.S., Free World and GVN), b) alternative concepts for the employment of forces in South Viet-Nam; against infiltration through Laos and by sea; and related actions against North Viet-Nam. (The projected Honolulu meeting 4 at the end of this January might serve this purpose among others.) 6. In its deliberations on rural construction/pacification (“the reconstitution of the social and governmental fabric”) the Warrenton meeting noted some encouraging actions by the GVN: a) to develop, in frequent consultation with the U.S. Mission, promising concepts to provide an agreed basis for this effort (see Annex C), b) to issue detailed instructions about the operation of the rural construction program including provision for continuous coordination between the civilian and military branches at national, corps, division and province levels and c) to organize cadre teams and groups designed to see the effort through from the conclusion of large-scale military action to the point where reconstituted governmental and social institutions can resume their functions in cooperation with a receptive population. 7. On this same subject conclusions and recommendations were adopted (see Annex D) on the following aspects: a. concentration of effort and resources on the four already designated rural construction priority areas for 1966, with lower priorities in turn for the extensive remaining areas where that program is also underway and for other kinds of U.S. programs in rural areas (a report will be submitted to the VNCC by the Mission by March 31 on the prospects for successful execution of the plans for the four priority areas in 1966), b. continued direct U.S. funding to support the most crucial aspects of the rural construction program (i.e. cadre for the teams in the Rural Construction 80-man Groups), c. the importance of encouraging the development of representative bodies at the hamlet or village level, as well as the development of non-government institutions such as cooperatives and labor unions, d. the optimum organization of the U.S. Mission for its support of the rural construction/pacification program—a senior official with a supporting staff with full-time responsibility in this field was considered necessary. (Coordination is also required with Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Bellʼs conclusions on this point.) It would also be desirable for such an official to have in Washington a high-level point of liaison to assure the expeditious discharge here of urgent Viet-Nam business in this field (See also items 10 and 14 below.), e. the proper relation of the respective roles and missions of rural construction teams, police and regional and popular forces, and with the missions of the regular forces, and the requirement for a police force of adequate size and charged with an appropriate mission, f. the collation both in Washington and Saigon of available material on the primary needs and requirements of the rural population (e.g. as reflected in findings of the Census Grievance Teams)—(See Annex D.). 8. The need to be prepared for an expanded role of the police in a situation of ceasefire (and eventual peace) was also noted and Mission Saigon will prepare a contingency plan for the immediate incorporation of some element of the various paramilitary forces into the police in anticipation of such circumstances. 9. On the matter of resource allocation the meeting took note of the grave danger to essential GVN and U.S. programs of insufficiently controlled construction and free bidding for scarce manpower and the contribution of these activities to the inflation problem. In this connection, the Saigon Mission representatives described the setting up of the Deputy Ambassadorʼs committee on construction priorities and the joint GVN-US committees on manpower, construction, logistics, construction material and wages. Measures recently taken to relieve port congestion were also noted. 10. It was the sense of the participants that Ambassador Lodge be invited to consider the appointment as his own direct adviser or assistant of a high-level resource allocation official to devote full time to the anticipation and elimination of resource stringencies; such an official might chair the U.S. side of the joint GVN-US committees mentioned above and serve as principal adviser to the Deputy Ambassador on the construction priorities committee. He should also have a Washington counterpart to follow up such business here (see also paragraphs 7d above and 14 below). For guidance in this field, it was proposed that the Mission regard combat operations, the rural construction program and the logistical support for both of these, and measures for economic stability as having top priority; other GVN-US activities will take second place. Pending the preparation of the strategy paper mentioned in paragraph 13, the meeting did not attempt to agree on any further refinement of priorities for resource allocation. 11. On the other subjects treated at Warrenton the following conclusions, which are elaborated in Annex E, have been drawn: a. The U.S. should take advantage of General Coʼs recent invitation (see Embtel 2451) 5 to submit suggestions on a GVN program for the Montagnards as an opening to press hard for concrete improvements in GVN-Montagnard relations in the economic, social and, as soon as possible, political fields. b. At present the Chieu Hoi program most requires effective reception and resettlement of returnees. The Mission will seek to stimulate this through the provincial authorities, perhaps through the occasional direct application of funds; it will also continue to press the GVN for recognition of the importance of the program at national level and continue to urge the designation of an effective head. c. Studies of land tenure, credit and related programs will be expedited to enhance their use as support of the rural construction program. d. While rural construction takes priority over urban programs in general, the U.S. Mission will examine how the U.S. might expand its educational and cultural activities directed at youth in urban as well as rural areas. 12. On a number of occasions during the meeting there was discussion of the intensity of pressure the U.S. should seek to exert on the GVN to adopt or vigorously pursue policies or programs which we favor. In principle the U.S., by paying attention to forms, should take care to maintain the full appearance of GVN independence, but in view of the U.S. involvement and commitment in South Viet-Nam, it may be necessary to exert considerable pressure. Ambassador Lodge and the Saigon Mission will have to be the judges of how pressure, persuasion and manipulation are managed in any specific case. (Some of the participants believe that unless this basic issue—the U.S. ability to influence the GVN—is resolved satisfactorily, our already questionable chances of success in South Viet-Nam will be significantly reduced.) 13. Finally, with regard to policies and programs in Viet-Nam, the absence of any recent strategy paper was noted and the Saigon Mission will undertake the preparation of a first draft to cover the coming 3–5 year period. This should correlate political, military, economic and prop-aganda policies and future activities, assure that they are in harmony with each other and best serve U.S. objectives. Such a paper will have to be related to several alternative assumptions provided by Washington. 14. Note was taken also of the inadequacy of present U.S. Government machinery in Washington to handle Viet-Nam problems quickly and decisively. The need for referral of too large a number of problems to the Secretarial level was one of the problems mentioned. While the meeting did not have time to come to any firm conclusions, there was a view that the VNCC because of its coordinating rather than decision-cum-enforcement powers could not perform this task except in part. If endowing the VNCC or its Chairman with larger powers, and with a staff associated with no one agency, is not a feasible solution, it was considered that the required directing position might have to be set up at a higher level, perhaps related to the National Security Council. (See also paragraphs 7d and 10 above.) 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Jan 1966. Secret. Drafted by Unger. The report was addressed to Rusk, McNamara, Raborn, Bell, McGeorge Bundy, and Lodge. 2 The Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee, chaired by Unger, was a Washington-based interagency group established in 1965 to coordinate non-military programs in Vietnam. 3 Annexes A-E are attached but not printed. Among the attendees from Saigon were Habib, Jorgensen, Lansdale, Charles Mann, Porter, Zorthian, and Brigadier General James Collins of MACV. Among the attendees from Washington were Colby, Chester Cooper, DeSilva, Alvin Friedman of OSD/ISA, Stanley Marlowe of USIA, Major General William Peers of JCS, and Unger. 4 Reference is to a military conference in Honolulu involving General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp, not to President Johnsonʼs meeting with General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky in Honolulu February 6–8. 5 Dated January 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 22. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 22. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 14, 1966, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Top Level Reorganization in Saigon Dave Bell, Bob McNamara, George Ball and I have now had a chance to talk some more about top level organization in Saigon which you asked me to work on at the end of December. There is fairly general agreement now that the most important gap in Saigon is in the overall command of the pacification effort and establishing real security in a growing number of villages. According to Bell and others this is more critical than the task of resource allocation. There is also considerable agreement that the right man to run this pacification job is Deputy Ambassador Porter. He has fully lived up to the expectations of his backers, and McNamara and I have both decided that our doubts of last summer are unjustified. Porterʼs only trouble is that he has become fully indispensable to Lodge in a lot of day-to-day administration and hand-holding. The pacification job is a full time task, and if we settle on Porter, we shall have to get another senior diplomat type to support Lodge on the things that Porter is doing now. A lot of us lean toward Leonard Unger for this job. In addition to a pacification chief, we need a stronger requirements planning group in Saigon to deal with the real problem of resource allocation. But we think this could be done by finding the right first-rate bureaucrats. We do not see room in Saigon for a business executive. There is agreement that MACV and AID have plenty of management. What they lack is coordinated planning and control, and we are now inclined to think that this job can be done by Lodge, Westmoreland and Porter with the right staff support. A pacification chief in the field will need a back-up man here. We are still working on that problem of organization and should have a concerted recommendation for you soon. To persuade Lodge of the virtue of these changes is likely to mean a trip to Saigon for one of us, and I would like to do this myself. There is a slight problem of timing, however, as I do not think I ought to go to Saigon while the pause is going on because my last trip was so intimately associated with the initiation of the bombing. My current thought, therefore, is that Porter (who is here now) should go out and talk this matter over with Lodge in a preliminary way, and that I might follow early in February. None of this requires immediate decision, but it is background for the suggestion that you might wish to see Porter briefly before he goes back. He will be here until Monday morning. 2 Quite aside from the organization problem, he has a lot of interesting things to say about the situation in Saigon today, and he will give you good value for a fifteen minute appointment. McG. B. Arrange an appointment 3 Let him go back 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. Secret. 2 January 17. 3 The President checked this option. He met with Porter from 12:36 to 1:01 p.m. on January 17. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) No record of the conversation has been found, but Bundyʼs briefing memorandum for the President, January 17, on “Possible topics for your talk with Porter” is ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 18. 23. Memorandum of Conversation 23. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Saigon, January 15, 1966. PARTICIPANTS General Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman, National Leadership Council, Viet-Nam Lt. General Pham Xuan Chieu, Secretary General, National Leadership Council Tran Van Do, Foreign Minister Secretary of State Dean Rusk Ambassador Lodge Ambassador Harriman Philip C. Habib The Secretary said that he brought the greetings of President Johnson to General Thieu. The President was pleased that the Secretary would have the opportunity to meet with General Thieu. Such a meeting provided a valuable opportunity for the President and his colleagues to get General Thieuʼs personal impression of the situation and problems in Viet-Nam. The Secretary asked for General Thieuʼs assessment of the situation and said he was prepared to express his own views. General Thieu said he would be frank in his comments. He had been following the recent peace offensive closely. At this time he believes the communists have rejected the offer and he expected that they would continue to be stubborn. If the communists do not accept going to the conference table it is because they will never accept appearing guilty before the world. When one looks at their purpose it would appear that they would not like to negotiate at this time but might rather wait until after the rainy season so as to use at the conference table any gains that they make. They continue to infiltrate more and more troops even during truce periods—whether it is the Christmas truce which had just taken place or the Tet truce which will take place. Since the stopping of the bombing in the North, the enemy has benefited by reorganizing in the rear, moving in troops, and reinforcing troops already infiltrated. In Vietnamese opinion if we decide to bomb again, we will have to be more aggressive. General Thieu said the Government is in difficulty with public opinion on peace moves or meetings with the communists. The Army and the general public have the feeling the GVN has not been kept informed of all measures the USG has taken in the peace offensive. This has made it difficult for the Government. Viet-Nam has the right to conduct war because it is opposing aggression. If they ask for help it is to give more strength to their struggle. If Vietnamese public opinion or VC propaganda look upon the war as one between the U.S. and the VC it would be bad. While welcoming the moves of the U.S., other allies and the Pope, the GVN calls for a common policy. At any time there are proposals for a truce or negotiations or decisions on bombing, the Vietnamese should be consulted. Secretary Rusk said he would like to make a few general observations. To look at the matter in its most simple aspect, if Hanoi and Peiping continue to push into Southeast Asia we will have two choices: either get out of their way or meet them. We have decided to meet them. This is not simply amiability or philanthropy. It derives from U.S. national interest. We cannot see Southeast Asia seized by the communists. If one looks at the situation locally we have committed substantial forces, with more on the way. We do not know how much more will be required, but communist aggression will be met and will not succeed. Beyond purely local considerations is the world where one billion communists are opposed primarily by 190 million Americans. If the war in Viet-Nam moves into a larger war, it is the U.S. that will have to take it on. Viet-Namʼs resources are occupied in full. The U.S. has the problem of making it clear to one billion communists that they are on the wrong track and cannot succeed. We are interested in dividing the communist world; that is one of the main reasons for the recent move we have taken. While we have not seen the success of these moves there are some signs that the communist world is not solid and this is particularly important when you look at the overall situation. The communists have rejected negotiations. They are afraid that they will not succeed in getting at the table what they have not been able to succeed in getting militarily. They are afraid that they will not be able to get Viet-Nam by negotiations. They are the ones who are afraid to negotiate. We should not be. Unless they are prepared to give up their aggression, they will hesitate to negotiate. We will not negotiate in a way that will impair the independence of Viet-Nam. The Secretary said that the last three weeks have made it clear the burden for peace lies on Hanoi and Peiping. Throughout the world there is understanding that if peace is to come, Hanoi must change. Neither Viet-Nam nor the United States stands in the way of peace. Even the communist world is subject to international opinion. In 1948 the Soviets brought the Berlin blockade to an end because world opinion went against them. In various crises since 1945, during which the U.S. had suffered 160,000 casualties, we have not given in to the communistsʼ objective to take over people by force. The Secretary cited the cases of Iran, Berlin, Korea and the Cuban Missile crisis. In the post war period, the U.S. has spent $800 billion on peace in aiding nations. The American people will do what is required if they understand that the alternatives have been exhausted. This is important to the President who secures his resources and his men from Congress. American support for the necessary effort is very strong. Viet-Nam need not be concerned about the determination of the U.S. to see it through. The Secretary commented that there have been elements in the press which have called exaggerated attention to the U.S. effort here. We know the burden Vietnamese forces carry is great. But with U.S. troops here, the U.S. press tends to concentrate on the U.S. effort. This is not to distract from the Vietnamese effort. Ambassador Lodge noted that in President Johnsonʼs State of the Union Message, he made note of the fact that Vietnamese casualties in 1965 were 8 times those of the U.S. The Secretary said that we will try to keep in close touch with the GVN as the situation develops. There have not been any significant signs from the communist capitals. He agreed with General Thieu that there was no change in the communist intention to pursue their objectives. If Hanoi continues along these lines, it will have to suffer the consequences. Hanoi must stop trying to impose its will on South Viet-Nam by force. That is the essence of the matter; all the rest is decoration on the Christmas tree. The U.S. and Viet-Nam have a common objective and we need to find out how best to get on with the job. The problem of peace is in Hanoi and Peiping; that has been clearly demonstrated to the world. Governor Harriman said that it would be fair to say that until the peace offensive there had been a feeling that this is a civil war. Now in many countries they recognize the Presidentʼs sincerity and peace has become Hanoiʼs problem. Communist China may find it in its interest to keep the war going, hoping that we will tire and get out. One thing that is important is that there has been no sign that our peace offensive has been taken to be a sign of weakness. Secretary Rusk commented that rather than being taken to be a sign of weakness, the Communists have taken it as an ultimatum. Governor Harriman said we were driving a wedge in the communist world. Countries like Poland and Yugoslavia want peace and donʼt want to see Communist China expand its influence. This is an advantage to our worldwide objectives as well as to Viet-Nam. If Hanoi wants to stop it can; there is no doubt that Eastern Europe would like to see it stop. But Eastern Europeans do not control Hanoi, and Hanoi has given no sign of changing its way. General Thieu said that all the members of the Leadership Council in the Government are confident of the U.S. determination to support Viet-Nam. He had read President Johnsonʼs State of the Union Message with great interest and this confirmed their understanding. Vietnamese are waiting for the world to condemn the aggression of Communist China and Hanoi. The Vietnamese believe that Hanoi doesnʼt want negotiations, not only because of military reasons but also because they fear their ability to maintain the morale of their people. If they go to the table, they feel they will not be able to maintain their regime in the North or the confidence of the communists in the South. General Thieu thought that when Hanoi finds it no longer has the ability to take over the South, the most logical way would be for them to just quietly stop. Secretary Rusk commented it was a possibility that they would not make peace at a table but would just stop. General Thieu said there were many points of view in South Viet-Nam. In order to maintain morale, the Government would not offer a soft position. When anyone talks about the four points of Hanoi or about the National Liberation Front, this has an effect on morale, and helps those who wish to weaken the Government or those who wish to offer an easier solution. The Vietnamese Government does not doubt the U.S. commitment but it is concerned with the psychological impact of what is going on. Secretary Rusk said that in a way this is more a problem for us. Quite frankly the world position of South Viet-Nam is weakened when a sense of disunity is shown. We know that there are differences between various elements in Viet-Nam: Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards and others. But we do know that there is unity in that they all do not want Hanoi. The more one can find fanatical unity in South Viet-Nam, the more will one get support. This sort of fanatical unity of people under attack is important, as has been demonstrated in such places as Berlin and Korea, and anything that can be done to promote it is for the better. General Thieu said that the Government has been trying for seven months to do its best in this regard. The Government is seeking to develop a democratic viewpoint and promote constitutional development in the future. But the basis of unity is a strong national policy. Offers of neutrality or other solutions arise but if the country stays strong it can fight. The position of the Government and the position of its friends must stay strong. Secretary Rusk replied that the Vietnamese people must know that we havenʼt put in 1/4 million troops to run away. The U.S. is not going to abandon Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk said he knew President Johnson would be most interested in General Thieu ʼs remarks. The President spends an enormous amount of time day and night thinking about Viet-Nam. The Secretary noted that a Communist Foreign Minister at the UN recently told him that the single most important question in the world is to require Peiping to turn to peaceful coexistence. The U.S. has commitments all over Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia. Peace in the Pacific is vital to the U.S. and is in no way second to peace in the Atlantic. We need peace in both oceans. The persistent policy of militancy in Peiping will have to change or they would have to pay the price. They must pull back. Governor Harriman commented that in particular Tito had spoken to him of the danger to peace from Peiping, and the need for a buffer between Communist China and the rest of the world. Governor Harriman has asked Nasser if he wanted to turn over Southeast Asia to Communist China. Nasser has said “Oh, no.” They all want us to stay here to insure peace. Secretary Rusk said a major disappointment has been that more nations have not helped. The issues have been confused, the nature of the war which involves movement by infiltration, rather than across the 17th parallel with divisions, has caused many people to believe that South Viet-Nam was not a problem. The issue was now more clear. It concerned Hanoiʼs willingness to live in peace with its neighbor. General Thieu said Vietnamese recall the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. They knew that the Communists would not respect them. The Communists have a war all over Indo China. They are now putting in more troops in Laos. One must think of a concept of defending the entire area. We must not only defend Viet-Nam, we must defend Laos and the whole area with a complete strategy. Secretary Rusk added we would have to include Thailand as well. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Prepared by Habib. The meeting was held at the Gia Long Palace in Saigon. A memorandum of Secretary Ruskʼs conversation with Prime Minister Ky on the same day is ibid. On January 16 Rusk and Ky issued a joint communique, which is printed in Department of State Bulletin , January 31, 1966, pp. 155–156. Ruskʼs stopover in Saigon followed his visit to New Delhi January 12–13 to attend Prime Minister Shastriʼs funeral and his meeting in Bangkok on January 14 with senior Thai officials. Rusk met with President Marcos in Manila on January 16 and returned to Washington on January 19. 24. Editorial Note 24. Editorial Note On January 15, 1966, Prime Minister Ky delivered a state-of-the-nation address to the Second Congress of the Armed Forces. The text of the speech was transmitted in telegram 2544 from Saigon, January 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S) Ky announced three major objectives of his government during 1966: 1) “to win the war” and “to pacify and to reconstruct the rural area”; 2) “to stabilize the economic situation”; and 3) “to build democracy.” He declared that a “Democracy Building Council” would be appointed shortly to draft a constitution, which would be reviewed by local groups and then submitted to a national referendum in October 1966. Ky pledged that the constitution would serve as the basis for a democratic regime and promised democratic national elections in 1967. 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 25. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 1 Washington, January 17, 1966, 7:16 p.m. 1745. 1. Although we have prodded Sov Embassy here on possible significance Shastri report that Kosygin suggested to him you make direct contact with DRV Ambassador Moscow, we have had no response. 2 In meantime, there are some indications Hanoi may try make propaganda capital by claiming no direct substantive contact was made by US with DRV during current diplomatic activity and pause. On balance, we have therefore concluded that you should seek to make such direct contact and to carry out instructions below. 2. You should send message to DRV Ambassador that you wish direct conversations. 3 You should suggest meeting in some inconspicuous location that would not come to notice of press, since you assume that they would not wish contact to become publicly known. (We virtually assume Sovs will learn of it.) We leave to your judgment place of meeting and would not want possibility of meeting to break down on this issue, so that you are authorized to meet at place DRV representative may suggest if he accepts. Please inform us immediately his reaction. 3. In event meeting is arranged, you should conduct substance of conversation along following lines: a. USG suspended bombing of DRV on December 24 and as DRV knows, notified DRV officially of this in Rangoon on Dec. 29. As was made clear in that message, suspension might continue for limited period in absence of major provocation, and further extension would depend on response and action from DRV. Since suspension X days have elapsed and we have had no indication of Hanoi response. b. DRV rep may take line that suspension amounts to ultimatum or propaganda prelude to increased US actions. You should counter by saying that it should be considered rather as opportunity and responsive to repeated suggestions by Hanoi itself and others that suspension of bombing might create conditions in which moves could be made toward peaceful solution. This is basic and serious purpose of US in taking suspension action. It is in no sense ultimatum. If pressed as to actions US will take in absence of response, you should say that, in face of continued DRV military actions such as introduction of regular forces, US will of course have to take necessary military actions to continue assisting SVN toward objectives thoroughly defined in our statements of position. This is simple statement of fact, not ultimatum, and does not change basic USG view that suspension constitutes opportunity for responsive action by Hanoi. c. You should then go on to say that there seemed to you to be two possible purposes to be served by direct conversation between USG and DRV. One would be to explore possibility of reciprocal reductions of hostilities (not cease-fire). As we have repeatedly said, we could continue suspension if there were significant reciprocal actions by DRV. At same time, we have recognized difficulty DRV might see in admitting that it had ceased these actions or that it was responsible for action in South to degree to which we believe it to be the case. Direct contact could provide opportunity for private and confidential indication by DRV of actions it was taking, so that these would be fully understood by USG and appropriate action taken on US and GVN side. Does DRV rep wish to use contact for this purpose? In making this point, you should initially not indicate what types of actions we have in mind. You should however indicate that since bombing was suspended we have had evidence that supply activity through Laos is continuing at substantial rate and that there has been high incident rate in South but low level of large-scale attacks. In the absence of contrary indication, we must conclude that DRV is continuing infiltration on substantial scale, and that level of activity in South is normal fluctuation. If DRV rep pursues subject, you could indicate that “significant reciprocal actions” could relate to sending of men and equipment from DRV to South, level of military activity and terrorism in South, and withdrawal of regular DRV military units in South in particular. However, we do not wish to get too specific except to leave clearly in record our present reading of military actions, and invite their comment. d. Unless answer indicates desire to pursue this topic, you should go on to say that second possible purpose in direct contact might be to explore conditions under which more formal negotiation might take place. This would be appropriate point, if you have not already done so, to hand over copies of Viet-Nam portion of State of Union address, 4 fourteen points 5 and Goldberg letter of Jan. 4 to U Thant, 6 which you might run over briefly touching on point relating to economic aid which might include DRV in conditions of peace. You would then go on that, as to conditions for negotiation, USG has repeatedly made clear it would be prepared for negotiations either without conditions or on basis Geneva Accords of 1954. However, USG has interpreted Hanoi position, both public and private, as insisting on prior acceptance by USG of Hanoi four points 7 as basis for negotiation, and perhaps also even withdrawal of US forces prior to any negotiation. USG has also understood Hanoi to be insisting that NLF be recognized as sole representative of SVN or at least as independent party. USG has interpreted these Hanoi positions as amounting in effect to prior conditions before negotiation. Is this understanding of past Hanoi position correct, and if so, what would DRV rep now suggest to remove obstacles? 4. Second point would probably lead to general discussion of Hanoi and US positions, in which you should deal with possible points that might arise as follows: a. Four points . USG has no serious difficulty with first two points as basis for negotiation, provided it clearly understood that all elements introduced by DRV will be considered as foreign forces in SVN, and subject to withdrawal. As to fourth point concerning reunification, USG has no difficulty in envisaging reunification by peaceful means but would prefer formulation that specifically called for free popular determination (elections) in both North and South under international supervision to be agreed upon by the governments of North and South, as basis for eventual resolution of question of reunification. This we believe to be true meaning of Geneva Accords, as well as consistent with best answer to this and similar problems as in Germany and Korea. In sum, US regards differences as not serious on first, second, and fourth points. Real US problem is and has always been Hanoiʼs third point, which we interpret to mean insistence on immediate NLF major and probably dominant role in coalition government that would replace present government in Saigon, prior to any election process. This would be imposed and arbitrary solution which we cannot accept in principle as basis of negotiations and for which we see no warrant in Geneva Accords. Of course Hanoi would be free in any negotiations to put forward this, rest of four points, or any proposal it wished, and USG would of course discuss such points if raised, along with its own points. If Hanoi insists that its four points, especially the third, are authentic interpretations of Geneva Accords, then solution might be to base discussions or negotiations on Geneva Accords and argue in negotiations about valid interpretations. b. NLF representation . USG does not regard NLF as independent entity, but as created and in last analysis controlled by DRV. This point aside, USG cannot regard NLF, even in SVN terms, as representing more than one interest group within SVN. Most basically, whole USG concern in SVN arises from DRV role, and this can only be discussed and negotiated with DRV itself. At same time, USG in President Johnsonʼs State of Union message and statement of July 28 8 (repeated in point 13) suggested that ways might be found for NLF to be represented and to pre-sent its views. We would be interested in any suggestions DRV might have along these lines. c. Negotiating forum . USG would accept Geneva Conference of those nations represented in 1954, or any appropriate grouping of governments having major concerns with issue. d. US withdrawal . As indicated in discussion of Hanoiʼs first point, we are prepared envisage US withdrawal as soon as DRV role itself eliminated. However, any insistence on prior US withdrawal is obviously unrealistic, and we have understood some private Hanoi messages to mean that DRV does not thus insist. Could DRV confirm this or clarify its governmentʼs position? 5. If discussion becomes deeply involved in nature and meaning of four points, you could say that there was third possible basis of negotiations in addition to our suggestions of unconditional negotiations or negotiations on basis of Geneva Accords. This would be to frame four-point declaration following subject matter of Hanoiʼs four points but stating third and fourth points somewhat differently to meet our objections. Acceptance of such formula would be minimum change from apparent present DRV position, and might create acceptable common basis. If DRV rep were interested, we have possible text such formulation which could be subject further discussion. 6. Other than as elaborated above, you should stick closely to State of Union message, fourteen points, Goldberg letter, and related previous US statements. As indicated, you should in any event indicate that you will report Hanoi views promptly to USG and will await further instructions with view to further early contact, if desired. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Thompson, and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House. 2 In telegram 1781 to Moscow, January 20, the Department relayed the Soviet Embassyʼs response: Kosygin had told Shastri on January 4 that if the United States was sincerely interested in peace it could seek direct contact with DRV representatives, but Kosygin did not recommend any specific place. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 2228 from Moscow, January 18, Kohler reported that the DRV Ambassador was not in Moscow and he proposed meeting with the DRV Charge instead. The Department concurred in telegram 1756 to Moscow, January 18. (Both ibid.) 4 See footnote 3, Document 19 . 5 See footnote 8, Document 2 . 6 For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 744–746. 7 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. II, pp. 544 – 545 . 8 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, p. 803. 26. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 26. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 17, 1966, 9:15 a.m. [Here follow brief opening comments.] LBJ: Whatʼs your thinking these days. I havenʼt talked to you. Whatʼs happening to our pause? What are our Generals saying? RSM: I sat with George Ball and Mac Bundy late Saturday 2 to consider whatʼs happening on the pause and I think we agreed that we still arenʼt sure and that there are a number of leads that we should follow up so that by the end of this week weʼd be in a position to make some kind of a recommendation to you. We should go back to Rangoon and have our Ambassador there approach that Consul and say, “Three or four weeks ago I gave you a note to send to your government. I havenʼt heard. When will I get an answer?” We should go to Kohler in Moscow and say, “Shastri told us Kosygin said you should contact the North Vietnamese. What does he tell you?” We should go through Rapacki in Poland and say, “You promised to go to North Vietnam. We havenʼt heard a word from you.” And, follow each one of these hot leads or warm leads so that by the end of the week we can tell you that weʼve checked them off and thereʼs nothing more to expect from them. I think that thereʼs a feeling in some parts of State, particularly George [Ball], that we shouldnʼt resume bombing at the end of Tet. Of course, over here among the Chiefs, thereʼs a feeling that we should have resumed before this. I think, my own feeling is, and I think Cyʼs [Vance] as well, that we were well advised to continue to pause through Tet in order to allow an ample period of time to elapse for North Vietnam to respond to any one of these several lines of contact and to establish firmly in the minds of our own public and in the minds of the international public that we gave a reasonable time for them to respond. And that reasonable time, in my incline, will elapse with the end of Tet. I think youʼll get some criticism if you resume bombing at that point, but unless something develops between now and then I would certainly urge that you do so. Thatʼs a week from today or a day or two later. I had just gotten the memo you had Jack Valenti send me from Arthur Goldberg . 3 I was just reading it. Iʼll be prepared to comment on it to you later today. LBJ: Iʼm rather amazed at the minimum amount of hell-raising thatʼs come forth on the pause. Arenʼt you? RSM: Not really. I think that the Republicans read the same poll the rest of us did that showed the wives and mothers of this country donʼt want war. And theyʼre just scared as hell to come out and say, “He should have started bombing last week.” And I noticed Jerry Ford, this morning and yesterday, was very, very careful on this point simply showing the support you have for it in this country. LBJ: Do you get anything in your cables from Westmoreland or any of his people? RSM: Yes. Itʼs clear they would like to see it resumed as promptly as possible, although theyʼre being very quiet and very well disciplined, I think. I talked to a number of members of the press in the last week and over the weekend including yesterday, and theyʼre just not getting any bitching, as far as I can tell, from the military either here or in South Vietnam about the extension of the pause. LBJ: Jack Sutherland told me that he had been to lunch with a General last Friday. Heʼs US News and World Report . I havenʼt seen it this week. Said he was raising hell and said we were throwing the war away. I didnʼt ask him what— RSM: Iʼm sure there are many that feel that, Mr. President, but Iʼve noticed very, very little reflection of that view in the press attributed to military personnel. LBJ: Well, do you think then weʼre going to have a sentiment that will support our resumption if everybody feels this way about it? RSM: I think so, Mr. President, particularly among the great majority of the people in this country. I think youʼll find some foreign leaders will criticize you if you resume bombing on, letʼs just say the 26th as an illustration. I think Nasser will feel that it would have been wiser to continue the pause. I think probably Aiken and Mansfield and Church and McGovern certainly will feel that way. But I think the great majority of the people in the country will believe that you gave them a reasonable time, over a month, and there was no movement at all on their part. As a matter of fact, the intelligence information that we get back doesnʼt indicate that theyʼre even thinking of moving at this point. We havenʼt yet had any reflection of Shelepinʼs visit from Moscow and that might throw a somewhat different light on the statement I just made. But no other intelligence source that Iʼve seen indicates that Hanoi is even considering that—moving toward negotiation in order to lead us to extend the pause. I keep thinking they will give some indication of that. It would just seem smart bargaining on their part to do so. They could get a continuation of the pause with very, very little action. Even if they came in with some questions, weʼd almost be forced to extend it. But I havenʼt seen any evidence that theyʼll move in that direction. I was so concerned about it that I had brought over here, Friday or Saturday, 4 the leading British authority on North Vietnam, a man named Honey, Professor Honey, 5 and he has been following them for years and years and years and we have found him useful in the past, and I talked to him Saturday, as did Cy, and his own analysis was that the balance of power in Hanoi and among the Politburo there is such that itʼs in the hands of what Iʼd call hard-liners. And particularly itʼs in the hands of the First Secretary of the Communist Party, a man named Le Duan, who was in command in the South in 1954 at the time of the Geneva Accords and who always felt that Ho Chi Minh made a serious tactical error at that time. He had the war won. He let himself be negotiated out of it at Geneva. And who today, therefore, is putting considerable pressure on Ho Chi Minh and others to ensure continuing a war that he thinks they either are winning or can win. But in any event, whether thatʼs a proper interpretation or not, and Iʼm not prepared to say it is, I donʼt see the signs of movement toward negotiation by them, as much as I have been looking for them and as much as Iʼd like to see them. LBJ: Do you see any signs of dangerous build-up during this period or that weʼve sacrificed much? RSM: I donʼt, Mr. President. I do see signs of dangerous build-up, but I donʼt think that itʼs a result of the pause nor do I think it would have been prevented if we had not had a pause. But, I do definitely see signs of— LBJ: You sure want to watch that and be prepared on it because I think thatʼs gonna be a campaign issue. RSM: Mr. President, Iʼm sure it is. And I think the longer you extend the pause, the more dangerous a campaign issue it becomes. LBJ: Thatʼs right. RSM: But I am prepared to say that the action they have taken, which has led to this build-up, was decided upon and originated prior to the start of the pause. LBJ: What about their defections and their desertions? RSM: Well, weʼve had an interesting report from a man named Goure, 6 who works for the Rand Corporation. And we hired the Rand Corporation to go out there and carry on, over a period of months, an extensive interrogation of Viet Cong prisoners and defectors. And his report shows what I think youʼve heard from other sources. First, that the number of defections has increased substantially, Iʼve forgotten exact figures, but itʼs on the order of 10,000 for 1965 versus 2,000 for 1964. The 10,000, still being a rather low number of defections from a force thatʼs at least two hundred and some odd thousand, 250,000, in total. And these 10,000 may include Viet Cong sympathizers as well as members of that force. So that itʼs not a great number, but itʼs a substantially larger number than in 1964. Much more important than the number of defectors is the attitude that they reflect of the morale of those who havenʼt defected. They say, for example, that theyʼre ridden with disease. Theyʼre harassed by air. Theyʼre constantly forced to move. They have no sanctuary in which they can rest and recuperate. The bases that they formerly used, with the deep underground tunnels and caves, are under constant attack. They never know when theyʼre safe. They find it difficult to obtain hot food. They find it difficult to move. Theyʼre short of medicines. The rate of incidence of malaria and other diseases, particularly in the Viet Cong in the highlands, appears to run between 24 and 35 percent. And that many of them are discouraged and many who did believe that they were winning or would win now question whether they will. Now I donʼt want to indicate to you the morale is shot. I just want to indicate that the pressure that is being applied to them by air and by constant offensive probing by the government and U.S. forces is beginning to appear in morale. LBJ: What do you hear from the Kennedy boys on this? RSM: I havenʼt talked to Teddy. I called him over the holidays to wish him holiday greetings. But, I havenʼt talked to him since he got back. I have talked to Bobby about it. He was very pleased to see the pause started. I think he feels that weʼve got to continue to increase our forces there, but that we ought to carry on efforts toward negotiations or some form of non-military settlement. As do I. I think if we resume the bombing, Mr. President, we ought to continue to carry on a number of these diplomatic moves. You remember the suggestion for the Six Nation meeting that came up in your office when Dean Rusk and George were present one day about a week or ten days ago? Well, that kind of action, it seems to me, ought to be initiated even after we resume bombing, if we do. LBJ: Will Bobby oppose resuming bombing in light of The New York Times ? I assume they will. Theyʼre gonna oppose anything we do, arenʼt they? RSM: Well, I donʼt know if theyʼll oppose it. I think theyʼll say we didnʼt wait long enough or we didnʼt handle it right during the intervening period. They may oppose it as well. I talked to Scotty Reston , Friday or Saturday. My impression was that he personally would oppose it. While— LBJ: Oppose the resumption? RSM: Oppose the resumption. LBJ: Whatʼs his thinking? RSM: Well, it just isnʼt militarily effective and therefore by continuing the pause you donʼt suffer a military penalty and you may obtain a political advantage. LBJ: Thatʼs not correct, though. You think you do suffer a military penalty donʼt you? RSM: I think you suffer a military penalty in the sense, Mr. President, they can carry on the war in the South at a lower cost to their society. It doesnʼt cost them nearly as much to infiltrate the men and the equipment without our bombing as it does with our bombing. And I am absolutely certain in my own mind, beyond that, that the bombing represents a political pressure which we benefit from. The very fact that weʼre talking about negotiation, the very fact that the Soviets put pressure on them, and other nations of the world have put pressure on them, is a result of our bombing, which pressure would not have been put on them if we hadnʼt had the bombing. The bombing represents something we can give up in return for something theyʼll do at some point. Apparently, this isnʼt the point. LBJ: Tell me about the women out there, Bob. Iʼm getting some—The Post is starting nagging at me. RSM: The lack of women? LBJ: Yeah. In the services. There ainʼt nothing but nurses. Say that you wonʼt let any of the WACs go, or any of the WAVEs go, or any of the rest of them. You reckonʼ we can sprinkle any of them out there? RSM: Frankly, the question of WAVEs and WACs hasnʼt been brought to me, Mr. President. I would oppose it. I think it would just cause a tremendous amount of unrest and trouble. We wonʼt let the wives go out there, of officers or enlisted men or diplomatic personnel. And to introduce WAVEs and WACS, in the first place, they donʼt add anything in the way of efficiency to the operation. In the second place, they require a lot of special quarters and special handling. In the third place, it causes morale problems because of apparent discrimination. The wives in Bangkok are just sore as hell that there are wives of civilian employees and female employees out there. And beyond that, the wives of foreign diplomats allied with us, for example, the Australian diplomats, are allowed in Saigon and they take pictures of young American women in the area and they wonder what their husbands are doing. It seems to me that to send WAVEs and WACs will simply accentuate that problem. And I havenʼt felt any pressure for it. As a matter of fact, none of the serv-ices have even raised the question with me, but Iʼll look into it. LBJ: No. No, I wouldnʼt stir it up. But, theyʼre raising hell with me and I assume that itʼs coming from, they say, some Major Bonnie somebody at the Air Force, whatever they are, I guess WACs, Air Force, whatever you call ʼem. I asked [indecipherable] told me they didnʼt want them unless they were a nurse; say they got about 250–300 nurses. RSM: Well, I noticed an article or two a week or so ago about it. I didnʼt follow it up then because I just wanted to let sleeping dogs lie on this thing. But I can do so anytime. LBJ: No, I think weʼll just let it go. Iʼll tell them. I got a question in a press conference about it, and said they were very distressed, from a lady at The Washington Post . So I just anticipated Iʼd get that. Do you think we ought to have a meeting? Whenʼs Dean coming back? Do you know? RSM: He should be back tomorrow, I believe. Heʼs stopping in the Philippines yesterday. LBJ: Are we doing everything we can now with the Philippines and with the Koreans to get them to come in? RSM: Yes we are, Mr. President. LBJ: Got any indication theyʼre gonna come? RSM: Well, the Koreans at least. Thereʼs no question but what the Koreans will come. Itʼs just a matter of price. And they turned in a request for several hundred million, itʼs about $600–$700 million worth of cumshaw that they wanted from us in order to send that division. Both State and we have refused that and have gone back with an instruction to the Ambassador to negotiate the movement of the division in return for what amounts to something on the order of $70 million worth of extra equipment and payments. But Westmoreland didnʼt ask for the division to be landed in South Vietnam until about July. So weʼve got reasonable time to work that out. He wonʼt be ready to have them until then. He does want a brigade by some time in April and thatʼs our first requirement there for him. In the case of the Philippines, the problemʼs more complicated by the fact that the Presidentʼs just come in. Heʼs trying to get his government organized. Weʼre not making nearly the progress there that we are in the case of Korea. But, in Korea weʼre talking about an additional, maybe, 17,000 men. In the case of the Philippines, weʼre talking about a couple of thousand. So, itʼs much more important that we push on Korea than the Philippines, but we must have some Philippine contribution as well. Theyʼre talking about construction engineers at the moment, military construction engineers. LBJ: The Germans coming through with anything? RSM: Not a damn thing except the hospital ship. The Ambassador came in the other day and asked if the hospital ship was satisfactory as the substitute for combat troops and I told him absolutely not. I donʼt think itʼs going to make any difference to him, having said that. But at least I didnʼt think we ought to give in after the strong efforts you made to get combat units. I told him that you had personally asked the Chancellor for a medical unit and a combat construction battalion, done it twice in my presence, and I saw absolutely no excuse whatsoever for their failure to send it. Well, he didnʼt indicate they would. [Here follows discussion of base closings, the deferment of authorized military construction funds, and the Springfield Armory.] LBJ: Iʼm gonna rely on you heavily now in this decision this next week. I think you know where my leanings are and how I feel about it, and except for you, I doubt weʼd have gone on as long as we have gone and Iʼm not sorry for it at all. I want to be patient and understanding and reasonable. On the other hand, I think you know my natural inclinations. You were down there when we made the decision. But I sure do want you to start building your case for a resumption and be able to discuss it before we really make the decision so I get every angle of it. RSM: Right, right. LBJ: OK. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.02, Side A, PNOs 1 and 2. No classification marking. The transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 January 15. 3 Entitled “Viet Nam Prospects,” January 12, it was forwarded to McNamara by Valenti under cover of a January 15 memorandum. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966) 4 January 14 or 15. 5 P.J. Honey, author of Communism in North Vietnam: Its Role in the Sino-Soviet Dispute (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), was a lecturer at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. 6 Leon Goure. For a summary of a report later in 1966 by Goure on Viet Cong motivation and morale, see Document 198 . 27. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 27. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, January 18, 1966. JCSM–41–66 SUBJECT Air Operations Against North Vietnam (NVN) (U) 1. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in JCSM–16–66, dated 8 January 1966, 2 forwarded to you their recommendation to resume offensive air operations against North Vietnam (NVN). They consider these operations a principal element of our strategy in Southeast Asia. This memorandum provides their recommendations for the conduct of offensive air operations when resumed. 2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the air strike program against NVN, taking into account the recent views of CINCPAC. They have concluded that restrained air strikes against the north, as conducted thus far, will not achieve the primary military objective of causing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to cease its support and direction of the aggression in South Vietnam (SVN). The piecemeal nature of the attacks against the DRV has permitted the enemy greater freedom to replenish and disperse his stocks, redirect the flow of materials, and improve his defenses. The geographic restrictions and limitation on the number of armed reconnaissance sorties authorized have limited effective interdiction of the extensive rail, highway, and inland waterway LOCs. Moreover, these restrictions and the requirement for single coordinated attacks on specified targets have exposed our forces to greater risks. 3. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that offensive air operations against NVN should be resumed now with a sharp blow and thereafter maintained with uninterrupted, increasing pressure. This course of action, as recommended in JCSM–982–64, dated 23 November 1964, 3 offers the best probability of achieving our objectives at the least risk, casualties, and cost and with the least probability of enemy miscalculation. These operations should be conducted in such a manner and be of sufficient magnitude to: deny the DRV large-scale external assistance; destroy those resources already in NVN which contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of military facilities; and harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and materials into SVN. 4. (TS) The denial of external assistance to NVN requires closing of the ports as well as sustained interdiction of land LOCs from China. Approximately 67 per cent of all imports in 1965 entered NVN through seaports (principally Haiphong). Military considerations would dictate that mining be conducted now; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the sensitivity of such a measure and recognize that precise timing must take into account political factors. Moreover, present sanctuaries should be reduced to permit more flexibility in interdicting major LOCs and striking key military targets. 5. (TS) The destruction of resources already in NVN would include the entire POL bulk and dispersed storage, distribution, and transportation system which contributes directly to the movement of supplies to the south. Large military facilities in the northern part of NVN would be destroyed. An intensified armed reconnaissance program, without sortie limitation, would be mounted to harass, disrupt, and attrite the dispersed supply and transport activities which have been identified through detailed intelligence analysis. Day and night air operations would concentrate on LOC centers, predicted traffic flow areas, transshipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits from the DRV. Electric power would be disrupted in order to hamper command and control as well as bring home to the DRV leadership and populace the heavy price of continuing the war. As in the past, these attacks would be designed to minimize civilian casualties and damage to population centers. 6. (TS) The increasing DRV air capability is a continuing threat to the security of our military forces and should be destroyed. In the execution of the air campaign, continuous surveillance of DRV airfields would be maintained. The neutralization of these airfields must be authorized whenever interference with our planned air operations, or offensive air actions against our military forces in SVN, is initiated. Further, the operational commander must be furnished the authority to deal with the SAM threat, as required to prevent interference with planned air operations. 7. (TS) Operations against additional target systems would be the subject of separate authorizations as the air campaign develops. 8. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the likelihood of adverse international reaction in response to sharply intensified air strikes and particularly to mining of the DRV ports. However, they believe that responsible Free World leadership will understand the necessity for these actions. Recognized also is the possibility of Communist Chinaʼs direct entry into the war either through miscalculation or gradual escalation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that continued US restraint may serve to increase rather than decrease the likelihood of such intervention by encouraging gradual responses on the part of the Chinese Communists. This is in addition to the probable interpretation of such restraint as US vacillation by both the Communist and Free World leadership. 9. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that: a. The authorized area for offensive air operations be expanded to include all of NVN less the area encompassed by a ten-mile radius around Hanoi/Phuc Yen Airfield, a four-mile radius around Haiphong, and a twenty-mile China buffer zone. Exceptions to permit selected strikes within these restricted areas, in accordance with the air campaign described herein, will be conducted only as authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. b. Numerical sortie limitations on armed reconnaissance in NVN be removed. c. No tactical restrictions or limitations be imposed upon the execution of the specific air strikes. d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff be authorized to direct CINCPAC to conduct an air campaign against the DRV as described herein. Upon your approval of the above concept, a JCS directive of execution to CINCPAC will be prepared and submitted to you separately for approval. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 54, Folder B, “Joint Staff Papers, 1965–66.” Top Secret. 2 Document 13 . 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 932 – 935 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original. 28. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson 28. Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 19, 1966. SUBJECT Non-military aspects of the effort in Vietnam—January 1966 I spent the period January 1 to 5 in Vietnam, accompanied by Chet Cooper of the White House staff, Rud Poats and others of A.I.D., and Dick Cooper of the Bureau of Economic Affairs in State. We concentrated on the problems of inflation, port congestion, and the pacification of the countryside. Our principal conclusions and recommendations are reported in this memorandum. I would be glad to amplify them in any way you may wish. 1 . Pacification/Rural Construction. Now that the introduction of U.S. troops has arrested a deteriorating military position, the highest priority problem in Vietnam, in my opinion, is to develop a tested and reliable system for “pacifying” the countryside. “Pacification” means, once major VC or NVN military units have been swept from an area, to establish effective local security against terrorism, to identify and eliminate the hidden VC cells (the “invisible government”), to establish effective institutions of local government including means for popular participation, and to commence solid programs of economic and social development (education, health, agricultural improvement, etc.). The joint GVN-US objectives in Vietnam require a steady widening of the “pacified” areas, behind the shield of military protection. And yet it is a striking and melancholy fact that no significant progress has been made in pacification for the past several years, despite a great deal of effort. Now a new effort is underway under the title of “rural construction.” In some ways the new effort is more promising than anything that has gone before: it has good leadership and backing within the GVN, and is based on more realistic plans and timetables than anything tried previously. There is as yet, however, no basis for optimism. The pacification task is inherently very complex and difficult and will require years to complete under the best conditions. The new effort is still almost entirely on paper. And neither the GVN nor the U.S. approach to the pacification effort, in my opinion, is yet strong enough or well enough organized to get the job done. In view of the importance of this subject, I attach to this memorandum as Annex A 2 a fuller discussion of the present situation. In summary, my recommendations are: —that higher priority—second only to that given the seeking out and destruction of major enemy troop units—be given to the pacification program by all U.S. elements in Vietnam; —that, since all elements of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam are necessarily involved in pacification, a single point of responsibility be established in the Mission for managing the U.S. effort in support of the GVN rural construction program. My own suggestion for accomplishing this is to assign this responsibility to Ambassador Porter as his first priority assignment. Under this concept, Ambassador Porter, supported by a small staff and working with the heads of the country team units (MAC/V, A.I.D., JUSPAO, etc.), would be responsible for preparing integrated plans and schedules for the various action programs and, when they have been approved by Ambassador Lodge, for supervising their execution. (In preliminary discussions of this recommendation in Saigon, General Westmoreland and Mr. Mann expressed agreement with it, and Ambassador Lodge seemed to receive it favorably.); —that, in view of the experimental nature of the pacification effort at present and the need to develop as soon as possible a proven system, a strong, continuing program of evaluation and analysis be undertaken with the objective of building a tested doctrine for Vietnamese pacification. I would suggest that this should include a thorough review of progress and problems in Saigon at least once a quarter, with high level participation each time from Washington. Ambassador Porter has been asked for a first report of this type on March 31st. 2 . Economic problems of the war effort. With the step-up in the scale of fighting and the involvement of more U.S. troops over the last nine months, the economic situation has changed radically—from a position of some underemployment of resources and relative price stability to one of severe shortages of resources, particularly of skilled labor, and strong inflationary pressures which have already resulted in price increases on the order of 40 per cent since the beginning of 1965. The prospects are for even stronger inflationary pressures this year, stemming from large GVN budget deficits, more spending by U.S. troops, and a larger military construction program, and for even greater pressure on scarce resources—labor, transportation facilities, etc. Remedial action of at least three kinds is required. (1) There is now serious port congestion in Saigon and in the coastal ports. The latter problem should be short lived; actions now underway are expected within three or four months to enable the coastal ports to handle the anticipated traffic. The port of Saigon is a different matter. There is agreement in the U.S. country team on the steps that are necessary to enlarge the capacity of the port of Saigon, but these steps will require strong and continuous managerial energy in the GVN, which is not now in sight. Accordingly, with Ambassador Lodgeʼs approval, I recommended to Prime Minister Ky that he name a single, strong port manager, reporting directly to him, with sufficient authority to get the job done. The U.S. would name a single senior U.S. adviser to the port manager, who would have such staff as he needed and who would have authority over both the MAC/V and A.I.D. resources needed to improve port efficiency. The Prime Minister accepted this recommendation in principle. If he carries it out, there will still be needed steady and continuing effort over a period of months to raise the capacity of the port to what is required. And beyond the problem of port expansion as such there will be further difficult problems of warehousing, internal transport, and other logistics elements. (2) A strong and vigorously executed anti-inflation program will be necessary for the foreseeable future to prevent what could become a runaway inflation. The GVN leaders are seriously concerned, as they should be, by this prospect, and Bui Diem gave me unequivocal assurances, “speaking for the Prime Minister,” that the government intends to do whatever is necessary to meet the problem. The GVN has already taken the most important single step in an anti-inflation program, namely, to decide on an austerity expenditure budget for 1966. While I was in Saigon, a number of additional steps were agreed on: raising GVN taxes, requiring advance deposits of piasters by importers, eliminating the grace period on customs duty payments, increasing government bond sales, and at least doubling the rate of imports financed by the GVN and by our economic aid (both A.I.D. and P.L. 480). Moreover, General Westmoreland has been most cooperative in seeking ways to limit troop spending on the Vietnam market, and to limit the impact on the Vietnamese economy of the military construction program. Nevertheless, GVN and U.S. economists are agreed that the meas-ures adopted thus far are not sufficient to hold price increases during 1966 to a reasonable figure (say 20–25 per cent). We discussed with the GVN a number of possible monetary measures, some of them rather unorthodox, which might help, but could not reach agreement on proposals which promised both to be useful and to be politically acceptable. Accordingly, it is necessary to regard the inflation problem as unfinished business, and to keep working urgently with the GVN to reach agreement on a sufficient program. (3) The underlying problem of resource allocation also remains a very important one for which neither GVN nor U.S. programs and actions are yet strong enough. On the GVN side, the government is roughly in the position of trying to run a war without a War Production Board or a War Manpower Commission. The overall demands on men and on material are not gathered in one place, examined in relation to each other, and the hard choices made of what to eliminate when it is plain that not all demands can be met. (For example, I was told that little progress can be expected on land reform this year because the technical men in the Department of Agriculture needed to carry on the work have been drafted into the army or have gone to work for construction companies—not as a result of conscious decision as to priorities but simply the haphazard working of the present system. The same is true of our village health station program.) On the U.S. side there are the beginnings of arrangements to deal with issues of resource allocation, principally country team committees to consider competing demands on the ports and on construction materials and skilled labor. Stronger arrangements will clearly be needed both in the GVN and in the U.S. country team. I suggest: —that a small staff be established in the U.S. country team to study anticipated requirements and availabilities for key resources, and to propose means for enlarging resources and for allocating scarce items according to proper priorities; —that the U.S. country team develop a proposal for establishing staff and organizational arrangements in the GVN to deal with problems of resource mobilization and allocation. 3. As one means for improving the non-military aspects of the U.S. program in Vietnam, I discussed with Ambassador Lodge the idea of sending high-level teams from the United States to examine our work in such fields as agriculture, education, and health. Such teams could achieve three valuable results: —to provide expert appraisals of our present programs and recommendations for improvement—particularly as to how these non-military activities can better support the pacification/rural construction effort; —to emphasize to senior GVN officials the importance of these non-military fields and the nature of the program they ought to be supporting; —to re-emphasize the importance that the U.S. gives to these fields. As you know, the Ambassador agreed with the idea of sending out such teams, provided their trips were carefully prepared and focused on what it is practical to do in Vietnam under present circumstances. While I was in Saigon, the Ambassador discussed with the GVN the proposed visit of the first such team, to be headed by Secretary Freeman. GVN officials welcomed the proposed visit, which is now planned for sometime in February. I recommend that we plan now to send further teams in the field of education (headed perhaps by Assistant Secretary Keppel) and in the field of health (headed perhaps by Dr. Boisfeullot Jones of Atlanta and by Assistant Secretary Philip Lee of HEW). The possibility of additional teams could be examined in the light of the experience gained in sending these three. 4 . A few miscellaneous observations. (1) I visited three camps for refugees—one at Hoi An, south of Danang, and two at Qui Nhon—and talked at length with the A.I.D. people in charge of refugees nationwide. At present, the number of refugees is fairly static at around 400,000 in recognized camps, with some still arriving but some also returning to their villages or becoming resettled in urban areas. All are receiving food and are under shelter. Much remains to be done to provide schooling for the children, training for adults, and assistance in resettlement. (2) At Averell Harrimanʼs request I looked into the matter of help and advice to other free world aid donors. In order to improve our performance in this area, the A.I.D. Mission is now establishing a special office whose sole job will be to act as liaison with other donors—to offer advice on the kinds of aid that will be most valuable, to arrange for logistic support for aid teams from other free world countries, etc. (3) I talked with staff of A.I.D., Embassy, and General Lansdaleʼs group about the problem of economic warfare, that is, the effort to deny medicines, food, and other items to the VC. This is a very complex problem on which the combined U.S. Mission is beginning to focus. We are proposing to assign an experienced senior officer to work full time on this task, which will require strong coordinated efforts by the police, the military, and the economic agencies in Vietnam. (4) The A.I.D. Mission in Vietnam is being expanded rapidly from about 650 Americans to around 900–1000. It is by far the largest A.I.D. mission in the world, and has a much faster-moving, more operational set of responsibilities than most other missions. We are striving hard to find the executives we need, by reassignment from within A.I.D., by borrowing from DOD, by recruiting from outside. We have not yet caught up with the workload, and I expect that for months to come our top management in Saigon will be spread very thin. This is basically the result of the fact that A.I.D. has less of a career personnel system than any of the other U.S. agencies in Vietnam. Nevertheless, I was for the most part impressed and pleased with the calibre of the A.I.D. personnel in Vietnam. We agreed on some replacements while I was there, and on some improved and simplified organizational arrangements. My present judgment is that if we are careful not to add low priority assignments to their present workload, the A.I.D. Mission in Vietnam will be able to carry out its assignments successfully. David E. Bell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President— McGeorge Bundy , vol. 19. Secret; Limited Distribution. In his January 20 covering memorandum forwarding Bellʼs report to the President, McGeorge Bundy stated: “I think you will find it well worth reading all the way through. I agree with nearly all of it, and so does Bob McNamara.” (Ibid.) See Document 15 for Bellʼs oral report to the President on his trip. 2 Attached but not printed. 29. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson 29. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 19, 1966. SUBJECT Possible Signal from Hanoi Many of us have believe that at the last moment before the Communists think we may resume bombing, Hanoi will try to muddy the water by an ambiguous response. It is possible that this is now occurring through Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma has told Ambassador Sullivan that the North Vietnamese Charge approached him on Monday 2 to deliver a demarche under instructions from Hanoi. 3 This demarche consisted of four general headings, two of which related directly to our fourteen points: a. The DRV cannot accept the accusation that their troops are guilty of aggression, since there are no DRV troops in SVN (Point 13). b. Peace can only be restored if the people are permitted to exercise free choice concerning their political and social future. There can be no free choice while US troops remain in the South (Point 8). c. The US will never leave the South because of its agreement with Saigon and the extension of SEATO protection to the South. d. The DRV denies any violation of Laos territory by the sending of 4,500 troops per month over the Ho Chi Minh trail. Again, there are no DRV troops in SVN. Souvanna asked the Charge why he did not make these points directly to the Americans. The Charge replied that Souvanna was particularly familiar with Indochinese affairs. Souvanna then asked whether the North Vietnamese wished him to act as intermediary between Hanoi and the Americans. The Charge replied that he would seek further instructions on this point. Souvanna raised the question as to Sullivanʼs authority to participate in a meeting directly between Sullivan and the Charge. Sullivan has asked for instructions and we have authorized him to talk with the Charge if Souvanna arranges it. Our telegram to Sullivan is attached at Tab A. 4 Why This May Be Hanoiʼs Response to Our Peace Offensive There are several reasons it is logical for Hanoi to approach us through Souvanna: 1. It would be consistent with past conduct to use an Asian. In 1950 Peiping communicated to us regarding Korea through an Asian, the Indian Ambassador Panikkar, rather than through Eastern European Communist allies or neutrals. 2. A communication through Vientiane is less likely to be listened in on by the Soviets or Chinese than a communication through Moscow or one of the Eastern European capitals. 3. Communications with Hanoi from Vientiane are quicker and more secure than from Rangoon since the ICC plane goes back and forth three times a fortnight. 4. The North Vietnamese know Bill Sullivan since he was at the Geneva Conference of 1962. They also know that Averell Harriman (also associated with the 1962 Conference) was recently in Vientiane. 5. Since our pause began Sullivan has reported that the North Vietnamese Charge has twice made friendly social noises to him. The Content of the Message The Chargeʼs message is significant in that it is addressed to our Fourteen Points. (Peiping has publicly denounced this formulation with the phrase “to hell with the Fourteen Points.”) The most interesting point in the message is that there can be no free choice (meaning quite possibly free elections) until American troops are withdrawn. We have never taken a position on the timing of troop withdrawal but have insisted only that conditions must first be created and guarantees provided under which elections can be held free of all outside interference. The question of our withdrawal prior to elections has been very much on Hanoiʼs mind as the following facts disclose: 1. The Polish ICC representative, who was in Hanoi on January 10 to 11, is reported by an authoritative Western source to have said that Shelepin had tried to persuade the Hanoi Government that unification should come about in two stages. Under the Soviet plan the first stage would be an election in South Viet-Nam in which all representative parties including the Liberation Front would participate in the creation of a new government. The second stage would be an election in which both North and South Viet-Nam would determine the issue of reunification. The Hanoi leaders reportedly told Shelepin that they disagreed with this two-stage approach but put special emphasis on the United States desire to take part in the supervision of elections. 2. The fact that the Polish ICC representative was in Hanoi and purported to know about the Shelepin proposal suggests that the Poles may have participated in planning—or at least were familiar with—the approach that the DRV has now made to Souvanna. This may explain the implication in Rapackiʼs conversation on January 18 with Ambassador Gronouski that something was moving on which he could not comment. 5 3. On January 16, the DRV official newspaper, Nhan Dan, discussed the issue of troop withdrawal in a manner similar to that employed by the Charge to Souvanna: “Everyone knows that there can be peace and free elections in South Viet-Nam only when American troops have withdrawn from there… . US troops would never get out of South Viet-Nam or they would withdraw only on condition that the elections in South Viet-Nam are held under the US aggressorsʼ control and will lead to the domination of South Viet-Nam by their lackeys.” Where Do We Go From Here? Ambassador Kohler has asked for an appointment with the North Vietnamese Charge in Moscow. 6 He has been advised of Souvannaʼs conversation in Vientiane but we are instructing him not to mention it unless the other side raises the question. If in fact Hanoi has selected Vientiane as the channel of their choice we do not wish to confuse the situation. Certainly what has been said through Souvanna so far offers no basis for a solid dialogue. It is possible, however, that it may be the prelude either to the opening of conversations through Souvanna or a direct exchange between Sullivan and the North Vietnamese Charge. We are giving Sullivan full instructions in the event such an exchange becomes possible. As you will see from Tab A Sullivan will suggest that Souvanna go back to the DRV Charge promptly in the hope that we can get clearer evidence within the next two or three days whether the North Vietnamese Government is serious or just trying to confuse the situation. George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7 p.m. on January 19, noting in his covering memorandum that he agreed that it was right to follow up quickly Hanoiʼs approach to Souvanna but that he thought that Ball “somewhat overstates its significance.” (Ibid.) 2 January 17. 3 Sullivan reported on the approach to Souvanna in telegrams 773 and 774 from Vientiane, January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 Attached but not printed. The message was transmitted in telegram 478 to Vientiane, January 19. (Ibid.) 5 Gronouski reported on this conversation in telegram 1172 from Warsaw, January 18. (Ibid.) 6 See Documents 25 and 37 regarding Kohlerʼs contacts with the DRV in Moscow. 30. Intelligence Memorandum 30. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, January 20, 1966. OCI No. 0490/66 COMMUNIST REACTION TO THE US PEACE OFFENSIVE Attached is a brief assessment of Communist views of the present state of the conflict in Vietnam. Attached also are compilations of selected Communist statements on the current US diplomatic campaign and the lull in bombing North Vietnam. 2 Attachment COMMUNIST VIEWS OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM North Vietnam The halt in US air strikes on North Vietnam, coupled with intensive US efforts to elicit a positive response from Hanoi on negotiating an end to the war, have thus far produced only biting denunciations of US motives by the North Vietnamese and a stiffening of previously stated North Vietnamese demands. Hanoiʼs failure to show interest in discussions with the US on any but its own terms probably stems largely from its belief that the military situation in South Vietnam is still in its favor. Based on this belief, the North Vietnamese apparently feel that ultimately the US will be forced to accept Communist demands. The North Vietnamese apparently see the current standdown in US air attacks mainly as a welcome opportunity to repair bomb damage and to step up the shipment of supplies to depots which support Communist operations in South Vietnam. Hanoi probably hopes that by delaying an official response to the US peace overtures it can prolong the lull in air strikes. The North Vietnamese public response to the US “peace offensive” also appears to be calculated to reassure the Chinese Communists and the Viet Cong of Hanoiʼs determination to continue the fight. To this end a series of propaganda statements out of Hanoi during the past three weeks have set forth three “actual deeds” which the US must perform to “prove” its acceptance of North Vietnamʼs “four points.” These deeds are: unconditional cessation of air strikes on North Vietnam, unconditional withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam, and US recognition of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) as the representative of the South Vietnamese people. In its propaganda statements, Hanoi has come closer than ever before to suggesting that these “actual deeds” are preconditions for negotiations. Hanoi is doubtless also concerned over the success of the US peace effort in convincing world opinion of US willingness to seek a quick and reasonable end to the war. To counter this, Hanoi has attempted to impugn US motives. A constant stream of propaganda since the standdown in air strikes began has stressed the theme that the bombing lull and the “peace offensive” are only a “cover up” for further US escalation of the war. NFLSV The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has largely ignored the US moves. In its limited response, it has echoed Hanoiʼs attacks on the US peace effort, characterizing it as a “trick” designed to cover up further escalation of the war. Front spokesmen have defiantly reaffirmed the determination of the Viet Cong to continue fighting. The Front central committee has voiced its full support for Hanoiʼs position on the US peace moves. Communist China Peking has responded to the US peace campaign and suspension of bombing with a mounting propaganda attack which suggests that the Chinese are uneasy about the possibility that their position is being undercut in the non-aligned world—and perhaps also in Hanoi. The Chinese have pumped out a flood of caustic editorials denouncing the US effort as a “peace hoax” designed to prepare for further escalation of the war if the Vietnamese Communists do not knuckle under to US “blackmail.” Hanoi is repeatedly urged to continue the fight until victory, and to reject any negotiated settlement except on Communist terms. This public position which is almost certainly being conveyed privately to Hanoi, reflects Pekingʼs view that if the Communists press on resolutely, the war in Vietnam can only end in victory. Such a victory would take the Chinese a long way toward their ultimate goal of driving the US out of Asia, and at the same time strike a heavy blow at Moscow—Pekingʼs other principal enemy—by validating Maoʼs formula for world revolution through “peopleʼs war.” USSR Moscow has assumed a notably cautious attitude with regard to the US “peace offensive.” Soviet party secretary Shelepinʼs speeches during his recent visit to Hanoi provide a good illustration of Soviet reserve on this point. Despite the North Vietnamese leadersʼ repeated and virulent denunciation of Washingtonʼs diplomatic efforts as “deceitful,” Shelepin let pass the opportunity to echo this view. He did point out, however, in keeping with standard Soviet propaganda treatment, that the “so-called peace initiative” coincides with a continued US buildup in South Vietnam. If, as seems likely, Shelepin encouraged the North Vietnamese to give more serious consideration to recent US moves toward a political solution, he was apparently unable to persuade them to modify their tactics. The lack of any reference in the communique following Shelepinʼs visit to recent US probes is a sign that the two parties were unable to achieve a consensus or even a compromise. Soviet party chief Brezhnev, at a 15 January rally in Ulan Bator, expressed doubt over Washingtonʼs “sincerity” and maintained that if the US really wanted to end the war in Vietnam, it need only agree to the “just demands” of the Vietnamese people. Soviet propaganda has generally avoided any extensive commentary on US diplomatic efforts, but has accompanied factual reportage of the travels of US envoys with a moderate amount of routine remarks alleging they were “cover” for further “aggression.” In reporting North Vietnamese statements on the US diplomatic offensive and the bombing standdown, Moscow has toned down Hanoiʼs particularly abusive commentary. Privately, Soviet leaders have adopted a generally non-committal stance on US peace initiatives, avoiding the sharp, negative reaction Moscow has expressed over such moves in the past. While reacting with caution and reserve to the “peace offensive,” the Soviet leaders apparently have not been overly optimistic regarding its chances for success. Soviet president Podgorny is reported to have told the French ambassador on 30 December that he was skeptical that current US diplomatic efforts would induce Hanoi to negotiate. 1 Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam—Intelligence Estimates. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. A copy is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV. 2 Attached but not printed. 31. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk 31. Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Meeker) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 20, 1966. SUBJECT Length of the Pause in Air Attacks on North Viet Nam There has been a background assumption lying behind the pause in air attacks on North Viet Nam: that a pause lasting through the period of the lunar New Year would allow sufficient time to pursue the US peace offensive to a conclusion, whether affirmative or negative. A reading of the current situation indicates to me that more time is required. I think we are not now in a position to decide that the pause should end. There are a number of efforts in train at the present time which need to be completed: (a) Ambassador Kohler has sent word to the DRV charge in Moscow requesting a discussion with the charge. The DRV Embassy is evidently now seeking instructions. (b) In Vientiane the DRV representative has undertaken a substantive discussion with Premier Souvanna Phouma, evidently on instructions from Hanoi. A cable has been sent to Bill Sullivan to prepare for further developments in this dialogue. 2 (c) We have not directly questioned the Soviet Government about the end results of the Shelepin visit to Hanoi, after Moscow would have had a chance to digest the outcome. Through Ambassador Kohler, we should put some questions to Premier Kosygin as soon as feasible. (d) Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina has been in Moscow since Saturday. He was to have another discussion on Viet Nam with Gromyko today. We need to talk with Shiina as soon as he has returned from Moscow. (e) Secretary General U Thant has discussed with Ambassador Goldberg some procedural ideas for launching an international discussion on Viet Nam. The Secretary General has now been given US comments. He is in the process of refining his thoughts and considering in what way his proposal should be launched—perhaps by someone other than the Secretary General. A review of the available information does not disclose any military reason why the pause needs to be terminated now rather than sometime hence. The INR review of Viet Cong activity indicates that the level of activity has not changed materially since the Christmas truce. The level may have been somewhat higher in early January than the weekly average for 1965. It appears to have been a little lower than in the three or four weeks before Christmas. The locations and activity of PAVN units is unclear. There have been no confirmed PAVN attacks since November 1965, although a POW interrogation suggests that a PAVN battalion may have been involved in the January 17 attack in Binh Dinh province. We may assume that resupply and reinforcement of the Viet Cong from North Viet Nam has been proceeding during the period of the pause. Reconnaissance indicates that such activity has continued. During the same period, the United States has, of course, augmented its own forces in the South. The available evidence does not show that there are military reasons why we need to end the pause just now in order to prevent the Communist side from obtaining some marked advantage. Conversely, there is nothing to suggest that a prolongation of the pause would require us to forgo some significant military opportunity in the immediate or near future. On the other hand, there are powerful political reasons for deferring, for the present, any decision to terminate the pause in air attacks on North Viet Nam: (1) While four weeks may seem to us a lengthy period in which to await an answer to our overtures, we should bear in mind the likelihood that the debate in Hanoi, and between Hanoi and Moscow and Hanoi and the Viet Cong, has probably been extensive. That debate may not yet have run its course. In this connection, we should remember that it took the United States nearly nine months—from the Presidentʼs Johns Hopkins speech last April until December 1965—to formulate its own statement of an approach to peaceful settlement. Now that we have been through this process, it may be unrealistic to expect the Communist side to coordinate fully with our timing and to respond promptly after the fourteen points have been communicated. (2) We want to know, ourselves, the answers that will be produced by the initiatives still in progress. If we do not wait to get these answers, our action may not only prevent the answers from being given, but also wipe out the practical possibilities of further efforts at peaceful settlement for quite some time to come. A whole new phase of escalation and much higher military costs would ensue. (3) Terminating the pause now would probably end the efforts at prisoner exchange which have been started in Berlin and Algiers, 3 and thus also cut off whatever hopeful developments might flow collaterally from the prisoner discussions. (4) One of our great disabilities around the world in the Viet Nam situation has been a lack of agreement, and even understanding, on the part of many governments and large opinion groups, in regard to our policies and actions. President Johnsonʼs peace offensive has had major political impact in building both understanding and confidence for the United States. We ought not to jeopardize any of this gain, or fail to maximize it, by coming to a decision too quickly on the length of the pause. It is known around the world that the peace offensive is still actively in progress. It would be harmful to our political interests to end the pause before the returns are in and the result is plain to the rest of the world. We have been criticized in the past for impatience in regard to the pause of May 1965 and for lack of sufficient interest and responsiveness to earlier moves characterized at least by some as peace initiatives. We need to take special care this time. (5) It is greatly in our interest to have the onus for a failure of peace efforts placed on the Communist side. If we were at this moment to resume bombing of North Viet Nam, the United States would probably incur, justly or not, a large share of the onus for bringing peace efforts to an end. (6) Within the United States there is very strong support for the Presidentʼs peace offensive. In the interest of having the country united so far as possible behind him, the President would be well advised to carry the peace offensive a further distance before concluding that it has failed. People in this country also will want to be convinced that the possibilities of a reasonable peace settlement have been exhausted before the war is fully resumed and in all likelihood escalated. 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Exdis; Pinta. Also sent to Ball. 2 For a summary of the cable, see Document 29 . 3 See Document 47 for a summary of the negotiations through Algiers. 4 On January 19 Sisco sent a similar memorandum to Rusk and Ball, outlining a number of “compelling” reasons “why the pause should continue at least a while longer.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) Meeker sent a supplemental memorandum to Rusk and Ball on January 22, arguing that public pressure to resume the bombing was slight and proposing eight steps to consider “before the peace offensive is judged to have run a full course.” (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam, Misc. Notebooks) In a January 25 memorandum to Ball, which Ball drew on in preparing Document 41 , Meeker contended that resumption of the bombing entailed a high risk of Chinese intervention and rendered illusory “for a long time” any meaningful peace efforts. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Misc. Viet-Nam, Vol. VI) 32. Notes of Meeting 32. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 20, 1966, 5:54–6:31 p.m. PRESENT The President, Rusk, Harriman, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, Valenti 2 President: Assuming we are going to stay there—and thatʼs a safe assumption. Want in order of priority all we should do—go after this railroad—that POL, this trail, would take so many planes—and here are estimated results. Return of Rusk and Harriman If our military can say if we do certain things we can interrupt their supplies and hurt them—or at the end of 8 months they will need reinforcements, etc. In other words, I want the coach to give me the seasonʼs schedule—what the other teams will do—and what we will do. Bob, you need to get from Westmoreland his plan for using our resources and what results—what happens July—and next January. What is estimate of NVN response? Rusk, give much thought to this—think weʼll be subjected to immense propaganda over next weeks from peace lovers. They told us bombing cease would help us—now theyʼll say “another month or so.” Donʼt want to be impetuous. Must be careful and cautious. Honestly believe we all talk too much. Only useful purpose is it might confuse Ho so much heʼll go crazy. The newspaper articles only serve no useful purpose. Tom Wicker says he has it on high authority that President will wait 10 days and then let them have it. (What President wants Rusk to tell press) “Itʼs been 26 days since cease bombing. Harriman has been to 11 Capitals. Goldberg and I, too, plus 113 nations. We know weʼve done everything we can do and should do to talk rather than fight. Adequate time to reply—nothing encouraging—we donʼt want to mislead American public.” Then stop there. Donʼt say any more. We have done everything that is within the bounds of self respect—we will not grow weary. Then you have given a signal—but without dramatics. Then I would hope they would break out—show their bottom before we showed ours. When other nations come in asking more time, tell them to go talk to the other side. It takes two to tango. I read we have a commitment that we will not bomb until H. Wilson has departed Moscow. Weʼre going to have to double our manpower. At the same time, we must surface all our peace moves. We canʼt hold much longer than 30 days. Iʼve told State to tell all other nations weʼve heard nothing. Bundy: Since that order, U Thant and Vientiane had intruded. My own curbstone reaction is that a “no answer” ought to go on the record. President: Rusk, now that you are back, you tell the press that whatever the hopes, there has been no response. We think 26 days is long enough. The aggressors donʼt want to talk. Rusk: Can see some advantage in starting with Baltimore 3 —the 5-day pause—and go on through all the other moves— But the whole question is the bombing pause. They want me to tell them about the pause. I have to say nothing has happened. What am I going to do? They ask. I have to say I canʼt say except our men will give a good account and will not run. Bundy: Would strongly say that these 26 days have proved that we have done all we can do—and the other nations in the world know this. President: These Russians are the same ones who told us there were no missiles in Cuba. They let us believe good would come from pause. But we canʼt endure this indefinitely. McGovern and his crowd always want you to go further than you do. Bundy: Youʼll have two pieces of paper—Ball on the case against resumption—also an intelligence report on the pros and cons of bombing resumption. 4 Hope you wonʼt start bombing the day after Tet. President: Iʼm not going to start now. I just want McNamara to get the decks clear. We have to think about getting our story out quickly. Rusk: Having a press conference tomorrow. 5 President: It would be good if you can do in the Senate what you are doing in the House. Get the hawks and the doves together at the same time. Perhaps get Armed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign Relations. McNamara: Let Rusk ask Fulbright to bring in other committees. President: Main thing is to drive the nail in. They have had sufficient time and have not responded. None of the nations we have talked to have anything to report. Rusk: But U Thant will probably say that Souvanna Phouma talked to him—and will say we threw it out. Ball: Iʼll make a prediction this will get a dirty answer from Hanoi. Rusk: Even a dirty answer is better than nothing. Moyers: Story Iʼd like to see on Monday is that though Rusk has spoken, the President hasnʼt decided. President: Iʼd like to see “the peace jig is up.” We donʼt have to say everything we know to newspapers. I might be turned around tomorrow, so we have to be able to talk to each other. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) 2 Moyers was also present. (Ibid.) 3 Presumably a reference to the Presidentʼs Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 394–399. 4 McGeorge Bundy forwarded the two papers to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. on January 20. Ballʼs memorandum, dated January 20, argued that resumption of the bombing would “substantially increase the risks of escalation” but would not “substantially contribute to persuading Hanoi to stop the aggression.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 10) The intelligence memorandum, dated January 19 and prepared by CIAʼs Office of National Estimates, estimated probable reactions both to resumption of the bombing and continuation of the pause. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLV) 5 For text of Ruskʼs news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin , February 7, 1966, pp. 189–197. 33. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State 33. Telegram From the Embassy in Burma to the Department of State 1 Rangoon, January 21, 1966. 365. Eyes only for the Secretary. 1. Called upon DRV Consul General Vu at his residence at 8:00 p.m. tonight. 2 Participants on both sides the same as at our Dec 29 meeting 3 and atmosphere of our talks was much the same as reported at that time. 2. Vu did not wait for any introductory remarks on my part but remarked as soon as we were seated that I had delivered an aide-memoire to him recently which I had said I would keep confidential. He said he had transmitted document to his government as he had promised. He wanted me to know however that in his own personal opinion the tone and contents of the aide-memoire were such that he considered it an ultimatum. 3. I said I was sorry to hear him say this as I could assure him that this was a misunderstanding on his part and that no such impression had been intended. Told him that for my part I had kept our meeting secret even though I had been pressed by several Ambassadors for information. I told Vu that exact understanding of his remarks most important to me and asked if his opening remark was also the view of his government. He repeated again that it was only his personal view. (This I wonder about.) 4. I reminded him that when I last saw him I had said I would stand by for a reply from him. So far none had been received and there was no indication of any response either related to military action or to obstacles to negotiation. I asked if he had any reply for me. He said he had had no instructions from his government to reply. He said that in the meantime his government had issued public statements which indicated its position. 5. I said my government wanted me to make sure, through direct contact with him, that there was no misunderstanding and no chance of mishap on this very important matter in any attempt they may have made to contact us. Vu shook his head and sat silent for a while. I told him for my part I would continue to stand by for any contact he wished. He nodded his understanding. 6. I said there was one other aspect I would like to mention. The worldʼs attention was focused on Vietnam. The press of most capitals of the world was alert to any new sign and in this atmosphere it was probably expecting too much to think our contacts could long remain secret. (I had learned of U Thantʼs Jan 20 press conference remark 4 minutes before seeing Vu but did not mention it and he apparently had not heard of it.) I said if leaks occurred that we had met that this should not discourage us. We need not admit what we talked about. Rangoon would still be a quiet place and we could still meet secretly. I said that I would find a place where we could meet with complete secrecy and he might wish also to give this some thought. 7. Vu said he had read press reports from the White House which hinted at our direct contact. I said I was aware of this statement 5 but Rangoon had not been singled out. He said “such news should not have been disclosed, if you sincerely wish to exchange views.” I said I understood and would do all I could to preserve secrecy our contacts. 8. I said I wished to revert to his opening remark. Told him I know President well personally as well as his important advisers. From this knowledge and based upon the most intimate knowledge US policy, I was absolutely certain that President was sincere in wanting peace to come to Vietnam. I said it would be a great tragedy in the end if there was any misunderstanding on this point. 9. I made remark that I hoped I received a telephone call some day from him and was preparing to depart when he said he was ready to listen if I had anything more to say. I said I had no instructions to say more but would make one more comment. I said from Washington viewpoint it was obvious that VC initiated military activity in South Vietnam had remained at a high level. We also had reliable evidence of major truck movements continuing to South Vietnam through Laos. It seemed we had no alternative but to assume that DRV was continuing to support large scale military effort in South and send regular units there. 10. Vu said that as we were now speaking informally he would comment. He said that immediately after the US made its 14 points public, 4000 US soldiers had landed in South Vietnam. He also mentioned the figure of 9000 more arrivals (but I never got period of time to which he referred). He said there are reports that 20,000 more South Koreans may come. This was ample proof that our President was not sincere. 11. I said we both had had military experience, and therefore we both knew the advance planning that had to go into major movements of military units. Certainly it was obvious that the actual decision to move these troops was made long before the time they arrived. This however was not the major point. Anyone who understood the Presidentʼs position clearly would not be surprised that more troops should be sent to help the South protect itself. We are constantly faced with military action against the South. There was evidence of unrelented build-up from the North. Our youth were being attacked and killed. The President had made himself quite clear as to what he considered his obligations to be as long as this situation continued. 12. I said I hoped he and his government would study most carefully our 14 points and the Presidentʼs more recent State of the Union message. Vu said our 14 points contained nothing really new. I said I hoped he would find it a useful summary of our views for study. 13. I said while it was obvious we could not agree on many things I thought that it was good nevertheless that we could talk together in this fashion and that I hoped we could meet again in the future. He was personally quite friendly in escorting me to my borrowed Volkswagen and in saying goodbye. Byroade 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:46 p.m. and forwarded to President Johnson by McGeorge Bundy at 4:15 p.m. with the observation that “the man from Hanoi has nothing to say.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19) 2 In telegram 227 to Rangoon, January 20, Rusk instructed Byroade to seek an appointment with the DRV Consul General “as part of our effort to close all circuits.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 135–136) 3 See Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 736 – 737 . 4 For a summary of U Thantʼs comments at his January 20 press conference, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966 , pp. 146–147. 5 See footnote 8, Document 16 . 34. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 34. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 22, 1966. SUBJECT Your noon meeting today I think we have three basic problems, two of which need not concern us much today. The first is whether to resume bombing. The second is when to resume bombing. The third is what targets to bomb. I think question one should clearly be answered in the affirmative, and that question three can be pushed ahead of us, although I think it would be helpful to decide today that this is a very important question and should be most carefully reviewed. The easiest way to do this is to resume bombing on a pattern very much like that which existed before the pause. The Chiefs will not like this, but they will sit still for it in the context of a definite decision to resume. The immediate problem and the hard one for today is when and how to start the bombing again. My brother Bill is bringing a timetable of diplomatic and political actions. 2 I have not seen it, and he has been so busy that I have not wanted to interrupt for an advance description. But I think that the following questions are those that need to be considered. 1. Have we given adequate public warning that the pause is failing? I do not think we have, and I attach a paragraph 3 that Harriman or Rusk or both might work from tomorrow, on television. 2. Are we doing everything we can to close all the circuits? It is already clear that Hanoi is trying to pretend that its Vientiane demarche was a serious response. Joe Kraft telephoned me this morning to say that he has reliable information from Paris that there has been a request for clarification from Hanoi on the 14 points. This can only refer to Vientiane and he admits that it comes from a Frenchman (whom he refused to name) who has talked to Bo in Paris. 3. How much private warning should we give to friends before the bombing actually begins? I think it is most important that men like Wilson and Pearson and Sato have advance notice even at the risk of leaks. This diplomatic advantage conflicts with the desire of CINCPAC and others to catch Hanoi off guard with a surprise resumption, and thus hit some rewarding targets in daylight. 4. What degree of Congressional consultation should there be before resumption? My own suggestion is that we should make it very clear that the pause has failed through such devices as the Tuesday leadership meeting but not engage in any formal consultation about any resumption any more than we did about starting the pause. 5. In addition to special friends who get a day or two of advance notice, we must have diplomatic notice to everyone at the time the bombing resumes. I assume this item will be in Billʼs scenario. 6. There should probably be a major statement on the results of the pause and on our continuing purpose of peace by the Secretary of State as it is on the record that the bombing has begun. This memorandum does not address the question of the date of resumption. I think you will want to keep a free hand on that. I think you will find that Goldberg and Harriman are strong for another two weeks of delay and that Bob McNamara wants to get cracking. My own view is that once we have made the definite decision that we will resume, we are not in a hurry about the particular day. On the other hand, if you donʼt give the State Department a deadline, I doubt if they will get all their homework and wire closing done as fast as you want. So I think I would tell them today that I wanted to be free to send out the bombers by Thursday, 4 and that in fact I would plan to hold my hand for another few days and tell no one. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. 2 “Scenario and Checklist for Possible Resumption of Bombing,” January 22. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI) 3 Attached but not printed. 4 January 27. 35. Notes of Meeting 35. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 22, 1966, noon-2:12 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, Helms, McNamara, Harriman, Taylor, Ball, Raborn, Thompson, Goldberg, Mac Bundy, Valenti 2 President: Want to survey what has happened—and see what is ahead of us. Want to feel I have options to proceed on what is the best interest of the United States. Hope we can keep what we say totally secret. Want McNamara to give report on what happened in his testimony. 3 McNamara: Generally 15 to 20 members present. Committee split—Gavin approach—and—the other: expand the bombing—even to taking on China. Believe it is possible to bring the poles together—same thing can be done, I believe, with public. President: Is there much criticism of what we have done? McNamara: Not so much in the pause. Eight to twelve are critical of our bombing policy. My answer: not fundamental to what we do in the South. Difference between McNamara and Chiefs is very minor. POL and power plants are only difference. Far too much time directed at these minor differences rather than direction of the war. No changes in pattern of activity in pre-pause period. (What has happened in last 30 days.) PAVN building up response for future. Weʼll have 220,000 by first of March. Commanders tell us theyʼll need 400,000 by end of year. Westmoreland requests 75 battalions instead of 45—99 by end of year. President: Anticipate Chinese coming in? McNamara: No. This based on China not coming in. This month weʼll drop twice the level of bombs as in peak Korean months. Will expand this further. By end of year, weʼll be in roughly same balance with VC as we are now. All this assumes China will not come in. President: Rusk, what are we waiting to hear from? What suggestions do you have? Rusk: Only live contact still open is Laos. DRV rep there seems nervous. This is delicate contact—has become known. Souvanna dropped it at dinner party. Austrian Foreign Minister says he has high level Kremlin contact. If US continues pause and discontinues force buildup, North Vietnam will talk. But doesnʼt say what North Vietnam will do in regard to military side. General advice from Yugoslavs is: take more time to do anything. General international approval on pause period. But this is thin, and resumption of bombing would produce disappointment internationally. Key point to be tested: whether or not there has been response from other side. President: Admiral Raborn, any information you have? Movements in the last 30 days? Raborn: Indications are North Vietnam is rebuilding all repairs—resumed normal daylight infiltrations to South—food, men, etc. 4500 a month. Roads improved to take 250 tons a day, roughly double the number of troops required in North Vietnam. Some indication that VC are getting a bloody nose. Morale may be deteriorating. Commencing to feel effects of military actions against them. VC unhappy that Hanoi (unreadable) worldwide—frightens them. Goldberg: I have confirmation of Rusk and McNamara. U Thant anxious to make a proposal. His public statement 4 was not good but could have been much worse. He said he would like a coalition government reflecting his French conversations. Privately, he is willing to propose the five powers plus North and South Vietnam—including the National Liberation Front. This very best we can get him to do. U Thant has feeling something may come of all this. Have checked Ambassadors at UN. UK wants pause continued. Italy has crisis. Moro has been loyal friend. Needs pause to shore him (up) domestically. Canada for pause. Thailand doesnʼt want U.S. to show weakness. France pushes pause for three months. Bloc countries need time, they say. Latin Americans support pause longer if military situation permits. Indians talk about initiative on their part. Yugoslavs believe Soviets need more time. U Thant places great importance on Laos move. Thinks it is definite forward step. Friends want us to go along more—nonaligned want more then more. Bloc countries stress you need more time from communist countries than other countries. President: General Taylor, what do you think? Taylor: Events have developed about as we anticipated. Profitable move but now at resumption point. I think the longer we wait to tidy up loose ends, the harder it is to resume. President: Therefore, you recommend … Taylor: We ought to resume bombing. President: If we can, we ought to say to all countries—we have gone 30 days—and thatʼs longer than any of us agreed to do or thought. Thus, tell them weʼve had no response—we are not obligated or well advised to keep one hand tied behind us. Without saying we are resuming bombing, we must get this across. We can talk to military people to find out how to exert maximum strength at minimum danger. Do we have pledge to tell anyone what we do? Rusk: Notify British, Canadians, one or two others if we resume. President: Tell them today we feel free to move whenever we judge it to be required since others have not responded. Rusk: Effect of my statement yesterday 5 was that string has run out. McNamara: Think it wise to send out message as President suggests to go on record. Harriman: We must build up case of what has moved forward since cessation of bombing—need to show men and materiel moving down—or use some provocative act as reason. We have built much good will, we must try to preserve as much as possible. Try to get public opinion to isolate Hanoi. President: Important before we take action we carefully consider every step we could take to hold what approval we can. Think weʼll keep little because the countries donʼt want the war to go on. They really want unilateral disarmament. If other people respond at all, we could carry the pause further. Iʼm of the mind to continue it anyway—but weʼve had no indication of any success at all. We canʼt impose hardships on our soldiers much longer. How to do this is what I want State to work on. Now I gather we gave no indication that we havenʼt done what we promised. I think we have gone much longer than we said. Bundy: We said 12 to 20 days. Goldberg: I want to add Pope and U Thant to those we consult. President: Are we keeping in touch with the Pope? Bundy: Yes within 48 hours. Goldberg: I am told that there have been no North Vietnamese soldiers involved this month—or since November. Bundy: Thatʼs a Times story. President: What do you hear from Westmoreland and Lodge? Their fears from military standpoint? McNamara: Unanimous view of military commanders we must resume bombing. If not, can expect higher level of infiltration. My impression is Lodge feels this way. All officers from second level feel this way. Even getting emotional. They see North Vietnamese actions to reconstruct bridges, moving substantial units through Laos. All indications are of substantial buildup during pause—and preparing for intensified action in South Vietnam. My own appraisal—they overestimate the effect of North bombing in stopping infiltration. Helms: May I interrupt? We have report of economist. Increased bombing in the North would not stop movement of supplies to the South. McNamara: We need to really search this out. I think it essential to resume the bombing. Weʼve had good fortune with the pause. Consider more peace moves, but unless we resume bombing, we will give wrong signal to Hanoi, Peking and our own people. Strongly recommend bombing resumption. Raborn: Our reports support McNamara. View about wrong signal. Thompson. We have given impression we would not continue pause unless something happened. Soviets told me pause wouldnʼt be considered sign of weakness. How could we be weak when we are bringing in additional troops and money? Raborn: Hanoi might believe domestic pressures and international opinion cause us to hold back. Ball: Let me utter minority view. Only one systematic way to resolve this—list pros and cons. President. I would think you are wrong. I read your excellent brief. 6 Is the pause continuation a sign to Saigon that we are pulling out? Taylor: Yes. I think they are beginning to suspect things and it is causing them difficulty. McNamara: Also my opinion. Seen signs of it in the cables. We havenʼt told Saigon anything at all about our buildup. They also see controversy in this country. They donʼt understand why we donʼt punish those who foster [protest?] the war. Ball: If that is the case, why donʼt we sit down with Ky and tell him. McNamara: Because it would leak. We havenʼt told the U.S. people. Rusk: I think weʼll see a drop in morale if we donʼt resume. Ky told me we talk about their country without telling them. It embarrasses them. President: I have a feeling Ky, Lodge, Westmoreland were against the pause. We did it. Once done they were good soldiers and enduring it as long as they can. Iʼm distressed when I see frantic attitude on part of some of our Senators and Congressmen. Iʼve always known weʼre on thin ice. Iʼm aware of this. Go ahead, George. Ball : Question: On evidence Iʼve seen, bombing is not effectively going to interdict supply requirements. Needs are too small. What effect bombing on will of Hanoi? Experience in the past shows it doesnʼt erode will of a people. Comes down to this: most reasonable argument is that it gives a bad signal to Hanoi. That is a possibility. 1. Effect on morale in Saigon, hard to evaluate. 2. Wrong signal to Hanoi. This is persuasive. We donʼt know what the flash point is if we escalate. McNamara About flash point, we can carry on level of bombing of last November without hitting flash point. If we go beyond that point, we may draw them in. President: If we go back in, the pressure will be on us to go further. Your Senators proved that. McNamara: Thatʼs true. But I think I persuaded them that differences in bombing targets will not affect the course of the war. Our bombing has evolved slowly—slowly we were successful in interdicting rail lines between China and Hanoi. President: What do we signal to the enemy if we resume? Thompson: Peace moves may be more important than stopping bombing. What Russians do hinges on China. If we take out Hanoi airfields, pressure on China to use their fields. If China decides to let their fields be used, they will no doubt try to get Russians to come in. Peace moves have eased pressure on Russians. President: If we didnʼt resume it, would they assume we are weak at home and would have to pull out? Thompson: No. The Soviets have indicated that what we do in the South doesnʼt affect them. Bundy: How would Asian countries view it? Thompson: Donʼt know. Rusk: Sat around the table during Korean War. Was with MacArthur when he made mistake about China coming in. But because we have moved slowly, we have been able to do a great deal. If we donʼt resume, China will think a sanctuary has been approved and they can do more than ever. This could be important. Goldberg: This move might involve more cooperation between Soviets and China, dampening their ideological conflict. If we draw Soviets and China closer together, it puts a wedge at helping nonproliferation. I get much evidence of this in my talks. “Donʼt push us into cooperation,” they say. Ball: Must do what we can to make an independent peace with Hanoi. This is more difficult if North Vietnam becomes more dependent upon on China. Hanoi under pressure from China to do more. To extent we direct an attack on Hanoi, we build up pressure to continue war and achieve Chinese objectives. Realistically, we are not going to let Ky make a separate deal with Hanoi. Eventually, if we bomb, weʼll see Chinese—not fighting men but coolie workers—all over Hanoi. There is a difference between bombing in the North and fighting in the South. President: I feel that we have given away a trading point without getting anything in return. Next, the cry will be not to bomb in the South. Ball: There is a fundamental difference. We are in South Vietnam—we are helping them. But we bomb in the North to punish them. We are big, powerful; they have no air force and are small. Itʼs like Italy bombing Ethiopia. If we make clear this is not done from weakness, and that we are going ahead—it is supportable. Taylor: If we give up bombing, we will seriously hurt the war effort. We should punish Hanoi, else we will (be) there 20 years. Goldberg: But evidence shows that rate of infiltration continues with bombing. Rusk: In the Korean War, we destroyed everything east of Yalu. Every time they attacked they had to wait and restock. Prisoners told us it took them five days to go 45 miles. Taylor: I confirm the Secretaryʼs comments about Korea. Bombing has an effect on the number of troops the enemy can commit on the front lines. W. Bundy: I believe we should resume. Believe we need a few days to tidy up though Iʼm in sympathy with Taylorʼs remarks. We need to run through the Vientiane thing. On January 17 the North Vietnam Charge dʼAffaires went to Souvanna—and raised questions about 14 points. Went into detail about the points. Souvanna asked him if he should pass this on. Said no. Souvanna mentioned this at dinner on January 18 and it leaked. Sent message that Souvanna could act as mediator and answered questions about 14 points. 7 Souvanna called in North Vietnam Charge today and reported to our Ambassador. North Vietnam asked further questions such as why we are reinforcing our troops. Until we probe further on this, we ought not start. Ball: Problem of communication. Few planes going to and from Hanoi and Vientiane. Bundy: Also have circuit to close in Paris. Kohler has instructions to seek appointment with Charge in Moscow. Have no response. He has instructions when he sees him to make full statement of our position. 8 Rusk: The Vice President and I probed Kosygin hard on this and got no reaction. The Soviets have denied they mentioned Moscow as site of meeting place. Bundy: I asked Dobrynin about Kosygin and Shastri. He had no information. W. Bundy: General suggestion by number two Soviet man here was to be in direct communication with Hanoi. President: Have Soviets retreated from what they told us? Bundy: Not formally. But they donʼt assert they have tried to get Hanoi to the table. Goldberg: Dobrynin says “I canʼt commit my government. You have made a good move.” President: Arenʼt you going back to Kohler and Souvanna and see if we can close that circuit? Bundy: Yes, we intend to do that today. Rusk: U Thant is a man of no principles. Goldberg: Yes, but we may get a man of less principle. If we get Sawicki (the African), U Thant will look like a shining star. President: We ought to get out to all the countries we need to notify. We havenʼt bombed in thirty days. But they have done nothing. They are reinforcing—rebuilding—reinfiltrating— Even bombed us (unreadable) Saigon. We went into this in good faith. We wanted to examine every and any chance for peace. We have gone longer than anyone thought necessary. Now, this is what they have done. Not telling them we will begin bombing again but here is the picture. Now, George, go on. Ball: You have made it clear we are searching for peace. I think there would be value for you to write the six governments and tell them Rusk is willing to meet with them. This would be a formal act by you—not just a speech. President: Let the State Department get together and see if thereʼs anything we can do along this line. And have this back at our next meeting. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that William Bundy was also present. (Ibid.) 3 On January 20 and 21, McNamara testified in support of a request for supplementary military appropriations before a joint committee composed of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee for Defense. 4 See footnote 4, Document 33 . 5 For text of Ruskʼs news conference on January 21, see Department of State Bulletin , February 7, 1966, pp. 189–197. 6 See footnote 4, Document 32 . 7 See Document 29 . 8 See Document 25 . 36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 36. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 24, 1966. SUBJECT The Military Outlook in South Vietnam You have asked for my comments on the outlook for military operations in South Vietnam. This memorandum addresses that question. 1. Expansion of Forces and Levels of Operation . The following statistics summarize our best estimates of force levels and operational rates for the next twelve months: June ʼ65 Dec ʼ65 a June ʼ66 Dec ʼ66 Strength VC & PAVN: Men 187,000 236,900 ? ? Batns 63 107 150 155 RVN (excl police): Men 522,400 573,000 631,457 661,000 Batns 128 133 168 173 US: Men 59,900 178,800 b 277,800 b c 378,800 Batns 9 34 46 75 3d Country: Men 3,300 22,400 38,000 44,600 Batns 1 10 19 23 Aircraft US Fixed wing (in SEA) 886 1,487 1,684 1,879 Helicopter 508 1,483 1,853 2,391 Attack Sorties per Month NVN: Sorties 2,401 2,198 4,000 4,000 Losses 9 12 18 18 SVN Sorties 7,234 13,114 12,000 15,000 Losses 6 9 8 12 Laos Sorties 511 3,047 4,500 4,500 Losses 2 3 4 4 Total 10,146 18,359 Tons Dropped 30,510 31,341 51,500 68,800 a December activity figures are reduced by Christmas Cease-fire and Pause. b The JCS believe that it would be necessary to have a selective call-up of reserves and a selective extension of terms of service to achieve the personnel strengths shown at the times indicated. c Would rise substantially above this if estimates of CINCPAC are accepted. 2. The Enemy Force Build-up . The Communists appear to have decided to increase their forces in South Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the Delta) and by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces from the North. The infiltration from the North is mainly by truck. It is on greatly improved routes—routes, some of which are new and some of which have been widened, or upgraded for truck use, or all-weathered, or built to by-pass points vulnerable to choke-point bombing, or constructed under jungle canopy and bamboo-trellised camouflage to prevent aerial observation. General Westmoreland estimates that, through 1966, North Vietnam will have the capability to generate and infiltrate 3 regiments (9 battalion-equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South Vietnam (now with 85 battalion-equivalents) can recruit and train 7 new battalion-equivalents a month—together adding 16 battalion-equivalents a month to the enemy forces. Despite serious attrition—desertions and increasing combat casualties—the enemy can be expected to enlarge his present strength of 107 battalion-equivalents to more than 150 battalion-equivalents by the end of calendar 1966, when—by our deployments and aggressive strategy—hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input. 3. The Enemyʼs Supply Requirement . The 107 battalions of PAVN and VC forces in South Vietnam need only 20 or so tons a day of supplies from North Vietnam to sustain “1964” levels of activity and only approximately 80 tonsʼ a day to sustain “light combat” (1/5th of the force in contact once every 7 days using 1/3d of their basic load). The requirements from the North after the expansion of enemy forces to 150+ battalions at end of 1966—assuming that the enemy refuses, as it can, to permit the level of combat to exceed “light”—should approximate 140 tons a day. 4. The Enemyʼs Supply Capability . As for the Communistsʼ capability to supply their forces in the South, it is clear that our program of bombing North Vietnam has caused them difficulties. It has destroyed many of their infiltration-oriented facilities (e.g., bridges, roads, railroads, trucks, rolling stock, barracks, storage centers, etc.), increasing the cost and difficulty of infiltration of both men and materiel. There is evidence that the volume of infiltration that the system could otherwise handle has been halved; that approximately 50–100,000 men have been diverted from normal activities to defense and repair work; that government activities are being decentralized, causing inefficiencies and political risks in a totalitarian state; that mobility within North Vietnam has been reduced; and that the reduction in enemy initiatives in Laos may be attributable to their need to husband their resources for their South Vietnam effort. Nevertheless, despite our anti-infiltration efforts at pre-Pause levels, it is estimated that the enemy is capable of generating in the North and infiltrating to the South not only the 4500 men a month mentioned above, but an average of 200 tons of supplies a day depending on the season—considerably more than the perhaps 40–140 tons a day required to maintain activities at “1964” to “light-combat” levels. 5. The US Interdiction Capability . It is not clear that the US 1966 bombing program will cut the flow of men and materiel from the North to the South to a point below the VC/PAVN minimum needs. It is clear that the success of the interdiction program is contingent upon a cumulative and sustained effort. The interdiction can be while the supplies are en route into North Vietnam from the outside world, inside North Vietnam, en route from the North by sea or through Laos or Cambodia to South Vietnam, or inside South Vietnam; it can be by destruction or slow-down; the effectiveness can be prolonged by exhausting the Northʼs repair capability, and can be enhanced by complicating their communications and control machinery. At a minimum the bombing program against North Vietnam should include 4000 attack sorties a month as compared with 3125 in the month of November 1965 before the Pause, intensive day-and-night armed reconnaissance of road and rail lines of communication throughout North Vietnam (except for the cities and the strip alongside China), and destruction of POL storage targets. (The efforts in North Vietnam are to be added to intensified bombing of the lines of communication in Laos, tight surveillance of the sea, increased efforts on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers from Cambodia, harassment of the lines of communication in South Vietnam, and destruction of base areas in South Vietnam.) Recognizing that the estimates as to enemy needs and capabilities and as to our interdiction results may be wrong by two either way, all that can be said now—before some studies are completed—is that the increased program probably will not put a tight ceiling on the enemyʼs activities in South Vietnam, but probably will reduce the flow of supplies to the point where the enemy receives too little for full flexibility and for frequent offensive actions, too little to defend themselves as often against aggressive US/GVN forces, and too little to permit Hanoi to continue to deploy forces with complete confidence that they can be supplied. Furthermore, as very important by-products, the program will keep the pressure on North Vietnam—to condition them toward negotiations and an acceptable end to the war—and will maintain the morale of our South Vietnamese allies. 6. The US Force Build-up . The US force build-up plan is to deploy additional US and third-country forces, raising the battalion strength from 44 in December ʼ65 to 98 in December ʼ66. This should do several things. According to General Westmorelandʼs estimates, the deployments of the additional forces will: a. Result in destruction of one-third of the enemyʼs base areas, i.e., in-country resources. b. Permit friendly control of just under one-half, as compared with the present one-third, of the critical roads and railroads. c. Attrite VC/PAVN forces at an increasing rate, leading to the leveling off of enemy forces at the 150+ battalion level mentioned above (provided the Chinese do not supply “volunteers”). d. Ensure that friendly bases and government centers are defended under any foreseeable circumstances (though some district towns may be overrun and have to be retaken). e. Lead to government control of an estimated 50 per cent of the population. (In this last connection, Prime Minister Ky has stated that the Government now controls 25 per cent of the population and that it will take two years to raise the control to 50 per cent. The Mission and the Government have just initiated a 4-area priority pacification effort—emphasizing the Danang (389,000), Qui Nhon (650,000), Hoa Hao (800,000), and Saigon (3,500,000) areas. They believe that, taking account of the concentration of effort and resources required to make progress in pacification, these quite limited areas are all we can hope to handle during the next year.) 7. Evaluation . The situation at yearʼs end could be either better or worse than implied by the above information. The reported drop in enemy morale and in quality of his recruits together with interdiction successes and continuity of the Ky government could lead to the start of snow-balling in our favor before December. On the other hand, if the enemy force build-up is as predicted and if attrition of that force and of its supplies fall short, we could find ourselves “behind the power curve” going into 1967; we could be faced with the requirement to deploy at least an additional 3-division corps (27 battalions) in 1967. Our intelligence estimate is that the present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally, and that their own staying power is superior to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US troops can be expected. Even though the Communists will continue to suffer heavily from our ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month.) If the US were willing to commit enough forces—perhaps 600,000 men or more—we could probably ultimately prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. When this point was reached, however, the question of Chinese intervention would become critical. (We are generally agreed that the Chinese Communists will intervene with combat forces to prevent destruction of the Communist regime in North Vietnam; it is less clear whether they would intervene to prevent a DRV/VC defeat in the South.) The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little better than even that, at this stage, Hanoi and Peiping would choose to reduce the effort in the South and try to salvage their resources for another day. It follows, therefore, that the odds are about even that, even with the recommended deployments, we will be faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level, with pacification hardly underway and with the requirement for the deployment of still more US forces. 2 RMN 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII, Late Vietnam. Top Secret. Neither the original nor a copy of the memorandum has been located in the White House files at the Johnson Library. 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe “that the evaluation set forth in paragraph 7 is on the pessimistic side in view of the constant and heavy military pressure which our forces in Southeast Asia will be capable of applying. While admittedly the following factors are to a degree imponderables, they believe that greater weight should be given to the following: “a. The cumulative effect of our air campaign against the DRV on morale and DRV capabilities to provide and move men and material from the DRV to South Vietnam. “b. The effects of constant attack and harassment on the ground and from the air upon the growth of Viet Cong forces and on the morale and combat effectiveness of Viet Cong/PAVN forces. “c. The effect of destruction of Viet Cong base areas on the capabilities of VC/PAVN forces to sustain combat operations over an extended period of time. “d. The constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a struggle which they realize they cannot win in the face of progressively greater destruction of their country.” [Footnote in the source text.] 3 The source text bears these handwritten initials indicating McNamara signed the original. 37. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 37. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1 Moscow, January 24, 1966. 2306. Ref: Embtel 2297. 2 1. I met with Le Chang at 11:30 this morning accompanied by Akalovsky. I attempted establish whether there was some common language between two of us. He seemed to understand some English but insisted that conversation be conducted through his Russian interpreter; thus bulk of one hour 35 minute meeting consumed by double interpretation. 2. I opened by noting we had suspended bombing of DRV one month ago and had notified DRV officially of this in Rangoon. Pointed out our message had made clear suspension might continue if there was no major provocation and further extension would depend on response and reaction of DRV Govt. Expressed hope willingness DRV Govt to have Charge meet with me today might mean he had some response to transmit. 3. Le Chang said DRV position had been repeatedly stated, most recently in Jan 4 statement by their MFA spokesman. 3 4. I noted there had been many suggestions from Hanoi itself, as well as from many others including Soviets, that cessation of bombing would create opportunity and conditions in which moves could be made towards peaceful solution in Vietnam. In seeking this meeting today, we thought there might be two possible purposes in direct conversations between DRV and US Govts. One such possibility might be to explore whether or not there could be reciprocal reduction of hostilities. As we have said, we could continue suspension of bombing if there were reciprocal action by DRV. We prepared recognize that there might be difficulties for DRV to make public statements admitting cessation of certain actions or responsibility for them; therefore, we thought if two sides had direct and confidential contact DRV could communicate to us re actions it proposed to take so that they would be fully understood by us. If this of interest to DRV, we prepared continue contact for this purpose. 5. In response my direct question whether there was such interest, Le Chang said DRV position remained unchanged and his govt adhered consistently to Geneva Accords. DRV position and its adherence to provisions of Geneva Accords reflected in DRVʼs four points. Those points recognize basic right of Vietnamese people to peace, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In accordance with Geneva Accords, US Govt should withdraw from Vietnam all troops and all armaments of any kind, as well as liquidate its military bases in, and military alliance with, South Vietnam. 6. I asked Le Chang whether he was talking about Pham Van Dongʼs four points and got affirmative reply. Le Chang continued that US Govt refused accept this position. As to suspension of bombing, US Govt has no right to bomb or strafe North Vietnam, and DRV regards such actions as act of war against its sovereign govt and as gross violation of Geneva Accords. Although US has said it had suspended temporarily bombing of North Vietnam, US Govt has been sending reconnaissance planes for intelligence and provocative actions. All these actions severely condemned by DRV. Indeed, temporary suspension of bombing of North Vietnam is for purpose of preparing new stage of escalation and expansion of war in Vietnam. In conducting such maneuvers, US pursuing objective of forcing other side to sit down at table and of forcing Vietnamese people accept conditions favorable to US and based on position of strength. During past month, while conducting so-called peace campaign, US has taken other actions as well. It has actually expanded its effort and sent to South Vietnam about 13,000 additional troops; it has sent Generals there to develop new plan for widening war; US and South Vietnamese puppet forces have conducted large scale operations, including use of gas and other toxic agents; and B–57ʼs have been used to bomb and destroy villages in South Vietnam. Can all these actions be called peaceful initiative? While conducting so-called search for peace, US continued reconnaissance and provocative flights into North Vietnam and sending additional contingents to South Vietnam. All this creates serious tensions in this area. Therefore DRV position remains as stated and has not changed. US Govt should recognize position DRV Govt because DRV four points reflect all basic provisions Geneva Accords. It should not only recognize that position but also prove such recognition through practical deeds. At same time, US Govt must cease, unconditionally and forever, bombing of DRV. Only on this basis can a way be found for solving Vietnam question. 7. I said we had to recognize fact there military conflict between North and South Vietnam, in which US committed help South against what we regard as aggression from North. Even during period of suspension of bombing, during past month, we have had evidence of further DRV forces infiltrating to South Vietnam through Laos. Thus there is state of conflict and this is what we discussing here today. This sending of troops is also regarded by US as infringement Geneva Accords, which specifically state there should be no such troop movements and no use of force. In suspending bombing, however, we discontinued one aspect of hostilities and, as I had said, we could continue discussions of reduction of hostilities if DRV Govt interested in exploring such mutual reduction. Far from seeking to widen war, very fact I here today shows we interested in reducing and limiting war. Even better than that, we could, if DRV Govt ready, use this contact to explore more formal possibilities for moving toward peace in Vietnam. Suspension of bombing in no sense effort to force other side sit down; rather it responsive to many suggestions we have had even from North Vietnamese sources that such suspension could lead to creation of conditions for peaceful settlement. Thus this is opportunity and not ultimatum. Fact my presence here today intended to indicate to him and his govt that we sincerely want peaceful solution in Vietnam. I then handed him 14 points, State of Union message, and Goldberg letter to U Thant, noting that they public knowledge but I wished give him texts officially. 8. Le Chang said DRV had those documents. Referring to my remark that we defending South Vietnam from aggression by North Vietnam and that we committed to South Vietnam, asserted US is distorting fight of Vietnamese people in order create pretext for expanding war in Vietnam, for maintaining hold on Vietnamese people and for retaining South Vietnam puppets, who have no popular support, do not represent anyone, and merely small group of traitors their fatherland. 9. I then said I very much wanted hear what Le Chang had to say and myself had many additional points to discuss, including DRV four points. However, I had diplomatic luncheon at 1:15 pm and therefore wondered whether this conversation could perhaps be continued at 4:00 pm today, or perhaps tomorrow, or at any time convenient to Le Chang, either at his Emb or, if more convenient, at my residence. I pointed out that it very important keep these discussions confidential and my absence from luncheon would require explanations which I wished avoid. 10. Le Chang said their Emb suitable meeting place. However, he had said everything he wished to say and therefore saw no need for further meeting unless I had some additional remarks to make. Specifically, he wished to know whether I had anything new to convey. I said that among other things I also wished discuss DRV four points and believed what I had to say would be new and important to Le Chang and his govt. After repeated inquiries by Le Chang whether I had something new to convey, and repeated affirmative responses from me, he finally said they would call us when they ready to meet again. 11. Le Chang then resumed what seemed like prepared statement, saying Vietnamese people love peace, which necessary for building their life, but peace connected with independence and freedom. Vietnam and its people far away from US and Vietnam has made no aggressive action against US. Source of, and immediate reason for, situation now obtaining in Vietnam is aggression by US. For 11 years it has systematically violated all provisions Geneva Accords acceptance of which it had solemnly stated. US has no right send troops to Vietnam or bomb or strafe North Vietnam. Therefore, if US ceases aggression peace will prevail on Vietnamese soil. Repeated that DRV position as formulated in four points reflects all basic provisions Geneva Accords, and therefore only basis for solution Vietnam question is acceptance by US Govt of DRV position and cessation forever of bombing and strafing DRV. Only then could one count on finding way for settlement. Also reiterated US Govt must prove acceptance DRV position through practical deeds. Asserted if US did so, that would be in accord with interest and honor of US, interest Vietnamese people and peoples throughout world. 12. I said I would be glad continue discussion as soon as possible since I had many important points to make, some of them also relating to what he had said. 13. Le Chang then said that if US had anything to say it could meet with DRV reps in Rangoon in order to do so or to learn DRV position. DRV reps in Rangoon prepared clarify DRV position if necessary. 14. In response my question whether this meant Rangoon preferred place of contact, Le Chang said he wished repeat that if our Amb Rangoon wanted say something on behalf his govt or obtain clarification DRV position he could do so with DRV reps there. However, this did not mean that he, Le Chang, not prepared meet me, although such meetings difficult to set up; his Emb had a very heavy schedule these days and he had had to cancel some commitments to meet with me today. I said I would promptly report his remarks, particularly re Rangoon. He then returned three papers I had given him, saying that in addition to already being available to his govt they also referred to aggression by DRV. He could, however, accept any formal communication from my govt to his govt I might wish to give him. He repeated that there would be no point in having further meetings if I had nothing new to say and that DRV position had been consistent and remained unchanged. This position reasonable, and if US Govt recognized it and stopped bombing way for settlement could be found. He noted that he agreed our discussions should be kept confidential, as stated in my letter to him (Embtel 2239). 4 15. In leaving at 1:10 pm, I told him I would await a call at his earliest convenience. Kohler 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:30 p.m. and passed to the White House. 2 In telegram 2297, January 24, Kohler provided a brief report of his meeting with the DRV Charge. (Ibid.) 3 For excerpts from the January 4 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 742–744. 4 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 24, 1966. SUBJECT Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 1966 Thirteen Members of the Committee, including Senator Mansfield and excluding Senator Morse, were present for a large part of this morningʼs briefing, in which the atmosphere was frankly more friendly and less critical than I expected. A number of the Senators were complimentary about the “Meet the Press” TV show last evening. My opening statement was confined to the present negotiating situation and our assessment of the attitudes of the various parties, which I repeatedly cautioned was extraordinarily sensitive. Senator Fulbright opened the questioning with a considerable discussion of the problem of dealing with the National Liberation Front, attempting to draw out, by a discussion of the history since 1940, that it might represent a continuity of the basic opposition to French colonialism, and that our willingness to deal with the NLF might be the key to satisfactory negotiations. This subject was referred to throughout the questioning by several other Members, and we had a full airing of the difference between recognizing the NLF on an equal footing with governments, and bringing it into the picture as just one minority element in South Vietnam. Senator Fulbright remained sceptical of the difference. Senator Hickenlooper aired some concerns that the continued bombing pause, which he feared might be extended through Prime Minister Wilsonʼs visit to Moscow in February, might give the enemy an undesirable chance to regroup and strengthen themselves. I informed him that Wilson had not asked us to postpone the bombing through his visit and that the decision would be taken on its merits after weighing all factors. There was extensive discussion of alternatives of all sorts. In an obvious effort to be helpful, Senator Lausche asked where we would draw the line in Southeast Asia, if we donʼt hold it in Vietnam. The view was also expressed by Senator Case that we are getting in a position where we will have to shoulder the responsibility of containing every war of national liberation without assistance from our Allies. While I have no illusions of having changed any positions (although Senator Clark seemed a little less withdrawal-minded than usual), I again feel that the subject was thoroughly aired. There was considerable discussion about our willingness to accept free elections without anything very much new having been added, and with Senator Fulbright quoting General Eisenhowerʼs book to the effect that if there had been free elections in 1956, about 80% of the South Vietnamese would have voted for Ho Chi Minh. 2 Senator Symington requested my estimate of whether the Chinese would be brought in if we bombed Hanoi or Haiphong and landed troops at Vinh to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail, saying that many of the American officials he consulted during his travels in Southeast Asia did not think they would. I replied that while it is difficult to predict with certainty what the Chinese would do, in my judgment such action would increase the chances of Chinese Communist intervention. Several questions in a similar vein brought a reasonable degree of consensus on my statement that our present general course of measured action was ultimately less likely to provoke a nuclear war than either of the major alternatives of either abandoning Vietnam or a major escalation on our part. Senator Pell advanced the Gavin theory of perimeter defense 3 as an alternative to which I noted some objections, but the question was not completely explored. Senator Symington raised the question of adequate control of CIA, referring to the Sunday 4 editorial in the Washington Post. He had earlier confided to me that his question would be designed to pre-empt and undercut a similar question by Senator McCarthy. Senator Pell was somewhat obdurate in questioning the credibility of the Administrationʼs view that there have been no peace initiatives by Hanoi and cited the Schoenbrun article last November 5 to try to prove his point. I hammered the point that the original initiatives were taken by third parties and not by Hanoi, but Pell remained unconvinced. Consultation: Perhaps the single matter most concerning the Members was the extent and method by which they would be consulted prior to taking crucial decisions on the conduct of the conflict. There was general agreement that we were right in not declaring war, but all felt we should bring the Congress in on major decisions. Several Members, primarily on the Democratic side, requested consultation by you with the whole Committee, before resuming bombing of North Vietnam. Senator Pell went so far as to suggest that you should also consult with the Committee, before substantially increasing our forces and also on the relative merits of holding a few enclaves versus more aggressive action by our forces in South Vietnam. Senator Mundt, on the other hand, favored consultation with you on policy, but opposed consultation on tactical questions, among which he characterized resuming the bombing in North Vietnam and Laos, the selection of targets, etc. He observed that the war could not be won by Committee quarterbacking. Nonetheless, almost all Members of both parties specifically mentioned the feeling that the Chairman of the Committee was not always included with the Leadership in consultation on key decisions. I was requested, and promised, to transmit their views to you. Senator Case asked some questions about long-term objectives, if we were going to make a greater physical commitment. I offered to set up an informal session myself with those who might wish to discuss the broader philosophical implications, including such thorny questions as “spheres of influence” and our own posture in the world. I came away with the impression that what most of the Members most wanted was a chance to sit down with you on a give-and-take discussion basis rather than for formal presentations and disclosures of pending decisions. While I am aware of the great difficulty of doing this with this Committee as a whole, given the several other Committees in both Houses, who would consider themselves entitled to equal treatment, I do feel that the time is perhaps ripe for us to take another look at the problem of Presidential consultation. 6 DR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. For text of Ruskʼs testimony, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) , vol. XVIII, pp. 133–187. 2 In his 1963 memoir The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 , Eisenhower stated, “I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.” (p. 372) 3 For an analysis of Gavinʼs theory by the JCS, see Document 61 . 4 January 23. 5 Not further identified. 6 On January 25 Rusk sent a memorandum to President Johnson summarizing his briefing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that morning, noting that both Chairman Morgan and Representative Zablocki raised the issue of Presidential consultation. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Dept. of State, vol. VIII) 39. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 39. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 24, 1966, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Pros and cons of immediate resumption of the bombing I think this question narrows to one of timing. The arguments for a complete end of the bombing are unacceptable, and no one wants to bomb Hanoi tomorrow morning. The real question is whether it is better to resume within the next two days or to wait another week or two. The argument for prompt resumption has the following elements: 1. We can get started just ahead of a chorus of restraining voices which talk of delay but which really will always oppose any resumption. 2. The Saigon cables tell us that we will have real trouble with the GVN if we wait much longer. 3. The enemy has it within his power to give us a troublesome and ambiguous signal any minute, and it is a wonder he hasnʼt done it already. 4. The Republicans will begin to make headway if we keep hesitating. 5. Every day of delay is that much of trouble to our own troops. 6. We have already done more than we set out to do, and we will show weakness in patience if we continue. The arguments for a delay are more subtle but they are not feeble. 1. There are still a lot of people of genuine good will who think that another week or two might show real progress. They cite the discussions on prisoner exchanges, the Vientiane open wire 2 the pressure from nearly all our friends abroad. (Goldberg rehearsed these points on Saturday.) 3 2. It is quite possible that Hanoi really wants us to resume the bombing and is trying to push us into that position while pretending to keep the Vientiane line open. 3. There has not been any important military action by Hanoi in the South, and until there is, we can easily say to our friends in Saigon that the suspension of bombing has in fact lowered the rate of aggression. 4. The country knows very well that the President is not weak, and is quite ready to stay with him another two weeks on the present peace effort. 5. It is quite possible to delay from day to day with no real loss and to wait for the Communists to stir up the fighting by a more impressive outrage than the one in Danang today. Whenever the bombing resumes, it seems to me that the case is persuasive for a very carefully selected set of targets which should combine, as far as possible, the following characteristics: (a) low risks; (b) consistency with previous bombing patterns; (c) immediate relationship to the aggression against South Vietnam. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret. The memorandum was attached to a note from Juanita Roberts, the Presidentʼs secretary, dated January 24, 6:10 p.m., that reads: “For your meeting at 6:15 p.m.” 2 The following words were typed after “Vientiane open wire” but then crossed out: “(a pretty feeble one).” 3 January 29. 40. Notes of Meeting 40. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 24, 1966, 6:30–7:30 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, Valenti Bundy: Westmoreland says (through Porter) that he can wait a few days after Tet before resuming, but not longer. Increasing risk. “Undue risk particularly in IV Corps zone.” President: What danger waiting for day or two? Taylor: No danger in day or two, but no longer. McNamara: I feel exactly that way. Donʼt see the political gain in waiting. (Bob Anderson told me that Ike told the Koreans he was tired of nothing happening and he was ready to drop the A bomb. Sent word through Nehru that there would be no sanctuary.) (Rusk gave President a memo to read from Doug MacArthur on Ruskʼs meeting with Senators.) 2 Rusk: Important problem as to whether you see Fulbright. You would shore up some opposition if you saw Fulbright. Committee would have no serious problem if you see Fulbright. President: Today we had five leaders—four for us and Mansfield against us. In the House weʼd get Ford, Arends, and Mahon. Donʼt know about Bow. Rivers and Bates are with us. Weʼll lose only Fulbright and Mansfield. How long does it take to communicate an order through Westmoreland? If we tell them weʼre ready, how long before target selected and ready to go? McNamara: 24 hours, Iʼd say. It would be better if we gave them the kind of target. President: Are they doing us any damage now? McNamara: After Tet, I canʼt say. They have thrown mortars at us. President: What do you recommend, Dean? Rusk: Make firm decision to resume on Friday or Saturday. 3 Full report submitted to Security Council beginning with Laotian Conference in 1962. Wilsonʼs appointment to Moscow was announced before the pause, so he has no critical reason to hold us back. President: Bob, what do you recommend? McNamara: Iʼd go sooner. Political delay can be damaging. Start Wednesday. Donʼt feel strongly Wednesday or Thursday. 4 Taylor: The sooner the better. Wouldnʼt want longer than 48 hours. Rusk: Reaction to our Ambassadorsʼ cables is that most governments are expecting this. President: I think weʼll spend a good deal of political capital in resuming. I donʼt agree with Bob or General Taylor in that weʼll gain politically from this. I think we ought to—quietly—visit with Dirksen and see how he feels. Quietly talk to a couple of Republicans in the House. Then next morning, meet with leadership, when Iʼm ready to go—so they canʼt leak anything. Suggest we talk briefly now about type of target and weight. (McNamara?): (1) Small attack on infiltration point—advantage of directly relating to infiltration route. Disadvantage—it alerts the enemy—and ruins surprise. (2) Perishable targets. (3) POL. Advantage is surprise and antiaircraft will be less alert. Recommend against POL though, and recommend perishable targets. Recommend against targets north of Hanoi. President: Why donʼt we tell the leaders that if we continue to get pictures of supplies coming down, we must stop them. It will make it difficult for Fulbright to argue against this. I wonʼt say anything specific, but I will say I canʼt wait forever for these supplies to come down. Bundy: Iʼm having a sanitized document prepared to show communist activity. It is a persuasive document (Bundy showed President the document). 5 Only problem is the one which we havenʼt closed down. All else shows nothing. We are left with Vientiane. My brother went over it with the British and Australians. Both said, “Youʼll have to hold off until you hear more.” Rusk: If you are going to see Dirksen, I urge you to see Fulbright and Hickenlooper before you make a decision. Taylor: On the bombing program, I hope weʼll get back to hitting the key rail and bridges. POL will help stop the trucks, too. Rusk: Think we ought to knock out the power stations and POL south of the 24th parallel. McNamara: We have. President: Be prepared to meet tomorrow afternoon. Bring Wheeler. Rusk: Got to give thought to a statement with the communist world in mind. Bundy: How many friends ought to get a pilot message that we have just about made up our minds? Rusk: We probably already have done that with our previous cables. (Decided—with the lead of Bundy—that a White House statement be issued—and Rusk to hold a backgrounder citing chapter and verse.) President: When you go to Sharp, Bob , tell him we are thinking along these possibilities—and get their views. Rusk: Tragedy about situation is that Fulbright statement urging extending the pause and recognizing the Viet Cong. Times will pick it up and applaud it. Bundy: And denounce us for smothering debate. McNamara: Ask Sharp to reply by 5 p.m. our time tomorrow. They can be ready after … (Discussion on whether to send Vice President with Freeman to Saigon. Taylor, McNamara worried about security. Bundy and Rusk join in to advise against sending him.) About leadership: Instead of having all together, bring into Mansion the Senate group—and later in the day, bring in House group. Meeting ended at 7:30. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 Not found, but see Document 38 . 3 January 28 and 29. 4 January 26 and 27. 5 Entitled “Evidence of Continuing Vietnamese Communist War Preparations,” undated. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI) 41. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 41. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 25, 1966. SUBJECT The Resumption of Bombing Poses Grave Danger of Precipitating a War With China In my recent memorandum to you 2 I expressed the conviction that—if the war is to be won—it must be won in the South. In my view, the bombing of the North cannot win the war, only enlarge it. The most important item on the balance sheet against resumption of bombing is the danger of escalation. I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But before a final decision is made on this critical issue, I feel an obligation to amplify and document my strong conviction: that sustained bombing of North Viet-Nam will more than likely lead us into war with Red China—probably in six to nine months . And it may well involve at least a limited war with the Soviet Union. This is necessarily a view based on personal judgment. It cannot be proved as one proves a mathematical proposition. But I have not arrived at it lightly. It stems from a conviction that there are forces at work on both sides of the conflict that will operate in combination to bring about this result. I have tried in this memorandum to describe these forces as I see them. I. Why Our Bombing Will Escalate No matter how firmly we intend to limit our air offensive against North Viet-Nam, we will move inexorably toward the destruction of increasingly sensitive targets. This is not a question of bad faith on anybodyʼs part. It is part of a process demonstrated over time: that a sustained bombing program acquires a life and dynamism of its own . There are several reasons for this: A. Our philosophy of bombing requires gradual escalation. Admittedly, we have never had a generally agreed rationale for bombing North Viet-Nam. But the inarticulated major premise has always been that bombing will somehow, some day, and in some manner, create pressure on Hanoi to stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not only by the military who have planning and operational responsibilities but by most civilian advocates of bombing in the Administration. Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to have this desired political effect, we must gradually extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this way—it is contended—we will constantly threaten Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face mounting costs—with the destruction of its economic life at the end of the road. B. We have given effect to this philosophy in the pattern of bombing so far. In the eleven months that we have been bombing North Viet-Nam, we have gradually shifted from military targets located in the southern part of North Viet-Nam and directly associated with infiltration to targets in the Northeast Quadrant associated more with the economy of the country and its lifelines to China than with the movement of men and supplies to the South. This progression is graphically shown on the attached chart. 3 As the chart discloses, we have been bombing closer and closer to the Chinese border. At the same time we have been closing in on the Hanoi-Haiphong area, steadily constricting the geographical scope of immunity. C. Chinese-Soviet and DRV action will force escalation. The inevitable escalation of our bombing will result not only because of the dynamics of the process but because the enemy will not stand still. Our bombing of North Viet-Nam cannot be conducted in a vacuum any more than it has been in the past. We began bombing as an act of response to an incident of terror in the South. More of those incidents will occur—presumably at an increasing pace as our deployments grow larger. Chinese and Soviet aid will also tend to increase the pressures for bombing escalation. As more SAMs are installed, we will be compelled to take them out in order to safeguard our aircraft. This will mean killing more Russians or Chinese and putting greater pressure on those two nations for increased effort. Each extension of our bombing to more sensitive areas will increase the risk to our aircraft and compel a further extension of bombing to protect the expanded bombing activities we have staked out. D. The pressures to bomb sensitive targets will increase. Unless we achieve dramatic successes in the South—which no one expects—we will be led by frustration to hit increasingly more sensitive targets: 1. to mine Haiphong harbor; 2. to destroy POL supplies; 3. to destroy the system of power stations; and 4. to attack airfields. Each of these target objectives has already been recommended to you by one of your principal military or civilian advisers in Washington or Saigon; each has a special significance for the major Communist capitals. The mining of Haiphong harbor would impose a major decision on the Soviet Union. Could it again submit to a blockade, as at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and thus lose its only link with Hanoi that does not cross Chinese territory or air space? Or should it retaliate by sending increased aid or even volunteers to North Viet-Nam or by squeezing the United States at some other vital point, such as Berlin? Would North Viet-Nam accept the blockade of its harbor without launching some kind of attack against the crowded harbor of Saigon? Or would the Soviet Union feel compelled to provide surface-to-surface missiles with conventional warheads targeted on Saigon harbor or US fleet units? The bombing of POL would put great pressure on North Viet-Nam (with the possible assistance of China) to launch some kind of attack against the exposed POL in Saigon harbor. Any attack against Saigon harbor or our POL supplies would in turn put enormous pressure on the United States to retaliate with some further act of escalation. The bombing of the airfields would very likely lead the DRV to request the use of Chinese air bases north of the border for the basing of North Vietnamese planes, or even to request the intervention of Chinese air. This would pose the most agonizing dilemma for us. Consistent with our decision to bomb the North, we could hardly permit the creation of a sanctuary from which our own planes could be harassed. Yet there is general agreement that for us to bomb China would very likely lead to a direct war with Peiping and would—in principle at least—trigger the Sino-Soviet Defense Pact, which has been in force for fifteen years. To bomb the energy sources of North Viet-Nam would threaten the industrial life of the country. Yet, as noted by the Special Memorandum of January 19, 1966 4 approved by the Board of National Estimates, none of these attacks —on the harbor or POL or the power stations— “would, in itself, have a critical impact on the combat activity of the Communist forces in South Viet-Nam.” It would not, in other words, impair the fighting capabilities of the Viet Cong. But it would profoundly affect the pressures on the major Communist powers to engage themselves more deeply in the war. II. How the War Can Start We must judge the possibility of war with China not only in light of the forces that are at work to enlarge and intensify the bombing on our side, but the forces at work on the other, as well. Quite clearly there is a threshold which we cannot pass over without precipitating a major Chinese involvement. We do not know—even within wide margins of error—where that threshold is. Unhappily we will not find out until after the catastrophe. We did not measure the threshold adequately in Korea. We found out how low it was only after 300,000 Chinese descended on us. I think it quite clear that both China and the Soviet Union recognize a major distinction between the loss of a War of National Liberation and the capitulation of a sister Socialist state under direct air attack by an “imperialist” power. We can do almost anything we like in the South, with little if any danger of directly involving the big Communist powers. But there are several things that we cannot, in my judgment, do in North Viet-Nam without the practical certainty of involving at least Red China. a. I do not think that China can stand by and let us destroy the industrial life of North Viet-Nam without increasing its assistance to the point where, sooner or later, we will almost certainly collide with Chinese interests in such a way as to bring about a Chinese involvement. b. At some point our bombers are likely to be so harassed by MIGs that we will feel compelled—to save the lives of pilots—to take out the North Vietnamese airfields and the planes that are on them. Recently, we have received reports of MIG–21s in North Viet-Nam. I cannot believe that we can go on much longer bombing more and more sensitive targets without increasing MIG encounters. Yet when we do take out DRV air bases, we can reasonably expect Hanoi to ask assistance from the Chinese, either in the form of airfields in China or the actual use of Chinese planes and pilots. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize this possibility. They have already requested permission to engage in hot pursuit over Chinese Communist air space “in light of the increasing Chicom MIG threat ” and because of “ the likelihood that other hostile air forces will utilize Chicom bases as a sanctuary.” III. Both the Soviet Union and Red China are Increasing Their Commitments to North Viet-Nam and Red China Is Making Active War Preparations A. The Soviet Union Mr. Shelepinʼs visit to Hanoi resulted in promises of increased aid. The exact nature of the aid was not specified. Less than a month before, on December 22, the Soviet Union had promised increased economic aid. Almost certainly Shelepinʼs promise contained a substantial component of military assistance. Our intelligence indicates that large ships are already en route. B. Red China Our resumed bombing will almost certainly bring stepped-up Chinese aid to the DRV. The Board of National Estimates has recognized this. They state, in their memorandum of January 19 (page 9), that “It is likely that [the Chinese] 5 would respond to enlarged air attacks on the DRV with greatly increased logistic support, including large additional numbers of engineer and supply troops and, possibly, anti-aircraft units.” Peiping has steadily increased its covert cooperation. It has sent regular army engineer units into North Viet-Nam, is sending Chinese Communist fighters over North Viet-Nam, and is improving both sea and land communication routes to North Viet-Nam. War Preparations in China Even more significant than its stepped-up aid to Hanoi are the increased signs that China is making materiel as well as psychological preparations for war, particularly in the South and Southwest parts of the country. The Weekly Intelligence Digest (WID) 52–65 December 24, 1965, of the Pacific Command states (page 11): “Current activities include increased military use of the railroads with concurrent restrictions on civil use, stepped-up efforts to complete vitally needed rail links in Yunnan Province, recall of railroad personnel to duty, military build-up, intensified indoctrination of the population and evacuation of women and children from the cities. Curfews and travel restrictions are in effect. Efforts to speed the development of air warning and installations of air defense systems, including emplacement of anti-aircraft guns, have been indicated. Some key industries are reportedly being relocated and the government is said to be developing contingency plans for the emergency evacuation of its offices from the cities. New airfields are also being built.” Air Fields and Air Defense Communist Chinaʼs military preparations since the Gulf of Tonkin have focused upon the correction of its major weaknesses, notably air facilities and air defense in South China. The focal point of this effort has been an all-out drive to construct or radically improve half a dozen large airfields in South China. Some of these are clearly not positioned solely for the defense of China but appear related to the Vietnamese war. (See accompanying map.) 6 Simultaneously with this construction program, a high proportion of Peipingʼs advanced jet fighters has been deployed to South China. Eighteen months ago there were virtually no MIG–19s or 21s in this area. As of January 1966, more than one-half of Chinaʼs estimated 230 MIG–19s and one-third of its 35-odd MIG–21s were based in South and Southwest China. In all, some 350 jet fighters are based on Chinese Communist fields within two hundred miles or less from North Viet-Nam. Accompanying these twin developments has come evidence of growing coordination between the air defense systems of North Viet-Nam and South China as well as of more aggressive air patrolling by Chinese fighters, not only along their southern border, but over North Viet-Nam as well. Troop Deployments Chinese ground forces already in South China are not only adequate for local defense, but they exceed the number that can be readily transported over existing lines of communication into mainland Southeast Asia. An estimated 151,000 troops are in the Kunming Military Region (Yunnan and Kweichow Provinces) opposite Burma, Laos, and western North Viet-Nam. Another 317,000 are deployed in the adjacent Canton Military Region (Kwangtung, Hunan and Kwangsi Provinces) bordering North Viet-Nam. The Weekly Intelligence Digest of 24 December estimates that for a Chinese attack into Southeast Asia in conjunction with North Vietnamese forces, less than half of the nearly one-half million troops now located in the Canton and Kunming Military Regions would be required. Reinforcing divisions could be provided from elsewhere in China. Though there have been no indications of large-scale redeployments of Chinese forces toward Southeast Asian borders, this could be accomplished in a relatively short time with little strategic warning. The flow of military supplies to South and Southwest China is believed to have increased in recent months. Improvement of LOCs The same Weekly Intelligence Digest also points out (page 11) that it is the capacity of lines of communication for logistic support into Southeast Asia, not the size of forces available that control the magnitude of a Communist invasion. In Yunnan Province, the Chinese are improving logistic lines to provide better access to North Viet-Nam and to the China-Laos and China-Burma border areas. Similarly the rail construction program in Southwest China has been greatly intensified in the past year. A new line between Kueiyang (Kweichow Province) and Liuchou (Kwangsi Province) which connects with the main railroad between the DRV and Central China became operational in late 1965. While ninety percent of Chinaʼs bulk storage of POL is in the eastern and coastal provinces, a separate military reserve storage program was recently identified of which a large proportion is in South China. Construction was begun on these facilities several years ago, but it was considerably increased in tempo during the past year. Political Preparations In contrast to military and civil defense contingency preparations which have been undertaken behind a curtain of secrecy, the psychological preparation of the population has been, in large part, out in the open. “War preparation” conferences and neighborhood briefings have been held in secret; apparently, however, they tend to take their cue from public pronouncements. Since Spring 1965, there has been a barrage of propaganda on the “peopleʼs war”. These preparations and the level of warning have tended to increase in recent months. Since year-end, there are indications that Peiping considers the prospects of war with the United States have increased. Chen Yi acknowledged that the Third Five-Year Plan to begin in 1966 would have to take into account both the war in Viet-Nam and its implications for China. Another regime spokesman, Liao Cheng-chih, in a January 20 message to overseas Chinese, stated: “We are planning all our tasks on the basis of the assumption that US imperialism will forcibly impose a war upon us.” And a Peiping radio domestic broadcast on January 18, describing a recent military political work conference, stated in regard to the US imperialist threat: “A test of strength with us is inevitable and this will come only in a matter of time.” IV. We Cannot Count on the Chinese Thinking as We Do We face the real and present danger that we may miscalculate the threshold of Chinese intervention as we did in Korea by assuming that the Chinese think as we do. In dealing with a people as complicated and remote as the Chinese, logic is not enough, since it may rest on quite mistaken premises. We must look at the evidence as well. This becomes sharply clear when we consider the usual arguments against the possibility of Chinese intervention. 7 A. “If Peiping were intending to intervene it would have done so by now.” It is constantly argued that since—by escalating slowly—we have got away with our bombing attacks so far, we can continue to escalate with relative impunity. The argument runs, in a more sophisticated form, that if Peiping were prepared to intervene it would have done so long since. By standing down it has suffered loss of prestige—particularly in the face of increasing Soviet help—and has permitted North Viet-Nam to suffer severe damage. The answer to this is that until recently—after the arrival of our massive deployments—we were taking a licking in South Viet-Nam. Now the situation has changed and the need for Chinese intervention has greatly increased. Moreover, one should never forget the behavior of the Chinese during the first five months of the Korean War. No Chinese troops came to give North Korea the punch necessary to push UN forces from their toe hold at Pusan. The Chinese erected no defenses along the 38th parallel to stop a UN invasion when the Inchon landing turned the tide. Even Pyongyang was sacrificed, as was virtually all of the industrial and agricultural area of North Korea. The general estimate in Washington by October 1950 was quite logical: if Peiping had intended intervention it would have done so by then. Yet Chinese Communist troops crossed the Yalu October 14, engaged UN forces October 26, and massively counterattacked General MacArthurʼs armies November 26. Today only the most reckless will assure you that we know when Peiping will feel it necessary to intervene to safeguard its own military and political interests. B. “Peiping fears war with the United States and seeks to avoid it.” Another popular contention is that the Chinese are unwilling to expose their hard-won industry and nuclear capability to US air attack. They, therefore, will avoid any measures that might lead to such retaliation. The Chinese have, however, watched the slow escalation of our bombing for eleven months and they must assume that if bombing is resumed it will be at an increasingly higher level of intensity. If they were fearful of being put in a position where they might be compelled to intervene, one would expect them to encourage measures (a) to bring about a prolongation of our pause, and (b) to facilitate negotiations. Instead, Peiping has done everything possible to prevent such measures being taken. It has denounced the pause as a “peace swindle”. It has vehemently and incessantly attacked each of our Fourteen Points. It has gone much farther in vilifying United States actions and intentions than has Hanoi. C. It would make no sense for Communist China to intervene with air support.” Another popular argument is that if China intervened it would use its massive ground forces and would not risk its relatively small obsolete air force against United States air power. Thus, it is contended, there is little chance that Peiping would either use its air to attack US aircraft over Viet-Nam or would provide safe haven for DRV fighters. The logic of this analysis was shared by almost the entire Washington intelligence community until recently. Now, however, the increasing evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are preparing to cooperate in defending North Viet-Nam against air attack has led the representatives of NSA, INR and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, to conclude: “That the chances are about even that the Chinese, if requested by the DRV, would permit DRV aircraft to intervene from Chinese bases, or would even do so with their own aircraft in the event of continued US air attacks near the Chinese border. They would not expect any of these measures, of themselves, to repel the US attacks militarily, but would hope to make our operations increasingly costly and possibly deter further US escalation while running high but acceptable risks of being bombed themselves.” (SNIE 10–12–65, Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action, 10 December 1965, p. 6) 8 D. “Even if the Chinese did intervene with air support we could take out the bases in South China with little trouble.” The consequences of our attacking Chinese bases would be far-reaching. In calculating Communist responses to such attacks, the United States Intelligence Board has stated: “There is an almost even chance that the Chinese choice would be to break off the air battle and make political moves designed to dissuade the US from continuing its bombings of the DRV. On balance, however, we think it somewhat more likely that they would make a major military response to the continuation or expansion of US strikes against China.The exact combination and timing of military moves would vary greatly. If they had not already done so, Chinese Communist forces would probably move into North Viet-Nam. Chinese or additional DRV forces would probably move into Northern Laos. The DRV armed forces, with Chinese support, would probably open an offensive against South Viet-Nam. Thailand would be threatened, especially if its bases were used in air attacks against China.” (SNIE 10–5–65, Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 28 April 1965, pp. 8–9) 9 V. Have Been Burned Once Before In October, 1950, in Korea, we faced a similar question as to Chinese intentions. The intelligence community at that time was confident that the Chinese would not intervene. We should never forget the implications of the following colloquy between President Truman and General MacArthur: “‘In your opinion,ʼ President Truman asked General MacArthur, ‘is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?’ “MacArthur shook his head. ‘Iʼd say thereʼs very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they havenʼt any air force. If they tried to cross the river our air force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas.’ “At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking, there were already more than 100,000 Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike—and the ROK, American and other UN forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over, the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men.” (Lawsonʼs “The United States in the Korean War,” pg. 79). George W. Ball 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Secret; Nodis. During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on January 26, President Johnson discussed this memorandum briefly with Ball and Rusk and indicated that he had read it. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 2 See footnote 4, Document 32 . 3 Attached but not printed. 4 See footnote 4, Document 32 . 5 Brackets in the source text. 6 Attached but not printed. 7 In analyzing the “usual arguments,” Ball drew heavily on a January 24 memorandum from Allen Whiting of INR. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam) 8 Not printed. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 9 Not printed. (Ibid., INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10–5–65) 42. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 42. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 25, 1966, 1:15 p.m. Let me capsule some thoughts on the problem confronting you. Recommendation: That the bombing resume—on a surgical basis—picking out strictly military targets, and avoid, if we can, any target that summons up a direct response from the Chicoms or NVN Air Force. Why Resume? — We lose an option , a bargaining point, when we stop the bombing without any equal concession on the part of the VC. Now, with resumption, we are back at the playing table, with chips to use if it looks like a conference table can be had. —If casualties mount or continue, we are hard put to explain our softening attitude, politically to our own people, when the VC still kicks us, refuses to talk with us. —Itʼs common sense, confirmed a thousand times in the history, that we never win at the conference table what we have lost on the battlefield . It is not now in the best interests of the VC or Hanoi to talk to us. The ChiComs want us to bleed—the VC believe we will tire and grow weary—and Hanoi remembers the story of the French. Unless we hurt them, why should they talk? Dangers to the resumption: The minute we resume, there will be two vital points we must nail down, else the doves, the Lynd-liners and the Times will shriek: 1. Did we have a response? The Secretary is on record as saying no “serious response.” What is serious? Does it mean we rejected something? Thus, it is absolutely imperative that we close every circuit, and close it tight so our record is visibly clean. 2. Did we have to start bombing again? We need evidence—hard, photographic, verifiable evidence that the infiltration, the reconstruction, the unimpeded training of troops really hurts us—and puts our own troops in jeopardy. This must be clear so that anyone who denounces the resumption is saying in effect, “I donʼt care what happens to American troops, I just donʼt want to bomb again.” Whatʼs Ahead: The Lynd-line—on page A7 of Tuesday Post 2 is going to be the new line, i.e. Stop the bombing forever—recognize the Viet Cong —(and soon, it will be: organize a Popular Front or coalition government, then get out troops out and let the Vietnamese decide their own fate. This surely will come next as the line). After this will come cries of anguish over our place losses, and ground casualties. I suspect we will hear a number of those who want the pause to continue, cite the horrible cost of resumption. Then you will hear “why not accept the four VC points” because “they donʼt really mean what they say.” I have a hunch this will be the next real thrust on our position. Pell, Fulbright, McGovern and Lippmann are advocating the Gavin “retire to the enclaves” thesis as well as the Lynd-line … more will take up this line because it looks like an easy way out. So it is all of a piece. Slowly, but like lava pouring over a volcano, the flow is resistless—first, one concession, then another, and then another, and as we adjust to each new position, the Lynd-liners go onto the next retreat point. Perhaps we must harden ourselves to the realism of the problem: There is no easy way out. We can never achieve a settlement that is honorable until we have demonstrated to the VC and Hanoi they canʼt win—and we are hurting them. If we resume, consider this as a scenario: 1. A re-statement of the long list of peace moves we have made. 2. A re-statement of our objectives: why are we there—what do we want to happen before we get out. 3. A clear declaration of what happens if we allow the Hanoi “Liberation Front” to win in Vietnam. As Mr. Durant said, the loss of S. Vietnam will lead to the loss of Malaysia and Singapore, restore the subserviency of Indonesia to China, weaken our positions in Formosa, Philippines and Japan, cause the Australians to live precariously, allow the funds of a strengthened Communist bloc to pour into South America, and for a long time force us to live with hostile governments. 4. The President, within a week (or earlier) after resumption, go before a TV press conference—and state our case to the nation. Only the President can really nail our case to the sticking point … and expose the phony arguments of the Lynd-liners. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Top Secret. 2 “Lynd Urges Talks With Viet ‘Front,’” Washington Post , January 25, 1966. 43. Notes of Meeting 43. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 25, 1966, 5:30–7:40 p.m. PRESENT Bipartisan Congressional Meeting from Republican-Democratic Leadership. Chairman and ranking members of Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs. Senate and House. President, Rusk, McNamara and Valenti 2 SUBJECT Resumption of Bombing Rusk recounted peace efforts—and their fruitlessness. McCormack: Must protect our soldiers. Use means available to do it. Time has arrived—unless other side does something. Ford: What are the alternatives you face right now? President: Could pull out. Bomb on heavier scale. Sit and do nothing. Decision: When to resume bombing. Ford: What do your advisers suggest? President: State, Defense, Joint Chiefs all agree to resume in near future. Ford: What kind of bombing do they recommend? President: Security problem. Donʼt want to telegraph our shots. Ford: If your advisers say bombing is necessary—Iʼm for it. Mansfield: Does McNamara say that infiltration reached 4500 a month? McNamara: This is dry season. Usually associated with larger infiltration. Indications of larger infiltration. Mansfield: Instead of 22 per cent under control, only 18 per cent is under control of VC. Bombing lull should be continued. We have little to lose by lull. Time is on the side of the enemy. Best chance of getting to peace table is to minimize our military action. President ought to issue statement: “Favor cease-fire now. Call for meeting of all interested parties. Call for elections within three to six months. Contemplate withdrawal of our forces after secure amnesty. Favor resumption in conjunction with Geneva Accords.” Lull is to be preferred: 1. Our casualties go up with escalation. 2. Bombs mean civilian deaths—possibly gas or atom bombs. 3. Increase isolation of U.S. 4. More we destroy North Vietnam, the more we treat with China instead of North Vietnam. Dirksen: (Recounted Wilsonʼs declaration of war, and how people applauded his declaration of death.) I am sensitive to young blood as any man. You can withdraw. This would be a disaster. You could let this be a war of attrition. Keep what we have. Be patient. But this is expensive and wearing. It doesnʼt reduce casualties. Country wouldnʼt support you. Patience is like a holiday in war. Or you can fight. You go in to win. If we are not winning now, letʼs do what is necessary to win. I donʼt believe you have any other choice. I believe the country will support you. The enemy would be foolish not to use every pause to build up his forces. Russell: This is the most frustrating experience of my life. I didnʼt want to get in there, but we are there. I donʼt think the American people take this war seriously. I donʼt credit the polls on Vietnam. Those people have been ground under so long, all they want is peace. I donʼt know if our Defense Department is adequate enough to meet all our obligations around the world. We are prepared to fight a war we are not fighting. I think we have gone too far in this lull—although I recognize the reason. This pause has cost you militarily. We are going to lose a lot of boys as a result—casualties of our care for peace. For God sakes, donʼt start the bombing half way. Let them know they are in a war. We killed civilians in World War II and nobody opposed. Iʼd rather kill them than have American boys die. Please, Mr. President, donʼt get one foot back in it. Go all the way. Saltonstall: Itʼs clear to me if we have our boys there, we have to go forward with bombing. Donʼt want to broaden the targets so much as to include civilians, but there are enough targets there. I believe we must take risks—but we must take them. All four Chiefs believe the Chinese will not come in. Thatʼs a risk that must be taken. You must give our boys full support. I will support you in any decision you take. Albert: You and your advisers have my trust. Arends: You have proven to the world you want peace. Should resume in future, near future. Fulbright: One comment about Russell that the lull cost us. It helped us, too, in matter of supply. (McNamara said this didnʼt matter at all for us.) Fulbright continued: Concur in Mansfield statement. This is not similar to World Wars I and II. We have never tried to reimpose colonial power on anyone before. We undertook to help France with her colonies. Precedents donʼt appeal to me. We are in a false position now. We are properly accused of taking the place of the French. We ought (to find?) a way to negotiate a way out. No possibility of negotiation except with the help of the Russians. Need their help. They could reconvene the Geneva Conference. Maybe our dialogue with the Russians has been exhausted. If we win, what do we do? Do we stay there forever? There has never been a war where there has been American discontent like this. Therefore, I think we should play for time. Nobody believed the Chinese would come in in Korea—but they did. Hope we would not resume the bombing—and try to find a way out. After large casualties, we will come to a negotiation. President: Perhaps if we took the Majority Leaderʼs paper 3 point by point—and see what it says. McNamara: 1. Bombing lull should be continued—minimize military activity. At what level should military action be continued to bring peace? At present the lever to negotiations is continued military action. If we adopt the Gavin line, 4 the initiative would pass to the VC. The balance of opinion is that minimal military action would be costly—and not lead to peace. Rusk: Under guerrilla action, it is difficult to get a frozen cease-fire. We have said to the other side that we will try for a cease-fire. President: We canʼt get anyone to the table. If you produce them, weʼll meet them. Fulbright: What have the Russians been told? (President:) They canʼt deliver the Hanoi (people?). (President read letter from Shastri.) 5 Rusk: At New Delhi the Vice President asked the Russians what they could do. They had nothing to offer. Russell: Of course, the Russians cannot do anything. They are vying with the Chinese and canʼt bring any pressure. But the problem is, not to fight this war with one hand behind us. The American people wonʼt stand for it. This is an unpopular war but the people want us to win. Rusk: We are prepared to rely on the Vietnamese people in free elections. Perhaps the cease-fire would cause a little procedural difficulty. President: We have said we would talk about their four points, but we wonʼt agree to preconditions. (Fulbright and President had a little exchange about the four points and the Russians. What did we say and vice versa?) Boggs: North Vietnam knows they canʼt run us off. If it were just a localized war, we wouldnʼt be there. The colonial argument is fallacious. They have tried the same thing in Thailand and there is no colonial history in Thailand. If ever been a demonstration of dedication to law and rule of law, it is what we have been doing. Decision: a military one. We are going to stay there, and Iʼm for whatever is necessary to bring an honorable peace. We have made progress in the last six months. And we will defeat them. Bill Bates: From military standpoint—support our troops. Bow: I agree. Morgan: Iʼm for resumption of bombing. Rivers: Senator Russell has stated my position. The American people are afraid of land war in Asia. We need air protection. We need to stay there. It would be disastrous to leave. The American people will not follow indecision. Win or get out. Let the military select the targets. My Committee will follow you. Be decisive. President: Always seek counsel of military. Hickenlooper: If only Vietnam were concerned, Iʼd get out. But we are confronting the Communist world. Either get out or lick them. Iʼve been restless with our light bombing. If we win, we must take out their ability to make war. Donʼt go for this enclave philosophy. It doesnʼt make sense. Get out and get ready to fight somewhere else. Or go lick them. It involves risk but all war requires risk. If we are in it to win, resume bombing and win. Fulbright: If we follow Hickenlooperʼs advice, it will get us into World War III. Mahon: In Congress, we have been oversimplifying. We are there for a long time. No easy answer. I think we ought to resume bombing, but we are oversimplifying. I will follow your leadership. Hayden: Proceed promptly to bomb all areas in North Vietnam that contribute to carrying on the war—and do it quickly. Long: We get into some trouble by letting the communists believe we are weak. Only way China will keep out is that weʼll lick her, too. Unless we let them know we aim to be strong, and to win, we are in for trouble. When the communists take one country, theyʼll take them all over. Every democratic leader will know he is doomed. All Southeast Asia will fall. President: Thank all of you. Senator sent me Never Call Retreat. Read passage from one page. Disturbed not by differences but by the interpretations placed on these differences by the enemy. (Picked up an intercept—read it to the assembly of those present.) Ready to talk to anyone, at any time. Goldberg has urged U Thant to take any initiative. We have tried to take it to the Security Council. Appreciate your advice and views. Will take whatever action is necesary. I always keep your resolution in mind. I know you can take it away from me anytime you want, and I canʼt veto. Mrs. Bolton: My people feel as I do. We have let our enemies think we wouldnʼt fight, as we have so many times. We must bear in mind we build an image of cowardice. Canʼt we fight? Donʼt let them think we wonʼt fight. Saltonstall: Keep that resolution in your pocket. We wonʼt take it away from you. President: I urge you to let me [not] jeopardize our options by discussing this in the newspapers. Too many lives depend on our security. I want to discuss with you further my problems. I hope you will not discuss this. At appropriate times, decisions will be made. I want to feel that I can talk Top Secret matters without (their) being divulged. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that Ball, Harriman, McGeorge Bundy, Raborn, Wheeler, and Taylor were also present. (Ibid.) 3 Not further identified. 4 For an analysis of Gavinʼs enclave strategy by the JCS, see Document 61 . 5 Transmitted in telegram 1218 to New Delhi, January 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 44. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk 44. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, January 26, 1966. RFE–3 SUBJECT Why Is Hanoi Reluctant to Negotiate? It is a commonplace observation that Hanoi has responded inadequately to our peace offensive and pause because of its confidence that time is on its side and that victory is ultimately attainable through persevering on the path of aggression. Less discussed, however, are inhibiting factors which may delay Hanoiʼs hand should it be tempted to seek through a mixed political-military strategy that which it no longer sees as attainable through military efforts alone. Because the men in Hanoi are professional military planners whose lives have been almost wholly devoted to the battlefield, we believe they must, by now, have a fair appreciation of what faces the Viet Cong even should US force levels remain at 200,000 in South Vietnam—to say nothing of what is foreshadowed by authoritative reports of planned increases to 400,000. Therefore we have turned our attention to the possible factors which inhibit Hanoiʼs willingness to embark on systematic discussions with the US or intermediaries. This query assumes, of course, that at least some weighing of this alternative has occurred in Hanoi, however limited and recent such deliberations may have been. Negotiations: More Risk Than Gain The advantages of making some concession to US demands, of entering into some sort of discussions, however informal, are so obvious that Hanoiʼs reluctance is puzzling. Even the most indirect and insubstantial dialogue, once begun, would raise serious obstacles to a resumption of US bombings and would have disquieting repercussions in Saigon. The North Vietnamese are not stupid; they see the possibility of these tactical gains even if they have no intention of themselves sincerely working for a negotiated settlement or do not in the least credit us with such a sincere intention. Why then do they not seize the opportunity to advance their cause? Clearly they perceive grave dangers when they analyse the negotiatory track. The most fundamental obstacle probably lies in their understanding of the nature of “negotiations.” They look on diplomatic deals as dishonorable haggling or what is now called a zero-sum game: anything that A gains must be exactly what B loses. Moreover, as Marxists they are idealists (though they can be very pragmatic) and they look on every concession made to the imperialists as a derogation from the ideal course of history, a detour on the road to the perfect society. It is their duty to reject all detours unless absolutely unavoidable. Thus they are deadly serious when they say that matters of principle are not subject to bargaining; only the “details” can properly be compromised. These philosophical positions combined with the profoundly suspicious character and instrumental attitude toward “truth” which foreign observers of the Vietnamese have long remarked (most recently Professor Kissinger), make the very word “negotiations” an extremely negative one for the leaders in Hanoi as well as those in Saigon. Past Experience: Negotiations Never Work Out On top of this underlying distrust of diplomacy has been superposed a series of bitter experiences with negotiations. From 1945 to 1947 the Viet Minh reached a series of agreements with the French, all of which certainly worked out badly for the Viet Minh, whether or not one agrees that the French simply violated them. The subsequent military successes against the French led to Geneva where the Viet Minh were pressured by the Soviets into accepting much less than they thought they had won. And even the terms of Geneva were, they feel, openly violated in 1956 by their adversaries, notably the Americans who by then were Diemʼs principal support. These general arguments against any negotiations are reinforced in present circumstances by a number of specific considerations. For one thing, it is at least as difficult for Hanoi to conceive of a middle course (neither victory nor defeat) as it is for the US/GVN side. Their objective has always been victory—not some modest reform of the Saigon government but its outright replacement by a regime in fundamental rapport with Hanoi. Reunification under Hanoi might not come immediately, a Front government might maneuver slowly and carefully in that direction, but the direction would not be in any doubt. With an objective framed in such terms, anything less is defeat and to accept anything less is capitulation. What then is there to negotiate? The Hawks in Hanoi are saying to the putative Doves: “If we are beaten, we simply withdraw. At least that way we do not publicly acknowledge our defeat and we have a better posture for another try later.” We may presume, however, that not all the policymakers in Hanoi categorically rule out an “indirect” or “political” approach to their objective in the South. Some of them must be entertaining the idea that the US can be enticed or duped into withdrawing and leaving Saigon open to another, perhaps more subtle subversion effort. But even these more flexible minds show real concern over the problem of a US withdrawal. Can the US possibly be trusted to keep any promise to withdraw? Will not its desire for bases, its neo-colonialist impulses, make it as treacherous as the French? Hostages Against Negotiations: The NFL/VC Still another very practical concern in the minds of the Vietnamese communist leaders is the hostility toward negotiations among those most directly involved in the insurgency in the South: the military and political cadres who have been the backbone of the effort. These are the officials whose policies would be most sharply repudiated if Hanoi shifts to negotiations. It is they who miscalculated in 1964 that the Saigon government was in its death throes, who urged the introduction of PAVN forces to give the VC more punch, who then advocated a PAVN escalation to meet the increased American presence, and who have insisted that the Ia Drang Valley battles were a communist victory. An eloquent statement of their position by General Nguyen Chi Thanh was made public just before Christmas. (Thanh is reputed to be Hanoiʼs commander in the South.) To what extent the policymakers in Hanoi have their freedom of action constrained by these Hawks is not clear—there is no evidence at all on which to identify the leaders of this group or to gauge their strength—but at least the Politburo must move circumspectly and avoid impairing its authority and control. Military morale and the esprit of all elements of the Viet Cong operation are still another factor to be carefully weighed by Hanoi. Forward momentum and the conviction that victory will come—and will come within a year or two—are important, probably vital elements in such a movement. Already there are intelligence reports that the expressed determination to “fight 10 or 20 years” has impaired VC morale. A switch to a radically different, possibly very extended political effort could not fail to have grave repercussions among the VC. Yet even after entering on a political track, Hanoi would want to retain as long as possible its option of reviving the insurgency—certainly until a considerable measure of American compliance with the terms of any accord had been registered. A very careful preparation of its cadres for any such shift in strategy is thus of primary importance for Hanoi. Hanoi must be able to present whatever it agrees to as a “victory” when it explains its shift to its supporters. This concern for VC morale is at least part of the explanation for the extremely rapid and vigorous denials which all DRV and Front representatives automatically issue whenever the press attributes some softening to one of them. China: Anchor to Windward Finally there is China. The DRV is no doubt capable of deciding unilaterally whether or not it wants to begin negotiations; but does it want to assert its independence so bluntly? Peking is Hanoiʼs nearest neighbor, a gigantic power which has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to dominate the Red River valley. It is thus something to be feared. But it is also something to be loved: the Vietnamese communists have clearly shown that ideologically (one could almost say spiritually) they are closest to the Chinese. Many of them spent years in China, generally in the heroic Yenan period. The essential aid that defeated the French came from China. And it is Peking with its massive armies which, far more than it threatens, ultimately guarantees the survival of the North Vietnamese regime against even the most total US ground invasion. Compared to China the USSR is very remote indeed. It is therefore only common sense for Hanoi to make every effort to keep its position in line with that of Peking. There is no doubt, of course, where Peking stands on negotiations, and we should perhaps be surprised at the gap that has developed between the positions of Hanoi and Peking, rather than disappointed that there has not been an outright break. As the US knows very well, junior partners also have their leverage against their more powerful allies and in the end Peking must accommodate to Hanoiʼs decisions on matters which directly involve Hanoi; there remains a question of how Peking is to accommodate and when. Moreover, the discrepancy between Hanoi and Peking has even a certain tactical utility to the former. Having decided (if it does) to negotiate, Hanoi might want Peking to drag its heels, to play the reluctant dragon, to extract whatever additional concessions the US might have held back from Hanoi. Then with the bird in its hand, Hanoi would signal to Peking that the moment had come to change to a new strategy. This complex of problems—their conditioned reflex against “negotiations,” their inability to envisage any acceptable compromise, their problems with their hard-liners and with VC morale, and the question of the Chinese—is complex indeed, so tangled that a decision to negotiate may be impossible for Hanoi. Yet such a decision is clearly under consideration: there has been no acceptance of our invitation to negotiate, no unambiguous signal has come through any of the many channels available, and at the same time there has been no rejection of our invitation, either. It would have been very easy for Hanoi in the early stages of the pause or at any time since to slam the door even more resoundingly than last May. And if a negative diplomatic response proved inconvenient, there have been other channels available: a vigorous offensive in South Vietnam by PAVN forces, for example. (We do not look on the inaction of the PAVN as a positive “signal” that negotiations and de-escalation have been chosen, but rather consider the inaction as a negative indication, a sign that Hanoi does not yet want to close the door to negotiation.) While Hanoi wrestles with these problems, we can expect a certain amount of confusion, inconclusive, even contradictory evidence as to what course they are selecting. In fact, they may try to have their cake and eat it—for example, to engage us in negotiations while they go on the offensive in the South. Until a clear decision is made—if indeed one ever is—we can only be sure that their irresolution is producing strains in Hanoi, and particularly acute problems with the VC and Peking. 1 Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 45. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 45. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 26, 1966, 10:40 a.m. I think you will want to read this important cable from Bangkok before our luncheon meeting 2 —it represents the summary of the view of Lodge and Westmoreland, Sharp and Bill Sullivan, General Stilwell and Ambassador Graham Martin, as they survey the prospects for 1966. Bob McNamara is very annoyed by the reference to the shortage of iron bombs. 3 He says there is no shortage except in the context of a perfectly fantastic rate of B–52 drops. But this is not the main point. The point is rather that this cable gives the best summary we have had from the field of the plans for the next year as the men in the field see it. Paragraphs 6 and 7 are of particular interest in the context of the decisions immediately ahead, but the whole telegram is worth reading. McG. B. Attachment 4 (Text of cable from Embassy Bangkok 1470) 1. During the course of a restricted session of the Southeast Asia Coordination Meeting we examined the limitations facing both the U.S. and North Vietnam in prosecuting the Vietnam war. As far as the U.S. is concerned, we defined our limitations as those imposed by: A. The current mobilization base; B. Current and foreseeable weapons shortage (e.g., iron bombs); C. The marginal capacity for logistical and air bases in Southeast Asia; D. U.S. public opinion; E. Free world attitude; F. Political and military considerations affecting Vietnamʼs neighbor countries, and G. The fact that, although improving, the Government of Vietnam is still ineffective by western standards. As far as North Vietnam is concerned, we defined the limitations as: A. Logistical; B. The requirement for clandestinity; C. Consideration of Sino-Soviet differences; and D. Morale. 2. In light of these evaluations, we attempted to project our view of the manner in which we expect the war to develop over the next year. As far as enemy action is concerned, we expect we may see a shift in his strategy. Rather than attempting to pursue his earlier campaign to seize control of the highlands from Pleiku to Qui Nhon, we may find him instead concentrating on Quang Tri and Thua Thien in the First Corps Zone, attempting to bite off the consolidated piece of territory immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone. 3. We feel that the enemy may have been impelled to move to this strategy as a result of several factors: A. Difficulty of maintaining forces in the Kontum-Pleiku complex against increasing concentrations of U.S. forces; B. Difficulties encountered in operating a long Line of Communication through Southeast Laos in the face of increasing air attack; C. Relative sparsity of U.S. and South Vietnam units in the northernmost regions of South Vietnam; D. Relatively simple logistic lines across western regions of the Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent territory of Eastern Laos; E. The need for some demonstrable military success to give a political stimulus both to Hanoi and to Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam. 4. Consequently we would expect to see the enemy concentrating infiltration effort on a rather limited area of terrain, partly within the Demilitarized Zone and partly in a shallow sector of Eastern Laos. While other more traditional elements of the Ho Chi Minh trail will continue to be used, we have evidence which suggests that an immediate concentration of effort will be in this strip of territory contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone. The enemyʼs motivation in this concentration is largely political, in his hope to precipitate an equivalent of Dien Bien Phu by taking significant territory, which we would have great difficulty in wresting back. The enemy would hope that this development would deliver such a blow to our public opinion and to our will to continue that we would be prepared to accept North Vietnam peace terms. 5. As for ourselves, we believe that the limitations imposed on us do not permit many imaginative options beyond those which already govern our current operations. With troops on hand or deployable, we cannot contemplate large scale ground operations outside South Vietnam territory, even if political considerations should permit. In any event we do not foresee any changes in those political considerations. 6. As far as air actions are concerned, we recognize that the sortie rate may have to be curtailed because of existing and foreseeable shortages in the supply of iron bombs. Although these sorties are not concentrated within South Vietnam and Laos, we assume their pattern will have to be realigned again when and as Rolling Thunder operations are resumed. In the resumption of Rolling Thunder, we expect that there will be a removal of previous restrictions and an expansion of allowable targets to include a number of North Vietnam installations directly affecting the enemyʼs ability to sustain the infiltration effort. Among these are the Port of Haiphong, petroleum facilities, power plants, etc. While we do not believe that hitting these targets will have an immediate dramatic effect upon that enemyʼs ability to continue the war in the South, we nevertheless feel that the cumulative effect will be significant. Therefore, in moving to these new targets we should avoid giving the public impression that this is a panacea, but merely indicate that it is part of the bombing pattern required to reduce infiltration effectively. 7. Given these assumptions, we foresee the war in 1966 as a mutual effort to make the most of the resources at hand within the known limitations of both sides. For the U.S. this means three general features: A. A more effective bombing campaign in North Vietnam and in Laos. Less resort to random sorties, especially in Laos. We must make the maximum use of intelligence assets in target acquisition and selectively control air strikes through the greater use of forward air controllers. B. We must continue to destroy enemy forces wherever they can be found, attempting to make his casualty rate greater than his ability to replace casualties by infiltration and recruitment. C. We must press forward actively with pacification and rural reconstruction efforts in expanding areas of South Vietnam. 8. We believe that if we can demonstrably increase enemy casualties well over and above his abilities to replace them, if we can significantly hamper his logistics system, and if we can prevent his seizure of any major new territorial gains, then we may effectively break his will to continue. If such a development could be combined with genuine pacification progress we might expect a rather rapid disintegration of the enemyʼs campaign in 1967. 9. At the same time we must expect, if and when the North Vietnam campaign begins to falter, that the ChiComs will turn to other fronts in order to occupy our attention and dissipate our strength. Their ability to stir up trouble in Thailand is not yet fully exploited and they can seriously harass Laos through direct support to Pathet Lao elements there. These areas therefore will require constant attention as we move through 1966. 10. The eventual cessation of hostilities in South Vietnam is unlikely to diminish the need for a U.S. presence in Thailand. On the contrary, for an indeterminate period there may be a reaction from Thailand that diminution would be evidence of U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, which would in turn permit renewal of Chinese Communist pressures. U.S. planning should, therefore, assure the need for a continuing military investment in Thailand, as a premium for maintaining the U.S./Free World position in Southeast Asia. In this connection it was emphasized that whatever future arrangements or official statements may be made by the U.S. regarding its willingness to withdraw from military bases, should be strictly limited to those in South Vietnam and the formulation “Southeast Asia” should be avoided. Care should be taken to avoid the implication that we would not continue to fulfill our SEATO commitment to Thailand. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Following a meeting in the Cabinet Room (see Document 46 ), the President met for lunch at 2:01 p.m. in the family dining room with Rusk, Ball, Raborn, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers. No record of the discussion has been found. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 3 Iron bombs are unguided high explosive bombs. 4 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, vol. IV. Top Secret. The telegram was transmitted from Bangkok at 5:36 a.m. on January 25 and retyped in the White House on January 26 especially for the President. The Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 46. Notes of Meeting 46. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 26, 1966, 1:25–1:50 p.m. SUBJECT Resumption of Bombing PRESENT The President, Rusk, McNamara, Mac Bundy, Raborn, Ball, Valenti 2 Rusk: Souvanna has problem—possibility of NVN coming back this weekend. Considerable strength if you resume the bombing as much in sorrow as in anger. Youʼve thought very hard about everything they said. And beneficial to let Michael Stewart get out of town before bombing. We are a little thin about VC activity on the ground. This may cause some trouble when we start. If you think you can stand the pressure—recommend you wait until Sat. 3 President: Worried not about pressure—am worried about another Souvanna item. Each time they will bring up something to delay us. J.S. Cooper (Senator from Kentucky) wants to wait. I asked him if he could deliver VC if I gave him more time. He couldnʼt answer. Rusk: But the central policy issue is embarrassment over some thin issue— McNamara: We canʼt start before Friday their time—and according to Dean he wants Saturday their time. Only a matter of 24 hours. President: Must emphasize how sorrowful we are—we must let this be known. If you understand Fulbright he wants us to get out. Mansfield wants us to hunker up. Rusk: Am disturbed as much by other statements as much as M. and F. President: I agree. Rusk: No one can look you in the eye and tell you where we are going if we donʼt get peace. President: Do you really belive Souvanna will pull something off? Bundy: No. Odds are nine to one nothing will happen. We ought to lean on Souvanna hard and tell him weʼre his friends and weʼll wait til Saturday. President: Iʼm afraid theyʼll give us some peace treatment that will be phony—and put us in a box. McNamara: It is only 24 hours—and we ought to wait. We need that 24 hours. President: Could you go tomorrow if we had to? McNamara: Yes, we can—12 hours from now, but it may be a little ragged. Better on 24 hour lead. President: Whatʼs your answer to PM Wilson telegram 4 (Prime Minister Wilson)? McNamara: He accepted our view, it seems to me, putting it on a military basis. (Bundy read Wilson telegram.) McNamara: What disturbs me is feeling the fire of the heavier bombing boys. Iʼm not sure we can shut off supplies with bombing. President: Bring me all you have of military evidence during the pause. Ball: Let the Ambassadors show it to governments and not put it out to the American press. President: Thatʼs good. Letʼs do it that way. McNamara: When should we have this evidence (compiled by CIA)? Bundy: In 24 hours. President: When will we hear from Souvanna? Rusk: Friday night our time. Bundy: Heʼs supposed to go Thursday and come back Friday. (Discussion about Fulbright and his position.) President: I donʼt want to be in Asia but if we tuck our tails and run … How do you answer Ballʼs memo on China (coming) in the war? 5 McNamara: I believe we can tell China we do not intend to destroy the political institutions in NVN. Ball: What we need is a philosophy of the bombing. We donʼt have any now. McNamara: I disagree. (McNamara had to leave to testify on the Hill.) President: There is something wrong with our system when our leaders are testifying instead of thinking about the war. Letʼs re-write the “Why Vietnam” booklet. 6 Bring it up to date. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that Moyers was also present. (Ibid.) 3 January 29. 4 Wilsonʼs message was transmitted in telegram 4352 from London, January 26. Stating that he thought the Johnson administration had made an honest and commendable effort to avoid further conflict, Wilson indicated that he would support a decision to resume the bombing and suggested that the United States help those who wished to defend its actions by releasing as much evidence as possible about the military use to which the North Vietnamese had put the bombing pause and the two holiday truces. Telegram 1447 to all diplomatic missions, January 31, summarized enemy military activity in South Vietnam and infiltration from North Vietnam during the pause. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 Document 41 . 6 Why Vietnam , containing statements on Vietnam by the President, Rusk, and McNamara, was printed by the U.S. Government Printing Office in 1965 and widely distributed. 47. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 47. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, January 26, 1966. SUBJECT U.S. Prisoner Exchange with NLF The NLF has closed the door on prisoner exchange by reversing its position. It has informed the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that it will not meet with U.S. and ICRC Representatives to discuss prisoner exchange. Following is the chronology leading up to the present negative NLF position: 1. December 12, 1965, Ky approved U.S. proposal of exchange, under auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of prisoner Hai (one of two terrorists who bombed our Embassy) for USOM civilian employee Hertz. 2 2. In response to our request, ICRC sent a representative to Algiers to convey Hertz-Hai exchange proposal to NLF representative Tam. 3 3. January 4, ICRC representative met with Tam for two hours; Tam rejected the Hertz-Hai exchange and countered with proposed meeting under ICRC auspices of NLF, ICRC and USG representatives to discuss “broad prisoner exchange.” 4. NLF willingness to discuss prisoner exchange with us was confirmed from a private source, Sanford Gottlieb, Washington representative of SANE, who saw Tam in Algiers January 13. Tam told Gottlieb: “The Front is prepared to discuss the exchange of all prisoners, including Mr. Hertz” and if the U.S. wants to discuss prisoner exchange it should contact Tam. 5. Kyʼs concurrence was sought to the NLF offer to meet with U.S. and ICRC representatives to discuss prisoner exchange. At a meeting with Secretary Rusk on January 15 Ky expressed his concurrence to our proceeding with meeting with NLF on subject of prisoners under ICRC auspices. 6. January 15, we informed ICRC Geneva of our willingness to meet, preferably at ICRC Geneva Headquarters, with ICRC and NLF representatives to discuss questions relating to U.S. prisoners, including broad prisoner exchange as suggested by NLF representative Tam in Algiers. 7. January 18, ICRC dispatched its representative to convey our response to Tam in Algiers. 8. January 19, ICRC representative was received by Tam in Algiers. Tam accepted from ICRC representative an ICRC Geneva letter indicating U.S. willingness to meet with NLF and ICRC representatives, preferably at ICRC Geneva Headquarters, to discuss broad prisoner exchange. Tam told ICRC representative that he must now wait for definitive instructions from the Front which might take up to fifteen days; and requested ICRC representative to handle this matter with the “utmost discretion and secrecy”. 9. On the evening of January 25 ICRC Geneva received a letter from the NLF representative Tam dated Algiers, January 21, which was two days after his meeting with ICRC representative on January 19 at which Tam stated that he now had to receive definitive instructions from the Front which may take up to fifteen days. 10. Tamʼs letter of January 21 reflects a complete change of attitude and is completely negative. It has four main points: (1) Refers to January 4 meeting between Tam and ICRC representative; states that Tam had said to ICRC representative that NLF would not accept nor even consider a meeting with representatives of the U.S. (2) Refers to a press release issued by Red Cross of NLF of October 2 and states that according to the press release the NLF is not authorized to entertain any relations with ICRC and therefore NLF representative Tam returned to ICRC the letter which ICRC representative delivered to Tam on January 19 (that letter advised the NLF that the USG was prepared to meet with representatives of the NLF and the ICRC to discuss broad prisoner exchange, as suggested by Tam to the ICRC representative on January 4). (3) A general statement warning the ICRC to make no announcement on the exchange of letters and indicating that the NLF will deny the entire matter if it becomes public. (4) States that Tam already indicated to the ICRC representative that the NLF cannot receive visits from the ICRC or accept letters. Benjamin H. Read 4 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–7 VIET. Top Secret. 2 Gustav Hertz had been captured by the Viet Cong in February 1965 while working in Vietnam for the Agency for International Development. 3 Huynh Van Tam. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Read signed the original. 48. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 48. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 26, 1966, 7:30 p.m. I talked to McCloy and Lovett. Acheson is in Antigua and Art Dean was on his way to the West coast by air. I have asked for him to call me early in the morning. Though they differ from each other in important ways, McCloy and Lovett are in favor of prompt resumption and a prompt Presidential statement thereafter. McCloy thinks the pause has been good and useful on political and military grounds, but it has had no response. It makes no sense now to let the highways and bridges be repaired and put in use again after we have spent so much time bombing them. He thinks the risk of escalation is low and cites a recent conversation with Dobrynin to indicate that the Russians would also try to keep things cool. McCloy favors a low key statement but thinks that it should come from here. If it came from anywhere else the people would think the President was ducking it. Lovett wishes we had never got into Vietnam because he has such a painful memory of Korea. He says he was a charter member of the Never Again Club. But now that we are in he would go a long way. He was against the pause in the first place, and he wold favor a prompt and fairly massive air action in the North. He thinks we simply must give adequate support to the massive forces we have placed in Vietnam. In addition to air activity he would consider what he calls “a friendly blockade” of North Vietnam. He thinks keeping the pressure on is a kind of negotiation. He thinks the risk of escalation is low but he does report that his French contacts think the top ChiCom leadership is getting a little edgy. (This conflicts with what the French Ambassador Chauvel reported from his trip to Peking and may reflect Couveʼs stern instruction to Chauvel to say nothing in public that would give any comfort to the Americans.) Both Lovett and McCloy would find it extremely difficult to come down here tomorrow because each of them has an important board meeting. But they agreed to telephone me in the morning if they have any second sober thoughts and of course they will come if you want them to. Rusk and McNamara are pretty well pinned down with the British all day tomorrow from 10:00 until about 5:30 but could be pulled out for about half and hour about 12:30 if you want them. I myself see no need for a meeting until 6:00, when we ought to issue orders subject to a later confirming execute message on Friday afternoon. 2 At that time I will try to have necessary diplomatic messages and a preliminary outline of the content of a statement for use on Saturday 3 if you choose. 4 McG. B. I have also talked to Clark Clifford and he feels that the pause has now clearly failed with Hanoi as we all thought it would. He concedes that it has been helpful here and abroad. He says he wants to get out of Vietnam more than any other man he knows but the only way to do it is to use enough force and show enough determination to persuade Hanoi that a political contest is better than a military one. He would resume promptly with carefully measured attacks at first, and he would keep up the pressure until the other people decide that we are not the French. Clifford thinks the French experience is overwhelmingly important to the thinking in Hanoi. I have not reviewed with any of these gentlemen the delicate problem of day-to-day timing that relates to Vientiane and the level of VC activity in the South. McG. B. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Confidential File, ND 19/CO 312. Secret. 2 January 28. Bundy added “or later” in handwriting. 3 Bundy added “or later” in handwriting. 4 Bundy added a handwritten note: “I still notice that we have only ‘incidents,’ not ‘attacks’ in South Viet Nam—Mortars and sabotage, not attacks by military units on military units. And Vientiane is still loose, in N.Y. Times terms.” Regarding the Vientiane contact, see Document 51 . 49. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 49. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:55 a.m. Mr. President Here is an extraordinarily interesting dispatch from Ayub which makes the best case against the resumption of bombing that I have seen. I still donʼt agree with it but I am sure you will want to read it. McG. B. Attachment 2 Washington, January 27, 1966, 10:25 a.m. Text of Message from Ambassador McConaughy—Karachi 1510 I met on the evening of January 25 with President Ayub at my request. Our half-hour discussion was devoted entirely to Vietnam. The meeting was at the Ayub residence, and he appeared informal, cordial, and candid in a manner reminiscent of our conversations prior to the rocky course of Pak-U.S. relations during 1965. In discussing Vietnam, President Ayub appeared desirous of imparting through me to President Johnson the views of a sympathetic and concerned friend who, while gratified at having been consulted in a matter of such serious import, also sought to offer as straightforward and responsible a response as possible. Noting the seriousness and criticality of Vietnam, I said President Johnson and Secretary Rusk had instructed me to inform him that we had received no indication whatsoever of interest from Hanoi in our current effort to promote the cause of peace in Southeast Asia. Quite the contrary, there had been considerable Viet Cong military activity even during the Tet New Year, continued infiltration from North Vietnam, and an evident wish to continue hostilities without regard for the suffering and welfare of the Vietnamese people, and a generally threatening and provocative posture. The U.S. has tried through a large number of approaches, including the initiative which Ayub had kindly taken with Premier Kosygin at Tashkent, to open a constructive dialogue with Hanoi. Now in view of the great seriousness of the problem, the U.S. Government is undertaking last minute soundings bearing on the question. President Ayub agreed the Vietnam problem is an extremely serious and critical one which he had hoped might have been reviewed in light of some constructive Hanoi response. He assumed President Johnsonʼs military advisors must now be pressing him very hard to resume bombing North Vietnam. Nonetheless, “As I told you before, I have a personal conviction, based on no evidence but a strong feeling, that among Vietnamese Communist ranks there must be some desire to talk. I say this for your and our own sake, once you resume bombing there will be a desperate situation and escalation. I would still advise waiting with the hope of getting some response. The Chinese are telling them not to negotiate, but it is the Vietnamese whose lives are at stake. You can bomb hell out of them or just sit tight, but they canʼt throw you out. Looking at the situation as a statesman as well as a soldier, I would say ‘Come on you bastards, what can you do to us!’” I remarked that to sit tight would still mean numerous allied casualties. Ayub agreed but responded, “What can you do to that enemy in any event. The Vietnamese terrain doesnʼt lend itself to quick military decisions.” Ayub then implied his understanding and sympathy for the criticism to which his recommended sit tight policy would subject President Johnson by remarking, “Look, I am being criticized for Tashkent, which I agree was a very important decision. But people are emotionally aroused and donʼt understand.” With feeling and stress Ayub continued, “If you could get this message across, it is not in your own interest to escalate. Personally, I think you have such a large military force in South Vietnam the Communists couldnʼt do anything to you. Their boast to throw you out is nonsense. I still advise that you not start things up again. As Kosygin said to me at Tashkent, “Yes, we are giving a bit of aid there, but you cannot fly aircraft off a penny, and it takes months to get into the front lines whatever we may decide to send.” In my opinion if you start bombing again, you wonʼt see them coming to the conference table. On the contrary, those inclined to negotiate would be silenced, and you would have to fight on for three or four years. If you just sit tight there, in six months or a year that will convince them. But if bombing starts again, moderate elements will be silenced and you will have to move up the scale of military operations.” I asked Ayub if he thought we could stand idly by and allow supply routes to be built up and thereby expose our forces to that buildup. Ayub argued that U.S. could interdict supply routes within South Vietnam as effectively as in North Vietnam. When I mentioned Laos, Ayub admitted that is a difficult problem, but he stood by his view that concentrated interdiction is possible within South Vietnam. I referred to the military doctrine of attacking a problem at its source, but Ayub maintained such a doctrine during the present situation would require isolating North Vietnam not only from South Vietnam but from China as well. Commenting again that he was speaking only as a friend, Ayub pointed to the extreme military difficulties of solid interdiction and reiterated his opinion that, “If you want to convince them they must come to the conference table, let them throw themselves against your superior fire power and sooner or later they will see the light.” I asked Ayub if he didnʼt think the Viet Cong could spin out indefinitely a U.S. sit tight policy such as he proposed, and bog us down inconclusively in Vietnam for years. Ayub pointed to the limiting factor of Viet Cong logistics which cannot support a major fighting force without air and sea supply routes. Despite being a soldier, Ayub again deprecated the primacy of the military factor in Vietnam, arguing that history has proven repeatedly the fallacy of seeking to enlarge oneʼs area of operations for military reasons. It is necessary, he continued, to work backward from political-strategic considerations to the conference table. “Sit it out. Why present targets? Why move out into the country in vulnerable files? I spent six years under such conditions. You canʼt win on their terms; they always get in the first shot. You canʼt search a jungle area with fire. Therefore, I would adopt a different course and wait them out.” I referred to our experience in Korea and the critical role of our heavy military pressure in forcing negotiations beginning in 1951 which culminated in 1953 Armistice Agreement. Ayub agreed military pressure had been successfully employed in Korea. But he argued that the Vietnam situation was much different from Korea, what with larger armies, visible military actions, essentially non-Communist South Korea, distinction between friend and foe. He concluded, “In Korea you had to bring them to the conference table by fighting hard; in Vietnam you should wait them out.” Commenting on the American penchant for resolving the dirty business of war quickly and decisively, Ayub said, “Your enemies expect you to be impatient, to commit more and more forces, and finally to weaken your resolve in the face of unsatisfactory military results and your own democratic pressures.” While acknowledging there is always room for debate in such a matter, I suggested that General Westmoreland apparently had different ideas on the necessity of keeping down the military back-up activities in Vietnam. At the same time, I assured Ayub that President Johnson would give greatest care to all considerations as he contemplated the painful decisions facing him in Vietnam. Ayub then cited successful strategy in the Greek-Turkish War in 1922 in which Mustafa Kemal Pasha insisted upon remaining on the defensive and wearing down the enemy as they came in. This was an extremely unpopular strategy, particularly among his soldiers who wanted to seize the initiative and attack, but Mustafa waited for his opportunity and was successful. I referred to the full report on Vietnam given to the Foreign Minister by Stull on January 25. 3 I noted that the report made it quite clear there had been no real let down in Viet Cong military activities. Ayub indicated he had studied that report carefully and had it with him at the time. He said he assumed that Viet Cong military activity during the Tet period indicated the Viet Cong did not have complete control of all such activities throughout South Vietnam. He then reiterated his view that the U.S. has only the basic alternatives of sit tight until negotiations, or escalate and fight on for years. I said that I took it he had no word from the Soviets or any other Communist Source of interest to the U.S. Peace Initiative. Ayub replied there had been nothing other than what he had related during our January 18 meeting about the talk with Kosygin at Tashkent. I remarked that this absence of constructive response was the same in all quarters. Ayub said, “Those who want the war to go on must nonetheless be worried by your initiative. They must be hoping that the bombing will start again in order to win over those who may wish to stop fighting.” I then drew Ayubʼs attention to Secretary Ruskʼs January 23 internationally-televised interview. 4 I gave Ayub a transcript of Ruskʼs remarks relating to Vietnam, and drew his special attention to the Secretaryʼs observation that the U.S. does not consider itself “Gendarmes of the Universe,” but we do have commitments on which we are determined to make good. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. No classification marking. In response to a request from the President, General Wheeler prepared a 2-page commentary on the message from Pakistani President Ayub Khan, explaining why he disagreed with Ayubʼs major points and noting that the Joint Chiefs had “previously given such alternatives full consideration” and had “rejected them.” (CM–1146–66, January 31; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Vietnam 381, Jan-Sept 66) 2 Secret. 3 Not further identified. 4 Rusk appeared on “Meet the Press” on January 23. 50. Notes of Meeting 50. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 27, 1966, 6:20–8:20 p.m. SUBJECT Resumption of Bombing PRESENT President, McNamara, Rusk, M. Bundy, General Wheeler, Moyers, Valenti Rusk: Nothing to report on diplomatic front. Plane to Hanoi has been delayed from Vientiane. I canʼt honestly say I see any taker from the other side. One thin thread that hasnʼt played its course—from Souvanna. President: Did you ask McNamara and Bus Wheeler to see Ayub letter? 2 Bundy: Yes. Bundy or Rusk (not clear): From a diplomatic view only, the general reaction to a few days more pause would be good—balanced off against the military. Donʼt know how much you think the 15 Senatorsʼ view 3 will take hold. President: What do you recommend? Rusk: Resume bombing—but bombing policy be kept under firm control. The dangers of the Chinese coming in. Very little initiative on part of Viet Cong. Resume this weekend. President: What significance do you attach to low level of VC initiative? Rusk: If it went on longer perhaps it would be significant—reports are they will draw back to guerrilla type warfare. Perhaps if this continues, we can let our bombing intensity reflect this. Wheeler: Westmoreland said he is afraid of what is developing in First Corps area—may be getting ready to mount major effort in northern provinces. Also reports of sizable concentration in Quag Ny (probably Quang Ngai). ROK battalions are there. Fact there havenʼt been number of sizable attacks is meaningless. Bundy: It is unusual for (so) few attacks so long. (Wheeler:) Not so, really. McNamara: Rate of activity is off since Tet. Donʼt know why nor will we for at least a week. but they are continuing to reinforce at rapid rate. President: Donʼt know “why”—but the “why” is probably not to our advantage. McNamara: I agree. Further delay on resumption of bombing can polarize opinion in this country. I feel we should resume—and send execute order tonight. President: Does it make any difference if we start on Sunday? 4 McNamara: No, not really. Rusk: Senior officers in my Department would vote holding off a while longer. Canʼt find any solid basis, however, to recommend to you we refrain. Wheeler: Dean, how much would it take to get a definitive answer from Souvannaʼs man? Rusk: Probably a week—or never. Bundy: We wonʼt get this man to make any definitive … odds are very long if he came back in a week, he would have anything. Only reason for prolonging is the low level of VC activity—and opinion of Ayub and others that it would create confusion on the other side. Rusk: But with these trucks coming South, how do you justify refraining? President: What are the latest facts on infiltration? (President read report on ______) (Agreed we would not send execute order until we are absolutely ready to go.) President asked: “Whatʼs different in bombing on Saturday as compared to Monday?” McNamara: Thereʼs a difference in number of perishable targets. They might be off the roads by Monday. President: Are we doing any good on our bombing in South Vietnam and Laos? McNamara: Yes, we are. Running 1900 sorties a week in Laos. Wheeler: In area just opposite Laos, in the Delta area, destroyed 5 trucks, took out anti-aircraft plus others. This is the only day we havenʼt hit a secondary explosion. Rusk: Can planes going to Laos bring bombs back? Wheeler: Yes, they can bring bombs back. They donʼt like to bring ordnance back to carriers. McNamara: Cable 5 came in saying operations have been limited by bomb shortage. Laotian planes … Wheeler: But the cable didnʼt make sense— McNamara: Cable came out of meeting in Bangkok—of a meeting of military personnel. Sent out cable saying I wasnʼt informed of any shortage in bombs. 6 Only shortage is 750 pound (bombs) used in B–52s. Nobody in right mind thought weʼd drop these bombs in B–52 on Vietnam. But we are working hard on this. President: Whatʼs wrong with Ridgway? Wheeler: Heʼs probably bitten by bug that we should never get involved in land war in Asia. President: Do you think our failure to bomb the North will materially affect the balance out there? Wheeler: Yes, Sir. We should decrease by every pound we can to stop movement of supplies. In interdiction, you start at the beginning and go all the way through to finally stopping it in-country. Is like stopping water after it comes out of the hose. President: What are we cutting off? Wheeler: We hit the power plant. Hitting LOC (lines of communication)—and have raised the cost to them of moving supplies southward. We cannot apply interdiction to stop the supply of troops they are supplying today—about 80 tons a day. But we can stop the supplying of a larger force. McNamara: This is a very important question but Iʼm not sure of the figures. They need up to 80 tons to supply them—but if they increase troops they will need 165 tons but they have capabilities of 200 tons a day. But these figures are very rough. Our Air Force has learned all over again to do iron bombing. There is much to learn— President: We really pay a price—if we are not getting a payoff. (Either Wheeler or McNamara): We know it is costing them—and to feel pain. But I cannot tell you today that our bombing will cut down their operations in the South. Rusk: Purpose of bombing ought to directly help our troops and break the will of the other fellow. My own priority would be to concentrate on operational connections in the South. President: When you go back in here, Dean, weʼre going to have to go in closer—and do more risky bombing than we have before. You could see that the other night. 7 Are we getting closer to danger points by resuming our bombing—and shoving it—or by not resuming it? McNamara: By resuming, we increase military action with Communist China (presume he meant risk of military action). We must seek to avoid this at all costs. The burden is on us. Some of the programs recommended cause excessive risk. If we donʼt resume, the risk is more political than military. I personally think this is a high risk. The CIA estimators feel this way. Bundy: All estimators say that cessation will strengthen the will of the enemy. McNamara: People in this country believe that supplies will demand we protect our boys. President: Did we make a mistake in starting to bomb in the North? McNamara: No. Bundy: I share the view that we donʼt need to take the suggestions of those around the table the other night. We never said we would bomb cities. Wheeler: I must take issue. I agree with the political argument. But I think it is important to bomb militarily. We never had a heavy enough interdiction program. It has to be heavy. Day after day. We have had only 86 a day. Nothing at night. Now we can do a better job at night. POL is absolutely vital to interdiction. But the problem is not the 155 battalions they will have; itʼs what they could have if we allow them to continue supplying. The only industrial target is the iron works in Hanoi. We ought to take that out. But we need to expand our interdiction campaign. President: Will that materially increase the danger of pulling China in by increasing bombing program? Wheeler: Highest possible danger is if we make amphibious landing in North Vietnam. I could be wrong but I donʼt believe it. Donʼt think the Soviets will get involved. McNamara: Donʼt think we know how many sorties we need to stop the flow of supplies. We could apply quadruple intensity on certain targets. We need more facts. President: Do we need another 35 days of pause to get them? McNamara: This has nothing to do with resuming bombing. President: What have we lost during these 35 days? What are we getting out of these bombings? What reports do we get out of North Vietnam? Rusk: We get no real reports except from reconnaissance. We are old-fashioned in our spying. We ought to hit only those targets directly involved in support of troops. President: Who are people in your Department—their background—and what are their reasons for not resuming? Rusk: Ball, Thompson. Thompson wants at least two more weeks—to confuse [?] each other. Each of the enemy is afraid to get caught laying down their commitment. Thompson is concerned about Russian involvement. Bundy: His fundamental point is that Russians know they have a constraining influence on us. President: Doesnʼt it worry you that Russia might heat up the world somewhere else? McNamara: No. I think Russians are less a risk than China. And we are strong enough to handle other commitments. I donʼt agree (that) Senator Russell is right. Wheeler: I think we are strong enough. McNamara: He may be saying this in context of being a world policeman. Rusk: Bill Bundy is ready to go—but is worried over the Souvanna thing. President: What will U Thant say? Rusk: Some danger. U Thant will say “too bad”. “Some negotiations were in progress and they could have worked.” Goldberg and Sisco are hoping for holding off. Harriman would be more comfortable with some more time. President: What is the logic of Goldbergʼs position of three weeks more? Bundy: He says no damage militarily. Makes no claim that we would get peace. President: Does he want to pull out? Bundy: No. He wants to compromise it out. President: But the only way to get a fellow to talk to you is to show strength. To show daring and imagination and find a way to get to the table. Are we doing any good playing with the Viet Cong? Bundy: VC never said they would sit down and talk about prisoners. The door was slammed in our face. Rusk: Itʼs true we can give wrong decisions to Hanoi. But we donʼt know what they would do with the right signal. Bundy: One thing the bombing has done is to serve as an umbrella for 200,000 men. President: I think if you stop bombing they will go for something else. If you let them run you out of your front yard, theyʼll run you out of the house. I donʼt want war with Russia or China. I feel less comfortable tonight than I felt last night. I donʼt want to back out—and look like Iʼm reacting to the Fulbrights. We must realize the price we pay for going back in. We will lose a good part of the Senate. I thought of chucking that resolution back to them. Do we want to take on the Senators—or let others take them on? McNamara: I think the longer we delay the more controversy we produce. Bundy: We ought to be sure we hit only trucks and highways until later. President: We donʼt have anyone defending us. Bundy: Yes, thatʼs right, and we donʼt have anyone of stature. President: Douglas 8 could do it. Heʼs got the standing to do it. What I donʼt have is evidence. —Turn loose 115 nations and having them shout at us. Suppose we would not announce a resumption. We would keep the nations off us. Can we take this same firepower and use it in the South? McNamara: Why wouldnʼt we be better off applying all the sorties in the South? One, we donʼt need them in South Vietnam. Two, are we using them in Laos? I donʼt know. They are blind bombing and Iʼm sure we are getting benefit from this. President: We have to be sure—we must be sure. McNamara: I am sure we need to resume bombing. President: What did Bobby 9 say? McNamara: He says the burden of proof is on us. President: What will he say when we resume? McNamara: I donʼt know. Iʼll see him 10:30 Saturday 10 morning. President: I think weʼll carry a big burden when (we) resume with the Senate, peace lovers, ministers, etc. McNamara: We cannot use the same firepower elsewhere. I can prove that. President: I donʼt think we have the case made to resume bombing. What will the papers say? What I think we ought to do is to be prepared with statements—let the wise men chase it around. Ought to talk to all the people we need to talk to Saturday. And will send order—prefer Monday. McNamara: Will do it so it will be announced on Tuesday. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 Document 49 . 3 Fifteen Democratic Senators sent a letter to President Johnson on January 27 opposing resumption of the bombing. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI) 4 January 30. 5 See Document 45 . 6 Not further identified. 7 Presumably a reference to the January 25 meeting with the Congressional leadership; see Document 43 . 8 Presumably a reference to Senator Paul Douglas (D–IL). 9 Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D–NY). 10 January 29. 51. Memorandum 51. Memorandum 1 Washington, January 28, 1966. DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING A. Third Country Situation 1. We have sent a circular message during the week which has now been delivered to all countries with which we have had any meaningful exchanges during the suspension. This has covered every country except for the Soviet Union and two other very minor ones. We have every indication that the Soviets have received word of the contents through the Poles or Hungarians. In essence, this message served notice that we had not had a response and that we could not continue to refrain from steps required to protect our forces. It has been widely construed as our notice of imminent intent to resume. 2. We have had even closer exchanges with such key countries as the UK, Canada, and Australia. 3. Our various messages have been received with remarkably little protest and with considerable understanding. The British and Australians are solidly aboard. Among significant countries, only Japan, Canada, Poland, Pakistan (a very fervent plea from Ayub), 2 and about five lesser countries have expressed the hope that we could continue the pause to give something a chance to develop. None of these has indicated that they have any concrete expectation or grounds for belief that it will. U Thant fully understands that we may be resuming shortly. However, he has appealed publicly for a virtually indefinite continuation, and will doubtless be critical in almost any event. 4. There is no pending third country initiative which hinges on delay in resumption. U Thant is working on a proposal to have the ICC members propose a conference, and the Japanese and Canadians are considering sending high-level emissaries to key countries. Nkrumah has also concocted the idea of his going to Hanoi. However, all of these are well aware that we may resume before these actions were underway. B. Status of Contacts with Hanoi 1. Rangoon. We had originally delivered a message there on December 29 simply informing Hanoi that the suspension was underway and could be extended if there were a response. The message was accepted. On January 21, we sent Byroade back to see the Hanoi man, who said he had no instructions and made certain other comments, not calling for reply. 3 On January 24 the Hanoi man sent Byroade a written aide-memoire, pre-dated January 21, which simply repeated the same points. 4 On January 26, Byroade acknowledged the written message. He asked again whether the Hanoi man had any instructions, and said he would remain available. 5 There has been no response. 6 2. Moscow. Based on Shastriʼs report that Kosygin had suggested direct contact in Moscow, Kohler sought an appointment with the DRV Charge on January 19, and the DRV Charge finally accepted the meeting on January 24. We gave Kohler substantive instructions, 7 particularly inquiring whether this confidential contact might be used for Hanoi to make clear what military actions it was taking. Kohler also raised Hanoiʼs Four Points but was able to make only general comments. The over-all reaction of the DRV Charge was completely negative. 8 He reiterated the Four Points and standard statements of Hanoiʼs position and attacked the sincerity of our suspension. At the end of the conversation, the Charge said that he had nothing further to add. Kohler replied that he still had points he could discuss, but the DRV man showed no enthusiasm for a further meeting. He finally suggested twice that we could talk in Rangoon if we wished. The initiative was left to the DRV man to request a further meeting, and there has been no further word. The DRV manʼs mention of Rangoon led us to the Byroade reply of January 26, nailing Rangoon down tight as well. 3. Vientiane. On January 17, the DRV Charge called on Souvanna at the Chargeʼs request. Speaking from notes, he raised rather niggling questions about the meaning of our Fourteen Points. Souvanna pressed him whether Hanoi was asking Souvanna to act as an intermediary, and the Charge replied that he had no instructions. On the 20th, Souvanna went back to the Charge with a message from us commenting briefly on the questions raised concerning the Fourteen Points, and saying that we would accept Souvanna as an intermediary, or that Ambassador Sullivan could meet directly with the DRV man. The DRV man then made certain “personal observations” about accepting the NLF and the Four Points. 9 On the 25th, Souvanna conveyed to the DRV man a fairly substantial statement on the NLF and Four Points, pointing out among other things that we were prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva Accords and that this might be the answer if Hanoi insisted that its Four Points were “authentic interpretations” of these Accords. Souvanna himself thought this response quite “forthcoming.” The Hanoi man continued to say that he had no instructions. On January 28, he took the ICC plane to Hanoi but did not return. The next regular plane would not return until February 4. 10 This episode remains puzzling. The substance of the original remarks was quite peripheral, although Souvanna thinks that there was some serious intent behind it. Since we have now waited twelve days with no validation of any message, it seems hard to believe that anything significant was intended. Although the Charge has only limited air communications, we know that he has available cable communications and has used them. Souvanna himself on the 26th, asked only that we hold off to the end of the week. There are some complications to the Vientiane matter in that Souvanna indiscreetly mentioned it to third country representatives on January 18. U Thant and the British definitely know about it, and we believe the Soviets, French, and probably the Poles and Thai also do. However, none of these probably know more than the first conversation. In sum, we have clear deadlines in both Moscow and Rangoon, and only an unvalidated nibble, now eleven days old, in Vientiane. The fact that the Moscow and Rangoon negatives were both received after the Vientiane approach give us a tremendously strong public case, if it should ever be required, that the total picture was negative. C. Saigon Ambassador Porter talked to the Foreign Minister on the 25th, telling him about the Vientiane matter and saying that it might hold us up for a few days to make absolutely sure. The Foreign Minister expressed understanding, but also concern that we should not be drawn into a delaying gambit. Our over-all reading is that Saigon would begin to get seriously edgy if we waited many more days, but that we are not under pressure in terms of 1–3 days. We would plan to let Saigon know a day in advance of the planned date of resumption. 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. The source text is unsigned but the memorandum was presumably prepared by William Bundy. 2 See Document 49 . 3 See Document 33 . 4 Byroade transmitted the text of the aide-memoire in telegram 370 from Rangoon, January 24, which is printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 138–139. McGeorge Bundy forwarded telegram 370 to President Johnson at 10:45 a.m. on January 24 under cover of a memorandum stating that Byroade had “received a very tough memo from the Hanoi Charge which pretty well closes that circuit.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19) 5 Byroade reported this information in telegram 374 from Rangoon, January 27, printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , p. 139. 6 The DRV representative responded on January 31, presenting an aide-memoire to Byroade during a meeting that began 10 hours after resumption of the bombing. Byroade transmitted the aide-memoire in telegram 392 and reported on the meeting in telegram 394, both dated January 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 140–142) William Bundy analyzed the timing of the January 31 DRV approach in a memorandum to Rusk, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 150–151) 7 See Document 25 . 8 See Document 37 . 9 Sullivan reported this conversation in telegram 788 from Vientiane, January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 10 The DRV Charge did not respond until his meeting with Souvanna on February 8, during which he read a lengthy demarche. The meeting was reported in telegram 870 from Vientiane, February 8. (Ibid.) 52. Notes of Meeting 52. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 28, 1966, 1:20–3:45 p.m. SUBJECT Resumption of Bombing PRESENT President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Harriman, Mac Bundy, Bill Bundy, General Taylor, General Wheeler, Ball, Goldberg, Marks, Valenti. Also the Wise Men—McCloy, Dulles, Dean, Clifford President: Because of large range of judgment and experience you have, I want your evaluation of this. Fresh approaches can do much sometime. The Presidentʼs difficulty is not doing what is right—but knowing what is right. I see each day serious difficulties, mounting of pressure. It may result in deep divisions in our government. A year ago, by 504–2 the Congress told the President to do what was necessary in Vietnam. Today they could muster probably 40 votes. The Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee are against the general policy of that resolution. McGeorge Bundy: Situation not essentially different from what is in the press. While we did not expect any serious response to the pause, we have no answer—only nibbles of an undefined source to confuse the record. We have comprehensive evidence of continuing reinforcement from the North. Clear that PAVN units continue in VN. True, there have been no large-scale operations initiated by the VC. The President is not disposed to do anything in a hurry. We need your comments. McNamara: (President asked McNamara to give military assessment of situation.) Objective of VC to conquer in 1965 and 1966. US troops defeated this. VC has 27 battalions of PAVN. Capable of infiltrating 4,500 men a month, about three times the rate of last year. Our bombing objectives: 1. Lift morale of South Vietnam. 2. Cost the NVN and reduce their supply route. Perhaps we have reduced the flow by 50 percent. 600 trucks in four-week period beginning December 27. Twice the level of a year ago. Records donʼt show, because of lack of accuracy, if this is increased over before the pause. President: Assuming we were bombing NVN, is it your opinion that fewer trucks would be coming through? McNamara: We would eliminate some trucks—but they would probably use human backs. Ceiling on movement is about 200 tons a day. Canʼt tell you if air attacks limit movement in toto. They are reactivating routes, roads through reconstruction. Camouflaging trails and routes. (McNamara used a number of photographs to show evidence of substantial infiltration.) We do know they are steadily expanding forces in the South. President: Any questions for Bob? Dean: Resume bombing? As we were before or step it up to deter their supply movement? McNamara: Donʼt think we can affect their will through bombing. The pressure on VC in the South will affect their willingness to talk. What kind of bombing should we have. Did have 700 sorties a week. We could direct more sorties against supply lines by doubling the sorties. No matter what bombing we do we need more men. Dean: Assuming not bombing large centers of population. Would you bomb POL? Power stations? etc. McNamara: Right now thatʼs not as important as infiltration routes. McCloy: What can we accomplish by doubling sorties? Would this bring us victory? McNamara: To avoid a weakness, weʼll need to increase our forces. A chance that doubling our force over a period of six months might be sufficient to break their will. McCloy: Are we on offensive? McNamara: Yes, we are on offensive. McCloy: Would this kind of thrust bring about pacification? McNamara: No, this canʼt make peace until Vietnam has organized a pacification effort. Rusk: If there was general drift toward Hanoi, weʼd know about it. McCloy: How about morale of Vietnamese Army? McNamara: High desertion rate of about one sixth. But they go back to their farms—and not to VC. Rand Corporation report 2 shows VC morale problems. Goldberg: What is meant by “increased cost of bombing?” McNamara: This does not include China. It does mean … Dean: What effect on bombing installations near Hanoi—mine the harbor of Haiphong? McNamara: If we mined Haiphong, we would cut off petroleum supplies—donʼt know if we would markedly cut down supplies to the South. Dulles: How do you appraise the Vietnamese Government? McNamara: Evidence we have is good. Rusk: Government draws strength from the fact most of the country doesnʼt want Communism. Dean: Would it be possible to carry out Gavinʼs theory? McNamara:—unstable military situation—also proposed by men who believe it is not against Communists taking over Southeast Asia. Carrying on a bombing program against North Vietnam carries risks. Could escalate. And response from China. Think it is danger that can be avoided—but must consider it. If not bomb, it is risk. Donʼt think the American people will long support a government which will not support by bombing 400,000 troops there. South Vietnam will not understand why we donʼt bomb the enemy supplying enemy troops. Telegraphs the wrong signal to Hanoi, China. Universal opinion of our estimators that cessation of bombing would cause the enemy to believe their cause was right. At some appropriate time, we should resume carefully controlled bombing. Wheeler: We should resume. Reasons about the same as McNamara—although I would place greater weight on the part bombing would reduce supplies. Campaign against North should be increased more substantially. I think POL should be attacked. Basic to ability to move trucks and water craft. Westmoreland reports a continuing buildup in VC forces in, the North area. President: Is it because of the pause? Wheeler: Canʼt tell. On other hand, infiltration has continued. Pause permitted them to move more freely. President: Did the infiltration go up? Wheeler: Donʼt know. President: Iʼm trying to find out if this infiltration has increased. Wheeler: I think so. But canʼt tell. But they are moving in daylight now—and before the pause we didnʼt see any daylight moving. President: And if we bomb again, would daylight movement end? Wheeler: Yes. President: What proof do you have that our bombing has been effective? (Source of answer not identified): The very stridency of the screams from the enemy is pretty good evidence. Diverted large number of laborers to fix up lines of communication. You estimate 150,000 to 200,000 repairing bomb damage. We know two Chinese construction companies are in Vietnam to do construction. They would accept Chinese only under dire circumstances. Reports from defectors indicate disruption to transportation and general havoc because of bombing. Figures of actual destruction are impressive. Vice President: Do I gather that bombing targets should be enlarged from the report of the Secretary? Wheeler: You hear a lot about industrial targets. There are no worthy industrial targets except for one: steel and iron works. But even that is low return item in bombing. Others that are worthy: 1. POL system. Most located at Haiphong. 2. Next storage area near Hanoi. In my judgment these are vital. Also have thermal power plant system that is not too vital. In Haiphong and Hanoi area (within 30 miles) certain ammo and other terminals. Clifford: Can you bomb every target you want to bomb without endangering civilians? Wheeler: Yes. POL in Haiphong is located on the outskirts of the city. Great majority of bridges can be attacked without damage to civilians. President: On the theory that “a hit dog howls” is that evidence that we are hurting? Wheeler: Yes, Sir. President: What (do) prisoners tell you? Wheeler: One thing they cite for defection—the bombing. Afraid of B–52s because they donʼt know about it until the bombs fall. President: If you stopped in North Vietnam, do you think the next step will be to stop in South Vietnam and finally stop fighting? Wheeler: Yes, Sir. This always happens. President: Assuming not bombing civilians, what is argument against bombing in North Vietnam that wouldnʼt be true for the South? Wheeler: Donʼt know of any. Rusk: In terms of issues posed to North Vietnam and Moscow and China, there is difference. Russia feels there is no problem in bombing in South Vietnam. President: I agree. But if we refrain, will not peace lovers exhibit same instincts towards South Vietnam as they do towards North Vietnam? Goldberg: If bombing has caused Chinese construction workers to come in, will not more come in with more bombing? Wheeler: Not necessarily. They are there because the railroad they are rebuilding is important to the Chinese. Vice President: Considering Moscowʼs concern over bombing in the North and not in the South, how many North Vietnamese do you estimate now in South Vietnam? Wheeler: At least nine regiments—about 12,000–15,000 men. But we are not sure this is all. These are the only ones positively identified. Vice President: Then there is little punishment being inflicted in North Vietnam but only in South Vietnam—which means, what pressures are we bringing on North Vietnam? (Wheeler:) I think this is true. Until North Vietnam introduced his own men, Ho was fighting this war cheaply. No trouble in North Vietnam. Goldberg: Can you bring about an interdiction in Haiphong without retaliation in Saigon port? Wheeler: They have capability of doing this—and have already caused trouble in this respect. We are on alert against this kind of attack. In December we had 87 ships waiting to be unloaded. Now down to 76. We think we will be out of the woods by end of year. President: What are U.S. casualties in a month? Wheeler: Last week 28 or 29 killed. Heaviest month was November—250 plus. President: How many lost last year? Wheeler: 1300 plus in 1965. 20,000 VC killed—Vietnam lost about 9,000. President: How long can they take such losses? Wheeler: Not too long—or indefinitely. Morale of troops wonʼt stand up to it. VC are having substantial trouble on their part. President: Think possible it will break this year? Wheeler: Donʼt think so. If people in the South want to continue, might break in next year. Within the next two years we ought to get favorable results. President: That means continuing the bombing and doubling the forces. Taylor: I was with you on the pause, I was against the length. I donʼt think Hanoi will ever come forward unless our home front is strengthened. It works against all our efforts in the war. President: Our enemy gets great encouragement from the opposition voices here. Is that right? Taylor: Yes. Itʼs true. Hanoi lives in another world. They really believe we have lost 1200 planes. President: Weʼve lost 1400 to 1500 men in five years? Wheeler: Yes. McCloy: Anything developing in the way of tactics or weapons that give you hope. Wheeler: Yes, Sir. From a flat start, we inserted 100,000 in Vietnam in three months. No other country in the world could do this. Airlift Red Ball Express to bring vital items quickly. Asked every commander if any shortages—and in every case, no shortages were evident. Counting on weapons: 1. Choppers In late May, 400 plus Today, 1800 At end of year, 2000 2. Using fighter bombers for close support 3. Artillery in quantities—North Vietnamese have never run into before 4. B–52s running close support missions Vice President: Next argument will be noises to quit using B–52s. President: Do you think cessation will prolong the war? Wheeler: Yes. Rusk: If it were not for the Chinese dispute, Russians would settle for the Geneva Accords. But they are immobilized. Greatly complicates their problem with China. Peking is completely adamant on this. They will not talk or do anything. Peking has actively intruded on any talks between Hanoi and U.S. Hanoi appears to be somewhere between Moscow and Peking—but closer to Peking. Sufficient differences among them to make them look over their shoulders at each other—so that other nations find it difficult to bring about a consensus. Weʼve asked every nation, “Have you heard anything?” The answer is no. Dulles: If they are willing to stop the subversion, would the bombing cease. Rusk: This has been talked ad nauseam. But if they respond in some way, we can respond likewise. McCloy: Puzzled Hanoi hasnʼt thrown us off balance with some phony probe. Rusk: We were prepared for this but they havenʼt been as imaginative as they might have been. President: Allen, what is your reaction to the pause? Dulles: Helpful here—but Iʼm not sure about the other side. President: What about others? Will they say it is too short? Dulles: Donʼt think they can make a case out of it. McCloy: Been convincing we are eager to talk. But paid a price abroad. Thought this was done largely for political purpose. Hasnʼt been conducive to bringing about talks—weʼve been too excited, too panicky—an indication of weakness to the enemy. General impression abroad is we overdid it. But Iʼm not criticizing it. It helped us here at home. I think I would resume the bombing. After having made these efforts—and saying we would if we didnʼt get response—talks would be diminished if we donʼt resume. Insofar as Hanoi is concerned, they are confirmed in their estimate that we are weak and feeling the pressures at home. Dobrynin said that we have complicated Russian objectives. The whole issue of leadership of the communist world is at stake. He wanted to avoid escalation as much as we did. Dean: I would resume without question. If you donʼt American people wonʼt support you—and casualties will rise. In Korea, we lost more men after truce than before. I would do more than bomb infiltration points—and at same time keep up peace moves. Clifford: Only way to get out of Vietnam is to persuade Hanoi we are too brave to be frightened and too strong to be defeated. We must persuade them we cannot lose—and they will never talk until they are so convinced. U.S. attitude is misunderstood in Hanoi. They hear Senators and protests and they are convinced we are losing the support of our people. War must be made more costly to Vietnam. If we can accelerate military pressures to the point where the North Vietnamese people wonder if it is all worth it. I want to resume the bombing—before we get a phony peace bid. If we donʼt bomb, China will be more bold than us. If we keep the strength of our Air Force before them and make them feel we can destroy them if we come in. We must fight the war where we are strongest and we are strongest in the air. Dulles: I would resume the bombing—but we have left impression that bombing has been ineffective. Our bombing did two things: —Limited forces VC could put into the field —Limited momentum of their attacks Goldberg: Am in disagreement with Clifford. We have been helped overseas with the pause. The pause has not been an indication of weakness—we have strengthened our position, particularly in the communist world. That could not have been done without the Soviets. Accelerating military pressure in the North has advantages—and great risks—involving China and Russia. And this would defeat one of our objectives: to keep the split open with (meaning between) Russia and China. I suggest: donʼt bomb tomorrow. Think there is a way to handle public opinion. Therefore: out of deference to world opinion, continued deliberations and have decided to give another short period—but not under the setting of this one. Think would have great impact on the Hill. Vice President: The Congress is without leadership. We must take a firm position. The longer you delay, Congress will run all over the lot. President: I was the first Congressman to speak up for the Truman Doctrine. I am not happy about Vietnam but we cannot run out—we have to resume bombing. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President was out of the room from 2:40 to 2:55 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 2 See Document 26 and footnote 5 thereto. 53. Notes of Meeting 53. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 29, 1966, 11:35–12:40 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Wheeler, Moyers, and Valenti 2 Rusk: I talked to Thompson about the Soviets. Not worried about pushing them into a corner right now. Thinks we ought to break the suspense—it will give Hanoi wrong signal, combined with Fulbright and his Senators. Ball would like more time. Think hard about bombing policy, massive support of our troops—stay away from those things which cause risk. Very careful about immediate Hanoi and Haiphong area. Make it clear it is the other side who will escalate—not us. President: Are we trying to hold down statements from other nations? Rusk: We are sending out wires to Ambassadors. President: Do we have to let the Canadians know? Rusk: Would cause them less embarrassment. McNamara: Believe we should resume—whether Monday 3 their time or Tuesday their time. Would recommend Monday their time. Recommend targets south of Hanoi. President: When is the first we could do it without announcing on Sunday? McNamara: On Tuesday morning their time. Bombing wouldnʼt occur until 5 p.m. Monday our time. On the air probably 7 or 8 Monday night. Rusk: If we had working day—Monday—to notify governments, it would be better. Need to get embassies set. Wouldnʼt tell more than four or five exact time. Wheeler: When will we tell the South Vietnamese? Rusk: Tell Ky the evening before. Wheeler: Would hate to see it go any below that. Leaks would occur. Rusk: The 11 p.m. news would have it Monday night. President: What trouble if announced on Sunday? Rusk: Not consider it a problem. President: If announced on Sunday, it would close up debate—but Ministers might get noisy. Moyers: Donʼt think the Ministers will cause trouble. Problem of waiting till Tuesday will open up more sores here with questions. Bundy: Would rather go Monday. Moyers: Lodge could make the announcement—“began Monday Saigon time.” Being Sunday makes it easier for us. Bundy: We donʼt announce until planes are back, do we? Announce midnight Sunday. President: As soon as you can … desirable for Lodge to announce to press there. Prepared statement by me before cameras. Followed by a prepared statement by Rusk—emphasizing pause—work and failure—answer questions—getting us far away from bombing—and going back to where we were before. Might keep us away from nuclear war—people like Gore. Picked out about five men around the country—one man said “have you and Rusk gone crazy—youʼve been sitting around doing nothing.” Had talk with Fortas. Net of what he said was that whole communist world was working to prolong the pause. Rusk: If thatʼs their object, the communists have been stupid. President: Donʼt think we ought to discuss military plans with Senators. Problems with Senate and 76 in the House. But the thing that worries me are the others who want to go after it. McNamara: That worries me, too. We must not add fuel to this fire—not to discuss how much they have done so we can knock hell out of them. Taylor: I would suggest a joint announcement by the Vietnamese Government and U.S. Bundy: As soon as first bomb is down, we can announce. Drafted message to CINCPAC to get any time after 0001 on any day President determines. We canʼt sit here and predict when first bomb goes down. Time will vary from early morning til mid-day. It could be a small operation if weather is bad. Rusk: Important to hit those infiltration routes—where we lose the fewest planes. (Wheeler showed armed reconnaissance routes.) Wheeler: We should mount 500-strike effort—a later 300-strike effort. Weather has been bad. President: Is it desirable to go in with that heavy an effort? Wheeler: Weʼve been seeing larger convoys of trucks on these routes. 500-strike sorties is not too heavy to put on this. Rusk: I would hope if they see a 50-truck convoy and stay with this target until they finish it off. Wheeler: They will. McNamara: I would recommend a lesser quantity, such as 200. I doubt the effect of the advantage of 500 over 200. To be quite frank, I would be hard pressed to show trucks on the road. Also it may be difficult for the jets to hit them. Vietnamese are on alert. Problem is exactly what you have outlined—we must control ourselves without violating the military requirement. Wheeler: We can go in with any number you want, Mr. President. We need more than targets—pontoons and other targets. These are hard to see. Pontoon bridges are in place now. There are a number of truck rest stops—and these will be targets. President: But if it created a clamor around the world— Moyers: There is a general belief that if you go in with four times the number it will look like escalation. President: How many can you mount without moving in another carrier? Wheeler: 300. President: Letʼs do that and bring up that carrier later. Wheeler: Do you authorize us to continue at a rate of 300 a day? Bundy: What day, Mr. President? President: I think Monday. Bundy: Lodge would announce about midnight. McNamara: Lodge announce after return of first aircraft. President: Letʼs get a summary of all weʼve done and be ready to go with this—so Lodge can background the press. Taylor: Will you leave to Lodge to work in the Saigon government? Rusk: U Thant may scream if we report this to the Security Council. Under the SEATO Treaty we are obligated to report to SC (Security Council). If we offer a resolution and it is vetoed, Morse will say the UN has rejected us—and we ought to get out of South Vietnam. Two difficult points: 1. Pressure to take cease-fire without recognition of other side 2. Recognition of VC. President: Morse will go to repeal the resolution. Rusk: If on Monday morning we announce weʼre reporting to the Security Council, that would mute Morse. Moyers: Send message to Pope and say plan seems possible and will work at it. Include this in your statement. President: You want to ask for a vote in the Security Council? Donʼt we want to take initiative in peace efforts? Maximum initiative on our part. Rusk: I have statement I want to go over with Goldberg. President: Was Clifford right about talking about peace as a deterrent to peace? McNamara and Bundy: Disagree with Clifford. Wheeler: I agree with Clifford. President: We have to demonstrate to people we are not Goldwater. But we must make it clear that our military program will go forward vigorously. But we canʼt talk about peace on Saturday morning. We must do it all the time. (President talked about Morse electing Hatfield because Hatfield is against Vietnam.) We have to keep shoving on peace. I want Wheeler to have running room. Rusk has got to keep moving on peace—letʼs keep Goldberg busy on peace resolutions. If you can do more than report to the Security Council, I think we ought to do so. Do we have the best resolution possible? We would make statement about 9 a.m. Monday. Rusk would have news conference at 10 a.m. What should we do in Security Council meeting? Bundy: Intelligence reports—donʼt tip hand. Donʼt discuss level of bombing. Report on military and political situation. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Presidentʼs office. 2 The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that General Taylor was also present. (Ibid.) 3 January 31. 54. Notes of Meeting 54. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, January 29, 1966, 12:45–1:15 p.m. PRESENT President, Vice President, Rusk, Goldberg, Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti Rusk: Itʼs up to you and me, Arthur, to draft a first class resolution to the Security Council. President: Let me tell you my views. I was against the first pause, and the second pause. It has created a situation of doubt. I donʼt want to fail to explore every possible avenue. I donʼt want to fail the men out there. After the 12-hour and the 30-hour truce and the Popeʼs message 2 —I decided on the pause. We should write the Pope, encourage him—we must figure out what to do in reporting to the UN—in accordance with SEATO Treaty. What can we ask the UN to do? I want the diplomats to keep moving now. First, letter to the Pope. Second, a report to the UN. Third, how can we keep the initiatives going? Donʼt want to be constantly reacting to Ho. Goldberg: We have already good reporting on our peace efforts. Two other moves: 1. Go to Security Council. I favor going because it is demonstration of desire for solution. But donʼt think it will get anywhere. Whatever you do there are risks. Wilson did it cleverly. He presented the resolution. If the resolution did go far, we still have enough strength to defeat a resolution we donʼt want. Rusk: The Japanese are dying to do something for peace, so they will be eager. President: This afternoon and tomorrow figure out what we need to do to emphasize peace. Goldberg: Our friends will tell us not to go, but we shouldnʼt let them rule us. The dominant theme is disengagement between us and the Soviets. President: Iʼve played out my pause—not from 115 countries have I gotten anything. I want you men to evolve for me political and peace moves—initiatives of my own. —Letter to Pope. —Report to UN—and advocate peace. Because I certify that the Fulbrights and the Morses will be under the table and the hard liners will take over—unless we take initiatives. I can see lot of things developing in the future to distress us. So let us keep peace emphasis on. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Presidentʼs office. 2 See footnote 7, Document 3 . 55. Summary Notes of the 556th Meeting of the National Security Council 55. Summary Notes of the 556th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, January 29, 1966, 1:20–2:30 p.m. Vietnam CIA Director Raborn, reading from notes, briefed on the military situation in Vietnam. Six hundred trucks are reported in the south—twice the level of a year ago. They are carrying men and equipment. The North Vietnamese are taking actions in anticipation of a resumption of the bombing. They have improved their air defense. Equipment is being airlifted to Dien Bien Phu. The Chinese are moving forces up to their border with North Vietnam. The infiltration of North Vietnamese troops is heavy. Total North Vietnamese forces number 22 battalions. They are obviously girding themselves for battles yet to come. A cyclical lull usually follows a period of heavy activity. Secretary Rusk reported on the peace offensive, lightly referring to one comment alleging that “McNamara tries to keep us in and Rusk tries to get us out.” The enormous effort made in the last 34 days has produced nothing—no runs, no hits, no errors. The Ho letter (copy attached) 2 was the hardest yet. It did not even include a confusion ploy. Hanoi has done nothing. In all conversations—and we have a telephone on every line—the other party has merely hung up. We now need to make a report to the UN Security Council and consider whether the Vietnam problem should be taken to the UN. Ambassador Goldberg: The tone of the Popeʼs letter is favorable to us. The peace offensive has had a good effect on world opinion. However, we have received no encouragement from any source. We have talked to everyone at the UN—113 representatives. The President: We should have one last report from our allies to be certain that they have heard nothing. General Johnson briefed on Operation Masher. (A summary of this operation is attached.) 3 We are apparently at the beginning of a major engagement. We now have 197,000 men in Vietnam. The President: What do you want most to win? General Johnson: A surge of additional troops into Vietnam. We need to double the number now and then triple the number later. We should call up the reserves and go to mobilization to get the needed U.S. manpower. This involves declaring a national emergency here and in Vietnam. The bombing should be resumed at once to hold down infiltration. By resuming the bombing, we divert North Vietnamese manpower to repair their LOCs, put pressure on their infiltration and their government, and destroy their equipment, especially trucks. General McConnell: There is nothing unusual in the air effort recommended. It involves 330 sorties weekly, B–52 sorties at the rate of 300 a month, and 1200 weekly sorties into Laos. 4 When we resume the bombing, our losses will rise because North Vietnam now has a greater anti-aircraft capability. Secretary McNamara: Our plane loss is now running 5 per 1,000 sorties. General McConnell: We can get better results from bombing North Vietnam than bombing either in Laos or in South Vietnam. General Greene briefed on the current Marine Corps operations, including Double Eagle, which involves the landing of two Marine Corps battalions north of Operation Masher (maps attached). 5 Air strikes should be resumed by a sharp blow as soon as possible. POL storage areas should be struck at once. Armed reconnaissance is not enough. CIA Director Raborn: Our bombing cuts by 50 percent the amount of supplies being trucked from the north. 6 The President: We need evidence for Senator McCarthy. Secretary McNamara: We have destroyed 400 trucks and damaged 250 since the bombing began in February. The bombing will not hurt the infiltration of men, but it will reduce the number. Admiral McDonald: There has been no major infiltration via water of men or materials. We must resume bombing as soon as possible in order to do what we can to slow down infiltration by land. The President said he wanted the hardest proof. General Taylor implied that we cannot get firm proof. He recommended the resumption of bombing as soon as possible—heavy bombing to slow down infiltration as much as we can. He favored striking POL supplies, the port of Haiphong, plus railroad lines. The President said we need to know what we think about how much North Vietnamese traffic increased during the lull. Planners should go to work now on deciding what we can do if we resume the bombing. 7 Secretary McNamara: Four weeks from now we can answer these questions. The Vice President: General Taylor, commenting on his experience in Korea, pointed out that bombing did slow down the North Koreans. We should tell the Senators this because some Senators think our bombing in Korea was poor. We cannot win over Senators by merely citing numbers, but we can win them over by discussing our overall strategy. General Wheeler: We should resume the bombing as soon as practicable on infiltration-associated targets which we have advised on the basis of evidence from the North Vietnamese. General McConnell: Our bombing is ineffective because of the restrictions placed upon the Air Force. We should lift these restrictions and we would then get results. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Valenti also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) 2 Attached but not printed. Dated January 24, Ho Chi Minhʼs letter was sent to several Communist heads of state and broadcast over Hanoi Radio in English on January 28. The letter called the U.S. peace offensive a “sham peace trick” designed solely to conceal the U.S. “scheme for intensifying the war of aggression.” 3 Attached but not printed. Operation Masher, retitled White Wing, began January 25 when U.S. and allied troops moved into northern Binhdinh Province. 4 According to Valentiʼs notes, McConnell stated: “In South Vietnam attack sorties 1,000 a week and 300 a month for B–52ʼs. In Laos 1,200 a week.” 5 Attached but not printed. 6 According to Valentiʼs notes, the President asked: “Suppose we had been bombing every day. Would we have had 600 trucks coming down? How many?” Green responded: “Convinced we could have stopped half of them.” Raborn then stated: “With good bombing could have cut down flow by 50 per cent.” 7 According to Valentiʼs notes, President stated: “(1) Letʼs see what we think is happening in increased traffic since the pause; (2) see what we can do to stop that traffic; (3) see if we are really being effective.” 56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 56. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 29, 1966. SUBJECT Bringing Viet Nam to the Security Council On the assumption the bombing of the North has been resumed, Arthur Goldberg and I are agreed that an almost simultaneous request for a Security Council meeting would help demonstrate that we want to stop not just the bombing but the whole war by seeking an honorable settlement. Furthermore, the Popeʼs appeal for UN mediation provides the United States with a favorable opportunity to convene the Security Council promptly on the Viet Nam problem. We recommend therefore that you approve a US move to convene the Council. You could announce this decision on Monday morning; 2 Ambassador Goldberg would about the same time submit a formal letter to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting, and the Security Council could meet on late Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning. Our plan is to have the United States preempt the situation in the Council in two ways: (a) a detailed speech by Ambassador Goldberg laying out the full record of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, the lack of constructive responses by the other side, and their continued aggression; and (b) a resolution calling for unconditional discussions among the participants of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962. 3 It is true that our frequent soundings over the past year, including the last one two weeks ago, on the desirability of bringing the Viet Nam question to the Security Council have produced almost uniformly unfavorable responses. U Thant said in his press conference January 20: 4 “I felt, and I still feel, that at this stage the UN cannot be involved in the conflict”. The Soviets and French whom we consulted as well as the British, Australians, and New Zealanders were decidedly negative. The unfavorable reactions have been based primarily on the fact that Hanoi and Peking, because they are not UN members, have explicitly and repeatedly rejected any UN jurisdiction or involvement in the Viet Nam problem, and would therefore presumably refuse to participate in the Security Council debate or accept any decisions the Security Council might take. Consequently, it is assumed, no doubt correctly, that the Soviets would oppose any Security Council consideration or action, would feel obliged to attack the United States viciously during the debate, and would veto any substantive resolution that might be proposed. A debate could further reduce whatever capabilities the USSR may have as an eventual mediator and could further reduce their freedom to deal constructively with the United States on other matters such as disarmament. An additional argument against reference to the Security Council has been that it would cut across whatever moves toward negotiation were being made as a result of our peace offensive. Nevertheless, there are two strong reasons for convening the Security Council, one psychological and one substantive. First, once our bombing of the North has resumed, it will be especially important that it be clear to the world that our peace offensive is still being vigorously pursued; also such a move would meet the persistent domestic criticism that the full resources of the UN have not been brought to bear on the Viet Nam problem. Second, while we can assume strong Soviet opposition, a Security Council debate focusing on the need to move the Viet Nam problem to the conference table should at least help stimulate further peace moves (the Pope, the non-aligned, free world friends) through diplomatic channels whether or not the Security Council is able to adopt a formal resolution. This course is not without risks. We can expect that resumption of the bombing of the North will have dissipated to a degree the present favorable international climate and support for our position. The risks are threefold: a. there would be pressure to include in the resolution a call for a ceasefire; b. we will also be pressed to agree to a formulation on NLF participation in any negotiations which goes beyond our present publicly stated position; and c. those who would be willing to support a call for unconditional discussions in some appropriate forum are also likely to insist that such a proposal be made in the context of further suspension of bombing. The way to meet this is for the United States to preempt the situation with a resolution which formulates a number of key points in a manner acceptable to us. The attached resolution 5 is submitted for your approval. We estimate there is a majority in the Council for such a resolution. Moreover, because of our peace offensive we should be able to prevent a majority being mobilized in the Council for a resolution or an amendment calling for another suspension of the bombing by the United States without any reciprocity by the other side. There are two principal likely results: 1. Hanoi and Peking will deny Security Council competence and it may be that as a consequence the members would decide against pressing any formal resolution to the vote. Such an outcome would be satisfactory to us since it would then be clear to world opinion and our own that we seek peace but our adversaries do not. 2. If the members prefer to vote on a resolution, we are likely to have the requisite majority. 6 Dean Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19. Secret; Nodis; Pinta. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson at 7:30 p.m. (Ibid.) 2 January 31. 3 Regarding the resolution submitted to the Security Council on January 31, see Document 59 . 4 See footnote 4, Document 33 . 5 Attached but not printed. 6 At 4:30 p.m. on January 30 Rusk spoke by telephone with McGeorge Bundy, who stated that the President had asked if Rusk was certain that going to the United Nations was the right course. According to notes of the conversation, Rusk “replied ‘yes, he thought so.’ Let the Security Council take it on to see if they can do anything.” Asked by Bundy if his “subordinates were on board,” Rusk said, “Goldberg and Sisco think it is all right.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 57. Editorial Note 57. Editorial Note The United States resumed the bombing of North Vietnam on January 31, 1966, following a 37-day pause which began on December 24, 1965. President Johnsonʼs statement announcing the resumption of air strikes was broadcast over radio and television from the White House Theater at 10 a.m. on January 31. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pages 115–116. Later the same morning Secretary Rusk made a statement on the resumption of the bombing and held a news conference. For text, see Department of State Bulletin , February 14, 1966, pages 223–229. On February 3 the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry released a long memorandum in which it attacked Washingtonʼs “sham” peace negotiations during the bombing pause and defended the DRVʼs refusal to respond to U.S. overtures. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In an analysis of the memorandum prepared for Secretary Rusk on February 5, Thomas Hughes noted that it contained “Hanoiʼs most official and definitive rejoinder to the US 14 Points to date.” (Intelligence Note 71; ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives—North Vietnam) January 31–March 8: The Honolulu Conference; Congressional Hearings on the War January 31–March 8: The Honolulu Conference; Congressional Hearings on the War 58. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson Washington, January 31, 1966, 3:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. No classification marking. Valenti sent a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on February 2 at the Presidentʼs direction. 59. Editorial Note 60. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, February 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to the President at 11:30 a.m. (Memorandum to the President, February 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19) 61. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Top Secret. 62. Editorial Note 63. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 3, 1966, 4:25 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.04, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 64. Editorial Note 65. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, February 4, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B1676R, V–1 Vietnam 1966 (Jan.-Feb.). Secret. 66. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, February 4, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Vietnam Intelligence. Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. Raborn forwarded the estimate to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 together with a 25-page study, dated January 28, on “The Impact of Intensified Air Attacks Against Economic Targets in North Vietnam,” prepared by CIAʼs Office of Research and Reports in response to a request from the Department of State. (Ibid.) 67. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 5, 1966, 5:08 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Presidentʼs Honolulu Conference. Secret. The President and Rusk were on board the airplane en route to Honolulu; see footnote 2, Document 68. 68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea Washington, February 5, 1966, 6:07 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Canberra and Wellington and repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for U. Alexis Johnson. 69. Editorial Note 70. Paper Prepared by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) Washington, February 10, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files, McNaughton VII. Top Secret; Sensitive. McNaughton forwarded the paper to McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the corrected ‘Honolulu Sheet.’” McNaughton also sent copies to Vance and Goodpaster. A draft of the paper was forwarded to Unger by Blouin on February 12 under cover of a memorandum that called it “a draft of the US/GVN military objectives for 1966 which were developed at Honolulu.” (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, JCS Working Papers, 1966–1967) 71. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Indian Ambassador (Nehru) Washington, February 10, 1966, 6:14 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Nehru, Tape F66.04, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 72. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, February 11, 1966, 9 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.05, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 73. Editorial Note 74. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, February 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:25 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10:30 a.m. 75. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Moyers) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, February 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. 76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:38 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Ball and Bromley Smith, and approved by Rusk. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 154–156. 77. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson Washington, February 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20. Secret. In a covering memorandum to the President, Bundy indicated that he had written this memorandum on the airplane, presumably while returning from his Asian trip following the Honolulu Conference. (Ibid.) Bundy provided an interim report on his visit to Saigon, during which he discussed “strengthened administrative arrangements with Embassy officers,” in a memorandum to the President on February 11. (Ibid.) 78. Memorandum From George Reedy to President Johnson Washington, February 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex CO 312. No classification marking. Reedy served on Johnsonʼs Senate and Vice Presidential staffs and was Press Secretary to the President from March 1964 to July 1965. 79. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 19, 1966, 10 a.m.–1:30 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B0125A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65–31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 22. 80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, February 21, 1966, 7:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Read; cleared by President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Read. Drafts of the telegram with the Presidentʼs handwritten revisions are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Attached to the drafts is a note stating that the President read the telegram to Goldberg and Moyers for their approval while they were in his office on February 21. 81. Telephone Conversion Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, February 22, 1966, 8:52 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 6602.05, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 82. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 22, 1966, 11:45 a.m.-1:30 p.m. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65–31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 23. 83. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) Washington, February 23, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret. 84. Notes of Meeting Washington, February 24, 1966, 8 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No. classification marking. Valenti took these notes and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 85. Notes of Meeting Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bromley Smith Files, Meeting on Vietnam. No classification marking. Drafted by Bromley Smith. For Valentiʼs notes of the same meeting and an attendance list, see Document 86. Helms also took notes. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65–31 Dec 72) 86. Notes of Meeting Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting is from the President Daily Dairy. (Ibid.) For Bromley Smithʼs notes of the same meeting, see Document 85. 87. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield Washington, March 1, 1966, 9:42 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.10, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, March 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:16 a.m. and passed to the White House. 89. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 7, 1966, 9:25 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.12, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 90. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, March 8, 1966, 3:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Chrono. Secret. 58. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 58. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 1 Washington, January 31, 1966, 3:50 p.m. I think that your statement 2 of today makes it all the more important to begin immediately on one peace move right after another. Meanwhile, at the same time, we keep up our military pressure. Here are some suggestions about peace initiatives: 1. You write a letter to the Pope in which you thank him for his efforts and suggest your readiness to dispatch Goldberg or someone else to the Vatican to discuss with the Pope his idea about non-aligned nations taking an active role in peacemaking efforts. 2. Brief the members of the House and Senate in small sessions as you did in the early days of your Presidency. As Senator Clinton P. Anderson told me, there are many Senators and Congressmen who have not had the opportunity to hear the briefings of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. 3. Begin almost immediately the series of task forces on-the-scene in Vietnam—Secretary Freeman and agricultural experts—Dr. Hornig and health experts—Secretary Gardner and education experts—some well-known U.S. Mayor and public administration experts. As I outlined in an earlier memorandum, these task forces could go into Vietnam at two-week intervals to do substantive studies of how to increase the civil effectiveness of South Vietnam. 4. Have Walt Rostow gather a group of political scientists like James McGregor Burns, Dick Neustadt, and others to develop a viable political party system in Vietnam. 5. The President travel to Honolulu and meet with General Westmoreland and Prime Minister Ky. Here the President could get first-hand information on the military campaign. But most important, the President could appear with Prime Minister Ky and stress the political, economic, and social future of South Vietnam once the fighting has stopped. Perhaps economic news could be announced here—some specifics on the Mekong River project—housing projects—land reform—such a meeting could serve as a focal point for showing how bright the future for South Vietnam could be—and indeed a future for all of Southeast Asia. Moreover, it would be very helpful for the world to see the cordial relations between Ky and the President and their combined faith in the kind of world that can be built without fighting in South Vietnam. 6. Why canʼt the President write a personal letter to the heads of governments all over the world telling them why we are in Vietnam, what we hoped for in Vietnam and how the fighting can be stopped in Vietnam? These are some ideas which may or may not be worthwhile. Jack Valenti 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. No classification marking. Valenti sent a copy of the memorandum to McGeorge Bundy on February 2 at the Presidentʼs direction. 2 See Document 57 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Below Valentiʼs signature the President wrote: “Talk to Bundy and get him to recommend & supplement.” 59. Editorial Note 59. Editorial Note Implementing the plan recommended to President Johnson by Secretary Rusk in Document 56 , Ambassador Goldberg submitted a letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council on January 31, 1966, requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Vietnam. At the same time, Goldberg submitted a draft U.S. resolution calling for “immediate discussion without preconditions … among the appropriate interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia.” Goldberg explained and defended the U.S. proposal at a meeting of the Security Council on February 1. On February 2 the Security Council voted to place the Vietnam question on its agenda. The Council then decided that informal and private consultations be held to determine the most appropriate way of continuing the debate and adjourned to that end. For text of Goldbergʼs letter, his statements on February 1, and the draft resolution, see Department of State Bulletin , February 14, 1966, pages 229–239. Documentation on U.S. efforts to secure a favorable vote in the Security Council and on the ensuing consultations is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Regarding the outcome of the consultations, see footnote 2, Document 85 . 60. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 60. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, February 1, 1966. 2761. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Bombing resumption. Resumption of bombing renewed confidence in Vietnam. The govt understood why we had to have the “peace offensive,” but they were relieved when it was over. I agree that the 37 day pause has indeed “made a record”; and that we should rub this in and make the most of it, as we plan to do at the U.N. Also I am gratified by the way in which Secretary Rusk took my views into account. I believe our U.N. resolution is in good shape. Undoubtedly the fact that we are for peace and they are not is helpful with the U.S. public, with people in the United Kingdom and some other Western countries. I doubt if it does us much good with the so-called non-aligned countries—in which I include France. I donʼt believe there is a greater waste of time than to try to carry out literally what the non-aligned countries advise. Even when we do precisely what they specify, they will for many reasons never applaud us and rarely approve. As was once said of a certain American politician, they are no help to their friends and no threat to their enemies. Obviously, we must consider their interests and our interests, but we should not give too much attention to their whims and attitudes. The bombing pause, however, has created a much bigger opportunity than simply making a showing that we are for peace and they are not. I wonder if it does not create an opportunity to bring about additional enthusiastic popular support for your policy in Vietnam. To do this, we need something more than to prove that we are for peace and they are not. A colorful, somewhat emotion-stirring showing is needed to dramatize the fact that the Communists are in truth flagrant aggressors and not the moralistic, patriotic civil war fighters which Communist propaganda has, with considerable success, made them out to be. The Security Council meeting provides a great chance for this, and, as I have reported, we have dramatic materials here in the way of NVN uniforms, Chinese firearms, etc. with which to document a strong speech by Amb Goldberg that this is a clear case of aggression—and that suppression of aggression is the rock on which the United Nations is founded. In 1956, at the time of the Suez incident, Dag Hammarskjold said to me that the United Nations must always condemn the use of force except in self-defense if “it is to be a respectable organization—and I use the word respectable in the literal sense as meaning worthy of respect.” We face two kinds of aggression here: the Viet Cong with its rank and file recruited by terrorism in the South, but officered and directed from the North. This is the old aggression which has been with us for five years. And then we face a new and even more obvious aggression in the form of the Army of North Vietnam, which wear NVN uniforms, carry NVN identity cards, speak Vietnamese with northern accents and have Chinese firearms. This second aggression is absolutely flagrant, classic and conventional, and I donʼt believe we should be gingerly or apologetic about saying so. Since writing the above, I have learned of Zorthianʼs wire to Marks, 2 which, of course, he has the right to send, since I hold that Zorthian, like all U.S. Agency Chiefs here, has and should have an open channel to his agency. It is a statement of Zorithianʼs opinion which, of course, was sent without my approval or direction. I want to assure you that I am in no sense a candidate to do this, that I have a great deal to do here and that I believe Amb Goldberg would handle this whole thing beautifully. I believe that the bombing pause also has created other opportunities to educate U.S. public opinion so that Americans will not make utterly unreasonable judgments, using such asinine phrases as “a no-win” policy and expecting neat, gaudily packaged solutions. In most of the world today, there are no solutions, but there is the question of whether these tough problems will be well-managed or not. You should be judged on the extent to which you enable the United States to have some choice and not be pushed into a corner with a choice of being “Red”or “dead,” which is no choice at all. Your decision to move into the seaports and your decision to bomb the North has given the United States some real choices. It would also be well to accustom the public to the idea that in the modern world you work through a balance of defense and diplomacy or of military and civil, and that while occasionally a decisive action at the right time is possible and desirable, there are some things which we must simply weather out. In his biography of the late President Kennedy, Sorensen cites the case of the British statesman William Pitt, who was asked in the House of Commons in 1805 what had been gained by the war against France. He said: “We have gained everything that we would have lost if we had not fought this war.” This is even truer of our war in Vietnam than it was of the British war against France, and, as far as Vietnam is concerned, what we would have lost had not we fought it is nothing less than a climate in which we as a free nation can exist at all. 2. Basic political. We now have the figures for the number of returnees into TTA Chieu Hoi camps for the month of January. It is 1,426. This compares with a figure of 406 for January 1965 and 446 for January 1964—a three-fold increase. Of possibly even greater interest is the fact that since Tet, which fell on January 24, the daily rate of returnees is 84. The daily rate of returnees in December was 36. If, as some people think, the Tet campaign should be regarded as a start of a new trend rather than the culmination of a campaign, this figure of 84 per day could be tremendously significant. Many of the returnees are coming in with Tet campaign leaflets, but we cannot tell how many. There appears to have been a significant increase during the past three months of popular willingness to provide information on the Viet Cong to the GVN. While difficult to ascertain in terms of numbers of reports, the volume of usable information emanating from the police informant effort has increased 50–75 per cent since approximately October 1, 1965. 3. Current political. The reporters spent a lot of time listening to coup rumors and some of them filed stories based on these rumors. The most extreme story of this sort was a UPI item of January 7 suggesting that Prime Minister Ky had mysteriously disappeared. Ky knocked this down by strolling through the streets of downtown Saigon the next day. Ky has told me that he knows about what plotting has been going on and that a few people have been arrested including one Nguyen Bao Kim who was involved in the February 1965 coup which Ky suppressed. They were aiming either to kidnap or assassinate him—and myself. The Directorate is expected to meet on February 2 to pass on the membership of the “Democracy Building Council” whose formation Prime Minister Ky announced in his January 15 speech. 3 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. McGeorge Bundy forwarded the telegram to the President at 11:30 a.m. (Memorandum to the President, February 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 19) 2 Not further identified. 3 See Document 24 . 61. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 61. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 3, 1966. JCSM–76–66 SUBJECT Consequences of an Enclave Strategy (U) 1. (U) Reference is made to: a. Your memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 17 January 1966, on the above subject. 2 b. “A Communication on Vietnam from General James M. Gavin,” Harperʼs magazine, February 1966. 3 c. JCSM–652–65, dated 27 August 1965, subject: “Concept for Vietnam.” 4 d. JCSM–811–65, dated 10 November 1965, subject: “Future Operations and Force Deployments with Respect to the War in Vietnam (U).” 5 e. JCSM–16–66, dated 8 January 1966, subject: “Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U).” 6 f. JCSM–41–66, dated 18 January 1966, subject: “Air Operations Against North Vietnam (NVN) (U).” 7 2. (U) In response to your request, reference 1 a, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the proposals outlined in General Gavinʼs letter to Harperʼs magazine, reference 1 b. Their analysis of the military consequences of the adoption of such an “enclave” strategy follows. 3. (S) For this analysis, it has been assumed that the United States would continue to seek a stable, noncommunist government in South Vietnam (SVN) and would assist the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to defeat the Viet Cong (VC) and to extend GVN control throughout SVN. 4. (TS) Coordination of current strategy with the GVN is essential to successful operations. If forced to accede to such an “enclave” strategy, the political/military structure of the GVN is likely to collapse under the resulting stresses. For example: a. The GVN would probably lose its existing support and measure of control in areas outside enclaves. b. Experience to date has established the fact that without military presence the communication among and movement of people between enclaves, the maintenance of commercial activities and economic programs, and the day-to-day functions of government would essentially cease. c. If the RVNAF were to remain In areas beyond the enclaves, they must then combat the increased VC/PAVN forces essentially without the aid of the United States and other Free World ground forces and perhaps also without their direct advice and logistic support. Military coordination between the United States and the RVNAF could collapse. d. If, on the other hand, the RVNAF were to withdraw to the enclaves, they would abandon the paramilitary forces, as well as all province, town, and hamlet officials, in areas outside the enclaves to the enemy and permit the communists to consolidate their control over the entire countryside beyond the enclaves. e. The obvious and prolonged concentration of US forces in defensive enclaves could incite anti-US sentiment. 5. (TS) An essential element of the “enclave” strategy advanced by General Gavin is the requirement for fewer US forces, presumably not exceeding current in-country strength of about 200,000. CINCPAC estimated 8 that this force level could defend essential base areas and key LOCs and secure 10 per cent of the land area (encompassing about 40 per cent of the population) against the enemy threat existing at that time. In view of the increased VC/PAVN threat, commitment at the above level of forces to such an “enclave” strategy would not now insure the military security of essential base areas and population centers nor protect sufficient food-producing land to feed the population. Thus, a determined defense of enclaves of adequate size and number could now require US forces well in excess of 200,000. 6. (TS) Such an “enclave” strategy would not necessarily reduce casualties. Ultimately, a defensive posture in the enclaves might well result in casualties on at least the same scale as a more balanced strategy. In the ʼ“enclave” strategy, loyal Vietnamese, particularly local officials, must either flee to the enclaves or face VC reprisals. Permitted to consolidate their forces, their supply system, and their base areas, the VC and PAVN units would be in a position to launch more carefully-planned and highly-selective attacks—probes or large-scale efforts—against the enclaves. To the degree we surrender control of the countryside to the VC/PAVN, we facilitate their capability to employ longer range weapons. In addition, there probably would be a heavy influx of refugees, thus offering a channel for VC infiltration difficult to close. Such infiltrators could increase casualties. 7. (TS) General Gavinʼs letter implies that the expansion of our present actions would lead to a direct armed confrontation with the Chinese communists (ChiComs). In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such a confrontation is more likely to occur from a gradually increasing ChiCom involvement which leads almost imperceptibly into such a war than through a deliberate and abrupt decision to take on the United States. The defensive nature of the enclaves might further stimulate rather than discourage the ChiComs to exploit what they could regard as a weakening of US resolve in Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a deliberate ChiCom decision to risk direct armed confrontation, including the magnitude, character, and time-phasing of the introduction of ChiCom forces, will result from their assessment of US resolve and inherent risks to the attainment of Chinese objectives. Such a decision would not be the direct reaction to the deployment of sizable US forces to SVN nor to air operations against North Vietnam (NVN) which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have proposed. Moreover, the ChiComs would be invalidating the basic premise of communist “Wars of National Liberation” by bringing major powers into direct confrontation. However, as US force buildup continues, the likelihood of ChiCom support of the VC/PAVN will increase, especially as the United States approaches attainment of its objectives in SVN. 8. (S) The balanced strategy outlined in references 1 c and 1 d is designed to achieve US national objectives and to assure that, if the United States enters into negotiations to achieve these objectives, it does so from a position of strength. 9. (S) The Gavin “enclave” strategy, on the other hand, appears to depend upon two underlying implications: (a) that the withdrawal of US forces to enclaves would bring the communists to the negotiating table; and (b) that the United States is willing to negotiate itself out of SVN by forfeiting its objectives. These implications are highly questionable. In contrast, the US/GVN would be bargaining from a position of weakness due to the cessation of offensive operations in SVN, with only that leverage afforded by such bombing as might be continued in NVN to persuade the VC/DRV to yield the gains they acquired by default. Additionally, the VC, having undisputed control of the predominant land areas in SVN, could seek world recognition as the de facto government of SVN, or, alternatively, annex their holdings to NVN. 10. (S) General Gavin also proposes that the United States desist from bombing NVN. The serious consequences of halting air operations in NVN, set forth in references 1 e and 1 f, would be in addition to those foreseen for an “enclave” strategy in SVN. If the “enclave” strategy were implemented without air operations in NVN, this remaining major inducement toward negotiations and source of leverage would thereafter be forfeited, and the VC/PAVN would have unimpeded access to support from the north. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the offensive air operations against the DRV are an essential element of a balanced US strategy. They consider it no less so in an “enclave” strategy. These air operations are a principal military means for inhibiting the buildup and support of communist forces in SVN and for persuading the DRV to cease its aggression. 11. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not support such an “enclave” strategy since it contains significant deficiencies, and the advantages claimed are more illusory than real. By forfeiting the initiative, abandoning solid negotiating leverage, conceding large land areas to the enemy, and alienating the GVN and other friendly governments, the “enclave” strategy, in effect, abandons national objectives. The military consequences would, in their judgment, lead to US/GVN defeat in SVN or ultimate US abandonment of Southeast Asia. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 9 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Top Secret. 2 Not found. 3 Published January 16. Gavin proposed that the United States stop the bombing of North Vietnam and the escalation of the ground war, limit U.S. troops to the defense of several enclaves along the South Vietnamese coast, and renew efforts to “find a solution through the United Nations or a conference in Geneva.” 4 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 356 – 363 . 5 Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, JCS Memos, vol. I) 6 Document 13 . 7 Document 27 . 8 Appendix C to JCSM–811–65. [Footnote in the source text.] 9 Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original. 62. Editorial Note 62. Editorial Note In telegram [ document number not declassified ], February 3, 1966, Director of Central Intelligence Raborn sent the following message to the CIA Station Chief in Saigon: “1. Under Secretary George Ball has asked [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] to undertake ultra sensitive covert political action program targeted against National Liberation Front. Project designed to turn myth of NLF against its creators by playing on and exacerbating regional tensions within Lao Dong/NLF control apparatus and attempting to induce ethnic Southerners within this mechanism either to act as if they were independent or, at least, to chafe at heightened awareness of the fact that they are not. “2. Objectives this program include (1) exploiting and increasing tensions between indigenous Southerners whose names and faces are necessary to preserve fiction that NLF is spontaneously created South Vietnamese political group and Tonkinese Lao Dong cadre running show both in South and from party and DRV reunification committees in Hanoi, (2) inducing outright defections of key NLF personnel to the GVN, (3) inducing NLF personnel to complain about Northern control even though they do so within the fold and do not break away to join the GVN, (4) where possible, doubling such personnel to serve as additional sources of information and centers of political agitation within the NLF, (5) inducing detachment from NLF, if not outright defection or switch to GVN, of key groups or individuals at provincial and district levels to fragment NLF in local areas. “3. HQS well aware difficulty and complexity this program, its high risk and flap potential and its limited chances of success. These have all been stressed to Messrs. Ball and Alexis Johnson and acknowledged by them, but they want us to try anyway.” Raborn then discussed implementation of the project. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80–R01720R) In a follow-up telegram to the Saigon Station, [ document number not declassified ], February 10, Raborn amplified the fourth objective, stating that the persons mentioned therein “might perhaps also be useful as discreet channels for future political communications from the US and/or GVN.” Raborn also outlined the groups to be targeted: “(1) Upper echelon NLF figures whose names are in some measure known to the world at large (e.g. Nguyen Huu Tho, Huynh Tan Phat, Phung Van Cung, Nguyen Van Hieu, and Tran Buu Khiem). (2) NLF overseas representatives outside the bloc. (3) Middle echelon figures such as lesser known members of the Central Committee and staff officers in COSVN or regional headquarters elements. (4) Actually or potentially affiliated groups or organizations, particularly ones composed of ethnic or religious minorities such as Cao Dai and Hoa Hao factions, Khmer Krom, and Fulro. (5) Provincial, district, village and hamlet leadership and cadres.” (Ibid.) In a telegram sent through CIA communications facilities on February 15, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson notified Ambassador Lodge that the Department of State had developed with CIA “some new thoughts” on channels through which approaches to the National Liberation Front might be attempted. Johnson indicated that the Saigon Station Chief could brief Lodge on the details and asked the Ambassador for his comments and suggestions. (Ibid.) In a March 18 memorandum for the record, George Carver of CIAʼs Vietnamese Affairs Staff noted that the project “had been approved at highest levels within the CIA and the Department of State.” (Ibid.) 63. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 63. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 3, 1966, 4:25 p.m. LBJ: Hello? Dean? DR: Yes sir. LBJ: I donʼt want any other human to know this—Iʼve talked to you and Bob [McNamara]—but I fairly think I would like to go out to Honolulu on Saturday night 2 with you and Bob and meet Westmoreland, who is there now, and have Sharp give me a briefing on U.S. military matters on Monday and probably ask for Lodge to come up and, if he can, bring Ky and Thieu with him, the Chief of State, and talk to them about some of the non-military matters, pacification, and have with me, probably, Freeman and Keppel and the Surgeon General of Health, to kind of, as a cover and discussion on—weʼve been thinking of sending these educational, agricultural, and health missions out there. And I think it would give me a chance to visit with Westmoreland and get a little bit closer to his problems and what he envisages out there. And certainly let them see me and let Sharp see me. And I think at the same time, if I had the proper political diplomatic group with me, I could talk to them about what we could do to increase our pacification efforts and our economic aid thatʼs pending and so on and so forth. I rather think, too, that in the briefings that will follow that it would be good to have just visited with Westmoreland some. Now heʼs gonna be there for two or three or four days. I know of nothing urgent thatʼs keeping me here Saturday night. We could leave Saturday night and be there—leave here Saturday evening—be there at midnight and then stay over ʼtil about Tuesday and come on back. I want you to give it a little thought. Unless you have very violent objections, I would like you to send Lodge a cable without a bunch of secretaries over there knowing it, because I donʼt want anybody to know it. Just the most secret thing that we can have in the State Department, if we can have anything secret. And ask him if he could meet us there. I would be there Sunday on, if he could come up Monday. And for him to ascertain if he could bring these other two fellows with him. I rather think it might help this fellow in his own country and I think weʼd have a little insurance having Thieu, their Chief of State, so if something happened to Ky, well we wouldnʼt necessarily be tied to Ky too much. And I would like for us to be in a little contact with whatʼs happening as well as Mansfield. DR: Are you alone in your office here? LBJ: No, Iʼm alone in my bedroom. DR: Oh, I see. May I have a word with you about this after our briefing session. 3 LBJ: Sure. Sure you can any way. I just want to be sure we get a cable out to Lodge asking him if he can go. DR: Well, Iʼm here at the White House now so I can do this when I get back to the office. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.04, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 February 5. 3 The President and Rusk met with the Congressional leadership at 6:17 p.m. for a briefing on the Indian food situation. Rusk did not meet afterward with the President but did speak with him by telephone at 8:06 p.m. The conversation was not recorded. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 64. Editorial Note 64. Editorial Note On February 4, 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held the first of five televised hearings on President Johnsonʼs request for $400 million in supplemental foreign aid funds for Vietnam for fiscal year 1966. Earlier, on January 28, at an untelevised preliminary hearing on the supplemental appropriation, the Committee questioned Secretary of State Rusk about the war. Following its decision on February 3 to hold public hearings, the Committee heard testimony about U.S. involvement in Vietnam from the following witnesses: Agency for International Development Administrator David Bell on February 4; General James Gavin on February 8; former Ambassador George Kennan on February 10; General Maxwell Taylor on February 17; and Secretary of State Rusk on February 18. Transcripts of the hearings are printed in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966—Vietnam (Washington, DC, 1966). Extensive excerpts are printed in The Vietnam Hearings (New York, 1966). For background information on the hearings, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships , Part IV: July 1965–January 1968 (Princeton, NJ, 1995), pages 222–230 and 239–251. At 8:27 a.m. on February 5, the morning after the first day of televised hearings, President Johnson telephoned Larry F. OʼBrien and expressed his extreme displeasure at the hearings, calling them “a very, very disastrous break.” A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and OʼBrien, Tape 66.04, PNO 1. 65. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 65. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, February 4, 1966. SUBJECT The Managing Hierarchy of the NLF and the Current Political Goals of the Viet Cong At lunch on Wednesday, 2 February, I mentioned that, by and large, the upper echelons of the National Liberation Frontʼs managing hierarchy are staffed by second-raters with very little public prestige or personal following. This is a point to which insufficient attention has been paid in current public debates about Vietnam and allied current discussion about the NLFʼs stature as a “southern” political group. When Hanoi set up the Front in the summer and fall of 1960, it instructed the VC to select people for overt positions who would lend prestige to the NLF and, by their very names, be capable of winning some measure of active public support. The Communists, however, had a great deal of difficulty in meeting this requirement. The first NLF Central Committee, not announced until March 1962, had places for 52 members but the announcement gave only 31 names, most of them virtually unknown even in South Vietnam. The second Central Committee, announced in January 1964, had only 41 members, with no significant improvement in the caliber or personal renown of the announced members. There may have been additional reasons for leaving vacant slots on the Central Committee (e. g., bait for the politically ambitious who had not yet joined the NLF, or concealing the identity of covert members); but even so, the fact of such vacancies—which still exist—demonstrates in some degree that the Communists have been unable to get the use of the names of the kind of people they want. How far down in the barrel the Communists were forced to reach becomes apparent if we take a look at the backgrounds and stature of some of those who now hold senior positions within the NLF, such as the Chairman of its Presidium, Nguyen Huu Tho; its Secretary General, Huynh Tan Phat; its Public Health Commissioner, who is also a Central Committee member and Chairman of the NLFʼs “Committee for the Protection of World Peace,” Phung Van Cung; its External Relations Committee chairman (also a Central Committee member), Tran Buu Khiem; its principal Traveling Representative (and original Secretary General), Nguyen Van Hieu; and its Representative in Algiers, Huynh Van Tam. Nguyen Huu Tho (born in Cholon in 1910) studied law at a provincial university in France during the 1930ʼs, began practicing in Saigon in 1934, was admitted to the Saigon bar in 1939, and practiced law in Vinh Long in 1947. Some sources claim he was “President of the Tribunal” in Can Tho in 1949, though this is not certain. His legal career, even at the provincial bar, was far from distinguished, and he is frequently categorized by his former professional colleagues as a “lawyer without briefs.” His career as a left-wing agitator seems to have begun about 1947, though his Communist associations may have commenced considerably earlier since he appears to have been a school companion of a number of well-known Communist figures, including Tran Van Giau (the leader of the Cochin-Chinese Communists in the 1945–46 period). Tho was Hanoiʼs dictated choice for Chairman of the NLF Central Committee in 1962. He was not, however, a person of any particular prestige or prominence and, indeed, was regarded by many South Vietnamese intellectuals and professionals as something of a joke. Huynh Tan Phat is usually described as an “architect” though we doubt if anyone could point with certainty to any building he has designed or built. He is supposed to have been born in My Tho in 1913 and educated at the College of Fine Arts in Hanoi, graduating around 1936. He has been a left-wing political agitator and activist ever since his student days and held posts in a variety of Communist and Viet Minh front organizations and political splinter groups. Though apparently articulate and possessing a considerable clandestine organizational skill, Phat was virtually unknown even in South Vietnam when he became Secretary General of the NLF. Phung Van Cung was born in Vinh Long Province in 1909 and is said to hold a medical degree from the University of Hanoi. He has practiced medicine in Rach Gia and in Cholon and appears to have been mobilized as a major in the medical corps of the French-controlled Vietnamese Army in 1951, though there is some doubt as to whether he actually served in this capacity. NLF sources claim that Cung was a high-ranking government official under Diem before he moved his family into a Viet Cong-controlled area in 1960, but this is simply not true. Cung was never a leading light even in the limited circle of South Vietnamʼs doctors and has almost certainly become considerably better known since he was named Chairman of the NLF Peace Committee and the NLF “Red Cross” than he ever was before. Tran Buu Khiem was born in Can Tho in 1921 and is said to have studied law at the University of Hanoi, though there is no record of his ever having practiced or having become a member of the Saigon or Hanoi bars. He is a long-time Communist activist and appears to have been a senior member of the “Nambo Resistance and Administrative Committee” in the 1945–1949 period. The record on him is sketchy. Though it suggests considerable competence as a clandestine organizer and political agitator, it certainly has not given him any general stature or personal standing in Vietnamese political or intellectual circles. Nguyen Van Hieu was born in Camau in 1922. Available details about his educational and professional career are confused and contradictory. He seems to have studied agriculture or law, or both, at Hanoi and Saigon universities and is generally described as a “former teacher” (sometimes of biology, sometimes of mathematics) and a journalist, though it is hard to locate much that he has written. He has almost certainly been a Communist-Viet Minh activist and propagandist since about 1945. He was the NLFʼs first Secretary General but since 1963 has served, in effect, as its principal traveling salesman abroad. Like his colleagues in the upper echelons of the NLF, Hieu could hardly be described as a non-Communist Vietnamese of independent professional or political stature. Huynh Van Tam was born in 1919 somewhere in the southern part of Vietnam and was probably educated at a Catholic school in Saigon. He seems to have been a secondary school teacher in Saigon until about 1942 when he began devoting most of his time to Communist political activity. He was named to the NLF Central Committee when it was first formed in the summer of 1960, but is now the NLF Representative in Algiers, and, apparently, no longer a Central Committee member. Tam is fluent in French, knows a good deal of Latin, and is quite polished and articulate. He has made a very strong, favorable impression on a number of Western journalists who have interviewed him, most notably Joseph Kraft. In South Vietnam he is little known except as a long-time left-wing agitator. The above list represents the best that the Communists have been able to come up with, and their best—in terms of political appeal—is not very good. Some, if not all, of these persons are undoubtedly competent as clandestine organizers or agitators but none can be described with any measure of accuracy as a leading South Vietnamese professional or political figure, let alone as a non-Communist leftist or liberal. Given the facts of Vietnamese political history over the past two decades, there are very few people in South Vietnam who command the kind of general stature and reputation of, say, such well-known Americans as Governor Rockefeller, Thomas Dewey, Walter Lippmann, or even Professor Morgenthau. Even names fairly well-known in the hothouse salons of Saigon do not make magic in the countryside. The Communists in the NLF, however, have never been able to crack the circle of such “notables” as do exist, at least not in the sense of being able to persuade any such person to lend their names or prestige to the Communistsʼ front organization. Nguyen Huu Tho, for example, was far less well known and regarded as a lawyer than, say, Maitre Trinh Dinh Thao, a political leftist and almost certainly a VC sympathizer but one who has never been willing to take the public step of joining the Front. All of Diemʼs more celebrated political opponents—Phan Quang Dan, Phan Khac Suu, Nguyen Van Can, Pham Huy Quat, etc.—were united in opposing the VC and the pretensions of the NLF (even if they could agree on nothing else) and usually justified their opposition to Diem by claiming that they could combat the Communists more effectively than he. South Vietnamese intellectuals and professionals have a considerable measure of political sophistication and South Vietnamese interested in political life have had twenty years of firsthand experience with Communist manipulation of front organizations. Few are fooled by the NLFʼs claim to be either “spontaneous” or “indigenous”. Within South Vietnam it is hard to find anyone interested in politics who is not perfectly well aware that the NLF is something set up by and manipulated from Hanoi. This has made [it] extremely difficult for the Front to attract innocent or non-Communist political “names” to serve as window-dressing and, so far, that particular political objective has simply not been achieved. In fact, the Front has not yet been able to include in its overt roster a single South Vietnamese figure who can accurately be described as a non-Communist of significant personal, political, or professional standing. We do not know precisely how much discretionary authority Hanoi has delegated to or allows the NLF leadership, but the broad lines of NLF policy are patently dictated and rigidly controlled by its DRV masters. NLF statements on settlement or negotiation conditions have displayed some variations in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi but none of substance. Over the past year or so, public NLF pronouncements have paid rather more attention to the transition phase of “coalition government” in the South than DRV statements, which generally focus on the ultimate goal of “reunification” (i.e., total political domination by the Hanoi regime). The NLF, however, has always dutifully echoed Hanoiʼs theme that “Vietnam is one” and has consistently depicted “peaceful reunification” as the ultimate objective of its political endeavors. Some of these differences in emphasis have probably been dictated by tactical considerations and some have almost certainly been deliberately devised to support the myth that the NLF is an “independent” political entity indigenous to the South, not a puppet mechanism controlled from Hanoi. The Frontʼs most recent pronouncements are just as unyielding as those of Hanoi and play the same themes. The NLFʼs 30 January commentary on Ho Chi Minhʼs 24 January “letter” to various heads of state 2 stresses that “If U.S. Imperialism stubbornly keeps on intensifying and expanding the war, the South Vietnamese people will resolutely struggle until the end to liberate South Vietnam, protect North Vietnam, and reunify the fatherland.” Basically an “us-too” attack on President Johnsonʼs recent diplomatic peace campaign, this Front statement harps on the current Communist claim that the NLF is “the sole genuine representative of 14 million people in South Vietnam”, plays the line that U.S. disregard of the 1954 Geneva Agreements is the source of all of South Vietnamʼs present woes, and insists that peace can never come unless the “U.S. Imperialists recognize the Frontʼs correct platform”—i.e., its Five Point Program of March 1965. (The Frontʼs “Five Points, the DRVʼs “Four Points” and the actual relationship of both to the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords were analyzed in detail in CIA Research Memorandum No. 0483/66, 5 January 1966.) 3 The NLFʼs 31 January comment on the U. S. approach to the U.N. (broadcast by Hanoi radio on 2 February) is equally intransigent. It condemns the resumption of aerial strikes on the North and “solemnly declares” that the U.N. “has no right at all to decide problems of the South Vietnamese people”, adding that the NLF will consider “all decisions of the U.N. Security Council on Vietnam as null and void”. The statement concludes by emphasizing that: “The only correct solution to restore peace in South Vietnam is that the U.S. Imperialists must withdraw all troops and weapons of the United States and its satellites from South Vietnam, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own internal affairs by themselves. Should the U.S. Imperialists refuse to abandon their aggressive ambition, they will in no way be able to avoid complete and most ignominious failure, whatever barbarous and perfidious maneuvers they may resort to.” There are undoubtedly some regional stresses at least latent in the relationship between the VC/NLF apparatus and its directing supervisors in Hanoi. Within this complex there are almost certainly differences of opinion between persons with some measure of authority, and varying assessments (at least private ones) of the risks and probable outcome of continued struggle against the U.S.-supported GVN. We see no present signs, however, of what could accurately be termed a developing “VC” or “NLF” position on negotiation, peace or ultimate political objectives that differs in any material way from the line laid down by Hanoi. Richard Helms 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B1676R, V–1 Vietnam 1966 (Jan.-Feb.). Secret. 2 Ho Chi Minhʼs letter was printed in The New York Times , January 29, 1966. 3 Not found. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original. 66. Special National Intelligence Estimate 66. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, February 4, 1966. SNIE 10–1–66 POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED US COURSES OF ACTION ON DRV CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THE INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM The Problem To estimate how DRV capabilities to support the insurgency in the South would be affected by increasing the scope and intensity of the bombing of North Vietnam, and how long it would take for the impact to be felt in the South. 2 Concept of the Courses of Action The immediate aims of the bombing would be: 1. To destroy those resources already in North Vietnam that contribute most to support of Communist forces in the South; 2. To block external assistance to the DRV; 3. To harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material through the southern DRV into Laos and South Vietnam. Course A: The enlarged bombing program would include aerial attacks designed to: 1. Destroy all known POL facilities in the northern DRV; 2. Destroy all large military facilities in the northern DRV, except airfields and SAM sites; 3 3. Interdict the land LOCs from China and close DRV ports by various means including mining; 4. Put and keep electric power facilities out of action; 5. Carry out armed reconnaissance against land and water LOCs and all identified military facilities. South of the 20th parallel, such reconnaissance would be particularly intensive and carried out day and night. Course B: The program above, but without closing DRV ports by mining or otherwise. Note This estimate considers only how DRV physical capabilities to support the insurgency in South Vietnam would be affected by certain assumed US bombing attacks on North Vietnam; it does not deal with the possible effect of these attacks on DRV will to continue the war. Conclusions A. The combined impact of destroying in-country stockpiles, restricting import capabilities, and attacking the southward LOCs would greatly complicate the DRV war effort. The cumulative drain on material resources and human energy would be severe. The postulated bombing and interdiction campaign would harass, disrupt, and impede the movement of men and material into South Vietnam and impose great overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe that, with a determined effort, the DRV could still move substantially greater amounts than in 1965. 4 B. However, the cumulative effect of the campaign would almost certainly set a limit to the expansion of PAVN and VC mainforce units and activities in South Vietnam. There are too many uncertainties to permit an estimate of just where that limit would be set. C. If the main ports were not closed, supply of DRV needs from the outside would be greatly simplified, and the problem of moving goods within the DRV would be eased. [Here follows the 9-page “Discussion” section.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, Vietnam Intelligence. Top Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of AEC, NSA, and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant Director of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. Raborn forwarded the estimate to McGeorge Bundy on February 4 together with a 25-page study, dated January 28, on “The Impact of Intensified Air Attacks Against Economic Targets in North Vietnam,” prepared by CIAʼs Office of Research and Reports in response to a request from the Department of State. (Ibid.) 2 In a February 11 memorandum, CIAʼs Office of National Estimates examined the possible short-run effects and the advantages and disadvantages of four different bombing programs against the DRV. (Ibid., Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20) 3 Constant surveillance of the airfields would be maintained and their destruction undertaken whenever interference with our planned air operations, or any offensive air actions against our military forces in SVN, might be initiated. Any SAM installations threatening to interfere with these operations would be attacked. [Footnote in the source text.] 4 Major General Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, United States Air Force, believes that this conclusion and the tone of the estimate reflect an under-estimation of the overall impact of the postulated bombing program and closing of the DRV ports. He believes that the cumulative interacting effect of such bombing and port closure on the economy, the military structure and the political and psychological fabric of North Vietnam would degrade the DRV capabilities to support the war in the south to a greater extent than this estimate indicates. By excluding consideration of the North Vietnamese will to continue the war, a very important effect of the postulated bombing and port closing has been eliminated. [Footnote in the source text.] 67. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 67. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 5, 1966, 5:08 p.m. CAP 66043. The following rather tart message from General De Gaulle was brought this afternoon by Lucet. It is a reply to the Presidentʼs personal message of January 31 informing him of the resumption of bombing. 2 This message hardly calls for an answer. “Dear Mr. President: Your Ambassador in Paris has passed me your message of January 31 in which you explain to me the reasons that make you consider it indispensable to resume the aerial bombing of North Vietnam. I am grateful for the care which you are taking once again to inform me of the situation and of the purposes of your action. As far as France is concerned, I think I should make her opinion of this clear to you, taking account of the experience which she herself went through at an earlier time. For years now we have believed, first, that only a political solution is possible; further, that this solution can only be obtained by a negotiation undertaken on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954; and, finally, that there would be no way to open this negotiation if the United States has not taken and announced a decision to withdraw its military forces from Vietnam and to end all intervention in the internal affairs of the country. Anything which could tend to delay such a result or make it more difficult should, we think, be avoided. On the contrary, the interest of world peace and the friendship which we feel for the United States make us wish eagerly that the United States would accept the above conditions as soon as possible; they are the only ones which would allow an effort for a settlement. As soon as this should happen, you can be sure that France would be certain to assist in the opening of the necessary negotiations. With best personal good wishes, C. de Gaulle” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Presidentʼs Honolulu Conference. Secret. The President and Rusk were on board the airplane en route to Honolulu; see footnote 2, Document 68 . 2 Transmitted in telegram 3575 to Paris, January 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea 68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea 1 Washington, February 5, 1966, 6:07 p.m. 810. 1. Addressees should convey to host governments, with timing and levels at your discretion, assurance that Honolulu conference will not be aimed at any significant changes in the conduct of the war, much less at any discussions in depth of the negotiating situation. Primary purpose is, as President has stated, 2 to give him opportunity to meet with GVN leaders and to go over with them major non-military programs including particularly such key elements as rural construction program, economic difficulties and inflation, and possibility of additional effort concerned with education, health, and agriculture. Latter elements account for presence of Secretaries Freeman and Gardner and former is expected to proceed to Saigon with agricultural delegation after meeting. 2. President is of course also taking advantage of Westmorelandʼs concurrent visit in order to discuss with him the military outlook and to get a general reading on necessary force increases during the year. However, no decisions are expected in this area, 3 and we will continue to stay in close touch with addressee governments as our views and plans mature. Military matters may also arise with GVN, but we do not expect discussion on this subject to receive nearly as much emphasis as the crucial non-military programs. 3. In conveying above, you should make clear that we remain well aware of major interest of addressee governments, as suppliers of military forces, both in respect to strategic decisions and major issues in conduct of negotiations. As addressees know, bombing suspension ended with no significant change in outlook, and we do not at present have any reason to believe that UN initiative will produce anything immediate. We shall continue to stay in close touch. 3. Bangkok may use above in its discretion. Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Canberra and Wellington and repeated to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for U. Alexis Johnson. 2 The President announced at his news conference on February 4 that he planned to attend the Honolulu Conference, flying to Hawaii on February 5 and returning to Washington on February 8. He stated that the conference would consider both “nonmilitary and military matters,” with “a good deal on the pacification matters, particularly on agriculture.” ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 144–146 and 148) 3 Regarding the military discussions at Honolulu, see Document 70 and footnote 2 thereto. 69. Editorial Note 69. Editorial Note The first plenary session of the Honolulu Conference convened at 10 a.m. on Monday, February 7, 1966. The U.S. delegation included President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Gardner, AID Administrator Bell, Ambassadors Harriman and Lodge, and Generals Wheeler and Westmoreland. The South Vietnamese delegation included Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu, Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Huu Co, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Do, Minister of Economy Truong Thai Ton, and Minister of Rural Construction General Nguyen Duc Thang. During the first plenary session, members of both delegations made presentations on the situation in Vietnam, placing particular emphasis on the importance of pacification and other non-military programs. Prime Minister Ky enunciated four goals: defeat the Viet Cong, eradicate social injustice, establish a viable economy, and build true democracy. After lunch four working groups convened to discuss rural construction, economic stabilization, health and education, and the diplomatic track. That evening the President held private talks with Thieu and Ky, which are described in Document 75 . At the second and final plenary session on February 8, the working groups presented their reports, and the President summed up the work of the conference and outlined follow-up measures. The conferenceʼs “Conclusions and Decisions for Further Action” are described in Document 83 . For text of the Joint Communique and the Declaration of Honolulu, released in Honolulu on February 8, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pages 152–155. Plenary session records, working group reports, public statements, and other documentation of the conference are in the Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 305, Honolulu Meeting. Comprehensive documentation on the conference, including background and follow-up material, is also located in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the Honolulu Conference; and ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Honolulu Meeting Papers and Presidentʼs Honolulu Conference. Audiotape recordings of the plenary session on February 7 are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts. For President Johnsonʼs impressions of the conference, see Document 71 . Although the conference emphasized non-military issues, military discussions also took place during the U.S. delegationʼs stay in Honolulu; see Document 70 and footnote 2 thereto. Upon arriving in Los Angeles from Honolulu on February 8, President Johnson announced that Vice President Humphrey would fly to South Vietnam the next day, accompanied by Secretary Freeman, Ambassador Harriman, and McGeorge Bundy, to carry forward the mission agreed upon at the conference. The Vice President was then to visit other Asian capitals to report on the conference. For text of the Presidentʼs remarks in Los Angeles, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pages 155–157. Regarding the Vice Presidentʼs Asian trip, see Document 84 and footnotes 3 and 6 thereto. Reaction in Vietnam to the conference and to Humphreyʼs visit are described in Document 74 . After discussing non-military organization with U.S. officials in Saigon, McGeorge Bundy presented his observations and recommendations to the President on February 16; see Document 77 . 70. Paper Prepared by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) 70. Paper Prepared by Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) 1 Washington, February 10, 1966. 1966 PROGRAM TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ANTICIPATED RESULTS THEREOF A. Increase the strength of South Vietnamese, US and 3rd-country forces in South Vietnam 2 End ʼ65 End ʼ66 1. South Vietnamese National Military Forces —Maneuver battalions ** 139 162 —Regular forces 302,600 325,000 —Regional forces 132,000 150,000 Popular forces 136,400 192,500 2. U.S. forces —Maneuver battalions 35 79 —Strength 184,300 * 429,000 3. Third-country forces —Maneuver battalions 10 23 Strength 22,400 45,000 4. US strike sorties per month (includes for end 1966 CAP, SAR, etc.) —Tactical air 16,500 27,000 —B–52 300 600 * 30,000 less than MACVʼs II-A-Revised ** Breakdown = Reg 108, Ranger 20, Abn 6 = 139 5. All units are to be at full strength at End ʼ66. (This will require continued programs to stimulate recruiting, enforce conscription, and minimize desertions.) B. Expand the offensive actions of such forces while providing essential defense The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, in coordination will: 1. Defend military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under government control. 2. Open and secure lines of communications required to support military operations and for essential support of the civilian population. 3. Conduct clearing and security operations to provide military security in the four selected high priority national construction areas. 4. Conduct intensified offensive operations against major VC/PAVN forces, bases and lines of communications—almost doubling the number of battalion-months of offensive operations from 40 to 75 a month. 5. Increase the level of attack on the infiltration routes through Laos and North Vietnam by more than 60 per cent—from 5,400 to 9,000 attack sorties a month. C. Achieve the following results in 1966: 1. Increase the population in secure areas to 60 per cent from 50 per cent. 2. Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use to 50 per cent from 20 per cent. 3. Increase the destruction of VC/PAVN base areas to 40–50 per cent from 10–20 per cent. 4. Ensure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers and food-producing areas now under government control. 5. Military security needed for pacification of the four selected high-priority areas—increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000. 6. Attrite, by yearʼs end, VC/PAVN forces at a rate at least as high as their capability to put men into the field. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, John McNaughton Files, McNaughton VII. Top Secret; Sensitive. McNaughton forwarded the paper to McNamara on February 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the corrected ‘Honolulu Sheet.’” McNaughton also sent copies to Vance and Goodpaster. A draft of the paper was forwarded to Unger by Blouin on February 12 under cover of a memorandum that called it “a draft of the US/GVN military objectives for 1966 which were developed at Honolulu.” (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, JCS Working Papers, 1966–1967) 2 In his “Historical Briefing,” dated February 16, Westmoreland stated that he spent February 6 with McNamara, at which time McNamara “made the decision that we would go for the full package of combat troops that I had asked for, namely 102 total battalions, but that there would be no reserves called.” (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #4 History File) For McNamaraʼs report of his February 6 meeting with Westmoreland, see The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , vol. IV, pp. 312–313. 71. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Indian Ambassador (Nehru) 71. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Indian Ambassador (Nehru) 1 Washington, February 10, 1966, 6:14 p.m. [Here follows discussion of U.S.-Indian relations.] BKN: I hope you had a very successful visit in [Honolulu]. LBJ: We were very, very pleased in several respects. One, I knew very little about Westmoreland, and youʼre having to act on a manʼs cables here. And itʼs good, I think, for the commander in chief to know the man whose cables he has to act upon every day. Second, I knew nothing about Ky and Thieu, the Chief of State, and what I learned was quite favorable. The impressions, the titles, the military backgrounds, the generals, the air marshals, the field marshals, so on and so forth. They never have been very impressive to civilians in Johnson City, Texas, cause we didnʼt have many storm troopers out there. And we havenʼt had many of them in our government. And I was amazed, as Alex Johnson said, whatever else may be, he [Ky] certainly knows how to talk. Whether he knows how to do as well as he knows how to talk is different. The declaration 2 that we wrote was really his speech and it said in effect that we are going to act to prevent aggression, to defeat aggression. He didnʼt take in any more territory. He was defeating aggression. And weʼre going to defeat social misery, with considerable details along the line of his January 15th speech. 3 And Ky was a young man who was going to lead the revolution in his country and build a new society and a stable society, and he was going to seek and obtain an honorable peace. And thereʼs not anything in those four points that any country, I think, wouldnʼt apply to themselves: to prevent an aggressor, and try to defeat social misery, and establish a stable society, and seek an honorable peace. And it was so eloquent and so simple and so young, [but] we have no illusions and weʼve seen a good many governments come and go and we donʼt know whatʼll happen that night. It was quite different from the General marching around with a sword at his side. And when we had the technicians, sixteen of ʼem, with Orville Freeman, sit down and meet with him, they all, every Ph.D. there, came away rather stimulated at this manʼs exciting interest in the quality of the rice seed and how youʼre going to increase its production. And his demand that we get eight million more school books in there next year. And his telling us how to handle the economic aid that Dave Bell has given him. And he just traded back and forth with Dave Bell for an hour on how to build classrooms. And he said that the American contractors come in and put ʼem up overnight, and the Viet Cong come in and burn ʼem down a week later. And they say, “We burned down American schools.” But he said, “You gave me some materials. We took the materials and put our own people to building the schools and when the Viet Cong came in to get the school they said you cannot touch our school.” BKN: That is very important. LBJ: It becomes our school if they built it. In any event, my point—we have tried for two years to get these people to thinking in terms of building a better society there and not just strictly a military operation but a political one, too. And you canʼt do it unless you can get Lodge and Westmoreland and the Prime Minister to adopt the baby as their own. And we did that. So they went back to put in the Lodge-Ky-Westmoreland program. And I sent along the Vice President and the Secretary of Agriculture, and in about a month from now Iʼll send out the Secretary of Education and Health. And then Iʼll send out the Surgeon General of Medicine. And then I told him weʼd meet back in Honolulu six months from now to just see what weʼve done in this period of time. So, Iʼm gonna stay on it and if itʼs impossible Iʼll find it out, but Iʼm gonna try. [Here follow closing remarks.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Nehru, Tape F66.04, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 See Document 69 . 3 See Document 24 . 72. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 72. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, February 11, 1966, 9 a.m. [Here follows discussion of a telegram from McGeorge Bundy concerning the U.S. Mission in Vietnam.] LBJ: I would wish that you would put the best lawyer—this Meekerʼs been spending his time over here worrying about whatʼs gonna to happen to the Visa Division. I wish that heʼd get busy on something substantive like analyzing the testimony as a lawyer and making the basic points that Gavin made and that Kennan made. 2 And they both seem to be unaware that we have a treaty 3 at all or that we have a resolution 4 at all or that we have a commitment at all. And they both would just rather not be troubled with Asia. And theyʼd just like to be content in Honolulu if somebody would leave them alone. UAJ: Yes, yes. LBJ: And I would like for Meeker or some real expert to prepare for me forthwith today or tomorrow at the minimum, first—I asked for it yesterday—the shifting positions on the loyal opposition. UAJ: Yes, Bill Bundyʼs doing that. LBJ: Then second, I want somebody to analyze the opposition testimony and just take their whole thing and say, “Now hereʼs what a lawyer would brief it as and a rejoinder—hereʼs what they have said.” And take the toughest things theyʼve said and say, “Now here is the answer to ʼem as we see it.” And I would sure see that somebody follows these television things very, very carefully. I doubt that anybody with any political sensitivity in the State Departmentʼs doing that. Do you know? UAJ: I donʼt know if anybodyʼs looking at the television, weʼre getting the transcripts. LBJ: Well now, itʼs very important to watch that and watch the hearing, watch the reaction to it and what the folks are doing and things like that. [Senator Frank] Church takes the position that we are [in a] very dangerous position and that weʼve got to surrender. Thatʼs his position this morning on the “Today” show, Frank Church. UAJ: Oh, he was on this morning? LBJ: Yeah and rather effective. Theyʼre doing a real job each day now. I donʼt think that, when you analyze, if they [were] ever answered—I think itʼd just go over like a puff of wind can blow ʼem over. Everything that he said can be just answered in one sentence [which] is that we have a SEATO treaty and Senator would you ignore it? UAJ: Yes, yes, yes. LBJ: And if so, how and what do you do about it? And what effect does it have on the world? And he acts like he never heard of it. I think that also somebody ought to brief that SEATO Treaty for me. So letʼs get about three things for the President and get some staff officers busy doing that instead of interviewing the press. First thing Iʼd have ʼem do is give me the shifting positions. The second thing Iʼd do is have ʼem take the position of Gavin and the position of this guy [Kennan ?] and answer ʼem. And the third thing Iʼd like for ʼem to do is brief the SEATO Treaty hearings, particularly for any comments of members, who are now members of that, with quotes. 5 And particularly people like Fulbright and Sparkman and folks who apparently were members of the committee at the time it was adopted. And along with that Iʼd like to have a good brief of the resolution and what they said about the resolution. I would gather that weʼre getting—if weʼre not, we ought to get—a brief that Rusk or somebody can put in the record on our legal position. And I think our legal position ought to be that the Commander in Chief has a right to respond when his forces are attacked and that the Commander in Chief powers—weʼve taken that position all along. But then we got the treaty commitment, then we got the resolution specifically. And we ought to have that legal position ready to put in the record. But in developing that, I want to see what Fulbright said when SEATO was up. I want to see if he ever asked a question or answered one. I want to see what questions he asked and what he answered and what he said on the floor of the Senate when the resolution was up. UAJ: We started work on that yesterday. LBJ: And I think that you ought to have the most astute politician youʼve got in the Department watching this thing very, very carefully. Theyʼre out to destroy Rusk and destroy the Department and destroy our position. And theyʼre taking the position that what theyʼre doing is going to change the foreign policy of this country. Now I donʼt know how theyʼre gonna change this treaty or change this resolution. But Gore says that we are going over the Presidentʼs head to the people, that the President has gone over the Senateʼs head to declare war without our declaration. UAJ: I saw him on that yesterday. LBJ: Weʼre going over the Presidentʼs head, too. UAJ: Yes, yes. LBJ: Now, thatʼs what theyʼre doing and I think that weʼve got to take a little time and develop this position. First, I think weʼve got to develop it pretty clearly in Ruskʼs statement. 6 And before he goes heʼs gonna have to background people on what heʼs going to say. Heʼs gonna have to summarize what Kennan said and what Gavin said. “Now this is the substance of what these two men have said and here are the transcripts, if you want ʼem, of what theyʼve said. Now hereʼs the answer to ʼem” and let ʼem have their stuff before they go up there. And when he goes in he ought to give ʼem copies of his statement so they can really write because, by and large, these writers up there are unfriendly to our position. UAJ: Yes they are. LBJ: The infiltration in the networks and in the press on this is rather serious, I think, and I think itʼs more serious than any of us realize. UAJ: Yes, yes. Wonder about motives on some of this. LBJ: Yes, I think thereʼs no question but what [ 1 minute 58 seconds deleted by the Lyndon B. Johnson Library under the donorʼs instrument of gift ]. I think that they think—the opposition to our system—that theyʼre gonna win this thing right here in Washington. UAJ: Yes, yes. I feel that very deeply, Mr. President, as I told you yesterday. Thatʼs what theyʼre betting on. LBJ: Well now, do you think weʼve got our first team out working on it? UAJ: I do sir. Dean got some of these assignments made yesterday. He was already working on this. LBJ: Thatʼs sure what I want done. UAJ: I think that heʼs gonna be well prepared to handle them, insofar as they can be handled. [Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.05, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 See Document 64 . 3 Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954; for text, see 6 UST 81–86. The treaty established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. 4 Reference is to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Joint Resolution 1145, “To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia,” passed by the Senate and the House on August 7, 1964, and signed by the President on August 10, 1964. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964 , pp. 991–992. 5 The Department of Stateʼs 18-page memorandum, February 11, responding to this request was forwarded to the President by Bromley Smith on February 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20) 6 Rusk testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18; see Document 64 . 73. Editorial Note 73. Editorial Note In a telephone conversation with Senator Abraham Ribicoff that began at 4:25 p.m. on February 14, 1966, President Johnson stated the following regarding negotiations with North Vietnam: “They are under three illusions, our judgment is: first, they think they can win it in Washington like they did in Paris (we think they think that); two, we think that up until the last ninety days they think they have been winning; three, we think they have the illusions that we may go a year, may go two years, but we wonʼt go the distance; four, they think that we canʼt go the distance if we wanted to because we are spread thin in the world and we have malaria and we have root rot and we have long supply lines and we have shipping problems that they read about—at least are talking about—and just general things; and we think that they are indulging themselves [in] these illusions just like Hitler indulged himself. Now we may be wrong but thatʼs what our best men think. Now we think until we get over that hump of illusion that they are not going to talk.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Ribicoff, Tape F66.05, Side B, PNO 1) 74. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 74. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, February 16, 1966. 2985. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Honolulu aftermath. We think that a large number of Vietnamese throughout the country knew of the Honolulu Conference and the events associated with it, including the final Vietnamese-American joint statement and the subsequent visit to Viet-Nam by Vice President Humphrey. Among less sophisticated Vietnamese—the farmer and the cyclo driver for example—the focus was almost entirely on Prime Minister Ky and the Vietnamese delegation. The dominant attitude appeared to be one of national pride, because the Vietnamese sat as equals with the leader of the worldʼs most powerful nation. The more knowledgeable were conscious that conference took place at a halfway point between Saigon and Washington rather than in the American capital. Among the sophisticated but generally non-political Vietnamese—merchants and provincial capital businessmen—there was a feeling that the Honolulu Conference, by the mere fact that it was held, somehow meant that the war in Viet-Nam was destined for an early end. Some members of this group even said that the war would end by mid-year as the result of decisions, unspecified, taken at the meeting. Exactly what particular event or statement from the conference should have left this feeling is not clear. Undoubtedly, the attitude represents wishful thinking rather than a sober, thought-out judgement. Among the better-informed Vietnamese—civil servants, middle class and newspaper editorial writers, for example—the Honolulu Conference had a favorable impact. There was a strong reaction that the non-military aspect of the war—the “other war,” as Vice President Humphrey expressed it—had at last gotten the attention it deserved and that as a result of the meeting, new social welfare and economic development programs could be expected. The Vice Presidentʼs visit contributed heavily to this feeling. It favorably influenced Vietnamese attitudes toward Americans in general and by all measurements can be considered a singular success. The Vice President made a particular impression on the average Vietnamese whom he contacted personally, and struck the rank and file as a man seriously interested in the problems and sympathetically understanding of their aspirations. Herewith local press summary for February 6–12: Tia Sang and Tieng Viet wrote about the “spirit of Honolulu” and urged the government to implement as soon as possible the programs adopted there. Dan Chu, Tieng Viet , and Ghanh Do applauded the Honolulu declarationʼs call for social justice and the building of democracy as priorities in the Viet-Nam conflict. Tieng Viet and Xay Dung wrote that the conference was a major step in closer cooperation between Washington and Saigon. Tieng Vang saw it as reassurance by the United States that she respects South Viet-Namʼs sovereignty. The papers viewed Vice President Humphreyʼs visit as an indication of the importance President Johnson places on the three pledges—building democracy, creating social justice and continuing to seek peace. 2. Basic political. Chieu Hoi program figures are almost complete through February 10 (one province not yet recorded for both February 9 and 10). As of that date, a total of 789 returnees have been reported for February. If this rate continues, the record high of 1,672 achieved last month will be exceeded on February 22. In the 18 days since the end of the official Tet period (midnight January 23), 1,455 returnees have been recorded for an average of 81 per day. This compares with 41 per day as the average for September through December 1965. 3. Current political. During Thieu and Kyʼs absence in Honolulu, General Chieu, the Secretary-General of the Directorate, and number 3 man in the government, started contacting the nominees for the “Democracy Building Council”, which will draft the new Constitution. The Directorate approved part of a list of about 80 nominees at its February 2 meeting, but the names have not been announced. Low level rumors continued to circulate that certain groups were interested in organizing demonstrations against the government to take place near the end of the month. These people would key their demonstrations to protests against the high cost of living. It would be hard to get such demonstrations going on a significant scale because those who are usually potential demonstrators are doing too well. The cyclo drivers, taxi drivers and day laborers who usually could be easily persuaded to take to the streets in the past are all beneficiaries of the full employment resulting from the American build-up. In a sense they “never had it so good.” Junior civil servants and others on fixed incomes, unfortunately, are another story. The government apparently has not yet made up its mind regarding the Montagnard problem, which is still tense and potentially dangerous. But Prime Minister Ky made a speech at Kontum on February 12 in which he restated the governmentʼs determination to extend equal treatment to all Vietnamese citizens regardless of religion, region or ethnic origin and promised to give greater consideration to the Montagnards in 1966. 4. Economic. Secretary of Agriculture Freeman met the Vietnamese Agriculture Minister, received extensive briefings on agricultural programs and visited a variety of agricultural projects. His trip was a real plus. Saigon retail prices dropped substantially from the post-Tet high level. Rice deliveries from the Delta increased slightly but imported stocks continued to make up the bulk of the stocks on hand in Saigon. Wholesale and retail rice prices were rising slowly. Both Viet Cong interference and slackened activity by merchants hoping for higher prices seemed to be contributing to this situation. 5. Inflation. Our recent talks with Vietnamese officials convinced me that your message in Honolulu on the importance of measures to stem inflation was understood by Prime Minister Ky and General Thieu. They have told top Vietnamese officials, including Ambassador Vu Van Thai, that the economic problem is now top priority. The next step is that the other Vietnamese Generals understand the necessity of bold action. We are working closely with the Vietnamese to assure effective action. The Honolulu meeting has given us a good push forward and we intend to make the most of it. The economic situation overall has become critical during the last two months. The greatest danger is that a series of wage increases would be granted which would lead to further price increases and move into a second and even more dangerous phase of the inflation. This can be prevented if our economic program can be launched quickly, including appointment of capable personnel by the GVN, increased imports, increased port capacity, larger tax collections, and a lowering of the black market rate. The latter step is rather unorthodox but the Economic Counselor feels the rate of 170 piasters to the dollar must be brought down in order to give hope to the Vietnamese that prices can go down as well as up. If this price is brought down by U.S. Government purchases of piasters in Hong Kong, he believes this will have a salutary effect on overall prices in Viet-Nam and, most important, it will give a real psychological boost to the Vietnamese. In fact, it will be interpreted (somewhat erroneously) as being evidence of increased Vietnamese confidence in a successful outcome of the war, partly stemming from the historic meeting in Honolulu. These measures to bring the black market rate down will require concurrence from Washington and a separate message is on the way requesting specific approval. 6. Pacification. The first class of rural construction cadre graduated from the National Training Center at Vung Tau after ten weeks of paramilitary and political training. The 3,095 graduates included 119 women, and represented 15 southern and 9 central provinces. This class had started training in November 1965. MACV reports that the greatest single request from the Vietnamese provinces, of all the requests for U.S. personnel, is for public safety advisers. This would appear to me to indicate the pressing nature of the criminal (as distinguished from the military) side of Viet Cong violence, requiring police type measures to cope with it. 7. Military. Allied forces continued on the offensive with a high rate of activity but major Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units evaded significant sustained contact in these operations. Zorthian reports that most Vietnamese were unaware that there had been a 37-day cessation of the air strikes in North Viet-Nam. Those who were aware of the halt generally did not approve and welcomed the resumption. Latest reports on RVNAF desertion rate continue to be unsatisfactory. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:25 a.m. and passed to the White House at 10:30 a.m. 75. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Moyers) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 75. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Moyers) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, February 16, 1966. At the private meeting between the President and Generals Ky and Thieu in Honolulu on Monday, February 7: 1. The principals agreed that their economists would study again the question of the exchange rate and make recommendations for resolving the issue. 2. The President pressed Ky and Thieu to implement the measures designed to improve the economic stabilization of SVN. Ky agreed to announce some of the measures “upon my return and no later than next week.” 3. Ky said he intends to split the Ministry of Economics into a Ministry of Trade and a Ministry of Industrialization in order to weaken the present Ministry which “has too much power and is prone to corruption.” 4. The President urged stronger support of the “Open Arms” program and Ky and Thieu agreed to place greater emphasis on it. 5. The President strongly urged Ky to urge the defection of “three or four” prominent VC or VC supporters and use them on radio for prop-aganda and psychological purposes. He pressed Ky and Thieu to develop better contacts with the VC in order to gain increased understanding of the movement. 6. President stressed specific implementation of economic, social, and political steps agreed upon during Bellʼs visit to Saigon in January and at the Honolulu Conference. 7. The President urged a strong program aimed at the “very young members of the VC.” 8. The President told Ky and Thieu they should study more carefully and consistently the criticisms and policies of anti-Vietnam Americans, including “journals like the New York Times and members of the Foreign Relations Committee.” The President said: “You need to know what our pressures are just as we need to know what yours are.” 9. The President and the Secretary of State made strong appeals that “we all should list those reasons we think Hanoi believes it will win, and go after them one by one to change their mind about the prospects of succeeding.” 10. The President urged further internal reforms in the South Vietnamese military. He urged Ky to spend more time in the countryside “acting like a politician instead of just a general.” 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. 76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma 76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma 1 Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:38 a.m. 267. You should seek appointment with DRV Consul General to deliver following aide-memoire: Begin Text: 1. The USG has taken note of the Aide-Memoire delivered to American Ambassador in Rangoon on January 31, 1966. 2 2. The USG fully respects the basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. As the USG has repeatedly said, it believes that these Accords, together with the 1962 Accords concerning Laos, are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia or for negotiations looking toward a peaceful settlement. 3. The USG has repeatedly stated and hereby reaffirms that it is prepared to withdraw its forces from South Viet-Nam when peace is restored. The US has never stated that it must be the sole judge of when this condition exists. Plainly, the restoration of peace requires the adherence of all concerned to the essential provisions of the Geneva Accords dealing with the regroupment of opposing forces to their respective areas, and dealing with the obligations that the two zones shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. It is the view of the USG that the DRV, in introducing armed forces, military equipment, and political cadres into South Viet-Nam, has breached the provisions of the Accords, and has thus made necessary the actions undertaken by the USG in support of the legitimate right of the Republic of Viet-Nam to self-defense. The withdrawal of US forces would be undertaken in the light of the actions taken by the DRV in this regard, and would necessarily be subject also to the existence of adequate measures of verification. The USG seeks no military bases of any kind in South Viet-Nam and has no desire whatever to retain its forces in South Viet-Nam after peace is secured. 4. With respect to the third of the DRVʼs four points, the US takes note that Chairman Ho Chi Minh in his letter of January 29 3 described the program of the NLF as seeking “to achieve independence, democracy, peace and neutrality in South Viet-Nam and to advance toward peaceful reunification.” If this is all that is intended when it is stated that the affairs of the South Vietnamese be settled “in accordance with the program of the NLF,” the third point would not be an obstacle to negotiations. However, it appears that in referring to the program of the NLF the DRV may contemplate that the NLF arbitrarily be accorded integral participation in a coalition government or be accepted as the “sole genuine representative of the entire South Vietnamese people” prior to, and without regard to, an election. If this is what is meant by the third point, we would consider it in contradiction of the very objectives specified above, and quite without warrant in the Geneva Accords of 1954. It remains the essence of the USG view that the future political structure in South Viet-Nam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through truly free elections. The USG is categorically prepared to accept the results of elections held in an atmosphere free from force, intimidation or outside interference. 5. In the light of the foregoing and to make clear our understanding of a possible basis for discussions leading to a peaceful settlement, we submit for consideration of the DRV the following: Point I—The basic rights of the Vietnamese people to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity are recognized as set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954. Obtaining compliance with the essential principles in the Accords is an appropriate subject for immediate, international discussions or negotiations without preconditions. Such discussions or negotiations should consider, among other things, appropriate means, including agreed stages, for the withdrawal of military and quasi-military personnel and weapons introduced into South Viet-Nam or North Viet-Nam from one area to the other or into either area from any other outside source; the dismantling of any military bases in either area, and the cancellation of any military alliances, that may contravene the Accords; and the regrouping and redeployment of indigenous forces. Point II—Strict compliance with the military provisions of the Geneva Accords must be achieved in accordance with schedules and appropriate safeguards to be agreed upon in the said discussions or negotiations. Point III—The internal affairs of South and North Viet-Nam must be settled respectively by the South and North Vietnamese peoples themselves in conformity with the principles of self-determination. Neither shall interfere in the affairs of the other nor shall there be any interference from any outside source. Point IV—The issue of reunification of Viet-Nam must be decided peacefully, on the basis of free determination by the peoples of South and North Viet-Nam without outside interference. End Text. 6. In delivering text, you should take care not to go beyond its terms in providing explanation to any questions asked. Naturally, we would be most interested in any comments he may care to make then or at future date. 7. FYI: Bundy will bring to Baguio some additional material for your background in case of future contacts. However, for time being, we do not wish to be drawn into extended oral discussion which might be misunderstood. End FYI. 8. In arranging appointment, you should avoid any impression of undue urgency. 4 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Ball and Bromley Smith, and approved by Rusk. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 154–156. 2 See footnote 6, Document 51 . 3 Printed in The New York Times , January 29, 1966. 4 In telegram 433 from Rangoon, February 19, Byroade reported that he presented the aide-memoire to DRV Representative Vu on February 18, who responded that because the United States had resumed the bombing, it was “inappropriate to continue our contacts.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 28–29) In telegram 436 from Rangoon, February 21, Byroade transmitted an aide-memoire from Vu, dated February 19, explaining why the DRV was discontinuing contact. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET; printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 29–30) 77. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 77. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 16, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Non-Military Organization for Vietnam—in Saigon and in Washington 1. The Ambassador Lodge has weaknesses and blind spots, but their effects can be minimized by proper staff support. He has outstanding qualities which are not easily replaced. They make him a very valuable man in Saigon. He is 64 and he talks of resignation when he is tired or irritated. Since we have to accept the risk of bothering him on the big things, he should be humored on the little ones His qualities are these: First and foremost, he is a determined, perceptive, and disinterested servant of the President and the Secretary of State. He has no axes left to grind. This direct and disciplined loyalty is of great importance. It means that he always backs up a clearly explained decision and never tries to undercut. He can be less helpful when he does not know just what is wanted, but that is only to say that we need to be sure to keep him fully informed. On matters marked as truly sensitive, I believe him to be reasonably discreet. Second, Lodge has a clear and strong—if somewhat simplified—view of the war. He knows and respects its military aspects, but he also knows that it is fundamentally a political and social struggle. He is receptive to good advice when it comes from men he trusts. He gives strong men wide discretion. Third, Lodge is trusted and admired by the Vietnamese. He is popular because he stood up to the hated Diem (this may or may not have been wise as a matter of U.S. policy, but Diem had few Vietnamese friends in his last days—he had become hated, and his family more so.) He is respected because of his personal dignity and courtesy (he has never affronted their pride as Max Taylor unintentionally did.) If he does not make full use of his influence, he does at least work hard for continuity, and he avoids the error of forcing splits by undue pressure. He is entitled to much of the credit for the relative stability and good sense of the Ky Government. Fourth, Lodge has unusual human rapport with the U.S. military. In a country where fully 90% of all U. S. resources are under Westmoreland, this easy relationship is of great importance. It is not automatic. When Lodge was first appointed, in 1963, one important point in his favor was that he was presumed to be able to get along easily with his old friend General Paul Harkins. In fact, the two men did not get on at all, because they had radically different views of the real situation in Vietnam. (Lodge may not have been right, but Harkins was surely wrong, and his prolonged tenure was one of our major mistakes.)But now, with Westmoreland, all is changed. The two men see eye to eye on all fundamentals. They like each other as well. And now Lodge gets the full advantage of the fact that he did well in World War II, and knows the Armyʼs ways. He gets much more cooperation from them than he would if he began with a chip on his shoulder, as too many civilians do. Fifth, Lodge has the real—if exasperated—affection of nearly all of his staff. His weaknesses can make him a very difficult boss, but his dedication and decency come through. Finally, Lodge understands the care and feeding of important visitors, especially Congressmen and U.S. newspapermen. He spends too much time on this—as he does on diplomatic luncheons—but he does it well, and he is right about its importance. His weaknesses are equally real. First, he has little taste for the hard work that lies between a general assertion of purpose and a concrete administrative achievement. The only things in Saigon that he really administers are the arrangements for comfort and security at his own house (they are excellent). He does not manage the U.S. program himself, and he does not insist that others do it. Because he does not watch details, he thinks many things are easier than they are (although he is more realistic today than he was a few months back). Second, his energy level is not high. He can spend two days on a single cable, with time out for social activity and a daily swim and a couple of diplomatic visits. Third, he gravely underrates the importance of economics. The subject bores him, and he does not make it easy for his senior economic advisers to press their concerns. As a result, the voice of the U.S. is slow and weak at the highest levels on what is now a problem of the first urgency. Fourth, Lodge frets over trivia. Many great men have this weakness, but Lodge is not a great man, and he does not have the strength to spare. Seen against the stakes of Vietnam and the sacrifices of the fighting men (not the Saigon staffs), the matter of wives is a small one, at least for a man whose wife can take it, but it is never out of his mind and seldom out of his talk. He is loyal to the Rusk-Lodge understanding, but he frets about it. And the same characteristic shows in many other smaller matters. This combination of qualities and defects makes Lodge the very model of a man who needs staff support. He needs a chief of staff; he needs a handholder on political affairs; he needs a second-level factotum; and he needs a bright young personal assistant—and he needs the sympathetic understanding of all the top men on the American team. The wonder of the matter is that with the arrangements that the President has successfully pressed upon him, Lodge will now have exactly this kind of help (with a single exception noted below). The first indispensable man in this enterprise is William Porter. Porter is shrewd, cool, strong, experienced and determined. He understands the war. He is admired throughout the mission. Lodge trusts him entirely. He knows and is known by Washington. He likes and understands management. The second indispensable man is Westmoreland—and if I put him second it is only because he has now set the shape of MACV so firmly that any successor will be guided by many of his standards. Westmoreland has made 200,000 Americans understand that they must make the Vietnamese be glad of their presence and not hate it. He has also made his large and strong-minded military command remarkably responsive to the needs of half a dozen other agencies, all of which would be gravely hampered if MACV should give them only grudging support. Finally, Westmoreland has never neglected the critically important task of persistent effort to strengthen the forces of the GVN (in this last respect his officers are not all as determined as he, and if he were replaced by a more single-minded U.S. fighting man, the future of the GVN forces could become bleak). The appointment of Porter to be Chief of Staff for all aspects of pacification/rural construction is a major forward step. Several valuable secondary changes are already planned. The most important will put Philip Habib and Sam Wilson on Lodgeʼs small floor of the revamped chancery, in place of Porter (who will have a staff of his own) and Chadbourn (transferred). The more gently these changes are handled, the less Lodge will fret—and the less the Vietnamese will gossip about “coups” among the Americans (the rapid turnover among senior Americans—especially in AID—has been a topic of Vietnamese talk). But the fact of change is more important than its manner, and the most important thing is speed. Lodge will fuss about all this until it is done. Then he will like it very much. The one remaining weakness in the Saigon staff is in Economic advice and resource management. No easy remedy is at hand. The present head of USAID is Charles Mann, and he is the best officer to hold this assignment so far. Moreover, he has an excellent economic deputy, Roy Wehrle, who is fully competent to give good advice both to Mann and the Ambassador. But neither Mann nor Wehrle is really able to make Lodge listen. Economics irritate him, and so do Mannʼs teutonisms and Wehrleʼs dire warnings (though the latter are fully justified). It would be a mistake to change Mann now (he has many virtues and would be hard to replace), but Wehrle leaves in June and it is a matter of great urgency to find an economist to replace him who will have the tact and rank and persistence to make Lodge do what only he can do—keep a steady and top priority pressure on the GVN. Meanwhile in this field (unlike others) there is a continuous need for prodding from Washington. 2. Organization in Washington The best way to attack this problem is to look at it first from Saigon. The new arrangements in Saigon make a triangle. At the apex is Lodge. He is the Presidentʼs representative and the senior American in Vietnam. In particular, he is charged with political advice both to Washington and to the GVN. He has direct access to the President, but he normally communicates through the Department of State. The staff agency which supports him is the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department. He is currently well served. One line of the triangle goes from Lodge to Westmoreland. West-moreland is the top military commander and he has a special responsibility to the President through the Secretary of Defense (the charts make it more complicated, but on major policy matters this is how it really is and how Westy thinks of it). He is responsible for U.S. military operations and for military advice to Washington. On day-to-day matters, he gets his support from CINCPAC and from the JCS. He too is well served. Porter will now be at the end of the other side of the triangle. He will get overall guidance from Lodge and from the President. He will have local authority over agency heads. But who will give him prompt executive support in Washington? That man does not now exist. It cannot be done by any one agency alone—not AID and not the State Department; it cannot be done by a Committee of Assistant Secretaries; it cannot be done by the President himself; it certainly cannot be done by the Pentagon (though all of these means have been tried at one time or another). My own belief is that we need a Director of Non-Military Operations in Vietnam (DINOMO?) appointed by the President and responsible to him through the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense together—with advice from the Director of CIA, the Director of USIA, the Administrator of AID. This officer should keep his military flank clear with DOD and his diplomatic and policy line clear with State—but as far as possible he should stay out of both areas. His responsibility should be for non-military operations only. He should have the right of direct communication with Porter, and he should be charged with assuring that no needed action is delayed, for any reason, without a prompt report to the President. He should be an officer who prefers action to excuses and management to contemplation. He should count himself successful when both the President and Porter are happy. He will not be successful at once. I recommend that the President request the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and myself to prepare and submit a list of candidates for this appointment before the close of business on Friday, February 18. 2 McG. B. 3 Yes 4 No 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 20. Secret. In a covering memorandum to the President, Bundy indicated that he had written this memorandum on the airplane, presumably while returning from his Asian trip following the Honolulu Conference. (Ibid.) Bundy provided an interim report on his visit to Saigon, during which he discussed “strengthened administrative arrangements with Embassy officers,” in a memorandum to the President on February 11. (Ibid.) 2 In his covering memorandum, Bundy indicated that this procedure was deliberately designed to give Johnson “a Presidential result,” since both Bundy and McNamara had reluctantly concluded that “this operation cannot be managed through State Department channels alone.” 3 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 4 The President checked this option and wrote: “This is excellent.” 78. Memorandum From George Reedy to President Johnson 78. Memorandum From George Reedy to President Johnson 1 Washington, February 17, 1966. 1. The unfortunate aspect of the current public debate on Viet Nam is less the impact it is having on Peking and Hanoi than the effect that it is having on the American people. Persons are being swept by the force of the debate into categories where they do not belong and if the current trend continues, deep divisions will result which will hamper the President in the conduct of foreign policy and perhaps make it impossible to act intelligently. 2. At the present time, the debate is being conducted in the tone of a “hawks” and “doves” clash with the “hawks” convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a “chicken” and the “doves” convinced that anyone outside of their ranks is a “vulture.” In reality, this is a very subtle problem with many fine shadings of emphasis and it is probable that except for the extremists on both sides it would be difficult to find a clear cut position that commands a national majority on all major points. In a situation like this, however, people who are in between find themselves pushed into one camp or the other. And it really does not matter which camp wins—because either way, the Nation loses. 3. The current debate has also, to some extent, limited the Administrationʼs freedom of action. At the present time, the “doves” are having their innings and therefore the Administration is being presented to the public as a “hawk.” Somewhere along the line the “hawks” will come up to bat and at that point the scene will shift and the Administration will look like a “dove.” Nothing good can come from this as in either role the Administration is forced on the defensive and distracted from its primary purpose—finding an honorable way to close out the situation in Viet Nam. 4. In this case, the situation is not helped by the unanimity among the Presidentʼs advisors. This is an honest unanimity but to the public it presents the picture of a President who is listening only to advice from a group of men who are so deeply involved themselves in an enterprise that they have no alternative other than to agree with him. It would, of course, be foolish to create an artificial discord among competent and conscientious men where it does not, in fact, exist. But it would be reassuring to the public if it were thought that the President was giving a real audience to the more respectable and responsible voices of dissent. 5. The testimony of General Gavin and George Kennan before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2 offers an excellent example of men being placed in categories of opinion which they do not really hold. In reality, they approached the issue from a moderate standpoint and in a sensible tone. They made clear their uneasiness and expressed some opinions that are worth considering. They did not indulge in any personalities or vituperation. Yet, they have become the darlings of the “doves” who are anxiously hoping that the Administration will blast Gavin and Kennan and thus drive them into the “dove” camp, which now lacks really respectable leadership. 6. It would appear (although it is difficult to discern amidst the current partisan bickering) that the Gavin-Kennan concern really centers about one point—whether the operation in Viet Nam is being conducted properly as an integral part of an overall United States world strategy. It is possible that they have a point, in which case somebody should listen to it quietly and reflectively and come up with a reasoned evaluation. It is possible that they donʼt have a point—and if this could be demonstrated to them in a calm, orderly atmosphere, they would be removed as a potential rallying point for the “doves.” In either case, however, neither one of them has said anything unforgiveable and both are responsible, reputable men to whom any President can turn for advice without demeaning himself. 7. It would have a good effect upon the country if the President were to invite Gavin and Kennan to the White House for a quiet, but lengthy and thorough, luncheon conference. 3 It may be that out of such a conference there could come a continuing arrangement in which their advice would be available to the Government on a continuing basis. If this could be arranged, it would have the following benefits: a. They might have some thoughts that are well worth having. b. They might have even better thoughts if they had continuing, day-to-day contact with the realities of the situation. c. The country would have an example of a President seeking, on a personal basis, advice from men of demonstrated independence of thought. d. The “doves” would lose a rallying point that could present some difficulties. e. The frantic tone of the present debate would be ameliorated and Viet Nam could be discussed in a calmer atmosphere. 1 Source: Johnson Library, White House Central Files, Ex CO 312. No classification marking. Reedy served on Johnsonʼs Senate and Vice Presidential staffs and was Press Secretary to the President from March 1964 to July 1965. 2 See Document 64 . 3 The President did not meet with either Kennan or Gavin during 1966. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 79. Memorandum for the Record 79. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 19, 1966, 10 a.m.–1:30 p.m. SUBJECT White House Meeting, 19 February PRESENT WERE The President For State: Mr. Rusk (part time) and Mr. Ball For Defense: Mr. McNamara and General Wheeler For the White House: Messrs. Bundy and Moyers and General Taylor For CIA: Richard Helms 1. The meeting convened at 10:00 A.M. and adjourned at 1:30 P.M. without interruption. 2. The following matters were among those discussed. a. Relations with the Congress on the whole problem of Vietnam. In this connection, there was considerable discussion of difficulties caused for the Administration by speeches of individuals such as Senator Stennis which had the effect of scaring other members of Congress. 2 b. Senator Robert Kennedyʼs responsibility for the first pause in the air bombing of North Vietnam. c. A detailed discussion of the motivation of those Senators, fifteen in number, who signed a letter to the President 3 opposing any escalation of the war in Vietnam. d. Constitutional problems connected with presidential authority to wage the war in Vietnam. e. The Presidentʼs desire to have cheap TV sets placed in Vietnam for purposes of education and indoctrination, the cost of this program to run around $3,000,000. f. A discussion of how to handle the build-up of United States forces in Vietnam. g. A schedule of meetings with congressional leaders. 4 h. The problems posed by the testimony of General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan. i. The advisability of using the White House for large meetings of Senators and Congressmen. j. A poll on Vietnam taken in the State of Rhode Island and certain counties in New York and New Jersey. k. Telegrams to the White House from citizens around the country on General Taylorʼs testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. l. Discussion of a possible candidate for the back-up job in Washington on the non-military aspects of United States programs in Vietnam, this individual to be the Washington counterpart of Ambassador Porter in Saigon. RH 5 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B0125A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65–31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 22. 2 According to McGeorge Bundyʼs personal notes of the meeting, the President stated: “Real source of our trouble is Stennis. The wild figures in the papers come from him & thatʼs what scares Mansfield & Fulbright.” Johnson continued, “the problem is that he gets our figures.” McNamara stated: “We have not indicated our plans.” Johnson responded: “The real plans do get to Stennis & letʼs try to prevent it.” (Johnson Library, McGeorge Bundy Papers) 3 See footnote 3, Document 50 . 4 According to McGeorge Bundyʼs notes, at one point in the meeting Johnson said, speaking of Congress, “maybe we consult with ʼem too much—that and the press may be the root of our trouble.” 5 Helms handwrote the following note below his initials: “A recurrent theme of this meeting was the question of a Congressional resolution, although no decision was reached. The President is weighing in his mind whether to stand on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution or push for a new one in this Session which would reaffirm his authority.” For a discussion of Senator Wayne Morseʼs amendment, introduced on January 29, to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and of growing interest among some Senators in a new resolution to augment or replace it, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War , Part IV, pp. 251–259. 80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, February 21, 1966, 7:15 p.m. 2478. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from the Secretary. We are sure you will have been watching the discussions in the Foreign Relations Committee and also the statement of Senator Robert Kennedy, 2 with public reactions to it. We are sure that your own understanding of the Administration position will not have been affected by comments of critics, but it seems important here that Thieu and Ky should be informed not only of debates and discussions, but of this Administrationʼs position. We therefore hope that you will make sure that the essentials of the position presented by General Taylor and myself are fully understood by the government in Saigon. In particular it can be assured that our position on the NLF has not changed. We do believe that their views can be considered (see Presidentʼs statement of July) 3 but we do not believe that the United States should force a place for them in a coalition government. We share the hopes and purposes of the GVN for elections with safeguards which will permit a really free choice without coercion or fraud. What we hope you can communicate to the GVN, in short, is a full understanding of both our own firmness and determination and of the real problems created by critics here who seize upon any minor difference to exploit. The government in Saigon can rely on us, and at the same time they can help us by implementing and accelerating the policy and purpose of progressive social action set forth by them in Honolulu and afterwards. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Read; cleared by President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Read. Drafts of the telegram with the Presidentʼs handwritten revisions are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVII. Attached to the drafts is a note stating that the President read the telegram to Goldberg and Moyers for their approval while they were in his office on February 21. 2 In a statement at a press conference on February 21, Kennedy stated that admitting “discontented elements in South Vietnam”—including the National Liberation Front— “to a share of power and responsibility is at the heart of the hope for a negotiated settlement. For excerpts from Kennedyʼs statement, see The New York Times , February 20, 1966. 3 Reference is to the Presidentʼs remarks on the Viet Cong made at his press conference on July 28, 1965. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, p. 803. 4 In telegram 3061 from Saigon, February 22, Lodge responded that “Thieu and Ky are well aware of administrationʼs position arising out of current debate in Washington. Coverage of your statements and those of General Taylor is good here and I will see to it that they are aware of all you are saying and what it means.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 81. Telephone Conversion Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 81. Telephone Conversion Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, February 22, 1966, 8:52 a.m. Rusk: I will call Mac [Bundy] and see whether he feels that heʼs been over the testimony and knows your view on these matters. President: Whatʼs your evaluation of the Kennedy statement? 2 Rusk: I think itʼs bad myself. I was surprised at what it had after Bob told me that he thought it wouldnʼt cause us much trouble. President: I think itʼs tragic. I just think itʼs tragic. Everybody Iʼve talked to thinks the same thing. Itʼs so presumptuous. Some of the things he says—one of the first things is, he says that he doesnʼt want the Russians and the Communists to be over-gleeful and expect him to be elected President because if he were elected President it wouldnʼt mean that heʼd have an easy surrender himself. Ever hear of anything that presumptuous? Listen to this [reading]: 3 “The Senator in effect warned Russia, China, and North Vietnam not to anticipate a turn of events in which he would become President and quickly end the war on terms more favorable to the Communist side.” Well hell, he donʼt have to become President to do that—thatʼs what heʼs trying to do now. Rusk: No, I think it has greatly weakened our position with Hanoi and it prolongs the war actually. Itʼs another one of those things that keeps the other side going. President: And I think it means a majority in the Senate against us, Dean. I honestly think that. I think that the Bayhs, and the Tydings, and the two Kennedys, and the Muskies—the general Catholic operation there—when the chips are down they will pick up enough Cases and perhaps a Javits, with the New York Times leveling that way, and maybe a Scott, he hasnʼt yet, but I see the way the ADA and the liberals and how it flows—the ball—and if the Times keeps hitting us this way, why weʼre just really going to be murderous [murdered]. I talked to Clark Clifford a long time last night. He thinks that we would just be idiotic to ask for a new resolution. He says that that resolution 4 cannot be plainer than it is, that it is unlimited, that what you do, you imply that you have questioned yourself about what youʼve been doing. You imply to the people that well, hell, you didnʼt have authority all along. I [He] said that first thing youʼve got to do is make abundantly clear that youʼve got all the authority you need as commander in chief—160 times youʼve gone in. Number 2, youʼve got to make it clear that this treaty 5 requires you to stand up to your commitment. Number 3, youʼve got to make it clear you wouldnʼt exercise any of these troops—wouldnʼt put them out there, wouldnʼt start the bombing until they said theyʼd go in with us and weʼre all together and weʼre one nation united indivisible. Now then, he says, you come along and say, well, I want a new resolution. You imply that thereʼs something wrong with this one and [he ?] said would this [new] one just last 18 months like the last one? And where the hell would you be? Rusk: Well in the floor debate in the Senate, it was pointed out that the President has this authority and that this is the case of the Congress joining with the President. A hell of a lot of them made that point. President: Thatʼs right. I think that would be one good thing though, for George to point out—that there are 160 times the President has gone in without a declaration of war to protect the interests of the United States—the President has this constitutional power. Rusk: The figure I have is 125, Mr. President. President: Well whatever it is—they told me 163—or 23, I donʼt care. Just assert that he has it, number 1; then, number 2, that the treaty comes along and everybody debates that. Foster Dulles—the liberals that were against him are not ever going to be with us anyway but weʼve to show that this was some of his handiwork, that he says that we have got to stop subversion and weʼve got to stop the Communist aggression and if we notify them ahead of time, weʼve got a chance to do it. May not do it. We may have to stop them finally in their boots but we ought to tell them ahead of time so theyʼll know what theyʼre doing. And that was generally his position. Rusk: And that is what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said in its conclusion. President: Thatʼs right. Now then they did that and Mansfield and all of them signed it. So we have an obligation there and the President wouldnʼt be worthy of his salt if he didnʼt do it or else why have a treaty. What would the Senate think about a President that wouldnʼt live up to a treaty. Thatʼs number 2. But this President says now he knows the Senate pretty damned well. I donʼt think any of you all [who] would want to be nice to them can afford to say this bluntly but the net effect is that he knows you so damned well, he knows youʼre going to run when the going gets tough and therefore he wants you tied, bound, and delivered beforehand and he says to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense he will not pee a drop until you come in with a resolution that says, number 1, direct me to respond to armed attack; number 2, authorize me to enforce this treaty; and number 3, direct me to prevent any aggression. Now, thatʼs what they did; now he is in the process of doing that and if you donʼt want any of those things done, weʼve provided you a remedy. Anytime you want to change your mind and do a flip-flop, you can do it. But until you do, why weʼve just got to move. I think that ought to be stressed a good deal so that the people of the country know that this dammed Senate thatʼs wandering around—I was just talking to a good lawyer in New York and he says what theyʼre doing, theyʼre confusing the people. The people donʼt see their alternatives; they canʼt find what would you do. They donʼt get it one time. When you just say it once on television: what would you do if you were President of the United States—that doesnʼt get through to them. Youʼve got to repeat it like Hitler did, 20 times and then maybe they do. And I think weʼve got to repeat this resolution and say, now we donʼt say you canʼt debate, we donʼt say you oughtnʼt to debate, and we donʼt say you oughtnʼt to discuss it all you want to. But we do say this is what youʼve done. Now if you donʼt want to do this, if you want to seat Communists, if they want to surrender to the Communists, if you want to let them go on and have aggression, if you want to abandon the treaty, or if you do not think this is good national policy you enunciated, then repeal it. And the Presidentʼs got no voice in it. Now heʼll go on fighting if he wants to, because he has that power anyway. I donʼt know, but Iʼm afraid that Mac and George could today, with this thing as vicious as it is, with the Kennedy infiltration all over the place, Iʼm afraid that out of that will come some commitment that will be a little bit difficult for us. I have a hunch this morning that theyʼre going to say something like Averell said, that we ought to sit down with the Viet Cong. Now, I thought Averell just made a mistake but in light of Bobbyʼs statement, he may have kind of been paving the way a little because theyʼre awfully close and Joe Kraftʼs awfully close, and every damned time I call Averell to compliment him, heʼs at Joe Kraftʼs house. I donʼt know how much of this is kind of a wing. You know Bob McNamara has felt that while we ought to have limited objectives, that we ought to make it abundantly clear that we did not necessarily have to have everybody of our own choosing in this government, that it could be a Communist government and we could have some doubtful characters like we had in Laos. And heʼs said to me not once but I guess a dozen times that if we would moderate our objectives and what weʼre fighting for there, weʼd have more chance of succeeding. And heʼs also felt, which is a very dangerous position to me (and thereʼs not a man in the government Iʼd say this to but you, not another one), but he has said to me a number of times that he thought that we ought to give serious consideration to this. And then when he said the other day that we only have one chance out of three of winning, it just shocked me and furthermore it shocked everybody at the table. It shocked Bill Moyer Rusk: Well Bob, quite frankly, Mr. President, he hasnʼt had too much experience in dealing with crises, and I just donʼt believe that, and I canʼt pull out a slide rule and prove it, but the boys out in the field are proving it and are proving that we can do better than that. I am absolutely sure myself that the other side is going to make some new decisions on this thing. President: They must be getting great encouragement though. If this is causing us this much trouble, donʼt you know that theyʼre enjoying it. Rusk: Yes. Well Iʼll get hold of George and Mac right away. President: And what do you think that our official response is going to be to the Kennedy statement? Rusk: Oh, I think we ought to go right back to your July statement, 6 just stay with that. President: Well, theyʼll just say “do you agree with Senator Kennedy that we ought [to] appoint some Viet Cong ahead of time?” Iʼm inclined to say—I may be wrong on this—but Iʼm inclined to say that we have made it abundantly clear that weʼre for free elections, that weʼre willing to let the United Nations supervise them or anybody else thatʼll give us an honest free election and weʼre not in the business, thatʼs just not our occupation of the moment, going around appointing Communist governments. Rusk: Thatʼs right. Thatʼs right. President: And we believe in self determination and we donʼt believe in trading with the Communists and appointing them. Now, whatʼs wrong with that? Rusk: I think thatʼs right. President: OK. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 6602.05, PNO 8. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 See footnote 2, Document 80 . 3 What the President was reading has not been identified. 4 Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; see footnote 4, Document 72 . 5 Reference is to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954. 6 See footnote 3, Document 80 . 82. Memorandum for the Record 82. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, February 22, 1966, 11:45 a.m.-1:30 p.m. SUBJECT White House Meeting, 22 February PRESENT WERE The President For State: Messrs. Rusk, Ball, and Rostow For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance and General Wheeler For AID: Mr. Gaud For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Komer, Moyers, Smith, plus General Taylor and Mr. Clark Clifford For CIA: Admiral Raborn and Richard Helms 1. The meeting convened at 11:45 A.M and adjourned at 1:30 P.M. 2. In addition to the items set forth on the printed agenda, attached, 2 the following items were discussed at this meeting: a. The President decided to have the congressional leaders meet with the Vice President at 8:00 A.M. on Thursday morning followed by a 9 to 10:30 meeting with him for the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House in the East Room. b. A decision was made to have General Taylor make a public statement clarifying the Administrationʼs disagreement with Senator Kennedy on the subject of a coalition government in South Vietnam. c. Central points which the Vice President should make in his talks with Congressmen were enumerated: (1) That this is a limited war. (2) That the United States is being successful in its prosecution. (3) That we are receiving help from SEATO countries in the battle. d. There was a lengthy discussion of non-military programs in South Vietnam with particular reference to the role to be played by Secretaries Gardner and Freeman. It emerged that the President wants to make South Vietnam a showcase for Asia as to what the United States can do to make a better life for the Vietnamese people. He is pushing for a variety of programs, including new teaching techniques, temporary hospitals, an increased flow of medicines, etc. Concern was expressed over the United States proceeding too fast and overloading the capacities of the South Vietnamese Government. e. The resolution question was again discussed at considerable length. Mr. Clark Clifford argued that the Administration should stand on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution and should not go for a new one. He was supported by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and appears to have carried the day. 3 f. Mr. Moyers described a dinner conversation which he had had with Senator Fulbright on Monday evening. RH 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65–31 Dec 1972. Secret. Prepared by Helms on February 23. 2 The attached agenda lists three items: 1) Vice President Humphreyʼs return and the Congress; 2) Handling any new policy resolution in Congress—alternative administration resolutions and alternative tactics with the resolutions of others; 3) organization of non-military efforts in Washington. Prior to the meeting the President discussed the agenda with McGeorge Bundy during a lengthy telephone conversation. A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, February 22, 1966, 9:04 a.m., Tape 6602.06, PNO 3. 3 Helmsʼ handwritten notes of the meeting, recorded on the attached agenda, include the following: “Resolution Question “a) Stand on ʼ64 resolution, or “b) Go Morse route, or “c) Joe Rauh moderating resolution” “Clifford re resolution problem “a) admin should go on doing what itʼs doing “b) Pres thinking we should guide events “c) Clifford disagrees—this is Cong problem.” 83. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 83. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, February 23, 1966. HONOLULU MEETING RECORD OF CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION 2 [Here follows a table of contents.] Explanation The Consensuses recorded in the following text were those jointly reached by the U.S. and Vietnamese delegations at Honolulu. In some cases these represent a specific form of words as adopted; in others they are an effort to record the sense of one or several general discussions. The Further Actions noted are based on specific discussions which involved both Vietnamese and U.S. representatives. In the parentheses following the action there is noted which agency is primarily responsible for follow up on this matter; this means in many instances a responsibility is placed on the U.S. Mission Saigon to keep the Vietnamese Government moving on the agreed action. I. Diplomatic Track Consensus: The United States Government and the Government of Viet-Nam will continue to press the quest for a peaceful settlement in every forum and explore every path to peace. They will stay in close touch to proceed internationally as closely together as possible. Further Action 1. U.S. and GVN leaders agreed on full consultation on further action at Security Council. (Resp: State) 2. The Secretary and FonMin Do reportedly agreed on language for Japanese consensus statement. 3 (Resp: State) 3. It was agreed everything possible will be done to prevent an independent VC role at any future negotiation. (No more precise decision taken.) (Resp: State) 4. All measures possible will be taken to increase pressure on Hanoi to bring them to the conference table or persuade them to stop aggression by their tacit acceptance of the fact they cannot win. (See II. Military Program.) (Resp: DOD, State) 5. The President asked for the GVNʼs suggestions on further peace initiatives we might take. (Resp: GVN, Embassy) 6. Vice President Humphrey and Governor Harriman will visit Asian capitals to explain our position and describe the Honolulu meeting. (Action taken) II. Military Program Consensus: U.S. and GVN leaders announced a policy of “growing military effectiveness and still closer cooperation.” We will act with all possible regard for the rights of civilians and respect for the territorial integrity of peaceful neighboring countries, and will adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1949 on treatment of prisoners of war. Further Action 1. Among the measures to be considered to induce Hanoi to move to the conference table will be Ambassador Thaiʼs idea of feints by GVN sea forces against North Viet-Nam to preoccupy and pin down North Vietnamese armed forces and to create uncertainty there. (Resp: DOD, State) 2. The Secretary of State will take another look at various possible measures for bringing pressure on Hanoi which were mentioned, including bombing dikes or water gates in the pre-flood period. (Resp: DOD, State) 3. The GVN was urged to carry out further internal reforms within the RVNAF. (Resp: GVN, Mission) III. Free World Assistance Consensus: The GVN, with strong U.S. support, will press for a maximum number of contributors and a maximum number of types of assist-ance. Further Action 1. Free World assistance activities should be more closely coordinated. In addition to close coordination in Saigon, Washington is to be kept fully informed so that GVN Missions in Washington and New York can take initiatives with foreign representatives located there. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, all Washington agencies concerned with FWA) 2. Study will be given to increasing Free World assistance to the GVN agricultural cadre program. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID with Dept. of Agriculture and State) 3. Study will also be given to increasing Free World assistance to the GVNʼs medical programs. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID and Dept. Health, Education and Welfare and State) (See also IV–F.) 4. Top level U.S representatives will be sent to Australia, Korea and New Zealand to thank them for their assistance and to the Philippines to press for further assistance in the form of an engineer battalion with an adequate security force. (Resp: White House, State) 5. Ways of gaining further Latin American assistance will be studied. (Resp: State) IV. Internal Vietnamese Programs IV–A. Rural Construction Program Consensus: Building democracy in rural areas is as important as military battles—rural construction is the central instrument in bringing about the social revolution on which Viet-Nam is now embarked. For 1966, program should concentrate on four priority areas. Further Action 1. Assure that province chief actually retains operational control over necessary military forces to support program in his province. (Resp: U.S. Mission Saigon, with reports to Washington if problems arise) 2. Areas where program under way, and four priority areas in particular, should be placed under superior province chiefs who should not be removed while program being developed without serious cause. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) 3. Move forward with elected village executive councils as rapidly as feasible. (Resp: GVN & U.S. Mission) 4. Assure that all Ministries concerned with pacification work out effective coordination among themselves. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) 5. Adequate military priority should be given by ARVN commanders to priority rural construction areas. (Resp: GVN, MACV to follow up) 6. General Thang stated provinces should achieve 75 percent of their 1966 plans by the end of the year. This would involve the pacification of 963 new hamlets, consolidation of 1,083 existing hamlets, and the building of 2,251 classrooms, 913 kilometers of roads, 148 bridges, 57 dams and 119 kilometers of canals. 7. Emphasis will be given to increasingly effective cadre training, with emphasis on political indoctrination and winning the peopleʼs sympathy. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) 8. Greater emphasis is to be put on U.S. and RVNAF troop indoctrination to assure better understanding of how to win over population, with U.S. to study additional support requirements. (Resp: GVN Political Warfare Directorate, DOD, JUSPAO) 9. Develop more agricultural cadre for greater emphasis on agricultural development, especially in priority areas; study increasing Free World assistance in this area. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID with Dept. of Agriculture and State) (See also III: Free World Assistance.) 10. Expand the development of handicraft and light cottage industries, emphasizing priority areas. Handicraft industries should be encouraged to hire refugees, veterans and, in Minister Tonʼs words, “people whose livelihood comes from the presence of allied forces in Viet-Nam.” (GVN, U.S. Mission and AID) (See also IV–B. Refugees.) 11. Study formation of a land reform organization in each priority area. (GVN and U.S. Mission) 12. Expand rural electrification program, adding at least 50 new stations if feasible during 1966. (GVN, USAID, Secy Freeman to investigate) 13. Study improved credit facilities for farmers, and place emphasis on more efficient production. (Resp: GVN, USAID, Dept. of Agriculture) 14. Study possibilities of joint training program for village and hamlet chiefs, who would presumably be elected. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) 15. An agreed name for the program should be selected as among pacification, rural construction and social construction (see Saigon Embtels 2967, 4 2997 5 and 3063). 6 IV–B. Refugees Consensus: The care of refugees is highly important as a means of including in the social revolution now going on in South Viet-Nam the large numbers of people who have courageously, of their own free will, left the Viet Cong. The refugees must be prepared to resume a useful role in society. U.S. aid for refugees is an important demonstration of the humanitarian aspects of U.S. aid to Viet-Nam, and the U.S. will provide full support for GVN plans in this area. Further Action: 1. Special effort will be made to provide schools for refugee children. (Resp: GVN, AID with HEW) 2. In addition to the school effort, the President urged special attention to other refugee projects such as vocational training, small loan programs and the like. (Resp: GVN, AID with HEW) 3. Refugees should be given employment in light industry and given training in handicrafts. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) IV–C. Political Development and Current Politics Consensus: The GVN affirmed its intention to proceed with the building of democracy and encouraging a widened and more active popular participation in and contribution to this process. The U.S. affirmed its support for free elections. Further Action: 1. The GVN will appoint an advisory council consisting of 80 members selected from a cross-section of society and all regions of the country. Appointment will be made by the end of February. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy to monitor) 2. Advisory Council will draft a constitution, which will be taken to the people for discussion and modification and submitted to a referendum in late 1966. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy) 3. The Council will also discuss electoral laws and political party formation. On the basis of elections, rooted in the constitution, the GVN will create an elected government. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Embassy) 4. Ambassador Lodge will continue to carry on a dialogue with the GVN on this subject. 5. A Washington representative or group will go to Saigon at some point in the future to discuss political development with GVN leaders. (Resp: State) 6. The President made it clear we are not pushing the GVN to move more quickly than would be wise or to change its ideas on the subject. (Resp: U.S. Embassy) 7. General Ky was urged to spend more time in the countryside in the role of a political leader. (Resp: U.S. Mission) IV–D. Montagnards Consensus: General Thang stated that in the new society the GVN was trying to build all groups, including Montagnards, would be treated equally. IV–E. Chieu Hoi Consensus: The GVN is making an appeal to the enemy to leave VC ranks and join with South Viet-Nam in the “national, revolutionary adventure” on which it is embarked. The U.S. pledged its full support to the principle of open arms and amnesty for all who turn from terror toward peace and rural construction. Further Action: 1. Generals Ky and Thieu agreed to place greater emphasis on the Chieu Hoi Program. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, especially JUSPAO) 2. President Johnson urged a strong program directed at “very young” members of the VC. (GVN, U.S. Mission, especially JUSPAO) IV–F. Economic and Social Programs 1. Health Consensus: The GVN will intensify efforts to meet at least its basic needs in context of mounting demands upon scarce resources. The U.S. hopes to expand its health program considerably to assist the GVN to meet these goals. Further Action: (For details, see Saigonʼs Toaid 4985.) 7 a. A team of experts under Secretary Gardner will go to Saigon to clarify specific future goals and agree with GVN on action assignments. (Resp: HEW) b. Both governments agreed to make increased efforts to train health personnel. (GVN, USAID, HEW) c. A more effective medical logistics system will be established. (GVN, USAID, HEW) d. Increased medical manpower to be sought through the dispatch of U.S. and Free World medical teams to the provinces. (GVN, U.S. Mission, State) e. Attempts will be made to stem drain of manpower through adjustment of wage levels, and to gain manpower through incentive systems, and possibly a release of health personnel with long service in the Armed Forces. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) f. Improvement will be sought on epidemic reporting system; U.S. (and hopefully Free World) will assist in providing modern immunizing equipment. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, State) g. Increase assistance to refugees, including surveillance, immunization, etc. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) 2. Education Consensus: Strong emphasis should be put on vocational and technical education, and on assistance to refugees. Further Action: (For details, see Saigonʼs Toaid 4985.) a. GVN will inform USG of appropriate time for visit of team headed by Secretary Gardner to go to Saigon. (Resp: GVN, HEW) b. Efforts will be made to increase vocational training for students finishing primary education. (Resp: GVN, USAID) c. Agreement to strengthen cooperation in building elementary schools as rapidly as possible, paying particular attention to priority areas and refugees, and in training teachers. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) (See also IV–B.) d. U.S. will continue supply of textbooks to schools, with 7 million more scheduled for 1966. (Resp: USAID) 3. Agriculture Consensus: Increasing food production is a fundamental part of the GVNʼs effort to create a better life for its people, and U.S. assistance in this is a fundamental part of U.S. efforts to help the Vietnamese people build while they fight. It is also part of the U.S. pledge to attack hunger wherever it is found. Further Action: a. Secretary Freeman and team of experts to develop enlarged program of agricultural cooperation from visit to Saigon. (Resp: GVN, USDA) b. It was agreed that a special effort will be made to move agricultural know-how—particularly new species of rice and corn and vegetable seeds—from the experimental station to the farmer. (Resp: GVN, USAID) c. Steps for more rapid land reform were reviewed and will receive further study. The U.S. pledged its full support for land reform. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission) d. Production in the agricultural sector will be increased. Top priority will be given to expansion of agricultural industries such as processing of agricultural products and production of fertilizer and agricultural implements. (Resp: GVN, USAID) 4. General Economic Further Action: a. US agreed to increase its project assistance to the level of at least 150 million dollars. (Resp: USAID) IV–G. Financial Stabilization Consensus: South Viet-Nam faces a serious problem of inflationary demand during the current year, but with appropriate stabilization measures the situation is manageable. The GVN will follow a policy of economic austerity. Further Action: (see February 8 Minutes of Understanding, and report on February 7 meeting—Annex IV G—for details.) 8 1. U.S will increase commodity import and PL 480 Title I assistance to at least $400 million in CY 1966, subject to market demand and port capacity. (Resp: AID) 2. Subject to market demand and port capacity the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam agreed to increase imports to a level compatible with a policy of using its foreign exchange earnings in 1966 to help combat inflation. (Resp: GVN, USAID, Embassy to monitor) 3. Advance deposits by importers will be required. (Resp: GVN, USAID and Embassy to monitor) 4. The 90-day grace period on payment of duties will be eliminated. (GVN, AID and Embassy to monitor) 5. The customs force will be enlarged, with U.S. technical assistance. (GVN, AID, Treasury) 6. Overall import procedures are to be simplified. Study to be made of the entire system of import procedures, to begin in the next few weeks. (Resp: GVN, AID) 7. U.S will eliminate present barter requirements with respect to procurement from less developed countries of commodities other than petroleum products. (Resp: AID) 8. AID will reduce the time required to produce bulk items. (Resp: AID) 9. The GVN will appoint a master port director, responsible directly to the office of the Prime Minister, and give adequate authority to a single Saigon port director. (Resp: GVN, USAID to monitor) 10. The U.S. will supply technical assistance in port management. (Resp: AID) 11. Security stockpiles will be established as quickly as port facilities allow. Plans will be drawn up at once for warehousing and management of stockpiles. (Resp: GVN, AID) 12. The U.S. will remove PX supplies from port area warehouses as expeditiously as possible. (Resp: MACV) 13. The GVN will increase revenues, both from increased taxes and better tax collection, as well as from other sources. The target for increased tax receipts in 1966 is approximately 4 billion piasters. (Resp: GVN; USAID to monitor) 14. Non-tax receipts should be increased by greater promotion and sales of GVN lottery tickets, including sales to U.S. forces, and by flotation of piaster bond issues of approximately 2 billion piasters in 1966. (Resp: GVN, MACV; USAID and Embassy to monitor) 15. Foreign exchange earnings accruing in 1966 to the Republic of Viet-Nam, will be used promptly to help combat inflationary pressures, by financing imports or by other appropriate means. (Resp: GVN; USAID to monitor) 16. The U.S. will support the Vietnamese request to the IMF for technical assistance in the financial area. Mr. Bell will talk to Mr. Schweitzer of the IMF to press for an IMF groupʼs visit to Saigon by the end of February. (Resp: AID) 17. High level political consideration of raising the exchange rate for import duties from 35.1 to 60.1 will be initiated promptly, with a view to activating this measure at the beginning of the second quarter of 1966. It was agreed that this would be the most appropriate and equitable additional measure to reduce liquidity, expand GVN revenues and reduce excessive wartime profits. (Resp: GVN, U.S. Mission, AID, State) 18. Discussion will be held and recommendations made before the end of February on modifying the Special Currency Fund rate of 118 piasters per dollar and on the GVNʼs possibly increasing and using the gold component of its international reserves. (Resp: GVN, AID) 19. The U.S. will provide technical assistance where appropriate in support of GVN anti-inflationary measures, and will moderate the demands of U.S. expenditures in the Vietnamese economy. (Resp: All agencies) 20. Prime Minister Ky will announce some of the economic stabilization measures to be taken by no later than mid-February. (Resp: GVN; U.S. Mission to monitor) 21. The GVN agreed to carry out promptly the measures to which it had agreed with Mr. Bell in early January. (Resp: GVN; USAID and Embassy to monitor) V. Public Affairs Consensus: The U.S. and the GVN will both lay stress on their joint efforts to carry out a social revolution and build a new society in South Viet-Nam. 1. The U.S. and GVN will both publicize the Honolulu meeting. (Resp: GVN, all U.S agencies) 2. The President urged GVN officials and Secretary Gardner to stress at every possible opportunity work being done in increasing school enrollments, building schools and increasing the number of health teams. (Resp: GVN, HEW) 3. Generals Ky and Thieu should be encouraged to make more American TV appearances. (Resp: JUSPAO) VI. General and Miscellaneous Further Action: 1. It was agreed that GVN and USG leaders will have similar meetings in the future “for the continued execution of the policies and purposes of the Declaration of Honolulu.” The first such meeting will take place about June, for the purpose of assessing progress on agreements reached at the Feb. meeting. (Resp: GVN, all U.S. agencies concerned) 2. The U.S. will try to formulate a way to better our organization in support of the Vietnamese effort. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret. 2 As recorded in public communications, records of plenary and working group sessions and notes on restricted sessions. [ Footnote in the source text.] 3 Not further identified. 4 Dated February 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 Dated February 17. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) 6 Dated February 22. (Ibid.) 7 Dated February 15. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam, Misc. Notebooks) 8 Not attached. 84. Notes of Meeting 84. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, February 24, 1966, 8 a.m. PRESENT President, Vice President, Harriman, as well as Congressional Leaders: McCormack, Albert, Smathers, Ford, Arends, Kuchel, Boggs, Long, Dirksen 2 President: The Vice President made report to me. 3 Governor Harriman and Vice President are in general agreement. Make brief report to you and me now. Make himself available to all members of Congress. Had letter from General Westmoreland. Very reassuring. Didnʼt have shortages—nothing to impair operations or health of troops. In due time, Lodge and Westmoreland to come back and make report. Will ask leadership to talk frankly with them—and various committees also. Vice President: Objectives are clear. Stop aggression—bring a better life to all people. No one saw easy solution. No one predicted speedy end. Aggression can be defeated, subversion could be stopped, social revolution can be started. Difficult to talk of victory in this country. Some people resent victory. I went as researcher, not as advocate. If we donʼt veer—donʼt weaken—help South Vietnam build a better society, our objective can be accomplished. First two years of the Marshall Plan, six changes of government in France. While we didnʼt select the battlefield, it isnʼt the best place for R.C. (presumably Red China) either, Westmoreland is great soldier. Backed by high caliber civilian team. Thieu and Ky are men of high leadership. Donʼt know how long they will survive. These men are trying to do what is right. Ky has reorganized Cabinet to deal with problems that need solving. October will be plebiscite on Constitution. Went over skeptical about B–52s. They are doing superlative job in blasting VC redoubts that havenʼt been reached for 10 years. When ports are all working this summer, we will be doing much better. Have plan of pacification—as soon as an area is secured, these pacification teams move in. Training of cadres to do this goes on. Philippines will soon be sending engineer construction battalion. Koreans will be sending 25,000 more men. ChiComs are pushing hard in Thailand. They (the Thai) are cooperating with us and less said about this cooperation the better. In Laos, Souvanna Phouma said he would fight to the death. Army of 80,000—but equipment for only 60,000. If Pathet Lao move to the Mekong, our plans for that river will go away. Talked to Indians and Pakistanis about implementing Tashkent Agreement. Famine is real in India. Theyʼre trying hard. President: More people will die this year from hunger in India and Pakistan than all of the people now living in North and South Vietnam. Vice President: They are improving agriculture standards and techniques. Indians know that Red China is the enemy. Australian Government is with us 100 per cent. Are studying ways to increase our [their?] aid to Vietnam. Spent time in New Zealand with opposition. They pledge to keep in Vietnam the battalion already there. In Manila, found Marcos a real leader. Put his entire political life on the line. Dastardly are the news stories coming from U.S.—“Philippines are human mercenaries.” Marcos made strong statement—courageous statement—in which he came down firmly on side of U.S. In Korea, Pak hopes to have more troops there by first week in March. Spent time with government party and opposition. Not one act of hostility on part of the Koreans. Vietnam is immediate battleground—part of larger struggle. Tide of battle has turned in Vietnam. We need to understand that this battle can be won. Realization that improving the lot of the people is the way to the future. President: Will ask Gene Black to go back and make another visit to this area where he brought into existence the Asia Development Bank. Vice President: No doubt in Asia who the culprit is blocking peace talks—Hanoi. Your peace offensive showed that. Only concern about U.S. is our perseverance to stick it out and stay. I tried to persuade them that our commitment was deep. If you want to see hopes of people come alive, you must go see those people and their hopes. I did that. I donʼt think we have to hold back—and not talk of beating the VC. We can beat them—and are beating them. President: Believe non-communist people are willing to resist aggression. Also believe the communists are ready to take it over. Dulles signed SEATO Treaty in Manila—which spoke our resolve to resist aggression—82 to 1 (Langer) in the Senate. Before we went in, ground forces—and began to bomb—I remember Senator Taft saying Truman should have gotten resolution from Congress. So I went to the Congress after Tonkin. Wanted Congress to join me—in “preventing aggression.” SEATO ought to be enforced. Resolution was debated after hearings. I believe that the Congress knew what they were voting on. Iʼve done everything I know how to bring them to the conference table. They donʼt want to talk. We ought to be ready to meet Westmorelandʼs requests. I intend to carry out the resolution. If you choose, you can repeal the resolution. I think I have the authority without the resolution. We aim to do all thatʼs prudent to bring this from the battleground to the bargaining table. McCormack: Resolution repeal wouldnʼt get to first base. Dirksen: Repeal wouldnʼt get four votes. Ford: Agree with Speaker. What was impact of those who want to withdraw? Vice President: I explain when this question is asked that dissent is part of our society. I told them that when the chips are down the people are firmly resolved to see it through. People in the world need to know of our unity. We need to let communists know of our resolve. It doesnʼt help. President: Ambassador Lodge report last night. 4 (Incidentally this is secret and should not be taken out of this room.) Visited First Cavalry. They just had been through bloody campaign. VC in the 2nd priority area are virtually cut off. Our boys showed them how to fight hand-to-hand. Canʼt understand why Americans who dissent canʼt do their dissenting in private. Once we are committed to a program of action, there never has been public dissent. You have to go back to the Civil War to find this public dissent. Men canʼt understand why prominent men in the United States continue to criticize our policy. Our men understand why we are in Vietnam even if our Senators canʼt. Government in Vietnam could not survive if VC were brought into Government. What Hanoi wants is for us to meet their conditions. They have made no concessions whatsoever. We want peace. They want conflict. They regard us as weak. Therefore, they think they will win. To treat VC, who are murderers and assassins, as legitimate government would disintegrate all that we have in Vietnam. Honolulu Conference has focused attention on the “other war”. Now the eyes of a major campaign have been opened to ending poverty. Newspapers in Saigon are full of comments on the social revolution going on in Vietnam. Harriman: Most fortunate you sent the Vice President out at this time. Leaders in all countries were worried about our commitment. I share everything the Vice President has said. Our allies want to be sure weʼre going to stick. Lippmann and The New York Times have contributed to this feeling. Kuchel: Laos. Another example of how the communist word doesnʼt amount to much? Rusk: Much in Vietnam is based on fact we can [not] have a Laos agreement in Vietnam. Look at Laos agreement—if you want to test what can be done in dealing with communists, look at Laos. Boggs, Albert (presumably speaking together): Vice President did great job. Long: Hope Vice President can come before the Foreign Relations Committee and tell this story. President: Statements about Vice President making commitments: Congress gave me authority to commit money. We held up India and Pakistan money until Tashkent. 5 Following Tashkent, I told both I would send someone out to talk to them. After Tashkent it was time to reopen talks. It was decided that it was wise to grant India $100 million, Pakistan $50 million. I told Ayub, “Are you with us or not—can we depend on you or not?” He said: “As long as I am in charge in Pakistan, I will do nothing inimical to the United States Government.” I said, “Okay, weʼll make no announcements now.” Vice President: I have been accused in editorials of making conditions. I merely said: 1. Implement Tashkent. 2. Quit throwing dead cats at the U.S. If you disagree, tell us in private. President: I hope I can talk to you in private—and keep this secret—you are part of this policy. Smathers: What about the average citizen in Vietnam? President: No Vice President has ever testified before a Committee—but will talk to any groups you want to meet with informally. Vice President: There is no evidence of defection to VC of average Vietnamese people. 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No. classification marking. Valenti took these notes and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. 2 Also attending this Bipartisan Leadership meeting were Rusk, Ball, Goldberg, McNamara, Wheeler, Vance, Rostow, Taylor, Komer, Bromley Smith, OʼBrien, Marks, Gaud, Raborn, and Helms. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 3 Vice President Humphrey returned to Washington on February 23 following a 2-week Asian trip during which he reported on the Honolulu Conference to officials in South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Pakistan, India, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea. Humphrey reported orally to the President at a White House meeting on February 23, which is briefly summarized in the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A 48-page draft report to the President on the trip, dated March 1, together with a covering memorandum from Unger to S/S, March 2, discussing the drafting of the report, are in Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272, Vietnam No. 7. A much briefer final report to the President, March 3, was released to the press on March 6 and is printed in Department of State Bulletin , March 28, 1966, pp. 489–491. 4 Reference is to telegram 3075 from Saigon, February 23, major portions of which Johnson read aloud and which are covered in the next five paragraphs in the notes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 In the Declaration of Tashkent, January 10, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed on the withdrawal of troops in Kashmir and the normalization of diplomatic relations. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 681–682. 6 The meeting ended in time for the President to attend a Congressional briefing in the East Room at 9:07 a.m, during which Humphrey reported on his Asian trip to members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs Committee. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) On the last page of his handwritten notes for the 8 a.m. meeting, Valenti recorded the following: “At briefing in East Room—Pres: I donʼt know when this will end. During the battle of Britain, Churchill said weʼll fight in the alleys and in the streets but he didnʼt say how long.” 85. Notes of Meeting 85. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m. Meeting with the President on Vietnam, Saturday, February 26, 1966, at 12:45 P.M. in the Cabinet Room The President joined the group at 1:10 and suggested that the group might meet every Saturday for an hour and also during the week, depending on whether the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense felt a meeting would be useful. There was a discussion about naming a czar to coordinate the Washington end of all non-military programs in Vietnam. The President, turning to the Secretary of Defense, said he thought the czar should be a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. Secretary McNamara replied that that was agreeable to him. The President said that a candidate would be picked within the next three or four days. There was a discussion about the TV program for Vietnam. Both Mr. Gaud and Mr. Marks commented on the agreement reached between AID and USIA to initiate this program. They noted that the Japanese might be prepared to give some TV receivers for use in Vietnam. The President was asked whether he would approach Robert Nathan to persuade him to accept the job of economic czar in Saigon. The President replied that he would like to have the Vice President take this on and he would come in if it were necessary in order to persuade him to accept. The job would have the rank of Minister. The economic czar would not be under the Saigon AID Director, Mr. Mann, but report directly to the Ambassador. The holder of this position would work on the economic problem directly rather than with Vietnam officials. Secretary Rusk said that it was clear the UN Security Council would not be making a statement on Vietnam. He said that the parliamentary situation in the Council was such that it could do nothing. 2 Even a special session of the General Assembly would not be able to do anything. The President then suggested that Ambassador Goldberg explain the full situation on TV this afternoon and that he give background information to the press about our unsuccessful efforts to involve the UN in the Vietnam problem. 3 Secretary McNamara said that he was drafting a statement which he hoped would appear in the New York Times rebutting the allegations made by Hanson Baldwin in his New York Times article. 4 He thought that most of the charges had been answered but more needed to be done to overcome the false impression which many got from the Baldwin piece. Upon being asked about what our position was on a congressional resolution supporting the administrationʼs policy in Vietnam, the President said that nothing more need be done now. It was agreed that Senator Morseʼs motion to repeal the August 1964 resolution should be allowed to go to a vote but that Senator Russellʼs suggestion to get an affirmative vote of support in the Senate should not be followed up. CIA Director Raborn reported that his hearing with Fulbright 5 had been rather rough in that Senator Fulbright was primarily interested in matters other than intelligence. Mr. Raborn said the intelligence community did not get into the policy field. The President asked how we keep retired military officers briefed on the developments in Vietnam. He mentioned particularly Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway and Bradley. He asked that we get a list of retired Generals who may be making public statements and keep all of them currently briefed. There was an exchange about General Gavin. General Wheeler said he thought we had heard the last of General Gavin for the time being but acknowledged that Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance did not agree with him. There was an exchange between the President and McGeorge Bundy on George Kennan. The President could not understand why Kennan testified on Vietnam despite the fact that he had never been in the area and acknowledged he knew nothing about the situation there. McGeorge Bundy defended the contribution which Kennan had made in Europe, pointing out that Kennanʼs motivation may be explained by his extreme Europe-first attitude. The President discussed the suggestion that an Asian Task Force be organized which would list the potentialities of the area and recommend solutions to some of the problems. He thought we should direct intense public attention to Asia such as was done on the civil rights issue. Now that Europe is restored to economic health and military strength the U.S. should turn to Asia. He thought the Task Force should study food production, for example, and come up with recommendations. The Asian Development Bank should be linked to this endeavor. Mr. Rostow suggested that we should persuade the Asians to come up with their own plan which we would then say we could support. Mr. Marks commented that Ambassador Reischauer would be the perfect man to get the Japanese to come up with their own plan for Asian development. The President responded by saying we ought to get the Asians to ask us to help them and named in this connection Nehru and Marcos. Mr. Moyers suggested that a group be organized in Washington to plan our long range strategy toward Asia. The President thought that a group of five men should be asked to undertake this task. He said that McGeorge Bundy should work this out with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. 6 He added that there were not enough dreams in the foreign field. The President commented that Senator Russell was insisting on a vote in the Senate to reaffirm the congressional resolution of August 1964. He then discussed public support of the administrationʼs policy and cited a Paris [Harris] poll to indicate that the extremists consisted of about ten percent doves and sixteen percent hawks. He said he thought that the rising cost of living was a major element in determining public attitudes. The President concluded the meeting by asking that more effort be placed in working out sales of commodities now in our strategic stock- pile. He mentioned rubber specifically and suggested that Tom Mann be assigned to do whatever is required to get on with the reduction of U.S. stockpiles even though some foreign countries would be unhappy with our actions. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bromley Smith Files, Meeting on Vietnam. No classification marking. Drafted by Bromley Smith. For Valentiʼs notes of the same meeting and an attendance list, see Document 86 . Helms also took notes. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Memos for the Record, 01 Jan 65–31 Dec 72) 2 On February 26 the Security Council President informed the Secretary-General and Council members by letter of the results of the private consultations on Vietnam authorized on February 2 (see Document 59 ). The letter noted that serious differences of views remained unresolved, particularly as “to the wisdom of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam at this particular juncture.” These differences “had given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time.” For text of the letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 791–792. 3 For text of the statement released to the press by Goldberg on February 26, see Department of State Bulletin , April 4, 1965, pp. 547–548. 4 Baldwin reported in the February 21 issue that U.S. forces were “spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere” and that there were shortages in uniforms, clothing, ammunition, and equipment. At a March 2 news conference, reported in The New York Times on March 3, McNamara stated that U.S. armed forces were neither overextended nor suffering shortages and were “fully capable” of meeting their commitments. 5 Raborn testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 25 and again on February 28, mainly concerning the Soviet Union and China. For text, see Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) , vol. XVIII, pp. 333–409. 6 Rusk outlined his proposal for an Asian Development Task Force in a March 2 memorandum to the President, which Komer forwarded to the President on March 5 under cover of a memorandum giving his own views. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, vol. 21) 86. Notes of Meeting 86. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, February 26, 1966, 1:10 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Marks, Bundy, Vice President, Raborn, Helms, Gaud, Johnson, Rostow, Unger, Komer, Valenti 2 President: Want to meet in limited time on Vietnam—maybe every Saturday—during week—(make) sure weʼre doing everything we need to do. Going to pick someone to be assistant to President or Secretary (of State) to be Porterʼs counterpart on peace. Special Assistant to Secretary, probably. Assume no irritation from Pentagon. Will pick him in next three or four days. Lots of talk about pacification. Thrilled about General Walt. What heʼs doing makes you proud. Work being done by Marines on health, reconstruction, schools. General Greene was very cooperative. Tribute to military. Need this special assistant in Washington to carry out peace plans. Any requests from Freeman? Bundy: Will come in Monday. 3 Need organization to match Porterʼs. We need that here. Marks: Gaud will put up money to get TV going in Vietnam. President: What about TV sets? Marks: Hope to assemble sets there. Hope Japanese will contribute sets. Bundy: Need senior American to advise on economic (matters) and inflation. Robert Nathan is our choice. President: Vice President talk to him. Bundy: He ought not to be under Charles Mann. Report directly to Lodge and Porter. Rusk: President of Security Council at UN has letter to U Thant—amounts to resignation of UN from problem. 4 Had hassle over paragraph on mutual reduction of arms. Africans didnʼt want mutual because of our bombing. That is now out. Morse will call for meeting of Assembly but Assembly will do exactly what Security Council did. President: Let Goldberg find forum to explain this. Rusk: Would be inopportune to hold debate. Bundy: Get Goldberg to hold press conference next week with State Department auditorium. President: Think it ought to be this afternoon, otherwise newsmen will draw conclusions. 5 Bundy: One loose end in public opinion. Hanson Baldwin article. 6 McNamara: Statement will be ready Monday. Have to get Times . To be printed in entirely. Vice President: If statements are ready ahead of time, I can do work quietly with key Congressmen. Bundy: Resolution matter—President put rose on Morse—willing to have that issue joined. Raborn: Meeting didnʼt go as planned. 7 Committee members interested in what I had to say. But Chairman cut it off and asked questions aimed at finding out how we got our intelligence. Need to equate intelligence with sources of intelligence. McCarthy tried to get me to admit that F.R. (Foreign Relations) members ought to be on Russellʼs committee. Pell interested we didnʼt overdo covert action. Hickenlooper and Symington came to my rescue. Gaud: Have you read my memo? 8 President: Havenʼt read it yet. Didnʼt want to predict at press conference any length of time—or victory. Wheeler: Military actions at same tempo in past. Several satisfactory events—though nothing dramatic to herald a change. Rolling Thunder in North hampered by bad weather lately. President: Want Goodpaster to be in touch with Ike. Want Goodpaster to know what you know. Ridgway seemed to support us. Yet Fulbright used Ridgway letter to hit us. McNamara: I think Ridgway letter is a difference. President: Why donʼt we send bright colonels to see Bradley and others—and get their statements out. Wheeler: Gavin wants no part of this anymore. Heʼs ready to retire. Itʼs one of these things where heʼs a writer and didnʼt realize it was going to cause a stir. President: He thinks heʼs an authority or geo-political expert. Thinks we canʼt afford to keep commitments around the world. Rusk: Kennan had the same view when he was on Policy Planning Staff. Believes Asia is not worth it. Bundy: He got in trouble with Russia and Yugoslavia. Wholly unfit for operational duty. President: Why donʼt we do a real study on brown men—and Asia—Task Force on Asia—heavy thinking on Asia—potentialities and solutions—build it up—Asian Task Force. That group ought to be getting up recommendations on what we ought to be saying and doing. Rostow: In wake of Asian Development Bank—Asia CIAP—ought to challenge that group of Asian planners. Would force this Asia CIAP over and above the bank. Need challenge from you to get it going. President: Perhaps a number of Asian leaders coming here could request us to join with them. Have our group staff an Asian Task Force. Then try to allow Asians to do these things on their own. 9 Rusk: Might want to bring in Arthur Dean, and let him take over. Komer: New York business community feels if we are going to spend $10 billion—let elections take place—and then bug out—then we ought to get out now. 10 President: It was shocking to RFK that after conferring with LBJ aides, he was judged to be wrong. Vice President: Jack and I agree with Rostowʼs assessment—they want to do something on their own. Maybe by the time Black goes out, the Task Force will have something to give him. McNamara: Russell feels strongly about three things: 1. Resolution giving President the power. 2. Calling up the Reserves. 3. Bombing Haiphong POLs. Rusk: First thing in Korean war to unleash Stu Symington. Vice President: Morse repeal resolution will not get four votes. Morse, Gruening—maybe Burdick, Young. Counter-resolution will lose more votes. Moyers: Latest in Harris Poll. American people want honorable end. Two to one to see it through. More in a split—hawks and doves. Support has dwindled—63 per cent to 49 per cent. Fifty-one fair or poor handling. Policy fails to satisfy either group. Sixty-seven (January) to sixty-two (February) in job rating. Gallup—59 to 62 in job rating. Doves—10 per cent. Hawks—16 per cent, up from 12 per cent. Great bulk are in between. As result administration is being criticized from both ends. President is either not moving strong enough or too strong. January ʼ65—41 per cent excellent or good. March ʼ65—60 per cent. Pleiku. May ʼ65—57 per cent. July ʼ65—65 per cent. September ʼ65—66 per cent. October ʼ65—65 per cent. December ʼ65—66 per cent. Dec. pause. January ʼ66—63 per cent. February ʼ66—49 per cent. In February: Disagree with policy (carry war to North Vietnam)—16 per cent. Agree with policy (increased military effort in South)—33 per cent. Agree with policy (negotiate)—34 per cent. Disagree (pull out)—9 per cent. Not sure—8 per cent. Those who changed—big shift: those who agree but want more bombings—those who agree but want negotiations. First signs of American impatience with long war. President lost five points in popularity: —Vietnam —Cost of living 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The time and place of the meeting is from the President Daily Dairy. (Ibid.) For Bromley Smithʼs notes of the same meeting, see Document 85 . 2 “Johnson” refers to U. Alexis Johnson. According to the Presidentʼs Daily Diary, Moyers and Bromley Smith also attended. (Ibid.) 3 February 28. 4 See footnote 2, Document 85 . 5 See footnote 3, Document 85 . 6 See footnote 4, Document 85 . 7 See footnote 5, Document 85 . 8 Not further identified. 9 See footnote 6, Document 85 . 10 Komer summarized the views of the New York business community on Vietnam, as reported by Arthur Dean, in a February 23 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos) 87. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield 87. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield 1 Washington, March 1, 1966, 9:42 a.m. LBJ: Mike, Dick Russell called me and I told him, he said that he wanted to offer his substitute, but youʼd talked to him about this tabling, 2 and that he thought that I was making a terrific mistake by agreeing with that because he thought there would be doubt left as to my authority and it would be an open sore and be coming up—the Fulbrights and the doves all the way through. I told him, I didnʼt think so, that I would favor letting Morse make his case and try to rescind it, and then, without hurtinʼ anybody or getting personal, get up and make a statement that the questionʼs whether you want to rescind it or whether you donʼt and this direct vote on it can be had by tabling. But, I sure donʼt want the motion to table to imply any dilution of that resolution because if it does Iʼm in a hell of a shape as head of the Commander in Chief and with other nations, too. MM: I donʼt think that it would in any way. LBJ: Well, it will unless you make a case for it when you make the motion to table or get somebody to do it. Either make Russell or somebody say, “Hereʼs what the authority of this resolution is.” Now, Morse wants to take that away. Now, our position is that weʼre not gonna take it away, because if we leave me in doubt there, whether I have authority or not, hell Iʼd rather turn the authority over to Fulbright. Iʼve got to know what authority I have, and I believe I have unquestioned authority as Commander in Chief—162 cases according to the Attorney General— MM: Without the resolution. LBJ: Without the reso[lution]—with the resolution, Iʼve got them in there with me. But is this motion to table in any way, in the light of what they said, diluting it? Now, if it does, Iʼm against it. MM: No. LBJ: I think the case ought to be made that Morse wants to rescind it and weʼre not gonna rescind it and thereby, by not rescinding it, it stays just as it is. MM: Thatʼs right. LBJ: And that we want every dictator in the world to know, we donʼt want Peking— MM: The case is made, Mr. President, without even saying a word. [indecipherable] two or three votes. LBJ: I donʼt agree with you without saying a word. I think it ought to be in that record before that roll call. And, thatʼs the case he makes. And, Iʼm for tabling it. And I donʼt what to rub anybodyʼs nose in it like he does with Nelson and the rest of them. But I do think that they oughta say, Morse wants to repeal this; now, weʼre not gonna repeal it; I am gonna move to table it. If you want to repeal it, you vote for Morse. But, if you want to leave it just as it is, with all the authority that it contains, why, you vote to table. If you donʼt, why you go on and vote with Morse. I just donʼt want some would-be fellow thatʼs waiting to see what to do, depending on the Senate, to misinterpret this, because I know what happened to us in a couple of wars by their misjudging our intentions. Iʼm controlling this thing just as carefully as a human can. Iʼm watching it just [indecipherable] but I cannot have them in doubt about my ability as Commander in Chief. MM: No, but you have you that responsibility and authority even without a resolution. LBJ: I agree with it. But all the play, Mike, all the editorials is, whatʼs going to be done this Senate—what this group of twenty or thirty or forty Senators—are they gonna take away authority? Are they gonna hold it back? And, they may interpret this—and the propaganda in all the morning papers is—that theyʼve kinda agreed. So, I think that when we make a motion to table, please see that someone points up the fact that this leaves the President without a bit of his authority changed or diluted. MM: Ok, Mr. President. LBJ: Thank you, Mike. MM: Yes sir. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.10, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 It was anticipated that Senator Wayne Morse was going to make a motion on March 1 to rescind the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 10, 1964. Senator Richard Russell proposed making a substitute motion to reaffirm the resolution. An alternative response under consideration was a motion to table Morse ʼs motion. Russell called the President at 9:20 a.m. on March 1 about the issue but his conversation was not recorded. (lbid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) Later on March 1, the President discussed the issue by telephone with Senator Gale McGhee (at 12:49 p.m.) and Senator Russell Long (at 2:40 p.m). Both conversations were recorded and the recordings are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 6603.01, PNOs 2, 5, and 6. The Senate voted later in the day to table Morseʼs motion by a 92 to 5 vote. For more information, see William C. Gibbons , The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War , Part IV, pp. 257–258. 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 88. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, March 2, 1966. 3159. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: A. Concerning Senators. 1. From a CIA source, I learn that Prime Minister Ky is writing to Senator Robert Kennedy disputing his thesis that the Viet Cong should be put in the Government of Viet-Nam, and in effect asking him, “Why donʼt you come out here and see the truth?” 2. Rev. Tam Chau, Chairman of the Institute for the Propagation of the Buddhist Faith, said Senator Kennedyʼs proposal had renewed uncertainty about U.S. objectives in Viet-Nam and would undermine anti-Communist morale. 3. In the February 25 issue of The Reporter magazine, Douglas Pike gives an account of the true situation of the Viet Cong, which I recommend that you read as I believe it will interest and encourage you. It should be put into the Congressional Record. In this article, he makes this statement: “Viet Cong theoreticians have traditionally held that there are three routes to victory: (1) the Khoi Nghia, or general uprising; (2) the famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary guerrilla war; or (3) coalition government.” It is not so surprising to learn that the Viet Cong themselves regard the creation of coalition government as one of the three principal routes to victory, since we in USG have long realized that to put the Viet Cong into the Government of Viet-Nam would disintegrate everything we have worked so hard to accomplish here and would gravely endanger the security of our own troops. But Communist skill in selling this idea to distinguished and patriotic Senators is surprising. 4. U.S. Senate debate on Viet-Nam drew heavy attention to American role in the Viet-Nam press. Quyet Tien asked if Senators Fulbright and Kennedy would accept Communistsʼ price for peace—a disgraceful American surrender in Southeast Asia. Tien Tuyen wondered what Mr. Fulbright would do if, Viet-Nam having been abandoned, Communist aggression turned to Thailand, the Philippines, India, and even the United States. Tien Tuyen labeled Senator Kennedyʼs proposal for coalition government violation of principle of self-determination and uncalled for interference in Viet-Namʼs affairs. Tieng Van commented that “While many people think White House cannot ignore … Messers. Fulbright, Wayne Morse, Robert Kennedy, best informed observers think that defeatist camp cannot shake determination of U.S. number one citizen L. B. Johnson.” B. Communist propaganda success. 5. Persuading U.S. Senators unwittingly to support V.C. victory formula is on a par with Communist successes in convincing the non-Communist public that: A double standard about aggression is all right that is—if Israelis attacked Egypt in 1956 it was dreadful, but for North Viet-Nam to commit aggression against South Vietnam is fine. Or that the words of the U.N. Charter calling for “suppression of aggression” are somewhat disreputable. 6. I suggest publicity be given to the statement which you made in Honolulu in which you mentioned the word “aggression” fourteen times in a row. You really put your finger on something very crucial and for this reason: 7. In the propaganda war, we have been on the horns of a dilemma. If we stressed peace negotiations, we pleased certain elements in the West but we aroused contempt in Asia and probably hardened the Communist will to fight. But if, on the other hand, we decided to “play it cool”, we would increase the chances of impressing the Asians with our toughness and improve the chances of peace, but we appeared bellicose and indifferent to human suffering in the West. 8. The way out is, I think, to stress the idea of aggression and the corollary that we are fighting a limited war. The thought to get across is that “The North Vietnamese must get out of South Viet-Nam. Then the war will be over. They are the escalators; we are fighting a limited war.” 9. I realize that this has been said many times, but the Communists repeat and so should we. Your stress on aggression at Honolulu, therefore, hit the bullʼs eye. C. “Revolutionary development”. 10. Porter is doing superbly in his new job, sharpening the whole U.S. approach to “revolutionary development”. He is boldly and rapidly pulling all the strings together. I frankly admit that I had not realized that giving him this added status would make such a tremendous difference. My congratulations for having thought of it. 11. Under your leadership, a corps of men and a body of ideas and procedures are developing here [that] will be available for use elsewhere to overcome subversion and terrorism and carry out the true revolution, in freedom, which will be more potent than the Communist revolution. If we succeed here, we will have men and measures for use in underdeveloped countries anywhere in the world and the downward spiral of world Communism will have begun. The year that this blow at Communism is struck in Viet-Nam may well be, in the history of Communism, on a par in importance with 1917—the year of its birth. 12. We are watching the national priority areas in Quang Nam (no.1) and Binh Dinh (no.2) even more closely than usual because the GVN changed chiefs of both provinces this week. We are uncertain as to the effect these changes will have on the revolutionary development effort, though Americans generally in Binh Dinh feel that the departure of Col. Tuong, the Province Chief and Major Be, his chief deputy and the guiding hand of provincial revolutionary development efforts, may have an adverse effect on the program there. But it is too early to tell. 13. Lansdale visited Quang Nam and found General Thi much more involved in revolutionary development than in conniving against Prime Minister Ky. 14. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, spent most of last week visiting provinces in the IV Corps area checking progress against provincial plans. He plans to continue trips of this sort until he has visited every province. 15. Prime Minister Ky has issued a decree making trainees at the National Institute of Administration available for work in the Revolutionary Development Program for one and one half years of their total three and one half year training program. It is hoped that this arrangement will help meet needs for trained personnel. D. Military. 16. Contacts with the Viet Cong increased in both number and intensity and the enemy mounted one regimental attack and at least three attacks employing one or two battalions. As a result of this harder fighting, allied casualties reached a new high for the war. E. Economic. 17. Retail prices in Saigon, including rice prices, increased slightly but the USAID index showed the general price level three percent below the level of a month ago. The free market price of dollars remained unchanged and the price of gold rose very slightly. Imports increased rice stocks in the Saigon area but deliveries from the Delta remained low. Minister of Economy plans to announce new economic program on March 17. F. News from Hanoi. 18. Hanoi reports indicate that, while the hold of the Communist government is as ironclad as ever, the government is disappointed by the failure of the people to have an enthusiastic attitude towards the war. Apparently the “prospect of protracted conflict with no foreseeable assurance of victory” has created “lack of confidence”, even “pacifism” and perplexity”. The pressure of pursuing an expanding war in South Viet-Nam, while defending the North, and maintaining economic progress is apparently a problem. 19. For the first time, I note reports from Hanoi that all our military activities plus our psychological activities have “created much difficulty for the political struggle movement”. There are reports of “confusion about the political struggle”, the political movement not developing “apace with the arms struggle”. 20. This undoubtedly does not indicate big trouble, but it is the first time that I have seen reports that they were having any political difficulties at all. We are accustomed to military success and political failure. It is cheering to read that we are finally giving them political troubles, however small in number. 21. After talks with North Vietnamese political and military prisoners, General Thi (I Corps) was struck by the immunity they felt they had. They were “sure there would be no U.S. or GVN invasion”. Therefore, he told Lansdale, “They could afford to send a great mass of their manpower into South Viet-Nam rather than keeping them North for the defense of the homeland, and simply to inundate South Viet-Nam.” They were no longer even pretending to “liberate South Viet-Nam but were quite nakedly setting out to put their own people in place.” 22. Question: Might it not be well to take some action which would make Hanoi think we were planning an invasion? Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:16 a.m. and passed to the White House. 89. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 89. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 7, 1966, 9:25 a.m. [Here follow opening comments.] LBJ: Whatʼs happening in Vietnam? RSM: Oh, I think weʼre getting along pretty well. I havenʼt actually checked up this morning. I did yesterday and we were getting along pretty well. This big engagement is very favorable to us. And I keep my fingers crossed but actually the progress is better than I thought it would be at this time. Weʼre engaging more Viet Cong and the fatalities are Viet Cong. LBJ: Looks like weʼre killing a thousand. How many does North Vietnam have? 250,000? RSM: They have about 250,000 in their regular force, but they also have an ability to expand that very substantially—I was going to say from reserves; theyʼre not really reserves—to mobilize additional manpower. But, as I said, weʼre killing more VC than I thought we would at this time. LBJ: Now, Bob, you sure youʼre shooting ʼem as fast as they can take ʼem, just as quick as we can get ʼem out there? RSM: Absolutely. Iʼm just sitting here right now with Cy [Vance] and thatʼs exactly what weʼre working on. LBJ: Well, ask each one of your services now, quit belly-aching and do it now or for[ever] hold your peace. Because thereʼll be times here when we want to say stop, look, and listen. RSM: I know that. I know that. LBJ: And letʼs get some more men in there, if we can, right now. I think itʼs a good psychological time to get ʼem in. RSM: I completely agree with you and thatʼs just exactly what weʼre doing, Mr. President. Weʼre just going to send out another instruction today in writing to be absolutely sure that this is clear because theyʼre conjuring up all kinds of problems that stand in the way of meeting the manpower requirements out there and thereʼs a tendency to hold back on some unless youʼre sure you can send all. But our instructions are very clear. Weʼve made it personally and in writing that we want to accelerate in every way the movement of men there. Again, Iʼll call ʼem myself personally today. LBJ: And then make also this notation, do everything we can to cut some lead time off the Australians and Koreans any way in the world we can, because thatʼll help us if they are in there when youʼre gettinʼ these big bills through up here along the middle of the year. If theyʼve moved, itʼll be some help. [Here follows a brief discussion of Senator William Fulbright.] LBJ: Have you ever got settled down on your reserve policy yet? Are they still—? RSM: Reserve and Guard reorganization? LBJ: No, on reserve— RSM: Oh, call up the reserves? Well, weʼre still fighting the battle on that. LBJ: See you announced that you donʼt have to, but have you got them to where theyʼre not agitating you on it? RSM: No, no. But everyday weʼre getting a little stronger in our opposition to those that want to call up the reserves. And this is just exactly what weʼre working on now, right in my office at the moment. And I, myself, am convinced, Mr. President, that we will not have to call up the reserves to support some 350,000 or so strength in South Vietnam. And I donʼt think weʼll get much above 350,000 before the end of this year. So my view is we wonʼt have to call up the reserves before the end of this year. [Here follows a short discussion of briefings of the President and the public by military personnel from Vietnam.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.12, Side A, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 90. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 90. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 8, 1966, 3:45 p.m. Vietnam civil czar: I am not up on where this matter stands, but think the attached worth passing on. Bundy, Bell, and Alex Johnson all agreed that for such a concept to work, the man involved must have full authority to operate—and not end up at just the assistant secretary level in State. Also, to get the calibre of man we want and to enable him to operate effectively, we have to give him the proper base. True, this goes against the grain of the new State alignment. 2 The counter-argument is that Vietnam deserves to be treated as an exception which calls for exceptional measures. One way to compromise would be to designate the czar as both a Special Assistant to Sec State and a Special Assistant to you, thus making clear that he would have direct access to the President as well as Rusk. R.W. Komer 3 Attachment Memorandum From Chester Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson 4 Washington, March 5, 1966. SUBJECT Management of Vietnam Policy For the past 18 months I have spent much of my time pushing, prodding and needling the various elements of Government with responsibilities in Vietnam. I have long felt strongly that something more than a committee arrangement was necessary if we were to win the pacification battle. (I attach a brief memorandum on this subject that I wrote in March 1965.) 5 Now that the issue is on the front burner, but in danger of being buried in the State Department, may I urge the following views: 1. “Mr.Vietnam” should not be located in the State Department, but in the White House complex: the operating, public information and policy management programs cut across many agencies; they are of the utmost importance to you personally; they require for efficient, effective and expeditious implementation the kind of leverage that can only come from the knowledge that “Mr.Vietnam” and his staff are directly responsible to you. With all due respect to the Department of State, it has never had any experience in running a war—and your Mr. Vietnam will be spending his time running a very large chunk of the Vietnamese war. Also, if attached to the White House, he will not be forced to spend time before Congressional Committees—a matter that might become increasingly important. 2. If the management function is nevertheless assigned to State, it should be regarded as an exception and not incorporated into General Taylorʼs reorganization plan. The problems to be dealt with relate primarily to fast and effective interagency implementation of established policy rather than the development of interagency policy. Furthermore, if the management of Vietnam policy is to be incorporated into the Taylor plan, Mr.Vietnam will, in actuality, rank only as an Assistant Secretary of State. I submit that a “Bureau of Vietnam Affairs” will inevitably become a routine State Department organization operating under routine State Department procedures. As I understand it, this is just what you donʼt want to happen. 3. So if the assignment is made to State, your “Mr.Vietnam” should also be designated, as was Tom Mann, a “Special Assistant to the President” with direct access to you. In State he should work directly under the Secretary. Interagency guidance and the resolution of interagency problems should come from the Saturday Vietnam Group, of which he should be a member. There are few precedents for this, but there are no precedents to the Vietnam war. Four names that occur to me as candidates are Bob Nathan, Paul Nitze, Dave Bell and Robert Nelson (Litton Industries). As one deeply committed to your Vietnam policy (and in many respects the originator of the “Vietnam Czar” concept), I feel compelled to urge these views. Chet Cooper 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Chrono. Secret. 2 In National Security Action Memorandum No. 341, March 2, the President assigned the Secretary of State “authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas.” NSAM No. 341 and Komerʼs March 2 memorandum to the President regarding the location of the “Vietnam civil czar” are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, volume XXXIII . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 4 Secret. Sent through Komer. 5 Attached but not printed. March 9–June 28: Buddhist “Struggle Movement”; Emphasis on Non-Military Programs; Escalation of the Bombing March 9–June 28: Buddhist “Struggle Movement”; Emphasis on Non-Military Programs; Escalation of the Bombing 91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, March 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 92. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, March 9, 1966, 7:50 p.m. Source: Johnson Library National Security File, Memos to the President—Robert Komer, vol. 21. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 93. Notes of Meeting Washington, March 11, 1966, 12:35–1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files) 94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, March 13, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to CINPAC for POLAD. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:26 a.m. 95. Editorial Note 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, March 16, 1966, 4:13 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Moyers, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. 97. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, March 16, 1966, 6:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVIII. No classification marking. 98. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, March 19, 1966, 10:20 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE, Primarily McNamara Recommendations re Strategic Actions. Secret. Attached to the memorandum is a note indicating that the President told his secretary at 11:30 a.m. on March 19: “Tell Brom Smith to try to prepare a memorandum giving a careful survey and/or study of how to best use the next 60 days to make the maximum effort with bombs, troops, and everything else against infiltration before the rainy season, and we ought to provide any extra planes, bombs, etc., and find out how best to use napalm. I want it to be a good report showing everything and every way being explored … very comprehensive study.” 99. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 19, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret; Controlled Dissem; No Foreign Dissem. 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, March 23, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 11:05 a.m. and passed to the White House. 101. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, March 26, 1966. Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (24 Mar 66). Top Secret. 102. National Security Action Memorandum No. 343 Washington, March 28, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, NSAM. Secret. In forwarding NSAM No. 343 to the President on March 28 for his signature, Komer noted in his covering memorandum: “Joe Califano and now Bill Moyers have finally worn down Secretary Rusk and others in State who wanted to fit the Vietnam job to their conception.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Robert Komer, vol. 21) Rusk expressed some of his objections and concerns in telephone conversations with Califano on March 24 and with Moyers on March 28. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 103. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington March 28, 1966, 4:44 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.13, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 104. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Washington, March 29, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret. Komer forwarded the memorandum to the President at 6:15 p.m. on March 29. (Ibid., Memos to the President—Robert Komer, vol. 21) 105. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, March 30, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:22 a.m. and passed to the White House. 106. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, March 30, 1966. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that Rusk saw the memorandum. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, March 30, 1966, 5:21 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, April 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Secret; Exdis. The first page of the source text bears the notation, in Ruskʼs handwriting, “not used, except orally, DR. “An unsigned copy of the memorandum, without Ruskʼs notation but marked “WPB Chron,” is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. 109. Notes of Meeting Washington, April 2, 1966, 1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the family dining room on the second floor of the White House. 110. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, April 4, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:50 a.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, and Department of Defense. 111. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson Washington, April 4, 1966, 8:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. No classification marking. In his April 4 covering memorandum to the President, Valenti noted that there was one vital piece of information that he had not yet seen concerning the “so-called mutiny of SVN troops.” (Ibid.) 112. Notes of Meeting Washington, April 4, 1966, 7:10–8:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President returned to the Oval Office from the Cabinet Room at 8:42 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 113. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, April 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-VN Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Mar-Aug ʼ66. Secret. Drafted by J.J. Helble of FE/VN. 114. Draft Scenario Prepared in the Department of Defense Washington, April 5, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966. Top Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted in OASD/ISA. The source text is stamped: “Sec Def has seen, 9 Apr 1966.” Attached to the source text is a 14-page draft paper, “Some Thoughts About Vietnam,” dated April 4. Referring to the paper printed here as “a possible scenario,” the paper concludes: “All factors taken into account, we should seriously consider seizing the opportunity offered by the I Corps crisis to change our policy with respect to Vietnam and to disengage from the war there.” 115. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 5, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Moyers and Valenti. 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, April 6, 1966, 7:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Rostow and McNamara, and approved by Rusk. 117. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson April 8, 1966, 1757Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. Secret. The source text does not indicate where Vanceʼs telegram originated. 118. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, April 9, 1966, 7 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN II. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Helms, McNaughton, William Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti. 119. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Washington, April 12, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. Attached to the source text is a note indicating that the President told his secretary on April 13: “I want reactions right away. See what they are doing to carry out the suggestions made—as soon as possible.” Unger commented on Taylorʼs memorandum in a memorandum to Rostow, April 15. (Ibid.) Rostow jotted his own reactions on a copy of the memorandum located ibid., vol. LI. 120. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, April 13, 1966, 1813Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer dated his message April 12, but it was not sent to the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas until April 13. 121. Paper Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, April 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Copies were sent to McNaughton, Komer, Carver, William Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers. 122. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts Washington, April 14, 1966, 7:33 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by D.A. Engel in FE/VN, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger. Sent for action to 26 posts and repeated to Saigon. 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, April 16, 1966, 1140Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:25 p.m. on April 18 under cover of a memorandum stating: “This is a first class stock-taking by Saigon which I commend to you for reading at your first relatively easy moment. It underlies the discussions we will be having later in the day and over the next week.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1) Also passed to Defense, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 124. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington April 18, 1966, 8:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. 125. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, April 21, 1966, 11:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret. 126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, April 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 127. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Washington, April 27, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret. Rostow forwarded this memorandum to President Johnson on April 27 under a covering memorandum asking whether he could pass the memorandum to William Bundy and urge that the Department of State be prepared to present its views during the Lodge discussions in May. The President gave his approval and wrote on Rostowʼs memorandum: “I think we should have public statement if all agree.” (Ibid.) On April 28 Rostow forwarded Taylorʼs memorandum to Rusk, highlighting in his covering memorandum “one critical question” raised by Taylor: “do you trade a cessation of bombing in the north for a cessation of infiltration or for an end to terrorism in the south. It hinges substantially on whether a cessation of infiltration could be monitored.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET) For William Bundyʼs response, see Document 129. For Lodgeʼs comments, see Document 158. 128. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, April 29, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Prepared in the CIA at Desmond FitzGeraldʼs request and forwarded to Rostow on April 30. 129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, May 4, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Papers, McNTN II. Secret; Nodis. 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, May 7, 1966, 6:32 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Miller and approved by Unger. 131. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas Washington, May 9, 1966, 1515Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables Between Porter & Komer, May-June 1966. Secret. The President was at the LBJ Ranch. 132. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive/Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, Vietnam 1966 (May-Dec.). Secret. Forwarded to Rostow by Helms on May 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the study you requested.” Copies were sent to Taylor, Rusk, McNamara, and Komer under covering memoranda indicating that Rostow had asked that the copies be provided in preparation for the NSC meeting on May 10. (Ibid.) 133. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, May 10, 1966, 3:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 134. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon Washington, May 10, 1966, 2210Z. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DOD/EA Files, Job 92–00428R, File 137–6–72/3, TUBRACE, Buddhist Operations. Secret. 135. Summary Notes of the 557th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, May 10, 1966, 5:45 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting, which ended at 7:32 p.m., was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 136. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson Washington, May 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Harry McPherson. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 137. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, May 14, 1966. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S. Personal & Secret; Absolutely No One Else To See. Prepared by Harriman. 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, May 15, 1966, 1:29 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk. 139. List Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, May 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. The source text is handwritten. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that at 2:35 p.m. on May 15 he met in his office “re recent developments in Danang” with Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Unger, Habib, Raborn, Helms, Taylor, Rostow, Komer, and Jorden. The meeting ended no later than 3:02 p.m., when the President went to the Mansion in the White House. (Ibid.) 140. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. Prepared by Jorden and sent to Rostow. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 12:20 to 1:05 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) On May 12 and again on May 14 Rostow forwarded briefing papers to the President for the meeting, one by Komer on coping with inflation and a second by Unger on “Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional Assembly in South Viet-Nam.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 2) 141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, May 19, 1966, 1:46 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House; cleared by Bell, William Bundy, and McNaughton; and approved by Unger. Repeated to CINCPAC. 142. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 19, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, POL 7, Bui Diem Visit. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miller and cleared by Unger. A memorandum of Bui Diemʼs conversation with Rostow on May 20 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. 143. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) Washington, May 20, 1966, 2158Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp. 144. Editorial Note 145. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, May 24, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret. 146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, May 25, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to President Johnson at noon on May 25 under cover of a memorandum stating: “This is Ambassador Lodge at his best. There is a good deal to be said for the approach he suggests for a fireside chat.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6) 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:09 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Helble, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger. 148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, May 28, 1966. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S. Secret; Personal. Prepared by Harriman on May 30. 149. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson Washington, May 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV. Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow and Taylor. Leonhart was Komerʼs deputy in the White House office established by NSAM No. 343 (Document 102) to oversee pacification and other non-military programs in Vietnam. 150. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Saigon, June 2, 1966, 1135Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp. 151. Editorial Note 152. Editorial Note 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, June 8, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:15 p.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:45 a.m. on June 9 under cover of a memorandum stating that it was “worth reading through to the end” and had “much more good news than bad.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5) 154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield Washington, June 10, 1966, 8:45 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.16, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 155. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, June 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret. Komer sent copies of the attachment to Rostow and Taylor under a June 17 covering memorandum in which he stated that the President was “strongly in favor” of his proposals. (Ibid.) 156. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson Washington, June 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6. Top Secret; Personal; Exdis. The message was drafted by Rusk, reviewed by the President, and redrafted by Rusk and Rostow in light of the Presidentʼs instructions. Rostow informed Read in a June 14 memorandum that the message had been sent that day and that an information copy had gone to McNamara. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 157. Memorandum From William N. Morell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, June 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The memorandum and attachment were forwarded to the President on June 16. 158. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Saigon, undated. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LV. Secret. Lodge forwarded the memorandum to Rostow under cover of a memorandum dated June 17. (Ibid.) 159. Summary Notes of the 559th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, June 17, 1966, 6:05–8 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, June 22, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:36 a.m. and passed to the White House. 161. Notes of President Johnsonʼs Meeting With the National Security Council Washington, June 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking. Prepared by George Christian. In a memorandum to Bromley Smith dated October 30, 1968, Christian stated: “I have reconstructed the NSC meeting of June 22 from sketchy notes I took which have been locked up for all this time.” (Ibid., White House Central Files, Ex FG 11–5) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and lasted from 12:50 to 2:20 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, June 23, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Nina. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:02 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:50 a.m. on June 23 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Thieuʼs reaction to your decision is worth reading.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7) 163. Letter From George B. Kistiakowsky to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, June 23, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966. Confidential; Privileged. 164. Editorial Note 91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 91. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, March 9, 1966. 3260. 1. General Kyʼs office called at 11:55 and asked whether I could call at 12:15. 2. When I entered, he first told me he had decided to appoint a woman as the Mayor of Dalat. He then said he wanted to talk to me about his troubles with General Thi. He was speaking to me in my capacity as a “friend”, and having in mind that he, Ky, is the same age as my son, he spoke as follows: 3. Thi was becoming more and more difficult. His judgment was poor, he had delusions of grandeur, he did none of the things that were expected of him. For example, he had done nothing about pacification/revolutionary development. He was deliberately insubordinate; he would receive orders from the government and return them, scribbling on the order “this crazy government”. It was obvious that one fourth of the country was exempt from the control of the national government. As long as this condition obtained Viet-Nam could not really call itself a nation. 4. He had had a meeting with all of the Generals this morning, less Thi, Vinh Loc and Quang, and had told them that he intended to share this burden with them, and asked them to take appropriate steps for removal of General Thi. If not, he, Ky, would go back to commanding the air force and someone else could be Prime Minister. He could not go on this way. The Generals this morning had wanted to know what I thought. 5. A meeting of all ten Generals with Thi present is scheduled for tomorrow, Thursday, morning. He asked my advice. 6. In reply, I said that as U.S. Ambassador, I could not, of course, interfere in what was essentially an internal affair, and that for the record I could not say much more than that the United States Government very much desired the stability of the Government of Viet-Nam which we regarded as indispensable to successful prosecution of the war. 7. General Ky had, however, said he wished my comments as a friend and that in that same spirit the Generals this morning had wanted to know what I thought. Speaking in this unofficial and friendly capacity, I submitted the following thoughts: 8. This was obviously a question of major importance. Being as important as this, it was absolutely indispensable that every step be carefully prepared so that there could be no possible hitch, and that General Ky would not stumble and fall flat on his face. 9. If the charge of insubordination was made against General Thi, I asked, could it be substantiated? Did you have names and dates and specifications to support charges of nonfeasance as well as charges of insubordination? Were your charges so well documented that they would command the support of public opinion? Better still, were your charges good enough so that they would stand up in court of law, and so that General Thi would realize that the jig was up and he had better leave? Did you have plans made for his successor? Did you feel that you knew how to remove him and install his successor? Can you put it across? Can you make it stick? 10. Could you insulate I Corps effectively enough so that the removal of General Thi would not result in a chain reaction in which the other corps commanders and all the members of the Directorate might not find their tenure shaken? 11. I advised him to get some bright lawyers to go to work immediately and go through all of the instructions and paper traffic between him and General Thi, and see whether they could document a case of insubordination and nonfeasance. I thought this was the best way in which the afternoon could be spent. I agreed to think about the matter and if I had any further views to call on him again later in the afternoon. 12. Comment: I hope that this search for proof will cool him off and persuade him back away from the confrontation tomorrow. It was also clear to me that I was being brought in long after a decision had been made to try to do something. Ky had taken the preliminary steps this morning and was definitely committed to going ahead with it tomorrow. 13. One must sympathize with his view that he cannot accept responsibility without being able to give orders that are carried out in all the different corps. As the Department knows, I have long disapproved of the corps system, although recognizing it as one of the facts of life. Thi, in his recent actions in the DMZ, reminds one of the Chinese warlords whom I first encountered when I visited China in 1929. Subordination of corps commanders to central authority may be part of Viet-Namʼs march toward nationhood. 14. In response to questions from me, Ky said (a) that there was no suspicion of Thi playing with Communists and (b) that Thieu was supporting Ky. If Thieu is supporting Ky wholeheartedly and actively it might mean much since no one is more expert at elimination of troublesome persons. 15. Had lunch with Marine Generals and the U.S. military all spoke well of Thi, his cooperativeness and devotion to pacification. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Secret; Flash; Exdis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:21 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 92. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 92. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 9, 1966, 7:50 p.m. 1. Likely showdown between Prime Minister Ky and I Corps Commander General Thi. This trouble is apparently reaching a climax. Ky has called a special meeting of the ruling military directorate for 1000 hours tomorrow (9 p.m. tonight our time) to seek Thiʼs removal. Ky is convinced that there is no alternative other than to remove Thi. 2 2. Thi is to be accused of insubordination, “war lord” behavior, alienation of the population and general obstruction of the pacification effort. Recent CIA reports indicate that Thi may have begun conspiring with such retired officers as General Tran Van Don, 3 and this may have influenced Ky to seek Thiʼs dismissal. 3. Lodge had two urgent meetings with Ky today. He told Ky that he was not in a position to give advice on such an internal political matter. But he warned Ky of the disastrous consequences of any government crisis at this time particularly in the wake of the Honolulu conference. He told Ky that if there was any possibility whatever that the ruling directorate could not enforce the removal of Thi, then the confrontation should be put off. 4. But Ky remains adamant, and claims that the removal will be painless since all the generals are with him. Thi would be given the graceful exit of either a study tour in the U.S. or the post of Ambassador to Bangkok. 5. State is worried too. If Thi is alerted to the action contemplated he may refuse to attend the March 10 meeting and take unilateral action in his area. Tri Quang and the Central Vietnam Buddhists are also known to be close to Thi and unsympathetic to Kyʼs government. Ky has sent an emissary to speak to Tri Quang, apparently to mollify him in advance of Thiʼs removal. 6. So State told Lodge to do all possible to avoid a showdown. If Ky and the directorate still choose to proceed, Lodge is to insure that they handle Thiʼs removal, to the extent possible, as a normal change in corps commanders, with Thiʼs next assignment announced simultaneously. Lodge has clearly done as much as feasible, and Stateʼs instructions 4 give him the leeway he needs to attempt to cope with the situation. We will keep you posted. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library National Security File, Memos to the President—Robert Komer, vol. 21. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 In telegram 3277 from Saigon, March 10, Lodge reported that the Directorate meeting had ended about 4 p.m. and that Thi had been relieved of his duties. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 This report appeared in Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/02963 from Saigon, March 4. According to the cable, Ky told several members of the Directorate after its meeting on March 2 that he had disturbing reports about Thiʼs activities and that Thi “was attempting to make I Corps his personal fief.” (Central Intelligence Agency, EA/DDO Files: Job 85–00329R, 137–9–23, Government Activities in SVN) 4 Transmitted in telegram 2653 to Saigon, March 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S) 93. Notes of Meeting 93. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, March 11, 1966, 12:35–1:30 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, Komer, Gardner, Marks, Helms, Raborn, Bell, Ball, Bromley Smith, General Goodpaster, J. Valenti 2 Goodpaster: March 4–10 ground operations (briefed group on latest military action). President: What accounts for substantial difference in KIA (killed in action)? Wheeler: 1. Heavier fire power—fighter bombers and artillery. 2. Mobility—choppers. 3. Good troop leadership and aggressiveness. Killed around 8,000 men since first of year—close to 30,000 casualties. Taylor: Fair to reduce casualties from 3 to 1 to 2 to 1 because of seriously wounded. President: How many casualties before they feel it? Taylor: When casualties are above infiltration. 3 McNamara: What parts are coming from main force units? Others are porters, messengers, etc. Number of battalions are increasing in spite of casualties. President: If this keeps up for the year? McNamara: Donʼt think so. His strength at end of year should be stronger. They can increase from 105 to 155 (presumably battalions) at this rate. Rusk: It would require 10,000 a month casualties. Is that right? McNamara: They are infiltrating at rate of 8,000 a month. Taylor: All our plans are based on road nets in Laos—and difficult to know about forward supplies. Marks: (Read report of defectors saying food and material was short—malaria (35 per cent carrying malaria).) McNamara: But they carry malaria and fight. They will continue to fight hard. President: What about malaria for our people? McNamara: Down dramatically. About 25 per cent rate. Meningitis has dropped, too. President: Spreading out camps do it? McNamara: No. Medical help mostly. Goodpaster: (Continued on air operations.) McNamara: First time weʼve had attacks by IL–28s. Shows theyʼre more aggressive and are attacking. They have not attacked in South Vietnam. Would not recommend knocking out IL–28ʼs now. They are not that much of a threat. Goodpaster: As of March 5, strength was: 216,400 (presumably U.S. strength) 690,900 (presumably South Vietnamese) 23,000 (presumably other free world forces) 930,000 Total 225,000 Viet Cong 13,100 North Vietnam President: Gardner will be leaving tomorrow. Rusk: How specific can we put to other governments medical assist-ance and health? More detail on kinds of personnel needed. Gardner: Assembled 22 people—ready to go. Covers all health and education facilities. 4 Komer: Have General Williamson on hand. Should he brief the Governors? 5 President: Yes. Outline agenda and have him speak and answer questions. McNamara: General Thi has been removed as I Corps commander. 6 Under control, looks as though itʼs coming out alright. I believe he will come out. Helms: GVN paratroopers marched in Saigon in Thiʼs favor. McNamara: Some bad taste in mouths of our people. Looks like weʼre weak in GVN Government. President: Do our people want him to leave? McNamara: I do. Taylor: Heʼs a bad character and good riddance. Wheeler: General Walt got on well with him. But a conniver. Had to keep eye on him. President: How do we get Lodge and Westmoreland to stop giving out Top Secret information? The press is saying they have to go to Saigon (for) Top Secret information and itʼs available there. Rusk: Will get a wire off to Lodge. President: What about inflation problem there? Bell: Theyʼre carrying out some of our ideas, but not enough. New man in charge is bright. Has announced one step—but not enough. Reaction to first step is good and the Minister is encouraged. IMF to take mission out there. One assurance from IMF: If this mission finds that radical steps are needed, will we back him up? Fowler and Bell believe log jam may be beginning to break. Some evidence of good chance but still insufficient. [Here follows discussion of China and NATO.] 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and Bromley Smith also took notes. (Ibid., National Security File, Bromley Smith Files) 2 Moyers also attended. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 3 Smithʼs notes state: “General Taylor pointed out that when we are really hurting the North Vietnamese is when we are destroying a larger number of their forces than are being infiltrated into South Vietnam. In answer to the Presidentʼs question as to when this situation will be realized, Secretary McNamara predicted it would take more than a year.” 4 Smithʼs notes state: “Secretary Gardner commented that the trip his group was taking was the first step in a continuing effort to see how measures of education and health could improve the situation in South Vietnam.” 5 Smithʼs notes state: “There was a brief discussion of the Vietnam briefing to be given by Rusk, McNamara and General Wheeler to the Governors who will be attending a conference in the White House on Saturday [March 13].” 6 According to Smithʼs notes, McNamara stated that Thi was removed because he “did not cooperate with the Directorate and was running the First Corps area as if it were his fief.” 7 According to Smithʼs notes, prior to the close of the meeting, “Secretary McNamara noted that he felt that we had broken the back of congressional criticism of shortages of material in Vietnam and he predicted that critics would now try to prove that there were shortages of personnel.” 94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 94. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, March 13, 1966. 3321. Ref: Embtel 3319. 2 1. Following is unofficial translation full text communique issued at Buddhist Institute press conference Saigon 1700 local time March 12: “In recent days the country has been in a state of crisis. Since the November revolution, our country does not yet have effective institutions to inspire prestige at home and abroad, nor to settle the fundamental problems of an independent and democratic country. And also since November 1963 we have witnessed disputes and purges within our ranks. “This state of affairs has created disunion and friction in the ranks of the army and obstacles dividing the people and the army, thus causing harm to the efforts of national salvation and reconstruction and more suffering to the people who have already borne untold hardships. “Realizing the danger of destruction, and faithful to the fate of the fatherland, the United Buddhist Church of Vietnam recognizes the following points: “1—The Generals and officers who have contributed to the revolution should be restored to their positions so they can take part in the reconstruction of the country. “2—To avoid political frictions which can create disunion and cause harm to the spirit of unity within the army, the Generals serving abroad or at home should return to their purely military duties. “3—The nation urgently needs fundamental institutions characteristic of independence and democracy, a National Assembly, and a government of national solidarity. “4—The government should implement without delay what it has promised—even a small part of its promises—for the revolution, particularly the social revolution related to the life of the masses. “Faithful to the spirit of union in this historic period, the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam eagerly hopes to contribute along with other civic organizations, religious groups, all classes of people and particularly with the army, toward carrying out the above-mentioned aspirations.” 2. While question-answer period was in progress a so-called “proclamation from the movement of the youths, students and school children, Saigon” was circulated. This document, which bears no Buddhist Institute seal (as communique does), is sharp attack on Chief of State Thieu, the Directorate, General Nguyen Huu Co, Can Lao remnants, governmentʼs failure to execute Chinese merchant Ta Vinh. Document was disowned at press conference so it seems likely that certain individuals took advantage of audience press conference provided to distribute tract. 3. Institute declaration itself is interesting but not necessarily incendiary document. The four points have obviously been drafted with extreme care and certainly avoid any head-on confrontation with Ky government. No gauntlet is thrown, no deadline for action is set. No mention is made of Thiʼs removal and in fact, during question-answer period, it was stated that there was no connection between conference and that event. Point one of communique could be read as not necessarily relating to Thi in view of fact that he was in exile in Cambodia when 1963 coup took place. 4. Nevertheless, point one is most interesting aspect of entire document. It certainly reads as a call for reinstatement of ousted southern Generals “Big” Minh, Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim. Point may very well represent bid for southern Buddhist support for UBA. As Dept aware from our reporting, southern Buddhist elements have become disenchanted with USA to point where leading southern layman Mai Tho Truyen refused to participate in last UBA biennial convention in December 1965. Point one may stem from Tri Quang who, though he did not participate in press conference probably had hand in drafting communique. He had nice things to say about Minh, Don and Kim in mid-February (see para 5, enclosure 1, Embassy airgram 489, Feb 17). 3 5. As for point three case could be made that Ky government is already making progress in this direction with blueprint for political development outlined by Ky January 15 speech. As for point four, all Vietnamese can agree with the sentiment. 6. In sum communique appears as cautious testing of political wind. Institute has been politically mute for some time—to the point where some of its more influential lay and clerical members have complained about its impotence and inaction. To those critics Chau and his colleagues can now reply that they have done “something”. They have let government know they are still there and that due attention must be paid them. 7. Ky and Chau have had at least two separate private meetings over past few days. Ky has indicated his confidence that organized Buddhists are not supporting Thi. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to CINPAC for POLAD. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:26 a.m. 2 Dated March 13. (Ibid.) 3 Not printed. (Ibid.) 95. Editorial Note 95. Editorial Note In his weekly telegram to President Johnson, dated March 16, 1966, Ambassador Lodge reported on the events that followed in the wake of the March 10 decision of the Directorate to relieve General Thi of his duties: “Unfortunately, many of the subordinate officials and commanders in I Corps are Thi appointees and when they heard that their commander had been relieved, they began to fear for their own futures. When certain political elements began to organize demonstrations in support of Thi in I Corps, these officials gave tacit approval and support. So far the demonstrations have consisted of mass meetings and general strikes centered in Danang, the largest city of I Corps and second largest in the country. But there have also been smaller meetings elsewhere in such cities as Hue and Hoi An. “Now a new and more significant element has been added. The political Buddhists and other elements who have their main strength in I Corps have now begun to agitate against the government using the Thi removal as pretext and take-off point. These elements have been quiescent for some time. They have had no great affection for the Ky government; but neither did they dislike it to the point where they openly opposed it. It has not, however, been a government subservient to their commands. They obviously read the new political situation in I Corps as an opportunity to bring pressure on the government hoping either to transform it into a creature subject to their will or to replace it with a government to their liking.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, March 16, 1966, 4:13 p.m. 2736. Statement attributed Thich Ho Giac, reported by UPI, pledging Buddhist struggle “to last drop of blood, to last breath” to achieve four-point program, 2 including replacement present government, has been noted at highest levels. 3 We must find way to make Buddhists understand that, with profound US involvement in defense their country against Viet Cong take-over, to say nothing of deep commitment their own government and armed forces, this is not the time to overturn everything and set back efforts now beginning to show results. Furthermore US, as well as Ky Government, has also pledged itself to economic and social progress which Buddhists are also insisting upon but these things cannot be achieved overnight and certainly would not be achieved at all if the Viet Cong were to win out. Moreover, their achievement can only be delayed, not hastened, by starting over again with a new government. Buddhists must be told in fact that our possibilities of continuing to help the Vietnamese to defend themselves and develop their country depends heavily on their readiness also to put aside differences among themselves and work together. In your discretion you are authorized to convey or have conveyed to Thich Tri Quang and such other Buddhist Institute and lay leaders as you consider desirable the Presidentʼs considered view that, if they persist in their present irresponsible and destructive course, not only will they lose the US public and official sympathy that they have heretofore had, but they may well bring about a situation of chaos and anarchy in which USG support to Viet-Nam could no longer be effective. The President hopes that they will most deeply reflect on this, not only as patriotic Vietnamese interested in the future of their country but also as religious leaders interested in the future of their believers and the religious tenets for which they stand. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Unger and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Moyers, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. 2 See Document 94 . 3 UPI-80, March 16, reporting Thich Ho Giacʼs statement, was forwarded to Rusk by Read the same day under cover of a memorandum stating that Moyers had advised Unger “that the President would like to hear from you by the end of the day concerning the attached ticker.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) 97. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 97. Note From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 16, 1966, 6:15 p.m. Mr. President: The hardest information we have gotten from Hanoi in some time is contained in the attached cable reporting the views of Chester Ronning, a retired Canadian Foreign Service Officer, with life-long personal connections with China. 2 His report to Prime Minister Pearson will be helpful in destroying illusions still held by some in Ottawa. Bromley Smith Attachment 3 Consul Armstrong Reports from Hong Kong: Results of Mission: Ronning characterized results of his mission by quoting old Chinese saying: He had “travelled ten thousand miles to present a feather.” He said he is more pessimistic about long-range Vietnamese problem than before his trip. North Vietnamese Confidence: North Vietnamese leaders he spoke to from Pham Van Dong on down convinced they were winning war, although they concede it will be long struggle. In response my query how North Vietnamese expected achieve victory (e.g. by military victory, US loss of determination, South Vietnamese collapse), Ronning said North Vietnamese view not clear. North Vietnamese leaders told him they fully expected stepped-up US military effort, both in South and in bombing of North, including bombing of Hanoi, industries, etc. Explained they had few large industries; small industries being dispersed and plans made for evacuating government offices and populace. Ronning commented to me that he did not disabuse North Vietnamese leaders of their estimates of increased US military action. Instead, he tried to impress upon them that US could bring vastly greater military power to bear than could the French in 1950ʼs, and that therefore no chance of history repeating itself (as they seemed to believe). Negotiations: North Vietnamese leaders were totally unwilling budge from “Four Points.” His remonstrances that strict adherence “Four Points” would amount to total American surrender and were therefore unworkable as negotiations formula were greeted with attitude “thatʼs the Americanʼs problem.” 4 Soviet Ambassador, while expressing full support North, implied there was somewhat greater possibility for negotiations by telling him that first prerequisite permanent cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. When Ronning asked why, if this was the case, North Vietnam had made no response during recent bombing pause, Soviet Ambassador said “they did respond” but refused specify channel or content. Soviet Ambassador said resumption of bombing came at just the wrong time and gave Ronning impression resumption had “loused up” overtures Soviets were making to Hanoi at the time. Sino-Soviet Dispute: North Vietnamese leaders attempted downplay importance of dispute and particularly its impact on Vietnam situation. Geneva Accords: Ronning said both South Vietnam and North Vietnam leaders talked of return to Geneva Accords but in completely different terms. South Vietnamese leaders stressed provision for withdrawal of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, and claimed that reunification would eventually come through “disintegration” of Communist control in North. North Vietnamese leaders stressed elections and claimed they were confident election results would pave way to early reunification. Ronningʼs Treatment: Ronning found that as a Canadian he was treated better than British who support American position fully, but was made politely aware that Canada little more than American satellite. However, Pham Van Dong appreciative of Pearsonʼs public statement of regret over resumption of bombing in North. Ronning found his several hours of talks with Hanoi leaders very wearing and frustrating with conversations wandering down blind alleys and always returning to same intransigent dead end. He got impression he was object of team effort at wearing him down, as long, hard hours of conversation with one group of officials would soon be followed, with little rest, by another session with fresh team. Some talks also scheduled in early morning with scarcely fifteen minutes notice, apparently to keep him off balance. Impressions of Hanoi: People adequately clothed and fed. Ronning made special point of visiting market and found rice, fish, meat and vegetables in seemingly good supply. Only stall with line of people in front was selling flour. (He could not tell whether it was Canadian or not, but noticed word “flour” in English on bag.) Streets were practically empty at night, and Ronning was told that many oldsters, youth, and cadre dependents had been evacuated. Ho Chi Minh Out of Sight: Ho, an old acquaintance of Ronningʼs, sent apologies explaining that round of meetings in connection with forthcoming Soviet Congress left no time to see him. It was rumored in Hanoi that Ho planning attend Congress. Chinese Not in Evidence: With exception of banquet room full of Chinese cultural troupers in Sun Yat Sen suits, Ronning saw no Chinese in Hanoi. ChiCom Embassy personnel invited to reception given by North Vietnamese his honour did not show up. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVIII. No classification marking. 2 Ronning visited Hanoi March 7–11. A memorandum of his March 20 conversation with William Bundy on the visit, together with his undated memorandum summarizing his principal meetings in Hanoi, are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S/PINTA. 3 Secret; Exdis. The attachment bears no date or drafting information. 4 Following his conversation with Ronning on March 20, William Bundy prepared a note for the Presidentʼs Evening Reading that reads: “Ronning reports that his conversations in early March were friendly in tone but completely obdurate in substance. The only possible glimmer of light was a vague suggestion by Pham Van Dong that Hanoi might be ready to talk if we would undertake to stop all attacks on North Vietnam ‘unconditionally and for good.’ This demand has usually been linked with acceptance of the Four Points, and we suspect it still would be if the right questions were asked.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 98. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 98. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 19, 1966, 10:20 a.m. SUBJECT General Westmorelandʼs Recommendation on Air Operations in Vietnam General Westmoreland has sent to Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler for their consideration a proposed reallocation of existing military resources which he believes will more effectively counter the larger scale warfare which he believes the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are now preparing. 2 The status of his recommendation is as follows: 1. Admiral Sharp, in a telegram not yet decoded, 3 raises certain objections to General Westmorelandʼs concept and asks for an explanation of some of the points not clear in Honolulu. One suggestion is that Westmoreland meet with Admiral Sharp and Admiral Moorer at CINCPAC to clarify the details of the general concept. 2. The Joint Staff is at work assembling their views on the recommendations. 3. Secretary Vance will meet with the Chiefs for preliminary consideration of the recommendations on Monday. He and Secretary McNamara will meet with the Chiefs on Wednesday to arrive at conclusions which they will want to discuss with you. The view in Washington is that even if the recommendations were approved, as they stand, they could be implemented by using aircraft now in the Vietnam Theater. Basically, Westmorelandʼs plan alters the bombing pattern now being followed in the Rolling Thunder Program. Some of the authority Westmoreland requests, he already has. The timing factor in his recommendations consists of how to use the next month and a half to destroy the maximum of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops, which his intelligence officers believe are being moved down during the present dry season. General Westmoreland makes certain suggestions which he feels will retard the forward movement of enemy personnel from North Vietnam: 1. Heavier attacks on fixed targets in Northern North Vietnam, such as: petroleum storage facilities, power plants, dams and locks, affecting inland waterways, airfields, and selected ports, including Haiphong. 2. Greater flexibility in the number of planes he is allowed to use against specific targets (Westmoreland apparently has this already, but that point is being clarified). 3. Greater freedom to attack targets in the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam. 4. Use of napalm in the area, including Laos, under certain circumstances against trucks and armored personnel carriers, supply and storage areas, anti-aircraft batteries and air control facilities. 5. Use of B–52ʼs in Laos. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE, Primarily McNamara Recommendations re Strategic Actions. Secret. Attached to the memorandum is a note indicating that the President told his secretary at 11:30 a.m. on March 19: “Tell Brom Smith to try to prepare a memorandum giving a careful survey and/or study of how to best use the next 60 days to make the maximum effort with bombs, troops, and everything else against infiltration before the rainy season, and we ought to provide any extra planes, bombs, etc., and find out how best to use napalm. I want it to be a good report showing everything and every way being explored … very comprehensive study.” 2 Telegram 171037Z from COMUSMACV, March 17. (Ibid., Box 260, Gen. Taylor) 3 Presumably a reference to telegram 190452Z from Sharp to Westmoreland, March 19, which has not been found. In telegram 190500Z to Westmoreland, March 19, Sharp agreed that there was “pressing need to intensify the scope and pressure of our air campaign against NVN” as proposed by Westmoreland in telegram 171037Z. (Ibid., Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) 99. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 99. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 19, 1966. No. 174 SUBJECT GVN-Buddhist Confrontation Hardening But Compromise Seems Possible Latent Buddhist opposition in South Vietnam has quickly developed into an open confrontation with the Ky-Thieu leadership unprecedented since the Huong government crisis in late 1964. Both the government and the Buddhists remain inflexible and appear prepared to test their strength in a showdown. Demonstrations Widening . The small rallies by Buddhists, students, and military personnel in Danang on March 11 prompted by General Thiʼs dismissal have widened to sizeable demonstrations in Hue and elsewhere, accompanied by strikes and school shutdowns. Public protests, though still orderly, have now spread to Saigon, the first in the capital area since those directed against the Huong government in January 1965. However, almost from the outset, the demonstrations have clearly focussed more on demands for national elections and return to civilian government than on Thiʼs fate. Buddhist Leadership Firmly Committed. It is uncertain how involved Buddhist leaders were in the initial demonstrations. However, the official Buddhist communique, 2 announced by Thich Tam Chau on March 12, placed the Buddhist hierarchy on record against the government in the current crisis. The communique demanded the restoration of civilian government, a National Assembly and representative political institutions, reinstatement of retired military officers, and implementation “without delay” of the revolution, “particularly the social revolution related to the life of the masses.” Subsequent developments, including Buddhist discussions with Premier Ky, now clearly indicate that the position of the Buddhist Hierarchy is firm and that it is prepared to test its strength against the government. The Buddhist leaders reportedly are planning further demonstrations and general strikes in Saigon and elsewhere and attempting to win support for their demands among members of the Military Directorate. Buddhist Demands Longstanding . Buddhist demands reflect longstanding grievances against the Ky-Thieu leadership which is felt to have moved too slowly and grudgingly to legalize its status, hold national elections, and return the reins of government to elected officials—in general reversing rather than furthering the 1963 revolution. Although advanced particularly by Tri Quang and his Buddhist and student followers, these views appear to be widely shared among other Buddhists, students, intellectuals, and out-politicians. Many of these critics are almost certainly motivated by personal and political ambitions and by their basic antipathy to almost any conceivable government. But many others regard “the revolution”, however vague their understanding of even its broad outlines, as the only means of achieving any degree of political stability and national unity in the face of the Communist insurgency. Legalization of the government, therefore, has become an issue synonymous with stabilization among an increasingly large sector of the politically articulate elements of Vietnamese society. Apparent military procrastination, coupled with spiraling inflation, have served to strengthen the undercurrents of political opposition. In addition, the Buddhists, who regard themselves as the major political force in Vietnam, have been offended by Kyʼs apparent failure to consult them on the cabinet reorganization that followed the Honolulu conference where they fear Kyʼs convictions as to the correctness of his policies and his political indispensability were hardened. GVN Appears Equally Rigid. Thus far, Ky and some of the other generals have held fast against any compromises and have indicated that their position is widely supported within the Military Directorate. Although the possibility of concessions to the Buddhists was discussed at the March 18 meeting of the Directorate, first reports indicate that the generals decided on a “hard line.” Nevertheless, some officers, including Generals Chieu and Chuan, new I Corps commander, are apparently inclined toward compromise or at least prefer cautious handling of the Buddhists. Most of what little information we have on the attitude of the generals is based on a few sources and Embassy Saigon regards these reports, whether indicating moderation or firmness, as probably over-stated. Thus, despite the alleged “hard line” adopted by the Directorate, an appreciable number of the generals are likely to have mixed feelings, at the very least. Key Issue: Civilian Government . The central issue of GVN-Buddhist confrontation thus far appears to be the question of timing the return to civilian government. Suspicious of government intentions, the Buddhists contend that a National Assembly should be convoked within a month or so from among the elected representatives of the people—members of the provincial and municipal councils. Such an assembly would draft a constitution and elect a provisional chief of state and a prime minister. Later there would be national elections for an executive and a national legislature. No timetable is indicated for this process and it is not clear whether the drafting of a constitution or the election of a provisional executive has priority. The GVN position, on the other hand, reportedly reaffirmed by todayʼs Directorate meeting, calls for the appointment of an advisory council to draft a constitution. This would be followed by nationwide debate, a popular referendum on the constitution in November 1966, and national elections sometime in 1967. The government contends that such a procedure is orderly, would reduce friction and political in-fighting among political groups, ensure broader representation of their views, and pose fewer obstacles to political development. Compromise Possible . A GVN plan already adopted but still unannounced for a second round of provincial and municipal council elections sometime this spring could offer some basis for a realistic compromise. The timing would appear to accord with the Buddhist timetable for concrete action by the government. The procedure might overcome two of Kyʼs principal objections to transforming the existing councils into an assembly; the claims that Catholics would have disproportionately low representation and that the councillors have no knowledge of national issues or constitution-making and were elected largely on local issues and interests. If the government were to announce that members of a constituent assembly would be selected from among councillors to be elected this spring, it would be incumbent upon the various political groups to put forward their most qualified candidates and attempt to ensure the election of as many of their representatives as possible. The realities of Vietnamese politics suggest that members of a constituent assembly selected on this basis, if no better than those selected by other means, are unlikely to be worse. Moreover, any such body is likely to call upon intellectuals, lawyers, and other political notables for suggestions and drafting assistance. Finally, if they win their point on the creation and powers of a provisional assembly, the Buddhists might be willing to drop or postpone their demand that the assembly should also elect a provisional executive. Situation Volatile . Failure to reach a realistic compromise would raise serious dangers of increasingly widespread and possibly violent demonstrations in the days ahead. The Buddhist leadership, though lacking the religious issue which they have effectively exploited in the past, are expressing a widely held position and will probably be able to garner substantial active support among their own followers and possibly among non-Buddhists. Even if they do not seek to oppose the government in the streets, the Buddhists are likely to attempt to dissuade government nominees from joining the governmentʼs advisory council and to attack the drafting process throughout as unrepresentative. The opposition will have further opportunities to attack the government and its procedures during the period of public debate that is to follow the completion of the draft and during the revision process that will precede submission of the draft to a popular referendum. In short, rigid adherence by the government to its present plans seems unlikely to enhance the prospects that the long process of constitution drafting and approval will be an orderly and constructive one. On the other hand, while there is no assurance that some form of elected rather than appointive constituent body will do its work with a minimum of political infighting, a decision to elect rather than appoint would remove at least one potent weapon from the arsenal of the opposition. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret; Controlled Dissem; No Foreign Dissem. 2 See Document 94 . 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 100. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, March 23, 1966. 3467. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: A. Governmental stability. 1. From the standpoint of the ability of the Government of Viet-Nam to influence events and promote stability, last week was bad and so is this week. 2. On the one hand are certain Buddhists who are making impossible and preposterous demands. They actually say they want to change the government and yet are utterly unable to give the names of anyone who would be able to step in and run the government. Tri Quang even says: “Overthrow the government and then elect Ky Prime Minister.” These Buddhists actually say that they want to hold elections now when there is no election law, no suitable election machinery, and when the country is evidently totally unready. 3. This Buddhist attitude undoubtedly reflects Communist advice, subtly planted among Buddhist priests, who think themselves very clever but who actually are lacking in knowledge of the world. They have all been told time and again by me personally and by other Embassy officers that to follow the course which they suggest would look crazy to Americans. But they are so parochial and so limited in their outlook that it apparently leaves them indifferent. 4. Now we have the beginning of an anti-American flavor in Hue, with widely untrue and improbable charges being made, which I am certain reflects Communist activity among the students. 5. If I were required to prove what I said about Communist influence, I could not do it. But the logic of the situation drives me to that conclusion. 6. So much for the Buddhists. Now, what about the government? 7. The Buddhists have in effect infiltrated the government in many posts. The government radio is publicizing Buddhist meetings, and government broadcasts are actually stimulating opposition to the government. I worry lest the Directorate may be coming apart. 8. And what about Prime Minister Ky? He stayed too long in Dalat, and it is absolutely impossible for a Vietnamese political leader to influence events when he is in Dalat. I was content for him to go up there for Saturday and Sunday because I believed his stomach was giving him trouble, but I hoped he would get back Sunday night. I heard that over the weekend the Minister of Youth, Mr. Trieu, who is a close personal friend, berated him so harshly in Dalat that Mrs. Ky left the room. 9. It is ironic that many Vietnamese are saying the U.S. should “fix things up” without ever saying how, it being absolutely certain that if we tried to impose anything there would be first an “anti-colonialist” howl from those with whom we differed and ultimately a howl from everybody. 10. I do not, therefore, think that what is happening now will mean the end of the world, or anything like it. But I wish to heaven that it wasnʼt happening. 11. One reason Hanoi thinks it can win, I believe is because it knows the fragility of the government structure here. They are counting on this to weaken American enthusiasm. They realize that the average American at home cannot possibly understand the social structure in Viet-Nam and the lack of a tradition of national government in this country, even though there is a strong sense of peoplehood and a strong and courageous desire not to be a victim of aggression. This governmental fragility is what Hanoi is depending on, and if I were advising them, I would advise them to do just what they are doing to encourage the natural divisiveness in South Viet-Nam. 12. We are at the stage here when everything you try to grab is like quicksilver. Moreover, as the Buddhists go further, the chances of Catholics and Southerners (Cochinchinese) getting going increases and instead of the delicate balance we have had for 8 months, the scales will start wildly clashing up and down. 13. So now I find myself thinking the same thoughts that I was thinking in October 1963, that is: “What can be done without a civil government?” I think it is clear that military operations could go on for quite a while but everything which requires forward planning, such as “revolutionary development”, would start grinding down. But also everything else today is so much better than it was in 1963 that there is scarcely any comparison. 14. I still strongly hope that this government will not fall, and all of us here are leaving no stone unturned to do whatever we can. B. Public attitudes. 15. As far as the general public is concerned, it appeared interested in but not worried about the dismissal of Thi. In the southern delta there appears to be little interest in the maneuverings by the Buddhists and by various center Viet-Nam personalities. Even in the Hue-Danang area there appears as yet to have been no genuine popular interest in the strikes, meetings and speeches of the past week which have been the work of individual Thi partisans, students and certain politicians interested in stirring things up for their own purposes. 16. Among influential middle and upper class Vietnamese there are both optimistic and pessimistic views. The optimists believe that the agitation in the wake of Thiʼs dismissal will blow over after a certain amount of jockeying for position among the Buddhists and the Generals. The pessimists, most of whom are journalists or intellectuals fear that the agitation may drag on for several months with unfavorable effects on government stability. 17. All parties seem agreed that if the government maintains the initiative in moving towards a more representative base and avoids making a martyr of anyone, the Vietnamese public attitude will not change appreciably. C. Economic. 18. Port congestion in Saigon became worse during the first half of March. Slowness in moving goods on the part of both importers and customs officials seems to be the explanation. We are giving this question our urgent attention to see what can be done to get things moving. 19. At the same time applications for new import licenses dropped sharply, reflecting uncertainty in the Chinese business community after the execution of a leading Chinese businessman for economic crimes and uneasiness about increased police visits to business firms. 20. The overall level of retail prices in Saigon remained unchanged. The piastre price of dollars declined somewhat while the price of gold rose, slightly indicating some uncertainty among dealers about the GVNʼs economic policy. 21. The rice situation improved relatively during the first half of March with deliveries from the delta up slightly, prices declining and stock levels comparatively high. D. Military. 22. Large unit operations by friendly forces decreased slightly during the week but the number of large unit contacts increased reflecting some increase in incidents initiated by the Viet Cong. F. Killing—and saving—civilians. 2 23. I understand Congressional committees are exercised about U.S. killing of civilians in Viet-Nam 3 and I make the following comment which may be useful: 24. There is a moral difference between accidentally killing civilians, as we and GVN sometimes inevitably do, and deliberately and cold-bloodedly killing civilians as the Viet Cong do through terrorism, torture and murder, shamelessly acknowledged as an instrument of military policy. 25. It is hard here in Saigon to understand why there is so much distress in the United States about accidental killings by our side, and apparently so little indignation about the fact that every time an American is killed here in Saigon about 20 or 30 innocent Vietnamese women and children go down with him. 26. Innocent civilians have always been killed in wars. I can remember a number in World War II. It is always an accident. But instances are all too common here of a Viet Cong who was apprehended with a large load of explosives and who said, when asked, that he realized perfectly well that many innocent civilians would be killed, but that it was part of the doctrine to do this. In fact, without torture and murder of civilians, Viet Cong recruiting would shrink to an insignificant dribble. 27. I realize it is quite impossible to get figures on the number of Vietnamese who have been terrorized by the Viet Cong, and this is perhaps one reason why the press doesnʼt talk about it or print photographs of it, as it always so eagerly does whenever we have an accident. 28. But another reason may be found in the following thought: in World War II there was no hue and cry about accidental U.S. killings of civilians because at that time the extraordinary Communist propaganda machine aimed at non-Communist opinion, which is emerging today as just about the most successful Communist activity, was not working against us. 29. Under Communist practice classic international law does not apply since there are no Communist “civilians.” Everyone is supposed to be either “fish” or “water.” This would not, of course, apply to the killing of non-Communist civilians, of which there is undoubtedly some. 30. If Congress wishes to compute civilians killed by Americans, should they not also list civilians whose lives have been saved by Americans? I refer to Dr. Humphreyʼs program, which is a great American success story and a direct personal accomplishment of yours. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 11:05 a.m. and passed to the White House. 2 Telegram 2749, a State-AID-Defense message to Saigon, March 17, noted “increasing Congressional interest and concern here” in the question of civilian casualties and indicated “a need for more complete figures which can be used by all agencies here and in SVN in response to queries.” (Ibid.) 3 Lodge provided a much fuller discussion of civilian casualties in telegram 3594 from Saigon, March 30, approved by COMUSMACV, USAID, JUSPAO, and the Embassy. (Ibid.) 101. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 101. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, March 26, 1966. JCSM–189–66 SUBJECT Air Operations Against North Vietnam (U) 1. (TS) On 21 March 1966, in discussing air operations against North Vietnam (NVN) with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, you requested that a controlled armed reconnaissance program be developed against selected LOCs in the northeast quadrant. Such a program conducted within the 8,100 monthly attack sorties currently authorized for NVN and Laos could be combined with strikes against a small number of bridges and other targets not contiguous to northeast area LOCs. In a subsequent conversation with the Chairman on 23 March 1966, you requested additional information regarding attacks on the NVN POL system. This memorandum provides the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above. 2. (TS) A controlled armed reconnaissance program in the northeast quadrant would result in placing additional pressure on NVN and can be accomplished within currently deployed resources. The resulting interdiction of the main railroad to China and key LOCs to the northeast could reduce significantly the support NVN is now receiving from external sources. Six hundred attack sorties monthly in the northeast quadrant would provide an adequate level of attack on the rail lines from Hanoi to Haiphong and the South China border as well as on three of the principal through highways in the area. A level of effort of 900 attack sorties per month would provide coverage of these key routes and their principal alternates. Destruction of key bridges on the main rail and highway routes in the northeast would complement this armed reconnaissance effort by disrupting traffic flow where density is the highest. Strikes would be directed against JCS Targets No. 15, 16, and 18.22 as well as restrikes on JCS Targets No. 11, 17, and 18.21. 3. (TS) Further, since cement and steel are prime materials used in the construction, repair, and restoration of the LOCs, attacks on the Haiphong cement plant and the Thai Nguyen iron and steel combine are considered to be militarily remunerative. The Haiphong cement plant is collocated with JCS Target No. 80, a 10,000 kilowatt thermal power plant. Both facilities should be attacked simultaneously. Incident to attacks on these targets and to assist in the protection of our strike forces in the northeast, the early warning and ground control intercept (EW/GCI) radar at Kep, which contributes to the MIG intercept capability in the area, should be destroyed. 4. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that attacks on the POL receiving, handling, storage, and distribution systems should be undertaken now, whether or not mining of the ports is to follow. Since the NVN transportation network is heavily dependent on the government-operated, POL-powered transport system, attacks on POL are required to reduce significantly the NVN ability to move war-supporting material within the country and southward through the infiltration routes. The Thai Nguyen iron and steel combine manufactures or fabricates 2,000–2,200 gallon POL tanks. Thus it has become an important element in the POL dispersal and distribution system. Haiphong has the only deep-water facility for the direct offloading of tankers and follow-on attacks should be made to preclude further use of its POL facilities. A graphic presentation of the routes and fixed targets discussed above and the salient features pertaining to the targets and the routes are contained in the Appendix hereto. 2 5. (TS) The North Vietnamese have the capability to launch and control a fighter defense against our aircraft which would probably vary, depending upon the method and timing of the attacks and the target selection. If the initial attacks were launched against Haiphong POL and related targets, there probably would be little, if any, fighter reaction. However, as certain POL facilities closer to Phuc Yen and Kep Airfields are brought under attack, the probability of strong fighter reaction would increase. The North Vietnamese have a total of 78 MIGs in the Hanoi-Kep area; at least 60 to 65 per cent of these aircraft would probably be operational. A lesser number could be effectively committed to air intercept. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that if the Chinese communists should react to successive attacks, this would present a separate problem. 6. (TS) There is no doubt that US forces can defeat the NVN MIG capability in an air battle resulting from strikes in the northeast quadrant. However, if a strong NVN fighter reaction should take place, it is probable that there will be US losses, due primarily to the impressive buildup over the past months in the NVN air capability as evidenced by the presence of MIG 21s and an established EW/GCI net. From a strictly military point of view, the NVN air capability preferably should be destroyed prior to or simultaneously with attack of the targets listed in the Appendix hereto; however, in view of the military importance of these targets and other factors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the risk is acceptable. When NVN air operations interfere with our strike operations, attacks should be initiated against the NVN air capability. 7. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the controlled armed reconnaissance program and strikes against the NVN POL system and other targets discussed above are included in their views as expressed in JCSM–41–66, dated 18 January 1966, subject as above. 3 Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend as a next step that Rolling Thunder 50 be initiated on 1 April 1966 in accordance with the following: a. Controlled armed reconnaissance be conducted at a monthly level of 900 attack sorties over the routes designated in the Appendix. b. Attacks be conducted against the nine POL storage areas, six bridges (three restrikes), one cement plant, one iron and steel combine, one thermal power plant, and one EW/GCI radar site as shown in the Appendix. c. CINCPAC conduct these operations within the over-all sortie allocation of 8,100 attack sorties for Laos and NVN as the operational situation dictates. d. No tactical restrictions or limitation be placed upon the execution of the specific air strikes. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler 4 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (24 Mar 66). Top Secret. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Document 27 . 4 Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original. 102. National Security Action Memorandum No. 343 102. National Security Action Memorandum No. 343 1 Washington, March 28, 1966. MEMORANDUM TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Director, United States Information Agency The Director of Central Intelligence In the Declaration of Honolulu I renewed our pledge of common commitment with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to defense against aggression, to the work of social revolution, to the goal of free self-government, to the attack on hunger, ignorance and disease, and to the unending quest for peace. Before the Honolulu Conference and since, I have stressed repeatedly that the war on human misery and want is as fundamental to the successful resolution of the Vietnam conflict as are our military operations to ward off aggression. In recent weeks I have asked those Departments of the Government with special competence in our continuing attack on hunger, ignorance and disease to bring their resources to bear in Vietnam. I have expressed my special interest in the progress of these new initiatives and the effective marshalling of all governmental resources and programs being brought to bear in the civil sector of our commitments in Vietnam. In my view it is essential to designate a specific focal point for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam. I have accordingly designated Mr. Robert W. Komer as Special Assistant to me for carrying out this responsibility. I have charged him and his deputy, Ambassador William Leonhart, to assure that adequate plans are prepared and coordinated covering all aspects of such programs and that they are promptly and effectively carried out. This responsibility will include the mobilization of U.S. military resources in support of such programs. He will also assure that the Rural Construction/Pacification Program is properly coordinated with the programs for combat force employment and military operations. His functions will include ensuring full and timely support of the U.S. Mission in Saigon on matters within his purview. In accordance with established procedures, any instructions to the U.S. Mission in Saigon will be issued through the Secretary of State. In carrying out these duties, I want him to act in close and constant liaison with the heads of appropriate departments and agencies, and to draw on them for such administrative and other support as he may need. In addition to working closely with the addressee Cabinet officers he will have direct access to me at all times. Those CIA activities related solely to intelligence collection are not affected by this NSAM. Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, NSAM. Secret. In forwarding NSAM No. 343 to the President on March 28 for his signature, Komer noted in his covering memorandum: “Joe Califano and now Bill Moyers have finally worn down Secretary Rusk and others in State who wanted to fit the Vietnam job to their conception.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Robert Komer, vol. 21) Rusk expressed some of his objections and concerns in telephone conversations with Califano on March 24 and with Moyers on March 28. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 103. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 103. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington March 28, 1966, 4:44 p.m. [Here follows discussion of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.] LBJ: Now in this Westmoreland wire. 2 I just feel like we just havenʼt done enough to prevent losing that government out there yet. I donʼt know what else we can do, but I just—itʼs gonna be so much more difficult to rebuild a government than it is to hold the one weʼve got. If we could do it, I thought that maybe in view of the fact that Lodge concurred in Westmorelandʼs wire, that we might say to Lodge, “This is excellent. Weʼre glad to see that youʼre getting Westmoreland to do that and we hope that you will say substantially the same thing to every Buddhist element there.” Really put up to ʼem high handed because we canʼt take this back home. If anybody ever knows beside you and me that Westmoreland says “abuse of United States military presence in northern reaches of the Republic is inconsistent with the spirit of solidarity that unites our forces” and “such abuse not only degrades troop morale but places me in a difficult and embarrassing situation in attempting to explain it,” and the “unjustified abuse to United States policy reflected in a succession of radio broadcasts, with display of English language signs intended to provoke US military personnel, the same personnel whose sacrifice of life and limb has played an important role”—if our people got the idea that the Vietnamese are insulting our men—Marines up in that northern area that are dying for ʼem—why theyʼll jump ahead of Bill Fulbright and Morse and tell us to get the hell out of there, and Lodge better let these damn Buddhists know that and straighten it out damn quick or we better make our plans accordingly. DR: Iʼve got Alex Johnson in the next room. Let me go over this telegram with him and see what we can say to Lodge on it. 3 LBJ: All right. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F66.13, Side A, PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 Westmorelandʼs telegram, forwarded to President Johnson by Arthur McCafferty on March 28, contained the text of a letter Westmoreland sent to General Vien the same day. The letter sought Vienʼs assurance that appropriate steps would be taken to halt the “abuse of United States military presence” in Hue carried on through radio broadcasts and signs “obviously intended to provoke” U.S. troops. (Text of retyped telegram from Westmoreland, March 28; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX) 3 See Document 107 . 104. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 104. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 1 Washington, March 29, 1966. Mr. President: As you know, on March 17 General Westmoreland cabled an urgent recommendation 2 to increase at once the air effort against targets in North Viet-Nam and Laos in order to limit the accelerated influx of war materiel into South Viet-Nam in anticipation of the monsoon rains beginning in May. His cable is causing a comprehensive review of the past effectiveness of our air campaign and a consideration of possible changes in future target systems and levels of attack. 3 I presume that recommendations on this subject will soon reach you—indeed, a reply to General Westmoreland, in view of his sense of urgency of the situation, is now overdue. My own conclusion is that the time has now come to raise significantly the level of pressure on North Viet-Nam by attacking POL stocks, interdicting effectively the two railways linking Hanoi with China and mining Haiphong and the two secondary ports in the area. In the eyes of the Hanoi leaders, the ground war in South Viet-Nam must now appear to be going rather badly and it is important that they receive an equally discouraging impression from the air war. Not until they get a gloomy composite from both is there much hope of bringing them to negotiations. The risks involved in this course of action appear to me to be acceptable and, in my judgment, should be undertaken in view of the probable advantages accruing from a significant increase of pressures on the will of the leaders in North Viet-Nam. Whatever the decision, I feel that General Westmoreland should have an early answer to his pending request. 4 MDT 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret. Komer forwarded the memorandum to the President at 6:15 p.m. on March 29. (Ibid., Memos to the President—Robert Komer, vol. 21) 2 Summarized in Document 98 . 3 On April 2 the Joint Staff prepared a 5-page status report on Westmorelandʼs recommendations. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966) 4 Wheeler provided Westmoreland with a status report on his request in a front channel message, JCS 7643, April 4. (Ibid.) Goodpaster advised Westmoreland in a back channel message, JCS 1759–66, April 4, that Wheelerʼs telegram would not “add much” to what Westmoreland already knew but was being sent at the Presidentʼs request so that Westmoreland would know his request was getting “high-level attention.” (Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) The President advised Taylor of Wheelerʼs message in an April 5 letter; Johnson also indicated that he was “seriously considering” Taylorʼs recommendations. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor) 5 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 105. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 105. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, March 30, 1966. 3589. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: A. Current crisis. 1. The delicate balance which has prevailed for nine months having been disturbed, the government now finds itself caught between two dangerous alternatives: A. To restore order too soon, and too forcefully, thereby creating opportunities for Communist agents-provocateurs, for incidents, for bloodshed, and for the creation of martyrs. This is what the Diem government did three years ago with results which are well remembered. B. The other danger is that they wait too long, that as time goes by, the “struggle” forces, which I believe to be subtly but effectively influenced and utilized by the Communists, get more and more boistrous so that the more time goes by, the greater the danger of agents-provocateurs, incidents, bloodshed, and martyrs. 2. It is hard for me to conceive that another week can go safely by in Central Viet-Nam with the government doing nothing to restore order. I said this to the GVN, notably to Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, at a recent dinner. He was very solemn, but quickly added that he was optimistic, and that he thought that in “two or three weeks” the Saigon Buddhists and government would get together on a scheme to move toward constitutional democracy. 3. Frankly, this seems to me to be the merest figment of the imagination. The Buddhist clergy hardly ever gives its word, and when it does, it doesnʼt feel obliged to keep it. To make the restoration of order in Hue-Danang dependent on this will-o-the-wisp is to me fantastic. 4. At this same dinner, I told Tran Van Do that I was specifically worried about the U.S. Marines in Hue-Danang, if the government continued the policy of not taking effective measures to restore order. I sense that my remark led to a call from Ky to me the next day in which he asked me to come in and assured me that he was definitely determined to take all the necessary steps to protect the U.S. troops from any kind of mob violence. 5. If one omits the very fallacious estimates which Ky and Thieu both made regarding the reaction to the relief of General Thi, it must be said that, since then, Ky has said many right things and said them quite well, as regards: moving toward constitutional democracy, restoring law and order, dividing the Buddhists, and uniting the Directorate. He is thinking hard and seems to be thinking straight. He also maintains his poise and appears to be in good health. 6. But to me, as a typically impatient American who naturally wants action, most of the things he says come about a week too late. He seldom gives dates or specifications. Also, one always wonders whenever a Vietnamese says something intelligent and true, whether he is in any way able to do anything about it. One must, to be sure, concede the dangers of moving too fast and he is, as he says, following the advice of Confucius “first to try protocol (negotiations) and then to use force”. (Incidentally, this is his second reference to Confucius.) Maybe his timing is right, although I believe strength tends to beget strength and that he has lost precious time. But Iʼm glad to have gotten this promise out of him as regards our Marines—and I impressed him with the vital necessity of moving quickly and sure-footedly when the time comes to move. 7. I, therefore, think the situation is precarious and, although there are a few hopeful signs, I fear serious developments unless the government moves in to restore order. 8. While there is a non-Communist element in all this, brought by the envy which the “outs” feel for the “ins” and by their reckless selfishness, there is no doubt that the Communists have subtly taken advantage of the “struggle”. There is also a believable report of French trouble-making and Communist collaboration. Having been hurt on the field of battle, seeing the Chieu Hoi rate going so much against them, and observing the promising beginnings as regards revolutionary development, they are trying out their political arm. 9. Buddhist (and presumable VC) agitators have tried—unsuccessfully so far—to start trouble in Saigon. They will surely keep trying despite some signs that Buddhist moderates such as Tam Chau are exerting a dampening influence. It is vital to keep Saigon and the South calm. If the pot boils up there, the gravity of the governmentʼs position will increase immeasurably. 10. The government has decided to move toward the “speeded up” establishment of a constitutional preparatory council (the precise name not yet decided). At a meeting of the Directorate on March 25, it was agreed this body would be composed of one representative from each of the 43 provincial and municipal councils, with an equal number of members selected from religious and social organizations. In addition there would be a small group of lawyers to act as a secretariat to the council. 11. By seeking to settle the national political uncertainties the government hopes to strengthen its hand in dealing with local disturbances. By seeking to separate the Tam Chau and Tri Quang factions the government hopes to make its task of dealing with Buddhist agitation easier. By enlisting support of other political elements, government hopes to limit extent to which it cedes its authority to Buddhists. Finally, by establishing acceptable national council with firmer schedule for return to civil government, authorities hope to neutralize those demanding immediate civil government, and to take away what has become the rallying cry of the agitators. The preservation of the form of the present government would then become easier, allowing some sense of national unity to be evident, and providing a transition period in which the job of governing could be pursued with some measure of continuity and efficiency. These are the optimistic objectives. Difficulties are obvious, and the weakening of government authority over the past weeks has increased the seriousness of the problem and lessened the chances of success. 12. All of the above must be a real shot in the arm to Hanoi who, according to reports, have been badly hurt and urgently needed this evidence of the “inner contradictions of capitalism.” 13. I do my best to see to it that every contact we have and every bit of influence which we possess is being brought to bear as rapidly and as effectively as possible. Sam Wilson has returned from Hue-Danang and I believe every possible preparation has been made for the safety of the American community. B. Economic. 14. Saigon retail prices, according to the USAID index, were about 4 percent lower than for the preceding month. Piastre prices for dollars and military payment certificates fell while gold prices rose, continuing the trend begun last week. The Minister of Economy announced an increase in government buying prices for Delta rice—so as to attract more rice from the Delta by paying a higher price for rice sold to the government and by reducing the fears and hesitancy among the merchants who would otherwise be selling on the open market at higher than official prices. C. Military. 15. The tempo of war increased during the week as allied large unit operations reached a peak and Viet Cong fired on Phan Thiet and Dalat airfields with mortars and carried out a daring raid on an American training center escaping with a tank. D. Chieu Hoi. 16. The returnee figures for the month of March are running more than 10 percent higher than those in the record month of February. As of March 18, with 14 provinces yet to be heard from, the returnees figure stood at 1,401. This compares with total all-province figures of 817 and 1,402 for January 18 and February 18, respectively. E. Reactions to Americans. 17. The newspaper Tieng Vang has this say about American misbehavior here and Senatorial behavior at home: “Americans and Viet-Nam. “The presence of the U.S. is necessary in Viet-Nam, but the U.S. authoritiesʼ carelessness has provoked regrettable misunderstanding. “The U.S. authorities have overlooked the possible effects of the possible daily conflicts between foreign soldiers and the population of a country attached to its sovereignty. “Luckily the U.S. authorities have awakened to the reality and the recent press conference held by the American captain, it seems, has succeeded in clearing most of the city populationʼs misunderstandings, which have not been wholly due to the soldiers in Viet-Nam. “It must be recognized that the defeatist attitude of some U.S. officials showing disrespect for the sovereignty of Viet-Nam has made smaller discontentments caused by price escalation, house and transportation shortage become bigger. “The Vietnamese people, already displeased with higher prices, traffic detours, snack bars mushrooming everywhere, cannot help being discontent with Mr. Bob Kennedyʼs advocating a coalition government. “Coalition or no coalition the problem could not be settled by Mr. R. Kennedy. Recently Mr. R. Kennedy has even gone further into his violation of Viet-Namʼs sovereignty in negotiating with the VC exchanging the terrorist Nguyen Van Hai with a relative of his, Mr. Gustav Hertz. “Such a queer attitude of Mr. Kennedy suffices to make the misunderstanding deeper from day to day, and even a daily press conference could not prevent the misunderstanding from deepening.” Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:22 a.m. and passed to the White House. 106. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to Secretary of State Rusk 106. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, March 30, 1966. SUBJECT Increased Military Pressures Against North Viet-Nam 1. You mentioned the possibility that a policy decision may be taken calling for our exerting heavier military pressure on North Viet-Nam. The purpose of the present memorandum is to provide you with our recommendations as to what would be the preferable actions and which actions should be avoided if it is decided that an intensification of activity is required. 2. In general, we believe that our air activity against North Viet-Nam should continue to be directed primarily at interdicting the infiltration routes (hitting convoys, roads, bridges) and striking the facilities which support the infiltration (POL storage, depots, repair facilities, etc.). This would speak for a continuation of the armed recce activity now under way, including action in the Laos panhandle, with intensification where lucrative targets are available. 3. Action against new kinds of targets is something which should be undertaken on a selective and individual basis since any significant innovation has great impact in itself quite aside from its military effects. Our objective continues to be to persuade the powers that be in Hanoi to abandon their efforts against the south and for a time at least, when we are striking a new kind of target which poses a threat to a part of their economy or infrastructure hitherto considered immune, we can influence their calculations by one strike practically as much as by 10. 4. Having these considerations in mind and taking as a point of departure the present pattern of operations against North Viet-Nam we would recommend the following list of targets, all of which are understood on the basis of SNIE 10–1–66 2 to have a military value. Entry on to even the first target on this list is, of course, premised on a decision having been taken that overall policy considerations require an intensification of our activity. (Our view on that point will be covered in a separate memorandum.) 3 This decision in turn presupposes a readiness to increase the risks of Chinese and possibly Soviet responses up to the point of some measure of direct participation. We would of course wish to keep those risks as low as possible for as long as possible, and with that as the central criterion, the target list is arranged in roughly ascending order of risk. (1) Destruction of Hai Duong highway-rail bridges between Hanoi and Haiphong. (Already struck pre-pause) (2) Interdiction of railway and highway routes leading toward the Nanning area of China. (Such activity was already underway prior to the pause beginning December 1965) (3) Extension of armed recce, on basis now operating elsewhere in NVN, to Northeast quadrant, excluding Hanoi and Haiphong circles and Chinese border areas. (4) Restrike Uong Bi and other power plants. (5) POL complex at Haiphong. (6) Kep airfield and other jet capable fields except Phuc Yen and Hanoi Gia Lam. (7) Phuc Yen airfield. (Only if MIGs begin to hamper operations) 5. We believe that we should be prepared to accept the introduction of B–52ʼs to carry out strikes in North Viet-Nam, but only if such strikes are authorized through the same procedures as followed today for Arc Light strikes in Laos. B–52 strikes would not be objectionable in remote, sparsely inhabited areas (e.g. the Vietnamese side of the Mu Gia Pass) but would raise serious problems if proposed for densely inhabited areas. 6. We continue to feel that the mining of Haiphong harbor is undesirable for the reasons set forth in my memorandum to Ambassador Johnson of March 10, copy at Tab A. 4 Likewise we continue to feel targets should be avoided, whatever their nature, which lie directly within heavily populated areas in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas or other urban areas and where there would probably be large numbers of civilian casualties. 7. Vietnamese Ambassador Vu Van Thai and Foreign Minister Tran Van Do have raised at various times two other proposals for military action against the north: (1) A bombing of dikes and/or watergates early in the season of rising river levels (i.e. the spring) as a means of warning Hanoi of our capability to wreak considerable havoc without in fact seriously endangering life at this time, and (2) A feint by Vietnamese craft against the north which would cause Hanoi to immobilize substantial numbers of soldiers on its coast and would also have an unnerving psychological effect. The second of these proposals seems to us dangerous in terms of possible provocation of the Chinese and also out of keeping with our stated policy of not threatening the regime in North Viet-Nam. The first proposal might, if we must continue to intensify still further, have some utility, and a discussion of this possibility is appended at Tab B. 5 8. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs have under consideration some MACV target and operation proposals regarding NVN on which CINCPAC has not commented fully or definitively. I mention this since those proposals, which are summarized at Tab C, 6 may come into any discussion of intensified action against NVN. Recommendation 7 9. That targets be selected, if intensification is desired, from the list set forth above in paragraph 4, approximately in the order listed. No increased measures should, however, be undertaken prior to the conclusion of the Communist Party meeting now under way in Moscow. Approved Disapproved Suggest following modifications in priority list proposed above 1 Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that Rusk saw the memorandum. 2 Document 66 . 3 Not further identified. 4 Attached but not printed. 5 “Strikes Against Flood Control Dikes in North Viet-Nam,” undated; attached but not printed. 6 “Summary of MACVʼs Intelligence Assessment and Recommendations for Counter-actions and CINCPAC Comments,” undated; attached but not printed. 7 Rusk did not indicate a recommendation on the source text. 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, March 30, 1966, 5:21 p.m. 2884. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I am reluctant to harass you with our anxieties here when you have your hands full with the political delicacies and dangers on the scene, particularly since we find it difficult to make really constructive suggestions. Westmorelandʼs recent letter to General Vien, sent with your concurrence, puts some fundamental issues to our South Vietnamese colleagues. 2 It is becoming increasingly difficult for us to understand or to explain to the Congress and to our own people why the Hue Radio (see FBIS 53) can spew forth such vitriolic anti-American propaganda in the center of an area being defended by American forces. We are deeply distressed by the seeming unwillingness or inability of the South Vietnamese to put aside their lesser quarrels in the interest of meeting the threat from the Viet Cong. Unless that succeeds, they will have no country to quarrel about. Perhaps the very effort announced by the Generals to move toward a constitutional system has stimulated an active maneuvering for position among South Vietnamese groups. I assume you have exhausted your possibilities with Tri Quang and other extremists such as Tien Minh to impress upon them the importance of putting first things first. It seems ironic that, at the very time when all other efforts were beginning to move favorably, these internal differences among the South Vietnamese should threaten their and our total effort. Please let us know if you and the Country Team feel that there are steps which we can take from here which would be helpful. Is there anyone here or any way that we from here can bring any influence to bear on Tri Quang? Have you discussed with your Japanese colleagues the possibility of some of the Japanese Buddhists who established relations with him bringing influence to bear on Tri Quang? Our present impression is that the political differences are not likely to die away but seem to be gathering momentum. I note from your 3589 3 that the government has decided to speed up a Constitutional Preparatory Council and has given assurances that necessary steps will be taken to protect US forces. We face the fact that we ourselves cannot succeed except in support of the South Vietnamese. Unless they are able to mobilize reasonable solidarity, the prospects are very grim. I much appreciate your frank and realistic reporting and am relying heavily upon your good judgment to exert every effort to get us over the present malaise. 4 Regards. Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLIX. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. 2 See Document 103 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 Document 105 . 4 In telegram 3614 from Saigon, March 31, Lodge responded that the Embassy had been doing its best to bring to the attention of all concerned the gravity with which the United States viewed the situation. Tri Quang, however, refused to listen. “He has embarked on a course deliberately designed not only to bring down the government, but to have its replacement substantially subject to his control.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 2, 1966. SUBJECT Political Situation in South Viet-Nam 1. The April 2 reports 2 further reinforce the picture that Hue and Da Nang are now virtually out of control and that the themes of the so-called “struggle” movement are spreading to other areas in a significant fashion. In addition to the Buddhist- backed “struggle” group, the important Cau Dai sect has now said that the present government is “illegal”. Catholic discontent is also evident and would probably become acute if the government made special concessions to the Buddhists. The only bright spots are that Saigon has remained under control and that Ky and the government apparently have considerable latent support in the southern part of South Viet-Nam and to some degree in the central areas. 2. So far the government has been operating by trying to make minimum concessions on the political timetable for a constitution and elections, in an effort to separate the moderate groups from the more extreme Buddhists and students. A meeting with the moderate Buddhists on March 31 was supposed to produce an agreed communique that would solidify moderate sentiment. However, the resulting communique was extremely general and bland and seems most unlikely to have achieved this effect. 3. Meanwhile, the government has held off in applying force to restore order, and the situation has reached the point, in Hue and Da Nang at least, where it is absolutely clear that local police and military forces would not take orders and the introduction of special marine forces from Saigon—which was the governmentʼs plan in the middle of the week—has become known to the “struggle” group and would now almost certainly produce drastic bloodshed if applied. The most recent reports from Hue and Da Nang indicate that the police, civil servants, and large elements of the local 1st Division are in total sympathy with the “struggle” group. 3 Anti-American themes have been increasing, and local civilian employees of US installations in that area have started to leave. 4. What can the government do? The following are at least headings for possible actions: a. A more explicit political program. We do not believe the government could or should promise immediate elections or give the Buddhists a predominant role in constitution-making that they are seeking. But there is one immediate move that would not involve such unwise concessions, namely the appointment in the next 2–3 days of a constitution-drafting body. Thieu and Ky have talked of doing this by April 10, and Lodge has already told them that they must make it much sooner. We last night cabled Saigon (outgoing 2939 attached) 4 asking whether a Presidential or high-level message from here would be helpful. b. A deal with Thieu. However, now that the “struggle” group so clearly has the bit in its teeth, it seems most unlikely that even such a political move would in itself bring them to accept government control again. The “struggle” group seems to be imbued with ideas of “neutralization” and reducing the US role “though not asking us to get out as of now.” These ideas are plainly unacceptable and we could not support any government gestures in these directions. However, there remains the significant element of local “central Viet-Nam” sentiment which has for a long time felt that the Annam area (Hue and Da Nang) was inadequately represented in the government. Thi was the symbol of this local representation, and his dismissal added this major element to the broader political and corruption grievances on which Tri Quang and the “struggle” group are capitalizing. At this point, we know of no leaders from this area who could be brought into the government except for bringing back Thi himself. While Thi is probably playing for the top spot—which would set off its own train of opposition from other elements notably the Catholics—it is just possible that some deal could be made that would give him a major Saigon role and at least partially satisfy the need for representation from central Viet-Nam. This morningʼs report that Chieu, the governmentʼs emissary to Thi, has been allowed to return to Saigon may indicate that some deal is in the making. We should certainly lend our weight to doing it. c. A new I Corps Commander acceptable to the Buddhists. Plainly, the Directoryʼs first choice is not able to control the situation. A new man is needed with such prestige as to be acceptable to the Buddhists and yet at the same time with as little risk as possible of again making I Corps a separate warlord area. Such a man might be found in General Minh, the leader of the post-Diem government, who is now in Bangkok. It would be a tremendous gesture for the Directory to bring him back, and he might come in response to this need. d. Controlling other areas. So far, the “struggle” movement has made only moderate headway in a few other cities. This must be brought under control by judicious granting of lesser demands combined with clear capacity to use force. The government seems to be doing this reasonably well in Pleiku and Dalat. We need to impress this point on them. e. A face-lifting for the Directory. Both Thieu and Ky have lost tremendous prestige during the crisis, but Ky probably the most. The replacement of the Directory as a whole would be a tremendous loss in every respect, but some face-lifting might be possible in two directions. First, Ky might step down as Prime Minister and be replaced by someone such as Chieu, who is reasonably astute and has handled his visit to Hue well. Second, to meet the demand for a civilian role, one or more senior civilians might be brought into the Cabinet, and some defined relationship provided between the Directory and the Cabinet. This would both meet the Buddhist demand as far as it is now practicable to do so, and this would help the somewhat demoralized state of the civilian Ministers evident for some time and apparently virtually amounting to a complete loss of confidence as a result of the crisis. 5. The above would be a prescription that we might now urge forcefully on the GVN, perhaps in the form of a Presidential message. We suggested this possibility in last nightʼs cable, but have as yet had no reply. However, it must be faced that the situation has deteriorated to the point where even this program, applied immediately, would have no assurance of success. The plain fact is that Thieu and Ky have been drastically weakened by their inability to cope with the crisis, and we must still be prepared for the worst, namely a complete change of government. We have had no real exchange with Lodge on the subject of possible alternatives, and the only one that occurs to us as having any possibility of success would be the possible return of some such figure as General Minh, who is military but also commands a wide civilian following. From here, we do not see any civilian, nor do we believe that Thi could be installed without setting off drastic counteraction from other elements such as the Catholics. However, it is time we started exchanging views with Lodge on the “least bad” possible alternative. Dean Rusk 5 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Secret; Exdis. The first page of the source text bears the notation, in Ruskʼs handwriting, “not used, except orally, DR. “An unsigned copy of the memorandum, without Ruskʼs notation but marked “WPB Chron,” is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. 2 CIA analyses of the political situation in Vietnam at the beginning of April include a memorandum on “Struggle Groups in I Corps,” April 1, prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, and a 14-page memorandum on “The Political Situation in South Vietnam: The Current Crisis, Possible Future Developments, U.S. Options,” April 2, prepared by George Carver. (Ibid.) 3 A CIA field appraisal of the situation in Hue as of April 3 reported: “Governmental authority for keeping law and order in Hue collapsed this week. “Participants in local demonstrations included “virtually all police,” significantly increased numbers of Vietnamese military personnel, and about 1,000 of the 5,000 civil servants ([ document number not declassified ], April 4; Central Intelligence Agency, EA/DDO Files, 137–9–23, Job 85–00392R) 4 Dated April 1; not attached. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 VIET S. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 109. Notes of Meeting 109. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, April 2, 1966, 1:30 p.m. PRESENT President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Moyers, Valenti President wanted the following done: 1. Invite publishers and editors to state dinners—and have them in earlier to lunch with the President and Rusk and McNamara. Perhaps Rusk and McNamara could fly out and meet with various editorial boards— Louisville Courier Journal Times —the night newspapers— St. Louis Post Dispatch — Providence Journal . Wants research done: in other emergency periods—isnʼt our position much better overall, economic, etc., than in other such periods. On Vietnam: 1. Make every effort to keep Ky. But be ready to make terrible choice. Perhaps take a stand in Thailand—or take someone else other than Ky. 2. McNamara said what happens to I Corps is not as important as to what happens to other corps. Thinks we ought to get rid of Tri Quang. President said there are two basic things we need to do: 1. What do we do to preserve Ky? Thinks we ought to preserve him if possible. 2. Prepare fallback position. Involves talking to Buddhists and if necessary, get out of I Corps area and even Vietnam. McNamara said Lodge ought to have it out with Tri Quang. Quang needs to know what situation is and how prepared we are to clear out of I Corps area. We need to know if Quang really wants us out—for if he does, we better get out now. But McNamara thinks that Quang believes that we are committed. President said to send Lodge a cable telling him to get in touch with Quang now and get tough with him. 2 [Here follows discussion of Indira Gandhi.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the family dining room on the second floor of the White House. 2 Telegram 2950 to Saigon, April 2, passed on the “suggestions” that came out of this 1:30 meeting. Rusk asked Lodge to consider meeting again with Tri Quang “to disabuse him of idea that the American commitment will tolerate division or discord from within or will permit Communist leaders or sympathizers to achieve their purposes through our leniency.” (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3) 110. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 110. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, April 4, 1966. 3698 1. I called on Prime Minister Ky at his request at 1:00 pm, Monday, and, as I entered, thanked him for his friendly words about American aid. He said that at the meeting yesterday, two resolutions were adopted: 1) for a political convention and 2) for taking strong meas-ures. After this, General Vinh Loc said that he thought they ought to say something showing appreciation for American aid. Ky suggested that Vinh Loc make a motion which he did, so it was the third resolution of the day. 2. He then turned to me with a very serious expression on his face and, looking somewhat shaken, said: 3. “We have waited too long. Now we must be very firm. How can I describe this situation? All these different groups and minorities and sects make an infernal combination”. He used the French work for “infernal”. 4. “I told the Directorate today: either I resign or we all stay together, and we have decided to stay together. Thieu will speak to the nation tonight. We have decided to declare an ‘etat de siege’ (state of siege) in the whole country. Before that we were in an ‘etat de guerre’. A state of siege means that we are authorized to have a curfew all day long all over the country if we want to. We plan temporarily to close all schools and universities.” 5. He asked me whether I had heard that the Dalat radio had been burned, which I had. 6. I said that some thought that Tri Quang was a Communist, but I remembered that Prime Minister Ky had said he was a “visionary” (un illumine). Ky said that he now thought he was a Communist and that undoubtedly we face a great Communist conspiracy to take over the government, ask the Americans to leave, and turn the country over to Hanoi. 7. Ky said he realized now that he had had too much faith in the value of making concessions to the Buddhists. He had been talking with Thich Thien Minh all day and night. He said you canʼt satisfy them. Minh had asked him for two things: one a job for Thi, to which Ky said he was not opposed; secondly that Thieu would reply to the Buddhists agreeing with everything that they ask for. Ky then said: 8. “I have given Minh until [garble] tonight to issue orders to all the Buddhists to sit down and discuss a way to achieve our common goal. I wanted him to prove his good will. I did this using the Secretary of Health, Kha, as an intermediary. 9. “The Directorate meeting today was a very good meeting—thoroughly military and professional—with everything staffed out. We have plans for psychological warfare, leaflets, mobile radio. I want to move three battalions to Danang and bring up one division from the Fourth Corps for security in Saigon. 10. “I, myself, will go to Danang and be at the command post tonight with General Vien who will stay after I come back to Saigon, presumably tomorrow. I would like to have more aircraft to reinforce Danang. We have not enough Vietnamese Air Force planes. I know that MACV is ready and that they need an order from you. Will you give it?” 11. I said that I would and I notified General Westmoreland to that effect at 1:30. 2 12. Ky said he had received members of the VNQDD who wanted to help and asked what is the government going to do. 13. Ky looks for a “mass effect”, quickly and simultaneously. The strategy for the nation is to have a big success in Danang first and then the people in the other communities in Viet-Nam will see it. For the time being he will isolate Hue, but believes he will have no trouble with Hue once Danang is disposed of. 14. If necessary he will move M–113s from Quang Nam. All Saigon troops are 100 percent restricted to their camps. 15. General Thieu will send invitations to representatives of all the different groups in Viet-Nam to organize meeting to be held “the day after tomorrow”. There will be two to three hundred people and everybody will be given a chance to talk. He believes he has put the Buddhists on the defensive. 16. There is now no doubt in his mind that the Communists are striving for a “soulevement”, that is a general uprising. He said: 17. “If I am weak they will succeed, but if I am strong they will not. History will judge whether I have done well or not, but I am ready to make the supreme sacrifice.” 18. He was deeply moved and so was I. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:50 a.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, and Department of Defense. 2 At 1135Z on April 4, Westmoreland informed General Walt that two Vietnamese Marine battalions, field police and military security elements, psywar teams, and a command group would move to Danang under cover of darkness that evening and that Lodge had agreed to Kyʼs request for airlift. (MAC 2667; Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) Subsequent events during April 4–10 and the role of U.S. forces can be followed in Jeffrey Clarkeʼs Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington, DC, 1988) pp. 131–133. 111. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 111. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 4, 1966, 8:30 a.m. You are being counseled by those far wiser than I, but I pass along these thoughts to you for whatever value, if any, they may have. These are troubling times for you and I am only trying to help clear the dark alternatives that seem to be available. Where are we? 1. The Ky government will hold on or 2. The Ky government will fall and a) Either another government takes over that will choose to continue both the fight and the peaceful reconstruction or b) Another government will determine to strike a bargain with the Viet Cong. Two questions present themselves: 1. How can we help preserve Ky? and 2. What do we do if Ky falls? I. Preserve Ky: 1. We can help with the use of United States force. This would be dangerous. It would erode our moral, even our treaty obligations. It would smack of colonialism. Thus, the decision is how to preserve Ky without the deployment of United States force. A. Elections Now. This is hazardous. The Viet Cong may win in the heat of the anti-government demonstrations; a public whipped up to march against the government is likelier than not to vote against that government. But if Ky were to set a date—say June 1—for a national election it may take the starch out of the demonstrations. At least it would give Ky some breathing room to present the case for a unified central government whose objective is to defeat the Viet Cong, not commit suicide. B. Bring in four to five Buddhist-Catholic leaders as part of the directorate. This might ease the pressures, if this move were coupled with a definite election date. C. Surface Viet Cong agents as provocateurs—and link them to the demonstration leadership. The drawback to this is the lack of time available to make the case. Communicating with the Vietnam public is not as easy as in this country. But suppose we airlifted 100 soundtrucks to Vietnam (or sound gear to put in South Vietnamese trucks) and the government put on a campaign (U.S. style) to convince the people the Viet Cong were inciting the demonstrations? Suppose we didnʼt indict the Buddhist leadership, but focused on a known enemy (the VC), and the perils that would come if the VC intrigue won (i.e. if the central government fell). It is a long shot, but it might work. D. Split the Buddhist leadership. This has possibilities. There is no durable cohesion in the Buddhist leadership. Can we pit some of the leaders against Tri Quang? Can we use the Dalai Lama and Buddhists outside Saigon, Hue and Da Nang to our advantage? As a corollary to this—why canʼt Ky ask that all the Buddhist factions—indeed all religious factions—gather together for a meeting to discuss the future of the government. Perhaps Ed Lansdale and his group could be useful in getting this meeting together. Object of the meeting: To try to drive a wedge between the leadership groups—and to bring to bear the argument that the real enemy is the Viet Cong and if the leaders would allow the government to have an orderly free election all groups would benefit. It might be worth a try. E. Urge Ky to use force. Only those on the scene can assess the value of this. It looks like this would not work for the demonstrators have seemingly gathered too much momentum. Before it would work, Ky must restore the usefulness of the 1st. Corps soldiers. Is it possible to restore Thi—and back him in efforts to retrieve the sagging loyalties of the 1st Corps? This is admittedly dangerous, but as a final, totally last resort it could be tolerated. II. If Ky Falls: 1. We could wait and see what a new government would bring. Past history indicates it would have the same durability as Quat—or even worse. A new government will a) Be a weak reed, but insist that we stay. At least we retain our credentials as an invited guest rather than an interloper. b) Demand that we leave—which is unlikely since the Buddhists have an irrational goal of destroying central governments but under our over-all security. c) Be satisfactory to us for the moment, but leave a sour taste in the domestic mouth. Our antagonists would seize this change-in-government as final evidence we are fighting windmills and pour the steam on for us to get out. It would be a cheerless several months in the White House. 2. We could announce we were going to leave Vietnam because of a lack of national will to secure stability and freedom. 2 If we did this, our reasons are, as follows: a) We adhere to our beliefs in self-determination—and in our resolve to protect a small country from being chewed up by its neighbors, but we cannot force anyone to choose stability and liberty. We can only aid when the people are determined to help protect themselves. b) We would, if the Thais invited us, assist them, for as long as they chose to have our aid, to help them resist intrusions on their national sovereignty. Thus, we should withdraw from Vietnam, not because our resolve or our objectives are shaken, but because there existed no longer a central authority with a desire to remain free of aggression. This would have the following effects: 1. The Vietnamese might be so shocked it would cause even the erratic Buddhist leaders to sober up. Perhaps a really stable government could then be formed. Thus, we could turn political catastrophe into a hopeful direction. Or 2. We could rid ourselves of the Vietnamese- bone-in-our-throat and at the same time give sustenance to those allies and friends where a truly nationalistic spirit and tradition exists. At the same time, we would call for a neutral zone along the Mekong to get on with the development of that region. United Nations authority would be asked for—with our troops supporting much of the force. In this way, we get rid of the South Vietnamese albatross, secure the rich Mekong, and hold the Thai resolve to resist. We would have demonstrated that we will stick with an ally and a commitment until the one becomes insane and the other no longer has real meaning. Jack Valenti 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. No classification marking. In his April 4 covering memorandum to the President, Valenti noted that there was one vital piece of information that he had not yet seen concerning the “so-called mutiny of SVN troops.” (Ibid.) 2 At 9:30 p.m. on April 3, Valenti drafted a personal note to the President that began, “I truly believe we need to find some way out of Vietnam. All that you strive for and believe in and are accomplishing is in danger, as long as this war goes on. If there were a way out, some hint of the end with honor, I would believe it best to stay there til the bitter conclusion. But there is no reasonable hope. All your military advisors insist you must double your force, and still they give you no prophecy of victory, however shapeless, however mild.” No record has been found that Valenti sent the note to Johnson. (Ibid., Office of the President File, Jack Valenti) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 112. Notes of Meeting 112. Notes of Meeting 1 Washington, April 4, 1966, 7:10–8:35 p.m. PRESENT President, Vice President, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, General Taylor, Bill Bundy, Justice Fortas, J. Valenti President said Westmoreland thinks [there is] “prospect of success in Danang.” Said he didnʼt think so. McNamara and Rusk agree with President. President thinks it important to keep our troop and equipment out of riot area. We donʼt want to become involved. President approved telegram (first one) 2 on what posture our Vietnam people should take—hands off. President wonders about (second telegram) 3 on political situation. Says appeasement never wins. Worried about a constitutional assembly—rather have someone we can control rather than a communist takeover at the Assembly. Rostow: Government has not been credible. President: Why and how? Rostow: Ky was going to call a group to draft a constitution—and hasnʼt done so. President: What are problems in calling it? Rostow: Not getting agreement on total list. Bundy: Working on a list since January. When I was in Saigon four weeks after Honolulu, difficulty in getting groups organized to take part. Now we urge something to get the government off dead center. Vice President: Who is in touch with Thi? Bundy: No one, really. What about Cochran, Consul General at Danang? President gave approval for second telegram to go out (Now he looked at third telegram on alternative governments). 4 General Taylor: Worried about Thi. Tri Quang is back of him and we cannot take a Tri Quang government. He will tear down everything. (President said to insert this caveat in the telegram.) Rusk: Alternatives are less desirable than what we have now, so we are trying to save what we have. President: Need to do more planning on how to pick a man before he takes over so we wonʼt have to get out when the wrong man gets in. Time has come when the alternative is to get out—or do what we need to do to get the government shored up—move in with power and stay there. Vice President wanted to know more about Thi. Taylor says he is flamboyant, rash, and an associate of Tri Quang—but a brave commander—troops like him. Vice President: Thi is pleasant, Buddhist and clever. Ky is jealous of Thi. Some of our Mission people think Thi is able. Sam Wilson thinks he is competent. President: Isnʼt he out of our hands now? Vice President: I donʼt know. But we ought not let him get out of our hands. We need to know more about the Buddhists. President: We need a Garcia-Godoy type—with an advisor by his side. McNamara: We need a Bunker in Vietnam. President: Donʼt rely on polls on D.R. (Dominican Republic). Theyʼre not very accurate 60 days from now. Keep Camano in London. Donʼt let him out. Camano could win. Keep that poll going. Know every week what is happening. Donʼt lose an hourʼs contact. The way I see it, Ky is gone, the last gasp. Doubt he can pull it off. When he goes, thereʼll be hell in this country. Letʼs get a government we can appoint and support. We need a tough advisor. President: What do we tell the world? General Taylor: We can minimize our losses if Ky goes and the Directory stays. We have to take sides this time. President: Thought Ky made bad judgment in saying the Mayor of Danang ought to be shot. 5 Any other bad judgment we know about? Taylor: The Hitler statement 6 —but I thought he had matured. 1 Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Valenti took the notes. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. The President returned to the Oval Office from the Cabinet Room at 8:42 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 2 Telegram 2965 to Lodge and Westmoreland, transmitted at 9:03 p.m. on April 4, stated that “US forces should not be used in any way within Da Nang or Hue or against dissident GVN forces.” Nor should any endorsement be given to the GVN claim that the Struggle Movement was “Communist-dominated,” a claim “contrary to any evidence we have.” (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3) 3 Not found. 4 Telegram 2966 to Saigon, transmitted at 9:05 p.m. on April 4, discussed “Possible Alternative Governments,” stating that “if worst comes to worst, our first choice would be the one you suggest, keeping the Directory united and bringing in someone else to replace Ky,” with “Chieu at top of tentative list for this purpose.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3) 5 While speaking at a news conference in Saigon on April 3, Ky threatened to shoot the Mayor of Danang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man. ( New York Times April 4, 1966) 6 Not further identified. 113. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 113. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, April 5, 1966. SUBJECT Viet-Nam Sitrep as of 1000 April 5 1. General Situation: Saigon—The situation in Saigon is apparently quiet although press ticker this morning indicates a demonstration was broken up near the Buddhist Institute by Vietnamese troops which employed rifle fire over the heads of the demonstrators. Curfew has been extended from 2100 hours to 0500 hours. Danang—ARVN troops which are unidentified, regional and popular forces, and “Struggle Forces” and civilians are reported manning roadblocks from the air base into the city of Danang. No estimate of the number of these forces has been received. Three Marine battalions have been air lifted from Saigon and are presently located on the Danang air base. There is no indication that these forces have attempted to leave the area of the air base. I Corps commander General Chuan reportedly made two trips to the air base to confer with Prime Minister Ky during the day of April 5. Late ticker items state that Ky has now returned to Saigon, after broadcasting in Danang that he was now convinced the city was not in Communist hands. General Chuan has told newsmen that Prime Minister Ky, prior to his departure for Saigon had assured him that his forces would not attempt to leave the air base, and as a result General Chuan had ordered a Ranger battalion, which had been deployed to defend Danang, back to its post. Posters have been put up in Danang signed by General Chuan stating that the situation is in hand, that troops are to return to their camps, and civilian demonstrators should stay home. Hue—A small demonstration of about 600 students took place in front of MACV billets in Hue April 5 demanding the removal of barbed wire barricades which were impeding traffic on a main route. The barbed wire was removed and the demonstration quietly dispersed. On the orders of the commanding general of the III MAF, the MACV senior advisor to the I Division has ordered the removal of all advisors to the I Division and has informed the Division commander General Nhuan that he is withdrawing all American fixed wing and rotary air craft support for the Division. Consul General Corcoran in Hue has stated that the removal of the MACV advisors may provoke hostile action on the part of the Struggle Forces toward American civilians in Hue and Quang Tri and is, therefore, ordering all American civilians with the exception of Consulate and CAS staff to be evacuated. Nha Trang—Press ticker items report the USIS library and adjoining Vietnamese Information Services offices have been sacked and burned in Nha Trang. No confirmation has been received from the Embassy. Dalat—The situation in Dalat remains uncertain, although late press ticker indicates that the Government has regained control of the Dalat radio station. 2. Ky-Buddhist Negotiations: Embassy Saigon reports that Ky has been actively negotiating with the top Buddhists including Tri Quang and Thien Minh. Ky reportedly gave Minh a letter with a GVN promise to convene an immediate political conference to consider: a) the establishment of a constitution-drafting council, or b) the establishment of a constitutional assembly. 2 The Buddhists stated that with this letter they would try to calm the situation. 3. Over-all Outlook: The negotiations which Ky has been engaged in with General Chuan and with the Buddhists, together with the avoidance so far of any armed engagements in the Danang area, give rise to some cautious optimism that a settlement satisfactory to the Government and the Struggle Forces may emerge. Agreement allegedly reached between Ky and the Buddhists would appear to represent substantial compromise on the part of the Buddhists. At the same time, it is clear that tensions have not been substantially reduced and the possibility for an outbreak of violence either between military units or between the GVN and civilian demonstrators remains very real. 3 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-VN Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam, Mar-Aug ʼ66. Secret. Drafted by J.J. Helble of FE/VN. 2 In telegram 3746, April 5, Lodge reported that Thieu had shown him a statement he was issuing that announced the convening within 1 week or 10 days of a National Political Congress. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) 3 Bundy forwarded this memorandum to Rusk on April 5 under a covering note in which he stated: “My net judgment is that the worst possible outcomes have been avoided, but that Ky essentially capitulated to the combination of local Buddhist sentiment represented by General Chuan. I would guess that this would seriously damage his position.” (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 114. Draft Scenario Prepared in the Department of Defense 114. Draft Scenario Prepared in the Department of Defense 1 Washington, April 5, 1966. POSSIBLE “FALL BACK” PLAN 1. Most Important: Change objectives from do-what-it-takes-to-make-the-North-stop-it to do-what-it-takes-to-force-a-GVN/VC-compromise. 2. Recognize that we are on a losing wicket in Vietnam. While the military situation is not going badly, the political situation is in “terminal sickness” and even the military prognosis is of an escalating stalemate. 3. Make private Presidential decision to seize upon the I Corps troubles as the vehicle for disengagement by the United States. Success will require secrecy and completely loyal execution. (Query how to bring Lodge on board and how to deal with Congressional leaders.) 4. Choose between two approaches: (a) Fast (“fed up”) withdrawal, and (b) slow (“patch up but squeeze the GVN”) approach. The former would be wise only if GVN left-footedness or anti-Americanism becomes extreme. 2 5. While a new Saigon government is being formed (now), deliver a US “ultimatum” to all interested parties (including Buddhists) that they must shape up or we will ship out. We could either (a) insist now that they compromise with the VC or (b) assume that they will be be able to shape up, so that compromise with the VC would come later. 6. Ensure that US civilian and military personnel in Vietnam can be protected. 7. Initiate an effort to re-educate US and world opinion: a. That our commitment is to support a representative government and a people who help themselves (and that the GVN has now shown itself not to be representative and that the people of South Vietnam have demonstrated that they will not help themselves). b. That the South Vietnamese case is unique—unlike the case of our other “clients” (giving the reasons in detail). c. That we have more than delivered the goods in blood and treasure in Vietnam—enough to honor our guarantee and enough to cause any aggressor to pause lest an equivalent amount be delivered against him in another case. 8. Consult with key allies—ROKs, Australians, New Zealanders, Japanese, etc. 9. Continue US aid and deployments to and actions in “cooperative” areas and continue strikes against North Vietnam and Laos if and only if solid efforts are being made toward working out a compromise with the VC. (Of course, if we were surprised by the appearance of a Magsaysay, we could change our strategy.) If no such efforts toward compromise are made, stop new deployments, move into a unilateral US ceasefire, and withdraw into enclaves preparatory to departure from Vietnam. 10. Press for an international conference, moves in the UN and an election. 11. Be prepared for serious deterioration in Vietnam, shock in Asia, damage to our influence throughout the world, gloating by the Communists, and political back-lash at home. 12. Take initiatives in Asia and elsewhere to offset and diffuse the issue. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966. Top Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted in OASD/ISA. The source text is stamped: “Sec Def has seen, 9 Apr 1966.” Attached to the source text is a 14-page draft paper, “Some Thoughts About Vietnam,” dated April 4. Referring to the paper printed here as “a possible scenario,” the paper concludes: “All factors taken into account, we should seriously consider seizing the opportunity offered by the I Corps crisis to change our policy with respect to Vietnam and to disengage from the war there.” 2 At their meeting on April 15, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took note of a report, JCS 2343/805–1, April 14, “Assessment of Political Unrest in SVN As It Affects US Military Efforts,” which concluded: “The United States should continue to prosecute the war in Vietnam as long as requested by the South Vietnam Government and confront the prospect that a regime could come to power which would seek to end the war and request the withdrawal of US forces. The United States should plan accordingly.” The Chiefs then agreed to direct the Joint Staff to draw up terms of reference for a study on how to withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam, if required. (Note by the Secretaries, April 20, and attached report; Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3. (30 Mar 66) IR 6091) 115. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 115. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 5, 1966, 1 p.m. I drafted the attached comment on Sunday, 2 in the midst of the worst of the Vietnam political crisis. As a little light—only a little—breaks through, 3 I would summarize its conclusions as follows: 1. If the Vietnamese work their way out of this—and a civil constitution-drafting group is born—we will have passed a great turning point; although there will be plenty of trouble before they actually find their political feet. 2. The Communists are serious and understand the importance of politics: they will take it as a major defeat. 3. Then will be the time to pour it on and see if we canʼt force, in the months ahead, a resolution of the conflict. The strain on our political and economic life and the strain on the South Vietnamese is all but intolerable . Specifically, as the memo suggests, we should on the military side: —continue maximum effort to impose attrition on VC and PAVN forces in South Vietnam; —work more effectively from the air on the supply routes from the North; —increase the costs to Hanoi of continuing the war by going for oil or other precision target systems that hurt without killing an excessive number of civilians. 4. On the diplomatic side we should: —keep close to the Russians, but not hope for too much until Hanoi and the VC are persuaded by the situation itself that the jig is up; —keep lines open to Hanoi; —begin to get word to the VC that their destiny is: to sit on the Hanoi delegation at the international conference; and to talk to Saigon about how to end the war and get back into the national life of South Vietnam. —request Mr. Rusk to conduct a high level review of negotiating papers developed at the working level. 5. On the side of the Honolulu program the memo argues that the most critical dimension is political. —We should, of course, continue our present program of concentrated effort in four areas of rural reconstruction—full blast; —but we should concentrate more effort, once they hire a hall and begin to talk, on political development; how to keep the Directorate together; the political party clause in the constitution; how to balance majority and minority interests; the formation of a national wide-ranging party, etc. Walt Attachment Washington, April 5, 1966. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson You ask for comments on the attached. 4 They follow: 1. The USSR and Negotiations. 5 I believe Russian leverage on Hanoi depends mainly on our persuading Hanoi that negotiation is the best course. Aside from what we do militarily and politically in Vietnam, the Russians have little leverage. They can keep a presence by assisting with arms—notably arms to defend Hanoi from the air. Hanoi wants them as a presence: to balance Peking; to supply arms; and as an insurance policy, should negotiations be undertaken. But only we—not Moscow—can push them over the hump into negotiations. That means, in my view, that we must push harder on the second and third elements in the military equation . The first element , which is going quite well, is to impose heavy attrition on the VC and PAVN main force units. The second element is harassment of their supply lines from the North . Here I would be prepared to take the risks of B–52 bombing of Mu Gia pass and other elements of that supply route in North Vietnam and Laos. I would press to the maximum production and use of special interdiction weapons. The third military element is making the war more expensive in the North to Hanoi . There I prefer oil to bombing the Northeast supply lines. The latter justifies more and more Chinese engineering and logistical forces. Oil hits the over-all military logistical capacity in the North, as well as industrial and civil operations. Iʼm certainly not the last word on this; but I do believe we should lean harder on Hanoi, on a precision bombing basis. It is not, Mr. President, that Iʼm bloody-minded or a hawk. But the strain of trying to do the job principally by attrition of main force units places almost intolerable burdens on the political life of our country and on the war-weary South Vietnamese. Weʼve got to try to shorten this war without doing unwise or desperate things . I believe the Russians would fully understand and accept this course; although they are keeping their oar in Hanoi as a contingency whether we succeed (for negotiations) or whether we fail (to balance the Chinese). In short, I would suggest that, if we survive the present political crisis, we do more about the supply line from the North and we increase Hanoiʼs costs for continuing the conflict . Meanwhile, we should remain close to the Russians; because none of us is so smart—certainly not me—to be absolutely sure they wonʼt help end this earlier rather than later. 2. Peace Talks. 6 The negotiating papers are pretty good . 7 They move toward what I have called a “two-track” negotiating plan: an international negotiation , involving the Geneva Accord powers, with the NLF on the Hanoi delegation, dealing with the restoration and strengthening of the 1954 and 1962 agreements; an internal negotiation , between Saigon and NLF to end the war and create the conditions for absorbing the South Vietnamese now caught up in the VC insurrection into the life of the Country. There is some fuzziness about this high in the government . Some of our public talk suggests we might settle internal South Vietnam affairs at an international conference; some suggests no one would ever talk to the VC—ever. The surfacing of a two-track policy is a delicate matter. But in the meanwhile what we say should be consistent with it . Incidentally, the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique was consistent with a two-track negotiation. The reason for the fuzziness is that the preliminary papers have been developed at the working level; and you may wish Mr. Rusk to render you a personal judgment on existing plans, negotiating concepts, and ways of talking about the problem . It follows from this line of thought that it may be wise to find some way of suggesting to the NLF that we think they ought to be talking with the government in Saigon . 3. Political Tutelage and Organization. 8 Organization comes first . If there is one thing I regret about Honolulu it is that we didnʼt nail Ky down harder on a date for implementing the political side of his January 15th speech. The unrest in Vietnam doesnʼt come from hungry people . The folks carrying banners and organizing all this eat regularly. And thatʼs the way it is in most political disruptions in developing countries—and even in our race troubles. What they want is either personal power (Tri Quang and Thi) or participation in politics , which is the application of power. And the Communists are, of course, in there trying to make the most of it. The most urgent non-military business is to cut the radicals out of the herd by getting the literate, urban leaders—and others—into a hall and around tables talking about the political future. Some force may well be necessary in this crisis; but essentially weʼre trying—and the Directorate is trying—to get the moderates off the streets and into a position where they have to think and talk responsibly about the future of their country. Once they are there, we have a number of ways we can help them think along the right lines; Washington and Saigon are in pretty good shape, if and when we get over that historic hurdle which is what todayʼs crisis is about. There may be ways of beefing up Saigonʼs administrative capacity through a relatively few first-rate advisers working for the Vietnamese and acceptable to them; but we need a government with a bit of a future first . 4. The Four Key Areas. 9 Bob Komer will report. I donʼt need to tell you that I support increased economic and social development in South Vietnam as elsewhere. And Iʼm sure that something like the Lodge Plan—and the four key areas—is the right way to proceed; by concentration of effort. But I donʼt think this war is going to end by pacification of most of the country . It will end—if we win it—when some combination of the following four things leads Hanoi to knock it off: — sufficient attrition on the main force units to break up structures, produce a marked deterioration of morale, and an enlarged flow of defectors—to our side and back home to their VC-controlled areas; — sufficient obstruction to the supply lines to make replacements expensive and, if possible, less than attrition of men, equipment, and ammunition; — sufficient cost to military, civil and economic life in the North to help tip the attrition-supply equation further in our direction; — sufficient order, unity, and stability in the South to rule out a Communist political takeover in the midst of chaos. If this view is right, the war will not end when we have pacified every district, village, and province. When it ends there will still be a hell of a mess in South Vietnam—as there was in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. There will probably still be some last-ditch VC to mop up; but, if other guerrilla wars carry any lesson, it is that when the organizational structure cracks, it cracks pretty well down the line. And the VC is the most tightly organized guerrilla structure weʼve seen except that of the Chinese Communists. For example, they are now feeding local guerrillas up to the main force units, in order to keep them up to strength. The main force and local guerrilla units are interlocked; if the main forces go, it will have a profound effect on the local forces . In short, we should carry forward rural reconstruction on orderly concentrated lines; but we should not measure the probable length of the war by the rate of successful pacification . The real job of rural reconstruction will be post-war . Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Moyers and Valenti. 2 April 3. Rostow gave his April 3 draft memorandum to Taylor, who commented on it in a memorandum of April 4 to Rostow. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor) 3 Valentiʼs notes for the Presidentʼs meeting with his advisers at 1 p.m. on April 5 include the following brief discussion of Vietnam: “Information from Vietnam seems unclear. Taylor thinks situation in Danang is better, but what will Buddhists do? Rostow feels this morning is much better than we anticipated last night.” The meeting mainly dealt with foreign policy issues other than Vietnam. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) 4 Attached but not printed are: 1) Valentiʼs memorandum to Komer, March 28, outlining four “non-military” questions, which Valenti had asked the President and which the President wanted Komer to comment on; and 2) Komerʼs March 29 memorandum to Valenti in reply, which the President asked Rostow to comment on. 5 Valentiʼs first question was: “Are we pursuing the one key to settlement in Vietnam—the Soviet Union?” 6 Valentiʼs second question was: “Have we really sorted out the sticky problems and issues of peace talks—so that we are absolutely clear on our objectives and trading points?” 7 Presumably a reference to negotiating papers drafted during late 1965 and 1966 by the Vietnam Planning Group, chaired by Unger, and in particular to the groupʼs paper on “A Settlement in Vietnam,” to which Komer referred in his memorandum of March 29. A copy of the paper, together with Ungerʼs discussion of it in a memorandum to Ball, March 15, is in Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Vietnam Coordinating Committee and Working Group, 1964–66. 8 Valentiʼs third question was: “Why shouldnʼt we organize in Vietnam a highly skilled group of political professionals to work with the current government in teaching them how to become democratic leaders—and build a durable democratic party?” 9 Valentiʼs fourth question was: “Are we keeping close tabs on the Lodge plan for pacifying four key areas in SVN?” 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, April 6, 1966, 7:15 p.m. 3001. For Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Embtels 3755 2 and 3761. 3 Over-all situation has been reviewed at highest levels today and I wish to give you clear flavor of our thinking. 4 1. Basic decision GVN faces is as stated in para 2 your 3761, whether to seek “over-all political solution before attempting local military solution in Da Nang.” Our own strong view here is that in existing situation this is right course for GVN to follow and that we should not seek to turn them from it in the direction of an immediate showdown in Da Nang. While we recognize there may be Communist influence at work in Da Nang, our overall reading is that Kyʼs charges of Communist domination and his announced intent to take over Da Nang and shoot the Mayor made it almost inevitable that Chuan would act as he did. 5 From previous reporting it had been apparent that large numbers of 1st Division troops were in sympathy with Struggle Movement and that significant elements in Da Nang and major sentiment in Hue were likewise. Whether Chuan was a weak man or not our reading is he would have forfeited his position and probably been unable to get the support of his troops if he had tried to carry out the original plan. We also note that the use of pro-GVN demonstrators, envisaged in the original plan, was tried on the morning of April 5 and clearly failed. Accordingly, under present changed circumstances our overall reading is that Da Nang operation would be unwise unless and until GVN has prepared the way by visible political moves and hopefully by obtaining agreement at least of moderate Buddhist elements led by Tam Chau to such moves. We reach this conclusion simply on our assessment of all available information from Embassy, CAS, and MACV reporting. But we must also bear in mind that our action in supporting Da Nang operation through airlift, including the decision to send tanks during April 6, 6 have heavily involved USG so that if Da Nang operation were undertaken and failed—as we believe overwhelmingly likely under present circumstances—it would result not merely in tremendous criticism of USG here and elsewhere but could mean that our whole position within SVN would be gravely damaged and we might be virtually unable to resume any kind of cooperative relation with major elements particularly in I Corps area. 2. Accordingly, we believe you should not urge immediate Da Nang operation at present, but rather that entire focus of your efforts at all levels should be to get political process started. Your offer to Thieu to sit down quietly with Directory and to help in lining up any recalcitrant groups struck the right note, and we believe you should be proceeding in these directions in every useful way. We share your doubts whether Tam Chau and much less Tri Quang can in fact make or stick to a bargain, but the only way to find out and to put Tri Quang in the wrong is for GVN to get ahead urgently with its projected national political moves. It appears possible that these moves may satisfy Tam Chau at least without any dangerous acceleration of the Constitutional timetable. GVN appears to be in position where by convening visible group immediately to work toward Constitution-making body it can satisfy at least moderate Buddhist elements while in fact it is merely fulfilling its earlier commitments. Whether, as national political script unfolds, GVN may have to accelerate timetable is something that we will both have to assess as occasion arises. But for time being at least we see no alternative but maximum support of immediate measures. 3. We recognize of course that situation in I Corps must be faced as soon as possible. However, visible political measures and, we hope, endorsement and possible participation by some or all Buddhist elements offer at least the hope that much of the wind would be taken out of the sails of the Struggle Movement. This could create entirely different environment in I Corps, both aiding and justifying any eventual use of force GVN may feel compelled to take. 4. As to our involvement in supporting GVN build-up in Da Nang, we still believe that our justification for this must be that GVN was and is entitled to defend country and thus to restore its authority over intolerable and unreasonable regionalistic opposition movement which cannot be tolerated in critical wartime situation. But, as I have indicated at the outset, it is our strong feeling that any showdown in I Corps should now await further national political measures, and that latter should be the focus of our immediate efforts. 7 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Rostow and McNamara, and approved by Rusk. 2 In telegram 3755 from Saigon, April 6, Lodge reported that if negotiations then underway with Struggle committees in Hue and Danang did not bring immediate results, Ky planned to return to Danang that afternoon, move into town with tanks at midnight, install a new mayor, and “reoccupy” the major public buildings. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 3761, April 6, Lodge reported that the GVN had decided to seek a political solution before a military one and had accepted the Buddhist proposal offered to Ky the previous evening to hold a constitutional convention within 6 months. (Ibid.) 4 According to Valentiʼs brief notes of the Presidentʼs meeting from 5:20 to 6:20 p.m., April 6, McNamara stated: “Struggle movement may be too strong to throw off. We donʼt know much about their objectives. They obviously have strength we didnʼt know about, and I donʼt want to go to war against them.” Humphrey agreed, stating that it was “too uncertain to judge who will line up on top.” (Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File) 5 In telegrams 3755 and 3761, Lodge passed on reports that General Chuan, ARVN Commander of I Crops, had lost control, did not follow orders, and had come under Communist domination. 6 In telegram 3755, Lodge reported that Ky had thanked him for U.S. support, “especially the tanks which he said were of the greatest psychological value in awing the crowds.” 7 At the Presidentʼs 5:20 p.m. meeting on April 6, it was also discussed “whether Lodge should say struggle movement is infested with communists.” (Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File) In telegram 3759 from Saigon, April 6, Lodge had proposed telling the press that Communists “had a good deal of influence” in the opposition movement. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L) In telegram 2996, transmitted to Saigon following the meeting, Rusk urged Lodge not to “underwrite personally the extent of communist involvement in the struggle movement,” due both to the lack of convincing evidence and the likelihood that such charges would prove counter-productive. (Ibid., NODIS, vol. 3) In a telephone conversation with McNamara at 7:45 a.m. on April 7, the President said that it looked to him like “thereʼs a very serious danger that thereʼs been a complete infiltration of the [dissidentsʼ] power base by the Communists.” McNamara responded that he felt the same danger, “particularly in that first corps area.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.14, Side A, PNO 3) 117. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson 117. Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to President Johnson 1 April 8, 1966, 1757Z. DEPSECDEF 1886–66. The principal conclusions which I reached as a result of my recent visit to South Vietnam are as follows: 1. We are doing well militarily and are continuing to impose heavy losses on both the VC and North Vietnamese. We are putting heavy pressure on their base areas and on the movement of men and supplies within South Vietnam. The campaign is going best in the 2nd and 3rd Corps areas. 2. The North Vietnamese are making a massive effort to move the maximum number of men and equipment into South Vietnam before the rainy season. They have even resorted to moving on the roads in North Vietnam during the daytime. We are taking a substantial toll, but the North Vietnamese will be able to move in more men and supplies than they require for the present level of operations. 3. The political situation is confused and chaotic. It is not clear whether Ky will survive. There is a division within the Directorate as to whether military force should be used in Danang. Both Co and Chuan are against using military force at this time, while Ky leans in favor of doing so. Thi continues to be a thorn in our side in the 1st Corps area, and I received varying reports from the Mission as to his power base and influence on the situation in that area. The political situation has not yet affected our military operations except unloading munitions at Danang, but may well do so in the future. 4. The civilian reconstruction program is lagging [behind] the military effort. South Vietnamese manpower is limited, and in my judgement priority on manpower should be given to the civil program. I was much impressed by the PAT program and feel that we must make sure that they get the required manpower, even if this means failing to meet the South Vietnamese military force goals. 5. The logistics situation is continuing to improve daily. Officers from the top down to the battalion level all told me that they had not been impeded in carrying out their mission in any way by the shortage of any item. There have been shortages of air munitions during the last four days due to Danang disturbances. Action is being taken to correct the situation. There are, of course, some internal distribution problems with respect to supplies, but these are being met by ingenuity and hard work. The situation will continue to improve as the new ports are completed and we begin to open up the roads. 6. The morale of our forces is magnificent. Even the men in the hospitals are in good spirits. They have a sense of dedication and display a professional competence which makes one proud to be an American. In addition, the morale and competence of our Korean, Australian and New Zealand allies are outstanding. They are proud to be fighting with us in the common cause. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. L. Secret. The source text does not indicate where Vanceʼs telegram originated. 118. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 118. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, April 9, 1966, 7 a.m. SUBJECT Breaking Tri Quangʼs Momentum 1. We are a nation that cannot use force to shoot people apparently demanding a constitution and free elections; and we cannot support for long governments that do this. 2. But we can use force to suppress disorder designed to disrupt or pressure a Constituent Assembly, if it is decently representative; and we can support a government that is protecting such an Assembly. 3. It follows that it may be better to accept a constitutional gathering heavily weighted with provincial and municipal officials, as the Buddhists claim they want, than it is to try first to suppress the disorder in the streets. There is, in any case, no evidence that the present Directorate commands the unity, will, or force capable of achieving the latter result. 4. This means: —substantial concessions to the Buddhist formula for a constitutional gathering; —maintenance of the unity of the Directorate; —probably—but not necessarily—the replacement of Ky, who has shown guts and some political sensitivity; —then, at the right moment, a countrywide curfew, backed, if necessary, by U.S. forces, to permit the constitutional group to work. 5. Right now, with the latest Buddhist communique, 2 we are faced with a classic revolutionary situation—like Paris in 1789 and St. Petersburg in 1917. What we desperately need is a pause in its violence and momentum. So long as a constitutional gathering is not in place, we can neither achieve that pause nor try, politically, to separate the sheep from the goats. 6. Tri Quangʼs tactics at the moment seem clear. He smells the indecision of the Directorate and its weakness. He sees the Directorate has managed to place in the hands of his organization the northern regional interests, idealistic students interested in democracy, even a part of the military itself. He is going for the jugular through the tactics of street agitation he knows best. Assuming he is not a VC himself, the VC obviously regard him as as a potential Kerensky. 7. I see no power capable of stopping, by force alone, the revolution he has organized; the Vietnamese military cannot; and we are immobilized by the nature of our deepest commitments. We are on a road to disaster unless we can get a pause and create a situation where we can bring counterforce and counter politics to bear. 8. It is evident that Tri Quang and his men—for example, the rector of Hue University (Saigonʼs 3846) 3 —have some ideas about the tactics they will use in a constitutional gathering. Both Lodge and we are under no illusion that we will be in the clear once the clan can be gathered—if it can be. But itʼs my hunch that Tri Quang will have less leverage and we will have more in those circumstances than either of us now imagine. And, as I say, the alternative is sleep-walking into disaster. 9. The gut of the issue is to get enough Buddhists into the convention to give the Directorate—and perhaps us—a credible basis for suppressing disorder. To that end, we should be prepared to make compromises that do not leave us without a Directorate. Some deal with Thi may be a critical element. 10. There is no major literate struggle leader—let alone the VC leadership—who is not now thinking in terms of the Russian revolution: a war-weary people; an unrepresentative government; the beginnings of disintegration in the armed forces; the issue of a constituent assembly; etc. If we are to prove Marxʼs dictum—that “history never repeats itself except as farce”—we have to bring into play the factor in the equation that was not present in Russia in 1917: the presence of U.S. force. (I believe Khoa is right in Saigonʼs 3842 from Thomsen, 4 that the VC would have long since taken over Hue if the U.S. Marines were not there.) The problem is for Lodge and Ky to create the political setting in which this factor can be brought into play. The only way I can perceive this can be done is if we take considerable risks in assembling a constituent group and then unite with the Directorate in creating around it an environment of order. 11. If I rightly remember, the Russian Constituent Assembly gathered in June 1917; in July Leninʼs first coup aborted; in the face of defeat in the field and Kerenskyʼs weakness, Lenin took over in November. This is about what would happen in Saigon if we were not there; but we are there. And right now we have to try to find the ways to make that fact count. W 1 Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN II. Secret. Copies were sent to Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Helms, McNaughton, William Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti. 2 Not further identified. 3 Dated April 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI) 4 Dated April 9. (Ibid.) 119. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 119. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 12, 1966. SUBJECT Current Situation in South Viet-Nam 1. Over the weekend, I reviewed the available information on the current situation in South Viet-Nam and developed the following thoughts which I am passing to you for what they are worth. I am always aware of the danger that an idea derived from cables may look well in Washington but be wide of the actual mark on the ground. 2. The pertinent facts as known here. The factors which have dominated the situation from the outset remain the same: the Tri Quang-Tam Chau Buddhist Institute, the Center malcontents in Danang-Hue, General Thi and his friends, and the Viet Cong. These remain the sources of our troubles but we must not forget two other national elements of vast importance though presently quiescent, namely, the Armed Forces and the other minority groups which are watching with intent concern the Buddhist maneuvering. 3. At this stage, the most impressive fact is that Tri Quang and his associates have united all their resources to pull down the Ky Government and to replace it with one which they can control pending the creation of a constitutional successor equally subservient to Buddhist interests. 2 They have formed their own political party for the first time and are in open revolt against Ky and the Directorate under the guise of supporting the “popular demand” for an immediate change to civilian government. With the support of General Thi and the Center malcontents, they are in de facto control of the I Corps area north of Danang and seem to have subverted at least a part of the 1st Division. Any attempt by force to restore government control of this region is likely to result in bloodshed (although there are lots of rabbits among the Vietnamese who will run from force). 4. Ky has had no success in placating or buying off his enemies. The Buddhists are out to win big and will not be placated by anything short of capitulation—at least, that seems to be their present mood. I do not find evidence in the cables that Ky has made any attempt to contact Thi directly and to find out what his price really is. On his recent visit to Danang last week, Ky talked only to General Chuan and apparently did not try to see Thi. 5. Ky has shown good judgment in refusing to be rushed into general elections as the Buddhists desire. He knows the risks the country would run in its present state of political unpreparedness and foresees the political turmoil which elections with their attendant factional struggles would generate in South Viet-Nam, probably to the detriment of the conduct of the war. 6. The Ky Government has not yet used any real force to restore order, hence, its ruggedness as well as that of its opponents remains untested. While Ky has won good marks for prudence, he has appeared vacillating on occasion and has certainly not yet shown himself capable of ordering the “whiff of grapeshot” which may be necessary some day if his government is to survive. He may be influenced (as General Khanh was when challenged by the Buddhists) by a recollection of the American reaction in 1963 to Diemʼs strong actions against these same Buddhists. 7. We know very little about the attitudes within the Armed Forces toward the current situation. We do not know the degree of unity within the Directorate—how do the Generals view the Buddhist revolt? What about the younger officers? There has always been considerable resentment among them toward the senior generals and present conditions with indiscipline in the air might favor a new “Young Turk” outbreak. (Ky presumably is now regarded as an “Old Turk.”) My point is that we can not take the solid support of the Armed Forces for granted in this resistance to the Tri Quang challenge. We need to take recurrent sensings of military attitudes, using the far-flung U.S. advisor net as a source of on-the-spot reports. I am not aware of use being presently made of this system. 8. In summary, the Ky Government is in real danger as are American interests. We can not work with anarchy or, in my judgment, with the kind of government which Tri Quang is likely to install. The problem is to restore order in South Viet-Nam under a cooperative government capable of an effective prosecution of the war, while progressing toward a constitutional, freely elected government. The ideal would be an indigenous Vietnamese solution without visible U.S. participation. This does not mean U.S. neutrality toward the issues involved—we have too much at stake. But we can do little in the open other than support the principle of an eventual constitutional government without incurring the charge of intervention and the blame for Vietnamese governmental failures. Possible Courses of Action 9. After considering the facts as known here, I conclude that, acting from the wings and using all available leverage, we must prevent Tri Quang from overthrowing the Directorate (with or without Ky who personally is expendable) and support a conservative, feasible schedule for a transition to constitutional government. In execution of such a program, the GVN (Ky, for the present) should be encouraged to use the necessary force to restore and maintain order, short of attempting to reimpose government rule by bayonets on Danang-Hue which, for the time being, should be merely contained and isolated. 10. More specifically, the following measures should be considered and those which appeal to you should be referred to Saigon for comment and, in appropriate cases, for subsequent implementation. a. With regard to the Buddhists (1) The government should first make clear what attitude it intends to take toward further political demonstrations and toward the harboring of illegal demonstrators. I am not sure now what the law is but it should be strengthened as need be to meet the current situation, then be thoroughly publicized, and afterwards rigorously enforced. To get strict enforcement, Saigon will have to give clear, specific orders to police and military commanders (something rarely done in the past) and then punish ineffective performance by responsible officers. (2) If rioters and suspect characters continue to seek sanctuary in the pagodas, after due warning the police should raid them, looking not only for malefactors but also for evidence linking the Buddhists to the Viet Cong. I strongly suspect such evidence would be found. (3) If Tri Quang, Tam Chau et al. violate the law, they should be arrested and tried. (4) At home, we are allowing ourselves to be trapped by the unqualified use of the term, “the Buddhists.” Our spokesmen should reiterate that we are confronted by a power grab by a small group of political bonzes who constitute a sort of Tammany Hall which speaks for only a minority of one wing of the Buddhists. b. With regard to the Center (1) If the Center leaders continue to resist, the dissident area should be isolated and brought to terms by withholding various kinds of government assistance. For example, the area of the I Corps could be reduced in size to those provinces north of Danang and all troops, except perhaps the 1st Division, withdrawn south into a special zone created out of the southern part of the I Corps. The command of this zone might be given to be 2nd Division commander who appears to be loyal. There would be Homeric justice in giving the reduced I Corps with its problems to General Thi or to General Nhuan of the 1st Division in order to fix responsibility on them for the security and welfare of the area which they have led into trouble. Then, by controlling troop reinforcements, air support and economic aid, the government could bring increasing pressures to bear on this area. Such a program should, of course, be accompanied by a public explanation of the reasons why the people in the Center are suffering for the misdeeds of their leaders. Meanwhile, in the procedures for setting up a new government, great pains should be taken to give evidence of sincere consideration for the legitimate interests of the Center. (2) Once the present crisis is settled, we should urge the GVN to change the practice of having military units in the Hue-Danang area composed of officers and men from that region. It is always going to be a center of political unrest and needs to be guarded by military forces without local ties. c. With regard to General Thi (1) I would like to see a final effort made to placate Thi who may be retrievable (whereas Tri Quang is not). The government could also give some assurance to his friends with regard to jobs and physical security. If this effort fails, we might try the proposal contained in subparagraph b above of putting him in charge of the mess in the North. d. With regard to the Armed Forces (1) I should think it very important to get an advisorsʼ report on the attitudes in the principal military units toward this situation. Such a report would probably suggest actions which should be taken with regard to the Armed Forces. I suspect it would show that the troop information provided has not been enough to keep the Armed Forces properly informed and hence properly oriented toward current events. (2) A few senior American officers should take a similar reading of attitudes within the Directorate. e. With regard to the U.S. position (1) We know that the motives of the United States Government are being misstated and misinterpreted by many elements involved in this struggle. The question is whether we can or should try to say something useful, addressed both to the Vietnamese and to our own public. I would think it desirable to try a draft to see what might be said. Points for possible inclusion are such things as our attitude toward the establishment of constitutional government, our concern over current disorders, our feeling for the heavy responsibility devolving upon the Armed Forces and our confidence in their continued loyalty and devotion to duty. More difficult to decide would be the inclusion of words of warning about the impossibility of our assisting South Viet-Nam in conditions of political chaos and the futility of continuing to introduce additional means if these disorderly conditions continue. 11. As I said at the outset, the foregoing observations have the fault of being formulated far from the scene of action and without personal contact with the principal actors. The suggestions are moderate because I feel it in my bones that over-reaction at this time either in Washington or Saigon is more dangerous than a continuation of restraint. Hence, I would recommend a prudent use of force within the law against the Buddhists, and an effective isolation of the dissident part of the Center while trying to buy off Thi and urging the military to close ranks. In Washington, we should continue to reject the slogan “take over or get out” which, unfortunately, will gain in advocates if the political situation does not soon stabilize. 12. Meanwhile, I feel that we should pursue with increased vigor the military campaign on the ground in the south and in the air in the north. If we are suffering a reverse on the political front, we need to seek compensations on the military front. Maxwell D. Taylor 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and McNamara. Attached to the source text is a note indicating that the President told his secretary on April 13: “I want reactions right away. See what they are doing to carry out the suggestions made—as soon as possible.” Unger commented on Taylorʼs memorandum in a memorandum to Rostow, April 15. (Ibid.) Rostow jotted his own reactions on a copy of the memorandum located ibid., vol. LI. 2 In a 12-page memorandum to Rostow, April 11, which was requested at a White House meeting on April 8, Carver analyzed what South Vietnamʼs Government might look like if the current cirsis ended with a complete Buddhist victory. (Ibid.) 120. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 120. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 13, 1966, 1813Z. CAP 66187. Herewith my preliminary Vietnam views, 2 to be taken with grain of salt as coming from a one-week expert. Even so, the insights from a full speed week on the ground were invaluable. To do the job you want done there is no substitute for periodic base touching in Saigon. McNamara told me so before I left, and Porter redoubled in spades. I. To report first on my primary mission—backing up pacification/rural construction—have established close working relationship with Lodge/Porter/Westmoreland and return confident can build effective non-military effort to complement military push. Porter doing outstanding job in starting to pull together loose, uncoordinated civil programs in way simply not done before. As Vance reported, 3 “the civil reconstruction program is lagging [behind] the military effort.” A key reason is that military effort got underway last summer and fall, and got top priority, while a coordinated civil program really dates from Honolulu. So I quite agree with him that it must now be given priority, especially in the competition for ever tighter manpower. Westy is naturally less eager (though agreed in principle), but I think it can be demonstrated that PATs can largely replace popular forces (local defense) which are the last remaining big manpower pool. We need to help GVN rationalize its manpower structure in manner which will meet essential civil as well as military needs. Other major area of civil/military competition is for clogged port space. Since US military port operations more efficient than AID/GVN, Lodge thinks draconian solution of former taking over whole Saigon port might be necessary as crucial anti-inflation measure. But civil port operations are improving and this may not be necessary. Basic reason why Vance, Porter and I are convinced that key elements of civil program must have priority is that without a coordinated pacification effort to secure and energize the rural areas which the military sweep, either the military will get bogged down holding terrain or the VC will come back in again once the military move out. Thus military and civil efforts must be closely coordinated and move in tandem—better coordination of forward planning may be needed here. Next problem—and perhaps the greatest bottleneck of all—is the sheer weakness of the GVN. It can do only so much at one time. In sharp contrast to our largely self-contained military effort, civil program necessarily must be operated through GVN. We must try to build up a stable progressive GVN—not take it over, and this imposes severe restraints. Instead of overloading the circuit, we need to focus it as well as ourselves on first things first and plan rationally for doing other desirable things only after the essential base has been laid. Indeed my key conclusion is that we may be trying to do too many things on civil side and not yet doing anything well. One gut problem is that we have a scattergun rather than a rifle approach. Porter and I see the answer as a system of priorities designed to put first things first. If we donʼt pacify the countryside and control inflation all our other grand enterprises will go for naught. So certain basic programs—cadres, police, and anti-inflation—need to be promptly and sharply stepped up. Others may need to be postponed until there is more of base on which to build. Porter and I will submit—after checking out with Lodge and Cabinet level—a directive aimed at giving effect to the above principles. 4 We also have detailed recommendations on new program emphases. This job can be done—if we have a halfway decent GVN to work with. II. On the military side, our effort is magnificent. It is like trying to kill mosquitoes with an elephant gun, but the thing is that weʼre doing it. The trend is still clearly upward. However, I would gently caution against undue optimism about the quality of the ARVN or about how much of the countryside is really cleared of VC. Statistics—especially GVN statistics—can be notoriously unreliable. So we have established a new province reporting system—direct to Porter—which will give us a better line. III. On the third factor critical to our success in Vietnam—a GVN which functions at least quasi-efficiently and generates enough popular commitment to be regarded as preferable to the VC—the outlook is naturally less encouraging. Lodge and the Mission believe the present regime—perhaps with some reshuffling—is far more effective militarily and is administering the country better than any likely successor. They are deeply pessimistic about being able to work with the Buddhists, whom they mistrust from direct experience. Lodge asked me to tell you personally that he foresees a period of painful jockeying, leading probably to “elections” and a weak civilian government, but then doubtless culminating in another military coup ( if it does not happen earlier). But Lodge also says that we can—and must—live through this cycle and can still achieve our aims if we stick it. He insists he is of good heart (but Porter worries about this—Iʼll report orally). We cannot just take over from the Vietnamese—the growing US presence is already creating its own problems. Yet with 230,000 Americans in Vietnam and more coming, nor can we afford to sit by and let the Vietnamese foul their own nest without a greater effort to keep them on the right track. Thus—despite the risks—there is a growing case for discreet exertion of greater leverage on the GVN, perhaps using the power of the purse more boldly. IV. Personnel . Over half the top people on the civil side are due to come home over the next few months. This talent drain would be a real setback. Some of them might be prevailed on to stay. I am looking into the matter. Finally, I claim at least one accomplishment—getting into and out of Saigon with almost no press notice, as proof that I can operate quietly. Though this report is eyes only at your request, may I send copies to Rusk, McNamara and Bell? 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer dated his message April 12, but it was not sent to the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas until April 13. 2 Komer sent the President his full report on his Saigon trip, together with a Special Annex, on April 19. (Ibid.) 3 Document 117 . 4 A draft of the directive on Civil Reconstruction in Vietnam was sent in Porterʼs back channel telegram to Komer, 1944 from Saigon, April 19. Komer wrote “ʼDraft NSAM” on the telegram, but no such NSAM was issued. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966) 121. Paper Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 121. Paper Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, April 14, 1966. HEADINGS FOR DECISION AND ACTION: VIETNAM, APRIL 14, 1966 With the apparent sorting out of the political crisis in Vietnam, the following appear to be the headings under which we ought to consider our strategy for the next phase. 1. A high-level U.S. statement. We should consider a statement which would express satisfaction at the forward movement toward constitutional democratic government; link that movement to Kyʼs January 15 speech and the Honolulu Declaration; but also indicate that our capacity to assist South Vietnam is dependent upon the demonstration of unity and responsibility in the widening circle of those who will now engage in politics, including the maintenance of order; the effective prosecution of the war; the vigorous prosecution of revolutionary development. The statement might include a passage suggesting that the historic problems which now confront South Vietnam in making a constitution and democratic political parties is like that which other nations have faced in their history, including the U.S. at the end of the 18th century, and many contemporary developing nations. It might be wise for the South Vietnamese, as they make arrangements suitable to their unique situation and history, to examine some of the successful experiences of developing nations in the contemporary world. 2. Bombing the North. a. Was the Mu Gia pass operation sufficiently successful to make it a milk run? b. Is this the time for oil? 3. Accelerating the campaign against main force units. Is a step-up desirable and possible? When and how can we get the I Corps back fully into the game? Could the GVN in general do more? 4. Stabilization. From all evidence, inflation is the most corrosive immediate factor on the domestic front. We need a vigorous and imaginative program urgently. 5. Revolutionary construction. We need to accelerate the whole track on the principle of concentration of effort. Are we prepared to let the South Vietnamese put more of their manpower into all dimensions of pacification (including PAT teams and police) while we continue our build-up? 6. Vietnamese politics. There are at least three major dimensions: a. Intelligence. As the political process widens out, we need to use all our resources in the cities and in the provinces (including military advisers, AID, etc.) to understand better the personalities and interests that will be reflected in the members of the constituent assembly. We should crank up a systematic effort which would yield us the same kind of knowledge of the local interests and personalities as we would for a U.S. national political convention. b. Political education. We must use every device that is not counter-productive to get the Vietnamese to examine other nationsʼ solutions to the constitutional and political party problems they now face. The notion of a junket for a group of representative leaders to Korea, Japan, Mexico, etc., should be now seriously considered. In addition, we might see if some part of the local press might be willing to run a series of articles for discussion on the constitutions and political party organization of such countries. Seminars in the universities might be helpful. What the Vietnamese need are their own Federalist Papers. c. Constitution-making. As in the case of Korea, we should try to get, in the most discreet way possible, some professional outside (preferably U.S.) experts to help. 7. Negotiation. Following on from the appeal to the VC in the Vietnamese portion of the Honolulu Communique, we should consider whether, when, and how we might suggest to the government that they try to open a covert dialogue with the VC and perhaps, when the constitution and party-making process is firmed up, an open invitation to the VC to stop their terror attacks and join in making a democratic nation, including a willingness to have them take part in constitution-making. This would be a political warfare measure, unless there are some unexpected results from Saigon/VC contacts. Nevertheless, it might be useful to get some captured or defected VC into the constitution-making game. WR 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Copies were sent to McNaughton, Komer, Carver, William Bundy, Valenti, and Moyers. 122. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 122. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts 1 Washington, April 14, 1966, 7:33 p.m. 2014. Ref: Dep Cir Tel 1995 (Notal). 2 1. This is second Viet-Nam sitrep for use as appropriate with host government officials. 2. Chief of State Thieu appeared morning April 14 before National Political Congress, convened by GVN to determine form of body to draft constitution, 3 and signed decree providing that free, universal elections for a constitutional convention be held within three to five months. Details as to election date, number of delegates and election regulations to be subject of later decree. Delegates to Congress greeted Thieuʼs action with enthusiastic cheers. 3. Before adjourning, Political Congress produced 10-point declaration, representing areas of agreement reached among delegates (attendance grew to almost 120 out of 168 invited), including: that present government agree to resign as soon as constitutional convention formed; that government issue decree providing for elected constitutional convention within 4 months (this subject of Thieuʼs decree); that communist and neutralist elements not be allowed to join constitutional convention; that GVN promise amnesty for those who participated in struggle movement; and that agitation and disturbances stop. 4. Reaction of militant Buddhist opposition to these developments not yet clear. Moderate Buddhist leaders reported to be satisfied for time being, and large planned demonstration in Saigon took place in somewhat abbreviated fashion, in good order and discipline. However, question in fore at moment is nature of government to hold power in interim until permanent institutions established. Buddhists still demanding immediate change in government on grounds present GVN cannot be trusted to carry out promises. This attitude stated in Congress by Buddhist Institute observer, who had been persuaded to attend final sessions of Congress by other members. 4 Ky himself had opened floodgates to discussion by addressing Congress to effect that form of interim government up to Congress. Congress tackled this problem inconclusively during final session. Chairman termed Congress very successful. 5. Hue and Danang radios, in hands of “struggle forces,” continued attacks on GVN and Political Congress. Situation in those cities and elsewhere in country generally calm. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by D.A. Engel in FE/VN, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger. Sent for action to 26 posts and repeated to Saigon. 2 Not printed. (Ibid.) 3 The Congress convened on April 12. The GVNʼs decision to convene the National Political Congress was reported in telegram 3746 from Saigon, April 5. (Ibid.) 4 The Buddhist Institute boycotted the Congress. Lodge summarized the observerʼs comments in his report on the Congressʼ morning session on April 14. (Telegram 3968 from Saigon, April 14; ibid.) 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, April 16, 1966, 1140Z. 4033. 1. The results of the National Political Congress make the political situation in Viet-Nam calmer than it has been for several weeks. We can look a little farther ahead than was true a week ago. But there is still much uncertainty. There are many pitfalls. Explosive forces still exist particularly in the Hue-Danang area where the anti-government “struggle forces” remain in control. 2. The Political Congress appears to have been a success and well justified our faith in it. The government came out of it rather better than could have been expected, given the Buddhist boycott for the first two days. The issues between the Buddhist Institute and the government appear to be fewer in number and less angry in tone. The Congress changed the bilateral—and the dangerous—nature of the conflict and, by involving other groups, seems to have given the government a chance to develop some political allies to help it contain Buddhist demands. 3. The Buddhists find themselves, for the first time in the current crisis, unable to call the shots exclusively. The government gained time and it spared itself damage by using the shield of the Congress to deflect the direct impact of Buddhist demands. 4. While not yet certain, it appears tonight as though the danger of a complete turnover of the government has been averted. The Buddhists may be in the process of modifying, if not abandoning, their move to get rid of the Directorate and the military regime which flowed from it. Whether this probability will be sustained will emerge more clearly within a few days. It is still not clear what line Tri Quang will take and he could upset arrangements which have been laboriously and precariously achieved. 5. There are a series of factors which should operate to sustain a shaky, weakened, but nevertheless substantially unchanged regime for a transitional period. The Buddhists were not able to whip up a mass reaction in Saigon against the government. The Saigon demonstration did not get rolling as might have been hoped by their instigators. In fact, there was a visible reaction against agitation and violence, not only in the expected quarters, but among many Buddhists not associated with the Vien Hoa Dao. 6. Moreover, a reasonable solution has been agreed upon and is being put into effect, so that the government can defend itself against charges of unwillingness to work towards constitutional democracy. 7. A base of military power for political support for the government has been preserved outside of the Hue-Danang area. It is undoubtedly true that Kyʼs ability to count on a substantial military force in the Saigon area gave the Buddhists considerable pause. In addition, the relative solidity of the governmentʼs authority in II, III and IV Corps undoubtedly served to contain its adversaries. The governmentʼs control over the major military formations south of Danang is intact. 8. Finally, the arousing of Catholic fears of the Buddhists, and the support derived from the sects, minorities, and political party remnants, added momentarily to the governmentʼs ability to maneuver. There was also a Southern reaction, although unorganized and ill-defined, against what had become identified as a struggle dominated by Buddhist leadership from the so-called central provinces around Hue and Danang. 9. The government now faces a set of problems deriving from the events of the past month. These are: A. How to bring Hue and Danang back under control now that the first steps towards a generally acceptable political solution at the national level have been agreed to and begun. The situation in I Corps is not good and it will take considerable time to correct it. Military involvement in the Struggle forces is extensive, as is participation by police and civil servants. The writ of the GVN in Saigon definitely does not run. B. How to exercise authority in the transitional period while continuing to execute utterly vital military, economic and social programs. C. How to develop political institutions which can canalize normal political disagreements in an orderly way and produce a rational constitutional convention free from intimidation which is able to do its assigned task. D. How to find a way in which the present military leadership can play its most useful role in the political future of the nation. E. How to mollify a potent reaction among younger officers (the so-called Baby Turks) who are on the verge of a radical revolt against civilian political ambitions. 2 F. How to settle differences which have caused strains within the ruling Directorate, while fending off possible further threats to continuity of the government. 10. Attempts must be made to solve each of these problems. Their solution is going to keep this country in a state of sustained political ferment for months to come. 11. It now looks as if the elections for the constitutional assembly will be held in August, barring any sudden upsets. Fortunately, the fact that a total change, or even a major change, in the government has not occurred will make it less difficult to get through the process. If the Directorate and the Ky government had fallen (or will fall), the situation would have been (will be) much worse. 12. With all the above considerations and circumstances in mind we suggest the following as sagacious ideas for the immediate future: A. We should work through the Ky government as much as we can—not in the sense that we are opposing its opponents and entering into domestic political contests, but because it is the established government. B. We should continue to persuade the GVN to be calm, patient and persistent in its task of re-establishing its authority in Hue and Danang. A military campaign against that area should not be mounted. But should not mean supine acquiescence. Clever police-type steps should be taken to shrink, whittle and subdivide. We should also consider what political and possibly economic measures can be safely used. First moves should be in I Corps area of Hue-Danang. This could involve non-Struggle forces in the countryside, and should be part of the process of isolating Hue and Danang, reserving them for later action. There are signs of a difference between extreme Struggle forces and their less radical supporters, which can perhaps be exploited by the government. The problem of General Thi should be solved, probably by finding him a place in the government but removed from his base in I Corps. Little by little the gas should be let out. C. We should divert the energies of the “Baby Turks” away from radical solutions to more normal political pursuits (see para H below), and continue to advise Ky to avoid recourse to their emotional support. It appears that Ky can control these elements, and needs to be influenced to do so. Given their temperament they will need to be watched very closely. D. We should look for further and sustained involvement of various civilian elements with the government in the process of political evolution. The government would be wise to enlist their participation in the preparations for elections, using well-known methods of political organization, with specific allocation of a large number of small tasks to a large number of workers. This could be the nucleus of the presidential campaign to follow under the constitution. E. If the situation looks as though it were becoming unglued again, we should immediately consider reconvening of the Political Congress in the hope that it can once again exert a moderating influence. F. If possible, there should be little or no change in the Directorate. Whatever changes in the Directorate or cabinet may come about should be gradual and selected so as not to prevent the re-establishment of equilibrium. Every addition or subtraction must be worked out in sharp focus on its individual merits, be it military or civil. If a proposed change seems to threaten a chain reaction it should be dropped at once. G. Political energies outside the government should be channeled into preparation for politics before and after the constitutional convention. They should not be focused on upsetting the transitional framework, but on working within it and gearing up for a longer term role. H. We should consider what form of political organization could be fostered involving an alliance between civil and military elements, to include the “Baby Turks”. This could hopefully form the basis for a political successor to military government which would act as a check on any tendency to military coups. A political role for the military probably cannot be avoided. Nor should it be, seeing that the military is the only major group in Viet-Nam thoroughly imbued with a national spirit. Perhaps a combination of military leaders, veterans, cooperating political leaders and groups of certain sects and minorities will emerge with a national organization based on rural construction cadre. The purpose would be to build a strong pro-government party before the end of 1966. We would seek the emergence of a unifying political group made up of nationalist elements. We will need to examine this in some detail before a clear-cut answer can be given as to its feasibility. There should be an election law to encourage development of a two party system. I. Finally, we should maintain the closest possible contact with all shades of political opinion, leadership, and groupings. Our ability to influence events needs to be strengthened and then exercised with prudence. Our contacts with unofficial Vietnamese must grow. 13. We are now faced with the prospect that political forces will be at work in Viet-Nam in great variety and without clear direction. The uncertainties are apparent. The consequences are not so visible. We must, as always, be pragmatic on method, while steadfast on the need to ward off the VC aggressors and to build an independent modern state. 14. We will undoubtedly not be able to control events but we should be able to influence them. We must expect that civil administration will suffer, particularly in the fields of economics and revolutionary development although there will be some progress. We do not believe that we need to suffer from lack of military progress where our own role is more definitive and where our influence can be brought to bear more directly. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:25 p.m. on April 18 under cover of a memorandum stating: “This is a first class stock-taking by Saigon which I commend to you for reading at your first relatively easy moment. It underlies the discussions we will be having later in the day and over the next week.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1) Also passed to Defense, CIA, USIA, and NSA. 2 On April 14 Raborn forwarded to Rostow a message received that day through CIA channels from Saigon summarizing Colonel Loanʼs description of the “Young Turksʼ” plans and intentions. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI) 124. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 124. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington April 18, 1966, 8:45 p.m. SUBJECT Vietnam 1. Force ceilings . Secretary McNamara will wish to ask that you raise our force ceiling in Vietnam from 260,000 to 325,000 men. That would take us to September on the present schedule. Although he could raise the ceiling less at this time and meet requirements, this would mean his coming back to you again before September. 2. Your decision on force levels in Vietnam relates to the policy you wish to pursue over coming months. We have a good appraisal from Lodge in Saigonʼs 4033. 2 Briefly, the situation is much better; although the Danang/Hue problem is not solved, we are working to bring Thi and Ky together. 3. By Thursday 3 the special group under George Ball will be prepared to present to you the alternatives open to us as they see them. 4 4. Briefly, what will emerge is roughly this: in the months ahead, as the political transition takes place, we face, say, a 10 to 15% chance of chaos and total paralysis; a lower percentage possibility that a government might emerge that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to leave; a 50% probability that the government continues somewhat weakened and in no position to prosecute with full vigor the non-military programs; and a modest, perhaps 25% possibility, that with the political process going forward quietly and the First Corps brought back into the game, we will have an even better situation than in the past. 5. On these possibilities, you should know that there are relative optimists and relative pessimists. George Ball and John McNaughton, for example, are relatively pessimistic. George Carver is relatively optimistic; Bill Bundy and Len Unger fall somewhere in between. 6. The question is what shall our policy be in the face of this situation where there is a possibility of moving toward constitutional government, which has many attractions in Vietnam and abroad, but considerable dangers as well. 7. Into this situation must be introduced the assessment that we are likely to have a Viet Cong offensive in May, when the monsoon takes hold, and they bring to bear the supplies and forces they have been accumulating down the trails in Laos. 8. The Ball group paper will examine several options: Option A would continue along present lines; protect the political transition with vigorous military action; and look relatively hopefully to the future. It might involve measures that would increase our forces in Vietnam; increase the weight of our attack on North Vietnam, including oil; and increase our effort to limit supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail, including the further use of B52ʼs. Economically , we would move forward as far as we can, exploiting the fact that we can work in the provinces quite well even if the central government is weak. Politically , we would do everything we could to maximize the cohesion of the moderates in South Vietnam and help them emerge with a good constitution and a sensible party structure. A part of this track would be to convey the message to all political groups that the maintenance of this track requires that they conduct their political differences without disorder and while permitting the transitional government to operate. Option B would consist of Option A plus a purposeful effort to encourage the South Vietnamese to explore the possibilities of opening negotiations on a settlement with the Viet Cong. There are several versions of this option. Secretary McNamara, for example, believes that while putting maximum military pressure on the Viet Cong and on the North, we should try to start a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue while not committing ourselves to exactly how tough or hard our terms would be until we see if that track could be opened up. Others would recommend our pressing Saigon to open a dialogue even if there were some risk that our pressure might fragment and weaken the non-Communist South Vietnamese political groups. All groups recognize the danger that a negotiation and a negotiated settlement between Saigon and the Viet Cong may not pass successfully between the upper millstone of excessively dangerous concessions to the Viet Cong (NLF) and the nether millstone of being insufficiently attractive to make the Viet Cong consider it worthwhile to negotiate. Option C , which George Ball will draft, would begin by deciding that the chances of bringing about an independent non-Communist South Vietnam have shrunk to the point, on an overall basis, that the U.S. effort is no longer warranted. It would purposefully set about to begin setting the stage for U.S. disengagement and withdrawal irrespective of whether any negotiation would work or not. 9. Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk are, I believe, supporters of Option B, with, perhaps, Secretary Rusk more cautious about the possibilities of starting now a Viet Cong/Saigon dialogue that would be consistent with our stated objectives; but you will wish to hear from them directly. W.W. Rostow 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. 2 Document 123 . 3 April 21. 4 In an April 14 memorandum, Rostow informed the President that “the contingency planning exercise you directed inside the government is now underway. With George Ball as chairman, it will examine four policy options.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI) Rusk reported the results of the exercise in an April 24 memorandum, Document 126 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 125. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 125. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 21, 1966, 11:45 a.m. SUBJECT Vietnam—The Critical Issues In Vietnam we face an enemy whose main hope is that American political life cannot stand the strains of protracted war and of baffling political turbulence in Vietnam. They are playing us as they did the French in 1953. They know we are militarily stronger than the French. They are not yet convinced we have more stamina. They do not believe they can defeat us in the field. They do not believe they command majority support in Vietnam. They are counting, like all the Communists before them, on the power a determined, disciplined minority can wield against a split and distracted majority. Our task is to convince them at the earliest possible moment that they are wrong; and that time is their enemy, not their friend. Our tasks break down into two groups: —those things we must do to avoid defeat; —those things that might help them decide to end the war sooner rather than later. Minimum Essentials. —to maintain present relatively favorable casualty rates with respect to VC and PAVN main force units; —to keep supplies through Laos down to a level that prevents a major build-up of VC/PAVN forces; —to keep sufficient Vietnamese military unity to maintain the ARVN as a reasonably effective force in the field; —to avoid political violence and chaos during the transitional phase through which we are now passing; —to keep inflation (and the weight of U.S. military and civilian personnel and expenditures) from tearing South Vietnamese society apart. If we do these things we can stay in the game; but war-weariness in Vietnam and the domestic strains of the whole affair might well cause a break in Saigon or in Washington at some point, if it appears endless. We must, therefore, look to measures which will force a favorable decision in Hanoi soon rather than later. To Force a Decision to Negotiate on Terms Relatively Favorable to Us. 1. Increase the cost to Hanoi of continuing the war by hurting them badly around Hanoi-Haiphong. 2. Find a way to block or radically to inhibit the supply roads through Laos. 3. Increase sharply the attrition rates against VC-PAVN main force units to the point where they begin to disintegrate. 4. Produce a relatively stable consolidation of anti-Communist political groups. 5. Get inflation under control and steadily build up rural reconstruction in the provinces. 4 and 5 (counter-inflation; stable politics) we must obviously try to do; but, unless we are extremely lucky, they will proceed at a pace not likely in themselves to impress the VC and Hanoi that they should give up their effort. 3 (higher attrition of VC-PAVN) could happen, if our build-up proceeds and we are extremely successful in finding, fixing, and destroying VC/PAVN main force units. But it depends on their not evading us and also on their rate of replacement and supply flows through Laos. We are, therefore, brought back to look afresh at the Laos supply line and the Hanoi-Haiphong targets. It is right that we should look hard at these. The Communists have obviously made an assessment much like this one. They have invested great military resources and diplomatic vigor in trying to keep us out of Hanoi-Haiphong; and, with Souvanna both incapable of closing the corridor and nervous about our moving troops into the corridor, Hanoi has felt free to build roads and mount a formidable truck-based supply line. Hanoi-Haiphong Targets. I am conscious of the international issues these raise; and there can be only one target officer in this government. I would only recommend a fresh look, bearing in mind that many of the targets can be attacked with relatively few planes: it took two aircraft to take out the Haiphong power plant the other night. They bombed at night on radar and were lucky. But for precision targets small well-planned operations often do better than big ones, due to smoke and dust obscuring the target. The Laos Trail. Here Iʼm sure we ought to concentrate our best brains and efforts. The VC are now dependent on that trail for ammunition. Since manpower reserves are low in VC-controlled areas, they are also dependent on the trail for fighting men. It is a true jugular. But itʼs tough to cut and hold cut. Roads can be repaired overnight. Trucks are hard to find. Nevertheless, we are improving due to spotter teams; small spotter aircraft; more sorties; more experience. The number of trucks shot up is increasing. The number of trucks seen coming down the road decreased in the past month rather sharply. We should push the new denial weapons program to the hilt. The equation of victory in Vietnam is as complex as anything this nation has ever faced. No element in the equation can safely be neglected. But the key to shortening the war lies not merely in trying harder on items 3–5; but focusing sharply on Hanoi-Haiphong and, especially, the Laos Trail. Against this background we could go to work to stimulate VC-Saigon contacts, dialogue, and, ultimately, negotiation. Now a word about the home front. At some stage the moment will come for you to speak again on Vietnam. The theme might be: We are all being tested by this crisis . — The Vietnamese by their desire to move towards constitutional government despite the war . We support this; but it will require great restraint and mutual accommodation, as democracy always requires. Our support can only be effective against the background of such restraint and mutual accommodation. — The Vietnamese military, ourselves, and other fighting allies: to maintain military unity and effectiveness in the face of a difficult, thoroughly professional form of aggression . Weʼre doing well. Pride should be expressed in U.S., as well as Korean, Australian, and Vietnamese forces. — The Vietnamese and ourselves in carrying forward the Honolulu program for the people, despite the war . Again the Vietnamese have a great responsibility to improve the quality and vigor of their administration. — Finally, the American people: we are being tested to understand the nature of the war; to understand the confusing but essentially constructive struggle of a democratic nation to be born; and, above all, by the fact the Communists are counting on us to despair and give up. After such a statement we would need to follow up by a systematic campaign to make clear the constructive—if precarious—process of political development going forward in Vietnam. If our people really understood, I believe they would be quite tolerant of the birth pangs. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret. 126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 24, 1966. SUBJECT Basic Choices in Viet-Nam At your direction, an informal working group chaired by Mr. Ball has analyzed our basic choices in Viet-Nam and has prepared the enclosed report. Three principal choices are discussed. (A) To continue roughly along present lines; (B) To continue along present lines but possibly reducing the rate of entry of United States troops and stimulating contact between the Saigon Government and the Viet Cong, and (C) To cut our losses. I should point out that option C is based upon the possible emergence of a factual situation outlined in the statement on the basic assumption. I do not believe that we are faced with that factual situation and neither Secretary McNamara nor I recommend option C. I do believe that we should discuss with Lodge upon his return the possibility of probing individuals or groups in the Viet Cong in an effort to create divisions among them. Such efforts have been attempted in the past but have not produced results. Otherwise, my recommendation would be that we stay on option A. We see some advantage in broadening the international base for what may be difficult decisions lying ahead. I believe we should consider a Ministerial meeting of those having combat troops in Korea soon after the Philippine Senate concludes action on the Philippine contribution. Such a meeting would include South Viet-Nam, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States. The purpose of such a meeting would be to make four points clear: (1) The reaffirmation of the commitment to fend off aggression; (2) The continued interest in moving the problem from the battlefield to the conference table; (3) A clear signal to the South Vietnamese that we expect them to show maximum solidarity in resisting the Viet Cong , and (4) To stimulate and emphasize once again the non-military programs. We can discuss these matters further at our meeting on Monday. 2 Dean Rusk Attachment 3 Washington, April 25, 1966. BASIC CHOICES IN VIET-NAM Assessment of the Situation The political crisis in South Viet-Nam has avoided outright disaster up to this point, but the temporary equilibrium appears to be uneasy and the crisis has meant a setback to the essential non-military programs. The Embassyʼs cable of April 16, Saigon 4033, 4 is a highly competent summary of the present situation and of the more immediate problems we face. Most basically, the mere fact that such crisis could come as close as it already has (and may again) to disastrous civil strife and chaos or could raise, as it also has, the spectre of a governmentʼs coming to power which would ask us to leave forces us to look hard at our basic position and policy in South Viet-Nam. We must now recognize that three contingencies of the utmost gravity are, in some degree, more likely than our previous planning has recognized: 1. There may be a state of chaos and total paralysis . This is what was threatened if the GVN had moved forcibly in Da Nang. It might still come about if the political Buddhists push in an extreme fashion, which in turn would probably trigger counteraction by Catholic and other groups. Even without continued extreme “Buddhist” pressures (i.e., Tri Quang), the vehement elements in the Vietnamese armed forces—the so-called baby Turks—could attempt a military coup against a continuing situation of moderate political unrest and confusion. In short, the situation is still precarious, and there is a chance of some action that would produce chaos and total paralysis at some time in the next several months. 2. There could emerge a government that would seek to end the war on almost any terms and that would ask us to leave, with such broadly based support that we would virtually have to accept or take what seems to most of us the practically impossible alternative of continuing the struggle on our own . This nightmare appeared quite vivid in the early April activity of the struggle movement in Hue and Da Nang. Subsequently, the anti-American element appeared to die down, partly in response to the sobering effect of the withdrawal of our people from Da Nang. Our present assessment here (which we should check out with the Embassy) is that even a Buddhist (i.e., Tri Quang dominated) government would probably acknowledge the need for continued US cooperation and support. We believe this is Tri Quangʼs personal position; but even if it is not, the center of gravity of the broader groups whose support he would need to hold (if not obtain) true power does not now advocate ending the war or asking us to leave. However, the inevitable continued frictions of a major US presence, the continued moderate political unrest and confusion which must be expected in any event, and the possibility that there may be specific military or other setbacks and reverses—all these mean that the nightmare cannot now be excluded to the degree that we would have done six weeks ago. The members of the working group generally believe that the chances of the first contingency are not high but cannot be disregarded (i.e., perhaps 10–15%), and that the chances of the second contingency are less. Mr. Ball would place the chances of the first contingency substantially higher than the percentage indicated. All members of the group agree that if either of these contingencies should materialize, we would have virtually no choice but to start withdrawing, and that in these circumstances we would have little bargaining leverage in connection with our presence or withdrawal. 3. The government continues weak and ineffective, especially in its prosecution of the non-military programs that are crucial to eventual success . The present crisis has somewhat weakened the already inadequate cohesion and drive of the GVN in carrying out these programs. While the III and IV Corps areas have been only slightly affected, there has been a real setback in I Corps. Even if the Directory government stays in power it will take some time to get the machinery in I Corps properly cranked up again. If the present Directory government should be replaced the dislocation could last longer. In any event the accelerated timetable for elections will almost necessarily mean a continued state of moderate political unrest and confusion. Thus, even in the absence of the first and second contingencies described above, we face a high probability that the GVN will be less effective than we had hoped for many months to come, particularly in programs that depend heavily on central government leadership, such as the taking of essential measures to meet inflation. And we face a significant chance, perhaps 50 percent, that this state of weakness will persist for a longer time even if the political process is carried on without disruption. A countervailing possibility—that the political process will produce greater maturity, a more broadly based government and wider popular appeal—does exist, and we should do all we can to further it. But it is unlikely that this countervailing trend could begin to take major effect within the next six months. Basic Policy Alternatives Faced with these prospects, we have tried in this exercise to assess three possible lines of action: Option A: To continue roughly along present lines, in the hope that the setback is temporary. Option B: To continue roughly along present lines, perhaps with a decrease in the rate of entry of US troops, but moving more actively to stimulate contact between the Saigon government and elements in the Viet Cong. Such contact could either begin with a public call for negotiations by the GVN or with covert tentative feelers. After the rough outlines of the VC position had been determined, the US would then decide on whether to press the GVN to continue negotiations or to support the GVN in its reluctance to accept difficult terms. Option C: To decide now that the chances of bringing about an independent and non-Communist South Viet-Nam have shrunk to the point where, on an over-all basis, the US effort is no longer warranted. This would mean setting the stage where, at the proper moment, steps can be taken that would probably lead to a disengagement and withdrawal. The specific elements of Option A, Option B, and Option C have now been spelled out in supporting papers attached to this paper. 5 It should be noted that in varying degrees all Options include indicating more clearly than in the past that our continued support is contingent upon adequate unity and effectiveness on the part of the Vietnamese. Broader Factors In approaching a decision on which line of action to follow, the framework for decision plainly includes broader elements that would have been present in the situation with or without the political difficulties that have now produced an increased likelihood of the conditions described earlier in this paper. These broader elements cut, as they always have, in deeply contradictory directions. Nonetheless, it may assist to have at least a checklist of them as follows: 1. Within the US popular and Congressional support for the conflict had been at adequate levels prior to the recent difficulties. This support has certainly been shaken, how much we cannot yet tell. The contingencies of “chaos” and “being asked to leave” would certainly reduce domestic support to the unacceptable level. Moreover, the contingency of continued GVN weakness and moderate political unrest is itself bound to cut down support. As we look a year or two ahead, with a military program that would require major further budget costs—with all their implications for taxes and domestic programs—and with steady or probably rising casualties, the war could well become an albatross around the Administrationʼs neck, at least equal to what Korea was for President Truman in 1952. It does not seem likely that the American people will wish to quit under pressure, as the French did, but the scars of a war conducted in an atmosphere of growing malaise and backbiting could be very serious indeed. 2. Among our key allies —notably Britain and Japan—the present general level of acceptance could degenerate into a predominantly critical attitude that could seriously affect our ability to work with these countries in wider projects. 3. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union , we would face a continuation of the present inhibiting effect of Viet-Nam on any move toward agreements in the disarmament area and in other fields. However, this consequence probably attaches to any continuation of the war, and is not materially affected by the internal contingencies that may make the war much harder to handle. 4. vis-à-vis Hanoi and Peiping the continuing political difficulties will almost certainly prevent any moderating influences from becoming effective in Hanoi. However, this is inherent in the over-all assessment that these political difficulties make an ultimate reasonably good outcome less likely. As to Communist China, the continuation of the war is the essential fact, and we could not in any event have anticipated any significant change in Communist Chinese attitudes in the next few years. As to the question of Chinese representation in the UN, it is hard to see that continuing the war under more difficult circumstances would have an impact, one way or the other, that would materially differ from the consequences of continuing the war in the circumstances we had hoped were developing. If we were to end the war on some basis, or withdraw, there might well be an immediate rush to admit Communist China to the UN. 5. vis-à-vis the threatened nations of Asia , we must ask ourselves whether failure in Viet-Nam because of clearly visible political difficulties not under our control would be any less serious than failure without this factor. The question comes down, as it always has, to whether there is any tenable line of defense in Southeast Asia if Viet-Nam falls. Here we must recognize that the anti-Communist regime in Indonesia has been a tremendous “break” for us, both in removing the possibility of a Communist pincer movement, which appeared almost certain a year ago, and in opening up the possibility that over a period of some years Indonesia may become a constructive force. But for the next year or two any chance of holding the rest of Southeast Asia hinges on the same factors assessed a year ago, whether Thailand and Laos in the first instance and Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma close behind, would—in the face of a US failure for any reason in Viet-Nam—have any significant remaining will to resist the Chinese Communist pressures that would probably then be applied. Taking the case of Thailand as the next key point, it must be our present conclusion that—even if sophisticated leaders understood the Vietnamese political weaknesses and our inability to control them—to the mass of the Thai people the failure would remain a US failure and a proof that Communism from the north was the decisive force in the area. Faced with this reaction, we must still conclude that Thailand simply could not be held in these circumstances, and that the rest of Southeast Asia would probably follow in due course. In other words, the strategic stakes in Southeast Asia are fundamentally unchanged by the political nature of the causes for failure in Viet-Nam. The same is almost certainly true of the shockwaves that would arise against other free nations—Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines—in the wider area of East Asia. Perhaps these shockwaves can be countered, but they would not be mitigated by the fact that the failure arose from internal political causes rather than any US major error or omission. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 April 25. In a memorandum for the record, April 26, Rostow noted that “at a meeting April 25, 1966, starting at 6:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room, the President made the following decisions: 1. We shall stay on course and explore with Lodge a cautious Track B.” (Ibid.) 3 Drafted by William Bundy. His second draft, April 19, is in Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Vietnam (Reference Papers). 4 Document 123 . 5 Attached but not printed. 127. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 127. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 1 Washington, April 27, 1966. SUBJECT Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips While favoring all efforts to open discussions on Viet-Nam with the Communist leadership, I have always been afraid of certain pitfalls which will beset the path of negotiations. For example, there is the danger that, from all the public discussion of our desire for negotiations, our people will assume that the initiation of negotiations is the advent of peace and will expect a cessation of all hostilities as soon as talks begin. You will remember that, during the long negotiations at Panmunjom, we remained on a passive defensive to avoid casualties with peace just around the corner, while the enemy attacked us at will and probably inflicted more U.S. and allied casualties than would have been lost had we retained the military initiative. One of the reasons that the Panmunjom negotiations dragged was that our adversary had no incentive to come to a prompt settlement. If we are to avoid this pitfall under present conditions, it will be essential to bring the Communists to the peace table this time convinced of the need for a prompt, negotiated settlement and, furthermore, to keep the military pressure on them until a settlement is reached. Another pitfall is one which is always an imminent danger. Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the north. In this case, our Government would be under great pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent negotiations. A somewhat similar pitfall is the appealing quality of a “cease-fire” to all peace-lovers and the attraction of a slogan such as: “Stop shooting and start talking.” Some of our best friends indulge in this kind of language and need to be put straight as to the significance of a cease-fire in a situation of guerrilla war such as we have in South Viet-Nam. Obviously under such conditions, a cease-fire can not mean literally a cessation of the use of fire-arms by both sides. The principal activities of the Viet Cong—sabotage, terrorism, propaganda, impressment of recruits, collection of taxes, infiltration from the north, etc.—do not depend on the use of fire-arms and could go on to the great advantage of the guerrillas if the government forces were deprived of the use of their weapons. While it might be possible to agree to a cessation of military activities by formed bodies of Viet Cong and by government units, we can never accept an unqualified cease-fire which would prevent the use of weapons by the forces of law and order and allow Viet Cong depredations to go unchecked and unpunished. To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will want from the Communist side and what they will want from us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final settlement. What are our negotiating assets, what is their value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the following are the blue chips in our pile representing what Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider giving under certain conditions: a. Cessation of bombing North Viet-Nam. b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units. c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam. d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam. e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong. f. Economic aid to North Viet-Nam. The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing actions we would like from them: a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam. b. Cessation of guerrilla military operations. c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and supplies from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres. e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong. If these are the chips, how should we play ours to get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d, the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; their big ones are c and e, the stopping of infiltration and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading even, our a and d for their c and e except for the fact that all will require a certain amount of verification and inspection except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact. Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined to accept as an absolute minimum a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action. This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoiʼs two big ones. However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable. We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-controlled territory. After a cease-fire on the foregoing basis, we should seek the necessary additional agreements for a final settlement, undertaking to stop increasing U.S. forces (our c) for a cessation of infiltration (Hanoi c) and, thereafter, to withdraw our forces (our d) in phase with a similar, inspected withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army units and cadres (Hanoi d). The final step (and perhaps the most important) would be to obtain the dissolution or repatriation of the remaining Viet Cong (Hanoi e) in exchange for some combination of our e (amnesty and civic rights for the Viet Cong) and f (economic aid to North Viet-Nam). The latter is an overall “sweetener” which can be used to facilitate any step in the negotiations. Such a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their purchasing power emphasizes the folly of giving up any one in advance as a precondition for negotiations. Thus, if we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is important for us to go through some such exercise and make up our collective minds as to the value of our holdings and how to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our friends, we need to make public explanation of some of the points discussed above. Particularly, we need to make clear that, to the Communists, the negotiating table is simply an extension of the battlefield and the start of negotiations does not mean by any means that peace is at hand. I would suggest that a discussion of the foregoing matters be put on the agenda of the meetings with Cabot Lodge when he returns next month. Maxwell D. Taylor 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1. Secret. Rostow forwarded this memorandum to President Johnson on April 27 under a covering memorandum asking whether he could pass the memorandum to William Bundy and urge that the Department of State be prepared to present its views during the Lodge discussions in May. The President gave his approval and wrote on Rostowʼs memorandum: “I think we should have public statement if all agree.” (Ibid.) On April 28 Rostow forwarded Taylorʼs memorandum to Rusk, highlighting in his covering memorandum “one critical question” raised by Taylor: “do you trade a cessation of bombing in the north for a cessation of infiltration or for an end to terrorism in the south. It hinges substantially on whether a cessation of infiltration could be monitored.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET) For William Bundyʼs response, see Document 129 . For Lodgeʼs comments, see Document 158 . 128. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 128. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, April 29, 1966. 1. In considering the role of CIA in the elections to be held for the Constituent Assembly, 2 we started from the following premises: a. It will be unwise to attempt either the creation of a broadly based political party or to give support to the Directorate, to the exclusion of others, before the Constituent Assembly elections: time is against one and the danger of driving the Buddhists again into the streets is against the other. b. It would be impossible to engage in a truly covert operation of large-scale support to a political movement. In the goldfish bowl atmosphere inherent in the present situation and under constant examination by the large press corps present, any large campaign support effort would probably be exposed with resulting damage to the U.S. Government and particularly the CIA, exceeding any hoped-for benefits. c. The best action for the U.S. is in the direction of selecting a limited number (perhaps five or six) Vietnamese to run for the Assembly, assisting their individual campaign efforts on a limited and clandestine basis, as and if necessary. 3 The selection would be made on the basis of (1) the individualʼs known following and ability to organize and (2) his stated or known willingness to cooperate in the Constituent Assembly after it is convened. During the course of the Assembly the five or six could commence the organization of a broadly based national political movement activated by close cooperation in the Constituent Assembly and leading to the presentation of candidates in the elections to be held after the new constitution is promulgated. 2. The CIA role under Ambassador Lodgeʼs direct supervision would be limited to: a. Providing immediately an expert on election laws to advise the Embassy and Station, said expert to visit Saigon under natural cover as a community development specialist who can consult with Embassy officers without arousing press interest. b. Making a concerted effort to provide soundings and assessments on individuals under consideration for selection to the group of five or six (1 c, above), and providing limited financial and other support to those selected as candidates. c. Providing soundings and assessments on all or most other candidates. d. Providing such other limited assistance as the Ambassador may direct. 3. In support of the over-all effort it is suggested that during the campaign for the Constituent Assembly: a. MACVʼs cooperation be sought to concentrate on providing security for as many places as possible in order to permit the largest possible number of Vietnamese to vote free from coercion. b. A behind-the-scene election advisor such as Mr. Richard Scammon be made available to Ambassador Lodge, and through him to such Vietnamese as may be desirable. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI. Secret. Prepared in the CIA at Desmond FitzGeraldʼs request and forwarded to Rostow on April 30. 2 In an 8-page memorandum to Rostow, dated April 25, Ropa analyzed the upcoming electoral process and projected the following timetable: “May 1: Electoral commission convenes; May 20: Electoral law completed; May 30: GVN promulgates electoral law; Aug 1: Electoral campaign begins; Aug 15: Voting; Sept 1: Convening of constituent assembly.” (Ibid.) 3 In an April 26 memorandum to Rostow, Ropa recounted the first meeting on April 25 of the Political Development Working Group, chaired by Unger, at which Colby suggested supporting “individual prominent persons” for election to the constituent assembly rather than working through “a broad political front.” Ropa faulted Colbyʼs view and expressed support for Rostowʼs position that the electoral process be used to “further the coalescence of a broad political front to include significant elements of the Buddhists.” (Ibid.) Summary records of several Political Development Working Group meetings during 1966 are in Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, Political Development Working Group. 4 In telegram 3268 to Saigon, April 30, the Department of State transmitted guidelines that restricted the U.S. role to non-partisan advice on political processes but did not rule out “special covert support.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) In telegram 4352 from Saigon, May 3, Lodge responded that the proposed guidelines were “so restrictive as to inhibit effective exercise of U.S. influence on political development process.” (Ibid., POL US VIET S) 129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 129. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, May 4, 1966. SUBJECT General Taylorʼs Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips General Taylorʼs memorandum 2 is an excellent summary of the problems of a negotiating sequence and particularly of the problem of determining what we would accept in return for a cessation of bombing the North. You may recall that this issue was extensively reviewed last March and April, when Max Taylor himself was here on consultation and we had a fairly thorough discussion of the problem. Essentially, the issue has always been whether we would trade a cessation of bombing in the North for some degree of reduction or elimination of Viet Cong and now North Vietnamese activity in the South or a cessation of filtration from the North, or a combination of both. In his memorandum, Max argues for combining cessation of bombing and GVN/US offensive military operations in the South, as a trade for a complete cessation of VC/NVA incidents and military operations in the South. He would then trade cessation of infiltration against our stopping any further increases in our forces, and move thereafter to reciprocal withdrawals and finally to the necessary solutions, somehow absorbing the remaining Viet Cong into the life of the South on some amnesty basis. The present Taylor proposal has the great virtue of simplicity and ready verification. At the same time, it might permit the VC/NVA forces to form solid hunks of territory in the South and reinforce them so that they became major bargaining counters for an NLF explicit role in government. Moreover, it would be most difficult under these circumstances to define exactly what the GVN was free to do about extending its writ in the countryside. For these reasons, I have myself been more inclined to an asking price, at least, that would include both a declared cessation of infiltration and a sharp reduction in VC/NVA military operations in the South. Even though we could not truly verify the cessation of infiltration, the present volume and routes are such that we could readily ascertain whether there was any significant movement, using our own air. Moreover, DRV action concerning infiltration would be a tremendous psychological blow to the VC and would constitute an admission which they have always declined really to make. Whichever form of trade might be pursued if the issue ever arose—as it conceivably might through such nibbles as the present Ronning effort—I fully agree with General Taylor that we should do all we can to avoid the pitfalls of ceasing bombing in return simply for a willingness to talk. Yet we must recall that during our long pause in January, we pretty much agreed among ourselves that as a practical matter, if Hanoi started to play negotiating games that even seemed to be serious, we would have great difficulty in resuming bombing for some time. This was and is a built-in weakness of the “pause” approach. It does not apply to informal talks with the DRV, directly or indirectly, on the conditions under which we would stop bombing, nor does it apply to possible third country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself believe that our past record sufficiently stresses that we could stop the bombing only if the other did something in response. Thus, I would not at this moment favor any additional public statement by us, which might simply highlight the issue and bring about the very pressures we seek to avoid. As you can see, these reactions are tentative as to the form of the trade, but quite firm that there must in fact be a trade and that we should not consider another “pause” under existing circumstances. If we agree merely to these points, I think we will have made some progress. But it may also be highly useful to get Ambassador Lodgeʼs thinking on the Taylor form of trade versus some alternative such as I have suggested. I agree with Max that this would be a useful topic to discuss with Lodge while he is here, and we should at the same time inform him fully on the Ronning effort, which directly involves this issue. I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Walt Rostow for his personal use, and also to Mr. Ball and Ambassador Johnson. William P. Bundy 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Papers, McNTN II. Secret; Nodis. 2 Document 127 . 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, May 7, 1966, 6:32 p.m. 3343. Ref. Embtel 4453. 2 1. Press here giving wide play to Kyʼs blunt remarks to journalists in Cantho, particularly his statement that he expects his government to stay in power for another year, until national assembly elected in 1967. Kyʼs plain talk in this regard, and his statement that constituent assembly will not be transformed into national assembly but kept only for drafting constitution, touch on two key issues with Buddhist militants. We can understand that Ky may wish to take strong position privately for negotiating purposes to counter Buddhist militant pressure. However, his placing it on public record cannot but be red flag to latter and will undoubtedly render their truce with GVN even more fragile than it already is. His comments to Buu (Embtel 4412, para D) 3 reinforce our concern on this score. Moreover, such statements by Ky get wide international play and add to existing skepticism in international circles regarding Kyʼs intentions to carry through with elections. 2. You should get these points across to Ky, making it clear that we are not taking any position regarding life of his government or of constituent assembly, but simply arguing for his not complicating political picture by ill-advised public statements. 3. We are also concerned at Mission spokesmanʼs comment on Kyʼs statement to effect it not unexpected, plus background elaboration (Embtel 4449, paragraph 3). 4 Spokesman should not comment on matters which are clearly sensitive issues in way suggesting U.S. has taken position on them. If queried on Kyʼs statements, Department spokesman will reply: “GVN and representatives from leading political and religious groups in Viet-Nam outlined a program on April 15 for a return to civilian government. We assume that as they proceed step by step a schedule will be worked out which will include, among other things, the matter of governmental succession. Obviously, this is a matter for decision by the Vietnamese.” Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Miller and approved by Unger. 2 Dated May 7. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 3 Dated May 6. Paragraph D reported that Ky confided to Tran Quoc Buu that he now realized that the Buddhists were the “‘dirtiest of all’ and that their actions ‘lead to Communist takeover’ and he intends to crush them.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII) 4 Dated May 7. (Department of State, Central Files, PPB 9–5 VIET S) 131. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas 131. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson in Texas 1 Washington, May 9, 1966, 1515Z. 2 CAP 66279. Before this next weekʼs Vietnam meetings and discussions with Lodge, here are my own private views on the uphill task of galvanizing the civil side. If I have not been much in evidence, it is because I have been trying to operate full tilt—as a flood of traffic and resulting anguished screams will attest. This job badly needs doing, 3 because in a word the civil side is a mess. The reasons are illuminating. First and foremost, our emergency military buildup simply preempted most of the port space, resources, and manpower in Vietnam, Westy has the big battalions and the top priority, while the civil side makes do with what is left. Second, unlike our largely self-contained US military effort, the civil side has to work through a weak and apathetic GVN. Nor would I urge otherwise. Suggestions that we just take over Vietnam miss the very purpose of the exercise, though a lot more can be done behind the scenes. But we have to recognize the limits of the possible in a country divided and torn by war, where the Governmentʼs writ is ignored in over half the countryside. Third, our US civilian agencies (unlike our military) are just not geared up to wartime emergency operations. Soldiers go where they are told, but about three key civilians turn us down (funny how they develop physical disabilities) for every one who accepts. Our best FSO candidate for Economic Counselor in Saigon suddenly turns out to have diabetes. AID, which has the biggest job, is in the worst shape—it was never set up to handle emergencies of this sort. Fourth and least, Lodge is no manager, and has little interest in or knowledge of the civilian side. He has failed to arbitrate civil US military operations. Let me warn candidly that his grandiose proposals—e.g. a whole PX/commissary system for ARVN officers and civil servants—just wonʼt fly. If I sound bitter, I just pushed the town hard on the new land reform program Lodge so enthusiastically endorsed till I found it so vague and half-formed that it will require complete redoing. This is not a tale of woe. Porter and I can and will bring order out of chaos on the civil side—and maintain good relations with Lodge in the process. But as your man on Vietnam, I owe you a candid picture of what Iʼve discovered in a month on the job. As I see it, our continuing military buildup will prevent disaster but cannot guarantee a win in a largely “political” war. It buys us time, and it may convince Hanoi that it canʼt win and better negotiate. But at present the enemy is just about matching our own buildup. Meanwhile our military buildup is generating some quite dangerous side effects. First is the inevitable anti-Americanism induced by an ever more visible US presence. Adding to this is the growing pressure of inflation, created primarily by our own buildup. We could end up sinking this feeble country under our weight. I am 100 per cent behind the decisions we have taken. There was no other sensible option in 1964–1966. But what I see as needed is a better balance between a military effort of $15 billion (added cost only) and a civil effort of only $500 million odd in FY 1966. You emphasized this “second war” at Honolulu, but Porter and I can point to mighty little progress as yet. Of course the recent political unrest—which will continue—got in the way. But it only points up the need for measures to generate more popular commitment to our side. The papers coming to you via Walt Rustow contain my recommendations. But they naturally lack the real flavor of my private view. A. Lodge must be told to insist on a better balance between military and civil needs. He must back Porter in getting port space, cadging MACV resources, and competing for a bigger share of GVN manpower. B. We must borrow heavily from our own military till we get the civil side rolling under its own steam. Crudely put, borrowing five percent of Westyʼs resources might beef up Porterʼs effectiveness by 50 percent. McNamara is eager to help, but the gun-shy civilians in Saigon are reluctant to ask (here is where Lodge comes in). And it must be effective help. In February MACV agreed to provide aid with 1800 tons a month of in-country airlift, but less than a third was used because it wasnʼt available when USAID wanted it. C. We must come to grips with inflation before it undermines our whole effort. I am trying to overscare everyone in town right now, because weʼve lost six months in grasping this nettle and I know that it will take months more in lead time before results will show. D. To flood the country with goods requires that we get them in through the ports, warehoused, and delivered in-country. McNamara licked his port congestion problem partly by giving military cargo priority and preempting port space. He was right, but it didnʼt make the civil side any easier. E. As you well know, Iʼm cast in a role where Iʼll have lots of friendly fights with McNamara to cadge resources and elbow the military. Unless we can further limit the inflationary impact of the military buildup, I may have to argue for limiting it. There is a legitimate case that we may be robbing Peter to pay Paul. F. Finally, given all the limits within which the civil side must operate, we must do first things first and do them more effectively before building monuments. I have on my desk many imaginative ideas for urban reconstruction, industrial development, people-to-people projects, educational schemes. These make sense in time, but not until we control inflation and pacify more of the countryside. At present a lot of our aid is servicing the VC. So while keeping a sharp eye out for dramatic initiatives and imaginative ideas, Porter and I feel that we must stress the basic building blocks. If we canʼt get pacification going in the villages and contain inflation, the rest wonʼt help much. Nor can we overload the GVN—it canʼt yet do the minimum weʼve already asked. So bold ideas that canʼt be carried out have little lasting value. I earnestly hope that youʼll press these points on Lodge and back my hand in the inevitable fights with the Pentagon. I also have some thoughts on the political side. We badly need a strategy to optimize the chances of coping with the open campaign season now upon us. Above all, we must take “the American issue” out of this campaign, so that we can live with whatever regime emerges. I am convinced that few Vietnamese want us to leave. This simply would mean that the VC would take over. Rather both the Directory and the factions are using the American issue to pressure us to favor them. In return for insisting on genuine elections, and proclaiming our willingness to work with whatever government emerges, we should be able to get all sides to lay off agitation. We should tell them privately that if they insist on making our presence an issue in the elections, nothing would be more likely to convince US opinion we ought to leave. There are risks in this approach, but even greater risks if we donʼt move. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables Between Porter & Komer, May-June 1966. Secret. The President was at the LBJ Ranch. 2 Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time. 3 Komerʼs new job is described in NSAM No. 343, Document 102 . 132. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 132. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, undated. SOUTH VIETNAM: AN APPRAISAL OF CURRENT POLITICAL DYNAMICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF POLITICS Summary Under goading political pressures by the Buddhist leadership, dominated by Tri Quang, the military government in South Vietnam has been forced unwillingly into commitments and actions which, at this reading, seem destined to produce a new constitution and civilian government, certainly within a yearʼs time. These political pressures, spawned in an environment of heightened armed conflict and effective Viet Cong political agitation, have created new tensions and fragilities in the Vietnamese military establishment. The clear Communist content of the propaganda lines used by the Struggle Groups in the I Corps area symptomize the continuing gravity of the turmoil there, in spite of a seeming easing of tensions there in recent weeks. General Dinhʼs command and leadership have brought about this superficial easing, but have not yet dominated the more fundamentally divisive forces at work in the area. His own objectives and motivations remain unclear as well. Odds would seem to favor the military establishmentʼs observing their present political commitments and going along with the constituent assembly and the subsequent formation of a civil government. Real risk remains, however, that military elements, not yet coalesced, may unite in action against suspect Buddhist motives. This risk is increased if a civil government begins to move toward a neutralist position of disengagement. The other religious sects and groupings appear at this time to have no decisive political impact. The contest is essentially one between the military establishment and the Tri Quang hierarchy. It appears that the U.S. does not have any significant leverage at its disposal in this contest. The imperative factors now at work in the social structure of Vietnam are deeply indigenous in their character and roots. If a Buddhist-dominated civil government emerges, and does not provoke military reaction by moving to the left we may indeed witness the forging of a new and intrinsically more natural Vietnamese national character, a development which could strengthen the national fabric in our joint endeavor. If a new government does move to the left, additional and greater political convulsions can be expected. [Here follows the main body of the paper.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive/Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, Vietnam 1966 (May-Dec.). Secret. Forwarded to Rostow by Helms on May 10 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the study you requested.” Copies were sent to Taylor, Rusk, McNamara, and Komer under covering memoranda indicating that Rostow had asked that the copies be provided in preparation for the NSC meeting on May 10. (Ibid.) 133. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 133. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 10, 1966, 3:45 p.m. THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF BOMBING POL The Situation Secretary Rusk believes that our launching of POL attacks in the North will greatly heighten international tensions. Although this is debatable (Gen. Taylor, for example, disagrees), the Secretary is probably correct if for no other reason than the Communists will, at the minimum, pull out their propaganda stops on a worldwide basis. Some of us believe systematic oil attacks could have a major effect on the military and economic position of North Vietnam. Although this is also debatable, it is a contingency worth taking into account. Taken together we may, therefore, be in a position where we: a) need a softening political-diplomatic track to reduce the noise level; b) have a better chance than ever before of inducing a serious negotiation with Hanoi. There is a third element: U.S. domestic politics. The polls show that something more than 30% of our people want a tougher policy: about the same percentage want a harder try for peace. Bombing POL will look like an Administration move to the hard side—giving in to the JCS, etc. We need something new on the dove side to balance our account. Recommendations Taking all these elements into account, here are the elements we need for a political-diplomatic scenario. 1. A first-class television briefing by Secretary McNamara on: a) the Laos logistical build-up; b) the location of targets and low expected civilian casualties. 2. Secretary McNamara and I believe you should override the inhibitions of the intelligence people and permit publication of the communications net controlling operations in the South from Hanoi. [ 1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified ] 3. A lucid statement of what the Geneva Accords of 1962 said about transitting Laos by Secretary Rusk. 4. Prior notification of the U.K., Australia, Korea, and New Zealand of our intentions and the reasons for them. 5. A Pen-Pal note to Kosygin of the kind I drafted. 2 6. Possibly a similar communication to the Chinese Communists indicating our intentions remain limited. 7. Possibly an open offer along the lines which Myrdal evolved from my prodding: 3 to stop bombing the North if infiltration stops and stoppage is effectively monitored—perhaps by the Swedes; plus a parley of the four fighting elements to bring this about as a preliminary to more general peace talks. Any formula for talking with the VC—even on a limited military basis—would be complex to arrange in Saigon; but it would also have a political wallop at home and abroad. I like the commitment to enter into talks because some infiltration is not via Laos but through Cambodia and even (a little) over the 17th Parallel. It only really makes sense to stop the bombing in the North if the war is going to stop. We need to hinge our commitment on a general intent of the four fighting parties to stop the killing. 8. Although we shall have to return to the key oil targets after repair and mop-up smaller ones—including some underground storage—we would do better, I think, to hit the major ones hard in a short space of time—for political as well as military reasons—rather than space them out. P.S. I have started some more detailed work on a political scenario in my shop; but you may wish to ask Secretary Rusk for his suggestions. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII. Top Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Not further identified. 3 On May 8 Rostow forwarded to the President a memorandum of his conversation with Gunnar Myrdal on May 6, during which the two men discussed Myrdalʼs ideas about how to end the war in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII) 134. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon 134. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Raborn to the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon 1 Washington, May 10, 1966, 2210Z. DIR 03194. 1. There still remains considerable concern here with regard to real intentions of Buddhists as they jostle for and acquire political power in South Vietnam. [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] has done several studies on this subject, most recent pouched to you under [ document number not declassified ]. 2 For most part, studies conclude that Buddhists, while desiring to lessen American impact on Vietnam society, would probably realize that American presence is necessary to defend South Vietnam against DRV aggression. At same time, studies caution that Buddhists, while grasping for political power, may make certain deals with DRV or VC, find themselves hopelessly entangled with opposition and, therefore, became involved in a neutralist movement/request our departure/make deal with NLF, etc. 2. All this being said, we still do not really know what real intentions of Buddhists are. Request Station pay particular attention to acquiring necessary information through Buddhist assets so that a more definitive assessment of Buddhist intentions will become possible. 3 Would be most helpful if current requirements levied [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] would include acquiring information on specific intentions of Buddhists should they achieve a dominant position in a civil govt or should they fail in their bid for power. Perhaps if we hammer away in a concentrated manner for next several weeks we can clarify this murky picture. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DOD/EA Files, Job 92–00428R, File 137–6–72/3, TUBRACE, Buddhist Operations. Secret. 2 Not found. 3 A CIA report on its religious project in South Vietnam dated May 1966, [ text not declassified ]. The objectives of the project included obtaining “information on the organizations, including factional differences, personalities, activities, and intentions” and channeling their energies “toward social, educational, and anti-communist political activities.” Buddhist operations included past successes at moderating the attitudes of the “radical factions in the Buddhist leadership.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 92–00428R, File 137–6–72/3, TUBRACE, Buddhist Operations) 135. Summary Notes of the 557th Meeting of the National Security Council 135. Summary Notes of the 557th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, May 10, 1966, 5:45 p.m. Vietnam General Wheeler gave a briefing on the military situation in Vietnam. The tempo of ground operations will continue at a low level until the monsoon arrives in two or three weeks in the south, at which time the tempo will step up. In response to the Presidentʼs questions, General Wheeler gave these answers: a. Infiltration from North to South Vietnam is estimated at about 4,500 men per month. b. Air operations in the north have hurt the North Vietnamese. They are having transportation difficulties and are using at least 80,000 men to repair their LOCs. They are calling for more trucks and have stepped up their imports of POL. c. Some 7,000 men have defected from the South Vietnamese forces since January 1. The rate has been high, but is now lower. d. During the pause, the North Vietnamese repaired the damage to their LOCs which we did during earlier bombing, expanded their infiltration routes, and improved their road nets. e. Morale is down in Viet Cong ranks and is uncertain in the North Vietnamese army. It is not yet at the breaking point. Secretary McNamara read from a Rand report 2 on the extensive damage done to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam during the past three months. General Wheeler: The effect of political events on U.S. troops is small, but the effect on the South Vietnamese forces is large. We have no supply problems. The President asked for a special report from General Westmoreland on Senator Mansfieldʼs allegations concerning drinking and irregular activities of our forces. Ambassador Lodge 3 praised the decision to deploy U.S. troops to Vietnam. The recent overthrow of the Communists in Indonesia is a direct result of our having taken a firm stand in Vietnam. 4 Analyzing the situation in the past few months, he said the events of March were really a counterattack on U.S. successes. The Saigon Government is now almost paralyzed but we will have to learn to work in this atmosphere. Military activity can go ahead and pacification can proceed, apart from developments in Saigon. Complicated things cannot be undertaken now by the Saigon Government. The word for the future is evolution rather than stability. Secretary Rusk: We base our support of South Vietnam on their desire not to have the Viet Cong take them over by force. A broad-based constituent Assembly is now required. It would be a real setback for us if this Assembly does not come out of the present political activity in Saigon. In order to ensure that Saigon will act, we may have to go so far as to use the threat to get out of Vietnam. Our military assistance to Vietnam is based on the SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf resolution of August. We must oppose the serious effort which is being made to downgrade these two commitments. We must staunchly support the SEATO treaty commitment. If they get us out from under these two commitments, then they get us out of our basic Southeast Asian policy. The President: To those who are testifying on the Hill, we should give a summary of the speeches and Congressional reports issued at the time of the approval of the SEATO treaty and of the August resolution. Secretary McNamara: Political events in Saigon are causing trouble in the military area. There are fewer Vietnamese casualties. We hope that heavy pressure by U.S. forces will carry us over the present period. The President reviewed three years of involvement in the Vietnam problem, expressing doubt that an unusually large amount of time was spent considering new proposals or changes in policy. Our strategy has been the same for three years. There are island hoppers who jump from issue to issue and there are those who would put a bag of cement on the back of the man running the race. We are committed and we will not be deterred. We must accept the fact that some will always oppose, dissent and criticize. We want results. It is acceptable that we referee some of the fights between General Ky and others in the Saigon government. Robert Komer: There are three harmful effects arising out of our military effort in Vietnam. a. Anti-Americanism. b. Inflation caused by the military buildup of both the U.S. and South Vietnam. c. Our pacification program has been out-run by our search and destroy capability. If the United States is blamed for these effects, real harm will be done to us during the forthcoming election period in Vietnam. We must have a program to avoid runaway inflation, and we must limit the inflationary effect of our military buildup at once. We must double the number of those in the Rural Development cadres. The manpower needed a small claim on military resources. Bill Moyers: Current press speculation is harmful. No comment should be made to the press until Ambassador Lodge completes his consultation here. The President: There are 26 men in this room. There must be no comment to the press about our discussions. Donʼt make it more difficult for me to make a decision. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. The meeting, which ended at 7:32 p.m., was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 2 Not further identified. 3 Lodge returned to Washington in early May for consultations and departed on May 17. In a May 3 memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow forwarded an agenda of 19 Vietnam items for possible discussion with Lodge during his visit and requested briefing papers on each item. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Walt Rostow) Copies of the briefing papers are ibid., Meeting Notes File. 4 Responding to a Presidential request stemming from this statement, CIA produced an intelligence memorandum, May 25, on the “Relationship of US Stand in South Vietnam to Stability in Southeast Asia,” which found a direct relationship between U.S. firmness in Vietnam and the relative stability of some Southeast Asian countries, but not Indonesia. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV) 136. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson 136. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (McPherson) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 13, 1966. For the President: I was disturbed by the speech last night in the Armory. 2 I felt it was harsh, uncompromising, over-militant. It seemed you were trying to beat Fulbrightʼs ears down before an audience of Democrats who, I am told, had earlier applauded him strongly. The speech does not read as bad as it sounded. The combination of tone, emphasis and frequent glances down at Fulbright made it (for me) wrong. There was nothing of Baltimore 3 or subsequent assurances that we want to negotiate an honorable way out. If the purpose was only to tell Democrats that the policy line is hard, that is one thing. But most of them know it. Those who agree can only holler yes when it is reiterated. Those who disagree feel further estranged by high-powered shouting. Even in the first group there are those who think Fulbright is a luminary of our Party, although wrong on this issue. I talked to couple of these who were embarrassed to see him gored like that. Lastly, there was nothing perceptive or careful or restrained in it. Even a political speech by the President ought in my judgment to make some distinctions. I am sure we are not going to fight Uganda if she attacks Rwanda and “oppresses her freedom.” Yet the speech sounded that way. Wherever it touched on foreign policy it was militant—if not in language, then in delivery. Nothing about the U.N. Nothing about food or education or health. Nothing about the willingness to talk without conditions. Standing in Viet Nam is the only issue for America. Mr. President, I am one who believes we are right to stand in Viet Nam. I abhor the kind of vapid sophomoric bitching Fulbright is producing nowadays. But there are questions about Viet Nam, and about our appropriate role in the world, that are extremely difficult for me to resolve—difficult for anyone, I think, who gives them serious attention. They cannot be shouted out of existence. Churchill rallying Britain in 1940 is not the only posture a wise and strong leader can assume today, especially an American leader with half of the worldʼs power at his disposal. The speeches you make, even on the stump, ought to pay some attention to the complexity and diversity of the questions America faces. To stand or not to stand is simple. After that nothing is. I hope what you say, and indeed, sir, how you say it, will reflect that; for you set the tone for all who follow your banner. Harry 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, Harry McPherson. No classification marking. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 The President spoke to 6,000 Democrats at a fundraising dinner on May 12 at the National Guard Armory in Washington. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 502–505. 3 Reference is to the Presidentʼs Johns Hopkins speech on April 7, 1965. For text, see ibid., 1965 , Book I, pp. 394–399. 137. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 137. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, May 14, 1966. Bob McNamara believes the Government in Saigon will become weaker and weaker as time goes on. On the other hand, the Viet Cong are showing signs of poor morale and also the bombing seems to have caused more difficulties in the North. Under these circumstances, he feels we should get in touch direct with the NLF, also the North Vietnamese, but particularly the NLF, and begin to try to work up a deal for a coalition government. I brought up the question of Moscow, and he said, “Well, canʼt we get Moscow to go along if we make it plain we are willing to take all of our troops out if the North Vietnamese do the same?” I said, “But can we trust them?” He said, “We have to get international guaranteeing machinery. What about Swedish division?” I didnʼt have the occasion to comment on the latter, but pointed out that in Laos the North Vietnamese didnʼt respect their agreement for a single day. He agreed with me that we must have some way of forcing the South Vietnamese government to avoid taking these disastrous actions, such as firing Thi or Kyʼs recent press conference. 2 He is satisfied that the Buddhists expect the Ky Government to be finished when the Constituent Assembly convenes, not simply to draft a constitution, but to be responsible for forming a civilian government, although not continuing in the function of a National Assembly for which, of course, elections would have to be held. I asked him why we shouldnʼt get the military committee to put someone else in as Prime Minister, rather than Ky, and he at first seemed to agree, and then said perhaps we better wait until after September 15 when the elections are held. On bombing, I impressed on him the desirability of postponing a decision on bombing the oil storage at Haiphong and showed him my memo of May 10 to Secretary Rusk. 3 I maintained that it would adversely affect our position in the world. It was a mistake to escalate as dramatically in the North and get ourselves more committed when things were so weak in the South. He admitted that it was a dramatic step and didnʼt argue against my position, but did indicate that he felt it would create further difficulties for the North Vietnamese government. I told him that I had not been satisfied with the political actions in Vietnam, that I couldnʼt understand why Lodge hadnʼt prevented the firing of Thi, and it certainly was a mistake to carry Kyʼs troops to the North. He agreed. He said he would be quite willing to tell Ky we would take our troops out if we really meant it. I suggested we devise sanctions, tough, but less complete than that. He stated that the First Corps was completely out of control, and the Fourth Corps was very much more in Viet Cong hands than we admitted, and that in the Fourth Corps deals were being made to send rice to the Northern area to support the Viet Cong operations there. There were a lot more dealings with the Viet Cong in the South than we would accept. WAH 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S. Personal & Secret; Absolutely No One Else To See. Prepared by Harriman. 2 See Document 130 . 3 Not found. 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, May 15, 1966, 1:29 a.m. 3448. Personal for Porter from the Secretary. 1. It is intolerable that Ky should take such far reaching move as that against DaNang 2 without consultation with us. 2. However, immediate problem is how to pick up pieces and prevent a major debacle. Most urgent need is to insist that principal figures in DaNang area (such as Ky, Vien, Dinh, Lam, Nhuan and Thi) agree at once to prevent further fighting among SVN elements pending further discussion of more lasting solution. This may require rough talk with several of them but United States can not accept this insane bickering. I recognize this is tall order but you, MACV, General Walt, Thomsen and others must do your best in next few hours. 3. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the disarray among South Vietnamese leaders has been rapidly undermining support of American people for war effort. The question “what are we being asked to support?” is becoming insistent and is becoming more and more difficult to answer. 4. We must rely heavily upon you at this moment and assure you of our full confidence. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 3. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by William Bundy, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk. 2 In Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 , p. 136, Jeffrey Clarke summarizes the situation as follows: “Government forces, commanded by Vien, seized Da Nang in the early morning hours of Sunday, 15 May [early evening hours of May 14, EST]. Two South Vietnamese Marine Corps battalions, supported by tanks of the South Vietnamese Army and covered by planes of the South Vietnamese Air Force, moved quickly into the city and secured the mayorʼs office, the radio station, the I Corps headquarters and other military installations, and the police stations. Two airborne battalions under the command of General Dong provided reinforcements. Little fighting transpired, as most of the dissidents fell back inside several Buddhist pagodas, which the troops refrained from attacking. Ky and Co later joined Vien, and during the next four days an uneasy truce prevailed inside the city.” 3 In telegram 4613 from Saigon, May 15, Porter reported on his meeting that evening with Thieu and Ky, during which he stated that the U.S. Government was “extremely annoyed that they would carry out operation of this importance without in any way consulting or informing us.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII) 139. List Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 139. List Prepared by the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, May 15, 1966. MEETING ON VIET NAM, MAY 15, 1966 Action Items 1. Do everything possible to discourage any move against DaNang by the dissidents. 2. Minimal comment on situation by U.S., here and in Saigon. 3. Encourage all Vietnamese elements to settle differences without resort to force. 4. Do what is possible to keep Tri Quang in main stream of political development. 5. Work toward bringing Thi and others into the GVN fold. 6. Get out press guidance (draft approved with minor modifications). 7. Convey our thinking to Tri Quang; 2 no Presidential message. 8. Play it cool! 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. The source text is handwritten. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that at 2:35 p.m. on May 15 he met in his office “re recent developments in Danang” with Rusk, McNamara, Lodge, William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Unger, Habib, Raborn, Helms, Taylor, Rostow, Komer, and Jorden. The meeting ended no later than 3:02 p.m., when the President went to the Mansion in the White House. (Ibid.) 2 Responding to a message from Tri Quang contained in telegram 4610 from Saigon, May 15, the Department proposed in telegram 3453 to Saigon, May 15, that Tri Quang be told orally that the U.S. Government fully supported the elections for a Constitutional Assembly announced in mid-April and would use its influence to establish unity in South Vietnam and persuade all groups to resolve their difficulties. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII) 140. Memorandum for the Record 140. Memorandum for the Record 1 Washington, May 16, 1966. SUBJECT Meeting with the President on Viet-Nam, May 16, 1966 ATTENDING The President Secretary Rusk Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Lodge Mr. Moyers Mr. Rostow Mr. Komer General Taylor Mr. Bell Admiral Raborn Mr. Helms Mr. Bundy Mr. McNaughton Mr. Leonhart Mr. Jorden Secretary Rusk described current situation. Main new item was report of formation of revolutionary committee including Generals Thi, Dinh, Nhuan and Don. Emphasis was on need to work on all elements to encourage Vietnamese political solidarity. Ambassador Lodgeʼs schedule: House Committee on Foreign Affairs—3:00 pm Backgrounder for press—5:00 pm Dinner with President—8:15 pm Depart for Seoul and Saigon Tuesday 2 Bill Moyers read proposed statement for the press. 3 Approved with minor changes. Discussion of non-military programs: Komer outlined major problems. General agreement on overall approach. Defense has agreed to take steps to reduce the impact of military outlays. Port congestion is major headache, particularly Saigon. Ambassador Porter has come in with negative reaction. MACV says it does not have necessary manpower. Two steps were agreed: get coordinated position from Mission in Saigon, and get report from MACV on what kinds and numbers of manpower and other materiel would be needed for U.S. military operation of port. President said we should “get recommendation and letʼs move.” Short discussion of package on monetary and fiscal policy. Need for effective sanctions stressed. Ambassador Lodge stressed need for care in kinds of pressure and for our willingness to carry through. He also pointed out his desire to combine granting help for GVNʼs desired programs with putting pressure on for reforms. Three programs noted as GVN preferences: wage increases, supply stores for military and others, and land reform. Ambassador Lodge also expressed desire to get increased American control over expenditures and programs, perhaps through requirement for “one American signature” on all such items along with Vietnamese. Mr. Bell also underlined inflation problem and need for corrective action but also firm decision by U.S. on how far it willing to go in exerting pressure. Need for manpower controls agreed with Defense. Land reform planning moving forward but we are waiting for results of a study on this matter from Mission in Saigon. WJJ 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. Secret. Prepared by Jorden and sent to Rostow. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room from 12:20 to 1:05 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) On May 12 and again on May 14 Rostow forwarded briefing papers to the President for the meeting, one by Komer on coping with inflation and a second by Unger on “Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional Assembly in South Viet-Nam.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 2) 2 May 17. 3 Not further identified. 141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, May 19, 1966, 1:46 p.m. 3531. For Porter from Komer. Non-military programs reviewed at highest level with Ambassador Lodge present 16 May. 2 The following measures were decided upon: 1. Make urgent three-pronged attack on inflation. a. DOD and AID will each make all-out effort to reduce to minimum inflationary impact of further US buildup. DOD is analyzing possibility of keeping demands on local economy and manpower at FY 1966 rate, despite increase in deployments and construction program—the analysis and a plan for accomplishing an agreed-upon goal will be completed about 1 June (breakdown of FY 66 target ceilings explained in JCS 2227, 17 May, para 1a.). 3 b. US will make all-out effort to eliminate bottlenecks to massive flow of aid commodities, especially port and in-country transport congestion. US military will assist in providing shipping, port aid, and in-country lift as required. US will insist that GVN take essential steps speed flow of goods, if necessary using leverage of suspension aid shipments and/or new aid tranches till bottlenecks removed. DOD will make prompt contingency study of US military takeover Saigon port and deliveries to importers. Instructions are being sent Embassy and MACV (septels) 4 for coordinated mission council recommendations by 31 May. c. As soon as IMF recommendations available, US will present to GVN revised Honolulu package of maximum realizable fiscal measures designed to sop up at least 10 billion piasters during the last six months of CY 1966. d. Negotiating strategy will be planned in light of IMF recommendations as reviewed Saigon and Washington, with appropriate consideration desirable carrots as well as sticks. Possible carrots might include US approval of wage increase, US financial support of new GVN land reform initiative, and help in establishment GVN PX system if current analyses establish their feasibility in time. FYI. Though not discussed, US provision of CIP security stockpile might be an added carrot. End FYI. Sticks to provide leverage might include withholding approval further CIP tranches or other means to be studied promptly. 2. We will increase annual rate of RD Cadre output from 19,000 to 39,000 as fast as instructors are available to maintain quality. DOD will provide construction resources as needed to construct new training center. Komer will resolve with appropriate agencies issue of how added cost is apportioned. 3. We will expedite expansion police forces to 72,000 end CY 1966 goal, and promptly study further expansion of police as the preferred longer term internal security instrument. 4. Aside from RD Cadres, SecDef and Komer will defer approval of any FY 1967 GVN manpower increases until overall agreement is reached on civil/military allocation. This means in effect a temporary freeze on all force ceilings at end FY 1966 approved levels until manpower budget can be worked out. 5. Foregoing FYI and should be closely held. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House; cleared by Bell, William Bundy, and McNaughton; and approved by Unger. Repeated to CINCPAC. 2 See Document 140 . 3 Not found. 4 Not further identified. 142. Memorandum of Conversation 142. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, May 19, 1966, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Current Political Crisis in Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS Bui Diem, GVN Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary, FE Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE Robert H. Miller, Director, FE/VN Bui Diem opened the conversation with a long apologia for the recent GVN action against Da Nang and with an assessment of future prospects which overplayed the positive and underplayed the negative. Bui Diem minimized the threat of civil war between I Corps and the GVN, but recognized that finding a political solution would take some time. He said the GVN had shown its good will in respecting the date set by the National Political Congress for elections and by cooperating in the preparations for those elections. He said that the election law drafting committee had worked reasonably well for two weeks and in fact better than the GVN had expected. The GVN felt that the committeeʼs conclusions so far were reasonable and that if it continued in this fashion the GVN could accept the committeeʼs conclusions without change. Diem emphasized that the GVN was not trying to delay elections and that Thieu and Ky recognized that elections must be carried out as promised. However, Bui Diem stated the GVN was faced with the problem of how to carry out the elections when its authority was not respected in I Corps. Diem pointed out that the GVN had to take into account not only the militant Buddhistsʼ views but also the views of Catholic elements and of young military officers who are getting impatient with the militant Buddhists. Diem noted that many elements were displeased that the GVN had agreed to proceed with the elections and that these elements were very concerned at developments in Central Viet-Nam. In view of this situation, General Dinh had been taking too long to restore the GVNʼs authority in I Corps; the 11th Ranger battalion had asked for GVN assistance in restoring the Central governmentʼs authority in Da Nang; and the GVN had no choice but to back the 11th Rangers even though it was well aware of the risks involved. At the same time, Bui Diem said, Ky had asked the election law drafting committee to finish its work by the end of the month, while the militant Buddhist representatives were trying to influence the committee to stop its work. Bui Diem emphasized repeatedly that the GVN intended to keep its promise to hold elections and its intention to deal with the I Corps problem as a local military problem. He emphasized also that a lack of confidence had unfortunately been created between the government and the militant Buddhists. He cited Kyʼs remarks to the press in Cantho, and observed that one issue undermining confidence between the government and the struggle forces was the question of whether or not the constituent assembly would be transformed into a legislative assembly. The GVN says that it is too soon to decide this issue, and the Buddhists use this position to charge the GVN with being insincere. Diem said that the GVN still felt that it had handled the situation correctly, that the Directorate and military establishment generally were still basically unified and that the problem in I Corps was created by a small group of 20 to 25 officers close to General Thi who had gone too far and could not pull back from an extreme position. Mr. Bundy expressed the belief that the situation was more serious than as described by Bui Diem. He cited several explosive elements in the situation, in particular the GVN siege of the main pagoda in Da Nang. Mr. Bundy noted that we had already expressed to the GVN our concern that we had not been consulted or informed in advance of the GVNʼs plan to move against Da Nang. He stressed that we understood the GVNʼs dilemma in agreeing to elections and working for their realization without being able to guarantee its authority of I Corps, but said that we could not understand why the GVN chose to move against Da Nang when the election law drafting committee was working well in Saigon and might have resolved these problems itself. Bui Diem explained that, from a military point of view, the GVN was dragged into the affair in Da Nang by the actions of some younger officers. According to Diem, the GVN had planned to replace the marine battalion in Quang Ngai with one from Saigon but that the latter was diverted to Da Nang when the GVN learned that the 11th Rangers, probably at Col. Loanʼs instigation, was plotting to move to re-establish GVN authority in Da Nang. Bui Diem said that the GVN had no choice but to back the Rangers at the last minute and that this was why Ambassador Porter was informed of the operation so late on Sunday morning. In response to Mr. Bundyʼs query, Bui Diem pointed out that Col. Loan had been furious when he was not allowed to crush the struggle movement with the three marine battalions in the earlier crisis. Diem also claimed that the battalion commanders themselves reacted very emotionally when they were held back from occupying Da Nang. He claimed that in a ceremony the commanders mingled their blood, drank it, and swore that they would return to Da Nang. Bui Diem noted that Ky had to take this kind of thinking and acting into account. Mr. Bundy asked what ideas Ky and Diem had to resolve the present situation and to make progress toward elections. He pointed out that, although the elections drafting committee was still carrying on its deliberations, it would be immensely difficult to arrive at conclusions on some of the difficult election issues unless arrangements were made in some fashion for Tri Quangʼs representatives to participate. Diem said that Ky did not plan to reoccupy Hue and that he was only trying to establish a position in Da Nang which would permit him to bargain with Hue. In response to Mr. Bundyʼs question, Bui Diem said that in resolving the political problem Ky would have to deal solely with Tri Quang in Hue and Thien Minh in Saigon. (Diem did not mention General Thi at all.) Diem said that contacts with these leaders had not been completely broken. For example, he said, the day before he had left Saigon Thien Minh had asked Tam Giac to see Ky. Ky, who had for some time refused to see Minh, said that he would be willing to see Minh at this time. Diem dined with Tam Giac and told him that it was up to him to get Thien Minh to talk to Ky. Tam Giac promised to do so. (Bui Diem left Saigon before any such meeting materialized.) In this connection, Bui Diem noted that U.S. influence could act as a catalyst to get the different sides together since the U.S. presence had to be taken into account by all sides, both by elements which accepted U.S. influence and by those which did not like to accept it. At the end of the conversation Mr. Unger noted that U.S. officials would like to discuss the serious economic situation with Bui Diem and that it would be discussed with him later that evening. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Diem agreed that, in response to press queries, it would be noted that Diemʼs trip had been long planned and that it was both for the purpose of visiting Vietnamese Embassies abroad and for discussing Vietnamese problems with foreign governments such as the U.S., and that the current situation in Viet-Nam made it even more important that the trip be carried out. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 70 D 102, POL 7, Bui Diem Visit. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miller and cleared by Unger. A memorandum of Bui Diemʼs conversation with Rostow on May 20 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII. 143. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 143. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 1 Washington, May 20, 1966, 2158Z. CJCS 2837–66. 1. I believe that both of you should have my reading of the effect here in the United States of the continuing political turmoil and backing and filling of the several contending parties in RVN. We have had adverse reactions here in the past arising from the numerous political imbroglios in that country; however, in my judgment, the effect of the present situation on the public and in the press and in the Congress (both of the latter in this instance reflecting early and muted public opinion) is far more adverse than heretofore. There are a number of reasons for this but the principal reasons, I think, are the facts that we have committed a quarter of a million men to combat in South Vietnam; the prestige of the United States is at stake; and U.S. casualties are mounting. I note that, for the third successive week, our casualties have exceeded those of Vietnamese forces. Rightly or wrongly, this latter fact is taken by the American people as proof positive of assertions continuously made by those in opposition to our Vietnamese policy that United States forces are fighting the war against VC/NVA forces while the South Vietnamese, whose freedom and country are at stake, squabble pettily among themselves to achieve political advantage. 2. To illustrate my point, I made an Armed Forces Day address yesterday in Houston, Texas, to an overflow luncheon audience of the Houston Rotary Club and the Military Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Houston. As you would expect, the audience and the local press rather unanimously support an American policy of strength and opposition to Communist initiatives. Nevertheless, I was impressed during my conversations with civic leaders and during the following press conference by the dissatisfaction and uneasiness of all as to our future in Vietnam. For example, I was questioned sharply as to whether, in view of the Vietnam situation, we were reducing or would cease our deployments to RVN. To widen the field a bit, Senator Javits yesterday expressed the view that we should stand down our military efforts in both North and South Vietnam. In brief, he advocated that we should stop our air campaign against North Vietnam and should, in agreement with the GVN, instruct our ground combat forces to desist offensive operations and fight only to defend themselves against attack. The demerits of Senator Javitsʼ proposal from the military point of view are so obvious that I will not discuss it further. You should be aware, however, that, as farfetched as this proposal to abandon the initiative to the enemy may seem to us in the military, it will have a distinct appeal to all flocks of doves and, even more importantly, to the relatives of our men in South Vietnam whose lives are at risk. The rationale of this latter group (for whom I have much sympathy) will be why should my son or brother or husband be killed fighting against the VC/NVA while the South Vietnamese whose country and freedom are at stake engage themselves in political bickering to the detriment of the effort against the enemy. 3. As I read the cables from Embassy Saigon and from Headquarters MACV reporting upon the actions, the statements and the proposals of the two sides, I get two distinct impressions: (a) all parties to the controversy appear to be convinced that the United States is so firmly hooked in Vietnam that nothing they do, or any circumstance arising therefrom, will cause us to disengage from our commitments; and (b) both parties to the confrontation are acting in bad faith, are cemented in fixed positions which they will not undertake to modify by compromise and that the GVN, at least, is proceeding without having a clear-cut objective in mind. 4. A further item in this devilʼs stew is Colonel Loan who, if the cables are reasonably correct, is a continuing troublemaker. I note that at last he has departed the Da Nang area for Saigon; based on the past, I wonder how long he will remain absent from the scene. Moreover, I recall that in response to an earlier query from me, you stated that the Directorate continued to be a cohesive body. Do you judge that cohesiveness continues? I note that General Thi at first agreed to, and has now backed out of, a meeting with General Ky at Chu Lai for reasons which at best seem specious. I note also the public statements of General Dinh calling for the ouster of Thieu and Ky. Does this reflect personal outrage or political conviction? 5. I really do not expect that either of you have answers to the questions I have posed or any reassurance of the early resolution of this mess. My purpose in addressing you is to convey my own deep distress and concern that the lives, the resources, and the political capital we have expended in our effort to preserve South Vietnam as a part of the free world approach the point of having been in vain. Very frankly, I am greatly worried, the more so because in all logic one cannot expect the American people to suffer indefinitely the continuation of this truly sickening situation. 6. As you know, I am usually pretty much of an optimist; but always, I hope, on the realistic side. This time, however, I think I can feel the first gusts of the whirlwind generated by the wind sown by the Vietnamese. Westy, I know that you will exert to the full your influence to set things once more on a proper course. If any of the above views will be of use to you, you have my full permission to use them as and how you think best. Even so, even if we get some semblance of solidarity and common purpose among the contending factions, we must all recognize that we have lost irretrievably and for all time some of the support which until now we have received from the American people. In other words, regardless of what happens of a favorable nature, many people will never again believe that the effort and the sacrifices are worthwhile. Warm regards. 2 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp. 2 In telegram MAC 4070, May 22, Westmoreland responded that he believed the situation in Vietnam had been “blown out of perspective” by the press. While it was “serious,” it was “not desperate,” and the GVN seemed “to be making positive headway in restoring government authority in the I Corps area.” In a telegram transmitted to Wheeler at 0929Z on May 23, Sharp concurred with Westmorelandʼs assessment. (Ibid.) 144. Editorial Note 144. Editorial Note In a briefing memorandum dated 8 a.m., May 21, 1966, Special Assistant Walt Rostow advised President Johnson that in Danang “heavy exchanges of fire between GVN and struggle forces [had] led to VNAF bombing of the latter” and that mortar fire, “possibly from struggle forces,” had injured 13 U.S. servicemen. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LII) In its lead story that morning, datelined Danang, May 21, The New York Times reported that “government marines today took over one of the pagodas used as a refuge by dissidents here after four hours of bitter fighting in which two Buddhist monks were killed.” The Times stated that “dissident soldiers and Buddhists were still holding out in two other pagodas.” At 10:10 a.m. on May 21, White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers telephoned Secretary of State Rusk and indicated that the President was “deeply disturbed” about Vietnam. “It seems to him that internally we cannot permit this thing to go on, it will tear us to pieces and [he] thinks time has come for us to try to push whatever buttons we have to push.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) In telegram 3575 to Saigon, transmitted at 6:29 p.m. on May 21, the Department of State advised Ambassador Lodge that the press was giving the events in Danang “full play with pictures of GVN tanks trained on pagodas.” The Department stated that the “situation now appears to American public to be getting out of hand with US in helpless position. While we should not be driven to actions not wise in themselves by these attitudes, fact is that they make resolution of crisis matter of drastic urgency from any standpoint. FYI: Gallup Poll being published tomorrow will indicate 54% saying US should withdraw from SVN if internal squabbling continues.” The Department then outlined a series of issues for Lodge to raise with Prime Minister Ky and concluded by asking Lodge whether he thought the United States should assert its power “forcefully and drastically” to end the crisis. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIII) Lodge replied in telegram 4829 from Saigon, May 22. He summarized his lengthy discussion with Ky earlier that day, noting that Ky claimed that his government “had virtually complete control over the city of Danang.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S) In a Vietnam Situation Report summarizing events in the Struggle crisis dating from May 22 to June 7, the Department of State reported that “the main Struggle base, the Tinh Hoi pagoda, fell to GVN troops on May 23 without a fight, and the GVN reasserted its authority over the city. Those dissidents who were not captured or who did not surrender either left the city or went underground. The total number of Vietnamese dead in the battle for Danang was between 60 and 75 although Struggle forces in Hue claimed the figure to be much higher.” (Ibid., EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Viet-Nam Situation Reports, 1966) In Advice and Support: The Final Years , page 141, Jeffrey Clarke states that “according to rough U.S. estimates, casualties for both sides included 150 South Vietnamese dead and 700 wounded, and another 23 American soldiers wounded.” 145. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 145. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 24, 1966. Curbing Inflation in Vietnam . Now that Ky has Danang at least temporarily under control, I am pushing for quick GVN action on anti-inflationary measures. The IMF mission, there now, is manfully pushing the GVN toward at least modest devaluation, plus related measures. It is just possible that Ky might bite the bullet in the next week or so. I have been taking a hard line, because without someone pushing neither Lodge nor Ky will face up to the inflationary threat. We have authorized the use of both carrots and sticks. One carrot would be to tell the GVN that we will increase FY 1967 economic aid enough to help cover any loss to it of foreign exchange from devaluation (estimated at $30 million). This is not a new add-on since we are already programming such increased aid anyway to help flood Vietnam with goods. But we havenʼt told the GVN yet. The only credible stick we have is to withhold disbursement of economic aid till the GVN acts. This can be done discreetly, I believe, if it becomes necessary. I am also pushing a set of major reforms in our chief aid instrument, the Commercial Import Program (CIP), to meet the rising tide of criticism over loose administration, windfall profits, corruption and the like. We hope to face down the GVN by simply telling it that from now on our aid will have to be handled according to the new rules. If not, new allocations may somehow get held up till the GVN complies. R.W. Komer 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret. 2 To the left of Komerʼs signature the President wrote: “Bob, I applaud you, good. Keep it up & Keep it Hot.” In telegram CAP 66323 to Porter, May 23, Komer stated that the President was “eager to put positive face on our VN effort and balance press horror stories by publicizing progress on civil side. We will probably have to produce some headline-catchers by mid-June.” (Ibid., Back Channel Cables between Porter and Komer, May-July 1966) 146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, May 25, 1966. 4952. For the President from Lodge. We are in such a fast moving situation here that I had just about decided not to send you a weekly telegram at all. On the other hand, I wrote what follows and thought it might interest you in the hopes that you would make allowances for the turmoil we are in. A. Crisis 1. Following is an effort to put things here in proportion: 2. The troubles centering on Danang and Hue seem to be stabilizing with regard to the former city with fair prospects of reestablishing government authority in the second, although not without considerable uproar. Contrary to the press portrayals which I have seen, the rest of the country has been relatively quiet. The Buddhist inspired demonstrations in Saigon have not yet assumed political importance. I try to be alert to opportunities to bring the government and the “Strugglers” together by talks, and General Westmoreland has in fact, talked with General Thi, with no apparent result. 2 The “Strugglers”, in characteristic Southeast Asian fashion, having apparently been unsuccessful, seem now to be turning toward fanaticism. They evidently realize that the most influential segments of the U.S. press take all their fanatic actions—riots, stone throwings, fires, signs telling Americans to go home, and self-immolation—at face value, however cynical these same journalists may be about the U.S. Government. But if we assume that the government establishes its sway in Hue and Danang and then maintains order in Saigon and the rest of the country, the following could be in prospect during the next few months: B. Military 3. Westmoreland and his Vietnamese colleagues may well inflict heavy losses on the North Vietnamese Army and the big units of the Viet Cong. He is extremely alert to the possibilities. 4. We have put it out to the press, but they have apparently taken no interest in the fact, that throughout this period of crisis, combat troops of the 1st Vietnamese Division in the Hue area have not behaved badly. I refer particularly to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 2nd Troop (Company) of the 7th Cavalry Squadron, an armored personnel carrier unit. The logistic and headquarters troops which have been demoralized by the Buddhist chaplains have behaved badly, but that does not justify the unmitigated gloom of recent days. 5. As far as chaplains are concerned, the government has put out an order that they shall cease and desist from talking politics and engaging in political activity. If they disobey the order, they are to be transferred. The government is talking about abolishing the Chaplainsʼ Corps, but I do not believe this will happen. There are about 70 Buddhist and 60 Catholic chaplains in the Vietnamese Army today. C. Casualties 6. The following has been prepared by the staff regarding casualties: “While U.S. casualties have exceeded those of the GVN for 9 of the past 16 weeks, not counting this week (U.S. figures are incomplete), in only two of those weeks have more Americans than Vietnamese soldiers been killed, and in those two weeks the total killed was very low compared to normal weeks. One reason why our casualties have been higher than Vietnamese is that we are much more thorough in counting wounded, with even small scratches being included in the totals, while the Vietnamese only include those who have to leave their units to be treated. We count all the ‘band-aid’ cases; they count only the ‘hospital’ ones. Over the long term, Vietnamese casualties have far exceeded our own. For instance, since the beginning of August 1965, when our forces began heavy involvement in combat, the Vietnamese have suffered 29,973 casualties, including 8,151 killed, while our soldiers have had 16,267 casualties, including 2,574 killed. When one compares the loss of life on the Vietnamese side to South Viet-Namʼs total population of about 15 million, including the Viet Cong, their suffering is seen to be far greater proportionately than ours. Roughly speaking, for each family in the U.S. which lost a son in the fighting in Viet-Nam in 1965, there were 200 Vietnamese families who suffered such a loss. And this leaves aside all those who suffered the loss of loved ones who were not soldiers through V.C. terrorism or by being caught in the cross-fires of this war. Thus there can be little doubt that the Vietnamese are carrying the major burden of suffering in this struggle, in both absolute terms and proportionate to our respective situations.” D. Elections 8. The elections which should take place in September, assuming that this rickety government can hold together, may finally produce something which we can support on the basis that it represents the popular will, although it could be denounced as null and void by the Army or the Buddhists or by some other group. By no stretch of the imagination could it end the political uproar which can be expected to go on as long as Viet-Nam evolves into a modern nation-state. But it might establish a “standard to which the wise and honest may repair”—in short, something to show them where north is. This is a good thing to do—even if they donʼt always steer straight course. E. Revolutionary Development 9. As regards revolutionary development, Porter reports that 90 more teams are now being inserted into the villages and hamlets and that these should be followed about September 1 by 100 more. This infusion of personnel is concurrent with the insertion of the first police field force units who will work in the areas between the villages and hamlets, thus complementing the work of the revolutionary development teams inside those places. Together with the self-help programs, which are now functioning on a wide scale, it appears that by mid-September, we may, with luck, have some interesting progress to report. This is all brand new and highly creative. In fact, if it actually happens, it would not be too much to say that nothing more imaginative than this would be going on in the entire field of government. F. U.S. Opinion 10. I have been mulling over the state of American opinion as I observed it when I was at home. I have also been reading the recent Gallup polls. As I commented in my Embtel 4880, 3 I am quite certain that the number of those who want us to leave Viet-Nam because of current “internal squabbling” does not reflect deep conviction but a superficial impulse based on inadequate information. 11. In fact, I think one television fireside chat by you personally—with all your intelligence and compassion—could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of a speech, the general tenor of which would be: “We are involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and complexity on which much depends. I need your help.” 12. I am sure you would get much help from the very people in the Gallup poll who said we ought to leave Viet-Nam—as soon as they understood what you want them to support. 13. You and the administration have done big things in educating public opinion. When I consider the degree of information today compared to what it was a year or two years ago, I applaud. But there is still more to be done—and only you can do certain parts of it. Of course, I am glad to help in any way I can. 14. Your own statement to the press about Viet-Nam was excellent in tone and substance. 4 G. Vietnamese Notes 15. Chieu Hoi returnees are up from the April slump but below the average during February and March. There was an increase in the number of veterans which were returned. 16. The newspapers Dan Chung and Thoi Su Mien Nam take issue with Fulbrightʼs brothel statement 5 and write that though thankful for American help, we donʼt have to tolerate such inconsiderate remarks by a politician like Mr. Fulbright—remarks that no self-respecting Vietnamese can forget. Many papers carried the wire story that Senator Fulbright “regrets” his statement. H. Economic 17. Retail prices in Saigon continued to rise, especially foodstuffs. The index is up 5 per cent from a month ago. These price increases are evidently due to not only the political unrest but also to rumors of devaluation of the currency. 18. The Saigon free market rate for U.S. currency and gold rose to an all-time high. 19. On May 19, General Ky and Porter signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the use of counterpart funds. This agreement should give us control over the use of part of these funds and increase our ability to exert badly needed influence. 20. One disturbing note is that the Saigon Special Court sentenced to death an iron and steel importer of Chinese origin whom it convicted of selling above official prices. If the sentence is carried out, it would have a seriously adverse affect on the business climate, which is greatly affected by the Chinese merchants. I plan to urge GVN to grant clemency in this case. 21. The Minister of Economy has announced that the GVN will make sure that sufficient personnel are available to operate the port 18 hours a day. This decision should help alleviate the problems we have had in moving cargoes through the port. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to President Johnson at noon on May 25 under cover of a memorandum stating: “This is Ambassador Lodge at his best. There is a good deal to be said for the approach he suggests for a fireside chat.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6) 2 Lodge reported on Westmorelandʼs conversation with Thi in telegram 4966 from Saigon, May 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)2 3 Dated May 23. (Ibid.) 4 Presumably a reference to the Presidentʼs remarks on Vietnam at his press conference on May 21. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 531–539. 5 At a speech delivered on May 4 at Johns Hopkins University, Fulbright stated that “both literally and figuratively, Saigon has become an American brothel.” ( The New York Times , May 6, 1966) Fulbright publicly expressed his regrets about the statement on May 17. (Ibid., May 18, 1966) 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, May 25, 1966, 1:09 p.m. 3626. During recent consultations in Washington of Ambassador Lodge following outline was basis for highest level discussions of elections and political development and its contents generally agreed upon. Outline, entitled “Principles Governing U.S. Operations Concerning Elections and Constitutional Assembly in South Viet-Nam,” is transmitted herewith FYI and for your general guidance. Begin Text: A. General Principles of U.S. Action The U.S. Mission should seek to exert maximum influence toward the achievement of the substantive objectives stated in B below. At the same time, this must be done with recognition that a key objective is to avoid anti-Americanism becoming a major issue; we shall be accused of interference in any event, but it is vitally important not to give potential anti-American elements (or the press and outside observers) any clear handle to hit us with. B. Objectives 1. Elections should be held as announced by GVN on April 15th, that is by September 15 of this year. 2. The issue of anti-Americanism should be kept out of the election campaign as far as possible. 3. The question as to whether the constitutional assembly will only have the role of drafting the constitution or will have some further function should not be allowed to become an active pre-election issue and the U.S. should take no position on this question. 4. The elections should be conducted so as to produce a constitutional assembly fairly representing the various regions and groups within South Viet-Nam (except those actively participating with the Viet Cong), including the Army, Montagnards, Khmer minorities, et al. 5. The elections should be conducted so as to gain a maximum improvement in the image of the GVN in the United States and internationally; this calls for a wide turnout, scrupulously correct conduct of the voting and counting process, as little political limitation on voter eligibility as possible and vigorous efforts to avoid voter intimidation from any quarter. Ideas to be explored are a brief election period ceasefire, international observation of the elections, students participating as poll watchers, etc. 6. The emphasis in the campaign should be on the selection of good men to draft the constitution; political parties are not expected to play a major role although the campaign may provide the occasion for laying foundations for future party organization. We will wish to work quietly with selected promising candidates all across the political spectrum in the expectation that some will be elected to the assembly and provide useful continuing contacts. 7. Unless new developments change our assessment, major efforts should be devoted not to stimulating the formation of a large nationalist party but rather to the adoption of the concept that these elections bring together all non-communist groups who are pledged, among other things, to their countryʼs independence and the continuing need to defend it with American help. Specifically, efforts should not be made to split the Buddhists or isolate the militant Buddhist faction. 8. The election process should be a vehicle for educating and engaging the population in the democratic process and it should be used to launch political and psychological initiatives with youth groups, students, labor, etc. 9. Restore as far as possible the unity of the Directorate and promote a reconciliation between Generals Ky and Thi. However, discourage efforts by the Directorate to form a government party designed purely to perpetuate the Directorate in power to the exclusion of other significant political groups. End Text . Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Helble, cleared by Miller, and approved by Unger. 148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 148. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, May 28, 1966. I saw Bob McNamara Saturday morning, May 28. He said he had spoken to the President about my going to Moscow and was very keen that I should go. He hopes for some settlement, and gave me the impression he didnʼt see any value in escalation. He said he thought a good settlement would be: if North Vietnam would pull its troops out, we should do the same; and establishment of an expanded ICC to assure no evasion. From the Russian standpoint, they would not want to have escalation which eventually might affect them, and he thought I should underline the dangers. On the plus side, he thought we could agree to a parallel reduction in the Defense budget, which he was sure the Kremlin wanted. He said he thought it might be a good idea for me to tell Kosygin that whereas on June 30, 1965 we had in the Army 968,000 men, this year we would have 1,217,000, and in June 1967, 1,600,000. We could certainly agree with the Kremlin to reduce our troop level. On interim steps, we might stop bombing if the North Vietnamese stopped infiltration of men and perhaps supplies. We should agree, he thought, to let the South Vietnamese decide their own future even if it meant a coalition government with the Viet Cong, which might or might not take over. WAH 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Box 486, McNamara, Robert S. Secret; Personal. Prepared by Harriman on May 30. 149. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson 149. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, May 30, 1966. SUBJECT Report on Visit to Vietnam: May 17–29, 1966 1. I returned yesterday from a ten-day visit—my first in fourteen years since a 1950–52 tour of duty in the Saigon Embassy. 2. Three general impressions from this quick trip: a. Our key programs have not been materially hampered by the recent political disorders. These programs may not be bounding forward but they are moving ahead—in revolutionary development, nationwide self help projects, and politico-military coordination. On the military side, the recent ARVN disaffections have largely involved rear support troops and headquarters units. The combat forces, even in I Corps, have kept up far better than press reporting from Saigon indicates. b. Kyʼs ability to cope with the intestinal discords of Vietnam remains in doubt, but since his original political blundering against Thi, his touch has improved. There are additionally strong possibilities that Vietnam will look considerably brighter by late September. The controlling factors: (1) a reasonable chance for substantial progress in our arms, on which all else chiefly depends, if Westmoreland finds, as he expects to do, the new VC regiments and their built-up supplies; (2) better prospects for healthier politics that the September Constitutional Assembly elections should bring; and (3) the political impact of the completion of the first village assignments by the 100 new RD cardre teams which graduated on May 25. c. To increase the new momentum in RD programs and to exploit these favoring possibilities, we have much to do over the next few months. 3. The original Komer priorities, as seen on the ground in Vietnam, seem sound and essential. Immediate requirements are: a. Anti-inflation . The problem is as bad as—or worse—than we had thought it. Retail prices continue to rise at 5% per month. In one year local construction materials have skyrocketed: lumber up 600%, rock 500%, sand 300% (USAID is now letting a 610,000 ton tender for sand to Taiwan—61 unbudgeted Liberty ships). Last week in Saigon the black market in US $10 bills reached an all-time high at 182 piasters. We should hit hard, and early. The GVN is now softened up by the visit of the IMF team. Delay in devaluation will only involve it more in the elections. We can try for the deeper range of devaluation around 120 or the lesser around 80 with special exchange surcharges. The IMF appears to favor the latter and it is important to keep it out in front. But a deeper devaluation would be cleaner, simpler to administer, and less subject to subsequent unravelling. My own view is that the door should be held open for a negotiating entry at about 110 and an exit at about 100. b. Port Congestion . At the end of May the number of non-military ships waiting off Saigon for their turn at unloading was 36. Average waiting time was 26 days. Civilian cargo clearances have been overstated through errors in reporting methods by about 20% or 50,000 tons a month. Westmoreland now seems to favor military operation of the Saigon port jointly with ARVN units which will provide some cushion for political sensitivities while letting the US do the real work. He will need full authority over US civil employees at the port, improved arrangements to remove warehoused goods, and a system to schedule and control outbound cargo from the States. Lack of such control is one of the basic deficiencies of the present AID system. He should be given what he needs to make the port function. c. Cadres . The new 59-man RD cadres are the most promising element in the country. The first 100 teams were graduated at the end of May. A second class of 115 teams will graduate in September. The decision to double the cadre this year was of basic importance. By June 1967, if the program goes well, 10,000 cadre will be trained each thirteen weeks. Westmoreland is now prepared to convert PF troops into cadre providing no villages are left uncovered in the process and CIA auspices can be reasonably concealed. We must work to insulate the cadre from changes in GVN regimes; hold the existing training facilities at Vung Tau at least until the new camp at Long Hai is fully operational and its surrounding area secured; improve our infiltration security as numbers increase rapidly; and keep a close cross-check on our training methods against cadre performance and experience. But if there had been imagination enough to form these teams fourteen years ago, Vietnam would be much different today. 4. The next steps are well understood as between Washington and the Saigon mission. We should aim for next-phase decisions in June on: a. A manpower survey , decently done, as a basis for overdue judgments on new allocations of increasingly scarce Vietnamese manpower. The Mission will need help, and we should get a manpower team out to Saigon soonest. b. Priorities guidelines for the pacification and developmental phases of rural reconstruction based on NSAM 343. c. Redefinitions of roles and missions to rationalize the hodgepodge of present security forces. The critical area is the 350,000 man agglomeration of RF, PF, Police, Police Field Forces, CIDG, special force units, and RD cadres now competing for money, manpower and material. d. Land Reform . A mission interagency group is now working on feasibility, but will probably favor a selective and gradual approach. 5. Ahead lie further priority actions. The most important of these seem to me: a. Urban Programs . We have tended to ignore urban areas and then find time and again that our political difficulties arise from the cities. Each of the eight districts of Saigon increased in population by 60–70,000 last year. Another 500,000 will probably be added in the next twelve months. Some form of political action team or an extension of the RD cadres to urban areas may be useful. Measures to repair the breakdown in urban services—particularly public health and refuse disposal—are urgently required. This is one of the few areas susceptible of visible results before the September elections. b. USAID Vacancies . Of a total of 3931 approved positions, USAID has 2991 on board. In its field operations staff, it is authorized 203 positions and had 128 present on May 23. Obviously recruitment programs need to be pressed, and there is an urgent need to fill certain vacancies at once—in auditors and commodity analysts, where weaknesses in control procedures are attracting adverse comment. In general, the USAID personnel structure needs reexamination (Lodge would favor a 25% cut). My own view is that reform and slenderizing should be undertaken against the new decisions on revised priorities. c. Joint Operations . We may need to move more toward joint boards and commissions with the GVN. In the period immediately ahead, the GVN seems unlikely to improve administratively quickly and sufficiently enough to carry out its programs with only liaison guidance. In the military area, we need to find a more effective means for advance consultation on plans and political actions. Westmorelandʼs project for joint operations of the ports and storage facilities seems promising. For the cadres, some adaptation of the JCRR, which did effective work on Taiwan, may be useful. Its key provisions were a direct appropriation of Congressional funds and the appointment of its members (three Chinese, two Americans) by the respective Presidents for fixed terms. Independence of tenure and funds may be needed to insulate the cadres—and to preserve the present dynamic chief, General Thang—from GVN politics. 6. Finally, press relations. The resident Saigon press corps by and large is young, inexperienced, and sensationalist minded. It will be a difficult group to work with at best, but I am convinced that more can be done. Barry Zorthian, the head of JUSPAO, will be in Washington for two weeks in mid-June. I strongly recommend that Mr. Moyers and Mr. Komer meet with him and that we work out an informational strategy and operational plan for the next several months on story lines, press treatment, and greater emphasis on third country programs in behalf of Vietnamese freedom and development. William Leonhart 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIV. Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow and Taylor. Leonhart was Komerʼs deputy in the White House office established by NSAM No. 343 ( Document 102 ) to oversee pacification and other non-military programs in Vietnam. 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Leonhart signed the original. 150. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 150. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Saigon, June 2, 1966, 1135Z. MAC 4508. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Ky between 1600 hours and 1655 hours, this date, in his office at VNAF Headquarters. 1. Ky reflected his usual self-confidence and was obviously pleased with the success with the Buddhists yesterday. 2 The Buddhists now realize that their position is very weak since they have no issue, have gone too far, lost control over the demonstrators, have little public sympathy, and no real support from the press or international Buddhist groups. 3 The Buddhists have admitted penetration by the VC. Today Ky received an official letter from a Buddhist leader asking the government to provide security to protect pagodas (Ky viewed this as a significant development). Most of the Buddhists are moderate people but there are a few “hawks” who have caused the trouble. Ky believes these “hawks”, led by Tri Quang and Thien Minh, are in the process of being isolated by the moderate monks who are in the majority. At the meeting yesterday the monks stated that Tri Quang would go along with their decision. The Buddhist chaplain problem is being handled according to plan and field commanders have been alert in dealing with the matter. 2. Enlargement of the Directorate to include 10 civilians for total of 20 has served to save face for the Buddhists. When Ky saw a Catholic leader this morning he was greeted with hostility since the Catholic was of the opinion that the government had again given in to Buddhist pressure. After Ky explained the situation, the Catholic leaderʼs attitude changed. The 10 civilians to join the Directorate will be as follows: one from the South, one from Central Vietnam, and one from the Northern refugee group, one from each of the four religious groups (Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai), and three from the intellectual/professional group. The Buddhists have accepted this arrangement. 4 3. General Tri, who now commands III Corps, is to replace General Chieu as Secretary General of the Directorate. It is planned for Tri also to take over as Minister of Information and Director of Political Warfare for the Armed Forces. Chieu will devote his full attention to political matters as leader of the Veterans Party. We discussed Triʼs replacement inconclusively. 4. The surprise movement of troops into Hue this morning did not go according to plan because it was compromised by Nhuan. Nhuan drove last night by jeep from Quang Tri to Hue and informed Tri Quang of the operation. Nhuan is afraid of Tri Quang. Colonel Toan who was all set to command the operation, on the assumption that Nhuan would stay in Quang Tri, had the rug pulled out from under him. When I inquired about Dinh, Ky classified Dinh as crazy and said that he was not worried about him. 5. Ky made the point that the big problem with senior officers was corruption and that temptations were great. He himself had been offered sizeable sums by many parties in return for requested favors. He had resisted these overtures realizing that once he had compromised himself there would be no turning back. He has recently talked to Thieu, Co, and Vien about selecting a number of promising young officers and grooming them for higher responsibilities with emphasis on leadership development and resistance to self aggrandizement. 6. As I left, Ky said he was going to the afternoon briefing at the 7th Air Force. I explained that we were particularly interested in showing him the results of the big strike at Yen Bay. 7. General Wheeler please pass to State at Embassy request. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp. 2 In telegram 5178 from Saigon, June 1, Lodge reported that Ky had reached an understanding with the Buddhist leaders at their meeting on May 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Buddhist and Directorate leaders, including Ky, met again on June 1 to complete their agreement. (Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War , Part IV, p. 330) 3 In telegram 5124 from Saigon, May 30, Lodge indicated that Ky was “embarked on a campaign to isolate the extreme Buddhists and their supporters,” whose “current cynical campaign of hunger strikes, letters in blood and suicide” Lodge viewed as a “desperate effort to bring maximum pressure on the U.S. to force the Government of Vietnam into conceding to Tri Quang.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5) 4 In its Viet-Nam Situation Report, 0630, June 6, 1966, the Department of State reported that the enlarged Directorate had its first meeting on June 6. (Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Viet-Nam Situation Reports) 151. Editorial Note 151. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Senator Richard Russell that began at 8:05 p.m. on June 2, 1966, the following exchange took place: “President: We got a pretty disastrous poll coming up on Vietnam. About 35–36% want to get out. About 40% approve of what weʼre doing—the way Iʼm handling it. About 41% approve of the way Iʼm doing it and about 36% disapprove. “Russell: Well, youʼre going have to do something different out there. If you donʼt youʼre going eventually get in trouble. McNamara gave you some good advice on that. “President: Whatʼs that? “Russell: About pushing it a little bit harder. “President: Well, heʼs not advising that now. We got until we get a government; until we get ʼem propped up, nobody really— “Russell: I think the governmentʼs straightened itself out pretty well out there. “President: Well, not yet. Not yet. Itʼs on its way to doing it, but itʼs not—. “Russell: Well, I donʼt think it ever will be clamped down and be a real government any more than I think weʼre gonna have one in Santo Domingo.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Russell, Tape F66.16, PNO 1) 152. Editorial Note 152. Editorial Note In JCS telegram 3086–66, June 2, 1966, General Wheeler notified General Westmoreland that he thought the time for decision on expanding the air campaign against North Vietnam was approaching. “It is quite clear authority to attack the POL system was within our grasp when the political turmoil in SVN rose to a height which caused many people here to take a second look.” Wheeler suggested that if the political situation remained stable Westmoreland submit a proposal the following week for attacks on POL targets. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) That same day a U.S. military officer, under arrangements made by Secretary McNamara, briefed Prime Minister Wilson at 10 Downing Street on pending air strikes against POL storage installations near Hanoi and Haiphong. Wilson responded in a message to President Johnson the next day that he would have to dissociate himself from such a move, which he believed would make settlement of the conflict more difficult, but he would continue his overall support for Johnsonʼs policy in Vietnam. (Telegram 7266 to London, June 3; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 19218 to Admiral Sharp, June 5, General Westmoreland proposed strikes on eight POL targets. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Rolling Thunder 50–A Extended) Secretary McNamara told Under Secretary Ball in a telephone conversation the next day, Monday, that he was having an operational order for POL strikes drafted, since the President wanted McNamara prepared to move later in the week. (Telcon, June 6; Johnson Library, Ball Papers) In telegram 107 to Brussels, June 7, Ball passed this information on to Rusk, who was attending a NATO Ministerial Meeting. Ball pointed out several reasons for delay, among them Ruskʼs meeting with Prime Minister Wilson, scheduled for June 10, and Canadian diplomat Chester Ronningʼs peace mission to Hanoi starting June 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In two memoranda dated June 8, Special Assistant Walt Rostow informed the President that Secretary Rusk was “firmly for postponement until we know the results of Ronningʼs mission,” while Secretary McNamara preferred to go ahead immediately. McNamara, however, felt that Ruskʼs request for postponement should be honored. Rostow estimated that a postponement would mean a 2-week delay, which he regarded “as unfortunate, but not necessarily a disaster.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5) 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, June 8, 1966. 5378. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram. A. Military Prospects 1. I have been hoping that we could get decisive military results within a year. I had based this hope on our considerable military accomplishments in overcoming the main force units of the Viet Cong and large units of the Army of North Viet-Nam, and in destroying the redoubts in the jungles. But MACV does not think that it can do anything decisive in a year. Their operational plans for the next year, if carried out, would mean that good progress had been achieved, but nothing decisive. The best estimate also is that 20,000 men of the Army of North Viet-Nam have come into South Viet-Nam since January and, as far as I can learn, we canʼt find them. 2. If we are now going as hard and as fast as we can go in South Viet-Nam militarily and cannot get a decisive military result in a year, the question arises as to whether we should not intensify the air attack on North Viet-Nam—whether we cannot thus bring about strains which will neutralize their army in South Viet-Nam, in spite of our inability to do it in South Viet-Nam on the ground within a year. 3. The reports I get are certainly consistent with the proposition that the Hanoi regime is feeling real pain because of our bombing. If there is this change of feeling in Hanoi—as seems likely—I believe the bombing has had a lot to do with it, although ground casualties, of course, play a part. This being true, an intensification of the bombing would be the most effective step we could take to get Hanoi to the negotiating table or—better still—to start “fading away.” B. Weekly Military Highlights 4. The highlights of last weekʼs military activity were two heavy battles won by U.S. and Korean forces and a sparkling performance by the Vietnamese Second Division which surprised a large Viet Cong force with a midnight assault on its bivouac in Quang Tin Province. After making the initial assault, the attacking force deliberately withdrew and then re-attacked at 3:00 in the morning, catching the Viet Cong survivors in the process of evacuating their dead and wounded. As a result, the Viet Cong lost 100 killed and 56 weapons, while the Vietnamese troops lost only two missing. 5. For the week ended last Sunday, the “killed in action” were: Vietnamese 135; U.S. 69; Viet Cong 902. These figures fluctuate from week to week as relative missions change, and we must expect weeks when there will be more Americans. This is undoubtedly still less than would be the case if we did not make a stand in Viet-Nam and were thus constrained to make it elsewhere. Our choice is not between casualties in Viet-Nam on the one hand or no casualties at all on the other. In the present state of the world, the choice probably is between casualties in Viet-Nam on the one hand and more casualties somewhere else if we were to leave Viet-Nam. C. Vietnamese Catholics and Elections 6. DʼOrlandi, the Italian Ambassador, and dean of the diplomatic corps, has a wide knowledge of Viet-Nam. He is an accurate reporter, and his opinions are stimulating, although I often disagree. He makes a business of keeping in touch with the different factions among the Vietnamese Catholics, and I have found him particularly well informed about them. He sums up the prevailing Vietnamese Catholic views as follows: 7. While they do not enthuse about holding elections, they probably will not boycott elections if they take place. A commonly expressed attitude early last week was that they should try to get Ky out of office, and then the elections would not take place. But as the Institute Buddhists have more and more turned against Ky, the Catholic desire to force Ky out has moderated. Also elections appear inevitable. 8. They do, however, fear that once the elections are held, the United States will pronounce them to have been good, thereby committing ourselves to what the Assembly may subsequently decide. They also think the Assembly will be the first and only national body ever to have been elected by the people, and will, therefore, at once try to take over from the GVN. They also fear that this Assembly will be badly intimidated by the Viet Cong, and, will in a very short space of time, ask the United States to leave. All this would happen even before the Constitution was drafted. 9. These Vietnamese Catholics believe that there are some who would think that for the U.S. to be thus invited to leave would be a very subtle and clever “out” for the United States. But actually, they believe, with the conditions as they are, it would be a resounding defeat, and the invitation to leave would be a device which would not, in their opinion, fool anybody. 10. They believe that it would immediately lead to the slaughter and enslavement of the Catholics and others in South Viet-Nam; it would turn Indonesia back to the Communists; and have catastrophic results in Southeast Asia. 11. My comment on this is as follows: 12. There are a great many elements here having doubts about the wisdom of having elections. To the Catholics must now be added the Tri Quang Buddhists who were frantically insisting on elections a while ago. A week ago, I would have said that it was totally impractical to think of not having elections. Now, I am not so sure, although the odds are still strongly that the elections will take place as scheduled in September. 13. My guess is that the Assembly to be elected at that time will undoubtedly consider itself more legitimate than the GVN, and that there will be a real row about that. Most of the members of the present electoral commission will probably be candidates and if their attitude is any guide—and I believe it is—I would feel confident that, if not intimidated, they would not invite us to leave. 14. But we must assume that many of them will be intimidated because that is a traditional way of doing things here. I realize this will be hard to explain in the United States where Congressmen and Senators are not influenced to vote a certain way by having their life threatened, and who will naturally think of the Vietnamese Assembly as a counterpart of the U.S. Congress. D. Paraplegic Veterans 15. This war has caused many Vietnamese to lose arms and legs, and until recently, the facilities for helping these victims were very limited. The National Institute for Rehabilitation had been painfully turning out a very few limbs and braces every month, using primitive hand methods. Mr. Juan Monros, of the World Rehabilitation Fund, who was brought here by Howard Rusk, has held a 4-month training course which 43 student technicians completed on May 27 on the techniques of producing plastic limbs and braces. He expects that the Institute will now be able to turn out some 500 limbs and braces a month, which will be a great help in solving what has been a serious human problem. I recall your personal interest in making this possible. E. Economic 16. The sharp rise in retail prices over the previous two weeks halted last week, as did the Saigon free market rates for U.S. currency and gold. The price of rice was stable and those of wheat, flour and sugar were down, as were those of most imported commodities. 17. The economic situation in Danang has improved somewhat. The airlift of meat and wheat flour into the city brought down their prices as much as 25 percent. The port of Danang is now operating satisfactorily. F. Success in Binh Thuan 18. Mission Coordinator Wilson spent last night in Binh Thuan Province, southernmost coastal province of II Corps. Population is roughly a quarter of a million, with more than 75 percent of the people estimated to be under GVN control as contrasted with about 20 percent of the physical territory being controlled by the government. 19. According to the Province Chief and his U.S. advisors on the ground, the people of Binh Thuan sense that the Nationalist side is going to win and thus are shifting their allegiance and support to province and district officials. These officials feel that this in no sense signifies a political conversion, ideological shift or endorsement of the present government. It is merely a pragmatic recognition that the Viet Cong is taking a beating and that it is better to get with the winning side. 20. Province Chief also attributes much of this shift in attitude to the leadership of General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development, who has spent some time visiting personally in hamlets and villages of the province and to new sense of urgency Thang has succeeded in imparting to provincial officials. Highly successful operation in the province several months ago by the 101st Airborne Brigade which resulted in a large number of Viet Cong casualties is also reported to have had a dramatic effect on peasant attitudes. 21. Wilson reports: A quick evaluation of such indicators as the number of VC defectors, number of refugees, willingness of people to provide intelligence on the Viet Cong, and the general rate of progress on the pacification front tends to substantiate the conclusion that a positive trend has indeed begun in this one province. 22. Comment: This seems to show all elements of our program working together as we have always hoped they would and that when they do work together the desired result is achieved. G. Education 23. By the end of May of this year we had completed 43 percent of our program of distributing fourteen million elementary school textbooks throughout Viet-Nam. This program, which we began in mid-1965, will be concluded in second half 1967. The books are distributed to the schools and lent to the students for the school year. We hope to get three yearsʼ use out of each book. 24. The significance of this program and its impact on the system of primary education is worth special note: for the first time, Vietnamese children have textbooks which they can take home and read and show to their parents. Content and illustrations have been carefully worked out with leading Vietnamese educators and cover such subjects as Viet-Namʼs history and geography, along with other standard subjects as arithmetic and personal hygiene and sanitation. I am providing a sample packet of these books separately, including brief descriptive comments, as an item of possible interest. 25. Next to safety of life and limb, there is probably nothing more highly prized in Viet-Nam than education—perhaps greater even than land reform. H. Chieu Hoi 26. The number of returnees during the period May 28 to June 3 increased slightly to 257, as compared to 247 for the previous period, for a total of 1,237 for May. This compared with a total of 1,620 for April and 2,294 for March. 27. This reduction is due in part to the political crisis, in part to the diminution of combat (combat tends to drive people into the camps) and in part to the fact that there are as yet no reports from I Corps. 28. It is to be noted that since early March, the number of so-called “high quality” defectors has increased to rate of one or two per week, contrasted to a rate of one or less per month before March. “High quality” defector is defined as meaning squad or platoon leaders from Viet Cong main force units. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:15 p.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:45 a.m. on June 9 under cover of a memorandum stating that it was “worth reading through to the end” and had “much more good news than bad.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5) 154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield 154. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator Mike Mansfield 1 Washington, June 10, 1966, 8:45 a.m. [Here follows discussion of several topics, including Vietnam and Senator Dirksen.] LBJ: What do you think about Vietnam? MM: Well, Iʼm not happy about it any more than you are. LBJ: No. Nobody is. MM: I was a little bit disturbed by Lodgeʼs first paragraph in his weekly report 2 to you about heavier bombing which I assumed meant the Haiphong-Hanoi complex or was leading up to it. I think it would be a serious mistake because those places have been evacuated to a degree except for industrial needs so there wonʼt be much damage hurt. But youʼve got Giap with his 320,000–330,000 man army waiting and if you knocked him out of there heʼd say, “What the hell. Weʼve got nothing to lose. Letʼs go.” And they wonʼt come down in divisional strength. Theyʼll just disperse those divisions into guerrilla units, and it will be awfully hard for us to maintain the ratio needed. As far as petroleum is concerned, I donʼt think it plays a hell of a lot in the life of the Viet Cong, or the Vietnamese rather. As far as mining or blockading Haiphong Harbor is concerned, youʼve got more stuff going out of Haiphong than going in. Very little is coming in at Haiphong. The ships have been reduced considerably. What British ships are left are usually under Hong Kong registry and are struck maybe under the ownership of the Communists. You run up against other nations and here the situation is already difficult; you make it more difficult. Itʼs just a hell of a can of worms. If you really go at ʼem, this could turn into an open-ended war and other countries would begin to criticize us more than they are at the present. LBJ: I think that nearly everybody—well, theyʼre not gonna mine anything and theyʼre not gonna bomb any industrial complex. What theyʼre gonna try to do is take out the POLs. They find the petroleum supply is almost double what it was last year—their needs are; and their supplies are stored there. And theyʼre trying to get rid of that storage and disperse it. And theyʼre scattering it around where we canʼt get to it with the individual bombs. Theyʼre puttinʼ it underground and puttinʼ it in concrete and they wonʼt take it out before itʼs all gone. And theyʼre just about to walk out on it. They think itʼs a tragic mistake not to destroy that petroleum thatʼs supplying ten thousand trucks that are coming down now. Itʼs in the edge. Itʼs kinda like Mt. Vernon, Alexandria, Arlington, and Washington, DC I seem to be the only one thatʼs afraid that theyʼll hit the United States Capitol or hit a hospital or hit a school or something. They donʼt think so. But I see so many of these airplanes that get off all the time—like this B–70 thing. They just constantly make mistakes. MM: Yes. And you donʼt know when these planes will fly over to China—two or three or four already. LBJ: Oh, they do that. They do that. They do that. I donʼt think thatʼll be a problem here, but just as they do get off over there theyʼre liable to get off here. And if they get off one little inch here you could drop a bomb on a school or on a hospital and thatʼs quite different from the oil. Now, the experts say that the oil is not going to infuriate or inflame them more than the bridges that weʼre taking out running to China now. That is about as big a needle as we can put in them, what weʼre doing now. But the oil is so much more important because they gotta have it for their trucks—and then now, weʼve got their light plant knocked out and they knocked out one of ours yesterday, too—that weʼve got to take out the oil. Now we just keep delaying these decisions for various reasons. Itʼs somebody going on a mission. This time Rusk is in Brussels—you canʼt do it. When you get back weʼve got another fellow going to Hanoi. And things of that kind that itʼs pretty hard to do this while this is going on ‘cause theyʼll say that you do it. But the military and the fellows out there, Westmoreland, just feel like that youʼre just lettin’ ʼem shoot our men unnecessarily. That you ought to stop this—you ought to make it as difficult—we canʼt stop it, but make it as difficult for them to get supplies as possible or you oughtʼn to be in there. And thatʼs another thing. None of them think you can get out this year. They all think that while they just—the casualties are hell, like hell. They killed several hundred yesterday in one raid. We just give ʼem a mopping up every time we meet ʼem. They nevertheless think that weʼre gonna be there all year. MM: Well, I think so. I wish it was only for just a year, Mr. President, but Iʼm afraid it may be longer unless thereʼs a break somewhere in between. [Here follows a brief discussion of peace negotiations.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Mansfield, Tape F66.16, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. 2 Document 153 . 155. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 155. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 14, 1966. Hereʼs my think-piece on where to go from here on the civil side. Itʼs long but every word counts, so I hope youʼll plow through it. Iʼve shown it only to Bob McNamara (since itʼs his ox I want to gore, I thought this only fair). He said to tell you he “strongly supports” it, which made me feel Iʼm on the track. The key point is that neither Porter in Saigon nor the civilian agencies are thinking boldly enough or pushing hard enough to galvanize the civil side. Porter needs a pep talk (McNamara and I will give him one too) and to be told that itʼs his job to take hold and run the civil side (not just understudy Lodge). Weʼve laid on the first meeting with Porter for 11 a.m. Thursday 2 (followed by impromptu press conference), then later perhaps the Congressional briefing you had in mind (by Monday I hope we could crow about devaluation). Is the attached war plan generally in accord with your views? Yes No 3 R.W. Komer Attachment Washington, June 14, 1966. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Before you talk with Porter, 4 here are the ideas which I am slowly maturing as I grab hold on Vietnam. I. The civil side—our “other war”—is even more central than I had realized . Indeed it may be the critical determinant of success or failure in Vietnam. Our military buildup has already reversed the trend toward defeat. As it continues, we can seize the initiative even more and outmatch any increase in Hanoiʼs infiltration. We can also selectively increase our direct pressure on Hanoi. But I doubt that we can definitively contain the guerrilla threat primarily by military means. We can chase the VC and PAVN around the countryside, maul them when we catch them, and weaken their resolve. Yet without a major pacification effort to secure the countryside and give Vietnamʼs war-weary people a sense of hope as well as security, this military process could be well nigh endless—and infinitely more costly. We also have to cope with a likely prolongation of the political turmoil of the last few months. The Buddhist extremists may have been balked for the moment, but we are committed to a democratic process which—necessary as it is—will create perhaps as much instability in the short run as it offers hope in the longer run. This leaves the pacification-social reform side of the equation. I suspect that only through an effort in this field, more fully complementary to our military effort can we achieve success. II. The Problem of Scale . So far I havenʼt said anything new. You and your advisors signed on to the above in Honolulu. What may be new, however, is my growing conviction that we are not thinking big enough, or moving fast enough, on the civil side to complement our military effort adequately—or achieve reasonably quick results. Some crude comparisons of scale are instructive. We are spending perhaps $15–18 billion on the military side and only $700–800 million on the civil side. Weʼve deployed about 300,000 troops compared to about 3,000 civilians. The ARVN contribution is about 700,000 (plus around 80,000 Vietnamese working for defense construction, etc.) while the GVN civil servants, police, cadre, etc. number on the order of 250,000. Of course, such gross comparisons are misleading—but they illustrate the basic point. Moreover, Porter and I have so far concentrated (and I think rightly so) on essential measures to prevent disaster, and to provide basic building blocks for a future civil effort: A. Coping with inflation , created largely by our own buildup, was Problem No. 1, because left unchecked it could undermine the country. With luck, weʼre on the verge of real success:—(1) if Ky goes through with devaluation, it will be a major step; (2) if DOD actually limits the local impact of our buildup to end-FY 1966 levels, weʼll at least prevent a whole new inflationary thrust—though weʼll still have the existing one; (3) a variety of steps—including military takeover of Saigon port—should reduce port and inland distribution bottlenecks so that we can keep supply more in phase with demand. B. We are also reforming and streamlining the aid program to reduce corruption, increase efficiency, and meet growing Hill and press criticism. C. We have underway a doubling of RD cadre output —the most promising rural pacification device—and are energizing the new Ministry of Revolutionary Development (clearly the best outfit in an otherwise feeble GVN). III. Need for an Expanded Effort . But the above is far from enough. Weʼve prevented economic collapse, and this in itself is good. But we arenʼt going anywhere fast. If we continue along present lines, and at the present pace, it may be years before we generate a major positive impact So weʼve got to think bigger on the civil side: A. Even at the accelerated rate, the cadre and RD program will take years to blanket the countryside. It lags far behind in ability to secure and hold what US and ARVN forces can initially clear. The police program is also too small and unambitious for its internal security mission. B. As Orville Freeman will attest, itʼs incredible that in 11 years in a rural country, even during wartime, weʼve accomplished so little in agriculture. C. Our overall economic aid program is not big enough—or good enough—to permit more than slow progress. It will only suffice to feed the people, help contain inflation, keep such little industry as exists going, prevent epidemics, slowly expand basic education. Nonetheless, AID is programming little more for FY 1967 than for FY 1966. Nor could AID, as presently organized, spend much more efficiently. It was never set up to run massive logistic, relief, and rural construction programs in a war-torn country with little infrastructure left, and to do so through a feeble “government” which works fitfully at best. AID has on board only 2,900 plus of the 3,900 US and local employees called for, and at the present rate of recruiting wonʼt reach strength for another year or two. Nor is 3,900 probably enough. In sum, while weʼve accomplished a good deal since Honolulu, especially in containing inflation, the rest of civil side is still barely off the ground, and not going anywhere fast. IV. My Solution . I donʼt want to argue for grand schemes which canʼt realistically be achieved in the short term. But a substantial gearing up of civil programs is (a) essential; (b) can be achieved fairly quickly by such measures as temporary turnover to our more efficient military of functions AID just canʼt do as well; and (c) would pay greater return per dollar and man invested than almost any other US investment in Vietnam: A. Administrative Steps . There is still too much “business as usual” on the civil side, both in Washington and the field. This will take time to correct; the lead time needed for most “civilian” enterprises seems to be two or three times longer than it would take our military to do the job. So if we want quick results, there is no substitute for borrowing from DOD. Iʼm fortified in this by a strong suspicion that borrowing say two percent of its Vietnam assets (less than one percent of its manpower) could give us a much higher percentage of improvement on the civil side. And this would be in the militaryʼs own interest as well as the nationʼs. 1. So my first proposal is to turn over more civil logistics functions to the military . AID is simply not geared up to the unfamiliar task of providing at least half the needs of a civil economy in wartime. Unlike its operations in other countries (where it works through a halfway decent local government and infrastructure) AID has to do just about everything in Vietnam—from managing the whole import program, scheduling ships, improving port facilities, and clearing goods to distributing them in-country. AID has sought to go about this by setting up a roughly parallel logistics organization to that of our military. But the lead time needed is great and AID is understandably less efficient. Hence my solution is for our military to provide temporarily as many logistic services as it can do more efficiently by simple extension of its existing machinery, e.g. take over scheduling of AID shipping, Saigon port, the bulk of in-country transport, medical supply, etc. Otherwise we just wonʼt get the job done soon enough. Then, when AID has shaken down it can plan in orderly fashion to take over again later. 2. Strengthen Porterʼs mandate . Though you put Porter in charge of Vietnam civil programs, he is still kept far too busy running the Embassy to devote more than part-time to it (Lodge confines himself mainly to high policy). Porter must be freed to do the civil job—more than enough for any one man—and get others to run the Embassy . Porter also needs a good chief of staff and more staff of his own, as heʼs now coming to realize. At present he has only a part-time Colonel from MACV; its contribution needs to be upgraded. 3. We need better coordination of the civil and military efforts . We are still running two wars, even though the military makes a major contribution to the civil side. I may be wrong, but I sense that Westy may be devoted too much to search and destroy, and not enough to slower moving clear-and-hold operations, to preventing the siphoning off of civil resources to the VC, and to helping the pacification effort. Rice control is a good example. The Delta delivered 700,000 tons of rice to the cities in 1963. This year we expect to get only 260,000 tons. We ʼre meeting this shocking deficit by importing PL 480 rice—and maybe this is right. But Porter and Westy ought to be working harder on control of this key resource—for example by pressuring General Quang in IV Crops. At present the Vietnamese economy is feeding the VC and Cambodia, while we feed the cities. B. Gearing up the Civil Side . Once we relieve AID of matters it canʼt handle efficiently, we can get it focussed better on the problems which only it can manage. Here are the actions I think needed—not AIDʼs alone—for the purpose: 1. Expansion of RD Ministry Operations . This most promising of the GVN ministries needs more US support. There are complaints of shortages of men, cement, and concertina wire from the provinces. Letʼs ship in more. Letʼs start planning now for CY 1967—civil agencies rarely plan ahead. And we must help the GVN strengthen its village and hamlet administration. 2. Further Expansion of Cadre and Police . We have planning exercises underway at least, but they will entail an argument over civil vs. military use of manpower. My proposal is to have the argument now, in the shape of discussion of a manpower budget, which will provide a framework for more rational US/GVN manpower use (and hopefully more manpower for the civil side). 3. Expand the US civil advisory role at district level . We donʼt really know enough about whatʼs happening at the cutting edge down in the village or even district. Instead weʼre dependent on what the Vietnamese tell us (which is notoriously unreliable). MACV is the only US agency with advisors below the province (roughly two captains and three sergeants at district headquarters). Of course, these MACV advisors spend much of their time on pacification matters. But this is not their primary function. So if we want to expand operations in the critical countryside, and monitor effectively what is done there, we need people with primary civil side duties at district too. But we canʼt recruit civilians fast enough for even the province level vacancies as yet. Once again my solution is quick and dirty—borrow temporarily from MACV three bright young captains and sergeants to work primarily to pacification in each of the 200 odd districts where our people can now function. This adds up to only about 600, who could be kept in uniform and supported logistically by MACV just like the other district advisors. Operationally, however, theyʼd be under Porterʼs direction. Iʼd experiment first with say 10 districts right now—and then the 26 districts in the National Priority Areas. 4. Porter should also be given clear and unequivocal authority over civilian agency operations in the regions and provinces . At present he shares this fuzzily with USIA, AID, and CIA. We need a unified chain of command on the civil side, reaching from Porterʼs office down to the districts. He should have—and assert—unequivocal control over all USG officials, from whatever agency, assigned to pacification operations. I would also favor strengthening his organization by giving to each of his Provincial Representatives a fund of up to $10,000 annually in piasters to be spent, subject to Porterʼs approval, on small-scale projects of high political impact where speed and flexibility are crucial for effectiveness (such a plan worked well in African countries where rural problems are similar). 5. Step up our agricultural effort . Freemanʼs program may contain too much now, but AIDʼs has too little for the peasant in this agricultural country. The program needs better direction, agricultural experts at provincial and district levels, a systematic effort to develop a local seed industry, expanded fertilizer distribution, and a stepped-up animal husbandry effort. Both Freeman and Gardener have also urged a broad-scale approach to irrigation, drainage, flood control, and rural water supply systems. We should at least make a beginning, though local security is a prerequisite. 6. Forestry . We are exporting lumber, which is in tight US supply, to Vietnam at exorbitant prices while forest reserves there are untapped and saw mills are operating at 40% capacity. Help to this industry is in Vietnamʼs interest and our own. Local security is the hooker, so letʼs get Westy in the act. 7. Defector Programs (Chieu Hoi) have had a tremendous pay-off for a peanut US contribution ($ 700,000 this year). The program is now deteriorating instead of building up. It needs new direction, and better backing than AID is now giving it. Here again Iʼd borrow some MACV bodies. 8. Reaching the very young VC . You urged at Honolulu that a psy-ops plan be developed to reach the VC age group in the 9 to 15 year old bracket. Little has been done to counter the long VC lead with this group. Iʼd like to get a small group of real experts onto this. 9. Resource Control and Economic Warfare . Weʼre not doing enough of either, largely because it falls between stools (CIA, MACV, AID). Surely we ought to be able to outbid Cambodia for rice. Keeping rice and aid commodities from being diverted to the VC ought to have a substantial pay-off at relatively modest cost. More Mission, MACV, and AID support and enthusiasm is the key. D. Doing the Above will take More Money as well as More Bodies . Once again, the way to get an immediate add-on is from a man whoʼll take decisions—Bob McNamara. AID is thinking only in terms of $650–700 million for Vietnam in FY 1967 (including about $100 million in PL 480), at most $50 million more than the $640 million programmed for FY 1966. But we are already considering $63–116 million more in add-ons, plus considerable dollar purchase of piasters. While I canʼt quantify yet all the further proposals Iʼve made above, Iʼm thinking for forward planning purposes in terms of at least $200 million more in FY 1967 than FY 1966. One way to get the money is a supplemental—if DOD goes for one in January, we could tack AID on. If DOD doesnʼt, however, Iʼd be dubious of AIDʼs chances. AID is already trying to cut some $80 million of over-commitments in FY 1966 programs, and has no stomach for a new round of hearings before Fulbright et al. Another solution is to cut AID programs elsewhere. But these are already pared and will probably have to be pared some more to absorb Hill cuts. Nor do we want to rob Peter to pay Paul. So the only quick answer (at least to carry us till a supplemental) is to bury a good chunk of the civil programs in the DOD and CIA budgets (the latter for RD cadre costs). My principle would be to have DOD itself pay for (instead of being reimbursed) all that it provides to the civil side. At a rough guess this might be on the order of $100–150 million ($25 million for operating Saigon port, $18–23 million for cadre and police ammo and ordnance, $20–40 million for medical supplies, $10–15 million for in-country airlift, $17 million for mothball ships, etc.) DOD is already providing major help to the civil side on a non-reimbursable basis—but it might be easier all around to hide another $100 million or so in a budget so big it could hardly be found. E. Conclusion . The above civil program is still painfully imprecise. It also ignores the gut issue of how to get a feeble GVN to play ball. But at least it starts us going somewhere, with a sense of urgency comparable to our military effort, at a piddling fraction of its cost. I believe that up to $200 million more so spent—even wastefully—would still pay more return per dollar than the same $200 million spent in any other way. And it will suffice to galvanize the civil side—which otherwise will limp along as primarily an anti-inflationary dole without making any contribution positive enough, quickly enough to complement properly our military push. My program is not dramatic—but it will help win the war. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, March-June 1966. Secret. Komer sent copies of the attachment to Rostow and Taylor under a June 17 covering memorandum in which he stated that the President was “strongly in favor” of his proposals. (Ibid.) 2 June 16. 3 The President checked neither of these options and instead wrote: “See me, L.” 4 The President met with Porter and Komer from 11:10 to 11:45 a.m. on June 16. Leonhart and Zorthian joined the meeting for 10 minutes at 11:35 a.m No record of the discussion has been found. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 156. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 156. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Wilson 1 Washington, June 14, 1966. Dean Rusk has told me of his private talk with you about the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi. 2 Specific orders have not yet been issued but I see no way of avoiding such action, given the expansion of the illegal corridor through Laos, the continuing buildup of North Vietnamese forces in South Viet Nam, the growing abuse of Cambodian neutrality, and the absence of any indication in Hanoi of a serious interest in peace. We expect costly fighting during the Monsoon season, the first engagements of which have undoubtedly come to your attention. I must do what I can to reduce our casualties at the hands of those who are moving in from the north. I deeply hope that you will find a way to maintain solidarity with us on Viet-Nam despite what you have said in the House of Commons about Haiphong and Hanoi. 3 We are not talking about an air assault on civilian centers but a specific attack on POL installations with a direct relevance to the fighting in the south. I hope that you can give further thought to your own interests and commitments in Southeast Asia under the SEATO Treaty. Dean tells me that, in his talk with you and your colleagues, several references were made to the “revival of SEATO.” South Viet Nam and five signatories of SEATO are not talking about a revival but are committing troops to repel an armed attack from the north. Nor do I believe that your role as co-chairman means that Britain should stand aside; the other co-chairman is furnishing large quantities of sophisticated arms and other assistance to North Viet Nam and is, therefore, an active partner in the effort to take over South Viet Nam by force. I know that you have some problems about Viet Nam, as do I. But I believe that it is sound for us to base our policy on the simple principles of the Geneva Accords and the SEATO Treaty, and on the assumption that North Viet Nam will not be permitted to seize South Viet Nam. Since we are determined about the latter point, much of the present criticism will come right at the end of the day. I gather Dean spoke to you of the possible combination of points which would put a different cast upon disassociation by you from a decision to strike the POL. Quite frankly, I earnestly hope that you will not find it necessary to speak in terms of disassociation. But it would be important to us if you could include the following elements: 1. You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, in our minds, become necessary. 2. You expressed your own views to us in accordance with statements which you have already made in the House of Commons. 3. The particular step taken by U.S. forces was directed specifically to POL storage and not against civilian centers or installations. 4. Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is not easy or appropriate for Britain to determine the particular military action which may be necessary under different circumstances. 5. It is a great pity that Hanoi and Peiping have been so unresponsive to unprecedented efforts by the U.S. and others to bring this problem from the battlefield to the conference table. 6. Britain is satisfied that U.S. forces have no designs against civilian populations and are taking every possible precaution to avoid civilian casualties. 7. Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the determination of its fellow SEATO members to insure the safety and the self-determination of South Viet Nam. I would hope that you could in this context affirm your support for the effort in Viet Nam and your understanding that it is Hanoi which is blocking the path to peace. The timing of a visit to Washington is somewhat complicated. You and I agree that there should be a good deal of blue sky between your visit and possible action in Viet Nam. That alone would suggest that the month of June is out, as we now look at the calendar of events. When we get into July, I shall expect to be away for almost a full week surrounding July 4th. You have Pompidouʼs visit on July 6–8 and your possible visit to Moscow on July 9–10. I have just suggested to President Senghor that he come here July 11–13. It appears, therefore, anything before mid-July is blocked by our respective calendars. If you feel a talk at that time is essential, we can say now that we expect it to be held in mid- or late July, leaving the precise dates open for further determination. In response to questions as to why you are coming, perhaps we both should simply say that we have felt occasional talks to be worthwhile and that a number of matters of mutual interest could be usefully discussed, and that mid-July appears to be a mutually convenient time. I was much interested in what Dean told me of your talks about Rhodesia and the maritime strike. You have my best wishes in bringing both of these troublesome matters to an early conclusion. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6. Top Secret; Personal; Exdis. The message was drafted by Rusk, reviewed by the President, and redrafted by Rusk and Rostow in light of the Presidentʼs instructions. Rostow informed Read in a June 14 memorandum that the message had been sent that day and that an information copy had gone to McNamara. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 2 Rusk met with Wilson in London on June 10. 3 In telegram 5768 from London, June 2, Bruce reported that on February 8 Wilson stated in the House of Commons: “We have made it clear in Washington that we could not support any extension of the bombing against North Vietnam by stages to Hanoi and Haiphong.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 157. Memorandum From William N. Morell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 157. Memorandum From William N. Morell, Jr., of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, June 15, 1966. SUBJECT An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam 1. The attached report represents a comprehensive research effort by this Agency and DIA on the effects of Rolling Thunder attack against North Vietnam in 1965, and will, I believe, be of interest to you. 2. Although the Rolling Thunder program flew many thousands of attack sorties against military and economic targets, the resultant damage was relatively light, in good measure reflecting the restricted nature of the air campaign. North Vietnam reacted vigorously to restore transport facilities essential to maintaining the flow of supplies to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The toll in human casualties, based on fragmentary sample data, is estimated to have been between 11,700 and 14,800, divided about equally between dead and wounded, with a somewhat higher percentage of military as compared to civilian casualties. 3. The major effect of the attack has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity and to divert manpower in significant numbers to war supporting activities. North Vietnam may now require 200,000 full-time workers (or about 10 percent of the non-agriculture labor force) for tasks associated with dispersal and emergency repair and maintenance, and the part-time work of another 100,000. Bill Morell Director Research and Reports Attachment Washington, June 1, 1966. Intelligence Report 2 AN APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM 3 Summary The Rolling Thunder program, a systematic but restrained air offensive against selected economic and military targets in North Vietnam, was begun on 2 March 1965. The basic objectives of the air attacks on North Vietnam have been made clear in public statements by the President and other high officials of the US Government. These objectives are (a) to reduce the ability of North Vietnam to support the Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos; (b) to increase progressively the pressure on North Vietnam to the point where the regime would decide it was too costly to continue directing and supporting the insurgency in the South; and (c) to bolster the confidence and morale of the South Vietnamese. The US and South Vietnamese air campaign against North Vietnam has been a carefully controlled means of gradual escalation to achieve strictly limited objectives. Consequently, the program has operated under a set of firmly defined ground rules which have limited both the choice of targets and the areas to be bombed. The existence of large restricted areas has effectively insulated almost 80 percent of North Vietnamʼs limited modern industrial economy from air attack; these areas contain 75 percent of the nationʼs population and the most lucrative military supply and LOC targets. The estimated dollar cost for the restoration of economic and military targets attacked in the Rolling Thunder campaign is less than 10 percent of the value of the economic aid given to North Vietnam in recent years by Communist countries. Restoration Costs of Facilities Attacked by the Rolling Thunder Program Million US $ Economic Military Total Attacks on fixed targets 23.6 26.4 50 Armed reconnaissance missions 12.8 0.7 13 Total 36 27 63 About 57 percent of the total damage—$36 million—is attributable to the destruction of economic targets. This cost has been broadly distributed throughout the economic sector, and no one sector has been forced to bear unacceptably high levels of damage. In terms of national capacity the greatest damage was inflicted on electric power and petroleum storage facilities. These target systems lost 27 and 17 percent, respectively, of their national capacity. In each case, however, the target system has adequate cushion in the form of excess capacity to absorb these attacks, and economic activity could therefore be maintained at almost normal levels. The damage to military facilities is just over $ 27 million. Almost 60 percent of this damage was to military barracks, but the effect has been negligible. The damage to military targets has shown a definite downward trend since the peak month of July 1965. The damage to military facilities not only has resulted in losses of equipment but also has prompted the abandonment of installations such as airfields and the dispersal of equipment and supplies normally stored in ammunition and supply depots. The United States has placed restrictions on the air offensive against North Vietnam in order to minimize civilian casualties. It has been to North Vietnamʼs interest to assert otherwise, however, and propaganda media attempt to give the impression that the air offensive has been a vicious and unrestrained assault on the civilian population, hospitals, schools, and other nonmilitary objectives. Nevertheless, in only one instance have Hanoi officials presumed to provide a total for the number of casualties. In September, Egyptian journalists were told that total casualties were 75,000, including 40,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. No procedures devised in this report for the purpose of estimating casualties can support a figure of this magnitude. Although the Rolling Thunder program has flown many thousands of attack sorties against targets in North Vietnam, the toll in human casualties has been light. Based on sample data, through the end of 1965, North Vietnamese casualties—both civilian and military—are estimated to have ranged from 11,700 to 14,800, divided about equally between killed and wounded. Estimated Casualties Resulting from Rolling Thunder Military Civilian Total Attacks on fixed targets 3,900 to 4,700 1,700 to 2,400 6,500 to l7,900 Armed reconnaissance missions 2,600 to 3,200 3,500 to 4,500 6,100 to 7,700 Total 6,500 to 7,900 5,200 to 6,900 11,700 to 14,800 About 55 percent of these casualties were military personnel. The civilians killed or injured by armed reconnaissance attacks were for the most part truck drivers or transport and construction workers rather directly engaged in maintaining the logistic pipeline to South Vietnam. Approximately 3,000 civilian deaths (one-half of total civilian casualties) as a result of military action against North Vietnam is a small number. The impact of 3,000 civilian casualties is slight in a country where over 350,000 persons died in 1965 from other causes and where the accidental deaths alone produced casualties some three to five times greater than those resulting from the Rolling Thunder program. The economic and military damage sustained has presented an increasing but still moderate bill to Hanoi, which in large measure can be (and has been) passed along to Moscow and Peiping. The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam has been to force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal economic activity, particularly in transportation and distribution. Reconstruction efforts have been hampered by difficulties in allocating manpower. The regime has relocated large elements of its urban population. Problems in the distribution of food have appeared, although these problems are not yet pressing. Where the bombing has hurt most has been in its disruption of the road and rail nets and in the very considerable repair effort which became necessary. On the other hand, the regime has been singularly successful in overcoming US interdiction efforts. An examination of destroyed and damaged facilities shows that only a small number were truly essential to the war effort. The major essential restoration has consisted of measures to keep traffic moving, to keep the railroad yards operating, to maintain communications, and to replace transport equipment and equipment for radar and SAM sites. These measures have probably been effected at a cost of between $4 million and $5 million, or between 5 and 10 percent of the total economic and military damage sustained in North Vietnam to date. The ability to react and to offset the effects of the air attacks has not been without its costs. It is estimated that the diversion of manpower to tasks associated with dispersal programs and emergency repair and maintenance of lines of communication throughout North Vietnam may now require the full-time services of 200,000 workers (equivalent to about 10 percent of the nonagricultural labor force) and the part-time impressment of another 100,000. An additional 150,000 people are also obligated, on a part-time basis, to serve in various aspects of civil defense which take them away from their normal pursuits. Thus a significant share of the labor force is diverted in varying degrees to supporting the war in the South. The diversion of labor has been supplemented, particularly in the northern provinces, by Chinese logistic support troops. In response to the intensified US and Vietnamese air offensive in 1965, all countries of the Communist camp have extended economic assistance as proof of their support. Total assistance extended by China and the USSR in 1965 is on the order of $250 million to $400 million, of which military aid accounted for $150 million to $200 million. This aid is a relatively insignificant drain on the capabilities of both countries. The USSR is by far the major source of military equipment for North Vietnam, supplying 70 to 95 percent, or $142 million, of the total provided in 1965. The major components of Soviet military aid were SAM sites (15 to 20), antiaircraft guns (1,000 to 1,200), planes (44), motor vehicles (2,600), radar, and jet fuel. Chinaʼs identified military aid, totaling only $11 million, consisted principally of planes (8) and trucks (1,400). In addition, large amounts of infantry weapons and ammunition are provided by Communist China. The inclusion of the cost of this equipment would probably raise the value of Chinaʼs total contribution by a few million dollars. Military aid from the Eastern European Communist countries—consisting principally of small arms and ammunition, medicines and medical equipment, and some trucks—is valued at only a few million dollars. [Here follows the body of the 146-page report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. The memorandum and attachment were forwarded to the President on June 16. 2 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of Bombing of NVN-CIA/DIA. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. Prepared by the CIA and DIA. 3 Covering the period from 2 March through 31 December 1965. [Footnote in the source text.] 158. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 158. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Saigon, undated. SUBJECT General Taylorʼs Memorandum for the President of April 27, 1966, entitled “Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips,” 2 concerning which you asked my opinion 1. Your attention is first invited to: a. Saigonʼs 1377 of October 21, 1965, 3 notably to suggestion for an opening negotiating position and for definition of a “ Satisfactory Outcome ”; b. Letter to Leonard Unger of November 30, 1965, 4 commenting on the State Department paper, “A Settlement in Vietnam” dated November 3, 1965; 5 which includes c. a paper by me entitled, “Negotiating with the Communists” (based on experience at the UN and study of negotiations elsewhere); 6 d. Saigonʼs 2343 of January 1, 1966; 7 e. Saigonʼs 2376 of January 4, 1966. 8 2. General Taylorʼs paper is of great value and he is to be congratulated on it. There are some observations of his which are particularly wise. They should be a guide to anyone who represents the United States at a negotiation and are as follows: a. The initiation of discussions does not mean the advent of peace. Probably more people were killed after the Panmunjom talks started than would have been killed had we kept the military initiative. b. There must be an incentive for the enemy to come to a prompt settlement. Without such an incentive the talks could drag on indefinitely. Therefore, military pressure must be maintained while the talks are taking place. c. The bombing must not be stopped without a quid pro quo. To do so solely for the purpose of getting talks going would seriously prejudice the success of any subsequent negotiations. d. Moreover, we should never give up any one of our assets in advance as a precondition for discussions. We should only concede one step at a time. e. Orthodox troop withdrawals, such as the US can make, are very easy to verify. Infiltration on the communist model is so elusive that an effective detection system of a “ceasefire” is not feasible. f. There should be an analysis by competent experts in Washington as to how our assets should be played. 3. In his last paragraph, at the bottom of page 3, General Taylor affirms that the United States must never give up any of its assets without achieving an equivalent gain. I agree emphatically. He also says that his specific “estimate of assets and values may be challenged,” which I take as a gracious invitation to comment—and possibly to suggest variants—on his assessment of the “blue chips.” In this spirit I make the following observations: 4. The Essence of the Taylor Proposal a. General Taylor proposes for the first phase of diplomatic negotiations that, in exchange for the US stopping its bombing and its offensive military operations in South Vietnam, the Viet Cong stop their incidents and their military operations. b. For the second stage, the US would stop its force increase and the Viet Cong would cease its infiltration. c. After this, would come withdrawal by the Viet Cong and by the US and dissolution of the Viet Cong (which the Viet Cong would agree to). In exchange, the GVN would give amnesty and civic rights to the Viet Cong. d. General Taylor adds that if the Viet Cong performance is bad as regards cessation of military operations, we can resume bombing. e. He also says that under his plan the US and GVN would retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory. 5. My General Comment on the Taylor Proposal a. General Taylor, in effect, proposes a general ceasefire as a substitute for unilateral ending of United States bombing. b. If this becomes our policy, we should never reveal the fact publicly because the pressure of so-called world opinion would probably force us to stop the bombing first, after which we would be committed to a general ceasefire. Then, when we came to working out the all-important specific provisions of a ceasefire, we would be without some very valuable bargaining power. c. I also question whether we could readily resume bombing if the Viet Cong performance is bad, given the influence of organized propaganda against the bombings. Whether we like it or not, bombing the North is in a special propaganda category. But we could, to be sure, resume operation on the ground. 6. My Comment on the Substance of the Taylor Proposal Regarding “Blue Chips” a. The Taylor proposal does not reach terrorism in the Viet Cong areas, even though it does enable us and the GVN to retain the right to use weapons to protect the civil population outside of the Viet Cong territory. b. But it is very difficult to define Viet Cong areas geographically and this makes it equally difficult, if not impossible, to define prohibited US–GVN “offensive” military operations therein. This would lead to continual charges that we are violating the ceasefire. For example, many large segments of the countryside are “controlled” by whichever side happens to be physically present at any given time. With a ceasefire, would we be able to use arms to protect the people in such areas from the VC? Other extensive areas of the countryside are controlled by the GVN by day and the VC by night. Would friendly forces be able to patrol such areas at night? Could GVN officials stay in rural areas at night with impunity from the VC? These considerations call into question the practicability of arranging a ceasefire in isolation from a more general political settlement. c. Whatever steps we might take to protect ourselves after the “ceasefire” was in effect would put us in clear violation of the ceasefire. d. On the other hand, the Viet Cong method of operation, being unorthodox from a western military viewpoint, makes it easy for them to keep below the threshold of the proposed “ceasefire” agreement. The term “ceasefire” cannot reasonably apply to such things as sabotage, assassination, terrorism, propaganda, impressment, kidnapping, torture, subversive action, VC tax collection, infiltration from the north, and direction of strategy and tactics. None of these things necessarily involve the use of firearms. e. In the areas now embracing about 25 per cent of the population and which are presently controlled by the Viet Cong, the forces of law and order would thus be prevented from using weapons, but the Viet Cong would be free to go on using the methods which they traditionally use. f. A general ceasefire would legitimize Viet Cong areas, thereby leading to partition or to irresistible demands for a coalition government. g. To end the military pressures against presently hard-pressed Viet Cong units, as a ceasefire would do, would also enable them to regroup and launch operations later under more favorable conditions, as happened very often in the Chinese civil war. h. If a ceasefire permits unimpeded access by the government to the entire country it will be unacceptable to the Viet Cong, but we would be committed to a ceasefire without a political settlement. i. If a ceasefire leads to the recognition of Viet Cong safe areas, a political outcome will have, in effect, been imposed by the formalities of the ceasefire. 7. My Alternative Proposal a. Instead of linking the cessation of bombing to a cessation of Viet Cong incidents and military operations, I would rather link the bombing to stopping infiltration by North Vietnam into the South and to an agreement to establish control posts along the Ho Chi Minh trail and along both sides of the Vietnamese-Laotian and Vietnamese-Cambodian borders. b. This has the advantage that it would not be necessary for Hanoi to admit that it has infiltrated. Hanoi could maintain a public posture of non-intervention and control posts could be established without loss of face. c. Also, this scheme has the advantage of relating the end of bombing to the interdiction of supplies—a logical thing to do since the purpose of bombing is precisely to interdict supplies. For Hanoi publicly to fore-swear infiltration would be a heavy blow to the morale of the Viet Cong. It would enable us to continue the bombing until a satisfactory inspection mechanism is worked out. The issue of a general ceasefire could be left to the general political settlement, where it belongs. d. I recognize that General Taylor doubts the feasibility of an effective detection system for infiltration. Concerning this very important objection, I make two observations: A. It should be promptly studied by the best experts we have; and B. We should, under my proposal, continue bombing while a detection system was being worked out—assuming that such a system was not ready when negotiations began. 8. Probable Consequences a. My trade looks somewhat less dramatic than General Taylorʼs, but I wonder whether it would not put us in a stronger position. b. If Hanoi refuses to cease infiltration—or to establish control posts to verify that it is not infiltrating—it will be in a difficult position to mobilize world opinion against an end of the bombing. c. Also, my proposal would not force us to stop military operations in the South during negotiations. We would thus remain in a position to maintain maximum incentives for a flexible communist attitude. d. Also, the trade which I propose would enable us to tie a “cease-fire” to a political settlement or at least to the outlines of it. And “cease-fire,” as regards the Viet Cong, is much more political than military. 9. “Satisfactory Outcome” a. I renew my recommendation that we be clear in our minds as to what constitutes a “satisfactory outcome.” Without a dependable standard of measurement we run the risk of yielding to the pressures of the moment to such an extent that we actually find that, immediately upon the conclusion of the negotiations, we have lost the war and thus all that we have fought and sacrificed for. See Saigonʼs 1377. b. The negotiator must not be made to feel that if the negotiations break down, he has failed. I have known negotiations at the UN where on three separate occasions the US representative said in effect that he was being asked to make such impossible concessions that there was no point in continuing the conversation—and left the room. Yet an excellent understanding finally resulted. The other side was simply trying to see how far we could be pushed. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LV. Secret. Lodge forwarded the memorandum to Rostow under cover of a memorandum dated June 17. (Ibid.) 2 Document 127 . 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 470 – 473 . 4 Not found. 5 Not found, but see footnote 7, Document 115 , regarding a later version of this paper. 6 Attached but not printed. Lodge sent a copy of this undated memorandum to the President on January 17, 1966. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 212, Negotiation) 7 Document 1 . 8 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 159. Summary Notes of the 559th Meeting of the National Security Council 159. Summary Notes of the 559th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, June 17, 1966, 6:05–8 p.m. Vietnam—POL The President summarized the actions required and the judgments which will have to be made in the next several weeks, emphasizing the decision to strike POL targets. In general, we should seek, with minimum loss and minimum danger of escalating the war, to achieve the maximum effect on the North Vietnamese. We know that the North Vietnamese are dispersing their POL stocks in an effort to anticipate our bombing. The effect of not disrupting POL shipments to the North Vietnamese forces in the field is to pay a higher price in U.S. casualties. The choice is one of military lives vs. escalation. A decision on bombing is not being made now and one is not imminent. The reasons for our delay include: the Secretary was at the NATO meeting, 2 Canadian representative Ronning was visiting Hanoi, 3 time was required to talk to Prime Minister Wilson and our allies, and some sounds have come from Hanoi. Every bit of information is needed in reaching a decision. There is no uncertainty about my willingness to use the authority which is the Presidentʼs. There must be no discussion of this meeting. Everyone present can be trusted but we must be careful about talking to the press or even to staff members who might talk to the press. The highest security must be maintained. Secretary Rusk: We have an elementary obligation to support our combat troops when they are carrying out an assignment. The American people have a feeling of impatience and, over time, they may demand a quick end to the war as the price for their continued support. This restlessness is evident in the public opinion polls. Opinion abroad hopes that no larger military measures will be necessary. It is difficult to separate in the minds of people attacks on POL supplies from attacks on the civilian economy. There is a major difference between a 2- to 3-day strike and strikes continuing over a long period. We are under constant observation by everyone abroad. We must get across to the public that if we widen the bombing program to include POL targets that this does not mean a change in our policy of making every effort to avoid killing civilians. Many people who have no responsibility for the conduct of the war oppose a wider bombing program. As early as we can we must get a check on whether the Ronning mission to Hanoi produced any change in the North Vietnamese position. Mr. Ronning is reporting only to Canadian Foreign Minister Martin. He declined to tell our Charge in Vientiane whether the Hanoi leaders told him anything new. 4 The President: We must get the news fastest about the Ronning mission. Secretary Rusk: Prior to executing any new orders on bombing, we must give 24-hour advance notice to several Heads of State, including Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia, and the UK. If the decision is negative, we have no problem. A go decision will produce sharp reactions throughout the world. There probably will be attacks on our Embassies. The reaction will be less if a decision is limited to a short, sharp action. We must try to bring Hanoi to a decision. There is no evidence of their willingness to talk now. We cannot guarantee what the Chinese Communist reaction will be. Our guess is that there will be no military reaction from the Chinese Communists or the Soviets. There will be many problems in the UN. Secretary McNamara: Strikes on POL targets have been opposed by me for months. The situation is now changing and the earlier bombing decision must be reconsidered. POL targets are military targets. The military utilization of these targets has been greatly increased. The North Vietnamese dispersion of their POL is lessening our chance of ever destroying their POL supplies. Military infiltration from the north is up sharply. Consequently, the pressure on their lines of communication has increased. Their POL imports have doubled. The military importance of their POL system is way up and will increase further. The reasons for attacking POL targets are: 1. Our guess is that such attacks will limit infiltration from North Vietnam. 2. Those North Vietnamese troops in the south will worry about their source of supplies. 3. Pressure will be exerted on the political leaders in Hanoi. This bombing program seems to be the least costly way to tell them of our serious intentions. The reason against the POL bombing program is that it moves us further away from a termination of the war, thus costing more U.S. lives. General Johnson: The number of Vietnamese trucks has jumped from 6,900 to 10,000. Approximately 2,600 are en route to South Vietnam. All need fuel to operate. North Vietnamese POL imports are up from 900 to 23,000 tons. The President: What is coming in the next few weeks or the next 60 days? General Johnson: The North Vietnamese will reinforce the military power they now have and make a drive into central Vietnam—possibly even further south. Hitting the POL targets will hurt them in moving rice and weapons to replace those we have captured. They have to step up the rate of supplies from the north to the south. We will lose 3 to 4–1/2 percent of planes used on these missions. (Secretary McNamara interrupted to say this amounted to 20–25 planes.) More U.S. troops will be lost on the ground in the same time period than will be lost in the air strikes. The off-loading capacity of the North Vietnamese in the port of Haiphong would be struck. However, the Chiefsʼ view is that POL targets should be hit as a first priority. These attacks might play a significant part in bringing the war to a halt. If the POL targets are hit, the North Vietnamese will have to find alternative ways of delivering POL. Meanwhile, the dispersion of their petroleum supplies is continuing. Secretary McNamara: Already we have identified 70–80 POL dispersal points. POL tanks are being put underground and more POL is being stored in small tanks. Existing large tank farms would be destroyed. The value to us of the destruction of their oil supplies has greatly increased. Following are the risks: a. Civilian casualties would be very small. The estimate is for 50 casualties in the three prime targets. If, as is possible, our bombs miss their primary targets, we will undoubtedly hurt our cause. The casualty figure could go as high as 12,000. Six thousand of these would be civilians and of the civilians, three thousand would be killed. The casualties caused if the bombs land on-target would be less than those which would occur on targets now authorized to be struck. Our operation orders to our commanders are to minimize civilian casualties by being certain of their targets, i.e., positive identification, visual bombing, etc. We have made clear our views to Admiral Sharp regarding civilian casualties. b. As to the military reaction to the widened bombing, every expert says the risk of this is small. c. If we do not widen our bombing, the morale of U.S. troops and of the American people will suffer. People will say: If you consider a POL target a military target, why do you not strike it? d. The risk of hitting a Russian or foreign ship in a North Vietnamese harbor is very small. The President: Have we hit targets deeper into North Vietnam and nearer to civilian centers? There will be a psychological reaction because our bombing will be nearer to the center of cities. Secretary McNamara: The POL bombing program would hit areas further north and nearer civilian centers. Secretary Rusk: The cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, rightly or wrongly, are symbolic. Although we have hit oil storage areas in the city of Vinh, the reaction would be different if targets in Hanoi and Haiphong were struck. Walt Rostow: The military and political payoff of a strike on the POL targets hinges on the success of the effort. We will never be able to get them all. Secretary McNamara: We probably cannot do the job in one strike and would have to go back at least once. We do not know how quickly they would be able to restore the oil storage facilities, but we doubt that frequent strikes would be necessary to prevent rebuilding. Mr. Rostow: Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy. We have been attacking their LOCs. Because of our restraint, the North Vietnamese have changed their military planning to take advantage of our existing target system. Ambassador Goldberg: Have we previously struck at the civilian economy as we would be doing if we destroyed their supply of oil? General Johnson: We estimate that 60 percent of POL is used by the military. Mr. Rostow: Our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges. Our policy should remain steady and our actions should be cool and professional. We should not be on the defensive. Our military effort is based on the violation of the Geneva Accords by the North Vietnamese. Ambassador Goldberg: The risk of widening the bombing program to attack POL targets is too great. The results will not be what we think. All of us want to save U.S. lives but will such air attacks achieve this objective? 5 The Chinese and Soviet reactions to the headlines reporting the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong will be a challenge to them to give all aid necessary to make up the loss. The Chinese Communists as well as the Soviets will not sit by. At the very least they will replace the petroleum and the facilities destroyed. The Communist bloc is not going to let this outfit go down the drain. They see the Vietnam war as a confrontation. With minimum risk, they can make up for the damage we do to the North Vietnamese petroleum supplies. In addition, the world reaction would be strongly adverse—even Canada would oppose our action. During the Presidentʼs absence from the meeting, Secretary McNamara estimated the probability of missing our targets as slight. This remark was in response to the Vice President calling attention to our having missed Mu Ghia pass on an earlier air strike. Added that a high level of damage was assured if we bombed the POL targets. He acknowledged that more than one strike would be necessary to do the job. When the President returned to the room, Ambassador Goldberg said that the maximum military risk is that Chinese Communists will move in troops. The decision to bomb POL will mean that we will be isolating ourselves internationally. If we lose Canada and Japan as a result of these strikes, we will lose the Chinese representation issue in the UN. The domestic reaction will be very adverse if we strike these POL targets and then this act does not end the war. The reaction domestically will be to demand stronger military action by the President. The countryʼs mood will turn at election time if the war is still going on. The American people are supporting the President because he is cool and reserved. My judgment is based not on an interpretation of the polls but on my travelling about the country. We must delay at least until after the Ronning peace effort is safely out of the way so that if we take additional action, Mr. Ronning will be unable to say that we got a peace feeler in Hanoi and wrecked it. The President: No one has been reckless. Had we been, we would have struck these targets already. The Vice President: We have been up and down this hill many times. If we authorize these strikes, our action will be considered and looked upon as a change in policy even though it isnʼt. The action will complicate our problems in the UN and in Europe. We should wait until Ronning is out of the way. If the air strike is done cleanly, there will be less reaction. The North Vietnamese will not come to a conference table but will slowly withdraw. We should keep up the punishment we are inflicting on North Vietnam while seeking peace. It would be a catastrophe if a Soviet ship were hit and if Soviet personnel were killed. I have come around reluctantly to accepting the wider bombing program. Not to attack the POL targets would be to contribute to North Vietnamese strength. The strikes will complicate their logistic problem and exert pressure on Hanoi. As to the political consequences, it will play hell. But we should go ahead with the additional strikes, exercising precautions. Secretary McNamara responded to the Presidentʼs question by saying that every precaution to avoid civilian casualties had been taken. He again summarized the limitations placed on the pilots carrying out the air strikes. Secretary Fowler: We should recall the Korean experience where we failed to strike military targets because of geographic limitations and where we failed to use our predominant military power. a. Operational judgment on the strikes should weigh heavily with us. It is a most persuasive case which has been made. (Secretary McNamara added that the military advice was unanimous and very strong in favor of the strikes.) b. We need to accelerate progress toward ending the heavy fighting in South Vietnam. The only way open to us now is to weaken Hanoi. c. Time is important because the North Vietnamese are dispersing their storage of petroleum. We should move ahead. Assistant Secretary of State Bundy: Ambassador Reischauer rather surprisingly said that he believed we could put up with the Japanese reaction which he thought would be steep but supportable. This view is different than that stated by Ambassador Goldberg as to the effect on Japan. The recent meeting of our Ambassadors in Asia recommended that we undertake the expanded bombing program. CIA Director Raborn: We estimate that the Japanese reaction will not basically affect our relations with Japan. As to the Chinese Communist reaction, we think that by no means would they invade. It is very difficult for them to move into Vietnam and to support troops there. As to Soviet reaction, it will be vigorous and sharp and might involve their moving oil ashore by emergency means. We should recognize that this is not a one-shot operation. These targets will be a cause of continuing concern. If we took out the two major targets, there would be a terrific effect, but not overnight, on the confidence of the North Vietnamese troops. We learned in World War II that we should step up pressure when the enemy shows signs of weakness. USIA Director Marks: We should not decide this question on the basis of world opinion but rather on a military basis. We have created our own problem in part by developing what have become sacred cows. We should make a statement concerning the importance of oil off-loading facilities to the North Vietnamese military effort. We should ride out the reaction rather than take to the TV. Director Raborn: No statement as to our plans should be made because to make public our intentions would result in the loss of more U.S. planes. Secretary Rusk: If we make any mention of our intention to strike POL targets, we will have given the other side preventive warning time. The President: In order not to be lobbied on the decision, not another soul should be informed of this discussion. Deputy CIA Director Helms: The petroleum supplies are feeding the meat grinder in South Vietnam and this North Vietnamese military effort will continue unless we take out their petroleum supplies. General Johnson: Must we tell all our allies in advance? The President: This is very worrisome. The fewest number of allies should be told on the shortest possible notice. Bill Moyers: We should be clear about what we say to the public. We should not oversell what we expect to accomplish. We should keep in mind what the increased bombing program will do as well as what it will not do. As to what it will do, we should stress the increasing burden and the cost of the war to Hanoi. Secretary McNamara: The reality is that we are not going to get all of the petroleum supplies but the effect on the North Vietnamese will be to hoard the reduced petroleum supplies which remain. Bill Moyers: No statement should be made to the public saying that we acted to shorten the war. If the air strike does not shorten the war, then later people will say we misled them. Secretary Rusk: Will there be any public reaction to bombing SAM sites near Hanoi? Ambassador Goldberg: There will not be a major reaction. Mr. Rostow: The decision is a rational one. Taking out the petroleum supplies sets a ceiling on the capacity of the North Vietnamese to infiltrate men into South Vietnam. A sustained POL offensive will seriously affect the infiltration rate. Each person in the room, during the course of the discussion, indicated approval of the recommendation to strike the recommended POL targets. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. 2 Rusk was in Europe May 31–June 10. He attended the NATO Ministerial Meeting June 3–8 and then met with Prime Minister Wilson in London. 3 Ronning met with DRV officials in Hanoi June 14–17. 4 Regarding the results of Ronningʼs visit, see Document 161 . 5 In a June 16 memorandum to the President, Rostow stated that, at the Presidentʼs instruction, he had met the day before with Goldberg on the issue of POL strikes and had “marched carefully through all the considerations.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6) 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, June 22, 1966. 5684. Herewith my weekly telegram: 1. Many congratulations on the statement which you made at your Saturday news conference. 2 It was impressive in its solidity, its broad base, and its well balanced view of the situation. A. Hue back under GVN 2. Hue, the countryʼs most persistent political trouble spot, has been brought back under government control during the past week after having been effectively in disloyal hands for the past three months. 3. Under the direction of National Police Director, and Ky intimate Colonel Loan, four battalions of loyal government troops plus about [garble] riot police dispatched from Saigon removed from the streets the thousands of Buddhist altars which have blocked traffic throughout the city. They also arrested many agitators including several prominent student and Struggle force leaders; and they dispersed a spate of small anti-government demonstrations. 3 First Division Commander General Nhuan, who has been mouthing his loyalty to the government while giving aid and comfort to the dissidents, has been relieved; and former I Corps Commander and dissident leader General Dinh has been taken out of Hue and sent to Saigon. Commercial activity is gradually returning to normal. 4. These operations were accompanied by a heavy outpouring of pro-government propaganda designed to bring the city back under control with a minimum of opposition. Partly because of this propaganda, but mostly because the majority of people in Hue never have supported Tri Quang during this Struggle movement. Opposition was not serious. During the operation of the last few days, the Buddhists had been able to gather only small bands of civilian demonstrators and a few First Division troops, largely from service rather than combat units, who had responded to Tri Quangʼs appeal. Tear gas sufficed to bring the dissidents under control. There were only rare instances of gunfire, producing very few casualties with no more than five persons believed to have been killed. Most people in the city were happy to see bright prospects for ending the turmoil. Once again, Ky had shown his skill in the use of force—a useful talent for anyone trying to run a government in this part of the world. 5. Tri Quang remains on his so-called “hunger strike” (15 days as of June 22, although he has been taking many types of nourishment in liquid form and can probably live indefinitely at this rate). His rabble-rousing activities, however, have been effectively stopped. He has almost certainly lost the considerable popular support he once commanded. He has now been brought to Saigon, reportedly at his request—some say to protect him from being assassinated by the Viet Cong. 6. I hope that the return of Hue to government control, and the failure of the Buddhist Institute to arouse mass popular support in Saigon mean that we are now at the end of the political crisis in Viet-Nam, which began with the relief of General Thi on March 10. Although Ky did not see the trouble this would make for him, he must be given credit for his wise and restrained application of force once the crisis had started. This allowed the opposition extremists to overplay their hand. Now the government has regained its power and can resume the many tasks which need doing. 4 B. Much governmental activity 7. Over the last weekend, there was more governmental activity than at any time since Ky became Prime Minister a year ago. On June 18, Minister of Economy announced a broad range of tough anti-inflation measures which we and the IMF have been urging. It looks as though Ky has shown real courage and decisiveness. 8. Sunday, June 19, was the first anniversary of the Ky government, making it the government which has held office the longest since the overthrow of Diem in 1963. Instead of making it an occasion for self-congratulation, Ky and his colleagues made the wise decision to designate the anniversary as armed forces day with an impressive two-hour parade, a torch light ceremony and display of fireworks, which, for the first time since I have been here, could be described as creating festive atmosphere. 9. It is good for Vietnamese to think about the armed forces who are still the one disciplined, anti-Communist and nation building element in the country. During the last few months, the armed forces have been attacked by the Viet Cong; they have had their prestige injured by the antics of certain political Generals; their unity has been a target for the Buddhists and their chaplains; and the “Struggle” movement has put a strain on their unity and morale. It was wise not only to have this celebration on June 19, but to have used it as the occasion for announcing promotions and a pay raise. 10. The so-called “Unified Buddhist Church” is in considerable disarray. Its “Young Turk” bonzes who are associated with the Struggle in Saigon appear unwilling to accept the moderate leadership of Thich Tam Chau. He, on the other hand, sent a letter informing them that he still regards himself as chairman of the Buddhist Institute. It would be wonderful if out of all this wreckage, a sober, responsible Buddhist church might emerge. C. Elections 11. On June 19, the government issued the election decree law setting forth the regulations for candidates and voters in next Septemberʼs election for Deputies to a National Assembly which aims to produce a constitution. A decree was also issued dealing with the organization of the Assembly. The election law represents the work of the drafting committee as modified by the enlarged Directorate (containing 10 military and 10 civilians). I believe it compares well with the election laws and regulations in one of our states. To organize elections in a war torn country, which has only had a very slight experience with elections, and which has never had elections in a national framework, is quite a job. 12. For this reason, I advise officials in Washington who speak about the Vietnamese elections not to over-praise what has been done. While it is as certain as anything can be that elections are going to be held, it is not at all certain that they will be held without intimidation, and that the results will command widespread respect. It would be imprudent for our spokesman in Washington to say what a great thing these elections are going to be, and then to have disappointing news. It is much better for us to say very little, and then if the elections turn out well (a possibility which is not excluded), public opinion at home will be entitled to feel really encouraged. D. Military 13. Our forces continued to enjoy significant successes in their operations against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese army forces during the week. A total of 928 enemy troops were killed and some 232 were captured. These figures are down somewhat from the preceding week. Contrasted with these totals, friendly forces lost 239 killed in action (including 44 U.S.). The wounded figure was 725 (including 306 U.S.), but we count all slight wounds and Vietnamese only count hospital cases. 14. Our Coast Guard units made a significant catch in the night of June 19–20. While on patrol duty in the China Sea, they picked up a steel-hulled coastal transport about 125 feet long. The vessel refused to respond to their challenge. They pursued it, ran it ashore and discovered that it contained 250 tons of Chinese war material destined for the Viet Cong. The Vietnamese Government is lodging a protest with the International Control Commission and an inspection team of Canadian and Indian officials has already gone to the site. 15. Despite the important gains we have made on the purely military front over the last several weeks, we still seem to be having great difficulty in dealing with the Viet Congʼs systematic campaign of terror. Two nights ago in the vicinity of Hue, the Viet Cong summarily executed a district chief. Last week in Binh Long, a village chief was murdered. This terror tactic which has been a Viet Cong trademark is still terribly effective in demoralizing the population and breaking down the governmentʼs administrative machinery. Since the turn of the year, there has been some slight improvement in the number of local officials killed or abducted, but it is still running at the rate of seventy per month. 16. The “village guerrilla” is the responsibility of regional and popular forces, which are under the Vietnamese military and, for the U.S., pertains to MACV. And the “village guerrilla” is also the responsibility of the police which, for the U.S., pertains to USAID and its police advisers. Finally we hope that our revolutionary development cadres will make life unbearable for local terrorists. 17. I doubt that Hanoi will conclude that it cannot win in South Viet-Nam as long as they can do so well with local terrorism. E. Chieu Hoi 19. We still get no Chieu Hoi figure from I Corps. I, therefore, have analyzed Chieu Hoi figures since January leaving out I Corps (which is 7 percent of the total) so that we can see how weʼre doing in the rest of the country. It looks as though it is starting up again. These figures are as follows: January 1005; February 1862; March 2141; April 1444; May 1458. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:36 a.m. and passed to the White House. 2 At his news conference on June 18, the President made a statement on Vietnam and answered questions about the war. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 625–636. 3 On June 10 Ky sent several hundred special riot police to the Hue area under Colonel Loanʼs command. The riot police took control of the local police force. On June 15–17 two airborne and two marine battalions joined the police and carried out a 4-day campaign against disorganized opposition. By June 19 open resistance from Buddhists and military dissidents had collapsed. (Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years , p. 143; The New York Times , June 11, 16, 17, 19, 1966) 4 Telegram 5712 from Saigon, June 23, provided a detailed summary of developments in the “GVN-Buddhist confrontation” during the previous 4 days. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 161. Notes of President Johnsonʼs Meeting With the National Security Council 161. Notes of President Johnsonʼs Meeting With the National Security Council 1 Washington, June 22, 1966. Bill Bundy: It is very clear there was no response from Hanoi. We had a long read-out from Ronning. 2 There is no give in their position. They indicated they wouldnʼt even talk as they did in Rangoon. There may be a slight lateral shift, but no forward move. Canada accepts that. Martin went before the House today. Our area of worry is their general underlying lack of sympathy with us. Martin said he would be disturbed if Canadians thought they had been used. They may charge we put them in a false position. Secretary Rusk: We cannot accept the merit of Martinʼs argument. Secretary McNamara: (Discussing proposed air attacks on POL) What are the benefits and costs? Why now? 1. Why now? The situation has changed dramatically. This is now an important target. Tonnage to the South is increasing; truck traffic is up 100%, personnel infiltration 120%. 2. Costs? Criticism from abroad; dissension in the United States. There will be some civilian casualties, and the estimate is 50 to 300. (Secretary McNamara read the orders, directing that the strikes be made only under ideal conditions.) General Wheeler: A POL strike will not stop infiltration, but it will establish another ceiling on what they can support. There are three divisions there with another ready to move. The President: How much chance is there of hitting a Russian ship? General Wheeler: Negligible. There is a tanker in port now. It draws too much water to get close. We have never seen a tanker tied up at any other pier. They use a 250 foot floating pipeline. The strike area is 1500 to 1600 yards from the main tank center. The tanker will be at least 1100 yards away. The President: MIGʼs? General Wheeler: Tactical surprise may prevent that. When there are later strikes, they may use MIGs to defend. The President: How many planes will we lose? General Wheeler: In all 7 strikes, we will lose about 10. The President: Suppose your dreams are fulfilled. What are the results? General Wheeler: Over the next 60 to 90 days, this will start to affect the total infiltration effort. It will cost them more. In a very real sense, this is a war of attrition. The President: You have no qualification, no doubt that this is in the national interest? General Wheeler: None whatsoever. The President: People tell me what not to do, what I do wrong. I donʼt get any alternatives. What might I be asked next? Destroy industry, disregard human life? Suppose I say no, what else would you recommend? General Wheeler: Mining Haiphong. The President: Do you think this will involve the Chinese Communists and the Soviets? General Wheeler: No, Sir. The President: Are you more sure than MacArthur was? General Wheeler: This is different. We had ground forces moving to the Yalu. Secretary Rusk: How many days until we are ready? General Wheeler: A week or ten days. The President: Can that tanker shoot back? General Wheeler: It is unarmed. The President: Will there be retaliatory pressure from the USSR? General Wheeler: They could stop duty trains in Germany. In 1962 they ran maneuvers in the air corridors in West Berlin. If the tanker is at the pier, we will not strike the pier. The President: Are we adequately prepared? General Wheeler: We have a family of contingency plans to counteract Soviet retaliation. Secretary McNamara: No senior military leader recommends anything other than proceeding with this program. The President: Would General Taylor give me his views. General Taylor: I am optimistic. I think we have to press hard on all four fronts—economic, political, military and diplomatic. I see a movement upward all the way. We should be escalating. Personally I would mine Haiphong at the same time and get the political flak over with. The President: I think that public approval is deteriorating, and that it will continue to go down. Some in Congress are disgusted about the Buddhist uprising and are talking about pulling out. Secretary Rusk: The overplay on the Buddhist matter hurt more than anything else. The President: What is the difference between POL and the power plant? Secretary McNamara: The plant is more dangerous in that they may react more forcefully. General Wheeler: POL is recognized as a legitimate military target, related to the movement of military supplies. We have already hit 4 POL facilities. Secretary Rusk: Llewellyn Thompson does not believe there is a danger from the USSR. The President: Who should we talk to? Secretary Rusk: The chiefs of governments with troops in Vietnam, Mr. Wilson 3 and Mr. Pearson. Secretary Rusk: On this matter of retaliation, might the North Vietnamese try to hit our carrier? Admiral McDonald: No problem. The President (going around the table): How do you stand? General Johnson: For, without qualification. Admiral McDonald: I am too. General McConnell: Agreed. General Greene: I concur fully. The President: Do we have enough men to prevent trouble? General Johnson: Yes. The President: If you were Ho, what would you do? General Wheeler: Attack in Pleiku. Westmoreland expects that and has concentrated his forces. He has his eye on eventualities of this kind. Admiral McDonald: If I were Ho, I would send IL 28ʼs against the air base at Danang. General McConnell: I would too. Admiral McDonald: We would have a hard time stopping them at Danang. The President: That is a little alarming. Bob, will you comment? Secretary McNamara: He would lose his Air Force. It would be a foolhardy military operation. Also, if we canʼt beat 6 obsolete bombers, we ought to abolish the carriers. The Vice President: I reaffirm my position in favor. Cy Vance: Fully agree. Walt Rostow: Fully agree. Ambassador Goldberg: I am still opposed. I do not think it will bring them to the conference table. I am the least expert of any in this room, but I can see these risks: —More involvement of North Vietnam in the South; —No real shortage of supplies (Red China has plenty for them); —More involvement by the Chinese; —More involvement by the Soviets; (It is inconceivable that they can allow this significant action to pass without reaction of some kind.) —Attrition of friends abroad and people at home. This would be regarded in the world as a major step and there are bound to be reactions. What are the alternatives? Donʼt withdraw. I think we are doing well. Beef up our forces, go after more successes and pressure of that type. Donʼt convert this to an extension of the war even to Hanoi. It is tougher and painful to absorb, but it will hopefully lead to an agreed solution to let the people in the South alone. Secretary Fowler: I support it as an operational movement, and think it will increase the prospects for peace. The time is urgent. Leonard Marks: I am for the target. Mr. Raborn: I support. We need even more pressure, such as mining. Dick Helms: The most effective thing we can do is mining. It would do extra damage of course. I agree there would be reaction from them. The President: Any warnings you want to give me before I go to commune with myself and my God? Mr. Ball: All things equal, this is a good thing to do, but it does not outweigh disadvantages. The world thinks Hanoi and Haiphong shibboleth that war not expanded. It will affect Europe. It wonʼt affect North Vietnamese manpower. It would be hard for the Russians to take. They will have to supply POL across China. I am concerned about increasing the level of violence. I believe we have considerable trouble ahead on the political front. But if we are going to do it, do it now. Mr. Bundy: I favor the strikes. 4 George Christian 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. No classification marking. Prepared by George Christian. In a memorandum to Bromley Smith dated October 30, 1968, Christian stated: “I have reconstructed the NSC meeting of June 22 from sketchy notes I took which have been locked up for all this time.” (Ibid., White House Central Files, Ex FG 11–5) The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and lasted from 12:50 to 2:20 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 2 During his Hanoi visit, June 14–17, Ronning met with ICC liaison officer Ha Van Lao, Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Go Thach, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. On June 21 Ronning reported on his visit in meetings with William Bundy and Canadian officials. Records of the meetings on June 21 include: 1) telegram 1740 from Ottawa, June 21 (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S); 2) memorandum of conversation in Paul Martinʼs office, June 21 (ibid., POL 7 CAN); and 3) Bundyʼs memorandum for the record, June 22, re Dinner Meeting with Paul Martin and Other Canadian Officials on June 21 (ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron). 3 The Presidentʼs message for Wilson was transmitted in telegram 7699 to London, June 23. The President stated that he had no choice but to proceed in light of the failure of Ronningʼs talks in Hanoi and “the accumulating evidence both of the importance of POL installations and a program to disperse them beyond our reach.” (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S/NINA) 4 JCS telegram 5003 to CINCPAC, June 22, authorized air strikes on June 24 against seven key POL storage installations in the vicinity of Haiphong and Hanoi. Lodge was notified of the decision in telegram 4011 to Saigon, June 22. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Due to bad weather and news stories anticipating the attacks, the initial strikes were delayed until June 29. See Document 164 regarding Johnsonʼs June 28 conversation with McNamara about the strikes. 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, June 23, 1966. 5710. 1. I gave Thieu gist of your 4011 2 (Ky not in Saigon today) and used appropriate material from the explanatory notifications being given to troop contributing countries. 2. Thieu listened with a most intense concentration and said that the President had chosen a “most favorable moment”. It had been clear, he said, that if we could survive the last political crisis, it would be much harder for the Communists to attempt any more troublesome maneuvers in the future. It is now clear, he said, that “this year will be a decisive year for the Viet Cong.” It is also clear that “they will make their maximum deployment this year.” We here in South Viet-Nam, he added, hope that this is what will happen. For the Presidentʼs decision to come after we have surmounted our political crisis and as the Viet Cong face such a bleak prospect is most welcome. 3. The Viet Cong, he said, cannot do any more than they are now doing; it is their maximum effort. It was clear to them in February that they could not reasonably hope for military success and that they needed some political gains. Before going to any peace talks, said Thieu, they hoped at least to have a government in Saigon which was weak and which, in the political field, would compensate for their own weakness in the military field. Now, if they accept conversations, they must hold them under conditions which are very unfavorable to them. If they cannot win militarily and if they cannot win politically, they will have no choice but to either stop the fighting or return to guerrilla war for ten or twenty years, and for them to do this will not be profitable for them. What can it accomplish? Nothing decisive. 4. If fact, he added, with our program of pacification, which contrasts so markedly with their terrorism, they will lose further public support without accomplishing anything militarily or politically. 5. What kind of conversations, therefore, he asked, can they have? If they stop the war in the South, they will surely have it in the North because there will be so much dissatisfaction with them which an admission of defeat would crystallize and bring to a head. Those who are running the show up there will surely lose their positions. 6. When I asked whether that meant Ho Chi Minh would go down, he said, “Maybe not. Maybe he could maneuver at the top and let the ones immediately under him be sacrificed.” 7. Under questioning by me, he said that there were really three courses open to them rather than two. The first was to have conversations, which meant that they would in effect have to admit defeat and which would bring down the responsible parties in Hanoi; the second was to continue the war by switching all their efforts to guerrilla fighting. Then he said, in response to my questioning, that there was a third possibility: they could look as though they were continuing the war but actually it would be at very low gear, and on a very small scale. 8. He believed they were now in a state of mind where it would be expedient to challenge them to accept the Geneva Accords of 1954. He did not believe they would do so. 9. Returning to the recent political crisis, he said it had been “a test for us”, for Hanoi and for all the accomplices of Hanoi. It was unquestionably the most serious political crisis which South Viet-Nam had had in three years. Their opponents had tried everything. In particular, they had tried to stir American emotions by the self-immolations, the demonstrations, putting the altars in the streets, etc. But this had failed. 10. Maybe, he said, “some people thought the GVN had been a little bit soft. But, he said, “if the GVN had operated against Danang early the consequences might have been dangerous.” The GVN, he said, wanted to allow time for the people to understand so that when they finally did move, they had public support and people thought they were reasonable. 11. During the conversation, I was called to the telephone to be given news of the tidal wave approaching the city of Danang. Komer, who came with me, then said to Thieu that if this year was the year of decision, as Thieu had said, and as Komer agreed, then it behooved both of our forces, Vietnamese and American, to make maximum effort. To this Thieu agreed. 12. When the time came to leave, Thieu, apparently recalling what Komer had said, commented on the fact that Komer had four more days in Viet-Nam and said that would give him plenty of time to speak with Vietnamese and see for himself how strong their determination was. He had said earlier that it was true there was war weariness in Viet-Nam, but that did not mean that they were for peace at any price, or that they were indifferent to the kind of a peace which would be made. He obviously thought that there was a great deal of war weariness in North Viet-Nam too. 13. Comment: A. This is the first time any high ranking and responsible Vietnamese has talked to me about a decision coming as quickly as this year and about specifics of the courses open to Hanoi. Thieu showed a new and unprecedented confidence. B. He was very clear that he thought that the President had picked an extremely favorable time to bomb POL facilities, having in mind all the factors in Southeast Asia with which he, Thieu, could not have first hand knowledge. End comment. 14. I gave him the pictures of the Moon, with the Presidentʼs covering letter, for which he was most grateful. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Nina. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:02 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11:50 a.m. on June 23 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Thieuʼs reaction to your decision is worth reading.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 7) 2 See footnote 4, Document 161 . 163. Letter From George B. Kistiakowsky to Secretary of Defense McNamara 163. Letter From George B. Kistiakowsky to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, June 23, 1966. Dear Mr. Secretary: The eight days of briefings certainly have not made us into Vietnam experts or enabled us to reach well-founded conclusions. However, they helped us to reach, among ourselves, a large measure of consensus on several tentative inferences and also to identify several problem areas, the intensive study of which might lead to conclusions and recommendations useful to you. 2 We have been strongly impressed by the arguments of our military briefers that effective suppression and liquidation of main enemy forces is a necessary condition to the successful prosecution of the war of the villages and pacification of the countryside. However we heard no evidence that it is also a sufficient condition for achieving this ultimate objective. In fact, the emphasis on the war of the big battalions and the attendant buildup of U.S. forces is apparently having harmful effects on the war of the villages because of its economic impact on South Vietnam, gradual disintegration of the fabric of Vietnamese society, etc. There was presented to us no convincing evidence that the war of the villages is progressing favorably on the whole. There is thus already, from this point of view—aside from many other reasons—a strong incentive for rapidly winning the war against the hard core forces of VC and PAVN. The military briefers left us with the impression that this war will “bottom out” early in 1967 so that the going will be easier thereafter. However we were forcibly impressed by the extraordinary unreliability and uncertainty of data on the infiltration of manpower and supplies from the North, on attrition of enemy forces, etc., data which, we assume, are the basis of their cautiously optimistic predictions for the course of war in the next twelve months. If these predictions come true or if the will to fight of North Vietnam is broken in the meantime, what we propose to do will be a wasted effort. However we feel that prudence requires us to act on a more pessimistic view of the course of the war, which is that the war of the big battalions will continue escalating far into 1967 without the turning point being reached. This process will, we suspect, make the winning of the subsequent war of the villages much more difficult. One natural reaction under these circumstances is likely to be a very major escalation of the air war north of the 17th parallel. Whether this would be successful in forcing North Vietnam to give up the fight we are unable to judge, but we are mindful of the historical facts that aerial bombing never did it in the past and that the government of Ho Chi Minh is a very tough bunch. What the briefings did bring out is that the present level of bombing has caused only limited damage to North Vietnam and could have had no significant effect on the present level of the flow of manpower and supplies to the south, although undoubtedly making this flow more difficult to maintain. We would, however, like to examine the relevance of these difficulties to the capacity of DRV to prosecute the war. Since North Vietnam, with its comparatively easy terrain and high density of population and roads, is most likely not the choke point in the logistic supply line from China to South Vietnam, probably only its conversion into total shambles could interdict such flow. We should like very much the opportunity through detailed study to understand better whether that is so. Since an operation leading to destruction of North Vietnam could have some very undesirable consequences for United States, we feel that the search for a different military policy option should become the central theme of our project. This option we can define at present only very vaguely as the creation of interdictory force fields (i.f.f.) at the proper choke points from the North and thus reduce the flow of materiel and manpower to such levels that the war of the big battalions could be substantially de-escalated. Where the choke points are—near the border between Laos and North Vietnam, in Laos or within the borders of South Vietnam—is not yet clear to us. Also the nature of interdictory force fields—stationary fences, air-sown mines and delayed action bombs, ECM, in addition to a further tightened sea barrier, etc.—or some combination of these—is still totally unclear to us, although the briefings left us with the impression that the present bombing of the Laos roads alone is not sufficient. The option for interdictory force fields, incidentally, may have some attractive side effects, aside from making the war of the big battalions more difficult for the enemy. If these fields are reasonably successful, the complex arguments for continued bombing of North Vietnam become clearly separated and some components eliminated. Also the acceptance of a cease-fire and subsequent policing of it will clearly be more feasible. On the other hand, we should be mindful that an i.f.f. could itself become a source of escalation of the war. One of the major factors for the determination of the nature of the optimum interdictory force field is better understanding of intelligence data on infiltration rates and rates of attrition (men and materiel) since, for instance, large dumps of supplies in the Laos-South Vietnam border area would make materiel flow interdiction further North less attractive. If the infiltration of personnel is the controlling factor, quite a different i.f.f. may be required, and so on. Hence we would like to study the base of intelligence data. A possible component of the interdictory force fields is an effective disruption of the enemyʼs command and control structure by selective electronic jamming and more sophisticated measures. The very limited information given to us does not prove that this would be either impossible or harmful to U.S. objectives on an over-all basis. We would like to study this question, also. Needless to say, these studies will include thorough exploration of means for better utilization of our technology in the war, although, generally speaking, we do not propose to become involved in a broad effort at inventing new gadgets. After some consideration, we concluded that the chances of our making useful contributions to the prosecution of the war of the villages and to the effectiveness of South Vietnam government are even less than in the above areas and do not propose to engage in systematic studies of these problems. George Kistiakowsky for Jason-East 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam, 1966. Confidential; Privileged. 2 From June 13 to June 22 a group of more than 40 distinguished scientists met in Wellesley, Massachusetts, for briefings on the Vietnam war by military and civilian officials and follow-up discussions. The meetings were organized by the JASON Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses under a contract funded by the Department of Defense. A list of attendees and an agenda for their meetings are attached to the source text but are not printed. Following the Wellesley meetings, the participants broke into four study groups and in late August submitted to Secretary McNamara four reports, which concluded that the bombing of North Vietnam was ineffective and recommended construction of a barrier as an alternative means to check infiltration. The reportsʼ major conclusions are excerpted in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , vol. IV, pp. 115–123 and in the appendix to Document 269 , and are discussed in Document 233 . 164. Editorial Note 164. Editorial Note At 7:59 a.m. on June 28, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara telephoned President Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening Washington time. The strikes had been decided upon earlier (see footnote 4, Document 161 ) but delayed several days due to bad weather and concern over press leaks. The President expressed hesitation about proceeding immediately rather than waiting until July 1, citing events scheduled for June 30 that might be impacted adversely, including his own trip to the midwest. The President then queried McNamara about the possible repercussions of hitting a Soviet tanker in the Haiphong harbor. After noting that he thought the chances of hitting one were small, McNamara replied: “I think itʼs serious, Mr. President, but I think that we have told the Russians that this clearly is—and we put it in writing—that we have done everything possible to avoid antagonizing them in this military conflict; and I think while it would be serious and while we would have a very strong protest, I myself doubt that it would lead to any military action. As a matter of fact, the appraisals are that if we mined the harbor and stopped Soviet ships from coming in there it wonʼt lead to military action, so if we hit the tanker I doubt that it would lead to military action.” After further discussion of this issue and of Secretary of State Ruskʼs position on the strikes, the following exchange took place: “President: I think now what weʼve got to analyze very, very carefully and we have, but before we execute, I think weʼve got to say, do we get enough out of this for the price we pay. The Hartkes are all—theyʼre starting their campaign tomorrow on the Senate floor, theyʼre speaking. “McNamara: Well, Lippmannʼs got an article in this morningʼs paper, same thing, on exactly that point, and I think the answer is, this is just a minor incident in the war, and itʼs almost an incident that you canʼt avoid taking. I donʼt see how you can go on fighting out there, Mr. President, without doing this, to be absolutely frank with you. I donʼt think you can keep the morale of your troops up; I donʼt think you can keep the morale of the people in the country who support you up without doing this. About that point. Now in addition to that I myself believe it has military value, although I donʼt for the minute put the weight on it that the Chiefs do; but I donʼt put the cost on it that some in State do. I donʼt put the cost on that George Ball does, for example. I donʼt believe any Soviet experts, including Tommy Thompson, put the cost on it that George Ball does.” During further discussion, McNamara recommended sending out an execute order and then canceling it later in the day if the President changed his mind. The President gave his assent. Subsequently the following discussion took place: “President: Things are going reasonably well in the South, arenʼt they? “McNamara: Yes, I think so. “President: What are these 6,000 men doing? Theyʼre trying to locate the enemy, I see, and theyʼve run ʼem into caves. Do you know anything about that? “McNamara: Yeah. Itʼs just so typical, Mr. President, itʼs a relatively small enemy force. We think weʼre taking a heavy toll of them. But it just scares me to see what weʼre doing there. Weʼre taking 6,000 U.S. soldiers with God knows how many airplanes and helicopters and fire power and going after a bunch of half-starved beggars of 2,000 at most, and probably less than that. And this is whatʼs going on in the South and the great danger, and itʼs not a certainty, but itʼs a danger we need to look at, is that they can keep that up almost indefinitely. “President: Well Iʼd say with their manpower resources they have, they canʼt. “McNamara: Yeah. Thatʼs the point. The only thing that will prevent it, Mr. President, is their morale breaking. And if we hurt them enough—it isnʼt so much that they donʼt have more men as it is that they canʼt get the men to fight because the men know that once they get assigned to that task their chances of living are small. I, myself, believe thatʼs the only chance we have of winning this thing. And thatʼs one reason Iʼm in favor of this POL, because thereʼs no question but what the troops in the South—the VC and North Vietnamese troops in the South—ultimately become aware of whatʼs going on in the North. We see this through the interrogation and the prisoner reports. Iʼve been trying to watch those carefully to see what comes through those. And they know that weʼre bombing in the North. And they know we havenʼt destroyed the place, so that in a sense our bombing isnʼt fully effective, but they also know that nobody is protecting North Vietnam, and we just have a free rein. And when we bomb this POL, ultimately that will become known to the North Vietnamese soldiers and the Viet Cong in the South. And this is just one more foundation brick thatʼs knocked away from their support. And when they see theyʼre getting killed in such high rates in the South and they see that the supplies are less likely to come down from the North, I think itʼll just hurt their morale a little bit more. And, to me, thatʼs the only way to win. Because weʼre not killing enough of them to make it impossible for the North to continue to fight. But we are killing enough to destroy the morale of those people down there if they think this is gonna have to go on forever. “President: Go ahead, Bob.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.17, Side A, PNO 2) Between 1:10 and 2:27 a.m. on June 29, the President had 11 telephone conversations with Walt Rostow and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance during which he was provided with reports on the air strikes. Recordings of 10 of the conversations are ibid., Tape 6606.06, PNO 1–PNO 10. June 29–September 18: Exploring Negotiations With North Vietnam and Contacts With the Viet Cong; Reassessing Pacification June 29–September 18: Exploring Negotiations With North Vietnam and Contacts With the Viet Cong; Reassessing Pacification 165. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, June 29, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sullivan was in Washington for consultations. 166. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson Washington, June 29, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Senator Mansfield. No classification marking. 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, June 29, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:06 p.m. Passed to the White House and to Canberra, where Rusk was attending the SEATO and ANZUS Council meetings. In telegram 1961 to Saigon, July 6, the Department of State indicated that all messages dealing with the “Italian-Polish approach on Viet Nam” were to be slugged with the code name Marigold. (Ibid.) The telegram is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 237–239. Many subsequent telegrams concerning Marigold are printed, in whole or in part, ibid., pp. 241–370, and are summarized in a 90-page “Chronology of Marigold,” prepared by the Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147, Marigold Chronology) 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, June 29, 1966, 8:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball. Repeated to Canberra for Rusk. 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, June 30, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:03 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 241–242. 170. Editorial Note 171. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, July 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, July 2, 1966, 0459Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Manila, where Rusk was meeting with President Marcos, and passed to the White House. 173. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Kyoto, Japan Washington, July 5, 1966, 8:31 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Ball and approved by Ball. From July 4 to July 7 Rusk attended meetings of the U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in Kyoto and Tokyo. Rusk approved the course of action proposed in this telegram in telegram Secto 113 to Katzenbach, July 6. In telegram 2673 to Tokyo, July 7, Ball informed Rusk that the President had approved the script and added that it was felt that, carefully nurtured, the approach might develop into something. Neither telegram has been found; telegram 2673 is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 243, and both telegrams are summarized in the Marigold Chronology prepared by the Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147, Marigold Chronology) 174. Memorandum From George Carver of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, July 7, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam. Secret. 175. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, July 7, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem/Sensitive; No Dissem Abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 176. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson July 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Rostow en route by airplane from Los Angeles, where he had attended the Governors Conference, to Washington, and transmitted from the White House to the President in Texas at 6:21 p.m. 177. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Washington, July 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top Secret. On July 11 Rostow forwarded Taylorʼs memorandum to the President and, at the Presidentʼs request, to Rusk and McNamara. In his covering memorandum to the President, Rostow indicated that he and Taylor had been “going into the negotiating question quite deeply” but that there were “some critical gaps.” He proposed to formulate these gaps into “key unanswered questions” in consultation with Taylor, submit them to the Departments of State and Defense, and later schedule a meeting for the President to review the planning. (Ibid.) The President indicated his approval on Rostowʼs covering memorandum, resulting in the preparation of Document 178. 178. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, July 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Top Secret. Benjamin Read forwarded the memorandum to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy on July 14 under cover of a memorandum stating that Rusk “has asked me to get your succinct private views on this matter.” (Ibid.) For background information on Rostowʼs memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 177. 179. Memorandum for the Record New York, July 17, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. In a July 20 letter to Bohlen, Johnson indicated that messages concerning the contact described in the memorandum printed here would be slugged “Elm Tree.” (Ibid.) 180. Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, July 18, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. Copies were sent to William Bundy and Moyers. 181. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) Washington, July 18, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam. Secret. 182. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 21, 1966, 1533Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, Hong Kong, and Moscow. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1022 to the President on July 22 under cover of a memorandum stating that he agreed that “our best chance for making negotiating progress is through very secret talks with Hanoi.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, July 22, 1966, 0910Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1631 to the President at 4:35 p.m. on July 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) Also passed to CIA and Defense. 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada Washington, July 22, 1966, 9:19 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Miller, cleared by William Bundy and McNaughton, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Also sent to New Delhi, Warsaw, and London, and repeated to Saigon, Moscow, Vientiane, Bangkok, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV. 185. Telegram From the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge and Porter) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms and the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) Saigon, July 23, 1966, 0456Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables. Secret; Eyes Only. Received in Washington via CIA communications facilities and transmitted by CIA to the White House at 0800Z on July 23. 186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, July 23, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence. 187. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, July 23, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the President and Sturm. 188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, July 23, 1966, 2:26 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy and Miller, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 189. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, July 24, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:25 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 248–249. 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, July 24, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:45 a.m. During a telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. on July 24, Rostow told Rusk that he had “left the negative Marigold cables upstairs for the Pres. to read”; Rostow also said that “his reflection this morning had been re press leak” and he wondered “if on next round it wouldnʼt be wiser for direct approach.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, July 25, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence. Helms forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Moyers on July 25 under cover of a memorandum stating that “After your call to me last week indicating that we had ‘a hard mandate’ from Higher Authority to collect information on North Vietnam, I thought it would be advisable to get together for you what up-to-date information we now have on the subject.” (Ibid.) In a July 20 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Plans, Helms indicated that, according to Moyers, the President was particularly interested in the intentions of North Vietnamʼs “leadership with respect to waging the war, the American prisoners, etc.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966) 192. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, July 25, 1966, 3:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw it. 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, July 27, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:04 a.m., and Rostow forwarded the text to the President at 6.45 p.m. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, July 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State Bangkok, July 29, 1966, 1141Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 195. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, July 30, 1966, 1100Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Elm Tree. Drafted and authenticated by Bohlen. According to a July 30 cover memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson sent a copy of the telegram to the President on August 1. (Ibid.) George, Ray, and Out are code names for Sturm, Khanh, and Le Van Truong, respectively. 196. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 2, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Kissinger, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. 197. Memorandum of Meeting Washington, August 2, 1966, 5 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 72 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Harrimanʼs office. Assigned by the President in July to devote full attention to the search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Harriman established a “Negotiations Committee,” which met once a week beginning with this meeting. In an October 4 memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman stated that his committee met each Thursday “to develop, assess and follow up all leads to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.” Principal participants were U. Alexis Johnson, Llewellyn Thompson, William Bundy, Joseph Sisco, Leonard Unger, Thomas Hughes, and Benjamin Read. (Ibid., S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State—Rusk)/1 198. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 2, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. A copy was sent to Moyers. 199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva Washington, August 2, 1966, 6:10 p.m. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Buffum, cleared in draft by William Bundy and Harriman, and approved by Rusk. 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, August 3, 1966, 1:21 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared in substance by Rusk and McNamara, and approved by Rusk. 201. Special National Intelligence Estimate Washington, August 4, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. Rostow forwarded the estimate to President Johnson on August 5, noting in his covering memorandum that it had been produced “at our request.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10) 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, August 4, 1966, 6:59 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and Unger; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Harriman, Thompson, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk. 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, August 5, 1966, 8:08 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, McNaughton, Thompson, Rostow, and Jorden; and approved by Rusk.1 204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, August 6, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:14 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 2818 to the President on August 9, together with the text of telegram 3038, August 9, in which Lodge provided a progress report on contact with Tho. In his covering memorandum Rostow stated: “Here is the first attempted major operation to go to work on the political orientation of the NLF. The case itself is attractive, if it works out; but it is equally important that Lodge is now aboard and interested.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10) 205. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Saigon, August 7, 1966, 0005Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to General Wheeler. 206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, August 7, 1966, 1:57 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk. 207. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State Geneva, August 9, 1966, 1936Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, August 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:34 a.m. and passed to the White House. In telegram 27780, August 13, Komer told Lodge that the President was “greatly heartened” by his latest weekly report, particularly by the plans to “shift much of ARVN into a stepped up pacification campaign.” In addition, the President hoped that the “civil side effort in the countryside” could be stepped up “in similar fashion” and also that, given the importance of a good election turnout, Lodge would “quietly keep pushing the GVN to get out the vote.” (Ibid.) 209. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) Washington, August 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor. 210. Editorial Note 211. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 17, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Unger. 212. Memorandum of Meeting of the Negotiations Committee Washington, August 18, 1966, 4:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. The meeting was held in Harrimanʼs office. 213. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 18, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Secret. 214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, August 19, 1966, 6:54 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Nodis; Thrush. Drafted and approved by Rusk. 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson Washington, August 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 216. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, August 24, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 381 Vietnam. Secret. 217. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, August 24, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Personal; Confidential. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Fulbrightʼs office. 218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, August 25, 1966. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and Unger. 219. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, August 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Special Intelligence Material, vol. X. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The source text, pages 19–21 of the memorandum, is attached to an August 29 memorandum from R.J. Smith, CIAʼs Deputy Director for Intelligence, to Rostow, under cover of which Smith sent Rostow a copy of the full study; the full study has not been found in Johnson Library files. Helms sent the President pages 1–21 of the study, consisting of the “Summary Discussion” and “Principal Findings,” under cover of an August 29 memorandum, in which he noted that McNamara had asked CIA to undertake the study several weeks earlier. Helms noted that he had sent copies of the full study, which included several hundred pages of basic material backing up the “Principal Findings,” to McNamara, Rusk, and Wheeler. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966) Helms also briefed Senators Mansfield, Russell, and Fulbright on the study on September 19 and summarized the discussion that followed in a memorandum to Rostow, September 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA) Rostow provided the President with his summary of this study in Document 239. 220. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 29, 1966, 11 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. No classification marking. The President wrote on the source text: “Letʼs get Komer to pick up & spark this inspiration.” 221. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson Washington, August 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson on August 30 under cover of a memorandum stating that the danger foreseen by Taylor must be met by 1) engaging elite ARVN units fully in fighting VC and North Vietnam main force units; and 2) “getting the ARVN engaged effectively in pacification.” The President indicated on Rostowʼs memorandum that, prior to getting Defense, State, and Komer to prepare analyses and recommendations, Rostow should first “talk over” pacification with McNamara. (Ibid.) 222. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson Washington, August 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret. Komer forwarded copies of this memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Taylor, Rostow, and Moyers under cover of a memorandum dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Leonhart)On September 13 Komer submitted to the President a 44-page report entitled “The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report.” In his letter of transmittal, Komer called the report “mainly a review of accomplishments.” Written for public release, the report and Komerʼs transmittal letter are printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 10, 1966, pp. 549–567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591–601. 223. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, August 31, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 11. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Moyers and Komer. 224. Intelligence Report Washington, August 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Controlled Dissemination; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared jointly in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The source text does not indicate a specific day of issue in August 1966. 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, September 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/Thrush. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Thrush. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:16 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11 a.m. on September 1, under cover of a memorandum stating that “we should keep our fingers crossed; but this could be good news.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush) 226. Editorial Note 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, September 8, 1966. Source: Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:29 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 250–251. 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, September 12, 1966, 1:25 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 251–252. 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, September 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 5970 to the President on September 14 under cover of a memorandum stating, “Herewith Lodgeʼs evaluation of the election—much like ours, but very interesting reading.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12) 230. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, September 14, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78–05505A, Area Activity-Far East-Memos Re Agency Planning. Secret. The memorandum was produced by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and was drafted by George W. Allen. 231. Intelligence Note From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam, September 1966. Secret. 232. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 15, 1966, 9:30 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam—W.W. Rostow. Top Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 233. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird) Washington, September 15, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, VIET 385 BARRIER. Secret. 234. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Largeʼs Special Assistant (Cooper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, September 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. A copy was sent to Unger. 235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, September 17, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER. Top Secret. In an earlier memorandum to McNamara, CM–135–66, April 18, Wheeler recommended against construction of a barrier and forwarded “A Study of Feasibility and Requirements for a Counter Infiltration Barrier” in support of his view. (Ibid.) 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, September 17, 1966, 6:17 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Lake, Miller, and Unger; cleared in substance by Cooper and Jorden; and approved by Rusk and Unger. 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, September 18, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:57 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 253–254. 238. Research Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 18, 1966. Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives—Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. 165. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 165. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Laos (Sullivan) to Acting Secretary of State Ball 1 Washington, June 29, 1966. SUBJECT Proposal for an “Asian Peace Offensive” 1. In Asia it is generally felt that our peace offensives concerning Vietnam are not sincere. This feeling derives from the fact that we have generally directed our efforts toward a Geneva-type conference which would include the Chinese Communists. The Asians understand that the Chinese Communists will not go to such a conference. They also assume that we understand it. Therefore, they feel that we are proposing a political arrangement which we know is a non-starter. Consequently, they doubt our sincerity in seeking a political understanding. 2. I believe there is a need for new political action which will make clear that our interest in a peaceful settlement is genuine and which will provide some feasible means for permitting the North Vietnamese to extricate themselves from the military and political situation in which they now find themselves. In the military field, I feel they are hurting badly and would be interested in seeking some way out of their current predicament. However, in the political sense, they cannot do this unless they are provided some assurances with respect to their future. 3. These assurances revolve fundamentally around their need to have a guarantor of their political and military continuance as a communist state and of their economic development to a tolerable level of existence. They are considerably dependent upon the Chinese Communists for both political and economic support in the current circumstances. However, this support is contingent upon the North Vietnamese continuing to carry out a line of disruptive action in Southeast Asia which is compatible with Chinese interests and tactics. If the North Vietnamese were to change their line of action, this support would doubtless shrivel and they would have to turn elsewhere for guarantors. Since they could not ideologically depend upon any Western country or upon the UN, they would obviously have to turn to the Soviet Union as their guarantor. 4. The Soviet Union, however, cannot be expected to be entranced by the prospect of assuming these responsibilities with respect to North Vietnam. They would in effect be buying a sort of Asian Albania or Asian Cuba and a rather expensive one at that. Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Soviet Union, if it were to agree to take on the responsibility of supporting North Vietnam in a state of peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia, would charge some price for these services. In short, they would wish to bargain with us and the Western world for the service of taking the North Vietnamese plague off our backs. 5. The problem is how to become engaged in a discussion with the Soviet Union on this subject. It seems clear that neither the Soviets nor the North Vietnamese wish to enter into blunt negotiations in this context. Therefore, an indirect, more oriental approach seems indicated. I would like to suggest such an approach in this memorandum and would submit that it has certain other values both in a domestic and an international context. 6. The approach I would suggest involves the public proposal that both North and South Vietnam become members of the UN and that the UN mechanism be engaged to help settle the problem of Vietnam. There are several by-products of UN membership, of which I shall mention only a few. First, it would enable the Soviets and others to recognize the accredited existence in Saigon of a government which is chosen by means acceptable to the membership of the UN. This absolves them of their responsibility to seek only a Viet Cong dominated government. Secondly, it could address itself to the ultimate goal of unification and stipulate that goal as part of the purpose of membership. Thirdly, it would provide us with a quid pro quo against which we could suspend bombing operations in the North. Fourthly, it would represent a clear break with China and Chinese policies but in a manner not so violent as to induce Chinese Communist retaliation. Fifthly, it would be a revival of an old Soviet proposal and therefore presumably difficult for them to ignore. 7. I would further suggest that we take advantage of the proposal for North Vietnamese membership to extend our “peace offensive” to all East Asia. That is to say, I would include also dual membership for North and South Korea and dual reception in the General Assembly for Communist and Nationalist China. In other words, I would propose wrapping all three of these into one large and rather impressive initiative which would capture public imagination and at the same time give a positive thrust to our inevitable change of policy on the question of Chinese representation. 8. This device would, in my opinion, bring us for the first time into serious negotiations with the Soviets on the price which they will demand for some initiatives with respect to Vietnam. Because of the nature of the proposal, I think it is clear that we can expect their price to be expressed in some similar terms: namely membership applications for East and West Germany. This may not be the case, but it would seem logical to anticipate and they have already given some indication of this by their recent proposal of East Germany for UN membership. In any event, I think we must assume that the Soviet price would somehow or other be associated with the European area and the questions of military confrontation in Europe which are paramount in their relations with the U.S. 9. I do not believe that we need to accept the Soviet proposal for East German membership, and perhaps we could even give West Germany an assurance that we would not accept it. However, since it would probably be the opening Soviet bargaining counter, we would at least have to discuss it in the context of moving toward an acceptable price for Soviet services. It is conceivable that the price could be in some related field such as MLF, nuclear proliferation, etc. etc. Nevertheless, I do not feel that we should preclude the possibilities of opening discussions in this vein merely because the subject which the Russians will wish to discuss would be offensive to our German allies and unacceptable to our national interests. 10. It would be my suggestion that this blanket proposal be discussed with a limited number of countries to sound-out not only their points of view but also the possibilities of various tactics. For example, we might conclude that it would be the better part of valor to have the Canadians take the initiative on this whole proposal and have ourselves become involved only in bilateral discussions with the Russians to determine how much the traffic will bear. 11. I end where I began with the conclusion that we have not yet offered a practicable political route of escape for the North Vietnamese to use under our increasing military pressure. I would suggest, therefore, that this proposal be examined in that light and that discussion of it at an appropriate level within the U.S. Government begin immediately. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. Sullivan was in Washington for consultations. 2 In a memorandum of July 1 to Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel called Sullivanʼs proposal a “non-starter and one we cannot afford, particularly at the risk of paying the price with no return whatsoever.” Stoessel contended that the steps proposed by Sullivan to get the negotiations started were unnecessary and would give the Soviet Union a political victory over Communist China “worth ten times the price of Soviet assistance in the rehabilitation of North Vietnam.” Moreover, the proposal would impair relations with West Germany and fuel suspicions in Europe that “we might be willing to sell European security interests for a solution to our problems in the Far East.” (Ibid.) 166. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 166. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 1 Washington, June 29, 1966. SUBJECT Two Meetings on Viet Nam with Democratic Members of the Senate On June 28, I met with two groups of Democratic Senators to consider the question of Viet Nam. Participants in the first meeting were Committee Chairmen or their designees. Those attending the second meeting were drawn from the bottom of the seniority list of Democrats in the Senate, in order and as available. The meetings were held on a confidential basis. Completely free discussion was encouraged. Members were asked to speak out on whatever aspects of the Vietnamese question were on their minds. There was no attempt to obtain a consensus. What was sought rather was a free flow of the concerns, ideas and attitudes of the older and the younger Democrats in the Senate. Yet, in the general outpouring of thought, there were several points so constantly reiterated and so unchallenged as to suggest areas of very heavy agreement. They may be stated as follows: 1. There is general support for you among the Members in your overwhelming responsibilities as President; 2. The prompt end of the war is seen as most essential and there is confusion and deep concern that we have not yet found the way to end it, either by extension or contraction of the military effort; 3. There is no sentiment among the Members for an immediate withdrawal; 4. There is a strong conviction that candidates of the Democratic Party will be hurt by the war. Enclosed are brief summaries of the various lines of thought and ideas which were expressed at the two meetings on yesterday. 2 There is also attached herewith a copy of a memorandum which was sent to you after a similar discussion on Viet Nam among a group of Senators from both parties which took place a year ago. 3 Attachment Washington, June 28, 1966, 12:30 p.m. DISCUSSION OF VIET NAM BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN OR DESIGNEES The following Senators attended: Russell (Ga.) Ellender Eastland McClellan Magnuson Fulbright Robertson Long (La.) Anderson Yarborough Jackson Bible Jordan Randolph Inouye Pastore Williams (N.J.) Summary of Principal Lines of Thought and Ideas Expressed A. General Comment 1. We may have gone too far in trying to obtain negotiations last year, even though we want the matter settled honorably at a conference table. 2. We ought not to withdraw unilaterally, but we are in a fix, and it is not clear how we are going to get out of it. 3. To get out in present circumstances would be very destructive of our stature in the world. B. The War and Policies 1. We already have 400,000 men in the area and the cost will soon reach $2 billion a month. 2. Unless stable government can be had, the war is not going to be won, and the pressure to pull out altogether will increase. 3. Stability of government in Saigon cannot be expected soon, and we make a mistake by emphasizing it. Any government there is going to be a “puppet” for the present. What is involved here is that “this is Communismʼs last stand” and the problem is to hit the Communists harder while giving whatever puppet government we have in Saigon the economic support it needs. 4. The only moral reason we have for being in Viet Nam is the contention that the South Vietnamese people want us there but have we tried to find out whether this is really so or not—whether, in fact, the people want us? 5. The Secretary of Stateʼs theory of the conflict has been that we are facing an aggression pure and simple; it is a wrong theory. We face, in fact, a situation not too different than that faced by the French. 6. Recent broadcasts by Eric Sevareid and Bill Lawrence have been very revealing and suggest we have not, heretofore, been getting a complete and accurate picture of what is happening in Viet Nam. C. Other Nations, International Organizations and the War 1. Beyond Viet Nam, the problem is the containment of China. The Chinese, however, are not likely to become active participants unless we put forces into North Viet Nam. 2. The only major country supporting us is Britain which is totally dependent on us. 3. Most friendly countries are concerned by our preoccupation with and entrapment in Viet Nam. 4. Although the Australians will stand with us, there are indications that they want us to get out. 5. The U.N. does not want in, in this situation. It may be that the Geneva group can be helpful in negotiations. 6. Improvement in relations with Eastern Europe is stymied by the Vietnamese war. D. Suggestions 1. If we cannot get a stable government, we should agree to elections and get out as best we can; and sooner rather than later, because it is a very expensive war. It is not dishonorable to have a conference and get out. 2. We must think of our prestige and honor even if the area is not vital in a geographic sense. 3. The Communists are seeking to protract the war in the hopes of U.S. impatience; we must contract the protraction or get out. 4. The question is not to stay in or get out but how to get out. 5. Increased military pressure is necessary. If we back off in Viet Nam, the U.S. public will support no President in any effort to save any part of Southeast Asia. 6. It may not be possible to settle the war by negotiations; both sides would save face if the war just peters out. 7. The bigger the war is expanded, the more it is going to be lengthened; a quick ending by expansion is a fallacy. 8. The way to get negotiations is by calling for a cease-fire and neutralism. 9. The President should get his advice from the Armed Services. 10. The President should call groups of Senators together and tell Rusk and McNamara to be quiet while they talked. 11. Is there not some way in which the U.N. can be brought in? E. Political Implications 1. The Democratic Party is badly hurt by the war even though individually some Democrats may not be troubled. 2. If war drags on, the Party will suffer badly. People want a decision, by a step-up of the war; they are not interested in casualties. Indeed, it might be a good idea to stop televising what is going on over there. 3. The people are following the President but not with enthusiasm, in part, because they do not understand the importance of the war. There is a lot of worry over why we are there. 4. It is not a major war, but its consequences are being felt by many families in the nation. 5. The war is hampering domestic programs of Administration. 6. Democrats are badly split in West Virginia; the matter is not an issue in Virginia; the political difficulties among Democrats in New Jersey over the war, as recently reported in the New York Times , were vastly over-stated. 7. Viet Nam is worse than Korea and remember what Eisenhower did with the latter. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Senator Mansfield. No classification marking. 2 Attached, but only the summary of the first meeting is printed. 3 Attached. Printed in Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 270 – 278 . 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 167. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, June 29, 1966. 5840. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary, and the Acting Secretary. 1. This afternoon DʼOrlandi, Italian Ambassador, telephoned to say it was urgent that I come to his office as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to his office at about 6:45, and he began as follows: 2. Two days ago, the Polish representative on the ICC, Lewandowski, came to him with a “very specific peace offer”. 3. DʼOrlandi said he had requested instructions from Fanfani, who told him 1) to submit the whole proposal to me, and 2) said that he, Fanfani, would send the whole thing to Washington for their consideration. 4. By way of background, DʼOrlandi said he considered the Pole to be a friendly and outspoken man, and that they had a number of general discussions with DʼOrlandi saying how very obdurate and foolish the North Vietnamese were not to accept President Johnsonʼs offer at a time when there were only 30,000 American advisers. Now there are now 265,000 fighting men which may go to between 400,000 and 500,000. 5. A salient feature of these various conversations had been that the Pole had talked about the need for absolute secrecy in diplomacy—that nothing could be done without it. DʼOrlandi felt that he was “not as stubborn as most Communists,” and had received the impression that he had “rather high rank,” and enjoyed the special confidence of his government and was actually in Saigon on a “very special mission.” 6. Nevertheless, DʼOrlandi said, he was surprised when he came to see DʼOrlandi within a half hour after his request for an appointment on last Monday. 2 7. When he arrived, DʼOrlandi spoke of having recently seen Sihanouk who thought that Hanoi was not willing to do anything. 8. The Pole said, “Youʼd be surprised how much my visit completely contradicts what Sihanouk says. I have been in Hanoi and can state a number of points.” After stating his points, he read them over to DʼOrlandi afterwards so there was no misunderstanding. 9. The Pole began by saying that Hanoi has been deeply disappointed by the proposals made by Ronning which, they are sure, had emanated originally from the United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had proposed that the U.S. stop the bombing if North Viet-Nam stopped the infiltration, and had talked about the exchange of prisonersʼ parcels and letters. This had bitterly disappointed North Vietnam. The first point, they had said, would be unconditional surrender, and they could not accept it, but they are open to a “political compromise” settling once and for all the entire Vietnam question. 10. When DʼOrlandi said that he was skeptical, the Pole said that Hanoi was prepared to go “quite a long way.” “It is useless for me to add,” said the Pole, “that should there not be any kind of a preliminary agreement, Hanoi will deny flatly ever having made any offer.” According to the Pole, the North Vietnamese are “tightly controlled” by the Chinese Communists. The preliminary talks, therefore, should be between Moscow and Washington. When and if proposals should emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations, Hanoi would at that time and under those circumstances get into it. The Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese Communists who have an interest in dragging on the war for many years. DʼOrlandi added that the Pole was evidently “proud of himself” for having brought these proposals about. 11. The proposals are as follows: A. They insist that the so-called National Liberation Front “take part” in the negotiations. The key word is “take part.” According to DʼOrlandi, there is “no question of their being the representative; they are not to have any monopoly.” B. There must be suspension of the bombing. 12. These are the two proposals. 13. Then there are other points, which DʼOrlandi called “negative ones,” which are that A) Hanoi will not ask for immediate reunification, either by elections or otherwise, of North and South Vietnam; B) they will not ask for establishment of a “socialist” system in South Vietnam; C) they will not ask South Vietnam to change the relationships which it has in the field of foreign affairs; and D) they will not ask for neutralization; E) although they will ask for U.S. withdrawal, they are ready to discuss a “reasonable calendar”; E) although “we would like someone other than Ky”—to quote the words of Hanoi—they do not want to interfere with the South Vietnamese Government. 14. The Pole thinks that these proposals were not made through Sainteny, because, he says, Hanoi feels that proposals through French channels would “not be sympathetically considered in Washington.” 15. Once again, the Pole insisted on utmost secrecy. He said to DʼOrlandi, “we as Poles and you as Italians are missing a terrific opportunity for agreement between Moscow and Washington. The sooner we settle it, the happier we will all be.” If this attempt failed, he would ask to be assigned elsewhere. To illustrate the amount of secrecy, he said that none of the Polish Embassies in the world, including the Polish Embassy in Rome, had been informed. 16. He did not give the name of the individual with whom he had talked in Hanoi. He did say that he believed that Washington knew of this proposal already. 17. DʼOrlandi said to me that it was clear from the above that Hanoi is trying to “run out” on China, that the top officials in Hanoi not only fear for their political lives, but that they are actually afraid of having the country occupied by the Chinese Communists. 18. The Pole said that his government would be willing to arrange for DʼOrlandi to meet with appropriate Polish spokesmen anywhere—Hong Kong or Singapore. In response to a question by DʼOrlandi as to why they had come to him, the Pole said they wanted “an able debater to put the case to President Johnson, and we feel that the Italian Government has the sympathy of the United States Government.” Moreover, the Italians have the same interest we have in agreement between Washington and Moscow, and in shutting out Peking. 19. DʼOrlandiʼs impression is that the Poles are desperately seeking a way out on Moscowʼs instructions. This, he said, may need further exploration. He had the definite impression that now Hanoi “was amenable to common sense” saying “they do not want anything that would not stop the whole war. They want a political settlement, and are prepared to go a long way.” Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:06 p.m. Passed to the White House and to Canberra, where Rusk was attending the SEATO and ANZUS Council meetings. In telegram 1961 to Saigon, July 6, the Department of State indicated that all messages dealing with the “Italian-Polish approach on Viet Nam” were to be slugged with the code name Marigold. (Ibid.) The telegram is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 237–239. Many subsequent telegrams concerning Marigold are printed, in whole or in part, ibid., pp. 241–370, and are summarized in a 90-page “Chronology of Marigold,” prepared by the Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147, Marigold Chronology) 2 June 27. 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, June 29, 1966, 8:17 p.m. 4108. Literally eyes only for Ambassador. Embtel 5840. 2 Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came in today with Faroche, Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada, who had hand-carried message similar to that contained reftel and who said he was under instructions to hand-carry our reply back to Rome. We did not indicate that we had received Saigonʼs message. Main differences between two messages was that “participate” was used in place of “take part” with respect to role of NLF in negotiations. We told Fenoaltea that, except for use of term “participate” with respect to NLF, which could have implication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be “sole representative” of SVN, and “suspension of bombing” in place of “cessation of bombing”, position Hanoi indicated to Pole was very similar to previous indications their position. Thus in light of various translations these words have gone through, it is not clear whether their use has any significance. Therefore, without indicating to Pole that message had been passed to USG, suggested Italian Government on its own responsibility, query Polish Rep on these two terms to determine whether formulations contained in Polish version of Hanoiʼs position were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in position or were accidents of translation. We told Fenoaltea we would be in better position to give him reply after receiving answer, and Fenoaltea promised immediately to query DʼOrlandi. 3 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball. Repeated to Canberra for Rusk. 2 Document 167 . 3 In telegram 61 from Geneva, July 6, Goldberg reported that he had learned of the Polish-Italian approach through U Thant, whose source was Fanfani. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, United Nations, vol. 4) In telegram 145 from Rome, July 9, Goldberg transmitted a written summary of the Polish-Italian approach from June 27 to July 7, which had been provided by President Giuseppe Saragat of Italy. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) Both telegrams are printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 242–243 and 245–247. 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, June 30, 1966. 5855. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary and the Acting Secretary. 1. To me the Polish “proposal” contains matters of substance which, so far as we know in Saigon, are new. The fact that the so-called NLF will not be the sole representative, and will merely “take part” or “participate” (in this context there is really no difference) seems to be a new departure. 2. The fact that the talk is of “suspension of bombing,” rather than a demand for complete “cessation,” also looks like new substance. 3. The proposals attributed to Hanoi, as a package, go far beyond anything we have heard mentioned before. In fact, they appear so forthcoming as to arouse suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish intermediary. It seems to us that not only is the so-called NLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining agent, but so also is the NLF program of a “socialist” state, of unifying the North and South, and of “neutralization.” Also the phrase “reasonable calendar” indicates a definite softening of position regarding U.S. troops. The same is true of acceptance of the Government of South Viet-Nam and its foreign relationships. 4. As I have said many times, it is indispensable that total secrecy be preserved. I am convinced that the slightest mention of anything like this will cause its immediate abandonment. 5. This proposal clearly comes in response to the successes we are having militarily, politically, and economically. They must see themselves blocked everywhere—except terrorism and we are making progress on that. 6. The officials in Hanoi are afraid for their own official lives, and they also undoubtedly have a generalized fear as to what China may be going to do to them and their country. 7. Unquestionably the Polish proposal would never have been made without specific Moscow approval. Hanoiʼs best chance is to get Moscow to underwrite some kind of a way out. An understanding between Washington and Moscow is, therefore, attractive to them and obviously has some very attractive aspects for us. 8. DʼOrlandi and the Pole conversed in English. Whenever I have talked with the Pole, he has pretended not to know any French. I do not know in what language the conversations were held in Hanoi. 9. It may be pertinent for me to remind the Department of the warm friendship which I have with DʼOrlandi, which goes back to my first tour here in 1963, and which was very much emphasized by the help which the U.S. gave him at the time of his desperate illness when, thanks to your support in Washington, I was able to get him a plane with a bed. 10. I believe him to be a careful and accurate reporter, and there is no doubt of his complete mastery of English. In fact, I gather he has really been bilingual in English since he was a child. 2 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:03 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 241–242. 2 Rusk responded in Secto 58 from Canberra to Katzenbach and Lodge, June 30, stating that there might be something in the Polish approach. The telegram has not been found, but is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , p. 241. 170. Editorial Note 170. Editorial Note In a telephone conversation with Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin that began at 9 a.m. on June 30, 1966, President Johnson made the following comments about the peace feeler that had been transmitted the previous day in Document 167 : “Iʼm not going to tell anybody else this, Bill, and I donʼt put much credence in it, but before the day was over yesterday I had the most realistic, the most convincing, the most persuasive peace feeler Iʼve had since Iʼve been President. That was at 3 oʼclock yesterday. I hadnʼt finished this dinner here with the Prime Minister [a luncheon for Prime Minister Holt of Australia] and they were calling me out on a very urgent call—the Secretaries of State and Defense. Now, I donʼt think it amounts to anything. Iʼm not a fellow like Adlai Stevenson that gets a drink in a bar and thinks that somebody buying for him means he wants to surrender. Iʼm too hard headed for that.” After a brief discussion of the previous dayʼs air strike near Haiphong, the President returned to the peace feeler: “Yesterday they had a man in Saigon and yesterday they had a man in Washington, one talking to the Secretary of State and one talking to our Ambassador, both of ʼem saying that Hanoi had said that here were conditions theyʼd never offered before. Now weʼre analyzing those, and I donʼt think much of ʼem, although the diplomats do, but I donʼt think so. I donʼt think theyʼve had enough yet.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Martin, Tape 66.18, Side A, PNO 3) 171. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 171. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 1, 1966. SUBJECT Second Komer Trip to Vietnam, 23–29 June 1966 This trip was far more valuable than my first. By now Iʼve established sound working relations with all the key people, and have begun to find out the real problems. I try to make these visits both educational (for me) and cathartic (for others). In the course of a week I talked with 60–70 Americans from Lodge and Westy on down to sergeants, and at least 60 Vietnamese from Ky down to villagers. Each got a tailored pep talk. I. General Conclusions . I return both an optimist and a realist. Optimistic because Westyʼs spoiling operations are going well; his prudent concern that a monsoon “offensive” is still in the offing is partly offset by abundant evidence that the VC has lost a lot of steam despite the infusion of strength from the north. Optimistic also because our own civil side effort has finally gotten off the ground, and because the GVN itself has a new wind—born of its success in containing the Buddhist bid for power over the last three months. It is taking pacification more seriously too. Third, weʼve got the economic situation under better control. In short, the US/GVN effort is greater and more efficient than ever before—though one keeps wondering why it takes so long. But is all this enough? The more I learn the more Iʼm sobered by the realization of how much further we may have to go. On the military side, our intelligence is improving but it is still only one in several sweeps that really catches and clobbers a VC main force unit. Nonetheless, Westy sees the VC/NVA as committed to a classical Phase III Maoist strategy rather than reverting to guerrilla war. He thinks they are trying to concentrate in divisional strength in at least 8–10 different areas. Their aim is to tie down our forces by synchronized though widely separated attacks and hopefully to overwhelm us in at least some cases. Westyʼs counterstrategy is to mount spoiling attacks, hitting the VC first wherever he can pinpoint a concentration. He seems to be keeping them off balance. But our military effort against the VC is not yet matched by our pacification and civil side operations. Our greatest weakness is our inability as yet to capitalize on the initiative our own military operations have givenus by extending our control over the countryside. We have stopped the erosion of GVN control, but I would judge that we have not really extended our control significantly outside the main towns over the last year. Until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense—securing the villages, flushing out the local VC (not just the main force) and giving the peasant both security and hope for a better future—we cannot assure a victory. The weak link in the chain is the GVN and the ARVN. We must get a greater return out of them—and it would be cheap at the price. The 700,000 ARVN forces are not pulling their weight. Nor is the GVN civil side. The US is bearing the brunt of the effort—which is neither necessary nor desirable. My two main conclusions from this trip are that we must (a) step up our own support of pacification/RD; and (b) galvanize the GVN and ARVN into a much greater—and better—effort in this field. There are some encouraging signs that this is feasible. My ideas as to how to do it follow—they differ in some significant respects from the views in my 14 June memo to you 2 (which proves to me that trips are quite useful). II. Stepping up the RD/Pacification Effort . This is essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN resources, and of generating enough resources to meet the need. On the US management side, there is encouraging progress. Porter has recognized that he canʼt run a billion dollar enterprise without a staff. He is organizing one, headed by Ambassador Koren, a top notch FSO. Heʼll report 10 July. With Westyʼs help, Iʼve also urged Porter to get a good general officer as No. 3, because better civil/military coordination is essential. Most of our pacification people in the field are military—some 2200 MACV advisers working at least part time on pacification vs. some 300 odd civilians. Also most encouraging is Kyʼs plan to give General Thang, the highly energetic RD Minister, super-ministerial supervision over the Agriculture, Public Works, and perhaps Information Ministries—as well as the Regional and Popular Forces. This step should serve to integrate control over the key security, cadre, and reconstruction assets in the countryside under probably the most capable man in the GVN. Equally important, the province chief will now be given more direct control over the local RF/PF security assets available. Divided authority between the province chief (usually a Lieutenant Colonel) who is pacification-minded and the ARVN regimental, division and corps commanders—who often are not—has been a serious problem. In my visits to five provinces I found this a concern of US advisors as well as province and district chiefs. Next steps . We may need to go further in this direction, however. The crazy quilt pattern of ARVN and local forces has further proliferated over the past year as pacification concepts have evolved. Now Police Field Force companies—which Westy has come around to favoring—and RD cadre teams have been added. The security element of the 59-man RD cadre team roughly equates to a Popular Force platoon; a Police Field Force company is not much different than a Regional Force Company. Confusion exists as to the proper roles and missions of each component of the pacification forces. There are also a number of hangovers from earlier programs, such as auto-defense forces and Combat Youth. So Porter and I started a high priority study by a top notch inter-agency group in Saigon to redefine these functions. Then, working with the GVN, the Mission hopes that the roles and missions of pacification forces can be precisely defined by a GVN decree. Such a rationalization of roles and missions might also lead to certain consolidations and overhead reductions—essential as well for meeting the growing Vietnamese manpower shortage. Some of the most knowledgeable and imaginative experts also believe that there is a critical lack of enough bodies to extend GVN control further into the countryside and provide security for the RD effort. They say that all the RF, PF, Cadres, and police put together are not enough to do more than hold the present real estate the GVN controls . One solution advocated is to shift many of the ARVN regular units—which are not pulling their weight in the battle against the VC main force anyway—into local security work. Those who advocate this solution would break up the lower grade ARVN units into battalions and put them under the province chiefs. They argue that when regular ARVN units are committed to a pacification (clearing and security) role, the ARVN regimental/division/corps levels frequently inhibit the proper tactical employment of company and battalion-sized units. This highly important matter of the GVN military and para-military structure merits open-minded investigation. It is plain that whatever change in operational roles or chain of command might be contemplated, the present MACV-supported logistic and administrative structure must be maintained. No one else could do the job. There might also be local political complications in disturbing the present distribution of military power. Major changes would doubtless be stoutly opposed by many in MACV or elsewhere. But as MACV necessarily devotes more and more attention to an ever larger US military effort, it inevitably becomes less of an advisory group and more of an operational headquarters. So experienced hands like General Krulak in Honolulu support a re-examination of this whole problem area. The MACV advisory effort . Whatever is done about the above, however, the MACV province and district advisory effort is indispensable—and one of the bright spots in Vietnam. We have 153 subsector (district) teams in 75% of the districts now, and MACV is considering 12 more. They are really the backbone of our effort in the countryside. Their high quality must be maintained. Indeed, I favor a “single manager” concept whereby the senior man in each province or district—military or civilian—would be designated as team chief for pacification/RD advisory purposes, reporting through region to Porterʼs office. Over a year ago, we experimented by appointing one of the US representatives at provincial level as US Team Captain, with coordinating authority over the entire US effort. I was impressed by how well this concept is still working in Binh Thuan province, even though the experiment ended six months ago with the decision to operate on a cooperative basis—not under a team captain. It stands to reason that if the province chief is a single manager on the VN side, we should have a single manager on the US side. Therefore, I intend to re-open the question of a US team chief. He would receive guidance directly from Porter operating in his expanded role. MACV would still be able to deal with the sector advisors on purely military matters. The RD Cadre Program is now fully launched. Over 26,000 cadre are in the field (not all well-trained). We will be graduating 5700 more each four months from the Vung Tau center and the Montagnard center at Pleiku. I visited three 59-man teams in their hamlets. Many of them were not on duty stations. Neither Porter nor I are satisfied with the quality of the cadre or their supervision in the field. I have urged that the MACV district advisory teams (the only Americans down at the district level) keep an eye on them. CIA is simply spread too thin to do the entire job; nor is AID much better Colonel Chau, a trusted member of General Thangʼs staff (assisted by Major Be, who did such an outstanding job with the cadre in Binh Dinh) has taken charge of Vung Tau. The former chief instructor (Captain Mai) and a group of close supporters attempting to build the cadre into a “third force” have been removed. There has been a temporary setback in the orderly development of an effective training establishment. Porter will recommend any slowdown in rate of cadre output needed to insure that quality has priority over quantity. The cadre program is promising, but it is just one of many pacification instruments and will take time to achieve significant impact. Police Field Forces (company sized units of motivated, well trained policemen working night and day in the areas between hamlets) are receiving a great deal of attention. The concept is good; execution on the part of the first units in the field has apparently been good also. Because of the manpower implications and the overlap with Popular and Regional Force roles and missions, MACV has opposed PFF expansion. Based on my discussions with Westmoreland, he now favors police and agrees with a 15,000 PFF level by 1967. Again (I will explain how later) this powerful instrument must be fully integrated with the overall RD effort. The Police Special Branch , charged with the local intelligence effort against the VC infrastructure seems to be progressing nicely. Black lists given to US units before operations have led to the capture of many VC cadre. Likewise, pacification has been enhanced by the pin-pointing of cadre and guerillas in hamlets. Here is an area where I think weʼll see progress of the most meaningful sort. Land Reform . No progress here. A study has recently been completed but the recommended program is more theoretical than practical. The big problem is now to administer a new land reform law with the very thin GVN administrative apparatus. My idea is to implement simple reforms in local areas as the areas are secured. Liberalized tenure and credit for tenant accomplished improvements are two possibly workable ideas. Cabotʼs people will work with the GVN. Chieu Hoi . Much more can be done. The cost per defector is 1/100th the cost per enemy killed by military action. Weʼve recruited a new and imaginative chief US advisor, who will work directly under Porter to step up our effort, since an inter-agency committee approach hasnʼt worked. The GVN has to carry the ball, but we can prod and help to insure that the effort at least keeps pace with expanding military operations. Area Priorities . Clearly, present capabilities for expansion of area control are limited and may not correspond with the four National Priority Areas to which the GVN and ourselves are committed. By and large, I favor instead more attention to those areas where greatest progress is feasible. For example, with very little additional effort it might be possible to pacify the entire province of Tuyen Duc. Binh Thuan Province under a dynamic province chief and an excellent US provincial team appears ready to expand the area of government control. Wherever US bases exist the spillover improvement in security and economic conditions should allow extension of pacified areas. Much depends also on the competence and morale of the local GVN organization at province, district, and village. As the RD mechanism at province and below grows in capability and the national level RD organization takes shape, this type of selective expansion probably should become the general operational approach. Porter intends to foster this concept. Better Civil/Military Coordination . In keeping with the move toward super-ministerial status for RD, the US Mission needs to strengthen its own machinery for civil/military coordination. I had useful discussions with our Mission principals, who all agree on expanding the capabilities of Porterʼs office, perhaps by adding a general officer as a chief of field operations and top-flight assistants for economic warfare, Chieu Hoi, manpower, revolutionary development (in the restricted sense), and possibly RF and PF. Given this organization, Porter should be able to work closely with the Ministry of Revolutionary Development and cover the key civil/military components of pacification. III. The Economic and Logistic Front . Here we are doing much better. Kyʼs bold devaluation plus McNamaraʼs piaster budget should between them keep about 30 billion piasters out of circulation during FY 1967, thus effectively braking inflation. Devaluation led to some short term price rises of 10–25% except for rice (which we got the GVN to subsidize)—but prices should drop back after a few months unless we undermine the devaluation by too many offsetting wage increases. This would also nullify the special wage increase allowed the GVN and ARVN, the chief victims of inflation. So I pressed the Mission not to yield too much to the RMK strikers—lest we trigger a further chain of wage demands. MACV port takeover should take place shortly . Westy, Lodge and I found Ky quite willing. Everyone (AID included) agrees that takeover is the right thing, even though Mann claimed that waiting time on commercial ships was down to two days. I gave Westy the green light to proceed as fast as feasible (he confessed that after I mentioned the likely need on my last trip, he laid on contingency planning long before formal instruction was received). The GVN also insists that goods are moving out of the port much faster under the new 10-day rule (and the spur of devaluation). Next, we are proceeding to bring AID cargo under the military shipping scheduling and priority system, which will help ensure a smoother flow of goods into the ports. I stressed to Westy the McNamara/Komer “most efficient operator” and “single manager” concepts for meeting civil sector needs. If the military are already doing similar things and can take care of the civil side as well by a marginal increase in already well-established military logistic programs, letʼs do so. It saves money and increases efficiency. Weʼre setting this up right now on medical logistics . (Westy would like to go further and integrate the whole civil/military medical effort under General Humphreys, but the latter is opposed.) My problem here is not Westy, who agrees, but the reluctant civil side. Both will cooperate in the BOB logistics study Iʼve laid on with DOD. My next target for possible integration is in-country lift. Meanwhile, AID is seeking to strengthen its Vietnam team and to increase the efficiency of our economic aid program . Weʼve made real progress toward agreement on streamlining the Commercial Import Program via consolidated procurement, bulk purchasing, and opening up the Saigon import community to insure healthy competitiion. I personally prodded Minister Thanh on this front, and believe I made some progress. AID is also sending a dozen more top people to Saigon. Wehrleʼs agreement to extend six months is another boon. I hit the AID people hard on stepping up our agricultural programs, and getting more help from Orville Freeman. Lagging rice collection from the Delta remains a critical problem . Collections are up a bit from the nine-year low of the last four months, but weʼre still estimating less than 300,000 tons this year (compared to 700,000 tons in 1963). A lot of this rice seems to be going to Cambodia, and then partly to the VC. So I taxed everyone from Ky and Thanh to Lodge and Westy on the importance of an integrated civil/military rice strategy. “Rice is as important as bullets” was my theme. I even invested a lunch with General Quang at IV Corps in pressing him on rice. Porter will join me in pressing for more effective rice control measures, before the next harvest begins around the turn of the year. Heʼs plugging the concept of a canal barrier along the Cambodia/Delta border, but MACV claims it will take too long to build, require too many engineer resources, and tie down too many troops. However, Westyʼs plan to put one or two US brigades in the IV Corps region will help a good deal. We will also press more effective resource control measures (the 750 police checkpoints are largely farcical). Next, Iʼm seeking ways to use over 400,000 tons of US aid rice as leverage to force the GVN to subsidize rice purchases and then subsidize rice sales (weʼll foot the bill through piaster counterpart). Lastly, we must open up the Delta transport routes and get more barges. We are still neglecting the Delta. Economic Warfare . Aside from the rice problem, the broader field of economic warfare requires increased attention. For years we have urged that a widespread resource control program be enforced. Except for some police check points (mostly statically positioned on major roads and simply bypassed by the VC), few effective resource control measures are being carried out. Yet thousands of military outposts exist on roads and canals. Ergo, use these outposts as resource control points and employ the many daily PF/RF patrols and ambushes as part of a system of mobile resource control check points. Ample laws exist giving military forces emergency police powers. However, the GVN has an aversion to using military forces for checking supplies and people moving throughout the country. It must be changed. The extensive bombing of VC base areas, military search and destroy operations against the bases, and crop destruction are effective economic warfare measures. But unsupported by other necessary measures, these military activities alone will not result in economic strangulation of the enemy. It should also be possible to undertake both active and passive measures against the widespread and productive VC efforts to tax merchants, truckers, barge operators and the peasants. Manpower . The most critical commodity in South Vietnam is manpower, particularly skilled manpower. Since some drastic control measures are needed, I took Assistant Secretary of Labor Leo Werts and Dr. Kidd from Dr. Hornigʼs office with me to look into the situation. They are doing a great job, and have outlined the dimensions for its solution. A carefully worked out manpower budget will be necessary before we can lift the temporary manpower ceilings that have been imposed. I should have a preliminary report on the manpower team findings within a month. IV. Briefing the Saigon Press Corps . Both Lodge and Porter have responded handsomely to your injunction that they devote more attention to the US press people. I followed up hard on this. It will take continued urging, so I will regard it as an ongoing chore. Lodge still complains about his Mission giving daily press briefings (i.e., only the Ambassador should speak), but he canʼt cover 350 pressmen by himself. The above is a mixed bag of large and small thoughts and actions. But I increasingly see the civil side problem as less one of discovering any single new key to success than one of much better management and stepped up activity on many fronts. At the least I can say that we are moving more rapidly in this direction, and I am reasonably confident that we can move faster yet. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. 2 Document 155 . 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, July 2, 1966, 0459Z. 2 131. Literally eyes only for the President, the Secretary and the Acting Secretary. 1. I bumped into DʼOrlandi unexpectedly Friday night, 3 and he told me the following: 2. He had received queries from his government concerning the two points raised in Deptel 4108, 4 that is the words “take part” versus “participate,” and the words “suspension” versus “cessation” of bombing. 3. His understanding of the words was the same as mine, but in order to make sure, he called on Lewandowski who confirmed his understanding that these words meant, respectively, that the so-called National Liberation Front would not be the sole representative, and that what was desired was a suspension, meaning stopping temporarily without any commitments concerning resumption. 4. DʼOrlandi said he had great difficulty getting Lewandowski on the telephone, which is why he called in person, and that he had arranged for Lewandowski to telephone him twice a day at 10 and at 4. He also has an appointment to talk with him on Monday night. 5. DʼOrlandi found Lewandowski more eager than ever. Lewandowski said he was sure that this was the right time to score against the Chinese. When DʼOrlandi brought up the bombing of the POL in Hanoi and Haiphong, Lewandowski made it clear that this, contrary to what some Senators are saying at home, did not affect the prospects for reaching a political settlement. He stressed that the heart of the matter was a political settlement, and not the question of whether or not the so-called National Liberation Front was the sole representative or whether or not they meant suspension or cessation. He evidently feels that we must get rid of the “cease-fire mentality,” and think in terms of a political settlement of the whole Viet-Nam issue. 6. Lewandowski was particularly earnest in saying that any initiative from the U.N. or the ICC at this time would be “most unfortunate.” He was sure that such initiatives would result in Peking putting pressure on Hanoi for immediate rejection, and this would jeopardize the maneuver which he, Lewandowski is trying to carry out. 7. This ends the report of what DʼOrlandi said to me Friday night. 8. This is another reason why U Thantʼs attempt to get into the act would be dangerous to the cause of peace. 5 Knowing U Thant quite well, I can understand his determination to get involved, now that he has realized that the wind is beginning to shift, which was reported from here in Saigon 5437, June 10. 6 I have been thinking of some way to bring about his participation without injury to the cause of peace and one idea, which is perhaps worthy of study, would be to consult with him before the Geneva conference, or alternatively we might ask him to present whatever agreement was reached to the United Nations once it had been ratified at Geneva. 9. Herewith a comment on the statement in paragraph 4 of the Secretaryʼs message from Canberra Secto 58, June 30, transmitted to me as Deptel 4113, 7 in which the Secretary says “DʼOrlandi is a professional, although his opinions seem to go up and down in Saigon on basis that seems to depend heavily on gossip.” 10. DʼOrlandi has a rather usual Italian love of making startling and paradoxical statements at dinner parties. He does so partly for his own amusement and also hoping it will startle and provoke other people into talking. He also often has opinions about what is going to happen here with which I disagree. I doubt whether many opinions are very firmly held. For example, he has been saying a number of unfavorable and pessimistic things about Ky, and when I knew DʼOrlandi was going to Cambodia, I asked him please not to give Sihanouk the impression that this whole place was falling apart, and believe he obliged in a very convincing way. 11. There are several things about him which, I think, are of great value. The first, as the Secretary says, “DʼOrlandi is a professional.” He is thus an extremely accurate reporter. He has a complete command of English, and can discern shadings and distinctions as well as any of us can. Secondly, in the very core of his being, he is pro-American, and believes that the United States is carrying out a wonderful and indispensable role in this dangerous world for the benefit of all humanity. If, therefore, you were decided to work through him, you could be guaranteed of devoted help actuated by the deepest feelings of friendship for the U.S. as well as absolutely accurate reporting with considerable insight into the implications of everything that is said. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Repeated to Manila, where Rusk was meeting with President Marcos, and passed to the White House. 2 Z refers to Greenwich Mean Time. 3 July 1. 4 Document 168 . 5 CIA Intelligence Information Cable [ document number not declassified ], June 28, reported that U Thant planned to send a representative to meet with Chinese Communist and NLF representatives “in an effort to obtain agreement that U Thant serve as an intermediary in a Vietnamese peace settlement.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS, vol. 4) Lodge commented on the report in telegram 81 from Saigon, July 1, calling it “improper and un-neutral.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET) 6 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 7 Not found; see footnote 2, Document 169 . 173. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Kyoto, Japan 173. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Kyoto, Japan 1 Washington, July 5, 1966, 8:31 p.m. 1773. Tosec 169. To Secretary from Acting Secretary. Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow 2 and I am proposing to send through them the following memorandum to the President. “Bob McNamara, Walt Rostow, Tommy Thompson, Alex Johnson and I have discussed further the Italian-Polish approach on Viet-Nam and concur in recommending for your approval the following line of action: 1. Tell the Italian Ambassador here that: 3 a. We are very appreciative of his governmentʼs role and are interested in the approach, but there are obviously aspects that require clarification. b. In view of the Polish representativeʼs statement that he would be willing to meet any place to follow up on the matter, we suggest that Ambassador DʼOrlandi, in Saigon, seek discreetly to arrange a meeting between himself, the Pole and Ambassador Lodge. At that meeting Ambassador Lodge would seek the necessary clarifications directly from the Pole. 2. Instruct Ambassador Lodge at such a meeting to: 4 a. State that the United States shares the desire for an over-all political settlement. b. Inquire when, where, and with what parties Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place. c. Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its part would propose to take or not to take during the period of suspension of bombing. (This is of course an implied reference to infiltration.) d. Inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends bombing with the inevitable speculation this would entail. 3. We would await outcome of foregoing action before making any XYZ approach. If these actions led nowhere or disclosed that initiative of the Pole was not well founded, we would seek to confirm this fact through XYZ. In other words, we would inform Hanoi, through XYZ, of the supposed approach and ask for their confirmation or denial. This course of action has the advantages of: 1. Keeping the Italians in the act for the time being and, if nothing comes of it, satisfying them that it was through no fault of our own. At the same time we would avoid too great a dependence on communications by the tortuous channel of the Italian Ambassador in Saigon to Rome to the Italian Ambassador here. 2. Directly engaging Ambassador Lodge in a matter with which he is already fully familiar and for which he has expressed some enthusiasm. 3. Keeping the XYZ channel in reserve either to confirm a negative result or to follow up on a positive result from the Polish channel. If anything positive comes from Lodgeʼs talk with the Pole we will have to decide whether or not to cut out the Italians. We will also have to face the hard decision as to what role we will give the NLF and how we can make that palatable to the GVN, what performance and degree of verification on cessation of infiltration we will require to suspend bombing, how we can best maintain our freedom to resume bombing if negotiations are unsuccessful, et cetera. We feel that, if Lodge does meet with the Pole, it will be desirable that he say something of a general nature to Ky in order to anticipate the inevitable rumors in Saigon. 5 However, I think that this is manageable with Ky, who will at this point probably see in it the signs of a change of heart by Hanoi.” If you have any comments or suggestions I would like very much to have them before 10:00 a.m. Washington time Wednesday. 6 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and Ball and approved by Ball. From July 4 to July 7 Rusk attended meetings of the U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in Kyoto and Tokyo. Rusk approved the course of action proposed in this telegram in telegram Secto 113 to Katzenbach, July 6. In telegram 2673 to Tokyo, July 7, Ball informed Rusk that the President had approved the script and added that it was felt that, carefully nurtured, the approach might develop into something. Neither telegram has been found; telegram 2673 is printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , p. 243, and both telegrams are summarized in the Marigold Chronology prepared by the Department of State in 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 147, Marigold Chronology) 2 Rostow, Harriman, Unger, and Goodpaster flew to the LBJ Ranch on the morning of July 6 to meet with the President, and departed about 1:30 p.m. for Los Angeles to brief the Governors Conference on Vietnam. McNamara arrived later that afternoon and departed the next morning. No record of the discussions at the Ranch has been found. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 3 A memorandum of Ball and U. Alexis Johnsonʼs conversation with Fenoaltea on July 7 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. 4 These instructions were transmitted to Lodge in telegram 2626 to Saigon, July 7. In telegram 604 from Saigon, July 9, Lodge reported that he had “stated the four points in your 2626” to Lewandowski at a meeting on July 9 and that Lewandowski had responded that he would seek to get answers “as soon as possible.” Telegram 604 is ibid. and both telegrams are printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 244–245. 5 Lodge reported in telegram 642 from Saigon, July 10, that he made an oblique reference to Marigold as he was leaving a meeting with Ky, to which Ky responded “that he was sure that North Vietnam could not stand much more of what they were getting.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 247–248) 6 July 6. 174. Memorandum From George Carver of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 174. Memorandum From George Carver of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, July 7, 1966. SUBJECT Comments on Mr. Komerʼs Report to the President on his 23–29 June Trip to Vietnam 2 1. Mr. Komer returns from Vietnam a cautious optimist. He feels the military side of the war is going fairly well but the civil/pacification side is not keeping pace with our military effort. In no small measure this is due to the fact that neither the GVN nor the ARVN is pulling its weight. His principal conclusions are that the U.S. must step up its own support of pacification and rural development and must galvanize its Vietnamese allies into greater and better effort. Mr. Komer offers a number of detailed recommendations for achieving this goal. 2. Though we should respect the request that circulation of this memorandum be restricted, its only really sensitive elements are its adverse comments on the performance of our allies. We recommend that copies be furnished on an Eyes Only basis to the DDP, Chief/FE, Chief/FE/VNC, the Acting DDI, D/NE, D/CI, and SAVA. 3. Mr. Komer makes a number of perceptive and valid comments on a variety of subjects: the need for better manpower allocation and a more rational definition of the roles and missions of various counterinsurgency elements, the Chieu Hoi program, area priorities, the economic scene, economic warfare, and the desirability of MACVʼs taking over the Saigon port. He also has some useful things to say about land reform, though like most observers he misses the point that credit, not tenure, is the principal problem. 4. Within the bosom of the family, however, this memorandum—or rather the analysis and perspective it reflects—has some serious flaws and raises some basic problems. Surface features such as its “gee whiz” style, fondness for the perpendicular pronoun, and breezy bandying of first names (“Westy”) are irritating but relatively unimportant. What is important is its tone of activist omniscience which masks some fundamental misconceptions about the nature of the war in Vietnam. Perhaps unconsciously, Mr. Komer is encouraging the President to anticipate early and quantifiably measurable results. Even with a proper mix of programs and personnel, such results are not going to occur in a short time span. If we expect such results, we may be misled into constantly re-jiggering valid approaches before they have had enough time to accomplish anything worthwhile. Mr. Komer perceives this unpalatable truth dimly (“… the US/GVN effort is greater and more efficient than ever before—though one keeps wondering why it takes so long.”), but he does not understand it. 5. The most serious defect in the memorandum arises from its misconception of the nature of pacification, which prompts action recommendations we feel would be counterproductive. Mr. Komer notes: “until we can get rolling on pacification in its widest sense—securing the villages, flushing out the local VC (not just the main forces) and giving the peasant both security and hope for a better future—we cannot secure victory.” Had he stopped right there he would have been on solid ground and his memorandum would have been most useful. He does not stop there. He goes on to argue that improvement in the pacification effort is “essentially a matter of better management of US/GVN resources, and of generating enough resources to meet the need.” Management and resources are both important, but the essential aspect of pacification is one of doctrine. Without the proper doctrine, management and resources can accomplish little. 6. Mr. Komer makes a number of concrete recommendations for improving the management of the pacification effort, particularly the Rural Development cadre program. Their net effect would be to give this program a military cast which would ruin its chances of success. For example, he recommends that Ambassador Porter have a considerably augmented staff and that a U.S. General Officer be assigned to it as Number 3 man in charge of all field operations—i.e., the Rural Development teams. He also suggests that because “CIA is simply spread too thin to do the entire job; nor is AID much better”, MACV District Advisory teams should be tasked to “keep an eye on” all RD cadre in the field. Should both of these recommendations be accepted, the rural development program that this Agency created would cease to exist and would be replaced by, essentially, a new form of Popular Forces. 7. The opinions outlined above are private ones offered for your eyes only. They have been discussed with Mr. de Silva who is in substantial agreement and would like to pursue this matter with you further. 3 We recommend that the Agency acknowledge receipt of Mr. Komerʼs memorandum with a bland and courteous response and not use his report as the vehicle for taking issue with his approach. 4 Nevertheless, we should also prepare an additional paper, not so closely keyed to his trip report as to be provocative, to set forth this Agencyʼs considered views on these larger questions. 8. At some point soon, fundamental decisions will have to be made on the shape and future scope of RD cadre program, how it is to be managed on the U.S. side, and how it is to be funded. The three questions are so closely interrelated that they will have to be answered collectively rather than seriatim. The Agencyʼs written and verbal input to this decision-making process would be the most appropriate vehicle for presenting our arguments on the fundamental questions raised in Mr. Komerʼs report. George A. Carver, Jr. 5 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam. Secret. 2 Document 171 . 3 In a July 8 memorandum to Helms, DeSilva called Komerʼs views on pacification “appalling.” He found “really depressing and discouraging” Komerʼs proposals for establishing a “single boss” at the province level and for giving MACV “broad supervisory authority at the lower levels.” He predicted this would result in rural pacification losing its momentum and coming to a halt. “If we have learned any lesson in the past two years,” DeSilva continued, “it is certainly the lesson that the military establishment is incapable of contesting the armed guerrilla subversion of the Viet Cong throughout the countryside.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam) 4 For Helmsʼ response to Komer, see Document 181 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 175. National Intelligence Estimate 175. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, July 7, 1966. NIE 14.3–66 NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY POTENTIAL FOR FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM The Problem To estimate: (a) the present strength of the North Vietnamese military establishment; (b) its capability to expand; (c) its capability through 1967 to send troops to the South and support them there; and (d) the probable buildup of forces in the South. Assumption For the purposes of this estimate, 2 we assume that North Vietnam will generally continue to pursue its current strategy in the war over the next 18 months. Conclusions A. We estimate the present strength of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces to be slightly over 400,000 with about 375,000 of these in the army. North Vietnam has sufficient manpower to provide a total military force of over 500,000 men without serious strain. B. The total Communist force in South Vietnam is estimated at between 260,000 and 280,000. The major combat elements include some 38,000 North Vietnamese troops, approximately 63,000 VC regular main and local forces, and about 100,000 to 120,000 guerrillas. C. North Vietnam is estimated to have a current annual capability to train 75,000 to 100,000 individual replacements for infiltration. By making a maximum effort, this total might be doubled. From these, North Vietnam could organize some 24 to 36 infantry regiments per year. D. There is considerable margin for error in estimating total Communist losses. Nevertheless, we believe these losses are mounting rapidly. The loss rate has already begun to strain the replacement capability of the VC in South Vietnam, but it appears that current total Communist losses could be replaced, if necessary, from within South Vietnam. E. We estimate that the VC could recruit and train 7,000 to 10,000 men per month. The replacement of cadre, however, is probably a problem and is almost certain to become more difficult in the future. By the end of 1967, the loss rate may exceed the estimated capability of the VC to recruit replacements from within South Vietnam, especially if the rate of combat increases. In such case, the Communists might be forced either to scale down their plans for expansion or to step up the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam. F. Present evidence suggests that the total infiltration for 1966 will probably be between 55,000 and 75,000 men. These would probably include one or two infantry regiments per month, additional units and combat support battalions, and individual replacements. G. We have no reliable evidence of Communist force goals. By the end of 1966, however, the Communist regular force may include 35–40 regiments and other units and number about 125,000 (65,000 VC and 60,000 NVA)—a net gain of about 50,000 for the year. By the end of 1967, this force may grow to over 150,000, provided attrition remains substantially at 1966 proportions. H. We believe that current and estimated future capacities of the Laotian road network are sufficient to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Even if this capacity could be reduced, say by one-third, and combat activities were to double, we would still estimate that the capacities would be sufficient on an annual basis to support the requirements for the Communist forces at current and future levels. However, at these higher levels of forces and combat, the excess of road capacities over requirements would be reduced during the rainy season. I. Maintenance and operation of the North Vietnamese truck fleet in North Vietnam and Laos is a serious problem, and the regime is dependent on the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe for trucks, spare parts, and POL. However, despite truck losses from air attack, breakdown, and retirement, we believe these losses could be offset by imports. The POL requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement has not been large enough to present significant supply problems. But local shortages have occurred from time to time and may become significant as a result of attacks on the POL distribution system. J. Other channels of supply complement the Laotian corridor, Cambodia has become an increasingly important source of supplies, particularly food. Although sea infiltration has been curtailed, the Communists will probably continue to attempt to resupply their forces by this means, particularly in the delta area. K. We believe that morale problems for the Communists will become aggravated in the future. Hanoiʼs problems in implementing its military strategy have increased, and the record of combat must raise questions, at least among some leaders in North Vietnam, as to the wisdom of their long term military strategy. [Here follows the body of the 18-page estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79–R01012A. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem/Sensitive; No Dissem Abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 The figures in this estimate are current as of June 1966. [Footnote in the source text.] 176. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 176. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 July 7, 1966. Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles What struck me about the Governors was their honest eagerness to hear the facts and to hear what we think and why. It is clear that even these mature and able men have not gotten a clear picture of all the elements in our policy and how they fit together. It is also clear, talking with people out here, that your Omaha speech 2 was a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL. I recommend, therefore, that we organize a campaign to drive home each of the themes of the Omaha speech: —We are fighting aggression; we are confident (not optimistic: we donʼt want to promise too much, too soon); we shall persist; we shall succeed. —We are proud of our skillful, brave, compassionate men fighting in Viet Nam; and we shall back them to the hilt. —There is a vital Free Asia emerging behind our defense of Viet Nam. (Several governors came up afterwards to tell me this was new, exciting, hopeful.) —There is a vital, modern South Viet Nam emerging. (The Honolulu program is slowly gaining credibility. We donʼt want to over-sell it; but I found by talking about how Korea emerged after 1961 I could make them see why it was possible.) —Peace. Why we believe that there is a fair prospect of a relatively tranquil era ahead if we see it through in Viet Nam, but only trouble and more war if we bug out. —Food and Development. This is the real war for all to fight. (At some stage you should consider a statement like that I got into President Eisenhowerʼs April 1953 speech after Stalinʼs death: 3 you are prepared to recommend to the Congress that we put a proportion of what we save in military expenditures, when the war in Viet Nam ends, into increased development assistance. This would put extra pressure from developing nations on Hanoi and Peiping.) These six Omaha themes must be repeated until every newspaper in the country knows them; every knowledgeable citizen; every commentator. Repetition is the heart of both politics and teaching. You should consider a series of talks in which you refer briefly to them all and then elaborate one of them at length. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara should do the same. And all our other foreign policy spokesmen should follow suit. You may wish to send a memorandum to this effect to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. 4 In short, I believe the POL bombing and Omaha have caught the nationʼs attention. Our people sense new determination; new ideas; new hope. Now, in a quite systematic way, we must drive the lesson home. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Rostow en route by airplane from Los Angeles, where he had attended the Governors Conference, to Washington, and transmitted from the White House to the President in Texas at 6:21 p.m. 2 The President spoke at Omaha on June 30. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book I, pp. 679–685. 3 “The Chance for Peace,” delivered before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953. For text, see ibid.: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953 , pp. 179–188. 4 In a July 8 memorandum to Rusk and McNamara, Rostow indicated that the President wanted the “six themes, developed in his Omaha speech, elaborated and driven home systematically in speeches and statements made by members of the Departments of State and Defense on Vietnam.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 177. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 177. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 11, 1966. SUBJECT Preparations for a “Cessation of Hostilities” in Viet-Nam In commenting on Mrs. Gandhiʼs statement of July 7, 2 our government spokesman included the following sentence: “A cessation of hostilities both in North and South Viet Nam could be the first order of business of a reconvened Geneva Conference.” 3 This, of course, is not new prose but I would like to raise the question whether, as a government, we are in agreement as to what it means or implies. As I understand it, it means that we will negotiate a cessation of hostilities (which the newspapers call a “cease fire” but is more properly an “armistice”) in advance or as a part of negotiations aimed at a final settlement in South Viet Nam. Since it took over two years to negotiate an armistice in Korea, I think it very timely for us to make sure that we are not about to get into an equally frustrating and unsatisfactory exercise. I am aware that considerable work has been done and is being done in the State Department at the planning level in anticipation of a possible cessation of hostilities. I have recently seen quite a good draft on this subject which undertakes to define terms and proposes a way to use our most valuable negotiating blue chips. 4 I would hope that this paper or one like it would get to you shortly because I am constantly fearful that a Communist proposal will catch us by surprise. Any day we may be presented with an offer to “stop bombing and start talking”. An analysis of the possible course of events in the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities reminds us that, before we are successful, we are likely to be faced with many difficult situations, particularly in winning and retaining public support in the face of the sharp criticism of allies, neutrals and segments of the U.S. public, evoked by the unpopular positions which we shall be obliged to maintain. Throughout the negotiations, unless we are willing to sacrifice vital interests, we will have to establish and maintain an unyielding position on points like the following: a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations with the Communists. b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjom-type negotiation. The negotiations will have to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation. c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached, the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action. d. The Government of South Viet Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain law and order. Obviously, the maintenance of these positions will subject us to Communist attack and will cause acute unhappiness in many international and domestic quarters. Thus far, I have the feeling that we have not prepared the domestic and international public for our attitude on these points. Not only have we not laid the ground work to justify our attitude on these matters, but in some cases in the past we have used misleading language which invites misinterpretation. An example is statement No. 14 of the U.S. Official Position which reads: “We have said publicly and privately that we would stop the bombing of North Viet Nam as a step toward peace.” 5 We need to clear up what we really mean by such a statement or run the risk of being charged with double-dealing or at least of misleading the hopes of the many nations who feel involved in the situation in South Viet Nam. As time may be running short, I would recommend that you urge State to propose to you at once a plan for negotiating a cessation of hostilities in advance or as a part of the negotiation for a final settlement and that the plan suggest ways and means for winning domestic and international understanding for the unpopular positions which we will inevitably be obliged to take and hold throughout the negotiations. Maxwell D. Taylor 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top Secret. On July 11 Rostow forwarded Taylorʼs memorandum to the President and, at the Presidentʼs request, to Rusk and McNamara. In his covering memorandum to the President, Rostow indicated that he and Taylor had been “going into the negotiating question quite deeply” but that there were “some critical gaps.” He proposed to formulate these gaps into “key unanswered questions” in consultation with Taylor, submit them to the Departments of State and Defense, and later schedule a meeting for the President to review the planning. (Ibid.) The President indicated his approval on Rostowʼs covering memorandum, resulting in the preparation of Document 178 . 2 Gandhi proposed an immediate reconvening of the Geneva Conference and an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam followed by a cessation of hostilities, with the ICC safeguarding the standstill military arrangement. ( The New York Times , July 8, 1966) 3 Telegram 4535 to New Delhi, July 8, reported the text of the spokesmanʼs statement on July 8 and provided “confidential observations” on the proposal to be put before Gandhi. Telegram 4653 to New Delhi, July 9, detailed the proposalʼs “numerous deficiencies,” which needed rectifying if the initiative was to “serve any useful purpose.” (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 Reference is to a 14-page paper entitled “Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam: Planning Considerations,” prepared by the Working Group of the interagency Vietnam Planning Group and sent by Unger to Rostow, McNaughton, Ball, William Bundy, and other officials on July 8 in light of Gandhiʼs July 7 proposals. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 72, E/Documents Relating to a Cease Fire in Vietnam) Taylorʼs July 11 memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, critiquing the paper, is ibid. 5 For text of the “Fourteen Points of the United States Official Position on Peace in Southeast Asia,” January 3, 1966, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 740–742. 178. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 178. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, July 14, 1966. The President wishes at an early stage to review with you both our planning for negotiations in Viet Nam. In this connection, it may be helpful if answers were developed with respect to the following questions, among others: 2 1. What are the US/GVN negotiating assets and how should they be played to gain what? In particular, what should we obtain from the other side to warrant a cessation of bombing in North Viet Nam? 2. How can we verify the cessation of infiltration of supplies and personnel into South Viet Nam, (a) with third party supervision and (b) without such supervision? 3. If no third party policing of a cessation of hostilities is possible, can we afford to enter into any such agreement? 4. What is our response if the DRV takes the position that it exercises no control over the VC/NLF and has no authority to represent them? 5. To get a negotiation started, what might we communicate in advance to the Communist side to make them see that an accommodation with us is preferable to the existing situation? What attractive “golden bridge” or bridges can we offer to them? What carrots? 6. How would we want the NVA/VC units to behave under the terms of a cessation of hostilities? How do we visualize the dissolution and/or repatriation of VC/NVA units and individuals? 7. During a cessation of hostilities, how would we prevent the DRV/VC from regaining strength and continuing “non-shooting” activities such as propaganda, recruiting, tax collection and accumulation of supplies? 8. During a cessation of hostilities, how do we avoid legitimatizing VC occupation and control of areas of the country which government forces can not enter without fighting? 9. If we are to maintain the right of the GVN to circulate throughout South Viet Nam during a cessation of hostilities to maintain law and order and to protect its citizens, how can these activities be carried on without violating a cease fire? 10. How do we avoid prolonged negotiations on the model of Panmunjom? 11. How do we prepare the domestic and international public for the hard nose positions we must maintain, such as: a. The U.S. will not stop bombing or pay any other price for the privilege of participation in negotiations with the Communists. b. The U.S. will not tolerate another prolonged Panmunjom-type negotiation. The negotiations will have to demonstrate sincerity and obtain tangible results within a reasonable time after their initiation. c. If it is impossible to get a system of international supervision of the execution of agreements reached, the U.S. will reserve the right to decide whether violations have occurred and to take appropriate action. d. The government of South Viet Nam will have the right of circulation throughout all of South Viet Nam during a cessation of hostilities and will have the obligation to protect its citizens and to maintain law and order. 12. How and when do we bring our allies into these pre-negotiation discussions? 13. During or after negotiations, is it feasible to relate the intensity of our bombing to the violence of VC activities in South Viet Nam? If so, we would probably never have to stop bombing completely and would have a flexible means of replying to VC incidents following a cessation of hostilities. Otherwise, when the inevitable violations occur, we would have no alternative other than to denounce the cessation of hostilities or to tolerate the violations. 3 W 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Top Secret. Benjamin Read forwarded the memorandum to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and William Bundy on July 14 under cover of a memorandum stating that Rusk “has asked me to get your succinct private views on this matter.” (Ibid.) For background information on Rostowʼs memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 177 . 2 The 13 questions were prepared by Taylor and submitted to Rostow in a July 12 memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor) 3 William Bundy responded to this memorandum in a note to Rusk, July 15, stating that “we do not have, at this moment, well organized answers to the questions” and thus Rostow “has precipitated the very need that I had foreseen before our trip.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 179. Memorandum for the Record 179. Memorandum for the Record 1 New York, July 17, 1966. I met with General Khanh from 1:00 p.m. to 4:15 p.m. July 17 in a suite at the Waldorf Astoria. As was previously the case in our meetings, we conversed in a mixture of French and English, with General Khanh talking primarily in French and with my interrupting to clarify points I did not fully understand. After exchanging pleasantries, I referred to his previous conversation with Col. Jasper Wilson, 2 which I said had been brought to the attention of the President, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. The President had asked that I meet with General Khanh to follow up on that conversation and no one else was privy to our conversation or to his previous conversation with Col. Wilson. General Khanh expressed much satisfaction and at my request went over the ground he had covered with Col. Wilson but in more detail. He traced the Viet Cong movement in the South back to the “Movement Republicain de Cochine” (MRC) which he said was one of several political movements that originated in the South in the 1946 period, others being the “Movement Populaire de Cochine”, which was a French puppet that disappeared, the Dai Viet and the Viet Minh. The MRC was heavily composed of Cochinchinese, essentially non-Communist intellectuals such as Tho. It was subsequently suppressed by the French and its leaders imprisoned. They were released in 1954 and initially worked with Diem. However, to these Southerners the Tonkinese Diem was essentially a “foreigner” and they broke with Diem around 1957 to form what became the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front. While southern-born cadre trained in the North were infiltrated and some supplies, the movement was thus essentially Southern as opposed to Annamite or Tonkinese. However, various units were under varying degrees of Communist or Tonkinese control, depending on the type and number of cadre. However, Khanh said (it was not clear how much he was expressing his own opinion and how much that of “Mr. Out”) 3 that there were no organized North Vietnamese forces introduced into South Viet-Nam until after the introduction of the Americans. Nevertheless, he agreed with my observation that, from what we now knew, the North began to move elements of the 325th Division toward the South before the introduction of the first American combat units into Danang in April 1965. We did not return to or further resolve this point. He then recounted the history of his relationship with “Mr. Out” along the same lines as to Col. Wilson. He said that “Mr. Out” alleged that he was one of the three leaders of the NLF along with Nguyen Huu Tho and “Mr. In”. He said that on our list of NLF officers “Mr. In” was listed as Ho Thu, a Deputy Secretary-General (but of course that was not his real name) and, contrary to Col. Wilsonʼs understanding, he was not now living in Saigon but rather in Viet Cong-controlled area in South Viet-Nam. In reply to my question as to how “Mr. Out” was able to maintain from Europe the communication necessary to be a leader of the NLF, Khanh said he was not familiar with the details but he knew that he exchanged communications in 48 hours, Khanh thought possibly through the NLF office in Prague and thence through Cambodia. Khanh said “Mr. Out” said that some three weeks ago the CIA had attempted to establish contact with “Mr. Outʼs” “liaison officer” in Brussels but he had turned them down as he did not want to deal with the CIA. Khanh said that, as a result of his talks with “Mr. Out”, Tho, “Mr. Out” and “Mr. In” now agreed on a program under which they would ask for the presence of American forces on the assumption that North Viet-Nam would not agree to accept any arrangement for an independent South Viet-Nam and would seek to continue its efforts to take it over. However, they would not want the presence of other foreign forces such as the Koreans, the Australians and the Philippines, as they desired to deal solely with the United States. They would also ask for continued American economic assistance. Khanh said that he had not discussed how the Viet Cong forces would come over or how arrangements could be made, but he thought it important that we not talk in terms of “ralliement” but rather in terms of “conciliation.” In reply to my observation that at some stage discussions of arrangements such as this would have inevitably to involve the GVN and how did Khanh foresee the possibility of working this out, Khanh said that it would be entirely impossible with Ky and the other Tonkinese now in the GVN. It would have to be a purely “Southern solution” by Southerners for Southerners. America should reach agreement with the NLF and then see that the kind of a government was installed in Saigon necessary to carry it out. In reply to my observation that, as Khanh knew, we did not have that kind of control over the political picture in Saigon, he observed that we had been very successful in bringing about a satisfactory solution in the Dominican Republic. In reply to my question on how we could test the bona fides of “Mr. Out” he suggested that we might ask him to arrange the release of a few selected prisoners within an agreed period of time or ask for a stand-down in Viet Cong operations in a specified area for a specified period of time. In this connection, he said that “Mr. Out” had pointed out to him that the NLF had at one time prolonged a stand-down in operations for three days longer than Hanoi had announced they were going to be stood down in order to demonstrate, particularly to Rumania, the independence of the NLF from Hanoi. Khanh said that he was not clear whether this was at Tet or at Christmas, but he thought it might be interesting for us to look up the record and see whether in fact such an event had taken place. 4 Khanh also said that Y Binh Aleo (a Vice Chairman of the NLF), whose real name he says is Y Bit, is the leader of the Montagnard element in the NLF and could probably bring along the Montagnards in any arrangement that was reached with the NLF. He said that, while, as I knew, the Montagnards did not like Vietnamese in general, they liked Tonkinese least of all and would prefer a southern government. Khanh said that as a political ploy he had in mind the pattern of Malaya, in which the British had, after careful arrangements, brought about the defection of the southern part of the country and the Malays from the rebels and left the Chinese element isolated in the North. In reply to his question, I told Khanh that he could be assured that the President was, in principle, interested in vigorously pursuing the matter. I said that, while the complications and difficulties were obvious, I knew that the President was deeply interested in anything that could bring about an end to hostilities in at least part of the country or would in any way shorten the hostilities. I told him that an individual 5 who enjoyed the Presidentʼs confidence and who could speak with authority was prepared immediately to go to Paris to make contact with “Mr. Out”. I said that the individual was a retired diplomat not now active in the government who spoke good French and who could visit Paris inconspicuously. I said that he was prepared to go at any time and urged Khanh immediately to go to Paris and arrange the contact between this individual and “Mr. Out”. I pointed out the importance of proceeding urgently with anything that could shorten hostilities by even a week or an hour. Khanh entirely agreed but said that the French had been very “sticky” about his visa and had given him a visa valid only for one exit and reentry. The French in Paris watched him very closely and, if he returned unexpectedly and applied for another visa to return to his daughter here, he was sure it would at the minimum attract much French attention and they might even refuse him a visa. He felt that attracting French attention in this situation was very dangerous and unwise. However, at my urging he promised to think it over and see whether he could not work out something that appeared practical and get in touch with me. We also discussed how contact could be made in Paris between himself and the individual we had in mind. After dismissing several possibilities that did not seem practicable, we agreed that, subject to my consultations in Washington, I would see him again in New York before he left and arrange for him to meet the individual we had in mind so that they could directly work out their arrangements for meeting in Paris without the interposition of anyone else. Unless Khanh can leave earlier, he will in any event leave New York on July 28 with his daughter. He said that, as “Mr. Out” travels a great deal, it will probably take him a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 7 days to make contact with him after he returns to Paris. NOTES During the course of our conversation, Khanh throughout and in many ways laid heavy stress on the fundamental differences and hostility between the Tonkinese, the Annamites and the Cochinchinese. He gave me illustrations. He said that while he was fighting in the North with the French he thought nothing of bombarding a village because he looked on the people of the North as being essentially “foreigners”. However, he had quite a different attitude when he was fighting in the South. He said the Tonkinese officers in the South Vietnamese forces have a similar attitude towards southerners; that is, they really look upon them as “foreigners” and have little care or concern as to what they do to the local population. He said that the Tonkinese are essentially warlike and their life revolves around making war. This applied to the Tonkinese officers in the South Vietnamese forces such as Ky and it would be a very serious problem for which he did not have the answer working out any arrangements such as we had discussed. As another example, he pointed out that, when General Cao was recently sent to the First Corps to put down the trouble in Hue and Danang, as a Catholic whose family had suffered at the hands of the Annamite Buddhists he had every reason to be very “rough”. However, he did not do so because he himself was an Annamite. In discussing the dispositions of the regular North Vietnamese forces as opposed to the Viet Cong forces, Khanh said that, while he did not have exact and recent information, it was his general impression that the North Vietnamese forces were generally to be found roughly North of the line crossing the southern part of the Pleiku and the northern part of Darlac down to the South of Nhatrang. As far as military command was concerned, he had the impression that these forces, which were generally in the V Military Region, were commanded directly from Hanoi whereas the command line to the forces in the South ran through the NLF and COSVN. He did not think that there was much distinction between the NLF and the COSVN. He stoutly protested that he was not seeking anything for himself in this but, if “we ever thought he could be of service” he would be willing to consider whatever we might propose. He accepted my replies to his queries to the effect that, after he had made contact between our representative and “Mr. Out”, the discussion should be entirely bilateral without his participation. In reply to my query, he said that Le Van Hoach had been in touch with Huynh Tan Phat, Vice Chairman of the NLF, during the period that I was in Saigon. He said that Phat was not a Communist but that Hoach was entirely out of the question as any channel or contact because he was known to everyone as such a big gossip. I pressed him hard on the identify of “Mr. Out” and at one time he seemed almost to the point of giving it to me, but said that he had “solemnly sworn” to “Mr. Out” that he would not disclose his identity until the meeting had been arranged. He said that we would of course then learn who he was but he doubted very much that we had much information with regard to him. He expressed great fear of the French and what they might try to do to prevent any such arrangement as well as what they might try to do to him personally. He said the French were determined to make an arrangement that would be acceptable to the Chinese and wanted to see all of Viet-Nam under the control of the North. I did not attempt to discuss with him where all of this would leave Annam or how it could be fitted into the picture. The strong implication is of course that the southerners do not care too much if they can make a deal that will take care of themselves. Khanh agreed that he would say absolutely nothing to anyone concerning our meeting and I said it would be discussed only with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara at present. 6 UAJ 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. In a July 20 letter to Bohlen, Johnson indicated that messages concerning the contact described in the memorandum printed here would be slugged “Elm Tree.” (Ibid.) 2 No record of this conversation has been found; prior contacts in July between Khanh and the CIA regarding this subject are summarized in two memoranda, dated July 7 and 20, from [ text not declassified ] of CIA to William Bundy, who are identified in the memoranda by pseudonyms. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78–000032R, Chipwood Memos-FE) 3 “Mr. Out” was Le Van Truong. Le Van Truong identified himself at a meeting with Paul Sturm on July 27. The substance of the meeting was reported in Document 195 , and the information on Le Van Truongʼs identify was reported in telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30. After serving in Vietnam as secretary general of the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois, established in 1946, Le Van Truong had lived mostly in France from 1947 to 1954 and then in Saigon from 1954 to 1963, when he left Vietnam. His overt political activity had principally taken the form of journalism. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET) In an August 11 memorandum for Sturm, U. Alexis Johnson noted that biographical information from CIA files, although very skimpy, generally “checks out with” Le Van Truongʼs story. (Ibid.) However, as Khanh saw the problem, it was a “problem of the South for the South”. 4 In a July 20 memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson stated that no substantiation had been found for this claim. (Ibid., POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE) 5 The reference is to Paul Sturm, who was “Y” in the XYZ negotiations (see Document 4 ) and is referred to as George in documents concerning his meetings with Khanh and Mr. Out during July 1966. 6 In his July 20 memorandum (see footnote 4 above), a copy of which was sent to the President, U. Alexis Johnson outlined a scenario for his next meeting with Khanh, scheduled for July 23, and for Sturmʼs first two meetings (as yet unscheduled) with Mr. Out. He concluded that if the contact with Mr. Out turned out to have some substance, a minimum objective was to obtain the release of some American prisoners and the defection of some members of the NLF, but that “a broad political arrangement with the NLF, which requires a radical shift in the personnel and orientation of the GVN,” presented “probably insurmountable difficulties.” 180. Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 180. Memorandum From William Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, July 18, 1966. SUBJECT The Viet Cong and Liberation Front We have been looking at the Viet Cong Liberation Front as the enemy, to be ignored politically or destroyed militarily. I think it is time to look at them as a target of opportunity. We keep getting reports, based on POW interrogations and other sources, that many VC are getting fed up. 2 If this is true of the fighting man in the field, it must also be true of some in the political structure of the Front. Surely there are some nationalists who are fed up with tight Communist control. Surely there are some Southerners disgusted with ever-increasing domination by the Northerners. There must also be many in both military and political echelons who are not happy with the prospect of continuing battles and bloodshed and who feel that their sacrifices are going to be in vain. I believe we and the GVN should be working on this in a forceful and coordinated way. The effort should be both overt and covert. On the covert side, we should be trying by every possible means to promote high-level defections from the VC and the Front. We have said that the failure of any genuine nationalist to defect to the Viet Cong is clear proof that they have no major appeal to the South Vietnamese. The other side of that coin is that there have been no major defections from the VC. We ought to try by every available means to generate some—the more the better. I need not point out how the appearance in Saigon suddenly of Nguyen Huu Tho or some of the other leading figures in the Front would influence U.S. and world opinion. The group defection of a VC military unit, however small, would be equally impressive. It would be worth millions—or worth a division—or both. On the overt side, I think Prime Minister Ky ought to make a major appeal to the VC. This would follow up that part of the Honolulu Pledge which stated the “Purposes of the Government of Viet-Nam.” I think Ky should make a major speech on this subject. He would point out that China is prepared to see the Viet-Nam War continue to the last Vietnamese; that Hanoi was ready to see the war go on to the last South Vietnamese. He would contrast his governmentʼs purposes—peace, independence, progress, security—with those stated just two days ago by Ho Chi Minh. 3 Ky calls for peace; Ho calls for war. Ky wants independence for Viet-Nam; Ho would put his people under the control of an alien ideology. Ky wants to work with his neighbors and with friendly states to build a new Viet-Nam and a new Southeast Asia; Ho wants to rule all of Viet-Nam and to put it at the mercy of the Communist world—which has neither the resources nor the desire to do anything useful for the Vietnamese. Etc., etc. Ky would call on the VC to look at what is happening around them, to recognize that military victory cannot be achieved. He would ask them to foreswear the use of terror and armed attack and to join with their fellow Vietnamese in the works and the satisfactions of peace. He would promise safe conduct, jobs and other assistance to those who come in with their weapons. He would cite the coming elections and ask them to participate in this new and exciting effort at nation-building and in the creation of a truly democratic state. He would challenge both the VC and Hanoi to a contest. He would urge that the fighting end. And he would say: “Let us see which system is better in peaceful competition! Let us see whether the Communist system in the North—with help from its communist comrades—or the system of freedom and independence in the South—with help from the free world—can produce more and achieve more!” And he would ask those southerners who have been impressed or misled into the VC ranks to join with him and their southern compatriots in building a new nation. I think Ky could take a powerful initiative in this manner. If it produced results—in terms of VC defections—all the better. But even without such defections on a large scale, it would be an impressive document—good for him and for his cause. With your approval, I will explore what has been done—and what further efforts can be undertaken—on the covert side. I will also draft a speech for Ky which we might get Ambassador Lodge to provide for him on a confidential basis. What do you think? 4 Bill 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. Copies were sent to William Bundy and Moyers. 2 Presumably a reference in part to Lodgeʼs report in telegram 879 from Saigon, July 13, of his conversation with Leon Goure of the Rand Corporation, who had just finished a study based on interviews with prisoners of war and defectors during the first 6 months of 1966. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) For Rostowʼs view of the implications of Goureʼs findings, see Document 198 . 3 In his appeal to “compatriots and fighters throughout the country,” reported in Hanoi newspapers on July 17 and over Hanoi radio in English on July 18, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed that “our people and army, united like one man, will resolutely fight until complete victory, whatever the sacrifices and hardships might be.” For text, see The New York Times , July 17, 1966. 4 In telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6, drafted by Jorden, the Department of State proposed a “psywar campaign”—launched by a speech by Ky and using appeals similar to those sketched in Jordenʼs memorandum—to encourage defections from VC and NVN forces. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 181. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) 181. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) 1 Washington, July 18, 1966. SUBJECT Report to the President on Your Recent Trip to Vietnam, 1 July 1986 You very kindly invited my reaction to your report to the President on your latest trip to Vietnam. 2 I find myself in accord with your general conclusions as to the situation in the area and the long road ahead. As you know, I also fully agree with your view as to the importance of increasing the emphasis on our pacification and civilian operations, as without this even successful military operations will not produce a lasting result. With respect to how to accomplish this greater emphasis, you lay a great deal of emphasis on better organizational approaches to the job, both on the Vietnamese and American side. Because of the weakness of the Vietnamese which you note as one of our problems, you quite properly emphasize the need to step up the American effort to compensate. To provide additional manpower, you suggest a greater engagement of MACV in the civilian aspects of pacification, at both central staff and district levels. This appears on the surface a quite reasonable judgment and one can only support the idea of increasing the contribution of our military resources to the overall pacification problem. I do suggest, however, that these steps may have to be watched very carefully in order that they not inadvertently alter the essentials of our pacification effort, which to date has given great weight to irregularity, local characteristics and individuality of leadership. While we refer to the “civilian” aspects of pacification, I believe that the greatest element of the program is its political content. The various civilian institutions, police structures, administrative programs, etc. are in truth merely supporting additives to the key political heart of a successful pacification program. Engagement of the population in a pacification effort, to secure its collaboration in expunging the Communist fish from the popular sea, must come as a result of a motivated population, not merely an administered one. Too much emphasis on our side on the administrative aspects can result in the major effort being put in this field with only lip service given to the importance of political motivation. This is particularly possible, of course, when our pressure upon the population is aimed at eliminating the enemy from its ranks rather than primarily to stimulate the community to better itself, and incidentally to purge itself of elements hostile to this process. A particular fondness of Vietnamese officialdom for eyewash pleasing to superiors has frequently led to such mistake in emphasis, i.e., counting barbed wire stretched, piglets distributed, or mass public pledges of loyalty. I am sure you have no basic disagreement with these thoughts, but I do believe that as we review the organizational aspects of the pacification job, we should be very sure that all Americans engaged in the program start from its basic principle of motivating the population as its guiding doctrine, rather than its statistical successes in terms of VC KIA or otherwise. This would be particularly important for MACV district teams asked to “keep an eye” on the RDC teams, as the standards they use and their command levels impose will clearly dictate their measurement of their effectiveness. With this approach, the various steps you propose seem unexceptionable; without it, I would have concern over some of the suggestions you make. There is a great difference between arousing local partisans and organizing a national soldiery. Aside from these general remarks, I should like to offer comments on some of your specific points: a. Study of Roles and Missions . This is a highly appropriate effort. Strengthening of the civilian or political command structure vis-à-vis the military in the pacification program would be a highly appropriate result of such a study. Of greatest importance is the strengthening of the local structure of pacification, of course, and improvement up the line, rather than from the top down. b. Province Team Chief . If these should be revived for more efficient coordination of the Americans in a province, they are critical figures to whom the general thoughts I expressed above must be put across. Our experience has been one of considerable success in working locally with other agencies on a cooperative basis and some problems under a formal team chief. Some of these stemmed from the nature of our intelligence or operational work; some stemmed from the degree of emphasis given by the chief in question to the political heart of the pacification program. c. RD Cadre Program . The problem of supervision of the RD Cadre teams is one on which I believe our Station is making considerable progress at this time, although I cannot contest your statement that we cannot match the MACV presence throughout the districts. Against the apparent desirability of this greater engagement of local Americans with the teams however, I do suggest that some thought be given to the impact of this attention on the mission and political content of the work of the teams. It may well be that a search for perfection in management through close American review of the work of the teams may create very substantial problems with the teams themselves, their political mission and their reception as “revolutionary” Vietnamese. d. Vung Tau . We have fully supported General Thangʼs assignment of Col. Chau to take charge of Vung Tau. Since Major Mai was so clearly the originator and most effective exponent of the motivational aspects of the training there, however, we are frankly concerned whether this change may have adverse effects on this all important heart of the program. We are examining this carefully. e. Area Priorities . I fully concur with your comments on areas for pacification work. Pacification is so heavily dependent on the exploitation of popular attitudes that I fully agree that we should exploit areas of movement and not batter remorselessly against targets fixed by selection from the map. This is another area in which the importance of flexibility may be greater than the apparent virtues of firm planning. This memorandum has addressed itself to your trip report. You are aware separately of my concern over CIAʼs responsibilities and role with respect to the Revolutionary Development Cadre program. I have sent Mr. Colby to Saigon to secure a clear statement of the Missionʼs recommendations on these points per the message he showed Ambassador Leonhart last week, a copy of which is attached. 3 The above comments on your trip report should be read in the light of this message as well. Richard Helms 4 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01676R, V–1, 1966 (May-Dec.), Vietnam. Secret. 2 Document 171 . 3 Attached but not printed. 4 Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original. 182. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 182. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 21, 1966, 1533Z. In telegrams 18844 and 20306 to Paris, July 30 and August 2, the Department of State requested clarification and further exploration of a number of points raised in this telegram. Bohlen responded in telegrams 1535 and 1657, August 2 and 3, noting that further consultation with Sainteny would have to await his return to Paris in early September. (All in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 1022. Ref: State 6653, June 15, 1966. 2 The following is a summary of a long conversation I had this morning with Jean Sainteny. 3 He asks of course that the information and the source be treated confidentially. I believe that Sainteny was very frank and spoke without inhibition, although of course it is always possible that he did not give me every detail of what the North Vietnamese said to him. 1. Sainteny saw no Russians during his overnight stop in Moscow, nor any Chinese at all during his stay in Peking. In regard to the latter capital Sainteny said that he had already sensed the Chinese were hostile to his trip to Hanoi and therefore for reasons of race he did not ask to see any Chinese. 2. While in Hanoi he delivered the innocuous letter from De Gaulle to Ho Chi Minh 4 and had several tete-a-tete conversations with Ho Chi Minh and several others with Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese officials. Sainteny said that he had come to the following conclusions in regard to the Vietnamese attitude: A. That they were determined to fight to the bitter end in protection of North Vietnam. He said the country is mobilized, its population has never known anything but war and considered it on the whole to be not an abnormal state of affairs. In reply to my question, he made a distinction between defense of North Vietnam and the pursuit of the war in the South and said he found the North Vietnamese attitude somewhat different in regard to the war in the South. B. That while they looked forward to the eventual reunification of the country, he said that all Vietnamese had spoken to him of the necessity of the creation of a government in the South which they maintain could be done by the inhabitants of the South itself following which, after an extended period probably five years or more, there could be negotiations as envisaged by the Geneva Accords of 1954. Sainteny said that he could not be absolutely sure but that he personally felt that the North Vietnamese were genuine in their view that there could be no military conquest or decision in South Vietnam but that the peaceful methods would be devised for the organization of a government. I pointed out to him that in effect it was largely because of the success initially of the Diem government that the North Vietnamese had organized in 1958 or 1959 the current Vietcong movement and assistance from the North. He did not disagree with this historical analysis but said that the Vietnamese had been very consistent in repeating this thesis to him. (I may add here that Sainteny is not naive in regard to the duplicities of the Oriental mind.) 3. He said that Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong had indicated to him on a number of occasions that they would not totally reject the idea of some form of negotiation. He doubted however if they would ever come to a conference or that there would be any public negotiation. He felt that the only method would be a secret channel by an individual, not too well known, possibly here in Paris or in some other neutral capital. He said that Pham Van Dong had said to him in Ho Chi Minhʼs presence that the U.S. should stop the bombardment of North Vietnam, and that finally after some discussion Sainteny stated that if they were being realistic at all there would have to be some North Vietnamese quid pro quo. Pham Van Dong finally admitted that there would be some such reply from the North, which night take the form of a cessation of “infiltration.” 4. In regard to the prisoners of war, Sainteny said that Pham Van Dong had told him that the American prisoners were being well treated and would continue to be well treated. The night before American prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hanoi. He said he thought it was conceivable that Pham Van Dong had not known of the intention to parade them when he made this statement to him. He anticipates that some of these pilots will be tried by typical Vietnamese popular courts, sentenced, but the sentence would be commuted. He said he had argued at considerable length with North Vietnamese on the subject that these men were not criminals of war under the Geneva Convention but that they had merely repeated the statement that there was no declaration of war. (Sainteny seemed to be familiar with Article 2 of the Convention.) 5 I told him that I thought any such action by the North Vietnamese would be very serious and the reaction in the U.S. extremely severe, and I could not say what reprisals we might undertake if any. Sainteny referred in this connection to the dikes in the North and said if these dikes were touched his estimate would be about a million people would be threatened with death. Sainteny said that his strong conclusion from this trip was that the Chinese were the real benefactors from this war. He said there were four factors which he felt led to this conclusion: (1) There had been a certain loss of American prestige in the Orient because we appeared in popular eyes to be successfully resisted by a very small nation. (2) The longer the war continued the more Hanoi became a prisoner of Peking. He said that there were Chinese commissions, political and other advisers in Hanoi, and that the Chinese were handling the aid in a way to increase Hanoiʼs dependency on Peking. He said the Russians were virtually non-existent politically in Hanoi. (3) He felt that the war in its present dimensions, which he was convinced the Chinese would do everything to maintain, was essential to the Chinese as part of the justification for the very savage and severe purge which was being done to the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. He said the Chinese could point to the assistance of capitalist aggressors almost on the border of China as a need to tighten the turn of the vise. (4) The Vietnamese war is a distinct obstacle in Soviet-American relations. In reply to my question, Sainteny said that of course he was not in any position to give advice to the U.S. Government but that his personal view was that we should seek through secret channels to get in touch with Hanoi and to suggest cessation of bombing in the North in return for some commitment to cease infiltration into the South. He seemed to think that such a case might be successful since he was convinced that Hanoi wished to find some means of bringing the war to an end although determined to resist attacks on North Vietnam indefinitely. He mentioned in this connection that Ho Chi Minh had twice been to Peking (he assumed to discuss with the Chinese either a search for settlement or an increase in Chinese aid). He believed that the Chinese had refused the first and had agreed to the second. Finally, Sainteny said that he had seen De Gaulle yesterday and made a report to him and he did not anticipate any French move in this affair since there would not seem to be any prospects at the moment. In this connection, he said the rumor from Phnom Penh 6 was quite without foundation. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, Hong Kong, and Moscow. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1022 to the President on July 22 under cover of a memorandum stating that he agreed that “our best chance for making negotiating progress is through very secret talks with Hanoi.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) 2 Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27–7 VIET) 3 Sainteny, a former French colonial official in Indochina who maintained close ties with Ho Chi Minh, visited Hanoi during July 1966 as President De Gaulleʼs personal emissary. 4 Not further identified. 5 For text of Article 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, see 6 UST (pt. 3) 3318. 6 Not further identified. 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 183. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, July 22, 1966, 0910Z. 1631. 1. I called on Ky at 11:00 a.m. on Friday, July 22. 2. As soon as I came in, he began by saying that he had been in the extreme northern part of Viet-Nam yesterday, and he felt that Vietnamese and Americans now fighting there had arrived “just in time.” He agreed with my guess that Hanoi had planned a double barreled retaliation for the bombings of June 29: a military surprise in the extreme North and sabotage-terrorism in Saigon. The Vietnamese-American reaction had, he thought, surprised Hanoi. 3. In a speculative discussion of what Hanoi was thinking, he made the same analysis which I have made to Washington: that Hanoi sees itself defeated militarily; politically in Saigon; and economically with the anti-inflation and port decongestion measures. But it still thinks it can triumph in the field of criminal violence, i.e. terrorism and subversion via the village guerrilla. Hanoi, Ky believes, is waiting to see if revolutionary development will succeed. They believe it will not, and that Americans, regardless of military, political and economic success, will tire and leave, and then Hanoi, still possessing its tool of criminal, subversive, terroristic warfare can start all over again. It is not, Ky said, a stupid theory. When, therefore, General Thangʼs program really gets rolling, Hanoi will realize the jig is up—and not before. This does not diminish the importance of winning the three other wars (of which bombing North Viet-Nam is a crucial part). 4. Continuing to talk before I had even raised the purpose of my visit, Prime Minister Ky spoke about the Province of Go Cong, where the local authorities had stopped the transportation of lobster and fish to Saigon. He looked into it and found that they had been bribed by black marketeers, and, he was sure, by the French. 5. Turning to the Buddhist self-immolation last night, Ky had the would-be self-immolator talk in response to questions, with the conversation being taken down on a tape recorder. The man had said that he had not given a thought to self-immolation and that suddenly he had felt strange (Ky indicated that he had been drugged). Then the man said he had lit a cigarette and “was set on fire.” Ky plans to give all this to the press. The man evidently was neither a religious fanatic nor a mental defective, but had been used. 6. I then brought up the purpose of my visit, which was to call his attention to the fact that two candidatesʼ lists in Saigon had been disqualified on the basis of technicalities. The first was led by Phan Khac Suu, and had been disqualified because one of the candidates had not produced an “extrait de casier judiciaire.” (Which I translate as a legal document certifying that the subject has no criminal record.) The other was headed by Dang Van Sung. I hazarded the guess that maybe the Prime Minister did not realize these disqualifications had been made—undoubtedly in good conscience—but that the political effect would be considerable given the prominence of the two men. 7. Ky knew all about both cases, and that the law was, strictly speaking, against both persons. He said, however, he had “done a favor” for Phan Khac Suu and had arranged to have him put on the list. He realized this could create a precedent which would plague him, but in view of Phan Khac Suuʼs prominence, he thought he should do it. 8. As regards Dang Van Sung, he said that he had no co-signers—no team mates—and was alone on his list. Sung was unable to find anybody to team up with him, even after he had been given two or three days to do so. He has, therefore, agreed to withdraw his candidacy. 9. I stressed the importance of these elections in terms of U.S. opinion, of which Ky was well aware—also the effect on world opinion. I told him our leading television and press men would be here. 10. He said that the Generals had had a meeting concerning the elections, and had agreed that it had to be organized honestly, that the world was going to watch, and that they were not going to emulate the procedure of the late President Diem, who had moved troops into an area to supply more votes as needed. General Thang had been put in charge of the elections to be sure that they would be free and honest. 11. I then read him paraphrase of POLAD Francisʼ wire no. 029, 2 which in paragraph 12 describes a scene in Tam Ky on July 16 of what might be the first anti-election action taken by Communists. On that date Viet Cong attached VNQDD headquarters, killing a number of party members. They were clearly after the party leadership. As a result of the attack, the leading VNQDD candidate, Phan Thong, lost both his legs, but has sent word from the hospital to the Province Chief that he would not be counted out and intends to run. 12. Ky knew all about this, and said that General Lam had told him about it. 13. I asked Prime Minister Ky what was planned in connection with regional forces and popular forces. I said they were badly needed to protect the pacification process and were frequently diverted by division and corps commanders. We believe that they should be under the primary control of General Thang. 14. In reply, Ky said the Generals had agreed to reorganize the regional forces, putting them under the direct control of the Province Chief, and, he said, General Thang now has control of the Province Chiefs. He evidently regards this as a big forward step. 15. I then adverted to the importance of not being stampeded by pressure for wage increases, which I said simply stimulate merchants to raise their prices, and in turn stimulates further demands for higher wages. I assured him that we on the U.S. side were doing everything that we could, and hoped the GVN would pay close attention to this, and try to keep wage pressures dampened. 16. Ky agreed and said that on certain items, prices have started to go down. He had heard an unconfirmed report that the Banque de lʼIndochine in Laos was selling gold. He was sure that both the French and the Viet Cong needed piasters badly, having in mind the plans they have for sabotaging the elections. 17. As I was about to leave, he talked to me in a very informal and personal way about his belief that the time had come to establish a rallying point (“centre de ralliement”) in North Viet-Nam for what he believed were many fervent anti-government elements in North Viet-Nam. The knowledge that there was a rallying point might, if all else was well organized, bring about an uprising. He made it absolutely clear that he was definitely not advocating an amphibious landing. He was talking about a parachute drop of “a battalion—about 400 men,” all Vietnamese, no Americans, at a point which he knows of south of the 19th parallel, in the western part of the area, in the mountains. North Viet-Nam is narrow at that point. The men would be thus close to the sea. They could be supplied at night by planes. There are now so many planes flying around at night that this would not attract attention. They could conduct sabotage operations, terrorism, and help political uprisings. Life would not be anything like as dangerous for them as the life of the Viet Cong is here now. He said that Viet-Nam has the finest soldiers in the world for this kind of duty. 3 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 1631 to the President at 4:35 p.m. on July 22. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) Also passed to CIA and Defense. 2 Not found. 3 In telegram 14858 to Saigon, July 25, the Department of State indicated that it would “not wholly rule out” such a project but believed that Ky should not be given any encouragement for now. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada 184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada 1 Washington, July 22, 1966, 9:19 p.m. 13905. 1. Intelligence gathered over recent months points to greatly increased use by DRV of demilitarized zone (DMZ) as infiltration route for DRV regular units coming into SVN. MACV and GVN have in fact confirmed publicly from prisoner interrogation and photo reconnaissance presence of DRV 324th Division in SVN just south of 17th parallel and that Division infiltrated into SVN through DMZ. GVN on July 21 energetically protested to ICC against DRVʼs infiltration of troops through DMZ and informed ICC that it (GVN) would be obliged to take appropriate measures to protect SVN population. GVN note 2 said that infiltration was dangerous threat to peace in SVN and made “urgent appeal” to ICC to take adequate measures to halt it. 2. To counter what is now large scale DRV use of DMZ as infiltration route in clear violation of Geneva Accords, USG has authorized air action in DMZ on both sides of demarcation line and artillery fire (land and naval) into that portion of DMZ south of demarcation line, only against clearly defined military activity. Before taking decision on what additional limited-defensive action on ground south of demarcation line circumstances may require, USG desires establish public and diplomatic case for such defensive actions. By separate tel of lower classification, action addressees are instructed to make demarche to ICC governments as major step in this effort. 3 3. Embassy Ottawa should inform GOC in strict confidence of authority granted for use of air and artillery action in DMZ as described above. 4. Embassy London should inform HMG at appropriately high level of authority granted for air and artillery action in DMZ as described above and of USG demarches to ICC powers. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Miller, cleared by William Bundy and McNaughton, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Also sent to New Delhi, Warsaw, and London, and repeated to Saigon, Moscow, Vientiane, Bangkok, Paris, CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV. 2 Not found. 3 Telegram 13895, July 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Joint State/Defense telegram 18807 to Saigon and the JCS, July 30, transmitted newly-approved instructions authorizing ground operations by US/FWMAF forces in the DMZ “south of the demarcation line while in contact with VC/NVA forces or when such engagement is imminent.” (Ibid.) 185. Telegram From the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge and Porter) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms and the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) 185. Telegram From the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge and Porter) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms and the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) 1 Saigon, July 23, 1966, 0456Z. We have carefully reviewed the over-all revolutionary development program with a view to determining the most appropriate role for CAS. As you know, we consider this over-all program an absolutely vital part of our total war effort here. Our military is involved in it both directly and through advisory influence on ARVN, arranging properly coordinated military actions to extend areas of pacification. USAID is heavily engaged in providing economic assistance and improving government programs and administration under a coordinated plan of strengthening of revolutionary development areas. USIA, through JUSPAO, is providing psychological support. CAS, of course, is providing intelligence support and has been heavily engaged in the cadre program. We believe that CAS should, at least for the time being, remain responsible for the cadre program. All of these activities, of course, are conducted as an integrated program under the direct command of Ambassador Porter. The present cadre program, of course, is a result of the work of CAS officers here who saw the need and went ahead and developed this tool. The cadre probably would not have been developed were it not for several of the unique attributes of your agency. Of great importance was the flexibility of your funding and logistics, but even more critical was your Agencyʼs ability to decentralize your operations to the Province Chiefs and to inject into the cadre a high degree of patriotic consciousness and motivation. While your Agency originally conducted these operations under an informal clearance from the GVN, the success of the approach has resulted in the GVN establishing a formal structure in the Ministry of Revolutionary Development to carry on this program as a fundamental element of its over-all prosecution of the war. The establishment of this formal GVN structure, and the scale the cadre program has assumed, caused us to review whether it should properly be continued by CAS, or whether it should be turned over to more normal mechanisms for our governmentʼs support of the GVNʼs efforts. We know that there are reservations on this point in various elements of the executive and legislative branches in Washington, who have doubts that a secret agency should be engaged in such a massive and overt program, with the difficulties this can cause in the procurement of the necessary funds, the exposure of the CAS apparatus, and adverse political publicity. We have also had rumbles of concern from some Vietnamese that CAS sponsorship may reflect some more menacing U.S. intentions with respect to this cadre program. Giving these factors full weight, we nonetheless conclude that, if this program is to fill its vital role in the war effort here, CAS must retain over-all responsibility and authority for it until a better alternative is discovered. We have directed that a review of the program and its future sponsorship be made by 21 October 1966, as outlined in Ambassador Porterʼs Memorandum of 24 March 1966, copy attached. 2 Further, we will carefully review the specific elements of the program to see whether portions of it could appropriately be performed by other agencies, even prior to a turnover of overall direction, so that the CAS role can be reduced to the minimum essential. In specific terms, therefore, we recommend that your Agency continue to pay the cadre, which should be increased in numbers as rapidly as feasible, commensurate with maintaining quality; provide the logistics channels and advisory personnel to support the cadre program throughout the country; and retain for the time being the over-all responsibility for support to the revolutionary development cadre training program, including the construction of new facilities as they are shown to be necessary. We have reviewed the over-all cadre program and recommend that it be supported in the sum of VN$2,376,814,000 and US$28,510,000. A recommended budget is attached 3 and has our full approval and strong recommendation for adoption. With respect to the proposal of a new training camp at Long Hai to supplement, but not to replace, the facilities at Vung Tau, we are reviewing the need for such a project. If, as, and when built, this will be accomplished in segments, reflecting the arrangements made to obtain additional manpower for the cadre program, and at the same time insisting that quality supersede quantity in future cadres. If built at Long Hai or elsewhere, we believe that the construction of new camp facilities should be the responsibility of your Agency in order to maintain the integrity of your authority over U.S. support to the revolutionary development cadre program. At the same time, we will direct that other agencies provide specific in-country assistance to this job as possible and appropriate. We recommend that the President charge CAS with this responsibility, and we are prepared to assist CAS as may be necessary in its requests to the appropriate sub-committees of Congress for the financial resources necessary to carry out this program. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables. Secret; Eyes Only. Received in Washington via CIA communications facilities and transmitted by CIA to the White House at 0800Z on July 23. 2 Attached but not printed. 3 Attached but not printed. 186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 186. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, July 23, 1966. No. 1683/66 AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (THROUGH 14 JULY 1966) 2 Summary 1. The most significant air strikes of June and early July were conducted against the major bulk POL storage facilities. Analysis of data available through 9 July indicates that the air strikes resulted in the loss of about one-half of the preraid targeted capacity which existed on 28 June. 2. A high level of road interdiction attained nearly four times as many road cuts and cratered segments as the previous month with a record number of trucks, ferries, and rolling stock destroyed or damaged. Through rail service probably is not possible on at least three and perhaps four of the five major railroad lines in North Vietnam, although rail shuttle service continues on all lines. Miscellaneous military targets, including SAM sites and naval craft, were also struck. 3. The cumulative effects of the bombing since March 1965 have placed some strains on North Vietnam, particularly in the economic areas, but on the whole the North Vietnamese have been able to meet their military needs and to support the insurgency in South Vietnam, although their capability for overt military aggression has been limited. 4. The recent US air strikes against targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area do not appear to have weakened the North Vietnamese leadershipʼs resolve to continue to prosecute the war. At the same time, the Hanoi leadership appears to be taking note of the effects the bombing raids are having on popular morale and is initiating steps to prevent or curb, if possible, any decline in the fighting spirit of the people. Presently, however, there continues to be no hard evidence of real alarm in Hanoi or that morale in North Vietnam has slipped to the extent that it would force the regime to change its policy of continuing the war. 5. The attacks on the petroleum facilities will make the operation of the economy more difficult and costly. Even before these attacks, thebombings were causing increasing disruption of economic activity. Food shortages and rising food prices apparently are becoming more prevalent throughout North Vietnam. The economy, nevertheless, is still able to provide the essential needs of the population. Measurable cumulative direct and indirect losses caused by the air strikes now amount to about $100 million. 3 In addition, there are other losses and costs to the economy and the military establishment which have developed as a consequence of the air strikes but to which values cannot be assigned. [Here follows the body of the memorandum.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence. 2 This memorandum is the Central Intelligence Agencyʼs issuance of a joint Central Intelligence Agency-Defense Intelligence Agency Study prepared monthly. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 US dollars are used throughout this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text.] 187. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 187. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) 1 Washington, July 23, 1966. Alexis Johnson and George 2 met with General Khanh at the Waldorf in New York from noon to 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, July 23. They discussed the detailed arrangements for their meeting in Paris. Khanh is leaving the evening of July 23 for Paris with his daughter. He was told that George will arrive in Paris the morning of July 28. Johnson told Khanh that he was authorized to tell “Mr. Out” 3 that the President was fully aware of the conversations between himself and General Khanh and that George was a trusted emissary who would be able to maintain direct contact with Washington. They went over much of the ground that Johnson and Khanh had previously discussed 4 but in more detail, and throughout the conversation Khanh was much less reticent than he had been at the previous meeting in implicitly and explicitly setting forth the role that he saw for himself in the developments that he hoped to see in South Viet-Nam come out of these discussions. In good Vietnamese fashion the detailed formulae that he spun out tended to end up, without his ever saying so, with the logical necessity of his playing a key role. It was difficult to tell how much of the formulae were his own creation and how much they were those of “Mr. Out” and his associates. However, Khanh took a very proprietary interest in them. Only from direct contact with “Mr. Out” can we hope to determine how much of this is Khanhʼs creation and how much of it is that of “Mr. Out” and his associates. In his usual orderly fashion, and reading from notes, during the course of the conversation he outlined a five-phase program substantially as follows: First Phase: Conversations between our emissary and “Mr. Out” leading to agreement in principle. Second Phase: The “signature” of a secret agreement between ourselves and the NLF, presumably with the direct participation of Mr. Tho and “Mr. In”. Third Phase: The establishment in Saigon of a “transition government” that would implement the “secret agreement” between the USG and the NLF, followed by a call by it to the NLF for a “cease-fire”. Fourth Phase: The establishment of a “government of national union” which would incorporate the non-Communist elements of the NLF. Fifth Phase: The holding of an international conference to put its “seal of approval” on what had been done, work out a “Federation” in which Cochinchina and North Viet-Nam would be joined (he was vague as to where Annam would fit into this) and generally work out the “Federationʼs” relations with its neighbors. Under these arrangements all allied troops except those of the United States would evacuate Viet-Nam and the U.S. troops would remain at the request of the new government on bases to be agreed upon. (He was very insistent on the importance of the evacuation of other allied troops on the grounds that, looked at through the eyes of “we Vietnamese”, the presence of these other forces would “infringe on the sovereignty” of Viet-Nam but the same would not be true of U.S. forces remaining at the request of a new government because U.S. forces would be there “for the protection” of Viet-Nam.) In reply to questions on how Khanh saw the “transition government” being established and what he saw becoming of those areas of the country not under NLF control, he said that the U.S. now has “enough troops” in Viet-Nam to take care of both problems. In reply to questions on how much of the NLF “Mr. Out” and his associates controlled, Khanh said he could not answer precisely but the Front contained a number of elements, including Buddhists, Catholics, Saigon intellectuals, Cochinchinese intellectuals, Center intellectuals, and Communists, but the majority of the Front is non-Communist. While “Mr. Out” and his associates probably could not speak for all of the NLF, he thought they speak for the majority. He somewhat airily dismissed the problem of Communists in the NLF, although he did say that great secrecy was required in order to prevent the Communists from carrying out a purge. In reply to questions as to why these non-Communist elements in the NLF had not made some approach at the time that, first, Big Minh and then he, Khanh, who were both Southerners, were in the Government, Khanh said that they did not at that time believe that he was really a Nationalist but thought that he was an “American puppet”. Khanh said that he had no reply to the question on how “Mr. Out” and his associates felt that they would be able to manage divorcing themselves politically and militarily from the Communists and the DRV. Khanh said that he had already discussed with “Mr. Out” the release of some prisoners as a means of verifying his position and authority, and indicated that “Mr. Out” said that it would take a “couple of days” to get a message back and then it would probably take a week or ten days to effect a release. When Johnson talked about “not less than four prisoners,” Khanh talked about “two or three,” but neither followed up this point. However, Khanh talked about the importance of a “gesture” on our part such as suspending the B-52 bombing in Viet Cong-controlled areas for “a few days” or carrying out the bombing in Viet Cong-controlled areas only “every other day” a la Quemoy as a signal to “Mr. Outʼs” associates in South Viet-Nam that he was really in contact with Washington. Johnson said that such matters could be considered in the conversations between George and “Mr. Out”. In reply to questions as to in what areas of the country the NLF exercised military control over the Viet Cong, Khanh said he had nothing to add to what he had said previously to Johnson. In reply to Khanhʼs pressing as to whether we “accepted” the phase concept as outlined above, Johnson replied that we could not accept anything that required us to carry out a “coup” in Saigon, and the concept obviously involved great difficulties. It was Johnsonʼs hope that, as the conversations proceeded, a way could be found for the NLF to fit into the constitutional process that was now under way. Johnson pointed out that, in the natural course of events, it would seem probable that the Constituent Assembly to be elected on September 11 would have a heavily southern flavor, and noted that it was perhaps for that reason that Tonkinese and Annamites such as Father Quynh and Tri Quang were opposing the elections. The Constituent Assembly would draft a constitution and presumably sometime thereafter national elections would be held under the new constitution. It seemed to Johnson that the critical period was between the undertaking of drafting of the constitution and the holding of elections under it. Johnson hoped that a formula could be worked out in which the non-Communist elements in the NLF could participate during this phase so that the government that would eventually emerge would be acceptable to all non-Communists in South Viet-Nam. Khanh expressed skepticism about elections “in wartime” but did not flatly reject Johnsonʼs remarks. NOTES In reply to questions about “Mr. Out”, Khanh said that he was of the “older generation”, three or four years younger than Khanhʼs father, and Khanh had known him all his life as a family friend. Several times during the conversation Khanh strongly pressed the point on the importance of protecting “Mr. Out” and preserving his incognito. In reply to questions on how “Mr. Out” was able to operate effectively from France under an incognito, Khanh asserted that he “saw many people,” wrote many letters, and travelled widely. Contrary to our Western concepts, his very significance to the movement lay in the fact that he was operating “in secret”. He asserted that “Mr. Out” “gives order to Tho”. In discussing meetings between George and “Mr. Out”, Khanh said he felt George should not see him more than once or twice in France, and then that another point, perhaps in Switzerland or Belgium, should be found. Khanh said that he believed “80 percent” of the information he received from “Mr. Out” but he could not be sure of the other 20 percent. In reply to questions about Mai Van Bo, Khanh said that he was a Southerner by origin from My Tho but was now completely a Northerner. He said that Mai Van Bo had gone to Hanoi some months before and had come back about six weeks ago, and that about three weeks ago the status of his mission in Paris had been changed from that of trade mission to a “general delegation”. During the course of the luncheon conversation, Khanh told Johnson that he knew the CIA had paid $10,000 to a colonel whose name Johnson did not recognize for a briefcase containing Khanhʼs private papers which had been left in a car in the confusion attending Khanhʼs departure from Saigon. Khanh said that he in fact was glad that we had the papers because he was sure that we would not have found in them anything personally discreditable to him. Johnson told Khanh that he could freely and frankly deal with George in exactly the same manner as he dealt with Johnson and, in reply to Khanhʼs request for a contact in Paris in the absence of George, Johnson suggested that he get in touch with Mr. McBride, DCM in the Embassy in Paris, identifying himself as “Ray”. Khanh accepted from Johnson, in accordance with their previous conversation, the exact amount of additional cost that he had incurred by converting his excursion ticket to a ticket that would permit him to return at this time, first class, but stoutly refused to accept any advance on future expenses that might be incurred. He said he would inform George of the exact amount of any “out-of-pocket expenses” but would not accept a “cent more” from us. U. Alexis Johnson 5 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to the President and Sturm. 2 George was a code name for Sturm. 3 Le Van Truong. See footnote 3, Document 179 . 4 For a summary of the discussion, see Document 179 . 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, July 23, 1966, 2:26 p.m. 14059. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. We had high-level review today of election progress as reported in your recent cables, including your useful discussion with Ky reported in your 1631. 2 Your reporting has been most useful, and we look forward to your more definitive analysis and assessment of candidates and, more generally, the real significance of the September elections for SVNʼs future political evolution. 2. In following paragraphs we list certain negative indications in Embassyʼs recent reporting which give us cause for concern. We therefore fully support your frank remarks to Ky reported Embtel 1631. We are fully aware of realities of Vietnamese political scene and do not expect political miracles out of September elections. At same time, we believe that Ky, Thieu, and others must be made to understand clearly that international focus of attention is on these elections and that there is already widespread skepticism regarding GVNʼs intentions to carry out free, meaningful elections. GVN leaders must be made thoroughly aware of importance internationally of these elections and that burden of proof regarding elections is on GVN. 3. Indications that could be construed as governmental rigging . As you know, this will be most sensitive possible subject from every standpoint. We recognize that Government has every right to put up and support sympathetic candidates, but we are somewhat perturbed by reports that many candidates in provinces are civil servants and that a significant number of military officers are filing to run. This situation can very easily give impression that Government is seeking to rig elections, and at very least will focus attention sharply on constituencies where candidates closely identified with Government are involved. For example, we find FBS 13, 396 3 particularly disturbing. 4. Screening of candidates . We wish to reinforce the views expressed State 8259 4 that this will be key process. GVN should bend over backward to see that ineligibility criteria are strictly applied and that minimum number of candidates are eliminated and these on solid grounds. We note from your 1641 5 that Government has now approved Saigon lists headed by Suu, Sung, and Nghe, and suspect your conversation with Ky may have contributed to this result. Article 16 provision 6 that whole list can be thrown out if one ineligible candidate is included could prove troublesome, and we gather from Kyʼs discussion with you that Government may find it possible to permit list to be corrected and re-submitted in cases where one candidate is ineligible, or there is some other defect such as existed in Sungʼs list. We hope Ky and others can be urged to make use of this discretionary authority wherever possible. 5. Boycott movement . Another unfortunate development, in our view, is ability of Father Quynhʼs Front of All Religions to attract personalities such as Mai Tho Truyen and to produce Tri Quang at a rally. September elections will be dealt another serious blow if Central Viet-Nam Buddhists are not represented in Constituent Assembly even indirectly and we would be concerned if Southerner of Truyenʼs stature cast his lot in opposition to elections. While GVN of course not directly responsible for those developments, Father Quynhʼs movement can only benefit by being able to point to evidence of GVN manipulation of election process. 6. Believe you should continue to discuss these issues very frankly with Ky, as well as with Thieu and others as appropriate, keeping pressure on them and making clear to them that we consider political progress in SVN as indispensable as military progress. We assume, too, that Embassy continuing to do everything within its power to encourage allelements to participate in and lend their support to September elections. We realize that these are delicate missions and leave to your discretion and judgment how they should be handled tactically. 7. General comment . We have following additional thoughts for prospective actions: a. For your use and our own full information here, we are planning to send you every Tuesday and Friday a round-up of significant comment here and internationally on election progress. US comment would include both media lines and Congressional angles. b. Handling of instances of VC harassment may become important. We gather that GVN is reluctant to publicize such incidents lest it contribute to very atmosphere of fear VC will try to create. However, it seems to us that background low-key briefing of US correspondents, for reporting here, would not be open to this objection and could assist in putting situation in focus. c. As we have already made clear to each other in our exchanges, our basic policy should be to maintain regular flow of information to press and media, not seeking to conceal defects and difficulties while trying to give proper emphasis to positive and favorable developments. We have been taking background line here that a certain amount of local skulduggery is almost inevitable in the situation, and that such actions have not been uncommon in advanced democracies recently or even now. d. We have been giving further thought to additional methods of international observation, particularly best use of Asian democratic countries. We will have further thoughts on this early next week. In this connection, we have been discouraging idea of individual American Congressmen going out to observe elections, believing that Asian observers would be much more effective and not open to charges of US intervention. You may be interested that there has been one Congressional demand for public hearings on election progress; at some point, this might conceivably be useful, and we are keeping it under review. In general, we will be trying here to get facts before interested Congressmen in all possible ways. 8. We gather that GVN campaign to get out the vote is proceeding with reasonable effectiveness, although with some spotty performance as well. Publicity to this operation would of course be helpful. In this connection, we note that there is considerable impression here that there are major restraints on right to vote, including impression that Communists and others are excluded. We should be keeping up steady effort to make facts clear in this respect. 9. One final point of potential concern here—as we know it is to you—is that Ky avoid public statements on what will happen after the Constituent Assembly convenes. We anticipate that the question ofwhether Constituent Assembly can assume legislative powers may become acutely controversial once Constituent Assembly is picked. However, any statement by Ky trying to pre-judge this issue or suggesting his determination to stay in power over a substantial period can only feed the fires of criticism that he is trying to rig the whole process. It would be helpful, of course, if he could reiterate his past statements about willingness to hand over power to a duly constituted civilian government just as soon as it exists. We say this knowing full well the difficulties you face in influencing his utterances, but trust you will do all you can through whatever channel is appropriate. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy and Miller, cleared in substance by Rusk, and approved by Harriman. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 2 Document 183 . 3 Not found. 4 Dated July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 14 VIET S) 5 Dated July 22. (Ibid.) 6 Reference is to Article 16 of the election law governing the Constituent Assembly election scheduled for September 1966. The election law is discussed in “Background on Vietnamese Election Law,” an enclosure to airgram CA-4 to all posts, July 1. (Ibid.) 189. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 189. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, July 24, 1966. 1785. 1. DʼOrlandi, Lewandowski and I met at DʼOrlandiʼs office at 4:30. The meeting lasted for twenty minutes. Lewandowski talked as follows: 2. “I have the following instructions from Warsaw which I have been asked to transmit to Ambassador Lodge: A. “It is difficult to discuss any proposition during the current important escalation of war activities in the South and of the bombing in the North. B. “To hold such discussions could be looked upon as a maneuver to force the DRV to negotiate under American conditions. C. “We know very well that the DRV will not give up the fight while the United States pursues its present policy of military pressure. D. “We have reasons to state that no proposition without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will produce results. E. “United States Government has no right to bomb the DRV and no right to propose conditions for its cessation. F. “If the United States desires a peaceful solution, it must recognize the Four Points proposed by the DRV and prove it in practice. G. “The United States must stop bombing and other military activity against North Viet-Nam. Only then can a political solution be expected.” 3. That was the end of his prepared statement. 4. I said that it was evident that not one of the three questions which we had asked on July 9 had been answered, to which he nodded his head. 5. I called attention to the fact that in his first paragraph, he had mentioned the escalation of war activities in the South as well as the bombing of the North. Did this, I asked, mean that they were not only insisting that we stop bombing the North but that we also stop all our military activities in the South while they offered to do nothing in return? 6. Lewandowski said, “my interpretation” is that there are five places in the text where the bombing of North Viet-Nam is mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. This is the most sensitive and most important part of the statement. Twice in the statement he said Warsaw says: “We know very well” and “We have reasons to state” that no proposition can succeed without cessation of bombing. He implied this was significant. 7. I said that I would, of course, report all this to Washington, but that it looked to me as though this was a backward step, and that we were being asked to give up a great deal and that Hanoi was not prepared to give up anything. 8. Lewandowski said it is a question of who will be the first to start giving. 9. I said: why canʼt each give something simultaneously? 10. Lewandowski read his statement in a very matter of fact tone and didnʼt seem at all surprised by my statement. 11. He then said: “There is one thing more in the telegram. My government believes that the contact here should not be made public for the very practical reason that if anything is known, we wonʼt be able to have this contact in the future”—the implication being that they would like to have the contact in the future. 12. I said that this was one thing on which we could agree and that he could absolutely count on the United States keeping this secret. 13. Lewandowski said that in the first week in August, he was going to Hanoi and that “I canʼt tell what effect that may have on this,” meaning our meetings. 14. This mentioning of future meetings led me to say that it was obvious that we could not in the future continue to meet in DʼOrlandiʼs office in the middle of Sunday afternoon. I was continually followed by Vietnamese police, I understood that he was too. I said that I felt sure that I could get out at night without being followed, and that I had access to any number of houses which were not being watched. I said that I understood that he, however, could not get out unobserved. 15. To this he said, yes, he could and that in the case there would be no great difficulty of him and I meeting in the future. 16. DʼOrlandi then spoke as follows: 17. “This is definitely a step backward. I had thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging. Both the opening and the American questions were encouraging. I felt something might come out and, as a matter of fact, I still feel this as a hunch. Accordingly, I hope the stiffness of your reply today is due to prevailing circumstances, and that this channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as possible. We were expecting a reply. Now we have a statement. I understood what led to this statement. It is the circumstances of the moment.” 18. I asked to what circumstances he was referring. He said to all of the rumors in the newspapers of peace talk. 2 19. I had thought he might say the bombing of the North or the intensified military activity in the South, and I was surprised when Lewandowski agreed that it was all the peace talk which created the current circumstances. 20. I said that I presumed Warsawʼs statement was formulated with the knowledge of Hanoi. Lewandowski did not deny this, but said that Warsaw was, of course, not in a position to commit Hanoi. 21. When I got up to go, Lewandowski said with a smile, “Iʼm sorry we canʼt have a glass of wine this time in celebration of a real result.” 22. There is one postscript which I should add to make the record complete, as follows: 23. DʼOrlandi told me last night (Saturday) at a diplomatic function that he had called on Lewandowski that morning and had said that Fanfani wanted DʼOrlandi to come to Rome for consultation. DʼOrlandi therefore asked Lewandowski how long it would be before Lewandow-ski had something since DʼOrlandi wanted to make plans. 24. Lewandowski answered by saying that, by a strange coincidence, the word from Warsaw had just arrived and that he would be ready to talk on Sunday. Lewandowski then made the following additional remark: 25. That realistically this whole conversation with the Americans could not take less than six months. DʼOrlandi gathered that what he meant was that it takes time for Hanoi and Warsaw to formulate its proposals; it then takes time to submit them to me; it then takes time for the USG to consider the proposals and formulate their own answer. 26. Comment: It seems obvious that if the conversations are to accomplish something and if misunderstandings are to be avoided and precise results achieved, this is not unreasonable. I also think that while there may be progress, one cannot expect decisive results until after our elections. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:25 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 248–249. 2 For example of speculation in the press about peace talks during June and July 1966, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967 , Book 12, Part VI–A, pp. 22–25. 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 190. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, July 24, 1966. 1788. 1. I allowed enough time for Lewandowski to leave and then talked with DʼOrlandi again. 2. He said that after I had left, Lewandowski made it clear that he was “much distressed.” He had walked up and down the room, saying how distressed he was. 3. DʼOrlandi said that Fanfani had called him to Rome and that there was now no reason to stay if this was the kind of line that Lewandowski was going to expound. He was, therefore, going to leave immediately for Rome. 4. Lewandowski asked him when he would be coming back, and DʼOrlandi replied by August 15. 5. According to DʼOrlandi, Lewandowskiʼs great preoccupation was China. He was terribly worried about China. DʼOrlandi thought it was Chinaʼs influence which was making Hanoi so intransigent, but he also feared that China might take some sort of action which would “mess up the situation.” Lewandowski was certainly worried about Chinese pressure. 6. It is clear, said DʼOrlandi, that three or four weeks will go by during which nothing will happen and, DʼOrlandi surmised, this may explain Lewandowskiʼs remark on Saturday 2 morning that the entire conversation between Lewandowski and me would take about six months altogether. 7. Fanfani is going to Warsaw tomorrow and will be back in Rome on Thursday. DʼOrlandiʼs telegram describing todayʼs meeting will reach Fanfani before he goes to Warsaw. 8. DʼOrlandi intends to ask Fanfani how much the Italian Government is interested in this whole procedure, and how long he, DʼOrlandi, should stay in Saigon. He said that Fanfani had had the idea of replacing DʼOrlandi as Ambassador and of sending him to Saigon on specific trips. Both DʼOrlandi and I felt that this would pretty much destroy the present arrangement. It appears that the minute anyone goes on a special trip connected with Viet-Nam the ensuing publicity causes failure. The advantage of the present situation is that DʼOrlandi, Lewandowski and I all have regular jobs in Saigon, which serve as cover for our conversations. 9. Lewandowski told DʼOrlandi that he would not spend more than a week in Hanoi which would get him back here around the 10th or the 12th of August. DʼOrlandi felt that Lewandowskiʼs trip to Hanoi might be “quite pointless” and that Lewandowskiʼs instructions were coming from Warsaw, with Warsaw undoubtedly telling Hanoi what it was doing. On the other hand, DʼOrlandi felt that the original demarche had come as a result of one of Lewandowskiʼs visits to Hanoi. 10. One thing is sure and that is that Lewandowski and Warsaw—and probably Hanoi—wish to maintain the current contact between Lewandowski and me. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:45 a.m. During a telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. on July 24, Rostow told Rusk that he had “left the negative Marigold cables upstairs for the Pres. to read”; Rostow also said that “his reflection this morning had been re press leak” and he wondered “if on next round it wouldnʼt be wiser for direct approach.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 2 July 23. 191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, July 25, 1966. No. 1684/66 NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR 2 Introduction 1. The Communist military drive in South Vietnam has been stymied and the prospects for victory as viewed from Hanoi are almost certainly dimmer than at any time in the past five years. Nevertheless, Hanoi probably feels that the moment for a basic decision on whether or not to end the conflict is still well over the horizon. As the Vietnamese Communists see it, the allied will to persist in the war has not yet been adequately tested. Also still to be fully measured, in their view, is the ability of the US combat force in Vietnam to sustain its effectiveness, particularly in rolling back the Communists from the substantial ground position they still hold or in uprooting their political infrastructure. 2. It is clear that the Vietnamese Communists believe Washington will soon be forced by the demands of the conflict to put the US on an extensive wartime footing. They hope that such measures, combined with the effect of sustained and increasing US casualties, will fan additional domestic American opposition to continuing the war. In their view, these developments may well inhibit substantially greater US ground escalation of the conflict and may, in the long run, force major concessions in Washingtonʼs policy which could offer a realization of some Communist objectives in the South. Hanoi probably still believes that Washingtonʼs determination to pursue the war will crack before curtailed Communist capabilities make it necessary for Hanoi to completely rethink its strategy. They realize that the domestic position of the Republic of Vietnam is stronger now than at any time in the past three years, but they also judgethat Saigonʼs programs to win the populace over have a long way to go before they reduce significantly the insurgent hold on the South. 3. In sum, the policy makers in Hanoi see little choice but to continue to support and prosecute the war generally along the present lines, at least until their prospects worsen decidedly. It is probable that they view the coming winter as at least the earliest point at which the long-term outlook for the conflict may come into sharper focus. In their view, the Vietnamese Communists have the ability to continue the fighting through this period, and probably well beyond. Despite the bombing of the North, sufficient supplies of men and materiel are still moving south and the will and ability of the domestic population to support the war remains adequate. The main force Communist units in the South still hold a powerful hand, and the Communist grip on a substantial segment of the populace in the South is still strong enough to ensure most of the indigenous logistic backing needed for the war effort. [Here follows the body of the 9-page memorandum.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Issued by the Directorate of Intelligence. Helms forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Moyers on July 25 under cover of a memorandum stating that “After your call to me last week indicating that we had ‘a hard mandate’ from Higher Authority to collect information on North Vietnam, I thought it would be advisable to get together for you what up-to-date information we now have on the subject.” (Ibid.) In a July 20 memorandum to the Deputy Director for Plans, Helms indicated that, according to Moyers, the President was particularly interested in the intentions of North Vietnamʼs “leadership with respect to waging the war, the American prisoners, etc.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966) 2 Produced by the Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ONE and SAVA. [Footnote in the source text.] 192. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 192. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, July 25, 1966, 3:30 p.m. Mr. President: This is the first explicit suggestion from Saigon that Ky might run for President of South Viet-Nam in the 1967 election. 2 This should be no surprise: Kyʼs Directorate has been studying the evolution of South Korea after 1961. There Park took off his soldier suit and became a politician, barely winning a quite honest election in 1963. He has since grown remarkably in his job. The Quayle polls showed Ky quite strong when they were taken late in 1965: 92% of the people were familiar with Ky; 34% liked him “very much”; 43% liked him “only a little”; only 5% “disliked” him. Only two other men in South Viet-Nam were close, in terms of being known and “liked”; the moderate Buddhist leader Tam Chau and our old friend Tri Quang. Since then he has gained stature by his showdown in Hue and Danang; but he will lose because of devaluation and inflation, unless we really get that rice, pork, etc., in there. Iʼm sure we shouldnʼt hook ourselves to Ky; but I believe we should keep our mind open to the possibility that he may emerge as a logical candidate, if he handles himself well over the next 6–9 months. The critical question, in my view, is whether or not in the months after the Constituent Assembly meets, the South Vietnamese can form a big national political party. The party should have military support but reach far out into every region, religious and racial group. 3 If Ky and the Directorate can form such a party and Ky can lead it, his candidacy might make sense. A party law in the Constitution, forcing the small fragmented parties to come together in bigger units, would be helpful. Such an article was written into the Korean Constitution. In the meanwhile, quarrels and jealousies inside the Directorate are our greatest concern: a sample is the attached bitter comment on Ky by his Foreign Minister. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw it. 2 Attached is an extract from the text of telegram 1848 from Saigon, July 25, in which Lodge reported that, according to Do, “Mrs. Kyʼs trip to the U.S. was also the opening gun in Kyʼs campaign for the President.” Also attached is the text of telegram 1786 from Saigon, July 24, in which Lodge stated that he thought it “imprudent to rule Ky out as early as this”; envisioning adoption of a Vietnamese constitution with a “strong U.S. type President,” Lodge saw no one else “as ready to fill this job” and “ready to run.” 3 Rostow elaborated on this point in an August 4 letter to Lodge, a copy of which he forwarded to the President under a covering memorandum, August 6, in which he noted that his views about the urgent need for a large national political party were shared by Kissinger, Unger, and Jorden. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI) 4 According to Lodgeʼs report in telegram 1848, Do said that “anybody could beat Ky,” who was “inescapably connected in peoplesʼ minds with devaluation and with inflation” and “literally had nobody with him.” Only Bui Diem could “get any work out of him,” and “if Bui Diem were removed, Do said, Ky would be like a man with both his arms and legs cut off.” 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, July 27, 1966. 2041. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: I thought your argument on your trip through Indiana was extremely effective. Your remarks about the Communists having bombed the Embassy were much appreciated here. 2 A. Elections 1. A preliminary analysis of the candidates running in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area and I Corps (that is 43 of the 108 seats being contested) shows that of 328 candidates, only 30 are active military. Another 34 are civil servants. The largest category is businessmen, with 69 candidates. 57 teachers, 23 provincial and city councilors, and 13 farmers are running. While there may be some government sponsored candidates who do not appear in the military and civil servant categories, there is no sign of the governmentʼs entering a large number of its own hand-picked candidates. 2. Two traditional parties, VNQDD and Dai Viet, are strong in I Corps. But in Saigon, slates tend to be built around prominent individuals, and party affiliation is distinctly secondary. Except for Dr. Phan Quang Danʼs alliance, the National Democratic Bloc, no party or group in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area is supporting more than one list. 3. Local election control boards were scheduled to complete screening of candidates on July 22. Preliminary reports indicate that few slates were eliminated. In I Corps, two or three were apparently rejected because of connections with the “Struggle,” which was a conspiracy to overthrow government authority by violence—not a bona fide political movement. Communist or police records and incomplete documentation have caused the control councils to eliminate some others. In the Saigon-Gia Dinh areas, no prominent politicians were struck from the lists; the slates headed by Phan Khac Suu, Dang Van Sung, and La Thanh Nghe were all approved. Suu and Sung had been stricken for technical reasons, and I spoke to Ky about them. 4. There are reports that the Viet Cong intend to make a major effort to interfere with the election. Some candidates in Saigon have told us of threats. Authorities in I Corps have told us that they expect the Communists to try to repeat past tactics such as attacking polling places, intimidating voters, and stealing voter registration cards. Perhaps the first instance of Communist terror directed against the election was the July 16 attack on the VNQDD Party headquarters in Quang Tin Province. 5. Popular attention is not yet focused on the election. JUSPAO field representatives speak of ignorance and apathy, with the cost of living and terrorism still the big worries. The government is trying to publicize voter registration and is producing a “how-to-vote” film. B. Elections are an opportunity 6. To try to hold elections in the middle of a war, in this underdeveloped country and with no real experience of democracy on a national scale, is difficult, complicated, unprecedented and dangerous. We must expect turbulence. Very few countries—developed or otherwise—hold elections in war time. Neither the British nor the French did during World War II. 7. But in spite of these considerations, I believe that holding elections in Viet-Nam at about this time had to be tried. The heart of this war, after all, is political, and the elections, while a danger, are also an opportunity for our side to look clean, to make it clear that cheating in Viet-Nam is really on the way out. It is no exaggeration to say that if our side looks clean, this can change the course of the war. 8. This is because the Communists, while brutal, imperialistic, ruthless, unscrupulous, crafty and cruel, appear puritanical by insisting that corruption exists on our side only. One rarely hears of a corrupt Communist—at least while he is with their organization, but their abandonment of their own movement and its values when they defect or are captured cast strong doubt on their supposed internal morality. Nonetheless they are widely believed to be incorruptible. 9. I have put Lansdale onto the job of helping to bring about this big psychological victory. This is what he did in the Philippines, admittedly an easier problem than this because of their island status. Another asset which should stand him in good stead is the excellent relationship which he has developed with General Thang, whom Ky has had the good sense to put in charge of the administration of the election laws. I hope that all this will work together. 10. I have suggested to Lansdale that he draft a brief statement of guidance for Thang to publish under his own name, listing the essential points: free speech for all candidates; travel in their districts, as far as the war permits; no intimidation of candidates or of voters during the campaign and on election day; watchers at the polls; and count of the ballots in the presence of all the watchers. After Thang has issued this statement, I would then put it out to all the Americans in Viet-Nam as guidelines for them to follow in their relationship with the Vietnamese. 11. I have also asked Lansdale to interest himself in the growth of national parties. They expect there will be about 700 candidates for about 100 seats. Will there be any organization that seeks to endorse candidates in every one of the 100 odd districts? C. Course of the war 12. Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News is the most senior and most experienced daily newspaperman in Viet-Nam, and one who has many times expressed his disgust at the journalism which is practiced here. He also has in the past criticized what he thought was the U.S. role in the ʼ63 coup. He recently came in for backgrounding and, after we finished talking, volunteered the statement that obviously the situation in Viet-Nam is “much, much better.” When I asked him what he meant by that, he said it was “much better than it was a year ago.” Then after short pause, he said it was “much better than it was when you and I first started talking three years ago.” Finally he said that itʼs the best itʼs ever been. 13. He thinks roughly: that we are winning militarily, politically and economically; and that once Hanoi is convinced we have learned how to overcome subversion, terrorism and criminal violence generally, they will stop—provided we continue to maintain momentum militarily, politically and economically. He does not anticipate ChiCom intervention or escalation into World War III, or a demand by the American public to bring the boys home. He does not think any publicized trips, such as those of Ronning or Sainteny or Wilson or Gandhi will accomplish anything, but that there will be a secret understanding and a quiet fade-out. 14. Beech has a house in Tokyo and travels all through the East. He says a new tide is running which makes the old fashioned anti-Americanism obsolete. People like Bhutto in Pakistan, who saw a career in trying to be a junior Krishna Menon, are out of step with the times. In none of the countries bordering China is there a move toward Communism. Although the U.S. has been clumsy and made mistakes, there is no doubt that our policies are beginning to bear fruit. 15. Beech says that once a place has felt the touch of the American bulldozer it is never the same again. The reason for the phenomenal growth in Korea is because during the American stay there, we trained many young men in handling the modern machinery which spells development of the country—that is bulldozers, trucks, airplanes, electrical equipment of all kinds. This is one of the things we leave behind us, which starts to grow after we have gone. He thinks that the progress in South Korea today is so great and dynamic and is having such a magnetic effect on North Korea that it may eventually unify the North and the South. 16. Comment: In Viet-Nam, we are doing the same thing—training young men in handling modern equipment. This is one reason why our decision to construct a big trade school in Saigon is valuable, and why we insist our contractors do on-the-job training. It helps to train the Vietnamese to develop their own resources; it will be giving them an educational institution and training which they really want (as compared with university educational facilities about which there is a great deal of doubt in my mind), and it is enormously popular. D. Pacification 17. I hate to say this, but I cannot see that any really big and significant headway is being made on pacification. I talked with a very dependable man last night who had just been in Long An, which is the province immediately south of Saigon, and on which I used to concentrate in my first year here and he said the situation there is just about what it was three years ago. 3 18. The reason is easy to find. It is that GVN will not give pacification the proper priority. I get reports which I am investigating that ARVN is not fitted to handle it—or else does not want to, or both. I am told that the present kind of war has become a way of life with ARVN and that the American logistic support is making it even more so. Apparently they wonʼt want to chance anything. 19. We are surely better organized on the American side than ever before and the Vietnamese have an organization headed by General Thang which is potentially better than they have ever had before. But General Thang is not being given the tools to do the job, particularly in the form of military means to protect the process of pacification. Everything should be geared to that. 20. What distresses me about this is that I believe our successes in military and other fields make this a particularly good time for a really effective body blow at the village guerrilla, and at terrorism, and subversion and criminal violence generally. Such a body blow would, I believe, very seriously diminish all recruiting into the Viet Cong, which depends overwhelmingly on terror. If you can stop recruits from going into the Viet Cong, you are crippling it just as surely as if you defeat it in battle. 21. Also I believe that Hanoi will regard their proficiency at terrorism as their ace in the hole—their way to start all over again, even though they are defeated militarily, politically and economically. E. Casualties, military and civilian 22. American military casualties this week were 108 killed and 478 wounded. Seven were listed as captured or missing. The Communists lost 1,272 killed and 120 captured as compared with the previous weekʼs total of 1,200 killed and 116 captured. 23. In a typical attack on civilians, the Viet Cong raided a refugee resettlement village near Quang Tin Province headquarters. They killed three refugees, wounded eleven, and left 145 homeless when they burned 11 buildings. The total number of civilians killed this week by the Viet Cong was 33, including one hamlet chief; 66 others were wounded. F. Economic 24. This week, for the first time since devaluation, the USAID retail price index was down two percent—probably due mostly to an increase in the official price of live hogs in Saigon. It is hoped that this will increase pork supplies by encouraging growers to send more hogs to market. The price of pork in Saigon fell ten percent or more following the announcement of the official increase. Imported commodity prices also dropped in most instances, breaking rises which had been continuous since before devaluation. Our rice sales seem to be helping hold the line in that respect. We are endeavoring to produce a rational rice policy for GVN acceptance and I will have more to report on this. 25. Port improvement surveys for Da Nang, Ba Ngoi and Nha Trang have been completed and designs are in the final stages. A contract between the Navy and designers of port construction (World Wide Consultants) was signed last week. 26. USAID cargo continued to move out of the port at an ever-increasing rate and, I am assured by General Breakfield of USAID, that this rate shows definite improvement over the past three weeks. General Pham Dang Lan, new port director, has formed a series of sub-committees to study port problems and recommend solutions by July 27. The 4th Transportation Corps (which is taking over supervision and control of the port of Saigon) and GVN customs officials have been meeting to work out ground rules of customs administration by the GVN within and under ARVN and U.S. military control. G. Psychological progress 27. From July 16 to July 22, 322 returnees entered Chieu Hoi centers. This is an increase over the 256 reported last week, but still below the 339 which came in during the week of July 2. The total number of returnees this year now stands at 10,754. For the same period last year, January through July, the total was 4,686. The total for all of 1965 was 11,124. If the present rate continues, the number of returnees this year may equal in eight months the total for all of 1965. Daily average this year is 52.9 as compared with 30.4 for 1965. 28. The successful youth project in Saigonʼs District VIII is now being extended to District VI. As in the first project, selected youth leaders will take over the government of the district as well as the organization of a comprehensive program of civil improvements. Other youth activities include 73 work camps set up in July, with participation by 5,000 students. H. U.S. Congressional candidates 29. Two candidates for Congress were here last week, one Republican and one Democrat—Robert Taft of Cincinnati, Ohio, and Clive Du Val of McLean, Virginia. Very confidentially, both appeared well impressed by our effort here and thought that they had learned much which they had not known before. Mr. Taft left a note of thanks, saying: 30. “Your staff has been extraordinarily helpful in every way as has the establishment at JUSPAO. This has enabled me to get maximum coverage in the shortest period of time. The experience has been an exciting and interesting one. The extent and necessity of the effort here is not sufficiently understood and my own views have been fortified so that they can be better expressed. If I can be of service in any way that can help the picture here, please call on me.” Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:04 a.m., and Rostow forwarded the text to the President at 6.45 p.m. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, July 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 9) 2 For text of the Presidentʼs remarks on Vietnam in Jeffersonville, Indiana, on July 23, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 782–783. 3 In a July 27 letter to Porter, Komer stated that “the civil side is a mess. Compared to our military operations, itʼs still farcical. There are many reasons, few of them your fault or mine. But we inherited this mess, indeed we were both appointed because it was such a mess; and from here on weʼre tagged with straightening it out. The President wants results.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Porter/Komer Numbered Letters) 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State 1 Bangkok, July 29, 1966, 1141Z. 1218. 1. In my meeting with Foreign Minister Thanat this morning, he said he had been giving considerable thought to what new initiatives might be made prior to the beginning of the UN General Assembly. He referred to the proposal previously tentatively advanced by Secretary for a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the nations contributing troops in South Vietnam. He also alluded to the unsuccessful attempts to get any constructive action out of the Geneva Co-chairmen on U.S. willingness to expand the ICC activities on the Cambodian borders, and further to the unsuccessful attempts of PriMin Wilson and PriMin Gandhi to move the Soviets towards any constructive utilization of their position as Co-chairman. He said he would like the Secretaryʼs reaction to the thought of having the Japanese invite the FonMins of SVN and the troop-contributing nations and the FonMins of the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping and possibly also the Soviets to meet in Tokyo sometime in early September. 2. Thanat explained that if we continued to depend upon the Co-chairmen machinery as the only device for negotiations, we were giving the Soviets not only a veto power, but making their position increasingly difficult since they were vulnerable to Chinese criticism had they made any forthcoming moves regarding the reconvening of either of the Geneva conferences. It might be time, Thanat thought, for an Asian initiative honestly seeking to break this impasse. He did not think the Chinese would agree, although he thought it might have quite a bit of attractiveness for Hanoi. He thought that even in the event of the highly likely refusal of both regimes of such an invitation, it would allow us to go into the General Assembly with still another demonstration of the intransigence of the Communist camp. On other hand, in the unlikely event of the acceptance of such an invitation, he assumed that we would be prepared to participate. 3. Thanat pointed out that his own appraisal of Shiina and Sato led him to believe that, after their initial shock, they might be attracted by the thought. He recalled that in the 15 months patient preparations for the Seoul conference he had brought a great deal of pressure on both the Koreans and Japanese to settle their outstanding differences before he would agree to facilitate the preparations for the conference which was finally held. In this process he said he had come to have an increasing respect for both Sato and Shiina and thought that together they could handle any initial internal Japanese opposition. 4. I said I would immediately convey his thoughts to the Secretary. 2 Martin 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 2 In telegram 1881 to Bangkok, June 30, the Department replied that Thanatʼs proposal had, in its view, “no chance of success,” but it would not deter Thanat from trying it out with Shiina. (Ibid.) Thanat announced his proposal on August 3. Rostow indicated in a telephone conversation with Rusk on August 4 that the President was “quite excited about it”; Rusk replied that “we had a session on this yesterday and we are quite enthusiastic about going ahead with this; the problem is the kiss of death problem.” (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) On August 5 Rusk endorsed the proposal at a news conference. ( American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , p. 848) In telegram 22271 to Tokyo, August 5, Rusk instructed Reischauer to convey “our favorable view” to Japanese leaders. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Circular telegram 36816, August 27, reported that “Japanʼs vigorous support” had been the “most hopeful immediate outcome” of the proposal but that “reaction from other 15 Asian states to which proposal was addressed has been reserved or distinctly skeptical.” (Ibid.) 195. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 195. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State 1 Paris, July 30, 1966, 1100Z. 1522. 1. George met noon 27th with Ray and Out for four-hour lunch at secluded restaurant and stroll in park of St. Cloud. Ray present during most of talk but both men seized occasion as it arose for private work with George. Ray helpful in keeping Out to issues at hand when latter tended to stray into jungle of Vietnamese politics. Outʼs identity and history, the major themes of conversation, are subject of separate message; 2 he is extremely sensitive this matter and welcomed assurances his name would become known only to handful of men in highest positions of U.S. Government. In these messages, therefore, he will be referred to by cover name. Following is summary of highlights of conversation which ranged widely over twenty years of Vietnamese history and politics. 2. Out presented himself as a Cochinchinese nationalist, of intellectual stripe, accustomed to good bourgeois comfort and with horror of physical combat and miseries of life in the Maquis, which his friend Nguyen Huu Tho appears able to tolerate. He expressed abhorrence and fear of Communists and apprehensiveness of DRV Mission in Paris. He is interested first in Cochinchina autonomy, second in a Vietnamese federation, and ultimately in an Indochinese federation to include Laos and Cambodia, although Sihanoukʼs instability seems to him an obstacle. Except for regional bias, Outʼs point of view as far as he expressed it to George, held few surprises. He appeared eager to use any means to bring war to an end before Cochinchina could be submerged by North (DRV) or Northerners (like present Premier). His conversation reflected no hostility toward U.S. or Americans except as sustainers of governments not chosen by people. He spoke with feeling of Diem government as bad U.S. creation. 3. Outʼs channel of communication to Vietnam is liaison officer stationed at Prague, who makes weekly visits here to carry messages. Ordered to report 28th to be available following meeting with George, he failed to appear. Moreover, Out was notified 28th by DST (French equivalent of FBI) not to leave French territory. Out feared liaison officer may have been intercepted carrying documents which compromised Out. Whereas he had hoped be able prove his bona fides and authority within two weeks, he now believed a month would be required. 4. George asked how Out was able to maintain his authority at so great a distance. Out gave no clear answer except to allude to subsequent performance of which he seemed sure, even though execution might be delayed. 5. Asked how and where next steps might be carried out if U.S. received proper assurances, Out said best locale might be Saigon. George expressed doubt and suggested it might be possible arrange for Tho and others to proceed to safe neutral spot where talks could take place in suitable atmosphere. Out replied that Tho was in effect a prisoner, not because he was detained but because he and his associates feared he might be replaced by someone unacceptable to them. George commented that U.S. view of coalitions including Communist elements was that these tended to become Communist tools. Out admitted FLN contained Communist members but said it was no more under Communist direction than the Movement Populaire Cochinchinois of 1946. (His statement regarding Tho suggested less confidence.) 6. With reference to possible outcome of contacts between U.S. Government and FLN, Out had little precise to offer but tenor of his remarks suggested belief that somehow might emerge a cessation of military action in Cochinchina, popular election of government in South acceptable to FLN, and gradual diminution of hostilities in 17th parallel region as upper hand is gained by U.S. forces, which would remain as “protection.” 7. George handed over prisoner list which Out pocketed without glancing at it. He accepted without comment Georgeʼs statement U.S. would consider acceptable evidence release any two civilians and any two military, with preference for those needing medical care. Ray mentioned possibility of quid pro quo. Out misunderstood this as reference to money and took offense. Reassured, he replied subject could be discussed later. Alone with George thereafter, Out said he would not ask for corresponding gesture on part of U.S. 8. Since delay in prisoner release seemed certain, George said he would report conversation to Washington and propose temporary return to his home. Simple code message based on reference to car would bring him back to Paris within hours to resume contact. Communication would be through Ray as Out indicated that great concern for his safety and especially for his wife, who is cardiac, made him reluctant have any possible compromising document about him. George said before he left Paris he would let Ray know. Ray too expressed some anxiety regarding his own security. He would return to Spain if need arose as his visa is still valid. In reply to question, both men explained fear of French on grounds latter have “own plan” for Vietnam. Comment: In this tangle of improbables, George feels some confidence in Outʼs sincerity. Certainly there was no doubt of his cordiality, to which George responded in kind. Whether Out can in the end produce remains to be seen. 3 On balance it seems at this time U.S. has nothing to lose in playing along with Out and company as long as interests of both parties remain parallel. This may not be very far. We might, however, along the way, win freedom for some prisoners and to some extent undermine NLF. George did all possible to assure Out of importance U.S. attaches to contact and its maintenance. In the early phases, such risks as there are threaten Out and his friends rather than U.S. In meeting, Ray played role of honest broker with more seeming disinterest than he displayed in New York. In aside to George he said much of what Out had to say of himself and his history he had never heard before despite intimacy of their families. His attitude was one of slight aloofness, which may have reflected some apprehension or reluctance on part of one of his former eminence to serve as a “letter box” (his word). Outʼs manner toward Ray, however, suggested latter was trusted collaborator. It is clear that Outʼs point of view in many respects departs from reality as U.S. sees it, and his claims and pretentions in the eyes of a detached observer are implausible on the face of them. Nevertheless, Vietnamese politics is a sphere in which the implausible need not be synonymous with the impossible. Note: George requests authorization proceed as stated numbered paragraph 8 above. Bohlen 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Elm Tree. Drafted and authenticated by Bohlen. According to a July 30 cover memorandum, U. Alexis Johnson sent a copy of the telegram to the President on August 1. (Ibid.) George, Ray, and Out are code names for Sturm, Khanh, and Le Van Truong, respectively. 2 Telegram 1523 from Paris, July 30; see footnote 3, Document 179 . 3 In telegram 55594 to Paris, September 28, U. Alexis Johnson asked McBride to tell Khanh: “Have heard nothing since Georgeʼs meeting two months ago and nothing has happened.” McBride replied in telegram 4675, September 30, that an Embassy official had met earlier that day with Khanh, who stated that Le Van Truong had delivered the message regarding the release of prisoners to Tho “about a month ago.” Telegram 5440 from Paris, October 13, reported that Khanh had again seen Le Van Truong, who was under the impression that one U.S. prisoner on Sturmʼs list had been released but was very disturbed about his failure to deliver on the agreed-on number, since it cast doubt on his influence within the NLF. Le Van Truong further stated that if the authority of non-Communist elements was waning within the NLF, it was due to Hanoiʼs recently increased efforts to strengthen its influence, which had led to tension between Hanoi and the NLF. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ELMTREE) 196. Memorandum of Conversation 196. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 2, 1966. SUBJECT Vietnam PARTICIPANTS W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador-at-Large Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of International Law, Harvard Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant, FE Monteagle Stearns, Special Assistant, S/AH Professor Kissinger came in at the Governorʼs request to give his impressions of the situation in Vietnam following his recent visit there. 2 He explained that this had been his second trip to Vietnam. His first visit was in October of 1965. Atmosphere Professor Kissinger emphasized the conspiratorial atmosphere which he said prevailed throughout South Vietnam. He had never visited a country which was so self-absorbed. During his two visits and countless conversations with Vietnamese he did not recall being asked a single question about problems outside Vietnam. He was also impressed by the amount of backbiting that went on among the Vietnamese and the value they attached to qualities like cleverness and cunning as opposed to attributes like probity and integrity which were esteemed in the Western World. He recalled a long conversation he had had with a Provincial Official in the First Corps area. The official had described with considerable pride the tricks and maneuvers he had employed at the time of the struggle movement crisis to avoid committing himself either to the Government or the struggle forces. To many Vietnamese, conspiracy had become a way of life making political stability that much harder to achieve. Military Situation Kissinger acknowledged that the influx of American troops into Vietnam had resulted in a short term improvement in the military situation. In the Spring of 1965 Hanoi and the Viet Cong had entertained real hopes of a military victory. Their prospects for achieving this in the foreseeable future had been greatly diminished. Nevertheless, Kissinger thought that the basic situation had not changed since October of ʼ65. In his travels outside Saigon Kissinger had seen no sign that the Viet Congʼs political organization and capacity for guerrilla warfare had been seriously affected by our military operations. The pacification program had made little progress. The Viet Cong still moved with relative impunity outside the main cities and towns. Their intelligence was excellent and more often than not, despite the mobility of our forces, the Viet Cong could avoid contact when they wanted to. While our military often pointed to the heavy enemy casualties as a sign that we were winning the war, Kissinger thought that Hanoi and the VC could accept a 10–1 kill ratio almost indefinitely. Even without infiltration of an estimated 4500 men a month from the North the Viet Cong could make good their losses by recruitment in the South. Kissinger did not seem impressed by evidence that Viet Cong recruiters were finding it difficult to get able-bodied men. He thought the Viet Cong were still far from the bottom of the barrel. Kissinger praised the morale and dedication of our military forces but asserted that our strategy was wrong. “The best way to exhaust ourselves”, he said, “is to spend our time chasing main force units near the Cambodian border.” Only the Marines had learned that the war had to be won against the guerrillas and not against the main force units. Governor Harriman said that General Krulak had told him that the Marines in the First Corps area were now starting to concentrate on small unit operations, the task of which was to break the link between the guerrillas and the villagers. Kissinger observed that this was a slow, hard job which did not appeal to the generals in Saigon. He thought that General Westmoreland still conceived of his job as the location and destruction of main force units. Kissinger cited as evidence of the lack of progress being made in pacification the fact that 18 months after our arrival in Danang it was still impossible to go four kilometers outside of the city at night without running a real risk of being shot. The situation around Saigon was almost as bad. Kissinger described his experience of flying over main highways in a helicopter and seeing as many as five or six Viet Cong road blocks. He noted that Government officials in ostensibly pacified areas refused to sleep in their villages at night. While praising the Marines for having understood the real problem, Kissinger said that they were just beginning to learn how to conduct anti-guerrilla operations. Our military were not well equipped by training or experience to fight this kind of war. The problem of how to establish effective civil administration in the Provinces was still unsolved. We tended to confuse charitable activities with political action. The rebuilding of schools and the distribution of emergency food supplies were useful and constructive actions which won friends for us among the villagers. Such activities, however, did little to break the Viet Cong stranglehold on the villages when our forces had departed. Kissinger said that he understood that the effectiveness of South Vietnamʼs military forces continued to suffer from their lack of aggressiveness. In the First Corps area General Lam actually deployed his troops within the Marine perimeter. He cited areas in which the ARVN set up its road blocks and conducted its patrols in the same locations night after night. Consequently, the VC learned quickly how to avoid them. Kissinger agreed with Governor Harriman that the best way to increase the effectiveness of the ARVN was to encadre South Vietnamese units with the American forces. Governor Harriman observed that General Krulak had told him that this was being done by the Marines in the First Corps area. Kissinger said that encadrement was not yet extensive. (Governorʼs note—2 Vietnamese squads to 1 U.S. Marine) GVN Attitudes Towards Negotiations with NLF-VC Professor Kissinger said that none of the Vietnamese military officers with whom he had talked showed any flexibility about negotiations with the NLF. He thought the civilians were less rigid and singled out Tran Van Do and Bui Diem as GVN officials who could conceive of some value deriving from contacts with the NLF. He thought this was a change from October 1965 when the NLF was “unmentionable” even among civilian officials. Tran Van Do had told Kissinger and Phil Habib that he thought, personally, that it might be easier to talk to the NLF than to Hanoi. Kissinger and Habib had not reported this remark by telegram be-cause, according to Kissinger, the mere mention of negotiations with the NLF would have greatly antagonized Ambassador Lodge. They feared that Lodge might tell Ky that Do was being disloyal. Kissinger thought that a factor strongly influencing some Vietnamese to think about the possibility of negotiations with the NLF was the increasing cost of the war. The massive influx of Americans had created a better military situation for the GVN but large numbers of Americans inevitably created frictions with the local population. Some thoughtful Vietnamese were beginning to conclude that whoever won the war in the South the Vietnamese would lose. Kissinger noted that it was generally believed in Saigon that many Vietnamese, including GVN officials, maintained discreet contacts with the NLF and VC. In some cases this was because they had relatives on the other side. In other cases they were simply hedging their bets. Few Vietnamese admitted that they maintained covert contacts of this kind because of the obvious danger of doing so. Similarly, few GVN officials were willing to advocate talks with the NLF-VC because they assumed that the Directory and the U.S. were strongly opposed to such negotiations. The Road to Negotiations Kissinger said that we should stop talking about “unconditional” negotiations if we wanted to convince the world that we were serious about trying to find a peaceful settlement to the Vietnam problem. He did not find that anyone in Saigon understood what the phrase meant and it was usually interpreted to mean that we did not want to talk. In Kissingerʼs view we should keep pressing for negotiations and state openly what our conditions were. This was particularly important if we wanted to persuade the GVN to think in terms of talks with the NLF-VC. At present the GVN leadership was convinced that we were completely inflexible on this question. Kissinger argued that negotiations with the NLF-VC offered greater chance of success than negotiations with Hanoi or multilateral negotiations under the umbrella of the Geneva Agreements. Of all the methods of negotiations available to us he believed that a big Geneva-type conference was the least likely to succeed. Such a conference would involve too many people who didnʼt know the situation and who brought to the conference nothing more than their prejudices. Furthermore, the composition of a re-convened Geneva Conference would be stacked against us. One advantage of direct negotiations between the GVN and NLF-VC was that it ducked the troublesome problem that would be posed by VC representation at an international conference. Kissinger also thought it possible that Hanoi would prefer to let the NLF-VC take the lead since their own prestige would not be directly engaged in compromises reached by southerners in the South. If agreements could be reached with the NLF they could be ratified by the Geneva powers in a large international conference. He agreed that the central problem was to conduct negotiations in the South which would not result in a take-over by the NLF. The fragility of the GVN created real difficulties and meant that we were continually in the position of being blackmailed by the political weakness of the GVN. Despite the problems, Kissinger thought that we should direct all of our efforts, military, political and economic, to creating a situation favorable to negotiations with the NLF-VC. In practice this would mean (a) re-orienting our military strategy to put anti-guerrilla operations before operations against main force units, (b) encouraging the development of a broader political base in Saigon through elections and increased civilian participation in the Government and (c) putting more effort into improvement of civil administration both in Saigon and the provinces. Another step that Kissinger considered necessary was to levy a top priority requirement on CAS to obtain more and better intelligence on the composition and leadership of NLF-VC. This was vitally important if realistic negotiations were ever to be conducted with the NLF. Even if a deal could not be made we might be able to induce the defection of non-communist members of the NLF. For this reason we had to do a better job of identifying non-communists and hard-core leaders. Kissinger noted that the NLF leader, Tho, had gone over to the communists in 1962 because of his opposition to Diem. He had tried to return to Saigon in ʼ62 or ʼ63 but Diem had refused to let him. It was barely possible that Tho and others like him could still be induced to return. Kissinger emphasized that we needed not only information on the principal NLF leaders but on their provincial leadership as well. Kissinger thought that an amnesty offer by the GVN would be useful and should precede any serious effort by the GVN to engage in talks with the NLF-VC. Impressions of the Embassy Kissinger said that it would be extremely difficult to bring Ambassador Lodge to accept negotiations with the NLF-VC. He thought it might be done on a step by step basis. If Lodge could be convinced, the job of convincing Ky and the GVN would be much easier. The Vietnamese were somewhat in awe of Lodgeʼs personality and his views would carry real weight with them. Lodge was completely sold on Ky and did not like twisting his arm. The Ambassador was sensitive to charges that he had pulled the rug out from under Diem and did not want the same thing to happen again. Bill Porter was doing an excellent job under difficult circumstances. He had to spend far too much time answering questions from Washington. This was particularly unfortunate because the mission needed pulling together and Washington often asked the wrong questions. Phil Habib was a first class professional. Kissinger regretted that he would be leaving in about 6 months. The 18 month tour of duty was a mistake since it took about a year and a half to learn the situation well enough to be able to influence it. The Department should reverse its decision not to let wives remain with their husbands and extend tours of duty to 2 to 3 years. Kissinger had mixed impressions of Lansdale who he thought was too much of a Boy Scout. He commented that Lansdale had the great virtue of patience and was willing to spend long hours talking to Vietnamese. He was an excellent man for contacts but ineffective when it came to details. According to Kissinger, Lodge should have put Phil Habib in charge of monitoring the elections instead of Lansdale. Kissinger did not believe that the PATs were accomplishing much. They had been recruited and trained too quickly. He said that it was admitted that they had a desertion rate of at least 15% and the rate might be significantly higher. His own observation of the PATs in operation indicated that they tended to stick close to their base of operations and were no match for the highly motivated VC. 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Kissinger, 1966. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. 2 Kissinger visited Vietnam July 16–29. 197. Memorandum of Meeting 197. Memorandum of Meeting 1 Washington, August 2, 1966, 5 p.m. PARTICIPANTS W. Averell Harriman U. Alexis Johnson Llewellyn Thompson Leonard Unger SUBJECT Vietnam: Negotiations Amb. Ungerʼs check list 2 was reviewed. It was agreed that a message to Saigon should be prepared exploring the possibilities and problems of secret GVN talks with the NLF-VC. The group agreed that we need to know much more about the leadership and composition of the NLF and the VC. Amb. Johnson commented that Mr. Helms had told him in a recent conversation that CAS was beginning to develop the capability to obtain better intelligence on this subject through penetration of the NLF-VC. He concurred, however, that more had to be done and that Saigon should be informed that we consider this a top priority requirement. It was agreed that the question of an amnesty offer by the GVN to the NLF-VC was closely tied to the question of secret talks. A meaningful amnesty offer should open up the possibility of NLF leadership (not merely rank and file) returning to “normal” political life in the south. Any GVN initiative to engage in direct talks with the NLF-VC should be taken against the background of the amnesty offer. It was recognized that there would be considerable resistance in Saigon, both on the part of the GVN military leaders and the Embassy, to the idea of negotiations with the NLF-VC. Amb. Thompson suggested that the idea might be sold on the basis that it offered the possibility of sowing dissension in the ranks of the enemy and peeling off non-communist elements from the NLF. Amb. Johnson commented that this point had to be handled very carefully because dissension could be sowed in both directions. He thought that in its present mood of confidence the GVN would be hard to persuade that an initiative for talks with the NLF-VC was desirable. He thought that it would take six weeks at a minimum to prepare the ground in Saigon. It was agreed that Amb. Unger would prepare a draft of a message to Saigon. The subject of a Congressional resolution setting forth US aims in Vietnam was discussed. Amb. Unger said that he visualized such a resolution as a means of emphasizing the limited nature of our objectives and our readiness to engage in unconditional talks. If the right language could be worked out, such a resolution might be a way of getting Fulbright back on the track. Governor Harriman commented that it was hard to conceive of any resolution which would be acceptable to both Congressional hawks and doves—to Fulbright and Symington for example. The group agreed that there could be no more effective way of convincing Hanoi and the rest of the world of our unity and determination than to bring Fulbright around. Amb. Unger will prepare a draft Congressional resolution so that the group can see how it might look. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 72 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Harrimanʼs office. Assigned by the President in July to devote full attention to the search for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, Harriman established a “Negotiations Committee,” which met once a week beginning with this meeting. In an October 4 memorandum to Katzenbach, Harriman stated that his committee met each Thursday “to develop, assess and follow up all leads to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict.” Principal participants were U. Alexis Johnson, Llewellyn Thompson, William Bundy, Joseph Sisco, Leonard Unger, Thomas Hughes, and Benjamin Read. (Ibid., S/S-Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271, Department of State—Rusk)/1 2 Not found. 198. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 198. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 2, 1966, 5:30 p.m. Mr. President: The attached latest report on Viet Cong motivation and morale, January-June 1966, 2 is important both as an intelligence document and as a basis for action. Not included in the report is the following estimate which I am having refined in Saigon and will present to you in about a week: —When Rand first began to interview the VC, 65% of those who defected or whom we captured believed that the VC would win; 25% felt the GVN would win; 10% were uncertain. —The present figures are: 20% now believe the VC will win: 60% believe the GVN will win: 20% are uncertain. The rise in those “uncertain” reflects, in itself, an important fact. The number of hard core Communist defectors has increased. These men find it difficult to go beyond a statement other than “uncertainty” about victory. What this report shows is a progressive decline in the morale and the fighting capacity of the VC. As you said at lunch yesterday to the newspaper men, no one can tell you when this progressive decline will lead to the breaking up of units or to the ending of the war. But the process under way among the VC is clear. The operational implication, in my view, is that we must now persuade the government in Saigon to mount a campaign which effectively appeals to the VC and the North Vietnamese troops along the following lines: 1. All Vietnamese should now rally to stop the killing and end the war. 2. The Americans will go home as soon as peace is assured. 3. It is time for all Vietnamese to turn to economic and social development of their country. I have put Bill Jorden to work this morning with State to produce an operational scenario which would hammer away at these three simple themes. Two final observations. We must get a team in Saigon to work now on a post-war Vietnamese development plan. One aspect of that plan should be the constructive post-war use of Camranh Base. Apparently nothing makes Vietnamese more skeptical that we will ever leave than our willingness to construct that marvelous installation. We ought now to encourage thought and planning as to how it might be used in the future development of the country. Second, all the interrogators (Vietnamese and U.S.) are convinced that if the VC fail this time in the South they—and the whole country—will be swept by a mood of wanting no further violence and killing. They are close to having had enough. As Goure put it, they will be like the Spanish after the civil war—prepared to take even a bad government rather than to risk civil war again. We have seen that mood also in the Dominican Republic and earlier in the 1920ʼs in Mexico after their bloody revolution. I cite this to illustrate the need of getting the government in Saigon to shift from talk about invading the North to a policy of appealing for peace, order, and progress in the South. It may be that you would like to hear directly from Goure his reflections on the evidence which now, as you can see, includes not only interrogations but a mass of captured documents which bear on morale. He will be here a few more days. It is, of course, extremely important that we not overestimate these trends and develop excessive optimism; but it is equally important that we look at them soberly and, especially, mount the kind of political as well as military operations which will accelerate them. Walt Bring Goure in (I spent an hour with him today) Not necessary 3 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Confidential. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. A copy was sent to Moyers. 2 Attached but not printed, is “Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study, January-June 1966: A Briefing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” August 1, prepared by Leon Goure for the Rand Corporation. Goure spent an hour with Rostow on August 2 and briefed McNamara on August 3. 3 The President did not mark either option. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that he did not meet with Goure during August 1966. (Johnson Library) 199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 Washington, August 2, 1966, 6:10 p.m. 20124. For Goldberg. Dept. has given most serious study to ICRC proposal (Urtel 466). 2 We commend you for handling discussion with great delicacy. We endorse fully your view that proposal must be handled with great care and that ICRC channel may offer possible fresh avenue to probe Hanoiʼs present intentions. Onus for any rejection of proposal should rest on Hanoi and not on US. Our willingness to continue to probe possibilities of peace talks through this channel should help our position both internationally and domestically. Note verbale which we providing you is drafted on assumption that at some point, if proposal is not accepted by Hanoi, it might be advantageous to have it surfaced publicly. We fully agree, however, that for the time being this should be treated as a matter of utmost sensitivity. General posture we wish to strike is appearance of being forthcoming without giving up any points of principle. In particular, we wish assure our response fully accords with frequently stated US readiness engage in unconditional discussions which might help terminate conflict in Viet Nam. We assume ICRC suggestion for broad conference on all humanitarian problems, based on resolution X, 3 would logically involve discussion of ways to end conflict. Recent reports of Hanoi mood and intentions are contradictory but merit further study. On one hand, Hanoi has recently moved one additional division to SVN. On other hand, there appears to be some difference between Hanoi and Peking on continuing validity of Geneva Agreements. Also noteworthy is timing of Hanoiʼs statement that foreign volunteers not now needed, 4 coming as it does on heels of Bucharest Declaration. 5 In short, these recent moves might presage some willingness on Hanoiʼs part to decelerate present trend of escalation, and we of course would be interested in probing meanings of these moves in very private and quiet manner. Following is text note verbale you may give Gonard: The US Government has studied carefully the note verbale given to Ambassador Goldberg by Samuel Gonard, President of the ICRC, suggesting that a conference be held under the auspices of the ICRC which would not be limited solely to the study of humanitarian problems arising out of the application of the Geneva Conventions as such, “but that its scope should be extended to include also the study of those problems arising out of the methods employed in the conduct of military operations.” Consistent with its position that it is prepared to engage in unconditional discussions, the US would be ready also to discuss all humanitarian problems “over and beyond the strict application of the Geneva Conventions” as suggested by the ICRC. The ICRC has asked whether the US would be willing to take now certain measures susceptible of facilitating the convening of such a conference. The US looks sympathetically on this request. The ICRC can state unequivocally to the government at Hanoi, that it is satisfied the US is ready to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and would be willing to accept a reduction of hostilities on a reciprocal basis, either prior to or during a conference. In addition to delivering the above note, you should make the following points orally to Gonard: 1. You should stress that when the US speaks of reduced military activities on a reciprocal basis, we are obviously including bombing of the North as one of the elements. While US cannot agree to a formal bombing pause except as part of a reciprocal reduction of hostilities accepted by Hanoi, you may reaffirm to Gonard that if he decides to pursue matter personally in Hanoi he need have no fear for his safety as far as US bombing concerned. You may add that if his efforts succeed in bringing about a meeting of the type he envisages, we would be prepared to consider sympathetically steps to facilitate such discussions. Moreover, we would be prepared to consider indications of an informal nature by Hanoi as to what it would do on its side by way of a reduction of hostilities; and would consider carefully indications that Hanoi was in fact reducing its infiltration or other operations, recognizing always that we would have to observe carefully whether such a reduction was in fact taking place and being continued. FYI: We had recent indicationfrom Sainteny report 6 that some Hanoi leaders recognized that they would have to do something on their side if we were ever to consider suspending or ceasing bombing. However, we have always recognized the difficulty they might face in saying something for the record as to what they would do or were doing. End FYI. 2. We remain concerned that ICRC initiative not result in effort to trade off safety of POWs for cessation of bombings of North Viet Nam. Should we continue discussions on wider issues as outlined by Gonard, we would feel free to discuss all aspects of military activities, including Viet Cong terrorism in South—not just bombing of North. 3. We continue to believe that first step would be for Gonard to go to Hanoi. As you have told him, depending on reaction he receives there, further consideration could be given to question of whether Viet Cong participation in conference is an important element. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Buffum, cleared in draft by William Bundy and Harriman, and approved by Rusk. 2 Responding to a question about possible war crimes trials in Hanoi for U.S. prisoners, President Johnson had indicated in his press conference on July 20 that the United States was ready to participate in an ICRC-sponsored conference on the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the Vietnam conflict. ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, p. 744) In telegram 466 from Geneva, July 26, Goldberg transmitted a proposal from the ICRC to convene a conference that would seek a more general settlement of the conflict. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) Rostowʼs notes of the Tuesday lunch meeting on August 2 state: “ICRC language was changed. President uneasy about drafting of that.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) 3 Resolution X, adopted at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, encouraged the ICRC to undertake efforts to prevent or settle armed conflicts. 4 Not further identified. 5 In the Bucharest Declaration, issued July 6, Warsaw Pact members meeting in Bucharest proclaimed their readiness to allow volunteers to go to Vietnam if the DRV requested it. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 832–834. 6 See Document 182 for a report on Saintenyʼs trip to Hanoi. 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 200. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, August 3, 1966, 1:21 p.m. 20533. For Ambassador Lodge. 1. Your recent comments that pacification seems to be moving too slowly, 2 plus other reports to this effect, 3 have been subject highest level discussion here. 4 We generally share your views, including your beliefthat GVN is not fully employing its military assets (ARVN, RF and PF) either offensively or in support of pacification. Clear to us they ought to put more effort into pacification. No one here believes that GVN military forces are contributing to offensive operations of pacification programs in a measure anywhere near what should be expected from a 600,000 man force. We also note that Ky himself is becoming much more concerned about pacification, for example in his 22 July talk with you. 2. Highest authority requests that you personally address the question of best means of accelerating and giving direction to the pacification effort—by pinpointing responsibility of both GVN and US officials at Saigon level as well as in provinces and districts, by clear-cut directives to both GVN and US officials, by appropriate assignment of GVN resources, by full and fast reporting, by vigorous follow-up, and so on—as a preliminary to discussing these matters with the GVN. Top levels here are most interested in your suggestions as to action needed to galvanize the lagging effort in this essential field. 5 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared in substance by Rusk and McNamara, and approved by Rusk. 2 See Document 193 . 3 In an August 2 memorandum to the President, in anticipation of Johnsonʼs lunch-eon meeting that day, Komer stated that pacification of the countryside, one of the “four chief components of our Vietnam strategy,” was the “area where weʼve made least progress.” He saw “Problem No 1 in Vietnam as increasingly that of redirecting the ARVN to the pacification task, with US logistic support.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Ko-mer Files, Memos to the President) 4 After the Presidentʼs lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to Read: “Go to Westmoreland and Lodge on weaknesses of pacification and ask Westmoreland and Lodge to do a cable asking for a plan to improve the whole pacification effort and to see in general how in that context can use ARVN more effectively.” (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, and Moyers attended the Presidentʼs lunch meeting on August 2, which lasted from 1:24 to 3:10 p.m. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary). No record of the discussion has been found. 5 Lodge replied in telegram 2675, August 4, noting that Westmoreland had a team studying Vietnamese military, paramilitary, and police forces and that once Westmoreland submitted his proposals, Lodge hoped to develop a unified U.S. position to take up with the GVN. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 201. Special National Intelligence Estimate 201. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, August 4, 1966. SNIE 13–66 CURRENT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION Conclusion The Chinese Communists have responded to recent US air action against North Vietnamese POL facilities and to Ho Chi Minhʼs July 17 appeal for more aid 2 with massive propaganda demonstrations all over China. These occasions were used to renew pledges of complete support for Hanoi and to reiterate the Chinese view that the war must be continued to final victory. At the same time, the Chinese seem likely to provide more manpower for logistical and engineering functions in North Vietnam, and, for the first time, they may move some infantry troops into North Vietnam as a precautionary step against the contingency of invasion. We do not conclude, however, that the Chinese have changed their basic policy because of the recent air strikes. We have estimated that Peking would almost certainly intervene if North Vietnam were invaded or if the collapse of the Communist regime seemed likely. But we continue to believe that, at present levels of US action against NVN, China will not commit its ground forces to the war, nor its air force to deliberate and sustained action against US forces. [Here follows the body of the 7-page estimate.] 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board except for the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. Rostow forwarded the estimate to President Johnson on August 5, noting in his covering memorandum that it had been produced “at our request.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10) 2 See footnote 3, Document 180 . 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, August 4, 1966, 6:59 p.m. 21944. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. Saigon 1781 and 1927. 2 Several of recent reports from Saigon have raised intense interest here at high levels in possibility of generating GVN initiatives to foment divisions among VC/NLF, stimulate increasing scale of defection and ultimately pave way to GVN-VC/NLF talks to work out negotiated solution to Viet-Nam conflict on favorable terms. We have in mind both a covert course of action for the GVN, which is discussed in this message, 3 and a longer range overt GVN program which will be discussed in Septel. 4 2. We have made specific note of Kissinger conversation with Tran Van Tuyen, and have related it to the reports of poor morale and dissension in VC ranks (e.g. recent Rand/Goure Report) 5 as well as hints at more significant divisions among VC/NLF leaders and eventual possibility splitting off certain dissatisfied, anti-NVN elements not wholly under communist discipline. Our conclusion is that time may now be favorable for aggressive GVN action on covert side to exploit its contacts with VC/NLF elements and encourage expanded contacts in order to smoke out all evidences of divisions in VC ranks and prospects for important VC defections. As opposed to earlier periods, we judge that GVN today could take such actions from position of relative strength and therefore avoid spreading suspicion and consternation among its own people about possible intentions of making a deal with VC. 3. You will know better than we how GVN might proceed but we have in mind generally accepted reports that through family and village connections, ties of northerners who have gone south, etc. there are many quiet and informal avenues to VC/NLF and we also understand many GVN officials and military commanders know in greater or lesser degree their VC “opposite numbers”. It may therefore come down to a matter of confidential GVN instructions to appropriate officials and military to lift present inhibitions on contacts and provide them with effective line to be taken in any contacts which ensue. 4. We would like you to consider how we might best get GVN into motion on this matter and if general line set out above makes sense you are authorized to proceed without further exchanges with us. If you see problems in what we are suggesting, please let us know and give us your suggestion as to how to move this matter forward. 6 5. You may also want to consider in this connection whether there is any way our own intelligence efforts might be expanded to develop greater body of information on VC/NLF especially their leaders, and potential weaknesses within its ranks (see Deptel 1130, Oct. 26, 1965 and Embtel 1467, Oct. 28, 1965 7 for our previous exchange on this subject). Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and Unger; cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Harriman, Thompson, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Rusk. 2 In telegram 1781 from Saigon, July 24, the Embassy reported that, in a conversation with Kissinger on July 23, Bui Diem seemed prepared to accept the NLF “into the body politic of the South if (1) they would turn in their arms, and (2) agreed to participate on same basis as other Vietnamese political elements.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In telegram 1927 from Saigon, July 26, the Embassy reported that Tran Van Tuyen, an influential VNQDD politician, had taken the same position in a conversation with Kissinger, indicating that it would be appropriate and easy for the Vietnamese to establish contact with both the NLF and Hanoi, whose leaders were known personally to him and many of his countrymen. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) 3 After the Presidentʼs lunch meeting on August 2, Rostow telephoned the following instruction to Read: “Cable to Lodge which asks him to encourage SVN to begin to see what contacts can make covertly with VC. Maximize covert operations. Suggest Ky, instead of sounding out about going to North, ought to launch peace campaign based on Honolulu where he said: come on over.” (Notes re Lunch Meeting by Rostow, August 2; Johnson Library, National Security Files, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) 4 Document 203 . 5 See Document 198 . 6 Lodge replied in telegram 2814, August 5, and in telegram 2818, Document 204 . In telegram 2814, he indicated that he had spoken to Ky about covert exploitation of contacts with the NLF leadership and that Ky had liked the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 7 Neither printed. (Ibid. and ibid., POL 15 VIET S, respectively) 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, August 5, 1966, 8:08 p.m. 23182. For Ambassador Lodge from the Secretary. State 21944. 2 1. In this message I would like to put before you longer range GVN program mentioned ref State tel. I would appreciate your giving this overt program intensive study at your earliest convenience and telling me how you feel it might most effectively be promoted with GVN (with such modifications as you consider desirable) for execution at appropriate moment. 2. We have touched on certain elements of this plan in past, notably through Deptels 2534 of last February 3 and 5454 of July 11, 4 in conversations when you were last in Washington and in paper (Item 17) prepared for that visit 5 and, we understand, it was discussed by you with Henry Kissinger during his recent visit to Saigon. 3. The essence of the program would be an approach to VC/NLF personnel, individually and collectively, to promote their reconciliation with GVN and reincorporation in body politic. As we see it now, and subject to your views, the approach would be in the form of a proclamation by the GVN PriMin or Chief of State offering the VC/NLF in return for the surrender of its arms and the abandonment of its insurgency, amnesty for its members and their right to participate in the political process as well as possible material rewards. Specifically the proclamation might follow these lines: Sketch out the origins of the present struggle; mention the improved military situation in the South and the strikes at the root of the aggression in the North; call on VC/NLF to recognize that it cannot impose its will on the people of SVN by force; urge it to join in effort to achieve national reconciliation and to carry out the peaceful reconstruction of the country. 4. More particularly, the proclamation would offer VC amnesty in return for turn in of arms, or freedom to return North; would renew GVN pledge to carry out program of transition to civilian, representative government, with VC participation in political life whenever they forswear violent means, would leave local administration undisturbed pending local elections, at same time affirming GVN authority throughout country in principle; would announce phased withdrawal of foreign troops as security reestablished; and would announce intensified economic and social programs. Finally, proclamation would envisage talks with Hanoi at appropriate future date on trade resumption, etc. and reunification. (Fuller exposition of program together with one or more versions possible text being pouched.) 5. Briefly, we see following advantages to such a program: (a) Would go long way to take heat, domestically and internationally, out of demands for VC/NLF representation in international negotiations or Conference, since GVN would have made offer (whether accepted or not) to work out internal political problems on reasonable basis. (b) If offer rejected would put onus on VC/NLF side and would probably intensify their internal differences over continued prosecution of insurgency, encouraging individual and group defections. (c) If offer accepted GVN dealing from strength in subsequent negotiations. (d) Would provide phased settlement of conflict without calling on DRV to admit defeat or direct participation in conflict. (e) Any later international conference could devote itself primarily to provision of guarantees and enforcement machinery since resolution of basic internal SVN political questions would hopefully have been largely achieved by GVN-VC/NLF negotiation. 6. Successful launching of such a program requires that GVN speak from strength so that its action is not interpreted as a preparation for a compromise deal with VC/NLF and therefore a signal for politically sensitive individuals to seek their own accommodation. Politically and militarily present time appears relatively favorable but we see following difficulties in moving ahead too soon: (a) Will require careful preparation with GVN, particularly to overcome anticipated reservations of military, and successful launching requires full understanding and acceptance of program by entire GVN leadership. May take time achieve this if violent reactions (coups?) are to be avoided. (b) Offers to VC/NLF personnel envisaged in proclamation concerning restoration civil rights if made prior to Sept. 11 elections could create embarrassment with provisions of present electoral law. (c) GVN forthcoming posture more credible following successful elections. We have concluded therefore the program could best be launched in late September or early October, but our views on this are not fixed. 6 7. In your comments I should appreciate your also covering the possible desirability of launching such a program in one area only at first, as for example in Region IV, before attempting it on a nation-wide basis. 8. Septel 7 discusses some more immediate measures, including psywar campaign, aimed at encouraging individual and group defections now. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, McNaughton, Thompson, Rostow, and Jorden; and approved by Rusk.1 2 Document 202 . 3 Telegram 2534, February 25, stated that “we should do all possible to try to break off some of the elements of the NLF/VC” and urged Lodge to “encourage Ky and Thieu to exercise their imagination and ingenuity in this field.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 In telegram 5454, the Department recommended that Lodge discuss the issue with Kissinger during his visit in July. (Ibid.) 5 “Contacts with the VC,” prepared for Lodgeʼs visit to Washington in early May 1966. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting, 5/10/66) 6 Lodge replied in telegram 3130, August 10. Given how “uninformed” GVN leaders were regarding “diplomatic techniques for bringing a war to an end,” Lodge proposed that such a program not be broached directly to the GVN but that a “broad dialogue on settlement possibilities” be opened with the GVN. “We would seek quickly in this educational process to reach agreement on your specific proposal.” (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department concurred in telegram 27973, August 15. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) 7 Telegram 23332 to Saigon, August 6; see footnote 4, Document 180 . 204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 204. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, August 6, 1966. 2818. Absolutely no distribution except at direction of Secretary. 1. This is in further reply to State 21944. 2 2. We have been impressed by growing number of indicators, buttressed by Rand/Goure report, that NLF-VC morale sinking. These have naturally led us to give intensive consideration to what might be done to stimulate decay in their organization. At present, we are endeavoring to set up test in a particular province (that of official now in charge of Chieu Hoi activity) with view to determining whether certain incentives can be provided, in the form of material and status rewards, which would induce high-level NLF-VC defections. By material and status awards, we mean (a) substantial cash awards to families to enable such high-level defectors to “reconstitute their lives” and (b) assurances that their status as officials will be recognized if they come over, that they will not be herded into ordinary Chieu Hoi centers or prisons, that they and their families will not be maltreated, and that they will be permitted to resume their professions if they have them, provided they maintain correct attitudes toward GVN. 3. It will probably not be easy to induce GVN to accept such approach, though their attitude toward returnees has improved considerably. Their objection stems from reluctance to “reward” NLF-VC, while patriotic elements are unrewarded. Their tendency has been to rely on rewards for NLF-VC taken “dead or alive.” To counter this, it is currently our idea that proposal be described as GVN rewarding families for performance of patriotic duty in persuading their relatives to return to GVN side. We are now developing format to propose to GVN on this. If we are blocked by bureaucracy from running test along general lines mentioned above, I will take matter to Ky with view convincing him that this is worthwhile effort, that it is better to induce NLF-VC by such means to walk in rather than have to go shoot them and get shot ourselves in the process. My talk with him yesterday will, I hope, have paved the way. We do not intend to confine awards to families of returnees, but will consider other devices calculated to minimize political resentment, such as donations to Vietnamese war veterans, etc. I will keep you informed as this matter develops. 4. A second effort we are making is at present closely held among very few of us here. On July 23, one of our most experienced American officials, a man with excellent reputation among Vietnamese, was approached and requested to meet with an uncle of Nguyen Huu Tho, 3 chairman of the National Liberation Front. The uncle is head of the Tho family as now constituted, and has assumed responsibility for the welfare of Thoʼs wife and nine children, the tenth child, a boy, being with Tho in the Maquis. We approved meeting between the American and the uncle in presence of the intermediary. The uncle said he wished to induce Tho to come back, not only for patriotic but for family reasons. As Tho would turn himself over only to the Americans, they wished to know whether we would help, if he did so, and particularly whether we would put Tho beyond reach of VC. 5. Bill Porter, who is handling matter at my request, instructed American to give assurances that we would assist Tho and family in every possible way, including protection from VC. This assurance was given on July 26 and in return, Thoʼs uncle stated that plan would be implemented immediately by sending his (uncleʼs) wife to Cambodia (they declared no problem doing this) where she would meet with Thoʼs mother-in-law. The two women would then go either singly or together to meet with Tho or call Tho to see them, their purpose being to obtain from Tho statement of conditions under which he would come back. Uncleʼs wife would then return to Saigon with these conditions, which would then pass from her to uncle to intermediary to American contact. uncle believes Tho will insist on talking to authorized American before actually turning himself in. He insists Tho not real Communist. 6. Intermediary who arranged meeting with Thoʼs uncle expressed view that if Tho comes over, several other prominent NLF-VC officials would also come. He cited by name Nguyen Van Tri, alias Muoi Tri, VC political and military advisor, Zone D; Hbay Mon, VC chief of west; La Van Liem, special commissioner, for VC special missions in Saigon, Cholon and Gia Dinh (terror, sabotage). Thoʼs uncle said during meeting with American that if Tho comes over, he may arrange to free some American prisoners when he does. uncle said there no further need for direct contact between him and American, that further messages on subject would come through intermediary. 7. We have learned that uncleʼs wife left immediately as scheduled. No further word. 8. If and when matter progresses to point where arrangements are required, CAS will be brought in to effect them. 9. Cannot forecast what will come of this, but it is interesting family initiative. We will look for others. 4 I assume I have authority to make any arrangements required to get Tho or any other top-ranking NLF-VC to come over and that if they wish to do so to us instead of to GVN, we should accept and leave problems to be cleared up with GVN later. 5 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 3:14 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 2818 to the President on August 9, together with the text of telegram 3038, August 9, in which Lodge provided a progress report on contact with Tho. In his covering memorandum Rostow stated: “Here is the first attempted major operation to go to work on the political orientation of the NLF. The case itself is attractive, if it works out; but it is equally important that Lodge is now aboard and interested.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 10) 2 Document 202 . 3 In a September 27 memorandum to Helms, Carver identified the uncle as Nguyen Huu An, Permanent Secretary of the (South) Vietnam Red Cross. (Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80–R01720R) Although Nguyen Huu An is referred to as “uncle” in most White House, State Department, and CIA documents dealing with him, Carver notified Helms in an October 17 memorandum that it had been revealed that An was not actually Nguyen Huu Thoʼs uncle but a cousin of Thoʼs father. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 27768 to Saigon, August 13, the Department of State notified the Embassy that messages referring to the possible defection of Tho and other key NLF leaders should be slugged Thrush. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH) 5 In telegram 23352, August 7, the Department indicated that Lodge assumed correctly that he had such authority. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 205. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 205. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) 1 Saigon, August 7, 1966, 0005Z. MAC 6814. Subject: 66–67 force requirements (U). Ref: Emrickʼs message, DTG 032207Z Aug 66. 2 1. Continuous study of the situation indicates that past and current developments reinforce my appraisal of the war on which the CY 66–67 force requirements were based. There are no indications that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased his rate of infiltration, formed division size units, introduced new weapons into his ranks, maintained lines of communications leading into South Vietnam, increased his use of Cambodia as a safe haven, and recently moved a combat division through the DMZ. These and other facts support earlier predictions and suggest that the enemy intends to continue a protracted war of attrition. We must not underestimate the enemy nor his determination. 2. The war can continue to escalate. Infiltration of enemy troops and supplies from NVN can increase and there is no assurance that this will not occur. 3. If, contrary to current indications, Hanoi decides not to escalate further, some modification of the forces which I have requested probably could be made. Under such circumstances, I conceive of a carefully balanced force that is designed to fight a long war of attrition and sustainable without national mobilization. 4. I recognize the possibility that the enemy may not continue to follow the pattern of infiltration as projected. Accordingly, my staff is currently conducting a number of studies with the objective of placing this command and the RVN in a posture that will permit us to retain the initiative regardless of the course the enemy chooses to pursue. These include: A. A study which considers possible courses of action by the enemy on our force posture and counteractions to maintain our superiority. B. An analysis of our requirement to determine a balanced US force that can be employed and sustained fully and effectively in combat on an indefinite basis without national mobilization. C. A study to determine the evolutionary steps to be taken in designing an ultimate GVN security structure. D. A study to determine the optimum RVNAF force structure which can be attained and supported in consideration of recent experience and our estimate of the manpower pool. 5. If a briefing officer or team is required as suggested by reference message, the briefing would only convey the philosophy reflected above and reiterate the forces requested and justified in CINCPAC CY 66 adjusted requirements and CY 67 force requirements, SER: 000255, 18 June 1966. 3 Moreover, it would emphasize the requirement for a well balanced, sustainable force in SVN for an indefinite period even if Hanoi elected to stop the escalation. 6. At this point in time I cannot justify a reduction in requirements submitted. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to General Wheeler. 2 In his August 3 telegram, Emrick indicated that CINCPACʼs 1966–1967 force requirement package was in trouble in Washington and that the JCS were loathe to recommend approval without additional rationale, which would probably mean presenting a special briefing. (Ibid.) In a memorandum to McNamara, JCSM–506–66, August 5, the JCS indicated that they had some reservations particularly with respect to CINCPACʼs added requirements for “air defense, security units, attack sorties, and the force requirements derived therefrom.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 320.2 Vietnam) 3 Not found. 206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, August 7, 1966, 1:57 p.m. 23355. Literally eyes only for Lodge from Rusk. I was most interested in your 2818, 2 especially beginning with paragraph four. You should know that we have had some intimation about Thoʼs attitude from an interested Viet Cong source in Europe. Some recent public discussion in Hanoi reflects concern about the solidarity of some of their comrades in the South. A defection by some of the key Liberation Front leaders could be worth many battalions to us and could greatly stimulate Chieu Hoi among rank and file. Iʼm sure you know that funds in any amount will be provided if silver bullets will help. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk. 2 Document 204 . 207. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 207. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 Geneva, August 9, 1966, 1936Z. 714. For Secretary of State, Goldberg, Harriman, Bundy and Sisco. 1. Met with ICRC President Gonard and Executive Director Gallopin today and received oral report on meeting of ICRC delegates August 8 at which USGʼs note verbale 2 reportedly received careful study and consideration. 2. Referring to moderation displayed by Hanoi in postponing trials of American POWs, Gonard said ICRC had hoped that USG, the major power in the conflict, would have offered a more positive gesture to enhance ICRC efforts to bring Hanoi to conference table. Gonard then recalled ICRC note verbale in which they inquired as to willingness of USG to suspend or restrict military operations. 3. The ICRC feels, Gonard said, that USG offer to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and willingness to accept reduction of hostilities on reciprocal basis, ties ICRC hands vis-à-vis Hanoi. As consequence, Gonard believes any approach by ICRC to Hanoi “would not appear to offer much hope for success.” 4. Gonard observed that humanitarian law, on which ICRC proposed efforts were to be based, “does not know the notion of reciprocity.” The purpose of this law, he said, is to alleviate the suffering of all victims of conflict regardless of relative positions of contending parties. 5. Referring to Ambassador Goldbergʼs comments and observations, Gonard said that ICRC appreciated that USG experiences during the Korean conflict and in Viet Nam during 1965 bombing pause account for the USG attitude now; however, he reiterated that our request for reciprocity would jeopardize ICRC chances for success in Hanoi. At this juncture I recalled to Gonard our complete lack of success in getting any favorable response from Hanoi during last suspension of bombing and informed him that during first four weeks of last suspension the Viet Cong committed more than 2500 terrorist acts against the South Viet Namese people, i.e., school teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, health workers, religious leaders and all categories of local civic officials. I said that I personally thought the reaction in the U.S., and in South Viet Nam, would be bitter if there were yet another pause during which Hanoi continued to carry on aggression and committed atrocities. Gonard said as soldier he appreciated problem for our forces if they were hit by enemy during a pause. 6. Referring to the Sainteny report 3 and other reports which suggest that Hanoi may be adopting a more conciliatory attitude, Gonard said ICRC does not agree with these views. Gonard observed that Hanoi is decentralizing its industry and that there is large-scale evacuation of civil populations from urban areas. Gonard stated further that he believes decentralization of industry reflects a far-reaching decision which suggests that Hanoi may be preparing for a long struggle. 7. Gonard said it was neither his wish nor intention to dictate to the USG but rather he wanted to make USG realize difficult position of ICRC in this matter. Gonard said that because USG so strong he thought it could afford make a more positive gesture. In this vein be observed that the greater power can make gesture at lesser risk. The USG must evaluate, Gonard said, whether risk of another pause would be worth taking on chance that it would lead to negotiations. He suggested pause of 10 to 15 days may be sufficient to test Hanoi. 8. While again reiterating ICRC willingness take soundings Hanoi, Gonard said USGʼs request for reciprocity makes it difficult for ICRC to operate on basis its proposal. He then expressed hope that USG would reexamine its position with respect reciprocity condition. He also alluded to possibility of abandoning broader approach and reverting to President Johnsonʼs proposal expressed at July 20 press conference 4 indicating that USG would be ready whenever the Hanoi government is ready to sit down at a conference table under the sponsorship of the ICRC to discuss ways in which the Geneva Conventions of 1949 can be given fuller and more complete application in Viet Nam. 9. I assured Gonard that ICRC views would be communicated to Washington immediately and that I would be in contact with him again when reply available. Gonard will be in Geneva balance current week but will be absent most of next week. 10. Comment: Despite strong representations by Ambassador Goldberg and myself re U.S. willingness to deescalate on reciprocal basis, clear that ICRC feels U.S. should make first gesture, even at risk that another bombing pause would not lead to negotiations. 5 As have previously reported Gonard on recent trip to several Eastern European countries got impression that new pause might lead Hanoi to table. However today he spoke of signs indicating Hanoi preparing for long struggle. ICRC caution understandably may be due to fear failure of mission to Hanoi “unless given a strong hand,” and I suspect even with it, they would recognize chances for success limited. Tubby 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 2 See Document 199 . 3 See Document 182 . 4 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, p. 744. 5 Rusk replied in telegram 26108 to Geneva, August 11, that the United States stood by its position on reciprocity and could not accept a bombing pause, “which would, once more, permit the other side to move substantial additional forces into South Viet-Nam with impunity.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 208. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, August 10, 1966. 2375. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: A. Smell of victor 1. In the struggle for the independence of Viet-Nam, the following can be said: 2. We are not losing; we cannot lose in the normal sense of the word; never have things been going better; indeed, never have things been going so well. We are “on the track” with regard to almost every aspect of the war and we are winning in several. 3. All of this is a great tribute to the excellence of your policies and to the courage with which you have made your decisions. It is also a tribute to those who execute the policies, notably our magnificent military men. 4. But all of this is still not called “victory.” Indeed, however much they disagree about many things, everyone—in Washington and Hanoi and in Saigon—seems to agree that what we have now is not “victory.” 5. In truth we do not need to define “victory” and then go ahead and achieve it 100 percent. If it becomes generally believed that we are sure to win (just as it is now generally believed that we cannot lose) all else will be a mopping up. If there is the “smell of victory,” we will be coasting. 6. There are a number of things which would psychologically mean “victory” to US, to Hanoi, to Saigon and to the world, as follows: A) First on the list would be some really smashing results as regards the “criminal” war: terrorism, subversion, village guerrilla. Figures indicate a diminution in assassinations of local officials, but we have as yet no good figures on the trend as regards civilian casualties in general. B) Important defections as described in Stateʼs 21944 2 could mean a great deal. C) A successful advance towards constitutional democracy could bring a feeling of success. D) Really spectacular numbers of people coming into the Chieu Hoi camps would look like the end of the war. E) Of great significance psychologically would be a situation in which one could start at Camau and drive securely all the way to Quang Tri, since this would mean that the 50 percent of the population which is in Saigon and the Delta and the 35 percent of the population in the coastal strip from Hue to Qui Nhon had been effectively pacified. To be able to ride the whole length of the railroad would also mean much. (Several months ago I sent you a population map 3 which illustrates this.) F) Other things which would have great meaning would be to be able to drive securely to Dalat or to Vung Tau. 7. Clearly the type of “battle victories” which we have been winning, and the impressive 10 to 1 casualties we are inflicting, do not look like victory to many Vietnamese as much as does the phenomenon of open roads. Driving the Viet Cong out of a certain place on the map seems to mean little in and of itself. In that sense this looks more like naval war in which one particular point in the ocean is much like another. The solid thing is the people and 85 percent of the people live in the area through which a traveller driving from Camau to Quang Tri would pass. 8. But none of these things are just around the corner. 9. Let us, therefore, by all means rejoice in the good news: that a wildcat, soul-destroying inflation seems unlikely; that a successful Communist takeover of the government of Viet-Nam seems now improbable; and that we have the beginnings of a policy on the main “unfinished business”—counter-terrorism, being mindful that unless definitively crushed, terrorism will always remain as Communist ace-in-the-hole and the ground for hope by Hanoi that it can at any time “go to Phase 1” and start the whole struggle up again. Finally, let us be thankful that our troops are so magnificent. 10. But our troops will be the first to speak of their respect for the hard-fighting Viet Cong—and General Westmoreland says North Viet-Nam army strength in South Viet-Nam has increased from 15,580 on January 1 to 47,100 as of July 31—the equivalent in battalion terms of from 31 to 81. Also 4 divisional and 10 regimental headquarters have been introduced since January 1. Average infiltration rate is 4,400 men per month. No evidence of serious food or ammunition shortage among major units is observable despite acknowledged effect of our air strikes. 60 percent of enemy forces, it is estimated, have yet to be committed to combat. 11. If the above is true statement of the situation, it is obvious that we have quite a stretch of time ahead of us. 12. The question, therefore, arises: How much time? And the corollary questions are: Can we shorten the time? Should we shorten the time: and, if so, how? 13. In trying to answer these questions, the first point is that time is not necessarily on the side of the U.S. or the Vietnamese. 14. Is not a relatively big, fast war easier for the U.S. to sustain than a relatively moderate slow war? 15. As far as the Vietnamese are concerned, they have demonstrated the patience for which Asians are famous and maybe they can keep on going as they have been. But their leadership is thin, both militarily and politically. This is partly due to the numbing effect of colonialism, with all its deliberate and rather diabolical discouragement of a national spirit, and with all of its educational effort aimed to make people Frenchmen rather than Vietnamese. The war has also played its part. Hope for the future of country is to be found among young people in Viet-Nam. But they will not be ready for some time. 16. Maybe the Vietnamese can last indefinitely—although it would be dangerous to assume it. But certainly they would be helped by a quick end to the war, assuming always that a satisfactory outcome was achieved. At present U.S. military forces must help the Vietnamese actively in order to get the Vietnamese pacification effort moving—let alone the war against the big units. We have high hopes that eventually they can undertake it all themselves and our soldiers have already expressed appreciation for the newly created Vietnamese political action teams and have recognized that they render the kind of service no American can render. Nonetheless our help is at present indispensable in the field of criminal/terrorist war as it is on the purely military side. 17. Therefore, it seems that, for both Vietnamese and American reasons, time is not necessarily on our side and that a quick victory would be of immense value to both. 18. These thoughts, which are not, of course, original with me, merge from many talks and much reflection. They reminded me of a statement which General Eisenhower once made to me, as follows: 19. If you desire to conquer one ably led and well organized battalion solidly entrenched and favorably located, and you try to do it with two battalions, you may succeed, but it will take you a long time and you will have many casualties. If, on the other hand, you use a division, you will do it quickly and the losses will be very slight. 20. In a war like this, in spite of everything, there is something tremendously effective about sheer mass. On the fifth floor of this building, I can see the port of Saigon, thick with shipping and in the green flat fields through which the Saigon River winds, I see more ships constantly making the sixty mile trip to and from the open sea. When I flew over Vung Tau last week, I counted eighteen ships anchored there. There are undoubtedly more in the Philippines and elsewhere. This is American mass, which none can produce as we can. 21. While I do not believe we can bring anything more into the city of Saigon (in fact, I think the American presence in this city must be reduced), I submit that if ports, piers and warehouses throughout Viet-Nam are ready and the military leaders can manage, and it can be done without political damage—three big “ifs”—there is a strong case for “more” coming in “quicker.” 22. Such are the agonizing questions of history, since we never know what would have happened had the course which was not followed been followed. But common sense suggests that the more we bring in and the quicker we do it, the sooner there will be the “smell of victory,” the sooner will the war be over and the fewer will be the casualties. Is this worth what it will cost in further dislocating the lives of Americans? Could they be made to understand that something is being asked of them now so as to avoid much great sufferings later? B. Pacification 23. At Mission Council meeting on last Monday, 4 MACV presented their proposal for a revised role for the Army of Viet-Nam (ARVN) as regards pacification, as follows: A. The war in South Viet-Nam is a political struggle with violent military and terroristic (criminal) overtones. We must thus succeed in both the conventional military and unconventional terroristic areas. If we are not equally successful in both, Hanoi will find some way to slide back to so-called “Phase 1” activities, consisting primarily of clandestine, guerrilla-type actions. (And Westmoreland recognizes that one effective guerrilla is worth two main force Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army soldiers.) B. In the past, says MACV, ARVN has been so hard-pressed by Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units that it has had no choice but to concentrate on major offensive and defensive operations against these forces, leaving regional and popular forces with primary responsibility for providing local security in hamlets and villages. The latter have not been adequate to this mission. Now the buildup in U.S. and free world military forces makes it feasible to release a major part of ARVN from its former primary task of search and destroy operations and direct its main attention to pacification. C. Thus, behind the security screen provided by U.S. tactical units (plus some elite Vietnamese Army units), who will take care of the enemyʼs regular, hard-core forces, the main task of the Vietnamese Army, along with regional and popular forces, political action teams, police and police field forces will be to support district and village chiefs in establishing and maintaining law and order in villages and hamlets. D. Greater stress will be placed on ARVN small units operating at night, on continuity of operations and on more prompt and thorough exploitation of local intelligence. E. For ARVN to be successful in these activities, there must be a new attitude among ARVN personnel towards the farmers, and ARVN commanders engaged in pacification will be evaluated to a large extent on their success in effecting this change. ( Comment: Lansdale points out that the turning point in the Philippinesʼ campaign against the Huks came when the Filipino soldier began treating the peasant as his brother. End comment .) F. No major changes in ARVNʼs organization in order to handle pacification is now envisaged. At least 50 percent of ARVNʼs strength in the I, II and III Corps areas will be diverted to this mission; in IV Corps, where U.S. forces will be much more limited in number, about 25 percent of the ARVN tactical units will be focused on pacification. In many instances, depending on the local situation, ARVN pacification forces will be placed under the direct control of the province chief. 24. General Westmoreland and his staff are working closely with the ARVN high command to develop a campaign plan for 1967 which will reflect and carry out this scheme. 25. This new concept of ARVN support of pacification operations will mean that U.S. tactical forces will be carrying the main burden of search and destroy operations against Viet Cong main force and North Vietnamese Army units, while ARVN will be concentrating on pacification. This will probably mean that U.S. military casualties will constitute a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties, although some elite ARVN units will participate with U.S. units in operations against main force units so that there will always be a Vietnamese presence. 26. But it will be important when announcing casualties in the future that the Vietnamese civilian casualties inflicted by the Viet Cong be announced concurrently with the Vietnamese and American military casualties. The Communists make no distinction between military and civilians and it seems ritualistic for us to adopt the World War II style of always announcing military casualties separately. It is disadvantageous to our best interests and, at the same time, it is not an honest reflection of the true situation. As I have said, we are working to set up a reporting system throughout the country on Vietnamese civilian casualties. 27. If, in the future, there should be criticism because U.S. military casualties are a higher proportion of total friendly military casualties than they have been, the answer is that the purpose of our military sacrifices and military successes is to create the opportunity to do the pacification job without which the war cannot be successfully completed. If we do not definitively end terrorism, this whole tragic business can start all over again. In pacification the overwhelming bulk of the casualties are borne by Vietnamese. C. Casualties, military and civilian 28. For the first time in thirteen weeks the total of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army dead dropped below one thousand—to 649 for the week. Overall friendly military losses for the week as follows 189 killed in action (including 59 U.S.) 605 wounded in action (including 229 U.S.) 60 missing in action (including 6 U.S.) 29. The July figures for local officials killed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong are still incomplete. So far all of the four corps have reported in except for II Corps. The total to date is 33. Depending upon what II Corps reports, this could represent the lowest figure in the last eighteen months. 30. Totals for GVN officials killed or kidnapped for the first seven months of 1966, as compared with the same month for 1965, are as follows: 1965 1966 January 258 76 February 68 91 March 119 59 April 120 52 May 112 78 June 214 64 July 73 33 Plus 31. As you see, generally speaking, the figures are lower in 1966 than they were in 1965. This may be because Viet Cong guerrillas were busy with military operations or that friendly defense against terrorism has been improving or a combination of both. It is hard to tell. Also, there is no reason to believe that the 1966 figures cannot be increased whenever the Viet Cong decide they want to do it. One thing is clear: this is a time tested traditional Viet Cong weapon. It is this—and not popularity—which brought them into existence at a time when there were no constabulary forces to cope with terrorism and it is their way to get started again if everything else they attempt has failed—as it looks as though it might. 32. I apologize because my civilian casualty figures are by the month and do not match up with the military casualty figures, which are by the week. I also apologize because we still have not got overall civilian casualty figures which are an integral part of the casualty picture. As soon as we have adequate figures for civilian casualties on a monthly basis, I will examine the possibility of providing them week by week, as I do the military figures. D. Elections 33. The Central Election Review Council has recently met in Saigon to examine the cases of candidates who had either been disqualified on the basis of provincial screening or had been challenged by their opponents. Of the forty-two cases reviewed, twenty-three were reinstated. This review process was carried on beneath the gaze of the local press and the interested parties and even those who were adversely affected by the councilʼs decision have admitted that the hearing was fair and free of pressure from the central government. 34. Election lists have now been posted in all cities, provincial capitals, district towns, and villages giving the names of qualified voters in each area. Purpose of the posting was to permit citizens to see if their names were inscribed. Anyone finding his name omitted could petition for its inclusion. I have no country-wide results as yet concerning how many people checked the lists, found their names omitted and complained. However, as a spot check, over 5,000 people had already registered in Saigon last week after finding their names not included in the lists. Many of these were undoubtedly refugees who had moved to the city within the last year. This statistic provides some measure of popular interest in these elections. 35. The campaign itself will not begin until August 26. Until then candidates are proscribed from engaging in campaign activities so that everyone will have an equal chance during the fortnight the campaign officially runs. Nevertheless, some of the more sophisticated candidates are already engaged in the campaign here in Saigon through their friends, the columns of the daily newspapers, and in other ways. 36. I am cautioning Americans here and Vietnamese against making any very optimistic claims about the September 11 elections. I have told them to say in response to questions that, to hold elections in war time is very ambitious, particularly for a country with no experience with democracy; that even the British never had elections in World War II; that the Viet Cong are going all out to intimidate; 5 and that the GVN will do very well if between 35 percent and 40 percent of the qualified voters vote. 37. As you know, I confidentially think it is going to be quite good. But if we make extravagant claims now, we will get no credit, whereas, if the public expects 35 percent and gets 70 percent, it will look like a miracle. I think this could be most important. 38. I am looking around for things to do which will put the people in a good humor as far as the government is concerned during the first ten days of September. The general supply office is helping: through the sale of rice from the backs of trucks in low income areas, the transportation and sale of pork, and the importation of motorbikes. Frozen pork carcasses will be arriving from Europe by September 1 and will be released on the market in Saigon at the rate of 50 tons a day, which is about 30 percent of the daily Saigon requirement. E. Psychological 39. For the first time awareness of the elections—in urban areas—has become more general than complaints about prices, according to the JUSPAO weekly “evaluation of attitudes.” They get reports throughout most of the country that “rising costs seem to have leveled and have stopped rising, and there is relief that inflation has apparently halted.” 40. JUSPAO also reports that the governmentʼs publicity efforts are resulting in more people knowing about the elections, and that elections are being talked about, although sometimes cynically. The Viet Cong are increasing their effort to disrupt the elections, particularly in IV Corps, and elements of Buddhism are opposing or boycotting. 41. There is more ground fire against planes dropping leaflets indicating increasing concern by Viet Cong commanders over the psychological effects. 42. Other notes are: the Mayor of Danang is making an excellent impression on the public and is meeting with many groups to explain the governmentʼs program, and to invite them to make known their complaints. In IV Corps the flow of farmers from outlying villages into more secure hamlets is increasing due to heavier Viet Cong taxation and artillery barrages. A Viet Cong propaganda officer reported stubborn resistance by peasants to the Viet Cong draft, saying that the peasants cried out: “If you want a revolution, fine, but donʼt make us and our sons fight it for you.” Also morale went up in Kien Toung where a military operation uncovered another sizable cache of foodstuff and equipment. 43. Evidence was uncovered in Chuong Thien that a large Viet Cong campaign was in the making to obstruct the voters from reaching the polls and to confiscate their identification cards which are the equivalent of registration in the U.S. F. Economic 44. The economic picture has brightened—a tribute to you and your associates for your long, hard efforts and to the GVN for following our advice. It is all set forth in Saigon 3055 6 which also includes news on Chieu Hoi and the port and which I will not repeat. 45. Some months ago, Prime Minister Ky asked me for help in setting up a GVN PX/commissary system for Vietnamese military and civil servants—people with fixed incomes whose purchasing power has diminished as prices rose. As a result of our reaction to this request USAID and MACV have been working actively with the GVN general supply office under the Ministry of National Economy to develop a series of PX/commissary outlets for civil service and military use. The layout of the first proposed outlet in Saigon for the sale of vegetables, meats and staple items has been forwarded to the U.S. military subsistence center in Chicago for technical review and the site for this first service center in downtown Saigon has been selected. Certain refrigeration items have been identified in U.S. excess property lists and are being held in place for use in this center. In addition, a U.S. military specialist in commissary and PX systems is being assigned to assist the GVN run their system. G. Visitors 46. Chester Bowles is here and is favorably impressed with our entire operation. He attended a Mission Council meeting and remarked on General Westmorelandʼs remarkable sensitivity to political factors and his breadth of view. Bowles believes this struggle is of both historical and world-wide importance and is the kind of thing that happens once in 200 years. If, he says, we succeed (and he is confident that we will) it will be the beginning of the end for world Communism and will be a date in Communist history comparable to 1917 when Communist government was born in Russia. He was much impressed by the way American soldiers understand and carry out in practice the truth that, in this war, unlike World War II, we must win the war and build the peace at the same time. He has seen them doing it. He believes also that victory here will change America, in that so many young Americans have seen at first hand the importance of economic and social development going hand in hand with security against violence. 47. Another visitor was Gough Whitlam, deputy leader of the opposition in the Australian Parliament. I had a fine visit with him. I sense that he does not think his party will elect the Prime Minister at their forthcoming elections. I also sense that he is favorably impressed with the effort here, and I would be surprised indeed to hear him attack what Americans and Australians are doing in Viet-Nam. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:34 a.m. and passed to the White House. In telegram 27780, August 13, Komer told Lodge that the President was “greatly heartened” by his latest weekly report, particularly by the plans to “shift much of ARVN into a stepped up pacification campaign.” In addition, the President hoped that the “civil side effort in the countryside” could be stepped up “in similar fashion” and also that, given the importance of a good election turnout, Lodge would “quietly keep pushing the GVN to get out the vote.” (Ibid.) 2 Document 202 . 3 Not further identified. 4 August 8. 5 In its Field Information Report, [ document number not declassified ], August 8, the CIA Station in Saigon reported that “from all evidence the Viet Cong/VC/ intend to make an all-out effort to disrupt the government of Vietnam/GVN/ elections.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 85–00392R, 137–9–23, Government Activities in SVN, 1 Aug 66 thru 31 Dec 66) 6 Dated August 9, not found. 209. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 209. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger) 1 Washington, August 11, 1966. SUBJECT Possible Sequence of Actions Toward a Settlement in South Viet-Nam I find the paper of August tenth on the possible sequence of actions toward a settlement in South Viet-Nam 2 excellent and most useful. I would like to suggest that I doubt that Hanoi will ever agree to negotiations until the Viet Cong are in favor of a settlement. If the VC should decide they have had enough, it seems to me that there might be great advantage in negotiating with them through the GVN rather than with Hanoi if this can be arranged. I do not believe that we can get away with trading a cessation of bombing against a cessation of infiltration, and believe it would be unwise to put such a position forward even as an initial bargaining position because of the damage we would suffer in a retreat from such a position. I believe that we would have to agree to trade a cessation of reinforcements for a cessation of infiltration and agree that so long as the provisions of such an agreement were observed we would not bomb North Viet-Nam. I do not believe that this is as unfavorable a bargain as it might seem at first glance. In the first place, we could prepare for such an agreement by stepping up the numbers of our troops in South Viet-Nam and there is, in any event, a question as to what the optimum number should be. Casualty ratios are running so much in our favor that even allowing for the fact that a high proportion are Viet Cong and not North Viet-Namese, a continuation of hostilities in the South might well be in our favor without significant reinforcements from either side. More important, such an agreement would presumably only come about if we were on the verge of serious negotiation, if not a real settlement. In these circumstances, I should think we would, for a considerable period of time, not want to send reinforcements even to replace casualties. If negotiations broke down, or if the agreement should be significantly violated by the other side, we could always call the whole deal off. I should think that in the event of such an agreement, large numbers of VC would rally to GVN in the light of the amnesty that presumably would be declared. This alone should mean that we would have no need for reinforcements. I quite agree that we would have to be free to bring in materiel and supplies. I must say I doubt very much that the North Viet-Namese will ever admit that they have sent in regular units and this is why I believe that our negotiations should be with the NLF or VC. The NLF would be representing Hanoi rather than the other way around, and if agreement were reached, I should think the withdrawal of the North Viet-Namese regular units would follow automatically. There are several positions in the paper which I do not believe could be sustained unless we have a greater victory than now seems likely. Among these are those on page 12. The first suggestion is that North Viet-Namese elements would have to be withdrawn before our withdrawal in stages. The second is that those southerners who went north for training and were reintroduced would also have to be withdrawn to the north. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. Copies were sent to Harriman, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor. 2 Drafted by William Bundy, the 28-page paper was sent by Unger for comment to Harriman, Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, Rostow, McNaughton, and Taylor on August 10. (Ibid.) In an August 13 memorandum to Unger, Taylor took issue with a number of points, calling the exchange of a cessation of bombing for a cessation of infiltration “bad business.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 72, B/Negotiations and Related Matters) Bundy sent Lodge a copy of his paper, together with Thompsonʼs and Taylorʼs comments, under cover of a letter, August 19, in which he noted that his paper concluded “that we should explore exactly the same kind of ‘three track’ approach” that had been under discussion for a while but that its “discussion of other issues is somewhat more full and blunt than in any other paper we have ever produced on this subject.” (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 210. Editorial Note 210. Editorial Note On August 13, 1966, General Westmoreland flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas to meet with President Johnson, arriving at 6:24 p.m. He stayed overnight and departed for Honolulu at midday on August 14. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) W. Thomas Johnson of the White House staff took informal notes of Westmorelandʼs meeting with the President on August 13, which are ibid., Tom Johnsonʼs Notes of Meetings. On August 14, the President made a statement to news correspondents about his meeting with Westmoreland, and Westmoreland also held a news conference. Transcripts of both are printed in Department of State Bulletin , September 5, 1966, pages 335–338. In a telegram to General Wheeler reporting on the visit, HWA 2419, August 16, General Westmoreland stated that the “only significant exchange” with the President “involved the possibility of another stand down of the air campaign in North Vietnam.” Westmoreland urged that President Johnson “not consider any cessation of the full bombing program to the north,” emphasizing that “as a minimum” the air interdiction campaign of lines of communications in the southern part of the panhandle of North Vietnam south of Vinh was “militarily essential to the battle in the south.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, #8 History File) In JCS telegram 5039–66 to General Westmoreland, August 24, General Wheeler reported that the President had talked with Secretary McNamara that morning about Westmorelandʼs visit to the Ranch, stating that he appreciated better the problems confronting Westmoreland and his efforts to solve them, but there was one area in which he wanted “new and further action”: the “scale-down” of American personnel and facilities in Saigon. (Ibid., COMUSMACV Message Files) 211. Memorandum of Conversation 211. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 17, 1966. SUBJECT Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Vu Van Thai, Vietnamese Ambassador Ambassador W. Averell Harriman—S/AH Mr. Leonard Unger—FE 1. Ambassador Vu Van Thai called on Ambassador Harriman following Ambassador Harrimanʼs having undertaken at the Presidentʼs request a “peace mission” on Viet-Nam. Their conversation, which lasted almost two hours, was quite full and frank and ranged over many aspects of US-Vietnamese relations as well as the situation inside South Viet-Nam. There are recorded below the more significant points which emerged from the conversation and which have not been recorded elsewhere. 2. Ambassador Thai agreed with Ambassador Harriman on the importance of a good turnout at the September 11 elections for a constituent assembly. He expected the Viet Cong to be trying in a few instances to infiltrate candidates sympathetic to their cause and, behind the scenes, to drum up votes for them. Of more significance he felt would be the Viet Cong efforts to discredit and interfere with the elections by various means including terror. He pointed out, however, that an election situation was different from a VC terror campaign aimed at one or several objectives and that the Viet Cong resources were probably insufficient to permit them to be effective all over the country at once. 3. The Governor turned to the question of Chieu Hoi and encouraging defections from the Viet Cong and splits in VC/NLF ranks. He emphasized the importance of the treatment of Chieu Hoi, as well as the treatment of prisoners in general and asked Ambassador Thai for his thoughts about what might be done to encourage defections, particularly of important figures like Nguyen Huu Tho. Thai reviewed his own acquaintance with Tho dating back to about 1954 when the latter was active although not an important figure in a peace movement. He mentioned Thoʼs imprisonment along with the present Finance Minister, Thanh, and of the efforts he, Thai, had made with Prime Minister Diem to secure their release or at least good treatment of them. Thai said that Tho was not a strong figure and was used by the VC/NLF primarily as a figurehead, someone who is pliable. He believes that the Viet Cong and the fighters and doers are separated from the NLF who play the role of spokesmen and he considers the latter not a fundamentally significant group. He expressed doubt as to how much would be achieved even if some of these front individuals should defect from the VC/NLF. While Thai recognized that important defections would have great significance internationally, he did not feel persuaded it would have real impact on either the Viet Cong or on the population of South Viet-Nam. The only effective action would be if some of the core Communist group could be influenced—here the personalities are not too well known to us. In answer to the Governorʼs question he agreed that Phat is perhaps a more important person and seemed dubious about the chances of his defecting. 4. With regard to North Viet-Nam Thai referred to the basic division between the Le Duan and Giap groups and he reminded the Governor of Le Duanʼs adamant opposition to compromise even as far back as when he opposed Ho Chi Minhʼs accepting the Geneva Accords of 1954. After some discussion of the relation of the Chinese-Russian split to North Vietnamese positions, Ambassador Thai stated that a fundamental difficulty for North Viet-Nam was that today it could not come to the conference table or in some other fashion bring the war to an end without ending up by being unacceptably dependent on the U.S. and its close friends in the Southeast Asian region. To bring the fighting to an end means a cooling off of relations with Communist China; since Chinese Communist prestige is so much at stake in the Viet-Nam war it is unlikely to acquiesce in North Viet-Namʼs bringing the war to an end. If it cuts its ties in that direction, North Viet-Nam has no alternative but to face a knuckling under to the United States since the Russians are not at present a force of any significance in the region. Thai thought that perhaps an environment could be created in Southeast Asia which would appear to the North Vietnamese to be some alternative to an exclusively U.S.-run show. He was thinking of some association of aligned and non-aligned countries, particularly in the economic field, in which the Japanese and French and others might also play some role. An important incentive to North Viet-Nam would also be concessions by South Viet-Nam on the matter of food supply, a field in which China can offer no effective competition. To illustrate the importance of this point, Thai referred to the situation in 1959 when the North Vietnamese dropped their five-year plan. He said this resulted from their having discovered, from a recent census, that their population was growing at 3% per annum as opposed to the previously understood 2 or 2–1/2% and this made them realize that without the possibility of securing food from abroad they could not proceed with the plan. At this time Vu Van Thai said he pled with President Diem to open trade but to no avail. 5. This led Thai into a discussion of his belief in the importance of stimulating economic development in South Viet-Nam and in the Southeast Asian region as a means of persuading Viet Cong sympathizers in the south of the wisdom of coming back to the Governmentʼs side and to demonstrate to North Viet-Nam the value of turning to cooperation within the region. Thai felt that within five years economic activity and output could be 200% of its present level and this might even be achieved sooner if cooperation within the area grows. He talked about the Mekong project and his favorite theme of a regional university and of selected industries in each of the four Mekong countries. He noted that both from the point of view of power requirements and food requirements North Viet-Nam was even more interested than South Viet-Nam in the Mekong. Governor Harriman pointed out that the five years which the Ambassador had mentioned might be an impractical period to wait in view of the dangers among other things of escalation. 6. The discussion then turned to the internal situation in South Viet-Nam and Ambassador Thaiʼs conviction that effective and clean administration, particularly on the part of the district and province chiefs, could do more than anything else to weaken the VC and increase the attractiveness of the Government side. He felt the quality of district officers was continuing to decline at present and attributed this, in answer to Governor Harrimanʼs question, to the fact that the military have taken over so many of these posts. He recognized that some of the military were quite competent but expressed concern particularly about growing corruption. This grows inevitably, according to Thai, as the scale and scope of the war grows and the opportunities for getting hold of large sums of money are expanded. He said the military are not trained, as were the civil servants formerly in charge, in a respect for laws and regulations and they are prone to taking arbitrary action. He referred back to the technically efficient administration under President Diem which, however, had its drawbacks also because of its arrogant style and preoccupation with building the record for Diem. Thai said that the civilians formerly in the Civil Service are many of them now working for American contractors or for the U.S. Government and others who are still civil servants have lost much of their earlier zeal. 7. In answer to Governor Harrimanʼs question the Ambassador said that the ten new civilian members of the Directorate were weak personalities and not likely to have much influence on decisions. He felt that the Constituent Assembly will have stronger figures elected and that even though the Assembly does not have legislative powers it nevertheless will serve as something of a deterrent to arbitrary action by the GVN. Returning to the matter of a government with more appeal for the people, Thai regretted the split that developed between Generals Ky and Thi. He identified them both as honest men who have some grasp of the aspirations of the people. He was hesitant to answer the Governorʼs question about General Thieu and only said that the latter played a “moderating” role. 8. The conversation turned once more to the question of how to end the war and whether the South Vietnamese could not find a way to work this out between themselves. Could not the Government, once the VC have accepted the fact that they are bound to lose, either bring them over to its side or divide them so that they no longer have any effective power? Ambassador Thai kept returning to his conviction that the key is in Hanoi and that Russian-Chinese relations are crucial in Hanoiʼs decision. He also referred to the bombing of North Viet-Nam and urged a pattern which would make the North more dependent on the Soviet Union. The Ambassador emphasized that the mining of Haiphong could increase the Chinese role. With regard to bombing, he advocated an irregular program with various starts and stops. This would serve to confuse but also bring North Vietnamese energies to bear on reconstruction with the threat of repeated destruction if they do not finally come to terms. 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. Drafted by Unger. 212. Memorandum of Meeting of the Negotiations Committee 212. Memorandum of Meeting of the Negotiations Committee 1 Washington, August 18, 1966, 4:30 p.m. PARTICIPANTS W. Averell Harriman U. Alexis Johnson William Bundy Leonard Unger Benjamin Read SUBJECT Vietnam 1. Memorandum to President and Secretary The Governorʼs memorandum for the President and the Secretary 2 was read and approved by the Group. 2. Ambassador Thaiʼs Conversation The Governor noted that he and Ambassador Unger had talked at length with Vietnamese Ambassador Thai on August 17 and that Thai had made a number of interesting observations about the situation in Vietnam. 3 Ambassador Unger observed that the Governor had tried to draw Thai out on the subject of contacts with the NLF-VC. Thai, however, had not committed himself on the desirability of such contacts. Instead he had turned the conversation toward the subject of talks with Hanoi. Mr. Bundy commented that Thai might be reluctant to reveal his true feelings in a formal conversation with Departmental officials. Ambassador Unger agreed that this might be so, but said that Thai had been extremely candid about other subjects including GVN personalities. 3. Corruption Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Lodgeʼs talk with Ky about corruption. In this conversation Ky indicated that he was aware that Generals Co and Quang were deeply implicated. Lodge had asked for guidance from the Department on what to tell Ky. Mr. Bundy said that his inclination was to tell Lodge that if Ky was confident that he could get rid of these officers smoothly and efficiently without bringing down the government, he should do so. Ambassador Johnson observed that the IV Corps situation was a mess and that action to clean it up was overdue. He pointed out that if Co and Quang were to be removed, the timing had to be just right. Ambassador Unger thought we should ascertain whether Co and Quang had significant support in the army. The Group generally agreed that both officers should be purged if the operation could be accomplished efficiently after the September 11 elections. Mr. Bundy commented that it was encouraging to see that Ky was doing some soul-searching on the problem of corruption. 4. U Thant in Moscow Governor Harriman raised the subject of U Thantʼs special talks in Moscow. He said that Arthur Goldberg wants the Department to develop questions that the SYG could put to Ho. These might include an effort to interpret Hanoiʼs 4 Points in a way that would be acceptable to us. Governor Harriman noted that Chester Cooper was preparing an analysis of the 4 Points along these lines. It was agreed that U Thant did not expect anything from us immediately to convey to Ho. 5. NLF Rep in Algiers Governor Harriman referred to the information which the SYG had given Arthur Goldberg about the new NLF representative in Algiers. The SYG understood that the new rep was a senior Lao Dong official and had suggested that we try to contact him through a non-American intermediary. The Governor said that he had approved a telegram 4 asking our Embassy to provide us with the best information it could obtain on the NLF rep and to suggest the names of non-American newsmen presently in Algiers who might be good intermediaries. Ambassador Unger said that information available in Washington did not indicate that the NLF rep was a significant Lao Dong official. The Governor thought it would be useful to supplement this information through CIA sources abroad. Ambassador Unger said that he would have CIA check their sources in Saigon [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and elsewhere to see if other significant information was available. 6. POWs Governor Harriman noted that the objectives which we hoped to achieve by encouraging direct contacts with the NLF-VC included increased defections and divisions in the ranks of the NLF-VC. His memorandum to the President and the Secretary spoke of the possibility of a proposal by the GVN for a general amnesty by early October. The Governor said that our ability to achieve these objectives would be impaired if we did not take immediate and effective steps to improve treatment of POWs in the South and to put more steam into the Chieu Hoi program. He recalled that General Johnson had made some encouraging remarks about improvements being made in the Chieu Hoi program. The POW question was difficult and complicated. The Governor wondered whether our military in Vietnam were sufficiently well indoctrinated on treatment of POWs. Ambassador Johnson said that the handling of POWs was always a problem but that he thought that General Westmoreland was keenly aware of the importance of handling it correctly. He observed that in Korea we had to offer a bounty to our forces to guarantee a flow of captives for intelligence purposes. Governor Harriman said that he understood that the critical period for prisoners in Vietnam was between the time they were captured at the front and the time they were delivered to a place of detention. Ambassador Unger said that Frank Sieverts was working on a series of recommendations which would help assure the security of POWs while being transported to detention areas. 7. Kissingerʼs Impressions Mr. Bundy said that Henry Kissinger had formed a number of interesting opinions about GVN contacts with the NLF-VC, some of which had not been reported when he was in Saigon. Kissinger had found Thieu and Vien negative about the value of such contacts. Tran Van Do had been less rigid and had told Kissinger that contacts between GVN officials in Paris and resident Vietnamese “neutralists” had been undertaken at Doʼs initiative. Mr. Bundy said that Dan Davidson was putting together a memorandum on Kissingerʼs views. 8. DeGaulleʼs Trip The group briefly discussed the pros and cons of communicating our views on Vietnam and Cambodia to the French prior to DeGaulleʼs trip. It was agreed that a message from Secretary Rusk to Couve would be preferable to a message from the President to DeGaulle. Mr. Bundy said that he would prepare a draft for the Groupʼs consideration. 9. 3-Track Paper on Negotiations Mr. Bundy said that he had discussed the 3-track paper 5 with Kissinger. He thought it would be useful to supply a copy to Lodge and to Arthur Goldberg before his proposed trip to Eastern Europe. Mr. Bundy thought that the paper was useful in setting down the fundamental elements of our thinking about the problems and possibilities of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Governor Harriman said that he wanted to re-read the paper and would let Mr. Bundy know his views about it. Note: Ambassador Goldberg is on leave in Virginia for a week. No definite date has been set for his trip to Eastern Europe. 10. Sainteny Mr. Bundy referred to the proposal that Henry Kissinger see Sainteny in Paris on or about September 9. He though Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and that there were two subjects in particular that we would like to see explored: (a) could Sainteny obtain clarification of Pham Van Dongʼs reported indication in an earlier conversation with Sainteny that Hanoi might be willing to stop infiltration into the South if we stopped bombing the North? (b) could Sainteny find out what Hanoi has in mind for a political settlement in the South? Governor Harriman agreed that Kissinger was the right man to talk to Sainteny and said it would be useful for him to determine what Sainteny thought we should be saying to Hanoi. 11. Tokyo Contact Mr. Bundy said that [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] had received information from a Japanese businessman to the effect that the President of a Japanese news agency who is an ex-communist had offered to set up a contact with DRV representatives and had claimed that Hanoi would be willing to have discussions with us which were not confined to or conditioned on Hanoiʼs 4 Points. Mr. Bundy said that he was telling Bill Colby to go ahead and see what the self-proclaimed intermediary could accomplish. If he could arrange for unconditional talks we would be there. 12. Thanat Proposals Governor Harriman asked whether there was anything further that we could do at this time on the Thanat proposals. He observed that even if the Thanat initiative did not produce a conference it was an extremely valuable example of Asian initiative. Mr. Read commented that Chuck Percy is claiming credit for Thanatʼs proposal and Senator Douglas would appreciate anything that could be done to show that Thanat was not a registered Republican. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. The meeting was held in Harrimanʼs office. 2 Document 213 . 3 See Document 211 . 4 Not further identified. 5 For information on the paper, see footnote 2, Document 209 . 213. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 213. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 18, 1966. As a result of previous consideration, and particularly Henry Kissingerʼs talks in Vietnam, we have begun to take several steps looking toward possible eventual reconciliation between substantial elements of the Viet Cong and the GVN. There are three areas of activity: 2 1) Efforts to increase defection, including the higher echelons; 2) Consideration of ways and means to create divisions within the NLF or VC; 3) Development of conditions which might eventually lead to negotiations between the GVN and NLF. Ambassador Lodge is on board but he points out, and we agree, that it will take some time to get full understanding and cooperation from General Ky and his colleagues. In the meantime the Chieu Hoi program will be emphasized and steps undertaken to bring about the defection of important individuals. It is our hope that after the elections, perhaps by early October, conditions will be ripe for a proposal by the GVN for a general amnesty with full social, economic and political status for those who come over. Our targets are the noncommunist VC. There is not much hope of influencing the hard core communists who are part of Ho Chi Minhʼs party apparatus. One interesting feature is that the Rand interrogation reports indicate little communist indoctrination among the VC rank and file. The propaganda emphasizes three themes—land, peace and a better life. These and other reports indicate that efforts along the lines undertaken will be useful even though it may take some time before their full impact is felt. There are a number of leads to Hanoi which we are investigating in detail, but none so far can be considered as a hot trail. W. Averell Harriman 3 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 8/8/66. Secret. 2 In a 6-page memorandum to Harriman entitled “The NLF and Where We Go From Here,” August 31, Cooper discussed a number of ideas for advancing activity in all three areas. (Ibid., Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968) 3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, August 19, 1966, 6:54 p.m. 31851. Personal for Lodge from Secretary. I am encouraged by information developed through Thrush 2 traffic. I am sure that it will occur to you that if we get through a good South Vietnamese election and operation Thrush comes to a successful conclusion before too long, the combined impact of both in the forthcoming General Assembly could be very constructive indeed. Even more importantly, such an event just might jar some of those on the other side to begin to think about a peaceful settlement. We will all keep our fingers crossed. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Secret; Nodis; Thrush. Drafted and approved by Rusk. 2 See footnote 4, Document 204 . 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 215. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 22, 1966. SUBJECT Ky and Lodge Discuss Corruption in Vietnam Prime Minister Ky in a long discussion with Ambassador Lodge 2 laid on the table the great problem he was having with two senior officers, Generals Co and Quang. Both senior and young officers were asking that the two generals be removed from office because of the corrupt conditions which existed in the areas that they control. Ky said that General Quang opposed the sending of U.S. troops to the IV Corps area because they would interfere with his corrupt practices. Ambassador Lodge replied that his raising the matter of corruption was indeed a coincidence. Earlier in the day he had decided not to raise this subject with General Ky because he did not want to urge on Ky a step which might precipitate a coup. Ky said that the people of Vietnam want to get rid of corruption and so did he, but that the generals he would have to act against would seek support from others to prevent him from removing them. He had decided not to do anything before the September 11 elections but to think very hard about it immediately thereafter. Ambassador Lodge replied that men in positions of high responsibility led pretty bleak lives in all countries, but that in this country he had the added problem of leading it out of the middle ages into constitutional democracy, and there were still some people like Co and Quang desperately fighting a rear guard action and it was bound to be very unpleasant. Ambassador Lodge believes that the decision to do nothing about corruption until after the election is wise. There is no doubt in his mind that there is widespread disgust with corruption and that it shakes confidence in the government and in the integrity of the elections. He believes that reports of corruption will get into the U.S. press, particularly in connection with the sale of U.S. supplies to the Viet Cong. He is convinced that the problem will have to be dealt with at some time or other but that it ought to be done quickly and surgically. Secretary Rusk replied 3 to Ambassador Lodgeʼs request for advice by saying that the Ambassador was quite right in warning about the dangers of precipitating a coup and thus risking the undoing of forward steps in the political and economic field so laboriously brought about over the past year. He added that the unity of the military is an indispensable factor in maintaining sufficient stability and continuity in the government of Vietnam to permit it to carry on its military fight as well as essential political and economic actions. He recognized that the problem of corruption is a fundamental stumbling block in the way of constructing a government in South Vietnam which could defeat the Viet Cong in the political realm. Secretary Rusk agreed that Generals Co and Quang should go when this can be managed without endangering government continuity. He believes that the sooner this can be accomplished the better but doubts that it can be carried off before elections. He asked the Ambassador to assess the line up of military leadership in the Co-Quang issue. Ambassador Lodge replied 4 that the first thing that must be done is to gather all the facts on Co and Quang. They would be confronted and asked to go abroad quietly and if they refused they would be forced to leave. The military directorate would have to be lined up by Ky prior to any such action. The embassy is assembling in detail how it thinks the military leadership would react to a confrontation with Co and Quang. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Sensitive. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Lodge reported on the discussion in telegram 3842, August 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 Rusk replied in telegram 32309, August 20. (Ibid.) 4 Lodge replied in telegram 4107, August 22. (Ibid.) 216. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 216. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, August 24, 1966. JCSM–538–66 SUBJECT A program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (U) 1. (U) In March 1966, the Army staff promulgated a study entitled, “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (short title: PROVN). You will recall that, on 13 June 1966, members of the Army staff briefed you on PROVN. A copy of the study is attached. 2 2. (C) At the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army referred PROVN to them for their consideration as to its utility in the conduct of our effort in Vietnam and as to what disposition should be made of the study. 3. (S) As might be expected, a study of this depth and scope has its controversial aspects. PROVN was forwarded to the Services, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV for comment and each of them took exception to certain of the proposals therein. The Joint Chiefs do not endorse PROVN in its entirety, particularly in regard to those proposals which would in effect: downgrade the role of the Government of Vietnam in the conduct of the war effort; involve the United States too directly in influencing the South Vietnamese governmental structures at all levels, including the local level; and result in a major revision of current channels of command from Washington to Saigon. Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs consider that PROVN, when viewed as a whole: a. Presents a conceptual approach to matters of major concern in the US effort in Vietnam. b. Provides a comprehensive digest of critical factors influencing the internal situation in South Vietnam. c. Provides background material for use in developing future concepts, policies, and actions to improve the US effort in Vietnam. 4. (C) While neither unanimity nor consensus has been reached on PROVN, it is believed that no good purpose would be served by presenting an expurgated version. Moreover, any effort to accommodate all interests by deleting passages would emasculate PROVN and detract from its effectiveness. 5. (S) In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Have requested that the Chief of Staff, US Army, distribute PROVN on a need-to-know basis to interested Department of Defense agencies. b. Recommend that you authorize the Chief of Staff, US Army, to distribute PROVN on a need-to-know basis to appropriate US agencies/activities outside the Department of Defense to include those listed below. Such distribution would be accomplished with a proviso to the effect that PROVN does not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (1) National Security Council. (2) Senior Interdepartmental Group. (3) Vietnam Interagency Committee. (4) Interdepartmental Regional Group, Far East. (5) Special Assistant to the President for Nonmilitary Programs Relating to Vietnam. 3 (6) Appropriate offices both in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. (7) Central Intelligence Agency. (8) US Information Agency. (9) US Embassy, Saigon. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Attachment Washington, March 1996. PROVN SUMMARY STATEMENT The situation in South Vietnam (SVN) has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to ensure eventual success. “Victory” can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the most important specific actions required now: Concentrate US operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over US operations to the senior US Representative at the provincial level. Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US–GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN influence. Authorize more direct US involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adequate to ensure the accomplishment of critical programs. Delegate to the US Ambassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all US activities, resources and personnel in-country. Direct the Ambassador to develop a single, integrated plan for achieved US objectives in SVN. Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of the ultimate US objective as stated in NSAM 288: 4 A free and independent, non-communist South Vietnam. The task of the enemy is much easier. He is opposing a “government” that cannot validly claim the active loyalty of a majority—even a significant minority—of the people. The US and the GVN, on the other hand, are dealing essentially from a point of weakness. Building upon the foundations of an ineffectual government, we must develop and “deliver” a positive program that assists the GVN to create an attractive environment so that a firm commitment of the individual to his nation will take root and grow. The VC do not have to deliver until they win. We have to deliver in order to win. The strategic implications of failure necessitate total resolve and effort. The Strategic Importance of South Vietnam The future role and accompanying strategy of the US in Asia, especially regarding the security of Southeast Asia, critically depends on the outcome of the current conflict in SVN. US foreign policy, through the short range, will have as its central focus the containment of world communism. Communist China today poses the most immediate danger. Targeting on the less-developed nations, the Communist Chinese have adopted the aggressive doctrine of “wars of national liberation” as a vehicle for communist encirclement of the US and Western Europe. Reiterated by Marshal Lin Piao on 2 September 1965, this doctrine is currently being tested in SVN. US strategy in mainland Southeast Asia includes supporting the provisions of the 1962 Geneva agreements in Laos, continuing to strengthen Thailand economically and militarily and restoring peace and security in SVN. In general, US policy calls for the continued development of the individual countries of all Southeast Asia and their increasing regional integration—economically, socially and politically— through the agency of such programs as the Mekong River Development Scheme and the recently established Asian Development Bank. The outcome of US involvement in SVN will determine the future strategy which we as a nation can or will be willing to adopt in Asia. Major Problem Areas Five major obstacles stand out above all others as hindering the achievement of the ultimate US objective in SVN: A Well Led and Adequately Supported Communist Political Military Machine: Long experience, the defeat of the French under the nationalist mantle, a formula attuned to peasant aspirations and sanctuaries continuous to the entire western flank of SVN have provided the Communists a significant advantage. An Inefficient and Largely Ineffective Government, Neither Representative of Nor Responsive to the People: Instability, ineffectual leadership, corruption, over centralization and disdain for the peasantry have compounded the limitations of skills, experience and equipment. The Marginally Effective US Method of Operation: Rapid expansion, lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict, inappropriate response and interagency competition have undermined US efforts to overcome the other four problem areas which fundamentally determine the nature of the conflict in SVN. The Escalating Requirement for Material Resources to Prosecute the War and Meet Consumer Demands: Having an underdeveloped agricultural economy, SVN does not possess the indigenous resources, the communications infrastructure or the skills necessary to sustain the rapidly escalating conflict. The Vietnamese Peasant Outlook: Fatalism and war-weariness have sapped peasant motivation; governmental corruption and inefficiency have caused disillusionment; and deeply ingrained traditional values have retarded social change. US Short-Range Objectives US short-range objectives must be designed and established to provide a base for gaining the initiative in the current struggle and to ensure significant progress toward overcoming the crucial obstacles. The five major short-range objectives should be: The defect of PAVN and Main Force VC units and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political infrastructure among the population. The development of GVN leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building. The establishment of an integrated US civil-military organization and method of operation capable of ensuring execution of US–GVN plans and programs in SVN. The provision of a war-supporting economic infrastructure and initial foundations for economic growth. The development of an allegiance to the GVN among the South Vietnamese people. The Concept of National Operations The situation in SVN is both challenging and unorthodox; it calls for the application of new and imaginative emphases and techniques. The US must devise an effective counter to “wars of national liberation.” The proposed US concept of operations is a broad-front offensive which directs major efforts along three mutually supporting axes—eliminating armed Communists; ensuring the effective performance of the GVN; and conducting an effective combined US–GVN Rural Construction Program. To launch and sustain the momentum of this offensive, four initiatives must be taken now: (1) The deployment of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) to destroy PAVN and Main Force VC units and base areas and to reduce external support below the sustaining level . Rural Construction can progress significantly only in conjunction with the effective neutralization of major enemy forces. The bulk of US–FWMAF and designated ARVN units must be directed against base areas and against lines of communication in SVN, Laos and Cambodia as required; the remainder of these forces must ensure adequate momentum to priority Rural Construction areas. (2) The establishment of Rural Construction as the essential vehicle for extending security to, developing the requisite leadership of and providing the necessary social reform for the Vietnamese people . The war has to be won from the ground up; the people of the countryside are the target. RVNAF must be the main Allied military element supporting Rural Construction, with the US providing material and technical assistance and stimulating social reform as required. Requisite authority and resources must be provided to the province chief. (3) The exercise of more direct US involvement to ensure the attainment of US–GVN objectives . Discriminate US involvement in GVN affairs—ranging from skillful diplomatic pressures, through the application of politico-economic leverage, to US unilateral execution of critical programs—is essential. The GVN has been either unwilling or unable to accomplish successfully many requisite tasks. The eventual creation of a cohesive society in SVN requires, however, that GVN achieve effectiveness and be directly credited with success. The US must exercise its influence to evoke GVN performance. (4) The delegation of command authority from Washington to the district level in SVN and the concentration of delegated authority at each intermediate US organizational level in SVN . The requisite flexibility and responsiveness of day-to-day operations can only be achieved if those closest to the situation are delegated adequate authority and means to influence counterpart action. An Executive Agent in Washington should coordinate support activities in the US; the US Ambassador in SVN, raised to the new post of Single Manager, should exercise unequivocal authority over all in-country US activities, personnel and resources; and a single, senior US representative (SUSREP) should be appointed at each lower echelon to function as the counterpart of his parallel GVN senior official. Maximum authority must be delegated to province. The Single Manager must be authorized an adequate super-agency planning staff and a deputy for Rural Construction and Development (RC&D) who exercises operational control over USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and the Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG) as well as MAP functions (a reduced MACV). US military units in SVN must be under the command of a newly established CINC US Forces Vietnam, coequal with the Director of RC&D. Priorities . US–GVN priorities for action must be established on the interrelated bases of population and natural resource concentrations, the location and nature of the enemy, available Allied resources, current successes and military logistical requirements. The complex interrelation of considerations for establishing priorities and the varying mixtures of limited military, economic and political resources that may be marshaled to achieve any one objective make the determination of priorities extremely difficult. For these same reasons, establishing clear priorities is all the more important. After securing requisite logistical bases, the first priority must be the Delta (current emphasis on An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon). The second priority area comprises the Coastal Lowlands; the third is the Central Highlands. Mid-Range Objectives and Subobjectives Successful achievement of the short-range objectives should allow gradual transition toward mid-range development objectives. These objectives, together with representative subobjectives, are as follows: The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability. Subobjectives would include: elimination of VC infrastructure, use of Allied forces to support completion of the Rural Construction Program and transfer of Regional Force-Popular Force responsibilities to the National Police as the RCP progresses. A government representative of, and responsive to, its people. Subobjectives would include: an efficient governmental and administrative system, increased authority and prestige of province chiefs and the development of responsible and forward-looking political parties. A US organizational presence adequate for assured national security and development. Subobjectives would include: termination of the Executive Agent, return to the country team organizational concept (as the RCP nears completion) and the reduction of the US presence commensurate with increased GVN capability. The amelioration of divisive social factors. Subobjectives would include: maximization of minority group integration into the social fabric, expansion of social reforms and the reintegration of the former VC into the society. A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion. Subobjectives would include: initiation of major land reform, acceleration of Mekong regional development and the development of light industry. Long-Range Objectives: The Ultimate South Vietnam Achievement of US–GVN mid-range objectives will lay the foundation for the long-term development of SVN as a free, independent, non-communist nation. Development should proceed toward a society that enjoys inner social cohesion; a viable government; a diversified, maturing economy; and an adequate security posture. In less than 50 years, SVN should have effectively integrated its significant minority groups into the fabric of its society. The government should be basically democratic with firmly established political institutions capable of withstanding crises and allowing for the legal and peaceful transfer of political power. Economically, SVN should have passed the take-off point to self-sustaining growth. A somewhat smaller, well-equipped and well-trained military establishment, backed by regional and international security guarantees, should be able to ensure national security. Throughout the long-range period, the US presence should be minimal. [Here follows a section on “Measuring Progress.”] 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, 381 Vietnam. Secret. 2 Attached, but only the “PROVN Summary Statement” is printed below. The 900-page report was produced by an Army study group formed in August 1965 at the direction of the Army Chief of Staff. 3 In a September 1 letter to McNamara, Komer stated: “While Iʼm still only a 5-month expert, Iʼve spent this time 100% on Vietnam… . Most of my ideas have been borrowed liberally from the people and studies which impressed me—especially the PROVN Study, the draft Jacobson Task Force report, and Brute Krulak (not Wally Greene).” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, McNamara/Vance/McNaughton) 4 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 172 – 173 . 217. Memorandum of Conversation 217. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, August 24, 1966. SUBJECT Vietnam PARTICIPANTS Senator J. William Fulbright W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large I lunched today with Senator Fulbright. I opened by explaining my assignment and asking for his opinion on the way to get negotiations going. He rather evaded the question but did say there were two matters which he thought were preventing discussions. First was our unwillingness to accept the NLF or VC as full-fledged participants; second, and even more important, Hanoi did not believe that the United States Government had any intention of withdrawing its forces from Vietnam or, in fact, Southeast Asia. He said he himself did not believe that we would in fact withdraw and pointed to the size of our installations in Thailand as well as Vietnam. He spoke disparagingly of the September 11 elections because the VC were not permitted to put up candidates. He maintained that all the 550-odd candidates were of the same line of thought—opposed to the VC. He admitted, however, that not very many people would have voted for Viet Cong candidates. I told him I was convinced that the President had every intention of removing our troops from South Vietnam if the North Vietnamese did likewise. I agreed that North Vietnam doubted our sincerity at the present time but that both Hanoi and Moscow were convinced that the President would be forced by public opinion to change his policies and that we would withdraw as the French did. He repeated that he had said publicly that Congress was more war-like than the President and would force the President to take action which would involve us with China and the Soviet Union. I disputed these statements but did not appear to have any effect. Towards the end of lunch he announced he had to go to a conference committee meeting on foreign aid, and the rest of the time was spent on my arguing with him to support the House version. I left the door open to come back and asked him to call me if he had some constructive ideas. He stoutly maintains we are overextended in Asia. He was skeptical when I described the new Asian initiatives—Asian Development Bank, ASPAC and ASA peace conference initiative. Intermingled with the above was a discussion of Arkansas politics and the state of our domestic economy. Needless to say, we did not agree on the latter. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Personal; Confidential. Drafted by Harriman. The meeting was held in Fulbrightʼs office. 218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, August 25, 1966. SUBJECT Proposed RT Program, and Escalation Generally I understand Defense has sent over a proposed RT program that would include strikes against the Haiphong docks, a steel plant, and other sensitive targets. 2 Since I will be away just overnight I am setting down my grave reservations about this proposal and about anything on our part which smacks of escalation at the present time. There are three reasons for my concern: a. I am very worried about the apparent escalation in which we have been engaged over the past six weeks As you may know, the number of our sorties over North Viet-Nam has substantially increased in this period. 3 Moreover, while I think the other side understood what we were doing on the DMZ business, they—and certainly third countries—may have interpreted this as escalatory. Thirdly, although I think your refusal to exclude the possibility of land action against the north totally or for all time at your press conference 4 was a right basic position, you probably have noted the Periscope item in this weekʼs Newsweek—just the sort of thing other governments, including the other side, pick up—that we are seriously making plans for such action. 5 (I was asked at my Congressional briefing about this and said flatly we had no such plans.) These specific problems exist in a background of general comment to the effect that sentiment in the country is becoming more hawk-like. Thus, I think we have to be terribly concerned with both the fact and the appearance of our actions in the present. b. The real convulsion in Communist China still defies assessment, but at the very least it means that any escalatory action on our part might be construed in Peking and Hanoi as a sign that we thought we could get away with something because of the political confusion in Communist China. This could trigger irrational action by one or both of these capitals. In other words, while I think an unsettled Chinese leadership will not take any initiatives, this is the time to be very careful in not appearing to take advantage of their troubles. c. On any reading we can make, Hanoi remains firm in its basic position, and our guess is that they are watching the September and November elections. There may come a time for extra pressure to bring about the right decision on their part, but there is no indication that that time is now. I would suggest that not only the RT program but our whole pace of action against the north be discussed with these factors in mind, and my own feeling is that we should reach high level agreement that we will maintain the present pace, perhaps even cutting back on the possibly excessive sortie rate in the north, which I doubt to be effective in the margin in any event, and avoid anything for the present that could be construed as a significant escalation. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, and Unger. 2 Presumably a reference to Rolling Thunder 52, which was approved by the JCS on August 19 and presented to McNamara by Wheeler on August 22. An August 18 memorandum for Wheeler outlining the proposal for RT 52 is in Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52. The proposal included strikes against the Phuc Yen and Kep POL storage facilities, a steel plant, a cement plant, two thermal power plants, four locks, the Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai ports, and other targets. CINCPACʼs recommendation of August 8 for strikes against some of these targets was analyzed in an August 17 memorandum to Ball from Hughes. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 Under cover of a memorandum dated August 16, Read sent Bundy a report on U.S. “Escalatory Signals in July,” which indicated that “10,198 attack sorties were flown against NVN [in July] compared with a previous high 7,398 in June.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII) 4 For text of Ruskʼs statement, see Department of State Bulletin , August 22, 1966, pp. 259–260. 5 “Many top-level civilian analysts predict that sometime this fall the U.S. will invade North Vietnam.” (“The Periscope,” Newsweek , August 29, 1966, p. 9) 219. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 219. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1 Washington, August 26, 1966. SC No. 09624/66 THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTSʼ WILL TO PERSIST Principal Findings 1. So long as the U.S. air offensive remains at present levels, it is unlikely to diminish North Vietnamʼs continued ability to provide materiel support to the war in the South. North Vietnam is taking punishment on its own territory, but at a price it can afford and one it probably considers acceptable in light of the political objectives it hopes to achieve. 2. The Viet Cong have borne the brunt of Communist personnel losses in South Vietnam and have also had to compensate for losses of North Vietnamese personnel. We believe that the Viet Cong capability to recruit and train manpower is adequate to cover losses estimated for 1966 but will probably be inadequate to compensate for casualties and losses in 1967. During 1967 the North Vietnamese will have to assume most of the burden of expanding force levels, and an increasing role in replacing losses. These manpower requirements can almost certainly be met from North Vietnamese resources, but they will impose additional strains on North Vietnamʼs limited supply of skilled personnel and leadership cadre. 3. The Communistsʼ present strategy is costly in both human and economic terms and is taxing Communist resources in some areas, particularly within South Vietnam itself. Allied actions are complicating Communist efforts and raising the costs of their execution. However, neither internal resource shortages nor allied actions within present political parameters are likely to render the Vietnamese Communists physically incapable of persisting in their present strategy. 4. In absolute numerical terms the Communists cannot hope to match present and projected Allied force commitments. However, if present estimates of Allied and Communist force projections are accurate, by mid-1967 the Communists will have a slight advantage in maneuver battalions—i.e., tactical combat troops available for commitment to offensive ground operations. 5. Nevertheless, if they are objective, the Communists must acknowledge that during the past year their insurgent campaign has lost momentum in both the military and political fields. Although they may not be losing the war at the present time, they are certainly not winning it. The Communists are far from being defeated; but they are faced with problems greater than any they have had to contend with before in this struggle. Furthermore, Communist forces have at least temporarily lost the aura of invincibility which was one of their most potent political assets. 6. Morale within Communist military forces and the political apparatus in South Vietnam has declined since mid-1965 but not to a point presently sufficient to force any major revision in basic Communist strategy. 7. The Communists must be disappointed in comparing the present situation with that which existed in the spring of 1965. At least indirectly, they have acknowledged that the infusion of U.S. and Allied combat forces has created new problems which must be overcome before victory can be won. Yet Communist realism is presently tinged more with defiance than pessimism; the Communists may be disappointed, but they do not yet seem to be discouraged. 8. Consideration of world popular opposition to U.S. policy would certainly enter into any eventual Vietnamese Communist decision on whether to revise present strategy but would most certainly not be a decisive factor. 9. The Vietnamese Communists pay close attention to evidence of opposition to current U.S. policy arising within the United States itself. The outcome of their previous struggle with the French almost certainly predisposes them to draw invalid parallels to French domestic opposition in the Indochina war and to look for signs of American domestic political pressures capable of forcing policy changes on Washington. 10. The timing of any Vietnamese Communist decision on altering basic strategy—and the nature of such a decision—will be greatly affected by a variety of considerations, including those outlined in this paper. We estimate that none of the pressures upon the Communists which we can now identify is severe enough to force a major change in Communist strategy over the next eight to nine months. The Communists would be even less inclined to alter their strategy if they should find political and military developments during this period running in their favor—for example, serious political deterioration in South Vietnam, a series of major Viet Cong military successes, or what they construe as a significant rise of anti-war sentiment in the United States. If on the other hand pressures on them are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take stock and consider a change in their basic strategy. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Special Intelligence Material, vol. X. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. The source text, pages 19–21 of the memorandum, is attached to an August 29 memorandum from R.J. Smith, CIAʼs Deputy Director for Intelligence, to Rostow, under cover of which Smith sent Rostow a copy of the full study; the full study has not been found in Johnson Library files. Helms sent the President pages 1–21 of the study, consisting of the “Summary Discussion” and “Principal Findings,” under cover of an August 29 memorandum, in which he noted that McNamara had asked CIA to undertake the study several weeks earlier. Helms noted that he had sent copies of the full study, which included several hundred pages of basic material backing up the “Principal Findings,” to McNamara, Rusk, and Wheeler. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chrono, Jul-Dec 1966) Helms also briefed Senators Mansfield, Russell, and Fulbright on the study on September 19 and summarized the discussion that followed in a memorandum to Rostow, September 20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, CIA) Rostow provided the President with his summary of this study in Document 239 . 220. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 220. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 29, 1966, 11 a.m. Mr. President: This cable from Gen. Westmoreland spells out his concept of where heʼs come from since 1 May 1965 and where he proposes to go from 1 November 1966 forward—towards pacification, without reducing the heat on the VC and NVN main force units. It underlines the need to mount a maximum political campaign, overt and covert, designed to defect VC and start Saigon VC negotiations as soon after the Sept. 11 election as possible. That is the political track required to match Westmorelandʼs military plan which is, clearly, in the right direction; although he and Lodge must engage Ky and the ARVN fully if it is to work. Walt Attachment 2 August 26, 1966. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (29797) SUBJECT Concept of Military Operations in South Vietnam In order to promote a better understanding of the role which military operations play in the overall effort in South Vietnam, I discern a need at this time to review the military situation in South Vietnam as it relates to our concepts; past, present and future. This is an appropriate time in light of the fact that we are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict resulting from our recent battlefield successes and from the continuing US/Free World military buildup. The enemy has launched a determined campaign to gain control of South Vietnam—its land, its people, and its government. There are no indications that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased his rate of infiltration, formed divisions in South Vietnam, introduced new weapons, and maintained his lines of communications into South Vietnam in spite of our increased air efforts. He continues to use Laos and the border regions of Cambodia as sanctuaries and recently moved a division through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into the First Corps Tactical Zone. His campaign of terror, assassination, intimidation, sabotage, propaganda and guerilla warfare continues unabated. The enemy still holds sway over large segments of the land and population. Although thwarted in his overt large scale campaign, he is still determined. As a companion of the foregoing appreciation of the present enemy situation, a review of our strategic concept for the past year would appear to be useful. A. During the period 1 May 1965 to 1 November 1965, our task was to build up our combat and logistical forces; learn to employ them effectively; gain confidence in ourselves in fighting in the counterinsurgency and Southeast Asian environment; gain the trust of the Vietnamese in our military skills, courage and ability; and protect our installations and forces from distraction by the enemy. B. During the period 1 November 1965 to 1 May 1966, our objectives were to extend our deployments toward the frontiers; exercise our logistics in furnishing support to troops in sustained combat; indoctrinate commanders on the techniques of sustained ground combat; interdict intensively by air the lines of communications leading from North Vietnam to South Vietnam; disrupt enemy bases by B–52 strikes; deny the enemy rice by protecting harvests and capturing caches in storage areas; increase our surveillance along the coast; and initiate a program of patrolling certain vital inland waterways. In summary, our purpose was to disrupt the enemyʼs effort to prepare his battlefield, to throw his plans off balance by offensive operations, and to continue to gain experience and self-confidence in this environment. C. During the period 1 May to 1 November 1966—the Southwest monsoon season—our strategy has been and is to contain the enemy through offensive tactical operations (referred to as “spoiling attacks” because they catch the enemy in the preparation phases of his offensives), force him to fight under conditions of our choosing, and deny him attainment of his own tactical objectives. At the same time we have utilized all forces that could be made available for area and population security in support of revolutionary development, rice harvests heretofore available to the enemy have been protected, lines of communication required by us have been opened, and some of the inland waterways used by the enemy have been interdicted to disrupt his communication and supply systems. The threat of the enemy main forces (Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army) has been of such magnitude that fewer friendly troops could be devoted to general area security and support of revolutionary development than visualized at the time our plans were prepared for the period. During the period 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967—the Northeast monsoon season—we will maintain and increase the momentum of our operations. Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of revolutionary development. A. The essential tasks of revolutionary development and nation building cannot be accomplished if enemy main forces can gain access to the population centers and destroy our efforts. US/Free World forces, with their mobility and in coordination with Vietnamese Armed Forces, must take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our ability to do this is improving steadily. Maximum emphasis will be given to the use of long range patrols and other means to find the enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus discovered will be subjected to either ground attack or quick reaction B–52 and tactical air strikes. When feasible, B–52 strikes will be followed by ground forces to search the area. Sustained ground combat operations will maintain pressure on the enemy. The growing strength of US/Free World forces will provide the shield that will permit ARVN to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of revolutionary development. Also, I visualize that a significant number of the US/Free World Maneuver Battalions will be committed to Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TOAR) missions. These missions encompass base security and at the same time support revolutionary development by spreading security radially from the bases to protect more of the population. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close association with ARVN, regional and popular forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are among the tasks of the ground force elements. At the same time ARVN troops will be available if required to reinforce offensive operations and to serve as reaction forces for outlying security posts and government centers under attack. Our strategy will include opening, constructing and using roads, as well as a start toward opening and reconstructing the National Railroad. The priority effort of ARVN forces will be in direct support of the revolutionary development program; in many instances, the province chief will exercise operational control over these units. This fact not-withstanding, the ARVN division structure must be maintained and it is essential that the division commander enthusiastically support revolutionary development. Our highly capable US division commanders, who are closely associated with corresponding ARVN commanders, are in a position to influence them to do what is required. C. We intend to employ all forces to get the best results, measured, among other things, in terms of population secured; territory cleared of enemy influence; Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army bases eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces destroyed. D. Barring unforeseen change in enemy strategy, I visualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will remain essentially the same throughout 1967. In summation, the MACV mission, which is to assist the Government of Vietnam to defeat the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces and extend Government control throughout South Vietnam, prescribes our two principal tasks. We must defeat the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases. We must assist the Government to gain control of the people by providing direct military support of revolutionary development in coordination with the other agencies of the U.S. Mission. The simultaneous accomplishment of these tasks is required to allow the people of South Vietnam to get on with the job of nation building. Ambassador Lodge concurs, with the following comment: “I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid in this message to the importance of military support for revolutionary development. After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases must be to provide the opportunity through revolutionary development to get at the heart of the matter, which is the population of South Vietnam. If this goal is achieved, we will be denying manpower and other support to the Viet Cong.” 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. No classification marking. The President wrote on the source text: “Letʼs get Komer to pick up & spark this inspiration.” 2 Top Secret. 221. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 221. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 30, 1966. SUBJECT “Concept of Military Operations in South Viet-Nam” I have just seen General Westmorelandʼs message on the above subject 2 and have found it thought-provoking reading. He has set forth very clearly what kind of war he thinks we should fight and the role of U.S. forces both in offensive operations and in support of “revolutionary development.” While there is little completely new in his paper, there are indications of emphasis which could carry very important implications for the future with respect to the size and the manner of employment of our ground forces in South Viet-Nam. The most significant change of emphasis is the reorientation of the military effort both of ARVN and of U.S. forces to support “revolutionary development.” General Ky made the proposal to me over a year ago that the U.S. forces should operate generally as a shield for population centers in front of ARVN forces which would assume as a primary mission the direct support of the development effort. Westy is now proposing the same kind of shield mission but goes two steps farther in putting U.S./Free World forces into the business of pacification. He endorses the expansion by U.S./Free World forces of control over terrain and population around base areas in application of the “oil spot” concept as the Marines have been doing in the I Corps area (and other U.S. forces elsewhere to a lesser degree). Beyond the creation of an indeterminate number of such American “oil spots”, Westy also contemplates mixed pacification operations in which U.S. forces would act in close cooperation with Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces in order to bolster their effectiveness in protecting pacification activities. An additional mission to be stressed in the coming months is the reopening of rail and highway communications, an activity which, while of the utmost importance, will require large numbers of troops if these communications are to be kept open. Several thoughts occur to me in reflecting on the consequences of the application of this new concept of military operations. The first is that, if successfully carried out, it offers the hope of speeding up the termination of hostilities in South Viet-Nam and of advancing the important non-military programs directed at controlling the population and rebuilding the shattered society and economy. On the other hand, there will be a cost to pay for this progress in a rise in the U.S. casualty rate and in the ratio of U.S. casualties to those of the GVN. Such a rise will reinforce the charges at home that the U.S. has taken over the war and is accepting a disproportionate share of the losses. Most importantly, the acceptance of this concept would seem to create an open-ended requirement for U.S. forces. If our goal is to reestablish GVN authority over the entire territory, open and keep open the road and rail communications, and make good the manpower deficiencies in the revolutionary development program, General Westmoreland will be justified in asking for almost any figure in terms of future reinforcements. If we undertake to meet such requirements, there will be ground for renewed concern for the increased strains on the GVN economy and for the effect on U.S./GVN relations if we become deeply involved in revolutionary development activities. In this connection, when General Ky raised the proposition I mentioned above, he was very explicit in saying that he felt the U.S. troops should be kept away from the Vietnamese population insofar as possible. At the time, I thought he had in mind the consequences of the U.S.-Montagnard relationship developed a few years ago in the Highland region. There, we became so popular with the Montagnards that GVN officials became convinced that we were trying to subvert the loyalty of the Montagnards to the government and to attach them to us. The recriminations arising from that episode are still heard from time to time. I have been expecting to hear some reaction of this sort from the very effective civic action efforts of the Marines in their “oil spot” activities. It is very easy for our representatives in Viet-Nam to forget that we are seeking to develop popularity for the Saigon government and not for ourselves. I have always been doubtful of the long-term benefits of U.S. actions, no matter how beneficent, in replacement of those of the responsible Vietnamese ministries. These thoughts boil down to the following. General Westmoreland has sent us a very thoughtful and important cable, outlining his proposed future military policy in South Viet-Nam. It is full of important implications and deserves close study and a considered reply. It should not be accepted without a reply as this would convey tacit approval and would justify Westmoreland to feel that his concept had official approval. Perhaps it should be approved but only after a careful analysis and in full knowledge of its implications. I recommend that you ask DOD for such an analysis. Maxwell D. Taylor 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 260, Gen. Taylor. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to President Johnson on August 30 under cover of a memorandum stating that the danger foreseen by Taylor must be met by 1) engaging elite ARVN units fully in fighting VC and North Vietnam main force units; and 2) “getting the ARVN engaged effectively in pacification.” The President indicated on Rostowʼs memorandum that, prior to getting Defense, State, and Komer to prepare analyses and recommendations, Rostow should first “talk over” pacification with McNamara. (Ibid.) 2 Attachment to Document 220 . 222. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson 222. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 30, 1966. SUBJECT Visit to Vietnam—August 1966 I. Pacification. 1. The main purpose of my second visit to Vietnam was to find out more about Ambassador Lodgeʼs views on where we go from here on pacification, how to speed it up, and how MACV planned to redirect more GVN military resources to tough local security problems. I tried out a number of ideas along these lines that Bob Komer asked me to discuss with Lodge and Porter. a. Lodge was more than receptive. Your recent messages 2 have firmly focused his attention on pacification which he now calls “the heart of the matter.” Westmoreland and Porter are similarly engaged. An extensive planning effort is now underway—but its real bite will not come until 1967. b. On the Embassy side, a Roles and Mission Working Group is targeted on streamlining the hodgepodge of GVN military and civilian security forces. MACV is doing staff exercises on an optimum ARVN force structure; a design for a post-hostilities GVN security establishment; and a balanced U.S. force structure which can be sustained, indefinitely if needed, without a reserve call-up. You should have their conclusions by early October. c. Similarly, a new US/GVN effort at coordinated pacification planning is underway, really for the first time. Porter has pulled together all the civilian agencies plus MACV in a Joint Planning Group on RD goals, resources, and guidelines. Regular meetings, including joint field trips, with GVN, RD and JGS officers are coordinating selection of 1967 national priority areas and setting combined resource and manpower requirements. Completion expected by December. d. All of these are useful initial steps, but they must be followed through effectively and on a scale that matches our commitments. Much more remains to be done before there is an effective and responsible pacification system in operation on the ground. Moreover, even at this planning stage, there are still a number of unresolved questions—the extent of participation by U.S. forces; the role of ARVN corps and division levels in pacification operations; possible transfer of RF/PF to the RD Ministry; or the conversion of the RF/PF to a Police Constabulary for post-hostilities civilian security. e. But there now seems general Mission agreement that, while U.S. forces must help, ARVN should carry the main weight of the pacification job and that in 1967 the GVN will devote at least 50 percent of its military resources to RD in I, II and III Corps, and 25 percent in IV Corps, where there are as yet no significant U.S. forces. As rough aggregates, these represent progress; their application to provinces and districts has yet to be worked out. 2. ARVN Force Improvement . Closely related to the use of ARVN for accelerated pacification is a systematic new MACV effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of GVN forces. This parallel effort may be the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam. a. At its core is expansion of combined operations and the military “buddy system.” It builds both on the small unit models of the Marinesʼ Combined Action Companies and the newer association of the US 1st Division with the 5th ARVN and of the 25th US with the 25th ARVN. It will cover the use of forces in both pacification and major combat actions. b. The ARVN improvement program will also include reduction of the ratio of tail to teeth in combat units, improved leadership training, battlefield commissions, reform of the draft law, new desertion penalties, and joint US/GVN military inspection teams to appraise the effectiveness of ARVN units and commanders in RD. (A similar program for ROK Forces turned the tide of battle in Korea.) 3. Enemy Situation . All intelligence available to us confirmed weakening VC morale: food and medical supplies are down; sickness up—enlistments more difficult; defections more frequent. The end of the beginning may be in sight. a. There are a number of projects now being explored which we hope will accelerate the process: Kyʼs proposal for GVN warehouses and ARVN rice collections (paying market prices) in the delta; the question of a U.S. delta offensive now under examination by the Embassy and MACV staffs; improved surrender, interrogation, and prisoner exploitation procedures; stepped-up economic warfare and resources control. Bob Komer and I have been plugging away at all of these in Washington and Saigon, and will continue to do so. b. Under pressure from here the defector program (Chieu Hoi) is now in higher gear. As you know, the rate is running twice last yearʼs; should total 22,500 in 1966; now has a target—based on better backing and more skillful use of the defectors against other VC waverers—of 45,000 in 1967. II. Economic Items. 1. Bob Nathan has reported to you separately on economic stabilization, field economic management deficiencies, and the need for top quality U.S. personnel in the field. 3 We are doing some of the economic forward planning here in Washington; and Bob Komer has laid on a new stabilization study to preserve the benefits of devaluation. But there is an urgent requirement for three or four qualified economic experts in the Mission to formulate—and negotiate with the GVN—an adequate stabilization strategy. 2. GVN Foreign Exchange Reserves pose a special problem. At present GVN reserves total about $250 million and are rising $10 million a month. If present practice continues, they will be in the $450–$500 million range by the end of 1967. We took a tough line with Minister of National Economy Thanh and National Bank Governor Hanh that such accumulations would pose major political problems for us—and could risk Congressional and public support for the AID program. We had in mind particularly the vulnerability of a possible AID Supplemental to this kind of exchange reserve build-up. We suggested these GVN reserves might better be used in 1967 to finance a larger share of imports, prepay DLF loans, or increase GVN contributions to international monetary institutions. Both Thanh and Hanh will attend the IMF/IBRD meeting in Washington at the end of September and we will hit them hard again on this. 3. Port Situation . The takeover has gone well. Relations between the MACV advisers and their GVN counterparts are close and effective. But we are not yet out of the woods. Some deficit in capacity will remain throughout 1966 and into early 1967. Our military, as you know, only assumed responsibility for military and government-to-government CPA shipments—not the much tougher task of handling commercial imports. What we need to do: (1) Give top priority to the completion of Newport, which continues to slip—restoration of a $30 million funding cut is now being sought; (2) Refurbish Saigon port by paving worn out dirt approaches, completing hard stands, and improving lighting and handling gear—MACV and USAID are now compiling estimates; (3) Control strictly U.S. civil/military inventory levels and shipments of non-essential supplies; (4) Review present arrangements for handling commercial cargoes at the end of the next 60 days, and, unless promised improvements have been made, press again for military management of commercial shipments. 4. Postwar Development Planning . At Komerʼs request, Nathan made a first-rate presentation to Ky of the political and economic benefits of launching a study now. He explained how it should be organized on sectoral and regional bases to best contribute to binding South Vietnam together as a nation. Ky seemed enthusiastic and eager to get started. The way now seems clear. III. Post-Election Prospects. Every indication points to a successful Constitutional Assembly election and an impressive voter turnout. The need to broaden the political base, to re-start the democratic process, to fold civilians into the directing military establishment, and to do so on terms the military will find tolerable are all evident. a. But the Assembly will mark a new and more complicated political phase in our relations with Vietnam. There will be new opinion currents with which to deal and new influences at work to which we may have to adapt the timing or substance of our decisions. The political process in short is likely to become a good deal more tricky in the period immediately ahead. b. These prospects strengthen the need to institutionalize the new network of joint US/GVN bodies that are now beginning to appear. While we were in Saigon, two new joint boards were set up: a Joint Economic Committee, to be co-chaired by the Minister of National Economy and the Deputy Ambassador which will meet regularly every ten days; and a Joint Rice Board for US/GVN cooperation on production, import, storage, sale and pricing. We still need a better handle on rice, and are trying to get one. c. Additionally, we now have a Joint Planning Group for RD, a Combined Postwar Planning Group in prospect, and the standing liaison between MACV and the JGS. Properly used, these joint agencies can provide moorings and stability for our policies against the waywardness or inexperience of the Constituent Assembly or the future Parliament. They can develop into essential instruments of U.S. influence. But they must be staffed by first-rate people. William Leonhart Postscript “Other War” Visits. We were received throughout, and particularly by Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland, with the warmest hospitality and the most unstinting cooperation. At staff levels, I think our visit alleviated some sense of strain in the Washington-field relationship. We have been pushing pretty hard, and the relationship between two unique jobs—Porterʼs as “theater commander” on the civil side and Komerʼs as the Washington guiding hand—is still in process of evolution. Such stresses can probably never be absent from a war-time situation which pits immediacy of field experience against the perspective of wider policy. But more, rather than fewer, visits from your “other war” headquarters may be the answer—so long as the overriding consideration is to speed up constructive movement on the civil side. WmL 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret. Komer forwarded copies of this memorandum to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Taylor, Rostow, and Moyers under cover of a memorandum dated August 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Leonhart) On September 13 Komer submitted to the President a 44-page report entitled “The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report.” In his letter of transmittal, Komer called the report “mainly a review of accomplishments.” Written for public release, the report and Komerʼs transmittal letter are printed in Department of State Bulletin , October 10, 1966, pp. 549–567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591–601. 2 See, for example, telegram 20533, Document 200 . In an August 9 memorandum to the President, Komer asked for and received permission for Leonhart to deliver a private verbal message to Lodge and Porter from the President that he was “dissatisfied with the slow rate of pacification progress,” that the GVN was “clearly not sufficiently pacification-minded,” and that a “more coherent US–GVN strategy for pacification” and “a strengthened management structure” were probably needed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President) 3 Nathanʼs August 31 memorandum for the President emphasized the need both for a tough stabilization program to keep inflation in check during 1967 and for top economic talent in Saigon. (Ibid.) 223. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 223. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, August 31, 1966. Mr. President: With reference to your note about General Taylorʼs comment 2 on General Westmorelandʼs message, 3 I had a long and good conversation with Bob McNamara. His view is that what is needed now is not a Washington exercise to review Westmorelandʼs message, but a reorganization of the military and civil resources in South Vietnam to produce concrete working plans, region by region, for pacification. In turn, this requires clear-cut chains of command and assignments of responsibility on our side and the Vietnamese side. The working out of this managerial task, he believes, can only be done on the spot. He envisages this as his primary mission when he next goes to Vietnam. This will be, he hopes, after the Erhard visit early in October. He would like Bob Komer to go and suggested that I also go (I am not sure the latter is wise, but would of course be quite willing). It will be interesting for you to read Lodgeʼs weekly telegram 4 in the light of Bobʼs comments. The first part wholly concerns pacification. They are drifting towards a recognition that the critical problem is how better to organize our military and other assets to do the job. On the basis of performance in the past, I suspect Bob McNamara is right in his assessment; namely, that much more radical changes in organization will be required if we are to move forward effectively. I recommend we discuss this matter at the next Tuesday lunch. W.W. Rostow 5 Put on Tuesday agenda and have Taylor present 6 See me 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 11. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Moyers and Komer. 2 See Document 221 and footnote 1 thereto. 3 Attachment to Document 220 . 4 Attached but not printed is telegram 4923 from Saigon, August 31. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 6 The President indicated his assent and added by hand the request for Taylorʼs presence, but no record of the discussion at the next Tuesday luncheon, on September 6, has been found. According to a handwritten note at the bottom of the source text, the President also responded: “Letʼs get something to Westy so that he will not assume that we have approved.” 224. Intelligence Report 224. Intelligence Report 1 Washington, August 1966. S-3690/AP-2F AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH 11 AUGUST 1966 Summary 1. (S/NFD) Air strikes against North Vietnam in July and early August have increased over recent months with particular emphasis on POL facilities, dispersed POL storage sites, lines of communications (LOCs) and transportation equipment. After the initial spectacular air strikes against the major bulk POL facilities, which began in late June, the campaign against NVN POL has steadied down to a slow and grinding effort to reduce the remaining bulk capacity and that of dispersed storage. This effort is slowing down and making difficult and costly the import and distribution of POL for the North Vietnamese. 2. (S/NFD) All five major rail lines were struck during the period. The Hanoi-Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh lines are interdicted for through service, the Hanoi-Dong Dang and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen lines are probably operational for through service, and the status of the Hanoi-Haiphong line is uncertain. With the exception of small water craft, the destruction of transport equipment in July was at the highest level to date. However, there are no indications that shortages in transportation have been serious. 3. (S/NFD) The North Vietnamese are placing emphasis on the development of alternate highway routing within the NVN Panhandle network. Highways in this area have been subject to extensive interdiction which has required heavy maintenance and the development of longer and lower capacity bypasses. Continued restoration and construction work on the LOCs throughout the country combined with the use of expedients have permitted the North Vietnamese to satisfy their logistic requirements and to continue their support of Communist activities in South Vietnam and Laos. 4. (S/NFD) Although there has been no noted change in VC/NVA military capabilities in South Vietnam which could be attributed to the air strikes in NVN, the recent B–52 strikes in the DMZ area disrupted support of the NVA 324B Division and have probably discouraged operations of this type in the immediate future. 5. (S/NFD) There is evidence that the regime is experiencing difficulty in implementing its urban evacuation program and that it has caused some popular dissatisfaction, but there is no concrete evidence that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale. 6. (S/NFD) Damage to the economy increased by almost $10 million, 2 the highest amount of economic loss measured during any reporting period in this series of reports. Total measurable direct and indirect losses to the economy and the military establishment are now estimated at $106 million. The loss of storage capacity in bulk petroleum facilities has presented Hanoi and its Allies with the necessity of improvising a makeshift storage and distribution system and conversion to this system has placed an additional heavy drain on economic resources. The cumulative debilitating effects on the economy are becoming increasingly apparent with the disruption of agricultural and industrial production. It is certain now that economic growth has stagnated. Shortages of economic goods and hardships are apparent among some parts of the civilian population but there have been no sustained and critical hardships among the bulk of the people. [Here follows the body of the 23-page report.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVII. Secret; Controlled Dissemination; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared jointly in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The source text does not indicate a specific day of issue in August 1966. 2 US dollars are used throughout this report. [Footnote in the source text.] 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, September 1, 1966. 4969. 1. Uncle 2 saw nephew at Go Dau Ha in Tay Ninh Province yesterday. Arrangements were made for uncle to take our man to Can Tho on “Monday or Tuesday” 3 at a point near the airport. The exact place will be given to uncle when he goes to Go Dau Ha on Saturday. On that day, uncle will meet nephewʼs son who will give him exact time and place and will then come back to Saigon with him. 2. On arriving in Saigon, son will give letter to our man at our manʼs house on Sunday morning. The letter will be signed by the nephew in his official capacity as president of the organization. Our man does not know what will be in the letter. 3. But he is sure that it will not impede further action since it is understood that our man will go to Can Tho on Monday or Tuesday to “pick up” nephew. 4. Comment: It becomes urgent to decide where nephew should be taken. He is understandably concerned about his security as regards the GVN. Unless you can think of something better, I plan to have nephew met at Can Tho by a CAS plane of sufficient size and arrange to take him and his party to Chu Lai, which is an all American base, and from where I suggest he be flown to Okinawa [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. 5. Upon reflection, I think this is better than flying him to Guam or taking him out to a carrier. Obviously we are honor bound to get him out of the country immediately. 6. Other questions which arise are: When do you divulge this? When do we tell GVN? And what do we tell them? End comment. 7. It is expected that the son will be staying at our manʼs house in Saigon as a “gesture of good faith.” 8. Our man has suggested that we would be generous with money and personal security. Nephew has said that he would eventually like to return to South Viet-Nam and take part in politics. 9. Please advise receipt this wire and give me any advice or instructions. 4 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/Thrush. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Thrush. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:16 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to the President at 11 a.m. on September 1, under cover of a memorandum stating that “we should keep our fingers crossed; but this could be good news.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush) 2 Nguyen Huu Thoʼs “uncle,” Nguyen Huu An. For more information on this operation, see paragraphs 4–9 of Document 204 and footnote 3 thereto. 3 September 5 or 6. 4 The Department of State replied in telegram 39769, September 1, approving the plan set forth in paragraph 4 and providing guidance for informing Ky and revealing the defection publicly. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/Thrush) On September 5 Rostow forwarded three additional Thrush telegrams to the President (5245 and 5246 from Saigon and 41139 to Saigon, September 5), noting in his covering memorandum that “the bird is not yet in hand; but he hasnʼt retreated to the bush either.” In a memorandum of September 9, Rostow informed the President that “Uncle, who has been trying to arrange Liberation Front leaderʼs defection, was picked up by South Vietnamese security men on the morning of the 7th” for apparently unrelated reasons and was still being detained. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Box 143, Thrush) 226. Editorial Note 226. Editorial Note In a letter of September 6, 1966, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Unger, the Department of Defense requested the Department of Stateʼs concurrence in authorizing air strikes under Rolling Thunder 52. The seven targets comprised three SAM support facilities, two POL storage areas, the Xuan Mai highway bridge, and the Yen Vien railroad yard. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966) In commenting on the proposal in an undated note to Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson observed that this was a “substantial reduction in the package McNamara gave you some time ago.” (Ibid.) Regarding the earlier package, see Document 218 and footnote 2 thereto. Assistant Secretary of State Bundy reviewed the Department of Defense proposal in a September 10 memorandum to Rusk. His reservations about attacking the Yen Vien railroad yard and the Hanoi SAM storage area were concurred in by U. Alexis Johnson in an undated cover note to Rusk and by Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson in a September 12 cover note to Rusk. Thompson also expressed concern about striking one of the POL storage areas. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966) In a suggested agenda for the Tuesday luncheon scheduled for September 13, forwarded to President Johnson on September 12, Rostow included an item on the bombing of North Vietnam. He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended additional targets, the Department of State was “resisting on the grounds of escalatory signals and the Rusk-Gromyko talks,” and Secretary of Defense McNamara wanted a freeze “at approximately the present level, with perhaps a few additional targets.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President) No record has been found of the discussion at the lunch meeting on September 13. According to Ungerʼs recollection, summarized in an October 31 memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, it was decided in a conversation between Rusk and McNamara not to proceed with Rolling Thunder 52 either as proposed by the Department of Defense or in modified form. (Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966) 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 227. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, September 8, 1966. 5517. 1. DʼOrlandi told me that in his recent talk with Lewandowski, the problem referred to in my last telegram 2 regarding Lewandowski and DʼOrlandi working up a proposal to submit to Washington and Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points: A. He did not want the only outcome of the procedure between DʼOrlandi and himself to be to inform the United States as to “just how far the North Vietnamese would give in.” B. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I had already given him ample assurances, he feels that emphasis must be given to the need of the U.S. approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam alone and not South Viet-Nam as a “piece of a general Chinese puzzle.” Lew-andowski feels that the problem could be “simple enough” if limited to South Viet-Nam—but not if the United States is thinking of using conversations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowskiʼs talks in Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese questions. I quickly assured DʼOrlandi that, of course, we were solely interested in suppressing the aggression in South Viet-Nam and in nothing else. DʼOrlandi said that not only did he realize this, but that Lewandowski did too. ( Comment: Perhaps Lewandowski has had this point impressed upon him in Hanoi or elsewhere. It is a curious angle, as I, of course, have never said or even implied anything to justify his admonition. End comment.) C. Lewandowski said that it was only fair to state that the “aim of the exercise” between him and DʼOrlandi should not be to reinforce the status quo, but to get a “global” settlement. When he says “global,” he obviously does not mean worldwide; he means “over all” as regards South Viet-Nam. This, said DʼOrlandi, quoting Lewandowski, means “guarantees, etc.”; therefore “not just deescalation.” 2. When I asked DʼOrlandi what this meant, DʼOrlandi, for illustration, said that it could mean “elections;” “a new government;” “settlement with the Viet Cong.” 3. Lewandowski went on to say that the purpose of his discussions with DʼOrlandi would not be to inaugurate a “socialist” regime in South Viet-Nam; it would not be to get a “cease-fire” and still less a “standstill.” ( Comment: In the light of para 3, the “settlement with the Viet Cong” mentioned in para 2 must refer to some governmental arrangement and not to military operations. End comment.) 4. DʼOrlandi told Lewandowski: “I have very clear cut instructions as I have already told you, and they are: be useful, or go home. Fanfani has instructions for me and Rapacki knows what they are. We may, of course, rule out an agreement confirming the status quo since this would be nothing more than the former approach. The fact is that either you and I are going to have these conversations or else nothing is going to happen at all anywhere concerning Viet-Nam. I was flatly told in Rome that you were to do something with me, and that it was you who wanted the conversation to go on with Ambassador Lodge.” 5. Lewandowski said he was sure that something could be done. Hanoi, he said, looks at the situation through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through whom they get all their information about the situation. “My job,” said Lewandowski, “is to explain to Hanoi that they have a wrong view.” The last time he had been in Hanoi neither Pham Van Dong nor General Giap were there, and “they are the only two in the whole place who talk sense and understand the real situation in the south.” 6. This was the end of the conversation. DʼOrlandi says he was going to puzzle over a possible agreement formula and when he has figured something out, he will get in touch with Lewandowski. No date has been set for their next meeting. 7. DʼOrlandi is sure of one thing: Lewandowski absolutely does not want the conversations stopped. DʼOrlandi surmises that the Communist intention is to state that there is no hope; for the record to break off all conversations; adopt an attitude of nothing doing; and then to have the kind of “non-talks,” to paraphrase the late E.E. Cummings, with DʼOrlandi of which this telegram treats. They would not only want to be able to deny publicly that they are having talks, they want to deny it to everybody privately. It is real “double talk”; if not “double think.” Lodge 1 Source: Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:29 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 250–251. 2 Telegram 5229, September 4, which reported that, according to DʼOrlandi, “Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts Pham Van Dong and General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 249–250) 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 228. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, September 12, 1966, 1:25 p.m. 44917. Ref: Saigon 5517. 2 1. We find Lewandowskyʼs thinking as conveyed by DʼOrlandi very interesting but not always lucid. Would like you to discuss some of these ambiguities with DʼOrlandi and suggest that he explore them further with Lewandowsky, hopefully not waiting until DʼOrlandi has his “possible agreement formula” worked out. In ensuing paragraphs puzzling items are identified, together with points we would like to have you make to DʼOrlandi. 2. Lewandowskyʼs remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to “reinforce the status quo” is all right if he is talking about the present status quo in South Viet-Nam. But we cannot buy a discarding of the status quo ante, i.e. the 1954 and 1962 Agreements. We have had so many experiences in the past 20 years with the Communists saying “What is mine is mine and is not discussable; we must talk about dividing what is yours”. You may add for DʼOrlandiʼs own information that we do not rule out consideration of revisions of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements but we could accept no changes until we had a clear picture of what was the total context of an understanding with the Communists. 3. As you have already indicated DʼOrlandi can reassure Lewandowsky that we are not thinking of South Viet-Nam as a piece of a general Chinese puzzle; nothing is further from our minds than the idea that we should try to settle the China question somehow in Viet-Nam. However, DʼOrlandi should be aware of our concern about Lewandowskyʼs statement that “the problem could be simple enough if limited to South Viet-Nam”. North Viet-Nam is inevitably involved if there is to be any lasting settlement in South Viet-Nam. At the same time we must be very careful not to accept the idea that North Viet-Nam has a full right to sit in on the disposition of the internal political arrangements within South Viet-Nam (for example the points mentioned Para 2 reftel) just because it has sent 19 regiments where they have no right to be. 4. FYI. As you know our hope is that the GVN will be able to improve successively its position as the sole governmental authority in South Viet-Nam and will be able to dispose of as many as possible of the problems mentioned in Para 2 as a government dealing with a dissident group within its borders. This is process which we are hoping to get underway at the earliest possible moment pursuant to Deptel 23182 of August 5. 3 5. Re Para 7 we remain skeptical as to whether Hanoi and even Warsaw likely to choose the Lewandowsky-DʼOrlandi channel for substantive negotiation. We do nevertheless want to do nothing to discourage this channel but somewhere along the way we suspect we will reach point where we will not be able to be more concrete about our positions unless we have better evidence that Lewandowsky empowered to speak for Hanoi and that they are ready to go beyond standard positions. Nevertheless we will consider here whether there is something that could be given to DʼOrlandi for his “possible agreement formula” which could demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and smoke out Hanoiʼs intentions. This might lie, for example, in realm of mutually-timed withdrawal formula, or quid pro quo on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion US forces against end to infiltration by Hanoi. 6. Please continue keep us closely informed of any indications of what Lewandowsky really in position do. For moment we would prefer you not even mention to DʼOrlandi possibility sweetener for his “formula” mentioned in preceding paragraph. 4 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by William Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, and Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 251–252. 2 Document 227 . 3 Document 203 . 4 Lodge replied in telegram 5965, September 14, summarizing a long session with DʼOrlandi during which Lodge clarified the points raised in this telegram. According to DʼOrlandi, Lewandowski was “not interested in de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would lead to a settlement and which would at the same time perpetuate the personnel of the present government.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 252–253) 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, September 14, 1966. 5970. For the President from Lodge. Herewith my weekly telegram: A. Elections 1. Looking back at the election on last Sunday, 2 the following can be said: 2. The Viet Cong went all out, both by violent deed and violent word. 3. By deed. There were 166 Viet Cong deeds—acts of terrorism just before and including the election day. This was about nine times the level of activity four days before election and fifteen times the level of activity on an average day in August. GVN casualties from 6:00 p.m. September 10 to 6:00 p.m. September 11 are estimated at nineteen killed and one hundred twenty wounded. The Viet Cong casualties are estimated at eighteen killed, three wounded, and fifteen captured. 4. The government losses were small considering the all-out campaign of the Viet Cong because the GVN on its side went all-out too. It was high tide both ways. The Ky government once again showed its talent in using force and handling troops and police effectively. 5. By word. Then the Viet Cong by word made the issue, pumped it up, and unrestrainedly boasted about their certain success. 6. In quite a miraculous way, the GVN suddenly seemed to grasp the technique of effective publicity, certainly the posters, billboards, radio, television, and dragon dances were skillfully designed to work up interest and to do so in an honest and attractive way. 7. All of this was observed by more than five hundred journalists, diplomatic observers, and Japanese and Korean Parliamentary groups. In particular the Vietnamese people were watching intently. The election was therefore as clean as such a thing can be. 8. Big political defeat. It, therefore, must be set down that the vote on September 11 was an immense vote of “no confidence” in the Viet Cong. They asked for it, and they got it. It is very big—on a par in importance with the departure of nearly 1,000,000 Vietnamese refugees from the north in 1954 rather than live under a Communist regime. 9. The vote also indicates that the government is capable of influencing and providing security for more people than we had thought. We have consistently used the figure of 54 percent, which is up three percent from what it was a year ago, as indicating the percentage of people living under secure conditions—with something over 20 percent under complete Viet Cong domination. Four-fifths of the 5,288,512 registered voters went to the polls on Sunday. The vote must reflect a base of at least ten million people if you add in the children and members of the population who didnʼt vote. This makes the number of people who were living under secure conditions on that day nearer 65 percent than 54 percent. 10. An interesting feature was the marked willingness of people to talk. Never in my service here have I had so many reports come to my desk describing Viet Cong intentions and plans as were told to our people throughout the country by Vietnamese. 11. I also believe that relatively stable prices helped the government in its very successful efforts to arouse public interest in the elections. 12. U.S. troops acted as a shield and prevented large units of the Viet Cong and the Army of North Viet-Nam from interfering in the elections. Had we not been here, there could have been no elections. But, then, had we not come in when we did last year, there probably would be no VietNam either. 13. For us on our side to destroy the redoubts, divide the main force units, and keep them off balance while the Vietnamese on their side do the face to face, elbow to elbow, work of population security is the ideal division of labor. What we have so often talked about actually happened last Sunday—and it worked. 14. In Saigon there were no Americans on the streets, and the Vietnamese had their own city to themselves. This was good all around—especially for us who thus could not be accused of interference in elections. We kept our hand from showing all over the country. My orders to keep it a Vietnamese show and keep away from overt support were followed with great efficiency by all elements of this Mission. 15. We have heard no evidence of fraud in any of the fifty-two election districts. Several candidates known to be favored by the local authorities were defeated. Only twenty military men were elected, a fact that has stopped the rumor that the government planned to pack the convention with military delegates. 16. The Vietnamese people showed amazing courage in the face of record breaking attempts at terror. Embassy officers observed heavy voting at four Saigon polling stations which were grenaded on election eve. An eyewitness reported that in Tra Vinh the population trooped to the polls even while the area was under Viet Cong mortar fire. Only one polling area in the entire country suspended operations for security reasons. 17. The elections also showed the weakness of the militant Institute Buddhists, confirming a long standing suspicion of mine and, I hope, destroying a myth which some journalists have promoted. In addition to the September 6 press conference which I reported last week, 3 the Institute militants tried several times to launch anti-election demonstrations and strikes. There was no popular response, and the handful of monks involved were quickly dispersed in every case. 18. Catholic opposition did not materialize. Nothing was heard from Father Hoang Quynhʼs front of all religions for three weeks before the elections. The Catholic citizens bloc never made good on its threat to call for a boycott of the election. On the contrary, Catholic citizens and candidates were very active in the campaign. And thirty Catholic candidates were elected. (This compares with thirty-four candidates who are listed under the broad label of “Buddhists.”) 19. Cynics claim that most people went to the polls simply to avoid future difficulties with the authorities and that the Vietnamese people fear they will be required to show canceled voting cards whenever they come into contact with officialdom. No doubt this is part of the explanation. But if 80.8 percent of the registered voters went to the polls simply because the GVN pushed them into it, it at least shows that the GVN has some authority and standing with the great majority of the population. And adherence by the population to the government is what this political-military war is about. I believe it is nearer the truth to say that the average Vietnamese voter realized that the election was a major contest between the Viet Cong and free Vietnamese. Both sides impressed this fact on him. He made his choice. 20. The GVN not only conducted a most aggressive information campaign and handled military, police, and civil authorities to insure security with great skill; Ky showed political cleverness in his move to spike the Buddhist Instituteʼs guns by sending them a conciliatory letter on election eve and encouraging the Peoples Army Council to try to mediate Institute-GVN differences. He and other government leaders made a series of well timed statements and public appearances designed to arouse general enthusiasm for the elections. We, of course, had been quietly counseling these things on Ky and some of his principal advisors. 21. The convention is truly representative. Regional differences are very important to the Vietnamese, and the Southerners often complain that they are not sufficiently represented in the government. There are forty-four Southerners in the convention. Twenty-seven successful candidates come from North Vietnam, five from North-Central Vietnam, and twenty-three from Central Vietnam. There are four ethnic Cambodian representatives, eight Montagnard tribesmen, and four Chinese. The convention also includes all major Vietnamese religions. We know of thirty-four Buddhist, ten Hoa Hao, thirty Catholic, five Cao Dai, and seven Confucianists among the successful candidates. The others are not clearly identified by religion but probably include people who practice ancestor worship, or are nominal Buddhists or are animists. The convention will include twenty-three teachers, twenty-two businessmen, twenty military, eighteen civil servants, eight lawyers, five doctors, and seven farmers. Twenty-three members have had valuable experience in provincial or municipal councils. The convention will also benefit by the experience of such leading political figures as former chief of state Phan Khac Suu, Saigon City Council President La Thanh Nghe, newspaper publisher Dr. Dang Van Sung, and prominent politician Dr. Phan Quang Dan. 22. The Vietnamese have taken the first step toward stable, democratic government. They still have a long, long way to go. But what we saw on September 11 is reason for confidence. B. Pacification 23. On September 20, elements of the U.S. 25th Division will start pacification of Long An Province. This has been a longstanding dream of mine going back to 1963. At that time Long An was the only province in Viet-Nam which stretched from Cambodia across to the South China Sea. It has since been divided, but is still important. It is only eight miles south of the Saigon city limits and heavily populated. It will be the biggest test which U.S. troops will have had in fighting against guerrillas under urban conditions—a different thing from the war of movement in the unpopulated, high plateau. 24. I have always suspected that the Viet Cong have some of their toughest and ablest officers in Long An because it is so close to Saigon and has always been such a depressing place for us and, I imagine, an inspiring place for them. In pacifying Long An, we will have to depend on very effective police type measures, a precinct by precinct comb out, and, because it is so thickly settled, we will not be able to use our huge artillery capacity and our air power as we would normally do in open country. A long time ago, General Westmoreland and I agreed that this would be a great thing to do but we have never been strong enough to take it on. Now General Weyand has done so well in Hau Nghia to the west of Saigon that we are all encouraged that he can slip to the south of Saigon where the challenge is much greater. If he does, it should impress Ho Chi Minh. We are going to watch this operation very close to see what lessons we learn for further operations in heavily populated areas. C. Economic 25. Prices edged up on imported items this week, but the Saigon retail index was down two percent over last week and six percent over amonth ago. Main reason for the decline in the retail index was an increase in rice and pork deliveries in Saigon. Dollars dropped very slightly, from 167 last week to 166 this week. D. Military 26. Although they attempted to avoid contact with allied forces and concentrated on terror and small unit actions against the elections, the Viet Cong lost over 1,000 killed in action during the reporting period. The 1,166 Viet Cong killed in action this week compares with 885 for last week. All other military indices were favorable. 27. Major operations during the week included: (1) Prairie, a USMC three-battalion operation immediately south of the DMZ intended to thwart a Viet Cong build-up there; (2) Paul Revere III and Su Bok (ROK), search and destroy missions in the Highlands area southwest of Pleiku; (3) Baton Rouge, a combined search and destroy operation in Rung Sai special zone designed to reduce the threat to the Saigon ship channel, and (4) Dan Chi 261B, a continuation of operations Dan Chi 261 in Ba Xuyen/Bac Lieu Provinces conducted by the 21st ARVN Division. The last named operation was a major ARVN victory with cumulative results Dan Chi 261 and 261B—313 Viet Cong killed, 179 Viet Cong small arms, 11 crew served weapons, and nine tons of ammunition captured. E. Reaction to De Gaulleʼs Phnom Penh speech 4 28. Prime Minister Ky publicly castigated De Gaulle, and the Vietnamese press generally attacked the French President for his September Phnom Penh remarks. The De Gaulle speech was widely interpreted as a cynical attempt to re-establish French influence in Asia at the expense of Vietnamese freedom. 29. On September 8 two prominent French businessmen in Saigon were arrested on charges of financially aiding organizations which were trying to sabotage the elections. Ky said publicly that the money involved amounted to 50 million piasters and that if investigation showed the two men to be guilty they will be expelled and their businesses nationalized. Many in the French community regard the arrests as a response to the De Gaulle September 1 speech. F. Americans and Vietnamese killed 30. Final totals of Vietnamese civilians killed and wounded as a result of Viet Cong action during the period September 4 through 10 are not yet available. However, incomplete figures available to us now indicate that at least thirty-four civilians were killed and thirty-three wounded. If we add the 174 Vietnamese military killed during that period to the 34 Vietnamese civilians, the total Vietnamese killed by the Viet Cong is 208. This compares with the 50 Americans killed in the same period. 31. I have just obtained figures of Viet Cong killed in action and captured in the months February to August inclusive. During that period the ARVN killed 17,692 Viet Cong, and the U.S. killed 15,187. The ARVN captured 2,399 Viet Cong, and the U.S. captured 1,521. Free world forces killed 2,135, and captured 236. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of telegram 5970 to the President on September 14 under cover of a memorandum stating, “Herewith Lodgeʼs evaluation of the election—much like ours, but very interesting reading.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12) 2 September 11. 3 In telegram 5433, September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 On September 1, De Gaulle gave a speech in Phnom Penh, which, among other things, called on the United States to make a unilateral commitment to withdraw its forces from Vietnam by a fixed date. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 646–648. Lodge commented initially in telegram 5090, September 2, which Rostow forwarded to the President under cover of a September 2 memorandum giving Ruskʼs and his own views on how the United States should react. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 12) 230. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms 230. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, September 14, 1966. SUBJECT Comments on Vietnamese Election Results 1. The unexpectedly high vote in the 11 September elections represents a resounding success for the GVNʼs efforts to turn out the vote in the face of Viet Cong intimidation and a threatened boycott by Buddhist extremists. It cannot be construed, however, as a ringing endorsement of the GVN as presently constituted, nor as a political repudiation of the Viet Cong though the Communists have lost considerable face and the lie has been given to their exaggerated claims of “control”. While the election does mark a significant step forward in the establishment of representative governmental institutions, it is only the first of many steps required in the evolution toward the viable political base which is essential to the success of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. 2. The official returns reported by the GVN probably are generally reliable, although they may have been padded in some cases by local officials. In retrospect, several factors operated to bring about a higher turnout than that recorded, for example, in the 1965 elections. The most important of these was the unprecedented GVN program aimed at registering the electorate and publicizing the election. Bolstering this was the “command interest” in the elections throughout the Vietnamese civil and military structure which was demonstrated in terms of briefings and inspections of local preparations, and emphasis at all echelons on the need to turn out the vote. As a result, the electorate was probably more aware of its “responsibility” than in most previous Vietnamese elections. 3. The turnout does not necessarily reflect support for the GVN nor opposition to the Viet Cong, because these were not issues confronting the voter. In effect, his participation was not merely solicited, but actively arranged by the full energies of the GVN administrative and security apparatus in a demonstration of what that apparatus can do when directed toward accomplishing a single, uncomplicated task. This, in itself, is encouraging when measured against the normal inadequacies and relatively ineffectual performance of that apparatus. 4. The failure of Viet Cong efforts to sabotage the elections can be described as a case of their once again biting off more than they could chew in the political-psychological field. Given the GVNʼs massive effort to turn out the vote in essentially government-controlled areas, the improved effectiveness of GVN intelligence, and the elaborate and extensive security arrangements to protect the balloting, the Communist efforts were bound to be largely ineffectual. Viet Cong plans, intentions and techniques for disrupting the elections were known in advance by GVN authorities in some detail, and appropriate countermeasures were taken. Although most voters probably were aware of Viet Cong threats, their sense of “responsibility” and awareness of government security measures probably led them to minimize their individual vulnerability at the polls. In any event, although the Viet Cong capped the week-end buildup of anti-election terrorism with a widespread display of harassments and terror incidents, including mortar fire on at least four provincial capitals and eight district towns on election day, the voters were not dissuaded from going to the polls. The Communists lost considerable face because of their inability to enforce much-proclaimed opposition. 5. The virtual collapse of the Buddhist boycott was telegraphed well before election day by the evident confusion and dissension within their hierarchy in Saigon and in the provinces. These factors are a carry-over from the ill-fated struggle movement earlier this year, which clearly demonstrated the political bankruptcy and increasing isolation of the Buddhist extremist elements, who seem to have lost their ability to either guide or reflect the desires of the masses. To many Vietnamese, the opposition of the radical Buddhist leaders was irrational, since the elections had been the direct result of Buddhist demands. Although the Buddhists still have some potential for mass political action if they can heal the differences within their hierarchy, they are not now the dominant force in Vietnamese politics they once were. 6. The elections have produced a body which is charged with drafting a constitution which will establish the institutional framework of a future Vietnamese Government. But many potential obstacles remain before any new governmental institutions take shape and a viable political base is attained. There are many ways in which this new body may make mischief for the GVN, and vice versa, as the Vietnamese grope for an acceptable political formula. Even when new legal institutions are established, ways must be found to ensure their stability and continuity under conditions of civil war, increasing U.S. involvement in that war, and the latent war-weariness and cynicism of the populace. In short, the elections represent only the initial—and perhaps the easiest—step in the long and difficult but essential process of creating a political base sufficiently strong, dynamic, and appealing to undergird the pacification effort and contest the Viet Cong apparatus for political control in the countryside. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/EA Files, Job 78–05505A, Area Activity-Far East-Memos Re Agency Planning. Secret. The memorandum was produced by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence and was drafted by George W. Allen. 231. Intelligence Note From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 231. Intelligence Note From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 14, 1966. No. 569 SUBJECT Assessment of Current Situation in North Vietnam Our assessment of the impact of the war on Hanoi leads us to believe that the strains are severe but not unbearable. The North Vietnamese people appear somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime has no evident difficulty in exercising effective control. The leadership has debated alternate strategies for conducting the war in the South but has not deviated from basic policy goals. Bombing has seriously disrupted North Vietnamʼs small modern industrial sector as well as seaborne foreign trade, but has not materially interfered with the maintenance of adequate lines of communications. While some shortages of consumer goods exist, the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for minimal needs. Some evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently. Morale and Central Government Control . Our intelligence on popular attitudes in North Vietnam is understandably spotty. However, what can be gleaned from various sources indicates that there is some dissatisfaction with hardships, as there always has been, but there is no serious dissidence. Although some war-weariness undoubtedly exists, the populace has an attitude toward the war that varies between enthusiastic support and resignation. Interrogations of prisoners in the South indicate that recruits for operations in South Vietnam start out in a state of high morale. The North Vietnamese regime has also been able to exploit nationalist sentiments and the instinct for self-preservation in order to impose an unprecedented degree of mobilization on the people, so as to insure the continuation of vital transport and essential production. There is no evidence that any significant portion of the population blames the Hanoi regime for the bombing. Instead “US imperialism” is the focus of hatred. Although some of the people realize that American bombers are concentrating on military targets, most appear to believe that the strikes are aimed at civilian targets as well. A number of reports show that considerable evacuation of city dwellers to rural districts has taken place without substantial discontent. Nor is there any evidence to suggest the central government is experiencing difficulties maintaining control over areas outside of Hanoi. The Leadership . Evidence of major disagreements within the leadership, notably Defense Minister Giapʼs alleged loss of influence, is tenuous and difficult to assess. However, in a number of recent polemical articles there have been clear hints of past and continuing disagreements over proper strategy in thwarting the strengthened US/GVN forces in the South. One side apparently argued unsuccessfully for a more cautious military policy against those who advocated maintaining an aggressive posture. There is no evidence, however, that the dispute involved a more fundamental change in political strategy, such as an effort to get negotiations underway. The Economy . It seems evident that North Vietnamʼs small heavy industrial sector has been seriously affected by the bombing. Since mid-1965 Hanoi has been concentrating its productive efforts in dispersed light industry and agriculture while relying on outside assistance for the essential products of heavy industry. According to the North Vietnamese press, light industry is producing at about the same level as in early 1965. Poor weather, the disruption caused by bombing, and other priority calls for transport combined to reduce substantially procurement from the spring crop. It seems likely that the same factors will adversely affect the harvest now underway. Despite Hanoiʼs denials, the Chinese have provided small quantities of rice. Visitors to Hanoi and intercepted letters from North Vietnamese in the countryside indicate that sufficient food is available. The rice ration has not been reduced, but meat is quite scarce. Western medicines are in particularly short supply. There are conflicting reports about the availability of consumer goods and textiles, but these appear adequate for minimal needs. Prices are kept low to guard against inflation, although the average workerʼs buying power is insufficient to allow a run on goods. Although the bombing of Haiphong has made off-loading more difficult, communist shipping continues to bring in supplies at a high rate. In July 1966 seaborne imports of goods other than petroleum reached the record volume of 80,500 tons, 76 percent of which arrived on Soviet ships. (Non-communist shipping is now almost nonexistent.) Strikes on transportation routes have all but halted North Vietnamʼs two principal exports, anthracite coal and apatite. Petroleum products are being imported by rail and sea at a level somewhat reduced from the high of last spring, but the supply is ample for North Vietnamʼs needs. Although distribution patterns have changed, there is no evidence of any shortage of POL as a result of the concerted bombing effort. DIA estimates that the entire country has POL stocks (most in small, dispersed storage areas) to meet normal civilian/military needs for two months and that two medium-sized tankers a month will be able to supply North Vietnamʼs needs. According to a recent CIA study, 2 the internal transportation system is now running more efficiently, though at obviously greater cost in manpower, than before the US bombing program began. Ingenious methods of repair and alternate means of communication, based in part on the Korean experience, have ensured the maintenance of adequate communication and rendered the transportation system increasingly less vulnerable to interdiction. Civil Defense and Evacuation . The North Vietnamese are keenly aware of the need for continually improving their civil defense. An August 7 Nhan Dan editorial stresses the importance of digging shelters and communications trenches, evacuating urban areas, dispersing offices and living quarters of those remaining in the cities, and preventing resettlement areas from becoming densely populated zones. Evacuation of some citizens, industries, and government ministries from Hanoi has taken place throughout the summer. Possibly about 40% of the populace had been evacuated by late August, although this figure must be weighed in light of other reports that many people apparently move out of the city during the day, but return at night, in part owing to the lack of accommodations in the countryside. Canadian ICC reports 3 describe a large-scale section-by-section evacuation of old people and children, with priority given those living near bridges and dams. Some government ministries have been relocated (probably to a limestone region near Phu Ly, whose caves and grottos were used by the Viet Minh in the war against the French) and retail store hours have been ordered cut to reduce daytime activity in Hanoi. 1 Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam, September 1966. Secret. 2 Not further identified. 3 Not further identified. 232. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 232. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 15, 1966, 9:30 a.m. Mr. President: A reflection on bombing the North. 1. Clearly, bombing the North has not stopped infiltration to the South; although it may have set a limit on the scale of military operations in the South. For example, the Laos road net has been expanded, with great effort, to a capacity of 400 tons a day. A recent report 2 indicates it is only being used at a rate of 80–100 tons a day. 2. Clearly, bombing the North as we have done it has not, by itself, brought Hanoi to the conference table; nor has anything else we have done by way of military, civil, or diplomatic action. 3. What has it done? It has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese. Bombing in the North is our equivalent of Viet Cong guerrilla operations in the South: —It engages a large amount of civil manpower (2–300,000), and substantial military resources and foreign aid in countering damage and air defense. —It imposes economic stagnation or decline. —It imposes a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time. —It limits normal shipping to North Vietnam. —It assures that the bulk of external assistance is to shore up North Vietnam rather than increase its thrust against the South. 4. Again—bombing as we have conducted it—is not a decisive instrument any more than the guerrilla operations in the South are a decisive instrument. But if it werenʼt hurting we would not have either the vast effort at air defense in the North or the extraordinary diplomatic and psychological effort to force us to stop bombing without conditions. 5. Put another way, without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off. I keep close by me all the time the November 1962 interview in the Saturday Evening Post 3 with the Hanoi leaders, the punch line of which was this: “Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win.” A cessation of bombing in the North would make it much easier for them to make that judgment stick. 6. Therefore: —I am against taking the heat off the North: we should stay with oil and steady pressure on transport; —I believe we should be studying ways to increase the pressure on the North at the right time in the future; —We should not diminish our pressure on the North without a fully adequate quid pro quo in the South. 7. I add an amateur political judgment: a “pause” during the campaign, without solid evidence that a move towards peace will promptly follow, could be quite dangerous during the campaign, as well as providing evidence of over-anxiety and lack of perseverance to Hanoi. 4 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam—W.W. Rostow. Top Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Not further identified. 3 Bernard B. Fall, “Master of the Red Jab,” Saturday Evening Post , 235 (November 24, 1962), pp. 18–21. 4 McNamara handwrote the following note in the margin of the source text, next to this paragraph: “I am inclined to agree that a ‘pause’ prior to November would be unwise.” 233. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird) 233. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Director of the Defense Communications Agency (Starbird) 1 Washington, September 15, 1966. SUBJECT Infiltration Interdiction System for Vietnam An infiltration interdiction system, to stop (or at a minimum to substantially reduce) the flow of men and supplies from North to South Vietnam, is to be designed, produced, and put in place in South Vietnam and Laos as a matter of highest priority. You are hereby named Director of Joint Task Force 728 to achieve the objective of having the system installed and in operation by September 15, 1967. The present concept, which may have to be modified as your work progresses, is summarized on the attached sheet. 2 To make this system work: There will be required experimentation and further development for such features as foliage penetration, moisture resistance, and proper dispersion of gravel; development of a better acoustic sensor than currently exists; aircraft modifications; possible modifications in BLU–26B fusing; refinement of strike-navigation tactics; and total system tests. Production of components will have to be increased, personnel will have to be trained, a unit and command structure to operate and supply the system will have to be created, and a doctrine for its operation will have to be developed. Communist infiltration practices and the location of civilian populations will have to be studied. Political groundwork will have to be laid. Public relations questions will have to be addressed. 3 Furthermore, to keep ahead of countermeasures, new components of the system and new tactics will have to be under development even before the first generation system is installed. In carrying out your duties as Director of the Joint Task Force, you will report directly to me and are authorized direct contact with the JCS, the Military Services, and subordinate organizations. Dr. Foster (DDR&E) will represent me as necessary to assist you in the achievement of your assignment. Implementation will involve political affairs and matters of concern to ISA, the State Department and foreign governments; you should therefore keep Mr. McNaughton (ASD/ISA) fully informed and call on him for assistance as necessary in those areas. I expect you to make use of an advisory group of non-governmental experts, including Dr. George Kistiakowsky. You will keep the Chairman, JCS fully informed as to the status and progress of your work. You should immediately establish a project office and submit to me by September 29 an outline of a program for carrying out your task. This program should include the approximate time schedule you plan to meet over the next twelve months; preliminary estimates of your needs in personnel, equipment and facilities; and an initial plan of your proposed organization. The existence and operations of the Joint Task Force should be kept confidential. You are to feel free to call on me as necessary for resources, guidance, decisions, and any other assistance. Robert S. McNamara Attachment CONCEPT FOR INFILTRATION INTERDICTION SYSTEM FOR VIETNAM The system would have two different parts—one part designed against foot traffic and the other against vehicles. The location for the anti-foot-traffic part would be in South Vietnam along the southern edge (outside) of the DMZ to the Laotian border and then on westward, north of Tchepone, to the vicinity of Muong Sen. Except for the portion nearest the sea, the area involved is virtually unpopulated and the terrain is quite rugged. The location for the anti-vehicle part of the system would be the area, about 100 kilometers north-south and 40 kilometers east-west, covering the road networks in eastern Laos from north of Mu Gia Pass to south of Route 9. The eastern end of the anti-foot-traffic part would be a wide ground barrier of mine fields, concertina, fences, sensing devices, patrols and air-mobile troops. The remainder of the anti-foot-traffic system and all of the anti-vehicle system would be effectuated entirely by air actions. The first generation of the anti-foot-traffic part of the interdiction system would involve a combination of non-sterilizing gravel mines for area denial off the trails where sweeping would be difficult, gravel mines plus “button bomblets” on the trails to harass and to signal acoustic sensors, acoustic detectors to pinpoint explosions caused by infiltrators, and Sadeye/BLU–26B clusters for saturation attacks on areas where infiltrators were detected. The mined area—which would constantly be reseeded—would encompass a strip about 100 by 5 kilometers. The sensor patterns, laid through and around this field would be monitored 24 hours a day by patrol aircraft, which could call in strike aircraft on a few momentʼs notice. The first generation of the anti-vehicle system would consist of acoustic detectors, supplemented by gravel mines, distributed along all truckable roads in the zone; 24-hours-a-day monitoring by patrol aircraft; and strike aircraft using SADEYE prepared to respond to signals that trucks had been located. The cost of both parts of such an initial system has been estimated to be about $800 million per year, and the key requirements to be approximately 20 million gravel mines per month, 25 million button bomblets per month, 10,000 SADEYE/BLU–26B clusters per month, 1600 acoustic sensors per month, 70 appropriately equipped PO2V patrol aircraft, 20 mine-dispensing C–123s, 500 strike sorties per month, and sufficient photo reconnaissance to cover 2500 square miles a week. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, VIET 385 BARRIER. Secret. 2 The concept summarized in the attachment was drawn from the study, “Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Barrier,” August 1966, prepared by the Jason Division of the Institute of Defense Analyses. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2D, Barrier) For background information on the study, see Document 163 and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , vol. IV, pp. 115–123. 3 Fosterʼs memorandum for the record of a meeting on the barrier, September 6, attended by McNamara, McNaughton, Kistiakowsky, and other members of the Jason study team, indicates that “note was taken of a number of serious non-technical problems, including possible added dangers to Laos and Thailand; the CINCPAC, MAC–V and Ambassador Sullivanʼs attitudes; and the possibility of premature leakage to the press.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER) 234. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Largeʼs Special Assistant (Cooper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 234. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Largeʼs Special Assistant (Cooper) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, September 16, 1966. I met today with Bill Colby and Mr. Stone from the Agency. Stone is in charge of the “Intelligence Division” of CIAʼs station in Saigon. He has been here for several days and was returning to Saigon this evening. All the activities in connection with the Viet Cong are handled by Stone. (The other major division of the Agency in Saigon deals with the pacification cadres.) 2 Stone discussed in some detail their plans and their progress in the area of Viet Cong defections. He indicated that the Agency has made some inroads into the Front and Viet Cong apparat. Eight Province Committees have thus far been penetrated. Other things being equal, the Agency prefers to keep a defector “in place”, i.e. to have him ostensibly remain in the Viet Cong and meanwhile report valuable intelligence. They anticipate, however, as their program moves forward they will get an increasing number of Front officials who will prefer for many reasons, including their own safety, to “come over”. Stone was quite confident that they would have at least a few of these chaps in hand before very long. I told Colby and Stone of our hopes and plans for a large-scale amnesty program and our desire to have this go hand in hand with a stepped-up effort at defections. They welcomed this and indicated that it might be possible to line up some significant defections that would be timed to take place at the most dramatic moment following Kyʼs appeal. I cautioned Stone to do some quiet thinking and planning but to keep our conversation to himself until Lodge was informed directly from Washington of what we had in mind. I gave a copy of our amnesty memorandum 3 to Colby who later in the day called me back and said that he was in perfect agreement with it. Chester L. Cooper 4 1 Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Secret. A copy was sent to Unger. 2 In an undated report on CIA operations in East Asia through 1966, the Department of Stateʼs Bureau of Intelligence and Research stated the following regarding programs in Vietnam: “CIA has remained responsible for several political and social projects which originally had some intelligence potential. The Revolutionary Development program (which is to be funded in part by AID), the Chieu Hoi program, and Census/Grievance teams are run by CIA. In addition the Agency supports and trains various police and intelligence organizations. Veterans, labor, youth, and student organizations in Vietnam are being given guidance and support.” The report noted that “the cost of the Vietnam program is approximately $30,000,000 per year, not including any funds which will be supplied by AID.” (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, EAP General, EA Reviews, 1964–66) 3 Reference is to Cooperʼs draft paper, “A Program of National Reconciliation and Reconstruction,” which was discussed at length at a meeting of Harrimanʼs Negotiations Committee on September 15. Harrimanʼs record of the discussion is ibid., S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Vietnam Negotiations, 1968. A September 29 draft of Cooperʼs paper is ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, September 17, 1966. JCSM–594–66 SUBJECT Proposal for Barrier Systems (U) 1 (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the concept for an infiltration barrier system which was forwarded to them by your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966, 2 subject as above, and they have noted your directive to Lieutenant General Starbird, Director, Defense Communications Agency, dated 15 September 1966. 3 2. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the historic use of barriers and the potential inherent in this concept. The imaginative use of technology and surprise can contribute considerably toward solving the infiltration problem. While the capability of the system to meet the objective established for the system is subject to determination, the development of its component parts and operational techniques will be useful regardless of the success of the entire project. Your directive to General Starbird provides adequate direction, flexibility, authority, and control. It is requested that the project definition as developed by General Starbird be submitted to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3. (TS) The views of CINCPAC, incorporating those of his component commanders and COMUSMACV, have been received (CINCPAC 130705Z September 1966, JCS IN 99920). 4 CINCPAC affirms that any measure that will effectively impede and disrupt the flow of men and material into South Vietnam merits careful consideration, and he recommends the development of the components of the system regardless of the decision to proceed. CINCPAC questions the practicality of the concept as presented. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate and share the concern behind his reservations but recognize that these issues could be resolved by rigorous determination of feasibility that must precede execution or commitment of resources. 4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the barrier concept, as set forth in your memorandum, dated 3 September 1966, is not offered as a substitute to any major US or Free World military effort in North or South Vietnam. They concur. It is important that logistical support for the barrier be of a scale that precludes diverting critical munitions and strike forces from other combat operations. 5. (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the system deployment date given to General Starbird is optimistic. However, they recognize that the concept may have the potential of shortening the war and that proceeding in the manner directed will provide a quick determination of concept validity and accelerated development of associated hardware. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4662, VIET 385 BARRIER. Top Secret. In an earlier memorandum to McNamara, CM–135–66, April 18, Wheeler recommended against construction of a barrier and forwarded “A Study of Feasibility and Requirements for a Counter Infiltration Barrier” in support of his view. (Ibid.) 2 In this memorandum McNamara stated that he was “inclined to believe that the proposal has sufficient merit to warrant a decision that we will accept the plan or some modification thereof in principle.” (Ibid.) Attached to McNamaraʼs memorandum was a 6-page excerpt from the study noted in footnote 2, Document 233 . 3 Document 233 . 4 In telegram 130705Z, September 13, Sharp devoted eight paragraphs to questioning the barrierʼs practicality, doubting that it “would impede infiltration, even initially” or “appreciably improve the U.S. position in SVN.” He emphasized, among other things, that its establishment and maintenance would likely involve tremendous amounts of time, effort, manpower, and material and require either the “introduction of large numbers of additional forces” or the diversion of land and air forces needed for revolutionary development and ongoing air operations. In addition, the considerable force required to man the static barrier would be vulnerable to attack by a mobile enemy from both north and south. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966) 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, September 17, 1966, 6:17 p.m. 49407. From Secretary. Refs: A. State 27973; B. Saigon 3130; C. State 23182; 2 D. Saigon 1350. 3 1. We here are intensely interested in moving ahead rapidly on long-er range program directed toward VC discussed reftels. In favorable atmosphere surrounding highly successful Constituent Assembly elections, believe moment propitious, if you have not already had opportunity broach subject in pursuance Stateʼs 27973, to open dialogue with GVN on this whole subject. 2. With respect to timing, we are thinking in terms of Ky launching a call for “national reconciliation” on November 1, which would appear to be logical date since it is SVN National Day. On other hand, if earlier date would be feasible and appropriate, this would be even better. Appeal in effect would have various purposes, within SVN and internationally, which were outlined Reftel C, para 5. We accept that in present time frame chances of accomplishment better in field of encouraging defections and fomenting divisions among VC than in leading to discussions with VC/NLF as organization concerning wind-up of insurgency. We recognize of course that this appeal must be carefully worded in order to maximize psychological impact on VC without damaging current SVN fledgling political development process now so well begun. Appreciate your comment on foregoing. 4 3. With respect amnesty and defection questions we are developing some specific proposals for action which will be forwarded to you shortly. These include points which would, as appropriate, be covered in Prime Ministerʼs call for “national reconciliation.” Subject to your views, we would have in mind sending out two or three people very soon to elaborate on Washington thinking on these proposals and to stay longer to assist as you deemed useful. 4. Re idea of leaving local VC administration temporarily undisturbed (para 4, Ref A), see Unger-Furlonger August 11 memcon, 5 pouched Saigon; this provides some elaboration our ideas on this subject. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Lake, Miller, and Unger; cleared in substance by Cooper and Jorden; and approved by Rusk and Unger. 2 See Document 203 and footnote 6 thereto. 3 Dated July 19. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LVI) 4 Lodge replied in telegram 6423, September 20, that he would initiate the dialog with the GVN. Regarding the call for national reconciliation, he concurred on the timing and noted that he now envisaged its principal purpose to be to “encourage defections and foment division among VC,” since he saw no chance now that it could be used to open contacts between the GVN and the VC. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) 5 Not further identified. 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, September 18, 1966. 6280. 1. DʼOrlandi had a meeting with Lewandowski Friday night. 2 It started as a social affair on DʼOrlandiʼs invitation and on Lewandowskiʼs initiative became a discussion of the war. According to Orlandi, Lewandowski said the following: 2. The United States Government is not really interested in talks. He said he had reason to believe that the State Department is trying to promote talks elsewhere along lines having to do with the revision of the Geneva Convention. Therefore, he says, the United States doesnʼt care about talks in Saigon. He heard there might be another attempt by Ronning. This would be hopeless. What we do not need are messengers carrying bits of paper but men who are inventive and imaginative and out of whose conversations something creative could come. With this as a preface Lewandowski went on to say: 3. Obviously he cannot give any kind of guarantee and no one else can—“not even Kosygin”—but should any kind of a reasonable proposal emerge he would take the first plane to Hanoi and put it in the best possible way. 4. Averting to what the nature of such a proposal should be, Lewandowski said that it was very simple and very easy to agree on “immortal principles” and grandiose platitudes such as “we love peace in Viet Nam,” etc. It is the practical application which presents insurmountable difficulties. 5. If the Americans ever really cared, they should especially concentrate on Pham Van Dongʼs fourth point concerning “who is to speak for South Viet Nam.” This does not mean that Hanoi would be trying to ram the Viet Cong down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a coalition government, the bulk of which would be made up of “sensible South Vietnamese politicians.” To preserve appearances you could have “on the fringes” men from the “right” in one or two “unimportant Ministries” and from on the “left” fill one or two “unimportant Ministries with the so-called NLF.” 6. DʼOrlandi—this is unthinkable. If this is what you want to talk about, it is better for us to stop the talks. 7. Lewandowski asked whether DʼOrlandi realized that what he meant to say was that this would be the last step not the first. 8. DʼOrlandi said: What would be the ultimate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet Nam, I wonʼt even submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge. 9. Lewandowski said that is not at all what he meant to put to DʼOrlandi. Plainly, the ultimate aim would be: “To make of South Viet Nam a second Cambodia.” 10. DʼOrlandi said that makes more sense, it is at least worth talking about. 11. Lewandowski said: “But I donʼt believe the Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two things at once: military escalation grouped with political proposals. You canʼt do both. So long that they wonʼt make up their minds, we canʼt do anything. We must wait until November. 12. Comment: It is clear that the criticism of the United States for engaging in military escalation and political proposals at the same time is thoroughly disingenuous. Orlandi senses that Lewandowski realizes that the only possible chance for significant talks is that our military success should grow. End of comment . 13. DʼOrlandi fixed on Lewandowskiʼs statement about waiting until November to say that the more you postpone the worse things will get for you. If you had started having discussions a year ago when the Americans were much less numerous you would be in much better shape today. 14. Lewandowski said what I have said is my considered opinion. The Americans should produce some evidence that they are using their imagination. Why should we do it all? 15. DʼOrlandi said—Doesnʼt this mean that you donʼt care any longer to be in touch with me? 16. Lewandowski said: No, I want to be in touch with you, but when it comes to our tripartite talks, thatʼs how I see it. That is why I say we may all be in a better position in November. 17. Comment: As the Department is aware I have been thinking that there would be no real talks until after our November elections although I have also considered and still do think that the time between now and then can be useful for the formulation and consideration of ideas. Lew-andowskiʼs technique seems to be to say how hopeless it all is and how there is no use in going on and then sliding something in sort of at an angle, in this case a status for Vietnam similar to that of Cambodia. As I understand it, the problem has never been any difficulty with the idea of South Viet Nam being eventually neutral. The trouble has been that she wasnʼt strong enough to be neutral. The very weak cannot be neutral. The second difficulty has been that North Vietnam did not want her to be neutral but wanted to conquer her. End of comment. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not give the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:57 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 253–254. 2 September 16. 238. Research Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 238. Research Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 18, 1966. RSB–89 SUBJECT Soviet World-Wide Demarches on Vietnam Seek to Isolate the US and Deter Escalation Soviet diplomats have been active in recent weeks in pressing Moscowʼs views on Vietnam. In this paper we sort out the diverse and occasionally inconsistent elements of the Soviet demarches to governments other than the US. Abstract The USSR has approached a large number of governments in the past six weeks on the Vietnam issue. This campaign has not indicated any shift in Moscowʼs position on the settlement of the war and may be the prelude to a Soviet effort at the forthcoming UN General Assembly to generate opposition to US policies in Vietnam. The Soviet demarches appear intended to isolate the US on the Vietnam issue, to discourage the US from further escalation of the war, and to underline Soviet support for Hanoi and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). In a number of cases, these demarches appear intended primarily to intensify pressures on the US to desist from further intensification of the war by citing the potential dangers of Chinese or even Soviet intervention. These demarches and recent Soviet propaganda have shown a concern at the possibility that the war might spread into Laos and Cambodia. The Indian delegation left the USSR after Mrs. Gandhiʼs visit in July convinced that Moscowʼs major fear was that the extension of the war into these countries would lead to Chinese intervention. Kosygin, moreover, warned Mrs. Gandhi that World War III would result if the US crossed the 17th parallel, stating that the USSR would have to stand by its ally. On a number of occasions, Soviet officials have mentioned the possibility of “volunteers.” Soviet statements about the precise type of American escalation which it might hope to deter has been deliberately vague, since Moscow has not wished to imply approval for some further American step to intensify the war. Soviet emphasis has varied over time, primarily as it has responded to events. Thus, at the time of Mrs. Gandhiʼs visit, Kosygin stressed the dangers inherent in an invasion of North Vietnam at a moment when North Vietnamese infiltration through the DMZ was getting underway. At other times, when Western press reports have mentioned mining Haiphong, the Soviets have given public indications of their concern on that score. A general step up in Soviet emphasis upon Moscowʼs aid to the North Vietnamese air-defense effort has reflected Soviet concern over the relatively poor showing of the SA–2s as well as over the possibility of American extension of bombing beyond the POL facilities to include populated centers. Finally, press reports in the West about operations in Laos and Thailand have evoked expressions of Soviet concern over the prospect of the warʼs spreading to the rest of Southeast Asia. In other cases, the Soviets have used these demarches to indicate opposition to negotiations as long as Hanoi refuses them. The Soviet leaders continue to resist efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference or to bring about negotiations under any other aegis until Hanoi is ready for them. Gromyko told the Japanese in late July that the USSR had not and would not act as an intermediary. Gromyko asserted that the solution of the war must be found among the participants. This position was probably not meant to be taken literally as the Soviets have given some evidence of a concern about a peace settlement which would exclude them from Indochinese affairs. Rather, Gromyko merely sought to emphasize Moscowʼs position that it will take no initiative on a peaceful settlement until Hanoi indicates that it desires negotiations. The theme of full support for Hanoi is reflected also in Soviet public statements which seek to refute Chinese charges of Soviet indifference to the North Vietnamese cause. Recent publicity of pilot training given North Vietnamese in the USSR and of the alleged effectiveness of Soviet surface-to-air missiles are examples of Soviet efforts to demonstrate the extent and effectiveness of the support given Hanoi. Both private and public Soviet statements, then, are intended to convey the same message that Moscow is wholly loyal to Hanoi and will not take any step not already acceptable to the North Vietnamese. This message, while limited in scope, reflects continued Soviet desire to exert a voice in any future Vietnamese settlement. This concern reflects Soviet determination, since the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, to play a significant role in Far Eastern affairs. This determination has led Moscow to render Hanoi extensive economic and military aid as well as full diplomatic support. Having chosen this course, the Soviets find few diplomatic options open to them as long as Hanoi refuses to consider negotiations on any terms other than its own. [Here follows the body of the memorandum, including a list of 29 Soviet demarches on Vietnam during July and August 1966.] 1 Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives—Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. September 19–November 27: Manila Conference; Debates Over Pacification and Stabilization of the War September 19–November 27: Manila Conference; Debates Over Pacification and Stabilization of the War 239. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 19, 1966, 1:20 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIX. Top Secret; Sensitive. 240. Editorial Note 241. Draft Paper by the Presidentʼs Special Assistants (Rostow and Komer) Washington, September 20, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13. Secret. Forwarded to the President by Rostow on September 28 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the strategy paper which Bob Komer and I put together and talked over with Bill Bundy. We are all in basic agreement.” (Ibid.) Also sent to Komer and William Bundy. 242. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:15 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS Trip, vol. 1. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:58 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/Thrush. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Thrush. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rostow in substance; and approved by Ball. 244. Editorial Note 245. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, September 22, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. McNaughton sent copies of this draft memorandum to Ball, Gaud, Helms, Marks, Wheeler, and Komer under cover of a September 22 memorandum, in which he stated that McNamara had been asked to prepare a draft reorganization of pacification responsibilities and wanted to discuss his draft memorandum the following week with a view to having it ready for the President during the first week of October. (Ibid.) 246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb Harriman—Negotiations Comm. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 247. Memorandum of Conversation New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30–11 p.m. Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on September 26 by William D. Krimer of the Language Services Division, Department of State. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. A memorandum prepared on September 30 in the Bureau of European Affairs analyzed “new elements” in Gromykoʼs conversation with Rusk. (Ibid.)/1/ 248. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, September 28, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, McNamara Project. Secret/Sensitive. 249. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, September 29, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Gaud, Marks, and Helms. 250. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Moyers) to President Johnson Washington, September 30, 1966, 6:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill Moyers, BDM Memos, Sept. 1966–Feb. 1967. No classification marking. 251. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman-Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis. 252. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, S/S Miscellaneous Vietnam Reports: Lot 70 D 48, Briefing Materials on Vietnam. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Unger. 253. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, October 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on October 1 under cover of a memorandum suggesting that he read it and calling Ginsburgh a “superb JCS liaison officer” who “has made important contributions to our work on negotiating positions” and other Vietnam issues. (Ibid.) 254. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, October 2, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC. McNamara visited Vietnam October 10–13, accompanied by, among others, Katzenbach, Wheeler, McNaughton, and Komer. 255. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, October 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 9:30 a.m. on October 4 under cover of a memorandum stating that he concurred with McNamaraʼs recommendation. (Ibid.) During a telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President indicated that he had read McNamaraʼs memorandum and thought his decision was justified but also thought McNamara should get the Joint Chiefs and their adherents to point out how disastrous it would be for the United States to inaugurate a new policy of this type during the closing days of Congress and on the eve of the Manila Conference, and “how the propaganda people would just wreck us.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.27, Side B, PNO 2) 256. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, October 3, 1966, 2:35 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS Trip, vol. 1. No classification marking. 257. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 3, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 1 p.m. on October 4. In his covering memorandum he expressed his doubts that the Russians had the “power to make Hanoi end the war” and his opposition either to abandoning the hardware option or to letting the Germans “off the hook on balance of payments offsets.” (Ibid.) 258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, October 4, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:08 a.m. 259. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 4, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Secret. 260. Editorial Note 261. Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Approved in S on October 12. The meeting was held at USUN. 262. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, October 5, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, July-Dec. 1966. Secret. Komer sent a copy of the memorandum to Katzenbach on November 29 under a covering memorandum stating that he believed it had “had considerable impact.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 263. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 6, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, McNamara Project. Secret. 264. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Approved in the White House on October 13. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, lasted from 5 to 6:41 p.m. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) The President discussed his meeting with Gromyko in a telephone conversation with Senator Fulbright that began at 5:20 p.m. on October 11. Both a recording and a transcript of the conversation are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F66.28, PNO 2; the transcript is in Chron Series. 265. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 11, 1966. Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives, DRV North Vietnam. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. 266. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson Washington, October 13, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. No classification marking. 267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk Washington, October 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman—Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis. 268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, October 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 348–355. McNamara submitted the report to the President after visiting Vietnam October 10–13. 269. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. McNamara noted on his copy of the memorandum that it was received at 8:50 a.m. on October 15 and that a copy was sent to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966) 270. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 15, 1966. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job. 80–B01285A. Top Secret. Helms forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McNamara under cover of an October 16 memorandum, stating that it resulted “from a detailed analysis undertaken by the seven top officers in the Agency on Vietnam” and “had been reviewed by the Deputy Directors involved as well as the undersigned.” On his copy of the memorandum, McNamara wrote: “Prepared by Dick [Helms] at my request.” (Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII) 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, October 15, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, vol. IX. Top Secret. 272. Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council Washington, October 15, 1966, 2:40–3:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, October 16, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:59 a.m. 274. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) Washington, October 17, 1966, 2139Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 275. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:30–7:30 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved in S on October 19. The meeting was held in Ruskʼs office. In a letter to Bruce, October 18, Bundy explained that the meeting flowed from a “rather painful dinner party” on October 15 at which George Brown pressed Bundy and McNamara relentlessly for the “minimum terms” on which the United States would stop the bombing and claimed that what they told him “did not square with what he had been told by the President.” (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, October 19, 1966, 1230Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, October 19, 1966, 8 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by McNamara, Katzenbach, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington, eyes only for the President through Rostow. The President left Washington October 17 for an extended trip through Asia. He visited New Zealand October 19–20; Australia October 20–23; the Philippines October 24–26, where he attended the Manila Conference (see Document 281); Cam Ranh Bay October 26 where he visited U.S. military personnel; Thailand October 27–30; Malaysia October 30–31; and Korea October 31–November 2. He returned to Washington November 2. 278. Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms Washington, October 20, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 350.09 Vietnam. Secret. In his October 20 covering memorandum to Helms, Kent stated that “on the whole, we think the chances are better than even that the crisis will be compromised in some fashion which will limit the damage and leave Ky about where he is.” 279. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, October 22, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and approved in U on November 7. 280. Notes of Meeting Manila, October 23, 1966, 9:15–10:15 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Asian Trip Memcons. Secret. Drafted by Rostow (identified as WWR in the notes). The meeting was held in the Manila Hotel. Rusk, Lodge, Komer, and Westmoreland attended along with the President. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) President Johnson arrived in Manila about 3 p.m. on October 23. He flew from Washington to Honolulu on October 17 and stopped at American Samoa on his way to New Zealand October 18. (Ibid.) For his itinerary during his Asian trip, see footnote 1, Document 277. 281. Editorial Note 282. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Manila, October 24, 1966, 11:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. 283. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Honolulu, October 26, 1966, 1920Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Repeated to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and CGFMFPAC. The source text is marked with an indication that McNamara saw the telegram. 284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, October 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, VNS 2, Vietnam 66–68. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Vance, Hoopes, and Steadman. 285. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, October 26, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, DOD. Secret. 286. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Saigon, October 27, 1966, 1201Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 287. Report Prepared by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Washington, October 1966. Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (29 Oct 66). Top Secret. Prepared by J–3, Directorate for Operations. Forwarded to Wheeler by Goodpaster under cover of an October 31 memorandum, noting that the report was prepared in response to Wheelerʼs request. A copy of the report is also at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 193, Evaluation of the Effects of the Air Campaign. In a November 7 memorandum to Goodpaster, signed by General Robert Taylor for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA commented on the report, noting that its judgments and statements “could be challenged by someone unwilling to depart from the relatively confined area of solid intelligence evidence,” but that, on the whole, DIA was “inclined to accept the J–3 report as a reasonable analysis of the situation.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3/3200 (CY 1966)) 288. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) Washington, November 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. In his covering memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh stated: “Attached is my reaction to Secretary McNamaraʼs memo on Vietnam [Document 268]—which seemed to me exceedingly and excessively pessimistic.” (Ibid.) In a separate memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh listed the pros and cons of both a cessation and an intensification of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and also listed the major criticisms of the bombing together with opposing arguments. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam) 289. Editorial Note 290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, November 4, 1966, 1:20 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Katzenbach, and approved by Rusk. The President met with Rusk, McNamara, and Rusk from 10:35 to 11:20 a.m. on November 4. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. However, under a November 4 covering note in which he stated that reorganization of the revolutionary development program was on the agenda, Rostow forwarded to the President back-up papers for the meeting that included a draft of this telegram, which had originally been transmitted to the President for his concurrence in telegram 68390 to Wellington, October 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15) 291. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson Washington, November 4, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 292. Intelligence Memorandum Washington, November 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of Bombing of NVN. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. The CIA forwarded the memorandum to the President on November 5. 293. Editorial Note 294. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson Saigon, November 7, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. 295. Memorandum From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, November 8, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE Primarily McNamara Recommendations. Top Secret. On November 8 McNamara forwarded copies to the President (ibid.) and to Rusk (Department of State, EA/VN-Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966). 296. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, November 9, 1966, 1416Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Bombing. Top Secret. 297. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. On November 1 the Department of State changed the title of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 298. Editorial Note 299. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, November 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. See Document 298 regarding the transmission of this memorandum to the President. 300. Memorandum of Meeting Washington, November 10, 1966, 3 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. 301. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, November 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, Mc NTN VII. Top Secret. Printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. IV, pp. 364–365. 302. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 11, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 138, Nodis/Louisiana. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to McNamara. 303. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, November 11, 1966, 1 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. Top Secret; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Heyward Isham of EA and Unger. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655–661. The meeting was held in the Secretaryʼs Dining Room. Documentation on Aspen, the codeword for the negotiating channel with North Vietnam through Sweden, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14/ASPEN, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. A substantial selection has been printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 655–715. 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, November 12, 1966, 2:02 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by McNamara, Helms, Gaud, Marks, and Komer; and approved by Rusk and Katzenbach. In telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15, Rusk told Lodge and Porter that telegram 83699 “was discussed today at highest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decision.” (Ibid.) 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, November 13, 1966, 3:37 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 263–264. 306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, November 14, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:06 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 266–268. 307. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson Washington, November 14, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and Wheeler. 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam Washington, November 14, 1966, 6:03 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold [1]. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Cooper and Heywood Isham of EA/VN; cleared by Harriman, Unger, and William Bundy; and approved by William Bundy. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 268–269. 309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, November 15, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA. Secret. Drafted by Bundy. 310. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) Washington, November 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Drafted by Komer and cleared by McNamara and Rusk. In a back channel telegram, November 18, Komer gave Lodge “advance flavor” of the Presidentʼs reaction to Lodgeʼs November 7 letter, Document 294: “He said I agree with Cabot that pacification is the heart of the matter, Iʼve given him every support I know how and will give him more if he needs it. But I wish heʼd make his people stop arguing about the organizational instructions we send, accept them cheerfully, and get on with the job.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables) 311. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, November 17, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 312. Editorial Note 313. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 17, 1966, 1:30 p.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Rusk and Katzenbach. 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden Washington, November 19, 1966, 5:46 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ASPEN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 662–663. 315. Report Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) Washington, November 22, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. Secret. Harriman forwarded the report to the President and Rusk on November 28, and Rostow forwarded it to the President under cover of a November 29 memorandum stating that “Governor Harriman obviously did a first-class job.” (Ibid.) See Document 281 for information on Harrimanʼs trip. 316. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, November 27, 1966, 1315Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. 317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 27, 1966, 2:18 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 239. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 239. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 19, 1966, 1:20 p.m. SUBJECT Status of Civilian Morale in North Vietnam This wrap-up is based on the full text of the comprehensive CIA report from all sources, which Sect. McNamara initiated. 2 When bombing of the North first began, it generated a high degree of patriotic response. It was not unlike the initial reaction of the British when the Germans hit their homeland in 1940. But it seems clear that the initial level of patriotic fervor has not been maintained. As a result of the bombing, every segment of the population has been forced to make sacrifices in living standards. Hardest hit are those living in southern North Vietnam—about 15% of the population. Letters to relatives and friends (e.g., in Thailand) mention personal hardships and anxieties more than do letters from other parts of the country. The NVN Ministry of Labor released data early this year on absenteeism among construction workers. It was worst among the people in the southern provinces—averaging more than 16 days per worker—or 5% of total working days scheduled. Shortages of food are reported. Main sources of complaint elsewhere are: hardships caused by evacuation from urban centers; splitting of families; lower quality of consumer goods; longer work hours without added pay; loss of income resulting from transfers from normal jobs to defense-related tasks. The regime has talked publicly of the need for tighter discipline among both Party members and the general population. A high government official called a few months ago for revision of the legal code dealing with counter-revolutionary activities, protection of state property, and the rights and duties of citizens “in order to satisfy the demands of wartime.” As the bombing has continued, economic and political problems have intensified. Patriotic fervor appears to have diminished. Official publications have complained of difficulties in using people already mobilized. There have been complaints about lack of experience and discipline among Party cadres. Prejudice and discrimination against the young and against women are reported. Managerial inefficiency is reported; for example, a recent message reported 1,600 workers being sent to a highway repair site, with no supervisory personnel present or available. Captured North Vietnamese soldiers in the South have told us that people in the North are aware of the hardships, sickness and injuries suffered by infiltrated troops. As morale of NVN troops in the South drops, there is every reason to believe it will have an effect on the folks at home. Outlook Civilian morale is likely to continue to drop in the North over the next year. Trouble on the farms—resulting largely from labor mobilization—has already affected the current harvest. Food prices have started to rise on the free market. Beyond food shortages, other strains are likely to increase. There is no agreement in the intelligence community as to when morale may reach the breaking point. The intelligence community doubts that weakening morale will deprive the Hanoi leadership in the coming year of the freedom to pursue the conflict in any manner it chooses. My feeling is that the pressures on the regime may be greater than most of us realize. I make this point not because I believe they are hurting enough to force them to negotiate now—or at any particular early date; but because debate about bombing in this town between crusaders and detractors has sometimes failed to make clear the important middle ground: that we are imposing a day-to-day cost on Hanoi; this cost is considerable, if not decisive; it is rising; and we shouldnʼt let them off the hook until the very day they make parallel de-escalatory moves. Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LIX. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 Reference is to “The Vietnamese Communistsʼ Will To Persist,” August 26. See Document 219 for the principal findings of the report. 240. Editorial Note 240. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation on Vietnam with President Johnson that began at 5:30 p.m. on September 19, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara made the following comments: “What Iʼm much more concerned about, Mr. President, is what we should be doing on the bombing, and the force levels, and our whole position out there. Once you have time I want to talk to you further about it. I myself am more and more convinced that we ought definitely to plan on termination of the bombing in the north but not until after the election, and I hate to even talk about it before then for fear of a leak.” Following an unintelligible interjection by the President, McNamara continued: “So I havenʼt said anything in this building yet, but I just wanted to exchange some views with you when you had time on it. And I think also that we ought to be planning as I mentioned before on a ceiling on our force levels. I donʼt think we ought to just look ahead to the future and say weʼre going to go higher and higher and higher and higher—600,000, 700,000, whatever it takes. It will break the economy of that country and will substitute U.S. soldiers for South Vietnamese and will distort the whole pattern of conduct in South Vietnam if we do. We ought now to be planning on the ceiling of our forces. I would think they ought to be somewhere around—somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 ought to be the ceiling; and after the election we ought to tell that to our military commanders to get their planning on it.” The President did not respond to McNamaraʼs comments prior to concluding the conversation. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.25, Side A, PNO 1) 241. Draft Paper by the Presidentʼs Special Assistants (Rostow and Komer) 241. Draft Paper by the Presidentʼs Special Assistants (Rostow and Komer) 1 Washington, September 20, 1966. A STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT PHASE IN VIETNAM Barring either a diplomatic breakthrough in the conversations between Gromyko and Secretary Rusk, or a major increase in North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam, our position in South Vietnam can be described as follows: We have frustrated the VC and North Vietnamese main force units; we are imposing a painful but not decisive cost for continuing the war on North Vietnam through our bombing; we have moved politically and economically in the South to make increasingly unlikely a political disintegration which the VC might exploit. Meanwhile, at home, whatever the debates, Hanoi cannot count on a political cave-in of US public opinion which would destroy the foundations of the Presidentʼs policy towards Vietnam. Thus, all western logic would indicate that the NLF/Hanoi should start negotiating now, before they lose even more bargaining counters. Perhaps they will do so at some point after the US elections, at least putting out feelers. On the other hand, the VC have not yet come to a point of either military or political disintegration; the burden of bombing in the North, however awkward and painful, has not yet been decisive. Present evidence is that we have come to a point where Hanoi cannot win, but obviously we have not yet forced it to accept negotiations on our terms. Our problem is to present them with a situation where, whatever their will to hold on and sweat us out, they have no realistic option but to accept our terms. There are, in conception, two major routes to this objective short of occupying North Vietnam: First, to increase the weight of our bombing in the North so radically that the whole economic, social, and political infrastructure of North Vietnam is endangered. I believe this course of “bombing them back to the Stone Age” should be rejected. The pressures at home and abroad we would have to bear would likely be excessive. The possibilities of much deeper Chinese Communist involvement in the war would be increased if they thought our objective were to destroy the Communist regime in North Vietnam. A more temperate buildup in the pressure on the North, however, could play a significant role in the alternative strategy outlined below. The second way to force acceptance of negotiations is to produce a palpable process of political and military disintegration of the Viet Cong. This is the recommended strategy. The elements of such a strategy must be more than military. It is increasingly apparent that political, psychological, and economic factors—as well as the civil/military problem of pacification—have an ever more important role to play. A strategic plan should be developed on an across-the-board basis. Moreover, many of its components might conflict with each other unless adequately coordinated. On the military side, the ARVN/US ground campaign and bombing offensive will be stepped up. Barrier possibilities will be explored intensively. But perhaps the major new development should be a stepped-up attempt to deal with the “weak sisters” of the NLF/Hanoi combination, the VC. Their morale is already declining more rapidly than that of the NVN infiltrators. Their strength has stopped increasing. Most of the rising number of defectors are VC. They are probably hardest hit by food and medicine shortages, and by the increasing success of the GVN in establishing itself. By focussing on their vulnerabilities, we can accelerate their decline and possibly split them off from Hanoi, which could be a decisive step toward winning the war. At the same time by continuing the cost to Hanoi, Hanoi might be more willing to accept such a splitting off. Disintegrating the Viet Cong The headings for a policy to produce an accelerated disintegration of the Viet Cong should include the following: A. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new South Vietnamese nation (i) an amnesty offer. (ii) enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders. (iii) an expanded psywar effort to split the VC from Hanoi. (iv) a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts. (v) agreement on a Constitution followed by elections in accordance with the Constitution in which the VC who had accepted amnesty would be allowed to vote. B. Accelerated Pacification (i) new organizational arrangements providing more unified US/GVN civil/military management. (ii) size of forces to be allocated. (iii) converting appropriate ARVN forces to pacification functions. (iv) 1967 targets to be set, including rapid pacification of certain key areas (as recommended by Sir Robert Thompson). (v) contributing programs to be expanded, e.g., RD cadres, agriculture, land reform, police. C. An accelerated, workable land reform scheme D. Pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with formulation of post-war development program E. Assuring good military-civil political relations in post-election period, including creation of a national political party embracing both elements F. Avoiding another round of severe inflation G. US/GVN military offenses against VC/NVA Main Force maintaining the capacity to deal with present or enlarged North Vietnamese military formations introduced into the South, plus whatever we can do about infiltration. H. Bombing offensive in the North continuing to impose a cost on the North for continuing the war. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13. Secret. Forwarded to the President by Rostow on September 28 under cover of a memorandum stating: “Here is the strategy paper which Bob Komer and I put together and talked over with Bill Bundy. We are all in basic agreement.” (Ibid.) Also sent to Komer and William Bundy. 242. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 242. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:15 a.m. Mr. President: Here is Bill Bundyʼs proposed scenario. I would only add this: October will be a month of prayer among Catholics for peace in Viet Nam. That fact will be politically important in the U.S. and throughout the world. Therefore, if we go forward with this meeting, we ought to give a lot of thought to making the most of a common plea for peace at the meeting and give maximum emphasis to the civilian aspects of Vietnamese development: —An appeal to the VC and an amnesty offer; —The surfacing of work on a Vietnamese long-term development program; —Forward movement on the Honolulu program; etc. As for Billʼs raising the question of the political impact of the conference—at home and abroad—I have these observations: the domestic effect is a matter on which only you can render a judgment; the impact abroad will depend, in the end, on whether the conference produced serious results and an authentic sense of forward movement. In turn, that will depend on having the conference as well prepared as we can by a small first-class, imaginative group. If we go ahead, I would suggest that we put Bill Moyers, Bill Jorden, Bob Komer, Bill Leonhart, and Len Unger to work virtually full time from the moment you make a positive decision. I just talked to George Ball to ascertain what Sec. Ruskʼs view was of the enterprise. He is reported as “very enthusiastic.” Bill Jorden and I think Ky should initiate the meeting—the others should respond. Itʼs their war. Walt P.S. Now a wild idea. Send a message, in greatest secrecy, to Ho Chi Minh that you want to talk to him personally in, say, Rangoon. You win if he refuses or if he accepts. Attachment Washington, September 21, 1966. Memorandum Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) 2 SUBJECT Scenario and Issues on a Meeting of Chiefs of Government to Discuss Viet-Nam The Proposal The proposal is that a meeting be held in late October in Manila, to be attended by the Chiefs of Government of South Viet-Nam, the US, and the nations contributing military forces in South Viet-Nam—The Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Thailand. Such a meeting would have the over-all purpose of presenting to the world a dramatic picture of the collective support being given to South Viet-Nam; it would provide an effective occasion for reviewing the military situation at least in general terms, but stress would be placed on the non-military programs and on the posture of South Viet-Nam, the US, and the other participants toward a peaceful settlement. This memorandum discusses the possible sequence of actions in bringing about such a meeting, and the major issues that should be considered in making plans. Possible Sequence of Actions 1. Both Holt and Holyoake have elections, and would feel very hurt if they were not privately consulted before the Asian participants are approached. We believe that both will see no political problem in the proposed meeting—and may well see some advantage. Nonetheless, we should have a quick turn-around with them before we approach the Asians. (Messages for this purpose will be drafted immediately.) 2. Our next approach should be to South Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Ky and Thieu should both be “consulted” but in a fashion that makes clear that we expect them to agree, and that also makes clear to Ky that this conference would essentially be in lieu of his visiting the US separately. (A message for this purpose will be drafted immediately.) 3. Marcos, Park, and Thanom should then be approached concurrently; at the same time confirming invitations should go to Holt and Holyoake. Part of our approach to Ky should be to get him to agree to be the inviting party jointly with us, but he should agree also that we will be the ones to handle the diplomatic exchanges in establishing the meeting. (Messages to this effect will be drafted immediately.) 4. Announcement of the conference could then follow. As one possibility, it should be done concurrently in Saigon and Washington, with confirming announcements in the other four capitals. Alternatively—and perhaps better—Marcos could make the announcement. In view of the minimum period of 2–3 days required to get concurrence from Australia and New Zealand and then from Viet-Nam, it might be possible for Marcos to make the announcement before he leaves US territory on the 27th. However, to seek an immediate announcement without those clearances might well involve serious adverse reactions in Viet-Nam and to a lesser extent in Australia and New Zealand. In all of the above sequence, it would be desirable, although not essential, to have as clear a picture as possible on the scope of the conference, its duration, and other features. The question of dates should of course be firm in any event. Issues Requiring Early Decision 1. Dates . While a successful late October conference would have many great and perhaps decisive advantages, we must reckon that many quarters in the US and significant elements of third-country opinion would relate the timing of the conference to the US elections. However successful the conference in fact turned out to be, its “image” would be up against considerable cynical advance comment and resistance. If Ky later had political trouble—and particularly if that trouble was attributed, however wrongly, to the conference—the possible eventual net loss might be serious. In other words, a conference in late October has possibly greater potential gains but also greater potential losses, than a conference after the US elections. The alternative date would appear to be in mid or late November, which would not have a favorable impact on our elections but would have somewhat less risks. In the choice of dates, we do not see the Viet-Nam political situation as a predictable factor arguing either way. The Constituent Assembly will be in operation by late October, and will probably be continuing into November. It is just possible that it will have completed its work by early November, so that Ky would appear in a strong and favorable light in mid-November. On the other hand, the Constitution would represent a milestone on the election of some successor, so that Kyʼs authority and tenure might look more solid in late October. 3 2. Level and Location . We agree completely that a meeting of Heads of Government is the proper level, and that the Philippines is an ideal location. In many ways, however, Manila itself might be less desirable than Baguio. However, this need not be decided before the conference is set up, and Marcos might even suggest a third site. 3. Scope . The following are considerations and possible useful points. a. Since the meeting is based on military contributions, it would be incongruous to omit a review of the military situation. Moreover, the Koreans in particular would undoubtedly welcome and want this. However, we should probably try to confine this element to a simple review and forecast, with no implication that great new decisions on military strategy are being taken. This of course follows the Honolulu pattern. b. On the non-military side, the South Vietnamese should play a leading role in presenting a progress report on the actions that have been taken in pacification, economic benefits, and the rest. The communique should stress these elements, and also the South Vietnamese presentation of their political timetable and progress. An additional element which might be stressed in this area is that of plans for post-war reconstruction and development, including the conversion of military facilities to civilian use. At the same time, this theme should not be so stressed as to convey the implication that the participants are confident of early victory. c. The communique must contain a firm and clear statement of position on negotiations and the elements of a peaceful settlement. Here we must note that we have not had the fullest possible discussions with the South Vietnamese—although we plan to do so in the immediate future—and that we have never gone deeply into many of the issues with Korea, the Philippines, or Thailand. This suggests the practical need that each participant send its Foreign Secretary, and that the Foreign Secretaries meet separately in the early stages of the conference to hammer out the necessary communique language and to explore as much of the subject as can be profitably discussed. We would have to do careful advance work so that South Viet-Nam, through its able Foreign Minister—Tran Van Do—took as much of a lead as possible. 4. Duration . Because of time pressures on the Chiefs of Government, two days might have to be the duration of the actual conference, although a third day would have many advantages in cementing the picture of serious and deep discussions. With the time-change adjustment from a long Pacific trip there would be advantage if the President would plan to arrive at least a day before the opening of the conference. 5. The Philippine Angle . If the conference were held in Manila itself, a call by the President on President Marcos would not add significant time to the schedule. However, we must reckon that there would be significant Philippine pressures for the President to pay his respects to our bilateral relations with the Philippines through some separate speech, a separate reception, or otherwise. If the conference were held outside Manila, such actions might be even more pressed by Marcos. 6. Possible Additional Visits . It is understood that the President might consider going on to Australia. If so, this reinforces the importance of the first contact being made with Holt. As of now, we would suppose that Holt is fairly certain of reelection and that a Presidential visit would if anything enhance his chances. However, we must reckon that such a visit would involve the US deeply in Australian politics, and would be open to sharp criticism from Holtʼs opponents. Working Preparations To get a solid and effective discussion of the issues and particularly to get good presentations by the South Vietnamese, a small and not too conspicuous US team might be sent to Saigon a few days in advance to assist the Mission. Extensive work will obviously be required on all the non-military programs, and General Westmoreland should presumably work with the South Vietnamese military leaders so that they take as much of a role as possible in presenting the military picture. On the diplomatic side, we should try to have careful advance discussions in the various capitals to cover the issues and to prepare the way for the meetings of the Foreign Secretaries. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS Trip, vol. 1. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Secret. 3 In a telephone conversation at 12:40 p.m. on September 22, Ball told Rusk that the President wanted to move very fast on the Manila trip and was thinking in terms of October 18, adding that “this may be a little soon but this would be a way of heading off Ky.” (Telcon; Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Vietnam II) 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, September 22, 1966, 9:58 a.m. 51896. For Amb. Lodge from Acting Secretary. There is an intense interest at highest levels in carrying through defection of principal and getting him out. 2 Assuming effort described Saigonʼs 6522, Para 2, 3 does not work out, would like you to consider again whether there is not some way in which matter might be again set in motion through your taking it up with PriMin Ky. He surely would grasp immediately how important it is for this project to succeed and might be able to develop some method of obtaining release of uncle without exposing operation to Loan or others. You should understand that in urging you to reconsider this point I do not mean in any sense to press you into any action which seriously risks spoiling the project. 4 Ball 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30 VIET S/Thrush. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Thrush. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rostow in substance; and approved by Ball. 2 In telegram 49432 to Saigon, September 18, Rusk stated (in anticipation of his meeting with Gromyko in a few days): “I suppose it is impossible to bring off the Thrush operation before then but it would be an enormous help could it be done.” Lodge replied in telegram 4773, September 19, that Thoʼs uncle, Nguyen Huu An, was still being detained by GVN authorities, for reasons apparently unrelated to Thrush, and that “in the interest of preserving the operation we should sit tight.” (Ibid.) 3 Paragraph 2 of telegram 6522, September 21, dealt with the issue of obtaining the release of Nguyen Huu An. (Ibid.) 4 In telegram 6811 from Saigon, September 24, Lodge recommended that the issue not be brought up with Ky; the Department of State concurred in telegram 54428 to Saigon, September 26. (Ibid.) In telegram 8570 from Saigon, October 15, Lodge reported that Nguyen Huu An was finally out of jail and commented that “perhaps now we will learn whether we have gold, brass or too much imagination.” Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President under cover of an October 15 memorandum stating: “Now we shall see. Timing is first class if it can be pulled off in the next few weeks.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush) 244. Editorial Note 244. Editorial Note On September 22, 1966, at the opening meeting of the 21st U.N. General Assembly, U.S. Representative Arthur Goldberg made a major speech on the Vietnam war in which he stated that the United States was “prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side.” For text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin , October 10, 1966, pages 518–525. In forwarding a draft of Goldbergʼs speech to the President on September 21 for his clearance, Rostow noted in his covering memorandum that the key passages on Vietnam did “not go beyond existing policy.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 13) William Bundy told Canadian Ambassador A. Edgar Ritchie that Goldbergʼs speech contained “nothing of substance” that “had not already been said privately,” but “as codified it represented a new formulation in certain respects. Moreover, the speech took more explicitly into account the need for realistic phasing in any supervised mutual de-escalation.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, summarized the reaction of Hanoi, Peking, and the NLF to Goldbergʼs speech in an intelligence note to Secretary Rusk, September 28. Peking and the Viet Cong were “predictably negative,” observed Hughes, while Hanoi avoided direct rejection of Goldbergʼs proposals but insisted that he had offered nothing new. (Ibid., EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, National Liberation Front) 245. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 245. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 22, 1966. Now that a Viet Cong victory in South Vietnam seems to have been thwarted by our emergency actions taken over the past 18 months, renewed attention should be paid to the longer-run aspects of achieving an end to the war and building a viable nation in South Vietnam. Central to success, both in ending the war and in winning the peace, is the pacification program. Past progress in pacification has been negligible. Many factors have contributed, but one major reason for this lack of progress has been the existence of split responsibility for pacification on the U.S. side. For the sake of efficiency—in clarifying our concept, focusing our energies, and increasing the output we can generate on the part of the Vietnamese—this split responsibility on the U.S. side must be eliminated. We have considered various alternative methods of consolidating the U.S. pacification effort. The best solution is to place those activities which are primarily part of the pacification program, and all persons engaged in such activities, under COMUSMACV. Attached (at Tab A) 2 is a chart showing the present organization in Vietnam, with the “pacification” activities indicated by the bolder bordered rectangles. Also attached (at Tab B) is an illustrative chart showing the proposed reorganization which integrates all pacification activities. In essence, the reorganization would result in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification activities in the field. It is recognized that there are many important aspects of the pacification problem which are not covered in this recommendation, which should be reviewed subsequent to the appointment of the Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification to determine whether they should be part of his task—for example, the psychological warfare campaign, and the Chieu Hoi (defector) and refugee programs. Equally important is the question of how to encourage a similar management realignment on the South Vietnamese side, since pacification is regarded as primarily a Vietnamese task. Also not covered by this recommendation are important related national programs, all of which have an obvious impact on the pacification effort—such as the anti-main force military activities and the efforts to control inflation. Finally, there is the question of whether any organizational modification in Washington is required by the recommended change in Vietnam. I recommend that you approve the reorganization described in this memorandum as a first essential step toward giving a new thrust to pacification. Under Secretary Ball, Administrator Gaud, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Helms, Director Marks and Mr. Komer concur in this recommendation. 3 Robert S. McNamara 4 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. McNaughton sent copies of this draft memorandum to Ball, Gaud, Helms, Marks, Wheeler, and Komer under cover of a September 22 memorandum, in which he stated that McNamara had been asked to prepare a draft reorganization of pacification responsibilities and wanted to discuss his draft memorandum the following week with a view to having it ready for the President during the first week of October. (Ibid.) 2 Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. 3 For Komerʼs response to McNamaraʼs recommendation, see Document 249 . For Gaudʼs response, see footnote 6, Document 263 . For Helmsʼ response, see footnote 3, Document 248 . Wheeler responded in JCSM–626–66, September 29, concurring in the draft memorandumʼs concept of organization, particularly in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would direct all pacification activities. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, VIET 380 PACIFICATION) In a memorandum to McNamara, September 27, Taylor raised six questions about the proposed organization which he felt needed answering at an early stage of discussion. (Ibid., McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 22, 1966. SUBJECT “Negotiations Committee” We have been reviewing for some weeks the advisability of a broad offer of amnesty and reconciliation to the NLF/VC by Prime Minister Ky. Because of the outstanding success of the election and moderately encouraging reports of decline in morale of the VC, we believe that the time has come for such an offer. Lodge is in agreement and has undertaken to talk to Ky and his principal colleagues at an early propitious moment. A draft speech of reconciliation and amnesty to be delivered by Ky has been sent to Lodge for his comment. 2 It covers three areas. The first deals with the economic, political and military progress during the past year. The second offers amnesty and reconciliation to all VC who are ready to put aside their arms. It also expresses Kyʼs willingness to talk to leaders of the NLF/VC as a group to achieve national reconciliation. The third states the GVNʼs war and peace aims. November 1 has been suggested as the most advantageous date as it is the anniversary of the 1963 revolution, and Ky made a significant speech on that occasion last year. I had favored an earlier date and Lodge is considering whether that is possible, though there are a number of preliminary actions to be taken. Lodge has accepted our offer to send a two or three man team from Washington to help work out the plans. Averell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb Harriman—Negotiations Comm. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 The draft speech was transmitted in telegram 52727, September 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The speech was discussed at a meeting of the Negotiations Committee on September 23. A memorandum of the meeting is ibid., S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Negotiation. 247. Memorandum of Conversation 247. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, September 24, 1966, 6:30–11 p.m. SECRETARYʼS DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1966 SUBJECT Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS US The Secretary Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg Ambassador Foy D. Kohler Ambassador William C. Foster Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson Mr. William D. Krimer (Interpreter) USSR Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Nikolai T. Fedorenko Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin Mr. Lev I. Mendelevitch Mr. Alexei A. Roschin Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter) The Secretary said he would appreciate a chance to make some observations concerning the problem of Viet-Nam. It was our clear understanding that the Foreign Minister felt he was not in a position to negotiate concerning Viet-Nam, since he had not been authorized by certain parties to do so and we respected this position. The Secretary did, however, want to explain to Mr. Gromyko the problems we were facing in bringing the problem of Viet-Nam to a conclusion. He wanted to express the frustration we were experiencing in this respect. In the Warsaw Pact Communique of Bucharest, 2 the Warsaw Pact countries had called upon us to comply with the 1954 and 1962 agreements concerning Southeast Asia. We agree with this proposal. We assumed that the Communique had meant that other parties, too, would comply with these agreements; how do we get started? We had said on many occasions that we agreed to sit down at a conference to talk about the problem of Southeast Asia; yet, such a meeting or conference had proved to be impossible to convene. We had said yes to Prince Sihanoukʼs requests to the International Control Commission to protect and insure respect for the neutrality and integrity of Cambodia; the other side had not reacted, even though we have no desire to involve Cambodia in the present conflict. We had urged the ICC to take the necessary steps to assure the maintenance of the demilitarized zone between North and South Viet-Nam. Yesterday Hanoi informed the ICC that they would have no part of any such idea. We had made it clear that we were prepared to carry on bilateral negotiations with Hanoi; we had made it clear that we would welcome third parties as intermediaries; we have also made it clear that we would welcome discreet and tactful unofficial contacts with Hanoi; still, nothing happens. We tried to talk to the other side about deescalation; nothing happens. We tried to arrange for an exchange of prisoners and have even returned some prisoners unilaterally; the other side expressed no interest. We had said that we would stop the bombing if anyone could tell us what else would happen if we did so; to date no one has been able to tell us anything in this respect. In the meanwhile North Viet-Nam continues to send its regular armed forces into South Viet-Nam. During the last few days again the traffic has increased and a new regular North Vietnamese army division has entered South Viet-Nam through the demilitarized zone. Hanoi and Peking have called Ambassador Goldbergʼs new proposals a “peace swindle”. They have called the Pope a mouth-piece of the reactionary forces. It seems to us that the Soviet Union and the United States have no conflicting interests in this situation. We are not interested in punishing or bombing or attempting to destroy North Viet-Nam. The bombing can stop, literally within hours, if something can be done to stop the attacks of North Viet-Nam upon South Viet-Nam. We are puzzled over the fact that all the processes capable of bringing about a peaceful settlement appear to have been blocked. Hanoi had asked us to accept its four points. 3 We had replied that we were prepared to discuss their four points if others at the table were free to state the points they had in mind. Actually, we had no great problem with points one, two and four; we had suggested some changes in point three; we have received no reply. Over the last five years we had made literally hundreds of efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement; so far, the only reply has been a continuation of the traffic from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. We have had absolutely no indication that Hanoi is interested in a peaceful settlement. We think that is unfortunate. Concerning the Warsaw Pact Bucharest Communique: the Soviet Union has prompted us to comply with the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962; we agree, but how do we get started? Foreign Minister Gromyko said in reply that the Soviet Unionʼs position on Viet-Nam had been stated many times and he saw no need to repeat it. He had to say in the name of the Soviet Government, however, that the many statements of the US Government on Viet-Nam and the actions of the United States in Viet-Nam had very little in common, to say the very least. Concerning these statements about the desirability of a peaceful solution of the question: if one were to read these statements only, one could indeed come to the conclusion that the United States was seeking a peaceful solution to the problem. Yet, the concrete facts of escalation of US military actions in Viet-Nam lead us objectively to the opposite conclusion. If we were to characterize such statements, particularly some of the statements made by the US Secretary of Defense, we would have to use very harsh words indeed. Mr. Gromyko had no desire to do so, he only wanted to speak on the substantive aspects of this problem. Therefore, he repeated, words were one thing, actions—something else again. Thus, the latest US statement before the UN General Assembly 4 also failed to produce any new confidence, for it had been preceded by very recent evidence of plans and by statements indicating further escalation of US military actions in Viet-Nam. Secondly, the proposals the US had made before the UN General Assembly were accompanied by conditions which the other side could not possibly accept. In fact, each statement made by the US had been accompanied by such conditions, conditions which cannot be fulfilled. The Soviet Union was therefore not surprised that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam did not react to these American statements in any other way except to reject them out of hand. He therefore concluded that while he could not negotiate, and while he did not want the US to underestimate this influence, 5 he had seen nothing new in the American position during the latest period of time. As to what the Secretary had said about US efforts to establish contact not having produced any results, he was not surprised. The trouble was that the US had made no effort to make its proposals acceptable to the other side. He was therefore concluding that the United States was determined to continue the war in Viet-Nam with all the consequences that ensued. Thirdly, the Soviet Government had, of course, not failed to consider the reasoning and the position of the United States, not just once, but repeatedly. His Government had concluded that for reasons of its own the United States had decided to unleash and escalate the war in Viet-Nam. It was his Governmentʼs view that this was a grave mistake, if the statements of the United States Government about its desire to reduce international tensions were to be taken at face value. For, if the US really wanted peace in the area of Indochina and wanted to put an end to the war, it would have to furnish proof of this desire to the other side. Not only verbal declarations, however. What kind of proof? What, specifically, could improve the situation? Cessation of military actions in South Viet-Nam. The United States was a great and strong country. As Mr. Gromyko saw it, the prestige of the United States would not be damaged if the bombing of North Viet-Nam were stopped, as “ a minimum of minimums ”. On the contrary, such a step would be evaluated positively throughout the world. Yet, the US did not even stop the bombing. The US ought to realize just what it was doing; it was unthinkable to try and bring the DRV and South Viet-Nam to their knees. The Soviet Union knew and thought the US also realized the fact that the people of Viet-Nam were full of resolution to expend whatever time and effort were required, whatever sacrifices were required, in order to defend their land. What would unconditional cessation of military actions accomplish? It would improve the general situation in Viet-Nam and create more favorable preconditions for a solution of the problem that would be satisfactory to all. Above all, it would improve the situation of the people of Viet-Nam since the fire was, after all, burning in their house; the other side would then probably react to the American statements and proposals. At present it could not react in any other way. Mr. Gromyko said he did not know how the Secretary would take his words; he could conclude that this was just the Foreign Minister of the USSR speaking in support of the position of the DRV. This would not be untrue, for the Soviet Union had in the past and did now support the DRV. But, he was also speaking from a recognition of the common general responsibility of the USSR and the US for world affairs, fully bearing in mind the firm determination of the people of the DRV to defend their country. He wanted to conclude his remarks on this note: during his meetings with the Secretary on at least three different occasions the Secretary had said that in his view the US and the USSR understood their responsibility for world affairs better than any other nation, and this for obvious reasons known to all of us. If this is so, then he considered it to be his duty to call the Secretary’s attention to the situation created in Viet-Nam. Whether the Secretary liked this or not, not only in the Soviet Union, but throughout the entire world the actions of the United States in Viet-Nam were considered to constitute aggression, not the actions of the DRV. Therefore, the Secretary should come to the conclusion that what Mr. Gromyko was saying was dictated not only by narrow considerations of solidarity with the people of Viet-Nam although this solidarity as well as its causes was a well-known fact, but also by recognition of the common responsibility the Secretary had spoken of. Mr. Gromyko was gratified to note from the statements made by President Kennedy and from those made by President Johnson concerning this responsibility that there was continuity in the leadership of the United States. It would be very good indeed if the US were to take genuine steps toward peace in Viet-Nam. It has been said that if the Soviet Union were to take appropriate action to use its influence in Viet-Nam, this would bring about a peaceful settlement. But, by its actions the United States had severely limited the Soviet Union’s possibilities and had deprived it of opportunities to take some positive steps; this was true not only of the Soviet Union, but of a number of other countries also. Mr. Gromyko said that by his remarks he had explained the considerations of the Soviet Government to the Secretary concerning the situation in Viet-Nam and American actions there. He did not know how the Secretary would evaluate these remarks. Perhaps he might want to think about them and possibly return to a discussion of the problem at a later time; this would be at the Secretary’s discretion. The Secretary said that he was most interested in Mr. Gromykoʼs remarks, despite the fact that as Mr. Gromyko had indicated he was not in a position to negotiate. It was important that this problem be discussed between them, precisely because they both agreed that the problems of peace in the world depended heavily upon the US and the Soviet Union. These two nations had the power and the responsibility before mankind and before history. He hoped that there would be another occasion for them to discuss this problem further. However, he did want to comment on Mr. Gromykoʼs remarks about the difference between the statements and the actions of the United States. He recalled that in June of 1961 his Government and ours had discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. This had eventually led to an agreement on Laos and after some period of time this agreement had been signed by the USSR, the US and Peking. We were bitterly disappointed over the way that this agreement had worked out; in fact, President Kennedy had been bitterly disappointed by it. We had accepted the Soviet Unionʼs candidate for Prime Minister of Laos, we had also accepted a coalition government which included all three factions. This had not, however, deterred Hanoi from continuing infiltration into the areas which were controlled by the Pathet Lao. Neither the International Control Commission nor representatives of the coalition government were able to penetrate into these areas. Still, we continued to discuss peace in Southeast Asia. For a period of five years, while there was no bombing of North Viet-Nam, its Government continued to infiltrate its forces into South Viet-Nam. These five years were filled with efforts toward finding a peaceful solution. We continued to believe that the USSR had signed the agreements on Southeast Asia in good faith; for some reason Hanoi had not. Undoubtedly Mr. Gromyko knew better than we did, why. We cannot accept the view that the problem in Viet-Nam is purely a problem between the people of the two Viet-Nams; we could not accept such a view with respect to the people of the two Germanys either. The situation is becoming increasingly difficult for us. Over the past few years many governments, groups of governments and individuals such as U Thant and the Pope have continued to make proposals for peace. To all of these we have said yes; Hanoi—no. Yet, we are still expected to say something new in spite of the fact that there has been no response from Hanoi to any proposals for the past two years; we are expected to surrender South Viet-Nam to North Viet-Nam. It is not easy for us to separate the military actions of our side from those of the other side. No one can tell us what might happen to the 19 regiments of the regular forces of North Viet-Nam which are now in South Viet-Nam. When we stopped the bombing early this year the only response was more infiltration. It was carried on on a 24-hour basis instead of just at night. Hanoi made no proposals or counter-proposals at that time; it only said for us to get out and to turn South Viet-Nam over to North Viet-Nam. Nevertheless we continued to probe for a peaceful settlement. What the people of South Viet-Nam want we were prepared to leave to them, to ascertain their wishes by a vote. We did not believe that they wanted to have North Viet-Nam impose its will upon them by force. We intended to continue our efforts to find a peaceful solution, but we were made to wonder whether the very efforts we had been undertaking in that direction had not led Hanoi into a grave miscalculation. There had not been any other example in history when one side had made so many efforts to end the war, as had been the case with the United States with respect to Viet-Nam. Perhaps this then convinced Hanoi that we would weaken and eventually surrender South Viet-Nam to its forces. During the 1964 electoral campaign President Johnson had said repeatedly that we wanted no larger war. We wondered if this did not lead Hanoi to conclude that it could increase its efforts to take over South Viet-Nam without running greater risks of US opposition. It introduced the 325th Division into South Viet-Nam. But, despite the possibility that Hanoi may have miscalculated we would continue to be in touch to explore new possibilities. We were disturbed by the evident lack of reciprocity. We did not, for example, say as they do that we would not negotiate unless they stopped their bombing in South Viet-Nam; we were ready to discuss peace now or at any other time, but we could not be indifferent to the presence of large numbers of regular North Vietnamese soldiers in South Viet-Nam, killing people and trying to seize South Viet-Nam by force. If they remained determined to pursue their efforts, we should have to meet them, although we much preferred a peaceful solution to the problem. We would be appreciative of anything the Soviet Union could do to bring about a peaceful solution in the interests of all of us and indeed of the entire world. We were not asking North Viet-Nam to surrender anything; we did not ask them for a single acre of their territory and we did not ask them to change their regime. All we were saying was that we could not say no to requests for assistance from South Viet-Nam. We recognized the Soviet Union’s concern for North Viet-Nam. We hoped that the Soviet Union recognized our concern for South Viet-Nam. On this basis perhaps further discussions of this problem could be held between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Mr. Gromyko said that he had expressed the position of the Soviet Government, which was guided by the recognition of the great responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union for world peace. He hoped the United States would not be carried away by setting conditions for the other side. If the US was really interested in peace much depended upon its actions and its not raising complicated and humiliating conditions for the other side. He repeated that the views of his Government were dictated by recognition of the great responsibilities of the two powers. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S-Vietnam Briefing Books: Lot 70 D 207, Viet-Nam Negotiations, 1968. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on September 26 by William D. Krimer of the Language Services Division, Department of State. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. A memorandum prepared on September 30 in the Bureau of European Affairs analyzed “new elements” in Gromykoʼs conversation with Rusk. (Ibid.)/1/ 2 Excerpts from the communique, July 6, are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 832–834. 3 For text of the four points, April 8, 1965, see ibid., 1965 , pp. 852–853. 4 See Document 244 . 5 The Soviet interpreter omitted this particular reference to influence. [Footnote in the source text.] 248. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 248. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, September 28, 1966. SUBJECT The Agencyʼs Position on the OSDʼs 22 September Draft Pacification Reorganization Proposal 2 1. The 22 September OSD draft proposal raises and conflates two important but quite distinct questions: (1) Whether the U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam should be radically reorganized and placed under a single command authority—i.e., pacification czar. (2) Whether this pacification czar should be a civilian U.S. official directly subordinate to the Ambassador (or Deputy Ambassador) or a U.S. military officer subordinate to COMUSMACV. Our position on (1) should be affirmative. If such a czar is created, we should be willing to turn over to his control, under a suitable administrative agreement, the Cadre Operations Division of the Saigon Station. Our position on (2) should be diplomatically but firmly negative, since we feel strongly that it is neither in the Agencyʼs parochial interests nor in the larger interests of the pacification program and the U.S. Governmentʼs objectives that program is intended to further, for pacification (“the other war”) to be under direct military control. 2. Leaving the military versus civilian question momentarily aside, we have serious problems with the particular pacification organization structure proposed in the 22 September OSD memorandum. The “pacification staff” it advocates incorporates not only the Stationʼs Cadre Operations Division, which we are prepared to surrender, but also key elements of the Intelligence Division which we feel should not be removed from our Chief of Stationʼs command jurisdiction. Specifically, the DOD proposal would incorporate our liaison with the Police Special Branch at regional, province and district levels into the command authority of the pacification czar. This would complicate our continuing responsibility for liaison with the South Vietnamese police apparatus at the national level through the Director General of the National Police and with the Central Intelligence Organization at national, regional and local levels. It would splinter the internal intelligence collection capabilities of the CIA Station in a way that would make it difficult if not impossible to discharge our continuing overall responsibilities in this field. The takeover of our Stationʼs Intelligence Division assets implicit in the DOD proposal, therefore, is something we cannot accept and should resist. 3. Actually, if the pacification czar were a civilian, we probably could work out a satisfactory arrangement with regard to provincial and district Special Branch liaison. If he is a military subordinate of COMUS–MACV, however, we should stonewall on this point. DOD will not be able to budge us here since the same arguments for bringing our intelligence activities at province and district levels under the pacification command also apply to military intelligence activities at those levels. 4. Any assignment of Station functions, programs or personnel to a non-CIA command structure will generate serious support and, in some instances, legal problems. It will fracture the unified integrity of the present Station support structure and break up an intricate, interlocked cycle through which we presently supply funds, people and management to all CIA Vietnam programs. The administrative mechanisms of such a detailing of assets would have to be very carefully structured to avoid impinging unacceptably on the Directorʼs responsibilities to Congress for funds expended by this Agency on his personal accountability. The funding and support of the activities of the Cadre Operations Division are currently being organized so that these activities can be turned over to someone else to operate at some future time without major administrative or legal problems. The support of Intelligence Division activities, however, is not so structured. It is an integral piece of the total support for the Saigon Station. Though it could be factored out as a separate entity, doing so would be very difficult. 5. On the major issue, we agree that the pacification effort needs to be better managed on the U.S. side (and, for that matter, on the Vietnamese side as well). We cannot agree, however, that the road to progress lies through subordinating pacification to the U.S. military. Bureaucratically there are several major objections to the philosophy behind the DOD proposal. For one thing, what it does is implement much of the Command Relationships Agreement even though Vietnam has not been (and under President Johnson is never likely to be) formally and legally declared an “active theater of war”. The DOD proposal guts the present pacification arrangement, including Deputy Ambassador Porterʼs role and functions. General Westmoreland becomes, in effect if not in title, the U.S.proconsul or High Commissioner, with the other senior members of the country team being relegated to largely ceremonial functions and their assets and functions placed under the command of one of their peers. 6. As we know from private soundings, the Department of State is going to argue strongly against the DOD proposal. A central element of Stateʼs argument will be that the optics are all wrong. The U.S. Government is strongly encouraging, indeed pressuring, the Vietnamese to civilianize their pacification effort. Making our support of pacification a military endeavor would go directly against the grain of this policy. Stateʼs point is valid and we endorse it, but we feel it is a consideration we should let them argue. 7. Our objections to placing pacification under U.S. military control are not emotional or even predominantly philosophical. We have in Switchback an historical indication of what is likely to happen to the RD program if the U.S. military takes it over as they did not CIDG. 3 Undoubtedly the organization charts would be tidier. Without question RD cadre would be turned into good soldiers. But that is what they would become, soldiers. The spirit of revolutionary development and sense of movement towards an endogenously rooted political structure would be lost. Political aims would be subordinated to military objectives. Because of this, the pacification effort—however well managed—would almost certainly fail. The argument (Komerʼs argument, which we believe is in large measure responsible for the DOD proposal) that since the U.S. military organization in Vietnam is far larger than the civilian organization, it should be given control over all U.S. activities simply does not wash. This war can be lost by bad management but it cannot be won by good organization unless that organization serves as a vehicle for implementing non-charitable ingredients of spirit and attitude. It will not be won until a Saigon-directed civil structure takes hold of and roots in the countryside. Progress towards this essential goal will be impeded rather than facilitated by placing pacification under military direction. 8. As for the play of the Agencyʼs Washington hand in the immediate future, we believe your initial written reply to Secretary McNamara should address itself to the Agencyʼs difficulties with the details of the proposal submitted and should not address the larger considerations. 4 We should let State be the first to table these. However, we recommend that you be prepared to support Stateʼs view in oral discussion. We also recommend that you support State in arguing that basic decisions on how the U.S. pacification effort is to be organized should not be made in undue haste. This is a very complicated problem to which an optimum solution is not going to be worked out in a few days. Furthermore, it is a decision which should not be made until the field components of the U.S. agencies involved or affected have had the chance to express their views on the proposals Washington is seriously weighing. 9. As indicated above, we agree that the U.S. pacification effort needs managerial improvement but we feel you should oppose carving up the Saigon Station and should oppose placing pacification under military command. However, your posture should not be purely negative. As a constructive contribution to the discussion, you should support the following alternative proposal which State will make in some form and you can endorse: The outlines of a sensible pacification structure already exist. Ambassador Porterʼs present position was established as a result of the Warrenton Conference in order to accomplish the very ends that the DOD proposal is designed to achieve. The problem is that Porter has operated as a committee chairman rather than as a director or commander. The easiest solution, the one most in keeping with overall U.S. policy objectives as well as the one most administratively feasible to institute, is to make some senior civilian (Porter himself, or possibly Ambassador Sullivan) what Porter was originally intended to be—i.e., the pacification czar. In order to play this role he should have a planning and coordinating staff equivalent in function (though not necessarily in size) to the staff which supports General Westmoreland as COMUSMACV. He will have to exercise operational control over those elements of the various components of the U.S. Mission which deal primarily with pacification problems. This could certainly include the Cadre Operations Division of the Saigon Station, provided suitable support and funding mechanisms were arranged, particularly if through such a device the cost of the RD program could be taken off the Agencyʼs account. Other Station elements would, of course, be responsive to the requirements of the pacification director. 10. Your initial discussion with Secretaries McNamara, Rusk, et al., should focus on the major issues (e.g., pacification czar under the Ambassador or under COMUSMACV; civilian or military) rather than the details, which can be most effectively ironed out once agreement is reached on the basic points. We have appended, however, a sketch organization chart which shows bureaucratically how our preferred alternative would look. 5 In essence, it is an attempt to give the pacification czar the control and staff means for discharging his responsibilities without doing unnecessary violence to the organizational integrity of the components of the various U.S. Government agencies which, collectively, compose the present country team. It provides the pacification czar with an adequate staff, which Porter does not now have. This staff would be joint, its members drawn from the various components of the Mission Council, including our Station as well as the military. Our proposal would also include a military deputy which would insure ample representation of military views and facilitate integrated political-military planning. George A. Carver, Jr. 6 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, McNamara Project. Secret/Sensitive. 2 Document 245 . 3 Switchback was a program for transferring responsibility for advising and assisting ethnic tribal groups in South Vietnam from CIA to the U.S. Army. 4 A draft reply to Mr. McNamara is appended as an attachment to this memorandum. [Footnote in the source text. The draft is attached but not printed. In the reply sent on September 30, Helms indicated that the proposal “would cause us some problems in its present form,” particularly by providing “for assumption of operational control by the pacification czar of some of our Stationʼs intelligence collection and intelligence liaison responsibilities and assets.” Helms also called for careful examination of the political ramifications of assigning primary operational responsibility to a “subordinate military officer within the COMUSMACV command structure.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, McNamara Project)] 5 Attached but not printed. 6 Printed from a copy that indicates Carver signed the original. 249. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 249. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, September 29, 1966. After weighing the pros and cons, I concur in your 22 September 1966 memo proposing a unified US pacification management under COMUSMACV. 2 In fact, despite the many secondary disadvantages which might be entailed, such a step seems to me essential if pacification is to be given the large scale push forward which I strongly believe is central to a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam. As my small staff and I have progressively steeped ourselves in the Vietnam civil side, we have as you know also been insisting that stepped-up pacification is “central to success, both in ending the war and winning the peace …” We further agree that progress to date in this neglected aspect of the war has been negligible, largely in my view because of the lack of military resources which could be devoted to doing the local security part of the job. In any event, with most other aspects of the Vietnam war going better, pacification has become—as Cabot Lodge says—our chief unfinished business. Stepping up pacification seems doubly important because it targets directly on what I believe to be the most vulnerable element in the enemy lineup—the southern VC. If we can step up both pressures and inducements targeted on the VC, we can increasingly isolate Hanoi. Moreover, until we can crack the VC infrastructure, the enemy always has the option of reverting to protracted guerrilla warfare. I. So I favor every sensible measure to accelerate the momentum of pacification. The most important step is to get the GVN and ARVNAF really targeted on it, and adequately organized and motivated to do the job. At present the ARVNAF are not pulling their weight; unless we can get them fully involved in pacification, US forces will have to assume the main burden here too. On the principle of first things first, straightening out the lines of responsibility on the US side is an essential prerequisite to tackling the GVN and ARVNAF. Split civil/military responsibility has not worked well enough in the past, nor is it likely to do so in the future. Unified management on the US side seems to me essential to giving a real push to pacification. If such a “single manager” is thus essential, I further agree that he should be military. Indeed, I donʼt see any other realistic option given the simple fact that the bulk of the resources and management assets needed for pacification are military, on both the US and GVN sides: A. The first prerequisite for successful pacification is adequate local security . This is primarily a military job. Even if the civil side has the whole responsibility, it doesnʼt control the key assets. An estimated year end strength comparison drives home this point. GVN Pacification Assets Military Civil ARVN (the 50% that Gen. Westmoreland proposed to be devoted to pacification) 140,000 35,000 RD Cadre (mostly not-Vung Tau-trained) RF 145,000 20,000 Police (in provinces) PF 155,000 _____ Total 390,000 55,000 B. Similarly, on the US side there are far more Americans in uniform advising on pacification than there are civilians . This is entirely separate from the question of how many US forces are or will be engaged in supporting pacification. Again, the arithmetic is instructive, particularly down at the critical district (sub-sector) levels. US Advisor Assets for Pacification Military Civil Corps 480 143 Region Sector 860 327 Province Sub-Sector 1200 0 District Total 2540 470 C. The military are much better set up to manage a huge pacification effort . Quite frankly, I believe that we have made real progress toward strengthening the civilian management side of pacification since Ambassador Porter took this over last February. Progress has also been made toward better coordination between the military and civil sides of pacification. But coordination in my view is not enough to produce the needed results. The alternative of unified management under civilian control falls down because most of the assets involved are military, and because only the US military staff and advisory resources in Vietnam are big enough to manage pacification on the scale we seek. It would take at least eighteen months in my judgment to get a civilian management structure which might handle pacification as effectively as MACV could today. In sum, if 60–70% of the real job of pacification is providing local security, this job can be done by the military, and without it the civil side of pacification cannot really get off the ground, the advantages of providing military management seem over-riding. II. Clarification of your Charts would help . Your proposals raise several questions, particularly on US civil-military relationships. I believe that if they were handled in the manner described below, your proposal would be workable. A. Would the primacy of overall supervision of the pacification process by the Ambassador and Deputy Ambassador be clearly restated? I believe that the Ambassador and his alter ego must retain clear personal authority over pacification as over all other aspects of our operations in Vietnam. B. What would be included in pacification and put under the new MACV Deputy? We should avoid overburdening him with any more ancillary activities than he can effectively handle. The purpose of the exercise is to get pacification rolling in the countryside, not to get single management of a lot of functions that the manager wonʼt know how to manage. I assume you would put under him only those field activities (and the Saigon field operations staffs) which primarily and directly contribute to winning the village war. This should include Chieu Hoi, refugees, and resource control. It should not include (1) overall economic policy, the CIP, or anti-inflationary programs—these are best left to AID; (2) CIA programs other than Police Special Branch and Cadre; (3) national information and postwar programs other than those directed at the VC guerrilla structure and the rural population; (4) certain national AID project programs which are still best handled separately, e.g., medical, national agricultural activities, or education at other than the village level, etc. C. Would the civilian components merely come under the new Deputyʼs command control or would MACV take them over in toto? The new Deputy and his corps and province Pacification Directors should assume operational control over the existing civilian components, but these should remain in civilian clothes, and be paid, administered, and logistically supported as at present. This would lead to certain “dual responsibility” problems, but be less disruptive than blanketing all the civil echelons functioning in the field into MACV. D. What should a new Deputyʼs responsibility be for developing plans, programs and requirements for pacification? Clearly he must have such management tools at his disposal. Yet he shouldnʼt be burdened with the laborious tasks of preparing the CAP, programming personnel replacements, etc. Basically, he should be responsible only for those plans and programs that directly bear on field operations, and draw on the existing agencies for such support. E. Should the pacification organization have logistic responsibilities? These should remain with AID, CIA, JUSPAO, and other elements of MACV, which would together service the new organization. To do otherwise would be disruptive and cause major delays, when the purpose of the exercise is to get up more momentum now. III. Likely Disadvantages . Thereʼs no doubt that weʼd have to pay a price for unified US military management of pacification, but some of these seem to me to be more apparent than real. A. The image problem . At a time when weʼre trying to emphasize the non-military aspects of the war, and when the GVN itself is civilianizing, there will be criticism of any apparently opposite trend. But this must be offset against another, even more important image which we seek—that pacification is finally moving forward, that the NVA forces are being increasingly isolated as the southern VC fall away, and that the population is at long last coming our way in ever larger members. B. Is an essentially military US management the best means by which to influence the GVN? Since our policy is to utilize mainly Vietnamese for pacification rather than US forces, the interface between the US and GVN pacification structures is important. But the fact remains that the bulk of GVN pacification assets are under military control. Even the RD Ministry is largely military. So are the province chiefs. Military officers are in most of the key slots at region, province and district levels. The ARVN, RF, PF, and really the police are under military management, and likely to remain so. In practical terms, I suspect that a US military management could most effectively motivate and advise them. C. An essentially military pacification structure might put us in an awkward position in case of negotiations . This would be the case if any truce arrangement called for a stand-down of organized military forces on both sides, which could leave the GVN/US without adequate instruments to deal with the VC infrastructure. For this reason, some have argued that we should civilianize the GVN paramilitary forces and put them under a civilian ministry. But I doubt as a practical matter that the Directory would countenance this, even after another election. D. The proposed structure is too corps-heavy, when many argue that corps is an impediment to pacification and should be more decentralized . I agree, but doubt that it will be politically feasible to push the ARVN corps commanders out of the picture for a while. If so, letʼs use them, not deplore them. E. Problems will arise from putting US civilians under the US military . Will many of them refuse to serve in this manner, including some quite senior people? Many bureaucratic sensitivities will be affected. Would this result in a major loss in efficiency on the increasingly important US civilian side of pacification? I believe that keeping civilian personnel in their own agencies, even though under a new Deputyʼs command control, would mitigate many of these problems, especially after a shakedown period. The mixed civilian-military staff you contemplate at all levels would help further. F. Some dual responsibility and administrative confusion would result . I believe that this could be minimized under the leadership of Ambassadors Lodge and Porter, who would remain in policy control of all US activities in Vietnam. What is proposed is essentially to unify management responsibility for pacification in the field. I cannot see that such a reorganization would create more dual responsibility and administrative confusion than exists today. Simply having a US team chief in each province would be a major step forward; collaboration is no substitute for management control. IV. Conclusion . Despite the disadvantages cited above, and perhaps others, they seem to me to be outweighed by the positive thrust which would be generated by unified US management. To be perfectly candid, I regard your proposal as basically a means of bringing the military fully into the pacification process rather than of putting civilians under the military. Without minimizing the growing civil side contribution to pacification, the US and GVN military have the bulk of the assets needed to provide the essential local security input and the management structure needed to make pacification work. So assigning responsibility to the Deputy COMUSMACV is the best way to get pacification moving in Vietnam. I donʼt think that we can achieve this—soon enough or well enough—without such a step. 3 R.W. Komer 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, Gaud, Marks, and Helms. 2 Document 245 . 3 Carver forwarded a copy of this memorandum to Colby under cover of a memorandum, October 3, stating that “this office finds little it can agree with in Mr. Komerʼs memorandum.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80–B0158R, McNamara Project) 250. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Moyers) to President Johnson 250. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Press Secretary (Moyers) to President Johnson 1 Washington, September 30, 1966, 6:30 p.m. I have been concerned for some time because while we are at war in Vietnam, the Government is not really organized for war. We have no one high official of the Government who spends full time on the war; not even the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East devotes more than 50% of his time to the effort. We are just not orchestrating the handling of the most critical problem we face. One small step forward would be to take advantage of the new wind at State, and make Nick Katzenbach 2 chairman of a little kitchen cabinet— to meet at least biweekly and report directly to the President in writing. Nick would be a good impartial chairman and has no hawk/dove image problem. Cy Vance and Komer and Rostow could be members. 3 You are not getting the kind of service on Vietnam out of the Government that I think you need. Weʼre fighting a war on a part-time basis. 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office Files of Bill Moyers, BDM Memos, Sept. 1966–Feb. 1967. No classification marking. 2 Katzenbach was appointed Under Secretary of State on September 30 and entered on duty October 3, replacing Ball. 3 The wording of this paragraph was taken from a memorandum forwarded to Moyers by Komer on September 30. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, WH Chron) 4 Rostowʼs list of action items prepared following the Presidentʼs Tuesday lunch meeting on November 15 includes the following item: “President wants Mr. Rostow to set up a group—Katzenbach to chair—Komer, Rostow, Vance, good military man—to meet three times a week on Viet Nam and all its dimensions.” (Ibid., Rostow Files, Meetings with President) In a November 18 memorandum to Vance and Katzenbach, Komer proposed an agenda for the first “non-session” of “our non-club.” (Ibid., Komer Files, Katzenbach) For more information on the group, see Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War , Part IV, pp. 479–482. 251. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 251. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, September 30, 1966. SUBJECT “Negotiations Committee” While the Secretaryʼs discussion of Vietnam with Gromyko 2 did not reach any affirmative understanding, Gromykoʼs relatively relaxed attitude, his willingness to continue discussions and his emphasis on Soviet influence in Hanoi were encouraging indications of possible future Soviet initiative. We hope that further talks with Gromyko can be held prior to your meeting with him. The group found no significant concessions in recent statements by NLF Chairman Tho 3 and Pham Van Dong, 4 but we believe that our public reaction to these and other restatements of position by the other side should avoid being too negative. The Secretaryʼs statement 5 that we were studying the new formulations strikes the right note, as well as Ambassador Goldbergʼs attitude on proposals made in his UN address. Meanwhile we are asking Ambassador Goldberg in his conversations in New York to encourage the Eastern Europeans and others to try to obtain clarification of what the recent statements mean. The October meeting in the Philippines provides an excellent opportunity to convince “hard line” Asians such as the Koreans and the Thais of the necessity of continuing efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement. Our group believes we must establish promptly and emphatically that the October meeting is not a “council of war,” as not only the communist but other press and radio are already announcing, but is a “council of peace and postwar reconstruction.” The group feels strongly that between now and the meeting any escalation of our bombing of the North should be avoided. Military escalations could drown out talk of peaceful negotiation. In advance of the meeting the group thought it might be worthwhile to have me or another senior American emissary discuss with the leaders of other Asian countries not participating, the aims of the conclave and ask for their suggestions. The countries he might visit would be Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, India and possibly Indonesia. The thirty-odd countries who are making some contribution to the effort in Vietnam should also be briefed in advance as well as after the meeting through their Ambassadors here or by some other channel. Averell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman-Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis. 2 See Document 247 . 3 Nguyen Huu Tho outlined his peace terms in an interview on August 25 with Australian correspondent Wilfred Burchett, which was broadcast by NLF clandestine radio on September 13 and by Hanoi radio on September 28. For text, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967 , Book 12, Part VI B, pp. 218–219. 4 Presumably a reference to Pham Van Dongʼs speech in Hanoi on September 24 to a Czechoslovak delegation, broadcast over Hanoi radio the same day. For text, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service Report, North Vietnam, September 26, 1966, pp. jjj 13–19. 5 Not further identified. 252. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 252. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 1, 1966. SUBJECT Secretary McNamaraʼs Proposal for Placing Pacification Program in South Viet-Nam Under COMUSMACV 2 1. Secretary McNamara is seeking your concurrence in a Memorandum for the President proposing that all activities which are primarily a part of the pacification program and all persons engaged in such activities be placed under the command of COMUSMACV. This action is intended to increase the efficiency of the operation and remedy the split responsibility for the program on the US side. The proposal also rests in part on the fact that an important segment of the US personnel engaged in pacification are military, although some of them are presently working under civilian direction. 2. Secretary McNamaraʼs concern about the limited progress shown by the pacification program thus far is justified, and I agree with his emphasis on the program as central to the ultimate achievement of our objectives in South Viet-Nam. Here I would observe only that a much more serious liability of the program is the failure of the GVN to devote adequate ARVN forces to the task and take such forces out from under the corps commander whose interests lie elsewhere. 3. Secretary McNamaraʼs proposal does offer one possible means of remedying the problem of split responsibility, but before adopting this remedy I believe we should look very closely at some of its effects: a. We have made extended efforts to emphasize the “other war” and to project an increasing role for the civilian side in South Viet-Nam. This would be seriously undermined both in appearance and in fact by put-ting pacification under military command. It would be difficult to remove the impression that pacification had not become a civil affairs/military government matter, with all the overtones of the US taking over in an occupied country. b. As a military organization MACV quite naturally works through the corps and division, and orders to the sector level, where pacification must really be carried out, come through these filters. Placing pacification under MACV command would thus tend to emphasize the military channel through higher commands whose interests and competence lie much more in the military field than in pacification. This would also work against the civilianization of pacification which we are seeking in our efforts, among other things, to bring sector-level activities (including regional and popular forces) more directly under the authority of Revolutionary Development Minister Thang. In a more general sense both Thang and the civilian leaders now beginning to emerge on the political scene in the constituent assembly could also be expected to see the placing of pacification entirely under MACV as a set-back and reflecting a return to military rule. c. It is a fact of life whether justified or not that the morale of the many US civilians now working on pacification and indispensable to the program would be affected most adversely if they were put under military direction. 4. Without any intention of “fighting the problem”, I question whether the problem of split responsibility on the American side is such a serious one and so urgently in need of remedy that we should take on the liabilities mentioned above. Moreover, the present framework on the US side has been in operation barely six months and the RD program itself is hardly any older, and while I am certainly not satisfied with the progress of pacification, I am not sure that we yet have a reliable enough reading on how it is proceeding and where the problems lie to justify our again upsetting the organization and starting over. Furthermore, there are alternative means of reducing the problem of split responsibility which should be examined. A possible alternative would be the appointment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would also be adviser to the pacification czar, Ambassador Porter; Porter would have as deputies the chiefs of the civilian agencies (AID, JUSPAO and CIA) also involved in pacification, and those deputies and Dep COMUSMACV might form a Pacification Council under Porterʼs direction. While Dep COMUSMACV would himself command, under General Westmorelandʼs authority, the MACV elements advising the GVN military and para-military elements engaged in pacification, he would be made as integral as possible a member of Ambassador Porterʼs staff in order to achieve the fullest possible coordination. 5. The questions discussed above have received extended consideration in the Mission in Saigon and this is as it should be since there are involved many complex questions of US–GVN relationships and the need for an intimate knowledge of the workings of the machinery from top to bottom. Although we have not yet received any comprehensive comments from the Mission, Ambassador Porter will arrive in the United States this weekend and could tell us where this question stands in the Mission and could give us his own views. Recommendation 3 6. Before Secretary McNamaraʼs proposal is given final consideration, we should have the considered views of our Mission in Saigon on the overall question of organization for pacification on the US side. Meanwhile, you may wish to point out to Secretary McNamara our reservations about placing responsibility under COMUSMACV and our hope that a means should be found to put Ambassador Porter in a position to carry out his responsibilities, as originally envisaged, fully and effectively. 1 Source: Department of State, S/S Miscellaneous Vietnam Reports: Lot 70 D 48, Briefing Materials on Vietnam. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Unger. 2 Document 245 . 3 There is no indication on the source text whether Rusk approved the recommendation. In a telephone conversation with McNamara on October 3, Rusk stated that his “principal problem” with turning over pacification to the military “was that we seem to be moving toward military govt when South Viet Nam was moving the other way.” McNamara responded that he “realized this but his chief concern was that the administration of it be effective.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons) 253. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 253. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, October 1, 1966. SUBJECT Vietnam—The Next Phase Some time within the next two to three weeks I think it would be worth the Presidentʼs time to reflect on and plan for his immediate post-election strategy in Vietnam. I assume that the November elections will indicate basic public support for the Presidentʼs Vietnam policy. I am equally convinced that if Hanoi does not immediately sue for peace they will closely watch our actions immediately after the election for a clue to what they should expect from the US in the next two years. In the process of re-evaluating their position, they must attempt to gauge their capability for holding out until after the Nov ʼ68 elections. The closer we get to the Nov ʼ68 elections, the greater will be the incentive for the VC/DRV to hold on at all costs in hopes of a political reversal of the US position in Vietnam. In fact in terms of the effect of the war in Vietnam on US domestic politics, it seems to me that the national political conventions are equally as significant as the fall ʼ68 elections. I do not believe that any US administration—Republican or Democratic would either abandon our commitment to Vietnam or recklessly escalate—regardless of campaign oratory. Because of the campaign oratory, however, I believe that it is in the US national interest to win this war in Vietnam before the beginning of the political conventions in the summer of 1968. This does not mean that we would need to have all of our troops out of Vietnam by that time or that all anti-guerrilla action needs to have ceased. But we must do our best to be clearly over the hump by then, and it would be extremely helpful to have started a phased troop withdrawal. Action Program: In view of the above, I recommend the following: 1. Establish at top levels within the government the objective of winning—or at least passing the crest—by 1 June 1968. Keep this goal out of the press. 2. Allow the Communists one week to evaluate the political impact of the November election. 3. After one week, get the word privately to the VC/DRV that the US is prepared to resume its program of increasing pressure—at a faster rate than before. Issue no public ultimatums. 4. If no satisfactory de-escalatory signals are received within 10 days to two weeks resume our program of increasing pressures: a. Resume the POL campaign. b. Over a 2–3 week period take out the remaining hydro-electric plants. c. Destroy the steel plant. d. Mine the ports. e. Eliminate the NVN air forces. f. Attack the air defense system. g. As d and e are eliminated shift weight of effort back to interdiction campaign. 5. As soon as details are worked out announce reorganization of pacification activities and beginning of new phase of operations. 6. By 1 January announce intention and commence withdrawal of up to two divisions and appropriate air units from Europe for transfer to Vietnam, with redeployment determined on basis of logistic capability. Justify as temporary move without committing US to necessarily redeploy to Europe after Vietnam war is over. Finally, I urge that decisions on the above recommendations be made as soon as possible so that implementation can begin immediately after the November elections. G 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President on October 1 under cover of a memorandum suggesting that he read it and calling Ginsburgh a “superb JCS liaison officer” who “has made important contributions to our work on negotiating positions” and other Vietnam issues. (Ibid.) 254. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam 254. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, October 2, 1966. 4244. A. Following is suggested agenda for our discussions in Saigon beginning Monday, October 10: 1. Intelligence estimates . An evaluation of infiltration and of enemy regular and VC force levels, including a projection through CY 1967; of enemy morale (in both the North and South); and of any signs that population under VC control is wavering. Include also estimates of the enemy capabilities to hinder RD programs; of the situation in the DMZ and capabilities of the enemy for attack across the DMZ and from Cambodia or Laos; and of how good our intelligence is, especially with respect to estimates of enemyʼs strength. 2. Operational analysis and statement of requirements . This would be briefing, of type given previously by DePuy, showing military requirements through CY 67. It should include a statement of US military objectives; of our strategy for and likelihood of achieving them; of roles to be played by US, FWMAF, RVNAF, paramilitary and police; of actions to be taken against NVN, in Laos and at sea; of proposed force deployments; and of proposed aircraft and sortie levels. 3. Air interdiction operations . An evaluation of Rolling Thunder; Steel Tiger; Barrel Roll; Arc Light (also of Shining Brass). Are major changes required in any of these? 4. Logistical estimate . Herein the construction program, port and shipping management, communications needs, maintenance capabilities, common supply system, and adequacy of supplies. 5. Barriers . The interdiction infiltration system being developed by General Starbirdʼs TF 728. I suggest this be the first item on the agenda to permit Dr. Foster and General Starbird to depart promptly. Other concepts, including an involving compartmentalization of VC logistical movements within South Vietnam, could be discussed at this time. 6. Pacification (RD) . Include an evaluation of the situation country-wide and in the priority areas, present against past, with plans for the future. Under this item we can discuss the development of a pacification concept, the possibility of consolidating responsibility for pacification (RD) on the US side, the plans to devote a portion of ARVN (and possibly US) forces to the pacification mission, improvements in GVN RD organization, and an evaluation of the RD cadre program. 7. The Delta . Pros and cons of, and the plan for, deploying US forces into the Delta, with the accompanying pacification program. Herein an assessment of any accommodation that may exist in the Delta and the relation between such an accommodation and our efforts to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. 8. Chieu Hoi . Discussion of the program and how it might be improved. 9. US–RVNAF-FWMAF relations . Report on how the military commands are getting along, and comment on suggestions for changes in command relationships, e.g., the suggestion of a US Director of Military Operations (i.e., a Combined US–GVN-FWMAF Command under General Westmoreland). 10. US, RVNAF, and Pacification (RD) personnel morale . Morale of US military personnel and of US civilians, including proposals regarding any change in duty-tour or dependents policy; and, on Vietnamese side, the problem of desertions and the implications of the new anti-desertion program, and the question of Vietnamese will to implement the RD program. 11. Piaster budget for US military operations in CY 1967 . A comparison by category with CY 1966; an appraisal of how it pinches our efforts; its relationship to the total anti-inflation program; and the outlook for success of such a program. In addition to the above items, I will of course want to hear your views and to discuss (12) the extent and impact of corruption in the GVN at ministry, JGS, corps, division, sector and subsector levels, and the price if any paid for “fencing around” big violators like Co and Quang; (13) the outlook for continued political development and the prospect that the Ky-constituent assembly confrontation can be handled; (14) the lines that might be followed to split the VC off from Hanoi, to make both the VC and Hanoi more amenable to a satisfactory settlement, and to bring the GVN along with us in these efforts; (15) the degree of anti-Americanism that prevails among peasants, army, intellectuals, etc., and actions we should take in this connection; and (16) any matters that need to be ironed out in preparation for the Baguio meeting of Heads of State. B. I will want to get into the field while there; General Wheeler will discuss details of trips with General Westmoreland. C. I hope to avoid formality and diplomatic affairs. This of course does not rule out working lunches and dinners which you might consider desirable. I will want to talk with key Vietnamese and third-country representatives if such talks appear useful. D. I will be accompanied by General Wheeler, Bob Komer, Art Sylvester, and John McNaughton. I believe John Foster and General Starbird will be in Saigon when we arrive. The party will also include approximately five support personnel. As you know, I have offered a ride to Bill Porter and Henry Kissinger. E. Please give me your views as to any additions to or changes in the above-suggested agenda. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC. McNamara visited Vietnam October 10–13, accompanied by, among others, Katzenbach, Wheeler, McNaughton, and Komer. 255. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 255. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 3, 1966. SUBJECT Naval Gunfire Against North Vietnam On a number of occasions since May of this year, General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp have recommended the use of naval gunfire against North Vietnam. These recommendations have had the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but have never received final approval, largely because of the international problems such action might entail. At present, naval fire on North Vietnam is authorized only in self defense against attack from the shore. As you know, General Westmoreland is now quite concerned about the threat developing to the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam—in the form of enemy attacks supported, and potentially launched from, the DMZ and southern portions of North Vietnam. He is urgently requesting authority to employ naval gunfire against North Vietnam south of 175 30ʼ—i.e. from Dong Hoi south to the DMZ. Again, he has the support of CINCPAC and the Chiefs. The advantages and disadvantages of approving this request are briefly set forth below. 1. Advantages . General Westmoreland and the Chiefs point out that the enemy buildup in and north of the DMZ involves numerous fixed military targets and a vital supply axis along coastal Route 1, supplemented by waterborne traffic, all of which cannot be consistently and successfully engaged by air attack. Naval gunfire is less inhibited by darkness and weather than is tactical air. It can deliver reasonably accurate area and harassing fire under any weather conditions. It can engage targets, including moving targets, with observed fire in weather which would preclude effective air attack. In good weather, its accuracy at reasonable ranges is equal to that of air attack. Operating within 12 miles of the coast, the various ships and weapons involved can effectively engage targets up to 12 or more miles inland—a distance which encompasses the principal lines of communication in that part of North Vietnam and the eastern portions of the DMZ. At least in theory, the application of naval gunfire to targets in this area would free tactical air resources to engage targets along the more primitive LOCʼs to the west, in the western DMZ, and in the immediate battle area of any actual attack. Also, ships could be used to engage targets which the enemy has protected with heavy local defenses and thus avoid aircraft losses. (It is always possible, of course, to lose a ship to coastal guns or air attack.) This fire could be provided with resources already deployed, at the expense of support to forces in South Vietnam. Ammunition supplies are adequate. The most probable average commitment would be 4 ships (one 6" or 8"-gun cruiser, two 5"-gun destroyers, and one 5"-rocket ship) of the 7 to 11 such ships which have been engaged in naval gunfire support to operations within South Vietnam. On a number of occasions, this in-country support has been quite effective. In sum, the arguments in favor of employing naval gunfire against North Vietnam are: a serious threat exists involving targets appropriate for naval gunfire; the resources are readily available; and this fire can be delivered under certain conditions which preclude air attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that we approve the use of naval gunfire south of Dong Hoi against radar and antiaircraft sites, other fixed military targets, convoys and elements of LOCʼs and North Vietnamese craft which are definitely identified as naval vessels or vessels bearing military cargo. Attack would be prohibited against civilian craft and other targets which involve large collateral damage or civilian casualties. 2. Disadvantages . The disadvantages of this course of action still lie primarily in the reactions we may expect from the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, other nations, and certain elements here at home. There is also some doubt as to the measure of military advantage we would gain to offset these reactions. While from one point of view the additional destructive force applied against North Vietnam by naval fire would be proportionately small, from another viewpoint this would be escalation, and a step toward extension of naval bombardment still farther north. The enemy probably would claim that we were engaging in a new kind of attack. Perhaps more important, since this is the kind of activity which would normally precede such action, the North Vietnamese and Chinese might conclude that we were in fact preparing to invade the North, and undertake some escalatory action in response. (At the very least, this action would lend credence to past South Vietnamese threats and American newspaper speculation concerning invasion.) Other nations, including some allies, would probably regret that we found this new departure necessary, and might dissociate themselves from it. International legal questions could be raised. It is certain that at least some of our detractors here at home would point to the action as a new and serious form of escalation. On the other side of this question, it must be conceded that our ships have already fired on North Vietnamese territory—in defense against shore fire—on three occasions (February, March and April of this year while engaged in search and rescue operations). There was no serious adverse reaction in these cases, but the self-defense nature of the fire was immediately demonstrable. We have no guarantee that the incremental military benefits of naval gunfire would be of sufficient magnitude to compensate for these adverse reactions. Assuming that sufficient targets can be identified, ships engaged in this mission would probably fire on the order of 200 rounds per ship per day, or a total of 800 rounds. —As one measure of the concentration involved, this would amount to 16 rounds per mile over the 50-odd miles of Route 1 from Dong Hoi to the DMZ. —As another measure of weight of effort, the explosive charge in the average round involved is on the order of 14 pounds. This would mean about 6 tons delivered per day—quite a small amount (roughly the equivalent of 10 attack sorties) compared with tonnages we have delivered in the same area with tactical air. —The average shell has an effects radius of 40–90 yards against personnel, and a somewhat smaller radius against vehicles. Some types can achieve good penetration of concrete and other fortifications, particularly if the target presents a vertical face, but this requires precision, observed fire. Granted, this weight of effort could be concentrated (especially that of the rocket ship), or substantially increased (by committing more ships or by including a higher proportion of heavier guns). Even so, when we consider the large amounts of tactical air available—particularly in an emergency—and the rather limited sets of circumstances under which naval gunfire enjoys an undisputed superiority, the military advantages appear less imposing. —Few fixed targets would be so time-sensitive as to demand attack during weather conditions when naval ships could engage them and tactical air could not. —At least half the problem with fleeting targets, such as convoys, is to locate and identify the target; this part of the problem would be the same for naval fire as for tactical air. This detracts from the admitted ability of naval ships to engage a target, once located, under certain conditions when tactical air would not be effective. —While the enemy may undertake to increase antiaircraft defenses in southern North Vietnam to support a major effort, at present his defenses in that area have been neutralized to the point where we lose relatively few aircraft. 3. Recommendations . On balance, I conclude that the military advantages of approving naval gunfire against North Vietnam at this time are outweighed by the probable adverse reactions and possible military risks. The Secretary of State and I recommend against approval. Robert S. McNamara 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 9:30 a.m. on October 4 under cover of a memorandum stating that he concurred with McNamaraʼs recommendation. (Ibid.) During a telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President indicated that he had read McNamaraʼs memorandum and thought his decision was justified but also thought McNamara should get the Joint Chiefs and their adherents to point out how disastrous it would be for the United States to inaugurate a new policy of this type during the closing days of Congress and on the eve of the Manila Conference, and “how the propaganda people would just wreck us.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.27, Side B, PNO 2) 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 256. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 256. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 3, 1966, 2:35 p.m. Mr. President: We want these results from the Philippines conference: 1. A reaffirmation of the commitment among the fighting allies to see it through to an honorable peace. 2. An agreed position among the fighting allies and Saigon on the terms on which peace will be sought. 3. An approach by the Saigon government, backed by the fighting allies, to those now fighting with the VC, including perhaps an amnesty offer, which would be beyond the appeal made in the Honolulu declaration by the Vietnamese government. 4. Increased emphasis by Saigon, backed by the fighting allies, on pacification, land reform, planning for long-term economic development (including future use of our bases), education, health, agriculture, etc. 5. If possible, an agreed statement of support for Cambodian territorial integrity and independence. 6. Support from all the governments for Asian regional economic development without creating or appearing to create a new Asian grouping made up of the fighting allies. In general, we want the government in Saigon to recommit itself to its allies and to the world to getting on with the Honolulu program, where much progress has been made, including the commitment to go forward in next steps towards constitutional government. W.W. Rostow 2 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, POTUS Trip, vol. 1. No classification marking. 2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 257. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 257. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 3, 1966. SUBJECT “Negotiations” I believe the only real chance now in sight to induce Hanoi to negotiate a settlement depends on the influence Moscow is willing and able to exert. Events in China have probably made Hanoi look more towards Moscow than Peking, but have not eliminated Hanoiʼs dependence on Peking. If Moscow is to take on the task of persuading Hanoi to move towards a settlement, the USSR will probably have to assume certain risks and obligations. Thus I believe we must offer some compensating inducements. In my judgment, the overpowering desire of Moscow today is for greater stability in Europe. Regardless of how we assess developments in Germany in the years ahead, I am convinced that the Soviet leaders are deeply concerned over a possible reemergence of a German threat to Russian security. The Kremlin desires a nuclear non-proliferation pact with Germany particularly in mind. I seriously doubt that the Soviet Union will be satisfied with a formula which would permit “hardware participation” by the Germans. A possible quid pro quo for Moscowʼs action in Southeast Asia would be our abandoning the hardware option in our proposals for the pact. Although few Germans really believe a NATO hardware deal is probable, its abandonment would mean to the Germans the giving up of a hope which has some political appeal. To induce a German Government to abandon this hope would probably require concessions in “offset” agreements. Yet, the end of hostilities in Vietnam would more than compensate for the dollar drain resulting from such a concession. In addition, a mutual reduction in forces in Germany would probably appeal to Moscow. In sum, I believe that we will have to agree on some arrangement affecting Germany if we are to induce Moscow to act in Vietnam. I recognize the political difficulties in Germany at the present time, but our interests are so overwhelming to get the war over in Vietnam, that I cannot help but feel we should move as rapidly as feasible. I hope that there will be an opportunity for you to raise this subject, or at least touch on it, in your talk with Gromyko. It may require discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow before an understanding can be worked out. But the stakes are so great in ending the fighting in Vietnam, that action along the lines outlined above is highly desirable. 2 Averell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President at 1 p.m. on October 4. In his covering memorandum he expressed his doubts that the Russians had the “power to make Hanoi end the war” and his opposition either to abandoning the hardware option or to letting the Germans “off the hook on balance of payments offsets.” (Ibid.) 2 Responding to a request from the President for comments, Katzenbach and Eugene Rostow each expressed disagreement with Harrimanʼs proposal in memoranda of October 8 and 12, respectively. Katzenbach questioned both the necessity of the proposed concession to Moscow and “the wisdom of mixing Europe and Asia at our suggestion.” (Ibid., box 212, Amb. Harriman—Negotiations Comm.) 258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 258. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, October 4, 1966. 7630. Ref: A. Saigon 7243; 2 B. State 23182; 3 C. State 52726; 4 D. State 52727. 5 1. I met Thieu, Ky and Tran Van Do Oct 3 in long and frank session which revealed much of South Vietnamese thinking on peaceful settlement and national reconciliation issues. 2. After agreement on the agenda to be followed, and using an outline similar to that in Saigon 7243, we went down the list point by point on the objectives, guarantees, and components of satisfactory outcome to the war, the methods of reaching a settlement, and finally the approach to a national reconciliation program. I pointed out that these were ideas for discussion and for illustrative purposes and were not to be considered official positions. Objectives 3. In response to my question on their views regarding the three basic objectives (sovereignty of GVN to be intact, territorial limits of SVN to be intact, and system of guarantees), Tran Van Do and Ky emphasized that they were concerned with guarantees, specifically whether the US intended to keep its troops in SVN as one of the principal guarantees. They wished to know what kind of guarantees are envisaged and how control can be exercised in practice during critical period of withdrawal of NVA and VC as well as by US troops. Thieu asked what kind of procedures would be followed and how would timing be determined with respect to a so-called “cease-fire.” He asked would we accept a “cease-fire” when we all start to talk with the VC? Their concern was with defining the system of control, the machinery to be used prior to any agreement to withdraw. 4. I replied that I was authorized to state that the US will not withdraw our troops before security is assured or GVN is able to cope with terrorism or while the VC infrastructure remains intact; SVN would not be left without protection. In addition, there are other forms of possible guarantees such as multilateral commitments, expanded ICC, and bilateral pledges. The question of a “cease-fire” depends on definition; a “cease-fire” means something different to Hanoi than to US and we can say at present only that it would be part of a general package or settlement—a point for negotiation, not an end in itself to be agreed to separately at the outset. We were aware that terrorists often did not use firearms and that a conventional “cease-fire” might have very little relevance for the main source of aggression, i.e., terrorism. 5. Tran Van Do inquired if it would be useful and possible to obtain a multilateral commitment from the impending seven nation conference. Although all the participants have given evidence of support, what does the US think of a general pact to provide a specific international guarantee? The basis of the US commitment is also not entirely clear. Do said a formal guarantee of mutual security would broaden support so that in the future the US would not have to initiate aid alone and then persuade others to join in. Thieu said they wished a broader international commitment than that provided by SEATO, which, Do noted, is an obligation for separate bilateral commitments. They wish an international obligation which commits an entire group of nations to the security of each member. This would not, Do said, be aimed just at SVN, but would be for the benefit of all SEA nations, any one of which may be threatened at some future date. It would do what it had been intended for SEATO to do. Could this be raised at the seven nation conference? Do asked. 6. I replied that I would report their views to Washington; the question of a multilateral committee [commitment?] is significant. I noted that there had been discussion [garble]. On the US commitment, I pointed out that in addition to the SEATO protocol authority, the US Congress had, after the Tonkin Bay incident, authorized the President to undertake broad military assistance to SVN; this was a legal commitment as far as the US alone was concerned. As for discussion of a mutual security arrangement at the seven nation meeting, it is obviously something which could be discussed. Components of a Satisfactory Outcome 7. When we reached this item, I simply read the title and then paused, saying that I would very much like to hear their views on what they considered the specifics of a satisfactory outcome—or to put it in French terms, an acceptable result. They looked at each other and then said that they would like to hear what I thought the elements were. I then, making it clear that I was not making an official proposal on behalf of the US Government, but was merely proposing personal ideas for illustrative purposes, went through the following points: A. Cessation of aggression—by ending “military” hostilities. GVN comment: This met with no objection. B. Cessation of aggression—by “criminal” (terroristic) hostilities. This meant an end to the terrorist organization, to what is sometimes called the infrastructure. GVN comment: At this point Ky said the terrorist organization would have to be “dissolved.” It would be understood, I said, that after the satisfactory outcome had been reached, any new case of assassination, torture, or kidnapping, or of recruiting or impressment, or of sabotage for subversive reasons would be justification for immediate retaliation. C. Departure of hardcore Viet Cong officer personnel. GVN comment: Ky said, yes, but they would have to leave within a certain time limit. D. Reintegration of rank and file Viet Cong. (1) GVN comment: Ky pointed out that this depended on the Chieu Hoi program. (2) Thieu stated that departure of the North Vietnamese Army by a time limit is not difficult, but for the village Viet Cong infrastructure, it is another problem. If local members of the Viet Cong organization do not choose to go North or join the GVN after a specific time, the GVN would consider them rebels and take action to eliminate them. (3) I agreed that an intensified Chieu Hoi effort was most desirable and that a time limit would have to be imposed. The destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure was clearly a matter for police-type action. No government can be denied police powers, and I was glad to see that in that connection steps are being taken to train some ARVN troops in constabulary work. Thieu agreed. (4) Tran Van Do asked how in practice infiltration could be really halted. Supposing Hanoi should agree to withdraw and take out many troops, they can still leave many thousands behind and resume infiltration at a later date. The Americans, however, would have stopped their strikes and ground operations. How then could we be able to control the ground and prevent infiltration across the border? (5) Thieu said they had been thinking of constructing a surveillance system all along the border. Ky said that he wished to discuss this problem further with us. He was examining it carefully and was having a study made on a system of border outposts, of the question of troop roles and missions for all forces in South Viet-Nam on border control, counter-terror efforts, security, etc. I said that I had not realized that control of infiltration across these frightful jungles was a possible thing to do, physically. They assured me that it was and that it was entirely a question of whether one wanted to do it. They indicated a desire to bring this up with Secretary McNamara during his forthcoming visit. E. Departure of North Vietnamese Army. (Comment on this just covered above.) F. Stopping infiltration of men and supplies. (Covered above.) G. All roads to be open to the ARVN; new roadblocks or blown bridges or re-establishment of underground redoubts would justify retaliation. (They all agreed.) H. Viet Cong to disarm, give up explosives and weapons. (They agreed.) I. North Viet-Nam to stop direction of Viet Cong. (Agreed.) J. Staged withdrawal of free world forces. (Covered above.) K. Supervision and guarantee of the actions listed. (Covered above.) L. Peace talks not to be dragged on for a long period unless tangible results have been and are being achieved. (They agreed.) The methods to achieve objectives. 8. I went over each of the eight alternative methods, from tacit cessation of hostilities through a full multilateral conference, any of which might singly or in combination lead to a settlement, pointing out that we favored no particular one but that they should all be reviewed for planning purposes. 9. Thieu asked for our frank views on whether or not the US would agree to a new Geneva conference with the original participants. Tran Van Do asserted that “we do not know precisely what we want, but we know we do not want another Geneva conference.” Ky said that for their part the best place for a new conference would be Tokyo. “We will have nothing to do with Geneva. Nor will we ever sit down with France.” A cease-fire agreement now is 180 degrees different than it was in 1954, he stated, and the participants are now different, so why go back to Geneva or accept the same participants? Ky referred to Vice President Humphreyʼs statements that this war is an Asian problem and should be solved by Asian nations. Those involved number just about every nation in the area except Japan, and Japan, he pointed out, will not be attending the seven nation conference. The main point, Thieu said, is that SVN must not be committed beforehand to going back to Geneva. Thieu asked what nations might attend a Geneva conference? 10. We explained that the US has publicly stated it is prepared to go back to Geneva, that although we might prefer an Asian setting, we are always prepared to negotiate at any place, and that SVN has also agreed to this. Participation can be discussed and changed to comprise those countries with a legitimate interest in the war. We have not said that readiness to use a Geneva conference meant that we must reach agreement “in accordance with” the 1954 agreements, but rather “on the basis of.” The important point is that we must both be always prepared to negotiate. As for an Asian conference, our acceptance of the Thanat proposal was evidence of our approval of the idea. Although we are in favor of such a conference, we cannot also refuse a Geneva conference. I told them I took note, however, of their strong opposition to any full scale multilateral negotiations using the Geneva conference format and their opposition to the inclusion of France. 11. Ky agreed that many combinations of nations, excluding of course, France, could be acceptable. He said in this regard that the GVN thought too much attention was focused on Hanoi and Washington and that Peking, Moscow and Saigon were often not mentioned. Reports should equate Saigon to Hanoi, and Washington to Peking and Moscow so that the roles of the latter are not forgotten. Ky then took up the point of including the VC in negotiations. “We cannot accept any conference with the VC, we cannot sit down with the VC,” he said. He reiterated several times that the GVN must not go to a table where the presence of the VC is required; that any equating of Saigon with the VC is unacceptable. 12. It was explained that the issue is not one of sitting down at a conference, but of communicating with the VC to arrange a cease-fire. The VC would in no case be granted status as a sovereign equal, but as an internal Vietnamese problem. In the matter of reaching a settlement the enemy should be dealt with in alternative ways: externally, with Hanoi, as one channel, and internally with the VC as the other. It might be possible to handle the VC in one way and Hanoi in another. 13. Ky then switched to the possibility of a drawn-out tacit cessation of GVN-VC hostilities with a staged reduction of GVN-US military operations. He said he did not see how we Americans would have time to accept a “fade-away” solution, although he personally favored such a solution and he thought Hanoi would, too. It would mean fewer casualties, but he believed we were in too much of a hurry to make this acceptable to us. He feared that prolonged war of this nature would find US public opinion unprepared for the continued employment of US troops in what would be a purely guerrilla-type, terroristic war even though casualties would be light. He thought it possible that the VC might accept this option, but the US might have considerable difficulties. The fade-away of the Communists in Malaya, in this regard, is not comparable, Ky pointed out. Malaya did not have an active sanctuary behind the rebels. The point, according to Ky, is that SVN could accept a “fade-away” cessation only if it has a system of border guarantees. Even if NVN withdraws its troops from SVN, Ky strongly emphasized, a system of concrete guarantees will still be imperative. 14. We noted that the VC may very well opt for a tacit cessation, and this might be better for the US and GVN, but a system of guarantees was, of course, still required. 15. Ky said he preferred two systems of guarantees: first, an international commitment as discussed earlier for external threats, and second, a strong system of border protection against support of subversion. If it is decided after thorough study that we can establish a line of border outposts which will provide protection, then, Ky said, he believed the best option would be for all concerned to reach a secret agreement with the VC. We could afford it then, he said, but must exclude NVN. Tran Van Do supported the same doubts [re?] guarantee approach: an internal sealing off of the border by police efforts plus a broad international military commitment. Ky said that the actual number of geographical routes for infiltration in the air and on the ground into SVN are not numerous. It is possible to seal them off physically. 16. Concerning US–NVN negotiations, Ky said he did not believe that Hanoi would ever sit down with the US. To do so would contradict all its propaganda and destroy the peopleʼs belief in what the government has said. This is a Vietnamese reaction, and Hanoi cannot afford to accept it, which poses a real problem if it does want to consider negotiations. NVN has also never admitted its military presence in the South; to deal with the US would be an acknowledgement of this. Ky said he frankly believes that when Hanoi finally reaches the conclusion that it cannot win the war, they will simply withdraw their troops and cease active military operations for a period of years, leaving the GVN to cope with a revived VC at some later date. The VC, Ky said, if they decide to negotiate with the US, must, therefore, do it secretly. What they are really interested in, Thieu said, will be “la monnaie de change”—the chips to use in the poker game. In this case our best chips in NVN are our bombing, and our best chips in SVN will have to be our threat to the guerrilla infrastructure—when we have it. National Reconciliation 17. I read through an outline drawn from State telegrams 23182, 52726, and 52727, noting the possibility of an amnesty proclamation on Nov 1. 18. Ky replied that the timing appeared to him to be premature. This is important since poor timing of an appeal could adversely affect the morale of the South Vietnamese troops who would see their enemies being accepted back before they were defeated. This could pretty well eliminate their fighting capacity. 19. Thieu, however, said he was planning a speech for November 1 which would be the kind of plea which we desire. I left with them a memorandum covering the proposal and they agreed to consider its applicability for the November 1 speech. 20. Ky said the govt can help itself by effectively helping the victims of the present floods in the Delta. A program is being launched by Social Welfare Commissioner Tran Ngoc Lieng to provide materials and assistance to build new houses upon stilts in flood areas. These would be permanent alterations since the floods recur annually, and houses on stilts would eliminate need for evacuations. The people are enthusiastic about the program, but it will take more time. 21. A further consideration to hold off on a proclamation is to allow successful dry-season operations to have full effect. We are agreed in principle, Tran Van Do said, on the idea of appeal, but it should be delayed until after the flood problem is resolved and the government has been able to demonstrate its authority and responsiveness to the people. 22. The flood alleviation concept is sound, I agreed, and said I would get USAID to provide what it could to help the program in addition to the food distribution program now underway. This is an area where the VC cannot be of any help to the people, thereby offering the government a useful opportunity. I asked their views on the Chieu Hoi program, saying I had been disappointed that the highly successful elections had had no effect on it. 23. Thieu replied that over the years Chieu Hoi has not had a powerful appeal. The enemy tends to wait things out, to sit back and see how actual conditions develop rather than respond to governmental appeals. What is needed is a dramatic gesture to get momentum started, backed by better organization. All agreed on the importance of improving the Chieu Hoi effort. 24. The meeting ended with mutual agreement that it had been extremely useful and that we would meet again in about six days. 25. Comments: One aspect of the positions taken by Thieu, Ky and Do deserves special mention. Those positions reflect a continuing fragility in the political structure in Viet-Nam, despite the substantial success of recent months. This lies behind some of the caution with which they approach the problem of negotiations, as well as the caution with which they approach other problems. We are still greatly concerned, as we have been for some time, with the importance of maintaining governmental stability in Saigon. The unity of military leadership is always precarious, given the rivalries that exist. Even self-assured people like Thieu and Ky recognize limits on how far and how fast they can move on any question—whether negotiations or the fight against corruption. I believe they responded well to our presentation, particularly to the dealing with amnesty and a reconciliation proclamation of November 1. On other items they were more cautious. They recognize something which I have mentioned before—namely, that there is a pace at which things can be made to move here. If we or they exceed that pace too greatly, then there is a danger of reaction and instability despite the best of intentions. This needs to be taken in particular account when dealing with a subject so replete with potential pitfalls as negotiations and contacts with the Viet Cong. 26. Please let us have your views on Tran Van Doʼs proposal that the seven nation conference make some sort of a multilateral mutual security commitment. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:08 a.m. 2 In telegram 7243, September 29, Lodge transmitted a proposed outline for the discussion summarized in this telegram. (Ibid.) 3 Document 203 . 4 Telegram 52726, September 22, discussed national reconciliation, contacts between the GVN and the Viet Cong, and the encouragement of Viet Cong defections. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 Telegram 52727, September 22, transmitted a draft speech on national reconciliation for Ky. (Ibid.) 259. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 259. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 4, 1966. Dear Dean: By message of 16 August 1966 (Saigonʼs 3601), 2 Ambassador Lodge raised the question of the possible extension of defoliation operations into the DMZ and requested the views of the Departments of State and Defense on the desirability of doing so. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that, from a military standpoint, defoliation of areas in SVN within and near the DMZ is highly desirable and should be undertaken. I agree with this position. As you are aware, Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces have been exploiting the combination of remoteness and heavy vegetation found in the DMZ to their own purposes and advantage. This is particularly true in the western sector. The seriousness of NVA/VC use of the zone is illustrated by the recent introduction of the 324B Division of the NVA directly across the zone into SVN where the force now confronts GVN, US and other friendly forces in combat. Intelligence indicates that the communists are resupplying the units recently infiltrated into South Vietnamʼs Quang Tri Province through the DMZ and are building a supply base in the zone for future operations. Defoliation in the southern portion of the DMZ may have political as well as definite military advantages. Such operations are defensive in nature and would assist the efforts of the ICC and all who seek actual demilitarization of the zone. Defoliation has been conducted in SVN since 1961 and in Laos since 1965. Such operations continue routinely today. In my opinion, the political risks of defoliation in and near the DMZ should be less than the predictable military risks of failure on our part to take all reasonable measures to deny the communists continued use of the DMZ. Since it takes up to three months for the jungle cover to fall after spraying, this matter is one which requires early attention. Current authority for defoliation within SVN was delegated to the American Ambassador Saigon and COMUSMACV after review by the highest authority in May 1963. Extension of this authority to include the southern portion of the DMZ would seem to be appropriate under current circumstances. If you agree, I would appreciate your releasing the required instruction essentially as contained in the attached draft joint State/Defense message. 3 Sincerely, Bob 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Secret. 2 Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–10 VIET S) 3 Attached but not printed. Rusk concurred in a letter of November 18 to McNamara, stating: “While I can foresee some unfavorable political reaction to these operations, I believe the reaction would be manageable as long as we avoid defoliating any area of North Vietnam.” Defoliation operations in the southern sector of the DMZ were authorized in telegram 91707 to Saigon, November 26. Ruskʼs letter is quoted and telegram 91707 is cited in JCS telegram 1752, December 19. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII) 260. Editorial Note 260. Editorial Note In his weekly telegram, October 5, 1966, Lodge notified President Johnson that a Cabinet crisis was brewing in South Vietnam: “A crisis, so far not of serious dimensions, is taking place in the Ky government. The chief of the office staff of the Minister of Health, Nguyen Tan Loc, who, under Vietnamese and French custom, has the impressive title of ‘Director of Cabinet,’ was arrested September 29 and held overnight on vague charges of Southern separatist activity. The charge is believed untrue. Southern members of the Cabinet, particularly Youth Minister Vo Long Trieu, interpreted the arrest as a move to intimidate Southern officials. Trieu and other Southern Ministers apparently seriously considered submitting their resignations as a result. “At an October 3 Cabinet meeting Minister of Education Truong (Southerner) raised the issue and suggested that Minister of Health Kha (a Northerner) was trying to force Loc out of the Ministry, a charge which may well be true since Loc and Kha are known to have been at odds over proposals to reorganize the Ministry. Deputy Prime Minister Vien (Southerner) then charged that Kha has managed the Ministry of Health very poorly. Kha thereupon tendered his resignation. “It is not yet clear whether Prime Minister Ky will accept Khaʼs resignation. To fail to do so could trigger resignations by Trieu, Truong, and Vien. In any event regional differences have unfortunately been intensified within the government.” (Telegram 7732; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 261. Memorandum of Conversation 261. Memorandum of Conversation 1 New York, October 5, 1966, 3 p.m. SecDel/MC/41 SECRETARYʼS DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York, September-October 1966 SUBJECT Vietnam Conflict PARTICIPANTS U.S. The Secretary William M. Owen Republic of Vietnam Bui Diem, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Deputy Foreign Minister Diem said that Prime Minister Ky had instructed him to come to New York and to present his governmentʼs views to as many delegations as possible. The Secretary noted that it was important that this be done since Diem spoke as an Asian and his views would carry weight amongst the Afro-Asians. The communique issued at the ASPAC Meeting in Seoul 2 had also been very helpful in this respect. Diem said he had also been instructed by Prime Minister Ky to inquire as to the outcome of any discussions the United States had had with Russian and French representatives. The Secretary said that the talks with the French had been of no use whatsoever, since it was quite clear that France accepted no responsibility in Southeast Asia. De Gaulleʼs attitude was that he desired peace regardless of the consequences, which was not the U.S. view. The press had reported that Couve de Murville had tried to draw us out on an eventual peace settlement. The Secretary had told Couve that he would not negotiate this matter with him because Couve could not stop the fighting. 3 We have had no indication from Hanoi directly or indirectly that they are interested in a serious approach to peace, so it looks as if the fighting will have to continue for a period of time. As to the Russian attitude, the Secretary said that their basic view is that if they were acting alone they would be prepared to see the matter settled on the basis of the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel. The problem was that they were attacked by Peking, which accused them of conspiring with the U.S. The Soviet Union is impotent in the face of this bitter attitude from Peking. Russia does not like the fact that we are bombing a fellow socialist country in North Vietnam, but, when we ask the Russians what will happen when we stop bombing them, they have nothing to say on that point. They say they cannot negotiate on this matter because Hanoi has not asked them to do so. They are embarrassed. On the other hand, it would be of some interest to Diem to know that Gromyko did not interpose Vietnam as a barrier to discussion of other subjects with us. This was of some significance because it showed that Vietnam was not an overriding problem with them. Russia was very much concerned about Communist China, where none of us really knew very much about what was happening. Diem said that he had met with Secretary General U Thant earlier in the day and pointed out to him that the South Vietnamese were more interested than anyone in peace. At the same time, Diem drew U Thantʼs attention to the fact that the Communists have not shown the same desire for peace, whether through the UN or any other channel, and said that fact should be taken into account. After the discussion of another subject, the Secretary observed that he thought we were coming to a very interesting and critical period because Hanoi must now be coming to realize that they could not succeed by military force. They must therefore decide what consequences would derive from such a situation. Diem recalled the Secretaryʼs visit to Saigon last year and the speculation which it created in Hanoi. The Secretary expressed the belief that the recent elections in South Vietnam have had a very important international result. If the Constituent Assembly succeeded in working out a constitution and could cooperate with the government on progressive measures, there would be a new chapter in the development of Vietnam because it would be made quite clear to Hanoi that they could not succeed politically in the south, which has been one of their hopes. The military side was also going quite well despite the problems of guerilla warfare. One of the difficult tasks was, of course, to bring as many as possible of the misguided people in the National Liberation Front back into the orbit of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Diem agreed, but noted that progress had been made only at a low level. The NLF has a very tight control. Whenever a member of the NLF moves from one area to another, he is very closely scrutinized. Many people have raised the idea of having a government of the NLF, but Hanoi has frankly refused because it is afraid of such a government. Diem said he had told the African delegations here that it was crystal clear that the conflict was an international problem since North Vietnam was infiltrating personnel into the south and that they should go back north. When they did so, there would be no problem. It was clear from his talks that the various delegations had a common concern for peace. He also felt that there was now a better understanding of the Vietnamese position, although they were not going to say publicly that they understood it. The Secretary estimated that there were 65–70 governments who very much hoped that the South Vietnamese, the U.S., and their allies would succeed although they did not emphasize the point publicly. About 25 governments, composed of the communist bloc, France, and some others hoped that we would not succeed, while another 15–25 did not want to hear or think about Vietnam. The Secretary did not believe that the situation with respect to these various governments would change very much, but we should not be timid about making them realize that the security of South Vietnam is of great significance to other small countries. In reply to Diemʼs query as to what we had heard of a draft resolution on Vietnam at the General Assembly, the Secretary said that there have been reports that a number of countries have been working not on a joint resolution but on a joint statement, but that it appears that only a limited number of countries are interested, including Cambodia, Algeria, Guinea, and two or three others. Apparently it would not be a bilateral but a unilateral initiative. They were not getting much response, but we would watch the matter closely. The Secretary suggested that Diem need not be concerned about the statement. The Secretary stated that it sounded rather harsh to say so, but the fact was that international opinion was not going to make these decisions as far as the U.S. was concerned, because most of these countries bore no responsibility. He found it rather distressing that those who have treaty commitments are not as solid as they should be: these include France, the UK—which should be doing more than it was—and Pakistan. Otherwise, all SEATO members were taking an active part and bearing responsibilities. Diem stated he did not think the French position was going to change unless De Gaulle left the scene. The Secretary agreed. The Secretary added a point of clarification which he thought was of some interest. He had pressed Couve very hard to tell him whether his reference to the use of foreign troops in Vietnam included the use of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Couve responded ambiguously that he did not make that point publicly. If he did clarify that point, the Secretary observed, it would help somewhat. Diem said that while his discussions with other delegations were helpful, he did not have the impression that the Secretary General was really willing to understand the problem. U Thant explains that he is trying to see the problem from a very humanitarian aspect. Diem was very frank with him and told him it was impossible to solve the problem from that viewpoint alone. The Secretary agreed and added that it would not be solved by being humanitarian and getting out of the way, thereby letting North Vietnam overrun South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would then be able to liquidate the leadership of the non-communist elements in South Vietnam, which was the bulk of the leadership. Diem said that many delegations had asked if South Vietnam had any concessions to make to the other side. He had told them that they had one shirt and nothing more. They had no territorial ambitions north of the 17th Parallel; they did not wish to destroy any regime; they simply wanted to be left alone. When queried about one of Kyʼs most publicized statements, he was able to explain that the Prime Minister had been speaking in purely defensive terms but that they had no choice but to fight if they were pushed against the wall. The Secretary said that we have no doubt in our own mind that all of the Asian countries outside Peking, Hanoi, and possibly North Korea hope that we succeed in our efforts, although some of them will not say so publicly; for example, India and Pakistan. Even Prince Sihanouk hopes for our success now that he has been made apprehensive by China. Diem referred to the television statement by Deputy Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia 4 in which he was quoted as saying that Malaysia would be sending troops to South Vietnam. The Secretary said that he had heard the program and thought that an ambiguous question and answer had been misrepresented by the press. The question seemed to ask for Malaysian views about sending troops to South Vietnam, which Razak apparently interpreted as referring to the troops which had already been sent there by other countries. He was thinking in general terms and was not thinking of sending Malaysian troops. The Secretary was quite sure that Razak had been misunderstood. Diem said that it was quite amazing because he had understood that the Malaysian position on the subject was still very vague. The Secretary noted, however, that Malaysia was prepared to give political support, as they did at the ASPAC Meeting in Seoul when they joined in the communique. Diem stated that he had been present, and understood that the Malaysians had had a problem with Indonesia and wished to stay on good terms with them until the non-confrontation agreement and withdrawal of troops had been fully implemented. The Secretary said he thought it very important from the viewpoint of public opinion in the U.S. to let Asians speak for themselves on these matters. Diem said that he had tried to do so during his New York stay by giving the views of his government. Prime Minister Ky had directed that more initiative be taken in this respect, perhaps including the sending of more envoys abroad. If such measures were not taken, there would be an impression that they were only a tool of the big powers. The Secretary expressed the hope that the Constituent Assembly would move along constructively and smoothly and would build political solidarity which would demonstrate especially to Hanoi that the country was on firm foundations. Diem agreed, saying it was very important that Hanoi realize they would have to negotiate or at least to cease their aggressive actions. The Secretary inquired whether there was any doubt now amongst the South Vietnamese that the United States meant business, that we were determined to see the matter through. Diem replied that in the government there was no doubt as to U.S. intentions. There was also an understanding of the difficulties faced by the U.S. in the exercise of its world-wide responsibilities and commitments. Nevertheless, sometimes the man in the street in Vietnam was rather vague about the U.S. position, as were people in the provinces. An example could be found in Ambassador Goldbergʼs recent speech. “All of us” agreed with 99 percent of his statement but on one point in which he referred to the “obstacle as not being unsurmountable,” 5 there was some misunderstanding even though the government understood it very well. The Secretary noted that the same statement had been made by President Johnson in July 1965. 6 Diem said they understood, but some people thought it was really a change in United States policy. They had been told that it was not. Diem asserted that it was a problem of tactical approach. The Secretary stated that there were two points which Diem might keep in mind if anyone raised this question with him: (1) the 300,000 Americans who were in South Vietnam were not there as tourists, but were fighting; (2) the democratic society of the U.S. was made up of people who wished to do what was necessary provided they understood that there was no honorable alternative. It was, therefore, necessary to tell them that there would be peace now if the other side would make peace. By tradition, if one scratched the skin of an American, one found an isolationist. The change of tradition which had developed in the past 20 years had called for an act of will on the part of the American people. They had suffered 180,000 casualties since World War II in resisting communist aggression around the world, most of the casualties being in Asia. If people looked at what we are doing, they should be persuaded. We have not abandoned anyone, but have kept our treaty commitments. We are not giving South Vietnam away. We have lost 5,000 killed to prevent his country from falling under Hanoiʼs control. The Secretary believed we should all concentrate on getting the job done. He did not know when and how the denouement would come. Diem said he hoped it would not be too far away. We had the initiative now. He hoped we could show the communists convincingly that they could not win. They would then accept the situation. It was a matter of pushing forward very hard, but it would take a certain period of time to do it. In South Vietnam they had suffered from various coups and changes of government which had stimulated the hopes of Hanoi. The Secretary said that if he might be very frank these problems have been our biggest concern in terms of U.S. public opinion. Americans keep asking, “whom have we to support?” Accordingly, if there was real solidarity in South Vietnam, there would be general encouragement and the American people would feel that progress was being made. The Secretary said he looked forward to seeing Diem again in Manila and asked him to convey his good wishes to Prime Minister Ky and other South Vietnamese leaders. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Approved in S on October 12. The meeting was held at USUN. 2 The communique was issued following the first Ministerial meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council, June 14–16. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 618–619. 3 Accounts of Ruskʼs conversations with Couve de Murville concerning Vietnam on October 3 and 4 were transmitted in telegrams 60476 and 62579 to Paris, October 5 and 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 Not further identified. 5 Reference is to Goldbergʼs statement regarding the role of the National Liberation Front in peace negotiations in his September 22 speech to the U.N. General Assembly; see Document 244 . 6 For text of the Presidentʼs statement on July 28, 1965, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book II, p. 803. 262. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 262. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 5, 1966. Manila—and Vietnam in General . Now that Iʼve been on Vietnam six months (the only full time senior official in Washington), I feel that Iʼve learned something about Vietnam. I. The REAL OBJECTIVE. To me, it is achieving a satisfactory outcome by the end of 1967, or at the minimum achieving such momentum that it will be clear to all—including the US public—that it is only a matter of time . To me, this is quite feasible if we take the right steps beginning now. We canʼt predict such imponderables as ChiCom intervention; but we can devise a policy which reduces their likelihood. For example, I believe we can develop a “win” strategy without further major escalation against the North, or sizable US deployments beyond what youʼve already approved. Weʼre doing better than we think . Weʼve actually gotten up more momentum in Vietnam than weʼre willing to admit as yet. Most of the indicators are running favorably—indeed all except pacification and continued infiltration from the North. On the latter score, Westy has hit on a winning strategy against the NVA/VC main force. So far this year the NVA/VC have mounted on the average only 1.3 battalion or multi-battalion-sized attacks a week. So most of the 170-odd enemy battalions our order of battle carries must be busy defending themselves or hiding from our air, artillery, and search and destroy operations, or foraging to support themselves. Westy keeps prudently estimating that they will yet catch us off-guard somewhere, but they havenʼt won a major battle in over a year so far. Meanwhile, Westyʼs strength continues to grow; he can go anywhere in the country and does. Our air power is up to more than 30,000 sorties a month. Weʼre inflicting heavier casualties than ever before. In fact, where is all that enemy strength? Iʼd agree with Joe Alsop that enemy effectives, especially VC, may be lower than our conservative O/B indicates. Certainly the enemy is hurting more if PW and defector reports, the generally declining incident rate, the total NVA/VC inability to win victories mean anything at all. Nor were the enemy able to exploit effectively the major dissidence in I Corps last spring or the 11 September elections, though we know they tried. Add our success in controlling inflation and in promoting the start of a healthy political evolution, and we have at the end of September 1966 achieved some real momentum in Vietnam. II. HOW DO WE ACHIEVE EVEN GREATER MOMENTUM IN 1967? To me, there is no one decisive element! Rather it is a matter of properly orchestrating and pushing on at least seven different major fronts in 1967. If we do so, I think we can achieve sufficient cumulative impact either to force the enemy to negotiate or cripple his ability to sustain the war. A. Step up Westyʼs campaign against the NVA/VC main force . This is essential to contain the NVA infiltrators and keep the organized enemy large units off our backs while we step up pacification. When I see what 80 or so US/FW maneuver battalions plus our air and artillery have already accomplished, Iʼm confident that with 10–15 more battalions by end 1966, weʼll do even better. Westy prudently predicts new NVA/VC offensives, but if they couldnʼt mount one up to now the odds are he can keep them even more off balance from here on. The prognosis here is for even greater success, perhaps without much increase in US forces beyond our presently scheduled buildup. But neither Westyʼs spoiling campaigns nor our graduated air offensive against the North seem likely by themselves to force the enemy to cry uncle. Our best estimate is that he could sustain this punishment and keep infiltrating for quite a time. I also doubt that Hanoi will accept that itʼs lost this war until we start steadily pacifying the countryside. This would also deny it the option of reverting to guerrilla war. So we need yet other strings to our bow to increase the pressure on Hanoi, deny it the guerrilla option, and erode its base in the south. B. The trick is to focus increasingly on the most vulnerable enemy element—the VC . Even present intelligence suggests that their strength has already peaked, their morale is declining, and they face increasingly difficulty in finding food, medicine, and recruits. The more we can erode their strength and peel off the VC from the NVA, the more we can isolate the latter, sharply decrease their effectiveness, and demonstrate to everyone that the only real problem is invasion from the North. We can achieve this via the following programs, if we really back them up. C. Step up Pacification in the Countryside . As Iʼve repeatedly warned privately, weʼre not yet going anywhere fast. Nor will we, in my judgment, so long as we fail to recognize that pacification is first and foremost a military task—providing continuous local security. Thereʼs no point in blaming the civilians when the critical first phase of pacification is primarily a military job—and one which only the US and RVNAF military have the resources to do. This is why I back McNamaraʼs proposal as an important first step. D. Reviving the GVN Armed Forces . But unless we want to send a lot more US forces, and keep them there a lot longer than our political posture calls for, we must get the Vietnamese to do most of the pacification job. This makes sense, because they certainly arenʼt pulling their weight now. Weʼve got to get them back into the war more effectively, so it wonʼt be so much a US war. I think this is the biggest single thing we could do toward getting quick results in Vietnam—and it wonʼt cost the US much at all because weʼre already paying and supporting all 700,000 GVN armed forces. To markedly increase their efficiency would be a major breakthrough at little cost. But it means guiding them more effectively—mostly into pacification, ensuring better leadership, improving their attitudes toward the peasant, and perhaps getting them under Westyʼs actual command (see below). E. Mounting a massive national reconciliation campaign . Harriman is already effectively pushing this, and deserves top backing. We need to step up sharply all defector programs—high level and low. As we increase the pressure on the southern VC, it will increase the effectiveness of appeals to them to rally to the new South Vietnam. As the GVN acquires more confidence, plus a broader popular base, I believe that it will be less fearful of extending a hand to the VC. F. We must avoid a retrogression to military government in Saigon . The success of the above strategy, and the credibility of our political purpose, depends on forestalling new military coups. Iʼm all for the military continuing to play a major political role in VN (we canʼt prevent it, and need their help). But weʼve passed the point of no return with the 11 September election. There are already worrisome signs of military wire-pulling in Saigon, and we canʼt afford to let it happen. G. We must have a tough stabilization program to keep inflation under control . I wonʼt rehearse the arguments, because I think weʼre all agreed. Iʼm also confident that McNamara can keep the really big spenders—the US and ARVN military—in line. Iʼve even got Lodge on board in favor of a tough spending limit. Weʼll have to keep constantly after this matter, but note that my program does not require big US outlays. In fact, if it works we could cut back in certain respects. H. Step up the “other war”—not just pacification but other positive measures . We have plans for this, and should gain enough momentum in agriculture, health, education, port clearance, etc. during 1967 to help considerably. I. If the above seven programs go at all well, weʼll have another factor working for us—increasing confidence that our side has it made . This intangible psychological factor may be the most important of all. Lodge, who has a shrewd ear for such things, already senses a new mood of confidence in Saigon. We must build on this to get a real bandwagon psychology rolling—which will greatly reinforce all other elements of our strategy in 1967. By our own postwar programs we can add to this bandwagon effect. III. We badly need a carefully orchestrated strategic plan and program in order to accomplish all the above in 1967 . It wonʼt just happen. To get optimum results will require pulling all the strands together in a comprehensive program for 1967, getting all US elements on board, selling it to the GVN, and last but not least establishing the machinery to make sure itʼs carried out. In all honesty, I must report that I donʼt think weʼre properly organized in Saigon or Washington to serve you most effectively on Vietnam. We need: A. A comprehensive strategic plan for 1967 . Youʼve seen the Komer/Rostow paper 2 which was a first crack at one. So far State is too busy with Manila preparations to be able to flesh it out. B. An effective sub-cabinet level mechanism in Washington to monitor performance . We badly need to organize more systematically to (1) keep you properly informed on key programs; (2) do the staff work necessary to present you with coordinated recommendations; and (3) follow through on your decisions. Youʼve seen my proposal for a small “war cabinet” chaired by Nick Katzenbach. 3 C. A Joint Command which gives Westy more control over ARVN —an essential in my view if we are to get proper use out of this asset. With 400,000 US troops soon to be in Vietnam, and with six of seven countries at Manila already accepting US command, why couldnʼt you sign Ky on too? The Koreans have proposed this for the agenda, which gives a great opening. D. Give Pacification Management to Westy . Youʼve heard my voice on this. Iʼll just say again that we wonʼt get up real momentum in pacifying hamlets until you give it to the only people who can do most of the job. Lack of progress so far is not the fault of the civilians—it is basically because the US and ARVN military havenʼt provided the one essential ingredient—local security. 4 IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: If what I say makes sense we can take a big step toward it during the upcoming trips to Saigon and Manila. In fact, what you can get moving privately there could be just as important as the public posture we create. A. A real coup at Manila would be for you to sign Ky on to (1) continued political evolution—and no more coups; (2) a big push on pacification; (3) a tough anti-inflationary agreement; (4) a national reconciliation program. B. But this will take a lot of prior spadework in Saigon . Lodge alone canʼt do it, but McNamara, Katzenbach, and I could help a lot if charged to do so. C. So I urge that the above be the agenda for a meeting Saturday morning 5 at which you tell us: (1) You want us to press Ky/Thieu to stand up and say the right things at Manila. (2) You want an across-the-board strategic plan and program for 1967 before Manila—one which will produce irresistible momentum before the end of 1967. (3) You want an overhaul of our machinery both in Washington and Saigon so that this program can really be made to work (no need to saw off specifically on pacification management yet). Postscripts . I may be way off base, but I think that a program like the one I describe offers the best chance of a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam: First, it doesnʼt call for a lot more troops or escalated strikes against the North (Iʼve omitted barriers, where Iʼm with McNamara). Instead, it calls for better management, better orchestration, and better use of the assets we already have. Second, I donʼt think it will cost a lot more money beyond what we already plan to spend. It seeks to avoid greater inflationary pressures by making better use of whatʼs already going for us. Third, it is just as well designed to bring Hanoi to the conference table as it is to “win” the war. Few things would maximize the pressure on Hanoi more than our cutting down or defecting the southern VC—which leaves the NVA increasingly isolated. Finally, if it works, and we do get up visibly growing momentum in the South, it opens the option of cutting back (I donʼt say stopping) at least the marginal increment of our bombing in the North—which seems to me awfully expensive in proportion to return. R.W. Komer 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President, July-Dec. 1966. Secret. Komer sent a copy of the memorandum to Katzenbach on November 29 under a covering memorandum stating that he believed it had “had considerable impact.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 2 Document 241 . 3 See footnote 4, Document 250 . 4 In a telephone conversation with McNamara that began at 7:48 a.m. on October 5, the President said regarding pacification: “I feel very strongly that it ought to go to the military.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape 66.27, Side B, PNO 2) 5 On Friday, October 7, the President flew to the LBJ Ranch for the weekend, returning to Washington on October 10. He did not meet with Komer in Texas. However, from 7:35 to 8 p.m. on October 7, prior to his departure for Texas, he met privately with Komer, McNamara, and Katzenbach on board Air Force One at Andrews Air Force Base. No record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 263. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 263. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, October 6, 1966. SUBJECT McNamara Pacification Reorganization Proposal Activity Summary (1) The President has apparently bought the rationale behind the McNamara pacification reorganization proposal and presently feels that the burden of proof is on its opponents to come up with something better. No firm decisions, however, have yet been taken. (2) AID (Mr. Poats), State (Ambassador Unger) and Ambassador Porter are all strongly opposed to the proposal but not sure how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in the way of an alternative. (3) AIDʼs counter proposal (copy attached) 2 is not likely to carry the day. As of now (6 October) it looks as if the final decision will not be made until the McNamara party (including Messrs. Komer, Katzenbach and Porter) has returned to Washington after reviewing the bidding with Ambassador Lodge and his colleagues. (4) In discussing this whole affair, Ambassador Porter had high praise for [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ] and the Saigon Station. 1. On Wednesday, 5 October, I spent several hours with Ambassador Unger, Ambassador Porter and, intermittently, AID Assistant Administrator Poats, going over the McNamara proposal in all its aspects and ramifications. For essentially similar reasons AID (Poats) and State (Unger) and Ambassador Porter are all opposed to the proposal but uncertain about how to proceed in fighting it or what to offer in the way of an alternative. 2. Ambassador Unger felt that someone (Mr. Komer, Secretary McNamara, or both) had already gotten to the President and sold him on the thesis that pacification was not working, drastic U.S. organizational rationalization and surgery was required, the U.S. military alone “had the horses” to do what was needed, hence the U.S. military should be given command authority and told to do the job. 3 According to Ambassador Unger, the President was strongly inclined to endorse the McNamara proposal. He had listened to counter arguments (from Secretary Rusk) but was not persuaded and felt the burden of proof was on the dissenters, who should fall in line unless they could soon come up with a better alternative. In any event, the President wanted a decision made in principle before the McNamara party left for Saigon on 8 October. A White House meeting was tentatively scheduled for the morning of 8 October to review the bidding and come up with a decision. Ambassador Lodge would be consulted but, in effect, after the basic decision had already been made. 3. Ambassador Porter objected strongly to the McNamara proposal itself and to the mode of procedure outlined above. 4 He felt: a. It was inaccurate to say that pacification was not going well and unrealistic to have expected spectacular, measurable results in the eight months since Honolulu. Pacification involves rebuilding the whole structure of South Vietnamese society, a task that could not possibly be accomplished in a short span of time. b. No organizational structure is perfect. The current U.S. pacification organization could be improved; but scrapping it to set up a new one would inevitably check the momentum now building up. It would take us another eight months of shakedown to get back to where we are today. c. Putting a military cast on the U.S. pacification effort would work against the major U.S. political objective of trying to civilianize the GVN and would seriously complicate our political problems within South Vietnam. d. Past experience (CIDG/Switchback, the Saigon Port) does not indicate that civil programs are likely to improve if the U.S. military takes them over. For years the U.S. military has had all the command authority it needs to address itself to the crucial problem of rural security, which is far from being solved. This is hardly an argument for giving it more authority and assigning it additional tasks. Rural development, especially its associated cadre program, is not a military activity and its essential spirit would be lost if it became a military activity. e. Above all, major reorganization of the U.S. Mission should not be decided on until Ambassador Lodge and his immediate colleagues have had a chance to examine the proposal and express their views on it. If the McNamara proposal were presented as a virtual fait accompli, Ambassador Porter felt Lodgeʼs reaction was likely to be pyrotechnic and he would probably resign. 4. Mr. Komer called during our discussion and told Ambassador Porter the final decision would not be made until Ambassador Lodge had been properly consulted, though Porter had serious reservations about the value of these assurances. Komer also said the tentatively scheduled Saturday morning (8 October) White House meeting would not focus on reorganization of pacification but would be a general review of the bidding in Vietnam. Even after this call, Porter was not sure whether he was to attend the Saturday morning meeting, but understood that he was to accompany McNamara to Saigon. 5. Ambassador Porter mentioned that the essence of the McNamara proposal had been surfaced by Mr. Komer in an informal letter sent to Saigon last summer. 5 Mr. Komerʼs letter had stressed, however, that it was not an official proposal for the U.S. Mission to study but only an informal note designed to give Lodge and Porter the flavor of “some ideas circulating around town” (i.e., Washington). Unger felt that Komer might cite the letter as evidence that Lodge had in fact been consulted already on the reorganization proposal. (Unger later told me privately that it seemed to him that Lodge and Porter had apparently ignored Komerʼs letter, hoping the ideas expressed therein would die quietly. It was obvious that they had not done so.) Porter also said that Lodge plans to return to the U.S. in November on leave and to remain at least through December. If the U.S. pacification effort should be reorganized, Porter would be in charge during the transition period. 6. The only piece of paper that emerged from our 6 October conversations was the attached AID memorandum to McNamara, drafted by Poats and signed by Mr. Gaud. 6 Ambassadors Porter and Unger felt it was a weak lance with which to do battle and that AIDʼs proposed “alternative” was not a satisfactory answer to the problem. (I agree.) They also felt that the best alternative lay in using the present structure (i.e., a civilian pacification director reporting directly to the Ambassador) but giving the pacification director a stronger personal staff and more direct command authority over pacification programs at regional and provincial levels. (In essence, this is the approach suggested in our 28 September memorandum to you.) 7 I took the line that the Agency would be willing to turn the RD program over to such a structure (i.e., the assets and responsibilities of the Stationʼs Cadre Operations Division) provided suitable arrangements could be made to relieve the Agency of the responsibility for funding this program and supporting it logistically. I also indicated that we would not be willing to turn over control of our intelligence collection activities at regional and provincial level (Police Special Branch liaison), but would be willing to detail an officer to the regional and provincial pacification directors to serve as their intelligence advisor and ensure that their requirements were serviced efficiently and promptly. 7. The real problem remains that of integrating U.S. military assets into the pacification directorʼs command channel, in particular giving him some effective control over the activities of U.S. military advisors to Popular Forces, Regional Forces and ARVN units assigned to pacification duties. Neither Porter nor Unger had an answer for this one that they felt the military would buy. Both were inclined to the notion of giving the pacification director a military deputy (two or three star) who could service his military requirements but could still, somehow, remain subordinate to COMUSMACVʼs overall authority. (One solution might be to double-hat such an officer as COMUMACVʼs deputy for pacification operations and as the pacification directorʼs military deputy. This was the suggestion Unger planned to make to Mr. Katzenbach, who was to be briefed on the whole affair later in the afternoon of 5 October.) 8. As of now, all that can be said with assurance about the pacification reorganization proposal is that no firm decision has been made and there will almost certainly be more thrashing about before one is taken. It now appears that the final decision will not be made until after the McNamara party (which will include Messrs. Komer, Katzenbach and Porter) has visited Saigon and reviewed the bidding with Ambassador Lodge. 9. During the discussion outlined above, Ambassador Porter spoke several times in glowing terms about the Saigon Station and [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. He had high praise for the Stationʼs performance and warm appreciation for the support and wholehearted cooperation he received from [ less than 1 line of source text not declassified ]. George A. Carver, Jr. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, McNamara Project. Secret. 2 Not attached; see footnote 6 below. 3 In an October 2 memorandum to Rusk, Unger summarized Porterʼs views on McNamaraʼs proposal following a telephone conversation with Porter. Under cover of an October 4 memorandum, Rostow forwarded Ungerʼs memorandum to the President “as background to our discussion at lunch today.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX) No record of the luncheon discussion has been found; Rostowʼs agenda noted, under “Viet Nam: Organization of Pacification,” that “Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been informed by Porter that there will be great difficulty with Lodge about turning the organization of pacification over to the military.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 14) 4 In a September 30 memorandum to the President, Komer made the following comments regarding McNamaraʼs proposal to put pacification under the military: “I will say flatly that unless we do so, despite all the confusion it will entail, we will NOT get the early results in pacification necessary to ‘win’ the war with dispatch… . Itʼs the only way to get real results before 1968.” (Ibid., Komer Files, Memos to the President) 5 Presumably a reference to Komerʼs August 10 letter to Lodge. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Komer Files, Lodge) 6 Gaudʼs October 5 memorandum proposed six standards for organizing pacification/revolutionary development, including direct responsiveness to the U.S. Ambassador, unified command, and an “emphasis on civil leadership and constructive purposes, while fully utilizing military capabilities at all levels.” Gaud stated that McNamaraʼs proposal would “look like a move toward military government, play into the hands of critics,” and run counter to the evolution of civilian government. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966) 7 Document 248 . 264. Memorandum of Conversation 264. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 10, 1966. SUBJECT Miscellaneous Matters PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson Mr. Rostow U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Sukhodrev The President opened the conversation by saying that he had been informed of the Ministerʼs talks with Secretary Rusk and the Ministerʼs other activities and thought he must have been a very busy man. Gromyko said it was true that he had much to do here. He had an exchange of views with Secretary Rusk and had also had a meeting with Ambassador Goldberg to discuss questions which he had raised. He assumed the President was informed of the content of these meetings and this would facilitate his task. The President said he had been informed of these discussions and that Secretary Rusk would have a further discussion with him this evening. While waiting for the photographers to come in, the President said that the Soviets had allowed their Ambassador to come back to Washington and in return the President had selected the best man we had to go to Moscow. Mr. Gromyko said Mr. Thompson would be very welcome in Moscow. After the photographers had left, Mr. Gromyko remarked that the temperature of the room had risen as a result of their activities. The President replied that he hoped not as his job was to cool things down. Gromyko said that the leadership and the Government of the Soviet Union often discussed the question of where the policy of the United States is leading. He presumed that there was an awareness of the responsibility of the United States and of the Soviet Union in world affairs. However, certain facts related to United States policy baffled the Soviets. He could declare on behalf of the Soviet Union that it was in our mutual interest to work for better relations. If the United States Government and Mr. Johnson, as President, were willing to take steps to promote international detente to improve relations, they would not find the Soviet Union lacking in response as this was in accord with the wishes of both the Soviet Government and its people. The President said he agreed with the points Mr. Gromyko had made. We were just as baffled about the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It was evident that we had not communicated with each other very well. He also agreed that agreement between our two great powers was of the highest importance and that we had a great responsibility to the world. He had on many occasions tried to take steps to ease tension. He had been greatly encouraged in the correspondence that had taken place during his early months in office. He had been deeply disappointed that the keeping of our commitment to South Viet-Nam seemed to frustrate these early beginnings. He had been distressed to read in the Soviet press remarks about himself personally and about the motivation of his Administration. He knew that the Soviet and American people wanted friendship and he was always ready to go more than half way to reach agreement. The greatest reward to him as President, and the greatest blessing for all people, would be if we could succeed in this endeavor. Gromyko said that the President had referred to Viet-Nam and remarked that he had discussed this with Secretary Rusk and had explained the Soviet point of view. 2 He had also touched on this in the meeting with Ambassador Goldberg. He would like to hear the Presidentʼs personal view and know what way out of the situation he saw. The Soviet Government has expressed its position on Viet-Nam and he had explained it to Secretary Rusk, but he would like to touch on certain points after hearing the Presidentʼs point of view. The President said he had mentioned Viet-Nam because he had heard that it was this question that explained the Soviet attitude toward the United States and its leaders. He had tried to explore every possible avenue to peace. There had been many consultations with various representatives of various countries interested in bringing about negotiations. He had always thought that as co-Chairman, the Soviet Union could exert its leadership in trying to bring about a negotiation. Early in his Administration and in his Baltimore speech, 3 he had expressed our willingness for unconditional negotiations, he had made clear that we were willing to withdraw from that area and give up a very important negotiating position provided there was self-determination for South Viet-Nam and that it was not overrun. The President pointed out that United States forces had been moved into South Viet-Nam only after North Viet-Nam had moved into the South and we saw that we were faced either with tearing up our agreements as scraps of paper or of resisting. The United States was going to discharge its obligations and he hoped the Soviet Union would do the same. He believed the Soviet Union could exercise an important influence if it chose to do so. We were prepared to pull out our troops and convert our bases to civilian uses. We were prepared to try to improve the lot of the poor people in that area but we could not do this by running away or by capitulating. The United States could do more than it was doing in the war and the President said he had difficulty resisting pressures upon him to do more, but he had no desire to destroy Viet-Nam or to change its Government. He did, however, have an obligation to South Viet-Nam. The President said that if South Viet-Nam tried to change the Government in North Viet-Nam, he would have a few words to say about this. His position was that he desired to see this difficult problem settled as there was so much that our two countries could do for the good of the world. We were willing to go from the battlefield to the negotiating table. If South Viet-Nam wanted to vote to go with North Viet-Nam, that was their business. He hoped that the Soviet Union and Great Britain or the United Nations or non-aligned countries or neutral nations could make proposals that could be acceptable to both sides. He had arranged a pause in bombing for thirty-seven days despite the opinion of the military that this would not help our situation, in the hope that we would get some message, but when we called, the other side hung up the telephone. He knew that Mr. Gromyko did not interpret these efforts on his part as a sign of weakness, but rather as an indication of his determination to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Namese affair. If the United States wanted victory over North Viet-Nam, we could achieve it, but our aim is not that but to settle the problem. The best way to test our sincerity in this would be to name the time and place for negotiations. He had said that Secretary Rusk would be ready to be there in twenty-four hours. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to make a couple of preliminary remarks. The President was familiar with the Soviet statement that they were not the country to conduct negotiations on this question and he was familiar with Soviet views about the conduct of the war and the Soviet assessment of the chain of events leading to it. Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Government pays attention to statements made by the President concerning his desire to see an end to the war. He had likewise given attention to the most recent statements on that score. He said he would make a detailed report to the Soviet Government on the statement which the President had just made. He said he must, at the same time, frankly state that the Soviet Government could not help but note that the United States Government has not taken any real step to end the war. Statements made by the United States, both by the President personally and on behalf of the United States Government at the United Nations had been accompanied by conditions known to be unacceptable to the other side as the other side would have to capitulate. Mr. Gromyko thought the United States should take a more realistic position and should not give ultimata or pose conditions as that was not the road to settlement of the war. This is what he had tried to emphasize to Secretary Rusk. The United States statements on the desire to end the war were not compatible with the steps which the United States had taken which had actually widened the war. (The President interrupted the interpretation at this point to ask Mr. Gromyko if he was aware that the North was invading the South. We had not asked anyone to surrender. We were asking that they stop shooting, in which case we would stop shooting. Didnʼt Mr. Gromyko know that North Viet-Nam troops were in South Viet-Nam before ours? At first we had had only advisers getting shot but they sent whole divisions in and we had to act. If they would go back now, we would quit shooting. Every move on our part had been in answer to a move on the part of North Viet-Nam. The Minister talked as though the other side did nothing to escalate. Now they were coming across with four or five divisions.) The interpretation of Gromykoʼs remarks was continued at this point. Gromyko said that when Mr. Goldberg spoke to the United Nations and had put forward what we called a program for ending the war, the United States Minister of Defense had made quite another statement, implying a widening of the war. (The President interjected that when Ambassador Goldberg made that statement, the Minister of Defense had asked Congress to place orders for planes for delivery two or three years from now. He assumed the Soviet Union may have placed some orders about the same time, but this had nothing to do with the Goldberg speech. He said we might also have laid the keels for some ships to be delivered six years from now.) (The President again interrupted the interpreter to ask if Mr. Gromyko wanted to stop half the war or all of it. Mr. Gromyko replied that stopping the bombing was the first of first steps. This would bring a better atmosphere for a general settlement.) The interpreter continued. Mr. Gromyko asked what would happen if the United States widened the war and other countries, including the Soviet Union would give further aid to Viet-Nam. In that case, the Soviet Union and the United States would find themselves drawn into these events. The Soviet Union earnestly believed that the key to a solution was in the hands of the United States. The President had said he wanted the Soviet Union to use its influence to end the war. Although the Soviet Union did not engage in negotiations, he did not deny that they had some influence among their own friends but the position of the United States made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to use this influence. The Soviet Union was in favor of ending the war in Viet-Nam and believed this was in the interests of the great powers, including the United States. The first of first steps was to stop the bombing. Mr. Gromyko said he could not say what North Viet-Nam or the NLF would do, but the reaction would be a different one. He repeated he was prepared to say that the behavior of the other side would be different if the United States ended the bombing of North Viet-Nam. The President said he had received some suggestions for a bombing pause twice before. The first time the other side sent our note back to us. As for the second pause, Ambassador Dobrynin would recall that he had been instrumental in convincing McGeorge Bundy and others that we should try another pause. The President asked whether if we stopped bombing, the other side would continue to bomb our soldiers in South Viet-Nam. We were prepared to stop the bombing if they would say what they would do if we did stop. The President asked Mr. Gromyko how long he thought we should stop before we should get some reaction. He also asked Mr. Gromyko what the reaction would be in his country if they found themselves in similar circumstances. Mr. Gromkyo replied that the Soviet Union had no soldiers in the same situation as ours. He observed that the President had said we had stopped bombing and we had told the Soviet Government that we were going to pause and see what happened. This was not said in public statements but tens of governments knew that this was our position. (At this point the President interrupted to say that he understood the Soviet Government had recommended this. Gromyko said this was true, but without conditions.) Mr. Gromyko continued that the Soviets were very sincere in their point of view. It was their earnest opinion that the United States had no interest in establishing a base in Viet-Nam. (The President interrupted to say that he agreed.) Mr. Gromyko continued that when the question arose about the withdrawal of troops, the United States had avoided being specific and had given only a very general statement. He said that perhaps if we were more specific and would give a more concrete statement, this might be of use. He said that the Soviet Union was not holding anything back and was acting in good faith. They would like to see the end of the war. The President said that he agreed. He had never questioned the Soviet good faith and he fully agreed with the importance of peace to both of us. He wondered if the Minister had any idea of what the other side would do. He saw some merit in stopping the bombing if the other side would stop. He pointed out that they had killed more of our soldiers with mortars and bombs than we had killed in the North by aerial bombardment. Was he expected to, in effect, tie our soldiersʼ hands behind their backs? He said, however, he would give attention to Mr. Gromykoʼs suggestion for clarification of our position and in his next public statement he would be careful to try to make our position clear. As he had said in Baltimore, we were ready to talk without conditions at any time and any place. We were ready to withdraw our troops when the other side was willing to stop bombing us and to withdraw their troops. The President said we would like to take the resources we are spending on killing people and use them to enable these people to live longer, both in North and in South Viet-Nam. Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat that the Soviet Union could not give a detailed schedule as to what the other side would do, but he could say that the reaction of the other side could be very different. The discussion continued on the subject of non-proliferation. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US–USSR. Secret; Nodis. Approved in the White House on October 13. The meeting, held in the Oval Office, lasted from 5 to 6:41 p.m. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) The President discussed his meeting with Gromyko in a telephone conversation with Senator Fulbright that began at 5:20 p.m. on October 11. Both a recording and a transcript of the conversation are ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F66.28, PNO 2; the transcript is in Chron Series. 2 See Document 247 . 3 April 7, 1965. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 , Book I, pp. 394–399. 265. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk 265. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 11, 1966. RFE–41 SUBJECT The Vietnam War: Situation and Prospects Underlying the rigid Communist response to peace proposals from all quarters is an apparent confidence in ultimate victory. This memorandum, prepared at the request of the Under Secretary, examines some of the factors in both South and North Vietnam on which they may base the view that, their heavy losses notwithstanding, they still hold the advantage, and assesses the threat in Chinese intervention against the background of the Mainlandʼs internal upheaval. Abstract The massive introduction of US forces into Vietnam beginning in 1965 retrieved a situation that was all but desperate. In the period immediately preceding our intervention on the ground, the GVN military response to the Communist drive had become virtually ineffective. The Communists were able to maintain at increasingly high levels the harassment of small forces, military outposts, administrative centers, and lines of communication that denied the government control of much of the countryside. Further in their increasing resort to large-scale operations, they were able to take full advantage of GVN military weaknesses in organization, force strength, mobility, and morale. With the GVN military fabric increasingly stretched and torn, the prospects that the country could be held together politically to support continued resistance over any long period were growing dim. US intervention faced the Communists with a force of great mobility, vast fire power, and increasing strength. In so doing, it blunted their military offensive, heavily increased their costs in both North and South, seriously reduced their opportunities to move unexpectedly in strength, and opened them to attack in formerly almost impregnable base areas. At the same time, the new US role reassured the South that the US commitment was a firm and lasting one, and insulated the government against the full consequences of its many and continued weaknesses in cohesiveness, performance, and support. This said, however, it must also be noted that the Communists retain the capability and, by all evidence, the will to prolong the war over a considerable period. They have shown that they are still able to increase the number of the small unit and harassing actions that have been the real key to their success to date, maintain their political infrastructure, interdict lines of communication, and reinforce and supply themselves from both North and South. For its part, the GVN has not yet been able to increase its control of the countryside to any appreciable extent despite its own and our efforts to move more rapidly into effective pacification programs. The Communists can still utilize or at least deny to the government much of the terrain and resources of the countryside. They are also fielding a combat force almost equal in number to allied forces actually committed to combat, and thus still have some basis for believing that in due course they will be able completely to undermine the resistance of the South. In their apparent confidence that domestic and international pressures will make it impossible for the US to stay the course, they are open to misreading a situation with which they have little or no first-hand familiarity. They may well be closer to the mark however, in their belief that they can maintain much of their position in the countryside and that—as the war presses increasingly heavily on an urban population thus far relatively immune to their political influence—they can make political inroads in the cities to the point where the impact of the US presence as well as the level of conflict will become intolerable to the people of South Vietnam. In the North, the war appears to be having a severe but not unbearable impact. The North Vietnamese people seem somewhat weary but not disaffected, and the regime has no evident difficulty in exercising effective control. The leadership had debated alternate strategies for conducting the war in the South, but has not deviated from basic policy goals nor altered its carefully balanced attitude towards Moscow and Peking. Bombing has seriously disrupted North Vietnamʼs small modern industrial sector as well as seaborne foreign trade, but has not materially interfered with the maintenance of transportation and lines of communications adequate to sustain its war effort. While some shortages of consumer goods exist, the supply of basic commodities, including foodstuffs, appears adequate for minimal needs. Some evacuation of urban areas, particularly Hanoi, has taken place recently. Although it is too early to make any final judgment on the effects of the Peking purge, it has yet to result in any increased militancy on the part of the regime. The Chinese continue to view the conflict as essentially a Vietnamese affair. Like Hanoi, they may feel that Communist prospects in the war are far from bad and that current levels of Chinese aid, together with North Vietnamese resources and assistance from other Communist countries, may be enough to maintain Hanoiʼs will to fight and to lead eventually to the wearing out of American patience and determination. In addition, fear of US retaliation in all probability weighs importantly in Chinaʼs calculus. Thus it appears that at the warʼs current level of intensity, which involves neither a threat of invasion of North Vietnamese or Chinese territory nor the destruction of the Hanoi regime, the Chinese will not actively and openly intervene in the fighting. 2 [Here follows the 13-page body of the research memorandum.] 1 Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives, DRV North Vietnam. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. 2 This conclusion parallels that made in the latest coordinated estimate by the intelligence community on “Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation” (SNIE 13–66, August 4, 1966, SECRET). [Footnote in the source text. For SNIE 13–66, see Document 201 .] 266. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 266. Letter From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 13, 1966. Dear Mr. President: In spite of your repeated efforts and those of Arthur Goldberg and others, a way to open the door to negotiations on Viet Nam has yet to be found. With the passing of time, I am afraid that the options are growing fewer and that we are beginning to run out of alternatives. It would be my hope, as I know it is yours, that we lose neither the desire nor the will to continue to try to bring about an honorable conference. In my judgment, the negotiation of a just and mutually acceptable settlement in the near future is the one possible way to end this war in accord with the interests of the United States. The alternative of looking for a way out by continuing to raise the military ante gets us in deeper all the time, with no terminus in sight. In the end, we are likely to wind up either in war with China, or all of Viet Nam (if not all of Southeast Asia) will be so devastated and depopulated by protracted conflict that the great delta areas of that vast region may become once again, as in the remote past, “natural” areas for colonization by the surplus rice farmers of China. So I would say, with all due respect, that we should go to very great lengths to try at once to reduce the intensity of the struggle, both from the point of view of checking the rising cost in lives and resources, and as a possible prelude to negotiations. We should do so, not out of fear of the Viet Cong—the war is far more miserable for them than it is for us—and they know it. We should do so, not because we lack the means or will to stay with this conflict—we have both for as long as it is necessary and useful, and the world knows it. We should do so, rather, because a prompt settlement is the best, if not the only way, to serve our interests and those of the people of Viet Nam whom we set out to help in the first place. On the basis of this view, I would respectfully suggest that the following points be considered for incorporation into existing efforts to bring about negotiations: 1. We should be prepared to terminate the bombing of North Viet Nam abruptly, without indicating whether it is permanent or temporary, but in the expectation that it will help to open negotiations in any reasonable forum, whether it is Geneva, the U.N., and Asian conference, or some other. 2. We should be prepared for an immediate and reciprocal “hold-fire” (“fire only if fired upon”) in South Viet Nam, to be succeeded by a firm “cease-fire” and “stand-fast,” as soon as the conditions thereof can be agreed upon in negotiations. 3. We should be prepared for a token and unilateral withdrawal of 30,000 U.S. forces, to be completed during the first week or ten days of negotiations, and we should be prepared to work out a time-table for joint and total withdrawals of all forces alien to South Viet Nam as part of a settlement by negotiations. 4. We should be prepared for the full participation of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in all negotiations, with the understanding that they can be represented separately or together with Hanoi, as they choose, along with the Saigon military government. If these points seems useful in your judgment, I would suggest, further that U Thant be enlisted, in his diplomatic capacity, to convey their content, as he sees fit, to the Hanoi government. If, for some reason, his services cannot be effectively used at this time, other routes such as Rangoon, Paris, or the Vatican or even a direct U.S. approach to Hanoi might be considered. However, these would be of considerably less utility, in my opinion, than the mediation of U Thant, with whom I am sure, on the basis of your New York meeting, you have a closer rapport. In writing you, I have advanced what I hope are helpful suggestions for you to use or discard as you see fit. Some of them you may have already considered, because all of them, in my opinion, fit in with public statements of our position which you have made in the past. While a military victory against us is impossible, our national interests seem to me to require of us that we seek a restoration of peace at the earliest possible time. The approach suggested above is not “tuck tail and run.” Rather, it is proposed in the hope that it will be useful in producing bona fide negotiations which will accord with our interests, the needs of the Vietnamese people, and the hope and expectations of the world. Respectfully, Mike Mansfield 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. No classification marking. 267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) to President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, October 14, 1966. SUBJECT “Negotiations Committee” The Committee believes 2 that an encouraging aspect of Gromykoʼs visit was the evident Soviet desire to have the war end in Vietnam. Another gain is that the Soviets have been put on the spot publicly as having a responsibility to get negotiations going. Sometime after our elections, which will undoubtedly confirm US support for your policy in Vietnam, consideration should be given to the next step in our dialogue with the Russians. I believe your statement to the press yesterday regarding your talks with Gromyko 3 will be given searching consideration in Moscow and perhaps provide a basis for progress in later discussions. In Manila, we hope that you will have an opportunity to impress on Ky (as well as Lodge): (1) The importance we place on the constitutional process with the emergence of a government that has legitimate roots. This will vastly strengthen not only the position of Saigon but our own position in international discussions and world opinion. (2) We hope that in the speech which Chairman Thieu or Prime Minister Ky will deliver on November 1, the anniversary of the revolution, there will be included a declaration on amnesty and national reconciliation. You have placed great emphasis in your public statements on the fact that the people of South Vietnam should be permitted to settle their own affairs. This means that if the NLF-VC abandon violence, these people would have the opportunity to play a legitimate role in the political life of the country. 4 I talked to Gene Black yesterday in New York and suggested that in his trip to the Far East, he might be able to develop more specific ideas about economic cooperation with North Vietnam on a regional basis after the end of the war. This would be a follow-up of your Johns Hopkins speech. Saigon for its part could offer the possibility of trade relations, especially in rice, which would be mutually beneficial and relieve Hanoiʼs dependence on Peking. Out of Geneʼs talks and the discussions at Manila could come Asian proposals that might give some inducement to Hanoi to end the war. Averell 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 212, Amb. Harriman—Negotiations Comm. Top Secret; Nodis. 2 A memorandum of the Committeeʼs meeting at 4.30 p.m. on October 14 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 PHIL. 3 For text of the Presidentʼs statement, made during his news conference in Washington on October 13, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1166–1167. 4 In a 9-page memorandum to Harriman on “The Pursuit of Peace in Manila and Elsewhere,” October 14, Cooper sought to “diagnose the reasons for Hanoiʼs sluggish responses to our overtures and to prescribe some new medicine that might produce a bit more animation.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XL) 268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 268. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 14, 1966. SUBJECT Actions recommended for Vietnam 1. Evaluation of the situation . In the report of my last trip to Vietnam almost a year ago, 2 I stated that the odds were about even that, even with the then-recommended deployments, we would be faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much higher level of conflict and with “pacification” still stalled. I am a little less pessimistic now in one respect. We have done somewhat better militarily than I anticipated. We have by and large blunted the communist military initiative—any military victory in South Vietnam the Viet Cong may have had in mind 18 months ago has been thwarted by our emergency deployments and actions. And our program of bombing the North has exacted a price. My concern continues, however, in other respects. This is because I see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon. Enemy morale has not broken—he apparently has adjusted to our stopping his drive for military victory and has adopted a strategy of keeping us busy and waiting us out (a strategy of attriting our national will). He knows that we have not been, and he believes we probably will not be, able to translate our military successes into the “end products”—broken enemy morale and political achievements by the GVN. The one thing demonstrably going for us in Vietnam over the past year has been the large number of enemy killed-in-action resulting from the big military operations. Allowing for possible exaggeration in reports, the enemy must be taking losses—deaths in and after battle—at the rate of more than 60,000 a year. The infiltration routes would seem to be one-way trails to death for the North Vietnamese. Yet there is no sign of an impending break in enemy morale and it appears that he can more than replace his losses by infiltration from North Vietnam and recruitment in South Vietnam. Pacification is a bad disappointment. We have good grounds to be pleased by the recent elections, by Kyʼs 16 months in power, and by the faint signs of development of national political institutions and of a legitimate civil government. But none of this has translated itself into political achievements at Province level or below. Pacification has if anything gone backward. As compared with two, or four, years ago, enemy full-time regional forces and part-time guerrilla forces are larger; attacks, terrorism and sabotage have increased in scope and intensity; more railroads are closed and highways cut; the rice crop expected to come to market is smaller; we control little, if any, more of the population; the VC political infrastructure thrives in most of the country, continuing to give the enemy his enormous intelligence advantage; full security exists nowhere (not even behind the US Marinesʼ lines and in Saigon); in the countryside, the enemy almost completely controls the night. Nor has the Rolling Thunder program of bombing the North either significantly affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi. There is agreement in the intelligence community on these facts (see the attached Appendix). 3 In essence, we find ourselves—from the point of view of the important war (for the complicity of the people)—no better, and if anything worse off. This important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst, for training and inspiring them into effective action. 2. Recommended actions . In such an unpromising state of affairs, what should we do? We must continue to press the enemy militarily; we must make demonstrable progress in pacification; at the same time, we must add a new ingredient forced on us by the facts. Specifically, we must improve our position by getting ourselves into a military posture that we credibly would maintain indefinitely—a posture that makes trying to “wait us out” less attractive. I recommend a five-pronged course of action to achieve those ends. a. Stabilize US force levels in Vietnam . It is my judgment that, barring a dramatic change in the war, we should limit the increase in US forces in SVN in 1967 to 70,000 men and we should level off at the total of 470,000 which such an increase would provide. 4 It is in my view that this is enough to punish the enemy at the large-unit operations level and to keep the enemyʼs main forces from interrupting pacification. I believe also that even many more than 470,000 would not kill the enemy off in such numbers as to break their morale so long as they think they can wait us out. It is possible that such a 40 percent increase over our present level of 325,000 will break the enemyʼs morale in the short term; but if it does not, we must, I believe, be prepared for and have underway a long-term program premised on more than breaking the morale of main force units. A stabilized US force level would be part of such a long-term program. It would put us in a position where negotiations would be more likely to be productive, but if they were not we could pursue the all-important pacification task with proper attention and resources and without the spectre of apparently endless escalation of US deployments. b. Install a barrier . A portion of the 470,000 troops—perhaps 10,000 to 20,000—should be devoted to the construction and maintenance of an infiltration barrier. Such a barrier would lie near the 17th parallel—would run from the sea, across the neck of South Vietnam (choking off the new infiltration routes through the DMZ) and across the trails in Laos. This interdiction system (at an approximate cost of $1 billion) would comprise to the east a ground barrier of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and mobile troops; and to the west—mainly in Laos—an interdiction zone covered by air-laid mines and bombing attacks pin-pointed by air-laid acoustic sensors. The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but I believe that it can be made effective in time and that even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially change to our advantage the character of the war. It would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of friendly troops, and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the South from the North and that we intend to see the job through. c. Stabilize the Rolling Thunder program against the North . Attack sorties in North Vietnam have risen from about 4,000 per month at the end of last year to 6,000 per month in the first quarter of this year and 12,000 per month at present. Most of our 50 percent increase of deployed attack-capable aircraft has been absorbed in the attacks on North Vietnam. In North Vietnam, almost 84,000 attack sorties have been flown (about 25 percent against fixed targets), 45 percent during the past seven months. Despite these efforts, it now appears that the North Vietnamese-Laotian road network will remain adequate to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam—this is so even if its capacity could be reduced by one-third and if combat activities were to be doubled. North Vietnamʼs serious need for trucks, spare parts and petroleum probably can, despite air attacks, be met by imports. The petroleum requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement, for example, has not been enough to present significant supply problems, and the effects of the attacks on the petroleum distribution system, while they have not yet been fully assessed, are not expected to cripple the flow of essential supplies. Furthermore, it is clear that, to bomb the North sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoiʼs political, economic and social structure, would require an effort which we could make but which would not be stomached either by our own people or by world opinion; and it would involve a serious risk of drawing us into open war with China. The North Vietnamese are paying a price. They have been forced to assign some 300,000 personnel to the lines of communication in order to maintain the critical flow of personnel and materiel to the South. Now that the lines of communication have been manned, however, it is doubtful that either a large increase or decrease in our interdiction sorties would substantially change the cost to the enemy of maintaining the roads, railroads, and waterways or affect whether they are operational. It follows that the marginal sorties—probably the marginal 1,000 or even 5,000 sorties—per month against the lines of communication no longer have a significant impact on the war. (See the attached excerpts from intelligence estimates.) When this marginal inutility of added sorties against North Vietnam and Laos is compared with the crew and aircraft losses implicit in the activity (four men and aircraft and $20 million per 1,000 sorties), I recommend, as a minimum, against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnam and against increasing the intensity of operations by changing the areas or kinds of targets struck. 5 Under these conditions, the bombing program would continue the pressure and would remain available as a bargaining counter to get talks started (or to trade off in talks). But, as in the case of a stabilized level of US ground forces, the stabilization of Rolling Thunder would remove the prospect of ever-escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political posture and distracting from the main job of pacification in South Vietnam. At the proper time, as discussed on pages 6–7 below, 6 I believe we should consider terminating bombing in all of North Vietnam, or at least in the Northeast zones, for an indefinite period in connection with covert moves toward peace. d. Pursue a vigorous pacification program . As mentioned above, the pacification (Revolutionary Development) program has been and is thoroughly stalled. The large-unit operations war, which we know best how to fight and where we have had our successes, is largely irrelevant to pacification as long as we do not lose it. By and large, the people in rural areas believe that the GVN when it comes will not stay but that the VC will; that cooperation with the GVN will be punished by the VC; that the GVN is really indifferent to the peopleʼs welfare; that the low-level GVN are tools of the local rich; and that the GVN is ridden with corruption. Success in pacification depends on the interrelated functions of providing physical security, destroying the VC apparatus, motivating the people to cooperate, and establishing responsive local government. An obviously necessary but not sufficient requirement for success of the Revolutionary Development cadre and police is vigorously conducted and adequately prolonged clearing operations by military troops, who will “stay” in the area, who behave themselves decently and who show some respect for the people. This elemental requirement of pacification has been missing. In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years have ARVN forces actually “cleared and stayed” to a point where cadre teams, if available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets and survived, let alone accomplish their mission. VC units of company and even battalion size remain in operation, and they are more than large enough to overrun anything the local security forces can put up. Now that the threat of Communist main-force military victory has been thwarted by our emergency efforts, we must allocate far more attention and a portion of the regular military forces (at least half of the ARVN and perhaps a portion of the US forces) to the task of providing an active and permanent security screen behind which the Revolutionary Development teams and police can operate and behind which the political struggle with the VC infrastructure can take place. The US cannot do this pacification security job for the Vietnamese. All we can do is “massage the heart.” For one reason, it is known that we do not intend to stay; if our efforts worked at all, it would merely postpone the eventual confrontation of the VC and GVN infrastructures. The GVN must do the job; and I am convinced that drastic reform is needed if the GVN is going to be able to do it. The first essential reform is in the attitude of GVN officials. They are generally apathetic, and there is corruption high and low. Often appointments, promotions, and draft deferments must be bought; and kickbacks on salaries are common. Cadre at the bottom can be no better than the system above them. The second needed reform is in the attitude and conduct of the ARVN. The image of the government cannot improve unless and until the ARVN improves markedly. They do not understand the importance (or respectability) of pacification nor the importance to pacification of proper, disciplined conduct. Promotions, assignments and awards are often not made on merit, but rather on the basis of having a diploma, friends or relatives, or because of bribery. The ARVN is weak in dedication, direction and discipline. Not enough ARVN are devoted to area and population security, and when the ARVN does attempt to support pacification, their actions do not last long enough; their tactics are bad despite US prodding (no aggressive small-unit saturation patrolling, hamlet searches, quick-reaction contact, or offensive night ambushes); they do not make good use of intelligence; and their leadership and discipline are bad. Furthermore, it is my conviction that a part of the problem undoubtedly lies in bad management on the American as well as the GVN side. Here split responsibility—or “no responsibility”—has resulted in too little hard pressure on the GVN to do its job and no really solid or realistic planning with respect to the whole effort. We must deal with this management problem now and deal with it effectively. One solution would be to consolidate all US activities which are primarily part of the civilian pacification program and all persons engaged in such activities, providing a clear assignment of responsibility and a unified command under a civilian relieved of all other duties. 7 Under this approach, there would be a carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilian-in-charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer, who would give the subject of planning for and providing hamlet security the highest priority in attention and resources. Success will depend on the men selected for the jobs on both sides (they must be among the highest rank and most competent administrators in the US Government), on complete cooperation among the US elements, and on the extent to which the South Vietnamese can be shocked out of their present pattern of behavior. The first work of this reorganized US pacification organization should be to produce within 60 days a realistic and detailed plan for the coming year. From the political and public-relations viewpoint, this solution is preferable—if it works. But we cannot tolerate continued failure. If it fails after a fair trial, the only alternative in my view is to place the entire pacification program—civilian and military—under General Westmoreland. This alternative would result in the establishment of a Deputy COMUSMACV for Pacification who would be in command of all pacification staffs in Saigon and of all pacification staffs and activities in the field; one person in each corps, province and district would be responsible for the US effort. (It should be noted that progress in pacification, more than anything else, will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw.) e. Press for negotiations . I am not optimistic that Hanoi or the VC will respond to peace overtures now (explaining my recommendations above that we get into a level-off posture for the long pull). The ends sought by the two sides appear to be irreconcilable and the relative power balance is not in their view unfavorable to them. But three things can be done, I believe, to increase the prospects: (1) Take steps to increase the credibility of our peace gestures in the minds of the enemy. There is considerable evidence both in private statements by the Communists and in the reports of competent Western officials who have talked with them that charges of US bad faith are not solely propagandistic, but reflect deeply held beliefs. Analyses of Communistsʼ statements and actions indicate that they firmly believe that American leadership really does not want the fighting to stop, and that we are intent on winning a military victory in Vietnam and on maintaining our presence there through a puppet regime supported by US military bases. As a way of projecting US bona fides, I believe that we should consider two possibilities with respect to our bombing program against the North, to be undertaken, if at all, at a time very carefully selected with a view to maximizing the chances of influencing the enemy and world opinion and to minimizing the chances that failure would strengthen the hand of the “hawks” at home: First, without fanfare, conditions, or avowal, whether the stand-down was permanent or temporary, stop bombing all of North Vietnam. It is generally thought that Hanoi will not agree to negotiations until they can claim that the bombing has stopped unconditionally. We should see what develops, retaining freedom to resume the bombing if nothing useful was forthcoming. Alternatively, we could shift the weight-of-effort away from “Zones 6A and 6B”—zones including Hanoi and Haiphong and areas north of those two cities to the Chinese border. This alternative has some attraction in that it provides the North Vietnamese a “face saver” if only problems of “face” are holding up Hanoi peace gestures; it would narrow the bombing down directly to the objectionable infiltration (supporting the logic of a stop-infiltration/full-pause deal); and it would reduce the international heat on the US. Here, too, bombing of the Northeast could be resumed at any time, or “spot” attacks could be made there from time to time to keep North Vietnam off balance and to require her to pay almost the full cost by maintaining her repair crews in place. The sorties diverted from Zones 6A and 6B could be concentrated on the infiltration routes in Zones 1 and 2 (the southern end of North Vietnam, including the Mu Gia Pass), in Laos and in South Vietnam. 8 To the same end of improving our credibility, we should seek ways—through words and deeds—to make believable our intention to withdraw our forces once the North Vietnamese aggression against the South stops. In particular, we should avoid any implication that we will stay in South Vietnam with bases or to guarantee any particular outcome to a solely South Vietnamese struggle. (2) Try to split the VC off from Hanoi. The intelligence estimate is that evidence is overwhelming that the North Vietnamese dominate and control the National Front and the Viet Cong. Nevertheless, I think we should continue and enlarge efforts to contact the VC/NLF and to probe ways to split members or sections off the VC/NLF organization. (3) Press contacts with North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and other parties who might contribute toward a settlement. (4) Develop a realistic plan providing a role for the VC in negotiations, post-war life, and government of the nation. An amnesty offer and proposals for national reconciliation would be steps in the right direction and should be parts of the plan. It is important that this plan be one which will appear reasonable, if not at first to Hanoi and the VC, at least to world opinion. 3. The prognosis . The prognosis is bad that the war can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion within the next two years. The large-unit operations probably will not do it; negotiations probably will not do it. While we should continue to pursue both of these routes in trying for a solution in the short run, we should recognize that success from them is a mere possibility, not a probability . The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and in taking actions immediately which will in 12 to 18 months give clear evidence that the continuing costs and risks to the American people are acceptably limited, that the formula for success has been found, and that the end of the war is merely a matter of time. All of my recommendations will contribute to this strategy, but the one most difficult to implement is perhaps the most important one—enlivening the pacification program. The odds are less than even for this task, if only because we have failed consistently since 1961 to make a dent in the problem. But, because the 1967 trend of pacification will, I believe, be the main talisman of ultimate US success or failure in Vietnam, extraordinary imagination and effort should go into changing the stripes of that problem. President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky are thinking along similar lines. They told me that they do not expect the enemy to negotiate or to modify his program in less than two years. Rather, they expect the enemy to continue to expand and to increase his activity. They expressed agreement with us that the key to success is pacification and that so far pacification has failed. They agree that we need clarification of GVN and US roles and that the bulk of the ARVN should be shifted to pacification. Ky will, between January and July 1967, shift all ARVN infantry divisions to that role. And he is giving Thang, a good Revolutionary Development director, added powers. Thieu and Ky see this as part of a two-year (1967–68) schedule, in which offensive operations against enemy main force units are continued, carried on primarily by the US and other Free World forces. At the end of the two-year period, they believe the enemy may be willing to negotiate or to retreat from his current course of action. 9 Note: Neither the Secretary of State nor the JCS have yet had an opportunity to express their views on this report. Mr. Katzenbach and I have discussed many of its main conclusions and recommendations—in general, but not in all particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own. Appendix Extracts from CIA/DIA Report “An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam through 12 September 1966” 10 1. There is no evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations. 2. Air strikes against all modes of transportation in North Vietnam increased during the past month, but there is no evidence of serious transport problems in the movement of supplies to or within North Vietnam. 3. There is no evidence yet that the air strikes have significantly weakened popular morale. 4. Air strikes continue to depress economic growth and have been responsible for the abandonment of some plans for economic development, but essential economic activities continue. Extracts from a March 16, 1966 CIA Report “An Analysis of the Rolling Thunder Air Offensive against North Vietnam” 11 1. Although the movement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and made somewhat more costly [by our bombing], 12 the Communists have been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam. 2. Hanoiʼs determination [despite our bombing] to continue its policy of supporting the insurgency in the South appears as firm as ever. 3. Air attacks almost certainly cannot bring about a meaningful reduction in the current level at which essential supplies and men flow into South Vietnam. Bomb Damage Assessment in the North by the Institute for Defense Analysisʼ “Summer Study Group” 13 What surprised us [in our assessment of the effect of bombing North Vietnam] was the extent of agreement among various intelligence agencies on the effects of past operations and probable effects of continued and expanded Rolling Thunder. The conclusions of our group, to which we all subscribe, are therefore merely sharpened conclusions of numerous Intelligence summaries. They are that Rolling Thunder does not limit the present logistic flow into SVN because NVN is neither the source of supplies nor the choke-point on the supply routes from China and USSR. Although an expansion of Rolling Thunder by closing Haiphong harbor, eliminating electric power plants and totally destroying railroads, will at least indirectly impose further privations on the populace of NVN and make the logistic support of VC costlier to maintain, such expansion will not really change the basic assessment. This follows because NVN has demonstrated excellent ability to improvise transportation, and because the primitive nature of their economy is such that Rolling Thunder can affect directly only a small fraction of the population. There is very little hope that the Ho Chi Minh Government will lose control of population because of Rolling Thunder. The lessons of the Korean War are very relevant in these respects. Moreover, foreign economic aid to NVN is large compared to the damage we inflict, and growing. Probably the government of NVN has assurances that the USSR and/or China will assist the rebuilding of its economy after the war, and hence its concern about the damage being inflicted may be moderated by long-range favorable expectations. Specifically: 1. As of July 1966 the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoiʼs ability to mount and support military operations in the South at the current level. 2. Since the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program the damage to facilities and equipment in North Vietnam has been more than offset by the increased flow of military and economic aid, largely from the USSR and Communist China. 3. The aspects of the basic situation that have enabled Hanoi to continue its support of military operations in the South and to neutralize the impact of U.S. bombing by passing the economic costs to other Communist countries are not likely to be altered by reducing the present geographic constraints, mining Haiphong and the principal harbors in North Vietnam, increasing the number of armed reconnaissance sorties and otherwise expanding the U.S. air offensive along the lines now contemplated in military recommendations and planning studies. 4. While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that some limit may be imposed on the scale of military activity that Hanoi can maintain in the South by continuing the Rolling Thunder program at the present, or some higher level effort, there appears to be no basis for defining that limit in concrete terms, or for concluding that the present scale of VC/NVN activities in the field have approached that limit. 5. The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of the North Vietnamese to continue fighting and on their leadersʼ appraisal of the prospective gains and costs of maintaining the present policy have not shown themselves in any tangible way. Furthermore, we have not discovered any basis for concluding that the indirect punitive effects of bombing will prove decisive in these respects. Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , vol. IV, pp. 348–355. McNamara submitted the report to the President after visiting Vietnam October 10–13. 2 November 30, 1965; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. III, pp. 591 – 594 . 3 Printed below. 4 Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force an end 1967 deployment limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 See footnote on page 7. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 8 below.] 6 Section 2e, below, entitled “Press for negotiations.” 7 If this task is assigned to Ambassador Porter, another individual must be sent immediately to Saigon to serve as Ambassador Lodgeʼs deputy. [Footnote in the source text.] 8 Any limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam will cause serious psychological problems among the men who are risking their lives to help achieve our political objectives; among their commanders up to and including the JCS; and among those of our people who cannot understand why we should withhold punishment from the enemy. General Westmoreland, as do the JCS, strongly believes in the military value of the bombing program. Further, Westmoreland reports that the morale of his Air Force personnel may already be showing signs of erosion—an erosion resulting from current operational restrictions. [Footnote in the source text.] 9 Lodgeʼs report of McNamaraʼs meeting with Thieu and Ky is in telegram 8161 from Saigon, October 11. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US–VIET S) Westmorelandʼs memorandum for the record of McNamaraʼs meeting with Ky, October 11, is in the Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, #9 History File. 10 Not found. 11 Not found. 12 All brackets are in the source text. 13 A full copy of the report, “The Effects of U.S. Bombing on North Vietnamʼs Ability To Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospects and Prospect,” August 29, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 192, The Effects of U.S. Bombing. Attached is a memorandum from Ginsburgh to Rostow, September 13, critiquing the five points excerpted in the Appendix printed here. 269. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 269. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, October 14, 1966. JCSM–672–66 SUBJECT Actions Recommended for Vietnam (U) 1. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed your memorandum to the President, subject as above. 2 Their views as to the situation in Vietnam and the proper courses of US actions coincide substantially with yours in many areas; however, in some important areas the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with you. For convenience of reference their comments are set forth in subsequent paragraphs in the same sequence and with the same headings as in your memorandum. 2. (TS) Evaluation of the Situation . a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military situation obtaining in Vietnam has improved substantially over the past year. Since the President authorized the deployment of US ground forces to South Vietnam (SVN), Free World military forces have enjoyed an almost unbroken series of successes in combat. The few enemy victories have been gained at the expense of South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Force units. Our present posture achieves our often-expressed objective of ensuring that the enemy cannot win militarily in SVN at his current level of effort; our future programs should be geared, as a minimum, to retaining this favorable situation. Our restricted air campaign against North Vietnam (NVN) has destroyed substantial quantities of military supplies and war-supporting facilities, inflicted major damage on lines of communication, and forced the diversion of at least 300,000 men from agriculture and industry to repair and maintenance activities. The demands of communist leaders and leftist sympathizers for cessation of bombing give strong indication of the impact the bombing is having on the North Vietnamese. Widespread and uninhibited Viet Cong (VC) sabotage in SVN over a period of five years has been far less detrimental to a sustained war effort. b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree there is no reason to expect that the war can be brought soon to a successful conclusion. c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agree that the enemy strategy appears to be to wait it out; in other words, communist leaders in both North and South Vietnam expect to win this war in Washington, just as they won the war with France in Paris. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is reason for such expectations on the part of the communist leadership. d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that, manpower-wise, the enemy should be able to replace his heavy combat losses. This assessment, however, does not—indeed, cannot—take into account the adverse impact over time of continued bloody defeats on the morale of VC/NVA forces and the determination of their political and military leaders. Pertinent to the foregoing, there is evidence that the VC increasingly must resort to forced conscription to fill their ranks, and that men furnished from NVN to replace casualties suffered by the 324B Division are a mixture of hard-nosed regular soldiers (about 25%), fanatical communist volunteers (about 25%), and unmotivated conscripts (about 50%). e. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that pacification (revolutionary development) programs have not been, and are not now, adequate to the situation. f. Additional Comment . The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that your memorandum addresses only SVN; it does not consider the prospect of the expanding threat in northeast Thailand or Laos, or the requirement for the Free World forces to cope with these threats. 3. (TS) Recommended Actions . The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in your general recommendations that we should continue to press the enemy militarily, improve pacification programs, and attain a military posture we can maintain indefinitely. Their comments on your specific recommendations are: a. Stabilize US Force Levels —The danger to Government of Vietnam (GVN) viability imposed by inflation is recognized. However, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that a stable, sustainable force level in SVN is desirable, the suggested level of 470,000 is substantially less than earlier recommendations of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve judgment upon the force level required until they have reviewed the revised programs now being prepared under the supervision of Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland at Headquarters, Pacific Command. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out the necessity of having in CONUS, Hawaii, and Okinawa, forces capable of immediate deployment to SVN to cope with contingencies. b. Install Barriers —The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that barriers properly installed and defended by ground and air effort can impede infiltration into SVN from NVN. As you know, they have reservations concerning the effectiveness of the currently-proposed air-laid munitions barrier; moreover, they consider that this effort must not be permitted to impair current military programs. c. Stabilize Rolling Thunder —The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your recommendation that there should be no increase in level of bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets subject to air attack. They believe our air campaign against NVN to be an integral and indispensable part of our over-all war effort. To be effective, the air campaign should be conducted with only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid indiscriminate killing of population. d. Improve Pacification Program —The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed you earlier that, to achieve early optimum effectiveness, the pacification program should be transferred to COMUSMACV. They adhere to that conclusion. However, if for political reasons a civilian-type organization should be considered mandatory by the President, they would interpose no objection. Nevertheless, they are not sanguine that an effective civilian-type organization can be erected, if at all, except at the expense of costly delays. As to the use of a substantial fraction of the ARVN for pacification purposes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur. However, they desire to flag that adoption of this concept will undoubtedly elicit charges of a US takeover of combat operations at increased cost in American casualties. e. Press for Negotiations —The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with your proposal that, as a carrot to induce negotiations, we should suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against NVN. Our experiences with pauses in bombing and resumption have not been happy ones. Additionally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the likelihood of the war being settled by negotiation is small; and that, far from inducing negotiations, another bombing pause will be regarded by North Vietnamese leaders, and our Allies, as renewed evidence of lack of US determination to press the war to a successful conclusion. The bombing campaign is one of the two trump cards in the hands of the President (the other being the presence of US troops in SVN). It should not be given up without an end to the NVN aggression in SVN. As to maintaining contacts with NVN and the USSR in order to find ways to end the war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree; however, they advocate that US personnel involved should reflect a quiet determination to prosecute the war until communist aggression against SVN ceases. 4. (TS) Prognosis . The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree we cannot predict with confidence that the war can be brought to an end in two years. Accordingly, for political, military, and psychological reasons, we should prepare openly for a long-term, sustained military effort. 5. (TS) Additional Comment . The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the war has reached a stage at which decisions taken over the next sixty days can determine the outcome of the war and, consequently, can affect the over-all security interests of the United States for years to come. Therefore, they wish to provide to you and to the President their unequivocal views on two salient aspects of the war situation: the search for peace; and military pressures on NVN. a. The frequent, broadly-based public offers made by the President to settle the war by peaceful means on a generous basis, which would take from NVN nothing it now has, have been admirable. Certainly, no one—American or foreigner—except those who are determined not to be convinced, can doubt the sincerity, the generosity, the altruism of US actions and objectives. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time has come when further overt actions and offers on our part are not only nonproductive, they are counterproductive. A logical case can be made that the American people, our Allies, and our enemies alike are increasingly uncertain as to our resolution to pursue the war to a successful conclusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate the following: (1) A statement by the President during the Manila Conference of his unswerving determination to carry on the war until NVN aggression against SVN shall cease; (2) Continued covert exploration of all avenues leading to a peaceful settlement of war; and (3) Continued alertness to detect and react appropriately to withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from SVN and cessation of support to the VC. b. In JCSM–955–64, dated 14 November 1964, and in JCSM–982–64, dated 23 November 1964, 3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided their views as to the military pressures which should be brought to bear on NVN. In summary, they recommended a “sharp knock” on NVN military assets and war-supporting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted. Whatever the political merits of the latter course, we deprived ourselves of the military effects of early weight of effort and shock, and gave to the enemy time to adjust to our slow quantitative and qualitative increase of pressure. This is not to say that it is now too late to derive military benefits from more effective and extensive use of our air and naval superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend: (1) Approval of their Rolling Thunder 52 program, which is a step toward meeting the requirement for improved target systems. This program would decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorize attacks against the steel plant, 4 the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs, SAM support facilities within the residual Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong, Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) and Can Thon (Kep). (2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict North Vietnamese coastal waterborne traffic and appropriate land LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such as radar and AAA sites. 6. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views as set forth above be provided to the President. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle J. Wheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Top Secret. McNamara noted on his copy of the memorandum that it was received at 8:50 a.m. on October 15 and that a copy was sent to the President. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SVN Trip, October 1966) 2 Document 268 . 3 For text of both memoranda, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 902 – 906 and 932 – 935 . 4 Inserted in handwriting at this point, apparently by McNamara, is “the cement plant.” 270. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 270. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (Carver) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, October 15, 1966. SUBJECT Comments on Secretary McNamaraʼs Trip Report 2 SUMMARY We endorse Secretary McNamaraʼs evaluation of the situation and his prescriptive analysis of what needs to be done. We have problems with his proposed package of “recommended actions” and serious difficulties with the details of some of the actions recommended, particularly the “press for negotiation” recommendations which we feel would be counterproductive. We consider his prognosis too gloomy. If the odds for enlivening the pacification program are indeed “less than even”, present U.S. objectives in Vietnam are not likely to be achieved. 1. Evaluation of the Situation: Secretary McNamaraʼs evaluation of the situation is sound, perceptive and very much in line with our own appreciation. We agree that the struggle “for the complicity of the people” is “the important war”, though we feel that the important struggle is not just for the “complicity” of the people but, rather, for their engagement, for a degree of active participation whereby they come to identify their fortunes with the political institutions and instruments of a non-Communist Saigon government. The only part of Secretary McNamaraʼs evaluation with which we would take issue is its concluding sentence. We believe that despite the errors and administrative weaknesses of present programs, in the concept of revolutionary development (which involves much more than surface “pacification”) we have found the right formula, a catalyst that is potentially capable of inspiring the Vietnamese into effective action. Revolutionary development, however, involves fundamental structural and attitudinal changes in Vietnamese society which even perfectly conceived and managed programs could not effect overnight. Thus, in spite of organizational weaknesses and performance shortfalls in our present programs, it is far too early to write them off as discouraging failures. Serious and systematic effort in this field is really a post-Honolulu Conference development and it would be unrealistic to expect dramatic, readily quantifiable progress in the short span of eight months. 2. Recommended Actions: We agree that “we must continue to press the enemy militarily”, that “we must make demonstrable progress in pacification”, and that “progress in pacification, more than anything else, will persuade the enemy to negotiate or withdraw”. (The last point is in our view the most important one made in the whole report. It should be highlighted, not buried in a parenthetical aside at the end of paragraph 2.d.). We also agree that the U.S. should adopt a military posture that unmistakably signals its readiness to stick out a long war. Yet, though we agree with Secretary McNamaraʼs prescriptive analysis of what needs to be accomplished, we do not believe the specific action mix he recommends would accomplish these objectives and feel that some elements of this recommended mix (particularly the “press for negotiations”) would actually be counterproductive. 3. The key problem here lies in the fact that the U.S. simply cannot try to work both sides of the street and hope for any kind of success. On the one hand, we can keep the Communists under pressure and militarily at bay while we endeavor to help the South Vietnamese build a viable political structure and while at the same time we adopt a posture on negotiations which will put the onus on Hanoi, minimize domestic and international pressures on the U.S., and avoid detrimental effect on our political efforts within South Vietnam. Or, we can adopt a course of action which has some genuine chance of getting Hanoi to the table within the reasonably near term future. We cannot realistically hope to do both simultaneously. 4. Specific Action Recommendations: We have the following comments on the specific actions recommended in Secretary McNamaraʼs report. a. U.S. force levels: A U.S. force level of 470,000 will be sufficient to punish the enemy at the large-unit operations level and keep the enemyʼs main forces from interrupting pacification only if the increase over present levels is primarily in maneuver battalions (not support elements) and if measures to check the enemyʼs buildup through infiltration are effective. b. The barrier: In order to achieve the objectives set for the barrier in our view it must be extended well westward into Laos. Air interdiction of the routes in Laos unsupplemented by ground action will not effectively check infiltration. c. Rolling Thunder: We concur in Secretary McNamaraʼs analysis of the effects of the Rolling Thunder program, its potential for reducing the flow of essential supplies, and his judgment on the marginal inutility of added sorties against lines of communication. We endorse his argument on stabilizing the level of sorties. We do not agree, however, with the implied judgment that changes in the bombing program could not be effective. We continue to judge that a bombing program directed both against closing the port of Haiphong and continuously cutting the rail lines to China could have a significant impact. d. Pacification: We agree that revolutionary development (pacification) must be pursued vigorously, and that success in pacification depends on the interrelated factors Secretary McNamara catalogues. Although “the U.S. cannot do this … job for the Vietnamese”, neither can the Vietnamese do it alone—we must integrate our efforts. We agree that corruption is a serious problem and the attitude of GVN officials must be improved, but we do not believe that these problems have to be solved at the top before attempting to make pacification cadre effective. We must work at both ends of the Vietnamese command chain simultaneously; working unilaterally if necessary at the lower end. We concur in the comments on ARVN. e. The management of the U.S. pacification effort needs improvement. We are not sure just what Secretary McNamaraʼs first recommended solution really involves. If it involves only minor cosmetic surgery on the present arrangement, it is unlikely to succeed. If Secretary McNamara is proposing real organizational change under which the civilian director would have a joint staff of sufficient scope to enable him to plan, control and direct the U.S. effort and have operational control over all—not just civilian—elements engaged in revolutionary development activities, then we support his recommendation wholeheartedly. “A carefully delineated division of responsibility between the civilian-in-charge and an element of COMUSMACV under a senior officer”, however, does not look to us like the unified control and management arrangement necessary or an arrangement which would give the civilian director sufficient authority over U.S. military pacification activities. f. A civilian pacification structure cannot be given a “fair trial” unless the civilian director has the necessary authority. Also, the trial will not be “fair” if major quantifiable results are anticipated in a matter of months. Further, even if a particular civilian-headed administrative structure does not work, the fact remains that revolutionary development (which is what we ought to be talking about, not pacification) can only succeed if it is something in which the civil populace engages itself. If an attempt is made to impose pacification on an unengaged populace by GVN or U.S. military forces, that attempt will fail. g. Negotiations: While we agree that the U.S. must maintain an open posture toward negotiations for domestic and international political reasons, we do not believe we should actively press for negotiations until definite progress has been made in the revolutionary development/pacification program. Otherwise, we will be negotiating from a position of weakness and running a great risk of undercutting what we are trying to develop politically within South Vietnam. h. Shifting the air effort from the northwest quadrant to the infiltration areas in Laos and southern North Vietnam would be quite unproductive. Such a course of action would not induce Hanoi to negotiate (since it would still involve bombing of the north) and would probably have little effect in changing present international attitudes. Furthermore, a concentration of sorties against the low-yield and elusive targets along the infiltration routes in the southern end of North Vietnam and in Laos would not appreciably diminish North Vietnamʼs ability to maintain the supply of its forces in South Vietnam. i. For a variety of diplomatic, image and psychological warfare considerations, much needs to be done on imaginative amnesty programs. However, any U.S. effort at the present time to sponsor proposals which would give the VC a role in the government of South Vietnam would have very adverse effects on the morale and determination of our South Vietnamese allies. 4. Prognosis: We agree with Secretary McNamaraʼs prognosis that there is little hope for a satisfactory conclusion of the war within the next two years. We do not agree that “the odds are less than even” for enlivening the pacification program. If this were true, the U.S. would be foolish to continue the struggle in Vietnam and should seek to disengage as fast as possible. We think if we establish adequate management and control on the U.S. side and ensure that the Vietnamese follow through on redirecting their military resources as promised, there are at least fair prospects for substantial progress in pacification over the next two years. George A. Carver, Jr. 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job. 80–B01285A. Top Secret. Helms forwarded a copy of the memorandum to McNamara under cover of an October 16 memorandum, stating that it resulted “from a detailed analysis undertaken by the seven top officers in the Agency on Vietnam” and “had been reviewed by the Deputy Directors involved as well as the undersigned.” On his copy of the memorandum, McNamara wrote: “Prepared by Dick [Helms] at my request.” (Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII) 2 Document 268 . 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 271. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 15, 1966. SUBJECT Administration of Revolutionary Development I. Introduction You requested a position paper on the administration of the “other war” in Viet-Nam. Let me begin by offering two powerful first impressions which I believe bear decisively on that question. 1. My overriding impression after five days in Viet-Nam is of a topic so common it is all-too rarely reported and so obvious it is all-too rarely considered: the unceasing, backbreaking toil of the peasant population. To see rows of coolies bending down, hour after hour, tending rice plants in the exhausting sun, is to recognize that it is not so much water that their rice grows in; it is sweat. They seed, nurture, replant, irrigate, dig manure, harvest, dry, and carry day upon day, year upon year to squeeze only the barest of essentials from the land. And to see all this is to recognize a political fact: how easy it is for these people not to give a whit whether they are governed by the GVN or by the VC or by anyone else. Given the dawn-to-dusk imperative of their work, what they may wish more devoutly than anything is simply to be left alone. They wish no longer to be bombed and shelled or knifed and shot, drafted or kidnapped, propagandized or harangued, gouged by landlords or “taxed” by guerrillas. 2. Second, I could not help but be struck by the extent to which Viet-Nam is commonly discussed in a strange language of abbreviation and acronym. For example, “If we can get MACV, USAID and JUSPAO to prod the GVN, then maybe ARVN—working with the PF, RF, PFF, CIDG and the PAT cadres—can get RD off the ground.” It is easy to understand why such sentences would be common in Saigon, where people talk of little other than the war and where shorthand thus becomes a necessity. The same is true, however, at a less superficial level, when shorthand is applied to concepts as well as to agencies—when real words become shorthand symbols—but destructive symbols because they mean such different things to different speakers. An example—and one closely relevant here—is the word “security,” which has come to blanket a variety of different meanings. I believe decisive, effective revolutionary development depends on a clear and precise common understanding of the security we all recognize to be the foundation of success in “the other war.” To illustrate the divergence of meanings, let me report briefly on a conversation I had with a small group of reporters in Saigon. It quickly degenerated into a debate, not between the reporters and me, but between Ward Just of the Washington Post and Charles Mohr of the New York Times . Just argued heatedly that RD could not even begin to be effective unless security were first guaranteed both to the peasants and RD workers. “An AID man cannot do his work,” he said, “while he is being shot at by the VC.” Mohr responded, just as heatedly, that security could not come first—because security from guerrillas is meaningless and impossible until the peasant populace is motivated to support the GVN and deprive the guerrillas of havens, secrecy, and resources. Obviously, the easy answer to this circular chicken-egg debate is to say that both are necessary—military protection and public motivation against the VC. And yet even that answer is incomplete for it defines security only in the American frame of reference (more police in Central Park; or National Guard against riots). What we must also ask is, what does security mean to the Vietnamese peasant, stooped over in the rice paddies? Does security mean a guarantee of the absence of physical danger? Or is the peasant willing to take some risks in exchange for other factors? If so, what are those factors: Communist ideology? Land reform? Lowering of crushing taxes—whether imposed by the GVN or VC? No further conscription—again by either side? Social justice—such as the elimination of corruption which requires under-the-table payments even for an act so elemental as registering a birth? A voice in local government? The VC have found effective answers to such questions, tailored to specific local needs. We must do at least as well. And indeed each of these factors is important to the peasantry in some, many, or all areas. They must be seized on as a critical element in defining and providing true security. If the peasant were not willing to accept any risks, then the outlook for revolutionary development would be grave, indeed. No matter how effectively they are administered, even military security and capable RD efforts cannot bring instant success. At best, they can give us a mutually reinforcing stairstep route to success. A high level of physical security (against guerrilla, rather than main-force opposition) cannot be achieved without motivating the populace. Such motivation cannot be achieved without considerable progress toward physical security. Both must be sought at once, in a way designed to lower the peasantʼs current risks while at the same time inducing him to accept the risks of involvement that remain. Given limited time, we must carefully identify and concentrate on those risks which are least acceptable to him and on those gains which are most essential to him. II. The Ideal, Theoretical Program I know of no one who believes we have begun effectively to achieve this goal, despite a series of pacification programs and despite even the budding early efforts of Ambassador Porterʼs new program. The Military Aspect . Secretary McNamara, Mr. Komer, Ambassadors Johnson, Lodge, and Porter, Mr. Gaud, I, and all others who have approached the problem are perfectly agreed that the military aspect of Revolutionary Development has been spindly and weak. This probably is the result of the entirely understandable preoccupation by MACV in recent months with the main-force military emergency. However justifiable this has been, a major effect has nonetheless been our failure effectively to press RVNAF to even start meeting their crucial RD responsibilities. (I know of no one who believes that these should be met principally by American forces—unless we should wish the whole RD effort to collapse once we leave.) The Civil Aspect . Similarly, the work of civilian agencies has fallen short—largely, but not only because of the failure of RVNAF to provide a military screen behind which to work. For example, we have been successful in persuading farmers to turn to modern insecticides and fertilizers, overcoming the skepticism and hostility borne of old ways used for centuries. But having sold the peasants on the concept, there is not enough insecticide in the whole country now to meet the demand in Long An province alone. We have built—as Mr. Komer outlined in such careful detail in his report to you of September 13 2 —large numbers of school rooms. But, again to cite Long An, the province which I visited, we built 65 school rooms in 1965—but 55 American-funded schoolrooms were so located that they were blown up by the VC. We have sent 2.2 million textbooks to Viet-Nam, but how many are still tied up in warehouses? Recent discussions of such shortcomings have been conducted in terms of who should control the program—civilian agencies or the military. I believe this is too narrow a frame of reference. It is too late to worry about organizational symmetry or inter-agency niceties. Rather than engage in a civil-military debate, I think we should devote our efforts toward trying to devise an administrative structure that capitalizes on the assets each agency can offer to RD . What should be the elements of an ideal organization? 1. It should have maximum leverage on RVNAF to engage in clear and hold operations in direct support of RDM efforts. 2. It should have a single American “negative”, anti-VC channel—that is a single commander for all action against Communist guerrilla forces. This commander would calibrate and choose among the various force alternatives—depending on whether he believed the need to be military, para-military, or police. This command would include complete responsibility for all anti-VC intelligence—that is, concerning all VC suspects either in the infrastructure or in guerrilla units. 3. It should have a single, unified channel for all “positive”, pro-people aspects of RD, irrespective of the present lines of command within civilian agencies, allowing a single commander to calibrate and assign priorities to relevant positive programs on behalf of the peasantry. This, too, would include the immediate expansion of and control over all “pro-people” intelligence—that is, detailed district-by-district and province-by-province reporting on the particular gains most wanted by the populace (land reform, for example, in one province; or schools in another; or agricultural assistance in another). 4. Sensitivity to political inputs and wise political guidance of the whole process are needed to ensure that military programs support rather than negate efforts to win public support and participation. Failure to assure this—which characterized French efforts in Indochina and Algeria, in contrast to civil-led, successful, British efforts in Malaya and the Filipino campaign against the Huks—means that the very process of gaining security would be weakened and prolonged, at increased cost in Vietnamese and American lives. Thus, overall civilian command of the RD program is needed for fundamental practical reasons, by no means for considerations of international image alone (though on the latter point, it must be observed that as soon as we put “the other war” under obvious military control, it stops being the other war). In particular, it is important not to block or reverse—by the way we organize our efforts—the current genuinely hopeful Vietnamese trend toward increased civilian influence and participation in government. In short, it is not the precise form of organization or the precise choice of flow chart that is important. What is important is: 1. An immediate and effective military screen for RD efforts; and 2. Authoritative and compelling administration of the efforts of civilian agencies. III. Achievement of the Ideal I believe we can institute effective administration of the RD program—which Ambassador Lodge has aptly described as the heart of the matter—achieving all of these ideals: 1. Maintain the effect and the appearance of civilian control by immediately assigning overall supervision of all RD activities to Ambassador Porter (and assigning a second deputy to Ambassador Lodge to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter). 2. That the several civilian lines of command within agencies be consolidated into one. Thus, USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and the Embassy personnel assigned to RD all would continue under the nominal administrative control of their respective agencies but full, unified operational control would rest solely with Ambassador Porter. 3. That Ambassador Porterʼs authority be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the RD team, including: —relocation of personnel; —the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities; —and the apportionment of the funds allocated by each agency to Viet-Nam, bounded only by statutory limitations. 4. That MACV immediately give highest-level command focus and consolidation to its RD concerns and staff, now that it is no longer so completely distracted from RD by the compelling requirements of main-force combat. This would be organized around the thesis that the central need is the most effective persuasive power or leverage on RVNAF. This thesis is strengthened substantially by: —The firm intent, expressed to us in Saigon last week, of President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky to shift ARVN infantry to revolutionary development work starting in January; —The enhanced powers they intend to give to General Thang, already an able chief of RD for GVN. 5. That the MACV effort embrace at least advisory control over all levels of force—starting with ARVN but also including RF, PF, CIDG, and the para-military operations of the RD cadre, PFF, and PRV. These steps would greatly strengthen both the military and civil lines of command. They would contribute significantly to the success of RD. But not even these changes would be decisive without a strong link between them . The civil side requires the capacity to influence military movement which no organizational chart can provide. The MACV side requires the political and substantive expertise which a military organization does not—and is not expected to—possess. Thus the fundamental recommendation I would make is: 6. To appoint, as principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, a general of the highest possible ability and stature—of two, three or even four-star rank. To do so would win the following advantages: a. Compelling indication of the seriousness with which the Administration regards RD; b. The rank and stature to insure optimum RD performance from MACV. c. The rank and stature to afford maximum impact on GVN military leaders and capacity to persuade them properly to prod RVNAF when necessary. d. Demonstrated command administrative capacities with which to assist Ambassador Porter, while bridging the inevitable institutional difficulties that might well otherwise develop from one arm of MACVʼs taking orders from a civilian. e. A solution to the military control image problem, by which the advantages of close military support would be veiled by civilian control. f. The capacity and position to formulate an effective, qualitative plan encompassing both military and civil realities. Previous plans have focussed on numbers of provinces, volume of RD cadre trained, and so on. They have put an unrealistic premium on quantitative, “statistical” success. Meaningful criteria, however, must be qualitative. I would envision such a qualitative plan intended to cover at least the next 12 months. There would be an additional prospective advantage as well. If it should later be found that dual lines of authority—even given this strong link—are not successful, then we could more readily fall back to a unitary, military command structure—with the new RD general taking charge. He would have the benefit, in that situation, of having been under civilian control and his relationship to RD would already be evident, making the change to military control less abrupt and less susceptible to criticism. Beyond the form of organization, I also would, later, like to advance a series of specific thoughts on matters of substance for the RD program. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, vol. IX. Top Secret. 2 “The Other War in Vietnam—A Progress Report,” printed in Department of State Bulletin , October 10, 1966, pp. 549–567, and October 17, 1966, pp. 591–601. 272. Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council 272. Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council 1 Washington, October 15, 1966, 2:40–3:30 p.m. Vietnam—Manila Conference The Council Meeting had originally been planned to give Secretary McNamara a chance to report on his visit to Vietnam. However, it was later decided to spend the meeting time discussing the Presidentʼs Asian trip. Following the change in the subject matter of the meeting, it was arranged that Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler see the President alone prior to the NSC Meeting. The purpose of this private session was to have been a discussion of the differences between General Wheeler and the Chiefs and Secretary McNamara with respect to future military actions in Vietnam. The meeting in the Presidentʼs office included, in addition to Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, the Vice President and possibly the Secretary of Treasury. There is no record of this discussion 2 but it apparently centered on the differences recorded in memoranda from Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, single copies of which are attached. 3 The formal NSC Meeting was opened by the President, who requested Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler and Under Secretary Katzenbach to report briefly on their recent visit to Vietnam. Secretary McNamara: The military situation in Vietnam is better than he expected it to be. Military preparations are progressing in an entirely satisfactory way. Progress in pacification is less than he had hoped. More emphasis needs to be placed on pacification programs. The pacification situation was worse than it had been when he was last in Vietnam. We will be in Vietnam longer than we have thought. We should prepare now contingency plans looking toward the future so that if it turns out that we have to stay a long time, we would be prepared to do so. General Wheeler: There has been substantial improvement in the military situation. The morale of our troops is the best ever. General Wheeler then gave a short summary of fighting in and along the Demilitarized Zone, citing the activity of the North Vietnamese 324B Regiment. He described Operation Irving 4 and said that there was still a belief in the field that the North Vietnamese were trying to separate the two most northern provinces from the rest of South Vietnam. Under Secretary Katzenbach: Efforts in the field of pacification are not as good as they should be. Lack of security in many areas prevented progress toward re-establishment of the authority of the South Vietnamese Government. For example, we constructed 65 school rooms in one area, only to have 55 of them destroyed within the year. The Council then turned to a discussion of the Presidentʼs Asian trip, including the Manila Conference. 5 Secretary Rusk: The purpose of the conference is to give the President an opportunity to meet with the Heads of State of those countries contributing to the war effort in Vietnam. Although there is basic unity among the seven countries involved, there is rivalry among Korea, Thailand and the Philippines for Asian leadership. The conference will come out satisfactorily for us. Bill Moyers: The purpose of the Asian trip is to show our friendship for Asian countries rather than accomplish substantive policy gains. There are specific problems which will be encountered in each country, e.g., Malaysia—the rubber problem; Thailand—the internal security problem. In addition, there is the problem of rivalry between Korean President Pak and the Philippines President Marcos. There followed a discussion of public information problems which was initiated by the President who referred to a leak to Drew Pearson of the substance of the Presidentʼs conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The President: There should be no backgrounding on the Manila Conference unless it is cleared with Bill Moyers. Our public information must be coordinated. Our Ambassadors in these countries should talk to the heads of government about the dangers of public airing of differences among us as well as the critical need for unity. Mr. Moyers: We should play down any expectation that a hard peace proposal will come out of the conference. Our emphasis should be on reconstruction in Vietnam after the fighting stops. Secretary Rusk: Summarized the draft communique (copy attached). 6 The President: The conference will probably accomplish little so we must consider now how to keep the initiative in the period ahead. Bromley Smith 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Manila Conference. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. 2 For Wheelerʼs record of the discussion, see Document 274 and footnote 3 thereto. The meeting with the President in his office began at 2:10 p. m. and was attended by McNamara, Vance, Wheeler, and Humphrey. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 3 Documents 268 and 269 . 4 U.S. troops, assisted by South Vietnamese and South Korean soldiers, launched Operation Irving on October 2 against a combined Viet Cong-North Vietnamese force in the central coastal area about 305 miles northwest of Saigon. 5 Filed together with the source text is telegram 66747 to Saigon, October 14, 16 pages, transmitting a paper drafted by William Bundy that discusses the scope and issues of the conference. 6 Not attached. 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, October 16, 1966. 8583. 1. This is in reply to your 66655. 2 2. On Saturday I asked DʼOrlandi this question: “Does Lewandowskiʼs strong position against what he calls any form of ‘barter’ i. e., ‘We stop doing this and you stop doing that’ reflect his own appraisal of Hanoiʼs position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by North Vietnamese?” 3. DʼOrlandiʼs reply: This question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities. Lewandowskiʼs views reflect Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only two North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. DʼOrlandi believes you know more than we do about that. 4. Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldbergʼs September 22nd bombing-infiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoiʼs apparent determination to avoid actions which would be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure? 5. Answer: DʼOrlandi says: I donʼt think he would answer that question. It would be going back on what he has said he refused to do. He wants an overall agreement—not a truce which would allow conversations. He wants a “package deal” which covers everything and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is “final.” 6. When I asked DʼOrlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: After one or two years, elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese government which would abide by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave “eventually” (this word was stressed); a coalition government (which he said was not a “must”) which would contain representatives of so-called “extremists” having nominal ministries. By “extremists” he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the other. DʼOrlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the question “What will you do if the bombing stops?” But a “real package deal” would get “very serious” consideration and it would get it “immediately”. 7. This is also an answer to the last question in your paragraph 1. 3 8. As far as the question in your paragraph 2 4 is concerned I think it is answered effectively by Lewandowskiʼs intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U.S. elections. Lewandowski says he “attaches special importance” to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our national politics, he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will “clear the air, whatever the results may be.” It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed and he will know that the United States “can deal if it wants to.” 9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks are very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them. End comment. 10. DʼOrlandiʼs illness has been diagnosed as a type of slow moving leukemia. He is very pleased with the care he is getting here from Dr. Richard Cohen, Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, who has had tests made, the results of which DʼOrlandi can take with him to Rome. Would you tell Dr. Shirley Fisk, the special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for medical matters, about DʼOrlandi so that he will have it in mind should there ever be an opportunity for a doctor who is a specialist in such diseases to come to Saigon and then take a look at him? Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Priority; Nodis/Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 5:59 a.m. 2 In telegram 66655, October 14, the Department of State posed four questions that Lodge should put to DʼOrlandi and that are answered in this telegram. (Ibid.) 3 The last question in paragraph 1 was: “Are there in Lewandowskiʼs view other elements which might be included in formula which would cause Hanoi to give it serious consideration?” 4 The question in paragraph 2 was: “Did Lewandowski have a particular reason to attach importance to the November 15 date, after which, according to him, there would be ‘much to do.’” 274. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 274. Telegram From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) 1 Washington, October 17, 1966, 2139Z. JCS 6339–66. 1. Reflecting on our telecon on Saturday afternoon, 2 I have come to the conclusion that I can and should give you a better grasp of the situation here as regards pacification. The discussion of the inadequacy of the pacification program took place in the smaller meeting which preceded the National Security Council meeting to which I referred in my message Saturday afternoon. 3 Those present were the President, the Vice President, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance and me. It came out clearly that the President views pacification as critical to the success of our effort in South Vietnam; that he is dissatisfied with the present direction and execution of the program; but that he is unwilling to override the strong objections of Secretary Rusk (in consonance with those of Ambassador Lodge) to transferring the control of the program from civilian to military hands. However, he stated flatly that he wanted action soonest. “Soonest” was established as a period of ninety days within which to produce, the implication being that he would entertain a transfer of responsibility at the expiration of that time if the pacification situation remains unsatisfactory. As I mentioned to you on the telephone, he directed Cy Vance to draft for him a memorandum which would establish this deadline. 2. During the NSC meeting pacification was referred to in more muted and general terms. However, the need for speedy strengthening of the civilian side of the program was made amply clear to all concerned. 3. Now as to the matter of personalities, my thinking along these lines is influenced by several factors: A. The heightened Presidential interest in and dissatisfaction with our pacification efforts is going to increase the boiler pressure substantially with every passing day. B. You and Heintges are both extremely busy and, in my judgment, can devote only a fraction of your time to pacification activities. Someone on your staff should devote full time his attention to pacification in its many ramifications. C. Fred Weyand would no doubt make an admirable choice for this job. D. Bruce Palmer would be equally good, I think, once he got his feet wet. E. No one here is optimistic that a civilian-type operation can be gummed together to perform the pacification function effectively except at the cost of considerable delay. Many of us, and I am one, doubt that an effective civilian-type organization can be put together at all. Therefore, your effort should be designed, first, to plug in a pacification channel between the Embassy and your headquarters; and, second, to permit a transfer of authority and direction of the whole operation to you at some future time. If the above factors are valid, I come down on the side of establishing in your headquarters now a deputy charged with pacification; of course, his title is immaterial, it is the functions performed that are important. Apropos of this, I have learned that Porter may be furnished an officer, in civilian clothes, to assist him. Rest assured there is no intent to take any of your forces from you. 4. New subject. As I mentioned in my message of Saturday, the President is receptive to striking a few targets of greater worth in North Vietnam despite advice he has had from some quarters to forego expanding the target system or increasing the weight of effort in the North. Specifically, he told me on Saturday that he was opposed to reducing the sanctuary areas around Hanoi and Haipong. As we know, there are many targets in these two areas which should be struck; a fine example is the motor repair facility, a picture of which your J–2 showed us during our meetings in your headquarters. I surmise that this subject may be discussed with you during the Manila Conference. I suggest that you be prepared to discuss the air campaign against North Vietnam in a broad way. I think you agree that the air campaign against North Vietnam is an integral and indispensable part of our overall military effort in Southeast Asia. Since we are committed to a program of increasing pressures, we should continue to increase pressures rather than staying on a level of decreasing effort.In this regard, I think it would be good for you to mention also the need to apply Naval pressures against ground LOCʼs and other high-value coastal targets in North Vietnam such as radar and air defense sites. 5. Mr. McNamara informed me one hour ago he finally got the President to agree that he will not attend Manila Conference. Neither will I. Best regards to you both. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 2 October 16. No record of the telecon has been found. 3 In JCS telegram 6313–66, October 16, Wheeler reported that at the “smaller” meeting “the President was quite receptive to certain proposals I presented regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Specifically, he indicated his readiness to take out the steel plant, the cement plant and certain thermal power plants. Without indicating which portions he disliked, he said that certain of the items gave him great difficulties. I consider that we will get favorable action from him on his return from the Manila Conference.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) 275. Memorandum of Conversation 275. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:30–7:30 p.m. SUBJECT Possible Conditions of a Cessation of Bombing PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Assistant Secretary Bundy Ambassador Dean of the United Kingdom Sir Michael Stewart, Minister, UK Embassy Dean said that he had come to talk about the conditions under which we might be prepared to cease bombing, for the guidance of George Brown in future contacts with Gromyko, specifically if and when Brown went to Moscow in response to Gromykoʼs recent invitation to him. The Secretary said that the first question was where we wanted to come out. In general, we looked to a solution under which all North Vietnamese elements were withdrawn, there was a return to full observance of the general principles of the 1954 Geneva Accords and of the 1962 Geneva Accords in toto, and South Vietnam was thus left free to determine its own future. The Secretary said that this was the eventual objective. However, the question of bombing could be separated from it. It seemed to him unlikely that all the elements of an eventual solution could be embraced in a written and negotiated agreement; some of the elements would come into place on a de facto basis and through a withering away of activity. In any event, the question of de-escalation was important and interesting, in itself. The Secretary therefore said that, in connection with the bombing, he was not inclined to spell out the details of a final settlement. The point was to get a significant process of de-escalation started. It would be difficult to get around a conference table while military operations were going full blast. But the way might be prepared by “sufficient identifiable concrete military action to indicate that a process of de-escalation was under way,” The Secretary then said that if we did stop bombing in response to such action, it must always be recalled that we could not “write in blood” that we would not resume. There was a possible snag here in that the Communists wanted a cessation accompanied by a guarantee that the bombing would not be resumed. Hence, serious difficulty could arise if the other side carried on everything else, so that we felt we had to resume. Therefore, the Secretary said, we must know what would happen if we stopped bombing. Gromyko had said that things would be different. We needed to know in what way and how. At the same time, we recognized that the action on the other side might be hard to smell out and that we might have to probe for a time to see what the true basis was and would be. In sum, the Secretary said that we must have “some indication” that something concrete would happen on the military side. At the same time, if this something did not extend into significant de-escalation, we would have to resume. Thus, Mr. Brown should explore with the Russians to see what more the Soviets could say about what would be different. The Secretary noted that the bombing constituted in our judgment a major incentive to Hanoi to stop the war. It was a military plus, but it also played a key political role, for without it Hanoi could simply watch events in the South and play them as it chose without any elements of pain to itself. The Secretary said that Gromyko had indeed gone a little further than any past Soviet statement, by saying that things “would be different.” He then remarked that Foreign Minister Peter of Hungary had told him that it was his impression that Hanoi would accept a solution based on the 17th parallel. When the Secretary had pressed him whether he in fact had this from Hanoi, Peter had responded that he had good information and that he was making the statement soberly on the basis of official responsibility. If Peter had any grounds for such a belief, Gromyko must be aware of them, and therefore may go further and give us something more on which to build. Dean then said that various forms of concrete actions had been mentioned in discussions with other Americans, specifically reduced military activity in the South, or a cessation of infiltration. It had apparently been made clear in connection with these conversations that the US could not accept a mere cessation of infiltration through the DMZ, but a combined cessation of DMZ infiltration and acceptance of ICC policing of the DMZ had been mentioned as an acceptable concrete action. The Secretary responded that the last could not be a final answer, but must be part of a process of significant de-escalation. The Secretary then returned to the suggestion that Brown could ask the Russians: “What more can you say?” and start the process of probing moving. The Secretary said that he wanted to make clear that he was not concealing from the British any piece of paper on the precise conditions we could accept for stopping the bombing. The subject had been discussed at great length between the President, Secretary McNamara, and himself. The fact was that there were too many variables and a wide range of possibilities that defied precise delineation. Among the variables he specifically mentioned the political confusion in Communist China and its possible effect on what would be acceptable. Dean chimed in that Hanoiʼs view of the American elections and the Manila Conference might also affect the timing question. He said that Gromyko had spoken to Brown in terms of a possible January visit by Brown. He asked, in effect, whether we thought this timing made sense. The Secretary did not respond directly on this question, and it was left open. The Secretary then returned to what Gromyko had said, and attached particular significance to Gromykoʼs response to the question of which Eastern European country had the most effective influence and role with Hanoi. Gromyko had responded flatly: “Moscow.” The Secretary then summarized what he had been saying along the following lines: a. The issues of a final settlement and de-escalation could be separated. b. The Communist side said it regarded the suspension as an ultimatum, and was therefore talking about a cessation. In that event, you must elevate the price, and this could be summed up as actions amounting to “the serious beginning of a process of de-escalation.” Sir Michael Stewart asked what we would think of any proposal to suspend the bombing and see what would happen. The Secretary responded that the Communist side appeared clearly to regard a suspension as an ultimatum. If the suspension went along without reciprocal action, a very dangerous situation would be created. Therefore, there must be “some substantial information” because what we had to consider in effect amounted to a cessation even if we stopped the bombing without saying we were doing so finally, as a cessation, at the outset. The Secretary then went back to the main threat, saying that his remarks should give George Brown enough to start discussions with Gromyko. If Gromyko produced any response, then we could consult urgently about how to move toward a deal. Dean returned to the question of concrete actions that we might regard as adequate. He asked in what areas to look. The Secretary responded that the actions we could consider should be “something highly relevant to continued infiltration.” Dean said this was most helpful. In explaining his definition, the Secretary said that any action meeting this criterion would surely have a significant effect on the other sideʼs morale, which would make it thus a serious matter for them to undertake. Finally, the Secretary noted that Ambassador Thompson had that day seen Dobrynin to ask him specifically about Gromykoʼs remark that “things would be different.” Thompson had asked whether Dobrynin had anything to add, and the response had been negative. Thompson had also alluded to the remarks by the President and Brezhnev, in order to counter any negative implications the Soviet side might have drawn from the Presidentʼs press conference remarks. Comment: It seemed to Mr. Bundy likely that the conclusions Dean would have drawn from their conversation, and reported to Brown, would be roughly as follows: a. As to the degree of likelihood of responsive action by Hanoi, that we must have “some substantial information” that such action would take place. b. As to the nature of responsive action by Hanoi we would regard as satisfactory, that we would be looking for actions that would be concrete and in the military sphere, and that we would require actions indicating that a significant process of de-escalation was being started. The best area to look was in the sphere of actions “highly relevant to continued infiltration.” c. That in the nature of the problem the US could not be more precise than this as to what it would accept in return for a cessation of bombing, and that it would be highly useful in any event if Brown were able to obtain from the Russians any indications that went beyond the general statement that “things would be different.” Such an indication could open the way to further discussions that would bring about an understanding on which a cessation of bombing could be based. d. That the Secretary was not suggesting at this point any acceleration of the contemplated January date for Brownʼs discussions in Moscow. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy and approved in S on October 19. The meeting was held in Ruskʼs office. In a letter to Bruce, October 18, Bundy explained that the meeting flowed from a “rather painful dinner party” on October 15 at which George Brown pressed Bundy and McNamara relentlessly for the “minimum terms” on which the United States would stop the bombing and claimed that what they told him “did not square with what he had been told by the President.” (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) 276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, October 19, 1966, 1230Z. 8835. Ref: Saigon 7630. 2 Subject: GVN national reconciliation program. 1. Thieu and Ky informed me today that they are prepared to go ahead with national reconciliation program as discussed at our October 3 meeting. 3 They will make a general reference to the program at Manila and will follow up with a proclamation on November 1. 2. They are in agreement with us on need to expand Chieu Hoi program and to make a concerted effort to win over VC cadre at all levels. General Tri, Minister of Information and Chieu Hoi, is now actively engaged in working out program and will be coordinating closely with US agencies. 4 3. Thieu reiterated GVN view that they cannot deal with VC as a political entity, but only as an internal security problem involving individuals or groups who will be given opportunity to return to the fold. In regard to the amnesty, he said, the VC will comprise two groups: those who may wish to return to NVN, and those who may wish to stay. The latter will be handled through national reconciliation program. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 2 Document 258 . 3 See Document 258 . 4 Lodge outlined his view of the components of such a program in telegram 8958, October 20. Kissinger outlined a program of national reconciliation in a 9-page paper prepared with Daniel Davidson of FE and forwarded to Lodge on October 19. Frank Sieverts of S/S forwarded a copy to Katzenbach on November 1 under cover of a memorandum stating that it was the “key memorandum” for a proposal for national reconciliation on which William Bundy and Harriman were working. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, October 19, 1966, 8 p.m. 69371. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from Rusk and McNamara. We are gravely concerned about continuing uncertainty over Cabinet situation and impressions of political disarray in Saigon on eve Manila Conference. 2 It is obvious that if general impression is created that there is nothing in Saigon to support, main purposes of Manila Conference will be frustrated and allied efforts will look ridiculous. We appreciate your own personal efforts but it does not seem to us that it is enough that certain patchwork be accomplished to paper over a major political crisis for duration Manila Conference since everyone knows that the crisis exists and that no answer has been found. From point of view of American and international opinion, situation is very close to that of worst days of Tri Quangʼs efforts and we can expect strong revulsion against South Vietnamese who play games while Americans are getting killed to carry the brunt of the battle. We believe that we should weigh in strongly with all parties concerned, but especially with Ky, Thieu and the seven dissident Cabinet members. The seven Cabinet members should be shamed or shocked into full realization that American people will find intolerable moves which destroy sense of South Vietnamese unity at a time when Constituent Assembly is meeting to bring about the very kind of political order they seem to want. If they have legitimate grievances about personal harassment or intimidation, you can assure them that we are much interested in that kind of point and will do what we can to bring about corrections. Believe you should discuss with Ky and Finance Minister Thanh whether they really want to engage in gross discourtesy to the President of the United States by Thanhʼs failure to appear at Manila Conference just after the President has himself received Thanh and when the President is traveling half way around the world to support the freedom and safety of South Viet-Nam. The object would be, in consultation with Ky, to bring about the withdrawal of the resignations of the civilian Ministers immediately. This may have to be accompanied by a hair shirt talk with Loan about some of his Gestapo tactics. This is a matter of such importance that a maximum effort should be made even if it means some delay in your own arrival at Manila. The object is to produce an international impression of solidarity in Saigon but this cannot be done unless there is in fact some resolution of the problem behind the scenes. Believe you should see Ky before his press conference to alert him fully to the grave dangers we see in this situation to insure that he not make matters worse by any ill-considered statements and that he knuckle down to a solution of the problem. At press conference he perhaps ought to say a police state will not be tolerated in South Viet-Nam. The American people are prepared to do what has to be done against the application of force by North Viet-Nam and their Communist allies but the South Vietnamese have the job of convincing the American people that the South Vietnamese themselves are interested in the result and are prepared to work together to achieve it. 3 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by McNamara, Katzenbach, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington, eyes only for the President through Rostow. The President left Washington October 17 for an extended trip through Asia. He visited New Zealand October 19–20; Australia October 20–23; the Philippines October 24–26, where he attended the Manila Conference (see Document 281 ); Cam Ranh Bay October 26 where he visited U.S. military personnel; Thailand October 27–30; Malaysia October 30–31; and Korea October 31–November 2. He returned to Washington November 2. 2 In his discussion of the Cabinet crisis in telegram 8838 from Saigon, received at 10:35 a.m. on October 19, Lodge indicated that even dissident Ministers were insisting on resigning. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 3 In telegram 8966 from Saigon, October 20, Lodge reported on his “lengthy conversation” with Ky pursuant to this telegram. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S) 278. Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 278. Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms 1 Washington, October 20, 1966. SUBJECT Implications of the Current Cabinet Crisis in South Vietnam 1. Situation . The current cabinet crisis derives from an unfortunate meshing of two of the major divisive factors which have long complicated political life in South Vietnam—regional rivalries and the issue of civilian versus military control. 2 It does not represent a new development, but merely the first significant manifestation of these fundamental maladies since the September elections. It will not be the last. 2. The seven cabinet ministers (out of 29) who have proffered their resignations are all of Southern (Cochinchinese) origin and are civilians. 3 They share the general Southern antipathy toward the Northern “carpet-baggers” who dominate the Ky government and the military establishment. They also suspect that the military leadership will not fulfill its pledge for a transition to a civilian government. The visits of various GVN leaders (in particular those of Police Director, General Nguyen Ngoc Loan) to military-dominated South Korea adds fuel to Southern suspicions. With this backdrop of traditional mistrust, the heavy-handed action by Loan, a Northerner, in arresting an acting cabinet minister provided a rallying-point for the Southern ministers. They began to pressure Ky and to charge that Loan was attempting to create a “police state.” Moreover, the imminence of the Manila Conference gave them an advantageous moment to bring pressure on Ky. The ministers assumed that Ky would be eager to avoid any political crisis before the Conference, in particular one involving the issue of civilian-military relations which the US considers crucial to the “other war” in Vietnam. 3. It is also likely that General Dang Van Quang (IV Corps Commander) and perhaps General Nguyen Huu Co (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of War) are involved behind the scenes in the challenge to Kyʼs regime. Both men are Southerners. More important, they have strong personal reasons to oppose Ky: both men are prime candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption. 4. In any event, Ky, a Northerner (Tonkinese) and a military man, is almost certainly the ultimate target of the Southerners although the ministers have scrupulously avoided attacking Ky personally. Instead they have aimed their attack at those close to Ky, particularly Loan, head of the two principal security organizations; but also at General Le Nguyen Khang, III Corps and Marine Commander; Bui Diem, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Dinh Trinh Chinh, Secretary of State to the Prime Minister. These men are all Northerners. Because they command the security forces in the Saigon area, Loan and Khang provide much of the physical protection for the Ky regime. Should Ky be obliged to remove these men, his power base and prestige would be seriously weakened. 5. The crisis has already done some damage to Kyʼs image. Regardless of the immediate outcome of the crisis, Ky will go to Manila with his domestic house in a state of some public disarray. There has already been adverse foreign publicity on this score, and the heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila will engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has helped dim the glow left by the successful September election. It also has publicly raised the issue of civilian-military conflict. This will have reverberations in the Constituent Assembly where there is a sizeable and vocal bloc of Southern delegates, the most notable and most vocal being Tran Van Van, who may be working covertly with the dissidents. 6. Implications . The crisis can almost certainly not be resolved before the Manila Conference, and the best that can be looked for is its deferral until after the Manila Conference. Such a deferral would put the best face on an embarrassing problem at Manila and might allow things to simmer down in Saigon. On previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning compromises which have at least temporarily tended to placate the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this time, or if Ky is compelled to meet the problem head on, he has two alternatives: 1) to accept the cabinet resignations, or 2) to sack or substantially curb Loan. 7. If Ky does accept the resignations, it would be a blow to civilian-military relations and would further exacerbate regional rivalries. There would be a chorus of unfavorable publicity in the foreign press. To lessen the impact of such a move, Ky would probably try to replace the ministers with other Southerners. He could probably do so, and this would help. Nevertheless, there would be a new round of anti-GVN statements, charges of “military dictatorship”, and the like. Some of the firebrand Southerners in the Assembly might resign in protest. In these circumstances, there might be some street demonstrations and the militant Buddhists might strike up a temporary alliance with some Catholic Southern elements. 8. A move by Ky to drop Loan could cause more immediate and serious problems. Ky realizes this and has said that he will not fire Loan, though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this is probably not irreversible. As director of the two major security organizations, Loan is a power in his own right. Moreover, he is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young, hard-line officers collectively called the “Baby Turks.” Loanʼs removal would raise the spectre of renewed military factionalism which has not seriously plagued the GVN since the removal of General Thi last spring. Moreover, Ky has confidence in Loan, who played a major role in upholding the GVN in its recent victory over the militant Buddhists. In considering a move against Loan, Ky would be aware that this would only temporarily appease the opposition elements and only whet the Southernersʼ appetite for more concessions. Loanʼs removal under pressure would weaken Ky in the eyes of all concerned. 9. On the whole, the best thing that could happen would be that the crisis not come to a final head before Manila and that after Manila it can be settled by a compromise or at least by a not overly disruptive showdown. The worst that could happen would be a shattering of the unity among the military. At present and for a long time to come, military support, and probably predominance as well, is essential for any regime in South Vietnam. For the Board of National Estimates: Sherman Kent 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 350.09 Vietnam. Secret. In his October 20 covering memorandum to Helms, Kent stated that “on the whole, we think the chances are better than even that the crisis will be compromised in some fashion which will limit the damage and leave Ky about where he is.” 2 A third major divisive influence is religion which is not yet openly involved in the crisis; but should the crisis drag on, religious animosities and political jockeying among the various religious groups could readily come into play. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 The exact status of these ministers is unclear. Ky has said that they have agreed to remain at their posts until after the Manila Conference (24–26 October). Nonetheless, the resignation statements have appeared in the press after the ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and the statements at least appear unequivocal. [Footnote in the source text.] 279. Memorandum of Conversation 279. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, October 22, 1966. SUBJECT Rumanian Approach on Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS H.E. Sergio Fenoaltea, Italian Ambassador The Acting Secretary 2 Robert H. Miller, Director, Viet-Nam Working Group The Acting Secretary received the Italian Ambassador at the latterʼs request on October 22. Ambassador Fenoaltea said that he had just received word from his Foreign Office that the Rumanian Ambassador in Rome had seen a senior Italian Foreign Office official on October 20. The Rumanian Ambassador stated that his government had carefully analyzed the situation in Viet-Nam and that on the basis of this analysis and various contacts which the Rumanian government had had, the Rumanian government had concluded that if the U.S. were to cease its bombing of North Viet-Nam permanently, a concrete response from North Viet-Nam would not be lacking. Ambassador Fenoaltea said that the Italians had queried the Rumanian Ambassador for clarification of the phrase “permanent cessation” on the grounds that it was difficult to imagine the U.S. taking such a step without a clear indication of what counteraction would come from the other side. According to Fenoaltea, the Rumanian had replied that the U.S. should not declare publicly a cessation of bombing for a limited time or with any conditions. The Rumanian had said that the 37-day pause last December and January had had the appearance of an ultimatum to Hanoi, and that the U.S. should now be asked to cease its bombing without any time limits or conditions. The Rumanian Ambassador repeated that his governmentʼs information had brought it to believe that if such a move were to take place, an appropriate and a positive reaction from the other side would not be lacking. The Rumanian Ambassador noted that a sentence in Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescuʼs recent speech in the UNGA 3 had apparently escaped the attention of the Western world, and that this sentence had particular significance. Ambassador Fenoaltea said that he had asked to see the Acting Secretary on Saturday 4 because he had been instructed to seek the U.S. Governmentʼs reaction to this Rumanian approach before Tuesday night, when the Rumanian Ambassador would be seeing the Italian Foreign Minister. The Acting Secretary noted that the U.S. position with respect to a cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam was most recently stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the UNGA. 5 He said that it was difficult to know who was speaking for Hanoi, if they were actually able to speak for Hanoi, and furthermore what the specific response to a cessation of bombing would be. In other words, the Acting Secretary said, we had to have a firmer and more specific idea of Hanoiʼs intentions. In response to Ambassador Fenoalteaʼs query as to whether this Rumanian approach to the Italians might possibly be the beginning of “the right channel,” the Acting Secretary expressed some skepticism. He observed that, although there is a feeling in some quarters that if the U.S. would stop bombing North Viet-Nam something would happen, this had not happened in response to the two previous bombing pauses. The Acting Secretary stressed that it was extremely important to be clear as to the specifics of any bona fide approach from the other side. He suggested that the Italian Foreign Minister press the Rumanian Ambassador hard on the details of the Rumanian approach to the Italians and to quite frankly emphasize to him that this was not a game. The Acting Secretary emphasized that the U.S. Government could not just turn the bombing of North Viet-Nam on and off lightly and that we really had to know whether the Rumanian approach was serious. We had to know, in specific terms, publicly or privately, what response would be forthcoming to a cessation of bombing. The Acting Secretary said that, on the basis of what we knew of the Rumanian Ambassadorʼs approach in Rome, he was not disposed to take it too seriously, but that of course we would be interested in any indication of serious intent. Ambassador Fenoaltea referred to press reports that Philippine President Marcos was proposing a bombing pause in connection with the Manila Conference. The Acting Secretary noted that, in our view, there was no relation between the question of a pause and the Manila Conference, and that our position was as stated by Ambassador Goldberg . Ambassador Fenoaltea asked whether he could report that the U.S. Government was not interested in a suspension of bombing as a good will gesture. The Acting Secretary replied affirmatively and added that the U.S. Government needed to have, publicly or privately, a concrete indication of what response a cessation of bombing would bring. The Acting Secretary expressed appreciation for the information conveyed by Ambassador Fenoaltea and emphasized that the U.S. Government would be most interested in any indication of Hanoiʼs serious intent to resolve the Viet-Nam conflict. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Miller and approved in U on November 7. 2 Katzenbach. 3 Not found. 4 October 22. 5 See Document 244 . 280. Notes of Meeting 280. Notes of Meeting 1 Manila, October 23, 1966, 9:15–10:15 p.m. Meeting of the President with Thieu and Ky (Republic of Vietnam) MEMBERS OF PARTY Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu; Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky; Dep. Prime Minister Co; Foreign Minister Tran Van Do; Secy of State for Foreign Affairs, Bui Diem; Amb. Lam—GVN Amb. to the Philippines The meeting opened with Thieu asking if the President were tired. The President replied that he missed his naps, but was feeling fine. He added, “I donʼt have as many or as burdensome problems as some of my colleagues.” He then went on to congratulate Ky and Thieu on the success of the election. He said that when Ky had come out in public with a prediction of 60–70% of the registered voters voting—and he thought of our 40%—his thought was, “What the hell are we both going to do when we only fetch up with 25%?” Ky replied that Ho thought the same, and thatʼs why he is still fighting. (This thought still remains somewhat obscure to me. WWR) The President reported that an Australian politician dealing with Labor Party attacks on Holtʼs phrase, “All the way with LBJ” came up with the slogan, “Better all the way with LBJ than half a win with Ho Chi Minh.” The President then asked General Westmoreland how the Australians were doing in combat. He reported they were fine: two strong battalions, two batteries, one manned by the New Zealanders. They were excellent troops. The President then resumed by saying that Honolulu was a much better conference than we were given credit for. It was a big blow to Hanoi. The press systematically misinterpreted it. “Both of us,” the President said to Ky, “must be careful not to let the press bait us.” The President said our task at this conference was to make it clear that it was not just the “imperialist” Johnson and Generals Thieu and Ky who were running this war, but seven nations were engaged because it was in their interest. We must indicate that we are ready to negotiate on the basis of reason, but we must give no grounds in Hanoi for illusion that weʼre going to give up, or that they can win the job in Washington as they once won it in Paris. The people of the world should get a picture of reasonable people ready to take steps towards peace when the other side is reasonable. The President then told Ky that he had an enormous opportunity in his speech the next day. 2 “The whole world will listen to your words. It will be much more effective than if you gave the speech in Saigon where it might get lost, the way some of my speeches in Australia were lost.” The Presidentʼs advice was this: lean as far away as you can from the “imperialist” Johnson, from the hard-liner Rusk, and that fellow with stars on his shoulders, Westmoreland. You just hold the Bible in your hand tomorrow. You be a man of good will; love your neighbor; but indicate, of course, that you will not take steps which tie your hands behind your back when they are still shooting. The President then went on to say that many in the West were prejudiced towards Asia because of ancestry, distance, and color. He told the story of his own position vis-à-vis Hawaii, and how he brought about the entrance of Hawaii as a state, pushing the U.S. 2500 miles out into the Pacific. This was one of the major sources of pride as he looked back over his career—to have overcome within the Congress and among the people of his region the color prejudice which had kept Hawaii out of the Union. Now he wanted to push the interest of the U.S. firmly out into Asia, not 2500 but 10,000 miles. One doesnʼt enter public service to make money. If one is interested in money one goes into a big corporation. In public service the only satisfaction is what you can do for human beings. It is in Asia that the bodies are—2/3 of humanity. It is there that people die under 40; where illiteracy is high and income is low. One of the purposes of his trip is to turn the spotlight of the world on this area. It is here where the problems of tomorrow must be faced. The President is prepared to do this, he said, because he sees the emergence of new leaders, new voices, new institutions, like the Asian Development Bank. With respect to the conference, the President doesnʼt think we should produce new battle plans. They should come from the soldiers. And he quoted Sam Rayburnʼs remark when the President once criticized Eisenhower: “If he doesnʼt know more about military matters than you and me, weʼve wasted a hell of a lot of money on West Point.” Nor can we expect peace as a result of the conference. The critically important negotiations are not here. What we can expect is a demonstration that we are united (and we must not let the newspapers pull us apart). We are there to stay as long as it is necessary. We are there in a group. We are willing to reason; we are willing to forgive and to forget; we are willing to live and let live; but we are not going to tie our hands behind our back and let them shoot at us. The President then told Ky and Thieu of his reaction to the demonstrators in New Zealand and Australia; they should talk to Ho, not to Johnson. Theyʼve already sold Johnson on peace. Again the President underlined the importance to Ky and Vietnam of his speech so he could do himself, his cause, and all of us a great deal of good the next day. He advised Ky to go into the causes of war—Asian poverty—and to look forward beyond today to the long future of Vietnam and Asia. The President said that every day he listens for a few hours to television. What makes news is what goes wrong—for example, if some of Westyʼs forces hit our men or friendly Vietnamese by accident. Here all they can report is what you say. Ky should try to reflect the new emerging Asia, young and fresh with great opportunities as well as great problems, beginning to build institutions like the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong Committee, etc. The President then turned to inflation. Ky replied that they had taken quite effective measures, but the problem was still there. This time they hoped to institute measures in anticipation of the inflationary pressures that might arise as the number of troops from abroad expanded. He said that they would deal with port congestion. Ky, going back to an earlier suggestion of the Presidentʼs, said he would love to talk in a speech about the future of Asia. The President advised him to put out the cold hard facts on life in Asia: the facts about health, and life expectancy, and the state of the children. The President then asked about the effectiveness of Viet Cong propaganda. Ky said that the people of Vietnam under the colonial and post-colonial governments had no reason for confidence. That is why they listened to the Viet Cong. The worst problem in Vietnam is the problem of corruption. The President then picked up this theme and asked if there were any steps we can take to find and deal with corruption before his critics got there. There were several Congressional investigations about to go forward in this matter. Ky said that this was his hardest problem. He said, for example, the port is run by his navy. The police and importers and some politicians make money. He gave orders to the police chief to clean it up. They found one case where a general was supposed to have gotten 40 tons of supplies. He informed the police that they must give him the hard evidence on this. They have not gotten back. Ky said he would struggle against these deeply ingrained forces and habits. The President then asked Ky what is in the mind of the Viet Cong—do they expect to win? (there was a thoughtful pause) Ky replied: “No. I donʼt think so. I believe they will very soon collapse—if we can get to them the facts.” He said that Westmoreland had reported to him the other day that half the prisoners captured in Operation Irving 3 still thought Diem was running the government in Saigon. We must improve our information, get to the people, give them the facts, enlarge the open arms program. Then they will come back to us. As for the port, aside from corruption, progress is being made. The problem is that commercial importers donʼt pull their cargoes out of the warehouses. They hold them awaiting higher prices. The warehouses are clogged. This slows down the unloading of ships. The shortage is warehouse space. The entrepreneurs exploit the fact that the warehouse storage rates are very low. Therefore they are issuing a decree which will specify that if importers donʼt remove their goods in a certain time, the government will pick them up. They will be moved to military warehouses and confiscated. In the interval, the storage rates will rise with the length of time that the goods are in storage. The President asked Bob Komer what he thought. He said he hoped it would be all right. But there have been lots of decrees. Westmoreland added that if it were enforced, the decree would clear the port. He believed it would be enforced. The President then asked Westmoreland for his assessment of the military situation. He said that by every index, things were improving. He cited Operation Irving as the biggest success of the war. He also cited the favorable trend of relative casualty figures, defections, weapons losses. Above all, an optimistic spirit was now unmistakable in Vietnam. The ARVN are fighting better and are more aggressive. There was improved outlook for pacification which would become the first task of the ARVN as they were retrained. Improved intelligence from the villages permitted more effective police measures. The President asked if the VC would still seek a major victory in October. Westmoreland thought they would try, but they would not succeed. Substantial forces were gathering in Cambodia, apparently aimed at the Kontum area. General Westmoreland then described operations over the past six months in the DMZ. The President asked General Westmoreland whether he had enough troops. He said he would certainly need more forces. He would like all the allies fighting in Vietnam to increase their forces at least by 35%. The President turned to Secretary Rusk and remarked that he had his work cut out for him. The President asked if there were any more troops to be generated from South Vietnam. General Westmoreland replied that he envisaged an increase of about 22,000—up 20,000—by the end of 1967, but basically South Vietnam was a country whose manpower for military purposes was being stretched to the maximum. There followed some discussion of the possibilities of individual nations generating more forces—the Philippines and Korea were referred to. General Westmoreland would like to see another Korean division, and expressed the hope that as the Philippines went into action, they would generate a national pride of the kind which took hold in Korea, with the passage of time. 4 General Westmoreland said that while there was light at the end of the tunnel, we had to be geared for the long pull. The enemy is relying on his greater staying power. It is only his will and resolve that are sustaining him now, and his faith that his will is stronger than ours. With respect to bombing, General Westmoreland regarded it as very important. We should in no case unilaterally quit bombing. Infiltration continues. The price of infiltration has definitely been raised. The President suggested that General Westmoreland talk with Secretary Rusk, and instructed Rostow to get a fuller version of General Westmorelandʼs suggestions about the future of the bombing program. 5 Returning to the conference and summing up, the President told Thieu and Ky that they should bear in mind the importance of projecting unity. Dissent is fine, and we all are for it; but there is a danger if Hanoi interprets dissent as weakness. It will prolong the war. The conference will be neither a war nor a peace conference. The central lesson will be that we are all together; that we wonʼt give up until it is over. The President asked Ky if he had anything to add. Ky said no, except the problem of infiltration. Bombing is good, but the establishment of a base camp and patrols above the 17th parallel could do more. This concept was explored at some length. The President asked how serious was the Cabinet crisis. Ky replied that it was not serious at all. These men were invited to work in the Cabinet as individuals and technicians. They are not representatives of substantial groups in the country. He can easily find replacements for them. He has spoken to each of them and explained his position. They were all present at the airport at the time of his departure. The Acting Premier is one of the dissidents. The President was grateful for this information, but noted that it was a considerable problem in the U.S., where people thought of Kyʼs government as a European Cabinet. He asked Ambassador Lodge to talk to the press and explain the distinction. The President then asked Tran Van Do if he had anything to add. He said that what Ky said was O.K. with him. He said he had already had a discussion with Secretary Rusk. The Presidentʼs last word was: Donʼt let the newspapermen divide us. WWR 6 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Asian Trip Memcons. Secret. Drafted by Rostow (identified as WWR in the notes). The meeting was held in the Manila Hotel. Rusk, Lodge, Komer, and Westmoreland attended along with the President. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) President Johnson arrived in Manila about 3 p.m. on October 23. He flew from Washington to Honolulu on October 17 and stopped at American Samoa on his way to New Zealand October 18. (Ibid.) For his itinerary during his Asian trip, see footnote 1, Document 277 . 2 The text of Kyʼs speech is in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, Presidentʼs Asian Trip, Oct.–Nov. 1966. 3 See footnote 4, Document 272 . 4 See Document 286 for Westmorelandʼs report of this discussion. 5 See the attachment to Document 282 . 6 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 281. Editorial Note 281. Editorial Note The Manila Summit Conference opened at 9:07 a.m. October 24, 1966. In attendance were President Lyndon Johnson; President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines; Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of Vietnam; President Chung Hee Park of Korea; and Prime Ministers Harold Holt of Australia, Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, and Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand. Three days earlier, on October 21, delegations from the participating nations, including Secretary of State Rusk, had met in Manila for preparatory discussions. An opening public session on October 24 was followed by a 3-hour closed session at which Vietnamʼs leaders reviewed the situation in their country and General Westmoreland made a statement. At a 2-hour closed session on the afternoon of October 24, following a working lunch, the chiefs of other governments, including President Johnson, made statements. The conference resumed at 11 a.m. on October 25 with a long executive session during which the communique was discussed and approved. A closing public session featured announcement of the three conference documents: the Declaration of Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communique, and the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pages 1259–1265. Summary and verbatim records of the public and closed sessions, except for the executive session on October 25, are in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, Presidentʼs Asian Trip, Oct.–Nov. 1966. No official record was kept of the executive session. Audiotape recordings of the public and closed sessions on October 24 are at the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts. Comprehensive documentation of the conference, including planning documents and follow-up reports on international reaction, are ibid., National Security File, NSC History of the Manila Conference; ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, boxes 2–12; Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, Presidentʼs Asian Trip, Oct.-Nov. 1966; and ibid., Central Files, POL 7/PHILIPPINES. Chester Cooper, a member of the U.S. delegation, described behind-the-scenes deliberations prior to and during the conference in The Lost Crusade , pages 310–320, including the controversy over insertion in the joint communique of wording calling for the withdrawal of U.S. and Allied troops within 6 months of North Vietnamʼs disengagement from the war. For commentary on the conference by two other members of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton and General Westmoreland, see Documents 284 and 286 . Following the Manila Conference, President Johnson visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea, returning to Washington on November 2. At the Presidentʼs request, Ambassador at Large Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State Bundy reported to foreign leaders on the results of the conference. Harriman met with Heads of State and Ministers of Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Iran, Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Morocco, in addition to Pope Paul VI. Memoranda of his conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. He discussed his trip at a meeting of the Negotiations Committee on November 10 (see Document 300 ) and submitted a report to the President on November 22 ( Document 315 ). Chester Cooper, who accompanied Ambassador Harriman, described the trip in The Lost Crusade , pages 320–324. Bundy visited Taiwan and Japan and summarized the results in a memorandum to the President, November 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15) 282. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 282. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Manila, October 24, 1966, 11:30 p.m. Mr. President: You asked me to go into more detail on General Westmorelandʼs views on bombing strategy. I thought the simplest way to proceed was to get him to put on paper his assessment of the value of bombing the North and what targets we ought to consider in the weeks and months ahead. In para. 6 he lists seven further target systems. I believe you will wish to read this line by line. It is the sober assessment of the responsible commander on the spot. I would not agree with all of his seven suggestions; but I am convinced: —bombing the North is a greater asset than our intelligence people recognize; —we should consider, if they persist in the war, having some further target systems, but our first duty is to mop up more oil because there is now evidence that they are hurting; and —I agree with his observation in para. 7 that we should, in any circumstances, “avoid any restriction on strikes in the extended battle area.” W.W.R. 2 Attachment Manila, October 24, 1966. Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) SUBJECT COMUSMACVʼs Comments on Rolling Thunder 3 1. The Rolling Thunder program (the bombing of North Vietnam) was designed to disrupt the movement of men and materiel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and to influence the will of the leadership in Hanoi against further prosecution of the war. 2. Although the program has not stopped the flow of men and materiel to South Vietnam, it has had significant impact on the war effort by the communists. The enemy has been required to divert to his air defenses substantial quantities of his manpower and skills that are in short supply. Also, quantities of labor and materials have been diverted through necessity to the maintenance of his lines of communication. Prisoners testify to the debilitating effect of the long march south caused by circuitous routes and inability to move personnel by vehicle. In addition, the amount of materiel and munitions that has been destroyed, as evidenced by pilot reports, has been significant. In my opinion, one of the main reasons for the lack of success thus far of the enemyʼs massive effort across the Demilitarized Zone was the disruption by the intensified air interdiction program north of the DMZ and along his major arteries of communication. 3. To stop the bombing campaign to the North would adversely affect the war in the South in serious degree. The enemy would be able with impunity to move his men, materiel and supplies to the South. He would no doubt move numbers of anti-aircraft weapons and surface-to-air missiles south toward the Demilitarized Zone and along his routes of communication leading into Laos. Furthermore, he would probably prepare jet airfields further south to give himself an offensive air capability. The adverse psychological effect that the cessation of bombing would have on the Vietnamese and allied forces fighting in Vietnam would be of significance. Our troops would be placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the enemy, since the enemy would no doubt continue his shelling of airfields, his sabotage of lines of communication, his ambushes, and his terrorism. 4. Thus far our air campaign to the North has been characterized by creeping escalation. This strategy has not influenced the will of Hanoi. The strategy has used air power inefficiently and expensively, and has achieved results far short of potential. In addition, a considerable and growing risk factor has been injected into the situation. The enemy now has a comprehensive air defense system under centralized control with a three-fold effectiveness. First, it involves a great number of automatic weapons and anti-aircraft units for use against low flying aircraft. Second, there are surface-to-air missiles for use at medium altitudes. While their kill ratio has been less than the enemy would have hoped, the threat of these missiles drives our aircraft to the lower altitudes where they encounter heavy automatic weapons fire. Third, there is a growing MIG capability at the higher altitudes. Besides the actual effect of these weapons, they have caused a degradation of accuracy in our bombing. In some cases, the threat of MIG attack has forced our planes to jettison their loads prior to reaching their targets in order to maneuver. This very hostile environment will result in mounting casualties as the war goes on—perhaps more than we will be willing or even able to sustain, given the present limitation on targets. 5. The time for a change in strategy is at hand. Two courses of action appear open to us. The first involves giving consideration to moving to shock action by striking over a short period lucrative targets that will hurt the enemy and convince him that our power does not have to be restrained. The second course of action would involve elimination of these same targets on a well programmed but graduated campaign, as opposed to shock action, and would be followed by a level of operations we can sustain. In any case, even with the elimination of any initial group of lucrative targets, it is doubtful whether the required effort can be supported without greater flexibility in target selection. Following either of these two courses, we should maintain a given level of air effort against North Vietnam on a sustained basis, but with sufficient target flexibility that will serve to bring maximum pressure to bear on the war economy of North Vietnam with minimum risk to our planes. 6. Specifically, the following targets are recommended in the general priority listed: a. Large motor maintenance facilities which support his transportation system regardless of their location. There is a particularly lucrative installation inside the Hanoi ring. b. The SA-2 missile assembly area, also inside the Hanoi ring. c. The Haiphong port with emphasis on the dock area. It is believed that this target could be destroyed without jeopardizing foreign bottoms in major degree. d. The complex of thermal power plants which numbers approximately twelve installations. These are known, are vulnerable, and could be struck without unacceptable risk. e. The steel plant which reportedly manufactures POL drums and has a direct role in supporting the war. f. The MIG air bases, to include supporting facilities and fighter aircraft. This could be done in retaliation for attacks on our airfields in South Vietnam which has been and will continue to be a recurring action by the enemy. 7. If the situation dictates that there be some cessation of the bombing campaign, the above targets should be hit before any consideration is given to such action. Furthermore, any change in the bombing program should avoid any restriction on strikes in the extended battle area, that area of North Vietnam from Quang Tri Province north to Vinh. In consideration of his responsibility in fighting the ground war, the field commander on the ground should be permitted to bring military power to bear on the enemy along those lines of communication leading directly to the battlefield. W. C. Westmoreland 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. 2 Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. 3 In a telegram to Rostow in Manila, CAP 66803, October 25, Bromley Smith transmitted a message from Wheeler stating that he had read Westmorelandʼs comments, concurred heartily, and urged from a military point of view the earliest approval of his recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 283. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 283. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Honolulu, October 26, 1966, 1920Z. 91125. Air campaign against North Vietnam (U). 1. The air campaign directed against North Vietnam is an essential element of our strategy for achieving U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this message is to establish clearly the critical importance of these operations to our military efforts in South Vietnam and to identify the grave risks involved should these operations either be suspended or their scope significantly reduced before NVN actually ceases infiltration of men and material into SVN and the DMZ. 2. Self-imposed controls on the use of air power against NVN have had an adverse impact upon the effectiveness of air power in reducing the capability of NVN to direct and support the insurgency in SVN. These operations, nevertheless, have had a significant impact upon the military capabilities of the North Vietnamese Army and the VC. Indeed, the amount of disruption and enemy material destroyed has been of such magnitude as to represent the probable balance of power which to date has denied the enemy a capability for seizing significant portions of I and II Corps. The enemy has been unable to move concentrations of requisite military force to SVN to accomplish such a task without incurring unacceptable losses from air attack. The tactics of the enemy, the nature of the terrain in SVN and the concealment which it affords all dictate that we must not withhold our airpower until he closes with us in close ground combat. We must begin disruption, harassment and attrition of enemy forces as far back as we can find and attack them, thus degrading his capability qualitatively and quantitatively before he reaches the battlefield. Otherwise, his full capability must be met on the battlefield in a mode of combat which is certain to increase our casualties by appreciable and unnecessary numbers. 3. The risks described above are of immediate and pressing concern in connection with NVA concentrations now known to be in and near the DMZ. This is an area where the enemy is adept at moving and concealing large forces, and from which he can attack with little warning. The military security of our numerically smaller forces in this area depends in great measure on the ability of our air power to deny the enemy freedom to move and concentrate in positions from which he can attack with great advantage. A stand-down of air operations against enemy forces in or within supporting distance of the DMZ for even the shortest period of time would create the gravest of risks to the security of friendly forces in the area. The enemy would be accorded a greater freedom of movement for his men and supplies. We cannot afford to risk creation of a sanctuary of this nature close to our own forces. 4. Our air campaign in the North is a major military activity wherein we have the initiative and control over the intensity of combat. In SVN, the enemy can engage or disengage on the ground almost at will, thus in a sense pacing the ground war to his advantage. Such is not the case in the air over his homeland, where he must make a concession if he is to gain any relief from the pressures being applied against him. It must be quite apparent to him that decisions which can increase his losses at home will not be of his own making. We cannot afford to relinquish these initiatives except under conditions clearly indicative of success in our over-all objectives. 5. There are very serious military risks attached to any form of a partial stand-down, either in terms of reducing the targeting base or in restricting air operations to small geographic areas. As soon as such reductions become apparent in the past, the enemy has reacted quickly by readjusting his air defenses and our attrition has increased proportionately. It is essential that we avoid any voluntary simplification/reduction of his air defense problems. In fact it is becoming critically apparent from current attrition trends that a broader target base in NVN is urgently needed. 6. Our primary objective in the air campaign against North Vietnam is to make it as difficult and costly as possible for the NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause Hanoi to cease controlling and directing the insurgency in SVN. To achieve this objective, a steady increase in the pressure applied to the enemy is necessary to cause him to reconsider his support of the aggression. The most recent increase of pressure was applied through the systematic destruction of the NVN POL system. Inaugurated in early July, the program has resulted in the destruction, greatly reduced capacity or abandonment of all major POL targets authorized for attack. In recent weeks our pressure on the enemy has not continued to increase. In fact, it has decreased. Our air power is not being used to its maximum effectiveness. Many lucrative targets and target systems should be attacked to increase the pressure applied to the enemy. 7. This is not the time for relaxation of pressure. A broadened target base designed to lead Hanoi to expect attacks anywhere, at any time, against any type of military target or activity that supports their aims is essential. The targets and freedom of actions proposed by the JCS for Rolling Thunder 52 are a first step towards this broadened target base. Implementation of RT 52 would again increase the pressure on NVN, although not using our air power to its maximum effectiveness. It is time now to tell Hanoi that no military target, no activity that helps sustain the NVN effort to prosecute the war, is free from attack. 8. In summary, air operations in NVN have not yet reduced NVN support of the insurgency in SVN to the level desired. Hanoi has not been brought to the negotiating table. However, air operations in NVN have prevented the enemy from supporting his forces sufficiently to mount any major offensives or to seize and hold any vital areas in SVN. The NVN air campaign is the one action that brings the war home to North Vietnam. It disrupts the daily life in North Vietnam. It causes multiple and increasing management and logistic problems. It prevents the enemy from conducting an aggression from the comfort of a sanctuary. Any continued relaxation of pressure in our air campaign against North Vietnam will provide the enemy with the incentive to sustain and increase his support of the aggression in SVN. Our allies in SVN will consider the US irresolute in its determination to force the Hanoi government to stop supporting the insurgency. The communists will be encouraged to increase their disruptive efforts throughout SEAsia. Our alternative is to convince Hanoi that its best hope is the negotiating table. A broadened target base is essential to achieve this end. The JCS proposed RT 52 is the first step towards a broadened target base. It is recommended that RT 52 be implemented now, with additional broadening of the target base authorized at the earliest to clearly signal our intent to Hanoi. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. Repeated to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, and CGFMFPAC. The source text is marked with an indication that McNamara saw the telegram. 284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, October 26, 1966. SUBJECT McNaughton in Manila, October 23–25, 1966 Herein: Key items on (1) Manila Conference, (2) Westmorelandʼs thoughts, (3) Thai-related problems, and (4) more ROK troops: 1. Manila Conference . The Conference went well. I think we got what we wanted: Display of not-US-aloneness, of resolve, of beginnings of an awakening responsible Asia, and of concern for the miseries of the Asian billions. Not least, the Heads really got to know each other, we clarified some stands (for the world and for the enemy), and we tacked Saigon down to some useful propositions. (The Presidentʼs extemporaneous statement 2 was particularly moving. He was tough and determined, saying, e.g., that he did not expect success on the economic or diplomatic front until we won the military front. But he also had a lot of “peace” and “Great Society” in it.) Most important Conference specifics— — Withdrawal within six months . This sentence (in para 28 [29] of the Communique, DOC/3 attached) 3 had to be negotiated by the President himself. Iʼll tell you the tale later. — US commitments not expanded . It was a continual battle to keep language out of our own drafts either hooking us to enlarge our treaty commitments or adding preconditions to our withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. The issue arose in the first form in Part I of the Declaration (DOC/4 attached); 4 and in the second form in the Communique, paras 3, 4, 27(1), 27(5) and 28 [29]. I would not allow “end of all terror” or “peace assured” language; in all cases but one, our position is protected by words such as “externally supported” or “aggression” (which implies “from without”). My failure was partial in para 28 [29] of the Communique. It resulted from the Presidentʼs having to negotiate the language himself. The offending language involved is “and the level of violence 5 subsides.” We also succeeded in avoiding giving South Vietnam any bilateral post-war guarantees (para 27(6)) or promising to do more than to consult with our allies regarding settlement of the war (see paras 28 and 29 [and 30] of the Communique). — Message to the enemy . Among the messages to the enemy are (1) a display of resolve (statements of resolve, the fact and aura of the meeting, the attention paid to long-term concerns); (2) a reference to conversion of military installations (para 18 of Communique); (3) tabling of the six-point South Vietnamese “essential elements of peace” (para 27 of Communique); and, probably most important, (4) the public undertaking to have our forces out within six months of the time North Vietnam “turns herself off” (para 28 [29] of Communique). — Specific Vietnamese commitments . In the Communique you will find specific references to treatment of POWs (para 9); to allocation of forces to RD (para 11); to fighting corruption (para 14); to holding down inflation (para 16); to forward political steps (paras 21 and 22); to national reconciliation (paras 23 and 27(4)); to staying south of the 17th Parallel (paras 27(2) [29] and (3); and to withdrawal of US forces (paras 18, 27(5) and 28 [29]). 2. Westmorelandʼs thinking . Westy sought me out twice to give me his thinking on force levels, Rolling Thunder, the barrier and RD. His thoughts— — Force levels . He is thinking of an end-CY 67 strength of 480,000 filled out by end-CY 68 of 500,000. Barring surprises, he would plan to hold it there. He believes that this will be what the US can sustain over time without mobilization and without calling up reserves and what the Vietnamese economy can bear. (In this latter connection, he said he could not live within P42 billion; but in further conversation he said he meant that he could not “plan” on that basis—that “reasonable” (conservative?) assumptions led him to P46 billion, but that as he moved along he might end up using no more than P42 billion.) He said the 480–500,000 men would be enough even if infiltration goes on at a high level—at one point he said that “we have great mobility and fire power” and that “there is only so much geography” (but at another he said, “I canʼt say now whether I will have enough troops to take on the Delta”). He said with respect to air power that he wants more B–52 strikes, but that, when he gets the presently programmed TAC air capability, he will need no more TAC air. He wondered if he got across to you his need also for a “Corps contingency force” to back him up in case of emergency. “It could be located in Hawaii, Okinawa or CONUS, and could be part of the rotational base.” His strategy is to create and maintain “a balanced, powerful force that we can sustain indefinitely.” He believes (perhaps as a result of my, or your, suggestion) that such a posture will be of critical importance in convincing the North of our resolve. — Rolling Thunder . He says he “shudders” at the thought of our stopping bombing the North. He called RT our “only trump card—our only pressure on the North.” He said that it has slowed down the movement of supplies, has been costly to the North, and has diverted enemy manpower. He favors reducing the restrictions on the program (“more flexibility”), noting that “you are asking for a very bad political reaction.” He was referring to the large aircraft losses when our aircraft are after “low-value targets.” (He mentioned the “most hostile environment weʼve ever operated in—AAA at low level, SAM at medium level, and MIG at high level.”) His recommended targets: The missile assembly area, the motor (truck) maintenance facility, the MIG bases, the Haiphong docks, the 12 thermal power plants (“which would cripple their war-making potential”), and the steel plant (“where we think they are making POL drums”). I did not, for obvious reasons, press Westy hard on this. But I did say that whenever I write a paper in support of RT strikes I have trouble developing the reasoning clear through, connecting recommendations with payoff. I noted that CIA says that, even with enlarged strikes, the enemy could supply several times the amount of materiel required to support a much-increased level of combat in the South. I asked how, for example, hitting the power plants would end up in fact helping him in the South. He said, “Iʼm not responsible for the bombing program. Admiral Sharp is. So I havenʼt spent much time on it. But I asked a couple of my best officers to look into it, and they came up with the recommendations I gave you.” At another point he reported that the President had asked him his views in front of Ky and Thieu, and that he had given them; that Walt Rostow had asked him to put them down in a memo for the President and that he was doing that. 6 It turns out that he favors some targets because they are directly related to air defense, some because he relates them to infiltration, and all of them because of their “shock” and “bargaining” effect. He said that, in any event, we should not shut off bombing in the “extended battle area” up to Vinh. He said the North will merely use a pause to improve their air defenses and air fields (“I would”). — The barrier . Westy seems to be fighting the barrier less (although he obviously fears that it is designed mainly to justify stopping RT, at which he “shudders,” as reported above). He seemed reconciled to an air-delivered area-denial system at the west end. He did comment that you may have too much time pressure on the Starbird program—“it may cause us to make some bad mistakes.” His only specifics, though, related to the need in Vietnam to evacuate people, to condemn real estate, etc., “all of which takes time.” He mentioned, in connection with the barrier, the possibility of using a Nike battalion in a surface-to-surface all-weather function. He said the conventional warhead, if authorized, could be ready in six months, but he had not done a cost-effectiveness study of the idea. — Revolutionary development . He plans for 75% of ARVN and perhaps 25% of US to be devoted to RD. What the mix will be as between ARVN and US, he cannot now say—in some cases, US might comprise 90% of the forces, in another case it might be the other way around. He thinks the new arrangement should be in operation by July 1, 1967. [Here follows a paragraph on Thailand.] — Korean troops . Ambassador Brown advised against bumping Park now for more troops for Vietnam. So far as I know, the President did not do so. But (1) the Presidentʼs off-the-cuff remarks on Monday hit hard at the “weʼre all going to have to get in there and do more” theme. The theme was so strong that word had to go out to all hands afterward to deny that the President had put the bite on the other six for more troops. And (2) Park was the one who asked Westy in the Monday session whether more troops would be needed. Westy said yes. John T. McNaughton 7 1 Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, VNS 2, Vietnam 66–68. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Vance, Hoopes, and Steadman. 2 For Moyersʼ notes of the Presidentʼs extemporaneous statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1256–1259. 3 Attached but not printed. Paragraph 28 in the attachment was divided into two paragraphs, 28 and 29, in the final text printed ibid., pp. 1259–1265. The sentence in question appears in paragraph 29 in the printed text. 4 Not attached; printed ibid., p. 1259. 5 McNaughton added here in hand the word “thus,” which appears in the final text. 6 Attachment to Document 282 . 7 Printed from a copy that indicates McNaughton signed the original. 285. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 285. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, October 26, 1966. SUBJECT Southeast Asia Costs As you requested, we have estimated the incremental cost to the Defense Department of the Southeast Asia conflict; that is, the cost over and above the normal costs of the Defense establishment. These estimates are: $ Billion For FY 1966 9.4 For FY 1967 19.7 Annual Rate as of 30 June 1967 22.4 Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, DOD. Secret. 286. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 286. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Saigon, October 27, 1966, 1201Z. MAC 9451. Subject: Manila Conference. 1. Now that the Manila Conference is over and the President has completed his short visit to Vietnam, on which I reported separately, 2 some comment on the events of the past few days are in order. 2. On Sunday evening, 3 the President asked Ambassador Lodge, Secretary Rusk, Walt Rostow and me to a meeting which started at 2000 hours. The President spoke briefly on his view of the Conference and his hope for unity of purpose at the meeting. In anticipation that I might be asked to comment on the general situation in Vietnam, I had drafted some remarks which I left with Walt Rostow. 4 These were in extension and support of remarks to be made by Vien and Thang. The next morning the President told me that he had read my prepared remarks and fully approved them. 3. At the same Sunday evening meeting, the President also asked my ideas on the bombing of North Vietnam. He requested that I write up my views and give them immediately to Walt Rostow. 5 I did so on Monday following which I sent both of you copies TWX. 6 4. At 2115 hours on Sunday, Thieu and Ky came in and joined the meeting. 7 The President discussed with them his concept of the Conference. There was some discussion as to the need for additional forces. When asked, I replied that such an increase was definitely needed and estimated about 35 percent above end year levels. I suggested that we urge the other nations to contribute their proportional share. The President tied the proportional share to percentage of population, a line which he subsequently followed in the closed sessions of the meeting. 5. The first closed session started Monday morning, 24 October. Statements were made by Ky, Vien and Thang, following which I made my statement, 8 a copy of which has been mailed to you. (Subsequently, the President asked that I make a videotape of my remarks which was done that afternoon.) I received a question from the Prime Minister of Australia asking about the impact of large numbers of foreign troops on Vietnam. In my reply, I admitted the political, psychological and economic risks, but explained how friction was minimized by careful orientation of the troops of all nations. Violations of standards are infrequent although one occurs from time to time. The Prime Minister of New Zealand asked about enemy activity in the DMZ. I replied with a detailed explanation. The Korean President asked if more troops would be needed, to which I gave an affirmative answer. 6. Late Monday afternoon, at the request of the President, I held a back-grounder for about 30 members of the press at the Manila Hotel. Questions revolved around revolutionary development, the state of training and morale of the RVNAF and the concept of troop deployments. I made the point that the available leadership of the RVNAF was stretched to the elastic limit. For leadership, manpower and economic reasons, the strength of RVNAF would expand only marginally over what it now was. I stressed that quality must now be emphasized, mentioning the detailed and practical leadership training programs we had launched, in which the Vietnamese Government was taking renewed interest. I explained the need for education of officers and retraining of troops to shift emphasis from the needs of combat to the support of revolutionary development. To questions on the U.S. Mission organization to deal with RD, I replied with a historical account and some general philosophy rather than in practical terms to avoid speculation of friction within the U.S. Mission. 7. The session on Tuesday, 25 October, was taken up primarily in waiting for the Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of State or Heads of Government to come up with a final report and communique. This gave me a chance to conduct further conversations with various delegations. I had ample time to talk with the Australian and New Zealand delegations and I believe we may get additional troop contributions after their elections next month. (I had had time for extensive talks with the Koreans while their President was here, and believe them receptive to a further contribution.) The attitude of the Philippine leadership is unclear, although I went out of my way to praise the quality of their contribution, both to individuals and to the press. The Australian and New Zealand delegates were interested in the question of the Cambodian sanctuary. At lunch, I had a long discussion with Ambassador Harriman on the same subject and believe I was able to cast some new light on the problem as seen from Washington. 8. With respect to the six months withdrawal provision in the final communique, I was as surprised as most when this emerged in final version. 9. As I have reported, when the final session ended on Tuesday, the President held me over to talk about his trip to Vietnam. I returned here early yesterday morning to make the necessary arrangements. 10. Best regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 2 In telegram 270440Z from COMUSMACV, October 27. (Ibid.) On October 26 the President flew from Manila to Cam Ranh Bay, arriving at 4:34 p.m. He reviewed the troops, awarded service decorations, spoke to the assemblage, visited the NCO Mess Hall, met with top commanders from all over Vietnam, and departed at 6:57 p.m. for Manila. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Dairy) 3 October 23. 4 Not found. 5 Attached to Document 282 . 6 In telegram 250532Z from COMUSMACV, October 25. (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) 7 See Document 280 . 8 Text is in Department of State, S/S-International Conferences: Lot 67 D 586, Presidentʼs Asian Trip, Oct.–Nov. 1966—Documents, vol. IX. 287. Report Prepared by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff 287. Report Prepared by the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 Washington, October 1966. AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS [Here follows a 2-page Summary.] Discussion 1. The war in Southeast Asia is a single conflict against an enemy whose operations are integrated militarily, geographically and politically, and therefore cannot properly be compartmentalized in strategy or in evaluation of results. Combat operations of all types, and in all areas, contribute to the eventual achievement of US objectives in Southeast Asia. Thus, the results of the air campaign against North Vietnam and the infiltration routes through Laos, are directly and decisively related to the success or failure of US/FW/GVN operations in South Vietnam. Conversely, increasingly effective combat operations in South Vietnam have a major influence upon North Vietnamʼs capability and determination to support the insurgency. (See Appendix A). 2 2. In early 1965, when the fortunes of the GVN were at their lowest ebb, two important actions were taken by the United States which have changed the course of the war in Southeast Asia: the deployment of US combat troops; and the initiation of the air campaign against North Vietnam. These two actions were integral elements of a single strategy designed to blunt the increasingly successful communist advance in South Vietnam, and to seize the initiative from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces; eventually to cause the communists to cease their aggression in South Vietnam; and finally, to assist that country in its development as a viable, independent, non-communist nation. It was understood at the time these critical actions were taken, that US objectives would not be achieved in a short time, even under optimum military conditions, and that the force build-up, as well as the accumulation of the over-all impact of this military effort upon the enemy, would take time. It became obvious also, as indications of rapidly increasing support and participation by NVN were obtained, that the successful implementation of US objectives in SEAsia could not be achieved without continued direct pressures against NVN, unless the United States was prepared to provide a major increase in the number of US ground troops already deployed or programmed for deployment. (See Appendix B). 3. There is increasing evidence that US/FW/GVN combat units have now successfully seized the initiative in SVN. Recent past and current combat results support this loss of initiative. This has been the combined results of operations in NVN, SVN, and the Laos panhandle. Increasingly effective combat operations in SVN have aggressively searched out and attacked VC/NVA main units, destroyed their bases, constantly disrupted planned schedules, and maintained continuously increasing military pressures against them. (See Appendix C). At the same time, the air campaign in NVN and the Laos panhandle has destroyed significant amounts of materials and munitions, killed numbers of troops moving south to the combat area, and disrupted NVNʼs transportation and lines of communication supporting this logistic flow. It has required the enemy to divert substantial quantities of his manpower and skills that are in short supply, and quantities of labor and materials have been diverted because of the necessity to maintain and expand his lines of communication. The lack of success thus far in enemy attempts to mount large scale offensives has been due in large part to the disruption of his main arteries of communication. (See Appendices D and E). 4. The substantial activities in US ground, air, and naval forces in SEAsia is beginning to evidence signs of positive results. Despite major military handicaps, indications of some of the cumulative effects of US/FW/GVN combat operations are now emerging. The VC/NVA force build-up has essentially leveled off, despite major attempts to infiltrate and recruit larger numbers of military personnel; VC/NVA organized large scale military initiatives have dropped to a low level; shortages of critical military supplies and morale problems among VC/NVA units in SVN are beginning to surface; VC control of population and area in SVN is decreasing; NVN support of combat operations in SVN in terms of men and resources has been degraded; NVN has been denied a total sanctuary from which to export insurgency; the life and economy of NVN has been disrupted; morale in NVN has suffered; national aspirations are being frustrated; large portions of NVNʼs population have been displaced; NVNʼs demands upon communist nations for war-supporting equipment and materials has increased substantially, and at the same time, its ability to provide reimbursement has decreased; doubts are now emerging among NVN leaders as to their ability to succeed in SVN; major drains on manpower resources have occurred; and a massive, well-coordinated worldwide communist diplomatic and propaganda effort to pressure the United States to cease bombings, whose scope and intensity testify to the growing impact of the US combat operations, is in full operation. (See Appendix F). 5. To decrease the current level of coordinated military pressures against the enemy at the very time evidence of progress is beginning to appear, would at a minimum, prolong the war significantly, require substantial increases in US ground troops, and result in greatly increased loss of US lives. It would also provide the communists with new hope and new opportunities, postponing or completely removing the necessity for any major strategy changes on their part. It would forfeit the hard fought gains which have already been achieved at significant cost in US lives and equipment, and in the long run, could result in failure by the United States to achieve its objectives in all of SEAsia. (See Appendix G). 6. It has been recent practice to attempt to evaluate the progress of operations in SEAsia by analyzing known statistical results. The problems which are associated with this approach are numerous and serious. It tends to separate the war into separate compartments, ignoring the interrelationship of all operations in support of a single strategy. Statistics on combat results are unreliable at best, and in general, focus on small segments of the over-all operations while overlooking the major trends on which little or no data are available. In SEAsia good intelligence information on the results of combat operations, particularly relative to their overall impact upon the enemy is minimal; and yet, this is the only kind of information which really measures the true pulse of the enemy. Recognizable indications of this kind of effect may not appear for months, or perhaps years, after a military campaign has been initiated. The history of past wars has repeatedly borne this out. Thus, the current statistical analyses by which progress is judged have not touched upon such matters as the depth of erosion of communist stockpiles in NVN and SVN, or the extent and nature of major deficiencies in NVNʼs war-supporting capability. They do not indicate the extent of disruption and upheaval within NVN, nor the real state of the morale of the North Vietnamese people. These analyses have therefore not indicated the true value of the investment in aircraft, munitions, and US lives that has been made to date. 1 Source: Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (29 Oct 66). Top Secret. Prepared by J–3, Directorate for Operations. Forwarded to Wheeler by Goodpaster under cover of an October 31 memorandum, noting that the report was prepared in response to Wheelerʼs request. A copy of the report is also at the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 193, Evaluation of the Effects of the Air Campaign. In a November 7 memorandum to Goodpaster, signed by General Robert Taylor for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA commented on the report, noting that its judgments and statements “could be challenged by someone unwilling to depart from the relatively confined area of solid intelligence evidence,” but that, on the whole, DIA was “inclined to accept the J–3 report as a reasonable analysis of the situation.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3/3200 (CY 1966)) 2 Appendices A–G are attached but not printed. 288. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 288. Memorandum From Colonel Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) 1 Washington, November 2, 1966. SUBJECT Winning the War in Vietnam (U) I believe that it is possible to win the war in Vietnam within the next 12 to 24 months. By winning the war I mean the elimination of infiltration of arms and men and the reduction in in-country insurgency to proportions generally manageable by the Vietnamese but without precluding U.S. troop and material assistance. I believe this outcome is possible without greatly increasing the risks of expanded CHICOM or Soviet participation in the war. Obviously, it is in the U.S. interest to win this war as soon as possible if it does not involve great risk, because any prolongation of the war causes U.S. casualties and diverts our energies and resources from pursuing the Great Society at home and abroad. Perhaps less obvious is the fact that prolongation of this war will probably encourage the communists to resort to other low-cost (to them) wars of adventure. I believe that it is especially important for us to win the war before our political conventions in the summer of 1968. If the war is still being fought in the summer of 1968, I think that the communists would have every incentive to hang on at all costs until after the fall elections in hopes of a change in U.S. policy. I do not believe that our present strategy is likely to end the war within the next 18 to 24 months— but it might . a. The final conclusion of the CIA study The Will to Persist , 795 stated: “If on the other hand, pressures on them (the communists) are maintained and the course of events gives them no grounds for encouragement, by late spring of 1967 they will probably feel compelled to take stock and consider a change in their strategy.” b. The continuing efforts to get the U.S. to stop bombing the north give a possible indication that the other side is genuinely interested in stopping the war. Until Hanoiʼs responses are more forthcoming, however, it is prudent to consider that the anti-bombing campaign may be simply part of their psychological warfare efforts to gain a respite to improve their chances of holding out until after the 1968 elections. The prolongation of the war by the other side involves a complicated interaction of will and capability. At the present rate of attrition, the communists would have the theoretical capability to fight on for at least 15 years. But the history of warfare shows that the will to resist collapses long before the absolute capability is destroyed. Thus, my analysis—which as you know is not shared by the intelligence community—indicates that the communist calculation of profit and loss applied to their manpower drain would bring about the end of the war within three to six years. It seems to me that this three- to six-year period will most probably be shortened by the U.S. elections in 1968. Regardless of the outcome of our elections (barring Senator Fulbrightʼs becoming President), I believe the war would most likely end between January and June 1969. If the above analysis is correct—and it is a big if—the policy question facing the President now is: What might reasonably be done now to shorten the war by 6 to 12 months? This is a question which should be faced now because of the time involved for decision, for implementation, and for the actions to take effect. Although it could be argued that we should wait until the spring of 1967 to see whether the communists will in fact change their strategy, this possibility does not seem sufficiently likely to base major decisions upon it. Furthermore, action taken now will have more impact than the same actions taken six months from now because of: a. The cumulative impact of an additional six months of pressure. b. The longer time that the communists would have to hang on before the 1968 elections. c. The apparent expectation by the communists of increased pressure after the Manila Conference which if not forthcoming will give them a psychological boost. There are five interrelated major elements of our strategy that need to be addressed: 1. National development . After many months of your urging, I believe that there is a general recognition of the need for developing national political and economic institutions. Some progress in both areas is being made. We need to get on with the job of developing (a) national political parties and (b) a long range economic development plan. 2. Pacification . In many respects, this element of our strategy has shown the least satisfactory progress but it is the single most important element. It is not only essential to our success within SVN but progress within SVN must greatly affect NVN calculations of gains and costs. With due regard to South Vietnamese sensitivities and interests, it is important to unify all pacification efforts as quickly and effectively as possible. Eventually, we should look toward the appointment of a U.S. “proconsul.” In the meantime, the U.S. effort in SVN should be unified—whether under civil or military leadership—and supported by a unified effort in Washington. This effort should be given equal priority with the military effort. 3. The war in the south . Perhaps the most satisfactory element of our strategy has been our search and destroy operations in SVN. While continuing an appropriate level of search and destroy operations, we must divert as much of the U.S. and Vietnamese effort as seems militarily sound to the clear- and hold-type operation essential to progress in pacification . 4. The war in the north . I believe that the war in the south has reached the point where the continued bombing of the north is no longer essential to victory in the south—unless the cessation of bombing were to bring about a major increase in infiltration. In any event, as long as North Vietnam pursues the war, we would pay a price for ceasing to bomb the north. If we relaxed our pressure on his lines of communication, we would need more troops in the south. No one can say precisely how many more troops would be needed but the bombing campaign must represent the equivalent of one to three divisions of troops. Even with additional troops, a cessation of bombing would most likely prolong the war because we would no longer be exacting a price on the North Vietnamese homeland for their continuing adventurism. Conversely, while it cannot be proven, it seems logical that at some point an increase in the intensity of the bombing ought to contribute to shortening the war. I believe that in conjunction with the other recommendations that a renewal of the program of increasing pressures would materially improve our chances of ending the war by summer of 1968. It must be recognized, of course, that increasing the intensity and scope of the bombing could cause a wider war. However, there are only two categories of targets—population and mining of the ports—which have not already been taken under attack. Although we have attacked a number of airfields, so far we have avoided those airfields in the vicinity of Hanoi. As long as these categories are avoided, we would not seem to risk widening the war by attacking additional targets similar to those we have already hit. Attacks on population we can reject out of hand, both on political and military grounds. Attacks on the remaining airfields have so far not seemed militarily essential. We can continue to take the calculated risk of avoiding attacks on these airfields without undue danger until the NVN air forces become a major interference to our bombing campaign . In the meantime, attacks on other elements of their defense network could decrease the potential effectiveness of their aircraft. In any event, a major air campaign should be undertaken against his radars, communications, and SAM facilities as soon as the appropriate weapons become available. There remains, however, the major gap in our pressure on the north—the ports through which they import without interference the materiels necessary to sustain their war effort. We should be able to reduce substantially their imports either by attacking their port handling facilities or mining their ports. Air attacks on the ports would have the disadvantage of causing noncombatant casualties. Even so, casualties could be minimized by careful targeting and precise attacks. Mining of the ports creates the risk of a potential confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese. I believe this danger is overestimated. If our mining is limited to North Vietnamese territorial waters and if everyone is forewarned that the waters are mined, the sinking of the ship would be the direct result of a positive action by the ship captain. This, it seems to me, is far different than sinking a Soviet or CHICOM ship by air or surface attack—both of which should be avoided unless we are prepared to take much greater risks. We should, therefore, immediately renew our air campaign of gradually but constantly increasingly pressures on the North. The proposals of Rolling Thunder 52 798 would be an appropriate start followed up in timely fashion by additional attacks on similar targets. In the process, we should carry the POL and electric power campaigns through to completion. As soon as appropriate weapons become available, we should mount a concentrated campaign on his air defenses—avoiding airfield attacks unless his aircraft cause major interference to our operations. Ports should be mined at times when there are no third country ships in harbor, and port facilities should be struck in such fashion as to avoid third country ships. Such a campaign should be played in low key. It should not be described as escalation. In answer to any queries, it should be described merely as implementation of U.S. determination to do whatever is reasonably necessary to cause the North Vietnamese to cease and desist. 5. Diplomatic posture . By any objective measure, I believe that the United States has been most forthcoming in a search for peace. I think we are now at the stage where any new diplomatic overtures will be counterproductive barring some kind of response from Hanoi. Further initiatives on our part can only serve to erode our negotiating position and give hope to the communists that we are looking for a way out. Our diplomatic posture should be one of simply quietly restating our position and remaining alert to any possibility of favorable response from the other side. G 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX. Top Secret. In his covering memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh stated: “Attached is my reaction to Secretary McNamaraʼs memo on Vietnam [ Document 268 ]—which seemed to me exceedingly and excessively pessimistic.” (Ibid.) In a separate memorandum to Rostow, November 2, Ginsburgh listed the pros and cons of both a cessation and an intensification of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and also listed the major criticisms of the bombing together with opposing arguments. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam) 795 For the principal findings of the study, see Document 219 . 798 See Documents 226 and 295 . 289. Editorial Note 289. Editorial Note In telegram 10098 from Saigon, November 4, 1966, Ambassador Lodge advised the Department of State that the scheme to secure the defection of National Liberation Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho by working through his purported uncle, Nguyen Huu An, was “largely based on wishful thinking.” In forwarding the telegram to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant, Walt Rostow, Arthur McCafferty of the White House Situation Room noted in his covering memorandum that “in short, the uncle is one of the best ‘fiction’ writers of our time.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush) Two months earlier, Lodge had notified the Department that a promising operation had been launched to secure Nguyen Huu Thoʼs defection and that other high-level defections from the NLF might follow; see Document 204 . Secretary of State Rusk and Rostow followed the case closely, and President Johnson was kept abreast of developments; see Documents 206 , 214 , 225 , and 243 and the footnotes thereto. Additional information on White House and Department of State interest in the operation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 143, Thrush, and in Department of State, central Files, POL 30 VIET S/THRUSH. Director of Central Intelligence Helms was informed regularly about the operation by his Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, George Carver, who wrote him at least 14 memoranda about Thrush from late September through late October 1966. In an October 11 memorandum to Helms, Carver noted that Secretary of Defense McNamara, who arrived in Saigon on October 10, had been briefed on Thrush and “seemed pleased at the way things are being handled.” Carver’s memoranda are in the Central Intelligence Agency, GAC Chron, Job 80–R01720R. In telegram 8635, October 17, Lodge informed the Department of State of “unresolved discrepancies, inconsistencies and apparent falsifications,” especially involving Nguyen Huu An, which affected the substance of the defection effort and called into question the honesty of the participants. A “confrontation meeting” on November 3 between a CIA representative and An, reported by Lodge in telegram 7657, confirmed that An had “lied about all of his activities during July and August.” An was still regarded as a potential asset, Lodge indicated, but given the operation’s “metamorphosis into a longer term intelligence/defection effort,” full control would be turned over to CIA personnel. (Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S/THRUSH) 290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, November 4, 1966, 1:20 p.m. 78865. Literally eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. You have described the RD program as the heart of the matter in SVN. We agree. Also, you have reported and we agree that progress in the RD program so far has been slight and unsatisfactory. We all agree that progress must be made in this crucial area if the war is to be won in the South and if the North is to be persuaded to negotiate. It is clear to us that some organizational changes are required on the American side to get RD moving—to bring harder pressure on the GVN to do its job and to get solid and realistic planning with respect to the whole effort. We had considered putting the entire program under COMUSMACV to achieve these ends; and this may ultimately prove to be the best solution. But recognizing certain objections to this approach, we are prepared to try a solution which leaves the civilian functions under civilian management. As we see it, the trial organization would involve the following changes: 1. The several civilian lines of command within U.S. agencies would be consolidated into one. Thus, line responsibility for all personnel assigned to RD civilian functions would rest solely with one high-ranking civilian. (We presume this man would be Ambassador Porter. If so, he would have to be relieved of all other duties, and you would have to have another deputy assigned to absorb the substantial other responsibilities now met by Ambassador Porter.) The authority of this civilian would be made clear and full to each constituent agency of the civilian RD team, including relocation of personnel, the establishment of priorities irrespective of agency priorities, and the apportionment of the funds allocated for RD by each agency to Viet-Nam (bounded only by statutory limitations). 2. To strengthen Porter administratively, it might be well to assign him a competent Principal Deputy and Executive Officer—a military officer of two- or three-star rank. If this officer is desired, General Westmoreland can supply him or, if he requests, the officer can be provided from here. This officer would not be to command U.S. military forces or operations or to perform MACVʼs functions of advising and prodding the ARVN, but would be to provide administrative strength on the civilian side and to serve as a bridge to MACV, ensuring efficient interface between the civilian and military structures. 3. We understand General Westmoreland is already considering a MACV Special Assistant for Pacification or a Deputy for Pacification. We presume that the appointment of such a Special Assistant or Deputy could be timed to coincide with the changes on the civilian side, making possible the highest-level command focus and consolidation to MACVʼs RD concerns and staff. 4. Careful definition and delineation of responsibilities of the U.S. civilian and U.S. military sides would be necessary in the whole RD establishment in South Viet-Nam to ensure that nothing falls between the stools and that the two efforts fully mesh. We are most anxious, as we know you are, to make progress in RD. So this new organizational arrangement would be on trial for 90–120 days, at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider whether to assign all responsibility for RD to COMUSMACV. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Katzenbach, and approved by Rusk. The President met with Rusk, McNamara, and Rusk from 10:35 to 11:20 a.m. on November 4. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. However, under a November 4 covering note in which he stated that reorganization of the revolutionary development program was on the agenda, Rostow forwarded to the President back-up papers for the meeting that included a draft of this telegram, which had originally been transmitted to the President for his concurrence in telegram 68390 to Wellington, October 18. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15) 2 Lodge responded in telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6. He stated that the crux of the problem was security, not defective organization, and that the first priority was more U.S. troops allotted to pacification. He agreed that civilian functions should be consolidated under Porter but argued against creating another deputy ambassador to absorb Porterʼs other responsibilities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 291. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson 291. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 4, 1966. At your instruction I went to Saigon from Manila and spent three days trying to convince the mission that a period of profound calm in Vietnamese politics was a top United States priority. I discovered on arriving that—with the elections here a mere ten days off—Ambassador Lodge was off on vacation in Thailand. Deputy Ambassador Porter has been virtually forbidden by the Chief of Mission to deal with Thieu and Ky. —The Kyʼs talk only to Lodges. And Lodge doesnʼt talk to anybody—in Saigon at least. This has as its practical consequence that effective American pressure on the GVN can come only from Ambassador Lodge. And he is seldom really there—he puts in a five or six-hour day. I went to make it clear that I consider Ambassador Lodge a fine American who has loyally undertaken what may be an impossible task. But we need in Saigon a man with immense vitality, who can and will work an 18-hour day. —one who can assert real administrative authority over that sprawling, feudal American mission. —one who can keep two jumps ahead of the Vietnamese, anticipate and head off trouble, and put the arm on them when they play French games. —For example, they have—in the best French tradition—agreed “in principle” to the reform of the Port of Saigon. —Which means they really havenʼt agreed to anything that will specifically remedy the problems; they are stonewalling at the administrative level. Plenty of trouble is coming. Some time this winter or spring there will be a moment of truth between the Directorate, the Peopleʼs Army Council and the Constituent Assembly. 2 —The recent resignations were a precursor and the lines of stress run through all three bodies. —There are generals in every camp and a, to me, ominous fact is that Chief of State Thieu (who has played second fiddle to Ky so far) is a very old buddy of two generals Ky is out to purge: Co and Quang. —None of them is Northern. (Thieu is from the center, Co and Quang from the south.) —They were together at Hue Military Academy (1948–49), at Infantry School in France (1949–50), Tactical Command School, Hanoi (1951–52) and at Fort Leavenworth (1956–57). Our task is to prevent any confrontations and disruptions—or we are likely to be back where we were after Diem fell—which would be disastrous in terms of American public opinion and the long-range conduct of the war. And somebody out there in top authority should be worrying about this sort of thing seven days a week, 18 hours a day (possibly even 24). In my considered judgment this is our top priority in Vietnam. We canʼt lose the war, but we can find ourselves fighting it endlessly in a political vacuum. John P. Roche 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 On October 4 Roche sent a memorandum to the President warning of a “head-on collision between the Directorate and the Constituent Assembly” and expressing criticism of the U.S. Missionʼs role in the matter. (Ibid., Office of the President File, John Roche) 292. Intelligence Memorandum 292. Intelligence Memorandum 1 Washington, November 1966. [ document number not declassified ] THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Rolling Thunder PROGRAM IN NORTH VIETNAM 2 1 January-30 September 1966 The Rolling Thunder air offensive against North Vietnam has been accelerated sharply in 1966, compared with operations in 1965. The 59,000 attack sorties flown in the first nine months of 1966 against targets in North Vietnam were about 2.3 times the 1965 effort; the 90,000 tons of ordnance dropped was 2.6 times the ordnance delivered on targets in 1965. The 1966 air operations have also been carried out more efficiently than the 1965 campaign. The average bomb load per attack sortie has increased, and the rate of aircraft losses has been some 58 percent of the 1965 rate. In spite of these improvements, it is estimated that the cost effectiveness of the air campaign diminished in 1966. The direct operating cost of inflicting a dollarʼs worth of damage in North Vietnam has increased by about 28 percent—from an estimated $6.80 in 1965 to about $8.70 in 1966. The major determinants of this decrease in cost effectiveness have been the far greater proportion of attack sorties accounted for by armed reconnaissance strikes (as opposed to initial strikes on fixed targets) and the geographic concentration of the air effort against logistic targets in the southern areas of North Vietnam, principally Military Region IV. By the end of 1965, a growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets outside of sanctuary areas, as well as other operational restrictions virtually forced a continually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance. This trend was temporarily interrupted by the strikes against major petroleum storage installations, which began late in June 1966. Strike sorties against JCS fixed-target systems dropped from more than 30 percent of the total sorties flown in 1965 to less than 3 percent in 1966. Armed reconnaissance sorties increased by over 230 percent, from about 17,300 sorties in 1965 to 57,300 in 1966. Almost two-thirds of these—37,000 sorties—were directed at the southernmost areas of North Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh. The air campaign over Laos shows similar emphasis on the attempted interdiction of the infiltration network into South Vietnam. Attack sorties flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs increased from 11,000 sorties in 1965 to about 38,000 during the first nine months of 1966. Ninety-five percent of the attack sorties flown in Laos in 1966 were on armed reconnaissance missions. The major measurable effects on North Vietnam of Rolling Thunder attacks are: (1) About 20 percent, or 70,000, of the total military forces are engaged directly in defensive programs and countermeasures against the Rolling Thunder program. About 220,000 full-time and 100,000 part-time workers have been diverted to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs in North Vietnam and Laos. In 1965 and 1966, from 25,000 to 35,000 persons are tentatively estimated to have been casualties of air attacks in the North. (2) Physical damage to economic and military targets has also increased. This damage amounted to $65 million in 1965 and an additional $95 million in the first nine months of 1966. Of the latter total, over 70 percent represented damage to economic targets. Despite the increased weight of air attack, North Vietnam continues to increase its support to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The Rolling Thunder program has not been able to prevent about a threefold increase in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966. The external logistic support needed to maintain the expanded VC/NVA force in South Vietnam has been adequate. In particular, despite the neutralization of the major petroleum storage facilities in the North, petroleum supplies have continued to be imported in needed amounts. Taking a broader view, during the course of the Rolling Thunder program the North Vietnamese capability to support the war effort has improved. (1) The capacity of the transportation system, at least as it affects the ability to handle the flow of men and military supplies to South Vietnam, has been increased. (2) The sizable manpower drain has peaked, unless there is a sharp increase in estimated VC/NVA manpower losses in South Vietnam or a radical change in the nature of the air campaign against North Vietnam. In 1965 and 1966, North Vietnam had to mobilize 80 percent of its physically fit males as they reached draft age. Subject to the assumptions just delineated, this levy could be as low as 50 percent of the 1967 class. (3) Aid from the USSR and Communist China received in 1965 and 1966 has amounted, in estimated value, to about five times the total caused by Rolling Thunder attacks. The fact that a large share of the imports now flowing into North Vietnam is not military aid but machinery and equipment seems particularly significant. On the one hand, it reflects a willingness of the major Communist powers to provide additional equipment for war-related industrial facilities, probably encouraged by the fact that the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy has been largely off-limits to air attack. On the other hand, it suggests that adequate reserves of skilled manpower, electric generating capacity, and other essential inputs are available on a significant scale for conversion to a war-supporting role. While this new emphasis accelerates the ability to support military operations in the short run, it does postpone Hanoiʼs long-run plans for the development of heavy industry. Nor has Rolling Thunder served visibly to reduce the determination of Hanoi to continue the war. We see no signs that the air attack has shaken the confidence of the regime, and with increased Soviet and Chinese aid to bolster its capabilities, North Vietnam in the short term at least, will apparently take no positive step toward a negotiated settlement. In any event, it is estimated that Hanoi will continue to be insistent on a cessation of the bombings as a prerequisite for negotiations. Analysis of popular attitudes in North Vietnam indicates a continued firmness in support of the regimeʼs policies. Although the long-term effects of the war may have some wearying effect on the population, there is no evidence that it has yet reached a point sufficient to deter Hanoiʼs leaders from their present policies. Finally, the course of the air campaign in 1966 has had no significant effect on the attitudes of third countries. From the resumption of the bombings in January 1966 to the escalation represented by the bombing of the petroleum storage facilities, third-country attitudes have been, predictably, relatively constant. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, particularly during the January bombing pause, has had a somewhat sobering impact on some third countries. Indeed, the escalation against POL storage facilities produced a reaction more restrained and less critical than had been anticipated. Among Communist third countries, the USSR and the Eastern European countries would prefer a negotiated settlement because they regard a continuation of the war as potentially dangerous to themselves and in any case as posing an awkward dilemma for them within the Communist world. The Chinese Communists, however, remain adamant in their attitudes toward the war and any steps leading toward a negotiated settlement. Over and above the measurable effects discussed in the foregoing, the Rolling Thunder program has certain intangible aspects such as enemy morale and determination which are much more difficult to assess. The Rolling Thunder program has been the object of much neutralist criticism and the target of a concerted Communist diplomatic and propaganda campaign. In one sense, this must serve to stiffen Hanoiʼs back; at the same time, the program has become one way Hanoi probably measures US determination—though the extent of US commitment on the ground conveys this determination far more persuasively. Moreover, the Rolling Thunder operation carries some threat of further escalation, and in this way may exert a certain worrisome pressure on Hanoi. On the other hand, if Rolling Thunder were to be terminated at this point without concessions, the United States would be deprived of one form of leverage against Hanoi which it now has. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 H (1), Appraisal of Bombing of NVN. Top Secret; [ codeword not declassified ]. The CIA forwarded the memorandum to the President on November 5. 2 This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this memorandum has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 3 November 1966. [Footnote in the source text.] 293. Editorial Note 293. Editorial Note On November 5, 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara flew to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, arriving about 10 a.m. At 11:30 a.m., following a meeting with the President, he held a news conference on the front lawn of the Ranch. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) He indicated that in a meeting the previous day (see footnote 1, Document 290 ) and continuing at the Ranch that day he and President Johnson had reviewed the Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 1968. As a basis for making decisions on the budget, they discussed the situation in Vietnam currently and as it looked “for the months ahead” in comparison to what it had been about a year earlier. “Whereas the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong forces were approaching possible victory some 15 months ago,” Secretary McNamara stated, “I think it is clear to all that today a military victory is beyond their grasp.” Secretary McNamara then stated that, looking ahead to 1967, the following points seemed clear, barring unforeseen circumstances: 1) draft calls for 1967 would be lower than for 1966; 2) increases in U.S. forces in South Vietnam in 1967 would be substantially less than during 1966; 3) a second cut in the planned annual rate of production of air ordnance, on top of the $1 billion cut already ordered, was a probability; and 4) he expected “that this same trend towards stabilization will govern our air operations, and the deployments of air units to South Vietnam, and the level of our air activities.” Secretary McNamara also indicated that the military situation had improved to the point that additional emphasis could be placed on the rural reconstruction program through shifting more South Vietnamese forces to the effort. For text of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pages 1325–1331. 294. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson 294. Letter From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) to President Johnson 1 Saigon, November 7, 1966. Dear Mr. President: At the meetings which I had with you in Manila, the urgency of bringing about a quick decision in the Viet-Nam war was touched on, but there was no opportunity to pursue the subject thoroughly. I, therefore, submit for prompt and searching analysis a program (the result of much study) to hasten the end of the war to the greatest degree possible, as follows: The heart of the matter in the war in Viet-Nam is to destroy the terrorist organization and network—what Ho Chi Minh calls the “guerrilla infrastructure”—so that terrorists can no longer assassinate, kidnap, torture, sabotage, cut roads, blow bridges, engage in sudden and surreptitious mortaring and shell fire (as they did last Tuesday 2 in Saigon), and, above all, so that they can no longer impress young males into the service of the Viet Cong, as they are still capable of doing, at a rate of four battalions a month. All concerned agree that this is indeed the crux, and MACV specifically states that what it calls “offensive operations” are conducted so as to create the opportunity to destroy terrorism, that is “pacification”. But the phrase “offensive operations” is defined as meaning to “seek out and destroy”. This is how the Germans were beaten in World War II. I believe that the Vietnamese war will certainly never be won in this way; that the phrase “offensive operations” should be defined as “split up the Viet Cong and keep him off balance”; and that U.S. participation in pacification operations should be stepped up. 3 This new definition of the phrase “offensive operations” will require fewer U.S. soldiers and will (according to reports made to me) mean fewer U.S. casualties. It will also mean that more U.S. troops will be available to help out in pacification (an even more fundamentally “offensive” operation)—to be catalysts; to lead by example; and to work with the Vietnamese on the “buddy” system. They would be the 10% of the total force of men under arms (90% of whom would be Vietnamese) which would get the whole thing moving. From experiments already made in doing precisely this, it is clear that U.S. casualties would be few. Yet the result would be durable—an unusual thing in Viet-Nam where much of the land is to the Army what the ocean is to the Navy—something you move around on, but most of which you donʼt want to hold. What counts in this war is people. The gains under such a program, while not flashy, would be solid. While it would take time, it would be absolutely clear at home that time was working for us, and the light at the end of the tunnel would get steadily brighter. What I propose has been done on a small scale by elements of the U.S. Marines, the 1st and 25th U.S. Infantry Divisions, and the Koreans. We know that it works. It means that the Vietnamese will ferret out and execute (or send into dependable exile) the hard-core terrorists—the human monsters who cut out menʼs livers and inflict other nameless tortures. They are the keystone of the Viet Cong terrorist organization. Their elimination would mean that the night no longer belongs to the Viet Cong and that the impressment of young men would stop. These key terrorists would be the real, the ultimate coonskin. While the Vietnamese must do the ferreting out and the executing, we can help through our police advisers and our CIA counter-terrorist intelligence. This would be in addition to our military help. I am calling a meeting of these men to stimulate action. This program will also hasten the revamping of the ARVN, which is now due to have been completed by normal Vietnamese bureaucratic methods by July 1967. (I believe this is an optimistic date.) My proposal would, in effect, revamp the ARVN by “on-the-job-training”. It is the only way I can think of to accelerate the present pace. This would at last correct an error made ten years ago when the U.S. decided that Viet-Nam should have a World War II type Army rather than a constabulary. To do this is constructive; it means building a nation; our men like it. In fact, a number have signed on for another tour so as to do it. None of the above, of course, applies to overt aggression—that is conventional invasions such as that in the DMZ and which must always be defeated. As regards public opinion at home, I think it most unlikely that a clean-cut news event can be brought about within an acceptable period of time which will cause the press to say that the “war is over” or that an “armistice has been signed”—or any sharp focus news stories such as we had in World War I, World War II, and Korea, and to which public opinion in the West is conditioned. The Communists will not make such an agreement, and if they did, their word is no good. Any peace proposal they make will probably be to make us stop winning while they keep on fighting. But I believe a condition can be brought about in which in effect our troops simply keep the enemy off the backs of the South Vietnamese so that they can go ahead on the job of permanently wiping out terrorists. An illustration of such an allocation of tasks is provided by the experience on Election Day, September 11, when a) We, in effect, kept the main force and NVN units off the backs of the South Vietnamese; b) with the result that South Vietnamese under arms—military and police—were enabled to provide order for the voter; c) with the result that more than 80% of the qualified voters voted; and that d) for that day anyway, 65%, rather than the commonly accepted 54%, of the population were secure. Had this condition continued, much ferreting out of terrorists could have ensued— durable progress. While the above does not produce a “war is over” type of headline, it would mean that the war had entered a new phase—a phase of which American public opinion would be clearly aware, in which our battle casualties would be very low, and in which time was plainly and obviously on our side. When Hanoi faded out, there would be no clean-cut headline, but everyone would know it. The above raises very large questions on the whole conduct of the war—questions which are far more than purely military. I propose that this should be thoroughly analyzed and decided on the broadest possible basis. With respectful regard, Faithfully yours, Cabot L. P.S. All my best wishes for your good health. 4 HCL 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. 2 November 2. 3 Lodge made the same argument he makes in this letter—that offensive operations should be defined as “split up and keep off balance” rather than “seek out and destroy”—in at least three other communications: 1) a memorandum he read to McNamara during their private conversation in Saigon on October 10 (Massachusetts Historical Society, Lodge Papers, Vietnam Papers; printed in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War , Part IV, pp. 451–452); 2) a memorandum to Rostow, October 24, which Rostow forwarded to the President the same day, noting in his covering memorandum that it raised a “first-class issue” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LX); 3) and telegram 10204 from Saigon, November 6 (see footnote 2, Document 290 ). 4 Lodge added the postscript by hand. 295. Memorandum From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 295. Memorandum From the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, November 8, 1966. CM–1906–66 SUBJECT Military Actions against North Vietnam 1. As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that we should increase military pressures on North Vietnam. They believe that military actions designed to reduce still further the capabilities of the North Vietnamese to receive help from out-of-country, to move men and material in-country and from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, and to reduce in-country war-supporting facilities and supplies are necessary and feasible—militarily, politically and psychologically. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Rolling Thunder 52 (RT–52) program, provided earlier, 2 is a desirable first step in undertaking such military measures against North Vietnam. 2. Another useful concurrent action would be the employment of our surface naval vessels against waterborne coastal traffic between 17 degrees 30ʼ N and 20 degrees N. 3. The salient features of the recommended program are set forth in the following subparagraphs: a. Reduction of Restricted Areas . Reduce the restricted areas around Hanoi and Haiphong to a ten-nautical-mile radius racetrack pattern around Hanoi/Phuc Yen airfield; reduce the restricted area around Haiphong to four-nautical-mile radius. Comment . Within the Hanoi restricted area are located at least thirty-six (36) major targets of military worth. The location of population argues against striking some of these targets; however, many are located in population-free areas. While the number of targets in the Haiphong restricted area is much smaller, there are worthwhile targets not now subject to attack. Additionally, reduction of both the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas will permit armed reconnaissance operations against an additional 284 nautical miles of the primary lines of communications around these two cities and the searching out and destruction of the increasing number of dispersed supply installations in these two restricted areas. Area reductions will also provide desirable flexibility, now lacking, in targeting and tactics, thereby degrading air defenses. b. SAM Support Facilities . Three (3)SAM support areas are recommended for attack. Comment . Since 1 July 1965 the North Vietnamese have launched at least 949 SA–2 missiles against our strike forces and have destroyed thirty-two (32) manned aircraft. At least twenty-eight (28) SA–2 missiles were launched in the Hanoi/Haiphong area on 4 November. Obviously, we should destroy concentrations of SAM equipment and SAM support facilities wherever discovered in order to reduce their limiting effect on our strike forces, which is greater than revealed by the number of U.S. aircraft destroyed by missiles. c. POL Storage Systems . As of 4 November our intelligence indicates that some 24,800 metric tons of fixed POL storage capacity remains of a pre-strike fixed capacity of 132,000 metric tons. Dispersed storage capacity has grown to 42,500 metric tons. The program recommends strikes on fixed POL facilities at Ha Gia and Can Thon, formerly erroneously identified as being associated with Phuc Yen and Kep airfields respectively. Comment . It is apparent that identified dispersed storage now represents the major portion of the POL storage system in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, it would be militarily desirable to destroy all fixed storage in order further to reduce flexibility in receiving, storing, and distributing POL throughout the country. In this connection, while the residual Haiphong POL storage area is not included in RT–52, railroad tank cars have been identified in the Haiphong POL storage area, leading to the belief that the remaining pumping station is still in use and should be destroyed. d. War-Supporting Facilities . The program recommends attacks on selected elements of the Thai Nguyen steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant. These two facilities are producing materials to repair damaged lines of communications and, in the case of the steel plant, to build barges and tanks to move POL products. Comment . There are other industrial areas which should be brought under attack because they produce or contribute to production of small arms, grenades, ammunition and the like. e. Electric Power Systems . Two electric power plants, Haiphong TPP West and Haiphong TPP East, are recommended for attack in RT–52. These two plants represent fifteen per cent of remaining generator capacity in North Vietnam and destruction will reduce operating efficiency in the entire Haiphong area; specifically, six (6) shipyards and the naval base, the ship and railway shops and, to an undetermined degree, the off-loading of cargo in the Haiphong port will be affected. Comment. There are eight (8) major electric-power generating plants remaining in North Vietnam. All should be struck, as should the Hanoi transformer station, in order to affect to a major degree both military and civilian support to the war effort. In this connection, the North Vietnamese have contracted from Czechoslovakia, and are in the process of installing, a number of small packaged generating plants which, apparently, they will employ to supplement or to replace electric power sources in North Vietnam. f. Waterway Locks . Four (4) waterway locks are recommended for attack. These locks control water levels on water lines of communications. We have noted an increasing use of inland waterways by the North Vietnamese to supplement or to replace interdicted rail and road lines of communications. Comment. These locks are not associated, except indirectly, with agriculture. Flooding resulting from their destruction will be minor and very few people will be at risk. Moreover, the North Vietnamese have expressed on many occasions their apprehension that we will destroy the Red River dikes as a part of our air campaign. The destruction of these four (4) locks should exert desirable psychological pressures on both leaders and population. g. Ports . Selected areas of Cam Pha port and Haiphong port are recommended for attack. The particular areas, remote from berths and wharves to preclude damage or destruction of foreign shipping, were chosen not only to destroy important facilities but to exert psychological pressure on the North Vietnamese, shipowners and crews by showing that ports are not sacrosanct. It is anticipated that attack of these port facilities could cause shipping (as in the case of the Soviet tankers) to move out of the port areas into roadsteads and unload by time-consuming use of lighters and barges. Comment. If the result hoped for is achieved, not only would the unloading process be impeded but barges and lighters would be open to attack once they had left the cargo vessel, thereby giving us the opportunity to destroy imported materials in bulk. 4. Mentioned earlier was the military desirability of using our naval surface craft to interdict coastal shipping in the area between 17 degrees 30ʼ N to 20 degrees N. Pertinent to this comment is the fact that, from 25 October through 2 November, 325 coastal craft were sighted in coastal waters between the DMZ and 17 degrees 30ʼ N with 132 craft destroyed and 140 damaged. Since 2 November very little movement of coastal water craft in this area has been noted. Comment. It is pertinent that, during the month of October, in the coastal waters lying between 17 degrees 30ʼ N and 20 degrees N our aircraft observed over 800 coastal craft. Obviously, surface naval activities in this area would restrict further the flexibility and capacity of North Vietnamese lines of communications. 5. I informed you the other day that I have had prepared folios of blown-up photographs of the target system in North Vietnam which reveal very clearly the military worth, the location of population and other factors pertinent to air strikes. 6. I recommend the following: (a) that President Johnson be briefed in the immediate future on RT–52 so that his early approval of the program can be obtained; and (b) that I be present in order to explain the photographs and RT–52 and to respond to any questions the President may have. 3 Earle G. Wheeler 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 2EE Primarily McNamara Recommendations. Top Secret. On November 8 McNamara forwarded copies to the President (ibid.) and to Rusk (Department of State, EA/VN-Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966). 2 See Document 218, footnote 2 thereto, and Document 226 . 3 See footnote 4, Document 299 , regarding Wheelerʼs meeting with the President. 296. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 296. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, November 9, 1966, 1416Z. CAP 66932. You will receive this morning by courier the JCS views on expanded military pressure against North Viet Nam. 2 Sec. McNamara and Sec. Rusk will forward their views 3 as soon as they have had a chance to study Gen. Wheelerʼs recommendations. My own views are as follows: 1. We must begin now to lean more heavily on the North. I have reviewed all the evidence and all the reports we have on the effect of bombing the North. It is clear that the attritional cost we are imposing is significant for the North Vietnamese in military and economic terms and increasingly significant for Moscow and the Eastern European countries which are being forced to expand military and economic aid to compensate for our bombing; and they donʼt like it. That increased burden may add to their interest in a negotiated settlement. 2. The expansion in military pressure should be as steady and undramatic as we can make it. 3. We have to take into account George Brownʼs visit to Moscow later in the month. There is no reason to be excessively hopeful about that visit; but we must give him a fair chance to probe. It might help his mission if we signalled, between now and then, our intent to up the ante in the North; but it could destroy his mission if we did anything dramatic or noisy. 4. The Rolling Thunder program proposed by the JCS probably goes too far at this time in the light of the Brown visit. 5. Therefore, I suggest you approve certain limited targets from the JCS recommendations, which would make clear to Hanoi and Moscow the seriousness of our future intent, without putting them under public challenge or ultimatum. For example, we might hit the SAM support sites, one or two thermo-power plants, one of the two unstruck POL storage facilities, and extend the surface sea interdiction zone a bit to the North. In the last few weeks the sea interdiction between the 17th parallel and 17 degrees 13ʼ has been an effective operation. An additional northward shift of 30 minutes would represent the kind of steady incremental increased pressure we wish to signal. 6. A limited quietly expanded program of this type, involving no new target systems, is, I believe, what we need between now and Brownʼs visit. Properly done it could both increase Moscowʼs leverage on Hanoi and Brownʼs leverage in Moscow. While he is actually in Moscow, we might cut back to armed reconnaissance. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Bombing. Top Secret. 2 Document 295 . 3 See Document 299 . 297. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 297. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 9, 1966. SUBJECT JCS Proposal for RT 52 1. This proposal which has been forwarded to the President and to you by Secretary McNamara (see Tab A) 2 is very similar to his earlier informal proposal presented early in September 3 which was subsequently withdrawn and considerably reduced in scope and re-presented somewhat later. Memoranda to you and the Acting Secretary of September 10, re-submitted on October 31, discussed this reduced proposal for RT–52; they are attached at Tab B. 4 2. The renewed proposal for an expanded RT–52 includes strikes on SAM support facilities, POL storage areas, electric power, steel and cement plants, waterway locks and port areas. It also proposes moving naval gun fire farther north and permitting armed recce up to within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi and Phuc Yen and 4 nautical miles of Haiphong. There is attached at Tab C a tabular review of each of these target proposals, together with recommendations for approval or disapproval. 5 Discussion 3. In general the RT–52 proposal would, if carried out in full, be interpreted as an escalation because of the inclusion in an RT program for the first time of steel and cement plants and waterway locks as targets. Whether or not RT–52 envisages a greater intensity of activity is not clear because there is no period mentioned within which the targets proposed would be struck. However, permission for armed recce to enter the present 30 and 10 nautical mile circles around Hanoi and Haiphong would undoubtedly appear to be an intensification in sensitive areas. The recommendations which are made in Tab C assume that we wish to continue the bombing pressure on North Viet-Nam as it has been applied over recent months but do not wish to make any sharp departures in the way of more intensive activity or new kinds of targets which begin to enter the civilian realm or which take less account of the danger of civilian casualties. 4. With regard to four SAM support facility targets which have not previously been proposed we are unable to comment intelligently since we have neither information on civilian casualties nor any photographs. With regard to the waterway locks, we have not had time to assess their full impact on the civilian population in terms of flooding and particularly crop destruction; the two targets where these dangers appear to be great have been negatively recommended. 5. Under Rolling Thunder 52, armed recce would be authorized up to 10 NM from the center of Hanoi and Phuc Yen airfield and up to 4 NM from the center of Haiphong vis-à-vis the present 30 NM for Hanoi and 10 NM for Haiphong. There would be a route and railroad segment which would approach within 10 NM of Phuc Yen airfield; however, this was authorized in Rolling Thunder 51. We believe the proposed new limits for armed recce to be too close for “free wheeling” without special justification and the designation of special route segments—(Rolling Thunder 51 included 4 railroad and 1 highway segments that were within the 30 NM limit of Hanoi). The attack of dispersed POL within the armed recce limits surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong would continue to be authorized provided positive identification is obtained, the targets are not in populated areas, and after notification to Washington of the plan to strike. (Attack against dispersed POL co-located with JCS numbered targets within the above limits that have not been authorized for attack is prohibited.) SAM sites would also be authorized for attack except in the Chinese buffer zone and in populated areas. 6. Naval gun fire operations against military and logistic water-borne traffic in coastal waters of NVN would be authorized south of 20 degrees north latitude vis-à-vis the present limitation of south of 17 degrees 30ʼ north latitude. The present authority has only been in effect since October 15 and we believe that it should remain in effect until greater experience factors have been developed. We are concerned with the possibility of engaging purely civilian or commercial traffic north of 17 degrees 30ʼ. 7. In light of the experience of the past eighteen months, we judge that the full program will have only marginal impact on Hanoiʼs general war effort and, in particular, its ability to sustain the conflict—at the present level or above—in South Viet-Nam. INR adds the following observations: The program proposed by JCS would have significant diplomatic repercussions in offsetting the positive impact of the Manila Conference and in reducing prospects for exploring modalities for negotiation. It is highly unlikely to have an adverse effect on the determination of the leadership in Hanoi to pursue the war, or significantly undermine the regimeʼs ability to maintain public control and a disciplined war effort. Recommendations 8. That you approve the targets as recommended in the Tabular Review at Tab C with provisions outlined and with the understanding that the strikes will be spread out over a reasonable period of time to avoid the appearance of undue intensification and escalation. 6 9. That armed recce be maintained with the present limits and subject to the present ground rules. 10. That naval gun fire operations against coastal military and logistic water-borne traffic be limited to the south of 17 degrees 30ʼ north as presently in effect. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. Sent through Under Secretary Katzenbach. On November 1 the Department of State changed the title of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 2 Document 295 . 3 See Document 226 . 4 Attached but not printed. 5 Attached but not printed. 6 Bundy recommended approval of the following targets: 2 of 8 SAM support facilities (he recommended disapproval of 2 and deferred a recommendation on 4 while awaiting civilian casualty estimates); 2 of 2 POL storage areas; neither of the 2 industrial targets (the steel and cement plants); 1 of 2 electric power plants; 2 of 4 waterway locks; and 1 of 2 ports (Cam Pha but not Haiphong). 298. Editorial Note 298. Editorial Note At 2:51 p.m. on November 9, 1966, Secretary McNamara telephoned President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch regarding the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to expand the air war ( Document 295 ). The President indicated that he had not yet seen it but had received Rostowʼs cable ( Document 296 ). McNamara stated he had just discussed the proposal with Secretary Rusk and would send to the Ranch a memorandum containing their recommendations ( Document 299 ). At the Presidentʼs request, McNamara outlined the differences between the JCS proposal on the one hand and his and Ruskʼs recommendations on the other, stating that the differences were “very substantial, I think. We recommend that we do more than we are presently doing but not nearly as much as they recommend.” The following exchange then took place: “RSM: Iʼd say we did about a third of what they recommended. “LBJ: Well, weʼll have to look at ʼem. How long can this wait? “RSM: It shouldnʼt wait until after you come out [of the hospital after surgery scheduled for the following week]. Some parts of it, at least, they and Dean and I are all in agreement on, and I donʼt see any reason, if you agree, why we shouldnʼt start that immediately. The remaining portions that weʼre in disagreement on can certainly wait. The weather is not too good at this time of year and we couldnʼt get all this in immediately anyhow. If you wished, I know that Buzz Wheeler and Iʼd be very happy to come down. He would appreciate an opportunity at some point to talk to you about it anyhow.” The President decided that they should come down the next morning, bringing McNamaraʼs memorandum ( Document 299 ) with them. The following exchange then took place: “LBJ: My feeling on this is roughly this: I think we should and must use every hour, every day, every week, and every two months between now and January that we can. Number one, effectively, all around the clock. Two, I think that this pressure must be as steady but—this looks like a contradiction but I donʼt want it to be—steady but undramatic as we can make it. I think weʼve got to bear in mind that weʼve got the Browns [George Brown] going to Moscow and that we donʼt want him to feel we donʼt give him decent opportunity for that and if we caused this mission to fail, that could be dangerous. And I would feel that we ought to make clear to these folks the seriousness of our future intent without rubbing their nose in it in front of a television camera. And I would think of some of the unstruck ones that weʼve played around with sometime before and our POLs and some of these other things, but I wouldnʼt get into something that is so dramatic that you have a headline every day that youʼre really changing your policy. I would— “RSM: Thatʼs exactly the character— “LBJ: Iʼd have it trotting but I wouldnʼt have it running right now from a walk. “RSM: Thatʼs exactly the character of the recommendations that Dean and I will make to you. Weʼll be there about 9 to 9:30 in the morning. “LBJ: In other words, I want a limited, very quiet, expanded program, but I think it could serve to give Moscow a little leverage on ʼem if it werenʼt so damn violent that it forced ʼem to react otherwise. Do you follow me? “RSM: Yes I do. Iʼm not sure I agree with the conclusion that it would give Moscow more leverage. I donʼt believe it would. But, in any case, I believe we arrive at the same conclusion. “LBJ: Well, what I think is this: I think if weʼre causing ‘em damage and theyʼre hurtin’ but we havenʼt got their childrenʼs hospitals afire and so forth, I think Moscow can say to Hanoi, ‘Goddammit, this thing is gettin’ awfully costly on you and on us and on everybody else. Letʼs try to find an answer here.ʼ If itʼs not being costly, I donʼt think maybe they got any real desire to stop the bombing if itʼs not hurtinʼ. But, we can debate that tomorrow. “RSM: Sure. Weʼll be there, Mr. President. Thank you very much.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.30, Side B, PNO 3) 299. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 299. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 9, 1966. SUBJECT JCS Recommendations for Military Actions Against North Vietnam Attached is a summary of the changes in the Rolling Thunder and associated programs which the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to me in a memorandum dated November 8, 2 a copy of which I sent to you yesterday. I recommend approval of the items checked in blue and disapproval of the items checked in red. 3 My recommendations are based on my belief that we should limit our attacks to military targets, and within the category of military targets, attack only those which can be successfully destroyed without substantial civilian casualties and the destruction of which will more than offset our probable strike losses. Because the military value of the targets and the possible strike losses may be expected to change with time, I may wish to recommend later that you authorize attack on certain of the targets presently checked in red. The Secretary of State concurs in my recommendations. 4 Robert S. McNamara 5 Attachment LIST OF CHANGES IN Rolling Thunder AND ASSOCIATED PROGRAMS PROPOSED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 1. Reduce the restricted area around Hanoi from a 30-mile circle to a 10-mile “race track” pattern and reduce the restricted area round Haiphong from a 10-mile to a 4-mile circle in order to: a. Permit strikes on approximately 36 identified military targets around Hanoi and approximately 8 such targets around Haiphong—these targets include bridges, supply depots, and similar facilities. b. Carry out unlimited strikes against vehicles and other forms of military traffic on the approximately 284 miles of roads and waterways between the present and proposed circles around Hanoi and Haiphong. c. Permit search for and destruction of dispersed military supply installations lying between the present and proposed circles. 2. Attack 3 surface-to-air missile support facilities: Kinh No SAM Storage (16 strike sorties); Hanoi SAM Storage (16 strike sorties); Haiphong SAM Assembly (40 strike sorties). 3. Strike fixed POL storage facilities at Ha Gia (40 strike sorties) and Cam Thon (54 strike sorties). 4. Strike Thai Nguyen steel plant (28 strike sorties). 5. Strike Haiphong cement plant (18 strike sorties). 6. Strike Haiphong thermal power plant west (4 strike sorties). 7. Strike Haiphong thermal power plant east (4 strike sorties). 8. Strike 4 waterway locks: Thanh Hoa (24 strike sorties), Ben Thuy (24 strike sorties), Xom Trung Hoa (24 strike sorties), Trung Luong (24 strike sorties). 9. Strike Cam Hoa Port (selected areas only—22 strike sorties). 10. Strike Haiphong Port (selected areas only—24 strike sorties). 11. Strike Xuan Mai highway bridge (34 strike sorties). 12. Strike Yen Bien railroad yard (4 strike sorties). 13. Strike Van Dien vehicle depot (56 strike sorties). 14. Extend the area in which naval gunfire is authorized against coastal shipping from 17 degrees 30ʼ N to 20 degrees N. 1 Source: Department of State, EA/VN-Vietnam Working Group: Lot 72 D 219, Rolling Thunder Memos, 1966. Top Secret. See Document 298 regarding the transmission of this memorandum to the President. 2 Document 295 . 3 Items 2, 3, 11, and 12 were checked in blue. Items 1a, 1b, 1c, and 4–10 were checked in red. The last part of item 14, “17 degrees 30ʼ N to 20 degrees N,” was checked in red, but an emendation handwritten just below the typed item, “extend from 17 degrees 30ʼ N to 18 degrees N,” was checked in blue. 4 McNamara, Wheeler, and Rostow met with the President at the LBJ Ranch in Texas on November 10. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) No record of their discussion has been found but see Document 298 . Also, a note of November 9 to the President from his secretary, Mary Slater, indicates that Wheelerʼs memorandum and Rostowʼs cable, Documents 295 and 296 , were among the papers that the President wanted to discuss with McNamara on November 10. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Appointment File) Presumably a decision was made regarding Rolling Thunder 52. Strikes were authorized in JCS telegrams 7735 and 7783 to CINCPAC, November 10 and 11, against the targets indicated in items 2, 3, 11, 12, and 13 on the attached “List of Changes.” Item 14, as amended by McNamara, was also authorized. Strikes on the targets indicated in items 4, 5, and 6 were authorized but deferred. (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52) McNamara recommended the deferment (tentatively until November 25), and the President approved, during a telephone conversation that began at 9:44 a.m. on November 11. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F66.31, PNO 2) Rolling Thunder 52 was initiated on November 22. 5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 300. Memorandum of Meeting 300. Memorandum of Meeting 1 Washington, November 10, 1966, 3 p.m. PARTICIPANTS W. Averell Harriman Eugene Rostow William P. Bundy Joseph J. Sisco John Roche Thomas Hughes Leonard Unger Benjamin H. Read Richard Steadman Chester L. Cooper Monteagle Stearns Frank Sieverts Daniel Davidson 1. Manila Conference Governor Harriman opened the meeting by summing up reactions to the Manila Conference in the countries he had visited. 2 He believed that the reaction to the Manila Communique had been favorable. The emphasis placed at Manila on our limited objectives, agreement to withdraw troops promptly after aggression had ceased and on finding a peaceful settlement had provided convincing evidence of our desire to negotiate. The sections of the Communique dealing with elections and with national reconciliation were also important. We had to recognize that Ky was regarded as an American stooge in most of the non-aligned Asian countries and in Europe. The Governor believed that we must persevere in our efforts to encourage the development of a government in Saigon with legitimate roots. We should follow constitutional developments closely and not permit the GVN to draft a constitution which would bely the promises of national reconciliation contained in the Communique. The Governor observed that the government leaders with whom he had talked on his trip had been virtually unanimous in wanting us to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. The Governor had made plain that this could not be done without reciprocal action by Hanoi. Many non-aligned Asians and Europeans believed, however, that the United States could afford to take the first step toward de-escalation. They wanted to see talks get underway, believed that this would not happen as long as the bombing continued but gave no evidence for this conclusion. Mr. Rostow asked the Governor about his talk with Couve. The Governor said that he had told Couve that DeGaulleʼs speech in Phnom Penh 3 had simply made Hanoi more intransigent. Couve had not denied this and the Governor said that he seemed to gloat over the fact that DeGaulle was making life uncomfortable for us. The Governor said that he would review the memorandum of conversation with Couve 4 to see whether any elaboration was desirable. 2. George Brown and DʼOrlandi The Governor said that the group should consider what guidance could be provided to George Brown before his trip to Moscow. We should also see what could be given to Italian Ambassador DʼOrlandi when he returned to Saigon. It might be useful, for example, to spell out with greater clarity what we mean by reciprocal action by Hanoi. Mr. Cooper said that he and the Governor had met Ambassador DʼOrlandi at the Fanfani luncheon in Rome. 5 He was returning to Saigon almost immediately and would be seeing his contact soon after he arrived. DʼOrlandi had told Mr. Cooper that his contact expected to leave soon for Hanoi. Mr. Cooper suggested that DʼOrlandi persuade him to postpone his trip a few days. This would give us time to pass to DʼOrlandi through Ambassador Lodge any information that we wished him to convey to his contact. Governor Harriman noted that he had been impressed by DʼOrlandiʼs evident sincerity. His health was bad and he had explained to the Governor that he would not be returning to Saigon if he did not believe that he could contribute to the task of getting negotiations started. While DʼOrlandi might not be the most direct or authoritative channel to Hanoi available to us the Governor throught that we should not shut it off. Mr. Bundy observed that George Brown was somewhat nearer the heart of things than DʼOrlandi and his contact. Consequently, he thought that we should concentrate on what we could give to Brown. Mr. Unger recalled that we had made a specific proposal for de-escalation in the DMZ to DʼOrlandiʼs contact not long ago. Nothing had come of this. In fact, we had no firm evidence that DʼOrlandiʼs contact was operating under instructions from his government. Mr. Cooper said that he had asked DʼOrlandi about this and the Ambassador had stated that he was convinced that his contact had specific instructions not only from his own government but from Moscow. Mr. Cooper agreed with Mr. Bundy, however, that George Brownʼs talks in Moscow offered better immediate possibilities than the DʼOrlandi channel. Governor Harriman said that he had promised to give Brown an analysis of last Tuesdayʼs election results in relation to the Vietnamese problem. Brown would then be in a position to disabuse the Soviets of any ideas they might have that the elections had been a repudiation of the Presidentʼs Vietnam policy. He asked what we could tell Brown to clarify what we meant by a “signal” from Hanoi that could lead to a new bombing pause. Mr. Bundy said that he intended to review the Secretaryʼs talk with Sir Patrick Dean. The criteria were well stated in that memorandum. 6 He doubted that we could go much further with George Brown. He had asked Mr. Davidson to work with Mr. Cooper to prepare a draft telegram covering the points that Brown wanted to raise with the Soviet leaders. This paper ought to be ready by Monday. 7 Mr. Bundy thought that the question was not only to define what we meant by reciprocal action but also to decide what next steps would have to be taken if Hanoi agreed to some form of de-escalation in exchange for a bombing pause. Mr. Bundy could foresee that if Hanoi took significant reciprocal action and we then suspended the bombing, pressures would quickly build up for us to stop troop re-inforcements as well. Mr. Cooper commented that we should keep in mind that George Brown in his Brighton Speech 8 had publicly advocated a formula calling for a bombing pause plus no re-inforcements in exchange for an end to infiltration. Mr. Bundy agreed that ending U.S. troop re-inforcements seemed to figure prominently in Brownʼs thinking and came high on his timetable. Mr. Bundy observed that we had to be careful about how far we went with Brown. We would not want to make substantial concessions before Hanoi was even at the negotiating table. Nevertheless he recognized that we had to give Brown something to contribute to the value of his talks. Though he was not a discreet man he was well intentioned and capable and was a good friend of the U.S. Governor Harriman thought that further discussion on this point could be deferred until the group could read the paper being drafted by Mr. Davidson and Mr. Cooper. The main thing to keep in mind was that the Soviets continued to be our best hope for getting negotiations underway. They were seriously embarrassed by our bombing of North Vietnam and he thought that they would go to considerable lengths to get the bombing stopped. Furthermore, they were deeply concerned by Chinese Communistsʼ policies and would probably like to see a non-aligned buffer state or states develop in Southeast Asia against Peking. The Soviets wanted to get off the hook in Vietnam and for this reason had a stake in seeing the war ended and negotiations begun. Mr. Bundy said that he doubted that the Soviets had anything new to say to George Brown about Vietnam. If there were new elements in the Soviet position he thought they would prefer to talk to us about them directly. Mr. Read observed that the Soviets might also be skeptical about Brown as an intermediary in the light of public statements he had made after talking to Gromyko in New York. Governor Harriman said that despite these cautionary factors we should try to make the most of Brownʼs trip to Moscow. The Soviets might be interested in trying out some ideas in their talks with Brown. We should not conclude in advance that nothing constructive would emerge. Furthermore, our relations with the British would suffer a damaging blow if the British government were to conclude that we were not serious about reaching a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The Governor agreed with Mr. Bundy that we should give Brown enough to work with to satisfy him but obviously should not give away our whole position. We might be able to refer to the concepts that the Secretary had mentioned to Pat Dean and then give Brown some examples of de-escalatory actions that Hanoi could take. The Governor thought that it would also be useful for Brown to point out to the Soviet leaders that the Manila Communiqueʼs reference to withdrawal of allied forces from South Vietnam within 6 months of the time that North Vietnam had withdrawn its forces was directly responsive to Gromykoʼs request for public clarification of our intention not to remain permanently in Vietnam. Mr. Bundy observed that this point had already been made by Ambassador Thompson to Ambassador Dobrynin but he agreed that it would also be useful for Brown to cover this ground. Mr. Davidson noted that Brown had requested any information that we could provide on the role we envisaged for the NLF/VC in negotiations. Mr. Bundy thought that the Soviets were less interested in this point than in stopping the bombing. In his conversation with Soviet Counselor Zinchuk before the Manila Conference this was one aspect of the Vietnamese problem that Zinchuk did not explore. Mr. Bundy doubted that it was either practical or necessary to give Brown much in the way of clarification of this point. Mr. Rostow noted that the Secretary had mentioned to him a recent telegram 9 in which the Soviets were reported to be telling Hanoi that the principal points at issue in Vietnam were the bombing of North Vietnam on the one hand and the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South on the other. If this was an accurate report it implied that the Soviets were trying to narrow the areas of disagreement. Governor Harriman said that other reports indicated that the Soviets wanted assurances about what the future of the NLF/VC would be if the conflict ended in Vietnam. He believed personally, however, that the principal Soviet objective was to stop the bombing. Mr. Unger said that it was possible that the Soviets would raise with Brown the question of the Geneva Accords and the fact that the Manila Communique did not specifically re-affirm their validity as a basis for settlement. He thought it might be useful to touch on this point when we communicated with Brown. Mr. Rostow wondered whether it would be worthwhile for Brown to discuss with the Soviet leaders the idea of stationing neutral troops in the DMZ. Mr. Cooper doubted that the time was right for this proposal. Mr. Unger commented that this was an idea that we had proposed originally but had never pressed because it presented a number of practical problems of implementation. In the first place it was hard to imagine the ICC as now constituted giving its approval to the proposal. It was also difficult to think of any neutral powers which would be willing to contribute troops. Finally, the proposal raised some tough military problems. Despite these considerations Mr. Unger could see no harm in Brown discussing the proposal with the Soviets. In fact, the subject could logically follow from whatever discussion Brown planned to have on the general subject of the ICC. It was decided that Mr. Cooper and Mr. Davidson would consider whether it was feasible to include some mention of the proposal in the package being prepared for Brown. In closing the discussion of George Brownʼs trip the Governor said that after we had prepared the material for Brown we should see what morsels could be given to DʼOrlandi. He repeated that he had been personally impressed by DʼOrlandi and believed that we should give him some encouragement. 3. National Reconciliation and Constitution Governor Harriman said that he was disturbed by indications that the new Vietnamese constitution would have a clause excluding “communists and neutralists”. We must assure that the constitution was not inconsistent with the principle of national reconciliation. Mr. Bundy thought that our first objective should be to obtain from Ky and Thieu a strong statement on national reconciliation. The reporting from Saigon 10 indicated that the GVN was now pointing to December to kick off their amnesty and reconciliation program. The wording of the constitution might present problems, as the wording of the electoral law had presented problems. But in Mr. Bundyʼs mind the first order of business should be to get the GVN firmly and publicly committed to the principle of national reconciliation. Mr. Roche recalled that we had been caught short on the electoral law. He thought it might be risky to delay putting pressure on the GVN for the kind of constitution we could support. Mr. Unger agreed that it would be useful to flag the issue now so that the Embassy would have no doubts about our attitude. Governor Harriman said that he tended to agree with Mr. Bundy that we should concentrate on the national reconciliation program as a first priority. He recalled that he had told the Indians and others that the GVN would announce a program of national reconciliation on November 1. This had been done. We had to hold the GVN to its new schedule so that an effective program would be announced and would get under way in December. Mr. Roche commented that it was easy to get the Vietnamese to agree to anything in principle. The real problem would be in getting them to follow through with an effective program. The Governor asked Mr. Davidson who would follow up with the GVN in Saigon. Mr. Davidson said that Henry Kissingerʼs recommendations to improve the Embassy organization as it related to national reconciliation, pacification etc. were not being followed. It was not clear to him who would be responsible for making sure that the GVN carried through a program of national reconciliation. Mr. Roche observed that Ambassador Lodge was the only American in Saigon with the access to and influence on Ky to do the job. He noted that Lodge expected to go on leave some time in December. Mr. Rostow said that this meant we should get to Lodge right away. Mr. Cooper remarked that Lodge would be able to provide the initial push but that we needed to keep after the GVN to see that a strong speech on national reconciliation was actually delivered. He assumed that by next week someone in the GVN would start drafting. The Embassy should be in a position to get our ideas across at an early stage. Mr. Unger said that he would undertake to see that a message to Saigon was drafted promptly to this effect. Before the meeting closed Mr. Davidson pointed out that even if we managed to get the GVN leaders to commit themselves publicly to a program of national reconciliation, we could still have trouble dissuading them from introducing a clause into the new constitution excluding “communists and neutralists”. We should realize that when Ky and Thieu spoke of national reconciliation they were thinking in terms of defections from the NLF/VC not of the NLF/VC itself playing a political role in South Vietnam. In short, a constitutional clause excluding members of the NLF/VC from Vietnamese political life would not necessarily seem to Ky and Thieu inconsistent with the principle of national reconciliation as they interpreted it. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stearns. 2 See Document 281 for information on Harrimanʼs trip. 3 For text of De Gaulleʼs speech in Phnom Penh, September 1, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 646–648. 4 Not found. 5 According to the memorandum of their conversation on November 2, DʼOrlandi told Harriman and Cooper that “it was time now to be more specific. In particular, he said that Washington should come to grips with the problem and find out from Hanoi just what kind of regime they would settle for, what kind of guarantees they expected, and what kind of guarantees they would comply with. In short, dʼOrlandi felt that we should face up to the kind of ultimate solution we wanted and then worry about moving toward it.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 6 Document 275 . 7 November 14. The resulting 12-page telegram for Brown, 86196 to London, November 16, spelled out U.S. views on a number of key issues, including the role of the NLF in negotiations, the withdrawal provisions in the Manila Communique, and especially the “conditions for a possible cessation of the bombing”; the latter discussion included the same language for the Phase A-Phase B formula in paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305 . (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET)7 8 Not further identified. 9 Not further identified. 10 Telegrams 9690, October 29, and 10005, November 3, both from Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S and POL 15 VIET S, respectively) 301. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 301. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Washington, November 11, 1966. SUBJECT Deployments to Southeast Asia (U) I have reviewed your recommendations in JCSM 702–66, November 4, 1966, 2 and the related military and economic effects of your recommended deployments. The attached table 3 summarizes your plan and the forces which I am approving for planning purposes. As you know, a reasonably stable economy in South Vietnam is essential to unite the population behind the Government of Vietnam—indeed to avoid disintegration of the SVN society. Runaway inflation can undo what our military operations accomplish. For this reason, we have already taken actions to reduce military and contractor piaster spending towards the minimum level which can be accomplished without serious impact on military operations. Nevertheless, the price stability achieved last summer may be giving way to a new round of severe inflation. More must be done. Ambassador Lodge has asked that U.S. military spending be held to P42 billion in CY 1967. The Ambassadorʼs proposed program of tightly constrained U.S. and GVN civilian and military spending will not bring complete stability to SVN; there would still be, at best, a 10 billion piaster inflationary gap. It would, however, probably hold price rises in CY 1967 to 10%-25% as opposed to 75%-90% in FY 1966. The burden of inflation falls most heavily on just those Vietnamese—the ARVN and GVN civil servants—upon whose efficient performance our success most heavily depends. Unless we rigidly control inflation, the Vietnamese Army desertion rate will increase further and effectiveness will decline, thus at least partially cancelling the effects of increased U.S. deployments. Further, government employees will leave their jobs and civil strife will occur, seriously hindering both the military and the pacification efforts and possibly even collapsing the GVN. For these reasons we must fit our deployments to the capacity of the Vietnamese economy to bear them without undue inflation. As your memorandum indicates, the program you recommend would cost over P46 billion in CY 1967 at current prices. I believe implementation of a program of this size would be self-defeating. The plan I am approving at this time for budgetary planning appears to me to be the maximum consistent with any reasonable hope of economic stability. If contingencies arise during the year, we can re-examine the plan accordingly. I plan to provide sufficient combat-ready forces in the U.S. to meet reasonable contingencies. A troop list containing each unit in Program # 4 is attached. 4 You may wish to suggest changes in the unit mix, if there are units that have been deleted that have a higher priority than those I have approved. I would like to have these recommendations by December 1, 1966. I also would like your proposals as to ways in which approved units can be accelerated so as to provide maximum combat capability as early as possible in CY 1967. 5 RMcN 1 Source: Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, Mc NTN VII. Top Secret. Printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , vol. IV, pp. 364–365. 2 This memorandum concerned “Deployment of Forces to Meet CY 1967 Requirements.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155.3 (18 Jun 66), Section 8A) 3 Attached but not printed. The table lists the following projected figures, in thousands, for total personnel in South Vietnam under the Southeast Asia Deployment Program: June 1967 December 1967 June 1968 JCS Plan: 455.9 504.0 522.2 OSD Plan: 439.5 463.3 469.33 4 Attached but not printed. 5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded in JCSM–739–66, December 2, proposing modifications in the plan for deployments to Southeast Asia. (Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII) 302. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 302. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 11, 1966. Yesterday the President elaborated to Bob McNamara and to me his desire to have a systematic assessment of what each of the following countries might do to help us in Viet Nam: Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, and others, including the Europeans. He has in mind three things: a. Troops or additional troops where possible. b. Other forms of assistance; e.g., increased training by Malaysians; increased economic aid for Viet Nam; increased political and diplomatic support; etc. c. Even if increased help is not forthcoming, he wants our request to be part of our bilateral accounts so that if they do not act, they understand they have failed to act and should bear this in mind when asking us for assistance. In this connection, he asked whether Ellsworth Bunker might not spend a part of his time touring some of these countries, where it is impossible for you to go before the NATO meeting. He raised the question, on a different basis, as to whether it would not be wise for Bunker to go quietly to Indonesia to make an assessment of the situation on the spot, perhaps accompanied by a couple of good young military officers—“young Goodpasters.” In any case, the President wants to have available by the opening of Congress a systematic record of all our efforts to increase and widen international support for our effort in Viet Nam, in the form of a record that might be shown to General Eisenhower, Senator Dirksen, Gerry Ford, etc. 2 Walt 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 138, Nodis/Louisiana. Secret; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to McNamara. 2 In circular telegram 8350, November 11, the Department stated that the “time is ripe for major effort to obtain additional manpower contributions by other countries in Vietnam” both for “practical importance” and to demonstrate “wide support for basic objectives in Vietnam”; cable traffic on this subject was to be slugged Louisiana. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA) 303. Memorandum of Conversation 303. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, November 11, 1966, 1 p.m. SUBJECT Swedish Diplomatic contacts with North Viet-Nam PARTICIPANTS United States Secretary Rusk Deputy Asst. Secretary Leonard Unger EUR/SCAN—David McKillop EA/VN—Heywood Isham Sweden Minister of Foreign Affairs Torsten Nilsson Director of Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry R. Hichens-Bergstrom Ambassador to United States—Hubert de Besche First Secretary, Pol.Div., Ministry For.Affairs—J.C.S. Oberg After preliminary exchange of greetings, Foreign Minister Nilsson read a report of two recent conversations between Swedish diplomats and representatives of North Viet-Nam which took place in Warsaw and Hanoi (The text of this paper is attached). 2 Having read the paper, the Foreign Minister summarized the salient points of what DRV Foreign Minister Trinh had told Ambassador Petri in Hanoi: North Viet-Nam preferred a political to a military solution and was interested in a climate favoring a political settlement provided certain conditions were fulfilled; withdrawal was not specifically mentioned; the National Liberation Front was described as one of the spokesmen for the South Viet-Nam people although the most valid one. Regarding the possibility of reaching a final settlement, the NLF and Hanoi supported the formation of a National Coalition Government in South Viet-Nam founded on a broad basis including all political and religious groupings as well as all social classes generally desiring to achieve national independence. Moreover, conditions should be created permitting moving in the direction of future re-unification. The Foreign Minister commented that it was difficult to judge the significance of the talks although it was interesting that a moderate tone characterized both of them. It was impossible for the Swedish government to assess the value of the information given to Ambassador Petri. An analysis of these exchanges in both Warsaw and Hanoi, however, might show them to contain elements justifying carrying on a discreet dialogue with the North Vietnamese government. The DRV Foreign Minister had concluded his conversation with emphasizing that he expected the conversation to be handled with absolute discretion. Foreign Minister Nilsson observed that although they had contacts with the Front and Hanoi since 1965, until now they had received nothing of interest but that a study of the recent exchanges had led them to feel that the atmosphere had begun to change and they felt it their duty to inform us. The Secretary prefaced his reply by underscoring the need for extreme accuracy in reporting such conversations and knowing the exact language that was used on the other side. Great issues were at stake. We receive many reports about Hanoiʼs attitudes and positions which when tested proved to have no substance. The Secretary went on to note that there were one or two positive and one or two negative elements in what had been told to the Swedish representatives. On the positive side, Hanoiʼs interest in a political rather than a military solution represented a small step forward. Foreign Minister Nilsson, describing the background of Ambassador Petriʼs mission, said he had been received by the head of the political department of the DRV Foreign Ministry and had several two-hour conversations and three dinners all within the space of three days. These had revealed nothing new in Hanoiʼs position. After all this, Trinh had sent him an invitation to come see him; Petri had not asked to be received by Trinh. While there was no discussion of conveying Trinhʼs remarks to the United States, neither did Trinh say Petri could not do so and he emphasized the importance of maintaining secrecy. The Swedes interpreted Trinhʼs attitude as a tacit indication that his remarks could be conveyed to the United States. The Secretary, continuing his commentary on Trinhʼs remarks said the missing element was what Hanoi would in fact do on the military side. At least 19 regular North Vietnamese regiments were in the South and three North Vietnamese divisions were in the DMZ and north of it. They could attack our Marines at any moment. If we committed ourselves to stop bombing permanently, we must know what would happen on the ground militarily. We could not possibly make a commitment on the ground unless we knew what Hanoi would do with those 19 regiments. Trinh had used the phrase, “We know what we will have to do” in the event their conditions were accepted. The Secretary said we would want to know what that phrase means. Mr. Bergstrom, noting that Petriʼs report had been in the form of one written and one telegraphic message, said they had queried him for clarification on the formulation regarding the National Liberation Front and the paper read by Foreign Minister Nilsson represented as accurate and precise a summary of Ambassador Petriʼs reports as they knew how to prepare. Ambassador Petri had observed to Trinh that if the two conditions were fulfilled, the North should follow suit. Bergstrom did not indicate whether there had been any comment to his remark. The Secretary said that Hanoi had denied, even to the Soviets, that they had troops in the South. However, we must have corresponding action on the ground; we could not be children in this matter. As to the role of the Front, we knew who their leaders were including North Vietnamese Generals in the South using a variety of names. The Liberation Front is Hanoi. Some southern individuals with other associations were included in the Front, but they had no influence. When Trinh said the Front was the most valid spokesman for the South Vietnamese people and that the situation must be consistent with moving toward reunification, he was expressing Hanoiʼs political objective of permanently unifying the country on a Communist basis. We were prepared to have South Viet-Nam decide on a solution through elections but so far Hanoi was not prepared to do so. The Secretary said we could not impose a coalition government on the South; we could not turn our men around and start them shooting in the other direction to impose a coalition government. If the South Vietnamese people were to decide on this it was up to them and we would abide by the result, but a coalition would not be imposed by our arms and our power. The Secretary asked what resources the Swedes had to continue this conversation; would the Ambassador be returning to Hanoi? It would be useful to get greater precision on the meaning of Trinhʼs phrase “they knew what they must do.” The Secretary told the Foreign Minister for his personal information that last fall the Soviets suggested that we suspend the bombing for 15–20 days in order to permit further explorations of Hanoiʼs positions. We had suspended the bombing twice as long as the Soviets had requested. During this time, Hanoi multiplied the number of trucks it was sending South and poured men and arms into the South on a 24 hour a day basis. On the 34th day of the pause, Hanoi had asked us to accept the four points, recognize the Liberation Front as the sole spokesman of the South Vietnamese people and get out of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi had not even used dilatory tactics as they might well have to embarrass us; they had simply asked us to surrender. This had been stupid of them. They could have made considerable problems for us if they had been more sophisticated or clever. Every week since January, we had tried to get an answer to the simple question: if we stopped the bombing as step 1, what would be step 2? Of course things would be better in the North, but what would happen in the South? We were vitally interested in this. Any further clarification as to the meaning of Trinhʼs phrase would be of some interest. The Secretary added that the other side had made clear we must end the bombing permanently, since they insisted that a suspension would imply an ultimatum. This represented an increased demand on their part and we must have something in exchange for a permanent cessation. The Swedish Foreign Minister noted that they had contacts with the Front or Hanoi in Algiers, Warsaw, Moscow and Hanoi as well as Peking. The Secretary noted that the only serious interlocutor was Hanoi—not the Front. The Secretary said that we did not discount the importance of any third party channels. In past crises, we never knew which channel would be important. In this case, we did not know whether Hanoi would say something important through the Swedes rather than through someone else. We did not wish to close any channel of communication but we did wish to know what Hanoi meant by the particular formulation Trinh had used. The Foreign Minister said that they also did not know about Hanoiʼs intentions in this respect, but were certainly prepared to ask for greater precision. The Secretary commented that since Hanoi was terrified of being caught by Peking talking with us it would be important for the Swedes to stress they were seeking these clarifications solely on their own. The Secretary went on to say that the Eastern European countries would probably be interested in settling for the status quo ante at the 17th Parallel but on account of Peking, were unable to move forward. We are prepared, he said, to accept the Communist worldʼs interest in North Viet-Nam if they are prepared to accept our interest in the South. Until Hanoi abandoned its objective of seizing South Viet-Nam, there could be no peace. It was as simple as that. We were prepared to cooperate in finding ways for Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over the South but not in finding ways to abandon our own effort in the South. The Swedish Ambassador commented that Petriʼs impression was that the North Vietnamese were deeply concerned over developments in China, were essentially North Vietnamese patriots and that because of these Chinese developments there were better prospects of negotiating than before. The Secretary said that Hanoi undoubtedly did not desire to be taken over by China nor did the Soviets wish this to happen. But they could not expect us to do anything about this if it meant giving South Viet-Nam up to them. If the Chinese wanted war over this, they could have it. We would not abandon South Viet-Nam under any circumstances. The Secretary continued that two things were vital: (1) Hanoi must abandon its attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and (2) the people of South Viet-Nam must have a chance to decide what government they want and to express their views on reunification without being subjected to force by the North. This principle was true for Korea, for Germany and for Viet-Nam. The Swedish Ambassador pointed to Trinhʼs implication that reunification could be a long term proposition and the Secretary countered that the thrust of that passage meant a Communist regime for the South. This was one of the negative aspects of Trinhʼs remarks. The Secretary pointed out the lack of reciprocity in the position of the other side. If we were to say we would not negotiate until the North stopped bombing in South Viet-Nam, people around the world would protest that we were being belligerent. We had suspended bombing in the DMZ to see if there would be any response, but there was none and the ICC had been denied access to the area under the North. Nevertheless the Trinh statement could be important if we had more precision. Ambassador Unger called attention to the reference by the North Vietnamese in Warsaw to “no military action being undertaken in the demilitarized zone.” He suggested, and the Secretary agreed, that this was also a point on which the Swedes might make further soundings in Hanoi. We were certainly ready to see the zone truly demilitarized and would welcome an end to violations of it by North Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister mentioned possible differences of opinion between the Front and Hanoi and pointed out that all elements of the Front were not Communists. The Secretary responded there was no problem about contact with the Front; the South Vietnamese were able to communicate with its representatives. South Viet-Nam could take care of the indigenous problem through reconciliation and bringing the dissidents back into the body politic. United States troops had only entered when North Viet-Nam regulars had come down. If the Swedes were in the same position, they would not accept a coalition government thus imposed on them. In answer to the Foreign Ministerʼs question as to how long the conflict might go on, the Secretary said that peace could be had by 6:00 this afternoon if the North told us they would stop trying to take South Viet-Nam by force. But we were not looking for a face-saving formula to permit us to abandon South Viet-Nam and some of the Communist states appeared at last to recognize this. The Secretary noted three channels to Hanoi: the direct one through which little was said because of Hanoiʼs fear of Peking; the channel through Moscow to which we attach importance because of Moscowʼs attitudes and influence—but here again Hanoi was probably afraid of Peking; and finally a channel through a third party, which could be Sweden. But, he continued, this represented perhaps 50% of the question; the other 50% was the possibility of resolving the problem by de facto action on the ground in the pattern of the Greek insurrection and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis. Ho Chi Minh might prefer to pull back troops rather than enter negotiations, calculating that Americans might go home and could not come back, although, the Secretary said, we can get back faster than they can. We would be prepared to try this route. There need be no confessions that they have 19 regiments in the South. In response to an analysis by the Foreign Minister of Hanoiʼs problem, the Secretary noted that we had reports from Eastern European sources that confirmed this precisely: Hanoi feared the effect of negotiations on the morale of the Viet Cong and Hanoiʼs present leaders feared that they could not survive a failure to achieve their objectives. However, the Secretary said on this we cannot help them; they are in places they have no right to be. Further, on the point of gradual de-escalation, the Secretary said that since January we had made clear our interest in responding to actions on the ground—what we call a process of “mutual example”—without evoking thus far any interest on Hanoiʼs part. If Trinhʼs phrase pointed in the direction of positive Hanoi response, this could be important. As to Trinhʼs own alignment in the regime as between hawks and doves, Mr. Bergstrom commented that the French considered him pro-Chinese but that Ambassador Petri did not have that impression. The Foreign Minister asked whether it would be necessary to specify how long we would halt the bombing. The Secretary said that under our system the press and Congress would force us to answer this question. A permanent bombing halt would require a very important reciprocal action. Ambassador Unger commented that Trinhʼs remarks implied some readiness to discuss now not only conditions for negotiation but also the terms of an eventual settlement. The Secretary agreed that Hanoi was hesitant about discussing the first step until they saw how the negotiations would end. He indicated that another reason for keeping further inquiries on the basis of a Swedish-DRV dialogue was to avoid having to bring Saigon into the picture, which we were disinclined to do at this stage. The Secretary suggested as a technical point it might not be wise to pursue the dialogue with Hanoi through other capitals. In order to protect Trinhʼs position if there are divisions within the leadership it was important not to have communications from abroad available to too wide a group in Hanoi. Foreign Minister Nilsson agreed with this suggestion. The Secretary emphasized the importance of examining very carefully all indications bearing on Hanoiʼs position but as he had told the press on another occasion, we could only negotiate with those who could stop the fighting. If we entered into too great detail on our conditions for settlement, the other side would just put that in their pockets and then propose to split the difference. We were not worried about real southern insurgents—16,000 of them had defected this year—but the Northern Generals must go home. We would even be prepared to give them a villa on the Riviera! Responding to a question by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said that Premier Ky was not particularly popular as an individual but that the majority of the population had strongly rejected the Viet Cong and supported the move towards a constitutional government. Even Tri Quang, opposed as he was to Ky, wanted us to bomb China. The trouble with the Vietnamese was the influence of the French “fourth republic mentality” where every man had his own party. Reverting to the paper given us by the Foreign Minister, the Secretary said we would wish to put it under a microscope and give a more systematic answer. Ambassador Unger would go to New York before Nilssonʼs departure next week and give him our further comments. In any event, these statements from Hanoi did have a certain resonance. Responding to a final question from the Foreign Minister about Hanoiʼs difficulty of believing that the United States could abandon such expensive United States bases, the Secretary pointed out that the United Statesʼ capacity in this regard should not be underestimated. We had built roads in India, over the hump, and Alaska during the war which we had never used, and we had demobilized 100 divisions after World War II. In the last five years we had closed 600 bases. As the President had said, we had no intention of leaving our soldiers in South Viet-Nam as tourists. Following the general conversation, Ambassador Unger privately mentioned to Minister Nilsson and Mr. Bergstrom our concern over reports that Ambassador Petri had spoken rather openly about his contacts in Hanoi. They agreed and said that recently they had twice communicated with Petri and instructed him to treat this subject with maximum discretion. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. Top Secret; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Heyward Isham of EA and Unger. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 655–661. The meeting was held in the Secretaryʼs Dining Room. Documentation on Aspen, the codeword for the negotiating channel with North Vietnam through Sweden, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14/ASPEN, and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 141, Aspen. A substantial selection has been printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 655–715. 2 Attached but not printed. 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, November 12, 1966, 2:02 p.m. 83699. For Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. Ref: (a) Saigonʼs 10204; (b) Stateʼs 78865. 2 1. We appreciate your views in reftel (a). Your review of organizational problems has been helpful to us. 2. We would like now to proceed immediately with measures on US and GVN side to get RD program moving forward effectively. 3. Re para 20 reftel (a), 3 realize you were not in position discuss our proposal in sufficiently wide circle. You are authorized now to discuss this and reftel (b) with Ambassador Porter and General Westmoreland and, once plans mature, inform members Mission Council. 4. Following steps need to be taken promptly if we are, in the time available, to give adequate test to organization which is intended to keep RD civilian functions under civilian management, an objective to which we know you attach considerable importance. These steps have already been discussed reftel (b) which should continue to serve as general guide. We would like you to prepare articulated plan to put these measures into effect as soon as possible, carefully delineating and defining US civilian and military responsibilities, with particular attention to most effective relationship among Ambassador Porter, his new military deputy and Gen. Westmoreland and his new RD/P deputy or special assistant. A. Mission directive should be issued providing that Ambassador Porter, working under your general supervision, should, pursuant para 1 reftel (b) take explicit operational charge of all personnel and programs carrying out RD/P civilian functions, including public safety, province reps and any other pertinent USAID elements; JUSPAO; CIA cadre and other RD/P programs; and military to the extent that civilian functions have been assigned to them. B. Mission directive should include new organizational pattern at regional, provincial and district level, putting premium on effective coordination with each province of all activities related to RD/P. C. Mission directive should also reiterate that Ambassador Porter is freed of any Mission duties other than RD direction and that provision is made for the direction of all other Mission business during your absence (for example, during your coming leave) by a designated officer, whether or not it is considered essential that Ambassador Porter be nominally in charge. Same directive should create staff for Ambassador Porter adequate to support him in discharge of these responsibilities. D. You and Ambassador Porter will wish to work out with General Westmoreland most expeditious means of accomplishing following, calling on Washington for additional authority or funds as necessary: (1) Assignment of principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, being general officer of two or three-star rank. This would require immediate consultation with General Westmoreland to secure most appropriate officer. (2) Designation by General Westmoreland of separate Deputy or Special Assistant for Pacification to MACV. (3) Preparation of realistic and detailed plan by MACV with assistance Ambassador Porter for bringing about change in mission for bulk of ARVN to responsibility for local security and coordination of such activities with RD Ministry priorities and plans. This should utilize MACV relations with leading GVN military officials, including use of all leverage provided through MAP and Adviser Program, and should draw on maximum support as necessary from yourself and high-level officials Washington. We are aware of resistance among top-ranking GVN military, including Corps Commanders, but believe time has come to take on this problem and find successful way to press ARVN to devote sufficient military muscle to accomplish this task, which, as you say, is the foundation of the RD/P program. This is task for entire Mission. Load inevitably falls most heavily on MACV and on you who must keep heat on Ky and Thieu. Your election analogy (para 8 reftel (a)) 4 suggests that when Vietnamese wish to take on task analogous to what we are advocating, they can do so. (4) Should either you or General Westmoreland have reservations concerning these actions, please raise specific alternatives with us immediately. (5) Re para 3 reftel (a), we understand General Westmoreland plans use of limited number US forces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate ARVN in RD/P. However, we have serious doubts about any further involvement US troops beyond this in straight pacification operations. We fear this would tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe pacification, with its intimate contact with population, more appropriate for Vietnamese forces, who must after all, as arm of GVN, establish constructive relations with population. Hence we believe there should be no thought of US taking on substantial share of pacification. The urgent need is to begin effectively pressing ARVN. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by McNamara, Helms, Gaud, Marks, and Komer; and approved by Rusk and Katzenbach. In telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15, Rusk told Lodge and Porter that telegram 83699 “was discussed today at highest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decision.” (Ibid.) 2 See Document 290 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 In paragraph 20, Lodge requested authority to discuss the proposal in telegram 78865 with the “heads of the different mission agencies involved here.” 4 In paragraph 8, Lodge noted how U.S. troops, working in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces, provided protection for voters on election day, September 11. 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, November 13, 1966, 3:37 p.m. 83786. Ref: Saigonʼs 10714. 2 1. Agree you should meet with dʼOrlandi and Lewandowski. We hope this way lead to the latterʼs being able carry out useful mission in Hanoi by securing better understanding there of our position and bringing back to us some clarification North Vietnamese position, although past exchanges with Lewandowski, received thorough dʼOrlandi filter, have not yet persuaded us Pole is in a position to provide effective line of communication. 2. We believe your meeting Monday 3 should be devoted primarily to asking questions so that we can get a better picture directly from Lewandowski of what he thinks can be accomplished through him. After we have had a chance to digest his replies, if they justify a further exchange, we will send you our more substantive suggestions immediately for an additional exchange with him prior to his departure for Hanoi. 3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski: a) What role does he envisage for himself? Is he, on the one hand, seeking merely to facilitate a better understanding on each side of the otherʼs position in order to pave way toward some kind of direct contact, and, if so, does he have reason to believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or, on the other hand, does he contemplate serving as an intermediary, conveying a series of proposals and counterproposals between two sides to try to achieve agreement on specific issues? b) What does Hanoi consider to be his role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to him and, if so, to whom were they to be conveyed? c) As we understand it, Lewandowski wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy something that is “final,” he doesnʼt want a truce just to “allow conversations.” How does he propose to get from here to there? How would he envisage overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify our position on one point or another without having any indication of what if any helpful response this would evoke from Hanoi? d) We understand that considerations of face inevitably play a role in Hanoiʼs thinking. Does this perhaps explain, in Lewandowskiʼs view, why we are unable to get any meaningful response to the question “what would happen if the bombing on NVN stopped?” Does Lewandowski see any way around this? Could some package deal be worked out which in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoiʼs actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension. 4. Lewandowski should understand that none of the foregoing represents a position which he is authorized to put to Hanoi on our behalf. We will review his replies to our questions and will then wish to determine what we wish to propose concerning his forthcoming visit to Hanoi. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 263–264. 2 In telegram 10741 from Saigon, November 13, Lodge indicated that he had agreed to meet with DʼOrlandi and Lewandowski on November 14 and would appreciate any further guidance the Department might have. (Ibid.) 3 November 14. 306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, November 14, 1966. 10856. 1. I met Lewandowski at DʼOrlandiʼs apartment at 3:00 p.m. Saigon time. 2. Lewandowski began by saying that he was “grateful” to me for being “so responsive to my request” that he see me today on the eve of his visit to Hanoi. What he was about to say was not “official” in the sense that he was not instructed by Hanoi to do it. But before his departure, he wished that “some things could be clear.” He added, “you may not be prepared to answer right away and, if so, I will understand.” He had four questions, as follows: A. “Regarding the offer at Manila concerning the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam on the condition that the troops of North Viet-Nam would withdraw (and, he said, “North Viet-Nam, of course, doesnʼt admit that they are there at all), does this condition mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by the present South Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of Saigon?” B. “In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new Government of Viet-Nam? The question of how the new Government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise.” C. “In case of a cease-fire, would the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by election?” D. “In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam, and if so, would the United States publicly declare its intention to this effect?” 3. I said that these were questions which I would have to refer to the U.S. Government, and that I would do so and provide answers as soon as I could. 4. I then said I had some questions to ask, and I asked him the four sets of questions listed in your State 83786. 2 When I had finished reading him these questions, which I did slowly so that he could take it all down, I added that none of what I had just said represented a position which he was authorized to put to Hanoi in our behalf. We would, however, review his answers and then decide what we wished to propose. 5. I then became silent, thinking that perhaps this would be the end of the meeting. 6. Without any prodding at all from me or DʼOrlandi, he said, “Well, some of your questions cannot be answered now. As to your question no. 1, my present role is in accord with the instructions of my government who would be prepared for me to take any role which would bring peace nearer. The two roles set forth in your question, that is, on the one hand, to work to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way to contact or, on the other, to be an intermediary, do not exclude each other. In fact, they could be done together. If the ideas which can be developed are not too far apart, then there can be talks, and if the ideas then start separating, both sides can withdraw. On the other hand, if I am successful in bringing the two sides together and they agree on something together, I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved something useful.” 7. As to the second question, Lewandowski said “You have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that diplomacy in Viet-Nam is different than what it is in Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very difficult to get. One has to be very patient and look for indirect symptoms.” He was not, he said, an agent of the Hanoi government, but “if and when they decide they want you to know something,” he said, “they would tell me. Of this I am confident. Each time I go, the Prime Minister asks me about Americans and what the Americans think.” 8. “On your third question, it is a frame without a picture. It is very theoretical.” 9. “As to the fourth question, it recognizes that you canʼt trade bombing suspension for something else. The question of bombing suspension in the first instance could be discussed informally. But if well founded hopes developed for reaching some agreement, then the bombing suspension could be brought in in the second phase.” 10. DʼOrlandi remarked that in the beginning of our talks, Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension would not be a precondition. 11. Lewandowski said, “Yes, there must be positive steps—not speeches or declarations. A package deal is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is the only one. The A and B in your fourth question are the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful. We must go right through to Z, including everything that needs to be in the package deal.” 12. I remarked that we would certainly be willing to accept the formula of a package deal as a way of doing business without, of course, committing myself to the substantive elements which might be in it. 13. DʼOrlandi thought that the package deal idea was a “positive step forward.” He regarded it as a “very substantial concession.” He saw the two distinct parts with no direct link between. The first, he said, gives full satisfaction. Phase B, he said, is very reasonable indeed. 14. The atmosphere was much the best that it has ever been since we have met. He had plainly asked for the meeting and said so. As I was about to leave, he said very much as an afterthought and in an extraordinarily mild tone of voice that he had forgotten to say something that he had meant to say which was that there should be no further escalation because to do so would “freeze the atmosphere.” I noted the casual tone and said equally casually that one could assure that that applied both ways. 15. Comment: Lewandowski is due to take off at 11 a.m. Tuesday, Saigon time. If you can get me a reply into my office by 9 a.m. Saigon time, I will try to get it to him if you desire. On the other hand, we have the perfectly good basis for saying there wasnʼt much time to give him an answer. End comment. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:06 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 266–268. 2 Document 305 . 307. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 307. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 14, 1966. SUBJECT Anti-infiltration barrier between North and South Vietnam I recommended in my October 14 trip report 2 to you that we install south of the 17th Parallel a barrier against infiltration from North into South Vietnam. We are now preparing to proceed to install the ground portions of this barrier. The easternmost portion will be a continuous ground barrier of fences, wire, mines and sensors, supported by artillery, aircraft and mobile troops, and will extend from the South China Sea westward approximately 30 kilometers, as far as the land remains relatively flat. To the west of this continuous ground barrier will be intermittent ground barriers placed in the ravines or defiles through which men and supplies are forced by the terrain to move. These barriers are supported by General Westmoreland and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. West of the ground barriers there is a clear need for an air barrier. The exact character of the air barrier has not been decided. It may be an intensification of the present program of air strikes on infiltration routes, a form of the Air Force “Beaver” proposal involving continuous bombing of three or four lines of choke points, or some other air method of denying transit to enemy trucks, men and supplies. We are now taking steps to acquire the munitions, sensors and other equipment and facilities necessary to implement the air portion of an anti-infiltration barrier. 3 Robert S. McNamara 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk and Wheeler. 2 Document 268 . 3 In two memoranda to Katzenbach, November 16 and November 26, Rosenthal summarized and discussed two briefings on the barrier provided to Department of State officials by General Starbird and Richard Steadman. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 308. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1 Washington, November 14, 1966, 6:03 p.m. 84238. Ref: a) Saigonʼs 10856; b) State 83786. 2 1. You should convey following to Lewandowski before he departs for Hanoi: 2. We will be awaiting with great interest Lewandowskiʼs account of his forthcoming visit. What he learns there may have an important bearing on how effectively he will be able to pursue his efforts to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way for further exchanges. 3. In connection with Lewandowskiʼs observation about the need “to be patient and look for indirect symptoms”, we believe we have exercised what in all objectivity can be called a high degree of patience. We would be prepared to be even more patient if we knew that something of importance was at the end of the road. We have listened to literally scores of well-intentioned persons who in varying degree have claimed to be reflecting Hanoiʼs views, but we have not yet had authoritative word from Hanoi itself as to its real conditions or how it would envisage reaching a peaceful settlement by any means other than our complete acceptance of its terms. 4. If during Lewandowskiʼs forthcoming visit to Hanoi, the Prime Minister should again ask him “what the Americans think”, Lewandowski should convey the idea, as his impression of our views, that while we remain intent on finding a path to a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not prepared to withdraw and find that armed subversive elements from the North have moved in again. We are serious in expressing our willingness to remove our troops, to dismantle our bases, and accept a non-aligned South Viet-Nam so long as it is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard the genuine neutrality of South Viet-Nam as opposed to our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an approach toward reciprocal actions of de-escalation, we are aware that Hanoi must assign weight to considerations of face, and we have said that so long as we were certain that the elements from the North were removed, we would not insist on any acknowledgment that these forces had ever been in the South. 5. In addition to the foregoing, we have the following specific comments on Lewandowskiʼs four questions: A. The Manila formulation on withdrawal was considered and worded with the greatest care. It was included in the communique in the light of specific indications from Eastern European sources that such a mention of a definite withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable basis for negotiations. The mechanics of a phased withdrawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by mutual example. B. We have often said that we supported free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese people a government of their own choice. We are prepared to abide by the genuine manifestation of that free choice. We support the emerging constitutional process in South Viet-Nam. The orderly formation of a responsive and representative government based on free elections will receive our support. C. We are on record that the question of the reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese of both North and South through their own free decision, without any interference from outside. How soon that can take place depends on a number of factors, above all the restoration of peace and order in South Viet-Nam so that South Viet-Nam will be in a position to treat freely with NVN on this matter. D. We have already declared our view that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. Since 1954 there have been many developments which have revealed sharply the need for an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision and control. We would be prepared to discuss all matters bearing upon this complicated problem. 6. We would also observe that what Lewandowski terms our “theoretical” third question of how we get from here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a “package deal” including, as he put it, not only A and B but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range all the way from the reciprocal measures of de-escalation to the components of a final settlement. The immediate issue is to find out precisely and concretely even if quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped bombing. Lewandowski would be rendering great service if during his conversations in Hanoi he is able to bring fresh light on the answer to this question. (You should refer again at this point to item 3d) of reftel b.) 7. Finally you might tell Lewandowski that the remaining aspects of the questions raised by you yesterday, i.e. those not discussed above, are also still of real concern to us and any light he can shed on them by virtue of his forthcoming visit will be helpful. We are proceeding on the understanding, of course, that Lewandowski in Hanoi will be speaking throughout for himself, on the basis of what he understands to be our position. 3 Katzenbach 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold [1]. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Cooper and Heywood Isham of EA/VN; cleared by Harriman, Unger, and William Bundy; and approved by William Bundy. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 268–269. 2 Documents 306 and 305 . 3 In telegram 10955 from Saigon, November 15, Lodge reported that in a meeting with Lewandowski and DʼOrlandi he had twice read the full text of this telegram, both men had taken copious notes, DʼOrlandi had indicated that he was “rather encouraged” by the U.S. response, and Lewandowski had stated that he shared that view. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk 1 Washington, November 15, 1966. SUBJECT Additional Contributions in Vietnam and Your Trip We have now received replies and reports from all our Embassies, 2 leading to the following judgments: 1. Australia and New Zealand . If the elections come out right, both will do more. But they need no urging and your arrival right after the elections would be badly misconstrued. 2. Korea . Park has now announced the formation of a service force, and is being vigorously attacked by his opposition for this. The Embassy believes it crystal clear that this is the maximum to be expected before the elections next March. With the decision made and the issue controversial, a stop by you in Korea would be a great mistake in my judgment. 3. Japan . Alex thinks the Japanese may be willing to undertake civilian assistance on a few projects but not on a broad basis. While a Japanese stop by you could be pegged to broad discussions, it could not be expected to produce more than very modest results in terms of any additional Japanese contribution. 4. GRC . The Embassy feels there is a distinct possibility of more civilian help in fields of engineering, agriculture, and health, subject to agreement on financing. However, it is my judgment that these contributions can be obtained without a visit by you, and that any such visit would in any event have to be directed to some other clear objective—lest we appear to stir up the question of GRC military forces. 5. Philippines . The Embassy feels it is definitely premature to seek additional military contributions, and that any further non-military assistance should arise from clear GVN initiative. There are various possibilities, but the slim pickings and the strong chance of negative reactions to a visit by you—which could hardly have any other purpose at this moment—lead me to recommend strongly in the negative on your stopping there. 6. Malaysia . The Embassy believes GOM would not now consider a military contribution. There is a fair chance they might be willing to send police and development advisors to a relatively secure Vietnamese province, but Bell doubts they have enough manpower to fully “adopt” a province. A stop by you might be some help, but the pickings would again appear slim. 7. Thailand . Martin is just in with the judgment that the Presidentʼs pitch will take some weeks to sink in. He reports a strongly negative reaction by Dawee. While Martin gives no judgment on your stopping, my own would be negative in the next 2–3 weeks, while the matter is obviously under intense private discussion. 8. Singapore . The Embassy thinks there is no chance of any kind of assistance for the present. 9. Burma . Byroade believes the Burmese would not be prepared to do anything. 10. India . The Embassy believes that GOI might be persuaded to consider some form of humanitarian help but might well feel compelled to offer similar contributions to North Vietnam. Bowles recommends against pressing the issue. 11. Pakistan . The Embassy believes GOP would consider civilian as well as military contributions to SVN to be beyond the realm of their political-military capabilities at this time. 12. Iran . The Embassy rates chances of getting any military element as infinitesimal. Tehran believes there would be an even chance of persuading the Shah to enlarge the Iranian civilian medical effort, but Saigon recommends against this on usefulness grounds for the moment. Meyer does recommend you stop in Tehran if you go to any neighbors. 13. Turkey . The Ambassador is not optimistic regarding a new approach to Turks for manpower contribution to Vietnam. If we are to approach Turks at a high level, the Ambassador suggests the best opportunity would be when President Sunay visits Washington in early December. 14. Greece . The Embassy doubts that GOG is now willing to become involved even marginally in the Vietnam issue. In terms of these responses and judgments, I find great difficulty in suggesting a meaningful itinerary for a trip by you. 3 For the various reasons given above, I would be clearly negative on Seoul, Taipei, Manila, Singapore, Bangkok, New Delhi, Rawalpindi, Ankara, and Athens. Burma, Malaysia, and Iran are at best make-weights and would create a very confusing picture of the purposes of the trip. Even a “search for peace” motif would have little bearing in these places, as likewise in India and Pakistan in view of their attitudes and the recent Harriman visits. In short, my own conclusion is that the only stops that make real sense would be Japan—always justified on broad grounds—and Saigon itself. If you did this routing to Paris, you could refuel in Tehran and stop briefly if you wish. This is not of course a trip that will raise new forces, but it does make other kinds of sense. As an alternative, I suggest the possibility of your doing a Tehran-Saigon-Tokyo itinerary after the NATO conference. This would be short enough to be compressed into the period between the NATO conference and Christmas, and might fit better with your other commitments and the possible importance of preparing carefully for the NATO conference itself. I hate to seem negative, but a highly selective contribution-seeking tour seems almost worse than none. I cannot imagine what the press and other capitals would make of it. Hence, the middle ground seems to me the only feasible kind of trip that would have any merit. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA. Secret. Drafted by Bundy. 2 See Document 302 and footnote 2 thereto. 3 In circular telegram 83500, November 11, the Department noted that Ruskʼs upcoming trip in connection with the NATO meeting on December 15 might be directed in part to obtaining additional manpower contributions for Vietnam. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–3 VIET S/LOUISIANA) 310. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) 310. Letter From President Johnson to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Lodge) 1 Washington, November 16, 1966. Dear Cabot: I have carefully digested your letter of 7 November on pacification, 2 as I did your memorandum at Manila. 3 In fact, I have consistently sought to encourage an accelerated pacification program ever since you were among the first to call it the heart of the matter some months ago. There does not seem to me to be any major difference between your ideas of what is needed to make pacification work, and those of my chief advisers and myself. Bob McNamara and the Joint Chiefs realize, as does General Westmoreland on the basis of the dispositions he is increasingly making, that a limited number of U.S. combat forces must be detailed to be the catalysts for the Vietnamese. What worries them is rather that if the U.S. takes over too much of the job, the ARVN will tend to sit back and let us fight that “war” too. Iʼm sure that you are no more eager than we are to let this happen. As a matter of fact, getting the U.S. military more heavily engaged in refocussing ARVN on the heart of the matter is one reason why we here have seriously considered charging MACV with pacification. I hope you will ponder whether this is not in the end the best way to achieve the aim you seek. I genuinely believe it is—however, I am willing to try out for a time a compromise solution, and warmly endorsed the recent instructions sent to you. 4 For this scheme to work, it is essential that there be a clearcut assignment of pacification responsibilities to Porter and MACV now, including a clear delineation between their respective responsibilities, and then that Porter and MACV each organize as effectively as possible to carry out the tasks assigned. If showing ARVN the way on pacification can take up to ten percent of our troops, it also deserves the full-time attention of some of our best generals. So I have asked Bob McNamara to send you the best men he has here for assignment to the civilian as well as military sides, in the event that Westmoreland cannot spare enough top talent for the key spots proposed. You have our full support and backing. In turn, we here depend on you not to let your people spend too much time in arguing details but to make them get on with the job. Warmly, Lyndon B. Johnson 5 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXI. Secret. Drafted by Komer and cleared by McNamara and Rusk. In a back channel telegram, November 18, Komer gave Lodge “advance flavor” of the Presidentʼs reaction to Lodgeʼs November 7 letter, Document 294 : “He said I agree with Cabot that pacification is the heart of the matter, Iʼve given him every support I know how and will give him more if he needs it. But I wish heʼd make his people stop arguing about the organizational instructions we send, accept them cheerfully, and get on with the job.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Back Channel Cables) 2 Document 294 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 294 . 4 See Document 304 . 5 Below his signature the President wrote, “Written from Hospital—but I applaud your comments in your personal note and when this reaches you it will be about a month since Manila and perhaps 500 of our boys are gone. Make them all follow your orders & letʼs get going. With admiration & thanks.” 311. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 311. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 17, 1966. Pacification Organization Moving at Last . Your Tuesday blast led Rusk to send a tough cable 2 which finally unfroze Lodge and Porter (I did a few back channel words to the wise myself). 3 Lodge is now in with three long replies (attached) 4 which essentially buy our proposals. Suggest you read only sidelined portions. The only significant resistance is that Westy refuses to assign a top Deputy for pacification but is otherwise strengthening his staff. I donʼt worry about this because Westy is really turning around and will in time see the logic of a Deputy. He told me privately he intends to put Major General Weyand (whoʼs tops) in as J–5 on pacification—a big step in the right direction. I hope youʼll forgive me if I feel pretty good about all this. It took four months of backstairs wheeling and dealing to get us even this far (plus some bruised feelings), but the fact that you showed everyone you backed me turned the trick. I think (as you do, judging from your latest letter to Lodge) 5 that even the new civilian organization wonʼt really be able to do the job, and that if we want solid results by end-1967 weʼll have to give it to Westy. 6 But at least weʼve already gone 25% of the way in the right direction. Your letter will set Lodge himself to thinking about whether to go the rest of the way. If he doesnʼt, the time to take the next bite may be when Lodge leaves. Iʼm sure heʼd like to switch no later than next spring (heʼd dearly love Rome and the Vatican as a reward), though I believe him when he says heʼll stay as long as his Commander-in-Chief wants him. However, I strongly believe that decisive results in 1967 demand an Ambassador who can take hold and manage that sprawling empire . Iʼm sure McNamara would agree. If you switched Lodge next February (after the 90–120 days are up), this change in ambassadors could cover up the shift of pacification responsibilities. I wish I could offer you a top notch name (a McNamara, Mac Bundy, or Katzenbach type). Iʼll keep thinking, as I doubt that youʼll have any more important appointment to make before November 1968. If Iʼm getting over my head, just tell me so. R.W. Komer 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum. 2 Telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15; see footnote 1, Document 304 . The President presumably delivered his “Tuesday blast” during his luncheon meeting on Tuesday, November 15, with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Komer, and Moyers. The meeting lasted from about 2:05 to 3:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. 3 See footnote 1, Document 310 . 4 Attached but not printed are telegrams 11124 and 11125, November 17. The third telegram from Lodge has not been identified. 5 Document 310 . 6 In telegram WDC 13803 to Westmoreland, November 23, General Johnson stated: “The more I ruminate about the rate of progress in Vietnam and the inevitable relationship to our own elections in 1968, the more convinced I am that you will be given full responsibility for the program [revolutionary development] sometime after the first of the year.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) 312. Editorial Note 312. Editorial Note In a 34-page draft memorandum for the President, November 17, 1966, Secretary McNamara recommended that a supplemental appropriation request totaling $12.4 billion be submitted to Congress in January 1967. He also recommended that “forces totaling 469,000 be approved, for planning and budgeting purposes, for deployment to SVN by June 30, 1968.” A copy of Secretary McNamaraʼs memorandum is in the Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII. A substantial portion of the first 22 pages is printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , volume IV, pages 133–135, 365–385. In explaining the operational concept that underlay his recommendations, Secretary McNamara first discussed “Military Strategy in Vietnam” (pages 7–17) and then “Consolidation and Extension of GVN Control” (pages 17–22), incorporating and developing many of the points made in his October 14 memorandum to the President ( Document 268 ). In a final section (pages 23–24), he provided his reasons for specific program recommendations and the costs by major area of activity. The opening paragraphs of Secretary McNamaraʼs discussion of “Military Strategy in Vietnam” read as follows: “The war in Vietnam has two highly interdependent parts: (1) the ‘regular’ war against the main force VC/NVA battalions and regiments, and the interdiction of their men and supplies flowing down from North Vietnam, and (2) the ‘Pacification’ or revolutionary development war to neutralize the local VC guerrillas and gain the permanent support of the SVN population. “The infiltrated men and supplies serve to bolster the regular units whose function is to support the local VC guerrillas and infrastructure by defeating the GVN forces in the area and generally exposing the GVNʼs inability to protect the rural populace. The local guerrillas and infrastructure maintain a constant VC presence in their area and support the offensive efforts of the regular units by providing intelligence, terrain guidance, supplies, and recruits. In addition, the guerrillas conduct many of the thousands of incidents of terror, harassment, and sabotage reported each month. The principal task of U.S. military forces in SVN must be to eliminate the offensive capability of the regular units in order to allow the GVN to counter the guerrilla forces and extend permanent control over areas from which regular units have been cleared. “We now face a choice of two approaches to the threat of the regular VC/NVA forces. The first approach would be to continue in 1967 to increase friendly forces as rapidly as possible, and without limit, and employ them primarily in large-scale ‘seek out and destroy’ operations to destroy the main force VC/NVA units. “This approach appears to have some distinct disadvantages. First, we are finding very strongly diminishing marginal returns in the destruction of VC/NVA forces. If our estimates of enemy losses (killed, captured and defected) are correct, VC/NVA losses increased by only 115 per week (less than 15%) during a period in which we increased friendly strength by 160,000 including 140,000 U.S. military personnel and 42 U.S. and Third Country maneuver battalions. At this rate, an additional 100,000 friendly personnel deployed would increase VC/ NVA losses by some 70 per week. Second, expanding U.S. deployments have contributed to a very serious inflation in South Vietnam. Prices increased 75–90% in FY66. An extra 100,000 U.S. forces would add at least P9 billion to our piaster expenditures, doubling the 1967 inflationary gap in SVN. Third, the high and increasing cost of the war to the United States is likely to encourage the Communists to doubt our staying power and to try to ‘wait us out.’ “The second approach is to follow a similarly aggressive strategy of ‘seek out and destroy,’ but to build friendly forces only to that level required to neutralize the large enemy units and prevent them from interfering with the pacification program. It is essential to this approach that such a level be consistent with a stable economy in SVN, and consistent with a military posture that the United States credibly would maintain indefinitely, thus making a Communist attempt to ‘wait us out’ less attractive. “I believe that this level is about 470,000 U.S. and 52,000 Free World personnel and less than half of the ARVN.* The remainder of the ARVN, plus a portion of the U.S. force, would give priority to improving the pacification effort. The enemy regular units would cease to perform what I believe to be their primary function of diverting our effort to give security to the population. This, plus the effects of a successful interdiction campaign to cut off their other support, would effectively neutralize them, possibly at the cost of far fewer casualties to both sides than the first approach would allow. “*Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 U.S. strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force a 6/30/68 deployment limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.] “I believe it is time to adopt the second approach for three reasons: (1) if MACV estimates of enemy strength are correct, we have not been able to attrite the enemy forces fast enough to break their morale and more U.S. forces are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future; (2) we cannot deploy more than about 470,000 personnel by the end of 1967 without a high probability of generating a self-defeating runaway inflation in SVN and (3) an endless escalation of U.S. deployments is not likely to be acceptable in the U.S. or to induce the enemy to believe that the U.S. is prepared to stay as long as is required to produce a secure non-communist SVN. Obviously a greatly improved pacification campaign must be waged to take advantage of the protection offered by the major friendly forces. Alternatively, if enemy strength is greatly overstated and our ‘seek out and destroy’ operations have been more effective than our strength and loss estimates would imply—a possibility discussed below—more than 470,000 U.S. personnel should not be required to neutralize the VC/NVA main force.” 313. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 313. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 17, 1966, 1:30 p.m. Mr. President: This memorandum suggests that the optimum form of negotiation with Hanoi may be: —a secret negotiation of a total deal; —a dramatic joint announcement followed by a complete end of hostilities, infiltration, and the beginning of troop withdrawals. 1. A Possible Problem It is certain that the men in Hanoi have not yet decided that their best option is to negotiate. And there is still a probability that they believe that the burden of the war on the U.S. will give them a better resolution in the future than they could get at present, although that conviction may be waning. But there may be another problem. They may be willing to accept the outcome we have outlined; but they may not be able to see how they can get from here to there without a complete collapse in their negotiating position along the way. Therefore, they may think a different outcome than the one we promise would result. That is why they may, with some candor, call our proposals “trickery”—or worse. Their problem is this: If they stop infiltration and if they stop terror in the South, two things are likely to happen: —the Viet Cong movement will quickly collapse; —they will then lose their international bargaining position. This is because the Viet Cong are so dependent on northern supplies, men, and leadership and because the ability to disrupt and to terrorize is the only serious bargaining leverage they have—or believe they have. Once the Viet Cong movement collapses, it is almost impossible to envisage its starting up again. For example, they may well feel that any substantial de-escalation by Hanoi—in infiltrated men, supplies, etc.—would be immediately recognized by the Viet Cong as the beginning of the end. The Viet Cong might scramble for their place in the society of South Viet Nam. On the other hand, we could sustain various degrees of de-escalation without a collapse in our position or that of South Viet Nam. With a patent collapse in the Viet Cong they may feel Saigon and we could claim a “new situation” and ignore prior commitments. Communists, as a matter of doctrine, are trained to rely on effective power, not verbal promises or good will. In this context we should remember that, quite contrary to a popular cliche in the West, guerrilla wars have been won or lost clean: mainland China; Malaya; Philippines; Greece. The only compromise solutions were not political but territorial; e.g., the split of Indo-China at the 17th parallel. (I do not count the Laos solution because it is not a solution—the war continues, awaiting the outcome in Viet Nam.) We are, thus, up against a tough problem in trying to talk our way to a satisfactory resolution of a guerrilla war—with no clear precedents. 2. A Possible Solution If I have correctly described a part of Hanoiʼs problem in ending the war by negotiation, the answer may lie in communicating to them a solution which takes that problem into account and making it credible. Specifically, we must communicate three things: — an end position which Hanoi and the Viet Cong could live with; — a way of making our guarantee of that position credible; — a way of getting there which would minimize the significance of Hanoiʼs and Viet Congʼs weak bargaining leverage along the way. Now each element in turn. 3. An End Position We can offer the Viet Cong only two things in South Viet Nam and the substance of one of them is dependent on how soon they move towards peace: —a guarantee against slaughter, as in Indonesia. —a right to organize politically and to vote, but only after arms are laid down. They cannot mix terror and political status. The meaning of the second offer is contingent on when it is picked up; for example, they have already missed the constitutional assembly; if they want to get in on the next round of village and provincial elections, they had better move fast (before early 1967), and this could prove important in establishing a local political base for them; if they want to influence the presidential elections under the new constitution, they have only between now and September 1967. Since they know that their prospects on a one-man-one-vote basis are not good in South Viet Nam, the Viet Cong may not find a role in domestic politics worth much; it may be more important to Hanoi which could be concerned to save some face for their proteges and protect them from the reprisals that could come if they persist in violence once the game from the North is called off. As for Hanoi, we can only offer them our withdrawal six months after they are out and violence subsides, plus a free Viet Cong run at peaceful politics plus the promise of an ultimate plebiscite on unity under peaceful conditions plus economic assistance in reconstruction as part of Southeast Asia if they want it. [It may, incidentally, be important to communicate to them soon that we do not intend to let the war drag; that we plan to up the ante; and our present offers to them may not hold indefinitely.] 2 4. The Problem of Credibility The credibility problem can only be fully solved in conjunction with the bargaining leverage problem discussed in Section 5 below. But two things could contribute: —negotiating in secret the end position while the war goes on; —announcing it publicly (and perhaps registering it before the UN)—the process described in Section 5 begins. Specifically, the U.S. and the fighting allies would join the government of South Viet Nam in guaranteeing the amnesty to the Viet Cong. If the Viet Cong wanted promptly to participate in peaceful elections—for example at the local level—we (and the government in Saigon) would accept international supervision. If asked what our sanctions would be in the case of violation of the amnesty, we could point out that the South Vietnamese would remain for a long time extremely dependent on our assistance and on the political support of the rest of the world. But no guarantee to the Viet Cong as an organization could be secure unless they cut out violence and did not revive it. 5. The Bargaining Leverage Problem There is only one answer to the Communist bargaining problem: speed. Once the end position is negotiated in secret and announced, then the war—North and South, main force and guerrilla—must stop dramatically; the North Viet Nam units must immediately begin heading home (from Laos, too); and we must begin immediately some withdrawals. All infiltration and supply movements south must stop on a given day—100%. The drama of the joint announcement of the agreement by ourselves, Hanoi, Saigon, and the NLF is the best facesaver they could have, with symmetrical movements promptly following. Then a Geneva conference could take place on the details of the international aspects of the deal—a beefed up control commission; straightening out Laos, etc. 6. How to Probe the Viability of this Concept The probe should be a direct U.S.-Hanoi gambit, with no intermediaries. It should be conducted in great secrecy, and evident seriousness, by a completely credible U.S. official. He should leave behind an aide-memoire for communication to Hanoi. 3 W.W. Rostow 4 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Rusk and Katzenbach. 2 Brackets in the source text. 3 In the agenda prepared for the President for November 19 (during Johnsonʼs stay at Bethesda Naval Hospital), Rostow included an item entitled “Direct Hanoi Probe” and noted: “Sec. Rusk is thinking about my suggestion. I believe we should try it as a supplementary track.” (Ibid.) 4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden 314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sweden 1 Washington, November 19, 1966, 5:46 p.m. 88128. 1. At luncheon meeting November 11 Foreign Minister Nilsson assisted by Mr. Bergstrom presented to the Secretary an account of Swedish contacts in Warsaw with North Vietnamese representatives and of the late October visit of Swedish Ambassador Petri to Hanoi and his conversations with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh. Memcon of that conversation together with Swedish precis of these recent contacts with North Vietnamese 2 and our analysis of Hanoiʼs positions as reflected therein 3 being pouched. 2. On November 17 Unger conveyed to Minister Nilsson, Bergstrom, Oberg and Ambassador de Besche in New York Secretaryʼs formal thanks, results of our analysis of message transmitted by Swedes and “Points for Clarification” which we would like to have Petri discuss with North Vietnamese Foreign Minister on next visit to Hanoi, speaking always of course for Swedish Government and without reference to conversations with us. Text of “Points for Clarification” follows: “1. What does the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister intend that his government would do when he says ‘We know what we will have to do’ [i.e., if US stops bombing of NVN]? 4 Mr. Trinh named two conditions which the United States must fulfill to bring about a climate for negotiations. It is understood of course that if those conditions were fulfilled, negotiations could promptly be undertaken, but since the fulfillment of those conditions would represent significant steps for the United States, what would be the reciprocal actions by North Viet-Nam? It is encouraging to know that the North Vietnamese apparently recognize this reciprocity but it is essential, if their position is to be accurately evaluated, to know what it is that they recognize they ‘will have to do’. “2. What is the significance of the FNL being characterized, as Mr. Trinh put it, as ‘the most valid’ spokesman for the South Vietnamese people? What is this intended to convey concerning the status of the FNL vis-à-vis other spokesmen? “3. With reference to the question of reunification, Mr. Trinh referred to the necessity of creating conditions in South Viet-Nam ‘to permit a move in the direction of a future reunification’. The conditions in South Viet-Nam as Mr. Trinh himself implied would grow out of general elections held in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy. Would Mr. Trinh not envisage that the question of unification would be resolved at that time in accordance with the mandate given a new government by the people through those general elections? “4. If Mr. Trinh should mention the point raised by the North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw, namely that ‘no military actions should be taken in the demilitarized zone’, Mr. Trinh might be asked whether this is intended to be in effect a proposal for the strict observance of the Geneva Accords in the demilitarized zone north and south of the demarcation line with the full functioning of the ICC throughout the zone.” 3. In reply to Nilssonʼs request for any additional comments Unger referred to Secretaryʼs letter 5 which mentions possibility that Petri might be asked by North Vietnamese about our knowledge of his contact there and of his conversations, and our suggestion that he respond with a query as to whether North Vietnamese Government would wish Swedish Government to inform us of these matters, in which case Swedes would be happy to explore question. 6 Unger explained that while there are many channels to Hanoi we have thus far been unable to set up any significant dialogue, and if North Viet-Nam should show a disposition to begin to communicate with us substantively, we would be happy to consider this. It was agreed that Petri and the Swedes in general might not turn out to be most suitable intermediary and that in fact the North Vietnamese might choose to turn to direct contact with us, but it was considered nonetheless useful for Petri to explore the matter of communication if he had any opening from the North Vietnamese. 4. Petri will of course be reporting his conversations directly with Stockholm and it was agreed that our further communications with the Swedes on this subject should be carried out through Ambassador Parsons there. This will be channel for conveying to us Petriʼs reactions to exchanges which have taken place during Nilssonʼs visit here, instructions he is given for his next visit to Hanoi and any other follow-up. 5. Unger indicated we would hope that Petri would again visit Hanoi as soon as this can be done without raising suspicions about any special role he may be playing. Swedes agreed and said that as soon as he makes visit to Stockholm, expected soon, on export questions as well as his Hanoi contact, he can then again visit Hanoi and this will be logical in view of his having reported on his previous visit to his own Foreign Office and presumably received instructions. They thought early December would be a likely time. 7 6. There was some substantive discussion of the issues which might arise in Petriʼs next conversations in Hanoi, it being understood that this exchange was between the Swedes and ourselves and not for discussion in Hanoi. Unger mentioned Goldberg formulaʼs reference to private and other assurances about a response to bombing cessation and illustrated the kinds of de-escalatory actions by Hanoi which we would take to be appropriate responses, such as a cessation of infiltration, a reduction of the level of military activity and/or terror in South Viet-Nam or some troop withdrawal from South to North. In response to further Swedish probing as to what would come next after these first steps toward de-escalation and their mention of a possible ceasefire, Unger said it was not possible, without knowing more of Hanoiʼs views, to carry the process further. We would hope that once a beginning has been made it would be possible to establish some mode of communication with Hanoi to arrive at some understanding of the next phases of de-escalation, although it was not to be ruled out that this might proceed by mutual example. He also made clear our recognition of the problem of face for Hanoi and our readiness to consider ways to meet with problem. With reference to the fourth point in the “Points for Clarification,” Unger emphasized that we were suggesting this be raised only if the North Vietnamese themselves refer to the DMZ problem. He added that it would always have to be understood that any arrangements that might conceivably be worked out for the DMZ would have to provide for a reasonably reliable means of detecting and dealing with violations; we could not agree to putting American and Vietnamese forces in jeopardy, exposed to surprise action by the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong. 7. The Swedes referred to their contacts with NLF representatives outside Viet-Nam and it was agreed that there was no reason not to continue these but at the same time no mention should be made in that channel of the contacts with the North Vietnamese or ourselves. Unger said we would of course be interested if there were any indications from NLF representatives of a desire to talk about bringing the conflict to an end or of any divisions within the VC. It was considered unlikely that the latter would come through these channels which are all outside the country. 8. The need for absolute secrecy concerning the present exercise was emphasized and the Swedes were particularly intent on keeping word of this out of their UN mission in New York. 9. We anticipate that Bergstrom will be in touch with Ambassador Parsons early this coming week to reopen contact on this matter but we envisage no further action required until Petri is in Stockholm and preparing for a return trip to Hanoi. At that point we will of course wish to be kept informed and have an opportunity to pass on our thoughts before he again leaves Stockholm. You will note this traffic is being handled Nodis and identified with the code word “Aspen”. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ASPEN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Aspen. Drafted by Unger and approved by Rusk. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 662–663. 2 See Document 303 . 3 Apparently a reference to a memorandum from Fred Greene of INR to Unger, November 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/ASPEN) 4 Brackets in the source text. Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, quoted the text of a paper provided by the Swedish Government stating that, in further talks with Petri, he “has now made clear that he repeatedly tried to make Mr. Trinh elaborate on this statement. Mr. Trinh, however, avoided to do so.” (Ibid.) 5 Not further identified. 6 Telegram 652 from Stockholm, November 29, stated that, according to Swedish officials who had had further “exhaustive talks with Petri to doublecheck accuracy his reports,” there was “no doubt at all in Petriʼs mind that Trinh meant and expected what he had said to be passed on to US.” (Ibid.) 7 Telegram 653 from Stockholm, November 29, indicated that it was intended that Petri would return to Hanoi about December 10. (Ibid.) However, Petri did not return to Hanoi until January 1967. 315. Report Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 315. Report Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Harriman) 1 Washington, November 22, 1966. REPORT OF POST-MANILA TRIP In my talks with Heads of State and Ministers, I found, everywhere, that the Manila Conference and the Presidentʼs Asian trip had made a most favorable impression. It was evident that several points in the communique and declarations were viewed as being of particular significance, and I stressed these in my presentation: 1) The fact that the President sat at a round table with six Asian leaders as equals; 2) The favorable military developments in South Vietnam; 3) Agreement that objectives were limited to giving South Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their own future; 4) The desire to reduce hostilities as soon as possible and undertake negotiations for a peaceful settlement; 5) Agreement that when aggression from the North had ceased, Allied troops would be withdrawn within six months; 6) The fact that the only discussion of escalation dealt with increased effort on pacification; 7) The commitment by the Government of South Vietnam to complete the Constitution, hold national elections next year, and village and hamlet elections in January. (In this connection, the September elections had made a favorable impression, and the commitment to take these further steps increased the prestige of the Saigon Government); 8) The further commitment of the GVN to undertake a program of national reconciliation giving hope that discussions would eventually take place between all political factions within South Vietnam; 9) The pledge for regional cooperation in social and economic development in which the US would participate; 10) Although a number of these points had been previously stated by the Government of the United States or South Vietnam, the fact that they were agreed to at this meeting of seven nations gave them greater weight and credence. I found uniform acceptance of the Presidentʼs sincerity in seeking a peaceful solution. In response to my request all government leaders stated their willingness to do everything they could to bring about private or public negotiations. Particularly in Italy and in London, the Ministers were interested in discussing this subject in detail. In other countries, good will was expressed but no specific suggestions emerged. There was also considerable opinion that it would probably be more practical to get negotiations started through private conversations between the United States and North Vietnam rather than through a Geneva-type conference. Some thought that the North Vietnamese would want to know where they and the NLF would come out in a settlement before agreeing to engage in public negotiations. In addition, some suggested that since Red China would continue to oppose negotiations, Hanoi might wish to face Peking with a fait accompli rather than an argument as to whether or not to negotiate. In almost every conversation the subject of a suspension of the bombing was raised, particularly now that the military situation had improved. Almost all expressed the belief that talks could be gotten under way if we would stop the bombing, but no one could give any positive assurances. In most cases the opinions expressed were based on contacts with Eastern European countries, although in India there had been direct discussions by Indian representatives in Hanoi. 2 I expressed as my personal opinion that calls for unilateral action on the part of the United States, as proposed by President De Gaulle in Phnom Penh, 3 did not further the cause of peace but, in fact, increased Hanoiʼs intransigence. I suggested that if anyone had proposals to make, a call be made to both sides to reduce hostilities. I explained that the President had expressed his willingness to stop the bombing, but only if reciprocal action were taken by Hanoi. I pointed out that the same people who were now asking for a cessation in bombing had done so last year, and were again holding out the hope for a favorable reaction from Hanoi. The suggestions last year had been for a pause of at most two to three weeks, whereas, in fact, the President had continued the pause for over five weeks. The only reaction from Hanoi was to take military advantage of the pause by substantially increasing shipments to the South, rebuilding bridges, constructing detours and repairing roads. I furthermore explained that the bombing was a military necessity and had to be continued unless there was parallel deescalation of hostilities on the part of North Vietnam. Although these discussions helped clarify the situation with the governments, they brought out the fact that bombing was extremely unpopular among the people everywhere. The bombing is thought of in terms of experiences of World War II with the heavy civilian casualties and suffering. In addition, the idea of a great power such as the United States hitting a small country was repugnant. Fear was also expressed that bombing would expand the war to a confrontation with China or the Soviet Union. I emphasized both in talks with the governments and with the press the restricted nature of the targets and the care exercised to avoid as far as practicable, civilian casualties. I pointed out that although the President was determined to achieve his minimum objectives, he had stated that he had no intention of enlarging the conflict. Nevertheless, in every country I visited I found the strongest hope that some way could be found to stop the bombing in the North, and particularly that there would be no further escalation. I gained the impression that the favorable reaction from the Manila Conference would be dissipated if there was an evident escalation of the bombing. George Brown, who has done much to keep the Labor Party in line on Vietnam, stated flatly that any further escalation “might well lose you the support of all your friends in Europe like me who are trying to help.” I took advantage of the opportunity to state to the press, and on television and radio where available, on my arrival and departure at the airports and at special press conferences the salient points I made to the governments. I had a remarkably good press, even in Pakistan where the press usually distorts anything an American visitor says. I believe this good reaction was primarily because of the good will the President had generated by the Manila Conference and his Asian visits. [Here follow specific reports on each of the ten countries visited by Harriman.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15. Secret. Harriman forwarded the report to the President and Rusk on November 28, and Rostow forwarded it to the President under cover of a November 29 memorandum stating that “Governor Harriman obviously did a first-class job.” (Ibid.) See Document 281 for information on Harrimanʼs trip. 2 A memorandum of Harrimanʼs conversation on October 31 with L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister, and T.N. Kaul, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Exernal Affairs, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. 3 For more information on De Gaulleʼs speech of September 1, see footnote 4, Document 229 . 316. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 316. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, November 27, 1966, 1315Z. 11814. Ref: Saigon 11790. 2 1. Subsequent to various discussions with Vietnamese officials described in reftel, Zorthian and Habib held lengthy discussion with Minister of Info and Chieu Hoi Nguyen Bao Tri Saturday afternoon to obtain latest GVN thinking on national reconciliation campaign and to stimulate action. 2. Tri said GVN discussions on basic principles to be incorporated in effort are now under way and reported on various talks he has had with Thieu, Ky, General Khang of III Corps and others. He said that present prospects are for proclamation by Thieu about one month before Tet, to be followed up with nation-wide radio and TV speech by Prime Minister. 3. Proclamation would outline governmentʼs proposals in terms of intent and appeal to Viet Cong to join hands with government. Prime Ministerʼs speech would provide more specifics, including commitments on rehabilitation into Vietnamese society, political rights and other specific measures designed to absorb VC into active government programs at level roughly equivalent to their present status. 4. Tri said in his talks with other government officials he had found a good deal of sentiment for initiating reconciliation campaign at time of promulgation of constitution sometime in March but that he personally felt period before Tet was preferable in order to exploit Tet sentiment. 5. We encouraged Tri to maintain this stand but we should also be aware that any proclamation prior to January 1st would be difficult to obtain in view of these pressures for further postponement. 6. Tri also said that his thinking, on which he believes he has Thieuʼs and Kyʼs concurrence, would include explicit opportunities for VC middle and high level cadre to assume responsibilities in Vietnamese society commensurate with their experience and present status. He said there would undoubtedly be a requirement for some sort of review of qualifications but subject to this screening process, military personnel would find opportunities in Vietnamese army, civil administrators would be able to obtain appointment, in the first instance, as contract employees for the Vietnamese Government, doctors would be able to practice their profession after period of national service in Vietnamese hospitals, teachers would be utilized as required in many educational institutions, etc. He also said that present thinking would permit all such returnees to enjoy full political rights, including the right of participation and voting in the forthcoming national elections. 7. Tri also outlined the highlights of his Ministryʼs exploitation campaign, which was described in reftel and on which we are working closely with the Vietnamese. 8. Meanwhile, we are accelerating our own efforts within U.S. Mission to provide Vietnamese with necessary support in this effort. To replace Koren, I have appointed Zorthian as overall Mission director for our support of the reconciliation campaign. He now has the time to devote to this effort because JUSPAO field operations have been taken over by Porter. Specific assignments in fields of psyops, follow-up actions, Chieu Hoi camps, policy direction, approaches to middle level and high level cadre and the various other arrangements necessary for conduct of this campaign have now been made and detailed document incorporating US ideas in all these fields are under preparation. This will serve to crystalize our own thinking and to provide a coordinated US approach to the Vietnamese as they prepare their own plans. Central to the whole effort, of course, is the necessity for the Vietnamese to be in the forefront of this effort, with the US role kept as much in the background as possible. 9. These various developments will be further pursued and refined in the coming weeks. As necessary, I will undertake further discussions with General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky in the course of the days to come and certainly I expect to have a long talk with both on the major elements of the program before my departure for Washington. We expect to provide more detailed information on the contents of the anticipated proclamation and speech in the near future but at this point Vietnamese thinking has not progressed to a stage where draft texts are available. We will, however, have more progress on preparations in general to report by the end of next week and will continue to inform you as events unfold. At this stage, however, believe it would be unwise to press Vietnamese for more immediate surfacing of campaign than they visualize or to draw more than cursory public attention to this effort. 10. As General Tri has indicated, the Vietnamese are going about this effort with deliberation and considerable advance preparation and I believe this sort of solid foundation is far preferable to any hasty announcements on their part which would be premature in terms of actual follow up actions and which would have been true had they made announcement on November 1. Given the sentiment described by Tri for postponement of the effort until the promulgation of the constitution, I would suggest it is far wiser on our part to push for actual public proclamation the first week of January rather than at an earlier time. 11. Meanwhile, we will of course continue to press for detailed preparations so that campaign may be conducted effectively and vigorously once it is initiated. I believe we are now moving in the right direction on this effort at a pace which will bring along the Vietnamese but not outpace them. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. 2 Dated November 26. (Ibid.) 317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 Washington, November 27, 1966, 2:18 p.m. 91787. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Ref: Londonʼs 4337, para 3. 2 1. Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Embassy here. “Gromyko gave me the thumbs up sign as I went aboard the ʼplane at Moscow this morning. I am not sure I can give the same to you, but I am satisfied that my journey was fully worthwhile. I would like to be able to tell you about it in detail at once but see no chance of doing so before Paris. If however you could spare one of your trusted people to come here within the next few days I would happily give him my impression whilst it is fresh in my mind. On the first day 3 I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the question of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message). 4 However, he gave no ground but his interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 14 of your message). 5 This I did orally before dinner on the first evening, giving it to him as my own proposal. Next morning, purely for the sake of clarity, I gave him a piece of paper. The actual words used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only. It was on the basis of this piece of paper that I talked with Kosygin this morning. He was very friendly and after being at pains to establish my credentials and the status of the paper I had given to Gromyko we had a full discussion. I told him that in my view the time was ripe for progress, and given a little help from him, we could perhaps get the result we both wanted. He listened carefully but was totally non-committal. I had to satisfy him that what I had proposed was no substitution for negotiations on the substance but only a way in. On his side after a lot of the usual stuff, pretty muted, about American aggression, he said that they were prepared to make the North Vietnamese four points and the NLF five points ‘a basis for discussion.’ When I said that I had interpreted a basis of discussion as meaning that they would be flexible neither he nor Mr. Gromyko contradicted me. Their package would seem to be an unconditional stopping of the bombing, some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the basis as above. I reminded him that I would be seeing you in Paris in mid-December and that Christmas itself might give some opportunity. On leaving I asked him if I could expect to hear from them again. To this he was pretty cool and said that they would hardly have anything to add unless Gromyko had some foreign policy of his own. However, he characterised our discussions as ‘very useful.’ I cannot really tell what this music means. Greenhill, who was with me and has been at our other meetings with Gromyko and Kosygin over the past year, says that without being able to quote precise words from either Kosygin or Gromyko as a basis for his impression feels sure that their interest in what I had to say was both earnest and profound. He doubts if they have yet made up their minds where to go from here but would not be surprised if in the end we get some bonus. You may hear of this before I do.” 2. Text enclosure to message, headed “Text of Unsigned Piece of Paper Foreign Secretary Handed to Mr. Gromyko on 24 November, 1966,” reads “The following plan is suggested to meet the situation in which the North Vietnamese require the cessation of bombing to be unconditional while the Americans require some assurance that a measure of de-escalation would follow. Consideration might be given to the possibility of the parties agreeing secretly on mutual measures of de-escalation which would be put into effect once the bombing had stopped. In this the first step would be to stop the bombing and the second step would be further action of de-escalation by the American side to which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would respond by similar acts of de-escalation: but with both phases forming part of a firm prior understanding. The order of events would therefore be: phase A. stop the bombing, while phase B., which would follow, would see the execution of the other agreed measures of de-escalation by both sides.” All this would require careful study in which you and I might have to help before there was direct contact between the two sides. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 The reference to telegram 4337 is in error; it should be to telegram 4377, paragraph 3, in which Bruce asked about Brownʼs message to Rusk. (Ibid., POL UK-USSR) 3 November 23. 4 Paragraph 10 of telegram 86196 to London, November 16 (see footnote 7, Document 300 ), introduced the following three issues, each of which was then discussed at some length: “What degree of assurance should there be that Hanoi will take appropriate reciprocal action? How soon might a response from Hanoi be expected (and, perhaps, how can it be verified)? And what sort of action would we regard as reciprocal?” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 5 Paragraph 14 of telegram 86196 discussed the Phase A-Phase B formula, using the same language as that used in paragraph 3d of telegram 83786, Document 305 . November 28–December 31: Planning for 1967; Marigold and the Controversy Over Bombing November 28–December 31: Planning for 1967; Marigold and the Controversy Over Bombing 318. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara Washington, November 29, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaughton. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer forwarded a copy of the attachment to this letter to Rostow the same day, noting in his covering memorandum that “while it gives less weight to bombing NVN than does your paper [attachment to Document 319], and more weight to creating a bandwagon psychology in SVN, we are basically on the same track. We both see 1967 as crucial, and the key to success in 1967 as developing, then effectively managing, a multi-faceted strategic plan.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy) 319. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson Washington, November 30, 1966, 9:20 a.m. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy. Secret. On November 17 Rostow forwarded to the President a 9-page paper by Edward Lansdale, “The Battleground in 1967,” which presented Lansdaleʼs views on strategy in Vietnam for 1967. In his covering memorandum, Rostow called the paper “Lansdale at his best—worth reading.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15) 320. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson Washington, December 1, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. 321. Memorandum From Richard Holbrooke of the White House Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) Washington, December 1, 1966. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam—1966. Secret. Also sent to Leonhart. On December 1 Komer sent copies to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Vance, Katzenbach, McNaughton, and William Bundy. (Ibid.) The source text is marked “Sec Def has seen.” 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, December 1, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 11:04 a.m. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at the LBJ Ranch on December 2 and commented in a separate telegram to the President, CAP 66134, December 2, that both Rusk and Thompson believed the message was of importance and that he himself was impressed by several factors, “above all, by the phrase ‘as fast as possible.’ As you know, I have felt that if Hanoi was ever serious they would want a quick complete deal, not a slow negotiation.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16) 323. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson Washington,December 2, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, John Roche. Secret. 324. Editorial Note 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, December 2, 1966, 6:15 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon. 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, December 3, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:55 a.m. 327. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 5, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:43 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 275–277. 328. Editorial Note 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, December 5, 1966, 8:58 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Katzenbach, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon for Lodge and to Tokyo for Rusk. 330. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin Washington, December 6, 1966. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a draft with extensive handwritten corrections. In a memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on December 7, Llewellyn Thompson reported that he handed the letter to Kosygin, who read it carefully and indicated that he would carry it back to Moscow. (Ibid.) 331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, December 7, 1966, 12:03 a.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Read, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 283–286. 332. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 7, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:31 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 281–282. 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, December 7, 1966, 10:33 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Rostow, Thompson, and McNamara; and approved by Katzenbach. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp 286–288. 334. Editorial Note 335. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 9, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:57 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 293–295. 336. Draft National Security Action Memorandum Washington, December 10, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Secret. Rostow forwarded the draft to Katzenbach and McNamara under cover of a December 12 memorandum stating that the President wanted to issue an NSAM “embracing guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam” and wanted comments on it “if you believe it constitutes a basis for such a NSAM.” This draft was based on a paper by Komer, “A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam,” November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaugton; see footnote 3, Document 320) In a December 5 memorandum to Katzenbach, Komer proposed that Katzenbachʼs “non-group” prepare a strategic plan for the President, working from his paper. “All it really needs is a preamble, and a bit of cleaning up.” (Johnson Library, Komer Files, Katzenbach) On December 10 Rostow forwarded the draft NSAM to the President, who wrote on Rostowʼs covering memorandum: “Itʼs good. Come in with Bob on Monday.” (Ibid., Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy) The President met with Rostow and Komer on Monday, December 12, from 12:20 to 1:03 p.m., presumably prior to circulating the draft NSAM to McNamara and Katzenbach, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Bangkok, December 11, 1966, 0701Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Rusk was in Saigon on December 9–11, following visits to Tokyo (December 5–7) and Taipei (December 7–9). He then proceeded to Bangkok (December 11–12), New Delhi (December 12), and Tehran (December 12–13), prior to attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris December 13–16. 338. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0035Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis. Received at 8:56 p.m. on December 11. 339. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0330Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Personal. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 340. Editorial Note 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 13, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 1:36 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 296–297. 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 15, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:30 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 302–304. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:50 a.m. on December 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 17) Gronouski amplified his comments in telegram 1475 from Warsaw, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 343. National Intelligence Estimate Washington, December 15, 1966. Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 344. Notes of Meeting With President Johnson Washington, December 16, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files. Top Secret. Prepared by Rostow on December 19. Rostow states incorrectly that the meeting was held on Friday, December 17, in Austin, Texas. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that the meeting was held on Friday, December 16, at the White House, prior to the Presidentʼs departure for Texas that evening. (Ibid.) 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 19, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:44 a.m. 346. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 19, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:06 p.m. 347. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) Washington, December 21, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. 348. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 21, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:07 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, p. 311. 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland Washington, December 23, 1966, 4:21 p.m. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted and approved by Read. In a telephone conversation with the President at 1:01 p.m. on December 23, McNamara informed Johnson that Wheeler had agreed to the action authorized in this telegram. Johnson then asked McNamara, “Would it give you any problem, do you think, before the hawks later on in your testimony?” McNamara responded, “I donʼt think so. We wrote this first to try to get these things [talks] started but secondly, in the event they donʼt start and this thing all leaks, to have a reasonable position with both the hawks and doves.” Johnson then said, “All right, itʼs OK with me.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.03, PNO 1) At 4:08 p.m. on December 23, the JCS notified CINCPAC in telegram 2135 that “until further notice from JCS you will not conduct air operations that involve attacks against targets within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52) 350. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) Washington, December 24, 1966, 2142Z. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Repeated to General Westmoreland. 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State Warsaw, December 24, 1966. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 p.m. 352. Editorial Note 353. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson Washington, December 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. 354. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, December 30, 1966. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold II. Top Secret; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 321–322. 355. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas Washington, December 30, 1966, 2313Z. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold—Incomplete. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Marigold. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the telegram. 356. Editorial Note 318. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 318. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1 Washington, November 29, 1966. Dear Bob: Hereʼs the personal prognosis of events in Vietnam 1967–1968 which you requested. Sorry to be late, but I hope youʼll find it worth the delay. On re-reading, I see it as less my view of what will happen than of what reasonably can and should happen—other things being equal—if we play our cards right. My prognosis seems to me quite consistent with the proposals in your October memorandum to the President, 2 even though it makes a rather more hopeful estimate. Whether or not it is over-optimistic, however, it does suggest the sort of orchestrated strategic program we ought to pursue in 1967 to optimize our prospects. This wonʼt just happen, so I for one strongly favor drafting such a program (perhaps initially in the Katzenbach “non-group”) for submission to the President. In my view, it should include not only policy and program guidelines for 1967, but the necessary management corollaries to give them life. Iʼd greatly appreciate your reactions. R.W. Komer 3 Attachment Washington, November 28, 1966. VIETNAM PROGNOSIS FOR 1967–68 I. WHERE WE ARE TODAY. Any prognosis for 1967 must start with oneʼs premises about end-1966, which I daresay are quite “optimistic.” But let me make my case: A. Westyʼs spoiling strategy (accelerating search-and-destroy operations) has already succeeded in throwing Hanoiʼs phase III strategy way off balance. Thus we are well past the first turning point where we stopped losing the war. B. My guess, though I canʼt prove it, is that we have also passed a second major turning point . I suspect that we have reached the point where we are killing, defecting, or otherwise attriting more VC/NVA strength than the enemy can build up. Iʼd support this by citing kill ratios, weapons loss ratios, the decline in enemy-initiated attacks, and the fact that even J–2 MACVʼs current O/B estimates now indicate a slight decrease in total enemy strength. Iʼm also impressed with the increasing evidence of VC recruiting difficulties, food shortages, and sickness. There is also enough inconsistency between our estimates of VC/NVA strength and what the VC/NVA have been able to do over the last several months as to justify the inference that either they do not have as many troops as we estimate, or they are a lot less effective than weʼve estimated. Our O/B estimates, especially of VC main force and infrastructure strength, are so flabby that my guess may be as good as anyoneʼs—and consistent with actual VC/NVA performance. Granted that the enemy may be increasing NVA infiltration, but he may well have passed the peak on VC southerner strength. C. We may also have passed a critical psychological turning point , in that the bulk of SVNʼs population increasingly believe that weʼre winning the war. This to me was the chief significance of the 80% voter turnout on 11 September. Even if one regards it as an exercise in competitive coercion, the fact is that 80% of those who could vote (in daylight) listened to the GVN rather than the VC. The ever-increasing weight of the US commitment, now felt literally everywhere in SVN, contributes greatly to this growing attitude. In sum—slow, painful, and incredibly expensive though it may be—weʼre beginning to “win” the war in Vietnam. This is a far cry from saying, however, that weʼre going to win it—in any meaningful sense. II. WHAT ARE THE CHIEF IMPONDERABLES FOR 1967–68? To me these make prognosis very difficult: A. Will Hanoi materially increase its infiltration rate? I gather this is feasible (though will the barrier make a major difference?). B. Will the enemy escalate? Aside from increasing infiltration, I see little more Hanoi itself could do. Or Moscow. Peking could intervene in Vietnam or widen the area of hostilities in SEA, but this seems quite unlikely. C. Will the enemy revert to a guerrilla strategy? This could be a serious complication before we get a major pacification effort underway. But the evidence suggests that the VC are still attempting to organize regiments and divisions. Iʼd also agree with Doug Pikeʼs conclusion in his new book “Viet Cong” 4 that such de-escalation would shatter VC morale. D. Will Hanoi play the negotiating card, and how? If Iʼm right about the trend line, Hanoi would find it wiser to negotiate. The only other options are escalation, growing attrition, or fading away. If Hanoi decides to talk sometime in 1967, a whole new calculus intervenes, involving questions of cease-fire, standstill, bombing pauses, etc. In this case weʼll have to do a new prognosis. E. Will the GVN fall apart politically? While it was a risk worth taking, weʼve opened Pandoraʼs box by promoting a political evolution to representative government. A series of coups or political crises in Cochin China or Annam could so undermine GVN cohesiveness as to cause a major setback or popular revulsion in the US. I expect plenty of political trouble, but would hazard that a crisis of such magnitude can be avoided in 1967 if we work hard at it. F. Will our new pacification program work? This too is a major imponderable. But weʼve nowhere to go but up. Weʼre at long last planning a major new resource input plus the necessary focus on improving US management and redirecting ARVN assets. So to me the chief variable is how much progress we can make how soon. Will it be enough to make a significant difference in 1967 or even 1968? G. Last but not least, will the US appear to settle down for a long pull if necessary? This is hardest to predict, yet crucial from the standpoint of SVN and NVN reactions. III. THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF EVENTS IN 1967. Netting out the imponderables, I see the odds as better than even for a gradual acceleration of present trends in 1967—with gains outweighing setbacks enough to show major progress in achieving our aims by the end of the year. But this prognosis is based on the assumption that the US will make a maximum effort to influence these trends in the desired direction—as a matter of systematic, orchestrated US policy and the more active use of leverage on the GVN. A. Trends by Mid-1967 . Even so, I doubt that within the next seven months we could demonstrate such progress as to force Hanoi to negotiate or to convince most observers that weʼre “winning” the war. But we could lay enough groundwork to offer reasonable confidence of such demonstrable results by end-1967. 1. We can expect continued success in spoiling the VC/NVA main force effort . What we had achieved by October 1966 with 80-odd maneuver battalions, we should do much better in 1967 with the added flexibility 120-odd will give. Despite possible increase in NVA infiltration, I believe it will be increasingly offset by an increasing enemy loss rate, a decline in VC recruiting and an upswing in returnees (Iʼll guess at least 15,000 in January-June 1967). Once the barrier is in, it should also help. As a result we should be in a position to increase our control of critical communications routes (Routes 15 and 20 should be early targets). 2. But pacification will not show a substantial upturn so early . Both ARVN and US forces will still be on a learning curve. The critical element will be the speed and effectiveness of ARVN retraining. Even so, we should begin to get rolling—if only because weʼll deploy more resources while VC guerrilla and infrastructure strength will probably decline (as the VC raid it for main force replacements). The civil side will become marginally better, as cleared and held territory increases, but it will still be small potatoes. 3. With luck (and hard pushing) we should get at least some of the Manila program through . Despite a lot of political jockeying, weʼve a better than even chance of getting village-hamlet elections started, a national reconciliation program begun, some land reform, a renewed, if low-level, anti-corruption drive, and a start on postwar planning. The new Constitution should be promulgated, and some workable division of power has begun to emerge between military and civilians, and between northerners and southerners. These last are most important—and most questionable. 4. We should at least hold our own economically . Despite some price rises, I think we can prevent the kind of runaway inflation in January-June 1967 that characterized January-June 1966. Easing port congestion will help. But the key will be the enforcement of a tough across-the-board stabilization program. Its outlines are now in hand: a GVN budget held to P–75 billion, US spending to P–58 billion, an import program of $725 million annually and port throughput of four million tons of non-military cargo. 5. We will continue bombing the North (perhaps at a reduced level) to impose a cost on NVN. 6. If the above prognosis is reasonably accurate weʼll also get some upswing in SVN morale . This intangible is most important, as emergence of a bandwagon psychology would help erode VC strength and give new confidence to the GVN. I doubt that weʼll see a real surge of confidence as early as mid-1967 (enough things will go wrong to fuzz the issue), but the people in the cities already see the tide turning. 7. If the above trends occur, they will register in Hanoi too, and may just lead to negotiating feelers before June 1967 . Iʼd see no more than a 1 in 3 chance of this, and if it comes it may be an attempt to throw us off balance rather than to strike a bargain. But Hanoi will start reassessing its strategy of waiting us out if it sees the US settling down for the long pull, increasing US forces by another 35% and building a barrier, VC southerner strength eroding, NVN losses mounting, the GVN building at least a partial base of legitimacy, and pacification at last beginning to be undertaken seriously. B. Trends by End-1967 . By this time, if not before, I see a better than even chance that the trends described above will have shown results demonstrable to all. At this point the key issue will become one of whether the US appears prepared to stick it out as long as necessary or to be tiring of the war. 1. If Westy canʼt clobber the large units with 470,000-odd Americans, plus ROKs, plus barriers, plus bombing, plus an even better logistic base, something unforeseeable will have happened . Indeed, my hunch is that heʼll have enough left over for 20–30% of his maneuver battalions to help ARVN in pacification if needed. By then we should have small US combat forces in the Delta too, which I think would start making a difference. Since weʼre asked to be bold, Iʼll estimate enemy end-1967 strength at not over 220–250,000 despite NVA infiltration. This is consistent with the thrust of CIAʼs 22 August 1966 study on The Vietnamese Communistsʼ Will to Persist . 2. Pacification ought to show quite visible progress by end-1967 , even if only the corridors between many of the towns plus some of the countryside is secure. (I donʼt equate security with total absence of incidents.) Many key roads should be reasonably secure for unescorted traffic (at least Route 4 to Can Tho, Route 15 to Vung Tau, Route 20 to Dalat) and the Saigon environs largely cleared. VC capability to recruit, tax, and collect rice in the south should decline significantly. Returnee totals should approach 45,000 for the year, and special operations should have turned up some higher quality defectors. The contrast between living conditions in GVN and VC areas should work increasingly to our advantage. 3. There is a 50/50 chance of a representative GVN emerging with a presidential system, an elected assembly, and reasonable checks and balances between the military and civilians . It wonʼt be a strong government (perhaps even weaker or more erratic than the present one), but its very existence will be a major political plus. Iʼd also hope to see further progress on land reform, local elections leading to a better administration in the countryside, etc. In fact, if the erosion of southern VC strength has gone far enough by mid-year, Iʼd consider asking the GVN to let the NLF run in the elections (a gesture of confidence which most experts think the NLF would refuse—to its cost). This ploy would also help split the NLF from Hanoi—if this is at all possible. 4. If the above trends occur, Iʼd predict a growing shift to a bandwagon psychology on the part of SVNʼs people . I believe that it will be stronger than war-weariness at this point. 5. Logically, Hanoi would start negotiating or withdrawing somewhere along this curve —if only to (a) preserve southern assets by slowing down the attrition; (b) prevent consolidation of GVN authority; and (c) secure a bombing halt. But Iʼd put the odds at only 50/50, the other real options being (a) to revert to a guerrilla strategy (forced on them) and still wait us out; or (b) to fade away for the time being. If Iʼm right about a growing erosion of southern VC strength, those NVA battalions will look a bit naked by end-1967. IV. PROGNOSIS FOR 1968. The farther ahead one tries to predict, the greater the role of the imponderables. So, other things being equal, Iʼd foresee more of the same for 1968—with enough declining VC southerner strength and improved ARVN performance that we might even be able to begin redeploying some forces. But to be realistic, Iʼd prudently allow for six monthsʼ slippage in my end-1967 projection. Even if we reached that point only by mid-1968, it would still be apparent to everybody—including Hanoi—that we were indisputably “winning.” Again, the critical variable will probably be less what Hanoi (or Peking, or Moscow) does than the US popular and Hill reaction and their impact on Administration policy. And, finally, though the above might seem grossly optimistic, even I am not prognosticating that by end-1968 (or 1969 for that matter) we will have “won” the war. If the enemy retains the will to persist despite the trends I see as likely, Vietnam could still be with us for some years. V. THE LESS LIKELY CASES IN 1967–68. I wonʼt spell these out in detail, because they would simply be a different weighting, and/or time-phasing, of the trends and imponderables outlined above. Pacification could go more slowly or more rapidly, for example. We might have another military coup. We might get into serious negotiation, which could change the name of the game. VI. LESSONS TO BE DRAWN. My prognosis of what is more likely than not to happen in Vietnam is reasonable only if we and the GVN mount a maximum effort in 1967–68 to make it so. The key is better orchestration and management of our Vietnam effort—both in Washington and Saigon. To me, the most important ingredient of such an outcome is less another 200,000 troops, or stepped-up bombing, or a $2 billion civil aid program—than it is more effective use of the assets we already have. A. The war will be “won” (if we can use that term) in the South . Now that we are successfully countering NVA infiltration and the enemyʼs semi-conventional strategy, what needs to be added is increasing erosion of southern VC strength (it has probably already peaked out). B. Assuming the above is broadly valid, the key to success in the South is an effective pacification program , plus a stepped-up defection program and successful evolution toward a more dynamic, representative and thus more attractive GVN. These efforts will reinforce each other in convincing the Southern VC and Hanoi that they are losing. C. Our most important under-utilized asset is the RVNAF . Getting greater efficiency out of the 700,00 men weʼre already supporting and financing is the cheapest and soundest way to get results in pacification. D. By themselves, none of our Vietnam programs offer high confidence of a successful outcome (forcing the enemy either to fade away or to negotiate). Cumulatively, however, they can produce enough of a bandwagon psychology among the southerners to lead to such results by end-1967 or sometime in 1968. At any rate do we have a better option? 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaughton. Secret; Eyes Only. Komer forwarded a copy of the attachment to this letter to Rostow the same day, noting in his covering memorandum that “while it gives less weight to bombing NVN than does your paper [attachment to Document 319 ], and more weight to creating a bandwagon psychology in SVN, we are basically on the same track. We both see 1967 as crucial, and the key to success in 1967 as developing, then effectively managing, a multi-faceted strategic plan.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy) 2 Document 268 . 3 Printed from a copy that indicates Komer signed the original. 4 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam , Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966. 319. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 319. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson 1 Washington, November 30, 1966, 9:20 a.m. Mr. President: You may be interested in the attached paper I wrote to clear my own mind and to share with my colleagues on the special committee you set up, chaired by Nick Katzenbach and including Cy Vance and Bob Komer along with myself. It is a map of the problem with, I believe, the right action headings. On reflection, we need three things to make it move: —Westmoreland must allocate more of his own military resources to pacification as well as press the ARVN forward into this task; and he should work up a plan for the military side of pacification for 1967. —We shall need in Saigon a vigorous Ambassador with great managerial skill, to drive forward hard this kind of program at that end. —As suggested on pages 24–25, 2 we need to tighten the back-stopping of this whole program in Washington. I am also considering, but did not put into this paper, further ways in which military power might be used in the course of 1967 to force a decision on the other side without excessive risk of escalating the war. Walt Attachment 3 Washington, November 28, 1966. A STRATEGY FOR VIET NAM, 1967 I. Object . The object of the plan outlined below is to maximize the chance that we force a decision by Hanoi in the course of the calendar year 1967 to end the war in Viet Nam on terms compatible with our interests; that is, an end to hostilities in Laos as well as in Viet Nam; the accept-ance of the Geneva framework for Southeast Asia; acceptance of an essentially independent South Viet Nam that can determine its future on a one-man, one-vote basis or a reasonable approximation thereof. The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem that will be posed for us if the war continues well into 1968. II. The problem: the Hanoi equation. We must assume that Hanoi will accept something like our terms only when a combination of factors makes it clear that it is more in Hanoiʼs interest to end the war than to continue. Hanoi remains in the war now because, on balance, each of the factors listed below has not tipped far enough, individually or in combination, to make it urgent and desirable to stop hostilities; the advantages and costs of continuing the war still outweigh the advantages and costs of getting out. A. The Situation in the South . The VC infrastructure in the South, although damaged, is still in being and capable of continuing to impose a heavy cost on South Viet Nam and to require the presence of massive allied forces to prevent a VC victory. In addition to this technical fact, Hanoi is thus far unwilling to take the decision to cut off support in men, supplies, and leadership to the South for reasons of ideology, self-respect, and, presumably, Chinese Communist pressure or threat. It does not now pretend to cherish the high hopes for early military victory of 1964 and 1965; but it clings to a position like that of 1962–63, when it believed that its staying power would be greater than that of the U.S.: “Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars—and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win” (Pham Van Dong, autumn 1962). 4 B. Damage in the North . There is no doubt that the bombing in the North constitutes a heavy burden on Hanoi. This is the principal difference between its view of the endurance doctrine of 1962–63 and its view in 1966–67. Thus far, however, with the support of other Communist nations it has been able to cushion the results of this bombing to some extent and has thus far accepted stagnation or decline in its over-all domestic development plus a massive diversion of manpower to fend off the most dangerous consequences of the bombing. What we do not know is whether the effects of the bombing are judged in Hanoi a major degenerative factor, with a time limit on what is endurable, or a stabilized factor, given the level of external assistance. Evidence runs both ways. What can be said is this: At its present level and targetting, bombing appears to involve the same kind of painful but endurable pressure on the North as small-scale guerrilla warfare in the South. C. Relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . Just as Hanoi is unwilling to take the ideological and political decision of cutting off the VC in the South, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are unwilling to take the decision to cut off military and economic aid to Hanoi. This is true despite the fact that the costs of economic aid to Hanoi are rising rapidly and are an awkward marginal burden on economies where resource allocation is, in any case, a difficult matter. In part, this reluctance is due to the ideological competition with Communist China and the fear that Chinese Communist influence might become decisive in Hanoi if the Soviet Union were to cut off economic aid. Nevertheless, the net influence of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on Hanoi is probably towards a negotiated end to the war: to counter Chinese Communist influence; to remove a situation which is both a demonstration of relative impotence and a threat of escalation; and to cut aid costs. D. Communist China . Hanoi has already permitted a substantial number of Chinese Communist engineering and anti-aircraft forces to enter North Viet Nam. It wishes, for purposes of its own long-run future to maintain a relationship with Communist China which is supportive but not dominating. It does not feel free, probably because of geographical and logistical circumstances, to move toward the kind of independ-ence of Communist China which North Korea felt free to assert because of the proximity of the Soviet Union and the credibility of Moscowʼs security as well as economic guarantees. Nor does it now appear credible to Hanoi to seek greater independence of Communist China by an understanding with the other major power which might offer that guarantee; that is, the United States. Communist China has thus far thrown its weight in Hanoi towards continuing the war. It may, in addition, exercise some direct influence over the leadership of the VC—almost certainly more direct influence than Moscow and Eastern Europe. It is probably true that Hanoi can make peace without risking a Chinese Communist invasion; but Chinese Communist influence is evidently an inhibiting factor of some importance. E. The Political Situation in the South . Although undoubtedly disappointed by the outcome of the I Corps crisis of April-May 1966 and by the outcome of the election for the Constituent Assembly, Hanoi may maintain hopes of either a political breakdown in the South which might permit it to join dissident non-Communist elements in the seizure of power, or the emergence of a civil government with which it could more easily negotiate a favorable solution than with the present military government in Saigon. Such hopes of a popular front or coalition government may be countered by fears that the potential VC role in South Vietnamese politics may progressively diminish if the constitutional process moves forward on present planned lines. F. Free World Diplomacy . With the assistance of other Communist nations, Hanoi has conducted a massive political and psychological campaign in the Free World with minimum and maximum objectives. The minimum objective is to restrain U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam to targets which constitute thus far livable levels of damage, given the outside assistance available to Hanoi. At the maximum, the objective has been to press the U.S. unilaterally to cease bombing the North and, even, unilaterally to withdraw from support of South Viet Nam. Although Hanoi has failed in its maximum objectives, it must judge that it has succeeded tolerably well in its minimum objectives and will continue the effort. G. The United States . Thus far Hanoi has avoided all direct negotiation with the U.S., while leaving many channels open for contact and negotiation should the equation shift in ways which made such negotiation desirable in Hanoiʼs interest. It may judge that knowledge of direct negotiation with the U.S. would leak and damage morale among the VC, notably at a time when the VC are on the defensive. Therefore, so long as the Communists are on the defensive, an indicated willingness to negotiate directly may signal a willingness to end the war soon. H. Conclusion. In short, while it has suffered a profound setback from its hopeful position in 1964 and early 1965, Hanoi has found, thus far, a rationale for continuing the conflict and a domestic and foreign policy strategy which permits it to continue. The most important factors holding Hanoi in the war appear to be: —the continued existence of the VC infrastructure and the VC capacity to continue guerrilla operations; —the possibility of rendering bombing of the North with existing targetting endurable by its own measures and expanded external assistance; —Chinese Communist influence, pressure, and (conceivably) threat. The other factors in the equation are either neutral or argue that the war should be ended. III. The Situation: the United States Equation. The equation for U.S. policy is, essentially, the other side of the coin of the seven variables which enter the Hanoi equation. We have been operating and we shall have to continue to operate in such a way as to shift these variables to a point where Hanoi concludes that it is its interest to end the war rather than to continue it. It is not a question of simply “proving that they cannot win.” In a military sense that has already happened; and what follows assumes we shall continue to keep the initiative against and impose heavy attrition on VC and NVN main force units. It is a question of creating a situation in which they feel there is more to gain (or less to lose) by ending the war now than by continuing it on current and foreseeable terms. In any situation as complex as this, the answer lies in acting on all of the variables available to the extent that one has a grip on them, rather than on any single variable; and, in any case, we can only guess at the weights attached to them in Hanoiʼs calculations. Some may prove more critical than others. Some may be more susceptible to our initiative and action than others. But if the picture of Hanoiʼs equation is correct, the object of U.S. policy is to produce in 1967 a sense that all the factors judged relevant by Hanoi are moving unfavorably—or as many of them as we can move. The following action program is based on this judgment about our task plus the concluding assessment in paragraph III, H, above. IV. The Proposed U.S. Program. A. Action against the VC. The relatively viable state of the VC infrastructure was judged in para. III to be a major factor keeping Hanoi in the war. Given Communist doctrines about guerrilla warfare—and especially the doctrine of superior endurance in protracted conflict—it is clear that perhaps the most important task in 1967 is to produce a setting in which the VC appear to be disintegrating. This would make the rationale for continuing to accept the costs of bombing in the North less persuasive. It would increase the leverage of Moscow and Eastern Europe over Hanoi. It would undercut the position of the Chinese Communists. The major headings for such a policy for accelerating the disintegration of the VC are familiar and appear to be the following. 1. A dramatic and sustained political and psychological appeal to the VC to join in the making of a new South Vietnamese nation a. an amnesty offer in which the Constituent Assembly might be associated with the government b. enlarged and sustained efforts to defect VC leaders c. a radical expansion in Chieu Hoi efforts 2. Accelerated pacification a. new organizational arrangements b. converting ARVN forces to pacification functions c. rapid pacification of certain key areas 3. A workable land reform scheme B. Increasing the cost in the North . The object of our bombing, against the background of A, above, is to make Hanoi feel that it is paying a higher and higher price to preserve a probably diminishing asset. To do this, three measures should be accelerated. 1. The barrier . The coming in of the barrier would promise Hanoi that the cost of infiltration is likely to increase and that it might, even, find difficulty in withdrawing its regular forces now in the South. Since the barrier will come in slowly, it is to be assumed that Hanoi will seek and find limited countermeasures. The barrier will evidently not work 100%. It is, however, an important cost-increasing tool. 2. Attrition against infiltration routes . We do not yet know the dispositions of Hanoi with respect to infiltration in 1967, either with respect to scale or routes. In particular, we do not know the extent to which the Laos routes will be used as opposed to direct crossing of the DMZ or various seaborne efforts. Given our experience with attacks on infiltration routes in 1966, it should be possible for us to mount in 1967 a more purposeful and effective attritional campaign against infiltration than we did last year, including the extension of close-in attack of coastal shipping in North Vietnamese waters. 3. The attack on high priority targets in Hanoi-Haiphong area . At various times we have already hit oil targets, power plants, SAM installations, docks, coal mines. Without drama or sudden escalation, we should gradually, steadily, hit more such targets where the problem of replacement requires time and expense, and the costs of the war economy are substantial. We should continue as an important insurance policy the attack on oil. Power plants appear particularly attractive because of the wide dependence on them. So long as the situation remains as it is within Communist China, the mining of the sea approaches to Haiphong should be ruled out because of the dependence on Communist China that would result; but this judgment should be periodically reexamined in the light of all the circumstances. In the meanwhile, ways of blocking access between Haiphong and Hanoi should be studied, including the possibility of systematic interdiction—the object being not to close off access to the USSR and Eastern Europe but to render the delivery of such supplies increasingly costly. C. Diplomacy via the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . It is a fact that Moscow and the Eastern European capitals have in recent months become more activist with respect to Hanoi and the ending of the war. We do not completely understand this shift. It may stem from some combination of these three elements: —A sense that the forces in Hanoi willing to end the war are gathering strength. —A sense that Hanoi is more willing to listen to Moscow due to the troubles inside Communist China. —Increased interest in peace (and increased leverage) due to the radical rise in aid to Hanoi required from the USSR and Eastern Europe because of our bombing the North. It is also clear that the influence of Mosocw and its friends has its limits in Hanoi. We cannot count on this influence and leverage alone to bring peace. We have to operate on all the other elements in the equation which might bring Hanoi around. But we should maintain as close and direct a dialogue with the USSR and Eastern Europe as we can, and, especially, try to understand better the reasons for their recent activism. In this connection, we should be prepared to discuss with Moscow, as soon and as explicitly as Moscow is prepared to discuss with us, the character of a Southeast Asian settlement, including what we believe our role and the role of the Soviet Union in that area might be over the long run. There are great inhibitions in discussing such matters explicitly. The Soviet Union has preferred to move in parallel and implicitly in similar circumstances; for example, the Indian subcontinent. Nevertheless, it is an area in which the Soviet Union evidently intends to maintain an influence in competition with both Communist China and the U.S.—an influence with which we can live to a certain degree. D. Communist China . Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam may be one consideration at stake in the struggle within Communist China. Our direct influence on the outcome of that struggle is exceedingly limited, although our indirect influence has been considerable via our policies in various parts of the world which have contributed to the failure of Maoʼs expansionist plans and tactics. We do not know enough about the so-called moderate forces inside Communist China to understand whether, if they gained the upper hand, they would join the Soviet Union in encouraging Hanoi to seek a settlement and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet Nam. Mao has clearly taken the view that the pinning down in Southeast Asia of massive U.S. forces was good for Communist China because it would lead to failure and a once-and-for-all withdrawal in humiliation of U.S. from the Asian mainland. It is conceivable that moderate forces might emerge which would settle for a negotiated withdrawal of the U.S. from its Viet Nam bases and the neutralization of South Viet Nam and Laos, implicit in the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. This kind of shift is a matter to which we should be sensitive; but it is in the hands of domestic Chinese Communist politics rather than U.S. diplomacy or communication. Of all the variables, the Chinese Communist policy towards the war in Viet Nam and the nature of its influence over Hanoi is least in our hands except to the extent that we and the Vietnamese succeeded in producing erosion and disintegration of the VC infrastructure—a fact which will undoubtedly impress Peiping, given the experience of its leaders and, indeed, the nature of its doctrines of protracted warfare. E. Political situation in the South . Here we have two major tasks with minimum and maximum objectives. At the minimum we must assure that the political life of South Viet Nam moves forward on the constitutional path to which it is committed, without conflict and disorder which would leave major openings for the VC, or produce, through instability and recurrent crises, a sense of hopelessness within the U.S. As part of this effort, we must contain inflation at the minimum within limits that are tolerable and do not produce social and economic disruption in the life of the country. At the maximum we must play for the emergence of a political and economic situation in South Viet Nam which is inherently attractive to the VC and projects to the world a vision of forward movement. On the political side, the key problem is clearly this: to develop a relationship between the military and civil politicians that would permit a constitutional government to emerge in 1967, which has legitimacy before the world and sufficient linkage to the military establishment; for the military will remain the heart of South Vietnamese organized nationhood for the foreseeable future. We must avoid either acute military-civil conflict or a military takeover which aborts the constitutional track. In cases where these conditions have been met at similar stages of history (for example, Turkey in the inter-war years, Pakistan since 1958, Korea since 1961), the key to the transition has been the emergence of a political leader or leaders who have the confidence of both the armed forces and a sizeable proportion of the civilian politicians. This is so critical an issue that we cannot afford to be passive with respect to it. A second maximum objective is to open the ports and roads at a pace which gives a short-run lift to the Vietnamese economy while pressing forward rapidly and dramatically with the formulation of a postwar development program. F. Free World diplomacy . The two critical elements here are: —An expansion—even a modest expansion—in Free World forces fighting beside us in South Viet Nam. —Pressing out to the world systematically the dual concept; a new and vital Free Asia is emerging; it is with us in our intent to see the war in Viet Nam through to an honorable peace. We have made progress with this doctrine as a result of the Presidentʼs trip to Asia. It must be systematically projected by every device of communication at our disposal. G. The United States base . The outcome of the Congressional election of 1966 has given us a base to pursue the strategy outlined above for 1967. The object of that strategy should be to shift the variables during 1967 to the point where Hanoi is willing to end the war. For 1967—and as a hedge against a continuation of the war into 1968—we face, nevertheless, certain fundamental, unsolved problems with domestic opinion: —The need to give our citizens a better sense of how to measure progress in a war of this kind. All our people now have is a bewildering statement of daily and weekly casualty figures plus accounts of occasional pitched battles on the ground and of raids on the North. These are accompanied by evidence that the VC still have the capacity to shoot up U.S. installations, throw mortars into the center of Saigon, etc. We have not found a way to make clear, even, the character of our progress against main force units, let alone a way of showing what progress we may make in the countryside towards pacification and development. A special task force in the government should take this problem in hand, coordinating with Saigon, so that in 1967 we get more mature and shapely reporting of the war. —We must drive home systematically the message of the Presidentʼs trip to Asia; that is, a new and vital Asia is emerging, which is determined to work together and is with us on Viet Nam. This must be, again, a steady campaign in which we find and project all the concrete evidence of forward movement in Free Asia and evidence of Asian attitudes towards Viet Nam. —By every device we can conceive, we should make the war a bipartisan venture in domestic political terms, reaching out to the Republicans for advice and engaging them with the fullest possible briefings. H. Negotiating with Hanoi . Our basic tactic with Hanoi has been to pick up their desire to have us stop bombing in the North and move them towards the conference table by asking them what compensatory de-escalation in the South they are prepared to undertake. Since various other nations, notably in Eastern Europe, are apparently prepared to talk to Hanoi along these lines, it should be pursued. But it should be pursued with a consciousness that it may have arisen not from an authentic desire of Hanoi to negotiate, but from a desire to lift from North Viet Nam and its allies the burden of bombing so that the war can be pursued in greater confidence with greater prospects of North Vietnamese success. It is also possible that the de-escalation formula poses a great danger to Hanoi because a cutback or end to infiltration might produce very serious consequences for the VC, both technically, in terms of supplies, and psychologically, in terms of a conviction that Hanoi was deserting the VC and making terms at their expense. Therefore, we should mount a parallel line of communication with Hanoi directly. The object should be the discussion of the end position—a complete package deal—while the war goes on; with the object of ending the war briskly and completely when the end position is agreed. V. Organization . The premium which attaches to ending the war in 1967 is obvious. The nature of the problem is such that if we are to maximize the chances that the war will be ended in 1967, we must force the pace of movement in a coordinated way along each of the lines of the program set out above. This requires: —A common understanding of the concept of working intensively on each of the elements of the equation, shared fully by Saigon and Washington. —The most vigorous possible leadership in Saigon, both by the Ambassador and MACV—and both in coordination. —Centralized drive and direction in Washington of all the elements of the program, cutting to the minimum normal delays in making decisions here. Under Secretary Katzenbach and his committee should undertake the latter assignment; but it will only work if the Under Secretary himself can allocate the time to lead the enterprise. It would be disastrous if present centers of initiative felt they were layered by such an undertaking—and the buck had passed somewhere else. The Under Secretaryʼs committee should: —spot delays in implementing the agreed plan and end them; —spot gaps in implementing the agreed plan and fill them; —re-survey the evolving situation and make recommendations for changes in the plan. VII. 1968 If the war cannot be ended in 1967 and runs through the election of 1968, the task will be: —to have achieved maximum progress; —to be able to demonstrate the reality of that progress persuasively to our people; —to achieve maximum bipartisan support for continuing our Viet Nam and Asian policies. We must be able to hold a position of: donʼt throw away a winning effort and defeat a position of: donʼt throw good men and money after bad. In seeking a decision in 1967 we must, as an insurance policy, lay the groundwork for such a stance in 1968. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy. Secret. On November 17 Rostow forwarded to the President a 9-page paper by Edward Lansdale, “The Battleground in 1967,” which presented Lansdaleʼs views on strategy in Vietnam for 1967. In his covering memorandum, Rostow called the paper “Lansdale at his best—worth reading.” (Ibid., Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 15) 2 Part V. “Organization.” 3 Under cover of a November 28 memorandum, Rostow sent copies of the paper, which is marked “Draft for discussion; Limited distribution,” to Katzenbach, Vance, and Komer. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 4 See Document 232 and footnote 3 thereto. 320. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 320. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 1, 1966. A Top Manager for Saigon . Iʼve talked this over with our little sub-cabinet “war cabinet” of Katzenbach, Vance and Rostow (and only with them). Except for the few obvious candidates who are probably unavailable, we have some differences as to who or even what type of man ought to replace Lodge. For example, they tend to react in terms of imagery—we need a “public presence” and preferably a Republican. To me, Vietnam itself has become so big an issue as to dwarf the role of any ambassador in Saigon. The only imagery that will really count in 1967–68 is whether we seem to be winning the war. So itʼs much more important that we get the man best capable of producing than whether he is suitably prominent. First and foremost, this means a top manager who can run a $20–25 billion show, make the military perform, and quietly lead the GVN by the nose. It also means, if we want early results, an insider who already knows his Vietnam . We donʼt have time to break in a totally new man. Where I think we all agree is that your choice for Vietnam might well be the single most important appointment you make in 1967–68. It is my own belief that the right “top manager” in Saigon could make a major difference between success and lack of it in 1967–68. This is frankly based on a more optimistic appraisal of our Vietnam prospects than McNamaraʼs, for example, but I think he underplays the political and psychological factors. The only two candidates who would almost unquestionably meet all non-political criteria are McNamara and Mac Bundy. If neither is in the cards, Iʼd think next of a DOD-type manager whoʼd know also how to move the military. You say Vance is out, so Iʼd suggest McNaughton. He may grate on some people, but heʼs a first-class doer. Nitze would be a poor third in this category. Ros Gilpatric would also be well qualified, but could we get him? Tough-minded managers are harder to come by at State. Katzenbach would be great but—. Doug MacArthur or Alex Johnson would be the only pros Iʼd even consider. Everyone I know agrees that Ellsworth Bunker has all the judgment needed, but he like Harriman may be too old (even though we could back them with a strong staff). When we get to others on the outside Iʼm on less firm ground. From the Cabinet there are Goldberg , Freeman , and John Gardner You know their management abilities far better than I, but theyʼd all need at least six crucial months to learn the ropes. If Lodge left in February, this would mean September before they really found their feet. The same is equally true of non-government people. To mention some names, however, Doug Dillon looks perhaps most interesting. Vance speaks highly of Governor Connally ʼs managerial ability. Nelson Rockefeller is certainly public-spirited. Tom Gates is probably not good enough. Clark Clifford is, but would he go to Saigon? Scranton may be available, but Nick says he hasnʼt got it. Rather than a largely unknown quantity (can we afford one if results are what we want?), Iʼd opt if necessary for McNamaraʼs solution— give Westy the job . Iʼm out of my element on the political calculus, but hazard that it would be a popular appointment with most Americans (as was Max Taylorʼs); the “intellectuals” are against us anyway. Westy knows the drill, has real clout with the GVN, would take orders (unlike MacArthur), and would listen to political advice from the bright State types we could put at his side. On the other hand, even an unknown quantity from the above list of 19 would in my judgment be better than keeping Lodge on. Cabot really wants to come home (not because he smells defeat or is disgruntled) but because heʼs done two tours (now 26 out of the last 30 months). He actually feels that overstaying his time increases the odds of physical harm—heʼs a nut on security. If you have not already done so, Iʼd urge you have Dean Rusk sound Cabot out and give an independent confirmation. Whoever replaces Lodge, it is important that Porter stay —not just for continuity but because heʼs good. If you agree, Rusk should also tell Porter this (it will save having to do so later). R.W. Komer P.S. I attach two long papers which I hope youʼll read. The first is my prognosis of how we can “win” by 1968 if we really sweat it. 2 The second is my outline plan for how to do so. 3 If we can decide on some such plan before 1 January and pick the right man to carry out the mandate, I believe weʼll have chosen the optimum road to solving the biggest (and messiest) problem on our plates for 1967–68—and the prerequisite to solving all the others. My recipe does not guarantee success but, as I wrote Bob McNamara, does anybody have a better one? 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. 2 Attachment to Document 318 . 3 “A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam,” dated November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaughton) In an introduction to his Strategic Plan, Komer stated that it should be read in conjunction with McNamaraʼs October memorandum ( Document 268 ) and Bundyʼs and his papers (attachments to Documents 318 and 319 ). “All three have a common central thrust, even though they differ in detail and emphasis, and in the prospect they foresee as likely.” Komerʼs Strategic Plan provided the basis for a draft NSAM, Document 336 . 321. Memorandum From Richard Holbrooke of the White House Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) 321. Memorandum From Richard Holbrooke of the White House Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) 1 Washington, December 1, 1966. SUBJECT Vietnam Trip Report: October 26–November 18, 1966 Returning to Vietnam after an absence of five months, I was first struck by how little things have changed. Sitting in on discussions within the Mission and hearing the same tired old arguments, visiting the Delta and listening to the same recital of difficulties and shortcomings, getting a constant refrain from each part of the Vietnam mosaic produced as if by rote—all emphasized the glacial pace at which real events happen in Vietnam, as opposed to the wild fluctuations in mood that grip the U.S. Government. Political The most encouraging developments were unquestionably political. The September elections were important primarily because they took place. The first hesitant steps of the Constituent Assembly, while they give no clear picture of the future course, hint at the encouraging possibility of a new and younger leadership emerging for Vietnam—not tied to the old French ways, and less reliant on the dangerous covert and conspiratorial methods of politics which are a Vietnamese tradition. While I was in Saigon the C.A. chose its “blocs,” and the delegates began tentative groupings. The most observant members of the Political Section were impressed with the process. But the dangers in the political situation are still very near the surface. Both regionalism and the growing civilian-military split are issues now out in the open. If they ever reinforce each other through some unfortunate combination, then the delicate balances that now exist could tumble. It is still not unfair to say that there is no real government in Vietnam, in the sense of a functioning administrative and political structure which can pass the word out, and get the job done. This is not merely because the GVN lacks good leaders; it is also the result of a political structure still so fragmented and weak that division commanders can choose those orders they intend to obey, and Ministries can follow their own paths regardless of the desires of the Prime Minister. With such fragmentation as a backdrop it is difficult to get the GVN to swing its entire weight behind a single program (Revolutionary Development, Hop Tac, and the efforts to break the port bottleneck are recent examples). When all the factions agree on something, they can do it, as demonstrated September 11. A final danger to an evolving political process is the American presence, which can be both a beneficial catalyst and an oppressive burden. While we often play a vitally constructive role—as we did in encouraging the elections—or an essential preventive role—in stopping coup attempts—our massive presence creates some dangerous vulnerabilities (see last section). The US Mission In the almost four years I have worked on Vietnam, and served in the Mission, I have never seen the Americans in such disarray. This is the result of a rapid buildup, great pressure from higher headquarters, rapid personnel turnover, poor results in the effort against the VC and great personal frustration, poor leadership, fatigue, the absence of families and the resulting abnormal social life. MACV and the civilian mission have been steadily drifting apart. The Ambassador has tended to allow this to happen, showing little inclination for the difficult job of welding together the entire mission. 2 In this atmosphere, with the Vietnamese getting further away every day from a mission turning steadily inward, a reorganization along the lines of your paper of August 7 3 could only serve to strengthen and streamline the Mission, and provide the tools with which to exert greater influence over the GVN. Such a reorganization is now taking place, along lines virtually identical to Alternative Two of the August paper. (Most significant difference: Westmoreland has so far rejected a Deputy Commander for Pacification/RD.) I think the reorganization plans look good. They will put every American civilian in the provinces into a single operational chain of command, reporting directly to the Deputy Ambassador. USAID, JUSPAO, and CAS will no longer have their own men in the provinces; rather, they will assume a staff relationship to Ambassador Porter and the field, and all communications to the provinces will go through a new Office of Operations, to be headed by Wade Lathram, who will be a member of the Mission Council. His headquarters staff will consist of the combined staffs now called USAID/Field Operations, USAID/Refugees, USAID/Public Safety, JUSPAO/Field Services, and OSA/Cadre Operations. Porter intends to regroup these offices, now spread out across the city of Saigon, into a single building, USAID #2 (the building next to the Xa Loi pagoda on Ngo Thoi Nghiem street), and he will locate himself there. In each Region/Corps, Porter will select a Senior Civilian Representative, who will command all US civilian operations in the area. His staff will be the merged staffs of the existing agencies. At the province level, a senior civilian representative will be chosen, who will also command the US civilians in the province. The Senior Civilian Province Representative, who will be chosen by Porter on the basis of merit regardless of parent agency, will write the efficiency reports of all the American civilians in the province, and will be the sole US civilian advisor to the Province Chief—the equivalent of the MACV Sector Advisor. The present system of multiple advisors, often giving conflicting advice, will cease. Porter gives every indication of digging in and taking charge. He is definitely looking forward to the new organization. Its importance is substantial. For the first time since the buildup, American civilians in the field will look to one office in Saigon for guidance. At the same time, the job remaining to the agency chiefs—MacDonald, Hart, and Zorthian—is substantial. MacDonald will retain control of the technical divisions of USAID, and be responsible for programs operating through the technical ministries such as Agriculture, Health, and Public Works. He retains primary responsibility, along with Wehrle, for the economic stabilization program. He must administer the huge CIP program. Zorthian is still responsible for elements of advice to the Ministry of Information, although his Field Services Division and the advice for VIS and Chieu Hoi both pass to the new organization. He remains the channel for technical assistance and advice. He still handles directly for the Ambassador the delicate problem of the U.S. correspondents in Vietnam. Hart remains in control of the covert operations of his agency. Special arrangements are now being worked out to safeguard covert and unilateral activity, particularly those of the Special Branch. All this is quite hopeful. Within the next ninety days, it is unlikely that measurable results will be available showing that this new structure is going to enable us to win the war any faster. But within ninety days we will be able to see whether or not this new organization holds promise of more effective management of the US Mission. I believe it does, and that it could have been accomplished months ago. But at least the Mission has finally made a start; now it needs support in Washington. This will include support for a better and more responsive personnel recruiting system here, drawing far more from the Foreign Service, finding better people from AID. Ambassador Porter expressed particular concern over the difficulty of finding good people for the senior positions in the new Office of Operations, including the jobs of Senior Regional Representative. He wants you to give him any suggestions you can think of. Personnel The problem of personnel is going to get more serious in the next six to eight months, and it is not too early to start thinking about it. Many of the better “old hands” have served as long as they are going to serve without their families. They simply cannot extend their tours again, except at the risk of a broken family. It is not generally realized that so many people of quality will leave but it is true. Only now are the tours of the first post-evacuation group of people beginning to come to an end, and it will prove impossible to keep any of them if they cannot have their wives with them. Examples are easy to find: Phil Habib, Roy Wehrle (the exception which proves the rule: only the special arrangements that were made kept him on), George Jacobson, Len Maynard, Bob Oakley, Ev Baumgardner. There is a saying now in Saigon that you canʼt be a good counterinsurgent unless you have wrecked your marriage. There is a grim truth to it. The situation forces people to choose between their commitment to our effort in Vietnam and their families. Most men can only choose Vietnam for a limited period of time. If our commitment in Vietnam is indeed a serious long-range one, we are going to need a cadre of superior officers who are willing and interested to serve extended tours out there, and see the war through. We cannot build such a cadre from unmarried and divorced men alone. The visitation program is no solution; trips every month to Bangkok or every six months to the States create a difficult situation, and frequent gaps in the staffing pattern. This is a growing problem, and deserves high-level attention. My recommendation is similar to one once made by Ambassador Lodge: Permit people who have served 18 months and who are needed for another tour bring their wives—no children—with them for the second tour. I think this is reasonable, does not cause unsurmountable housing problems (this is a minor issue), and does not cause undue security problems. US Relations With the Vietnamese The reaction of various elements of Vietnamese society to the continuing U.S. military and civilian buildup is baffling and contradictory. On one hand there are vague and elusive signs of growing annoyance on the part of many Vietnamese with American behavior. This can manifest itself in many ways. There are the continual complaints of General Nguyen Duc Thang, who feels that the U.S. simply does not understand Vietnam. (Despite these complaints, there is no question now of Thangʼs continued pro-American attitude.) There is the growing chorus of urban Vietnamese who see their cities being changed by the American presence. Ironically many of those who complain are also profiting from the buildup. There are the surprisingly strong neutralist statements of many student leaders in Saigon, who despite their family positions do not seem to feel any sense of commitment to the anti-VC effort, and blame the U.S. for every problem in their own country. Only a few of these anti-American sentiments are of value to the VC at this time; the great majority of the people are still not ready to turn grumblings of discontent into open action that would precipitate an anti-American crisis. But there is enough latent feeling about the Americans so that if the war continues for too long without victory in sight, war-weariness could merge with anti-American feelings to produce a reaction among the population. A clear-cut issue does not now exist, nor has a leader yet emerged to articulate and intensify these feelings. But the danger exists, and it may eventually create a strange sort of time limit for us, so that we must either win the war fast for the GVN or else face a reaction from the very Vietnamese whose original shortcomings caused us to increase our involvement. On the other hand, there are many other Vietnamese who are consciously deciding to cast their lot with the Americans, and become “our Vietnamese.” For the Vietnamese, if they understand anything, understand the colonial relationship, and no matter how hard we try to avoid it, as the buildup proceeds, more and more Vietnamese will assume that we are indeed becoming the new masters of Indochina. This does not mean that we behave like the French did; but in a situation in which many people do not take the GVN seriously and in which most Vietnamese think that we (i.e., the CIA) control events, many Vietnamese are going to see quick profits and possible power if they can become popular with the Americans. By our very presence, we are therefore creating a group of people—some totally sincere, some wholly devious—who are making a commitment to the American Marines, or the Army, or the “Embassy.” Despite the theories VIPs get in briefings, this commitment cannot be transferred from the Americans to the GVN. People who make this commitment and cast their lot with the Americans—be they village chiefs or farmers in the Da Nang TAOR, or government officials, or covert agents or VC defectors—are choosing Americans, not the GVN. We have given such people something to hope for, either security or a chance for quick profits. Whatever the reasons for their choice, the majority of those making this choice have decided that we are going to be in Vietnam for a long time no matter what we say publicly. People in this category—including 2 VC defectors and a village leader—told me that the VC would win in a matter of weeks if the U.S. even thought of withdrawal. They based this feeling not only on the military power of the enemy, but on his political sub-structure. So if the war drags on, we may find ourselves cast increasingly in the role of the only governing force in a given area, more and more embroiled in the business of running that area. This may sometimes be unavoidable, but we should minimize the area in which it happens. We are not trained or equipped to do what must be done in rebuilding government in the villages; moreover, it is an open-ended commitment in terms of both time and men, and could well lure us unwillingly and unwittingly into a strange sort of “revolutionary colonialism”—our ends are “revolutionary,” our means quasi-colonial. As this happens, we can be caught in the trap of trying to get the least revolutionary Vietnamese—“our Vietnamese”—to carry out programs with which they are in basic disagreement. (National Reconciliation and Land Reform are recent examples.) Thus, our very presence may prevent the emergence of a new leadership which would be willing to carry out the revolutionary programs which we are advocating and which are vital to our success—unless we exercise a rare combination of self-restraint and gentle covert encouragement to selected younger civilian leaders. Richard Holbrooke 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Vietnam Files: FRC 77–0075, Vietnam—1966. Secret. Also sent to Leonhart. On December 1 Komer sent copies to Rusk, McNamara, Gaud, Vance, Katzenbach, McNaughton, and William Bundy. (Ibid.) The source text is marked “Sec Def has seen.” 2 In a November 9 letter to Rufus Phillips, Lansdale stated: “Thereʼs such a dirty power-struggle going on behind-the-scenes among Americans that itʼs time that someone talked plain turkey to them about the war and Viet Nam. Incidentally, the civilian vs. military aspects are getting ludicrous—in Mission Council meetings, Porterʼs bi-weekly meetings, etc.” (Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers, Correspondence, Phillips, Rufus) 3 Not further identified. 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 322. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, December 1, 1966. 12247. A. When I arrived at DʼOrlandiʼs apartment December 1 at 6:15 for our meeting with Lewandowski, DʼOrlandi met me in the hall, saying that something big had happened. When we went into the room where Lewandowski was waiting and we sat down around the table, DʼOrlandi said that it was imperative that continued secrecy be assured. Hanoi, he said, had made a specific point of leakage. If there should ever be any leak, there will be an immediate denial by Hanoi and by the Polish Government. B. I assured him that I was totally in sympathy with the policy of secrecy and that so was the United States Government. They could absolutely count on our leaving no stone unturned to preserve secrecy. C. Lewandowski then began his statement. He first thanked me for coming today. He then said: “My trip to Hanoi was very important. You should understand that what has been reached up to now in our conversations in Saigon and in my conversations in Hanoi may be decisive. Both Mr. Rapacki and Mr. Gomulka think so. D. “I presented to Hanoi my understanding of the U.S. position based on our conversations of November 14 and our previous conversations.” He indicated the numbers of the paragraphs as he went along, as follows: “1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations. “2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige. “3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a permanent or long term military presence in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the conflict has been reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness. “4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops. “5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through free democratic elections, and that the United States would be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections. “6. The United States hold the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition. “7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam. “8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam. Comment: At this point Lewandowski cited Phase A and Phase B of our last conversation in which I quoted para 3D of your 83786. 2 End comment. “9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure. “10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to expect that the United States will declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Namʼs four or five points.” End of statement. E. He then stopped and said, “I ask you whether this is a correct statement of the United States point of view.” F. I said that obviously on a matter of such importance, I would have to refer to my government for a definitive reply, but I could say off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping with the spirit of our policy. G. Personally, I would like to have a closer definition of the language in his paragraph 2 stating that the “present status quo in Viet-Nam must be changed in order to take into account the interested parties opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam.” He said that he would be glad to change the word from “must” to “would.” I said that this was obviously something which could be discussed. H. Another point which I felt might need some clarification would be the first sentence in paragraph 8 which stated: “The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate a peaceful solution.” I. In general, it was correct to say that we were interested in a peaceful solution, we wished to humiliate nobody, we did not wish anyone to lose pride or prestige, and that our offer at Manila was made in good faith. J. Lewandowski then said that what he had just read was “very firmly based on conversations with the most respectable government sources in Hanoi” and that it was in addition “vouched for by Mr. Rapacki.” He said that he made that statement so as to “avoid any belief on your part that this was not a serious proposition.” K. He added: “I am authorized to say that if the United States are really of the views which I have presented, it would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw.” L. He then repeated once again that “in case of any leak, a denial would be issued.” He repeated that “secrecy is of fundamental importance in this case. In fact, it is an essential element of the whole proposition.” M. He then said: “The United States should stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam apart from all other things.” N. He stated: “I was also informed by Hanoi and Warsaw that I should be ready to place myself at your disposal for any comment that you might wish to make.” O. I said that I would be interested in knowing who was the “responsible government source in Hanoi” with whom he spoke. After some hesitation, he said that it was Pham Van Dong, who spoke after “collective debate among all the proper authorities.” In other words, this had “the Presidium behind it.” He then said: P. “If you agree that my presentation is in accord with yours and are ready to confirm it with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow, I would ask for another meeting to clear up things of a practical character.” I asked what these were, and he said “the identity of the U.S. representative.” He added that both Rapacki and Gomulka attached great importance to his talks with me. “They specifically want to convince you of the importance which should be attached by the United States,” he added. Q. I assured him that we did attach great importance to this. He added that Moscow had been informed. R. He then said that he hoped we would get at this as “fast as possible.” The more delay, the greater the danger. The dangers were two-fold—1) the danger of a leak, and 2) that there would be someone “working against a solution.” He felt that we should “keep the present channel” and that we should “not try other channels.” To do so would not only create the danger of a leak but also the danger of misinterpretation. 3 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 11:04 a.m. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at the LBJ Ranch on December 2 and commented in a separate telegram to the President, CAP 66134, December 2, that both Rusk and Thompson believed the message was of importance and that he himself was impressed by several factors, “above all, by the phrase ‘as fast as possible.’ As you know, I have felt that if Hanoi was ever serious they would want a quick complete deal, not a slow negotiation.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16) 2 Document 305 . 3 In telegram 94660 to Saigon, December 1, the Department of State told Lodge that telegram 12247 was “receiving urgent consideration with virtually no distribution” and then asked for clarification of several points, which Lodge provided in telegram 12323, December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 323. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson 323. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Roche) to President Johnson 1 Washington,December 2, 1966. In going over my memos to you on Vietnam, I realize that they have a somewhat disjointed, ad hoc character. Each was addressed to some specific issue, and nowhere have I pulled together the main aspects of the problem as I see them. Let me try to put the pieces together in coherent fashion. I trust you realize my bluntness implies no disrespect for you or for those involved, I am desperately concerned with the institutional dimension and to the extent that individuals are criticized, it arises from their failure—in my view—to fulfill their institutional obligations. The heart of my critique involves the character of the American Mission. The Mission is a shambles. The Ambassador does not provide forceful leadership himself but at the same time makes it impossible for his subordinates to act forcefully. —item: Deputy Ambassador Porter did not want Zorthian as Mission Coordinator for National Reconciliation. Porter is theoretically in charge of operations, but Zorthian was imposed upon him by the Ambassador. This is a bad beginning, particularly since the first man assigned as Coordinator (Double-Deputy Ambassador Koren) was hastily dumped shortly after he held his first briefing. The Mission is thus stalled at dead-center and policy slippage is appalling: —item: The National Reconciliation program, scheduled for announcement on November 1st, is not yet off the ground and the Vietnamese seem to be pushing it off still further: “General Tri said … he had found a good deal of sentiment for initiating reconciliation campaign at time of promulgation of constitution sometime in March.”—Saigon 11814. 2 —item: local elections are being pushed off: “we doubt that GVN has any firm idea of election date … so date may come anywhere from March to June 1967.”—Saigon 11763. 3 —In short, the GVN is welshing on the firm commitments they made to you at Manila. And while the State Department finds this “disturbing” (State 93272), 4 nothing can really be done by cable. Indeed, the Mission seems to think that we are lucky to be as well off as we are. When Tri said, in the best French tradition, that he, of course, supports the launching of the National Reconciliation before Tet, but cannot vouch for Ky and Thieu, the Mission noted soberly: “We encouraged Tri to maintain this stand, but we should also be aware that any proclamation prior to January 1st would be difficult to obtain in view of these pressures for further postponement.” (Saigon 11814) —This is the oldest form of political blackmail in the world: “I am on your side, but look at the pressure I am getting from the others.” I have no objection to the Vietnamese trying it out (I have used it myself on occasion), but I do get furious when they consistently get away with it. Furthermore, the Mission loves to project itself as a few wise men beleaguered by mad utopians in Washington. The Evans columns reflect completely the localism that pervades the top echelons. If they could just be left alone (without constituent assemblies, elections, reconciliation programs, etc.) with their man Ky and a military blank check, everything would be fine. At the same time, presumably to make the utopians happy, the Ambassador can cable the following sentiments (Saigon 12113) 5 — to which I have added a running commentary. 1. “Progress towards a constitutional democracy also makes for stability.” Comment: This is simply untrue. The introduction of representative institutions into a military government is obviously destabilizing in short run terms. 2. “Anyone tempted to make a coup must now consider the reaction both here and abroad toward interference with the democratization process. The chances of a coup may be really lessened by the awareness that any frustration of the movement toward constitutional government would be extremely unpopular.” Comment: The kind of men who make coups are seldom deterred by the knowledge that they will be chastised in the editorial pages of The New York Times , they are not competing in a popularity contest. The one sure deterrent is the knowledge that MACV will not permit a coup. 3. “Even if there were a coup, it seems actually likely that the coup makers would feel compelled to endorse the assembly and allow it to continue working on the constitution.” Comment: “Even if there were a coup… “ What comment could be adequate? Conclusions: 1. At the moment we have a Mission in Saigon which is far closer in viewpoint to Ky than to Washington. 2. The Mission thus unconsciously (I am not for a second suggesting duplicity) sympathizes with the Ky government and uses Vietnamese “sovereignty” as an excuse for permitting sabotage of United States foreign policy, e.g., the silent death of Kyʼs Manila commitments. 3. The Mission is beyond control by cable. Implementation of presidential policy, in my judgment, thus requires a new chief of mission who appreciates the fact that the war in Vietnam is not being fought to make the countryside safe for Ky, but rather as part of a diplomatic, political and military confrontation with Communist power, a confrontation with worldwide implications and consequences. 4. Moreover, in immediate terms, there will be a dangerous gap even in what authority we do exercise over the GVN when Ambassador Lodge leaves for a month about December 12th. No one else in the Mission has been permitted to deal with the top levels of the GVN. —A number of things will be coming to a head in the next few months. In particular, the GVN has so far refused to compromise with the Constituent Assembly (Saigon 11876) 6 and does not seem interested in working out a viable reconciliation. In my opinion, the Assembly has proposed a very reasonable bargain; the Directorate (and the Mission) have simply not responded. The Directorate could, for example, make the Constituent Assembly very happy by providing that between the time it finishes the Constitution and the establishment of the new constitutional government, the Assembly shall remain in session for “consultative” purposes. This ducks all the juridical issues, gets both sides off the hook, and increases civilian prestige without undermining the status of the Directorate. 5. At the risk of sounding slightly paranoic, I would even go so far as to suggest that Bill Bundy be left off by Secretary Rusk in Saigon for a month. We are playing for huge stakes in Vietnam and we need a wholesale reform of our civilian team. Aside from myself, nobody in policy circles in Washington has recently spent any sustained period of time in Saigon. The experts at State suspect me of hysteria, but my guess is that if Bundy spent a month there he would make me sound calm and moderate. 7 John P. Roche 1 Source: Johnson Library, Office of the President File, John Roche. Secret. 2 Document 316 . 3 Dated November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 18–1 VIET S) 4 Dated November 29. (Ibid.) 5 Not found. 6 Dated November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–5 VIET S) 7 Rocheʼs memorandum is attached to a note that indicates that, upon reading the memorandum on December 4, the President instructed his secretary to have the following message passed to Bill Moyers: “I like this last paragraph, and I donʼt think we can get in a problem with Lodge, and I donʼt want to get in a fight with him right now, but I sure do think it would be good if we could keep Bill Bundy there for a while.” The message was relayed to Moyers by telephone on December 5. 324. Editorial Note 324. Editorial Note On December 2, 4, 13, and 14, 1966, U.S. aircraft carried out strikes on two targets in the Hanoi area that had been authorized on November 10 as part of Rolling Thunder 52 (see footnote 4, Document 299 ) but had not been previously struck. The Van Dien vehicle depot, located 5 nautical miles south of the center of Hanoi, was a military transportation center for trucks and other vehicles moving men and materiel to the war in South Vietnam. The Yen Vien railroad yards, located 5 nautical miles northeast of the center of Hanoi, controlled North Vietnamʼs railroad traffic north of Hanoi. Both targets were outside Hanoiʼs city limits. (Telegram 103849, December 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Van Dien vehicle depot was struck on December 2, 13, and 14 by a total of 66 strike aircraft. The Yen Vien railroad yards were struck on December 4, 13, and 14 by a total of 58 strike aircraft. (Memorandum from Major General John McPherson to Admiral David McDonald, December 15; Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rolling Thunder 52, 9155 (18 Feb. 65) Section 13) On December 3, following the December 2 strike, the North Vietnamese Government filed a protest with the International Control Commission, stating that U.S. aircraft had “bombed and strafed a populated area in the southern suburb of Hanoi and attacked two residential quarters inside the city.” On December 14, following the December 13 and 14 attacks, the North Vietnamese Government issued a statement claiming that U.S. aircraft had attacked “a number of places in Hanoi, including the foreign embassy quarter and the suburbs of the town, killing or wounding over 100 people.” ( American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pages 883, 885–886) U.S. officials responded in public statements that the attacks were against the same kinds of military targets that had been under air attack for more than a year and did not represent an intensification of the bombing. A spokesman for the Department of State did indicate at a December 22 news conference, however, that the possibility of an accident could not be ruled out completely. (Ibid., pages 884, 886, 890–891) The Department of State provided information explaining and defending the air strikes to all diplomatic posts on December 16 and to British Foreign Secretary George Brown on December 30. (Telegram 103849; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S; and Material to be passed to Mr. George Brown; ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) Much the same information was used by Ambassador Gronouski in his meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki on December 19 (see Document 345 ). 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, December 2, 1966, 6:15 p.m. 95711. Lewandowski has told Lodge that he has presented to Hanoi a ten point statement of our position on a possible Viet-Nam settlement. He has suggested that we confirm his statement of our position directly to the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw. If talks should take place in Warsaw we would wish you to guide them. It is of the highest importance however that there be no leak and we are most anxious to avoid arousing any suspicion that we are in direct contact with North Vietnamese. We therefore believe that it would be too conspicuous for you personally to contact North Vietnamese if in fact they agree to talk in Warsaw. We would like your judgment as to whether Jenkins would be suitable to carry on these important discussions after appropriate briefing here or whether we should arrange to send someone with requisite background from Washington. In any event Jenkins or any officer you select should endeavor to see North Vietnamese Ambassador on December 6 or as soon thereafter as possible. If received by him he should state that he has been instructed to inform North Vietnamese that Polish Representative in Saigon Lewandowski has informed our Ambassador that he had informed North Viet-Nam Government of our position on Vietnamese problem in a ten point statement based on his knowledge of our views. He should say that while Lewandowskiʼs report of what he says he told the North Viet-Nam Government is basically correct, certain of the points as phrased by him are subject to important differences of interpretation. He should say that if North Viet-Nam is prepared to discuss the matter we would be glad to arrange to do so anywhere that is suitable to them. If they prefer Warsaw we would arrange for suitable officer to be briefed authoritatively to carry on discussions and inform them directly of our position. 2 Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon. 2 In telegram 1359 from Warsaw, December 3, Gronouski proposed that he, rather than Jenkins, make the initial contact and carry on subsequent discussions. He also proposed that Rapacki be asked to serve as an intermediary, given the considerable risk of detection and publicity if a U.S. Embassy officer made direct contact with the North Vietnamese Ambassador. (Ibid.) 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 326. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, December 3, 1966. 12428. 1. I met DʼOrlandi and Lewandowski Saturday afternoon 2 pursuant to your 95709, 3 and stated: 2. “I am instructed to tell you that the United States Government is instructing the American Embassy in Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese representative there on December 6. Our Embassy will be able to confirm that the ten points outlined by you broadly represent our position. We will have to say, however, that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation.” 3. Lewandowski said he assumed from what I had said that some of the ten paragraphs in our opinion need clarification and that this interpretation will be done in Warsaw, to which I agreed. He asked whether the U.S. would be ready on December 6, and I said that we would be ready to make contact. 4. He said: “Probably for the first meeting we will extend to you some help in getting in touch with the North Vietnamese. Someone from the Ministry will be in touch with the Embassy and will effectuate a contact.” 5. He then said that he was under instructions from Rapacki to tell me that on December 2, there was the most heavy bombardment of Hanoi since last July. Rapacki thinks, said Lewandowski, that when we are on the brink of such a delicate undertaking, it is wise to avoid anything which would create the impression that the United States interprets anything in Hanoi as a sign of weakness. To do this would be a most unhappy interpretation. 6. I said that I was confident that the event of which he spoke was undertaken for military reasons having nothing to do with the matter on which we had been working, and said that I would transmit what he said to the U.S. Government. 7. Lewandowski then referred to the paragraph of his statement which dealt with the cessation of bombing, and asked whether that was right. 8. I said that it was my understanding that broadly speaking, it gave a fair picture of our position, in that we agreed with them in not linking the cessation of bombing to anything but the broad cause of getting peace. 9. Lewandowski then said that if we reached no progress this time, it might be a long time indeed before there is another opportunity. He added, “I am not excluding the possibility that we three will be occupied with this again. I strongly believe that at the next stage, we may be useful in opening another channel, Not necessarily through Hanoi but to the representative of the ‘Front.’” 10. I said that there is nothing about that in anything that I had said. Lewandowski agreed and said he mentioned this on his own personal initiative. 11. DʼOrlandi then said that it is obvious that this matter would come up, and that it was very complicated and it would be more easily dealt with by men who were here on the ground and knew all the ins and outs than by men in a distant place who had no first hand familiarity with Viet-Nam. It might have been useful for us to have been authorized to proceed one step further. It is difficult for those who donʼt know what we know. But then, he said, “We wanted speed and we stressed speed, and we certainly got it, and our work has really led to a very significant result. We can congratulate ourselves.” 12. Lewandowski said that it was not for him to dwell on what he had said about the Front. He was not raising it under instructions, but he felt that it was a question which would arise. Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:55 a.m. 2 December 3. 3 Dated December 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 327. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 327. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 5, 1966. 1363. Department pass at its discretion to Saigon. 2 Ref: State 96235. 3 For the President and Secretary. 1. I was called to FornMin 11:30 a.m. Dec. 5 by DirGen Michalowski who, after determing that I knew what meeting was about, took me in to see FornMin Rapacki. 2. Rapacki remarked that Poles are again trying to play constructive role in ending Viet Nam war and expressed hope and wish that this attempt will bear fruit. 3. Rapacki then recounted prior events, beginning with two November meetings between Lodge and Lewandowski in which Lodge expressed USG desire for political settlement and described USG attitude toward basis of peaceful settlement. Because during second talk Lodge said he was expressing not only his views but those of “decisive center of authority in Washington,” Poles have concluded that Lodge expressed official USG position. 4. Rapacki continued that on Dec. 1, after return of Lewandowski from Hanoi, Lewandowski had third meeting with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as he had understood it from the two previous conversations. After Lodge confirmed Lewandowskiʼs resume, Lewandowski said contact of USG and North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Warsaw would have support of Poles. 5. Continuing his account of prior events, Rapacki said that on the afternoon of Dec. 3, at a fourth meeting between Lodge and Lewandowski, Lodge, on the basis of the Presidentʼs instructions, read a statement as follows: A. The President will instruct the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw on Dec. 6 or as soon as possible thereafter. B. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw will be in a position on Dec. 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese Ambassador that the Lewandowski Dec. 1 resume of the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of the USG. C. “We must add that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation.” 6. Rapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec. 3 meeting to precisely say which points were subject to differences of interpretation and what the nature of these differences of interpretation might be. 7. Rapacki then stated that question of interpretation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place. He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be read by Hanoi. He added that Poles must transmit USG position to NVN Govt., and that rather than a general reference to differences of interpretation it would be better if position transmitted contained statement defining differences of interpretation we have in mind. He said such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoiʼs attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole problem. 8. Rapacki then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the conversations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation will be read by Hanoi, particularly with intensification of bombing near Hanoi subsequent to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations? He said these questions had already been raised by Lewandowski during his Dec. 3 conversation with Lodge. 9. Rapacki said that it would be desirable if last para of Lodgeʼs Dec. 3 statement (on differences in interpretation) had not been formulated in the first place. He suggested that this para be deleted on the basis that it was inserted as a result of misunderstandings which have now been clarified. 10. Rapacki said that if Poles were to transmit to Hanoi statement as read by Lodge on Dec. 3, the most favorable response that could be forseen as reaction by Hanoi is a reexamination of whole matter again from the beginning. This would mean, he added, that the contact in Warsaw would have to be postponed. 11. Rapacki said that Lewandowski has been asked to contact Lodge for clarification of Dec. 3 note. 4 He said that the Poles are holding up conveying information to Hanoi in hopes of obtaining improved version, but observed that they have no right to delay too long conveying information to Hanoi. 12. Rapacki asked that I transmit to the President the Poles deep concern caused by modification of USG position which has been signaled by the Dec. 3 declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds that it was based on misunderstandings which have since been clarified. 13. I told Rapacki that I would immediately convey his concern and proposal to the President and Secretary and contact him as soon as I received a reply. Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 10:43 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 275–277. 2 A note on the source text indicates the telegram was not sent to Saigon. 3 In telegram 96235, December 3, the Department of State discussed procedures for the first contact with the North Vietnamese in Warsaw. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 4 Lodge reported on this meeting with Lewandowski in telegram 12601, December 6, indicating that he responded by paraphrasing telegram 97016, Document 329 . (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 328. Editorial Note 328. Editorial Note On December 5, 1966, Walt Rostow forwarded to President Johnson a 16-page memorandum on “The View from Hanoi,” which Sherman Kent, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, had sent to Director of Central Intelligence Helms on November 30. The memorandum discussed Hanoiʼs current evaluation of: a) the course of the war; b) the political situation in South Vietnam; and c) the international climate, including U.S. domestic opinion. It noted that from a military viewpoint, Hanoi must have found the previous 12 months “fairly discouraging,” while on the political front Hanoi was confronted with the “surprising durability of the Ky government despite repeated crises.” The memorandum then considered Hanoiʼs future strategy and concluded with the following paragraph: “Our best judgment is that faced with the defeat of its present strategy and confronted with unpalatable options, Hanoi is procrastinating. Next spring, after the dry season, is a more likely time than now for modifications in strategy. But if Hanoi is now reconsidering its fortunes, then the two live options are a modification of military tactics toward guerrilla operations or a shift toward the political track, with all its hazards. Our view is that the military option—i.e., some new combination of guerrilla and large unit operations—is still likely to be the preferred course; and given time to work out the consequences and problems, Hanoi may move this way. But this is by no means certain, and for the first time in the last two years, there is a chance of a serious political move from the Communist side.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII) 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, December 5, 1966, 8:58 p.m. 97016. Ref: Your 1363. 2 You should tell Rapacki we believe we have gone quite far in stating our position without anything directly or indirectly from the other side other than the monotonous repetition of their four points. Lewandowskiʼs statement to Lodge was an oral one and we presume this was also true of his contact with Hanoi. The points he described covered matters of great complexity and of the highest importance. They were, moreover, stated in very general terms and subject to the imprecision of multiple translation. We might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if we did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandoski. Lewandowskiʼs formulation broadly reflects the position of the US Government on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the North Vietnamese if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter, and if they are informed that latitude for interpretation of such general language is inevitable. We greatly appreciate the personal interest and efforts of the Foreign Minister and it is for this reason that we wish to avoid any possible misunderstandings on matters of highest importance. 3 Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Katzenbach, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon for Lodge and to Tokyo for Rusk. 2 Document 327 . 3 In telegram 1375 from Warsaw, December 6, Gronouski reported on the discussion that ensued after he conveyed the contents of telegram 97016 to Rapacki at a meeting on December 6. Rapacki disagreed with the U.S. position regarding “room for interpretation” but indicated that he would transmit the information to Hanoi. Rapacki and Gronouski then discussed the substance of the first U.S.-NVN meeting, should it take place. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 275–277) 330. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 330. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin 1 Washington, December 6, 1966. Dear Mr. Chairman: Ambassador Kohler has reported to me on his recent conversation with you in Moscow. 2 I have studied your remarks carefully and appreciate the frankness of your observations. [Here follow comments on the non-proliferation treaty.] I believe that it is important for us to search out every possibility of agreement, whether on large questions or small questions. We are prepared to consider seriously any thoughts which you might have about the improvement of bilateral relations. With respect to Viet-Nam, it is clear that we have important differences in our views of that problem. You accuse us of flagrant aggression. We consider that we are helping a small nation resist outside aggression which is contrary to existing international agreements such as the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. When the authorities in Hanoi decided to launch their attack against South Viet-Nam, they were fully aware of the fact that we had entered into treaty commitments which required us “to meet the common danger” if a protocol state of the Manila Treaty were attacked and asked for our assistance. Without polemics, but in order that you can understand what we think, I would draw attention to the fact that we did not bomb North Viet-Nam until after the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese regular army moved into South Viet-Nam. American combat forces did not move into South Viet-Nam until after substantial movements of regular army units from North Viet-Nam were moved into the South. Long before that time, we had ample evidence that the effort of the so-called Liberation Front in South Viet-Nam was directed from Hanoi. Moreover, the transit of the territory of Laos by military infiltrators proceeded steadily after the Geneva Accords of 1962 came into effect in violation of that agreement. I would note the special obligation assumed by the Soviet Union, as a Co-Chairman under Article 8 of the Protocol to that agreement … an obligation elaborated upon by the Soviet Representative, the late Mr. Pushkin, to the American Representative, Mr. Harriman. These are our views and the basis of our policy. Our sole objective is to permit the South Vietnamese to decide their own future for themselves within the framework of the Accords of 1954 and 1962. We cannot have that future imposed upon them by force from the North. From your remarks to Ambassador Kohler, it is clear that we both agree on the most important objective—that the fighting should be brought to an end as quickly as possible. I quite agree with your remarks about the dangers in the present situation. I know that you will not misinterpret the earnestness with which we seek peace to mean that we are prepared to abandon our commitment to the people of South Viet-Nam. On the contrary we shall do all that is necessary to meet that commitment. Nevertheless, I have tried by every means I know of to seek a peaceful solution of this problem. As we see it, there are two major possibilities for achieving peace. One path would be that of negotiation, and we are prepared to take this course either by direct contact, through an intermediary, or by means of a formal conference, or any combination of these. Our aim would be to permit self-determination for South Viet-Nam. This would enable us to withdraw our combat forces entirely from South Viet-Nam. Do not be misled by the enormous investment we have made in bases in South Viet-Nam. I can assure you that we are prepared to give them up and to withdraw our troops. At the Manila conference, I tried to respond to Mr. Gromykoʼs suggestion that we should be more precise about our willingness to withdraw. I stated that we were prepared to carry out such withdrawal within six months—the minimum time required physically to carry out such an operation. I can understand that it may be difficult for North Viet-Nam to agree to formal negotiations, particularly in view of the pressure which they are evidently under from Peking. It was for this reason that I endeavored to see if they would agree to secret exploratory talks either directly or through an intermediary. We have also made far-reaching suggestions on the substance of the issues involved. For example, we have stated that the kind of government which could exist in Saigon and what the result might be on the question of reunification are matters to be decided by the South Vietnamese people themselves. We have supported Prince Sihanoukʼs request for stronger assurances of his own neutrality. We support action by the ICC to demilitarize in fact the zone along the 17th Parallel. We accept the 1954 and 1962 Agreements as the basis for peace in Southeast Asia. Another possible path to peace might be a simple tapering off of military action on both sides, including the campaign of terror against the Government of South Viet-Nam. To this end, we have unsuccessfully tried to enlist the interest of the other side in such a mutual de-escalation of the violence. Neither of these paths to peace involves any injury to North Viet-Nam; we do not ask them to surrender an acre of ground or a single man; we only want them to stop shooting at somebody else. I draw your attention to the many efforts toward peace which have come from our side. In the advance of negotiations or any quid pro quo from Hanoi, I have made the public commitment to withdraw our troops and give up our bases. I have publicly stated that arrangements could be made for the NLF to express its point of view. I have twice suspended our bombing of North Viet-Nam. I have refrained from using much of the power available to the United States in order to minimize the risk of widening the conflict. All we have heard from the other side is a reiteration of a position which they know amounts to the surrender of South Viet-Nam. You remarked to Ambassador Kohler that you could develop your thought further but preferred for us to think about your observations since the problem was most complex. I should be most grateful for any further observations you may have and any efforts you may be able to make to bring to an end this conflict which appears to us to be without justification and which carries the risks which you have pointed out. Objectively considered, Mr. Chairman, there need be no basic conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States on this matter. We fully recognize and respect the interest of the Soviet Union in the security of North Viet-Nam. We know you understand our interest in and our treaty commitments to the security of South Viet-Nam. Surely it is to the best interests of both of us as well as both South and North Viet-Nam to find a way to stop the fighting and let any outstanding questions be settled by peaceful means. Since writing the foregoing, our Ambassador in Saigon has forwarded an important message from the Polish representative, Mr. Lewandowski, about which I am told you have been informed. 3 We shall be giving this urgent consideration. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson 1 Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. Attached to the source text is a draft with extensive handwritten corrections. In a memorandum of his conversation with Dobrynin on December 7, Llewellyn Thompson reported that he handed the letter to Kosygin, who read it carefully and indicated that he would carry it back to Moscow. (Ibid.) 2 Kohlerʼs farewell conversation with Kosygin on November 14 was reported to the President in telegram 2238 from Moscow, November 14. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, vol. XIII) 3 Presumably a reference to Document 322 . 331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 331. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, December 7, 1966, 12:03 a.m. 97930. Ref: Warsawʼs 1375. 2 1. Your reference telegram will receive urgent consideration here tomorrow and you will receive further guidance from us then. 3 2. In the meantime, you should take no further initiative with GOP. 3. In the unlikely event that, before receiving further instructions, you should receive notice that NVN representative is ready and available for talks with us, we submit the following for your interim guidance. 4. If such a meeting with NVN representative should occur, you should follow prior instructions. If desirable, you are then authorized to read to him Lewandowskiʼs 10-point presentation of USG position as set forth at end of this cable, stressing that it is Lewandowskiʼs formulation. 5. You should then inquire whether points as presented by you are the same in all particulars as those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandowski. 6. For your information only, one of our principal concerns about the ten points is set forth in the next following paragraph, but even if pressed you should avoid discussing the substantive problems relating to these points with the NVN representative at this stage and stress that such discussions should be the subject of actual negotiations. We would assume that NVN representative would have no authority on this first contact to do more than report your presentation to Hanoi so we would not anticipate such probing at this time. Further cable tomorrow will spell out our thinking in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken if you have heard nothing, after additional lapse of time. 7. Lewandowskiʼs point two relating to change of present status quo in SVN is obviously most troublesome. This point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forthwith or (b) simple endorsement of election process under constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to point out ambiguities in Lewandowskiʼs statement, however, you should not refer to this point but allude to less contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement. 8. Lewandowskiʼs 10-point statement follows: “1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations. “2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige. (FYI: Lewandow-skiʼs original presentation states status quo “must” be changed but when Lodge questioned this point Lewandowski said he would be glad to change word from “must” to “would”. End FYI.) “3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a permanent or long term military presence in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the conflict has been reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness. “4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops. “5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through free democratic elections, and that the United States would be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections. “6. The United States held the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition. “7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam. “8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam.” At this point you should interrupt recitation of Lewandowskiʼs points and state as follows: “Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in accordance with Ambassador Lodgeʼs earlier formulation, which was as follows: A package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the United States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable measure of de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North Viet-Namʼs actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to United States actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension.” You should then resume the recitation of the ten points. “9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure. “10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to expect that the United States will declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Namʼs four or five points.” ( End of Lewandowskiʼs statement ) 9. If NVN representative probes further on cessation of bombing, you should merely state that as you have already indicated Mr. Lewandowski has suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing and timing which could be the subject of later discussions. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Read, cleared by Rostow, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Saigon. Also printed in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 283–286. 2 See footnote 3, Document 329 . 3 Document 333 . 332. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 332. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 7, 1966. 1394. Reference: Warsaw 1376. 2 1. FonMin Rapacki called me to his office at 1800 hours Dec. 7. As in previous two meetings with Rapacki, DirGen FonMin Michalowski took notes and chief North American Sec FonMin Janczewski acted as interpretor. 2. Rapacki opened oral presentation by saying that misgivings, warnings of which he had informed us, are materializing. He stated that the “interpretation clause” conveyed by Lodge coincided with intensified bombing of NVN, in particular in the vicinity of Hanoi, and have been understood accordingly. He said this has led to impression that this new stage of bombing is either the work of those who are trying to complicate and undermine the peace effort or constitutes an effort to bring pressure on North Vietnam. He added that “in these circumstances I wouldnʼt see a possibility of fulfilling by Poland of its role in a fruitful way.” 3 3. Rapacki then said that Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will put an end to this intensified bombing. He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this score, and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw between the USG and NVN Govt. will occur, then “I avail myself of this opportunity to state” that it is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the NVN representative its whole position as described by Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side could no longer fear that the USG position as formulated might subsequently be changed through recourse to Lodgeʼs “important differences of interpretation” clause. Rapacki concluded by saying that “it is necessary to gain clarity on these two points fairly early.” 4. I asked Rapacki if it had occurred to him that there might be a third reason for what appeared to him to be an intensification of bombing. I said that if I recall correctly, there was a lull in bombing flights in late October and early November simply because of bad weather conditions, and what appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may simply be a resumption of bombing to its normal level. 5. Rapacki responded that “policy is more important than weather.” He added that what Poles are trying to do is create the proper conditions for peace negotiations, and if we donʼt want NVN to think we are attempting to exert pressure “one avoids everything which creates that impression” even if the other side is not entirely justified in harboring that impression. (He quickly added that in this case there is justification.) 6. Rapacki went on to say that at the very time when Lewandowski stated to Lodge that it was advisable for USG to restate its position to NVN in Warsaw, bombing against the whole of NVN was intensified and also was more directed to Hanoi. This, he added, clearly appears to be provoking. 7. I asked Rapacki if he were expressing to me the reaction of the NVN Govt. He replied, emphatically, that he was expressing the Polish position, and only that of the Poles. He added that nothing he said came from or was inspired by the NVN Govt. or anyone else. ( Comment: Despite this statement to the contrary, Rapackiʼs calling me in at an unusually late hour today to express a much tougher position than he did yesterday could very well reflect Hanoiʼs response to the message transmitted by Rapacki to Hanoi yesterday afternoon.) Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:31 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 281–282. 2 In telegram 1376 from Warsaw, December 7, Gronouski reported on a discussion the previous evening with Michalowski, during which Michalowski indicated that Rapacki had conveyed the U.S. position to Hanoi earlier that day. Michalowski also stated that the Poles had been “in frequent contact with Hanoi,” and that the “NVN Govt. and even some in Polish Govt. are suspicious that recently stepped up bombing outside Hanoi is the work of some elements in the USG who are trying to undercut Presidentʼs peace move.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 280–281) 3 In telegram 12953 from Saigon, December 9, Lodge and Rusk reported that DʼOrlandi had just informed them of a conversation on December 8 with Lewandowski during which Lewandowski expressed “grave concern” over the bombing. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, December 7, 1966, 10:33 p.m. 98754. Ref: State 97930. 2 1. If a meeting with North Vietnamese is arranged, you should proceed in accordance with instructions contained in State 96235 3 and State 95711 4 except as modified below. As regards the presentation to the North Vietnamese representative of our position, you should follow closely the following formulation: “a. Lewandowski has informed us of his discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the position he communicated to them as that of the US, based on Lewandowskiʼs prior oral discussions with Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. We assume that his discussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of paper have been exchanged which purport to state government positions. We are prepared to enter into direct discussions with your government on the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented to your government in Hanoi. b. The position was stated to us by Lewandowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten points as contained in State 97930, para 8 with the additional point about bombing covered under Point 8). c. We wish to emphasize that this language is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States. Nevertheless it presents a general statement of the US position on the basis of which we would be prepared to enter into direct discussions.” 2. FYI. The North Vietnamese and perhaps the Poles as well appear to be seeking a reformulation of our position in order to compare it with what Lewandowski has said. While we are entirely prepared to have Lewandowskiʼs formulation stand as “presenting a general statement of the US position”, we are anxious to avoid a restatement of our position in our own words because (a) this would oblige us to take some harder positions than those put forward by Lewandowski which apparently have gone far enough to make the North Vietnamese ready to consider talking with us and (b) any formulation which can be attributed directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVN or to embarrass us in our relating with them. In other words, if we stand on Lewandowskiʼs formulation through the first step in discussions with the North Vietnamese, we can always say with regard to any specific point that we donʼt accept just those words used by Lewandowski and thus maintain some room for maneuver at least until we know the discussions are really under way. End FYI. 3. After reading the ten points you should point out to the North Vietnamese that some matters, because of their complexity and the danger of varying interpretation, would be the subject of further elaboration by us as soon as discussions were to get under way. One of these has to do with the package agreement containing the so-called phases A and B with respect to bombing and a program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain points which directly involve matters of basic concern to the people of South Viet-Nam (as for example points 2 and 5). Whatever detailed arrangements are made on those matters would have to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese people, however this could be ascertained through consultations and negotiations there. 4. If the North Vietnamese refer to the earlier point made by us that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation, you should explain that this is not intended to suggest that the statement as it stands is any less a general statement of the US position but rather that it is inevitable with matters as complex and controversial as those covered in the ten points that they would be subject to interpretation and that their clarification would be the normal function of the discussions which we hope we will be embarking on. If the North Vietnamese press for an illustration you might refer to the phrase “long-term “ in Point 3, noting that it was specifically to clarify this point that the Manila Communique specified a six-month period. 5. Otherwise you should be guided in your discussion with the North Vietnamese by the limitations set forth in para 6 of State 97930, stressing that further discussion of substantive questions should be the subject of the actual direct negotiations which we hope can be got under way promptly. 6. In conclusion you should say that your government is prepared to enter into secret discussions with the North Vietnamese Government at any time and we regard this as a mater of the highest importance and urgency. 7. We understand from your latest reports that the next step, if all goes well, will be the opening of the direct discussions with the North Vietnamese and if this in fact materializes you should avoid any further substantive discussions with the Poles. We, of course, are anxious for direct and private discussions with the North Vietnamese and hope that the Poles have no idea of participating therein. 8. Have just received your 1394 5 and will reply soonest. Meanwhile, if the Poles reopen the question of our position, before an answer is received from Hanoi you may tell them that you have now consulted with Washington and are prepared to confirm to the North Vietnamese Government the position of the US with respect to negotiations in terms which will be consistent with the discussions which Lewandowski has had with them and with us. You may add that we are looking forward to an early opening of talks with the North Vietnamese in order to reduce the possibilities of leaks and resulting publicity which none of us desires. Katzenbach 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Unger; cleared by Rostow, Thompson, and McNamara; and approved by Katzenbach. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp 286–288. 2 Document 331 . 3 Telegram 96235 to Warsaw, December 3, stated that Gronouski could make initial contact with the North Vietnamese if security permitted. However, the Department of State indicated continuing concern over someone at Gronouskiʼs level carrying on extended discussions without discovery. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 4 Document 325 . 5 Document 332 . 334. Editorial Note 334. Editorial Note From 4:35 to 5:02 p.m. on December 9, 1966, President Johnson met in the Cabinet Room with Secretary of Defense McNamara, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance, Vice President Humphrey, General Earle Wheeler, and Special Assistants Walt Rostow and Robert Kintner. (Johnson Liabrary, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) According to a note prepared for his Daily Diary, the President “considered the problem of next steps in hitting targets in North Vietnam.” “Broadly speaking, the decision was made to carry forward with what was necessary but at this particular moment not to expand our targeting.” (Ibid., Meeting Notes File) On December 10, General Wheeler reported in JCS telegram 7591–66 to General Westmoreland that he had met the previous day with President Johnson “to discuss Rolling Thunder withheld targets” (pre-sumably the four targets authorized but deferred on November 10 and 11; see footnote 4, Document 299 ). Wheelerʼs message continued: the President “declined to make an affirmative decision at that time because of certain political problems; however, he stated that he wished to renew the discussion in about a week.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files) Also on December 10, the Department of State notified Ambassador Gronouski in telegram 100627 to Warsaw that “for the immediate future the bombing pattern will remain unchanged from what it has been over the past several weeks. This may well involve some targets which Rapacki will insist represent further escalation, just as in the past he took to be escalation certain variations in our bombing pattern which in fact represented no real new departures in the pattern as a whole.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 335. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 335. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 9, 1966. 1421. Reference: State 98924. 2 1. Met Rapacki at my request at 1600 Dec. 9. Michalowski and Janczewski present. 2. My opening remarks, based on reftel, were as follows: A. “I have requested todayʼs meeting as a result of consultations I have had with Washington since our meeting Wednesday afternoon. 3 B. I can now assure you that at the time of the first Warsaw meeting with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government, I will be prepared to confirm to the NVN Govt the position of the USG with respect to negotiations. I can also assure you that this confirmation will be consistent with the discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us. C. With respect to the question you raised Wednesday on bombing, I can state flatly that the pattern of our bombing in NVN has nothing to do with the current effort of the Polish and USGs to get underway the projected US–NVN talks. The pattern of bombing is dictated solely by military considerations and is, of course, always subject to operational considerations such as vagaries of the weather. The record will confirm that there have been numerous variations in the bombing pattern over time. There is no basis whatsoever for attributing any changes which you believe you have detected in the recent period to an effort on our part to bring pressure on NVN with respect to these talks. D. You will recall that the subject of bombing NVN was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Mr. Lewandowski. After his return from Hanoi Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had discussed this matter in Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodgeʼs earlier formulation. Amb Lodge had suggested that a package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the US and NVN would agree to as reasonable measure of de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. The first phase, Phase A, would be a bombing suspension. Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalation actions. NVNʼs actions taken in Phase B thus would appear to be in response to US actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension. Inherent in this formulation is the package approach to de-escalation which I assume you had in mind when you referred to ‘a new package deal’ during our conversation last Tuesday. 4 E. I would like to conclude by saying that we are looking forward to an early opening of talks with the North Vietnamese in order to reduce the possibilities of leaks and resulting publicity which none of us desires. We again express our appreciation to the Polish Govt for the constructive role it has played, and hope it will make every effort to move forward what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace.” 3. Rapacki responded by saying that the contents of my remarks do not advance us and if first impressions are correct could mean a step backward. He added that there appears to be no advance on the two points which were subject of our last talk (Warsaw 1394). 5 4. However, with respect to my first point (presentation of USG negotiating position to NVN) he said if this is done in a way which will dispel doubt on invoking interpretation clause, then one of the difficulties has been reduced. 5. On bombing question, he said there is nothing new in my argument and he is loathe to transmit to Hanoi our interpretation that we are carrying on military business as usual and abstracting from any political considerations. He said Poles had asked avoidance of steps that would have to be considered provoking to Hanoi. He said he takes note of our intentions but he doesnʼt know if this will be convincing. Adding that bombing was clearly intensified at the precise time it would create provocation, he said what Poles had in mind in their presentations on this subject was, “Do not create new elements of tensions particularly when critical decisions are at stake.” He added that the USG is ignoring this consideration in making its military decisions. 6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. 14 statement by Lodge: USG understands that the Liberation Front and Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG is willing to take practical measures to show good intentions, and would be willing to hear any suggestions. Rapacki said this statement by Lodge was treated as addressed “only to Polish ears,” adding Poles have been proved right in treating it so because in the case of their bombing suggestion they have not found such readiness to listen to suggestions as Lodge indicated. 7. Rapacki expressed concern over my use of term “de-escalation,” noting that Lodge said Washington was convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting talks under way with partial de-escalation. He said Lodgeʼs accent was on the package deal which would cover all problems, including withdrawal of US troops. If my use of de-escalation represents a short-cut for a package deal including cessation of hostilities and the resolution of a variety of other outstanding problems, then his concern over my use of the term is simply a matter of semantics. He asked if my use of the term was consistent with Lodgeʼs declaration on a package deal. 8. I said I did not clearly understand what he was driving at but referred to my opening text and pointed out that the degree or manner of de-escalation is not subject to unilateral determination. I said that this would have to be resolved in negotiating sessions between the USG and NVN. I said I could not tell him in advance nor could anyone else how de-escalation will be defined in the ultimate package deal. I said one must assume that both parties entering negotiations will enter them with the objective of ending the war in Vietnam and that through negotiations directed toward that end the package deal will include whatever is possible for the two sides to agree upon. I concluded that the package deal idea was suggested by Lodge in context of our failure to elicit from NVN an answer to our question, “How will you respond if we quit bombing?” I went on to say that the conception of a package deal involving two steps was designed to solve the problem of achieving mutual de-escalation without treating NVN de-escalation as a direct response to the cessation of bombing. I concluded that only time will tell exactly what the negotiators will include in the final package; that the definition of de-escalation will be a product of negotiation. 9. After this long dissertation, I was surprised to hear Rapacki say that inasmuch as the term de-escalation is used in Phase B, his concern has been resolved. 10. Rapacki returned to the question of “important differences of interpretation.” He said if this merely meant hammering out greater precision in negotiations then he could perfectly well understand what we were getting at; but if this is the case why did we mention it at all? But if we have important substantive reservations, and that would seem to be the most logical reason for inserting the clause, then Poles still do not know what is meant by “important differences” and are still concerned about the suspicions of Hanoi that this clause will be invoked during the actual negotiations to reverse USG position as stated by Lewandowski. He asked for my comment. 12. I said whether the differences that are bound to exist are simply a refinement or would fall into the category of important differences cannot be determined until the matter is tested in negotiations. What one side at one point may judge to be a refinement to gain more precision, the other side might regard as a very important departure from the original intent. I cannot predict the kind of differences that will arise in negotiations because the resolution of this question will be a product of the negotiations. 13. Recapitulating his position, Rapacki said that we still have not achieved clarity on the manner of presentation of the USG position in the first Warsaw meeting. He added that Poles are also disappointed in having to draw the conclusion that in intensifying bombing the U.S. took into consideration only military factors, rejecting consideration of suspicions that the intensification is designed either to exert political pressure or to undermine the peace effort. 14. I replied that I have felt during the year I have been here, and have expressed this feeling to my govt, that Mr. Rapacki was genuinely interested in helping to advance a negotiated solution to the Vietnam war. I said I felt that at no time since I have been here has the possibility appeared so hopeful to me, and that it behooves all of us to bend every effort to induce Hanoi to begin the Warsaw talks. I said that no one knows whether these talks, once begun, will succeed or fail but that this is a risk well worth taking. I said if they succeeded, nothing that he or I could do in a lifetime would have been quite so important. I added that it is inevitable when we are attempting to start negotiations between two who have been military adversaries that there will be doubts on both sides as to the good will of the other. I said I can understand how the NVN may have doubts about our good intentions as I hoped he could understand how we could have doubts about their genuine interest in wanting to come to the conference table and negotiate with good faith toward a peace agreement; these doubts will linger until they are finally resolved through the HACC process of negotiation. I continued by asking him to view our intentions in terms of the whole series of discussions in Saigon and here that began almost six months ago. I said I am convinced that no reasonably objective man could have any serious doubt, if he looked at the overall picture, including those suggestions advanced by Lodge on Nov 14 and 15, and the comments we have made recently here in Warsaw, that the President and the whole USG is genuinely interested in moving forward toward a negotiated settlement. The fact that doubts exist and will persist should not be permitted to blind anyone to the overwhelming evidence of our deep and genuine interest in finding the basis for a negotiated settlement. 15. I concluded by saying that it is essential that we take the first step. Nothing will be accomplished unless we begin the meetings; what will happen once they begin, I cannot predict. All I can tell, I said, is that the USG will enter the negotiations in good faith and with the intention of coming out of the negotiations having found a mutually agreeable solution to the problem. I added that the fact that we cannot predict how the negotiations will go is no justification for not getting them started; it would be criminal if after having reached this point their efforts and ours to get the two parties together failed. I hoped and trusted that the Poles would do their best to bring about a commencement of negotiations. 16. Rapacki concluded by saying that you are attaching great importance to this first meeting. 6 It is not easy, however, and we will have to wait and see what happens. He said he would be in touch with me if there is anything to report. 17. Comment: Rapackiʼs position was much less intransigent today than during Dec 7 meeting. I thought it significant that when I stressed importance of initiating talks Michalowski, Rapackiʼs major adviser on Vietnam war, nodded his head affirmatively three or four times. Because I found no threat to break off talks that was implied Dec 7, I did not use para 2 of reftel. 7 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:57 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 293–295. 2 Dated December 2. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 288–289) 3 December 7; see Document 332 . 4 See footnote 3, Document 329 . 5 Document 332 . 6 In telegram 1422 from Warsaw, Gronouski added a clarification to paragraph 16 at this point, based on a review of his notes, that included the following: “He continued, it looked as if we could move forward. You know the reasons for our concern: what basis do I have in our conversations to dispel suspicions of other side arising out of intensified bombing, bombing of Hanoi, the ‘important differences of interpretation’ clause? In such circumstances it is difficult for me to get a reply, to move the matter forward.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 7 Paragraph 2 of telegram 98924 to Warsaw reads “If Rapacki attempts to nail us to anything on bombing beyond our first contact with the North Vietnamese, or again threatens to break off the operation, you should inform him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains this position he will have to accept the full responsibility for the breakdown of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace.” 336. Draft National Security Action Memorandum 336. Draft National Security Action Memorandum 1 Washington, December 10, 1966. SUBJECT Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam Now that the extensive deployment and skillful use of U.S. forces has greatly improved our military position in Vietnam, it is imperative that we mount and effectively orchestrate a concerted military, civil, and political effort to achieve a satisfactory outcome as soon as possible. To this end, I approve the following guidelines for such an effort, and for ensuring that it is effectively carried out. I. Our Strategic Aims . These must be to: A. Maximize the prospects for a satisfactory outcome in Vietnam by December 1967 or, if this is not possible, put us in the best position for the longer pull. B. Be equally suited to (a) forcing Hanoi to negotiate; (b) weakening the VC/NVA to the point where Hanoi will opt to fade away; or (c) at the minimum, making it patently clear to all that the war is demonstrably being won. C. Complement our anti-main force campaign and bombing offensive by greatly increased efforts to pacify the countryside and increase the attractive power of the GVN—all these to the end of accelerating the erosion of southern VC strength and creating a bandwagon psychology among the people of SVN. This strategy is also well suited to exploiting any possibilities of a Hanoi/NLF split. II. Action Programs for 1967 . To achieve our strategic aims will require a maximum continuing effort in the following nine program areas: A. Press a Major Pacification Effort , employing the bulk of the RVNAF. 1. Devise a concrete and detailed US/GVN pacification plan for 1967 which will: (a) set realistic goals by region and by province, with emphasis on areas or LOCs where early results are possible; (b) provide for adequate force allocations and time-phasing; (c) properly dovetail the military and civil programs. 2. Retrain, re-motivate and deploy a steadily increasing proportion of ARVN in supporting the RF and PF in clear-and-hold operations as the key to pacification. 3. Progressively open essential roads, railroad and canals on a planned schedule. 4. Revitalize and accelerate the civil side of pacification. 5. Devise improved techniques for measuring pacification progress and presenting them to the public. B. Step up the Anti-Main Force Spoiling Offensive , as made feasible by the increase in FW maneuver battalions. 1. Introduce modest US forces into certain key Delta areas. 2. Stress offensive actions to clear VC base areas and LOCs around Saigon. 3. Lay on a major re-examination of our intelligence on VC/NVA strength. C. Make More Effective Programs to Limit Infiltration and Impose a Cost on Hanoi for the Aggression. 1. Refine the bombing offensive with respect to both efficiency of route harassment and quality of targets. 2. Press forward with barrier system. 3. Examine other ways to apply military pressure on the North. D. Mount a Major, Continuing National Reconciliation Program , designed to maximize the inducements aimed at eroding VC strength. 1. Expand and revitalize Chieu Hoi Program to handle 45,000 lower level defectors a year. 2. Press a sustained middle and high level defector program under appropriate auspices. 3. Ensure that new Constitution is consistent with reintegration of VC into the national life. 4. Develop a US contingency plan on how to handle VC/NLF in the next local and national elections, examining options of allowing VC to vote or perhaps even inviting NLF to run as a party in next national election. 5. Enlarge efforts to establish contacts with the VC/NLF. E. Press for the Emergence of a Popularly-Based GVN , with adequate checks and balances between the civilians and the military, and between northerners and southerners. 1. Make clear well in advance to the Directory that the US cannot accept a retrogression to military government, another coup, or blatant election rigging. 2. Press home to all—civilian and military—the importance of national unity and pulling together, as a minimum US condition for continued US support of SVN. 3. Use all our influence behind the scenes to bring about a smooth transition to a representative GVN, but one in which the still indispensable military role is not submerged. F. Press for Other Key Elements of the Manila Program which will enhance the GVNʼs attractiveness. 1. Encourage better local government, including elected hamlet, village, and district/province officials. 2. Insist on a workable scheme of land reform, land tenure, and rent moratorium. 3. Vigorously attack corruption and misuse of US aid. G. Maintain the Civil Economy and Keep a Firm Lid on Inflation. 1. Enforce a vigorous stabilization program. 2. Definitively lick the port bottleneck—both movement into the warehouses and movement out. 3. Maintain an adequate import level. 4. Generate more rice from the countryside. 5. Accelerate the creation of infrastructure for economic development. 6. Mount an imaginative postwar planning exercise. H. Devise a Pre-Negotiating and Negotiating Strategy Consistent with the Above. 1. Take such initiatives as will credibly enhance our posture that we are always ready to talk and ever alert for new avenues to negotiation. 2. Vigorously pursue serious negotiating leads. I. Mount a Major Information Campaign to inform both the US electorate and world opinion of the realities in Vietnam, finding ways credibly to measure progress. 2 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Viet S. Secret. Rostow forwarded the draft to Katzenbach and McNamara under cover of a December 12 memorandum stating that the President wanted to issue an NSAM “embracing guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam” and wanted comments on it “if you believe it constitutes a basis for such a NSAM.” This draft was based on a paper by Komer, “A Strategic Plan for 1967 in Vietnam,” November 29. (Johnson Library, Komer Files, McNamara-Vance-McNaugton; see footnote 3, Document 320 ) In a December 5 memorandum to Katzenbach, Komer proposed that Katzenbachʼs “non-group” prepare a strategic plan for the President, working from his paper. “All it really needs is a preamble, and a bit of cleaning up.” (Johnson Library, Komer Files, Katzenbach) On December 10 Rostow forwarded the draft NSAM to the President, who wrote on Rostowʼs covering memorandum: “Itʼs good. Come in with Bob on Monday.” (Ibid., Rostow Files, Vietnam Strategy) The President met with Rostow and Komer on Monday, December 12, from 12:20 to 1:03 p.m., presumably prior to circulating the draft NSAM to McNamara and Katzenbach, but no record of their discussion has been found. (Ibid., Presidentʼs Daily Diary) 2 The NSAM was never issued. State Department and Defense Department comments on the draft (and on a revised draft circulated in January 1967) are discussed and excerpted in Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War , Part IV, pp. 490–494, and The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition , vol. IV, pp. 392–440. Several internal Defense Department documents commenting on the draft are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 381 Vietnam, filed under December 23 and 27. In telegram 14767 from Saigon, January 3, 1967, Porter stated that he did not understand the need for such a document: “It does not provide guidelines, and it does not include priorities. Instead, it sets out a series of desirable objectives, all of which are already known and accepted.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 337. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State 1 Bangkok, December 11, 1966, 0701Z. 7466. Secto 38. Following were highlights of Secretaryʼs discussions with Thieu, Ky, and Do. (Third country assistance and Cambodia being covered septels.) 2 1. In all conversations, Secretary stressed great importance of showing real progress in 1967 and demonstrating clearly that we were on right track. Not only would such progress avoid any political problems in U.S., but it was particularly vital to try to achieve successful conclusion of conflict while Communist China continued to be engaged in major power struggle. If Mao and his cohorts emerge on top in that struggle, dangerously militant policy might result, while victory for more pragmatic group tending to “peaceful coexistence” might create different dangers even including reconciliation between Peking and Moscow. These arguments seemed to impress GVN leaders, who concurred in sense of urgency. 2. ARVN pacification role. Both Thieu and Ky profess themselves completely in accord with devoting ARVN wholly to pacification. Both had just spoken top military leaders and corps commanders in this sense, and Thieu particularly stressed to Secretary that ARVN could and should regard clear and hold missions as real central job to be done in conflict and natural division of labor, with allied forces concentrated on search and destroy operations, which Thieu described as “really secondary.” Both further agreed with Secretaryʼs observations, based on several reports, that Hanoi believes true test of its success or failure will be fate of subversive infrastructure in South. Thieu indicated he and other leaders would personally undertake to “brainwash”officers still influenced by ideas of prestige and glamour (perhaps implying a considerable indoctrination along these lines was necessary). 3. Leadership changes. Ky referred to recent shakeup (Quang) as helpful, and said three to four corrupt province chief would be removed in near future, with full agreement of corps commanders. (Another symptom of the committee at the top.) 4. Future Popular Forces and Combat Youth. Thieu initiated long discussion of problems GVN would face at end of hostility. He said Popular Forces (which he still calls SDC) could not be maintained financially at adequate levels and also indicated that they were not too good at dealing with local population. Moreover, there were not enough PF to protect all the hamlets and recruiting for the PF was more difficult now. Hence, he thought it useful to develop something larger along the lines of the old Combat Youth—despite the Nhu label—i.e., giving arms to village inhabitants under 18 and over 45 to provide security now and to deal with future threats when major hostilities had ended. Ambassador Lodge commented that combined action teams in I Corps seemed to fit this general concept, and Thieu agreed. Nonetheless, he was apparently trying out a more far-reaching idea. (While his purpose can only be surmised, fact that he referred favorably at one other point to the old spirit in 1963 might indicate that he has a political design in mind as Nhu most certainly did at that period.) 5. Chieu Hoi. In response to Secretaryʼs question whether defections would increase in future, Thieu responded that if GVN had strong government and army by 1968, and controlled 60–70 percent of country, lower level VC might become discouraged on large scale. (Secretary noted this made major progress in 1967 all the more crucial.) As to specifics of Chieu Hoi program, Thieu expressed concern that 32,000 out of the 40,000 total Hoi Chanh to date had gone back to their villages and were now totally out of GVN control. He thought progress to date was still not major and would not be so long as defector motives were primarily hardship and difficulty rather than positive appeal of GVN. For future, he thought GVN must offer better assurance of appropriate jobs and must likewise find better ways to control Hoi Chanh and see that they did not revert to VC. Finally, he noted that heavy military pressure would have major effect in increasing defections. 6. On same topic, Ky made virtually same points. Secretary suggested one control method might be to have Hoi Chanh report once a month to some designated official to be sure what they were doing. 7. Reconciliation. Secretary stressed great importance of this, along side Chieu Hoi increase, as part of overall pressure on VC. He also mentioned recent Eastern European inquiries about amnesty program, suggesting that it took the place in their minds of dangerous coalition ideas. While Ky appeared to agree, specifics and timing of reconciliation plans were not discussed. 8. Post hostilities prospects. Thieu devoted substantial discussion to this topic. He thought (as did Ky) that Ho might maintain the hope of victory until 1968. After that, if the U.S. showed itself still determined, Hoʼs attitude might change. However, Ho would then act so as not to lose too much, simply fading away, asserting that infiltration had stopped, perhaps pulling out divisions, and thus trying to get the U.S. out. If the GVN was not then capable of coping with its affairs, there could be a subdued conflict for many years, with the DRV possibly sending back more subversives, or aiming at a coalition or a “pink” National Assembly. Thieu reverted to the need for adequate armed manpower to cope with this kind of situation, and said that GVN must never repeat 1954 error of immediate sharp reduction in military forces. At same time, they could not afford to maintain VNAF at full strength. Hence, he had thought of the idea of converting discharged veterans to civilian employment for the GVN, which would provide good lives for these men, while at the same time there would have to be enough armed strength to control the country. Secretary responded that there would almost certainly be a rather long period of transition after hostilities have ceased. While the U.S. would withdraw its forces if the Manila conditions were met, U.S. interest would most definitely go on toward effective reconstruction. He agreed with Thieu that there should be no sharp reduction in GVN forces until we were really convinced of Hanoiʼs attitude. 9. Constitutional timetable. Both Thieu and Ky agreed with Secretaryʼs stress on importance of smooth transition to new constitutional government. Thieu implied that Directorate still holding to Article 20 but hoped to persuade CA that amendment provisions would not have to be used “too much;” he said CA making sound progress and that form of government appeared virtually agreed. (Ky made same point, saying majority now clearly favored President/Prime Minister executive with strong powers along Korean model.) Thieu said CA and Directorate really had co-responsibility for constitution. He said at least 50 percent of CA were able men, with only few extremists. Government could work with them and, he concluded quite frankly, there was no intent to maintain military power. Secretary asked about local councils, and Thieu responded rather vaguely that Peoples Army Council should act soon on local elections. Ky said more specifically that constitution should be definitely completed by end of February, then elections within six months. He agreed fully on vital importance of big participation in elections. 10. In informal closing exchange, Ky remarked that constitution as such did not mean much to common people of SVN. However, he then agreed fully with Secretaryʼs observation that political process could play vital role, not only for GVN image in eyes of world but in bringing about cooperation among divergent SVN groups. In relaxed and frank way, Ky then stressed that most important single aspect would be selection of a single leader who would unify the nation. 11. Negotiating prospects. To Thieu inquiry whether there was any sign from Hanoi, Secretary responded that we had had no such indication, and specifically no indication on the point so stressed by Soviets and Eastern Europeans, of what would happen if we stopped the bombing. Secretary thought Kosygin declaration in Paris 3 contained little new, but did note our relations with Soviets not really stymied by Viet-Nam issue (referring specifically to civil air and space agreements), and that he attached importance to Soviet reference to Geneva agreements in Bucharest Communique last July. We believed that Soviets and Eastern Europeans would accept return to Geneva agreements, but were immobilized, perhaps by concern for Peking, from bringing effective influence to bear on Hanoi. 12. Conversation with Ky touched specifically on the Christmas truce. Secretary noted we must be alert against betrayal, including possible use of truce period by other side for maneuver. He reiterated firm U.S. position on bombing cessation. Ky responded that much peace negotiating talk had been futile and that this was Communist game which could affect GVN morale badly. Hence, he had welcomed stand-firm declarations at Honolulu and Manila and appreciated Secretaryʼs attitude toward truce and bombing cessation. 13. Anti-American feeling. Both Thieu and Ky said they saw no significant signs of this, and specifically no belief that the U.S. had any selfish designs in SVN. Ky said that the majority of articulate Vietnamese understood why we were there, and that common people were deriving substantial economic benefits from U.S. presence. He said that of course there were some critics, but these same people were the first to protest when the U.S. moved its forces, for example out of the cities. In the countryside, he said U.S. personnel were well received and liked, and in general there was not the slightest resemblance between the U.S. position and that of the French. 14. Economic situation. This came up only with Ky. He said port problem should show improvement in 1967 with target of 2,000 tons per day (sic). Black market problem should be less because of recent strong measures. On piaster spending level, he said GVN would hold to 75 billion level, despite pressures from Ministries. Tax revenues were not as large as expected but were improving slowly; he had been startled to find many manufacturing concerns provided no records of their revenues, and he had introduced a new system to get such figures and to try to tax them at the source. At another point, Ky made general reference to rice price question, saying that key objective must be to prevent rice going to VC and Cambodia, and that rise in price, even if it caused loss and expense, would be worth it. (He did not indicate any specific plan of action on this point.) Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Rusk was in Saigon on December 9–11, following visits to Tokyo (December 5–7) and Taipei (December 7–9). He then proceeded to Bangkok (December 11–12), New Delhi (December 12), and Tehran (December 12–13), prior to attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris December 13–16. 2 Telegram 7467 from Bangkok, December 11. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 3 For text of the Joint Declaration of Kosygin and De Gaulle, issued at Paris on December 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966 , pp. 422–425. 338. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 338. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1 Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0035Z. 13122. 1. Following is current status Mission and GVN efforts on national reconciliation campaign: 2. Preliminary papers have been developed by Chieu Hoi Director Lt. Col. Pham Anh with assistance and cooperation Mission representatives. These include basic concept paper transmitted to Washington as Saigon 11958 2 and suggestions on basic themes for inclusion in national proclamation. We have also prepared list of necessary administrative actions which we are now reviewing and will present to Colonel Anh during coming week. 3. General Tri, MinInfo, has been in Taipei for most of this week but is planning review of proposals over weekend in anticipation presentation entire project to Cabinet on December 15th. Anhʼs plans will be presented in form of national reconciliation action plan. 4. December 15th meeting is critical meeting in progress on these proposals. As of now, only top-level GVN leadership and Col. Anh have done any real thinking about reconciliation effort. Presentation to Cabinet will represent first exposure of detailed proposals to other ministers. Until Cabinet endorsement is obtained, national reconciliation remains a concept in minds of Thieu and Ky and Tri rather than a GVN Government program. We will make every effort, therefore, to obtain strong endorsement these proposals by Cabinet. 5. SecState discussed subject with both General Thieu and Prime Minister Ky during course of calls Saturday and found both still committed to idea, although expressing some reservations about problems raised by such concepts as guarantees for employment at appropriate levels in Vietnamese society and restoration full political rights. We intend continue to work on these points with Thieu, Ky and Tri in order to ensure firm presentation to Cabinet next week. 6. On US side, our own preparatory planning continues and various elements of Mission have proceeded about as far as possible without actual endorsement of plan by GVN. When this endorsement obtained, we will urge GVN to inform corps and province officials promptly and we in turn will brief our own field personnel. 7. Col. Anh proposals to Cabinet recommend national proclamation by Chief of State on January 7 and all-media speech by Prime Minister Ky promptly thereafter. We believe this is earliest date on which we can expect public announcement in view continuation some sentiment to delay entire project until “Constitution Day,” presumably in March. Basic themes we are suggesting to GVN for inclusion in national proclamation, which we expect to be included in Cabinet presentation next week, transmitted by septel. 3 Lodge 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis. Received at 8:56 p.m. on December 11. 2 Dated November 29. (Ibid.) 3 Telegram 13123, December 11. (Ibid.) In telegram 14681, December 31, Porter reported that he had been advised by South Vietnamese officials that National Reconciliation would not come before the Cabinet until the first week of January and thus “some brief slippage in timing of proclamation will be inevitable.” (Ibid.) 339. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 339. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Saigon, December 12, 1966, 0330Z. MAC 10822. 1. The past several weeks have witnessed emergence within US civilian circles here, notably among senior State Department personnel, of allegations that the ills of revolutionary development may be laid at the feet of ARVN and MACV. According to the proponents of this theme, ARVN was organized improperly at the outset by its US military sponsors. The basic error is said to have been creation of a so-called conventional force instead of one tailored to excel in the counter-guerrilla role. The argument goes on to assert that the basic error, having been compounded over the years by short-sighted advisors, has produced today an ARVN that is powerless in terms of organization and attitude to cope with the security tasks incident to destruction of Communist infrastructure and guerrilla forces. 2. This body of opinion reflects a condemnation of the military, both Vietnamese and US. Particularly disturbing is the suggestion that MACV is delinquent in having failed to reorient and reeducate ARVN in the course of yesteryearʼs assistance programs. I do not rule out the possibility, let me add, that projects such as the Enke-Aspin study entitled, “Cost-Benefit Among Armed Forces in South Vietnam,” 2 which dwells on the notion that ARVN may be “a poor buy,” are associated directly or indirectly with this proposition. 3. In an effort not only to set the record straight with respect to evolutionary development of ARVN, but to counter a potentially dangerous groundswell of misguided reasoning, I addressed the Mission Council meeting on 6 December. My presentation embraced the following approach: A. As opposed to residing in organizational and doctrinal problems, real or imaginary, ARVNʼs structure and capabilities have been moulded by the necessity for its employment against major conventional enemy forces as well as against guerrillas. It will be remembered, in this regard, that as recently as the Spring of 1965, victories by enemy regulars produced a state of near defeat for the Republic. If ARVN had been organized as a lighter force, the results could have been disastrous. B. Only through maturing of the US/Free World buildup has it been possible to contemplate major reemphasis on ARVN capabilities from operations against enemy regular formations to security tasks in support of revolutionary development. C. Without a visible indigenous mobilization effort, expansion of US assistance to Vietnam would have been unacceptable politically during this decade. As the one viable organizational entity within the Republic, RVNAF provided the only feasible framework for mobilization of a major segment of RVN manpower. With the zenith of mobilization having been reached, emphasis can and is being shifted to improving the quality of the Vietnamese armed forces. D. Irrespective of organizational patterns and assigned missions, the fundamental weakness within RVNAF continues to be inadequacy of leadership at all levels. Although various measures are being applied to overcome this problem, leadership deficiencies will continue for an extended period. 3 4. Although I have tried to forestall widespread circulation of the unfounded and uninformed thesis discussed above, I would not be surprised to learn that it had reached Honolulu and Washington. On the premise that it has or will, you may wish to consider counter actions. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret; Personal. Also sent to Admiral Sharp. 2 Not further identified. 3 In a December 23 memorandum to the President, Roche summarized the gist of a CIA study, “The South Vietnamese Army Today,” December 12, which, Roche said, called the ARVN poorly trained, understrength, short of experienced leaders, and at a serious disadvantage in firepower. Roche concluded: “If this is the case now, the disruption of ARVN into battalions and companies to pacify provinces could lead to complete disintegration of the ARVN order of battle.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII) The CIA study is ibid. 340. Editorial Note 340. Editorial Note During a telephone conversation with President Johnson that began at 12:36 p.m. on December 12, 1966, Secretary McNamara informed the President that he was sending General Starbird to Vietnam to talk with General Westmoreland about plans to build a barrier. McNamara continued: “Westmoreland would like to do it, I think, but he wants additional forces to monitor it, so Starbirdʼs going to go out and talk to him and see what he thinks, and heʼll be back the end of this week or early next and Iʼll be able to give you a much better report at that time. Basically the military leaders, with the possible exception of Westmoreland and Wheeler, are opposed to it because philosophically they are opposed to static defense. And this of course is static defense, and they use the analogy of the Maginot Line and so on. There are some who are opposed to it because they think it might in some way or other reduce the arguments in favor of bombing of North Vietnam. But, Mr. President, when we donʼt have a winning plan for you, and we canʼt tell you how and when weʼre going to win, it seems to me we need to buy a little insurance, and thatʼs the way I look upon this, and I think we definitely should go ahead and take this preparatory step so that you later can have the option of putting it in, and basically thatʼs what Iʼve asked Starbird to try to work out with Westmoreland. I donʼt want to have us sit here in the position of ordering this to be done over the objection of all the military leaders. Weʼre trying to avoid that situation.” The President then said “OK,” and the conversation ended. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.01, PNO 001) 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 341. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 13, 1966. 1458. Ref: Warsaw 1429. 2 1. At 1400 Dec 13 meeting (attended also by Michalowski and Jan-czewski) Rapacki opened by observing that todayʼs meeting was not urgent but he felt it was good for us to meet frequently to transmit information and recapitulate attitudes. ( Comment: At outset and throughout meeting Rapacki struck me as being in relaxed and reflective mood.) 2. He stated that as result of our conversations, Poles have informed Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRNVN) that our conversations took place, and have transmitted those parts destined for transmittal. 3. Rapacki then recapitulated present situation: In mid-November Lodge presented the American view on possibilities of solving problem; Lewandowski then carried these observations and opinions to Hanoi. On basis of Hanoi conversations, Lewandowski was able subsequently to transmit to Lodge idea of Warsaw meetings. 4. Rapacki continued “We thought at that point that the meetings could be held soon and we were generally hopeful.” However starting with Lodgeʼs interpretation clause, complications have since arisen. On Dec 3 suburbs of Hanoi were bombed and NVN bombing intensified. Poles immediately and without asking anyone at that point presented their opinion to US. Thus, he concluded, in December new elements appeared on the scene which were negatively assessed in Hanoi. Not surprisingly, therefore, with this new situation and considering UGSʼs reaction to Polesʼ concern, there was reappraisal by party most directly involved. As a result, we are faced with this postponement of Warsaw meetings. 3 5. Rapacki said he was not insensitive to USGʼs expression of appreciation for role Poles were playing; however he was afraid US does not understand nature of Polandʼs role. He said he feels we are assuming that all of his words come from Hanoi and everything we say to him goes to Hanoi. He said this is not the case; “True, we have our own views and we are friends of Hanoi, but our role is neither that of postman nor advocate; what we want is peace.” He said that having knowledge of views of both sides, which neither of participants have, “we think we can play a contributing role.” 6. Rapacki continued, saying that Poles are sincere and in this sincerity they must say that they are not sure what USG wants: talks, or to get soundings as to how far DRNVN is ready to yield under pressure. He added that Poles assume that prevailing intention of USG is to bring about talks. He said this is why they are engaged; they are acting on this working hypothesis. 7. He continued that if this working hypothesis reflects reality then he must say that USG did great harm to its own objectives in December. The USG cannot afford a repetition in future, especially at time when this matter is reassessed. He added that if we want peace then we must realize that the carrot-and-stick approach does not work with DRNVN. 8. Rapacki added that we should realize leadership of DRNVN does not want to and cannot yield under pressure; every step from our side that evokes impression that NVN is acting under pressure would be interpreted as sign of weakness and be utilized by all those who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in Warsaw. ( Comment: Rapacki repeated this point with emphasis and was, I believe, making a clear reference to Communist China.) 9. Rapacki said that in first position expressed by Lodge it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG and this is why Poles were so hopeful. However the events of December mean, if the working hypothesis Poles are using is sound, that US does not fully appreciate this situation. He added that recent statements by USG officials leave the impression that USG wants to evoke pressure. He quoted from Reuters news story of Dec 12 US Navy spokesmanʼs statement that US intends gradually to increase air raids on NVN; Rapacki interjected at this point his realization that the Navy spokesman may not have known all that was going on and this could very well be an old idea. But he added that the Navy spokesmanʼs subsequent reference to escalation and to new targets having been recently placed on bombing list represented current information. He said “You can assume what effects such statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added.” 10. Rapacki then said that he even must allude to a statement by Secy Rusk, who has full knowledge of current developments, made in Saigon Dec 9. 4 He quoted Secy Rusk as saying that he did not detect on side of NVN “any indication which allows me to entertain hope, but this indication will come one day; it must come; NVN cannot win here, we are much stronger.” Rapacki asked me to visualize how this would be interpreted in Hanoi. 11. In summary Rapacki said that in judgement of Poles the US did a lot of harm in December and it would be good if no more harm is done in future. This, he said, is advice of Poles. He added that he did not expect me to respond immediately to his remarks. 12. I said that I would convey his comments to Washington but that I would like also to make one general observation. I said that in situation where war is going on and neither side is sure that peace talks will eventuate, it is understandable, if perhaps unfortunate, why both sides continue their operations in whatever manner appears to them to provide military advantage. I added that the NVN in recent weeks have shown no decline in their military aggressiveness. I mentioned the attempted bombing of the Italian Embassy in Saigon (which caused Rapacki and Michalowski to look at each other in surprise and then break out in broad smiles), attempts to bomb bridges, a movie theater, to kidnap and assassinate leading citizens of Saigon, and other kinds of war activities. I said I was raising these points simply to bring out that there has been no relaxation of the war effort on NVN side and we did not expect it to happen until peace negotiations actually commence, after which I would hope that a sharp change in the picture could result. I added that this is reason I feel it so important to do everything we can to begin Warsaw talks. 13. Rapacki said he did not intend to suggest that there had been an armistice and realized that the war was still going on, but he said, “Recognizing this does not change anything that I have said up to this point.” He added that we should also realize that bombing of NVN is the really sensitive point. He then concluded with a smile that this was what he had to say and he will wait for our response. Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 1:36 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 296–297. 2 In telegram 1429, December 12, Gronouski notified the Department of State of a meeting with Rapacki scheduled for December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 3 In telegram 102298 to Rusk in Paris, December 14, Katzenbach stated that he did “not interpret Rapackiʼs statement of December 13 to Gronouski as a negative reply from Hanoi in effect closing the Marigold door.” (Ibid.) 4 Not further identified. 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 342. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 15, 1966. 1471. For the President from Ambassador Gronouski. 1. I met with Rapacki (Michalowski and Janczewski present) at Polesʼ request at 1800 Dec 14. (In contrast to previous meetings, Rapacki entered the room unsmiling, and during entire meeting maintained a calm, serious and matter-of-fact attitude.) 2. Rapacki said that first he would like to bring some precision with respect to our conversation of yesterday (Warsaw 1458). 2 He said that this conversation took place before Poles were aware of last bombing of Hanoi. He said, “If I had had this news then, our conversation of course would have had different character than it did.” 3. Rapacki continued, “Today I must state the following facts. First, that the U.S. had to be conscious of and realize the importance of establishing direct contact with Hanoi.” He added, “You had stressed the unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the Warsaw talks with Hanoi presented.” He continued, “We thought so too, ever since we obtained the signal for which the USG had asked for for so long in so many official statements.” He added, “In this instance we received more than a signal; we received a direct, positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of talks in Warsaw.” 4. Rapacki said that immediately after this direct response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved the possibility of modifying their attitude and, of far greater importance, entered a new stage of escalation. 5. Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added that the Poles have done everything in their power to dispel any illusions, noting that on six occasions in Warsaw and Saigon “we have warned the USG side in all seriousness and with the greatest emphasis of the consequences of their actions.” 6. “Yesterday,” Rapacki continued, “the US Air Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment when the USG knew that the matter of a Warsaw contact with Hanoi was actively being considered. This,” he added, “was the last drop that spilled over the cup. From that moment, in Hanoi and Warsaw, all doubts as to the real intentions of the USG disappeared, including doubts not only in the present case but with respect to all other instances in the past when the US has advanced positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives.” 7. Rapacki then said, “We understand therefore and fully share the wish of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, which was transmitted to us today, that we terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon. The Polish Govt states that the whole responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam war rests on the USG.” He added, “I would like to express more than regrets because of the utilization by the USG of our good will. Once again it becomes clear how difficult it is to believe in your words.” He added “In future only facts can be taken into consideration.” 8. I said that I would have no comment except to say that I regretted this turn of events and would immediately convey these observations to Washington. 9. Comment: If Moscow dateline account of latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 14 Paris edition of New York Times and Herald Tribune, and recounted to me tonight by Rapacki, is true then we are in an incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace initiative—and it surely does unless we take decisive and immediate action—then the Soviets, the Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as anything less than a crisis in our world leadership role then I believe we are making a tragic mistake. 10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles, accepting the genuineness of our interests in negotiation, have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi (in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort to initiate US–NVN peace talks. I also am convinced that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when he warned that the increase in bombing was destroying what appeared to him a good chance that NVN would overcome Chinese influence and engage in Warsaw talks. 11. We have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get discussions back on track. For any chance of success this would require, in my judgment, conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept Rapackiʼs Dec 13 reasoning (Warsaw 1458) and are prepared now to assure the Poles that we will take care not to create impression of bombing intensification in NVN during the period of delicate negotiations over the holding of Warsaw USG-NVN peace talks. We would also assure the Poles that we do not intend to bomb in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during this period. We would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts. 12. I do not know whether this presentation will achieve its purpose, but I am deeply convinced it is imperative that we try. The alternative is not only to lose an opportunity for initiating negotiations, but also to do serious damage to the credibility of the USGʼs stated objectives. Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 12:30 a.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War, pp. 302–304. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:50 a.m. on December 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 17) Gronouski amplified his comments in telegram 1475 from Warsaw, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 2 Document 341 . 343. National Intelligence Estimate 343. National Intelligence Estimate 1 Washington, December 15, 1966. NIE 53–66 PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR SO Conclusions A. Over the last 18 months, there have been a number of favorable developments in the South Vietnamese political scene: the Ky-Thieu regime has successfully ridden out a series of crises; it has shown an ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises of troublesome issues; a Constituent Assembly has been elected; the military and civilian leaders have demonstrated an increasing willingness to work together. The longer the process continues, the more difficult it may become to reverse it by a single sudden move. Finally, the US presence has contributed significantly to stability, and the improved military situation adds generally to a better political climate. B. Nevertheless, South Vietnam is still plagued by important political weaknesses: divisive regional animosities, religious enmities, civilian-military rivalries, and factionalism within the military. Over the next year, crises are bound to occur, particularly as the process of developing a constitution and moving toward a more permanent form of government unfolds. No assurance can be given that some crisis might not undo the political progress made to date. C. On balance, we believe that the Constituent Assembly will succeed in drafting a constitution. If so, political maneuvering for new national elections may actually exacerbate the basic factors which threaten political stability. Nonetheless, we believe the chances are better than even that national elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate. D. If presidential elections are held, the military would probably find it easier to maintain unity behind a military candidate (or a military man who resigned in order to run). It is not clear, however, whether the military consider it essential that a military leader occupy the presidential seat or whether a civilian would be acceptable. Much would depend on which civilian. The election of a candidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of a military coup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded, political development would have received a serious setback. E. Even if a relatively smooth transition to an elected government can be achieved, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. The military is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almost certainly under strong military influence. Discussion I. Introduction 1. When South Vietnam achieved independence in 1954, it was already burdened with certain basic liabilities. Despite a deep sense of Vietnamese identity, there was no corresponding commitment to a concept of national government. Virtually no preparation for self government had been made during the decades of French rule. Not only was the country partitioned at the 17th parallel, but South Vietnam itself was also divided by ethnic, religious, regional, and other conflicts. Under the Diem regime, though some political stability was for a time achieved, little progress was made in resolving these basic problems. Moreover, a new threat emerged as it became apparent that Hanoi was determined to wage a revolutionary war against the South. Thus, when the Diem regime was toppled in late 1963, its various successors found no adequate base on which to build a stable government and faced a rapidly deteriorating military situation. One regime after another rose, quickly floundered, and fell. 2. By early 1965, the South Vietnamese Government—beset by military defeats, deprived of control of large sections of the countryside, incapable of effective bureaucratic performance, and ruling over a population in varying degrees indifferent, resentful, and deeply divid-ed—seemed in danger of imminent collapse. The vastly expanded US presence in South Vietnam, civilian as well as military, has retrieved this situation. In particular, the buildup of US combat forces was viewed by South Vietnamese as evidence of US determination to see the war through and to prevent a Communist victory. Thus bolstered, the Ky regime which assumed power in June 1965 has had more room to maneuver and has retained control far longer than any other regime since the fall of Diem. 3. These circumstances have given the government new strengths, although it remains subject to most of the same stresses and weaknesses as its predecessors. Like them, it must operate within the limits of a domestic political situation established as the result of Diemʼs downfall. On the one hand, the military leadership assumed the reins of power while lacking the cohesiveness and single-mindedness that had enabled the Diem regime to establish its tightly-knit, centrally-controlled power structure. On the other hand, Diemʼs overthrow also unleashed still other political forces—the religious sects (principally the Buddhists), the students, labor, and a variety of politicians and intellectuals. Since Diemʼs overthrow, political developments have focused on two basic issues: the relative roles and power positions of these forces in the new body politic, and the pace and nature of the transition to a more broadly-based constitutional government. In varying degrees, these issues precipitated or underlay each of the political crises since 1963. II. Major Sources of Weakness 4. Regionalism . South Vietnam has long been plagued by regional animosities. Native Southerners (Cochinchinese) generally regard those of Northern (Tonkinese) origin as “carpetbaggers,” who wield power within the government and the military establishment far out of proportion to their numbers. In addition, those native to Central Vietnam (Annamites) are viewed with suspicion by both Northerners and Southerners. The regional antipathies hamper efforts to forge truly national South Vietnamese institutions. In one way or another, regional biases intrude into most of South Vietnamʼs problems and touch all groups, including the military, where factionalism is often on regional lines. In short, regionalism remains a basic weakness of Vietnamese politics and shows no indication of becoming less divisive in the near future. 5. Religion . Political developments during the Diem period and particularly since 1963 have created deep suspicions between South Vietnamʼs badly split Buddhist majority and its active but less factionalized Catholic minority. The Buddhist and the Catholic mistrust each otherʼs influence in government and each fears the emergence of a government dominated by the other. This rivalry is of less immediate importance, however, than the political role of the militant wing of the Buddhist movement led by Thich Tri Quang, an adept and wily political tactician. 2 Although the militant Buddhist were weakened by their failure to topple Ky last spring and by their unsuccessful boycott of the Constituent Assembly elections, they remain a likely source of trouble. They still seem to constitute the largest body within organized Buddhism and may in time be able to reunite the Buddhists under their control. In any event, they still possess a substantial political base in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, from which they could reenter the political arena if they wished. In the shorter run, there remains a possibility of a new round of militant Buddhist demonstrations, given their assets among the students and the remnants of last springʼs “struggle movement.” 6. Civilian-Military Rivalry . The relationship between the military and civilian elements is fragile; neither group particularly respects the intentions or competence of the other. As the ultimate arbiter of power, the military is sometimes prone to ignore civilian interests. For their part, the civilian politicians tend to overreact to real or imagined provocations and thereby run the risk of needlessly precipitating reaction by the military. Frictions between the military and various civilian groups are unavoidable. There will almost certainly be occasional events which will threaten to burgeon into a serious civilian-military confrontation. 3 7. Military Factionalism . Factionalism has been chronic among Vietnamese military leaders, and plots and counterplots, personal rivalries, and jealousies have been common. This lack of cohesiveness among the military leaders has presented nonmilitary opponents of the government tempting opportunities to strike alliances with discontented commanders. The command structure itself is conducive to factionalism, since it has allowed the Corps Commanders to run their areas as personal satrapies. 8. Lack of National Awareness . As a result of the factionalism and parochialism which characterize politics in Vietnam, there is little awareness of broad national issues. There is nothing approaching a national political party. Most politicians think primarily in terms of advancing their own or their groupʼs interests. Moreover, activity by the multiplicity of political groups is generally restricted to urban areas, with the rank-and-file support seldom extending beyond personal and group loyalties. The rural peasantry, which constitutes the bulk of the population, has been largely unconcerned and unaffected by political developments in Saigon. 9. Inflation . Among the many economic problems, inflation presents the greatest threat to governmental security. For over a year, South Vietnam has been gripped by severe inflation, caused in part by the large war-related budget deficit and in part by heavy US spending also caused by the war. Since January 1965, the cost of living has increased by over 125 percent. Despite the salutary effects of the regimeʼs recent currency devaluation, the cost of living during 1967 will jump by at least another 20 percent, and probably by much more. Although the effects of inflation fall most heavily on the urban population, the rural areas also suffer difficulties which are often compounded by disruptions in the supply and distribution system. In general, inflation has increased dissatisfaction with the government and has provided the Viet Cong and other opponents with an exploitable popular issue. 10. Bureaucratic Inadequacies . South Vietnam has failed to develop an effective bureaucracy and administrative apparatus. There has been a separation of authority from responsibility; military officers administer most programs at the province and district levels, and the ministers have little control over them. Government procedures tend to be both rigid and cumbersome. Moreover, many trained individuals have been reluctant to work with the government, preferring instead to remain uninvolved. The succession of regimes and coups has resulted in frequent reorganizations, many of them inspired by political considerations rather than concern with increased efficiency, and has made many competent administrators politically unacceptable. It has also made them hesitant to commit themselves to a regime, out of fear that its tenure and their own were likely to be of short duration. In addition, corruption is rampant throughout the system, and its corrosive effect not only impedes government activities but adversely affects attitudes toward the government. 11. The War . These various problems would obstruct political development even in peacetime. The war, however, exacerbates every problem, magnifies every weakness, and makes even the simplest tasks of governing exceedingly difficult. Viet Cong control of large parts of the country, and varying degrees of insecurity elsewhere, greatly restrict the ability of the government to carry forward programs of social and economic development. Finally, the refugees who have fled from the country-side to the cities, and who may number a million in Saigon alone, add to the administrative burdens of the regime and may provide an object for exploitation by its enemies, including of course the Viet Cong. III. Major Sources of Strength 12. Consensus on the War . A significant and often overlooked source of strength in South Vietnam is the consistently anti-Communist attitude of the countryʼs politically active elements. Despite concern over various GVN policies toward war and peace and over the impact of the large US involvement in Vietnamese affairs, none has called for an end to the fighting or a withdrawal of US forces. The many governmental shakeups that have taken place have not been over basic policy concerning the continuation of the war or over the GVNʼs steadfast refusal to deal with the Communists. Thus the Communists have been denied the opportunity of gaining power through the back door in league with other South Vietnamese groups. Anticommunism is strongest among the Catholics and military, many of whom fled from communism in North Vietnam in 1954. 13. Continuity of Government . The Ky regime has now survived for 18 months. This remarkable longevity, reversing what appeared to be a persistent trend toward ever-changing, short-lived governments, has had positive psychological effects at home and abroad which have been reinforced by the impact of US military operations. The government has at least had time to begin implementing a number of major programs which heretofore had progressed little beyond the planning stage. Progress has been limited, and much of the emphasis and initiative have come from the US and US prodding. Nevertheless, Ky and his advisors have demonstrated greater insight into the issues facing them and have shown greater flexibility in adopting remedial measures. 14. Political Continuity . Politically, the regime has also profited from its ability to maintain itself in power, especially from its success in facing down both militant Buddhist opposition and military plotting. Most politically active Vietnamese viewed the September elections for the Constituent Assembly as an earnest of the regimeʼs willingness to sanction a larger civilian role in the government; about 80 percent of those registered and over 50 percent of the total adult population of South Vietnam voted, despite the opposition of both the militant Buddhists and the Viet Cong. The cabinet crisis in October demonstrated the persistence of regional rivalries, but the regime managed to dilute the impact of this episode. In any event, increasing numbers of politicians are probably coming to feel that there is political advantage in coexisting with the Ky regime as long as they see reasonable prospects for a transition to elected government. 15. Political Development . For the first time since Diemʼs downfall, political activity is manifested more in legal channels than in demonstrations and coup plotting. This political activity, while creating a raft of new frictions and problems, is essential and healthy in terms of political development. Moreover, the military leadership, which will remain the final arbiter of power in any case, is actively taking part in this political evolution. Borrowing from the experience of the South Korean military, the Ky regime is seeking to find political means to insure the militaryʼs participation in any future government. With this insurance, they appear to be prepared to accept an elected government with a constitutional mandate; such a development would be a promising step toward the creation of a government with a popular national base. 16. US Support . Obviously crucial in the military and economic fields, the greatly increased US presence has injected a new element of major importance into the South Vietnamese body politic. The US role carries great weight among the Vietnamese, so much so in fact that even inaction by the US is a form of involvement or, at the very least, has the same impact by being seen as such. For example, several previous regimes became vulnerable when their opponents suspected that US support was weakening. Kyʼs regime is strengthened by the fact that most Vietnamese consider the US to be solidly behind it. The expanding US presence has obviously increased the disruptive effect of the war on the Vietnamese economy, and there are some latent anti-American sentiments. These negative factors are likely to be aggravated by the infusion of larger numbers of US troops into the more heavily populated areas of the country. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the US presence has thus far been to contribute significantly to stability. IV. Current Situation 17. The Directorate . During the past year, the Directorate strengthened its position within the military establishment, enhanced its standing in the country, and preserved a considerable degree of cohesiveness. The successful removal of two deeply entrenched Corps Commanders, Generals Thi and Quang, added to the stature of both Ky and Thieu. The precise relationship between these two leaders is not clear, but Ky certainly has the leading public role. He also draws strength from the aura of US support, from the air force which he still commands, and from a group of younger officers called the Baby Turks. This latter group includes General Loan, Director of Police and Chief of Military Security and a close confidant of Kyʼs, and General Khang, Commander of III Corps and the Capital Military Zone. This combination has provided physical security for the Ky regime. 18. There are persistent rumors of friction between Thieu and Ky, though we see no evidence that such friction is now of serious proportions. But the future cohesiveness of the Directorate depends to a great extent on the cooperation, or at least continuing mutual tolerance, of these two officers. 19. The Constituent Assembly . Except for the Buddhist Institute, all the traditional political, regional and religious groups are reflected in the 117-member Constituent Assembly. The Assembly includes professional politicians, representatives of the Dai Viet and VNQDD parties (badly split themselves), regionalists (such as the militant Movement for the Renaissance of the South), and a large number of young and inexperienced delegates. Four political “blocs” were formed for the election of Assembly officers and committees, but each is a conglomerate of differing interests, and their membership and the lines between them continue to shift. 20. For the next few months at least, the Assembly will be the source of the issues on which the civilian politician and the regime will confront one another. The Directorate has not yet shown its hand, but its military members would almost certainly resist any move which would deprive them of a constitutional role in a new government. The precise goals of the civilians are not clear. In general, however, they distrust the Directorate and appear to believe that the time is ripe for the creation of a constitutional government with a much larger role for the civilian elements. The September elections whetted their political appetites, and since the military gave up some political power then, the civilians are pressing for more. Their motives range from parochial self-interest to genuine concern for a legitimate government. The many divisions and rivalries within the Assembly will impair its ability to present a solid front against the Directorate. 21. There are a number of potential problems that could lead to an open break, either by design or by accident, between the Assembly and the Directorate. The Assembly will continue to interpret its mandate for constitution-drafting broadly, while the Directorate will be suspicious of incursions into its domain of power. There is considerable resentment in the Assembly over the power of the Directorate to change items in the draft constitution, reversible only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. The regime, for its part, is reluctant to relinquish this power until it has a fairly good idea of what will be in the constitution. The desire of some Assembly members to retain the Assembly in being until the convocation of an elected legislature may also cause friction with the Directorate. 22. There are, however, factors that could lead toward compromise. The majority of the Assembly members probably are not interested in pursuing a collision course with the government, in large part because they realize that if the Assembly fails, they are unlikely for some time to have another chance of sharing power. Moreover, there may be many who will advocate caution in the expectation that the very establishment of a constitutional system, even if it is not fully in accord with their desires, will provide new opportunities for change. The Directorate also has reason to try to avoid a showdown. It probably believes that the real test is not so much the question of a constitution but that of power afterwards, and it is aware of the US concern that there be a constitution. Within limits, the regime will probably try to be forthcoming on this matter. On balance, we believe that an open break between the Directorate and the Assembly will be avoided and that a constitution will be produced. 23. Although we consider it unlikely that the Ky regime will be overthrown during the near future, its downfall could seriously endanger the promulgation of a constitution as well as the political progress made to date. Much would depend on how Ky was overthrown and what sort of regime succeeded him. Progress would not necessarily be wholly lost, for example, if Ky were overthrown by an internal palace coup with a minimum of violence and disruption, or if the new regime were no less disposed to work toward constitutional government. Should the coup be violent, however, or should there be a series of coups and countercoups, the whole structure created by past political development would almost certainly disintegrate. V. Problems and Prospects Over the Next Year or So 24. Judgments concerning the course of political development in South Vietnam must be highly tentative. The country is in the throes of political evolution, the course of which will be disputed even after a constitution is adopted. In a very real sense, political development in South Vietnam will be a day-to-day, month-to-month phenomenon for some time to come, and periodic upheavals and crises will threaten the entire process. Indeed, as the pace of political events quickens, the factors that work against stability may actually be exacerbated. Regionalism in particular is likely to be a politically volatile factor. The Southern elements are resentful of the Northern/Central coloration of Kyʼs regime and fear that Ky and Loan are conniving to perpetuate it at Southern expense. No assurance can be given that some crisis might not prove to be the ultimate undoing of the government. 25. A falling out among the military leaders could have serious consequences. As political activity increases, the possibility of frictions between Ky and Thieu also increases. Ky has thus far been skillful and fortunate in his efforts to contain the political power of individual Corps Commanders; on a future occasion, he might be less successful. The question of how much political power is to be shared with the civilian elements might become a cause of contention within the military, particularly since the Baby Turks appear to be less inclined to compromise with the civilians than is the Directorate. 26. The prospect of negotiations could introduce unsettling influences into the political situation over the next year or so. At present, no significant Vietnamese group publicly advocates negotiations and the military leaders are quite opposed to them except on terms that amount to Communist capitulation. Hence, any government that, in the near term, agreed to negotiations would increase its vulnerability to attack by its political enemies. On the other hand, the large US presence may encourage the Vietnamese to believe that the US will agree to no settlement that does not effectively insure the survival of a non-Communist SVN. The degree to which this confidence would remain as a counterweight to disruptive effects would depend heavily on the circumstances in which negotiations seemed an imminent possibility. 27. Nevertheless, there are developments which tend to make us cautiously optimistic about the prospects for a more stable political situation. These include the continuity of the Ky regime, its success in riding out a series of crises and potential crises, and its ability to fashion reasonably acceptable compromises without resorting to outright repression. In addition, the election of a Constituent Assembly, and the willingness of both the military leadership and civilian elements to attempt to work together augur well for continued political progress. The longer the process continues and is reflected in the development of new institutions and working relations, the more difficult it may become to reverse it by some single sudden move. Finally, the improved military situation contributes generally to a better political climate. 28. During the next year or so, the successful holding of national elections would be an important indication of growing political stability. Actually, events are moving in this direction; a constitution will almost certainly call for presidential elections, and probably legislative ones as well. Political maneuvering among the various civilian elements is already underway in anticipation of elections and will grow more intense. New political alliances will eventually emerge, although it is too early to determine what they are likely to be. The Directorateʼs final decision concerning elections will depend on its assessment of the situation at the time; if the military felt that elections seriously threatened their basic interests, they might move to postpone them. But we believe the chances are better than even that national elections will be conducted successfully during the period of this estimate. 29. If presidential elections are held, there will probably be a military candidate (or a military man who has resigned in order to run), perhaps Ky or Thieu, as well as civilian candidates. It is not clear whether the military considers it essential that a military leader occupy the presidential seat or whether a civilian would be acceptable. Much of course would depend on the civilian. The military would probably find it easier to maintain unity behind a military candidate. The election of a candidate who was opposed by the military leadership would raise the chances of a military coup attempt. Whether or not such an attempt succeeded, political development would have received a serious setback. 30. Even assuming a relatively smooth transition to an elected government, continuing political stability cannot be maintained without military unity and support. There is little evidence of any significant growth of a sense of national commitment that would submerge special interests. Civilian-military and other rivalries will persist and will manifest themselves in recurring conflicts over the distribution of power within the government. Any government, particularly a civilian one, will almost certainly be subject to debilitating bickering and jockeying for influence, and vulnerable to plots from within and without. As long as the military leadership remains relatively united, it will have the upper hand over others. It is probably more cohesive and certainly commands greater resources than any other group in the country. Thus for some time to come, any regime in South Vietnam will be dependent on military support and almost certainly under strong military influence. 1 Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam: INR & Other Studies, 1966. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of NSA and the Departments of State and Defense participated in the preparation of the estimate. The estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by all the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board, except the Assistant General Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. 2 Tri Quangʼs base of power is in Central Vietnam, particularly around Hue. The more flexible wing of the Buddhist Institute, led by Thich Tam Chau, is strongest in the Saigon area; much of its strength is based on Buddhists originally from North Vietnam. In addition, there are many Buddhists, including most of those from the southern provinces, who do not participate in the Buddhist Institute. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 In a December 23 memorandum to Rusk, Denney discussed NIE 53–66, summarizing a number of factors that needed to be taken into account in deciding on a U.S. response should a serious civilian-military confrontation develop. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 165, NIE 53–66) 344. Notes of Meeting With President Johnson 344. Notes of Meeting With President Johnson 1 Washington, December 16, 1966. PRESENT Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Katzenbach Ambassador Harriman Ambassador Lodge Ambassador Goldberg W.W. Rostow The President asked Amb. Lodge for his views on the situation in Viet Nam. 2 Amb. Lodge stated that many of the worries they had in Saigon a year ago they did not have now. —They no longer feared the Viet Cong might cut the country in half. —They no longer feared that regionalism backed by the Buddhists might tear the country apart. —They no longer feared a Communist coup from within. The Presidentʼs commitment announced July 28, 1965, to put major U.S. forces in South Viet Nam had made this progress possible and also denied the “great edge of Asia” to the Communists—from Korea to Malaysia. This region was moving forward with confidence based on our commitment in Viet Nam. On the other hand, we havenʼt won. The military war against the main force units had gone well. The Ambassador “expects brilliant results in 1967.” The constitutional process is evolving. The writ of the Saigon government runs throughout all the regions, except those directly controlled by the VC. They are moving well towards the making of a constitution and he expects it to be promulgated by February 9. Like everything in South Viet Nam, the political process is precarious; but there is progress. Inflation has been contained in the economy, although it is an endless struggle. On the other hand, no one in South Viet Nam is starving. The weakest point is failure to deal with terrorism, and this problem touches others. To get at terrorism, the retraining of the ARVN is critical. They must become a constabulary. The job will best be done by the soldiers if they operate where they live. They would then be more inclined to leave the chickens and the girls alone. General Westmoreland understands this but all the officers in MACV do not. He cited a U.S. general in II Corps who didnʼt appear to realize that 39 village chiefs had been assassinated in II Corps in the past year. The military do not think in terms of the police measures now required to achieve security in the countryside. He believes they need direct word from the President that this is their job. At present Amb. Lodgeʼs view is that a basic reorganization of the ARVN is required. Gen. Westmoreland is not sure. It is the kind of issue where judgment from outside might be helpful. With respect to third country participation, we have made progress and should make more. We have about reached the limit of generating such assistance by exhortation. For example, we need the kind of British policemen who have worked in Kenya. We ought to pressure the British to get some—perhaps by holding up shipments of scotch whisky to the U.S. U.S. AID does not have enough people. It could use some good foreigners. Latin Americans who trained with our Navy could help with Operation Market Time . 3 He cited an old friend of his, Tom Pappas, who helped in the rehabilitation of Greece. He believes Greece ought to send some troops to South Viet Nam. Mr. Pappas says he will pay for this as well as organize it. Mr. Rostow asked if it would not be wise for Thieu to get into the field and lead the ARVN in the process of pacification, stressing the dignity of the job and its importance to the future of the country. Amb. Lodge said this was something he might do. He is conscious of the problem and he may do it if he decides he cannot run for the presidency. With respect to corruption, he said, we are still dealing with a country where relatives are important. For example, Chin cannot be removed because he is Thieuʼs brother-in-law. In that culture if one lets down a member of the family, one loses face. The generals around Saigon are weak, partly because the government does not want strong leaders controlling troops too near Saigon for fear of a coup. Those are things one must take into account in Asia. But with Americans beginning to engage in pacification in the Saigon area, things may improve. The President then turned to Gov. Harriman who described his probing of peace feelers in Algeria 4 and Paris. The Algerians are prepared to follow up in Hanoi. He talked with Sainteny 5 and recommended Sainteny be given permission to probe in Hanoi. He feels either the Algerians or Sainteny would do better job than East Europeans. The people in Hanoi are suspicious. They feel they have been twice fooled in negotiations. In Paris he found Manaʼch constructive this time and also had a good talk with the Director of North African Affairs who said he thinks the U.S. should play an active part in Africa. Gov. Harriman found Franco full of plans for the future of his country and also for settling problems in the disputed areas of Africa. He was contemptuous of De Gaulle. He believes we have been too friendly with the French. When Gov. Harriman cited our ties to Lafayette, he replied that we “have milked that cow dry.” In general, he found Spain moving ahead very fast and recalled his opposition to Jimmy Byrnesʼ negative attitude towards Spain when Byrnes followed Molotovʼs line. President Truman followed Byrnes on this matter because he hadnʼt liked the way Spain treated the Baptists. They are now treating them better. He underlined the urgency and importance of South Vietnamese moving in the campaign for national reconciliation. Under Secretary Katzenbach then commented the most difficult thing is to get a handle on the ARVN in the pacification problem. How to convert the ARVN was the problem. In terms of organization, the division commanders and corps commanders controlled the military now when what was needed was unambiguous control by the province chiefs and the political system. Amb. Lodge said we need senior Vietnamese leadership for pacification. We need the argument about ARVN reorganization settled: Westy saying it was unnecessary but Thieu feeling the ARVN has to be rebuilt from the bottom up; and we need a talented man from the U.S. military to lead our side of pacification—a three-star general. Gen. Wyant 6 is the best man in Lodgeʼs view. We shall learn something out of the Long An experiment, with Sam Wilson in effect leading both the military and civilian teams. Amb. Goldberg asked Amb. Lodge what is the view ahead: Can the North Vietnamese maintain their ability to infiltrate; can the VC maintain their ability to conduct terrorist operations? Amb. Lodge replied that he expected brilliant results in 1967 in conventional military operations; we would move ahead politically; we would hold inflation although it would be a great struggle; we would make limited progress in pacification. Ho would not decide to end the war until, in his own phrase, the “guerrilla infrastructure” was destroyed. This embraces about 150,000 people. It might take 5 years to complete the job. But it ought to be clear during 1967 that we were on a winning track. He expected U.S. casualties to be way down by the middle of 1967. He returned again to the ARVN and said they were disliked by the people. The proper pattern was the kind of combined force he had seen when outside Danang, with 25 U.S. Marines and 50 local Vietnamese working together in local security operations. The regional forces and the popular forces killed more VC than the ARVN. We should be moving to convert the ARVN to RF and PF. That was only way to disengage them from bad habits derived from their training under French colonial rule. As for the national reconciliation program, this had taken hold at the top of South Vietnamese government. Zorthian was doing a good job and there should be an important announcement at the time of Tet concerning the national reconciliation program. The President then asked Secretary McNamara to report on the bombing situation in North Viet Nam and the NATO meeting. Secretary McNamara said that two targets outside Hanoi had been attacked on December 2d, 3d, 13th and 14th: a railroad yard and a vehicle depot. Some photos were available on 14th which showed the railroad yard had been hit, with some but not extensive damage. Some civilian buildings near the railroad yard were hit. There were no photos of the area within the city limits. There was some possibility that a SAM had fallen in the city limits. On the evidence, McNamara doubts that U.S. bombs fell within the city limits; but there were probably some civilian casualties near the targets. As for the Peking Embassy, we have no evidence that we hit it. Nor the Rumanian Embassy. It is exceedingly difficult, however, to prove a negative. A great deal of antiaircraft debris falls on the city during our attacks nearby. [Here follows discussion of NATO and United Nations issues.] 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files. Top Secret. Prepared by Rostow on December 19. Rostow states incorrectly that the meeting was held on Friday, December 17, in Austin, Texas. The Presidentʼs Daily Diary indicates that the meeting was held on Friday, December 16, at the White House, prior to the Presidentʼs departure for Texas that evening. (Ibid.) 2 Telegram 7472 from Bangkok, December 11, contained a memorandum, prepared by Lodge for Rusk, which also provided Lodgeʼs views on the overall situation in Vietnam. (Ibid., Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 16) 3 Operation Market Time referred to U.S. Navy counter-sea-infiltration operations along the coast of South Vietnam. 4 Harriman reported on his 3-hour talk on December 9 with Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika in telegram 1863 from Algiers, December 10. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) 5 A memorandum of Harrimanʼs conversation with Sainteny on December 2 is ibid. Bohlen reported on the conversation in telegram 8474 from Paris, December 3. (Ibid.) 6 Apparently a reference to Major General Frederick C. Weyand. 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 345. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 19, 1966. 1508. Ref: Warsaw 1506. 2 1. To save time of transmission after 1400 Dec. 19 meeting with Rapacki, following is advance text of my oral presentation to Rapacki (as derived from Stateʼs 102960, 3 103342, 4 103586, 5 and 83786). 6 Any variations or interspersed comments by Rapacki will be included with report of meeting. 2. “I would like to begin with a brief recapitulation of recent events. Before Lewandowski went to Hanoi we had discussed with him quite fully and frankly our position with regard to undertaking of negotiations, bombing suspension and other types of de-escalation, terms of settlement, and related matters. After his return from Hanoi, Lewandowski outlined to us on Dec. 1 what he said he had conveyed to Hanoi as the U.S. position. Amb. Lodge confirmed to him that this statement, despite the general language in which it was couched, represented our position, subject of course to interpretation which, to use your own terms, meant merely hammering out greater precision in negotiations. Following this, Lewandowski proposed, and we agreed, to meet with North Vietnamese representatives in Warsaw, something which it was strongly implied the North Vietnamese were prepared to do. 3. Before, during and after all this was taking place, the conflict in Viet-Nam continued, including the bombing of NVN, the infiltration of NV men and supplies into SVN, Viet Cong terrorist bombings, assassinations, kidnappings and so on. In the conversations in Saigon leading up to the proposal to meet in Warsaw, nothing was said to relate this continuing waging of the war to efforts to get underway talks to work out a peaceful settlement. Those talks, of course, were expressly intended to bring the fighting, bombing and terrorist activities to an end. It was precisely for this reason that we had been at such pains to elaborate a possible procedure, the package proposal with Phases A and B, to facilitate the arranging of a process of de-escalation as soon as possible after we and the NVN began to talk. 4. In any case, in a desire to promote a peaceful settlement, we responded quickly to Lewandowskiʼs suggestion, on Dec. 3, and were ready to talk in Warsaw. 5. As soon as we began to talk with the Polish Govt in Warsaw, pre-sumably preparatory to our meeting directly with the NVN representatives, we found that new terms and conditions seemed to be put forward, with the opening of direct talks contingent on our fulfilling them. It was stated that we had escalated our bombing during these most recent conversations, in contrast to a de-escalation which the Poles through the NVN had detected and favorably noted during Lewandowskiʼs last visit to Hanoi. 6. Regarding your recent comments on intensification of bombing of NVN, we wish to remind you once more that there has been no such escalation, or de-escalation; that there are variations that result from weather conditions and other technical factors; and that continued Polish references to the bombing have introduced a new issue which was not involved in the arrangements leading up to the opening of discussions in Warsaw. 7. There has been neither escalation on our part, allegedly to put pressure on Hanoi, nor has there been any de-escalation in NVNʼs infiltration and terrorist activities in the South. In fact, if there has been a change in the South it has been an increase in mortaring of not only military but also civilian targets and in assassinations, including that of an important individual. The bombing of NVN has proceeded on essentially the same pattern as before with no significant changes in intensity, proximity to Hanoi or type of targets. All targets are military and a good number of those struck recently had also been struck before; as long ago as last June a target closer to Hanoi than any of the current ones was struck. Great care has been and is being exercised to avoid civilian casualties. No raid has taken place on “a residential area in Hanoi.” Absolutely no target within Hanoi city limits was bombed. The nearest target was more than two miles from city limits and more than five miles from the point where it is claimed damage was done. We have inspected with the greatest care all our reports of the pertinent bombing missions and find no evidence to support your charges. 8. The latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien railroad yard and Van Dien vehicle depot, which are five nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi respectively, and well outside of Hanoi city limits. Both of these targets were struck on Dec. 13 and 14 but this was not the first time in either case. The Van Dien vehicle depot is a major military transportation center for operation, storage and support of trucks and other vehicles used for movement of men and materiel to the war in SVN. The Yen Vien railroad yard is the largest railroad classification yard in NVN. It controls all of the countryʼs rail traffic north of Hanoi and so represents a vital transportation link for all military equipment and supplies coming into NVN from this direction. This important yard services over a third of the nationʼs military cargo handling capacity. Our effort against both targets is part of our continuing program to strike against major facilities that support Hanoiʼs war against SVN. These strikes represent no departure from policy. The types of targets are in categories struck previously and this targeting constitutes no change in purpose or procedures. The Hanoi oil facility struck last June is closer to Hanoi than either of these two targets. 9. I want to comment specifically on the allegation that our aircraft bombed a built-up area of Hanoi at the west end of the Red River Bridge and the suburb of Dhatram to the southwest. Nothing received in detailed follow-up reports has substantiated this; this area of the alleged attack is nowhere near the areas targeted for attack. It is important to note that there was heavy surface-to-air missile, anti-aircraft and MIG activity and that our aircraft took action against these missile sites. Missiles were fired at our aircraft; an objective observer should not overlook the possibility that stray missiles or anti-aircraft shells could have caused the damage cited. 10. Careful review of specifics, as well as the general pattern of our bombing attacks against NVN over the past several months, brings out the following points which must be quite clear to Hanoi: A. U.S. bombing is directed against military and military-related targets, with an obvious effort to avoid civilian population centers, large and small. This, I might add, is in stark contrast to Viet Cong activities in SVN, which expressly include terrorism against civilian population as part of their tactics to gain control. B. U.S. attacks against NVN have consisted entirely of tactical, precision bombing against military and military-related targets, avoiding (except on a few occasions against infiltration routes at the NVN frontier which is away from settled areas) “carpet bombing” technique such as was used in World War II. This clearly shows that our intention is not to bring the Hanoi regime to its knees, but rather to direct attacks solely at destroying Hanoiʼs capability and willingness to support and supply the Viet Cong effort in the South. C. There is no basis for charging U.S. with escalation of the conflict over the past few days, either in geographic terms or as to types of targets. Hanoiʼs oil facility three nautical miles from the center of Hanoi was struck on June 29, and oil facilities on the edge of Haiphong were struck on June 29, July 7, and August 2. The two targets of Dec. 14 are both five nautical miles from Hanoiʼs center and both had been struck earlier. D. U.S. aircraft have attacked a number of targets close to Hanoi and Haiphong (ranging from 33 to 3 nautical miles away from the center of Hanoi) since early July and even before. These targets have been struck repeatedly, at least since early July. U.S. aircraft have not at any time struck cities themselves or civilian populated areas. E. The Hanoi-Haiphong area is heavily defended by surface-to-air missiles and regular anti-aircraft defenses, reflecting the concentration of military and military-related installations. Our aircraft are authorized to strike these installations in self-defense and have frequently been required to do so since early July and even before. F. It must be as clear to the NVN as to us that weather factors affect our pattern of air activity, and that this pattern in December and late November could not reasonably be interpreted by Hanoi as escalation or conscious effort to exert pressure on the NVN authorities. In comparable periods of good weather, such as Nov. 22 and 23, Dec. 2, 3, 4 and 5, and Dec. 13–14, essentially the same type of targets were struck and the same intensity of air activity in and around Hanoi took place as has frequently been the case during the last six months, and the same general areas of NVN were affected. 11. When you referred on Tuesday, Dec. 13, to complications having arisen, these have been introduced by the Polish side which has in Warsaw changed the basis of our discussions from what had been worked out with Lewandowski. This applies not only to the question of escalation and de-escalation of military activity but also to the exaggerated importance attached to Amb. Lodgeʼs perfectly natural statement about interpretation and also to the observations about statements of American officials—the Navy spokesman and Secy Rusk. 7 If the Polish Govt is concerned about public statements, it should review the monotonous consistency with which Hanoi has publicly declared its total unwillingness to take even the first minor steps toward opening up explorations for possible peaceful settlement. 12. We have been waiting now in Warsaw for almost two weeks to get started on discussions, and your govt must bear the responsibility for the fact that these have yet to get underway. You well know that one important subject for such discussions would be to arrange for mutual de-escalation, including bombing of NVN. You also know that in all of the discussions leading up to the Polish proposal and our agreement to meet with the NVN in Warsaw, there was no condition relating to bombing. All of the increasingly indignant charges we have heard here, including the threat to terminate the conversations, are based on events subsequent to the agreement reached with the Polish Govt on Dec. 3, events which are extraneous to what was the basis of our agreement at that time. 13. We are deeply concerned over the gravity of Polish actions which serve the basic, long-run interests of neither of the parties whom you say you mean to be helping. We regretfully find ourselves being led to the conclusion that the Polish Govt, whether on its own or in response to promptings from the NVN Govt, is seeking to make a case which is based on false premises and does not relate to the facts as we know them. This gives us concern not only because of the damaging effect it could have on prospects for working out a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam but because we would find it difficult not to have our attitude about our relations with the Polish Govt also affected. 14. But our desire is to move toward peace and our conviction is that the best road to take is one of direct discussion with Hanoiʼs representatives. We are somewhat confused as a result of our conversations here as to what Hanoi has said and what represents the views of the Polish Govt. Our strong impression is that, in spite of our readiness both in Saigon with Lewandowski and now in Warsaw to present quite fully and frankly our position, we have not received any communication at all from the NVN Govt. The issues that stand between us and a peaceful settlement are exceedingly complex and difficult and we despair of progress being made until the way is open for an exchange of views rather than a unilateral declaration from our side. 15. Nevertheless we want to leave no stone unturned in our search for peace and would like to turn for a moment from the total picture to one sector of it in which conceivably we might begin to move. This is with respect to the possible beginning of de-escalation through a two-phased arrangement referred to in Lewandowskiʼs eighth point. This, you will recall, involves a package deal, to be worked out, which in its totality would represent what both we and Hanoi could agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoiʼs actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension. 16. We are ready to sit down with NVN representatives tomorrow to see whether an arrangement along these lines could be worked out. On the other hand, the NVN may prefer in the initial stages to deal through the Polish Govt. In that case we are ready to consider whatever proposals the NVN would wish to put forward as to the elements which would go into such a two-phase package arrangement. Agreement here would solve beyond cavil the problems, real or imagined, which you present repeatedly. 17. On the other hand, if Hanoi officials wish to proceed promptly to a total agreement representing the terms of an agreed settlement, we are prepared to move along that track, including de-escalation as the final item. 18. Perhaps the coming holidays and the truces associated with them offer an opportune occasion to take some useful steps along these lines. This in turn should make it easier for the authorities in Hanoi to proceed then to discuss the other matters standing between us and a peaceful settlement.” Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:44 a.m. 2 In telegram 1506 from Warsaw, December 19, Gronouski briefly discussed his meeting with Rapacki set for later that day. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 102960 to Warsaw, December 14, the Department of State responded to telegram 1458 ( Document 341 ). The Department wondered whether the Poles “ever had any NVN commitment to a meeting in Warsaw.” In any event, in further conversation with the Poles, the Department wanted “to keep the door open as long as there seems to be any possibility of talks developing” while refuting the Polish contention that U.S. actions and statements had thrown a roadblock in the way of talks. Gronouski was instructed to ask for a further meeting with Rapacki and present him with the position statement spelled out in the telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 300–302) 4 In telegram 103342 to Warsaw, December 14, the Department of State notified Gronouski that telegram 1471 ( Document 343 ) did not alter the basic assessment conveyed in telegram 102960. Therefore its arguments should be conveyed to Rapacki as soon as possible, supplemented by several points discussed in telegram 103342. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 305–306) 5 Telegram 103586 to Warsaw, December 15, provided material on the air war used by Gronouski in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 A–F of telegram 1508 printed here. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 6 Document 305 . 7 See Document 341 . 346. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 346. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 19, 1966. 1513. Ref: Warsaw 1508. 2 1. I opened by saying that my presentation was going to be unusually lengthy but that I felt it important at this stage to have before the Polish Govt as full a statement of the USG position as possible. I then commenced reading statement in reftel. 2. After para 9, Rapacki asked where the missile sites are that our pilots are authorized to hit. I answered that I did not know their specific location but I presumed that they were in vicinity of vehicle depot and railroad yards. 3. When I finished reading the first sentence of para 12 reftel (saying Polish Govt must bear responsibility), Rapacki banged his fist on the table vigorously and in great agitation said, “Stop! I will hear no more of this.” In angry tone, Rapacki said he categorically rejected this attempt to shift responsibility to Poles, that responsibility is squarely on us for destroying chance for peace talks, and that our attempt to shift responsibility is wholly unprecedented and unwarranted. 4. I started to fold my notes but Rapacki, the storm having receded, said that he was keenly disappointed in what I had said so far because he had anticipated, when I asked for appointment today, that I had information to present to him that would be helpful in reducing the suspicions in Hanoi that had led to their asking the Poles to break off these discussions. I said I wanted to express our continuing desire to move toward peace and our conviction that best road to take is one of direct discussions with Hanoiʼs representatives. (Thus I resumed reftel remarks starting with para 14 and continuing through para 18.) ( Comment: Inasmuch as Rapacki had gotten point on responsibility and given his reaction to the first sentence, I thought it best to pass over remarks from second sentence para 12 through para 13.) 5. Rapacki referred to our last meeting in which he had said it was difficult to believe words of USG representatives as they relate to position of USG and that in future Poles would be influenced only by facts. “Yet I find in your remarks,” he said, “no facts.” He said that USG, after nullifying that possibility of meeting NVN representatives in Warsaw, is ignoring everything that has happened and maintaining that nothing has happened; this in total disregard of everything that brought on nullification. He said, “Nothing in your statement is a new fact, even the last paragraph referring to holiday suspension of bombing.” He added, “You must realize that this suspension of bombing is taking place during a period of escalation; that taking up Warsaw talks during holiday suspension, immediately after intensification of bombing and in midst of escalation, could give rise to misgivings and suspicions in Hanoi that such meetings were result of military pressure.” He alluded to the statement he had previously attributed to Lodge that US wants to avoid impression that talks are response to bombing suspension. Yet, he said, all USG actions are contrary to Lodge; “What you have said to me today does not dispel the concern that negotiations now would be the result of bombing pressure.” He noted that after experience of first part of this month, we have to take account of sensitivity of Hanoi. 6. Rapacki said that only conclusion he could draw from our assertion that our bombs did not fall on residential districts of Hanoi is that military has not informed the govt of the character and facts of the bombing. He said, “I could admit to this idea, but I also must assume that you transmitted to your govt accurately our concern about the negative impact that bombing of Hanoi and the escalation of bombing of NVN would have on the possibilities of Warsaw talks. Having been warned of this and having accepted responsibility for the bombing intensification that occurred, there is no basis whatsoever for allegations that it is our responsibility.” 7. Rapacki added that in Saigon Lewandowski had declared in a most formal way that bombing should be stopped in any case. He added that in subsequent Warsaw meetings they had told us that we had weakened our position because of the interpretation clause; that we had changed our position. “Now,” he said, “you want to shift to Poles responsibility for introducing new elements.” 8. “As to bombing,” he said, “we have warned repeatedly against escalation at precise time discussions are under consideration; yet you went right ahead and escalated your bombing. Having done so you assumed responsibility and your attempt now to shift it to us is unprecedented and cynical.” 9. With respect to bombing of Hanoi, he said bombing of railroad yards was presumably more important to USG than chance for peace. He said not just Poles but the whole world press is outraged by this. He repeated what he had said during previous meetings that this Dec. 3 resumption of bombing “came precisely when we received more than a signal from Hanoi.” He added that Poles did not put forth new conditions but “recalling speeches of Goldberg, the President, Secy Rusk and others, once we received the signal we did we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing.” He said, “You have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however, we did not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it.” 10. With respect to bombing of city of Hanoi, Rapacki read from what he referred to as “on the spot report from ICC in Hanoi” saying that a workingmanʼs residential district called Fukton (phonetic) was completely destroyed; two trade union buildings, university, and Chinese Embassy were damaged, and bombs fell 200 meters from Polish Embassy. He said in face of this evidence it is hard to take seriously the assertion that there is no evidence our bombs fell in Hanoi. 11. I said that since our last meeting I have consulted with Washington on all matters relating to our last two conversations, that we had made an exhaustive study aimed at determining whether or not our bombs landed in residential sections of Hanoi, and that not one shred of evidence had turned up to indicate that they did. I said I am further personally convinced that we have never during this war selected a residential area as a bombing target. All of our targets had been related to military activity and we have avoided many targets that could be designated as military simply because they were located in built-up areas. I said I served on a bomber during World War II and I know it is inevitable that occasionally the target is missed and a bomb goes astray, but we found no evidence that this happened on Dec. 13 and 14. 12. Rapacki said, “Your whole presentation today cannot be described except as confirmation of fears that USG has decided to withdraw from attitude expressed by Lodge, has chosen a brutal way to do this, and is now trying to twist facts and shift responsibility to Poland. I reject categorically,” he went on, “as outright cynical the statement on Polandʼs being responsible for postponement of Warsaw meetings. The Warsaw meetings were bombed by the U.S.” 13. Referring to suggestions I made in paras 16 and 17 reftel, he said, “I am astonished that at same time you accuse us of stalling talks, you ask us to help you get them going again.” He added that Poland rejects categorically our analysis, our accusations against Poland and the NVN side, and sees no new elements in last part of my statement. Inasmuch as NVN asked Poles to discontinue these discussions, what was new to justify returning to NVN on this matter? Rapacki continued, “I suspect that if we did approach Hanoi their response would be that USG has proposed nothing new which would overcome the reason why Hanoi asked for discontinuation of talks in the first place.” 14. I said it wasnʼt a question of something new as much as it was a question of bending every effort to bring two govts together to negotiate the end of this war. I continued that we should not deny the elementary fact that both sides in this war are continuing their military action, and neither side will let up until such time as they find some basis for gaining confidence that the other side prefers a negotiated peace to continued war. I added that the only way I know for the development of such confidence is for both sides to lay their positions side by side on a conference table, see how far they are apart, and make an attempt through negotiations to bring them together. 15. I said the longer we wait the worse the situation becomes, adding that reasons can always be found to keep negotiations from happening. I said that we must face the fact that unless we find some way to cut through and get negotiations started bombing and military action will go on and on, making it increasingly difficult to find a solution. 16. I said we should realize that antagonists in a war are naturally suspicious of each other. I added that I have a firm knowledge and personal conviction that President Johnson is deeply committed to negotiating a peaceful solution to the war, but I cannot frankly say that I have the same confidence in Hanoiʼs desire for negotiations. Many people in the U.S. and elsewhere believe that Hanoi is not interested in negotiation; that NVN officials want to continue the war because of their expectations that the U.S. will eventually lose its will to continue and Hanoi will thereby win by default. I added that from our conversations I gained some hope that Hanoi wanted to enter negotiations, but frankly I was not confident that this was the case. 17. I said that until we can get both sides together this confidence will never develop. I continued, this is your basic reason for trying again with Hanoi; to convince them to at least start the negotiations. If the peace negotiations fail we havenʼt lost anything, but we cannot hope to gain until we get the two sides together. 18. Rapacki referred again to absence of anything new and asked how I expected Hanoi to change its position of last week when Poles were asked to break off discussions. I said I hope there was somebody making as strong a presentation and putting as much pressure on Hanoi to come to the negotiating table as the Poles were putting on us. Rapacki replied with reference to those who are attempting to convince Hanoi to come to the negotiating table, saying whenever they feel that they are making progress the U.S. bombs their efforts. 19. At the end Rapacki had mellowed a bit, saying that of course if we convey to Hanoi everything you told us today we will destroy any possibility of their engaging in negotiations. Rapacki did not say Poles would take any further action; neither, however, did he say they would not. 3 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 9:06 p.m. 2 Document 345 . 3 The Department of State responded to this telegram and telegram 1508 ( Document 345 ) in telegram 105909 to Warsaw, December 20, proposing that Gronouski return to Washington for a day or two of consultations. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 347. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 347. Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 1 Washington, December 21, 1966. 1967 AND BEYOND IN VIETNAM The Rostow and Komer papers 2 provide a basis for a very large area of agreement on the action programs we should attempt to follow during 1967. These could be summarized in a single action program, subject to the vital caveat of maintaining flexibility at all times. Nonetheless, the general outlines of what we want to do seem fairly clear. However, these two papers do not fully consider three inter-related factors that must enter into our present thinking: A. The prospect of the 1968 US elections and their impact on our ability to maintain a prolonged struggle. B. The question of negotiation, including specifically the possibility of attempting a direct “package deal” negotiation with Hanoi—and above all the question any such deal would necessarily raise of just what risks we might be prepared to assume in connection with a VC/NLF role in South Vietnam. C. The vital importance of developing a responsible and effective GVN, and whether this argues in some ways against certain types of US involvement and action that might, in the short-term sense, appear to make sense. These three factors are the subject of this memorandum. However, it must start with a median prognosis of what we can hope to achieve by the end of 1967 and mid-1968, when the impact of the US election will start to become really acute. In brief, such a median prognosis, in our judgment, is not comforting. 1967 will be slow going at best on the pacification front, as the Komer paper admits; however effectively we organize the US side, ARVN will take time to do a passable job of security for pacification, and the mainspring of GVN government performance—already showing signs of slowing down because of a pervading “caretaker” spirit—is most unlikely to have shown really sharp improvement by the end of 1967 at least. The very existence of a timetable for a new type of government is bound to create continuing uncertainty, at least until late in the year, in the tenure and position of key government and province officials on whom any real progress in pacification ultimately depends. In short, even if the GVN and we both do the best we possibly can, the odds are on the whole against a major strengthening of the GVN position or a true crack in NVA/VC/NLF morale during 1967. The possibility of such a morale break is present, but its chances cannot be rated better than about one in three for 1967. We believe that it is against such a prognosis that we must weigh the three factors stated above. A. We are not the proper experts to appraise just what the 1968 election campaign would be like if the situation reaches that date without clearly evident signs of major progress. On the merits, it seems unlikely that an opposing candidate—be he Romney 3 or anyone else—will be able to present the American people with a clear and convincing alternative to the policy we will have been pursuing. On the whole, we will probably see a Republican strategy of trying to have it both ways—claiming that more might have been done (although with emphasis on bombing the North alone probably rather muted), while at the same time arguing that possibilities for peace have somehow been neglected and that a Republican administration, as would be alleged of Korea, can find the right handle of threatening greater force and thus bringing about peace. The point really may be much less what the Republican Party appears to offer than the basic fact of a prolonged and diffuse national debate. Whether or not such a debate brings the Republicans to power—however important in itself—may be secondary to the effect of the debate alone in weakening and dividing Americans. However the election comes out, a sharp deepening of the kind of malaise so clearly evident in the 1966 Congressional election would leave any repeat any newly elected administration in a much weaker position to carry the conflict forward. Worst of all, this is almost certainly the way Hanoi would calculate it. In a revealing remark only the other day, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris said in effect that Hanoi had only to hang on through the 1968 elections, and that only a Republican, or Conservative, administration could liquidate “wars or empires.” 4 Apart from this being the way Hanoi would interpret a possible Republican victory, they would almost certainly interpret a Democratic victory, after a sharply divisive campaign, as indicating that we would weaken in due course. In short, under the median prognosis given above, mid-1968 and beyond looks all too likely to be a period when the US position will be substantially weakened. B. These thoughts alone must lead us to the question of seeking in the meantime, and indeed as soon as possible, to find a negotiated answer. Yet we must reckon, at the same time, that a negotiated “settlement” that involved major early risks of Communist takeover—whether or not this had come about before the 1968 elections—would in itself virtually doom the Administration to defeat and might well set off a wave of isolationist revulsion against all of our now-promising efforts in the rest of East Asia. Thus, we are not talking at all about “negotiation at any price” even from a domestic political standpoint. Yet, the need for seeking a negotiated solution is still acute, and we must reckon that the bargaining factors may now be very close indeed to a situation where both sides would see advantage in negotiation. A recent detached paper by the Office of National Estimates 5 points up the pressures and difficulties not only in Hanoi but between Hanoi and Moscow and Peking. It concludes flatly that for the first time in the last two years the present may be a time in which the other side would be prepared to talk seriously about a peaceful settlement falling well short of its maximum objectives. More specifically, whether the recent negotiating nibbles by third parties were authorized by Hanoi or not, they most certainly indicate how very seriously the Soviets and Eastern Europeans are working toward this end. They are very tough indeed—and some of them are slippery—but in the last analysis they at least want Vietnam to end and would accept, we can be reasonably sure, a return to the Geneva status quo, albeit with some measures for protecting the lives and the political role of present members of the NLF and VC. In short, the time is ripe. Moreover, the recent negotiating nibbles and the views of such responsible third persons as Sainteny all point in the direction of discussions being initiated on the basis of the outlines of a total settlement, i.e., what we have called the “package deal.” The recent Cooper paper 6 comes very close indeed to the kind of package we might try to work out, although it is very much open to question whether we should table the whole thing as flatly as that paper indicates, at the outset. From the standpoint of our over-all pattern of action, there is one clear implication that must not be overlooked. If we are to pursue a serious negotiating track on a “package deal” basis, we simply must accept that we will not hit politically sensitive targets, and specifically the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, while we are pursuing such a track. Whether or not the nibbles of November and December 1966 were actually author-ized, their present status has undoubtedly been communicated to Hanoi with the conclusion that the US cannot be serious as long as it even appears to escalate the bombing in this politically sensitive sense. Moreover, there is rather more murky evidence from August of 1965 that Hanoi is sensitive to apparent escalation. We have brought them to the point where they may understand and accept continuation of the bombing at its present levels and target patterns, but they simply will not enter into serious discussions if we appear to be escalating, particularly during key periods of contact. The second major implication of seriously pursuing a negotiating track is that we must face as nearly exactly as possible the risks that we are prepared to run of an ultimate Communist takeover. Right from the beginning, and specifically in the planning papers of 1964, our analysis in the Department—then regarded as heretical by our military—was that there was a certain irreducible minimum possibility of Communist takeover that could not be avoided in the best of circumstances. The Manila commitment for withdrawal—and the practical reality behind that commitment that we simply cannot effectively occupy South Vietnam for any long period—simply underscore that at some point we have to accept, say, a 20% chance that the South Vietnam we leave behind will so mismanage its affairs that it will eventually fall prey to the highly disciplined NLF and VC organization, even if the latter is then receiving only the most covert assistance from the North. The issue is whether we should be prepared to accept a settlement that increases the irreducible 20% to perhaps 30%, or more. As of now, a guaranteed institutional NLF role in the government appears to raise the risk to something on the order of 60 to 70%, and we would now reject it as unacceptable. But, short of this point, the question of safeguards at successive stages, and possibly the question of accepting NLF individuals into the political structure at a senior level, raise these marginal issues of acceptability that might turn out to be the very crux of getting an agreement. This paper does not assess exactly what concessions we might make that involve these greater degrees of risk. But it does flag the vital importance of our looking hard at this issue, as indeed we are doing in the analysis of the Cooper proposal. C. Finally, there is the question of building up the GVN. All of us, in mid-1965, foresaw a danger that a massive American presence would simply smother the GVN, and inhibit the very development of responsibility and effectiveness that is the object of the whole exercise. To some degree, this has plainly already been the case, and continued massive infusions on the US side, or especially the US taking over where it does not absolutely have to (as it may on the economic front), will simply deepen the problem. The marginal issues in the assessment of our action programs for 1967 must be weighed heavily from the standpoint of this intangible factor, and not merely on the basis of such clear and concrete inhibiting elements as the piaster budget ceiling (although we think our conclusions from the latter have been wise). The point—and a most difficult one—is that, unless an added US element really changes the prognosis very markedly, we should be leery of such added elements wherever possible. This might be true in any event and on any timetable of the GVN being on its own. But it is particularly acute if we visualize a serious effort to work out some negotiated arrangement that puts the GVN in this position by mid-1968. 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. 2 Attachments to Documents 318 and 319 . 3 George W. Romney, Governor of Michigan and a Republican. 4 This remark by Mai Van Bo has not been further identified. 5 See Document 328 . 6 Memorandum from Cooper to Katzenbach, December 1, entitled “A Package Deal for Hanoi,” which was discussed at the December 1 meeting of Harrimanʼs Negotiations Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET) 348.Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 348.Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 21, 1966. 1535. Reference: State 105909. 2 1. I saw Rapacki 1800 Dec. 21 and explained trip to U.S., economic discussions excuse for trip, and fact that DCM is fully briefed on our discussions and would be available to continue discussions during my absence. 2. I asked Rapacki to clarify for me the role that Hanoi played in our discussions. Rapacki replied that the message Lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred to “three sentences”) upon his return from Hanoi expressing NVN positive response to Warsaw talks, Rapackiʼs warning after the Dec. 3 bombing, that Hanoi would have to reassess the situation, and the decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw were all decisions by NVN which were conveyed to us by the Poles. He said further that comments Poles made regarding danger of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw discussions there were a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and Hanoi, adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initiative accurately reflected Hanoiʼs opinion. 3. Rapacki then made the point, in reference to our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions since talks shifted to Warsaw, that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec. 3. He said “Clearly you know that we felt this was a matter of concern from the very beginning; it wasnʼt something interjected as a new condition afterwards.” He added, “Our concern was well taken because the reaction to interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what we predicted.” 4. He expressed pleasure that I was going to Washington, noting that telegraphic communication is less than completely satisfactory in conveying all the nuances of positions and attitudes, and expressed hope that I would convey to Washington Polandʼs dedication to solving the VN war. He also observed that the critical problem of bringing Hanoi to the conference table involves question of pressure; that Hanoi could never respond to pressure or give the impression that it was responding to pressure. This, he said, is the reason why the bombing issue is so important. 5. Rapacki added that the main problem at this point is the lack of confidence developed in Hanoi subsequent to the Dec. 3 bombing. He added that at time Lewandowski left Hanoi NVN officials were convinced that USG was genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement, but that after Dec. 3 and subsequent bombing attacks on Hanoi NVN concluded that U.S. was attempting to bring pressure on them to negotiate, to improve its tactical position in order to win greater concessions from Hanoi, or to sabotage the whole peace effort. He said what is needed now is to restore the degree of confidence in U.S. intention that existed in Hanoi at the time Lewandowski was there. He said, “If you genuinely want to initiate negotiations, this is the problem you face.” 6. Re State 106358, 3 I have appointment 0100 hours December 22 with Minister Rapacki. Will report following meeting. Intend to maintain Warsaw 1529 schedule unless advised to the contrary. 4 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:07 p.m. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , p. 311. 2 See footnote 3, Document 346 . 3 See footnote 2, Document 349 . 4 In telegram 1529 from Warsaw, December 21, Gronouski indicated that he planned to leave Warsaw for Washington on December 22. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) Gronouski left Washington to return to Warsaw on the evening of December 23, arriving in Warsaw on December 24. (Telegram 107809 to Warsaw, December 23; ibid.) 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland 1 Washington, December 23, 1966, 4:21 p.m. 107911. The following four paragraphs are intended to replace paragraph 2 of State 106358 2 and are transmitted for Ambassadorʼs use tomorrow after his return and to obviate his carrying sensitive message on flight. Begin Text: In our discussions you have repeatedly stated that bombing in the vicinity of Hanoi during the first half of December has created the impression in Hanoi that we are attempting to pressure Hanoi into beginning negotiations. This suspicion on Hanoiʼs part, you have stressed, has created a serious impediment to the beginning of the projected Warsaw talks. We have pointed out that this is not the case; that there is no basis for concluding that our pattern of bombing has been altered in any way with the intention of creating such pressure. However, we want to leave no stone unturned to get negotiations started. We are assuming that you share our interest in the early commencement of direct negotiations between the United States Government and North Vietnamese representatives. With this in mind we have removed what you regard as the major impediment to the initiation of direct United States Government-North Vietnamese negotiations. We have issued orders to insure that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds north, 105 degrees 51 minutes 21 seconds east, for an indefinite period. If we have understood you correctly, this action by us will permit the Warsaw talks to begin promptly. Let me add, Mr. Rapacki, that in judging as to whether Hanoi is as interested in successful negotiations as we are, we would be impressed by similar restraint on their part. This could take the form of a suspension of incidents in the area of Saigon, or a redisposition of North Vietnamese forces in the area of the DMZ, or action affecting infiltration. Perhaps other examples will occur to the other side. End Text. Rusk 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted and approved by Read. In a telephone conversation with the President at 1:01 p.m. on December 23, McNamara informed Johnson that Wheeler had agreed to the action authorized in this telegram. Johnson then asked McNamara, “Would it give you any problem, do you think, before the hawks later on in your testimony?” McNamara responded, “I donʼt think so. We wrote this first to try to get these things [talks] started but secondly, in the event they donʼt start and this thing all leaks, to have a reasonable position with both the hawks and doves.” Johnson then said, “All right, itʼs OK with me.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F6612.03, PNO 1) At 4:08 p.m. on December 23, the JCS notified CINCPAC in telegram 2135 that “until further notice from JCS you will not conduct air operations that involve attacks against targets within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.” (Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9155 (18 Feb 65), Section 13, Rolling Thunder 52) 2 Paragraph 2 of telegram 106358 to Warsaw, December 21, informed Gronouski that the United States was “prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center … for an indefinite period if talks with North Vietnamese can be gotten underway shortly.” It also stated that “reciprocal action with respect to bombs, mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon … would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegram 1537 from Warsaw, December 22, Gronouski reported on Rapackiʼs reaction to the U.S. proposal. Noting that it linked U.S. action to an appropriate step by Hanoi in the Saigon area and appeared to make U.S. action dependent on a signal from Hanoi that contact would be established, Rapacki stated that he preferred to delay a day or two before transmitting the proposal to Hanoi. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold; printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 313–314) 350. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 350. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) 1 Washington, December 24, 1966, 2142Z. A. JCS 2135/232114Z Dec 66. 2 1. We were just starting to put some real pressure on Hanoi. Our air strikes on the rail yard and the vehicle depot were hitting the enemy where it was beginning to hurt. Then, Hanoi complains that we have killed a few civilians, hoping that they would get a favorable reaction. And they did, more than they could have hoped for. Not only did we say we regretted it if any civilians were killed but we also stopped our pilots from striking within ten miles of Hanoi. Hanoi has been successful once again in getting the pressure removed. They will be encouraged to continue their aggression, hoping to outlast us. 2. With nearly 400,000 U.S. fighting men in RVN it must be apparent to Hanoi that they canʼt take over the country by force. But they can fight a protracted guerrilla war, terrorize the countryside, make revolutionary development very difficult, and kill a lot of people, including Americans. This kind of war can go on for a long time if we let them get away with it. 3. My limited sounding of public opinion, including the thoughts of quite a few members of Congress, leads me to believe that we had better do what we can to bring this war to a successful conclusion as rapidly as possible. The American people can become aroused either for or against this war. At the moment, with no end in sight, they are more apt to become aroused against it. Itʼs up to us to convince our people and Hanoi that there is an end in sight and that it is clearly defeat for Hanoi. However, our actions these last few days can only encourage the enemy to continue. 4. When Hanoi complains about civilians being killed, is it not possible to say, “Perhaps some were killed, we try to avoid that, but this is a war and some civilians are bound to get killed. Hanoi can prevent it by calling off the aggression in SVN.” 5. If the enemy avoids major engagements in SVN and gets back to Phase II of their plan, the guerrilla phase, then it becomes urgently important to step up the pressure in the North by hitting targets that hurt them. And if some civilians get killed in the course of these stepped up air attacks, we should recognize it as part of the increased pressure. This war is a dirty business, like all wars. We need to get hard-headed about it. That is the only kind of action that these tough Communists will respect. That is the way to get this war over soonest. 6. Letʼs roll up our sleeves and get on with this war. We have the power. I would like authority to use it. We should be authorized to hit all RT 52 targets. The restrictions of Ref A should be removed. And then when Hanoi screams in anguish, we should hit them again. 7. I realize that there are other considerations which are important in Washington. It is my duty, however, to report to you my strong belief that we need to change some aspects of our current posture as the enemy must view it. This I have done. Warm regards. 1 Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Repeated to General Westmoreland. 2 See footnote 1, Document 349 . 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 351. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State 1 Warsaw, December 24, 1966. 1555. Reference: State 107911. 2 1. At 1900 Warsaw time Dec 24, accompanied by DCM, I called on Rapacki (Michalowski and Janczewski were present). After opening pleasantries about Christmas Eve, I read text of reftel. I reiterated our willingness to talk with NVN representatives in Warsaw or, if NVN prefers, in another third country. 2. I then mentioned current discussion of the possibility of an ICC meeting in New Delhi, 3 which I termed a good idea for two reasons: (1) they might be substantively helpful; and (2) if they took place, they would distract attention from the Warsaw discussions. I expressed our hope that Poles would give this proposal most serious consideration. 3. After thanking me for trouble I had taken in going to Washington, Rapacki expressed regret that this action had not occurred Dec 4 or earlier. Had that been the case, he said, we might already have first Warsaw meeting behind us and have good results by now. 4. Rapacki referred to his doubts about our Dec 22 proposal (Warsaw 1537) 4 stating that we now have come in with a concrete proposal which Poles will immediately transmit to Hanoi. While unwilling to directly predict when we can expect Hanoiʼs response, during later discussion of timing of my Garmisch trip, he referred to unlikelihood of response in next day or two in matter which leads me to believe he expects fairly quick response. 5. I asked if he would permit me to express my personal views on reftel proposal. I said I had gone to Washington bearing in mind the problems which Rapacki felt were impediments to initiation of talks and that I believe Washington has responded very positively to Rapackiʼs views. I pointed out that our elimination of bombing around Hanoi had gone beyond his concern about intensification of bombing, noting that in the Hanoi area we had in effect implemented Phase A of the two-phase proposal, negotiation of which was agreed to be first order of business after the beginning of negotiations. 6. I added that in our Dec 22 proposal, by making stopping of Hanoi bombing conditional on a sign from Hanoi with respect to Viet Cong actions in area of Saigon, Rapacki had expressed concern that we were still trying to put pressure on Hanoi. I said that the present proposal eliminates this concern, because the order to stop bombing was ordered yesterday and thus could not be regarded as a contingent action. I added that our proposal for Hanoi to take some reciprocal action as an indication of good faith should be read in the context of the basic necessity of both sides taking reciprocal actions once negotiations get underway. 7. I concluded by referring to Rapackiʼs Dec 22 hope that I could bring back a message to convey to Hanoi which would be easier for him to give his blessing. I said I hope he agrees with me that this is the case. 8. Rapacki replied that present proposal has eliminated problem as far as bombing of Hanoi is concerned and modified his objections to the second point (Saigon). He noted, however, that we must distinguish between NVN and actions around Saigon which are an NLF matter, adding that he can well imagine Hanoiʼs response to this suggestion. I pointed out that we had not limited our present proposal to Saigon, but had noted that many alternatives are available to Hanoi. 9. Rapacki then said that he would like to look for other ways to get a more favorable start to talks but at this point any comments would be in his own name and not appropriate. He did not exclude the possibility that after hearing Hanoiʼs response the Poles might make proposals to both sides. ( Comment: Rapacki gave no hint but could conceivably have reference to second sentence para 16, Warsaw 1508: 5 “On the other hand, the NVN may prefer in the initial stages to deal through the Polish Govt.”) 10. Rapacki then expressed hope that U.S. order terminating bombing around Hanoi was more than simply a gambit to get negotiations started, and that it pointed way to an attitude that other drastic steps elsewhere would not be taken which would interfere with getting negotiations started. When asked for clarification, he repeated that he hoped that drastic action would be avoided elsewhere as well as Hanoi—possibly action initiated by those opposed to negotiations—so that Hanoi bombing cessation could be viewed as symbol of a trend toward a future broader approach. 11. I replied that I hope he was not looking on our cessation of the Hanoi bombing merely as one phase of a trend in our actions to get negotiations started. I regard it as a measure which removed the impediment to initiation of negotiations which you yourself had singled out. I said there are two sides to the picture, and in Washington there are those who have real questions about drastic actions around Saigon during the critical phase of discussions in the first half of December. I emphasized that the quicker we get talks going, the better the opportunity to avoid such problems in the future. ( Comment: At this point, Michalowski nodded his head affirmatively, as he had done on a previous occasion when I made a similar remark.) 12. I discussed briefly advisability of my joining family in Garmisch for Christmas, noting fact DCM Jenkins could notify me, at momentʼs notice, if something comes in from Hanoi. Rapacki concurred that this would work out all right. 13. I am leaving for Garmisch morning Dec 25 and returning Dec 27 unless DCM informs me of necessity to return sooner. 6 Gronouski 1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Marigold. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 8:20 p.m. 2 Document 349 . 3 In telegram 9077 from Paris, December 14, Rusk, who was attending the NATO Ministerial Meeting, reported that Paul Martin told him that morning that Canada had received a proposal from the Indian Government for the ICC countries to meet shortly in New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) In telegrams 105378 and 105380, December 19, the Department of State briefed six Embassies on the proposed ICC meeting. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S and POL 27–14 VIET, respectively) 4 See footnote 2, Document 349 , for a summary of the December 22 proposal and Rapackiʼs reaction, which was reported in telegram 1537 from Warsaw. 5 Document 345 . 6 On December 25 the President and Rusk had the following exchange regarding Marigold during an 11-minute telephone conversation that began at 7:45 p.m.:“President: Iʼve never thought it was anything but propaganda but maybe weʼre wrong. I gather you are more hopeful.”Rusk: Only marginally because I donʼt think the intermediary is very good on this. I think heʼs playing a separate hand there and I donʼt like the way heʼs handled it very much.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape F6612.03, PNO 2) 352. Editorial Note 352. Editorial Note On December 25, 1966, The New York Times published the first of 15 dispatches from North Vietnam by Assistant Managing Editor Harrison E. Salisbury. The dispatches reported on the situation in North Vietnam and the effects of U.S. bombing, implying that U.S. aircraft were regularly striking civilian areas. During his 2-week stay in North Vietnam, Salisbury talked with North Vietnamese officials and private citizens and toured Hanoi and a number of towns and villages. Salisburyʼs last dispatch from North Vietnam appeared in The New York Times on January 9, 1967, but upon departing the country he filed an additional eight dispatches from Hong Kong “summing up observations on his visit to North Vietnam.” These articles appeared in The New York Times between January 11 and January 18, 1967. For Salisburyʼs account of his trip to North Vietnam, published in 1967, see Behind the Lines—Hanoi, December 23, 1966–January 7, 1967 . For a description of the controversy in the United States touched off by Salisburyʼs dispatches, see William Hammond , Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988), pages 274–279. The Department of State discussed the dispatches in a 7-page telegram to all diplomatic posts, December 31, stating that they were “based to a large extent on official North Vietnamese information” and contained inaccuracies but could not “be dismissed out of hand.” (Circular telegram 111162; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) The Department provided material discussing Salisburyʼs articles to British Foreign Secretary George Brown on December 30. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron) For President Johnsonʼs response when asked about the Salisbury articles at a news conference on December 31, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pages 1461–1462. 353. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson 353. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the White House Staff to President Johnson 1 Washington, December 30, 1966. SUBJECT Visit to Vietnam—December, 1966 Report and Recommendations Most of this visit—my third in 1966—was spent outside Saigon in working sessions with US field teams at the four regional/corps headquarters and at a province in each region—Thua Thien, Pleiku, Binh Duong, Vinh Long. I also had useful talks with Porter and Westmoreland and their staffs, but my impressions and recommendations in this memorandum are largely views from the field not Saigon. My main purposes were (1) to consult with our field staffs on the non-military projects on which Bob Komer and I have been working (2) to see what effect the civil side reorganization has had on field operations (3) to find out more about what is being done to speed up pacification, including redirection of ARVN assets to the hard tasks of local security which underlie Revolutionary Development. 1. Non-Military Programs The main lines of our policies are moving ahead in all but one area—pacification . We have had a minimum of strains in the massive and necessary build-up of US forces and economic assistance. We have checked ruinous inflation, installed a basic set of stabilization controls, have a better understanding of the Vietnamese market. We have made some improvement in the management and coordination of our civil operations. We have helped launch a promising constitutional process which thus far the Vietnamese have managed competently. There are stirrings toward a modern party system which, if fostered skillfully, should reduce the religious-sectarian rivalries, North-South tensions, and civil-military suspicions that have riddled Vietnam. But the GVN, as matters now stand, is likely to be an increasingly uncertain instrument in the first half of 1967 . On the tough policies which support our main lines, the GVN seems both less effective and more reluctant to act. At Saigon, despite continuing exhortation, the Mission has been unable to bring the GVN to decisions on the stabilization agreement, port clearance, rice policy. Land reform, national reconciliation, anti-corruption, new revenue measures remain on dead center. Little has been done to give content to the GVNʼs Manila Declarations. 2 The Mission says that it is now holding 21 matters of importance which Washington has instructed it to take up with the GVN and on which it has not been able to obtain meaningful action. In the field, the situation may be worse. Our people complain of increasing GVN inertia or resistance even within agreed policies. They say that, more than before, there are unnecessary delays and unexplained evasions, lost files, inconclusive discussions, buck-passing of problems to Saigon—with few results. They speak of the “porcupine tendency” of their counterparts: when prodded, they roll up and when approached they shed needles. What seems involved in all this is the lame duck psychology now strongly at work in Saigon and the field. The 1967 elections will replace the Military Directorate, the Cabinet and most regional and provincial officials. The spin-offs are familiar: at the political level—jockeying for election odds; at the ministerial—difficulties in recruiting first-rate men; at the bureaucratic—reluctance to take decisions or even deal with the papers. As matters now stand, the prospect is that the gap will widen between a US sense of urgency that the first six months of 1967 should be used to the full and GVN impulses to waffle until after the next election. The basic question is—do we wait for a new GVN? The stakes are too great for us to waste half this year. Moreover, we have no necessary reason to suppose that a new GVN will act on matters which the Directorate has put off. It may be more reluctant to do so on the grounds that it is more “nationalistic” or “independent” than its predecessor. So we should press hard for what is crucial to us and for what we believe will shorten the war. We should try for as many irreversible commitments to social change as we can obtain from the present GVN. If persuasion and inducements are not enough, we must look to a more active use of leverage and influence to accomplish what we consider important to us over the next six months—in terms of impact on Vietnam and US public opinion. On our own side, staffing at the Mission in Saigon and in the new Porter organization in the field will require urgent attention this spring . Many of the key officers in Saigon and the field are now short-termers. Among them: Habib (Political Counselor), Wehrle (Economic Counselor), Zorthian (JUSPAO Director), Heymann (Regional Director—IV Corps). The turnover among middle grade officers in substantive work and junior officers with Vietnamese language capability will be high. Few replacements have yet been named. Additionally about 1,200 US civilians are in process of being transferred to the new Porter organization. Many of them will be in place only shortly before their tours are up. Moreover, we now have, or can expect, requests for about 60 additional positions needed at regional and provincial levels. Recruitment of first-rate people or voluntary extensions of duty remain severe problems, more difficult perhaps because of the no-wife policy than for any other reason. We will need special priorities to meet these requirements. 2. Civil-Side Reorganization and the Field Whether Porterʼs new Office of Civil Operations (OCO) is viewed as a final organizational solution or as an inevitable intermediate step it is achieving a number of useful purposes. It establishes, on the civil side for the first time, unified inter-agency direction with a chain of command and communication from Saigon to the regions and provinces. It centralizes US–GVN field coordination of civil matters in one US official at each level. It affords a civil-side framework which can work more effectively with US military for politico-military coordination and more integrated pacification planning. At the time of my visit, OCOʼs impact had been felt mainly in Saigon. Its headquarters organization was largely completed. Three of the four Regional Directors had been named, all were at work, and one was in full time residence in his region. Regional staffs were being assembled but not yet in place. At province level, teams were being interviewed for the selection of Provincial Representatives. Porter expects them to be designated by January 1. Some slippage is possible, and it may be 90 days or so before the new organization is functioning. I participated in the initial briefings of the province teams I visited, passing along and emphasizing Bob Komerʼs admonitions against over-bureaucratization of effort and for fast and hard action. These were well-received. Morale was good. All the GVN Province Chiefs with whom I talked thought the new structure a great improvement. But OCOʼs first test will come in the coordination of the out-of-phase GVN Revolutionary Development Plan with the militaryʼs Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 and in the influence it can bring to bear on the redirection of ARVN assets to the clear-and-hold operations which underlie RD. The next section reviews the status of these matters. 3. Pacification: 1967 The lack of progress in pacification remains the crux of the Vietnam problem , largely determining duration and extent of the war, persistence or fade-away of the NVA/VC forces, and the likelihood of negotiations. We may get negotiations without an internal resolution of Vietnamʼs security situation. We are unlikely to have negotiations or withdrawal without some significant progress toward genuine pacification. Despite the substantial results our arms have achieved against the enemyʼs main force in 1966 and our civil successes, we have not yet found a way to assist the GVN to achieve continuous local security below the provincial level—or to impose its obverse: continuous local insecurity for the VC guerrillas. This is the gap in our line. Closing it is a major task for 1967. The crucial inputs seem to me to be two: targeted civil-military planning at corps and province; redirection of ARVN to clear-and-hold. a. Civil-Military Planning The lack of detailed, coordinated, and focused civil-military pacification planning is appalling. The GVNʼs RD plans are built from the village level up. The militaryʼs Combined Campaign Plan (AB–142) from the national level down. Different time schedules compound the problem. Scatteration of security resources, RD cadre placement, economic development projects is the accepted order. At local levels we lack a systematic means for reinforcing situations of strength or exploiting opportunities presented by vigorous local leadership or favoring circumstances. The critical factor is the interface between civil and military programs. In the field this does not yet exist. AB–142 has been sent to Corps for detailed corps and sector planning. Final corps plans were due in Saigon on December 15 but had not yet been examined by any civilian agency for compatibility with RD cadre and police positioning, other GVN inputs, or the distribution of US economic projects and commodities. None of the civilian Regional Directors or provincial staffs with whom I talked knew of GVN plans for the time-phasing and deployment of the retrained ARVN battalions that are to be assigned to clear-and-hold in the regions or provinces of their responsibility. The need is to convert the largely separate functional planning of the past into integrated area planning based on provinces, districts, villages and lines of communication. The new plans should set concrete and detailed local goals, concentrate resources for their achievement, be developed on predictable force allocations and time-phasing, and coordinate civil and military means. This concept is generally accepted at Saigon. But at no corps or province I visited has this type of planning process been begun. b. ARVN Redirection In my report to you on August 30, I referred to the MACV effort to improve the quality and effectiveness of GVN forces as “the most significant event now taking place in Vietnam.” The effort has since gained some momentum. Manila provided a powerful new impetus. At the top of the GVN, there seems complete agreement. Thieu and Ky are abundantly on record. The Minister of Defense, General Co, spoke to me privately and eloquently on the need for a change in ARVN attitudes towards the civil population, retraining in tactics, new pacification medals and promotion criteria based on RD accomplishments, and tighter discipline and mobile court martials (to try offenders in the locale of their misdeeds). The rhetoric could not have been improved. And all is not words. At II Corps, I was told that General Vinh Loc had submitted his 1967 campaign plan using all of his 22 battalions on search-and-destroy. He was called in to Saigon, put on the carpet successively by Ky and Co, and told to redo it. His plan now assigns 10 of his 22 battalions to retraining for clear-and-hold. Yet in the field a different view emerges. None of the MACV advisers I met at sector or sub-sector level believes that the job is being attacked with sufficient urgency, comprehension or scope. They have much skepticism about retraining plans based on 14 ARVN teams, one for each division and corps, each receiving a two-week training course and sent out to lecture individual ARVN battalions from January through August 1967. They speak of long-standing reforms in attitude, behavior, and tactics needed and unlikely to be produced quickly by troop indoctrination courses. They note resistance developing on the part of ARVN officers who feel they are about to be downgraded from combat to secondary missions. They suspect this attitude is not dissimilar to the preference for combat over pacification or advisor duty held by many US officers. Generally, they favor a more comprehensive approach: improvements in ARVN living standards and dependent care, more use of combined US/ARVN units for clear-and-hold, an upgrading of advisor rank, and greater participation by MACV to speed up the redirection process. Underlying these matters, there was a deeper division of US opinion on priorities in the Vietnam war than I had previously found. The split was more in evidence in the field than in Saigon where daily relationships cushion acerbities of opinion. The controversy concerns the relation between the main force and the guerrilla threats, tends to polarize on civil-military lines (although there are dissenters on each), and centers on differences in estimates of NVA/VC order-of-battle, infiltration, and recruitment in the south. a. The military generally argue the unresolved and increasing main force threat and view the guerrillas and their political infrastructure as a supporting arm which can be readily dealt with once the main force war is won. They accept a main force O/B of 175 NVA/VC battalions, substantial deployment of main force units inside Cambodia, monthly average rates of infiltration from the north at 8,600 for calendar 1966, and steadily rising, VC recruitment in the south at 3,500 a month, and have much skepticism about reports of declining VC morale and capacity. These projections dictate an emphasis on one kind of war. b. The civilians stress the VC guerrillas and their political apparatus as the decisive enemy; view the NVA main force as a supporting and reactive arm; question the current intelligence estimates. They argue the Maoist theory that in highly developed nations, control of the central government and the cities ensures eventual control of the countryside; but that in Vietnam, as in most weak and underdeveloped states, the opposite is the more likely case: domination of rural areas will strangle the cities and eventually wear out the center. They emphasize that none of the indices of pacification progress shows much advance: secured hamlets, cleared roads and canals, collected rice, destroyed enemy infrastructure, arrested subversives. They center on Viet Cong assassinations of village officials and hamlet chiefs which will total more than 3,500 for 1966 and on forcible abductions which will be over 6,000. (For the month of November, the respective figures were 123 VC assassinations and 503 abductions.) In their view the shortest route to the enfeeblement or withdrawal of the NVA/VN main force is the destruction of the totalitarian revolutionary apparatus in the south and its replacement by a broad base of popular support for the GVN in the districts and villages and hamlets of Vietnam. It will be useful to end or narrow this cleavage quickly if it is possible to do so. There will be no black or white choice. But it is central to planning, strategy, training schedules, deployments (both US and GVN), an appropriate mix in the allocation of resources, and the emphasis to be applied to ARVN retraining. It is producing stresses and strains between the civil and military establishments at Saigon and in the field. These may grow worse. More importantly this unresolved difference, if prolonged, will impede concentration on the main vulnerabilities of the enemy. (I think it right that you have my personal view on what is implicit in this entire section. The civil-side reorganization is a move in the right direction. It should be fully supported and given every opportunity over a reasonable period to succeed. If it works it will have other advantages as well. But I remain doubtful that we can get pacification moving quickly or effectively enough with the present organization or that we will have the requisite planning, retraining, and leverage applied to ARVN until MACV is tasked with a single responsibility for the pacification program.) 4. Recommendations a. The Next Six Months: Reduce the number of items now being negotiated at Saigon. Reset our priorities in terms of what is crucial for us. My own choices would be: ARVN redirection, economic stabilization, a national reconciliation program, local elections. b. GVN Inertia: Reexamine and recapture the leverage of our aid programs, regain MAP control, reestablish flexibility in counterpart disbursal, commodity deliveries and budget support. Our threats to use such pressures in 1966 have been too ad hoc and sporadic. If you approve, Komer and I will organize an interagency lev-erage study to develop a system of graduated pressures and a scenario for applying them to our priority purposes within the limits of our legislation and our agreements with the GVN. The aim would be to produce a set of well-ordered contingency actions whenever decision is made to invoke them. But this will be a painful process and we will need your support. c. US Staffing: —Reissue your June 6, 1964 inter-agency directive 3 on the importance of an affirmative response by US officials recommended for service in Vietnam. —Reexamine the no-wife policy, at least during a second tour. —Resubmit to the Congress last yearʼs Vietnam provisions of the Hays Bill for additional hazardous zone benefits for civilian employees. —Request the prompt compilation of an all-agency list of critical positions with designated replacement for each. Saigon should not be asked to absorb staffing gaps because of transfer or assignment delays. And security and health conditions may require unexpected reliefs. d. Pacification: Priorities —Require a basic reexamination of our intelligence on NVA/VC force levels, infiltration and recruitment rates. The estimates involved are embedded in specialized fields. You may wish to consider a broader special blue-ribbon committee of inquiry—without publicity and with a mandate to report to you by the end of February. Planning —Insist on combined provincial RD/P plans by February 1 at the latest, coordinating civil and military programs and containing specific and detailed provincial goals for 1967. Request a prompt report to Washington of any major RD revision required for military security factors. ARVN Redirection —Press for an accelerated schedule for ARVN retraining. Insist on rapid and full implementation of ways and means, now identified, to increase ARVN effectiveness, including expanded use of US/ARVN combined units in pacification operations. William Leonhart 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. LXII. Secret. 2 For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966 , Book II, pp. 1260–1261. 3 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 205 . 354. Memorandum of Conversation 354. Memorandum of Conversation 1 Washington, December 30, 1966. SUBEJCT Reply to Presidentʼs Letter to Kosygin PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any reply to the Presidentʼs letter to Kosygin. 2 He replied that if he could speak completely off the record he could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed and that it was one we would have liked but then the bombing of Hanoi had occurred and this draft had been torn up and another one of quite a different character started. He said he had seen the report from their Embassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs had fallen on Hanoi itself. He said his own recommendation had been that in view of this change of circumstance, it was better for the Soviet Government not to reply immediately but he said that a reply would be made in due course. I said I could tell him categorically that it was not our intention to bomb the civilian areas of Hanoi and we were sure that some SAMs had fallen on the city. I said that one of the targets was so situated that our planes came over the city after dropping their bombs and it was always possible that one of the bombs had been hung up and subject to a delayed release. The Ambassador remarked that even if a SAM missile had landed in the city it would not have left the kind of crater that had been caused there. The Ambassador referred to our conversation with the Poles and asked if anything new had developed. I inquired whether he was aware of our action in stating we had stopped bombing within a certain radius of Hanoi. He said he was. I said that our Ambassador in Warsaw had an appointment with the Foreign Minister but I did not know yet what had transpired. The Ambassador remarked that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government considerable hope and he said rather cryptically that they had other reasons for some optimism but that our action in bombing Hanoi had spoiled everything. I pointed out that our targets were selected several weeks in advance and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time. The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-Nam and did not know how to judge our policy. He said there were many, and he was one of them, that wondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory. I said that I could assure him that we were genuinely interested in negotiations and that although there were some who felt that we should take a stronger action, this was not a question of military officers disobeying orders. Toward the end of our conversation, which covered other subjects, the Ambassador asked if I thought there was real hope of getting the Viet-Namese affair settled during the coming year. I said that I was personally hopeful, although the difficulties were obvious. He remarked that perhaps during my stay in Moscow I would be able to have contact with a certain Ambassador, obviously meaning the North Viet-Namese. 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold II. Top Secret; Nodis; Marigold. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL. Printed in part in Herring, Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War , pp. 321–322. 2 Document 330 . 355. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 355. Telegram From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas 1 Washington, December 30, 1966, 2313Z. CAP 661394. Literally eyes only for the President. Herewith Hanoiʼs negative response via Warsaw. We are at the end of a phase if not at the end of the line with Marigold. We shall now have to pause and consider next steps. Warsaw 1596 1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken further action on my statement of Dec 24, 2 but unfortunately this step could not make up for damage done by previous actions, particularly Air Force, during first part of December. 2. Rapacki added that “we have to consider our role at this stage as terminated.” He continued “We regret very much that matter took such a turn,” adding that Poles think they did everything they could have toward objective of peaceful settlement. 3. Rapacki expressed appreciation for my personal efforts which unfortunately have not been able to make up for what happened before. He said “It has been said that work done in a good cause sooner or later will yield results. I donʼt know if this is always the case, but we hope.” He added that this becomes possible only when proper conclusions are drawn for the reasons why this action did not succeed. 4. “As for the Poles,” Rapacki continued, “what has happened only strengthens us in belief that only unconditional stopping of bombing DRVN might create atmosphere for peaceful solution.” 5. Rapacki then thanked me for my cooperation, expressing regret that my holiday was ruined, particularly in that the results “we had hoped for” were not achieved. 6. I replied that it is not the holiday that matters, but I am keenly disappointed because after my Washington visit—during which the USG made substantial movement in the right direction—I had high hopes. I said I know there is a point where one gives up but I do not like to. What most concerns me is where we go from here. Having lost what I felt was a very good opportunity, and having personally full confidence in our keen interest in getting negotiations started, this development leaves me feeling that maybe we have been kidded from the very beginning. I added that it seems to me we went a great distance to meet a critical problem. I know I am speaking from deep disappointment, but I hate to go to the end of the road without knowing where we go from here. However, if that is the case, I can only report it. I am sure there will be the same deep disappointment in Washington. 7. Rapacki said, “I understand your personal feelings, but I donʼt think that those authoritative people were kidding from the beginning. I donʼt make such an accusation against Lodge or anyone else. But how the bombing could start at just that moment is something which evades me. No, I make no accusations; I only repeat my personal view that if that step you brought from Washington (on 24 December) had occurred on December 4—admittedly after the first bombing of Hanoi—then I feel personally we would have had the first contact with the DRV behind us. Moreover, I think I have sufficient reasons for my personal feeling. Even between Dec 4 and Dec 13, the matter was again actively being reconsidered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. We know, because we had contact with the proper quarter. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after Dec 13. The bombing again took place on Dec 14. But this is history known to all of us and it is hardly worth returning to it. What next is the real question. On some occasion we may talk about it in a different capacity and not in the framework of our present efforts. We share common misgivings and concerns; but our views on a solution differ.” 8. I said I know I may be repeating out of frustration. But despite what happened before, we made a very major step on the 24th of Dec—stopping bombing without requiring reciprocal action. What concerns me is that after taking this step we obtained a negative response anyway; this will influence many people to think Hanoi just does not want to negotiate. I said I am reluctant to give up this opportunity; slowly but surely the conditions for negotiations were being created. To recapture this, we would have to go way back to recreate the conditions we now have. This is a tragic development. 9. Rapacki said that, “You must have sensed on Dec 24 that my first reaction, while mixed, was not negative. But it was very difficult to separate that step from what had already happened beforehand. Therefore I expressed the regret that this action was 20 days late. It seems to me that what you called an inclination towards talks was demonstrated quite clearly by the DRVN. You are right that arguments to the contrary could be made. This is the aspect of the situation that concerns us. There are many reasons on the NVN side to believe that your proposals were not sincere. It does not seem very good when events take a turn which create new difficulties to move ahead. But the key to the situation is in your hands. You are a great power. You can use this key to turn the situation back.” 10. I replied that I thought we provided that key on December 24. But now there is no sense, as the saying goes, to cry over spilt milk. Particularly in light of these considerations, I hope you are giving serious consideration to the possibility of ICC talks in New Delhi where it might be possible to pick up a few of the pieces. 11. To Rapackiʼs query as to what could be expected from such talks, I replied that I did not know. However, I added there are three interested governments involved, each playing an important role and each with independent thoughts. I said it is very important to maintain contact. Whatever you think of the ICC, it is an existing agency, it may be weak but it is an agency involved in the Vietnam situation. 12. Rapacki replied that Poles cooperate with India and Canada in this organization, adding, “I cannot say that during the years of this cooperation that there have been any brilliant achievements: we are always ready to exchange ideas, primarily on the work of the Commission, as well as on other situations. The question is whether it is worthwhile at this moment holding another meeting on Vietnam, while there is still bombing. And if it takes place without a result—without a solution—its impact could really be negative.” He added that second objection just occurred to him: “We (Poland and the U.S.) have had a common experience over the past six weeks. The two remaining members of the Commission are not aware of these events. In the conversations within the Commission the countries involved might be divorced from the realities of the situation.” 13. I replied that I think that without divulging the last six weeks, the Polish Govt might present some insights and could make contributions. On another subject, I continued, we have maintained absolute silence regarding these talks. We have assumed that, except for Fanfani and presumably the USSR, which has a direct interest in the problem, your govt has not divulged the talks to any government or party. 3 Rapacki replied “What you say is in accordance with the fact, but probably the Pope is also informed.” I said, “The Pope is informed? By whom?” Rapacki answered, “Possibly Fanfani, but I donʼt know, I am not saying it was Fanfani, I donʼt know, but the Pope probably is informed.” I said I presume that unless we inform each other to the contrary, the rule of secrecy will prevail even though the talks are broken off. Rapacki replied affirmatively. 14. Comment: In this moment of frustration it would be easy to conclude that Poles have led us down the primrose path. But I think this would be an unfortunate misinterpretation of events. If the Poles had been playing this kind of game they would have come in today asking us to sweeten the pot. Instead, they threw up their hands and bowed out. 15. The posture of both Rapacki and Michalowski today was one of regret. I am convinced that Poles have had at least limited authority from Hanoi to investigate negotiation and Warsaw meeting terms, that they felt that our Dec 24 position was a satisfactory one, and that since Dec 24 they did what they could to induce Hanoi to enter negotiations. Failing this, they recognized Hanoiʼs intransigence and bowed out. 16. I recommend that we immediately request Soviets to take over and that cessation of bombing around Hanoi be continued at least until proposed Soviet effort fails or USSR responds negatively to our request. I believe we now have the initiative and should exploit it with the Soviets, the Pope and U Thant with the alternative objectives of either moving along the path toward negotiations or, if this fails, leaving us in a strong public relations position. Hasty withdrawal of our Dec 24 position would, I believe, seriously compromise either objective. (In retrospect, I am not sure I should have suggested that secrecy be maintained, but my intention was to curb possible inclination for public propaganda by Poles. At any rate, it is clear that we can talk to Pope and Soviets, and possibly U Thant, without violating spirit of my suggestion.) Gronouski 1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, box 147, Marigold—Incomplete. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Marigold. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the telegram. 2 See Document 351 . 3 In telegram 13640 from Saigon, December 17, Lodge reported that Lewandowski had leaked information on the negotiations and was “obviously loose-tongued.” In telegram 14206 from Saigon, December 24, Porter reported that the Polish Ambassador in Rome had revealed “all details” of the negotiations to Pope Paul. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 VIET/MARIGOLD) 356. Editorial Note 356. Editorial Note On December 31, 1966, President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg had a 47-minute telephone conversation commencing at 8:45 a.m. A principal topic of conversation was Vietnam. Included were the following comments: “President: I just think that Hanoi is not ready. Everybody thinks that Hanoi is ready; the Pope, the Poles, the Russians, but when you really get down to it, they just cannot make a budge there with this situation as it is. “Goldberg: I donʼt disagree with that assessment.” Later during the same conversation: “President: So I say OK, tell you [North Vietnam] what Iʼll do. You will not see a plane fly over Hanoi, and you wonʼt see a plane fly over Haiphong. And we got a circle here, and we wonʼt do anything. Now you give me some reciprocate action. And by God, they just shoot down one of my patrols immediately. They donʼt do one damn thing and they donʼt acknowledge it. And you canʼt hear from them and you ask the Russians why they canʼt deliver something and they say, well, theyʼre not quite ready yet. Now I havenʼt been over Hanoi in days. I havenʼt been over Haiphong in weeks. And Iʼm just sitting here urging them. But Iʼve got all the weight of the world saying for Godʼs sake quit letting these trucks assemble there and come down here and just kill our people. I think Iʼm going to be tried not by Bertrand Russell but by Mrs. Goldberg for killing her boy without giving him the weapons to protect himself. “Goldberg: Bertrand Russell has become a nut. “President: No but do you heed my point, sir? I think my great danger is how can a commander in chief stop his men from fighting unless the other side is just willing to do something.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Goldberg, December 31, 1966, 8:23 p.m., Tape F6612.04, PNO 3) Index Index Acheson, Dean G., 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] African countries, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Agency for International Development (AID), 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 263 ] Aiken, George D., 37 n [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] Air strikes against DRV. See Bombing headings . Akalovsky, Alexander, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Albert, Carl, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Algeria, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Allen, George W., 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Alsop, Joseph W., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 262 ] Ambassadorship in Saigon, 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 291 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] -885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Anderson, Clinton P., 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] Arends, Leslie C., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Anderson, Robert, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] Chaplainsʼ Corps, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] Corruption problem, 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 215 ] Day of national recognition for, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] Factionalism among commanders, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] “Improper organization” issue, 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] -931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 339 ] Improvement program, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 222 ] NLF infiltration of, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 208 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 220 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 353 ] -980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 353 ] Reorganization of, 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 294 ] Asian Development Task Force, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Asian Peace Offensive proposal, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] Australia, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Ayub Khan, Muhammad, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Baldwin, Hanson, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] Ball, George W. ( see also Ball group ), 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 95 n [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Asian Peace Offensive proposal, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165 ] Bombing of DRV: Chinese intervention scenario, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] Escalation issue, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 41 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets, 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] U.S. image abroad and, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] Bombing pause, 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 32 ] Bombing resumption, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] Chinese intervention in Vietnam, possible, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: Administration testimony to Congress re, 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] DRV initiative through Laotians, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Burma, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Moscow, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] XYZ initiative, 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Honolulu Conference, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] Manila Conference, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 655 n [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 242 ] Marigold peace initiative, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 173 ] National reconciliation program, 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 246 ] NLF representation at negotiations, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Thrush operation, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam and Congress, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Ball group, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 126 ] Bates, William H., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] Baumgardner, Ev, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] Be, Maj., 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 171 ] Beech, Keyes, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] Bell, David E., 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] Alliesʼ contributions, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] Bellʼs report for Johnson, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] Economic initiatives, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Management reorganization, 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] —41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 28 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] Port facilities, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] Resource allocation, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 28 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Technical visits, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Refugee situation, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Republic of Vietnam, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Black, Eugene, 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] Blouin, Rear Adm. F. J., 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Boggs, Hale, 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 950 n [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Bolton, Frances P., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] Bombing of DRV: Achievements of, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 232 ] B– 52 strikes, 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 106 ] Casualties, 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 157 ] -431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] Chinese intervention scenario, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] Civilian facilities, strikes against, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] -952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Controlled armed reconnaissance program, 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 101 ] Defensive response by DRV, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 101 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 101 ] DRV position re, 118 [ Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 37 ] -119 [ Pg. 119 is part of Doc. 37 ] Effects of bombing, intelligence reports on, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 186 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 268 ] -738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] -804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Effects of bombing, JCS report on, 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Escalation issue ( see also Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets below ; Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program below ), 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] -132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] Ginsburghʼs position, 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 288 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Ho Chi Minh Trail, focus on, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] Interdiction capability, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 36 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 66 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 66 ] International reaction, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 315 ] -862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] JCS recommendations, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Mansfieldʼs position, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 154 ] Marigold peace initiative and, 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] -919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 342 ] -938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 345 ] -955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 346 ] -960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 346 ] Militaryʼs unanimous support for, 734 n [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 268 ] Mining of Haiphong harbor, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 41 ] Morale situation in DRV and, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 239 ] Overall U.S. strategy, relation to, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 154 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 154 ] Administration discussions, 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Authorization for attacks, 452 n [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 164 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 164 ] Effects of bombing, 614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] International reaction, 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] Rostowʼs position, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 115 ] Thieuʼs assessment of, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] U.K. position, 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Political dimension, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] Reconstruction efforts by DRV, 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 157 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] -734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] -973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] -618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Authorization of, 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 299 ] W. Bundyʼs position, 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 297 ] JCS target recommendations, 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 295 ] -812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Johnsonʼs preferences, 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 298 ] -817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] McNamara-Rusk position, 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 299 ] Rostowʼs position, 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] Sharpʼs position, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Strikes against DRV, 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] -898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Withheld targets, 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Sharpʼs position, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 283 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Sortie rate, 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 45 ] Stabilization of, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] -731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Target selection, 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 45 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 101 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 106 ] -312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 282 ] Termination option, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Thaiʼs assessment of, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] U.S. domestic situation and, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] U.S. image abroad and, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 282 ] -779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 284 ] -785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] Bombing pause ( see also Peace offensive), 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Campaign issue in U.S., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] Extended pause option, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 32 ] Harrimanʼs position, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Lodgeʼs assessment of, 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] McNamaraʼs assessment of, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] Results in Vietnam, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] Resumption of, possible, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 232 ] U.S.-RVN discussions re, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] U.S. strategy, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Vietnamese peopleʼs unawareness of, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Bombing resumption, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] Administration discussions, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 32 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 35 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] Ayubʼs position, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 49 ] Country positions, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] Diplomatic and political factors affecting, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] Enclave strategy and, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61 ] French position, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Goldbergʼs position, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Implementation procedures, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 34 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 39 ] JCS position, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] Lodgeʼs position, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] McNamaraʼs position, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] Militaryʼs unanimous support, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] Opposition to, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] Resumption on January 31, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Sharpʼs position, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] Summary paper on resumption complexities, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 42 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] U.K. position, 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 950 n [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Bow, Frank T., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] Bowles, Chester, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Bradley, Gen. Omar n ., 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] Breakfield, Gen., 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] Brezhnev, Leonid, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 30 ] Brown, George, 758 n [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] -824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317 ] -866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Brown, Winthrop G., 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] Bruce, David K. E., 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317 ] Buddhist self-immolations, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] Administration discussion re, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Anti-American propaganda by Buddhists, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 107 ] Buddhist demands, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] -293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 99 ] Chaos in Vietnam, potential for, 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 126 ] Civilian government issue, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 99 ] -294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 99 ] Communist influence, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 336 n [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Decline of Buddhist strength, 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] Demonstrations against government, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] Government assault on Buddhists, 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 105 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 110 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 111 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] Intelligence reports on, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] -295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 134 ] Kyʼs inflammatory statements, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 130 ] Negotiations between government and Buddhists, 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Onset following Thiʼs removal from command, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 91 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Political impact, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 100 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Post-crisis agenda of government, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] -354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 123 ] Public attitude toward, 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 100 ] Reestablishment of government authority, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] Taylorʼs analysis of U.S. options, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Thieuʼs assessment of, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] U.S. domestic situation and, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] U.S. forces, instructions for, 323 n [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] U.S. intervention, proposed, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 118 ] U.S. policy re, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 108 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] U.S. withdrawal and, 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 114 ] Valentiʼs analysis of U.S. options, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 111 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 111 ] Buffum, William, 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] Bui Diem, 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] -394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] Ruskʼs meeting with, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Bundy, McGeorge, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 14 n [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 15 n [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] I n , 24 n [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 83 n [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 89 n [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 39 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 192 n [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 193 n [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 192 n [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Ambassadorship in Saigon, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] Bombing resumption: Administration discussions, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Ayubʼs position, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] French position, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Implementation procedures, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 34 ] -104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] -125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 39 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 52 ] Lodge, assessment of, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] Military program in Vietnam, 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] “Civil czar” position, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 77 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] Management reorganization, 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 22 ] Organizational structure, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Peace offensive, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] Prisoners of war, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Bundy, William P., 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 288 n [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 753 n [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 763 n [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] ARVN corruption problem, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] Ball group report, 361 n [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 126 ] Bombing of DRV: Overall U.S. strategy, relation to, 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] -600 [ Pg. 600 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] -815 [ Pg. 815 is part of Doc. 297 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] -393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: Japanese initiative, 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] -587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Phase A-Phase B peace formula, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] Ronning peace initiative, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] Honolulu Conference, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Manila Conference, 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] Marigold peace initiative, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] Military program in Vietnam, allies contributions to, 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -847 [ Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309 ] Negotiation issue: “Blue chips” for negotiation, 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 129 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] “Package deal” strategy, 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 347 ] -965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 347 ] Three-track approach, 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] RVN constitution, 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 300 ] -824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] U.S. policy planning for 1967, 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 347 ] -966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Bunker, Ellsworth, 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] -884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Burchett, Wilfred, 679 n [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] Burma, 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Burns, James McGregor, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] Byrnes, James F, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Byroade, Henry A., 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 302 n [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] Cam Ranh Base, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 198 ] Cambodia, 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 175 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 247 ] Canada, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] Cao Van Vien, Gen., 303 n [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] Carver, George A., Jr., 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] McNamaraʼs report on Vietnam visit, CIA response to, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Pacification program/civil operations: CIA assessment of Komerʼs views, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 174 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] Management reorganization, 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] -672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] -716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Thrush operation, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Case, Clifford, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ( see also Helms, Richard M. ; National Intelligence Estimates ; Raborn, William F, Jr. ), 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] Bombing of DRV, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] -432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 186 ] -518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] -616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 801 n [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] -378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 134 ] Defection encouragement program, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] DRV intentions and attitudes toward the war, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 191 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] McNamaraʼs report on Vietnam visit, CIA response to, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] National Liberation Front, penetration of, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] Negotiation issue, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 270 ] Pacification program/civil operations: CIA assessment of Komerʼs views, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 174 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 181 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] CIA involvement, 638 n [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] Management reorganization, 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] -672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 270 ] Political warfare, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Peace offensive, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 30 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 30 ] Religious project in Vietnam, 380 n [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 134 ] RVN elections, 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128 ] Southeast Asia, Communist threat to, 382 n [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] Thrush operation, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] Vietnamese Communistsʼ will to persist, report on, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] -603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Chadbourn, Philip, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] Chau, Col., 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] Chauvel, Jean Michel Henri, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] Chen Yi, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 41 ] Chieu. See Pham Xuan Chieu, Gen . Chieu Hoi program, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 74 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Chin, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] China, Peopleʼs Republic of, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 126 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 126 ] Benefits of war in Vietnam, 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 319 ] Democratic Republic of Vietnam: Policy of support for, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 319 ] Presence in, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Intervention possibility, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 265 ] Bombing of DRV and, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] Enclave strategy and, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 61 ] Marigold peace initiative and, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Negotiations, role in, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 44 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Peace offensive and, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 30 ] Southeast Asia, threat to, 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 11 ] China, Republic of. See Taiwan . Chon, Col., 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] Christian, George, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Chuan. See Nguyen Van Chuan, Gen . Church, Frank, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 72 ] Civil program. See Pacification program/civil operations. Clark, Joseph S., 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] Clifford, Clark M., 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Bombing resumption, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 52 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution, administration policy re, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Co. See Nguyen Huu Co, Gen . Cohen,Richard, 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Colby, William E., 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Cold war, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] Collins, Brig. Gen. James, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Commercial Import Program, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Communist insurgency, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] Army divisions from DRV, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 18 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] Attrition strategy, 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Force build-up, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 36 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 36 ] Military strategy, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17 ] -49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 45 ] -152 [ Pg. 152 is part of Doc. 45 ] Morale situation, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] Supplying of, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 36 ] Terror campaign, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 294 ] Thieuʼs assessment of, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] Congress, U.S. ( see also Senate, U.S. ): Administration strategy for dealing with, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] -239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] Bombing resumption, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 164 n [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] Congressional candidatesʼ visits to Vietnam, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Consultative role re Vietnam, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation, administration testimony re, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] -40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 166 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Administration testimony, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Congressional resolution on, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] Funding of, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] Connally, John, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Cooper, Chester L., 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 90 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 726 n [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] -823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 964 n [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 347 ] Cooper, J. S., 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] Cooper, Richard, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Corcoran, Thomas, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] Dang Van Quang, Gen., 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 278 ] -766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 343 ] Dang Van Sung, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] Davidson, Daniel, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] De Besche, Hubert, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] De Gaulle, Charles, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 928 n [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Phnom Penh speech, 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] De Pugh, Ben, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] De Silva, Peer, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 174 ] Dean, Arthur, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 265 n [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Dean, Sir Patrick, 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Defection encouragement program ( see also Chieu Hoi program; Elmtree operation; Thrush operation): CIA activities, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] General amnesty proposal, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] Jordenʼs proposal, 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 180 ] National reconciliation program, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] -826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] -864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 929–930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Thaiʼs assessment of, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] -581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 211 ] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 614 n [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Defoliation operations, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 259 ] Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV; North Vietnam) ( see also Bombing of DRV; Communist insurgency; Marigold peace initiative): Asian Peace Offensive proposal, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] China, relationship with, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 319 ] Chinese presence in, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Civil defense and evacuation, 632 [ Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 231 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: DRV initiative through Laotians, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 51 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] Ronning peace initiative, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 97 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Swedish initiative, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] -835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Burma, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Moscow, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 51 ] XYZ initiative, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Economic cooperation issue, 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Economic situation, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 231 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Food supply problems, 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 211 ] -582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 211 ] Four Points, 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 25 ] Future strategy, 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Intentions and attitudes toward the war, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 191 ] -531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 265 ] Long-term plans for Vietnam, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] -509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 182 ] Military potential for fighting in South Vietnam, 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 175 ] Morale situation, 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 239 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 239 ] Negotiation issue: DRV attitude toward negotiations, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 44 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] DRV intransigence, Johnsonʼs frustration re, 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] -987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 356 ] Soviet influence with DRV, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] NLF, relationship with, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 65 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 65 ] Peace offensive, reaction to, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 30 ] -93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 30 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Political and psychological campaign in the Free World, 876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 319 ] Political situation, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 231 ] Prisoners of war, treatment of, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 182 ] Salisburyʼs reporting from, 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] -974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Soviet assistance, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] Soviet bloc, relations with, 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 319 ] Soviet military presence, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 11 ] U.S.-RVN infiltration of, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] Will to persist, U.S. report on, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] -603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Denney, George C., Jr., 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 44 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] -723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 265 ] Diem. See Bui Diem. Dillon, C. Douglas, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Dinh, Gen., 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 160 ] Dinh Trinh Chinh, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation ( see also Marigold peace initiative; Peace offensive; Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam): Administration testimony to Congress re, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] -40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] Asian initiative, Thanatʼs proposal for, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] DRV initiative through Laotians, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] -91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 51 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] Harrimanʼs talks in Algeria and Paris, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] ICRC initiative, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Japanese initiative, 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] -587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] NLF representative in Algiers, U.S. contacts with, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Phase A-Phase B peace formula, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] Ronning peace initiative, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 167 ] Rumanian initiative, 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 279 ] Saintenyʼs visit to Hanoi, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 182 ] Swedish initiative, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] -835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314 ] Thantʼs initiative, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 172 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Burma, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 171, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Moscow, 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] -73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 51 ] U.S.-RVN consensus on, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] XYZ initiative, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Dirksen, Everett M., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] Do. See Tran Van Do. Dobrynin, Anatoliy F, 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 906 n [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 354 ] DʼOrlandi, Giovanni, 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] Marigold peace initiative: Chinese interference, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Clarification of issues of concern to U.S., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Proposal for negotiations by DRV, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 167 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] Reliability of, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 172 ] Tripartite talks in Saigon, 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 227 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 622 n [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 237 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 845 n [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] Warsaw-Hanoi relationship, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] RVN elections, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] Douglas, Paul, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Du Val, Clive, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Dulles, Allen W., 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] Duong Van Minh, Gen., 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 108 ] Eisenhower, Dwight D., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 208 ] Elmtree operation: Five-phase program, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Khanhʼs initial proposal, 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 179 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Paris meetings, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] Emrick, Lt. Gen. Paul S., 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] Enclave strategy, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61 ] Engel, D. A., 349 n [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] Fall, Bernard B., 634 n [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 232 ] Fanfani, Amintore, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] Faroche, Amb., 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Fedorenko, Nikolai, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] Fenoaltea, Sergio, 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] -471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 279 ] Fisk, Shirley, 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] FitzGerald, Desmond, 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Ford, Gerald R., 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] Fortas, Abe, 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] Foster, John, 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Foster, William C., 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] Fowler, Henry H., 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] -443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] France, 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 261 ] Bombing resumption, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Peace offensive and, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Franco, Francisco, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Freeman, Orville H., 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Frei, Eduardo, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] Friedman, Alvin, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Front of All Religions, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 188 ] Fulbright, J. William, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 716 n [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Brothel statement, 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] Harrimanʼs meeting with, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Gallopin (ICRC), 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] Gandhi, Indira, 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 238 ] Gardner, John W., 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Gates, Thomas, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Gaud, William S., 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 672 n [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 78 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Giap. See Vo Nguyen Giap . Gilpatric, Roswell, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] Ginsburgh, Col. Robert, 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Gleysteen, Culver, 12 n [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] Goldberg, Arthur J., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Ambassadorship in Saigon, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Bombing of POL targets in DRV, 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] -442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Bombing pause, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Bombing resumption, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] -24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] Administration discussions, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] Country positions, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] -107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] DRV intransigence, Johnsonʼs frustration re, 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] -987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 356 ] ICRC diplomatic initiative, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] Marigold peace initiative, 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Peace offensive, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] Phase A-Phase B peace formula, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 192 n [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 322 ] Gonard, Samuel, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Goodpaster, Lt. Gen. Andrew J., 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Gore, Albert, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 72 ] Gottlieb, Sanford, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] Goure, Leon, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 198 ] Greece, 847 [ Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Greene, Gen. Wallace M., Jr., 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] Greenhill, Denis A., 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 317 ] Gromyko, Andrei A., 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 275 ] Brownʼs meetings with, 865 [ Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 317 ] Johnson-Gromyko meeting in Washington, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Rusk-Gromyko meeting in New York, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Gronouski, John A., 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Marigold peace initiative: Instructions for, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] Talks with Rapacki talks in Warsaw, 899 n [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 327 ] -904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 905 n [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] -938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 346 ] -961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] -973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 355 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] Gullion, Edmund, 12 n [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] Ha Van Lao, 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Habib, Philip C., 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ] Haiphong harbor, mining, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 41 ] Hammarskjold, Dag, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] Harkins, Gen. Paul D., 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 77 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 23 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] Ambassadorship in Saigon, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Army of the Republic of Vietnam, NLF infiltration of, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Bombing of DRV, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 315 ] -862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] Bombing pause, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Bombing resumption, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] Chieu Hoi program, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] Defection encouragement program, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] -588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: Asian initiative, Thanatʼs proposal for, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Harrimanʼs talks in Algeria and Paris, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] ICRC initiative, 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] NLF representative in Algiers, U.S. contacts with, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Fulbrightʼs meeting with, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] Kissingerʼs meeting with, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 196 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Manila Conference, 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] -821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 315 ] Marigold peace initiative, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] Negotiation issue, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Peace offensive, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Post-Manila trip, report on, 860 [ Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 315 ] -862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] Prisoners of war, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Republic of Vietnam: Coalition government issue, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 137 ] Constitution for, 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] -825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Soviet-U.5. discussions on Vietnam: Brownʼs intermediary effort, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 300 ] Harrimanʼs trip to Moscow, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Thaiʼs meeting with, 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] Hart, Wilson, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 321 ] Hatfield, Mark, 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Hayden, Carl, 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] Hbay Mon, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] Heintges, John A., 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] Helble, John J., 325 n [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 403 n [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147 ] Helms, Richard M., 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 562 n [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 672 n [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Bombing of DRV, 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Ky-Thieu government cabinet crisis, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 278 ] McNamaraʼs report on Vietnam visit, CIA response to, 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] National Liberation Front, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 65 ] Pacification program/civil operations: CIA assessment of Komerʼs views, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 181 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] Management reorganization, 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 671 n [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] Republic of Vietnam, 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Thrush operation, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Hertz, Gustav, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 105 ] Hichens-Bergstrom, R., 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 303 ] -831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] Ho Chi Minh, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 503 n [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Ho Giac, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Hoang Quynh, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 229 ] Hoang Xuan Lam, Gen., 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] Holbrooke, Richard, 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Holt, Harold, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] Holyoake, Keith, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] Honey, P. J., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] Honolulu Conference: Ally governments informed about, 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] Johnsonʼs assessment of, 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] Johnsonʼs decision to attend, 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] Johnsonʼs meeting with Ky and Thieu, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Johnsonʼs public statement on, 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] Record of conclusions and decisions for further actions, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Summary of proceedings, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] Valentiʼs suggestion for, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Vietnamese publicʼs perception of, 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 74 ] Hornig, Donald F, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] Hughes, Thomas L., 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] -295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 599 n , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] -633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] Humphrey, Hubert H., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 n [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 n [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Asian Development Task Force, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Asian trip, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] -216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] -257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] Bombing of POL targets in DRV, 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] Bombing resumption, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] Peace offensive, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution repeal effort, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam, administration discussions with Congressional leaders re, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Hungary, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Huynh Tan Phat, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 179 ] Huynh Van Tam, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] India, 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 315 ] Indonesia, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 319 ] Description of, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 233 ] -637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Installation of, 842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] JCS position, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 235 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] McNamaraʼs order for, 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 233 ] -636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 233 ] McNamaraʼs rationale for, 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 340 ] RVN interest in, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 258 ] Scientistsʼ recommendation, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 163 ] Sharpʼs position, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 235 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] Information policy on Vietnam, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 176 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Institute for Defense Analysisʼ “Summer Study Group,” 736–738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Iran, 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Isham, Heywood, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] Italy, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] Jacobson, George, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] Janczewski, Zbigniew, 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] Japan, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] -587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Javits, Jacob K., 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 143 ] Jenkins, Walter E., Jr., 899 [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Jha, L. K., 861 n [ Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 315 ] Johnson, Gen. Harold K., 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] -188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 159 ] -440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 850 n [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Johnson, Lyndon B., 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 24 n [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 627 n [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 650 n [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 682 n [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 711 n [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 738 n [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 860 n [ Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 931 n [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 339 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] ARVN corruption problem, 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Asian Development Task Force, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Asian trip, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 763 n [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 281 ] Bombing of DRV: Achievements of, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Chinese intervention scenario, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] Effects of bombing in 1965, 428 n [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Escalation issue, 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 305 n [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 104 ] Interdiction capability, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 154 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 164 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 164 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 968 n [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 is part of Doc. 298 ] -817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Target selection, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 40 ] Termination option, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 240 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 282 ] Bombing pause: Campaign issue in U.S., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] Harrimanʼs position, 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] McNamaraʼs assessment of, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] Resumption of, possible, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] Bombing resumption: Administration discussions, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 32 ] -100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 35 ] -112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] Ayubʼs position, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] French position, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Implementation procedures, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Opposition to, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] Resumption on January 31, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Summary paper on complexities, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 42 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 52 ] -175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Administration discussion re, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] -325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Anti-American propaganda by Buddhists, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Communist influence, 336 n [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Government assault on Buddhists, 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] Onset following Thiʼs removal from command, 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Taylorʼs analysis of U.S. options, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] U.S. policy re, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] Valentiʼs analysis of U.S. options, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 111 ] Chieu Hoi program, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] Chinese intervention in Vietnam, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] Congress, administration strategy for dealing with, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] Defection encouragement program, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: Administration testimony to Congress re, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] -40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] Asian initiative, Thanatʼs proposal for, 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] DRV initiative through Laotians, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] ICRC initiative, 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] Phase A-Phase B peace formula, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] Ronning peace initiative, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] Elmtree operation, 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 179 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 179 ] Honolulu Conference, 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] Meeting with Ky and Thieu, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] J Public statement on, 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 340 ] Information policy on Vietnam, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 176 ] Kosygin, letter to, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] -908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 330 ] Ky, attitude toward, 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] KY and Thieu, meetings with, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Ky-Thieu government, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 280 ] : Leonhartʼs Vietnam visits, reports on, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Lodgeʼs weekly reports. See under Lodge, Henry Cabot . Manila Conference, 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 286 ] Administration discussions re, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Initial scenario for, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 655 n [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 242 ] Ky and Thieu, meeting with, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] U.S. desired results, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 256 ] Marigold peace initiative, 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 355 ] Instructions for Lodge, 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] Johnsonʼs attitude toward, 973 n [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Proposal for negotiations by DRV, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] McNamara mission to Vietnam, 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Military program in Vietnam: Alliesʼ contributions, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] Casualties, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] Costs of, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Kill counts, 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] Lodgeʼs assessment of, 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Naval gunfire against DRV, 686 n [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Outlook for military operations in 1966, 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Reserve call-up issue, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] “Split up and keep off balance” strategy, 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] Westmorelandʼs assessment of, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 280 ] -774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 280 ] Westmorelandʼs concept of military operations, 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 221 ] Womenʼs involvement, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] Negotiation issue: “Blue chips” for negotiation, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 127 ] “Cessation of hostilities” issue, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] DRV illusions about, 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] DRV intransigence, frustration re, 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] -987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 356 ] Mansfieldʼs recommendations, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 266 ] “Secret negotiation of a total deal” strategy, 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 313 ] Soviet influence with DRV, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] U.S. planning for negotiations, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] Negotiations Committee, 548 n [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Non-group on Vietnam, formation of, 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] Acceleration effort, 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Bellʼs report for Johnson, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] “Civil czar” position, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Economic initiatives, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] Katzenbachʼs assessment of, 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Komerʼs assessment and recommendations, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] Komerʼs Vietnam visit, report on, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 171 ] Management reorganization, 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 614 n [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] -75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 798 n [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] -849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Medical program, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Military takeover in 1967, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Obstacles to, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 131 ] Organizational structure, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Prioritization of programs, 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Technical visits, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] Valentiʼs suggestions, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Peace offensive, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] Republic of Vietnam: Constitution for, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] Economic situation, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Refugee situation, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 83 ] “Showcase” for U.S. capabilities, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 72 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] -265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam: Harrimanʼs trip to Moscow, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Letter to Kosygin, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] -908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 330 ] Meeting with Gromyko in Washfngton, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] State of the Union message, 56 n [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] Thrush operation, 617 n [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution: Administration policy re, 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] Repeal effort in Senate, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 87 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] Force ceilings, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 240 ] 470,000 force deployment strategy, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Gen. Johnsonʼs recommendations, 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 192 n [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] U.S. domestic situation: “Hawks and doves” division in debate on Vietnam, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] Public opinion re Vietnam, 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] U.S. Mission in Vietnam, problems with, 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 897 n [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam: Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Administration testimony to Congress, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Ambassadorial change in 1967, 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] Ball groupʼs assessment of options, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] Congressional attitude toward, 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 166 ] NSC discussion re, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Planning for 1967, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 336 ] Scale-down of personnel and facilities, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 111 ] Vanceʼs Vietnam visit, report on, 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Wilson, communications with, 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] Johnson, U. Alexis, 24 n [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 214 n [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 286 n [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 312 n [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 540 n [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] ARVN corruption problem, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] Bombing of DRV, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] Elmtree operation, 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 179 ] -502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] Honolulu Conference, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Marigold peace initiative, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 252 ] -682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 72 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 72 ] Johnson, W. Thomas, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] Bombing of DRV: Chinese intervention issue, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 27 ] Controlled armed reconnaissance program, 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] -300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 101 ] Defensive response by DRV, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 101 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 101 ] Effects of bombing, JCS report on, 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] -792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] International reaction, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 27 ] JCS recommendations, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] -83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Overall U.S. strategy, relation to, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 968 n [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 295 ] -812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] Sharpʼs position, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 283 ] Stabilization of, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] Target selection, 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 101 ] -301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 101 ] Bombing resumption, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] -36 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] Chinese intervention in Vietnam, possible, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 61 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 235 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] McNamaraʼs report of Vietnam visit, response to, 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Military program in Vietnam: Defoliation operations, 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 259 ] Enclave strategy, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61 ] “Indefinitely maintained military posture” proposal, 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] JCS assessment of, 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 269 ] Naval gunfire against DRV, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 255 ] Outlook for military operations in 1966, 117 n [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] “Sharp knocks” strategy, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 269 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Negotiation issue, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] -741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 269 ] Pacification program/civil operations: Management reorganization, 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] “Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN), 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216 ] -592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216 ] Peace offers, position re, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 269 ] Troop deployments by U.S.: Force requirements for 1966–1967, 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] McNamaraʼs approved program, 827 n [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 301 ] Stabilized force level, 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 269 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 328 n [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 114 ] Jones, Boisfeullot, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Jorden, William J., 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 532 n , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 242 ] Jorgensen, Gordon, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Just, Ward, 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 271 ] Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 684 n [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 707 n [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 711 n [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 763 n [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 798 n [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 842 n [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 853 n [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 898 n [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 964 n [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 347 ] Marigold peace initiative, 472 n [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] Instructions for Gronouski, 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Instructions for Lodge, 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] -845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Non-group on Vietnam, formation of, 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] ARVNʼs involvement, 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Romanian diplomatic initiative, 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 279 ] Soviet influence with DRV re negotiations, 692 n [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Kaul, T. N., 861 n [ Pg. 861 is part of Doc. 315 ] Kemal Pasha, Mustafa, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 49 ] Kennan, George F, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 78 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] Kennedy, Edward M., 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] Kennedy, Robert F, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 105 ] Kent, Sherman, 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 278 ] -767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Keppel, Francis, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Kha (RVN), 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Khang. See Le Nguyen Khang, Gen . Khanh. See Nguyen Khanh, Gen . Kidd, Dr., 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Kintner, Robert, 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Kissinger, Henry, 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 196 ] -548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 557 n , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Kistiakowsky, George B., 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 233 ] Kohler, Foy D., 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] Komer, Robert W., 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 304 n [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 185 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 568 n [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 684 n [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] Asian Development Task Force, 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] Bombing of DRY, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Chieu Hoi program, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Holbrookeʼs report on Vietnam visit, 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Military program in Vietnam, assessment of, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 318 ] Negotiation issue, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Non-group on Vietnam, formation of, 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] Agricultural program, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] “Civil czar” position, 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Commercial Import Program, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Coordination of civil and military efforts, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Deputy Ambassadorʼs authority, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Economic initiatives, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 155 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Forestry program, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] 4 -area priority pacification effort, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Funding for, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] Land reform, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Management reorganization, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 713 n [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] Medical program, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Military takeover in 1967 , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] -850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Obstacles to, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 131 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 131 ] Personnel issues, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Police cadres, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 171 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Port facilities, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Press relations, 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Prioritization of programs, 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 131 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 131 ] “Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN), 592 n [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216 ] Resource control and economic warfare, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Revolutionary development effort, 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Rice collection, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Stagnation of, 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] U.S. district-level advisory role, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] RVN elections, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 131 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam: Ambassadorial change in 1967, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] -885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] “Disintegration of NLF” strategy, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] NSC discussion re, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Planning for 1967, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 318 ] -872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 884 n [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 336 ] Vietnam visit, report on, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 171 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] CIA assessment of, 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 174 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 181 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] Korea, Republic of, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Troops for Vietnam, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] Korean war, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 is part of Doc. 49 ] Koren, Henry L. T., 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Kosygin, Alexei N., 24 n [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 49 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317 ] -866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 317 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Johnsonʼs letter to, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] Kraft, Joseph, 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] Krimer, William D., 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] Krulak, Lt. Gen. Victor H., 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216 ] Kuchel, Thomas H., 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] Ky. See Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Vice Marshal. Ky-Thieu government ( See also Buddhist Struggle Movement), 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Cabinet crisis, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] -767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 280 ] Civilian members, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 211 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] Constituent Assembly, relations with, 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 343 ] -946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 343 ] Continuity of, 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 343 ] Demonstrations against, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] First anniversary, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] Internal stability, 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 343 ] Kyʼs reelection bid in 1967, 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 192 ] Overthrow possibility, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 343 ] Public relations program, 254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 83 ] -255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] La Thanh Nghe, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] La Van Liem, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] Lake, William, 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Lam. See Hoang Xuan Lam, Gen . Lansdale, Edward G., 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 193 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 886 n [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 321 ] Laos, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 is part of Doc. 247 ] U.S. bombing in, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 50 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 98 ] Lathram, Wade, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 321 ] Latin American countries, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] -6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] Lausche,Frank, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] Le Chang, 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] -121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Le Duan, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 211 ] Le Nguyen Khang, Gen., 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 343 ] Le Van Hoach, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 179 ] Le Van Truong (“Mr. Out”), 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 179 ] -500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] Lee, Philip, 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Leonard, James, 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] Leonhart, William K., 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 419 n [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Vietnam visits, reports on, 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] —408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] -613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] -981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] Lewandowski, Januscz: Marigold peace initiative: Chinese interference, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Clarification of issues of concern to U.S., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] Leaks re, 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 355 ] Proposal for negotiations by DRV, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 167 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] Tripartite talks in Saigon, 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 227 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 622 n [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 237 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 845 n [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] Liao Cheng-chih, 135 [ Pg. 135 is part of Doc. 41 ] Lin Piao, Marshal, 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 216 ] Lippmann, Walter, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 164 ] Loan. See Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Gen . Lodge, Henry Cabot, 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] Ambassadorship, handling of, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 291 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 323 ] Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 294 ] Bell, attitude toward, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] Bombing of DRV, 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Bombing pause, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] Bombing resumption, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] -17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 335 n [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 116 ] Anti-American propaganda by Buddhists, 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 313 n [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 107 ] Buddhist demands, 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] -285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Communist influence, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 336 n [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Demonstrations against government, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Government assault on Buddhists, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 110 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] Government policy re, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 105 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] Onset following Thiʼs removal from command, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 91 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Political impact, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 100 ] -297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 100 ] Post-crisis agenda of government, 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] -354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 123 ] Reestablishment of government authority, 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] Thieuʼs assessment of, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] U.S. forces, instructions for, 323 n [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] U.S. policy re, 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] McG. Bundyʼs assessment of, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] -233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] Chieu Hoi program, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 74 ] -225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] Communist insurgency, 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] Army divisions from DRV, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] Terror campaign, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 is part of Doc. 294 ] Thieuʼs assessment of, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] Congressional candidatesʼ visits to Vietnam, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Defection encouragement program: General amnesty proposal, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] National reconciliation program, 641 n [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] -864 [ Pg. 864 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 338 ] -930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Departure from Vietnam, desire for, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] DRV political situation, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 74 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 258 ] Information policy on Vietnam, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] Ky-Thieu government: Cabinet crisis, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 764 n [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 277 ] Coup threat, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Demonstrations against, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] Kyʼs reelection bid in 1967 , 531 n [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Marigold peace initiative: Chinese interference, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Clarification of issues of concern to U.S., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] DʼOrlandiʼs reliability, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 172 ] Instructions for Lodge, 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] Kyʼs involvement, 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 173 ] Leaks re, 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 355 ] Proposal for negotiations by DRV, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] -472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] Tripartite talks in Saigon, 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 227 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 622 n [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 237 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 845 n [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] Warsaw-Hanoi relationship, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Military program in Vietnam, 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] -58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] Battles, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] Beechʼs assessment of, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] Casualties, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Civilian casualties, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 100 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Infiltration of DRV, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] Kill counts, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Outlook for military operations in 1966, 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] “Split up and keep off balance” strategy, 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 294 ] Negotiation issue: “Blue chips” for negotiation, 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 158 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 560 n [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 203 ] NLF representation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] Acceleration effort, 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] ARVNʼs involvement, 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 208 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Education program, 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] Long An Province effort, 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] Management reorganization, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 799 n [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] Obstacles to, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 131 ] Political warfare, 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Port facilities, 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Revolutionary development effort, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 185 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Stagnation of, 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] Technical visits, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Youth activities, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Press relations, 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Republic of Vietnam: Binh Thuan Province situation, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] Coalition government issue, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] Constitution for, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 105 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] Economic situation, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] -226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] Elections, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 193 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 208 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 229 ] -626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] National Political Congress, 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 123 ] Paraplegic veterans, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] Political situation, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] PX/commissary outlets for civil service and military use, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 240 n [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] Thantʼs diplomatic initiative, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 172 ] Thrush operation: High-level officials, focus on, 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] Termination of State Department involvement, 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Thoʼs possible defection, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] U.S. hopes re, 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 18 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam ( see also Weekly reports below ): NSC discussion, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] “Satisfactory outcome” issue, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] Winning the war, scenarios for, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 208 ] U.S. public opinion re Vietnam, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] Weekly reports, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 18 ] -55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] -272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] -286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 105 ] -309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] -402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] -448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 193 ] -538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 229 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Westmorelandʼs relationship with, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 77 ] Year-end summary of Vietnam situation, 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] -950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Long, Russell B., 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 267 n [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] Lovett, Robert A., 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] Lucet, Charles E., 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Lynd, Staughton, 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 16 ] MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] MacArthur, Douglas, II, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] MacDonald, Donald, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 321 ] Mahon, George H., 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] -145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] Mai Tho Truyen, 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 188 ] Mai Van Bo, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 187 ] Malaysia, 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Manaʼch, Etienne, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Manescu, Corneliu, 768 [ Pg. 768 is part of Doc. 279 ] Manila Conference, 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] Administration discussion re, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Country reactions, 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] -821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 315 ] Initial scenario for, 652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] -657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] Johnsonʼs meeting with Ky and Thieu, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] McNaughtonʼs report, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Summary of proceedings, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] -776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 281 ] U.S.ʼs desired results, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 256 ] Westmorelandʼs report, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 286 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Mann, Charles A., 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] -234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Mansfield, Mike, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] -142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 238 n [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 154 ] -418 [ Pg. 418 is part of Doc. 154 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 266 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 266 ] Mao Ze-dong, 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 319 ] Marcos, Ferdinand, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Marigold peace initiative, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] -822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] Bombing of DRV and, 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] -919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 342 ] -938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 is part of Doc. 345 ] -955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 345 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 346 ] -960 [ Pg. 960 is part of Doc. 346 ] Bombing restrictions around Hanoi and, 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] -969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] -973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Chinese interference, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] -529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Clarification of issues of concern to U.S., 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] -756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] DʼOrlandiʼs reliability, 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 172 ] Gronouski-Rapacki talks in Warsaw, 899 n [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 327 ] -904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 905 n [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] -938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 346 ] -961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] -973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 355 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] Gronouskiʼs presentation in effort to salvage talks, 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] -957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 345 ] Instructions for Gronouski, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -899 [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 952 n [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] -969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Instructions for Lodge, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] -485 [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 305 ] -839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] -845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Johnsonʼs attitude toward, 973 n [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Kyʼs involvement, 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 173 ] Leaks re, 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 355 ] NLF and, 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 326 ] Proposal for negotiations by DRV, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] -473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] -482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] Ruskʼs attitude-toward, 973 n [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Soviet assessment of, 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 354 ] Ten Point summary of U.S. policy, 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 322 ] -892 [ Pg. 892 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 331 ] Termination of 936–938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 346 ] -961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 355 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] Tripartite talks in Saigon, 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] -528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 227 ] -620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 622 n [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 237 ] -644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] -841 [ Pg. 841 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 845 n [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] -894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] -901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Warsaw, proposed, 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 905 n [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] -911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] -916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Warsaw-Hanoi relationship, 529 [ Pg. 529 is part of Doc. 190 ] Marks, Leonard H., 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 672 n [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] Marlowe, Stanley, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Martin, Graham A., 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Martin, Paue 448 n , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] Martin, William McChesney, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170 ] Maynard, Len, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] McBride, Robert H., 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] McCafferty, Arthur, 303 n [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] McCarthy, Eugene J., 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] McCloy, John J., 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 52 ] McConaughy, Walter P., 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 49 ] McConnell, Gen. John P., 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] McCormack, John W., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] McDonald, Adm. David L., 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] McGhee, Gale, 267 n [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] McGovern, George 5., 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] McKillop, David, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] McNamara, Robert S. ( see also McNamara mission to Vietnam), 13 [ Pg. 13 is part of Doc. 4 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 83 n [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 711 n [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 758 n [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 780 n [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 283 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 914 n [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Army of the Republic of Vietnam, NLF infiltration of, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Bombing of DRV: Civilian facilities, strikes against, 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] -952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Controlled armed reconnaissance program, 299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Interdiction capability, 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 36 ] -115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] JCS recommendations, 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] Militaryʼs unanimous support for, 734 n [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 268 ] Petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) targets, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 137 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 164 ] -460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 164 ] Political dimension, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] -374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 968 n [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 299 ] Stabilization of, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] -731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 268 ] Target selection, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 40 ] Termination option, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 240 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] Bombing pause: Campaign issue in U.S., 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] McNamaraʼs assessment for Johnson, 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] -76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] Resumption of, proposed, 634 n [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 232 ] Bombing resumption, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] Administration discussions, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 50 ] -170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] JCS position, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] McNamaraʼs position, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] Opposition to, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 52 ] -176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Administration discussion re, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 112 ] Communist influence, 336 n [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Onset following Thiʼs removal from command, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] U.S. intervention, proposed, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] U.S. policy re, 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] Chinese intervention in Vietnam, possible, 116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 36 ] Communist insurgency, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 36 ] -114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 36 ] : Congress, Administration strategy for dealing with, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] Installation of, 842 [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] JCS position, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 235 ] McNamaraʼs order for, 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 233 ] -636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 233 ] McNamaraʼs rationale for, 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 340 ] Scientistsʼ recommendation, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Information policy on Vietnam, 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Ky-Thieu government cabinet crisis, 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 277 ] Laos, U.S. bombing in, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 50 ] Manila Conference, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Marigold peace initiative, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] Military program in Vietnam: Alliesʼ contributions, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] Costs of, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Defoliation operations, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 259 ] Enclave strategy, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Increased effectiveness of military operations, program for, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] “Indefinitely maintained military posture” proposal, 728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 268 ] -738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] Inflation in RVN and, 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] —827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 301 ] Kill counts, 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] Naval gunfire against DRV, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 255 ] Outlook for military operations in 1966 , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Reserve call-up issue, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Scientistsʼ assessment of, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Shortages problem, 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Womenʼs involvement, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] National Liberation Front (NLF), 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Negotiation issue, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] -734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 268 ] Pacification program/civil operations: “Civil czar” position, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] 4 -area priority pacification effort, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] -116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 36 ] Komerʼs assessment and recommendations, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] Management reorganization, 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 245 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 682 n [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 268 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] “Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN), 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 216 ] Security issue, 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 268 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 268 ] Peace offensive, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] RVN coalition government issue, 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 137 ] Resolution of Vietnam situation, views on, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 81 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Thrush operation, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution, administration policy re, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] Approved program, 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 301 ] Battalion strength increases in 1966 , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] Force ceilings, 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 240 ] Force requirements for 1966–1967 , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] 470, 000 force deployment strategy, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 312 ] Stabilized force level, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam: Ambassadorial change in 1967, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] NSC discussion re, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] Planning for 1967 , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 336 ] McNamara mission to Vietnam: Agenda for discussions, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] -686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Ky and Thieu, meeting with, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] MeNamaraʼs report to Johnson, 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] McNamaraʼs report to NSC, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] McNaughton, John T., 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 635 n [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 659 n [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 684 n [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Manila Conference, 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Military program in Vietnam, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] McPherson, Harry, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 136 ] McPherson, Maj. Gen. John, 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Meeker, Leonard C., 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] -97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 72 ] Mendelevitch, Lev 1., 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] Menon, Krishna, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] Menzies, Robert G., 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] Meyer, Armin H., 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Michalowski, Jerzy, 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] Military program in Vietnam ( see also Bombing headings ; Infiltration interdiction system; Troop deployments by U.S.), 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] -227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 171 ] Alliesʼ contributions, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] -80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] -847 [ Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 344 ] Beechʼs assessment of, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] -536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] Casualties, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] -574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] -628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Christmas truce, proposed, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Civilian casualties, 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 100 ] -299 [ Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101 ] Costs of, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] Defoliation operations, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] -700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 259 ] Division of U.S. opinion on priorities in conducting the war, 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 353 ] -980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 353 ] DMZ infiltration routes, focus on, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 184 ] Enclave strategy, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] -201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 61 ] Increased effectiveness of military operations, program for, 216 [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] -218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] “Indefinitely maintained military posture” proposal, 728 [ Pg. 728 is part of Doc. 268 ] -746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Infiltration of DRV, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] Inflation in RVN and, 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 301 ] JCS assessment of, 738 [ Pg. 738 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] -739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kill counts, 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] -273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Kissingerʼs assessment of, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 196 ] -545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] Komerʼs assessment of, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 is part of Doc. 318 ] Lodgeʼs assessment of, 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] -58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] Morale situation, 337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 117 ] Naval gunfire against DRV, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] -689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 255 ] Operation Irving, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 280 ] Operation Market Time, 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 344 ] Operation Masher, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] Operation Starlite, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 17 ] Outlook for military operations in 1966 , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] -117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] Reserve call-up issue, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Scientistsʼ assessment of, 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] -457 [ Pg. 457 is part of Doc. 163 ] “Sharp knocks” strategy, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 269 ] -742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Shortages problem, 261 n [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 283 n [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] “Sit tight” option, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] -163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 49 ] “Split up and keep off balance” strategy, 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] -808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 294 ] U.S.-RVN consensus on, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 83 ] -248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 83 ] Westmorelandʼs assessment of, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 280 ] -774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 280 ] Westmorelandʼs concept of military operations, 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 221 ] Womenʼs involvement, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] Miller, Robert H., 349 n [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 403 n [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 514 n [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 522 n [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] Mr. Out. See Le Van Truong . Mohr, Charles, 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 271 ] Monros, Juan, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] Montagnards, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 10 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 221 ] Morell, William N., Jr., 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Morgan, Thomas E., 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] Moro, Aldo, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] Morse, Wayne, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 87 ] Moyers, Bill D., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 16 ] n, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 153 n [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 286 n [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 530 n [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 191 ] , 550 n [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 783 n [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 897 n [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] Mundt, Karl E., 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] Myrdal, Gunnar, 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 133 ] Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] Nathan, Robert, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 222 ] National Intelligence Estimates: NIE 14.3–66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] -490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 175 ] NIE 53–66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] -948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] National Liberation Front (NLF) ( see also Communist insurgency; GVN-VC/NLF talks option under Negotiation issue), 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] ARVN, infiltration of, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] CIA penetration of, 637 [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] -638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] Coalition government issue, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] Covert political program against, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Defection efforts targeting. See Defection encouragement program. Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: NLF representative in Algiers, U.S. cantacts with, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] -585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Swedish initiative, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] -835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314 ] “Disintegration” strategy targeting, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] —652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] DRV, relationship with, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 65 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 65 ] Elections in RVN, disruption campaign against, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 208 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 230 ] Managing hierarchy, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 65 ] Marigold peace initiative and, 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 326 ] Morale situation, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 198 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 222 ] -611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 222 ] Negotiation issue, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 44 ] Peace offensive, reaction to, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 30 ] Peace terms, 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] Political-program, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] -210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 65 ] Prisoners of war, exchanges of, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 47 ] Will to persist, U.S. report on, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] -603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] National Security Action Memorandum No. 343, 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] National Security Council (NSC): Meetings: 555 th, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] 556 th, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] 557 th, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 135 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] 559 th, 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] -444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] 565 th, 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] -754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] June 22 , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Negotiation issue ( see also Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation): “Blue chips” for negotiation, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 127 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 129 ] -372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 158 ] -437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] “Cessation of hostilities” issue, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 177 ] Chinese role, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 44 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] CIA position, 745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 270 ] DRV attitude toward negotiations, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 44 ] -150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] DRV intransigence, Johnsonʼs frustration re, 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] -987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 356 ] “Forcing negotiations” strategy, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 125 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Fulbrightʼs assessment of, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option ( see also National reconciliation program under Defection encouragement program), 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 115 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 121 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] -561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] -586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] JCS position, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] -741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 269 ] Kissingerʼs assessment of, 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] -547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 196 ] Kyʼs position, 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] Mansfieldʼs recommendations, 724 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 266 ] -725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 266 ] McNamaraʼs recommendations, 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] -734 [ Pg. 734 is part of Doc. 268 ] Myrdalʼs recommendations, 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 133 ] 1967 prognosis, 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 319 ] NLF attitude toward negotiations, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 44 ] NLF representation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] “Package deal” strategy, 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 347 ] -965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 347 ] RVN political situation and, 946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 343 ] -947 [ Pg. 947 is part of Doc. 343 ] “Secret negotiation of a total deal” strategy, 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 313 ] -856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Soviet influence with DRV, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Three-track approach, 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] . U.S. 14 points, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] U.S. planning for negotiations, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 178 ] Negotiations Committee, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] -587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] -661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] -679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] -727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] -826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Nehru, B. K., 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] Nelson, Robert, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 90 ] Neustadt, Richard, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] New Zealand, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Ngo Dinh Diem, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] Nguyen Bao Kim, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] -198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Nguyen Bao Tri, Gen., 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] -863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 338 ] Nguyen Cao Ky, Air Vice Marshal ( see also Ky-Thieu government), 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 65 n [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] ARVN corruption problem, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 215 ] Bombing pause, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Bombing resumption, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 335 n [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 116 ] Government assault on Buddhists, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 110 ] -319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] Government policy re, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 105 ] -307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 105 ] Inflammatory statements ref 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 130 ] Negotiations between government and Buddhists, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] -327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] Onset following-Thiʼs removal from command, 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 91 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Reestablishment of government authority, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 160 ] -446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] Taylorʼs analysis of U.S. options, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] -341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 119 ] Chieu Hoi program, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Communist insurgency, 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183 ] Defection encouragement program: Jordenʼs proposal, 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 180 ] -504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 180 ] National reconciliation program, 661 [ Pg. 661 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] De Gaulle, criticism of, 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] Doʼs criticism ot 532 n Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 258 ] Johnsonʼs attitude toward, 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] -219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 71 ] Johnsonʼs meetings with, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Manila Conference, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] Marigold peace initiative, 485 n [ Pg. 485 is part of Doc. 173 ] McNamaraʼs meeting “with, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] Military program in Vietnam, 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Montagnards, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] Negotiation issue, 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 is part of Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] ARVNʼs involvement, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] 4 -area priority pacification effort 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] Management reorganization, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] Port facilities, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Revolutionary development effort 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] Popularity with Vietnamese people, 835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] Prisoners of war, exchanges of, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] Republic of Vietnam: Coalition government issue, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] Constitution for, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Democracy Building Council, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Economic development need for, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 222 ] Economic situation, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Elections 392, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 229 ] Interim government issue, 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Popular Forces and Combat Youth, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] U.S. presence, popular opinion on, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Ruskʼs meeting with, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Satisfactory outcome in Vietnam, views on, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] Thrush operation, 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] Nguyen Chanh Thi, Gen., 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 91 ] -280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 343 ] Nguyen Chi Thanh, Gen., 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 44 ] Nguyen Duc Thang, Gen., 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 321 ] Nguyen Duy Trinh, 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 303 ] -834 [ Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 314 ] Nguyen Go Thach, 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Nguyen Huu An, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 657 n , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Nguyen Huu Co, Gen., 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 278 ] -766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] Nguyen Huu Tho, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 65 ] -207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Nguyen Khanh, Gen., 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] t 497–502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] -522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Gen., 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 is part of Doc. 143 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 343 ] Nguyen Tan Loc, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Nguyen Van Can, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] Nguyen Van Chuan, Gen., 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] -326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] Nguyen Van Hai, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 105 ] Nguyen Van Hieu, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 65 ] Nguyen Van Man, 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Nguyen Van Thieu, Gen. ( see also Ky-Thieu government), 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] Bombing of DRV, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Government assault on Buddhists, 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Onset following Thiʼs removal from command, 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 91 ] -279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Thieuʼs assessment ot 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] Chieu Hoi program, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Communist insurgency, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] -454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 162 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 258 ] Johnsonʼs meetings with, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] -228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Manila Conference, 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] -775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] McNamaraʼs meeting with, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] National reconciliation program, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] -763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 316 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] Peace offensive, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] Republic of Vietnam: Constitution for, 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Economic situation, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] Elections, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] Planning for post-war period, 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] -927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Unity of Vietnamese people, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 23 ] U.S. presence, popular opinion on, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Ruskʼs meeting with, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Satisfactory outcome in Vietnam, views on, 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] Nguyen Van Tri, 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] Nhuan. See Pharo Xuan Nhuan, Gen. Nilsson, Torsten, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] -835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Nitze, Paul, 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] Nkrumah, Kwame, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] Non-group on Vietnam, 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] -678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] Non-military programs in Vietnam. See Pacification program/civil operations. North Vietnam. See Democratic Republic of Vietnam . Oakley, Robert, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] Oberg, J. C. S., 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] OʼBrien, Larry E, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 255 n [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] Office of Civil Operations (OCO), 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ] -977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 353 ] Operations. See under Military program in Vietnam. Owen, William M., 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 353 ] Acceleration effort, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] -610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 222 ] Agricultural program, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Alliesʼ contributions, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] ARVNʼs involvement, 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 208 ] -573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 220 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 is part of Doc. 353 ] -980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 353 ] Bellʼs report for Johnson, 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] -88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] CIA involvement, 638 n [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 234 ] “Civil czar” position, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 77 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] -276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] -303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] Commercial Import Program, 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Coordination of civil and military efforts, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Deputy Ambassadorʼs authority, 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] Economic initiatives, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 145 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 155 ] -421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] -480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 222 ] -612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 222 ] Education program, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] Evaluations of, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] Forestry program, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] 4 -area priority pacification effort 115–116 [ Pg. 116 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Funding for, 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] Joint operations with GVN, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] Katzenbachʼs assessment of, 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] -752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] Komerʼs assessment and recommendations, 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] -425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 155 ] Komerʼs Vietnam visit, report on, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 171 ] -481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 174 ] -488 [ Pg. 488 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 181 ] -507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] Land reform, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Leonhartʼs year-end assessment of, 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ] -981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] Long An Province effort, 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] Management reorganization, 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] -41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 28 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] -422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] AID position, 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] -715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 263 ] CIA position, 668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] -672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] -745 [ Pg. 745 is part of Doc. 270 ] Decision on changes to be made, 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 290 ] Holbrookeʼs assessment of, 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 321 ] -888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] Implementation of changes, 836 [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] -837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] -849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] JCS position, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] Johnsonʼs letter of encouragement to Lodge, 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] -849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] Johnsonʼs position, 710 n [ Pg. 710 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] -757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] Katzenbachʼs position, 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 271 ] -752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] Komerʼs position, 672 [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] -677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] McNamaraʼs recommendations, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 245 ] -660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 268 ] -733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 268 ] Military takeover, opposition to, 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] -716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] State Department position, 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 252 ] -682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] Year-end assessment of, 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ] -977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 353 ] Medical program, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] -252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Military takeover in 1967, 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] -850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] 1965 results, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] -29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] Obstacles to, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 131 ] -375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 131 ] Organizational structure ( see also Management reorganization above ), 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 77 ] -235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Personnel issues, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Police cadres, 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 171 ] -478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Political warfare, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] -:203, 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 174 ] , 505–507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 181 ] Port facilities, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 149 ] -407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 222 ] -612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 222 ] Press relations, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Prioritization of programs, 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] -346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 131 ] -376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 131 ] “Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam” (PROVN), 591 [ Pg. 591 is part of Doc. 216 ] -597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 216 ] Province team chiefs, 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 181 ] Resource control and economic warfare, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 28 ] -87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Revolutionary development effort, 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] -271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] -479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 185 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] Rice collection, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] Security issue, 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 268 ] -732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 is part of Doc. 271 ] -748 [ Pg. 748 is part of Doc. 271 ] Stagnation of, 536 [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Technical visits, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] Urban programs, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149 ] -408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] U.S. district-level advisory role, 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] U.S.-RVN consensus on, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 83 ] -250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 83 ] U.S. troopsʼ involvement, 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 221 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 221 ] Valentiʼs suggestions, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] Warrenton meeting recommendations, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Washington-Saigon relations, 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] Youth activities, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Pakistan, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Palmer, Bruce, 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] Pappas, Tom, 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Park, Chung Hee, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] -786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 284 and Doc. 285 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Paul VI, Pope, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 355 ] Peace offensive: Communist reaction, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 30 ] -94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 30 ] Country responses, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] -35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] DRV position, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Hoʼs letter on, 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] Johnsonʼs assessment of, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] -22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] Thieuʼs attitude toward, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] Pearson, Drew, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Pearson, Lester, 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 97 ] Peers, Maj. Gen. William, 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Pell, Claiborne, 123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] Percy, Charles, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Peter, Janos, 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 275 ] Petri, Lennart, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 303 ] -831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 314 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets. See under Bombing of DRV. Pharo Anh, Lt. Col., 929 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 338 ] Pharo Dang Lan, Gen., 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] Pharo Huy Quat, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] Pharo Van Dong, 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 273 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 322 ] Pham Van Lieu, Col., 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 6 ] Pham Xuan Chieu, Lt. Gen., 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] Pharo Xuan Nhuan, Gen., 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 160 ] Phan Khac Suu, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] Phan Quang Dan, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] Phan Thong, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] Phase A-Phase B peace formula ( see also Marigold peace initiative), 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] Philippines, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Phillips, Rufus, 886 n [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 321 ] Phung Van Cung, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 65 ] Pike, Douglas, 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] Pitt, William, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] Planning for 1967. See under U.S. policy on Vietnam. Poats, Rutherford, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] Podgorny, Nikolay, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 30 ] POL targets. See Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets under Bombing of DRV. Poland, 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation. See Marigold peace initiative. Political Development Working Group, 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Porter, William J., 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] -64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 28 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 155 ] -424 [ Pg. 424 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 is part of Doc. 185 ] -516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 263 ] -714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 924 n [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 336 ] , 930 n [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ] -977 [ Pg. 977 is part of Doc. 353 ] , 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 355 ] Warrenton meeting on Vietnam, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Press coverage of Vietnam, 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] Prisoners of war: DRV treatment of, 509 [ Pg. 509 is part of Doc. 182 ] Elmtree operation and, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 187 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 195 ] , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] Exchanges of, 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 47 ] NLF-VC held in South, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Quang. See Dang Van Quang, Gen. Quynh . See Hoang Quynh . Raborn, William E, Jr., 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 211 n [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Bombing of DRV, 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 161 ] Bombing resumption, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 380 [ Pg. 380 is part of Doc. 134 ] NLF, covert program against, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] -203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] Rand Corporation, 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] -77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] Rapacki, Adam, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 326 ] Marigold peace initiative, talks with Gronouski in Warsaw, 899 n [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 is part of Doc. 327 ] -904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 905 n [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] -913 [ Pg. 913 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] -921 [ Pg. 921 is part of Doc. 335 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] -938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 is part of Doc. 346 ] -961 [ Pg. 961 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] -967 [ Pg. 967 is part of Doc. 348 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] -973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 355 ] -986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] Razak (Malaysia), 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 261 ] Read, Benjamin H., 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 47 ] -157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 47 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 909 n [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 968 n [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] Reedy, George E., 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 78 ] Refugee situation, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 83 ] Reischauer, Edwin 0., 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] Republic of Vietnam (RVN; South Vietnam) ( see also Army of the Republic of Vietnam; Buddhist Struggle Movement; Ky-Thieu government; Pacification program/civil operations): Anti-Communist attitudes, 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 343 ] Binh Thuan Province situation, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] Bureaucracy and administrative apparatus, 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 343 ] Civilian-military rivalry, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] Coalition government issue, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 137 ] Constituent Assembly ( see also Elections below ), 945 [ Pg. 945 is part of Doc. 343 ] -946 [ Pg. 946 is part of Doc. 343 ] Constitution for, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 83 ] -251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 105 ] -308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] -825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 323 ] -897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Democracy-building program, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 115 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Economic development, need for, 582 [ Pg. 582 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 222 ] Economic situation, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] -19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] -28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] -42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] -86 [ Pg. 86 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 74 ] -226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 83 ] -254 [ Pg. 254 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] -627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 343 ] Elections, 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 146 ] -401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 193 ] -534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 is part of Doc. 208 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 343 ] “American presence” issue, 376 [ Pg. 376 is part of Doc. 131 ] Catholicsʼ attitude toward, 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 153 ] -415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] CIAʼs role, 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] -370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 128 ] Disqualifications of candidates, 512 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 183 ] Fair elections, U.S. concerns re, 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Laws re, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] -447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 160 ] NLF disruption campaign, 575 [ Pg. 575 is part of Doc. 208 ] -576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 230 ] Public relations value, 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 193 ] -535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 193 ] Results of, 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 229 ] -626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] -630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] U.S. policy re, 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] Interim government issue, 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] International support for, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 83 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 261 ] Land reform program, 29 [ Pg. 29 is part of Doc. 10 ] -30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 171 ] Military and para-military structure, 476 [ Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 171 ] National awareness, lack of, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] -942 [ Pg. 942 is part of Doc. 343 ] National Political Congress, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] -351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 123 ] National reconciliation program. See under Defection encouragement program. Paraplegic veterans, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] Peace movement, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 10 ] Planning for post-war period, 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] -927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Political situation, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 319 ] -876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] -886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 321 ] 1967 prognosis, 879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 319 ] -880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] -948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 is part of Doc. 353 ] -976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ] U.S. presence, impact of, 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 347 ] -966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Popular Forces and Combat Youth, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Public opinion on U.S. presence, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] -890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] PX/commissary outlets for civil service and military use, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] Refugee situation, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 10 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 83 ] Regionalism problem, 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 343 ] Religious factiona1ism, 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 343 ] -941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] Revolutionary committee, 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] “Showcase” for U.s. capabilities, 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] -246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] Strategic importance of, 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 216 ] -594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 216 ] Unity of Vietnamese people, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 23 ] Reserve call-up issue, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] -274 [ Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Reston, James, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 26 ] -78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] Ribicoff, Abraham, 223 [ Pg. 223 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] Ritchie,. A. Edgar, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] Rivers, L. Mendel, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] Roberts, Juanita, 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Roche, John P., 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 291 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 931 n [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 339 ] Rockefeller, Nelson, 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Rodhain, Monsignor, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Rolling Thunder. See Bombing headings . Romanian diplomatic initiative, 767 [ Pg. 767 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] -769 [ Pg. 769 is part of Doc. 279 ] Romney, George W., 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 347 ] Ronning peace initiative, 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] -290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] -449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 167 ] Ropa, Donald W., 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] Roschin, Alexei A., 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] Rosenthal, Jacob, 842 n [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] Rostow, Eugene V., 692 n [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Rostow, Walt W., 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 334 n [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 350 n [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 391 n [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 412 n [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 162 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 508 n [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 607 n [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 623 n [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 627 n [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 686 n [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 736 n [ Pg. 736 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 798 n [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 867 n [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 905 n [ Pg. 905 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 909 n [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 914 n [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Asian Development Task Force, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Bombing of DRV: Achievements of, 633 [ Pg. 633 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] -634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 232 ] Effects of bombing in 1965, 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Escalation issue, 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] -651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] Ho Chi Minh Trail, focus on, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL)targets, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] -379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 133 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] -813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 299 ] Target selection, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 282 ] Bombing pause, proposed resumption of, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 232 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Administration discussion re, 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] Government assault on Buddhists, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] -388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] -397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] U.S. intervention, proposed, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 118 ] Defection encouragement program, 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Democratic Republic of Vietnam: Future strategy, 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Morale situation, 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 239 ] -648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 239 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: Asian initiative, Thanatʼs proposal for, 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] Phase A-Phase B peace formula, 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 244 ] Information policy on Vietnam, 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 176 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Kyʼs reelection bid in 1967, 531 [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] -532 [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 192 ] Manila Conference, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 242 ] -654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 256 ] Marigold peace initiative, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 355 ] Military program in Vietnam, 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] Alliesʼ contributions Westmorelandʼs concept of military operations National Liberation Front (NLF), 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 198 ] Negotiation issue: “Blue chips” for negotiation, 366 n [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 158 ] “Forcing negotiations” strategy, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 125 ] -359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 241 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 115 ] -332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 121 ] -349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 124 ] Myrdalʼs recommendations, 379 [ Pg. 379 is part of Doc. 133 ] 1967 prognosis, 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 319 ] “Secret negotiation of a total deal” strategy, 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 313 ] -856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Soviet influence with DRV, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 691 n [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] U.S. planning for negotiations, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] -496 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 178 ] Non-group on Vietnam, formation of, 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Pacification program/civil operations: Acceleration effort, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 121 ] 4 -area priority pacification effort, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 115 ] Management reorganization, 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] -614 [ Pg. 614 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Republic of Vietnam: Constitution for, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 121 ] Democracy-building program, 332 [ Pg. 332 is part of Doc. 115 ] -333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Thrush operation, 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] n, 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] U.S. domestic situation, 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 319 ] -881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 319 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam: Ball groupʼs assessment of options, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] “Disintegration of NLF“ strategy,651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Planning for 1967, 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] -882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 336 ] Post-war Vietnamese development plan, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 198 ] Winning the war, scenarios for, 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Rural construction program. See Pacification program/civil operations. Rusk,Dean, 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] , 129 n [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 627 n [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 229 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 672 n [ Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 842 n [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 310 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 853 n [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 860 n [ Pg. 860 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 351 ] ARVN corruption problem, 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Asian Development Task Force, 262 n [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] Bombing of DRV: Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL)targets, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 is part of Doc. 159 ] -439 [ Pg. 439 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 159 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 161 ] -451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] -969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] -819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 299 ] Target selection, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 106 ] Termination option, 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] -762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Bombing pause, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] -26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 31 ] Bombing resumption: Administration discussions, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] -11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] -155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] -169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] French position, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Resumption on January 31, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] -180 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 52 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Administration discussion re, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 112 ] Anti-American propaganda by Buddhists, 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] -313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 107 ] Communist influence, 336 n [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Government assault on Buddhists, 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] -387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] Intelligence reports on, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] Kyʼs inflammatory statements, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 130 ] Negotiations between government and Buddhists, 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] U.S.intervention, proposed, 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] U.S.policy re, 286 [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] -287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 108 ] -316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 317 n , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 116 ] -336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Bui Diemʼs meeting with, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] -707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Chieu Hoi program, 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Chinese intervention in Vietnam, possible, 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] Congress, Administration strategy for dealing with, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] -244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] Defection encouragement program: General amnesty proposal, 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] National reconciliation program, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] -641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 is part of Doc. 337 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: Administration testimony to Congress re, 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] Asian initiative, Thanatʼs proposal for, 539 n [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] ICRC initiative, 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] -554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 567 n [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 207 ] Ronning peace initiative, 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] Swedish initiative, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] -835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314 ] U.S.-DRV contacts in Burma, 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] XYZ initiative, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] DRV intentions and attitudes towardthe war, 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Gromykoʼs meeting with, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] Johnsonʼs decision to attend, 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] -204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] Johnsonʼs meeting with Ky and Thieu, 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] Information policy on Vietnam, 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] Ky, Thieu, and Do, meeting with, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Ky-Thieu government cabinet crisis, 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] -764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 277 ] Laos, U.S. bombing in, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] Manila Conference: Administration discussion re, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Initial scenario for, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 655 n [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 242 ] Marigold peace initiative, 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 332 ] , 933 n [ Pg. 933 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 973 n [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] Instructions for Gronouski, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] -899 [ Pg. 899 is part of Doc. 325 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] -969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Instructions for Lodge, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] -622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 305 ] -839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Proposal for negotiations by DRV, 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Military program in Vietnam: Alliesʼ contributions, 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] Christmas truce, proposed, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Defoliation operations, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 700 n [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 259 ] DMZ infiltration routes, focus on, 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 184 ] Kill counts, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] Naval gunfire against DRV, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 255 ] Negotiation issue: “Blue chips” for negotiation, 366 n [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 127 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 is part of Doc. 129 ] DRV attitude toward negotiations, 146 [ Pg. 146 is part of Doc. 44 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] -561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] NLF representation, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] “Secret negotiation of. a total deal” strategy, 856 n [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] Soviet influence with DRV, 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] U.S. planning for negotiations, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] Pacification program/civil operations: Acceleration effort, 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] -555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] ARVNʼs involvement, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] “Civil czar” position, 302 n [ Pg. 302 is part of Doc. 102 ] Economic initiatives, 390 [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] Management reorganization, 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 682 n [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 290 ] -799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] -837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304 ] Police cadres, 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] Technical visits, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] -15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Peace offensive, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] -8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] -21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] Republic of Vietnam: Constitution for, 927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Elections, 349 [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147 ] -404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] -525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Interim government issue, 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Planning for post-war period, 927 [ Pg. 927 is part of Doc. 337 ] Revolutionary committee, 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] -389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 140 ] Unity of Vietnamese people, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 23 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] Soviet de marches on Vietnam, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] Soviet-U.5. discussions on Vietnam, 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] Brownʼs intermediary effort, 865 [ Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317 ] -866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 317 ] Meeting with Gromyko in New York, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Thieuʼs meetings with, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Thrush operation, 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution, administration policy re, 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam: Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Ball groupʼs assessment of options, 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 126 ] Funding for, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] NSC discussion re, 382 [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] Ruskʼs explanation for Thieu, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] Rusk, Howard, 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] Russell, Bertrand, 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 356 ] Russell, Richard B., 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] Sainteny, Jean, 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 182 ] -510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 182 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Salisbury, Harrison E., 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] -974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Saltonstall, Leverett, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 43 ] Saragat, Giuseppe, 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Sato, Eisaku, 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] Scranton, William W., 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Senate, U.S. ( see also Congress, U.S. ): Hearings on Vietnam, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] -205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Administration assessments of, 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] -262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] -265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] Johnsonʼs assessment of, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 72 ] -222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 72 ] Vietnamese interest in, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] -240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 80 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] -270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution repeal effort, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 87 ] Sharp, Adm. Ulysses S. Grant, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 394 n [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 409 n [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 930 n [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Bombing of DRV, 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 283 ] -782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Overall U.S. strategy, relation to, 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] -52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] -970 [ Pg. 970 is part of Doc. 350 ] Westmorelandʼs recommendations, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 98 ] Bombing resumption, 52 [ Pg. 52 is part of Doc. 17 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 235 ] -640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Military program in Vietnam: Naval gunfire against DRV, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Outlook for 1966 , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Troop deployments by U.S.: Force requirements for 1966–67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] 470, 000 force deployment strategy, 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 312 ] Stabilized force level, 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 24 n [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 43 ] Shelepin, Alexandr N., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 8 and Doc. 9 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 30 ] Shiina, Etsusaburo, 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] Sieverts, Frank, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 261 ] Singapore, 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Sisco, Joseph J., 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 192 n [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 548 n [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] Slater, Mary, 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 299 ] Smathers, George A., 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Smith, Bromley K., 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 221 n [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 228 n [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] -590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 777 n [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 282 ] Smith, R.J., 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] Sorensen, Theodore, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 60 ] Southeast Asia, Communist threat to, 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 is part of Doc. 135 ] Southeast Asia Coordination Meeting, 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] -153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] South Vietnam. See Republic of Vietnam. Souvanna Phouma, 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 172 [ Pg. 172 is part of Doc. 51 ] -173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] Soviet Union ( see also Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam), 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 126 ] Asian Peace Offensive proposal, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] Bombing resumption, 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] China, relations with, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 11 ] De marches on Vietnam, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] -646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 238 ] Democratic Republic of Vietnam: Military presence in, 33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 11 ] Relations with, 133 [ Pg. 133 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 is part of Doc. 157 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 is part of Doc. 319 ] Marigold peace initiative, assessment of, 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 354 ] Negotiations, influence with DRV re, 330 [ Pg. 330 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 257 ] -692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Peace offensive, reaction to, 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 30 ] Settlement in Vietnam, interest in, 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 319 ] -879 [ Pg. 879 is part of Doc. 319 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam, 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Brownʼs intermediary effort, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] -824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 is part of Doc. 317 ] -866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 317 ] Harrimanʼs trip to Moscow, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] -405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Johnson-Gromyko meeting in Washington, 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Johnson-Kosygin letters, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] -908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 354 ] Rusk-Gromyko meeting in New York, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] -668 [ Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Ruskʼs assessment of, 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] Sparkman, John, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 72 ] Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 10–1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] -66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 66 ] -212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 66 ] SNIE 13–66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 201 ] Springsteen, George S., Jr., 44 n [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] Starbird, Lt. Gen. Alfred D., 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 842 n [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 340 ] Steadman, Richard, 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 842 n [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] Stearns,Monteagle, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 583 n [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 300 ] Stennis, John, 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] Stevenson, Adlai, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 170 ] Stewart, Sir Michael 761 Stilwell Gen. Richard G., 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Stoessel, Walter J., 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] Stull, Lee, 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 49 ] Sturm, Paul (“George“), 498 n [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 179 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] ,521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 187 ] Elmtree operation, 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 195 ] -542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 195 ] XYZ initiative, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Sukhodrev, V. M., 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Sullivan, William H., 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] Sutherland, Jack, 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] Swedish diplomatic initiative, 829 [ Pg. 829 is part of Doc. 303 ] -835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314 ] Sylvester, Art, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] Symington, Stuart, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] -123 [ Pg. 123 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] Taft, Robert, 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] Taiwan, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Tam Chau, 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 941 n [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] Tam Giac, 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] -189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 115 ] n, 377 n [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 178 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] Bombing of DRV: Escalation issue, 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] -305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 104 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL)targets, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 161 ] Target selection, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] Bombing resumption: Administration discussions, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] -128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Administration discussion re, 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] Onset following Thiʼs removal from command, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Taylorʼs analysis of U.S. options, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] -344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] Military program in Vietnam: Kill counts, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] Westmorelandʼs concept of military operations, 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 221 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 221 ] Negotiation issue: “Blue chips” for negotiation, 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 127 ] -369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] “Cessation of hostilities” issue, 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] -494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 177 ] Pacification program/civil operations: Management reorganization, 660 n [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] U.S. troopsʼ involvement, 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 221 ] -608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 221 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] Taylor, Gen. Robert, 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] n Thai. See Vu Van Thai . Thailand, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] Thanat Khoman, Col., 538 [ Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] -539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] Thang. See Nguyen Due Thang, Gen. Thanh (RVN), 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Thant U, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 31 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 261 ] -703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 261 ] Marigold peace initiative, 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Moscow visit, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] Negotiation initiative, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 172 ] -483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 172 ] Thi. See Nguyen Chanh Thi, Gen . Thien Minh, 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 142 ] Thieu. See Nguyen Van Thieu, Gen . Tho. See Nguyen Huu Tho . Thomas, Maj. Gen. Jack E., 212 n [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 66 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 70 n [ Pg. 70 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] -717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 264 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 898 n [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 906 n [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 914 n [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] -982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 354 ] Bombing of DRV, 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] Bombing resumption, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 35 ] -110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 168 [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] -578 [ Pg. 578 is part of Doc. 209 ] Marigold peace initiative, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] Thomsen, Samuel B., 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 118 ] Thomson, James C., Jr., 26 [ Pg. 26 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] -32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] Thrush operation: High-level officials, focus on, 561 [ Pg. 561 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] Termination of State Department involvement, 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] -797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 289 ] Thoʼs possible defection, 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 204 ] -563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 204 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 224 and Doc. 225 ] -617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] U.S. hopes re, 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] -589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] Tieng Vang (newspaper), 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 105 ] Tien Minh, 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 107 ] Tito, Marshal, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 23 ] -69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] Tonkin Gulf Resolution: Administration policy re, 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 81 ] -242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 82 and Doc. 83 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] Repeal effort in Senate, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 84 ] -258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 87 ] -268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 87 ] Tran Buu Khiem, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 62 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 65 ] Tran Quoc Buu, 373 n [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 130 ] Tran Van Do, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 is part of Doc. 51 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 531 n [ Pg. 531 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Ruskʼs meeting with, 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 337 ] -928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 337 ] Tran Van Don, Gen., 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Tran Van Giau, 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 65 ] Tran Van Tuyen, 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] Tran Van Van, 766 [ Pg. 766 is part of Doc. 278 ] Tri. See Nguyen Bao Tri, Gen . Tri Quang, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 313 n [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 113 ] , 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] -339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 362 [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 160 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 343 ] Trieu (RVN), 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Trinh. See Nguyen Duy Trinh . Trinh Dinh Thao, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 65 ] Troop deployments by U.S. ( see also Military program in Vietnam), 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] Battalion strength increases in 1966 , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] Force ceilings, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 240 ] Force requirements for 1966–1967 , 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] 470, 000 force deployment strategy, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] -852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 312 ] Impact on military situation, 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 18 ] -54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 18 ] Gen. Johnsonʼs recommendations, 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] McNamaraʼs approved program, 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] -827 [ Pg. 827 is part of Doc. 301 ] Stabilized force level, 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 269 ] -740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 269 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 270 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 284 ] Truman, Harry S, 138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 is part of Doc. 344 ] Truong (RVN), 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Truong Thai Ton, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] Tubby, Roger W., 566 [ Pg. 566 is part of Doc. 207 ] -568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Turkey, 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 309 ] -847 [ Pg. 847 is part of Doc. 309 ] Unger, Leonard S., 14 n [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 286 n [ Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 119 ] , 349 n [ Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 403 n [ Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 433 [ Pg. 433 is part of Doc. 158 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 173 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 177 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 192 ] , 557 n [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 202 ] , 558 n [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 637 n [ Pg. 637 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 657 n [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 243 ] , 680 n [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 838 n [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 856 n [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] , 914 n [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 333 ] ARVN corruption problem, 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] Bombing of DRV, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 10 ] G–312 [ Pg. 312 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 226 ] Diplomatic efforts toward negotiation: NLF representative in Algiers, U.S. contacts with, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Swedish initiative, 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 834 [ Pg. 834 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 313 and Doc. 314 ] -859 [ Pg. 859 is part of Doc. 314 ] GVN-VC/NLF talks option, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] -549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Marigold peace initiative, 821 [ Pg. 821 is part of Doc. 300 ] -822 [ Pg. 822 is part of Doc. 300 ] National reconciliation program, 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 263 ] Prisoners of war, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] RVN constitution, 825 [ Pg. 825 is part of Doc. 300 ] Soviet-U.S. discussions on Vietnam, 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] Warrenton meeting on Vietnam, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Unified Buddhist Church, 446 [ Pg. 446 is part of Doc. 160 ] United Kingdom, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 344 ] Bombing of DRV, 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] -428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Bombing resumption, 106 [ Pg. 106 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] -171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 51 ] Peace offensive and, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] U.N. Security Council discussions of Vietnarnissue, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 56 ] United Nations: Asian Peace Offensive proposal, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 165 ] -463 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 165 ] Peace offensive and, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Security Council discussions of Vietnam issue, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] -186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] -192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] -195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] -261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] U.S. domestic situation: Ball groupʼs assessment of, 364 [ Pg. 364 is part of Doc. 126 ] Bombing of DRV and, 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement and, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 144 ] Communistsʼ attention to, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 219 ] “Hawks and doves” division in debate on Vietnam, 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] -237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 78 ] 1967 prognosis, 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 319 ] -881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 319 ] Public opinion re Vietnam, 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 6 ] -18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] -411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] U.S.Intelligence Board, 137 [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 41 ] -138 [ Pg. 138 is part of Doc. 41 ] U.S.Mission in Vietnam, problems with, 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] -897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] U.S.policy on Vietnam ( see also Military program in Vietnam; Pacification program/civil operations): Administration discussions with Congressional leaders, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] -38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] -124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] -259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] Administration testimony to Congress, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 19 ] -57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] Ambassadorial change in 1967, 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 291 ] -801 [ Pg. 801 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] -885 [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] Ball groupʼs assessment of options, 355 [ Pg. 355 is part of Doc. 124 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] -365 [ Pg. 365 is part of Doc. 126 ] Colonialism issue, 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 321 ] -890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] Congressional attitude toward, 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] -44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 166 ] -467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Congressional resolution on, 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 197 ] “Disintegration of NLF“ strategy, 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 241 ] -652 [ Pg. 652 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] Fulbrightʼs assessment of, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 217 ] -599 [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] Funding of, 25 [ Pg. 25 is part of Doc. 9 ] Information policy, 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 is part of Doc. 125 ] -360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] -384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 is part of Doc. 176 ] -492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] 1968 U.S. elections and, 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 347 ] NSC discussion re, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 135 ] -383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Peace offers, JC5 position re, 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 269 ] Personnel issues, 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] Planning for 1967 , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] -805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] W. Bundyʼs views, 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 347 ] -966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Komerʼs views, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] -711 [ Pg. 711 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 318 ] -872 [ Pg. 872 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 884 n [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 320 ] Rostowʼs views, 873 [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] -882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 319 ] Strategic Guidelines for 1967 in Vietnam, 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 336 ] -924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 336 ] Postwar Vietnamese development plan, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 198 ] Ruskʼs explanation for Thieu, 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 23 ] -67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] “Satisfactory outcome” issue, 18 [ Pg. 18 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] -698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 258 ] Scale-down of personnel and facilities, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] Winning the war, scenarios for, 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] -571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] -684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] -796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] U.S. withdrawal issue: Ball groupʼs assessment of, 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 124 ] -357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 126 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement and, 327 [ Pg. 327 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] -328 [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 114 ] Fortasʼ position, 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] -33 [ Pg. 33 is part of Doc. 11 ] French position, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 67 ] JCS study re, 328 n [ Pg. 328 is part of Doc. 114 ] U.S. policy, 73 [ Pg. 73 is part of Doc. 25 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] -229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 76 ] Valentiʼs position, 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 111 ] Valenti, Jack, 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 n [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 35 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 150 n [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 187 n [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 188 n [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 259 n [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 260 n [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] Bombing resumption, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 42 ] -140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 42 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 111 ] -322 [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 111 ] Pacification program/civiloperations, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 58 ] -194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] U.S. withdrawal issue, 322 n [ Pg. 322 is part of Doc. 111 ] Vance, Cyrus R., 74 [ Pg. 74 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 338 n [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 752 n [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 885 n [ Pg. 885 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Vietnam visit, report on, 336 [ Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] -337 [ Pg. 337 is part of Doc. 117 ] Vatican, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Vien. See Cao Van Vien, Gen . Viet Congo See National Liberation Front. Vietnam. See Democratic Republic of Vietnam ; Republic of Vietnam. VietNam Coordinating Committee, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] Vietnam Planning Group, 331 n [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 493 n [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 177 ] Vinh Lac, Gen., 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 110 ] Vo Long Trieu, 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Vo Nguyen Giap, 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 273 ] Vo Van Sung, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 16 ] Vu (DRV), 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] -102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 33 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 76 ] Vu Van Thai, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 includes portions of Doc. 141 and Doc. 142 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 is part of Doc. 211 ] -583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 is part of Doc. 212 ] Walt, Lt. Gen. Lewis W., 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 110 ] Warrenton meeting on Vietnam, 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21 ] -63 [ Pg. 63 includes portions of Doc. 21 and Doc. 22 ] Warsaw Pact, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 247 ] Wehrle, Leroy S., 43 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] -234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 is part of Doc. 321 ] Werts, Leo, 481 [ Pg. 481 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Westmoreland, Gen. William C., 75 [ Pg. 75 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 319 n [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 is part of Doc. 146 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 196 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 969 n [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Ambassadorship in Saigon, 883 [ Pg. 883 is part of Doc. 320 ] Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN): Corruption problem, 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] “Improper organization” issue, 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] -931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 339 ] Bombing of DRV: Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets, 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Target selection, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 282 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] -291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 98 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 282 ] -779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 284 ] -785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] Bombing pause, possible resumption of, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement: Anti-American propaganda by Buddhists, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] -304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Reestablishment of government authority, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] U.S. domestic situation and, 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] U.S. forces, instructions for, 323 n [ Pg. 323 is part of Doc. 112 ] Communist insurgency, 113 [ Pg. 113 is part of Doc. 36 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] Importance to U.S. effort, 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 340 ] Ky-Thieu government, 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] -410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Laos, U.S. bombing in, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 98 ] Lodgeʼs relationship with, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 77 ] Manila Conference, 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 242 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 286 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Military program in Vietnam, 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 171 ] Alliesʼ contributions, 788 [ Pg. 788 is part of Doc. 286 ] -789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Increased effectiveness of military operations, program for, 216 n [ Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] Naval gunfire against DRV, 686 [ Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 255 ] Outlook for military operations in 1966 , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Westmorelandʼs assessment of, 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 280 ] -774 [ Pg. 774 is part of Doc. 280 ] Westmorelandʼs concept of military operations, 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 220 ] Pacification program/civil operations: Acceleration effort, 555 n [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 200 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 222 ] ARVNʼs involvement, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 220 ] -606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 284 ] Management reorganization, 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 28 ] -85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 28 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 is part of Doc. 304 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 is part of Doc. 304 ] Military takeover in 1967 , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 850 n [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] Police cadres, 407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149 ] Port facilities, 406 [ Pg. 406 is part of Doc. 149 ] -407 [ Pg. 407 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 is part of Doc. 171 ] U.S. troopsʼ involvement, 605 [ Pg. 605 is part of Doc. 220 ] Prisoners of war, 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 212 ] Senate hearings on Vietnam, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 35 ] Battalion strength increases in 1966, 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 36 ] Force requirements for 1966–1967, 564 [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] -565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] 470, 000 troop deployment strategy, 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 312 ] Stabilized force level, 729 n [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 268 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 284 ] Weyand, Maj. Gen. Frederick C., 757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Wheeler, Gen. Earle G. ( see also Joint Chiefs of Staff ), 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 141 n [ Pg. 141 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 83 and Doc. 84 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 86 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 is part of Doc. 205 ] , 601 n [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 684 n [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272 ] , 842 n [ Pg. 842 is part of Doc. 307 ] ARVN “improper organization” issue, 930 [ Pg. 930 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] Bombing of DRV: Achievements of, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] Escalation issue, 305 n [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 104 ] Interdiction capability, 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 50 ] Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) targets, 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 161 ] -450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] Restriction on bombing around Hanoi, 968 n [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 349 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] Rolling Thunder (RT) 52 program, 599 n [ Pg. 599 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 756 n [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 333 and Doc. 334 ] Stabilization of, 758 [ Pg. 758 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Target selection, 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 52 ] Westmorelandʼs position, 290 [ Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 777 n [ Pg. 777 is part of Doc. 282 ] Bombing pause, possible resumption of, 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 210 ] Bombing resumption: Administration discussions, 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 14 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 50 ] -167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 50 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 53 ] -184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Wise Menʼs opinions, 176 [ Pg. 176 is part of Doc. 52 ] -179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 52 ] Buddhist Struggle Movement, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] -396 [ Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 150 ] Honolulu Conference, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 69 ] Infiltration interdiction system, 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 340 ] Laos, U.S. bombing in, 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 50 ] -166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 50 ] Manila Conference, 787 [ Pg. 787 is part of Doc. 286 ] Military program in Vietnam: Casualties, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 52 ] Inflation in RVN and, 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] Kill counts, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 93 ] Operation Irving, 753 [ Pg. 753 is part of Doc. 272 ] “Sit tight” option, 160 n [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 49 ] Pacification program/civil operations, 660 n [ Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] -757 [ Pg. 757 is part of Doc. 274 ] Troop deployments by U.S., 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] U.S. policy on Vietnam, NSC discussion re, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 135 ] Whiting, Allen, 136 n [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 41 ] Whitlam, Gough, 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Wicker, Tom, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 32 ] Williams, G. Mennen, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] Williamson, Gen., 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 93 ] Wilson, Harold, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 154 n [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 46 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 is part of Doc. 54 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] -412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 161 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 194 ] Wilson, Col. Jasper, 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 179 ] Wilson, Samuel V., 41 [ Pg. 41 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 153 ] -416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] Wise Men, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 48 ] -159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 is part of Doc. 52 ] -181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 52 ] Women in military, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 26 ] -79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 26 ] XYZ initiative, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 4 ] -14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] -47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Y-Bham Enoul, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 10 ] Y Binh Aleo, 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 179 ] Yugoslavia,S, 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 23 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 35 ] Zablocki, Clement, 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] Zinchuk, Alexander, 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 300 ] -824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 300 ] Zorthian, Barry, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 419 n [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 316 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 is part of Doc. 344 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 353 ]